# \*\*\*Agriculture\*\*\*

## High

**US agriculture is high now---disproves their internal link**

**Neuman 10** (William, “Strong Exports Lift U.S. Agriculture Sector”, August 31, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/business/economy/01exports.html>, ZBurdette)

Even as the broader economy falters amid signs of a weakening recovery, the nation’s agriculture sector is going strong, bolstered in part by a surge in exports, according to federal estimates of farm trade and income released on Tuesday. The estimates confirm what economists have been saying for months: agriculture, which was generally not hit as hard by the recession as many other segments of the economy, remains a small bright spot going forward. “We’re just having a robust rebound in the agricultural sector and promises of more growth,” Jason R. Henderson, vice president and economist at the Omaha branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, said in a recent interview. The estimates show that American farmers will ship $107.5 billion in agricultural products abroad in the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30. That is the second-highest amount ever, behind the record $115.3 billion in exports logged in 2008, when commodity prices soared as the global demand for agricultural products was helped by fast-growing economies in the developing world. Next year, exports are expected to total $113 billion. In releasing the data, Tom Vilsack, the secretary of agriculture, said exports of grains and meats were leading the rebound. He called the new estimates “very encouraging.” The export growth is propelled by higher prices for many products, including wheat, whose prices have skyrocketed as drought and punishing heat decimated crops in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Exports to Asia have been particularly strong, and China is forecast to surpass Mexico next year to become the second-largest foreign buyer of American farm products. Canada is the No. 1 export market. Wheat exports this year are estimated at $6 billion, about the same as last year, as much of this year’s crop had already been sold when prices started to rise. But wheat exports for the fiscal year 2011 are expected to rise to $8 billion, because of higher prices and increased production. Prices for other grains have risen, too, encouraging farmers. “The better the demand, the higher the price, and it’s going to put another 10, 15, possibly 20 cents in the price of a bushel of corn,” said Bill Horan, a corn farmer in Iowa. Corn is about $4 a bushel, which is about 50 cents higher than last year. “It means my wife can go out and buy a new sofa, and I can put new tires on the pickup.” Prices have also risen significantly for cotton, meat and dairy products. Cotton exports are expected to reach $6 billion next year, up from $4.8 billion this year and $3.5 billion last year, on the strength of a large crop here and tight worldwide supplies that have lifted prices. Despite such increases, prices for most agricultural commodities remain well short of the record levels of 2008. And the price paid to farmers is only a small portion of the end cost of most foods. So economists predict that the prices consumers pay in the supermarket will rise only moderately this year. Other economic measures were also promising for the farm sector, which accounts for a small fraction of the overall economy but has a strong impact on the well-being of many rural areas, and a ripple effect for suppliers and other related industries. Total net farm cash income for the current calendar year was estimated at $85 billion, a 23 percent increase from last year and well above the 10-year average of $72 billion. About 75 percent of farm production occurs on just 271,000 farms, or 12 percent of the total farms in the country. Those large commercial farms were forecast to average $220,000 in net cash income this year, a 22 percent rise from a year ago. When all farms are taken into account, average farm household income is expected to be $81,670 this year, a nearly 6 percent increase from last year. Household income for many who live on farms comes largely from off-farm jobs and other sources, like investments. This year, on average, 11 percent of the household income for farm families was predicted to come from agriculture. Income from both farm and nonfarm sources is expected to rise this year, indicating an overall improvement in the rural economy, officials said. Joseph Glauber, the agriculture department’s chief economist, said that a strong rebound in livestock and dairy prices had been a major factor in the farm recovery. Dairy producers were hurt badly in the recession by high costs and low prices, which have recently begun to recover. Cattle and hog producers also struggled with low prices, caused by overproduction. But cattle and hog producers have managed to cut the size of their herds, pushing prices back up at the same time that international demand recovers, Mr. Glauber said. “Exports are kind of driving our market,” said Jason Anderson, who operates a cattle feedlot in Holbrook, Neb. “Demand is pretty good, and we’ve seen about a $5 to $7 price rally just this month,” he said, referring to the price per hundredweight. Economists said that the farm sector overall was not hurt as badly in the recession because farmers generally had better access to credit. At the same time, farms over all were not highly leveraged, putting them in a better position to withstand the economic storm. “The farm economy in rural America has not suffered as severely as the industrial part of the economy and, because of the strong exports, the rural economy is recovering what it lost during the downturn,” said Roy Bardole, a farmer in Rippey, Iowa, and chairman of the Soybean Export Council.

## No War

**No impact to ag [no food wars]**

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend.

Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

## Status Quo Solves

**Foreign ag solves**

Pingali 3 – Prabhu Pingali, Director of Agriculture and Economic Analysis Division – FAO, and Randy Stringer, Chief of the Comparative Agriculture Development Service – FAO, “Food Security and Agriculture in the Low Income Food Deficit Countries: 10 Years After the Uruguay Round”, 6-23-2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Pingali%20and%20Stringer.PDF

How serious is the food insecurity problem? At the global level, the long term trends of many food security indicators have been positive. For example, the prevalence of undernourishment in developing countries fell from 28 percent of the total population in 1979-81 to 17 percent in 1998-2000. In addition, The average global kcal/person/day grew by 19 percent since the mid-1960 to reach 2800 kcal, with the developing country average expanding by more than 30 percent. As consumption increased, diets shifted towards more meat, milk, eggs, vegetables oils and away from roots and tubers. Livestock products, vegetables and sugars now provide 28 percent of total food consumption in the developing countries, up from 20 percent in the mid 1960s (FAO 2003a).

**Current yields solve**

Poole 6 (Holly Kavana, Institute for Food and Development Policy,“12 Myths About Hunger”, Backgrounder, 12(2), Summer, 4-9, http://www.foodfirst.org/12myths)

Myth 1: Not Enough Food to Go Around Reality: Abundance, not scarcity, best describes the world's food supply. Enough wheat, rice and other grains are produced to provide every human being with 3,200 calories a day. That doesn't even count many other commonly eaten foods - ­vegetables, beans, nuts, root crops, fruits, grass-fed meats, and fish. Enough food is available to provide at least 4.3 pounds of food per person a day worldwide: two and half pounds of grain, beans and nuts, about a pound of fruits and vegetables, and nearly another pound of meat, milk and eggs - ­enough to make most people fat! The problem is that many people are too poor to buy readily available food. Even most "hungry countries" have enough food for all their people right now. Many are net exporters of food and other agricultural products.

**No famine**

Gardiner 8 – Duane T. Gardiner, Texas A&M University, and Raymond W. Miller, Late, Utah University, Soils in Our Environment, 2008, p. 21

In short the world is demanding more food, more fiber, and more industrial crops grown on less land using less water. If the population continues to increase at the current rate (7000 more people per hour), one can predict that the world will experience critical resource shortages during the lifetime of young people alive today. Despite all this doom and gloom, most people are not hungry. In fact, the food supply has become more stable, especially for the more developed countries. During the twentieth century, growth in world economies and standards of living exceeded growth in population.

**Long term trends prove global food security is increasing**

Pingali 3 – Prabhu Pingali, Director of Agriculture and Economic Analysis Division – FAO, and Randy Stringer, Chief of the Comparative Agriculture Development Service – FAO, “Food Security and Agriculture in the Low Income Food Deficit Countries: 10 Years After the Uruguay Round”, 6-23-2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Pingali%20and%20Stringer.PDF

From a longer term perspective, food security progress has been nothing short of remarkable. The proportion of people in developing countries living with average daily food intakes of less than 2200 kcal fell from 57 percent in the early 1960s to just 10 percent by the end of the century. During this period, per capita food supplies increased by more than 70 percent in China and Indonesia; by more than 50 percent in Pakistan and the Republic of Korea; and by more than 30 percent in Brazil, Burkina Fasso, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mauritania and the Philippines.

**Food security is increasing worldwide**

Pingali 3 – Prabhu Pingali, Director of Agriculture and Economic Analysis Division – FAO, and Randy Stringer, Chief of the Comparative Agriculture Development Service – FAO, “Food Security and Agriculture in the Low Income Food Deficit Countries: 10 Years After the Uruguay Round”, 6-23-2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Pingali%20and%20Stringer.PDF

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**All major populations have sufficient food**

Pingali 3 – Prabhu Pingali, Director of Agriculture and Economic Analysis Division – FAO, and Randy Stringer, Chief of the Comparative Agriculture Development Service – FAO, “Food Security and Agriculture in the Low Income Food Deficit Countries: 10 Years After the Uruguay Round”, 6-23-2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Pingali%20and%20Stringer.PDF

Much of this past progress in the developing country aggregate food consumption numbers and undernutrition indicators are influenced decisively by the significant gains made by the most populated countries -- those with populations of more than 100 million, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan (FAO 2003a). Bangladesh is the only developing country with more than 100 million people where per capita food consumption remains very low. Brazil, China and Indonesia now have daily food consumption levels in the 2900 to 3000 kcal range. China reduced the number of undernourished by 74 million since 1990-92. Ghana, Nigeria, Peru, Thailand and Viet Nam have all achieved reductions of more than 3 million.

## Food Prices Low

#### Global Food Prices Are Already Low and Will Stay That Way

Rutherford July 2012 [Hamish, “Cheaper dairy puts the brakes on food price index”, LexisNexis Academic, Business; Pg.1, 07/13, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/]

FALLING prices for milk and cheese more than offset a sharp seasonal rise in fruit and vegetable prices, with food prices down for the second month in a row in June.¶ The food price index from Statistics New Zealand showed that although food prices in June were 1.4 per cent higher than May, the basket of goods used to calculate food prices dropped 0.2 per cent, the same annual fall as May. In April, annual food prices showed no change.¶ On an annual basis, however, fruit and vegetable prices were 2.6 per cent lower than a year ago, when fresh-produce prices were setting records¶ Prices have been subdued by China's slowdown and a high NZ dollar.

# \*\*\*Air Pollution\*\*\*

## Inevitable

**Global air pollution inevitable**

Watson 5 (Traci, Staff Writer – USA Today, “Air Pollution From Other Countries Drifts into USA”, USA Today, 3-13, http://www.usatoday.com/weather/resources/climate/2005-03-13-pollution-\_x.htm)

Americans drive imported cars, wear imported clothes and chug imported beers. Now scientists are discovering another, less welcome import into the USA: air pollution. Mercury from China, dust from Africa, smog from Mexico — all of it drifts freely across U.S. borders and contaminates the air millions of Americans breathe, according to recent research from Harvard University, the University of Washington and many other institutions where scientists are studying air pollution. There are no boundaries in the sky to stop such pollution, no Border Patrol agents to capture it. Pollution wafting into the USA accounts for 30% of the nation's ozone, an important component of smog, says researcher David Parrish of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. By the year 2020, Harvard University's Daniel Jacob says, imported pollution will be the primary factor degrading visibility in our national parks. While the United States is cutting its own emissions, some nations, especially China, are belching out more and more dirty air. As a result, overseas pollution could partly cancel out improvements in U.S. air quality that have cost billions of dollars.

**Air pollution is inevitable – alt causes**

Brook et al. 4 M.D. and several other doctors writing for Circulation magazine from the American Heart Association [Circulation magazine Robert D. Brook, MD; Barry Franklin, PhD, Chair; Wayne Cascio, MD; Yuling Hong, MD, PhD; George Howard, PhD; Michael Lipsett, MD; Russell Luepker, MD; Murray Mittleman, MD, ScD; Jonathan Samet, MD; Sidney C. Smith, Jr, MD; Ira Tager, MD, “Air Pollution and the Cardiovascular Disease” June 1, 2004, http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/109/21/2655#SEC1/] k ward

A brief description of several individual air pollutants is provided first for background. A complete discussion is beyond the scope of this statement, and interested readers may find a more comprehensive review on this subject elsewhere.26 Particulate Matter Airborne Particulate Matter consists of a heterogeneous mixture of solid and liquid particles suspended in air, continually varying in size and chemical composition in space and time (Figure 1). Primary particles are emitted directly into the atmosphere, such as diesel soot, whereas secondary particles are created through physicochemical transformation of gases, such as nitrate and sulfate formation from gaseous nitric acid and sulfur dioxide (SO2), respectively. The numerous natural and anthropogenic sources of PM include motor vehicle emissions, tire fragmentation and resuspension of road dust, power generation and other industrial combustion, smelting and other metal processing, agriculture, construction and demolition activities, residential wood burning, windblown soil, pollens and molds, forest fires and combustion of agricultural debris, volcanic emissions, and sea spray. Although there are thousands of chemicals that have been detected in PM in different locations, some of the more common constituents include nitrates, sulfates, elemental and organic carbon, organic compounds (eg, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), biological compounds (eg, endotoxin, cell fragments), and a variety of metals (eg, iron, copper, nickel, zinc, and vanadium).

#### Glphosate makes air and water pollution inevitable

Barrett 12 [Mike, main researcher behind Natural Society, Studying the work of top natural health activists, and writing special reports for top 10 alternative health websites, has written hundreds of articles and pages on how to obtain optimum wellness through natural health, founder of NaturalSociety, Mike focuses on getting life-saving natural health techniques out to the world in a timely and efficient manner, syndicating his articles around the web, “Causes of Water Pollution – GMO Farming, Glyphosate Big Contributors” June 28, 2012, http://naturalsociety.com/glyphosate-causes-of-water-pollution/ SS]

Water pollution and air pollution has been and continues to be a serious issue in many nations. Both of these pollution types are successfully bringing down the health of not only humans, but also animals, plant life, and the ecosystem as a whole. While the causes of water pollution and causes of air pollution are many, research is actually pointing a straight finger at GMO farming and chemicals like glyphosate for being important culprits.¶ Causes of Water Pollution – GMO Farming, Glyphosate Big Contributors¶ One groundbreaking study found that glyphosate, the active ingredient residing in the ever-so-popular Roundup product from Monsanto, is making its way into groundwater across the nation through widespread contamination of aquifers, wells, and springs. The explosive study that confirmed the contamination effect of Monsanto’s Roundup was published in the journal Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry in late 2011, where researchers discovered that 41% of the 140 groundwater samples taken from Catalonia Spain were actually above the limit of quantification.¶ The findings indicate that glyphosate actually doesn’t break down rapidly in the environment, and is continuously building up in concerning quantities. With glyphosate growing among the causes of water pollution, it is becoming more and more apparent that the chemical is polluting groundwater in alarming quantities, enough to pose a significant threat to the purity of drinking water wherever it is used.¶ How prevalent is this issue, really? One study conducted by a German university found very high concentrations of glyphosate in all urine samples tested. The amount of the chemical found in the urine was quite alarming, with each sample containing concentrations of 5 to 20-fold the limit established for drinking water. Unfortunately, the study doesn’t clearly say how many samples were tested for, and needs to be translated using one of the many translators available.¶ In addition, the issue of water contamination is only part of the pollution problem. Other findings, published in the journal Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, came across glyphosate in 60-100% of all air and rain samples tested for. This shows that glyphosate is not only among causes of water pollution, but also resides in the air due to massive overuse.¶ While GMO farmers and other individuals using Roundup are the heavy contributors, biotechnology giant Monsanto is ultimately fueling water pollution surrounding glyphosate involvement. Monsanto is the world’s largest provider and producer of glyphosate, and dominates the genetically modified crops market. With many of Monsanto’s GM crops being resistant to glyphosate-containing Roundup, glyphosate is sprayed in massive amounts in order to function properly against the resistant crops. In fact, 88,000 tons were used in the US in 2007 alone.

## No Impact

**No impact**

Schwartz 3 (Joel, Adjunct Scholar – Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Particulate Air Pollution: Weighing the Risks”, April, http://cei.org/pdf/3452.pdf)

Nonetheless, both the Bush Administration and congressional Democrats have proposed sweeping new measures to further crack down on power plant emissions. The Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative and a more stringent Democratic alternative are largely justified by claims that current levels of particulate matter (PM) pose a serious public health threat. Supporters of these bills promise substantial benefits from additional PM reductions.

Nevertheless, the benefit claims for PM reductions rest on a **weak foundation**. EPA based its new annual fine PM (PM2.5) standard on a study known as the American Cancer Society (ACS) study of PM and mortality, which assessed the association between the risk of death between 1982 and 1998 with PM2.5 levels in dozens of American cities. Although the ACS study reported an association between PM and mortality, some odd features of the ACS results suggest that PM is not the culprit. For example, according to the ACS results, PM increased mortality in men, but not women; in those with no more than a high school degree, but not those with at least some college education; in former- smokers, but not current- or never-smokers; and in those who said they were moderately active, but not those who said they were very active or sedentary. These odd variations in the relationship between PM2.5 and mortality seem **biologically implausible**. Even more surprising, the ACS study reported that higher PM2.5 levels were not associated with an increased risk of mortality due to respiratory disease; a surprising finding, given that PM would be expected to exert its effects through the respiratory system. EPA also ignored the results of another epidemiologic study that found no effect of PM2.5 on mortality in a cohort of veterans with high blood pressure, even though this relatively unhealthy cohort should have been more susceptible to the effects of pollution than the general population. The evidence therefore suggests that the existing annual standard for PM2.5 is unnecessarily stringent. Attaining the standard will be expensive, but is unlikely to improve public health.

## Status Quo Solves

**Air quality is improving**

Hayward 4 (Steven F., Senior Fellow – Pacific Research Institute, Index of Leading Indicators, http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/04\_enviroindex/Enviro\_2004.pdf)

Average vehicle emissions are dropping about 10 percent per year as the fleet turns over to inherently cleaner vehicles, including modern SUVs. · Since 1985, nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions from cars have dropped 56 percent and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are down 67 percent, according to the most recent EPA data. · Stories touting an uptick in ozone pollution are based largely on the .weekend effect,. a paradoxical situation in which the weekend drop in NOX emissions, from 10 to 40 percent, causes an increase in ozone levels. · Asthma rates in children under the age of five rose more than 160 percent between 1980 and 1994, while air pollution rates fell from 25 to 80 percent. Was 2003 the year we started losing the battle against ozone smog? That is what you would think if you read the media headlines. .Smog Woes Back on Horizon,. trumpeted an abovethe- fold Los Angeles Times headline in mid-July.1 .It.s One Smoggy Summer,. declared the Associated Press. And USA Today joined the chorus in October with .Smoggy Skies Persist Despite Decade of Work..2 Unfortunately, a reader of these articles will learn very little about what is behind the recent uptick in ozone levels. To the contrary, most media stories convey loads of misinformation. The USA Today story, for example, offers this explanation of stubborn ozone levels: .One likely reason why the smog isn.t lifting: Americans are driving more miles than they did in the 1980s. And they.re driving vehicles that give off more pollution than the cars they drove in the .80s. (emphasis added). USA Today needs a better fact-checking department.

#### US has pollution under control – we are making advances

Schwartz 03 Adjunct Scholar @ Competitive Enterprise Institute [Joel Schwartz, “Particulate Air Pollution: weighing the risks” April 2003 <http://cei.org/pdf/3452.pdf/>] Kevin W. Prep ‘11

There is no question that high levels of air pollution can kill. About 4,000 Londoners died during the infamous five-day “London Fog” episode of December 1952, when soot and sulfur dioxide soared to levels tens of times greater than the highest levels experienced in developed countries today, and visibility dropped to less than 20 feet.1 A number of other high-pollution episodes up through the 1970s exacted a similarly horrifying toll.2 Fortunately, the United States has been very successful in reducing air pollution. Due to a combination of technological advances and regulatory intervention, pollution levels have been declining for decades, despite large increases in population, energy use, and driving. Nevertheless, many health researchers, regulators, and environmental activists are concerned that airborne particulate matter (PM), especially smaller particulates known as PM10 and PM2.5,3 might still be causing tens of thousands of premature deaths each year,.4 Policymakers and environmental activists have recently focused special attention on the health effects of power-plant emissions, which are a significant contributor to PM2.5 levels in parts of the eastern United States. Bills introduced by Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) and the Bush Administration would require cuts in power plant emissions well beyond current requirements; advocates for both proposals claim they would save thousands of lives per year.5 Environmental groups have published a series of reports claiming substantial harm to public health from power plant emissions.6 These groups ardently oppose the Clear Skies Initiative as well as the Bush Administration’s proposed reform of the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review regulation, arguing that it would allow substantial increases in power plant emissions.7

# \*\*\*Air Power\*\*\*

## No Impact

#### **No impact to air power- their empirics don’t assume US ground forces**

Press 01 Journal Article, International Security, volume 26, issue 2, pages 5-44 Fall 2001The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare Daryl G. Press The MIT Press Journals Daryl G. Press is Assistant Professor in the Government Department and a Research Fellow at the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College. He is also an Associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/press_fall_2001.pdf> /KG

The conventional wisdom among historians, military analysts, and foreign policy decisionmakers is that air power neutralized the Iraqi military before the groundwar began. 3 This interpretation of the Gulf War has important implications for U.S. foreign policy andfor U.S. military procurement strategies. For U.S. foreign policy, the Gulf War seems to show—andthe 1999 Kosovo conºict appears to conªrm—that air power is now so lethal, andAmerican air power so dominant, that the United States can win nearly cost-free military victories against its foes. For U.S. military procurement debates, the lessons are equally clear: The UnitedStates shouldsigniªcantly alter its military procurement priorities to favor air power over groundforces; in the future, decisive battles will be won from the air. 4 U.S. conªdence in air power is soaring, but the conventional wisdom about its decisiveness in the Gulf War has never been rigorously tested. It is undeniable that for six weeks—during the period now known as the air campaign— coalition aircraft droppedtons of bombs andmissiles on Iraqi targets. It is also undeniable that Iraq’s ground forces were totally ineffective against the coalition’s groundforces. But those facts do not prove that the bombing caused Iraqi ineffectiveness. The questions that must be answeredare: Why were the Iraqi groundforces so incapable during the groundwar? Were they neutralized by the air campaign? Or were they simply outmatchedby vastly superior U.S. andBritish groundforces? 5 To test the proposition that air power neutralizedthe Iraqi groundforces, I divide the argument into ªve different versions: 6 (1) air power preventedthe Iraqis from maneuvering, which is critical in desert combat; (2) air power disruptedIraqi command, control, communications, andintelligence (C3I); (3) air power severedIraqi supply lines; (4) air power attritedthe Iraqi forces too heavily for them to ªght effectively; and(5) air power broke Iraqi morale. Each version makes predictions about the conduct of the Iraqi ground forces during the groundoperation. In this article I use detailedevidence from the ground campaign to test these ªve explanations. The evidence from the ground campaign shows that the conventional wisdom about the Gulf War is wrong. Although air power played an important role in the coalition’s victory, its role has been exaggeratedandmisunderstood. I make two primary arguments about air power during the Gulf War. First, air power was not decisive; it did not neutralize the Iraqi ground forces. At the endof the air campaign, Iraqi groundforces couldstill maneuver, andthey still hadthe C3I, supplies, numbers, andmorale to ªght. Second, the six-week air campaign did not play a necessary, enabling role that made the groundwar “easy” for U.S. forces. Hadthere been no air campaign, U.S. andBritish fatalities in the groundwar wouldprobably have been slightly higher. But evidence strongly suggests that with or without the air campaign, the coalition’s groundattack wouldhave ledto a rout of historic proportions. In sum, air power contributedto the coalition’s effort, but the air campaign was neither sufªcient nor necessary for the very one-sided victory. If air power did not neutralize the Iraqi army, why were the Iraqi ground forces totally ineffective during the ground campaign? The answer is that they were simply overmatchedby the U.S. andBritish groundforces. In 1991 the Iraqis ªelded a military that was mediocre even by third world standards, and during the Gulf War they were facing the most powerful military forces in the worldon terrain ideally suitedto U.S. andBritish military strengths. Furthermore, Iraq’s timing was terrible; Iraq invaded Kuwait just after the Reagan military buildup was completedandjust before America’s post–ColdWar downsizing hadbegun. In sum, the UnitedStates andGreat Britain took the forces that they built to ªght while heavily outnumberedagainst the best divisions in the Soviet military, andturnedthem loose against Iraq. The Iraqi groundforces never hada chance. 7 To be clear, this article does not argue that air power was irrelevant in the Gulf War. First, air power was critical for getting combat power to the Gulf quickly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When it brieºy lookedlike Iraq might continue south from Kuwait and invade Saudi Arabia, the United States rushedcombat aircraft to the Arabian Peninsula to prevent further Iraqi attacks. Transport aircraft also ºew a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia to demonstrate U.S. resolve. Because of air power, the United States was able to quickly “draw a line in the sand” and establish an early capability to defend Saudi Arabia. 8 Second, during the coalition’s offensive to liberate Kuwait, U.S. aircraft successfully carriedout all of their important traditional roles: They gained air superiority, ºew successful reconnaissance missions, were signiªcantly involvedin coordinating the actions of coalition air andgroundforces, conductedstrategic attacks on targets deep in Iraq, andreducedanddisruptedIraq’s military. Air power fulªlledits traditional missions; it just did not neutralize the Iraqi forces. What does the Gulf War tell us about U.S. foreign policy and procurement priorities? The conventional interpretation of the war has been usedto support the view that there has been a fundamental shift in the relative decisiveness of air and ground forces in modern combat. Modern air power, it is now widely believed, has rendered heavy ground forces obsolete. The United States—with its large, advanced air force—should have little difªculty in defeating potential opponents, as long as America commits the full weight of its air power to the ªght. This interpretation also suggests that the UnitedStates shouldcut heavy divisions in favor of lighter ground forces, tactical aircraft, long-range bombers, andcruise missiles. they are pittedagainst thirdworldopponents. Air power is a more powerful tool of national policy than it once was, but it still does not dominate the battleªeld. Understanding the relationship between air and ground forces is necessary to make soundforeign policy decisions, to create a force structure that can meet the challenges that the United States will face in the coming decades, andin the end, to save American lives

#### **No impact to air superiority- empirics**

Corum 2k The Myth of Air Control Reassessing the History Dr. James S. Corum Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000 http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/corum.htm /KG

The end of the cold war and the rapid increase of US military intervention overseas have also stimulated considerable interest in using the RAF’s interwar air-control system as a model for US air operations. Articles and monographs by Air Force officers or by civilians working for the Air Force have presented the British air-control experience in a very positive light, as did Colonel Dean’s articles.80 Noted airpower theorist Carl Builder discussed British air control in an Airpower Journal article in 1995, arguing that it provided an excellent model for the kind of “constabulary missions” in support of the United Nations or peace operations that have come to characterize the current US military mission.81 Builder pointed out that the RAF had done the lion’s share of policing the empire with airpower and asked, “Could air and space power—by themselves—substantially pursue the constabulary objectives of the United States today?”82 He argued that the US Air Force could and should look to conducting air-constabulary missions without committing ground troops.83 The concept that airpower alone can enforce the national will in low intensity conflicts is very attractive to the US Air Force. It certainly supports the idea that the Air Force ought to be the primary military service of the United States. The history of RAF air control has been used fairly consistently to support the position that an airpower-alone solution is possible. For instance, Air Force political scientist Robert Pape used the RAF’s deployment to northern Iraq in 1924 as an example of successful airpower coercion. He points out that the Turks made incursions into Kurdistan and kept large ground forces on the border in an attempt to control the Mosul region. These incursions were met with a forward deployment of RAF squadrons and a few bombing raids to demonstrate British will. The British made it clear that if the Turks tried to cross the border in force, RAF attacks would seriously hinder their operations. Pape points out that this airpower coercion worked and that the Turks withdrew all forces from the border in October 1924.84 The problem with Dr. Pape’s example of the effectiveness of airpower as a means of threatening an enemy army, as well as the argument by others that with airpower one can control regions and populations, is that the idealized air-control system described by US Air Force writers never really existed. For example, the RAF did play an important role in coercing the Turks to retreat from the Iraqi border in 1924, but no one mentions that the army also deployed two brigade task forces (six battalions, two artillery batteries, one engineer company, and one machine-gun company) north of Mosul at the same time.85 Throughout the era of British air control, in all but the cases of minor local banditry, the British met any serious challenge to their authority with both airpower and sizeable ground forces. Airpower alone put down none of the serious rebellions in Iraq. On the Northwest Frontier of India, airpower was a wonderfully effective force multiplier; however, one cannot escape the fact that these military actions were actually joint operations rather than airpower-alone operations. Conclusion If one cannot really police an empire with airpower alone, then what are the lessons learned from the British experience in air control? I offer five lessons learned from the interwar RAF experience that ought to be relevant to modern military operations. Clausewitz Was Right: War Is about Politics When confronted with fairly large native rebellions, British officers often seem to have been clueless about their causes. Lt Gen Sir Aylmer Haldane, British commander in Iraq during the national uprising of 1920, believed that the rebellion had occurred because British occupiers had been too soft on the Arabs, who had naturally taken advantage of British slackness. He declared that “Arabs, like other Eastern peoples, are accustomed to be ruled by a strong hand.”86 An RAF officer explained the fighting in Iraq in another way: “A large percentage of the tribes fight for the mere pleasure of fighting. . . . We oppose the tribes with infantry, the arm that supplies them with the fight. Substitute aircraft and they are dealing with a weapon that they cannot counter.”87 Evidently, British officers in Iraq did not suspect that the major rebellions in Kurdistan had anything to do with a political objective—such as the Kurds’ desire for self-government. The British military apparently could not grasp that the “natives” might have strong nationalist sentiments and were fighting for a specific political objective—even though the British had encouraged such sentiments during the World War. After the war, the Colonial Office and Foreign Ministry quickly and conveniently forgot promises of self-government to the Kurds and Arabs. In Iraq, during the four major rebellions in the 14 years of the British mandate, the British applied air control and military force to deal with the symptoms of the problem. By treating only the symptoms (rebellion), the British failed to look seriously at the primary cause of the conflicts—the politically unsatisfactory arrangement of the Kurds under the Iraqi government. Multiculturalism Cannot Be Imposed by Airpower Without much thought, British political leaders cobbled together a large piece of the old Ottoman Empire consisting of three large groups that disliked and distrusted each other. The British imposed a multicultural state and system of government upon the population without any apparent plan. For 80 years, the three main ethnic groups of Iraq have been in a steady state of conflict, often exploding into large-scale rebellion. During this time the Kurds, in particular, have not given up aspirations for forming their own state. Iraq is only one example of the failure of a major power to impose a multicultural state upon a country with large and mutually hostile ethnic groups. In Aden and the Sudan, British air campaigns temporarily suppressed conflicts among the tribes, but when the British pulled out, the ethnic conflicts remained. Indeed, one cannot find an example of a viable, stable, and peaceful multicultural state that has been successfully imposed upon a nation by an external power in the twentieth century. If Iraq is a typical example of the imposition of a multicultural state by superpower air and military forces, then the current US goal of imposing multicultural states upon unwilling groups in the Balkans is clearly in trouble. Populations Adjust to Bombing The very first cases of air control, such as Somaliland in 1920, seemed to have worked very well. Aerial bombardment was a novelty, and its effect was impressive. However, as the British continued to use air-control methods on the frontiers of the empire, the psychological effect largely wore off. Many of the hostile tribes in Aden, on India’s Northwest Frontier, and in Kurdistan learned to camouflage their camps and dig air-raid shelters for their villages. Tribes in Kurdistan set up a primitive warning system with observers and smoke signals to warn the most likely targets of the approach of British aircraft.88 In later campaigns against the Kurdish leader Sheik Mahmud, the British heavily bombed the rebel capital and center of operations, but the rebels fought on. Arabs fighting the British in Palestine in the 1930s were not overawed by RAF airpower. Indeed, the revolt in Palestine ended not through military force but through a political deal and British compromise that limited Jewish immigration. Air-Control Skills Do Not Translate Well into Other War-Fighting Skills Air control took up a great deal of the RAF’s effort and attention during the interwar period. For 20 years, the RAF took part in constant combat operations—either bombing campaigns or ground-support operations. Despite these operations, the air-control experience did not translate into tactics useful in conducting a major conventional war.89 Surprisingly, 20 years of combat experience in supporting ground forces on the imperial frontiers did not develop into a close air support doctrine for the RAF when it went to war in 1939. Indeed, during the first years of World War II, the RAF could not provide effective close air support to troops on the battlefield. The organization, tactics, and control systems all had to be worked out from scratch during the first three years of the war. In short, although air control proved very effective in protecting the RAF’s force structure and budget in the interwar period, no one showed interest in learning any lessons that might apply to a serious conventional war. Beware of Serendipitous Solutions Air control looks like a perfect doctrinal solution to problems with some of the current peacekeeping operations that burden the US defense establishment. It appears cheap, looks effective, keeps US casualties low, and plays to the Air Force’s strengths of precision and rapid response. As an airpower-alone or predominantly airpower solution, it is especially appealing to many Air Force people. In short, it looks like the ideal answer. Of course, the reality of the situation differs considerably. Air control was never as effective as advertised, and it could not provide answers to the political causes of colonial insurgencies. Except in the case of minor policing, airpower served mostly as a support arm to ground forces. A colonial power in the 1920s could employ such a doctrine on the far reaches of the empire against natives who had no direct contact with parliament or the media. Even then, the RAF’s air-control methods set off a considerable amount of protest from politicians. Basically, one could barely justify air control as a doctrine 80 years ago, and people who advocate an updated version of such doctrine for current US Air Force operations have misread history

# \*\*\*Africa War\*\*\*

## No War

#### No risk of great power conflict over Africa.

Robert **Barrett 05**, PhD Military & Strategic Studies, U of Calgary, 6/1, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID726162_code327511.pdf?abstractid=726162&mirid=1>

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the U nited S tates, recently using the label ‘genocide’in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approachs at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.

#### Outside powers won’t intervene in African conflicts

Tim **Docking 07**, African Affairs Specialist with the United States Institute of Peace, 2007, Taking Sides Clashing Views on African Issues, p. 376

Since the tragedy in Somalia, the trend has been for Western nations to refuse to send troops into Africa's hot spots. Jordan recently underscored this point when it expressed frustration with the West's failure to commit soldiers to the UNAMSIL mission as a reason for the withdrawal of its troops from Sierra Leone.  America's aversion to peacekeeping in Africa also reflects broader U.S. foreign policy on the continent. Africa occupies a marginal role in American foreign policy in general (a point highlighted by conference participants).

## Inevitable

#### Other African conflicts make their impact inevitable

Dr. Jeffrey **Deutsch**, founder of the Rabid Tiger Project, December 15, **2002**, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 10, “Africa’s Horn O’Plenty (of Trouble),” <http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n10.html>

We must keep in mind that trouble can develop in other parts of the world on short notice. In particular, Africa is host to various conflicts, which may involve US interests. We will discuss one of the most contentious regions, the Horn of Africa (the easternmost part of Africa, south and west of the Arabian peninsula and on the Indian Ocean), in this issue. The Horn of Africa was a Cold War arena, as the US and the Soviet Union supported Ethiopia and Somalia (not necessarily respectively) in a long-running war between them. Since then, Eritrea, which comprised the whole Red Sea coastal area of Ethiopia, has seceded, leaving Ethiopia landlocked. Eritrea and Ethiopia have only been at peace for two years, and UN officials are still establishing their common boundary. Ethiopia’s borders with her neighbors the Sudan and Somalia (with whom Ethiopia is now at least officially at peace) have not yet been clarified. Somalia has been in anarchy for over a decade, and one of then-Presidents George H. W. Bush’s and Bill Clinton’s failures was a deployment of ground forces to Somalia in 1992-3 - Operation Restore Hope - in an attempt to protect humanitarian aid supplies. There is now a facade of a central government in Mogadishu, the capital, but its writ does not go very far as opposed to the will of various clans and tribes, the most powerful of which are the two effectively independent northern regions Somaliland and Puntland. Kenya, a country friendly to the US and bordering Somalia to the south, has suffered al-Qaeda attacks. Most recently, on November 28, 2002, an Israeli-owned hotel was attacked by suicide bombers, and a Tel Aviv-bound passenger plane taking off from Mombasa narrowly escaped destruction by a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile. Meanwhile, Sudan is suffering a civil war of her own, between the Muslim rulers in the north and the non-Muslims (partly but not mainly Christian) in the south. In fact, some Muslim parties in the north have joined the rebels. Sudan’s civil war is very much a religious one: Sudan is a Muslim theocracy with many people who object to Muslim religious rule. Sudan is under the shari’a - the Islamic law, which applies to everyone (at least where the government effectively rules in the north). By contrast, Eritrea, which also has both many Muslims and some non-Muslims (especially Coptic Christian, Roman Catholic and Protestant), has a secular set of laws, with shari’a law that only applies to cases with Muslim parties. Eritrea, like Somalia (and to a smaller extent Sudan) occupies a strategic position near the Arabian peninsula. In fact, Eritrea has disputed with Yemen the ownership of certain tiny Red Sea islands. Eritrea has an air force as well as a navy, which enable her to influence events on the peninsula and possibly beyond. Eritrea also has the enmity of her neighbors Ethopia, Sudan and Yemen. Eritrea had fought for her freedom from Ethopia and won it only in 1993, and also been at war with Ethiopia from 1998 until a peace treaty was signed in December 2000. Eritrea has also been alleged to support some Sudanese insurgents. Last but not least, Eritrea’s relations with the US have cooled since the arrest of two (Eritrean) employees of the US Embassy. The employees have been jailed for over a year without trial - according to some sources because they are thought to have leaked information to the press adverse to the government of President Afworki Isaias.

# \*\*\*Arab Spring\*\*\*

## No Impact

**Arab spring has no affect**

Clifford Krauss has been a correspondent for The New York Times since 1990. He currently is a national business correspondent based in Houston, covering energy. He covered the State Department, Congress and the New York City police department before serving as Buenos Aires bureau chief and Toronto bureau chief. Before working at The Times, he worked as a foreign correspondent for The Wall Street Journal and was the Edward R. Murrow fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2011, “In the Middle East, the Crisis That Wasn't”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/business/energy-environment/in-the-middle-east-the-crisis-that-wasnt.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1340424919-cSJ4I2XzJrh2+NMGe+aPSw> , KENTUCKY

*Simply put, there has been no lasting oil shock from the Arab Spring.* “Libya had an impact on the market, but the disruption was on the order of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina and was nothing like the 1973 OPEC boycott or 1979 Iranian revolution,” said Daniel Yergin, an oil historian, referring to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the two storms that interrupted production in the Gulf of Mexico for much of autumn 2008. “When you talk to refiners no one has said there is a shortage of supply, though *there was a temporary psychological effect* on the market.” *Potential revolts in Algeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia and other important oil producers have not occurred, as many had predicted.* Egypt has gone through a revolution without the Suez Canal’s being closed to oil tankers for even a day. Unrest in Yemen has interrupted some exports, but it has not jeopardized the adjacent shipping lane between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East through which nearly four million barrels of oil pass daily. To be sure, there have been sporadic demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait, where labor strife appears on the upswing. But so far, Libya has been the only major oil producer to suffer a market-shifting interruption of exports, and the emergence of a new government, indebted to some extent to NATO countries for their military support, could eventually turn its production into a long-term oil supply gain. Yemeni oil exports have been partially interrupted, but Yemen is too minuscule a producer to tilt markets. A Western boycott of Syrian oil could merely shift its exports from Europe to Asia, meaning little, if any, net difference in world supplies. And Iraq, despite sporadic attacks in recent months on its oil infrastructure, is beginning to recover its position as a major exporter. Perhaps the most worrying development to come out of the Arab Spring, in terms of future oil supplies, may be the sharpening tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two most influential members of OPEC. But regional production is little changed from that day in December when a Tunisian fruit cart seller set himself on fire and started the uprising, even with the loss of Libyan exports. Meanwhile, the Libyan rebels showed no interest in sabotaging oil fields; indeed, they protected them for the day — apparently coming soon — when they will tap them to rebuild their country.

# \*\*\*Arctic Conflict\*\*\*

## Cooperation

#### Cooperation will stop conflict and solve arctic war – Illegal fishing and mapping prove.

Brosnan, Leschine and Miles '11**[Ian, Thomas, Edwards.School of Marine Affairs University of Washington Seattle, Washington, USA.“Cooperation or Conﬂict in a Changing Arctic?”** http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40c969c4-6fe8-4c63-95d0-98d48b833759%40sessionmgr11&vid=2&hid=19**. Pg. 13-19. JCook.]**

**Under the theme of sovereignty,** the coastal Arctic states are interested in determining the extentof their extended continental shelves and projecting sovereign presence. There areincentives for the five coastal states to cooperate on both issues. Cooperation will allowthem to realize increasingly optimal outcomes. **In some cases,** cooperation among the states isalready occurring.***Extended Continental Shelves.*Article 76 of UNCLOS permits a coastal state whose continental margin extends beyond its 200-nautical-mile EEZ to establish the outer edge of its continental margin up to, but no further than, 350 nautical miles beyond the baselines used to delimit the territorial sea or not more than 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath. The coastal state is accorded sovereign rights to the mineral and nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil and sedentary living marine resources out to the extent of its continental margin and has 10 years from the national date of entry into force ofthe convention to submit to the Convention on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) the particulars of the limits of its extended continental shelf.29 Mapping the continental shelf to determine marginal extent and preparing the necessary information is a technically challenging and expensive task. It typically requires the use of multiple techniques to map seafloor topography and sediment characteristics and can involve the employment of two ships, one to perform mapping activities and the other to provide icebreaking services.30 *Cooperation and Extended Continental Shelf Issues.*** Is there room for cooperation on the first issue, mapping the continental margins? The United States, Russia, Canada, and Denmark are clear that delimiting their continental shelves is a national priority. The U.S. State Department describes why: certainty and international recognition **[of the limits of the continental shelves]** are important in establishing the necessary stability for development, conservation and protection of these areas [that are] likely rich in resources.**31 However, this is insufficient to suggest that an avenue for cooperation exists.** The answer may lie in comparing thepotential outcomes of unilateral action against cooperation. **Consider the first case,** a state engaging in unilateral mapping of its Arctic continental margins. The state will bear the full financial costs of mapping its extended continental margin; two ice-capable ships **carrying costly mapping equipment and technically competent personnel may be required, one to break ice, the other to map the seafloor.32 The ships and their availability may be particularly important as the national icebreaker fleets of the Arctic nations are aging and are prone to mission-limiting casualties.33 As developed, relatively wealthy nations, the Arctic states seem likely to have the resources to complete mapping efforts by their 10-year timetable (Norway succeeded and Russia submitted information34)but**, while the shelves are being mapped, shelf-related decisions and activities such as resource development and bilateral boundary resolutions must bedeferred and the legal and technical personnel to prepare and evaluate claims at the national and international level must be maintained**.35 The same holds true if submission timetables are not met.** Collaborative efforts can conceivably result in better outcomes. Nations may have access to more ship-time, comparative advantages in mapping equipment and ship capabilities may be realized, duplication of effort may be avoided, and mapping, submission, and approval may proceed more quickly, leading to cost savings and political stability that companies investing in resource exploitation value.**36 Submissions to the CLCS need not be for the whole of a nation’s extended continental shelf: Norway’s 2006 submission was for three distinct and important regions, with the possibility of additional future submissions.37 Thus,**collaboration need not encompass the entire mapping efforts of the states, but could focus on priority areas such as the regions where there may be overlapping claims**. Continental shelf mapping appears to represent a dilemma of common interest.** Collaboration would likely permit the states to realize a more optimal outcome: geopolitical stability supportive of development, conservation, and protection of a potentially resourcerich shelf, in a more timely and perhaps less costly manner**. The United States and Canada appear to prefer the outcomes from cooperation; they have conducted two cooperative mapping missions in the Beaufort Sea since 2008.38 *Sovereign Presence.* Sovereign presence in this analysis refers to efforts to deter, detect, and interdict illegal activities such as smuggling, terrorism, and illegal fishing. These are activities that, generally speaking, require combinations of enforcement vessels (aircraft and ships), trained personnel, and monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The capability of the states in these areas varies. In the U.S. Arctic, these sorts of activities are generally under the purview of the Coast Guard, whose Arctic assets include three icebreakers. Two, the most powerful, are well past their service lives and neither ship, at the time of writing, is operational.39 Other U.S. Coast Guard assets, including small boats and aircraft, were not designed for Arctic operations and summer tests in Barrow suggest they are not wellsuited to Arctic use.40 Canada’s icebreaker fleet is also aging and the country has long had plans to build a powerful Arctic icebreaker and, more recently, a small fleet of Arctic patrol ships. The icebreaker project has been slow and the Arctic patrol ship plans were recently placed on hold.41 Canada’s satellite-based Arctic surveillance project, Polar Epsilon, does appear to be proceeding.42Norway operates a dozen patrol ships, including several ice-strengthened vessels that operate in the Barents Sea and a program named i-Nord has been proposed to implement and operate a comprehensive monitoring system for the Norwegian Arctic.43 Denmark operates seven ice-strengthened ships that conduct fisheries and sovereignty patrols in Greenland and teams of specially trained dogsled forces patrol northern Greenland.44 A recent defense position paper released by the Danish government proposes a new Arctic command and military group with air, land, and sea components and new surveillance capabilities.45 Russia’s capabilities are less evident, but the country previously announced creation of a new Arctic security group under the Russian Federal Security Service and has reportedly awarded a contract for a fleet of coastal patrol ships.46 The Russian Federal Security Service operates a large, but aged, fleet of coastal patrol ships, several of which are strengthened for Arctic operations.47 *Cooperation and Sovereign Presence.*** Norway devotes the most attention in its strategy statement to sovereign presence. Three pages of its strategy are devoted to **illegal, unreported, and unregulated (**IUU) fishing. Norway, Canada, and the United States describe interest in bilateral cooperation to stem illegal activities**. Similar** interest in bilateral cooperation on such issues is not explicit in the Danish and Russian strategies, but may be inferred from their stated interest in Arctic cooperation generally. There are benefits to joint action that suggest that cooperation will result in outcomes that are otherwise not attainable and may represent the outcomes sought by the states, even if they are not explicitly stated in the strategy statements. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to deter, detect, and interdict illegal activities can serve as force multipliers, maximizing the use of limited resources**. For example, when the police force of one party participates in a ride-along of another state’s maritime patrol, the authority and jurisdiction of two states can be projected at once from one vessel rather than two. Comparative advantages in equipment and capability can also be realized if nations have invested in unique platforms for enforcement or surveillance, including satellite deployments.48 Such advantages need not be identified post hoc; the Arctic states are reviewing their surveillance and operational capabilities. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to stem illegal activity can also mean that international borders no longer serve as a means of escaping authorities.**

#### Cooperation will stop conflict and solve arctic resource scenarios – Prefer our evidence siting every scenario possible.

Brosnan, Leschine and Miles '11**[Ian, Thomas, Edwards.School of Marine Affairs University of Washington Seattle, Washington, USA.“Cooperation or Conﬂict in a Changing Arctic?”** http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40c969c4-6fe8-4c63-95d0-98d48b833759%40sessionmgr11&vid=2&hid=19**. Pg. 23-25. JCook.]**

***Cooperation and Resources.*Under the UNCLOS framework,** resource development outcomes **that may** require cooperation in order to be realized include transboundary fish stocks and resources in areas of overlappingclaims. These appear to be bilateral issues in the Arctic, **so it is useful to consider the potential dilemmas of the Arctic states in the context of four regions: a Norwegian/Russian region (the Barents Sea area); a Canadian/Danish region that includes the Lincoln Sea and two small areas of overlapping claims; a Canadian/U.S. region in the Beaufort Sea that also includes an overlapping territorial claim; and a U.S./Russian region north of the Bering Strait. *Norway/Russia (Barents Sea).* The case of Russia and Norway serves as a demonstration of two states forgoing unilateral action in order to attain a more optimal outcome. According to their strategy statements, the preferred resource development outcomes of Russia and Norway are similar; both seek to develop Arctic resources to sustain existing exports and domestic industries and support social and economic development. The fisheries and oil and gas resources they seek to develop are found in the Barents Sea, where fish stocks cross between the waters of both states (transboundary) and through a formerly disputed area known as the Grey Zone. The same** formerly disputed area is also believed to contain valuable energy resources.**70** Russia and Norway recognized early on that only cooperation in Barents Seafisheries would yield an optimal outcome, one of sustainable fisheries and exclusion of undesirable third parties**.71 A 1975 treaty established a joint Norwegian/Russian fisheries commission, an 1976 treaty established a framework for cooperation on joint stocks, and a 1978 Grey Zone Agreement that governs the harvest limits, catch allocations, fishing gear in use, and division of enforcement authority in the Grey Zone.72 Although outside the disputed Grey Zone, Norwegian state-owned StatoilHydro and Russia’s Gazprom have recently signed a 3-year memorandum of understanding to work jointly to develop Shtokman field.73 In late April 2010,** Russia and Norway jointly announced that they had resolved their dispute over the delimitation oftheir maritime boundary in the Barents Sea and, subsequently, signed a treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation **in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, effectively** eliminating political uncertainty that has been one barrier to development of Barents Sea resources.**74 *Canada/Denmark (Lincoln Sea).*** TheCanada/Denmark case is similar to that of Russia and Norway. There exist overlapping claims in the Lincoln Sea.**75 However, the area of the claims is far smaller than the Grey Zone, perhaps to the point of being insignificant as far as resources are concerned.76** Denmark and Canada’s Arctic strategies reveal a preference for resource development to support economic development and, ultimately, economic independence of their Arctic territories. If the area of overlapping claims in the Lincoln Sea proves to contain energy **and fisheries resources (or fisheries resources develop as a result of changing oceanographic conditions) and climate and market conditions support exploitation,** industry investors will likely seek geopolitical stability beforeinvesting in energy development in the disputed areas. Canada and Denmark face a dilemma of common interest. The preferred optimum result for the states appears to be development of the resources in the disputed area. To realize this optimal outcome, Canada and Denmarkmust collaborate to realize the geopoliticalstability that may be a prerequisite to energy development **and to manage transboundaryfish stocks to prevent overfishing and ensure long-term stock conservation and utilization. The Russian/Norwegian management scheme in the Barents Sea, establishment of a joint fisheries commission to set catch limits and agreements on harvest allocation, enforcement, and cooperative development of energy resources, provides an model for a possible Canadian/Danish regime in the Lincoln Sea if the location of maritime borders cannot be agreed on. *Canada/United States (Beaufort Sea).***In contrast to Russia, Norway, Denmark, and Canada, the U**nited** S**tates** does not express a strong preference for resource development. **In keeping with the overall tone of its policy,** the U**nited** S**tates simply** notes that it has interests in Arctic resources. **At first glance, the Canadian development-oriented strategy and the more neutral U.S. policy seem at odds.** Canadian strategy and recent federal actions have given attentionto the area through commercial fisheries-related investments in Nunavut and the focus on the energy resources of Mackenzie Delta**.77 It seems that** the U**nited** S**tates** and Canada have thesame preferred outcome. **Specifically,** they wish to preserve their potential fisheries interests in the Beaufort Sea and energy interests where they have an overlapping territorial claim. This seems to be a case where the states may obtain their desired outcome withoutcooperation. However, consider the hypothetical case where one country finds a compelling reason to begin fishing Beaufort Sea stocks or drilling for oil where the states have overlapping claims. This hypothetical scenario would place the interests of the other stateat risk and suggests that the states actually have a dilemma of common interest. The optimal result, and incentive to collaborate, is a case where each state’s interests in energy resources in the disputed area and potential transboundary Arctic fish stocks are not placed at risk by the activities of the other state. An informal moratorium on oil and gas development in the disputed region of the Beaufort Sea already exists to preserve the interests of both states.**78 A joint moratorium on fishing throughout the Beaufort Sea would ensure the states their preferred outcome: preservation of their interests in the Beaufort Sea. At some future date, should there prove to be commercially viable fisheries in the Beaufort Sea or accessible energy resources in the area of overlapping claims that both states desire to exploit, a dilemma of common interest would still exist. Only the desired outcome would have changed, and Canada and the United States would have the same incentives to cooperate as Canada and Denmark. Again, the Norwegian/Russian agreements provide an example of a regime to address such issues. Both Canada and the United States appear amenable to the idea of new governance arrangements. The U.S. Arctic Policy explicitly states that new governance arrangements should be considered as human activities in the Arctic change. Canada’s strategy is not as explicit, but it does indicate that Canada intends to continue to deepen cooperation with the United States on emerging Arctic issues. *United States/Russia.***The case of the U**nited** S**tates** and Russia is similar to that of the U**nited** S**tates** and Canada. Their preferred outcomes, as stated in their strategy statements, seem at odds. But a regional view suggests that Russia’s maritime focus is largely on development in northwest Russia rather than the Far East.**79 This suggests that both countries may at present be interested in preserving their interests in their border region.** The U**nited** S**tates a**nd Russia do not have overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic, although Russia has not ratified the 1991 treaty delimiting the U.S./Russian maritime boundary**.80 Russia does, however, abide by its terms so, unlike the Canada/Denmark and Canada/U.S. cases, there does not appear to be any immediate concern over overlapping claims to energy resources.81** This leaves potential transboundary Arctic fish stocks as anavenue forcooperation between Russia and the United States as existing agreements do not extend north of the Bering Strait. As with Canada, a joint moratorium on new fishing could ensure the states their preferred outcome: preservation of their fisheries interests in the Arctic.

#### Cooperation will occur because of shipping

Brosnan, Leschine and Miles '11**[Ian, Thomas, Edwards.School of Marine Affairs University of Washington Seattle, Washington, USA.“Cooperation or Conﬂict in a Changing Arctic?”** http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40c969c4-6fe8-4c63-95d0-98d48b833759%40sessionmgr11&vid=2&hid=19**. Pg. 26-27. JCook.]**

In order to determine how opposition to unmanaged shipping may represent an avenue for Arctic cooperation, a number of component issues need to be considered. **Among the five states, 10 topics related to shipping are mentioned in their Arctic strategy statements. These include: aids to navigation; Vessel Traffic Services (VTS); ports; weather and navigation services; iceberg and sea-ice reports; shipping monitoring; standards for Arctic ships; environmental response; and search and rescue response. There are not clear incentives for cooperation on port development, aids to navigation, and weather or navigation services. These are traditionally national activities and, while there are international standards for the marking of aids to navigation, the states do not seem interested in new standards but rather development of infrastructure. These issues seem likely to remain targets of unilateral action.** There are**, however,** incentives for cooperation to address state concerns regarding unsupported shipping through the remaining infrastructures and services **mentioned above; vessel traffic and monitoring services, sea-ice and iceberg services, and environmental and search and rescue response.** These represent dilemmas of common interest as cooperation may result in increasing optimal outcomes that the states cannot necessarily attain acting alone**. VTS can assist vessel movements in restricted, crowded, or otherwise sensitive areas. Coordinated VTS may permit smooth transitions for mariners moving between national jurisdictions and permit states to monitor traffic bound for their waters. Coordination ofCanadian and U.S. VTS services in Puget Sound through the Co-operative Vessel Traffic System Agreement is a prime example.95** There are **also** potential incentives for cooperation on icebergand sea-ice reporting. Aircraft observations funneled through a secretariat for analysis and distribution could accomplish iceberg and sea-ice reporting services. By poolingresources and establishing one or several international centers to operate the service, states could avoid duplicate capital investments and operational costs. The currentInternational Ice Patrol that serves the North Atlantic is an example. Seventeen statescontribute financially to the service and their payments are based on each participating nation’s percentage of the total cargo tonnage transiting the patrol area during the ice season**.96**Environmental response and search and rescue cooperation can delineate clearresponsibilities of states for responding to mishaps**, improve response by establishing lines of communication and standardized procedures before events occur, eliminate gaps in geographic coverage, and pool resources to prevent unnecessary redundancies in service.** A search and rescue agreement is presentlybeing negotiated by the Arctic states.**97 As events such as the *Exxon Valdez* grounding and the Deepwater Horizon explosion suggest, a similar environmental response agreement could be equally valuable. Finally, there are incentives to cooperate on standards for Arctic ships.** States have historically cooperated on such issues because they gain the assurance that the standards they apply to their ships leaves them free to transit the waters of other states **and engage in trade as well as the knowledge that ships entering their waters meet the states’ desired standards for construction and operation. States are averse to their ships and crews needing to meet numerous similar or unique requirements as they ply the seas.98 The Arctic states concern regarding underregulated Arctic shipping therefore represents a dilemma of common aversion. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has already issued guidelines for construction, equipping, and operation of ships intended for Arctic service.99 Guidelines often precede binding standards to determine that there is a need for such standards and, if the Arctic states are averse to substandard ships proceeding through their Arctic waters, codifying and making mandatory the current guidelines represents an opportunity for cooperation among the states.100**

# \*\*\*Asian War\*\*\*

## No War

#### Asian war is unlikely --- all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives throughout the region

**Bitzinger & Desker, ‘08** – senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf>)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints.Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

#### US won’t be drawn in – No escalation.

Jeffrey Record 01, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, senior research fellow at the Center for Int’l Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, PhD from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Int’l Studies, Winter 2001, Aerospace Power Journal, v15 i4, “Thinking about China and War,” p. InfoTrac OneFile

Chinese military action against Asian mainland states not allied with the United States probably would not occasion a direct, armed US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Vietnamese war scenarios of the kind that transpired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, would not directly engage the vital interests of the United States--unless they spilled over into attacks on US forces and allies. Why would the United States intervene in such conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest in peace and stability on the Asian mainland and a specific interest in deterring nuclear war between other states. But would it go to war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, say, Russia and China? It was certainly not prepared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani exchange during the South Asian nuclear-war scare of 1999.

#### No risk – Break-up of states is unlikely, ideological tensions decreased, and multilateral structures prevent war.

Straits Times 08 “Why War is Unlikely in Asia” <http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html>

Nevertheless, the region is more stable than one might believe. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is moving towards a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt into conflict, especially after the recent victories of the Kuomintang in Taiwan. The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the nascent Six-Party Talks forum and, in particular, Asean.

#### Rising Beijing Consensus unifies nations and shared vaue between Asian countries prevents conflict.

Straits Times 08 “Why War is Unlikely in Asia” <http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html>

Instead of Washington's perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs coercively, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs. The nascent 'Beijing Consensus', for want of a better term, would consist of the following attributes: The leadership role of the authoritarian state, a technocratic approach to governance, an emphasis on social rights and obligations over individual rights, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions. The argument that there is an emerging 'Beijing Consensus' is not premised on the rise of the 'East' and decline of the 'West', as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier 1990s 'Asian values' debate. But like the previous debate, this new debate will reflect alternative philosophical traditions. At issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the values China and other states in the region share. By contrast, one conventional American view is that Sino-American competition will result in 'intense security competition with considerable potential for war' in which most of China's neighbours 'will join with the United States to contain China's power'. Asia's shared values are likely to reduce the risk of such conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with China, rather than a confrontation with it.

# \*\*\*Biodiversity\*\*\*

## No Impact

**Biodiversity isn’t key to survival**

**Calgary Herald**, August 30, 19**97**

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature's greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three **new studies suggest a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties doesn't always translate to better ecological health.** At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. "Having a long list of Latin names isn't always better than a shorter list of Latin names," said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science. **Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden, found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems** -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the **communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients.** One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford's Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed**. British plant ecologist** J.P. **Grime, in** a commentary summarizing the research, **said there is** as yet **no "convincing evidence that species diversity and ecosystem function are consistently and causally related**." "It could be argued," he added, "that **the tide is turning against the notion of** high **biodiversity as** a controller of ecosystem function and **insurance against ecological collapse."**

## Inevitable

**Species loss is inevitable: they can’t solve all causes**

**New Straits Times** (Malaysia), February 4, **2001**

**Monash University** Malaysia's Bachelor of Science in Environmental Management trains students for careers with the government, industry, non- governmental organisations such as WWF, Greenpeace, Malaysian Nature Society, Friends of the Earth, schools and universities, consulting firms and research organisations. According to Monash **lecturer specialising in the ecology of tropical rivers and streams, Dr Catherine Yule**, the programme ensures that students understand how the natural environment works and how best to manage it and utilise it in a sustainable fashion. Students study subjects including of environmental science, marine and freshwater biology, chemistry, ecology, soil science, environmental health, forest management, atmospheric processes and microbiology, Yule said. She added that students are introduced to a wide range of laboratory techniques and much of the practical work will be undertaken in the field, leading to careers both in laboratories and in the field. Graduates will be able to conduct scientific studies, develop and enforce regulatory environmental standards and understand the broader social, economic, political and legal aspects of environmental management, Yule said. Having worked as an environmental consultant in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Malaysia for over 20 years, Yule said that environmental management is simply managing the environment to ensure that all species, including human beings, work in harmony with the environment. "There are two ways of looking at environmental management," Yule said. The environment in national forests and recreational parks are "managed from the perspective of plants and animals, where we study what the animals and plants need to survive and multiply". From a human perspective, environmental scientists study ways of protecting the environment in view of new developments in the country, such as setting up of manufacturing plants, housing developments, mining activities, she said. Yule added that managing the environment from a human perspective also includes the safety of the workers themselves. "There is a great need to protect our environment for without it, humans will not survive. A cascade of events from pollution and natural disasters to famine will happen to cause the extinction of the human race," she said. There are also economical reasons for sustainable management of natural resources, Yule said. "Natural resources are a source of income and with these resources depleted, the world economy will not be able to survive. In the end, it is for our own safety and interests to protect the environment. "Esthetically, people enjoy the outdoors and protecting the environment is for self-satisfaction." Yule **rates the loss of biodiversity as the number one environmental crisis. "The extinction of species that we know and don't not know of is happening at an alarming rate, caused by** pollution and the destruction of habitats. Other crises include **global warming, river and air pollution, destruction of rainforests and even over population.**"

## Evolution Solves

#### Species evolve to replace those lost

Larry D. Martin, professor of ecology and evolutionary biology and curator of vertebrate paleontology at the University of Kansas, World and I, February 1, 2001

Wells does not claim that there were any fish in the Cambrian seas, let alone fishermen. In fact, he accepts the fossil record and geological time as presented by the geologists. There has been a lot of extinction at different times. Probably 95 percent of all the species that have ever lived are now extinct, but this doesn't mean that at any time in the past there was nearly twenty times the biodiversity there is today. Many extinctions were followed by the appearance of new taxa. Either there is a Creator who operates according to the old motto "if at first you don't succeed, try again" or there is some mechanism, like evolution, to replace lost diversity.

# \*\*\*Bioterrorism\*\*\*

## No Attack

#### No risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - their evidence is hype

MATISHAK ‘10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,” 4-29, <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php>)

WASHINGTON -- The United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience. "There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

#### Weather blocks and solves death toll

LAQUER 99 (Walter, Cochair of the International Research Council at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The New Terrorism”)

Ironically, the major factor retarding the use of gases and germs by states and terrorists is no the revulsion or moral constraints but technical difficulties. “Ideal” conditions for an attack seldom if ever exist, and the possibility of things going wrong is almost unlimited, aerosols may nor function, the wind may blow in the wrong direction, missiles carrying a deadly load may land in the wrong place or neutralize the germs on impact. In the course of time these technical difficulties may be overcome, but it is still very likely that roughly nine out of ten of the early attempts by terrorists to wage chemical or biological warfare will fail. But they will not pass unnoticed; the authorities and the public will be alerted, and the element of surprise lost. The search for perpetrators may begin even before the first successful attack. And what has just been said with regard to terrorists may also be to state terrorism.

## No Retaliation

#### Retaliation is wrong

Schmitt and Shanker ’11 ( BY ERIC SCHMITT, THOMAS SHANKER | SEPTEMBER 6, 2011 Eric Schmitt is a terrorism and national security correspondent for the New York Times. Thomas Shanker is a Pentagon and national security correspondent for the Times.

3. The Threat to Bomb Mecca As fears of a second attack mounted following the 9/11 strikes, U.S. government planners frantically cast about for strategies to protect the country. Even the most far-fetched ideas had a hearing, however briefly. In one case, some government planners proposed that if al Qaeda appeared ready to attack America again, the United States should publicly threaten to bomb the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the holiest site in all of Islam, in retaliation. "Just nuts!" one Pentagon aide wrote to himself when he heard the proposal. The idea was quickly and permanently shelved.

## No Impact

#### Bioterrorism is exaggerated – won’t cause extinction.

Arms Control Center, 1-26-2010, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, report in response to the Graham-Talent Commission report on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Biological threats: a matter of balance,” Lexis Nexis

• The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. • New bioweapons assessments are needed that take into account the complex set of social and technical issues that shape bioweapons development and use by state and non-state actors, and that focus on more plausible threats than the worst-case scenarios that have largely driven discussion to date. • Continuing to emphasize and spend billions of dollars on measures to specifically counter bioterrorist threat scenarios distorts our national understanding of the important issues in public health, and diverts scarce scientific talent and resources away from more pressing public health and natural disease threats. • While it has been argued that spin-offs from biodefense programs contribute to countering natural diseases, the converse is more likely: direct targeting of effort and expenditure on natural disease threats would provide much greater public health benefit, and spin-offs from these programs would significantly strengthen resistance to bioterrorism. • Bioterrorist threats need to be seen and addressed within a wider public health context--as just one of the many possible ways in which infectious agents may harm human, animal, and plant health How Serious is the Bioterrorist Threat? • Beginning in the early 1990s, an increasing amount was written about the threat of bioterrorism. Prior to 2001 most examples of “bioterrorism” were in fact hoaxes or were only tenuously related to actual threats, with the single exception of the use of Salmonella to contaminate salad bars in Oregon in 1984. Much was made of the Japanese group Aum Shinrykio’s unsuccessful attempts to use anthrax and botulinum toxin without drawing the simple and obvious lesson that achieving success in such attempts is difficult. The 2001 anthrax letters were seen as validating large scale and catastrophic threat scenarios, despite the very real difficulties that isolated individuals or small groups would have had in making such material. By the time the source of those letters was identified in August 2008 as a government laboratory with capabilities vastly in excess of those of any terrorist organization, biodefense programs costing tens of billions of dollars were already established, producing a potent and vocal constituency for continued and increased funding. • Offensive, including terrorist, use of biological agents presents major technical problems. This is why the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and others needed to spend vast sums for decades in order to research and develop biological weapons. Even then the results were considered an unreliable form of warfare, and there was little opposition to their elimination by international agreement (indeed the US unilaterally eliminated its biological weapons stockpiles). • Fictional bioterrorism exercises such as Atlantic Storm and Dark Winter routinely used unrealistic values for critical parameters and were unrealizable by putative perpetrators. They tended to gloss over the very real problems involved in acquiring, growing and disseminating smallpox virus on a sufficient scale to represent a major threat. They also posited unreasonable assumptions about issues such as the rate of disease spread, which skewed the outcomes towards inflated and unlikely results.

#### **BioTerrorism Fails Multiple Reasons**

MHA, Missouri Hospital Association, No Date (probably around 2011)

(MHA, 7-13-12<http://web.mhanet.com/aspx/articles.aspx?navid=18&pnavid=&articleid=92,> Chemical Funding Awareness Training”. bcd)

The 1990s saw an increased use in chemical weapons both on the battlefield and in terrorist attacks. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers in the 1990s during the Iran/Iraq war and they also used them against their own Kurdish population. The Kurds were a minority group and mustard agents were used in vast amounts against their towns and villages, causing serious casualties. Terrorist also use sarin, a nerve agent designed by the Germans in World War II, in Tokyo. The attack caused 12 fatalities, but sent 6,000 people to the hospital. ¶ Today we recognize five levels of risk from terrorist in conjunction with chemical weapons. The first level of risk is a threat of use with no real capabilities. The second risk is unsuccessful attempts to acquire chemical weapons. The third risk is actual possession of chemical weapons. The fourth is the unsuccessful attempt to use them and the fifth and of course the most dangerous is the successful attempt to use chemical weapons against civilian populations. ¶ ¶ What you may be asking is why haven't we seen more use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups? There are several reasons. One reason is groups seeking political legitimacy may fear a severe backlash. Stated policy of the U.S. government indicates that any attack against U.S. targets, civilian or military using chemical weapons will be met with extraordinarily strong response. Governments may be unlikely to provide terrorist groups access to chemical weapons if they fear a severe retaliatory strike from the victims. Additionally, bombs are very inexpensive and have provided great shock value and carnage for media coverage. The Madrid bombings are an excellent example of the affect that even relatively small explosive devices can have on a country. The most likely reason is uncertainty. Chemical weapons are never guaranteed to work effectively. That was shown in the First World War where even though large quantities were used, they never were decisive. ¶

#### **Chemical Weapon Impact Small No Longer Called WMD**

Hargiel, Chemical Weapons Expert, November 2001

(Gert, 7-13-12, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/11/00_harigel_cbw.htm>, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment” .bcd)

The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD), used to encompass nuclear (NW), biological (BW), and chemical weapons (CW), is misleading, politically dangerous, and cannot be justified on grounds of military efficiency. This had been pointed out previously by the author [1] and discussed in considerable detail in ref. [2]. Whereas protection with various degrees of efficiency is possible against chemical and biological weapons, however inconvenient it might be for military forces on the battlefield and for civilians at home, it is not feasible at all against nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons have shown to be largely ineffective in warfare, biological weapons have never been deployed on any significant scale. Both types should be better designated as weapons of terror against civilians and weapons of intimidation for soldiers. Requirements on their transport system differ vastly from those for nuclear warheads. They are able to cause considerable anxiety, panic, and psychosis without borders within large parts of the population. Stockpiling of biological weapons is not possible over a long time scale [3, 4]. Only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called a weapon of mass destruction.¶ However, if one wants to maintain the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)", it is a defendable view to exclude chemical and biological weapons, but put together with nuclear weapons all those that actually has killed millions of people in civil wars since World War II. These are mainly assault rifles, like AK47s, handguns, and land mines, to a lesser extent mortars, fragmentation bombs, and hand grenades

#### RISK OF BIOTERROR LOW: TECH HURDLES, RISK OWN DEATHS, CULTURAL TABOOS, EASY ALTS

PARANCHI (RAND Analyst) ’01 [John, “Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses,” Rand Testimony, Ct 186, http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/CT186.pdf nov.//DeLo-uwyo]

The use of disease and biological material as a weapon is not a new method of¶ warfare. What is surprising is how infrequently it is has been used. Biological agents¶ may appeal to the new terrorist groups because they affect people indiscriminately and¶ unnoticed, thereby sowing panic. A pattern is emerging that terrorists who perpetrate¶ mass and indiscriminate attacks do not claim responsibility.5 In contrast to the turgid¶ manifestos issued by terrorists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, recent mass casualty¶ terrorists have not claimed responsibility until they were imprisoned. Biological agents¶ enable terrorists to preserve their anonymity because of their delayed impact and can be¶ confused with natural disease outbreaks. Instead of the immediate gratification of seeing¶ an explosion or the glory of claiming credit for disrupting society, the biological weapons¶ terrorist may derive satisfaction from seeing society’s panicked response to their actions.¶ If this is the case, this is a new motive for the mass casualty terrorist.

There are a number of countervailing disincentives for states and terrorists to use¶ biological weapons, which help explain why their use is so infrequent. The technical and¶ operational challenges biological weapons pose are considerable. Acquiring the material,¶ skills of production, knowledge of weaponization, and successfully delivering the¶ weapon, to the target is difficult. In cases where the populations of the terrorist¶ supporters and adversaries are mixed, biological weapons risk inadvertently hitting the¶ same people for whom terrorists claim to fight. Terrorists may also hesitate in using¶ biological weapons specifically because breaking the taboo on their use may evoke¶ considerable retaliation. The use of disease as a weapon is widely recognized in most¶ cultures as a means of killing that is beyond the bounds of a civilized society.¶ From a psychological perspective, terrorists may be drawn to explosives as¶ arsonists are drawn to fire. The immediate gratification of explosives and the thrill of the¶ blast may meet a psychological need of terrorists that the delayed effects of biological¶ weapons do not. Causing slow death of others may not offer the same psychic thrill¶ achieved by killing with firearms or explosives.¶ Perhaps the greatest alternative to using biological weapons is that terrorists can¶ inflict (and have inflicted) many more fatalities and casualties with conventional¶ explosives than with unconventional weapons. Biological weapons present technical and¶ operational challenges that determined killers may not have the patience to overcome or¶ they may simply concentrate their efforts on more readily available alternatives.¶ Pg 11-12

#### RISK OF BIOTERROR LOW—BASED ON VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS, NOT ACTUAL THREATS—THEIR CLAIM HAVE LITTLE GROUNDING IN REALIY

SIMON **(Frmr member, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project)** ’02 [Jacqueline, “Implications of the Terror Attacks for the BWC,” INESAP INFORMATION Bulletin, March n 19 pp 4-7//delo-uwyo]

The events of September 11 and the anthrax incidents that followed have led to a sea change in public perception and policy response with regard to biological weapons. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington and the anthrax letters have become irrevocably linked in the public psyche. This linkage has led to the expansion of America's defensive goals and the marriage of two previously distinct security threats, terrorism and attack by nuclear, chemical or particularly biological weapon. The progeny of this marriage, 'bio-terrorism', has vaulted to the top of the list of threats to international security, within the United States most obviously, but in many other states as well. This focus on bio-terrorism as the scourge of the new millennium will have a serious impact on proliferation policies worldwide.¶ As the Cold War with its foundation of nuclear deterrence faded into the background of public consciousness, chemical and biological weapons had begun to move to the forefront and gained increasing prominence in policy circles and the media as the "greatest threat to international security". Nuclear weapons were not forgotten, but lumped in with chemical and biological weapons under the misnomer and catch phrase 'weapons of mass destruction'. While the likelihood of the use of chemical and biological weapons was viewed as increasing, their use on Western soil was still regarded by most analysts as a distant threat. Many of the assumptions behind this view have been shattered and reconstructed since the events of the autumn of 2001.¶ For persons living in North America (and many others worldwide) it undeniably 'feels' like the threat of attack by terrorists or weapons of mass casualty has increased. However, this is a feeling based in a newfound sense of vulnerability rather than an actual increase in the threat itself. Analysts, intelligence agencies, and policymakers have been aware of the threat posed by these weapons for many years and this threat has not increased exponentially since September 11. Attack by biological weapons causing mass casualty is largely regarded as a low-probability, high consequence event. In other words, if such an event did occur the results would be devastating, but the likelihood of occurrence is very small. Most analysis conducted on potential biological weapons attack has focussed on attack by a state actor whose motivations, if not capabilities, are generally known. In the case of a terrorist attack however, it is very difficult to gain any information about the motivations, capabilities and intent of the enemy. This has resulted in a situation where vulnerability assessments are widely substituted for threat assessments and policy is based on worst-case scenario projections with little grounding in reality.

#### Beyond current terrorist capabilities

Milton Leitenberg, 2010 (senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies), Terrorizing Ourselves, Cato Institute, "Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism", http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ

For two decades, we have been told that bioterrorism would be perpetrated by terrorist groups with an international presence and international political objectives. As noted, however, these groups have little or no scientific competence, little or no knowledge of microbiology, and no known access to pathogen strains or laboratory facilities. The most recent U.S. National Intelligence Council terrorist assessment makes no reference to any of these capabilities. The report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, released in December 2008, states, "We accept the validity of intelligence estimates about the current rudimentary nature of terrorist capabilities in the area of biological weapons."

# \*\*\*Canada Relations\*\*\*

## Alt Causes

#### Other issues overwhelm relations

Blanchfield 6-25 (Mike, Reporter – Canadian Press, “Obama jilting Canada, plunging relations to new low, says U.S. policy journal ,” Canadian Press, 2012, Online)

Is Barack Obama squandering Canada's love?¶The answer is a resounding yes, according to an essay in a leading U.S. foreign policy journal.¶ "How Obama Lost Canada," is the headline in the online edition of Foreign Affairs, published by the influential Washington think tank, The Council On Foreign Relations.¶ The article cites a litany of wrongs that its authors pin on the current U.S. president, including the delay in the Keystone XL pipeline, protectionist Buy American provisions, even disrespect for Canadian military contributions in Libya and Afghanistan.¶ As a result, the U.S. has jilted Canada, leaving relations at "their lowest point in decades."¶The article is by Derek Burney, a former Canadian diplomatic heavyweight and one-time ambassador to the U.S., and Fen Hampson, a Carleton University foreign policy expert.¶ Theirs is not the first analysis to note this pattern. But its publication in a respected U.S. policy journal months before the presidential election offers a ready-made slogan for further Republican attacks on Obama's leadership during an economic downturn. Canada and the U.S. are each other's top trading partners.¶Obama's decision to delay the Keystone decision until 2013 \_ after the election and following intense lobbying by environmentalists \_ was a point of attack for Republicans during their protracted primaries.¶But Burney and Hampson cite that as only the latest in long series of blunders, not all of them economic.¶ The article offers a sobering counterpoint to the polls that consistently show Obama to be more popular in Canada than his own country, not to mention his outburst of "I love this country" when he first visited Ottawa a month after his 2009 inauguration.¶ "Whether on trade, the environment, or Canada's shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United States has jilted its northern neighbour," the essay says.¶ "If the pattern of neglect continues, Ottawa will get less interested in co-operating with Washington."¶The article notes how Prime Minister Stephen Harper has declared it an economic imperative to bolster trade with China, India, South Korea and other Asian countries. It highlights Harper's pledge \_ while in China \_ to "sell our energy to people who want to buy our energy."¶ Harper spoke after the delay of the Keystone pipeline project, which would have carried crude from the Alberta oilsands to U.S. refineries on the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Two-way trade between Canada and the U.S. totalled $681 billion last year, and supports eight million U.S. jobs.¶ "Yet the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this relationship," the essay says, through the Buy American provision in its stimulus bill that prevented Canadian companies from bidding on infrastructure projects in the U.S.¶ The U.S. recession and the rise of Asia have led to a decline of Canadian exports south in the last decade. About 85 per cent of Canadian exports went to the U.S. in 2000, compared with 68 per cent in 2010, the essay says.¶The slights don't stop there.¶The essay criticizes the U.S. for demanding concessions from Canada on agricultural subsidies as the price of entry into negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, "while preserving massive agricultural subsidies of its own."¶It accuses the U.S. of sticking Canadian taxpayers with the bill for a new bridge between Detroit and Windsor, the choked crossing point for one-quarter of the trade between the two countries.¶ "The U.S. share is to be repaid over time by the tolls collected, but any shortfalls will rest with the Canadian taxpayer."¶Beyond economics, "Washington has also failed to trust and respect its loyal ally," the essay argues.¶ "To name one small, but telling, example, when Canada ran for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, the United States offered little support. For whatever reason, Portugal was a more compelling choice."¶ Burney and Hampson argue that the Canadian military sacrifices in Afghanistan \_ including more than 150 lives lost and billions spent \_ as well as its major contribution to last year's NATO-led Libya air campaign have simply not won any enduring respect with U.S. leadership.¶ "Canada has no tangible interests of any kind in Afghanistan or Libya," their essay says. "Its participation in those countries, proportionately larger than any other ally, was intended primarily to strengthen the partnership with the United States on the theory that solid, multilateral commitments would engender more productive bilateral relations. That proved not to be the case."¶ U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is criticized for how she "went out of her way to rake Canada over the coals" during the March 2010 summit of Arctic coastal states in Gatineau, Que. Clinton was voicing her objections to the exclusion of other countries with "legitimate interests" in the region.¶The Obama administration is cited for showing no interest in Canadian overtures for common North American fuel standards to reduce carbon emissions. The so-called "clean energy dialogue" \_ the major deliverable of 2009 Ottawa visit \_ has become a "monologue," says the essay.

# \*\*\*China Relations\*\*\*

## Resilient

#### Relations with China are resilient

**Dongxiao 12** – Vice President of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (Chen, 01/05, “China-US Relations in 2012: Caution Ahead,” http://chinausfocus.com/slider/no-reason-for-chagrin-over-china-us-relations-but-cautious-management-needed-in-2012/)

The year of 2011 brought many unexpected, globally altering events. This year, non-stop crises and sea changes in the international arena; chaos and revolution in the Middle East and West Africa; catastrophic Tsunami and nuclear-leak crisis in Fukushima; paralysis of leadership of EU confronting the evolving debt predicament in Euro-Zone; and the sudden death of Kim Jong-il and its unpredictable repercussions on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia were just a few of the tumultuous events that led global economic and political instability this year. Bilateral relations between China and the US, in contrast have been relatively stable, and increasingly positive. Three driving forces have contributed to the improvement in US-China relations in 2011: mutual commitment, multi-function mechanisms, and increasing interdependence. Beijing and Washington both stressed their commitment to building a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit following a rocky year of bilateral relations in 2010. Both sides have stressed that the relationship between China and the United States should be cooperative and mutually beneficial rather than zero-sum, and that the two sides should **stand together in the face of difficulty** and carry out cooperation on an equal footing. The mutual commitment between China and the US has been bolstered by an increasing number of bilateral mechanisms with policy communication, coordination, and implementation functions (“C2I”). 2011 has seen of the growth of “C2I” mechanisms intensify. with a number of new initiatives, including High-level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges, the US-China Governors Forum, and the Strategic Security Dialogue and Asia-Pacific Affairs Consultation under the framework of Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). While the former two initiatives have either reflected thriving interaction in cross-cultural domains or tapped the huge potential of sub-national cooperation across the Pacific, the latter two mechanisms have greatly upgraded capacity to address difficult and sensitive military and security issues in bilateral relations n and build confidence in US-China relations. The **60 plus** bilateral mechanisms, plus frequent exchanges of informal visits and workshops between senior officials have built an **impressive level of institutionalization** in US-China bilateral relations that has enhanced the predictability of relations between the two countries and helped consolidate the foundation of the relations. The substance of the bilateral relationship, in essence, is not to follow the two presidents’ agreements in words, but to follow the roadmap in action, and those bilateral mechanisms have built significant capacity to do this. Thirdly and perhaps most fundamentally, the growing interdependence across the Pacific and emerging agenda of global governance has served as the “ballast” in the bilateral relationship. Despite numerous trade disputes between the two countries, economic interdependence has been steadily enhanced, manifested either by the hike of bilateral trade and investment volume, symbiotic financial relations, or the economic restructuring now underway in both countries. This interdependence has transcended economics, and is growing increasingly comprehensive in nature.

#### Security cooperation prevents disputes over trade pressure from derailing relations

Taiwan News 4

(4-27, Lexis)

He also said Washington's renewed protests about Beijing's human rights, weapons proliferation and trade practices were **insufficient** to destabilize U.S.-China relations, because America's reliance on Beijing in diplomatic efforts toward North Korea, and Beijing's hopes for U.S. pressure to be used against Taiwan, are part of a **broad set of calculations keeping the relationship on track**.

#### Relations resilient

Stokes 5

(Bruce, PhD, Snr Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, National Journal, 7-16, Lexis)

The Chinese resent growing pressure from Washington to revalue their currency, the yuan. They worry about mounting  
anti-Chinese sentiment in Congress. They anticipate potential bilateral friction over North Korea and over China's lengthening economic and diplomatic shadow in East Asia. And, said Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing University, "there are deep-rooted suspicions of U.S. intentions." Nonetheless, members of China's small community of experts on Sino-American relations are upbeat. They welcome April's agreement between Beijing and Washington to hold regular senior-level talks, with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick leading the dialogue, on the full array of issues facing the two nations. They think that the Taiwan issue is manageable. And they have faith that the U.S.-China relationship can be put on a stable course once Beijing convinces Washington that China's military buildup in recent years poses no threat to the United States, and that China does not want to exclude America from Asia. **Continues…**

As Yuan suggests, as dynamic as China appears from the outside, insiders here fret about their country's domestic  
vulnerabilities. Tens of millions of Chinese are jobless and drifting around the country with no permanent home. The possibility of an economic slowdown that might increase this number sends shivers through the leadership. Moreover, millions more work unproductively on the land. At some point, these people need to find jobs in industry and services if Chinese agriculture is ever to become more efficient. In addition, the strength of the financial system, burdened as it is by bad loans, is a constant worry. Opinions differ on how serious the problem is. Green, from Standard Chartered Bank, says there is "good reason to believe that China can get through this." But the banking system is likely to be vulnerable for years to come. All of this uncertainty exists amid an environment of mounting civil unrest. The number of demonstrations and other citizen protests has increased dramatically in the past few years, and many are aimed at the tax system and at environmental abuses. This internal political insecurity is compounded, analysts here say, by a growing wariness of U.S. meddling. Well aware of the role that Washington played in funding successful opposition groups in Ukraine and elsewhere, the already insecure Chinese leadership views Bush administration talk of democracy promotion with grave concern. For these reasons, Chinese experts on Sino-American relations welcome the new high-level dialogue between China and the U.S. that is slated to commence this summer. The talks aren't intended to solve specific problems -- such as Taiwan -- but will focus on building trust about each other's long-term geopolitical and security intentions. The Chinese would like to see the dialogue take up the expanding U.S. role in Central Asia, how Americans see their future relationship with Japan, and how to peacefully manage mutual energy needs. Although Chinese praise the dialogue as a good beginning, they do not have high expectations for the first meetings. They realize that the process will be slow. For that reason, some Chinese experts believe that there is also a need for a quick-reaction, crisis-management dialogue that would focus more specifically on emerging flash points. But they hold out little hope for such an interchange, saying the Pentagon opposes it. So the challenges facing the U.S.-China relationship, as seen from Beijing, are daunting **but manageable**. The course of events may depend on how Washington handles mounting frustration with China in the United States. "This is going to be very difficult," said Susan Shirk, a professor of political science at the University of California (San Diego). "The history of pressuring the Chinese to do things is not one of great success. When we pressure them, they dig in their heels. It turns into a contest of wills. And you can't keep any of this from the Chinese people anymore. The Internet sets the agenda, and Beijing has to react. So if we start venting, they will start to vent." Fortunately, said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a China expert and a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, the relationship has proven **quite resilient** over the years. "We are far beyond the era when one or two issues could break the relationship," he said.

## Stable Now

#### Relationship stable now

#### **Xinhua 7/24/12**

**(Xinhua, “Chinese president emphasizes healthy, stable China-U.S. relationship,” 7/24/12,** <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/24/c_131735953.htm> /mr)

BEIJING, July 24 (Xinhua) -- President Hu Jintao said Tuesday that China is ready to work with the United States to advance the China-U.S. relationship in a healthy and stable way.¶ President Hu made the remark when meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama's top security advisor Thomas Donilon, the first American national security advisor to visit China in eight years.¶ Hu said the two sides should further implement the consensus they had reached by strengthening dialogue, maintaining communication, enhancing mutual trust and expanding cooperation.¶ Hu said the two sides should respect and take care of each other's major interests and concerns and handle sensitive issues in a stable, careful and proper manner.¶ Donilon said U.S.-China relations "are among the most important in the world." He said the U.S. side is ready to work with China to implement the major consensus reached by the heads of state of the two countries. He said the United States is ready to deepen cooperation with China in all bilateral areas and on issues in the region and the world.¶ According to Hu, China-U.S. relations have generally maintained a momentum of stable growth in recent years due to efforts from both sides. Hu added that he and President Obama had reached an important consensus on building a cooperative China-U.S. partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefit and on exploring the way of developing a new type of relationship between the two countries.¶ Donilon said the U.S. side is firmly committed to building a cooperative partnership with China and jointly exploring how to build a new type of relationship between the two countries.¶ "We think our relationship is defined by practical cooperation," he said.¶ Hu said Donilon has participated in many important high-level events between China and the United States in recent years. He expressed appreciation for Donilon's efforts in promoting the development of bilateral ties.¶ Donilon is visiting China from Monday to Wednesday. He held talks with Chinese State Council Dai Bingguo Tuesday morning and is slated to meet a number of top Chinese leaders during his stay.

#### Relations increasing now – recent dialogues

#### Agence France-Presse 7/12/12

**(Agence France-Presse, “US, China Keen on Dialogue,” 7/12/12, Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation,** <http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/365685/us-china-keen-on-dialogue> /mr)

PHNOM PENH, Cambdia — China said Thursday it is ready to “enhance” its dialogue with the US, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Chinese counterpart met on the sidelines of an Asian security meeting.¶ “China and US relations have continued to make progress this year,” Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, adding the sides agreed to “enhance our dialogue... to continue to expand our common ground.”¶ His comments come as China comes under scrutiny for its handling of a series of territorial disputes with its neighbors, which include several key US allies.¶ Clinton welcomed the meeting, saying a slew of joint initiatives including disaster relief, forestry policy, and disease control, were “an important signal that the US and China not only can, but will work together in Asia.”¶ The positive diplomatic tone followed the Secretary of State’s warning on Thursday morning to countries around the South China Sea to settle their territorial disputes “without coercion.”¶ The Philippines and Vietnam accuse China of acting aggressively over its competing claims to several islands in the resource-rich sea, while Tokyo and Beijing on Wednesday exchanged barbs over a separate sovereignty quarrel in the East China Sea.¶ Analysts have said Clinton has been keen to avoid souring ties with China during her visit to Cambodia, amid a fraught background of rows between Beijing and its neighbors.¶ The US has made a military and economic “pivot” towards Asia in a strategic bid to counteract China’s influence in the region, the main bright spot of the morose global economy and home to huge untapped resources.¶ China claims virtually the entire area and has created an entirely new city to administer it, sparking deep concern from rival claimants. The sea hosts about a third of the world’s cargo traffic, has rich fishing grounds and is believed to store vast oil and gas reserves.¶ “The United States has no territorial claims there and we do not take sides in disputes about territorial or maritime boundaries,” Clinton told foreign ministers gathered in Cambodia’s capital. “But we do have an interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea.”¶ Asian countries should “work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats and without use of force,” Clinton added.¶ ASEAN’s 10 members announced earlier this week that they have drafted a set of rules governing maritime rights and navigation, and procedures for when governments disagree. But China is not a member of the group and hasn’t agreed to anything.¶ The ASEAN countries are presenting their proposal to China at this week’s conference in Cambodia’s capital.¶ Various longstanding disputes among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei involve the area’s busy sea lanes, and many observers fear the complicated web of disputes could spark a violent conflict.¶ The standoff between China and the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal off the northwestern Philippines began in April when the Philippines accused Chinese fishermen of poaching in its exclusive economic zone, including the shoal. During the tensions, both sides sent government ships to the area though both have since withdrawn vessels.¶ In Manila, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago said Philippine authorities may resort to “power politics” to resolve the conflict with China over ownership of the Scarborough Shoal and parts of the Spratly Islands.¶ “China has refused to bring our disputes to the international tribunals available…what is left to us, is power politics. That is all we’ve got. We cannot engage into a massive arms build up against China. We just don’t have the money for it. We have to use power politics. We have to naturally turn to our allies,” Santiago said.¶ An expert on international law, Santiago, who is set to assume her post as judge in the International Criminal Court (ICC), said the Philippines can its allies, the US, which has an existing visiting forces agreement (VFA) with the government, and Australia which has a pending VFA with the country.¶ “We can also turn to South Korea, Singapore and then fellow members in ASEAN with interest in South China Sea such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia,” Santiago said.¶ The senator said it is more appropriate for the Philippines to bring its case to the International Court of Justice which settles questions and disputes on territorial boundaries and sovereignty. China rejects what it considers interference by an international tribunal.¶ Santiago said the Philippines has a “conflicted relationship with the US” and it is “a grave mistake” for Filipinos to think that America will immediately come to aid the Philippines even with an existing 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty when its dispute with China turn for the worse.¶ The Americans “are subconsciously invoking the 1951 Philippine-US MDT. But if we read this MDT very carefully you would notice that number one: America will come to our defense only if in the case of an armed attack,” she said.¶ Citing other complications, Santiago said part of the provisions of the treaty says that the US will come to “our defense in accordance to its constitutional processes.”¶ “That means that the US Congress will make a decision first on how to defend the Philippines. Maybe they’d say, well, send them all our used, junk equipment we don’t use anymore. That would be in accordance of their constitutional processes. That’s why the Phil-US MDT is irrelevant with our present row with China,” she said.¶ Santiago said she is willing to “rethink” her position on the Philippine-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) which she and seven other senators have opposed if “countries would commit in writing that when the Philippines is under attack, not necessarily armed, but victimized by threat or use of force, they will come to the defense of the Philippines.” [Additional reports from AP and Hannah L. Torregoza]

#### Dialogues and building initiatives solve declining relations

#### China Daily 6/28/12

**(China Daily, “US calls for ‘sound’ China relations’,” 6/28/12,** <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-06/28/content_15530876.htm> /mr)

As Washington is gearing up its diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia, it is equally important to maintain a sound relationship with China for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, a senior United States official said on Wednesday.¶ The remarks, made by US Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell, came a week before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton departs for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional forum and post-ministerial conference in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.¶ Because of concerns among ASEAN members that this region may become an arena of "dangerous strategic competition" between the US and China, Campbell said: "One of the most important things for us at the forum is to make it clear, particularly to colleagues in ASEAN, that we are committed to a strong, stable and durable relationship with China. It is our strong determination to make it clear that we want to work with China."¶ Campbell made the remarks during a keynote speech at the second annual conference on maritime security in the South China Sea, held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.¶ At the coming meeting in Cambodia, Secretary Clinton and her Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi will roll out some specific initiatives on capacity building, humanitarian disaster relief, wildlife protection and other issues of common concern, he said.¶ Clinton's trip is one of the recent intensive diplomatic engagements by the Obama administration in the region, following Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's historic visit to Vietnam and the Joint Chief of Staff Army General Martin Dempsey's visit to the Philippines earlier this month.¶ Those high-level visits and Americans' frequent presence at the Asian regional meetings show Washington's long-term commitment to regular strategic engagement in the economic dynamic area, the official said.¶ The Americans are also trying to get their European allies involved more in Asian affairs following their close partnership in Balkan, Afghanistan and Pakistan issues.¶ European Union foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton will be invited to the regional forum for the first time as American diplomats are now lobbying their European colleagues into more dialogue and discussions on Asia.¶ "Campbell described as "dramatically lacking" the level of discussion or strategic engagement between Europe and US over Asia.¶ Apart the traditional security and defense aspects, Secretary Clinton will lay out a multi-facet diplomatic approach at the regional forum, especially "specific economic initiatives" directed at Southeast Asia, he added.¶ After the forum, Clinton will take the largest ever business group to North Cambodia's Siem Reap to meet business leadership from ASEAN and other parts of Asia to expand American economic and commercial engagement.¶ Beijing and Washington have been facing challenges on regional issues in recent years because of China's growing political and economic influence in Asia and the US' reengagement diplomatic policy in the area.¶ In July, 2010, Secretary Clinton waded into South China Sea territorial disputes by telling a regional security forum in Vietnam that a peaceful resolution of the disputes over the Nansha and the Xisha islands was in the national interests of the US. She also suggested a multilateral solution to the disputes.¶ China, which has South China Sea territorial disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, has always tried to resolve the issues through bilateral negotiation.¶ Beijing accused Washington of interfering in Asian regional affairs and trying to internationalize South China Sea issues.¶ On recent developments of the issues between China and the Philippines and Vietnam, Campbell said the US has insisted on not taking a position and supported the current diplomatic efforts by the relevant parties.¶ Bonnie Glaser, an Asia-Pacific security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the United States does not view the relations in the region in "zero-sum" terms and is not seeking to force ASEAN members to choose between the world's two largest economies.¶ She said although the US and some media often pin the blame on China, she believed other claimants over South China Sea territory also sometimes behaved in provocative or confrontational ways that generated concern from the US government.

#### **Military ties**

**Xinhua 6/26/12**

**(Xinhua, “China, U.S. to forge new military relations,” 6/26/12,** <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/26/c_123334081.htm> /mr)

BEIJING, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met here on Tuesday with Samuel Locklear, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, vowing to forge a new type of military ties.¶ China-United States relations have kept moving forward in the past 40 years despite ups and downs, said Liang, noting that the main reason has been the broad common interests shared by the two sides.¶ Healthy, stable development of China-United States relations is not only in the interests of the two countries, but also conducive to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world, he added.¶ China and the United States both have important domestic political agendas this year and have to concentrate on economic recovery, development and reform, so it is a common need of both sides to maintain the steady development of bilateral ties, according to the defense minister.¶ Chinese President Hu Jintao raised a four-point proposal on forging a new model of relations between the two world powers during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Mexico last week, which has pointed out the direction for bilateral relations, he noted.¶ Liang called on the two armed forces to establish a rapport based on equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, which is corresponding to the new model of bilateral relations.¶ He also reviewed his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta in May, noting that China is ready to work with the United States to beef up high-level military exchanges, deepen cooperation in non-traditional security, and develop bilateral military ties.¶ He also elaborated on China's stance on the U.S. side's adjustment of its Asia-Pacific strategy as well as reconnaissance activities by U.S. warships and planes close to China.¶ Locklear affirmed the importance of China-United States relations as well as bilateral military relations.¶ Although there remain differences between the two sides on some issues, they have common interests in broader areas, he pointed out.¶ In order to safeguard the common interests of the two sides and build a safe international environment, he called on the two armed forces to further enhance dialogue, communication and cooperation.

# \*\*\*Competitiveness\*\*\*

## US Leader Now

#### The US is still the leader in competitiveness—the world economy goes down with us.

Frederick E. Allen, May 30, 2012. “The US Still Leads the World in Competitiveness.” Frederick E. Allen, Forbes Staff.—Leadership of Editors at Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2012/05/30/the-u-s-still-leads-the-world-in-competitiveness/

Worried that we’re falling behind in the world economy, and that other nations, like maybe China, are pulling ahead of us? Relax. Here’s reassurance from IMD, the international business school in Lausanne, Switzerland: The findings of its annual World Competitiveness Yearbook are just out, and they show that the only place that can touch us is a relative pygmy, Hong Kong.¶ IMD ranked 59 economies across the world, measuring “how well countries manage their economic and human resources to increase their prosperity.” It used 329 ranking criteria, a third of them arising from a survey of more than 4,200 international executives. The 10 most competitive nations, with their scores relative to the first-place finisher, are:¶ 1. Hong Kong. Score: 100.00¶ 2. USA: 97.75¶ 3. Switzerland: 96.68¶ 4. Singapore: 95.92¶ 5. Sweden: 91.39¶ 6. Canada: 90.29¶ 7. Taiwan: 89.96¶ 8. Norway: 89.67¶ 9. Germany: 89.26¶ 10. Qatar: 88.48¶ The 10 Hardest Jobs to Fill in America¶ Jacquelyn Smith¶ Forbes Staff¶ The Red Hot Heart of Leadership¶ August Turak¶ Contributor¶ Last year the U.S. and Hong Kong were tied for first place, and Singapore, Sweden, and Canada were respectively third, fourth, and fifth. The last-place finisher is Venezuela, with a score of 31.45. It’s the only country to do worse than poor, beleaguered Greece (43.05). Mainland China, in case you were wondering, is No. 23, down from 19 last year. The rankings’ authors observe that in Europe, Ireland (20), Iceland (26), and Italy (40) look better positioned to recover economically, judging by the numbers, than Spain (39), Portugal (41), or Greece (58).¶ Prof. Stephane Garelli, director of IMD’s World Competitiveness Center, says, “U.S. competitiveness has a deep impact on the rest of the world because it is uniquely interacting with every economy, advanced or emerging. No other nation can exercise such a strong ‘pull effect’ on the world. Europe is burdened with austerity and fragmented political leadership and is hardly a credible substitute, while a South-South bloc of emerging markets is still a work in progress. In the end, if the U.S. competes, the world succeeds.”

#### US is the leader in global competitiveness in the status quo.

Graham White, June 1, 2012. “World Competitiveness Rankings: What do they tell us.” The Conservation—Latest ideas and research in Australia and around the world. Graham White is a Senior Lecture in the School of Economics at the University of Sydney. http://theconversation.edu.au/world-competitiveness-rankings-what-do-they-tell-us-7397

The IMD World Competitiveness Rankings released this week are worth reflecting on, not so much because of the relative positioning of various countries – including Australia – but rather because of the reasoning which underpins the rankings.¶ The press release accompanying the rankings gives some indication of this reasoning. The first point worth noting is the potentially misleading use of the term competitiveness. When this term is used by economists it usually refers to the price competitiveness of a country’s exports and import-competing goods. And for many economists this would over time be bound up with the relative real unit labour costs across different countries.¶ The reasoning accompanying the IMD rankings suggest however a much looser use of the term “competitiveness”. What’s suggested is rather a view about the potential of different countries for sustained economic prosperity.¶ Now, price competitiveness of one’s exports and import-substitutes may be part of this, but is certainly never the whole story.¶ Moreover, as a number of economists over the years have noted, the world economy is not an open economy, but a closed economy. This means that one country’s improved competitiveness is at the expense of another country.¶ In other words, growing your economy through exports at the expense of other countries can mean exporting not just goods and services, but exporting unemployment to other countries as well.¶ IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2012¶ So one needs to be cautious in drawing links between competitiveness and economic prosperity – it is not a game everyone can win.¶ Another interesting feature of the IMD release relates to the position of the US. It is suggested that the “US remains at the centre of world competitiveness because of its unique economic power”.¶ Undoubtedly the element of truth in this statement is the continued hegemony of the US in the global economy.¶ But one could reasonably contend that this is much less to do with any superiority in competitiveness of the US in the narrow economic sense and much more to do with the continued dominant status of the US dollar as a de facto reserve currency in the international monetary system.¶ And this dominance – effectively emerging as far back as the end of the First World War – has continued, interestingly, while the external accounts of the US – specifically, its current account – have been deteriorating.¶ In fact the US current account has been deteriorating since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods era in the early 1970’s.This in turn has reflected a long-run deterioration in US trade performance. Yet this has not seemingly impeded the economic dominance of the US.¶

#### Lack of credible competitors preserves American dominance

Qian, 2008—reporter of Yale Global [Jiang, February 29th, Is the Sun Setting on US Dominance? – Part II, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10435]

The proponents of such a "multipolar worldview" often confuse the immense potential of their favored giants with their actual influences. They often overlook the immense internal difficulties these rising giants must overcome to realize their potential. Most importantly, they do not take full account of the strategic interactions between these giants during their simultaneous rise and the strategic opportunities that such interactions present for the US. Among the rising powers, the European Union boasts by far the largest economy, with a strong currency and a comparatively large and prosperous population. However, after a long drive of expansion, Europe faces a serious cohesion problem. It still suffers from a weak security framework that's dependent on NATO and a legalistic rather than executive center in Brussels. Although the EU does chase strategic interests in its proximities such as the central Asia and North Africa, it does so, not for any overreaching vision to compete globally, but mostly for parochial economic reasons. Europe is not yet competing in any "Great Game," for the simple reason that Europe is not yet unified. Recent rejections of the EU constitution show that serious resistance remains towards further integration. After recent stabilization of its economy, a resurgent Russia is often mentioned as a future global power. However, Russia faces severe long-term internal challenges. Its population is declining and aging, its vast Siberia territories hollowing out after the end of Soviet subsidies. Extractive industries such as hydrocarbon, mining and timber account for 80 percent of Russia's exports and 30 percent of its government revenue, whereas its manufacturing industries are mostly outdated and uncompetitive. Russia therefore will have serious issues with its self-image as a major world power, finding it hard to forge an assessment of its global role commensurate with its long-term demographic and economic realities. Japan has a similar problem of updating its self-image as the most "advanced" nation in Asia for more than 100 years. Today Japan faces the harsh reality that, after its neighbors catch up, Japan will again find itself a geographically small, resource-poor island nation dependent on trade, living uneasily among large, populous continental neighbors. It has a largely pacifist, prosperous population in a neighborhood still rife with nationalism. Unlike Europe, East Asia has yet to extinguish historical grievances, border disputes and a taste for raw national powers. As Japan itself proved, economic rises, once initiated, can be rapid indeed, so its current economic strength does not guarantee its future influence. Furthermore, barring a rapid re-militarization, Japan's growth in national strengths is bound to be slower than that of its still maturing neighbors, therefore its relative strategic position in East Asia will only grow weaker. Either re-militarization or an erosion of its self-perceived leadership in the region is likely to require a profound reassessment of Japan's postwar consensus of national purposes. India sees itself as an up-and-coming power, proud to be a democracy yet simultaneously aspiring to more traditional "hard" powers. As a diverse and still poor country, it faces immense internal challenges. Its manufacturing base and infrastructure need major overhaul. Beyond these, India is limited by its geographical constraint in the South Asia and the thorn in its side that’s Pakistan. Sandwiched between Pakistan, Burma and the Himalayas, India’s ambition beyond the subcontinent could not blossom until its geographical perimeter is secured. China borders three of the ambitious giants – India, Russia and Japan. China's neighborhood is far tougher than that of either Europe or the US. Like India, China is a large, poor country rife with internal tensions. Unlike Europe or America, its current form of government does not enjoy wide ideological appeal. Compared with Russia’s or even Japan’s, its military is still modernizing. It has recently become fashionable in America and Europe to describe Chinese "expansions" in Africa and South America. But the evidence is mostly economic deals over raw materials. This is not expansionism, but mercantilism. China is indeed playing an active geopolitical game in its immediate environment: Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Korea Peninsula. But this only serves to show that China is still mired in local complexities.

## No Impact

#### Competitiveness is a myth.

Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994 [“Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite]

Guess what? Delors didn't confront the problems of either the welfare state or the EMS. He explained that the root cause of European unemployment was a lack of competitiveness with the United States and Japan and that the solution was a program of investment in infrastructure and high technology.¶ It was a disappointing evasion, but not a surprising one. After all, the rhetoric of competitiveness--the view that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is "like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace"--has become pervasive among opinion leaders throughout the world. People who believe themselves to be sophisticated about the subject take it for granted that the economic problem facing any modern nation is essentially one of competing on world markets--that the United States and Japan are competitors in the same sense that Coca-Cola competes with Pepsi--and are unaware that anyone might seriously question that proposition. Every few months a new best-sell-er warns the American public of the dire consequences of losing the "race" for the 21st century.[1] A whole industry of councils on competitiveness, "geo-economists" and managed trade theorists has sprung up in Washington. Many of these people, having diagnosed America's economic problems in much the same terms as Delors did Europe's, are now in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration formulating economic and trade policy for the United States. So Delors was using a language that was not only convenient but comfortable for him and a wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic.¶ Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses in the United States are equally misleading. The idea that a country's economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold--a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic.¶ This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system. This last issue is, of course, the most consequential from the standpoint of public policy. Thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to bad economic policies on a wide range of issues, domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade.

#### Economic power is not zero-sum

Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994

[“Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite]

Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost purely rivals: only a negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a negligible fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at Coke's expense. But the major industrial countries, while they sell products that compete with each other, are also each other's main export markets and each other's main suppliers of useful imports. If the European economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if anything a successful European economy is likely to help the U.S. economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of superior quality at lower prices.¶ International trade, then, is not a zero-sum game. When productivity rises in Japan, the main result is a rise in Japanese real wages; American or European wages are in principle at least as likely to rise as to fall, and in practice seem to be virtually unaffected.¶ It would be possible to belabor the point, but the moral is clear: while competitive problems could arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter the major nations of the world are not to any significant degree in economic competition with each other. Of course, there is always a rivalry for status and power countries that grow faster will see their political rank rise. So it is always interesting to compare countries. But asserting that Japanese growth diminishes U.S. status is very different from saying that it reduces the U.S. standard of living--and it is the latter that the rhetoric of competitiveness asserts.¶ One can, of course, take the position that words mean what we want them to mean, that all are free, if they wish, to use the term "competitiveness" as a poetic way of saying productivity, without actually implying that international competition has anything to do with it. But few writers on competitiveness would accept this view. They believe that the facts tell a very different story, that we live, as Lester Thurow put it in his best-selling book, Head to Head, in a world of "win-lose" competition between the leading economies. How is this belief possible?

#### Prefer our evidence – their authors use careless arithmetic.

Krugman 1994 (Paul, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, March/April, Available Online)

One of the remarkable, startling features of the vast literature on competitiveness is the repeated tendency of highly intelligent authors to engage in what may perhaps most tactfully be described as "careless arithmetic." Assertions are made that sound like quantifiable pronouncements about measurable magnitudes, but the writers do not actually present any data on these magnitudes and thus fail to notice that the actual numbers contradict their assertions. Or data are presented that are supposed to support an assertion, but the writer fails to notice that his own numbers imply that what he is saying cannot be true. Over and over again one finds books and articles on competitiveness that seem to the unwary reader to be full of convincing evidence but that strike anyone familiar with the data as strangely, almost eerily inept in their handling of the numbers. Some examples can best illustrate this point. Here are three cases of careless arithmetic, each of some interest in its own right.

#### And, indicators of a corporations’ competitiveness do not translate to national economies.

Krugman 1994 (Paul, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, March/April, Available Online)

In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line: if a corporation cannot afford to pay its workers, suppliers, and bondholders, it will go out of business. So when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is unsustainable--that unless it improves its performance, it will cease to exist. Countries, on the other hand, do not go out of business. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the concept of national competitiveness is elusive.¶ **One might suppose, naively, that the bottom line of a national economy is simply its trade balance, that competitiveness can be measured by the ability of a country to sell more abroad than it buys. But in both theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, a deficit a sign of strength. For example, Mexico was forced to run huge trade surpluses in the 1980s in order to pay the interest on its foreign debt since international investors refused to lend it any more money; it began to run large trade deficits after 1990 as foreign investors recovered confidence and began to pour in new funds. Would anyone want to describe Mexico as a highly competitive nation during the debt crisis era or describe what has happened since 1990 as a loss in competitiveness?¶** Most writers who worry about the issue at all have therefore tried to define competitiveness as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else. In particular**, the most popular definition of competitiveness nowadays runs along the lines of the one given in Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Laura D'Andrea Tyson's Who's Bashing Whom?: competitiveness is "our ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of international competition while our citizens enjoy a standard of living that is both rising and sustainable."** This sounds reasonable. If you think about it, however, and test your thoughts against the facts, you will find out that there is much less to this definition than meets the eye.¶ **Consider, for a moment, what the definition would mean for an economy that conducted very little international trade, like the United States in the 1950s. For such an economy, the ability to balance its trade is mostly a matter of getting the exchange rate right. But because trade is such a small factor in the economy, the level of the exchange rate is a minor influence on the standard of living. So in an economy with very little international trade, the growth in living standards--and thus "competitiveness" according to Tyson's definition--would be determined almost entirely by domestic factors, primarily the rate of productivity growth. That's domestic productivity growth, period--not productivity growth relative to other countries. In other words, for an economy with very little international trade, "competitiveness" would turn out to be a funny way of saying "productivity" and would have nothing to do with international competition.¶ But surely this changes when trade becomes more important, as indeed it has for all major economies? It certainly could change. Suppose that a country finds that although its productivity is steadily rising, it can succeed in exporting only if it repeatedly devalues its currency, selling its exports ever more cheaply on world markets. Then its standard of living, which depends on its purchasing power over imports as well as domestically produced goods, might actually decline. In the jargon of economists, domestic growth might be outweighed by deteriorating terms of trade.[2] So "competitiveness" could turn out really to be about international competition after all.**

## Competitiveness Focus Bad

#### Focus on competitiveness causes policymakers to oversimplify economic problems and fail to address the root cause

Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994 [“Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite]

Second, the idea that U.S. economic difficulties hinge crucially on our failures in international competition somewhat paradoxically makes those difficulties seem easier to solve. The productivity of the average American worker is determined by a complex array of factors, most of them unreachable by any likely government policy. So if you accept the reality that our "competitive" problem is really a domestic productivity problem pure and simple, you are unlikely to be optimistic about any dramatic turnaround. But if you can convince yourself that the problem is really one of failures in international competition--that imports are pushing workers out of high-wage jobs, or subsidized foreign competition is driving the United States out of the high value-added sectors--then the answers to economic malaise may seem to you to involve simple things like subsidizing high technology and being tough on Japan.

## High

#### The US is still the leader in competitiveness—the world economy goes down with us.

Frederick E. Allen, May 30, 2012. “The US Still Leads the World in Competitiveness.” Frederick E. Allen, Forbes Staff.—Leadership of Editors at Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2012/05/30/the-u-s-still-leads-the-world-in-competitiveness/

Worried that we’re falling behind in the world economy, and that other nations, like maybe China, are pulling ahead of us? Relax. Here’s reassurance from IMD, the international business school in Lausanne, Switzerland: The findings of its annual World Competitiveness Yearbook are just out, and they show that the only place that can touch us is a relative pygmy, Hong Kong.¶ IMD ranked 59 economies across the world, measuring “how well countries manage their economic and human resources to increase their prosperity.” It used 329 ranking criteria, a third of them arising from a survey of more than 4,200 international executives. The 10 most competitive nations, with their scores relative to the first-place finisher, are:¶ 1. Hong Kong. Score: 100.00¶ 2. USA: 97.75¶ 3. Switzerland: 96.68¶ 4. Singapore: 95.92¶ 5. Sweden: 91.39¶ 6. Canada: 90.29¶ 7. Taiwan: 89.96¶ 8. Norway: 89.67¶ 9. Germany: 89.26¶ 10. Qatar: 88.48¶ ¶ The 10 Hardest Jobs to Fill in America¶ Jacquelyn Smith¶ Forbes Staff¶ ¶ The Red Hot Heart of Leadership¶ August Turak¶ Contributor¶ Last year the U.S. and Hong Kong were tied for first place, and Singapore, Sweden, and Canada were respectively third, fourth, and fifth. The last-place finisher is Venezuela, with a score of 31.45. It’s the only country to do worse than poor, beleaguered Greece (43.05). Mainland China, in case you were wondering, is No. 23, down from 19 last year. The rankings’ authors observe that in Europe, Ireland (20), Iceland (26), and Italy (40) look better positioned to recover economically, judging by the numbers, than Spain (39), Portugal (41), or Greece (58).¶ Prof. Stephane Garelli, director of IMD’s World Competitiveness Center, says, “U.S. competitiveness has a deep impact on the rest of the world because it is uniquely interacting with every economy, advanced or emerging. No other nation can exercise such a strong ‘pull effect’ on the world. Europe is burdened with austerity and fragmented political leadership and is hardly a credible substitute, while a South-South bloc of emerging markets is still a work in progress. In the end, if the U.S. competes, the world succeeds.”

#### US is the leader in global competitiveness in the status quo.

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The IMD World Competitiveness Rankings released this week are worth reflecting on, not so much because of the relative positioning of various countries – including Australia – but rather because of the reasoning which underpins the rankings.¶ The press release accompanying the rankings gives some indication of this reasoning. The first point worth noting is the potentially misleading use of the term competitiveness. When this term is used by economists it usually refers to the price competitiveness of a country’s exports and import-competing goods. And for many economists this would over time be bound up with the relative real unit labour costs across different countries.¶ The reasoning accompanying the IMD rankings suggest however a much looser use of the term “competitiveness”. What’s suggested is rather a view about the potential of different countries for sustained economic prosperity.¶ Now, price competitiveness of one’s exports and import-substitutes may be part of this, but is certainly never the whole story.¶ Moreover, as a number of economists over the years have noted, the world economy is not an open economy, but a closed economy. This means that one country’s improved competitiveness is at the expense of another country.¶ In other words, growing your economy through exports at the expense of other countries can mean exporting not just goods and services, but exporting unemployment to other countries as well.¶ IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2012¶ So one needs to be cautious in drawing links between competitiveness and economic prosperity – it is not a game everyone can win.¶ Another interesting feature of the IMD release relates to the position of the US. It is suggested that the “US remains at the centre of world competitiveness because of its unique economic power”.¶ Undoubtedly the element of truth in this statement is the continued hegemony of the US in the global economy.¶ But one could reasonably contend that this is much less to do with any superiority in competitiveness of the US in the narrow economic sense and much more to do with the continued dominant status of the US dollar as a de facto reserve currency in the international monetary system.¶ And this dominance – effectively emerging as far back as the end of the First World War – has continued, interestingly, while the external accounts of the US – specifically, its current account – have been deteriorating.¶ In fact the US current account has been deteriorating since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods era in the early 1970’s.This in turn has reflected a long-run deterioration in US trade performance. Yet this has not seemingly impeded the economic dominance of the US.¶

## Low

#### US can’t compete – education standards & lack of immigrants

Bartlett, ‘6 [David L., president of the Global Economics Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, “Building A Competitive Workforce: Immigration And The US Manufacturing Sector,” August 23, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0823-bartlett.shtm]

Shortages of skilled labor constitute the foremost challenge confronting U.S. manufacturers who face growing competition from manufacturers in Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Demand for professionals with university degrees is rising as manufacturing becomes increasingly high tech. But the U.S. educational system is not producing enough highly educated native-born manufacturing workers to meet this growing demand. Moreover, the pending retirements of Baby Boom generation workers will further constrain the growth of the manufacturing labor force. Bridging this gap between the supply and demand for skilled workers requires new investments in the U.S. educational system and the formulation of immigration policies that respond to the labor needs of the U.S. economy. Yet current immigration policies, especially since 9/11, have made it more difficult for highly skilled professionals from abroad to enter the United States.

#### Competitiveness is declining because of decreasing traffic not poor technology – no need to update systems

Walker et al 2010 Brad Walker, Glynnis Collins, David Conrad, Christine Favilla, Bill Grant, David Hoskins, Scott Kovarovics, Dawn Merritt, Mark Muller, Julia Olmsted, Brad Redlin, Gwen Steel, and Dr. Don Sweeney, Nicollet Island Coalition, “Big Price- Little Benefit” <http://www.iwla.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/2079>, Accessed 6-26-12

As the environmental functions of the rivers have shifted, so have the economic opportunities in agriculture in the Upper Midwest. From 1950 through the late 1970s, the Mississippi River experienced steady growth in agricultural commodities traffic moving down the river via barge. However, since 1980, Mississippi River barge traffic has fluctuated significantly and the overall trend has been less traffic. At one key lock at Alton, Illinois, for example, barge traffic has declined from its peak of 80.5 million tons in 1990 down to 56.3 million tons in 2008.The causes of this transition include significant growth in agricultural production in other parts of the world and less demand than expected from emerging markets like China.

# \*\*\*Cyber Terrorism\*\*\*

## Alt Causes

#### Alt cause—space attacks

Mike Wall 2/28 – Space.com senior writer, PHD from the University of Sydney (“China's Space Advances Worry US Military” 28 February 2012 Space.com http://www.space.com/14697-china-space-program-military-threat.html)

The rise of China's space program may pose a potentially serious military threat to the United States down the road, top American intelligence officials contend. China continues to develop technology designed to destroy or disable satellites, which makes the United States and other nations with considerable on-orbit assets nervous. Even Beijing's ambitious human spaceflight plans are cause for some concern, since most space-technology advances could have military applications, officials say. "The space program, including ostensible civil projects, supports China's growing ability to deny or degrade the space assets of potential adversaries and enhances China's conventional military capabilities," Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote in testimony presented before the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee Feb. 16. Burgess was delivering the DIA's annual assessment of threats to U.S. security and interests around the globe. China's big space dreams China has made no secret of its ambitious space goals. In 2003, it became the third nation — after the United States and the Soviet Union — to independently launch a person into orbit. In November 2011, China successfully docked two robotic spacecraft in Earth orbit, a key step in its quest to have a manned space station up and running by 2020. Beijing also hopes to land an astronaut (called a "taikonaut") on the moon sometime after its planned 60-ton orbital outpost is operational. [Photos: China's First Space Station] This past December, China joined the United States and Russia as the only nations with operational homegrown satellite navigation systems. China's Beidou system — whose name translates as "Big Dipper" — is somewhat rudimentary at the moment, consisting of just 10 satellites and covering a swath of the Asia-Pacific region from Australia in the south to Russia in the north. However, China envisions a global system with 35 satellites by 2020. The emergence of Beidou should eventually make China far less dependent on the GPS constellation, which is operated by the United States military and is currently the world's dominant satnav network. Beidou "will enable subscribers outside of China to purchase receivers and services that give civilian and military applications greater redundancy and independence in a conflict scenario that employs space assets," Burgess wrote. China operates many other satellites, for research, weather monitoring, communications and reconnaissance purposes. But it's tough to know exactly what the nation is getting out of these spacecraft, even the seemingly innocuous ones, according to Burgess. "Beijing rarely acknowledges direct military applications of its space program and refers to nearly all satellite launches as scientific or civil in nature," Burgess wrote. While the United States has at least nominally separate civil and military space programs, China's space activities are driven almost entirely by the People's Liberation Army, experts say. Anti-satellite technology China is developing some space technology with indisputably military applications. In January 2007, the nation shot down one of its own weather satellites with a missile, spawning thousands of new pieces of space junk. The test drew strong criticism from the United States and other countries. But China has continued to develop its anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in the years since, aided by advances across various sectors of its space program, according to Burgess. Beijing "is developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions," he wrote. "A prerequisite for ASAT attacks, China's ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China's manned and lunar programs as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris." [Top 10 Space Weapons] The United States has long enjoyed playing a dominant role in space, giving the nation the "ultimate high ground" in military conflicts for decades, experts say. ASAT capabilities — whether they're developed by China or other nations — represent a genuine threat to this dominance, Burgess and other analysts contend. "From the counter-space perspective, Russia and China continue developing systems and technologies that can interfere with or disable vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication, and intelligence collection satellites," Burgess wrote

## No Threat

#### The threat of a cyber-attack is extremely low.

Scott Borg, January 21, 2012 “Threat of Future Cyber Attacks by Adversaries Remains Low” January 21, 2012. Scott Borg is the Director and Chief Economist of the United States Cyber Consequences Unit.

Will American adversaries respond to American improvement with serious cyber attacks? The short answer is, no. There could be some denial-of-service attacks on U.S. government Web sites, but these would probably be only a minor nuisance. And if they do happen, they might not be acknowledged or even noticed. Cyber conflicts between Hamas and Israel, beginning in 1999, and between Hezbollah and Israel, beginning in 2000, made virtually all political activists in the Middle East very aware of the potential of cyber attacks. Starting in 2001, senior al Qaeda leaders regularly said they would turn the Western superiority in information technology into a tool to bring down the West. In October 2001, an alleged al Qaeda operative, arrested in India, claimed that other members of the terrorist network had managed to get hired by Microsoft, so that they could build backdoors and bugs into the company’s new XP operating system. There is no evidence that al Qaeda operatives were actually able to do this. But after this news story was picked up by the international press, al Qaeda leaders and other ideological militants would certainly have been thinking about the possibilities. Beginning in early 2002, American intelligence officials repeatedly warned that computers belonging to al Qaeda associates had been used to access Web sites offering hacker tools and instructions. Imam Samudra, organizer of the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, urged Muslim militants to start hacking into U.S. computers, both to steal money and to do damage.¶ Starting in 2002, however, government forces were very successful in hunting down potential al Qaeda cyber attack leaders. Imam Samudra was arrested in Indonesia in 2002 and eventually executed for his terrorist acts. Abu Anas al Liby was reported captured in Sudan in 2002, although American officials have since said that his whereabouts is still unknown. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan in 2003 and is currently being held at Guantanamo Bay. Depriving al Qaeda of these leaders seems to have been a big setback to their cyber efforts. Cyber-attack threats are increasingly disappearing, strongly due to an increasing United States cyber-infrastructure. In March of 2005, Sir David Omand announced that British intelligence had surveillance reports indicating al Qaeda affiliates were preparing to use the internet and other electronic communication systems to cripple economic, medical, and transport networks. These attacks were either never launched or, more likely, were unsuccessful. Government forces had another round of successes in capturing al Qaeda cyber attack advocates in 2005. Younis Tsouli was arrested in the U.K. in 2005 and convicted of incitement to acts of terrorism in 2007. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was captured in Pakistan in 2005. In 2006, many cyber attackers in the Arab world got caught up in a cyber campaign against Denmark, prompted by the Danish cartoon of Mohammed. This effort seems to have temporarily reduced other cyber attack activity originating from the Middle East. In December of 2006 and again in October of 2007, Web sites associated with al Qaeda announced the beginning of a "cyber Jihad," directed against Western banks and other important institutions. There were rumors and circumstantial signs of ambitious cyber attacks being mounted by al Qaeda during this period, but they don’t seem to have gotten very far. Since early 2008, there has been no sign of any sustained or sizeable effort on the part of al Qaeda to assemble a serious cyber-attack force. This suggests, at minimum, that they have not been recruiting cyber attackers very widely or aggressively. It is possible the al Qaeda has been developing cyber-attack teams from within its own ranks, but bringing them to a very high level of capabilities without interaction with the wider hacker world would be difficult. Altogether, given its history and the lack of outward signs, it seems unlikely that enemies has developed significant cyber attack capabilities.

# \*\*\*Disease\*\*\*

**Disease inevitable**

Sky News 8 (“Warning Over Deadly New Diseases”, 7-21, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Health/New-Disease-Emerges-Every-Year-Pandemic-Outbreak-May-Not-Be-Stopped/Article/200807315047567)

In a highly critical new report, the committee said there was an "urgent need" for a better global surveillance system to identify diseases before they infect large numbers of people. It noted that three-quarters of newly-emerging human infections come from animals - but found many are only detected once they have made humans ill. Experts estimate a devastating pandemic outbreak of a new disease such as SARS or the H5N1 strain of flu could claim anything between two and 50 million lives. In evidence to the House of Lords Intergovernmental Organisations Committee inquiry, the Government said there had been no pandemic disease outbreaks since 1968. However, it warned another pandemic outbreak was "inevitable". Committee chairman Lord Soley said: "The last 100 years have seen great advances in public health and disease control through the world, but globalisation and changes in lifestyles are giving rise to new infections and providing opportunities for them to spread rapidly throughout the world.

## Inevitable

#### -- Disease inevitable

Sky News 8 (“Warning Over Deadly New Diseases”, 7-21, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Health/New-Disease-Emerges-Every-Year-Pandemic-Outbreak-May-Not-Be-Stopped/Article/200807315047567)

In a highly critical new report, the committee said there was an "urgent need" for a better global surveillance system to identify diseases before they infect large numbers of people. It noted that three-quarters of newly-emerging human infections come from animals - but found many are only detected once they have made humans ill. Experts estimate a devastating pandemic outbreak of a new disease such as SARS or the H5N1 strain of flu could claim anything between two and 50 million lives. In evidence to the House of Lords Intergovernmental Organisations Committee inquiry, the Government said there had been no pandemic disease outbreaks since 1968. However, it warned another pandemic outbreak was "inevitable". Committee chairman Lord Soley said: "The last 100 years have seen great advances in public health and disease control through the world, but globalisation and changes in lifestyles are giving rise to new infections and providing opportunities for them to spread rapidly throughout the world.

#### Long wait times and lack of access make it impossible to solve disease

Pallarito, 9 (Karen, August 8, ABC News, Health Day, “Expanding Health Coverage May Not Improve Access”, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=8278252&page=1#.UAIS-itYuA2)

FRIDAY, Aug. 7 (HealthDay News) -- Even if Congress extends health coverage to the nation's 46 million uninsured Americans, there's no guarantee that everyone will have access to care -- unless payment reforms and new models of care are adopted, some experts say. Significantly expanding coverage without reforming health-care delivery is "a recipe for failure," said Alwyn Cassil, a spokeswoman for the Center for Studying Health System Change in Washington, D.C. "You won't be able to sustain the expanded coverage because it will just bankrupt us." Spending on health care this year is projected to reach $2.5 trillion, or 17.6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, according to a Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of Medicare and Medicaid data. That's up from 7.2 percent in 1970, and by 2018 it could swell to one-fifth of the GDP, which is a measure of all goods and services produced in the United States. Meanwhile, a worsening shortage of primary-care providers and rising demand for certain specialists will continue to strain the system, perhaps creating long waits for appointments.

#### Not enough money to address diseases

CBO 8 (Congressional Budget Office, December, “Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals”, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-keyissues.pdf)

Other types of initiatives might ultimately yield substantial long-term health benefits but might not generate much savings, at least in the short term. Even if successful, measures to reduce smoking and obesity—two factors linked to the development of chronic and acute health problems—might not have a substantial impact on health care spending for some time. In the long term, spending on diseases caused by poor health habits could decline substantially, but the impact on federal costs would also have to account for people living longer and receiving more in Medicare benefits (for the treatment of other diseases and age-related ailments) as well as other government benefits that are not directly related to health care (including Social Security benefits). Similarly, investments in health information technology might require substantial start-up costs that would be difficult to recapture in the typical 5- and 10-year budgetary time frames used to evaluate legislative proposals.

#### Can’t solve the root cause of diseases

Forrester, 6/30/12 (“Dr. Frank Lipman’s Thoughts on Obamacare”, Frank Lipman is the founder and director of Eleven-Eleven Wellness Center in New York City, Wedharma, http://wedharma.com/creativity-lifestyle/dr-frank-lipmans-thoughts-on-obamacare/)

“I applaud President Obama for his efforts. I too believe that everyone deserves proper healthcare and that access to healthcare must be a right for all. But I think Washington is barking up the wrong tree. They’re busy arguing about what amounts to healthinsurance reform, while what this country needs is true health care reform. Interestingly, what is happening in Washington mirrors much of what we do in Western Medicine. We suppress symptoms instead of dealing with the root causes of the problem. All the options on the table now only address how we pay for healthcare, rather than why we are unhealthy and how we change that. If we don’t change why we are unhealthy, not only are we unlikely to secure better medical outcomes, but it will probably bankrupt us too. In terms of getting better health care or becoming a healthier nation we have to make serious changes. We will only flourish if we address the root causes of the problem.

## Disease – No Impact

#### No extinction

Gladwell 99 (Malcolm, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

**No impact to immune systems**

Gladwell 99 (Malcolm, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the **limitations** of microscopic life forms.

**Burn out stops disease**

Lederberg 99 (Joshua, Professor of Genetics – Stanford University School of Medicine, Epidemic The World of Infectious Disease, p. 13)

The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a **shared interest** in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a **dead end** when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a **wipeout** of **both** host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.

**-- Humans will adapt**

Gladwell 95 (Malcolm, The New Republic, July 17, Excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 29)

In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. They are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact, they begin to accommodate each other. Human populations slowly build up resistance to circulating infections. What were once virulent infections, such as syphilis become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults, such as measles and chicken pox, become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.

**-- Self-interest means no extinction**

MacPhee and Marx 98 (Ross, American Museum of Natural History and Aaron Diamond, AIDS Research Facility and Tulane University, “How Did Hyperdisease Cause Extinctions?”, http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit2.html)

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

# \*\*\*Economy\*\*\*

## Resilient

#### Econ resilient- new structural reforms prevent collapse

Behravesh, 6 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) // JMP

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth. So what would it take to trigger a recession in the U.S. or world economies over the next couple of years? Two or more big shocks occurring more or less simultaneously. Global Insight recently ran a scenario showing that a world recession could happen if the following combination of events were to take place: oil prices above $100 per barrel, inflation and interest rates running 3 percentage points above current levels and a 10 percent drop in home prices across many industrial nations (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, Sweden). The likely timing of such a recession would be 2007. However, given the extremeness of these assumptions, the probability of such a scenario is less than 20 percent. The good news is that the chances of a recession occurring in the next couple of years are low. The not-so-good news is that assertions about recessions being relegated to history's trash heap are still premature.

#### Global economy resilient

Fareed Zakaria was named editor of Newsweek International in October 2000, overseeing all Newsweek editions abroad, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html

This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.

#### Despite volatility, US econ is still resilient.

Joshua Zumbrun and Romy Varghese, May 9, 2012. “Fed’s Plosser Says US Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks.” Business Week. Zumbrun and Varghese are Business Week correspondents. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-dot-s-dot-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven “remarkably resilient” to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters.¶ “The economy has now grown for 11 consecutive quarters,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.”¶ Plosser, who did not discuss his economic outlook or the future for monetary policy, cited shocks to the economy last year, including the tsunami in Japan that disrupted global supply chains, Europe’s credit crisis that has damaged the continent’s banking system and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa.¶ “The U.S. economy has a history of being remarkably resilient,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.”¶ Plosser spoke at a conference at the Philadelphia Fed titled, “Reinventing Older Communities: Building Resilient Cities.”

#### Factory growth proves that US econ is resilient and will avoid double dip.

Fox News May 1, 2012 “US Factory Growth Shows Economy More Resilient.” Published May 1, 2012 by the Associated Press. No author listed, Fox News. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/01/us-manufacturing-grows-at-fastest-pace-since-june/

US Factory Growth Shows Economy More Resilient: WASHINGTON – U.S. manufacturing grew last month at the fastest pace in 10 months, suggesting that the economy is healthier than recent data had indicated.¶ New orders, production and a measure of hiring all rose. The April survey from the Institute for Supply Management was a hopeful sign ahead of Friday's monthly jobs report and helped the Dow Jones industrial average end the day at its highest level in more than four years.¶ The trade group of purchasing managers said Tuesday that its index of manufacturing activity reached 54.8 in April, the highest level since June. Readings above 50 indicate expansion.¶ The sharp increase surprised analysts, who had predicted a decline after several regional reports showed manufacturing growth weakened last month. The gain led investors to shift money out of bonds and into stocks. The Dow Jones industrial added 66 points to 13,279, its best close since Dec. 28, 2007. Broader indexes also surged.¶ The ISM manufacturing index is closely watched in part because it's the first major economic report for each month. April's big gain followed a series of weaker reports in recent weeks that showed hiring slowed, applications for unemployment benefits rose and factory output dropped.¶ "This survey will ease concerns that the softer tone of the incoming news in recent months marked the start of a renewed slowdown in growth," Paul Dales, an economist at Capital Economics, said in a note to clients. "We think the latest recovery is made of sterner stuff, although we doubt it will set the world alight."

## No War

#### 93 crises prove no war

Miller ‘00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### No impact- econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘9(Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### No impact to econ collapse

Fareed Zakaria was named editor of Newsweek International in October 2000, overseeing all Newsweek editions abroad, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.

#### No impact to economic decline – empirically proven

Ferguson, 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

## US Not Key

#### China global influence is on rise- NOT United States

Economic Times, business journal, July 2, 2012

(Economic Times Now, 7-2-2012, <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-02/news/32508439_1_joseph-stiglitz-global-economy-china>, China's influence on global economy to increase: Joseph Stiglitz) SQR

Stating that China has both the incentive and the resources to continue pushing growth, US economist, Joseph Stiglitz told ET Now that the Chinese economy's share in global GDP and trade will increase in the coming years.¶ Stiglitz was of the opinion that even though the China's economy may not grow at a high 9-10%, the fundamental change in the global economy will work to increase Chinese influence. He also feels that the influence of the developed nations is decreasing.

#### US power and economic influence is faltering

Switzer, writer for Brisbane Times, July 9, 2012

(Tom, Brisbane Times, 7-9-2012, <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/politics/bald-fact-is-us-power-is-waning-20120708-21p9e.html>, Bald fact is US power is waning) SQR

But among the foreign policy elite the really big problem facing Americans is how their nation is going to keep its flattering but onerous title of No. 1. As the distinguished left-liberal columnist E. J. Dionne has argued: ''American decline is the spectre haunting our politics.''¶ Both presidential candidates insist that their goal is to ensure US pre-eminence in the world.¶ In his State of the Union address this year the President, Barack Obama, declared: ''Anyone who tells you that America is in decline, or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about.''¶ Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican nominee, champions a new ''American century'', an idea coined by Time magazine's founder Henry Luce to describe US global predominance after World War II.¶ In the words of a leading neoconservative commentator Robert Kagan, who has influenced both candidates, the US ''enjoys a unique and unprecedented ability to gain international acceptance of its power.''¶ And yet, every day, Americans read about their country's declining power and influence.¶ The dollar is weak. Debt is of European proportions. Infrastructure is ageing. Economic growth is exceptionally sluggish for a nation that is three years out of a recession.¶ A polarised political system is beholden to special interests. And when it comes to defeating tribal warlords in medieval societies, the US finds itself wrong-footed and outwitted; not so much an eagle as an elephant.¶ Early in his term, President Obama heralded a ''new beginning'' between America and Muslims, yet US popularity has again fallen in the Islamic world. Its ''favourability rating'' in Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan is lower than in 2008, George Bush's last full year in office.¶ But it is not so much that the US is reviled. What is more serious is the loss of credibility and prestige and, consequently, a reduced ability to lead and persuade. Washington's demands and requests are increasingly ignored; by its long-time foes in Tehran and Pyongyang, to its largest aid recipients, Cairo and Jerusalem.¶ Its influence is fading at global summits, too: from the G20, where the Germans reject Obama's loose fiscal policy prescriptions; to climate conferences, where the Chinese chug along the smoky path to prosperity; to security talks, where the Pakistanis refuse to sever ties between their intelligence services and the Taliban.¶ To be sure, even at the height of the Cold War the US did not exert total control over events all across the globe. It could not prevent the Cuban and Iranian revolutions and it suffered defeat in Vietnam, but the US nonetheless exercised enormous influence around the postwar world.¶ Today, moreover, the US remains the world's largest economy, the issuer of its reserve currency, its lone military superpower; and many countries around the world want American protection. With higher immigration and fertility rates than other developed nations, the US is also in a relatively good position to deal with an ageing population.¶ All true. It's just that US power and influence has waned, and will continue to wane in what the American journalist and author Fareed Zakaria calls ''the post-American world''.¶ In recent times, we have witnessed the emergence of new power centres in several key regions. By most accounts, China's economy will become the world's biggest within a decade. And with its military budget rising about 10 per cent per year, Beijing could convert more of its wealth into military assets.¶ As a Harvard University professor of international affairs, Stephen Walt, has pointed out, if China is like all previous great powers, including the US, its definition of vital national interests will grow as its power increases - and it will try to flex its muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. A Sino-American security competition could result, with potentially serious consequences for Australia.¶ True, China has its own problems, not least demographic. Still, at some point in the next decade, it will become the No.1 world economy. The emerging powers of India, Turkey and Brazil have also achieved economic growth and political stability and are becoming more assertive in the world.¶ Meanwhile, Americans are increasingly less concerned about foreign policy than at any time since the heyday of isolationism between the world wars. In a polity that is acutely sensitive to public opinion - one that is driven by polls, focus groups and the relentless 24/7 internet and media cycle - this means that foreign policy is severely downgraded in politicians' calculations.¶ This is the strange new world that Americans find themselves in. All their lives they have known their country as the most powerful, most prosperous and economically and culturally the most influential one in the world.¶ For many Americans of different political and ideological persuasions, losing global pre-eminence means losing the country they know and love.

#### US has lost global economic influence to China

Taylor, writer for Business Insider, June 15, 2012 (Adam, Business Insider International, 6-15-2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/pew-china-economic-power-2012-6>, This Landmark Survey Says America Is NOT The World's Leading Economic Power) SQR

Whatever the reality, China is now generally perceived as the number one economic superpower in the world, according to research released this week from Pew Global.¶ Of course, if we talk about "economic power", it's a (probably deliberately) vague question. By size, China clearly isn't beating the US — the IMF puts its GDP at than half of the US size, and GDP per capita is far lower.¶ If we talk about economic influence, however, the Chinese argument becomes much more complicated, and arguably more pervasive — think of Chinese artificially-controlled yuan, Chinese holdings of US debt, their power over manufacturing sectors.

#### US not key

The Economist 7 (November 23, “America’s Vulnerable Economy”, pg. 13)

The best hope that global growth can stay strong lies instead with emerging economies. A decade ago, the thought that so much depended on these crisis-prone places would have been terrifying. Yet thanks largely to economic reforms, their annual growth rate has surged to around 7%. This year they will contribute half of the globe's GDP growth, measured at market exchange rates, over three times as much as America. In the past, emerging economies have often needed bailing out by the rich world. This time they could be the rescuers. Of course, a recession in America would reduce emerging economies' exports, but they are less vulnerable than they used to be. America's importance as an engine of global growth has been exaggerated. Since 2000 its share of world imports has dropped from 19% to 14%. Its vast current-account deficit has started to shrink, meaning that America is no longer pulling along the rest of the world. Yet growth in emerging economies has quickened, partly thanks to demand at home. In the first half of this year the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India added more to global GDP growth than that in America. Most emerging economies are in healthier shape than ever (see article). They are no longer financially dependent on the rest of the world, but have large foreign-exchange reserves—no less than three-quarters of the global total. Though there are some notable exceptions, most of them have small budget deficits (another change from the past), so they can boost spending to offset weaker exports if need be.

#### US economy doesn’t affect the rest of the world – EU/Sino trade

**Bangkok Post**, 1/25/**08** (HOW IMMUNE IS ASIA, http://www.bangkokpost.com/Business/26Jan2008\_biz33.php

Mr Casali said that despite the global turmoil and worries about the US economy, Asia in recent years has become better insulated through a higher proportion of intra-regional trade and trade with Europe. Today, he says, Chinese exports to the European Union are far more than those to the United States and therefore fears that a US economic setback will hurt regional economies are overblown. ''If you look at the percentage of exports from China into Europe and the US last year, you will see a marked rise and the decline to the US, but in overall terms the percentage of exports from China rose and that is what is the key.''

#### US no longer key to the economy

#### Commodity Online 9

**(Commodity Online, citing Keith Fitz-Gerald, Chief Investment Strategist for Money Map Press and Money Morning with over 500,000 daily readers in 30 countries. He is one of the world's leading experts on global investing, particularly when it comes to Asia's emergence as a global powerhouse. Fitz-Gerald is a former professional trade adviser and licensed CTA who advised institutions and qualified individuals on global futures trading and hedging. He splits his time between the United States and Asia with his wife and two children and regularly travels the world in search of investment opportunities others don't yet see or understand. Fitz-Gerald is a popular, highly sought after speaker at financial conferences around the world known for his candor, accuracy and global perspective, “US role in world economy shrinking alarmingly,” 11/18/9,** <http://www.commodityonline.com/news/us-role-in-world-economy-shrinking-alarmingly-23020-3-23021.html> /mr)

BALTIMORE, USA (Commodity Online): For the first time in 200 years, American consumers are no longer the driving force behind the world's economy. In his book, Fiscal Hangover, Keith Fitz-Gerald--one of the world's leading experts on global investing--picks apart every important change and identifies unprecedented opportunities. ¶ Investors will discover how the U.S. role in the world economy is shrinking at unheard-of rates; how and why government intervention may well prevent the U.S. markets from normalizing in years to come; why Asia is already well on its way to becoming the next great financial center; and why China's Yuan is quietly replacing the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency. (Wiley, Nov. 2009, ISBN 13 978-0-470-28914-3) ¶ Most importantly, investors will learn what to do right now to grab their share of the pie" says Keith Fitz-Gerald, Chief Investment Strategist for MoneyMap Press and Money Morning.¶ In "Fiscal Hangover--Protect Your Money and Profit in the New Global Economy," author Keith Fitz-Gerald answers the following critical questions: ¶ (1) Why are some nations set to reach new levels of prosperity and others doomed to mediocrity? Not all bailouts are the same. Understand which countries will profit and which will be hobbled for years to come. ¶ (2) Why will Asia become the world's new financial center? Seemingly inconsequential changes on formerly primitive financial exchanges are enabling a ferocious new brand of capitalism that will cause even seasoned investors to reassess their game plan, and open up fabulous new opportunities to individual investors. ¶ (3) Why is it inevitable that U.S. companies will list in China? New international company listings on Chinese stock markets will serve as catalysts for a new Golden Age of Wealth. ¶ (4) Is the U.S. doomed? Not necessarily. Learn why the inevitable changes already under way will actually make this country stronger and individual investors richer despite Washington's policies and efforts to screw things up. ¶ (5) When is the right time to own commodities? Fitz-Gerald points out why basic materials should be a permanent part of every investor's retirement plan, and suggests simple ways to own gold as it heads to new highs. ¶ (6) How do investors reduce risk right now? Wall Street's models are badly broken and may never work again in our lifetimes. Diversification is no longer enough to appropriately manage risk. Fitz-Gerald shares how to capture higher potential returns and avoid catastrophic losses for the rest of your life. ¶ (7) What are the stocks to buy now? Fitz-Gerald offers a few of his favorite choices any investor can use to achieve peace of mind and a more stable portfolio - beginning tonight.

#### China’s key

#### East Asia Forum 11

**(Peter Drysdale, ANU, “China’s role in running the world economy,” 2/14/11,** <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/14/chinas-role-in-running-the-world-economy/> /mr)

China’s emergence as the second largest economy in the world, and on some reckoning an economy that is already nudging America for the top spot, inevitably raises questions about how this remarkable and rapid shift in world power will affect the global economic order as we know it and what role China can now be expected to, and will, play in running the world economy.¶ At the end of the Second World War, the United States bequeathed the GATT, IMF and World Bank-based international system and assumed leadership in establishing the rules and norms in running the global economy. America was by far the largest economy in the world, accounting for upwards of 60 per cent of world output. The United States alone still accounts for almost a quarter of global gross domestic product, calculated at current exchange rates and around one fifth measured in real (or purchasing power parity). The European Union is collectively larger but no single country is yet a match for American economic power, nor the influence that power still has in shaping the global rules whereby economic behaviour is regulated or shaped.¶ As Wendy Dobson observes in this week’s lead essay, China’s embrace of the global institutions and the norms which the United States and its partners have created over the past sixty years has helped guide and drive China’s spectacular economic growth and integration into the world economy. The most immediate question that surrounds China’s economic rise is not how China’s new economic power will translate into political and military power, but how China’s economic power affects the running of the global economic system. Indeed, more than any other factor it is the interaction between China’s growing economic power and the global rules of the economic game which will condition the shape of China’s political and military choices down the track.¶ China’s impact on the global economic order is, of course, still an open question. China’s sheer size and dynamism make it a major force to be reckoned with.¶ Dobson argues that so far China’s influence has been constructive and, despite recent signs of political assertiveness in the Asian region and at home, China’s deliberative behaviour and policy strategies have worked to support the status quo in managing the global economic order, not to undermine it. China has played by the rules and assumed a largely constructive role in the international system and a positive and responsive role in Asia Pacific economic cooperation. China appears overwhelmingly to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system, not as a regime spoiler.¶ As Dobson also argues, just playing by the established rules will be a less and less adequate strategy the larger China’s impact on the global economy. Chinese policy initiative and change will be a more and more important element in the stability of the global economic order. Nowhere is this more pressing than in the management of China’s role the international exchange rate regime. China’s foot-dragging on modernising its exchange rate regime is seen as damaging to the international order. The Chinese leadership openly accepts that change is required but pleas for time to set its own pace according to the political importance of steady growth in output and employment. In any case, the transition in the exchange rate regime will not be easy as it will need to be accompanied by extensive domestic restructuring, challenging powerful interests at home. Adjusting the exchange rate alone will not solve the problems that US Congress-people hold undervalued RMB responsible for. It may reduce some of the pressure but the pace and extent will be limited by the need for China to painstakingly put in place the reforms that will allow retreat from capital controls to be and heavy exchange rate management.¶

#### East Asia’s the biggest economic contributor now

#### Xinhua 9

**(Xinhua, “East Asia playing bigger role in global economy, Bush says,” 4/18/9,** <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/18/content_11211976.htm> /mr)

BOAO, Hainan, April 18 (Xinhua) -- Former U.S. President George. W. Bush said Saturday that East Asia is playing a bigger role in global economy, and the world economic center has moved from Atlantic to Asia Pacific.¶ The Asia Pacific takes up 55 percent of the global economy, and it is of vital interest to stay "heavily engaged" with the countries in the region, he said at a banquet speech held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference 2009.¶ Former U.S. President George W. Bush gives a keynote speech at a dinner session in Boao, a scenic town in south China’s Hainan Province, April 18, 2009. Bush gave a keynote speech on the dinner session titled "The U.S., Asia and the Future" here on Saturday. (Xinhua/Zhao Yingquan) ¶ Photo Gallery>>>¶ ¶ "That's why I have never missed a single APEC meeting when I was in office, because I know how important it is to the prosperity," he said.¶ "The global financial system does need reform, needs greater transparency," he noted.¶ "Accessible banking standard is needed to be in place to prevent over leverage. A better warning sy stem is needed to be put into place to anticipate crisis," he said.¶ Long Yongtu (L), Secretary General of Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), welcomes former U.S. President George W. Bush at a dinner session in Boao, a scenic town in south China’s Hainan Province, April 18, 2009. Bush gave a keynote speech on the dinner session titled "The U.S., Asia and the Future" here on Saturday. (Xinhua/Zhao Yingquan) ¶ Photo Gallery>>>¶ He said that 20 years ago, a meeting of G7 or G8 was enough to sort out the problems, since they comprised a large share of the global economy. But now they are no longer significantly large, so such a meeting has to expand to 20, said Bush.¶ "We learn lessons from the past that we are intervened in close coordination with each other," he said.¶ As the 43rd U.S. president, Bush spoke out the fact that he had maintained good personal relations with China. He said making friends with Chinese leaders made it easier to do diplomacy.¶ Long Yongtu (L), Secretary General of Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), gives a speech while former U.S. President George W. Bush listens at a dinner session in Boao, a scenic town in south China’s Hainan Province, April 18, 2009. Bush gave a keynote speech on the dinner session titled "The U.S., Asia and the Future" here on Saturday. (Xinhua/Zhao Yingquan) ¶ Photo Gallery>>>¶ He said changes in China are marvelous, and to have discussions without China sitting at the table makes no sense.¶ He stressed the world must resist isolation and protectionism, and must resist the temptation to over-correct.¶ "More we interact, more quickly we can succeed," he said.¶ In mid-March, Bush gave his first speech after leaving office in Calgary of Canada, which stirred up a protest of 200 people and shoe throwing outside the event, according to media reports.

## High

#### Economy increasing as elections approach

Menza, news writer, July 12,2012

(Justin, CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48162062>, US Economy Will Rebound in Second Half: Paulsen)SQR

When the U.S. exits the current economic soft patch in the second half of the year, markets should benefit, James Paulsen, CIO at Wells Capital Management, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” on Thursday.¶ “I think in the next couple of months it's a race between ‘is the earnings news bad enough’ or will we start to see signs the soft patch in the United States is ending and we're bouncing,” Paulsen said. “If that happens I don't think we'll care about earnings in the last quarter. We'll care about where we're going.”¶ But if the economic data remains soft, Paulsen conceded “earnings season bad news will take on more significance.”¶ Paulsen expects an economic revival. Now that the drags of higher gasoline prices and mortgages rates are falling away, “we should grow closer to a pace of 3 percent in the second half,” he said. The economy grew 2 percent in the first half, he noted. (Related: U.S. Economic Growth Slowing: Buffett).¶ He also said this recovery is like the last two. “It’s rolling out much slower, but each time in the last two recoveries it took three years before we decided that we are in recovery,” he said. “Year four of the economic cycle things started to gear, confidence finally went up, the job market finally came to life. I think that’s exactly what’s happening here.”¶ Global policymakers should also succeed in bolstering the worldwide economy. “This is the first time in this recovery that you have almost every policy official around the globe easing,” he said. “I think they’re going to get better growth and higher markets.”

#### Their authors are wrong—growth isn’t slowing—prefer our methodology

Adler 7/18/12 (Lee, Wall Street Examiner, “One Crucial Indicator Shows The US Economy Isn't Slowing At All”, http://www.businessinsider.com/federal-tax-revenues-economy-not-slowing-2012-7)

One Crucial Indicator Shows The US Economy Isn't Slowing At All The mainstream consensus has lately been that the economy is slowing. Based on my tracking of federal revenues in real time, I suspect that that view is incorrect. Instead the recent data reflects only normal oscillations within the ongoing slow growth trend. Total federal tax collections, including withholding taxes, are available to us with just a one day lag in the US Treasury’s Daily Treasury Statements, which makes them an excellent analytical resource. Withholding is mostly for compensation, and thus it is a good measure of the economy’s strength. However, it is extremely volatile day to day so I rely more on a monthly moving average of the 10 day total collections, comparing that with the prior year. Smoothing sacrifices a bit of timeliness to get a clearer picture of the trend without losing too much of the edge that the daily data provides. Unfortunately, I have found even the 10 day total data too noisy for meaningful comparison so I’ve had to resort to additional smoothing. As a result the smoothed data is a little slow, so I also look at raw month to date data after mid month. As of July 11, the 4 week average of the 10 day total of withholding taxes is now up 4.0% in nominal and 1.8% in real terms versus the same period in 2011 (adjusted by the monthly BLS data on average weekly employee compensation which in June rose by 2.2% year to year). This indicator has been in the +1% to +3% range since mid May, with most of that time above +2% suggesting that the economy’s current rate of growth is 2-3%, not the 1-1.6% that most Wall Street economists are now forecasting.

#### Econ growing now

IANS 7/19/12 (IANS is the leading provider of in-depth security insights and decision support delivered through its research, community, and consulting. Fueled by interactions among IANS Faculty and end users, IANS’ experience-driven advice helps information security, risk management, and compliance executives make better, faster technical and managerial decisions, “US economy growing at modest pace, jobs tepid: Federal Reserve”, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/us-economy-growing-at-modest-pace-jobs-tepid-federal-reserve/1/186418.html)

The Federal Reserve has said the US economy expanded at a "modest to moderate pace" in June and early July, but the employment situation only improved at a "tepid" pace. In its latest national economic performance survey, the central bank noted that retail sales rose slightly in most areas and manufacturing activity continued to expand slowly in most districts, reported Xinhua. The residential housing market was gaining momentum in recent months, and overall loan demand grew modestly in most districts, according to the Fed report. The survey, known as the Beige Book, is based on economic information supplied by the Fed's 12 regional banks, and released eight times each year to provide a snapshot of the US local economy.

#### The current rate of growth staves off recession—shocks kill the economy

Bloomberg 7/19/12 (“Economists Argue If U.S. Economy Recovering Or Back In Recession”, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-19/economists-argue-if-u-s-economy-recovering-or-back-in-recession.html)

Ironically, the slow pace of the recovery could help stave off a recession. Although the economy remains vulnerable to external shocks, like the euro’s collapse or a sharp slowdown in China, growth’s been so weak that the U.S. doesn’t have the sorts of internal imbalances that tend to bring on recessions, like an overheated housing sector or high inflation. “Things are so lean and mean, there aren’t a lot of excesses that need to be reduced,” says Julia Coronado, chief economist at BNP Paribas. “In a way, that’s insulated us” from a deeper downturn. So look on the bright side: If a recession does hit, it might not be so bad.

#### The economy is in stable recovery now - four indicators

**Johnson 7/14**

(Robert - director of economic analysis at Morningstar – “Already in a Recession? Not So Fast.” – July 14 2012 - <http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=559974>)

While many commentators define a recession as two negative quarters of GDP growth, the official statisticians look at four metrics: industrial production, retail sales adjusted for inflation, personal income less transfer payments (unemployment, disability, Social Security) adjusted for inflation, and employment. Most of the metrics are currently improving after hitting lower growth rates earlier in 2012. Only retail sales are in a clear downward trend, and that is largely because of falling gasoline prices, which is actually a good thing for the economy.

## Low

#### Eurozone thumps the global economy

AFP 7/17/12 (Agence France Presse, “IMF Warns of Rising Risks to Global Economy”, <http://www.industryweek.com/emerging-markets/imf-warns-rising-risks-global-economy>)

The International Monetary Fund stepped up its warnings Monday on risks to the global economy, mainly from the crisis-mired eurozone, as it trimmed its growth forecast for the rest of the year. IMF economists said that the frail situations in Spain and Italy especially could quickly turn worse amid market doubts over eurozone leaders' resolve in implementing pledged reforms. But they also pointed to the U.S. "fiscal cliff" trajectory which, if not corrected, could crunch the U.S. economy and heavily impact the rest of the world. "In the past three months, the global recovery, which was not strong to start with, has shown signs of further weakness," the fund said in its quarterly economic forecast. "Financial market and sovereign stress in the euro-area periphery have ratcheted up," it said, while growth has fallen below expectations in a number of major emerging market economies. If policy reactions in major economies remain inadequate or too slow, the IMF said, fissures could deepen, they added. "The main risk is obvious," IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard told reporters. "It is that the vicious circle in Spain and Italy becomes stronger, that output falls even more than it does, that one of these countries loses its financial access to markets," he told reporters. "The implications of such an event could easily derail the world recovery."

#### Global econ low—Europe and China

Shilling 7/18/12 (A. Gary Shilling, a Bloomberg View columnist, is president of A. Gary Shilling & Co., a consultancy in Springfield, New Jersey. He is the author of “The Age of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies for a Decade of Slow Growth and Deflation.”, “No Good News For The U.S. Economy”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2012/07/18/no-good-news-for-the-u-s-economy/)

Meanwhile, don’t look abroad for ­relief. The euro zone financial crisis is worsening without any meaningful resolution in sight. China, as I have predicted in other columns, is navigating a hard landing as its GDP growth rate is slowing toward 5% or 6%. Say good-bye to our decadelong, China-fueled global commodity bubble. The economies and financial markets of the world are in the midst of a massive deleveraging, and I believe it will take another five to seven years to return debt levels to their norm. While there may be occasional rays of sunshine, don’t get your hopes up for a cloudless sky anytime soon, especially as a global recession looms.

#### Global econ low—IMF report

Blanchard 7/16/12 (Olivier, Chief Economist at IMF, “World Faces Weak Economic Recovery”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-blanchard/global-financial-crisis\_b\_1677246.html)

The global recovery continues, but the recovery is weak; indeed a bit weaker than we forecast in April. In the Euro zone, growth is close to zero, reflecting positive but low growth in the core countries, and negative growth in most periphery countries. In the United States, growth is positive, but too low to make a serious dent to unemployment. Growth has also slowed in major emerging economies, from China to India and Brazil. Downside risks, coming primarily from Europe, have increased. Let me develop these themes in turn. The baseline forecasts In Europe, we are observing an increasing divergence between core and periphery countries. Periphery Euro countries, including Italy and Spain, face a difficult adjustment. Fiscal consolidation is necessary, but weighs heavily on growth. Structural reforms will bear fruit, but only in the future. Banks have to deal not only with bad legacy loans, but also with increasing non performing loans, which reflect depressed economic activity. High debt burdens are making borrowing expensive for governments. The result is negative growth this year and next for both Italy and Spain. Core Euro countries, including France and Germany, face similar problems, but on a more limited scale. The required fiscal consolidation is smaller; banks in general are in better shape. Still, their growth is forecast to be low: 1% for Germany, 0.3% for France in 2012, and a bit higher for both in 2013. In the United States the recovery continues, with some good news early in the year offset by some bad news since. Fiscal consolidation is taking its toll; so are lower exports. The good news is that housing appears to be stabilizing. Still, the recovery is not strong enough to substantially decrease unemployment. Our forecasts are of 2.0% growth for 2012, and 2.3% for 2013, a revision of -0.1% in both cases. Growth in emerging market countries has slowed down a bit more than we expected in April. For example, we have revised our forecast for China down from 8.2% to 8% for 2012, our forecast for India from 6.9% to 6.1%, our forecast for Brazil from 3.0% to 2.5%. The proximate causes vary across countries, with lower exports and lower investment playing a dominant role. In general, we expect these countries to achieve soft landings, but at lower growth rates than in the past. Putting everything together, our forecast for world growth is 3.5% for 2012, 3.9% for 2013, down .1% and .2% respectively. Given the flow of bad news in the press, you might be surprised by this small downward revision. There are two reasons: we were not very optimistic to start with; and in many countries, while the second quarter was worse than forecast, the first quarter was better than forecast. This partly explains the small revision for 2012. The downside risks More worrisome than these revisions to the baseline forecast is the increase in downside risks. The main risk is obvious: the vicious cycles in Spain or Italy become stronger, output falls even more, and one of these countries loses access to financial markets. The implications could easily derail the world recovery. Our baseline forecasts are based on the assumption that policies will be implemented to slowly decrease the spreads on Spanish and Italian bonds from their current high to a still high, but lower level in 2013. This however requires that the right policies be adopted and implemented. On policies For the Euro crisis to be contained, and eventually resolved, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the countries under pressure must follow through with fiscal consolidation, wage and price adjustments, structural reforms, and bank recapitalization if and when needed. Spanish and Italian governments have taken important steps in this direction. But they can only succeed if they can finance themselves at reasonable rates. Second, as long as these governments are committed to reforms, other Euro members have to be willing to help make the adjustment feasible. This implies not only designing a euro level architecture, but also being willing, in the short run, to stabilize funding conditions in sovereign debt markets. Progress was made in recent weeks, but more remains to be done.

#### Economy is terrible now- unemployment is increasing

**Zuckerman, 07/18** (He has been the publisher and owner of the New York Daily News since 1993 and, as of 2007, is the current editor-in-chief of U.S. News & World Report; Graduate of the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law School; "For the US Economy the News Is Bad and Worse" on July 18, 2012 from in www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/07/18/for-the-us-economy-the-news-is-bad-and-worse/ak)

It's time to adjust the gambit that people in all situations commonly use when reporting results to a supervisor: What do you want first, the good news or the bad? The formula that more aptly applies to the latest indicator of America's [economic](http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/07/18/for-the-us-economy-the-news-is-bad-and-worse) predicament is: What do you want first, the bad news or the even worse news?¶ The bad news is the disappointing June unemployment numbers released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The worse news is that we are failing to train tomorrow's labor force for employment in a world of accelerating competition.¶ Jobs, first. The headline unemployment number remains at 8.2 percent, although President Barack Obama cited the 84,000 new private sector jobs last month as "a step in the right direction." He had the grace to add: "But we can't be satisfied." He can say that again. That 8.2 percent only measures people who have actively applied for a job in the last four weeks by going to an interview or filling out an application. It is not a relevant measure. People who have been unemployed for many months don't go through the business of applying for a job every four weeks.¶ [[See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.](http://www.usnews.com/cartoons/economy-cartoons)]¶ Given that the median period of unemployment is now in the range of five months, vast numbers who want to work are just not counted. If we include, as we should, people who have applied for a job in the last 12 months, and those employed part time who want full-time work, the real unemployment number is closer to 15 percent. And we've made virtually no progress in reducing this number. We need 150,000 jobs every month just to take into account the people entering the labor force. Today we are looking at monthly job creation estimates of only 75,000 over the last three months.¶ A more revealing clue to where we are lies in the term "structural unemployment," which indicates where jobs have vanished because of basic changes in how the [economy](http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/07/18/for-the-us-economy-the-news-is-bad-and-worse) works. In this area, people have little or no prospect of returning to the jobs they once had.¶ This is a fundamental fact similar to what happened to farm workers over several decades with the advent of threshing machines and other devices, easy [credit](http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/07/18/for-the-us-economy-the-news-is-bad-and-worse), land consolidation, and the like. Those workers found jobs in the new factories, but today manufacturing is the great source of our structural unemployment. We've lost some 6 million manufacturing jobs in the last decade or so. Automation has replaced many of them, but today, so different from earlier decades, there is another big jobs thief: globalization. Work is shipped abroad because of competition in skills, speed, and pay in all those places called Somewhere Else.¶ Here now is the worse news: America is adding to the length of unemployment lines in the future by falling behind today in skill areas where global competition has become so intense. Too few of our younger people are benefiting from what is called STEM education. STEM stands for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, the human capital at the core of any productive economy.¶ America has long been a STEM leader. We have dominated the world in innovation over two centuries but most recently in computer and wireless power, the development of the Internet, and cellphones, and with those innovations came well-paying jobs. But our leadership is at risk.

#### No Eurozone thumper—decline inevitable because of spending cuts

Goldfarb et al. 7/17/12 (Zachary, Zachary A. Goldfarb is a staff writer covering the White House, focusing on President Obama’s economic, financial and fiscal policy. Previously, he covered financial regulation and government investigations into corporate wrongdoing. He also has written about national housing policy. He graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, where he was editor-in-chief of The Daily Princetonian. He lives in Washington, D.C, and Michael A Fletcher, Staff Writer for the Washington Post, “U.S. economic fears shift from Europe toward ‘fiscal cliff’”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bernanke-warns-congress-of-economic-slowdown/2012/07/17/gJQAlCW8qW\_story.html)

The main threat to the economy is shifting from what others may do to us to what we are doing to ourselves. For much of the year, economists worried about the impact of the slowdown in Europe on the U.S. economy. Now, analysts say anxiety about the impact of the fast-approaching fiscal cliff — the series of federal spending cuts and tax hikes set to take effect at the beginning of 2013 if Congress and the Obama administration do not act — is displacing Europe as the primary threat to the nation’s sputtering economy. Chairman Ben S. Bernanke offered a sour assessment of the U.S. economy Tuesday and said the Federal Reserve is ready to take further action if growth doesn't pick up. The campaign’s founders believe policymakers may finally be forced to compromise on an ambitious debt-reduction strategy. AT&T to introduce shared-data plans Morgan Stanley said this week that concerns about the fiscal cliff are reaching new heights across a wide range of industries. It is already seeing reductions in business orders and hiring, among other areas. “While our analysts are somewhat less worried about the impact of European bank strains,” a Morgan Stanley report said Monday, “the negative impact of fiscal cliff uncertainty is becoming more widespread.” The potential economic impact could smother the flickering recovery and further stifle job creation, analysts warn. A new report commissioned by the aerospace industry says federal budget cuts set to take effect in January could cost the country’s economy more than 2 million jobs and raise the national unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points over the next year. “The results are bleak but clear-cut,” said Stephen S. Fuller, the George Mason University professor who wrote the report. “The unemployment rate will climb above 9 percent, pushing the economy toward recession and reducing projected growth in 2013 by two-thirds.” The report echoes warnings from economists and policymakers who are urging lawmakers to find a way to put the nation on a sustainable fiscal path without derailing short-term growth. “Do no harm,” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers Tuesday, repeating a warning to policymakers to take action to avoid the sharp spending cuts and tax hikes. Bernanke’s comments at a Senate hearing followed decisions by other top economic forecasters this week to reduce their expectations for U.S. economic growth, in large part because of the uncertainty about the fiscal cliff. Economists say the automatic actions slated to take place at the end of the year — an increase in payroll taxes and in income tax rates, as well as large cuts in domestic and defense spending — would tip the country back into recession. Congress could prevent that outcome, but lawmakers are pledging to do so only on their terms, creating fears of more partisan gridlock. Democrats insist that taxes rise for higher-income earners; Republicans want to include the affluent in any renewal of the George W. Bush-era tax cuts. Meanwhile, the prospect of a government-induced recession is already taking a toll on the economy. “The most effective way that the Congress could help to support the economy right now would be to work to address the nation’s fiscal challenges in a way that takes into account both the need for long-run sustainability and the fragility of the recovery,” Bernanke said in testimony to the Senate banking committee. “Doing so earlier rather than later would help reduce uncertainty and boost household and business confidence.” He said the economic recovery has lost momentum in recent months, sapping consumer confidence and crimping job creation. But Bernanke gave no indication as to whether the Fed would take additional steps to try to boost growth at its meeting later this month. He said the central bank’s decision on any further fiscal stimulus would turn on whether it determines that the job market is recovering or is “stuck in the mud.” Bernanke added that concerns about the fiscal cliff, along with ongoing economic problems in Europe, are a significant drag on U.S. growth. He noted that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that going over the cliff would trigger a shallow recession early next year. “These estimates do not incorporate the additional negative effects likely to result from public uncertainty about how these matters will be resolved,” he said. After strong gains at the end of 2011 and in the first three months of this year, job creation has slowed substantially. The nation’s unemployment rate is 8.2 percent, marking 41 consecutive months that it has hovered above 8 percent. The manufacturing sector in June contracted for the first time in three years, according to private data released this month. Also, U.S. retail sales fell in June for the third consecutive month as consumers cut spending. Bill Gross, founder of the investment management firm Pimco, said on Twitter that the nation is “approaching recession when measured by employment, retail sales, investment, and corporate profits.”

#### US econ low—most recent and best data

CFS 7/18/12 (Center for Financial Stability, The Center for Financial Stability is dedicated to becoming the leading nonprofit, nonpartisan, and independent think tank focused on financial markets for the benefit of investors, officials, and the public, “CFS June Money Supply Data; Weak Economy And Flight To Safe Haven Assets”, <http://www.sacbee.com/2012/07/18/4639154/cfs-june-money-supply-data-weak.html>)

Today, the Center for Financial Stability (CFS) releases the most current and broadest measure of the money supply available for the US. CFS proprietary money supply data provide a crucial barometer to measure Fed actions, the economy, and financial system in real time. The most recent data for June 2012 illustrate that the US economy is extremely weak. CFS Divisia M4 (DM4) growth registered 2.3% on a year-over-year basis in June 2012 - well below the 6% to 6.5% typically associated with trend growth (see Figure 1). According to CFS President Lawrence Goodman, "CFS monetary data foreshadow a subpar expansion in coming months." "A flight to insured deposits highlights that investors and the public are flocking to safe haven assets," Goodman added. Commercial banks' savings deposits and demand deposits were the largest contributors to monetary growth in June. Similarly, the monetary base contracted for the first time since December 2010, highlighting recent pressures on risky assets as well as policy (see Figure 1). CFS Divisia monetary measures were developed under the direction of Professor William A. Barnett - one of the world's leading experts on monetary and financial aggregation theory. CFS money supply data are essential, especially since the Federal Reserve ceased production of M3 in 2006. Similarly, Divisia measures are superior, as they accurately weight various classifications of money from cash to leverage in the shadow banking system.

#### Econ low—unemployment and innovation

Zuckerman 7/18/12 (Mortimer Benjamin Zuckerman is a Canadian-born American businessman. His business holdings include interests in magazines, publishing, and real estate, US News, “For the U.S. Economy the News Is Bad and Worse”, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/07/18/for-the-us-economy-the-news-is-bad-and-worse)

It's time to adjust the gambit that people in all situations commonly use when reporting results to a supervisor: What do you want first, the good news or the bad? The formula that more aptly applies to the latest indicator of America's economic predicament is: What do you want first, the bad news or the even worse news? The bad news is the disappointing June unemployment numbers released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The worse news is that we are failing to train tomorrow's labor force for employment in a world of accelerating competition. Jobs, first. The headline unemployment number remains at 8.2 percent, although President Barack Obama cited the 84,000 new private sector jobs last month as "a step in the right direction." He had the grace to add: "But we can't be satisfied." He can say that again. That 8.2 percent only measures people who have actively applied for a job in the last four weeks by going to an interview or filling out an application. It is not a relevant measure. People who have been unemployed for many months don't go through the business of applying for a job every four weeks. Given that the median period of unemployment is now in the range of five months, vast numbers who want to work are just not counted. If we include, as we should, people who have applied for a job in the last 12 months, and those employed part time who want full-time work, the real unemployment number is closer to 15 percent. And we've made virtually no progress in reducing this number. We need 150,000 jobs every month just to take into account the people entering the labor force. Today we are looking at monthly job creation estimates of only 75,000 over the last three months. A more revealing clue to where we are lies in the term "structural unemployment," which indicates where jobs have vanished because of basic changes in how the economy works. In this area, people have little or no prospect of returning to the jobs they once had. This is a fundamental fact similar to what happened to farm workers over several decades with the advent of threshing machines and other devices, easy credit, land consolidation, and the like. Those workers found jobs in the new factories, but today manufacturing is the great source of our structural unemployment. We've lost some 6 million manufacturing jobs in the last decade or so. Automation has replaced many of them, but today, so different from earlier decades, there is another big jobs thief: globalization. Work is shipped abroad because of competition in skills, speed, and pay in all those places called Somewhere Else. Here now is the worse news: America is adding to the length of unemployment lines in the future by falling behind today in skill areas where global competition has become so intense. Too few of our younger people are benefiting from what is called STEM education. STEM stands for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, the human capital at the core of any productive economy. America has long been a STEM leader. We have dominated the world in innovation over two centuries but most recently in computer and wireless power, the development of the Internet, and cellphones, and with those innovations came well-paying jobs. But our leadership is at risk.

#### Econ low—job growth increase is key

Hall 7/10/12 (Keith Hall is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and former commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Why the Economic Recovery Isn't Strong Enough”, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/07/10/why-the-economic-recovery-isnt-strong-enough)

The Great Recession officially ended in June of 2009 and for nearly three years economic growth has been maintained at an annual rate of 2.4 percent. With its usual delay, the labor market hit bottom 8 months after the recession's official end. Since then, we've had 28 straight months of payroll job growth totaling about 3.9 million workers (excluding the temporary government jobs added for the 2010 decennial census). While this superficially sounds like progress, it has been one of the weakest recoveries on record. Here's why: First, economic growth has not been strong. In fact, with the exception of the 1980 downturn that ended in a double-dip recession, we've had by far the weakest post-recession gross domestic product growth in more than 60 years. [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.] Second, while these job gains are welcome news, they are not nearly enough. A true labor market recovery would mean that job growth would need to outpace population growth. Right now, the share of the population that is employed remains near its 25-year low. In short, what we need is at least 250,000 new jobs per month, every month, for years. At our current rate of job growth, we would literally never reach a labor market recovery. Third, in addition to poor job creation, we've had slow wage growth. Growth in hourly earnings is now just 1.9 percent per year, barely above inflation. In addition, 90 percent of the private sector job growth has been by nonsupervisory production workers and their wage growth has fallen nearly in half over the past three years to just 1.5 percent per year. In fact, earnings growth has virtually stopped in some industries, falling below 1 percent in professional and business services, other services, and durable goods manufacturing, transportation and warehousing, and information services. [HBO Doc Takes a Hard Look at the Long-Term Unemployment Crisis.] Finally, the problem of the long-term jobless only grows. Well over 5 million people are currently counted as long-term unemployed. Plus, millions have lost their work but are not counted as long-term unemployed or even unemployed because they are no longer actively searching for work. The average person that becomes discouraged and quits looking has been jobless for over 21 weeks. This means as many as 9 million people may really be long-term jobless. Past experience shows that this group of unemployed people has a much more difficult time finding new work, even in robust economic recoveries.

#### Econ low now—data

Shilling 7/18/12 (A. Gary Shilling, a Bloomberg View columnist, is president of A. Gary Shilling & Co., a consultancy in Springfield, New Jersey. He is the author of “The Age of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies for a Decade of Slow Growth and Deflation.”, “No Good News For The U.S. Economy”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2012/07/18/no-good-news-for-the-u-s-economy/)

Here’s my read of the U.S. economy at halftime: If we aren’t already in a ­recession, we’re getting very close. The economic momentum coming into the first quarter of 2012 was strong. GDP growth was running at a solid 3% rate for the final quarter of 2011. Then it slowed a bit to 2.2% in Q1, only to get revised down to a tepid 1.9% annual rate. Expect the same or much worse when Q2 numbers hit. Payroll employment continues to slump, far below the level needed to accommodate new labor-force entrants, much less reduce the 8.2% unemployment rate. More grim news came from the downward revisions in job gains in April and May. Consumer spending is the last, and only, hope for a revival in our economic fortune. But that, too, has been disappointing in recent months, constrained by weak job creation and paltry wage increases. Retail sales actually fell in both April and May. My view is that our nervous markets are anticipating this global recession. Commodity prices have hastened their deceleration lately. Crude oil prices are down 23% since their late-February peak. Copper has seen price declines of 24% since last August and 14% just since February. Cotton has seen huge drops since early 2011. Most stock markets around the world have largely erased their earlier 2012 gains in anticipation of further economic weakness and a collapse in corporate profits. MSCI’s Emerging Markets Index and its Europe Index are down 9% and 2%, respectively, in the last three months. In the last year? Down a painful 20% and 17%. Early this year I predicted the S&P 500 index would fall to 800 on weak corporate earnings. It hasn’t happened yet, and the figure has been scoffed at. But disbelief is exactly how people reacted when I predicted the housing bubble’s burst in this column in early 2005. Don’t shrug off Facebook’s IPO debacle, either. I believe Facebook will become the poster child for the current social media stock bubble, just as Pets.com was for the dot-com bubble. The Treasury-bond rally is all about finding a safe haven. It is symptomatic of the unfolding global recession and gathering evidence of deflation. My three-decade favorite—30-year Treasury bonds—recently achieved my target of 2.5%. Nevertheless, long Treasurys and the U.S. dollar are still buys.

## AT Jobs

#### Employment is the last economic indicator to improve after a recession – it’s not key to recovery

Rosemary **Peavler** 5-14-09 How economic indicators help, 5-14-9, http://bizfinance.about.com/od/currentevents/a/Economic\_Indicators\_2.htm

If you look back at these economic indicators, you will see a mixed picture for our economy. We have a Gross Domestic Product that fell hard in first quarter 2009 and a Consumer Price Index that also fell in March, after an increase in the previous month. Neither of those statistics are good news. The Producer Price Index also fell so manufacturers are having trouble selling their products. These numbers mean that deflation could be on the horizon. Deflation, or falling prices, during a recession is a troubling sign and could lengthen the recession. We have to look at unemployment, which is still rising. We know from past recessions, however, that unemployment often keeps rising even after a recession reaches its peak and the economy starts to turn around. We need to look at stock prices. We’ve seen an uptick in stock prices in April and May which is always good news. When stock prices go up, it signifies investor confidence. We have to hope that this isn’t a “sucker’s rally,” but a real rally. Stock prices go right along with consumer confidence. The best news in these economic indicators is that consumers are becoming more confident that we are nearing the bottom of this recession and perhaps the economy is going to start getting better. There are other important economic indicators released by a variety of agencies including the Federal Reserve, the Conference Board, the Census Bureau and others, but these are the most important ones.

#### Unemployment levels continue to drop due to auto industry

Associated Press, news agency, July 12, 2012

(Associated Press,7-10-2012, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-unemployment-benefit-applications-fall-to-350000-lowest-in-4-years-drop-may-be-temporary/2012/07/12/gJQA3GODfW_story.html>, US unemployment benefit applications fall to 350,000, lowest in 4 years; drop may be temporary) SQR

The number of people seeking U.S. unemployment benefits plunged last week. But a big reason is that automakers have skipped some of their usual summer shutdowns to keep up with demand, causing fewer temporary auto layoffs.

## AT Guam Economy

#### Recent Regional Free Trade Agreement Solves

#### **Pacific News Center 12**

(Pacific News Center, 6/27/12, a speech by Judi Won Pat, <http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24944:speakers-weekly-address&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156> /mr)

Guam - Speaker Judi Won Pat reports on last week's Association of Pacific Island Legisaltures [APIL] in her Weekly Address.¶ HEAR the Speaker's Weekly Address HERE>>>6-27 speaker address.mp3¶ READ the Speaker's Weekly Address below:¶ “The Guam Legislature secures regional support for growing Guam's economy.”¶ My Dear People of Guam,¶ Buenas yan Hafa Adai! This past week the Guam delegation to the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures (APIL) was successful in¶ securing the support of regional nation states and territories for several important initiatives that are meant to stimulate and sustain local and regional economic growth.¶ I led a delegation of Guam Senators at the APIL’s 31st General Assembly on Saipan this past week and together we were successful in securing support from ten nation states and territories for the Guam-CNMI Visa-Waiver program and a regional Free Trade Agreement.¶ APIL Resolution No. 31-GA-10 expresses the support of APIL member states for Guam and the CNMI visa waiver program to include China. ¶ The resolution was authored and introduced by myself and was co-sponsored by Senator Chris Duenas who is an APIL Director. Senator Tina Rose Muna Barnes was vocal in her testimony and both she and Senator Sam Mabini worked with me to encourage APIL delegates to vote for passage of the resolution. ¶ The regional nation-state leaders saw that the inclusion of China into the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver program provides new access to a promising tourism market. ¶ In November of last year the APIL adopted a resolution that I introduced that further affirmed its united position in desiring to strengthen our Pacific peoples and governments through trade and economic accords that mutually benefit APIL member nations and territories. ¶ The resolution dubbed the “Blue Continent Free Trade Agreement” called for regional legislatures to facilitate, encourage and promote free trade among island countries and states in the Pacific Region.¶ APIL also adopted a resolution that respectfully called on the chief executives of the respective regional nation states to adopt and¶ promulgate free trade initiatives for our region in the exchange of local goods and services between our nation states.¶ In closing, the future of our island’s economic prosperity must be rooted in an actionable plan that incorporates new markets to Guam and in our region.¶ Saina Ma’ase.

#### Guam’s economy is way better off than US’s

#### Marianas Variety 12

(Mar-Vic Cagurangan, writer for M Variety, 6/26/12, <http://www.mvariety.com/cnmi/cnmi-news/local/47478-guam-banking-sector-still-stable-.php> /mr)

HAGÅTÑA — The local banking industry is generally a safe haven and unlikely to be affected by the crisis currently besetting U.S. banks, Bank of Guam chief economist Joseph Bradley said on Sunday.¶ “Because of our geographical location, Guam banks are conservative in their lending practices; they don’t engage in subprime lending and don’t expose themselves to risky loans,” Bradley told Variety.¶ Bradley also noted that local financial institutions don’t participate in high-risk trading that puts U.S. banks in peril.¶ Moody’s Investors Service on Thursday downgraded the credit ratings for five large U.S. banks — including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and Citigroup — along with those of 10 other global financial institutions.¶ In a statement posted on its website, Moody’s said the banks — whose credit ratings dropped by one to three notches — have shrinking prospects for long-term profitability and growth.¶ “All of the banks affected by today’s actions have significant exposure to the volatility and risk of outsized losses inherent to capital market activities,” Moody’s Global Banking Managing Director Greg Bauer said in a statement.¶ Citigroup Inc., which owns Citibank Guam, challenged Moody’s rating, saying its assessment was “arbitrary and completely unwarranted.”¶ “Moody’s approach is backward-looking and fails to recognize Citi’s transformation over the past several years, the strength and diversity of Citi’s franchise, and the substantial improvements in Citi’s risk management, capital levels and liquidity,” Citigroup said in a statement.¶ Citi said it had more than $420 billion of surplus liquidity held generally in cash and government securities at the end of the first quarter of 2012.¶ “We have surplus liquidity based on a variety of stress tests and liquidity models, and Citi exceeds the proposed Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirement with a ratio of approximately 125 percent, even though this measurement does not go into effect until 2015,” the statement said.¶ If anything, Citi said, the U.S. financial system is stronger, not weaker, than it was before the 2008 meltdown as a result of new regulations that “have substantially enhanced the stability and resilience of the system.”¶ While saying the U.S. banks’ credit rating crisis “will not have any impact on Guam at all,” Bradley agreed that Moody’s could have been a little more gentle with its verdicts.¶ “A one step downgrade may be more reasonable, but two notches may be a little harsh,” Bradley said. “Moody’s might have missed the adjustments that U.S. banks have made.”¶ He said Moody’s is still “recovering from the errors” it had made prior to 2008, which saw a global recession that analysts attributed to understatement of risks.¶ Just the same, Bradley said, the mass credit downgrade of U.S. banks “is not an indicator of another meltdown.”¶ “There are other problems in the world that can contribute to a meltdown,” he added.¶ At any rate, Bradley said Guam’s banking industry has its own story, with data indicating its healthy state. In his economic update presentation at the Bank of Guam-sponsored forum in March, Bradley said deposits in Guam banks have grown to $2.30 billion, accounting for an 18 percent increase in two years.¶ Bradley said the surge in deposits can be attributed to the tax refund releases, coupled with people’s new cautious attitude. “People are more nervous about the economy so they are saving more money in case something goes wrong,” he said.¶ The Calvo administration released a total of $197 million in tax refunds in December 2011 and another $93 million this year.¶ “That money stays in the local economy. Some people put their tax refund money in the bank while others spent their cash into local businesses. In turn, these businesses have more money to put in the bank,” Bradley said.¶ The local mortgage industry is equally stable, he said. “Those banks that were making bad loans are no longer in business,” Bradley said. “Today, banks are making every effort to work out arrangements with their borrowers.”¶ The last time Guam experienced a mortgage crisis was between 2003 and 2005. “There were lots of foreclosures then, but part of that was [a result] of a bad economy. Many people left Guam after (Supertyphoon) Pongsona,” he said.¶ Meanwhile, Moody’s noted that the banks with downgraded credit ratings also engage in other, “often market leading business activities that are central to Moody’s assessment of their credit profiles.”¶ “These activities can provide important shock absorbers that mitigate the potential volatility of capital markets operations, but they also present unique risks and challenges,” Bauer said.

#### Guam economy recovering- tourism and national defense

Osman 2k4

(Wali M. Osman ph.D. is a regional economist, “An Update on the economies off Guam and commonwealth of the northern mariana islands”, May 2004, pg online @ http://www.doi.gov/archive/oia/Osman/Osmanreports/An%20Update%20on%20the%20Guam%20and%20CNMI%20Economies.pdf)

Following several years of stagnation and decline, Guam’s economy is headed for ¶ recovery and growth. The levels of activity in the two main engines of growth, tourism ¶ and national defense, are rising, although for different reasons and with different effects ¶ on Guam’s economy, the labor market and public finances. ¶ While benefiting hotels, restaurants, shopping malls and other facilities catering ¶ mainly to tourists, increases in tourist traffic without discernible increases in the average ¶ tourist spending tend to have subtle and gradual effects on the economy, government ¶ finances and the labor market. With Guam’s hotel occupancy rates averaging in the 50-60 ¶ percent range during most of the last 3-4 years, currently projected increases in tourist ¶ traffic are a long way from bringing financial strength to local hotels and making a ¶ visible impact on the rest of the economy. At such an early stage of recovery and ¶ expansion, gains in tourist traffic have to be registered for several months to be ¶ considered a turning point from the current stage of the business cycle. ¶ By contrast, increases in defense spending, especially in force and personnel, ¶ refurbishment of base facilities and new construction projects tend to have a more ¶ perceptible effect, as some of these create immediate work opportunities. Now that both ¶ tourism and defense outlays are rising simultaneously, the prospect for recovery in ¶ Guam’s economy is better than in several years. It is too early to suggest the depth and ¶ breadth of this recovery, but if both tourism and defense spending rise consistently for 4-¶ 6 months, it will be possible to make a more quantitative assessment of gains in business, ¶ the tax base, public finances, employment and, eventually, total output.

Regional and Global Economic Downturn hurts the Economy

Guam Economic Recovery and Development Team, Bureau of Statistics and Plans, and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 3

(Government of Guam, “The Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy,” April 2003, <http://www.bsp.guam.gov/Socio_Econ/2003CEDSFINALv3.pdf> /mr)

As part of the Guam’s economic fate is not only tied to the United States but more directly affected¶ by the regional economic downturn that eventually led to the disastrous Asian economic meltdown¶ in 1997-1998. The island’s unemployment rate, which hovered at 8% from 1994 through 1996, rose¶ to 10% in 1997, and then surpassed 15% in 1999 and 2000. While Guam is now stabilizing from¶ the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis, the struggle to recover will be hampered by recent¶ economic setbacks in the United States and Japan. As the economic outlook for the U.S. (Asia’s¶ biggest single market for the region’s exports) has become increasingly less optimistic, the United¶ Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP), was prompted¶ to declare that its 2001 forecast for a 6.0 percent GDP expansion for Asia’s developing nations was¶ too optimistic. While no one is predicting another regional crisis, and the U.S. slowdown is¶ expected to be short-lived, the current economic performance of the U.S. and Japan will undoubtedly¶ delay the region’s full economic recovery.

#### Alt Causes

#### a. Social Services

Guam Economic Recovery and Development Team, Bureau of Statistics and Plans, and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 3

(Government of Guam, “The Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy,” April 2003, <http://www.bsp.guam.gov/Socio_Econ/2003CEDSFINALv3.pdf> /mr)

Lagging Social Services¶ Relative to the U.S. and developed countries is Asia, Guam’s education and health systems¶ are far below standard. Educational and skill levels of Guam’s workforces are not presently¶ sufficient for the needs of a growing and diversifying economy. Also, poor education and¶ health services adversely affect overseas investor or company decisions to use Guam as a¶ regional corporate base

b. Lack of land and labor

Guam Economic Recovery and Development Team, Bureau of Statistics and Plans, and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 3

(Government of Guam, “The Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy,” April 2003, <http://www.bsp.guam.gov/Socio_Econ/2003CEDSFINALv3.pdf> /mr)

Lack of Land and Low-Cost Labor¶ Guam cannot compete in industries that require an abundance of inexpensive land and lowcost labor. In combination with improved education and training, Guam should set its sights¶ on export industries that produce high quality, technologically advanced goods and services.

c. Tariff Regulations

Guam Economic Recovery and Development Team, Bureau of Statistics and Plans, and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 3

(Government of Guam, “The Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy,” April 2003, <http://www.bsp.guam.gov/Socio_Econ/2003CEDSFINALv3.pdf> /mr)

U.S. Tariff Regulation¶ Guam is subject to the U.S. minimum wage law and regulated shipping tariffs, which reduce¶ Guam’s wage and international shipping competitiveness, especially when compared with¶ neighboring Asian countries.

d. Restrictive local laws

Guam Economic Recovery and Development Team, Bureau of Statistics and Plans, and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 3

(Government of Guam, “The Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy,” April 2003, <http://www.bsp.guam.gov/Socio_Econ/2003CEDSFINALv3.pdf> /mr)

Restrictive local laws¶ Local regulation for some sectors, especially finance and insurance, are unduly restrictive¶ and inhibit overseas investment in those sectors.

# \*\*\*Economic Cooperation\*\*\*

## Impossible

#### Economic nationalism is inevitable – makes economic cooperation impossible

GOLDSTONE ‘7 - PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University (P.R.,”Does Globalization Bring War or Peace?”. September 25. http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)

¶ American policymakers should beware claims of globalization's axiomatic pacifying effects. Trade creates vested interests in peace, but these interests affect policy only to the extent they wield political clout. In many of the states whose behavior we most wish to alter, such sectors -- internationalist, export-oriented, reliant on global markets -- lack a privileged place at the political table. Until and unless these groups gain a greater voice within their own political system, attempts to rely on the presumed constraining effects of global trade carry substantially greater risk than commonly thought.¶ A few examples tell much. Quasi-democratic Russia is a state whose principal exposure to global markets lies in oil, a commodity whose considerable strategic coercive power the Putin regime freely invokes. The oil sector has effectively merged with the state, making Russia's deepening ties to the global economy a would-be weapon rather than an avenue of restraint. Russian economic liberalization without political liberalization is unlikely to pay the strong cooperative dividends many expect.¶ China will prove perhaps the ultimate test of the Pax Mercatoria. The increasing international Chinese presence in the oil and raw materials extraction sectors would seem to bode ill, given such sectors' consistent history elsewhere of urging state use of threats and force to secure these interests. Much will come down to the relative political influence of export-oriented sectors heavily reliant on foreign direct investment and easy access to the vast Western market versus the political power of their sectoral opposites: uncompetitive state-owned enterprises, energy and mineral complexes with important holdings in the global periphery, and a Chinese military that increasingly has become a de facto multi-sectoral economic-industrial conglomerate. Actions to bolster the former groups at the expense of the latter would be effort well spent.¶ At home, as even advanced sectors feel the competitive pressures of globalization, public support for internationalism and global engagement will face severe challenges. As more sectors undergo structural transformation, the natural coalitional constituency for committed global activist policy will erode; containing the gathering backlash will require considerable leadership.¶ Trade can indeed be a palliative; too often, however, we seem to think of economic interdependence as a panacea; the danger is that in particular instances it may prove no more than a placebo.

# \*\*\*Environment\*\*\*

## No Impact

**Environment is resilient**

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

**-- Long time-frame**

Kay 1 (Jane, “Study Takes Historical Peek at Plight of Ocean Ecosystems”, San Francisco Chronicle, 7-26, Lexis)

The collapse of ecosystems often occur over a long period. In one example, when Aleut hunters killed the Alaskan sea otter about 2,500 years ago, the population of their natural prey, the sea urchin, grew larger than its normal size. In turn, the urchins grazed down the kelp forests, important habitat for a whole host of ocean life. Then, when fur traders in the 1800s hunted the otters and sea cows almost to extinction, the kelp forests disappeared and didn't start to regenerate until the federal government protected the sea otters in the 20th century. In California, the diversity of spiny lobsters, sheephead fish and abalone kept down the urchin numbers. At present in Alaska, the kelp beds are declining again in areas where killer whales are preying on sea otters. Biologists think the killer whales switched to otters for food because there are fewer seals and sea lions to eat.

**-- Environment strong and improving – their authors lie**

Dutton 1 (Dr. Dennis, Professor of Philosophy – University of Canterbury (New Zealand), “Greener Than You Think”, The Washington Post, 10-21, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=& contentId=A12789-2001Oct18)

That the human race faces environmental problems is unquestionable. That environmental experts have regularly tried to scare us out of our wits with doomsday chants is also beyond dispute. In the 1960s overpopulation was going to cause massive worldwide famine around 1980. A decade later we were being told the world would be out of oil by the 1990s. This was an especially chilly prospect, since, as Newsweek reported in 1975, we were in a climatic cooling trend that was going to reduce agricultural outputs for the rest of the century, leading possibly to a new Ice Age. Bjorn Lomborg, a young statistics professor and political scientist at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, knows all about the enduring appeal -- for journalists, politicians and the public -- of environmental doomsday tales, having swallowed more than a few himself. In 1997, Lomborg -- a self-described left-winger and former Greenpeace member -- came across an article in Wired magazine about Julian Simon, a University of Maryland economist. Simon claimed that the "litany" of the Green movement -- its fears about overpopulation, animal species dying by the hour, deforestation -- was hysterical nonsense, and that the quality of life on the planet was radically improving. Lomborg was shocked by this, and he returned to Denmark to set about doing the research that would refute Simon. He and his team of academicians discovered something sobering and cheering: In every one of his claims, Simon was correct. Moreover, Lomborg found on close analysis that the factual foundation on which the environmental doomsayers stood was deeply flawed: exaggeration, prevarications, white lies and even convenient typographical errors had been absorbed unchallenged into the folklore of environmental disaster scenarios.

#### Status quo solves

Berg 8 (Chris, Columnist – The Age, “Isn't All This Talk of an Apocalypse Getting a Bit Boring?”, The Age, 1-27,

http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/isnt-all-this-talk-of-an-apocalypse-getting-a-bit-boring/2008/01/26/12011 57736917.html)

But there are substantial grounds for optimism — on almost every measure, the state of the world is improving. Pollution is no longer the threat it was seen to be in the 1970s, at least in the developed world. Changes in technology, combined with our greater demand for a clean environment, have virtually eliminated concerns about pungent waterways and dirty forests. Legislation played some role in this, but as Indur Goklany points out in his recent study, The Improving State of the World, the environment started getting better long before such laws were passed. Goklany reveals that strong economies, not environment ministers, are the most effective enforcers of cleanliness in our air and water. Indeed, the world's 10 most polluted places are in countries where strong economic growth has historically been absent — Russia, China, India and Kyrgyzstan have not really been known for their thriving consumer capitalism. Other indices, too, show that humanity's future is likely to be bright. Infant mortality has dramatically declined, as has malnutrition, illiteracy, and even global poverty. And there are good grounds for hope that we can adapt to changing climates as well. History has shown just how capable we are of inventing and adapting our way out of any sticky situation — and how we can do it without crippling our economies or imposing brutal social controls. Environmental alarmists have become more and more like those apocalyptic preachers common in the 19th century — always expecting the Rapture on this date and, when it doesn't come, quickly revising their calculations. Optimism is in too short supply in discussions about the environment. But four decades after The Population Bomb, if we remember just how wrong visions of the apocalypse have been in the past, perhaps we will look to the future more cheerfully.

#### Redundancy and adaptation check

Doremus ‘00 (Holly, Professor of Law – UC Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse," 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, Winter, Lexis)

Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. n212 Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213 the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. n214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

## War Turns It

**War causes environmental collapse and means the plan won’t be enforced**

Adley and Grant 4 (Jessica and Andrea, Sierra Club of Canada, “The Environmental Consequences of War”, 8-24, http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/postings/war-and-environment.html)

Throughout history, war has **invariably resulted** **in environmental destruction**. However, advancements in military technology used by combatants have resulted in increasingly severe environmental impacts. This is well illustrated by the devastation to forests and biodiversity caused by modern warfare. Military machinery and explosives have caused **unprecedented levels of deforestation** and habitat destruction. This has resulted in a serious disruption of ecosystem services, including erosion control, water quality, and food production. A telling example is the destruction of 35% of Cambodia’s intact forests due to two decades of civil conflict. In Vietnam, bombs alone destroyed over 2 million acres of land.[13] These environmental catastrophes are aggravated by the fact that ecological protection and restoration become a **low priority** during and after war. The threat to biodiversity from combat can also be illustrated by the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The risk to the already endangered population of mountain gorillas from the violence was of minimal concern to combatants and victims during the 90-day massacre.[14] The threat to the gorillas increased after the war as thousands of refugees, some displaced for decades, returned to the already overpopulated country. Faced with no space to live, they had little option but to inhabit the forest reserves, home to the gorilla population. As a result of this human crisis, conservation attempts were impeded. Currently, the International Gorilla Programme Group is working with authorities to protect the gorillas and their habitats. This has proven to be a challenging task, given the complexities Rwandan leaders face, including security, education, disease, epidemics, and famine.[15]

# \*\*\*Federalism\*\*\*

## High

#### Federalism high now – Affordable Care Act

**Posner 7/18/12**

**(Paul L. Posner, director Paul L. Posner, director of the public administration program at George Mason University, is a former federal official, a former president of the American Society for Public Administration, and author of "The Politics of Unfunded Mandates,” “The Supreme Court and the Remaking of Federalism,”**

The Supreme Court's ruling upholding the Affordable Care Act will be remembered in the short term as reaffirming President Obama's ambitious health-care-reform program. Yet in ruling as it did, the court tied the federal government's hands for the future by placing new limits on its role in domestic policy.¶ Much attention has been paid to the court's reliance on the taxing power of Congress to uphold the law, but the ruling's constraints on the use of Congress' spending power to achieve expanded coverage through Medicaid are perhaps destined to have greater effects on congressional and presidential actions to project federal goals into new areas.¶ The court essentially held that states failing to expand Medicaid under the new law cannot be penalized by the loss of their existing Medicaid funds. Republican governors in at least six states already have proclaimed that they will not apply for the new Medicaid expansion program. The federal government has little recourse should they opt out.¶ The implications of the new ruling go well beyond Medicaid, however. New questions are raised, for example, about whether Congress can legislate new conditions on existing grant programs. There are more than 950 federal grants that provide the vehicle for most federal mandates, rules and regulations affecting the states. They also are the principal constitutional vehicle that allows Congress to adopt policies beyond its enumerated powers in such areas as education, law enforcement, community development and social services.¶ The court's ruling on Medicaid needs to be viewed in concert with other rulings a decade or more ago that also placed limits on the power of the federal government to "commandeer" states to carry out federal programs. In one notable case, 1997's Printz v. United States, the court ruled that the federal government could not directly order local police to conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers. The court's previous rulings barring direct-order commandeering had left the door open to use grants instead, since the states could opt out. As my colleague Tim Conlan has noted, in the health-care ruling the court now is saying that some grants are themselves a form of coercive commandeering.¶ In addition, in this ruling, the court deliberately did not provide bright-line tests to define federal coercion. In a decision nearly 20 years ago, the court ruled that withholding 5 percent of highway grant funds was not sufficiently powerful to constitute coercion. But since Medicaid accounts for a far higher percentage of state revenues, federal penalties threatening the entire grant appear to have crossed that undefined coercion line. Would special-education or Title I education mandates be considered equally as coercive?¶ The ruling also raises new questions about whether the federal government can enforce one set of regulations by threatening to withhold funds under a separate program — what are called "crossover sanctions." The court's ruling concluded that the new Medicaid expansion was, in effect, a separate new program that impermissibly used the existing Medicaid program as a weapon to achieve leverage over the states. It is unclear whether existing federal rules that can cause withholding of highway grants for states not in compliance with federal clean-air requirements would withstand appeals based on the new ruling.¶ The ruling raises new uncertainties about the future of the federal role in our system. On first blush, it appears that states were the big winners, gaining newfound leverage in resisting federal grant programs. In fact, the state resistance movement had been picking up steam long before the health-care law. For example, states joined in pushing back against two of President George W. Bush's coercive initiatives: the "Real ID" security mandate for state-issued driver's licenses and the No Child Left Behind law for education.¶ Clearly, the new Medicaid constraints have further boxed in federal officials in responding to new national needs appearing on the federal doorstep. What options do federal officials have in working through states in the future? Given limits on federal coercion through either direct orders or grants, one scenario favored by conservatives might be for the federal government simply to foreswear national policy, leaving it in the states' hands. While appealing to some, this option fails to serve a nation whose economy is increasingly interdependent across states, nor does it account for the irrepressible compulsion by national elected officials of both parties to claim credit for legislating new programs and benefits.¶ Ironically, two other options might present themselves to hard-pressed federal officials. One would be to avoid the issue of coercion by expanding federal funding. In effect, the court ruled that Congress could sidestep the coercion tests by creating fully funded programs that did not burden existing programs with additional conditions.¶ Another option would be for the federal government to carry out the Medicaid program itself, sidestepping the states. Writing in the Fiscal Times, Merrill Goozner raised the prospect that the federal government might reconsider an offer made by President Reagan to nationalize Medicaid, as it nationalized old-age and disability assistance in 1974 under the Supplemental Security Income program.¶ One of the strengths of our existing intergovernmental system is that the federal government joins a partnership with 50 states and numerous local governments and nonprofits to deliver programs in ways that are adapted to the diverse conditions and values throughout our system. The premise of the court's ruling on the health-care law is that the decentralized promises of cooperative federalism have withered as the federal system has become more centralized and coercive. It would be ironic indeed if the ultimate outcome of the court's new federalism were to be a replacement of cooperative federalism with a more centralized system of direct federal management of complex national problems.

## Low

#### Federalism low – Arizona immigration policy

**McDaniel 6/28/12**

**(Chris McDaniel, state senator, “McDaniel – Immigration ruling: federalism eroded by federal judiciary,” Y’all Politics, 6/28/12,** <http://yallpolitics.com/index.php/yp/post/32584/> /mr)

During the past ten years, over a third of the nation’s illegal border crossings occurred in the State of Arizona. ¶ It has experienced the brunt of the republic’s illegal immigration problem, with its citizens describing themselves as under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services and even place their lives in jeopardy. ¶ Although the people of Arizona have long demanded federal action to assist in curbing the tide, our national government has refused to protect its border integrity. The state therefore had little choice but to pass legislation designed to address the problems associated with unfettered illegal immigration. In 2010, it passed SB 1070, known as “The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act."¶ In response, the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit on July 6, 2010, requesting that it be declared invalid since it interferes with powers vested in the federal government. ¶ After the matter was appealed from a lower court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that four of the provisions were unconstitutional. Arizona then fought to reverse that decision. The Supreme Court, in December of 2011, agreed to consider the case.¶ On June 25, the Court issued a surprising majority opinion which affirmed much of the Ninth Circuit’s injunction against enforcement of the four challenged provisions, declaring it unconstitutional for Arizona to make it a state crime for an immigrant not to be carrying papers, to allow for warrantless arrests in select situations and to forbid illegal immigrants from working in Arizona.¶ In an about-face, it then upheld the most controversial part of the law -- a provision which requires law enforcement officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is in the country illegally.¶ In striking down three of the four provisions, however, the majority opinion ignored the states’ traditional role in regulating immigration. Before the ratification of the Constitution, each state had the authority to prevent itself from being burdened by an influx of persons. The Constitution, upon adoption, did not strip them of that power.¶ There is nothing improper, traditionally speaking, with states prohibiting actions already prohibited by federal law, just as there is nothing wrong in assisting with enforcement when federal laws are violated. As noted by Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent, Arizona did nothing more than attempt to protect its sovereignty. It was not in contradiction of federal law, but in complete compliance with it. SB 1070 did not extend or revise federal immigration restrictions, but merely enforced those restrictions more effectively. ¶ "What this case comes down to," Scalia argued, "is whether the Arizona law conflicts with federal immigration law -- whether it excludes those whom federal law would admit, or admits those whom federal law would exclude. It does not purport to do so. It applies only to aliens who neither possess a privilege to be present under federal law nor have been removed pursuant to the Federal Government’s inherent authority." ¶ He eloquently explained, "federal power over immigration comes from the same source as state power over immigration: it is an inherent attribute – perhaps the fundamental attribute – of sovereignty. The States, of course, are sovereign, the United States being a Union of sovereign States. To be sovereign is necessarily to possess the power to exclude unwanted persons and things from the territory.”¶ In short, the Court essentially deprived Arizona of what most would consider the defining characteristic of its sovereignty, which is the power to exclude those who have absolutely no right to be there. ¶ Spin doctors on both sides of the immigration debate will attempt to paint the Court’s majority opinion as a victory. And to be sure, both sides will be correct.¶ But the states will suffer because core features of federalism continue to be eroded by the federal judiciary. ¶ And, in large part, Arizona still remains at the mercy of the central government’s refusal to enforce the nation’s immigration laws.

## No Modeling

#### No one model’s the U.S. – polls prove

Andrew Moravcsik 5, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, January 31, 2005, Newsweek, “Dream On, America,” p. Lexis

Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest of the world. East Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. You had only to listen to George W. Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But the greater danger may be a delusional America--one that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives on, that America remains a model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how Americans view themselves and how the world views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a source of good in the world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should spread globally. Foreigners take an entirely different view: 58 percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77 percent in Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for the United States is measured in single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the anti-Bushism of the president's first term is giving way to a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see American values spread in their country. Says Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the world. Unless the administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs." Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that Bush has been re-elected, all I can say is, God bless the rest of the world." The truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry would have had to confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy, free markets and international institutions--globalization, in a word. Countries today have dozens of political, economic and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have established their own distinctive ways--none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in his recent book "The European Dream," hails an emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural diversity and respect for international law--a model that's caught on quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a "model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman recently told the board of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake."

#### No judiciary modeling – distinct origins

Rubini 3 [Daniel L. Rubini is the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice in Iraq, “Ask the White House,” 11-03, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20031113.html]

Scott, from Washington DC writes: Judge Rubini - What similarities does the Iraqi judiciary process have with the United States? Also, what position does Iraq have concerning International Court of Justice decisions? Thanks, Daniel Rubini In the organizational sense, the court system resembles the European process. It does not resemble U.S., although the same basic elements of preliminary investigation, trial with presumption of innocence, and right of appeal are all present. Right now we are not affected on a day to day basis by the international courts. And without further checking, I do not know what protocols previous Iraq governments signed regarding the International Courts. [Continued…] Iraq’s legal system, without rule by decree from Saddam Hussein is more like a European system based on Spanish civil codes. It is not like the American system which is inherited from the British common law system.

# \*\*\*Hegemony\*\*\*

## No Impact

**Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war**

Haas 8 (Richard president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html>

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller b

**No impact---the US won’t exercise leadership**

Snyder 10 (PhD, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 2010 – [Quddus Z. Snyder, “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony,” <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf>]

At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. With its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China**.**43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

#### Empirically proven

Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010 “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### International system resilient – no conflict

Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### Even if the US declines, liberal international norms will survive - solves the impact

IKENBERRY 11 – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### Predictions underestimate locking mechanisms to heg

NORRLOF ’10 - an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto (Carla, “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 1-2)

We have seen erroneous predictions of American decline before. In the 1970s, the combination of high inflation, high interest rates, high unemployment, the Vietnam War, political and military challenges from China and the Soviet Union, and the economic rise of Japan led to eerily similar forecasts. Pessimists then, as today, underestimated the longevity of American power. The main reason the United States has continued to occupy a unique place in the international system is because a sufficient number of major and lesser powers have a strong interest in maintaining America at the top of the hierarchy. To bring America down would take a deliberate, coordinated strategy on the part of others and this is simply not plausible. As much as the United States benefits from the space it has carved out for itself in the current world order, its ability to reap unequal gains will remain unless and until allies start to incur heavy losses under American dominance. Even that, by itself, will not be sufficient to sink American hegemony. A strong alternative to American rule will have to come into view for things to fundamentally change. At present, no credible alternative is in sight. The United States is not invincible but its dominance is currently steady. Those who are inclined to think that American hegemony will persist – at least for a while – tend to dwell on the claim that the United States is providing a range of public goods to the benefit of all at its own expense. This is a chimera. The United States is self-interested, not altruistic. The illusion of benevolence has meant that very little attention has been given to uncovering the mechanism through which the United States gains disproportionately from supplying a large open market, the world’s reserve currency, and a military machine capable of stoking or foiling deadly disputes. This book exposes the mechanism through which the United States reaps unequal gains and shows that the current world system, and the distribution of power that supports it, has built-in stabilizers that strengthen American power following bouts of decline. Although all dominant powers must eventually decline, I will show that the downward progression need not be linear when mutually reinforcing tendencies across various power dimensions are at play. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the United States’ reserve currency status produces disproportionate commercial gains; how commercial power gives added flexibility in monetary affairs; and, finally, how military preponderance creates advantages in both monetary and trade affairs.

#### No impact to the transition

IKENBERRY ‘8 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### 1990s decreased defense spending. 1NC Haas – heg doesn’t deter conflicts – relations do. More ev – their evidence is biased and manipulated.

Christopher Layne 6 (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

#### War is obsolete- globalization, democracy prove

Wei, 08 (Chen Xiankui and Tang Wei, School of International Studies of Renmin, University of China. “Coming collapse of the hegemonic world” http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2008-09/12/content\_16440328.htm)

The decease of the US and Western hegemony will not be caused by the challenge from such rising powers as China or other countries. It will be caused by the world's irreversible efforts for a hegemony-free political structure. As the result of this situation, we can expect a hegemony-free and harmonious world in the 21st century in which big countries will fulfill their responsibilities and obligations and small ones can enjoy equality, democracy and assistance from each other. In the 21st century, the United States, the protagonist of the current unipolar world, will gradually evolve into a common power because of accelerated efforts of many countries which will advocate an end to the unipolar power pattern. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, a "balance of power" has come into being among the major countries. Despite its sole superpower status, the United States cannot always succeed in solving some global issues. It is even incapable of handling some domestic issues such as the subprime crisis. All these transmit to the world a strong signal that the US hegemony and Western dominance are now in an irreversible process of decline and final disappearance. In dealing with some global issues, today's United States not only needs substantial support from staunch allies, but also needs understanding, participation and cooperation from other key world or regional players. Sometimes, it even has to give up its leading role to other big powers in finding settlements of some intractable issues. With the spirit of peace and democracy exercising strong restraint within their boundaries, European countries have lost the basic driving force for hegemonic wars against other countries. On the other hand, economic globalization and marketization of the world since the end of the Cold War have activated the urge for peace and development among a number of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Especially the peaceful rise of some powers, such as China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, has prompted some Western countries to join the resistance to hegemonism. Some new-generation European leaders, though, still want to maintain the Western hegemony with the US at its core. They want to do so by advocating the "values diplomacy" and setting up the so-called democracy and values alliance or by forming a new trans-Atlantic union. But all these wishes will be difficult to fulfill. The emergence of some peace-promoting powers will be an irresistible historical tide in the 21st century. Their rise will lay solid groundwork for the final end of the long-standing hegemonism in world politics. New Delhi has generally chosen a path of peaceful development in South Asia despite its position of supremacy in the sub-continent. China has been even more committed to a peaceful development and always condemns any use of force in solving international disputes. The strong efforts and calls for a hegemony-free world from these new emerging powers and the massive populations of Asian, African and Latin American countries have exerted a huge pressure on hegemonic countries, prompting them to deal with others on an equal footing. The change of the world's hegemonic pattern pushed by newly emerging powers serves the basic interest of the whole world, including

#### US withdrawal won’t cause power wars - encourages NATO and Russian expansion

Gholz, Sapolsky, and Press 97 (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997)

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement. These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is greatest when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war. But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued US engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GOP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world's COP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states. But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

## Unsustainable

**The plan doesn’t affect the structural reasons economics effects hegemony**

Layne 9 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 21-23) PDF

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84

#### U.S. Heg unsustainable

Hamraie 11(James, Emory Senior student, “U.S. Hegemony is Unsustainable”, Emory Political Review, August 11, http://www.students.emory.edu/EPR/UsHegUnsust.html)

Economic woes have affected the ability of the United States to maintain its supremacy. The recent financial crises, the erosion of U.S. competitiveness in business and education, and the declining purchasing power of the dollar have created domestic turmoil and dented the leading view of U.S. dominance among international allies. These factors, coupled with dependence on foreign oil and energy resources, are weakening U.S. flexibility and allowing foreign nations with exploding economies, such as China and India, to close the gap. For example, if China’s booming growth continues, then China’s total GDP would be 2.5 times that of the United States. A weaker economy has high domestic dissatisfaction contributing to a greater urgency to focus on national issues instead of international affairs. It is essential for the United States to maintain its flexibility in international involvement and conflict resolution because it lends the impression that the U.S. does not have its hands tied and that the U.S. military is still extremely powerful. A strong economy also lessens the amount of domestic spending on social services and foundation-level economic stimulus and allows for greater allocation of resources into research and development of new military technologies and upkeep of military supplies. Both of these factors are essential for conventional combat readiness and warfare, and allow the U.S. armed forces to sustain their lead over other nations. Diplomatic woes arise from the United States’ diminished image. Although the War on Terror initially forged alliances and international sympathy, the unilateral policy decisions, human rights abuses, and exceptionalism that followed transformed the perception of the United States from a benevolent world power to an international bully willing to neglect multilateral solutions in favor of ad-hoc cowboy diplomacy. The abuses of Abu Ghraib, arguments over the Kyoto Protocol and global warming, and the invasion of Iraq are only a few examples of policies that have spurred heavy disdain and lasting animosity with both allies and hostile nations. Although Obama’s election has caused many foreign countries to begin changing their attitude towards the United States and public polls have illustrated a stronger approval rating of the United States, there are still major issues that need to be settled. The U.S. has failed to take concrete action on a majority of issues that the international community has been asking the United States to follow through on for over a decade. These include the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Being a world leader requires more than raw power. Sustaining alliances and goodwill with other nations is essential. Additionally, if the United States can convince other nations to comply with its wishes, it can lower the costs of shaping the global stage to reflect its interests. This arrangement, coupled with the evolving balance of power, can cause other nations to support the U.S. and oppose its potential challengers. For instance, the changing security dynamics in East Asia show that self-interest is spurring countries to be less willing to oppose neighbors on important issues or strategic circumstances. This is due to a fear of losing economic and trading ties, despite a long history of cooperation and positive relations with the United States. Imperial overstretch, domestic costs of forward deployment, fighting capability, and overburdening security and humanitarian commitments has caused a decline in military power, the lifeline of U.S. global dominance. The growing strength of foreign militaries exacerbates the effect of these problems. The post-Cold War apex of American power has begun to erode while other nations with larger populations are training substantial military forces with increasingly sophisticated technology. Recent events illustrate the implication of these factors on the decline of U.S. power and the growing strength of potential global rivals. India and China are economic powerhouses, whose growth has allowed for greater modernization. Despite the military edge currently held by the U.S., domestic sentiment has drifted away from an overwhelming focus on defense spending since the invasion of and subsequent public backlash from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, China’s expanding naval forces, such as the nuclear-armed submarines, are lessening the effect of U.S. nuclear supremacy and first-strike leverage. Furthermore, in other important global regions, Brazil is vying for regional hegemony, China is building security and economic ties with African nations, and Russia is legitimizing interventionist policies with the invasion of Georgia and fiery rhetoric over national expansion and national missile defense.

**Prefer our evidence**

Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

**Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives**

**Layne 9** (Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 09[“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009]

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.15 Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers**.**16 As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).17]Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

#### U.S hegemony is unsustainable

Snyder PhD, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 2010 – [Quddus Z. Snyder, “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony,” <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf>]

At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. With its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China**.**43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

## No Challengers

Heg is sustainable – US has dominance in all areas of power and its not going anywhere

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(Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 27- 31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

#### Heg is sustainable- challengers can’t make up the power differential, and trends point toward continued unipolarity

Beckley 2012 (Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)

More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the true military gap because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States “more bang for the buck” – each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is determined by a country’s level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political factors. As noted earlier, China’s per capita income has declined relative to that of the United States. China’s defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S. share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while China’s share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, an independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found “no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States.…The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and its allies.”207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-­‐2008 Source: Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-­‐2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-­‐2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-­‐thumping. China can “pose problems without catching up,” compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies, local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe China’s “anti-area-­‐denial” capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim – the Pentagon is developing sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt the strategic importance of China’s capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities, especially in littorals and low-­‐altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes, weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might continue to rise in place – steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And what the trends suggest is that America’s economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future.

#### Hegemonic ideas based on realism fail- empirics and theory prove that nobody will contest hegemons

Wolf 1 (Reinhard Wolf is a professor of international relations at the Department of Political Science at Goethe University, Frankfurt/M. His current research focuses on the relevance of respect and disrespect in international relations, notably on the expression of, sensitivity to and consequences of disrespect among states and nations. He is especially interested in applying insights and findings from both philosophy and social psychology to theoretical and empirical studies in international relations, "Hegemon without Challengers? U.S. Leadership in the 21st Century", Martin Luther University, July 2001, www2.politik.uni-halle.de/rode/texte/Hegemo3.PDF, KW)

Neorealism contends that hegemonic rivalry is bound to occur once a rising power catches up with the capabilities of the established hegemon. Neorealists back this claim with two basic arguments. The first one is based on the notions of anarchy and the balance of power. According to Kenneth Waltz and his disciples, a bipolar distribution of capabilities leaves the two dominant powers little choice but to balance against one another. Without a common threat powerful enough to make them join forces in common defense the two poles have little reason to trust one another. Rather, they have to consider each other as the only threat conceivable. Under conditions of an anarchical self-help system they are forced to take precautions lest the other superpower becomes so dominant that it can prevail in a future conflict. Because both poles will no longer be able to compensate major power shifts by skillfull alliance diplomacy, they will become more dependent on their own resources. Accordingly, they will do everything to prevent the other superpower from increasing its relative power. 9 The second realist argument focuses on the power transition which occurs when another power catches up with the hegemonic state. In this process, the hegemon gradually loses the superiority required for the defense of the existing international order while the rising power acquires the capability to undermine an order shaped according to the interests of the hegemon. As the protection of the status quo becomes ever more expensive for the hegemon, undermining or destroying that order becomes ever more attractive for the other superpower. Sooner or later, either the hegemon will initiate a preventive war or the rising power is bound to attempt a forceful overthrow the established order.10 On both empirical and theoretical accounts these realist arguments fall too short. Although they correctly point to the changes in costs and opportunities affecting the stability of great power relations, there is little evidence that a mere shift from either unipolarity or multipolarity to bipolarity inevitably leads to hegemonic conflict. To be sure, the defeat of a powerful common opponent often feeds distrust among the most powerful victors. This change will be potentially stronger if a major conflict ends with just two polar states. Yet often perceptions and concerns do not change to an extent which necessarily brings about intense conflict between erstwhile allies. Even in cases where just two dominant powers remain, security cooperation may be continued for many years.11 After the Napoleonic Wars, for instance, Britain and Russia clearly commanded much greater capabilities than all the other powers. Some historians, therefore, have called these states the two superpowers of that age. 12 Bipolarity, however, failed to bring about an early conflict between the two preponderant poles. It took 17 years until Britain and Russia finally became rivals. Moreover, they did so at the very moment when France was sucessfully closing the resource gap separating it from the two “superpowers”. That means, Britain and Russia became antagonists just when the European system seemed to shift from bipolarity to tripolarity, i.e. when security interdependence between them actually should have increased again. 13 Nor is there convincing evidence that power transitions between preponderant states must always result in intense rivalry. Otherwise, Britain and the United States should have become bitter enemies during the first decades of the twentieth century when America was overtaking Britain in terms of economic and military capabilities. Although this power transition sometimes complicated relations between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, its destabilizing effects were quite easily mitigated by other factors such as common economic and ideological interests or conflicts with other powers.14 All this points to the conclusion that shifts in the distribution of power can hardly be regarded a sufficient cause of hegemonic challenges.

Trends show strengthening U.S. hegemony

Smith 2010 (Perry a retired U.S. Air Force major general, is the author of six books, including Rules and Tools for Leaders Agusta chronicle,, In a troubled world, America still has a multitude of strengths, accessed: 2/22/10, http://chronicle.augusta.com/2010-02-19/troubled-world-america-still-has-multitude-strengths?v=1266701777 DA 7/15/10)

With so much in the media that is gloom and doom, it might be useful to remind ourselves that America has many fundamental strengths. Here is a listing of some of the political, economic, technological, cultural, creative and entrepreneurial factors that define the United States today. Largest economy. At $14 trillion, our Gross National Product is the largest in the world. You must add up the three next largest -- Japan ($5.5 trillion), China ($4.5 trillion) and Germany ($ 4 trillion) -- to get to America's total. Best military. Although our services have faced many stresses since 9-11, the U.S. military excels in many ways. The only military with a genuine worldwide reach, it has more combat experience than the military of any other nation. Best alliance/coalition potential. Our ability to find coalition partners has been especially helpful to us in countering terrorism (even the Russians and Chinese assist), and in the war in Afghanistan. Best brain/talent sponge. If you live in another country, are really smart and want to get both a great education and an enlightening work experience, the United States will, in most cases, be your first choice. More and better entrepreneurs. It seems to be in our genes. Productive work force. Whereas Japan led the way in the past, recent analyses by a number of international agencies rank the United States first. Ability to bounce back from major setbacks. Just think of what we have faced in the past 70 years -- Pearl Harbor, 1941; Korea, 1950-53; Sputnik, 1957; Vietnam, 1965-1975; Watergate, 1974; the 9-11 attacks, 2001; and the Great Recession, 2007-2009. Venture capital availability. If you are German, Japanese, Chinese or Brazilian with a great idea or a new invention, finding venture capital within your own nation is very hard. Communications reach and cultural influence. Beginning in the 1940s, America has surpassed all others in reaching even the most remote parts of the world. Natural resources. America's supply of coal and natural gas is enormous. In addition, the potential of solar power is huge. Unlike northern Europe, Russia and northern China, America has a great amount of sunshine. Being windy is another American asset. The English language. For almost 100 years, English has been dominant. Computer power. Led by such corporations as Google, EMC, Cisco, IBM and Intel, America holds the top spot in gross computer power. Culture of lifetime learning. Americans have a great love of learning. A high percentage of mature Americans, often encouraged by company policies on pay and promotions, pursue college and postgraduate education. Technical colleges. These colleges are a treasure for those seeking good jobs. The CSRA has two first-rate schools, Augusta Tech and Aiken Tech. Universities. Sixty-six of the 100 top universities in the world are American. Agricultural sector. Only the Brazilians come close to the productivity of the American farmer. Contributions of philanthropies. It is not just Bill and Melinda Gates who give away money with great skill. Foundations in the CSRA help make our community a better place to live, work and enjoy our lives. Birth rate of 2.1. This ideal birth rate, combined with our ability to attract so many talented and hard working people from other nations, should ensure that we will meet the challenges of the future. Diversity. Having so many of us coming from different national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups allows America to interact comfortably with the world's many cultures. Nanotechnology, biotechnology and genome research. America leads the world. Fundamental optimism. Americans continue to have high confidence in their ability to solve problems, as well as to get things done and done well. This probably is our greatest strength. I would like to close on a personal note. In the more than 75 years that I have had the blessing of being an American, only twice have I been pessimistic about America's future. First, in the period between the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle of Midway (I had witnessed the attack, and in the months following I read lots of scary headlines about Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Singapore and Bataan). Second, in 1969 when I returned from Vietnam and observed America in turmoil. In sum, sustained pessimism can create a death spiral for any organization or institution. Tough-minded realism with an overlay of optimism is the key to our future**.**

US hegemony is sustainable – supremacy in all aspects of power and global support

Min 04 (Min Ye, expert on China, Princeton University, “The US Hegemony and Implication for China,” http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)

Clearly Waltz argued that the unipolarity in the wake of the Cold War was temporary. For one, nations rise and decline. The U.S relative power will decline and it will increasingly become difficult for it to preserve unipolarity, as Robert Gilpin argued. Furthermore, other nations will come into each other’ aid to balance against the U.S, because minor states feel safer to be with other minor states. Waltz’s prediction may not hold, however, if we consider the following aspects of U.S power. First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers— Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

U.S. Hegemony is sustainable – The U.S. is dominant in every single sector – assumes Obama

Kreft, Senior Policy Advisor at CDU, 2009 (Heinrich Kreft, senior foreign policy advisor to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the german bundestag, The World Today, February 2009, p. 11)

During the presidential election campaign, both Barack Obama and his Republican opponent John McCain expressed the view that the United States was and ought to remain the guarantor of international stability and the indispensable stabilising power. Against the backdrop of the present financial and economic crisis and rekindled discussion about the decline of US power, it is easy to overlook the fact that America is structurally superior to all other countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE UNITED States, its material resources and human capital, its military strength and economic competitiveness as well as its liberal political and economic traditions, are the ingredients of superiority. It has the capacity to heal its own wounds like no other country. STRENGTHS The US not only possesses large deposits of natural resources and vast areas of productive farmland, but also enjoys favourable medium- and long-term demographic trends. Thanks to immigration and a high birth rate, it has a young population compared to Europe, Japan, Russia as well as China. This makes the burden of providing for an ageing population far less onerous. In spite of the present crisis, the economy, which accounts for more than a quarter of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), is essentially vibrant. Over the past twenty five years, its growth has been significantly higher than Europe's and Japan's; the economy is adaptable and more innovative than any other. It is the most competitive globally, with particular strengths in crucial strategic areas such as nanotechnology and bioengineering. The US has the best universities and research institutes and trains more engineers in relation to its population than any other major economy. It invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 percent in Japan. President Barack Obama's plan for more educational investment aims to maintain this advantage also against China, which is increasing its higher education investments. In the military domain too, no other country comes close to matching the capability of the US to project its power globally. America accounts for almost half of global military spending, six times more than China, its only potential rival. Current defence spending, however, at 4.2 percent of GDP, is still far below the double-digit Cold War peak. Even if the cost of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan runs at an annual figure of $125 billion, this is less than one per cent of GDP and hence considerably lower than the cost of the Vietnam war. In contrast to the 'hard power' of military strength, Iraq and the Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib problems have severely dented the image and thereby diminished its 'soft power'. Nevertheless, the structural components of soft power remain intact, from US mass culture - the dominance of American global communications such as the internet and television - to the unfailing appeal of its universities.

#### No credible threats now

Doug Bandow (senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan) January 2010 “Military Spending — For What?” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11143

The United States dominates the globe militarily. The threats facing America pale compared to its capabilities. Why, then, is Washington spending so much on the military? In 2010 the U.S. will spend roughly $700 billion on the military. This is an increase of 2 percent (after inflation) from the Obama administration's original nonwar defense budget of $534 billion. Despite initial plans for zero growth in defense spending in coming years, there are rumors that the Department of Defense will receive a 2 percent increase in real outlays through 2015. Still, some conservatives want to enshrine a military buildup in a law mandating fixed outlays at 4, 5 or even 6 percent of gross domestic product. Hawks focus on the percentage of GDP going to the military — currently about 4.4 percent — since that figure has fallen over the years. America spends more inflation- adjusted dollars on the military today than at any time since the end of World War II. Figured in 2000 dollars, the U.S. devoted $774.6 billion to the military in 1945, the final year of World War II. In 1953, the final year of the Korean War, military outlay ran to $416.1 billion. Expenditure during the Vietnam War peaked at $421.3 billion in 1968. By contrast, in 2010 — even before the Afghan surge and other unplanned expenditure — the administration expected to spend $517.8 billion. That's more than during the lengthy, but often warm, Cold War. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen because the U.S. economy has grown. GDP in 2010 (in 2000 dollars) will run to about $11.7 trillion. That is almost twice as much as in 1986, more than three times as much as in 1968, and nearly six times as much as in 1953. Military outlay should be tied to threats, not economic growth. Can anyone credibly claim the military threat facing America is two, three, or six times as great today as during those years? Today the U.S. does not face a significant military threat. As Colin Powell famously declared in 1991 when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung." The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state. America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force. Washington's reach exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues — Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria — and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone. The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global military outlay hits 80 percent. In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to overpower other nations. But it will become increasingly expensive for America to preserve the ability to attack countries like China. Terrorism remains a pressing security threat. However, terrorist attacks, though horrid, do not pose an existential danger. Al-Qaida is no replacement for Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to combat terrorism. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes terrorism, like swatting a hornet's nest. America's military spending is determined by its foreign policy. America's commitments are a matter of choice. They don't make sense today. Engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement. And any international involvement must balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure. The U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated military — one well able to defend Americans.

#### Western alliances ensure no violent overturning of the current liberal order

John Ikenberry (professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University) January/February 2008 “The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -- an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power -- shifts the balance in the order's favor. Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system. The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past -- making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful. ACCOMMODATING THE RISE The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.

**There are no challengers who would risk conflict over leadership**

Qian 8—reporter of Yale Global [Jiang, February 29th, Is the Sun Setting on US Dominance? – Part II, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10435>

The proponents of such a "multipolar worldview" often confuse the immense potential of their favored giants with their actual influences. They often overlook the immense internal difficulties these rising giants must overcome to realize their potential. Most importantly, they do not take full account of the strategic interactions between these giants during their simultaneous rise and the strategic opportunities that such interactions present for the US. Among the rising powers, the European Union boasts by far the largest economy, with a strong currency and a comparatively large and prosperous population. However, after a long drive of expansion, Europe faces a serious cohesion problem. It still suffers from a weak security framework that's dependent on NATO and a legalistic rather than executive center in Brussels. Although the EU does chase strategic interests in its proximities such as the central Asia and North Africa, it does so, not for any overreaching vision to compete globally, but mostly for parochial economic reasons. Europe is not yet competing in any "Great Game," for the simple reason that Europe is not yet unified. Recent rejections of the EU constitution show that serious resistance remains towards further integration. After recent stabilization of its economy, a resurgent Russia is often mentioned as a future global power. However, Russia faces severe long-term internal challenges. Its population is declining and aging, its vast Siberia territories hollowing out after the end of Soviet subsidies. Extractive industries such as hydrocarbon, mining and timber account for 80 percent of Russia's exports and 30 percent of its government revenue, whereas its manufacturing industries are mostly outdated and uncompetitive.Russia therefore will have serious issues with its self-image as a major world power, finding it hard to forge an assessment of its global role commensurate with its long-term demographic and economic realities. Japan has a similar problem of updating its self-image as the most "advanced" nation in Asia for more than 100 years. Today Japan faces the harsh reality that, after its neighbors catch up, Japan will again find itself a geographically small, resource-poor island nation dependent on trade, living uneasily among large, populous continental neighbors. It has a largely pacifist, prosperous population in a neighborhood still rife with nationalism.Unlike Europe, East Asia has yet to extinguish historical grievances, border disputes and a taste for raw national powers. As Japan itself proved, economic rises, once initiated, can be rapid indeed, so its current economic strength does not guarantee its future influence. Furthermore, barring a rapid re-militarization, Japan's growth in national strengths is bound to be slower than that of its still maturing neighbors, therefore its relative strategic position in East Asia will only grow weaker. Either re-militarization or an erosion of its self-perceived leadership in the region is likely to require a profound reassessment of Japan's postwar consensus of national purposes. India sees itself as an up-and-coming power, proud to be a democracy yet simultaneously aspiring to more traditional "hard" powers. As a diverse and still poor country, it faces immense internal challenges. Its manufacturing base and infrastructure need major overhaul. Beyond these, India is limited by its geographical constraint in the South Asia and the thorn in its side that’s Pakistan. Sandwiched between Pakistan, Burma and the Himalayas, India’s ambition beyond the subcontinent could not blossom until its geographical perimeter is secured. China borders three of the ambitious giants – India, Russia and Japan. China's neighborhood is far tougher than that of either Europe or the US. Like India, China is a large, poor country rife with internal tensions. Unlike Europe or America, its current form of government does not enjoy wide ideological appeal. Compared with Russia’s or even Japan’s, its military is still modernizing. It has recently become fashionable in America and Europe to describe Chinese "expansions" in Africa and South America. But the evidence is mostly economic deals over raw materials. This is not expansionism, but mercantilism. China is indeed playing an active geopolitical game in its immediate environment: Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Korea Peninsula. But this only serves to show that China is still mired in local complexities.

**America is too awesome – Other countries can’t even eat on the same plate**

The Economist 8 (“What crisis? Innovation” June 14, 2008, U.S. Edition. Lexis)

Worries that America is losing its edge in science and technology are overblown "THE wolves have not encircled us yet," the Denver Post opined in an article in 2006 entitled "Signs America's Scientific Edge is Slipping", "but there's no denying the sounds of scratching at the door."This was a pithy summary of a mountain of reports from congressional committees, scientific panels and business groups. But a new report from the RAND Corporation's National Defence Research Institute, "US Competitiveness in Science and Technology", suggests that the panic is overblown. The report demonstrates that America is still the world's science and technology powerhouse. It accounts for 40% of total world spending on research and development, and produces 63% of the most frequently cited publications. It is home to 30 of the world's leading 40 universities, and employs 70% of the world's living Nobel laureates. America produces 38% of patented new technologies in the OECD and employs 37% of the OECD's researchers. There is little evidence that America is resting on its laurels, according to RAND. Developing countries such as China and India may be boosting their science and technology muscle faster than America. But they are starting from a low base. America is outperforming Europe and Japan on many performance measures: in 1993-2003 America's growth rate in patents averaged 6.6% a year compared with 5.1% for the European Union and 4.1% for Japan. One reason for America's angst was that the growth of federal spending on R&D slowed significantly with the end of the cold war. It only grew by 2.5% a year in 1994-2004 compared with a long-term average of 3.5% since 1953. The trouble with this statistic is that America has lots of sources of R&D spending: federal money accounted for only $86 billion of the $288 billion that it spent on R&D in 2004. Spending on the life sciences is increasing rapidly, a reasonable bet on the future. Others worry that non-US citizens now account for 41% of science and engineering PhDs. But this is arguably a sign of America's continuing world domination: the world's brightest people are gravitating to the world's best opportunities. A higher proportion than ever of these paragons want to make their homes in the United States.

#### Heg is inevitable: structural foundations buffer heg decline

NORRLOF ’10 - an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto (Carla, “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 1-2)

The United States has been the most powerful country in the world for more than sixty years. Throughout this period, it has had the world’s largest economy and the world’s most important currency. For most of this time, it had the world’s most powerful military as well – and its military supremacy today is beyond question. We are truly in an era of US hegemony, a unipolar moment, a Pax Americana, which has enabled Americans to enjoy the highest standard of living in human history. Is this privileged position being undercut by serial trade deficits? The pessimists are growing more numerous by the day. They see the country’s spendthrift ways as a disaster waiting to happen. They warn that the cavernous gap in merchandise trade, well above 6 percent in 2006, is an ominous sign of competitive slippage. In 2008, the liabilities acquired to finance the shortfall in exports reached an amazing 29 percent of GDP. A falling dollar, military overstretch, the rise of the euro, the rise of China, and progressively deeper integration in East Asia are among the factors that many believe herald the imminent decline of American hegemony. In my view, the doomsayers are mistaken. I argue that American hegemony is stable and sustainable. While the United States certainly does face a number of challenges, an analysis of the linkages between trade, money, and security shows that American power is robust. This book is a story about why and how American hegemony works, and what other states would have to do to emulate or, on other grounds, thwart, America’s power base. As I will show, the United States benefits from running persistent trade deficits as a result of its special position in the international system. I will argue that any comparably situated country would choose to pursue the same cyclical deficit policy as the one encouraged by the US government. A series of size advantages cut across trade, money, and security: the size of the American market, the role of the dollar, and American military power interact to make a trade deficit policy rewarding and buffer the United States from the extreme consequences that a sustained deficit policy would otherwise have.

## Low

#### Heg low—challengers and economy

Regilme 11 [Santino Regilme, CfP: The Decline of US Hegemony: Emerging Power(s) and the Future of World Politics (ECPR Grad Conference 2012, Proposed Panel), “The Decline of US Hegemony: Emerging Power(s) and the Future of World Politics”, November 30, 2011, http://politicalcogito.wordpress.com/2011/11/30/cfp-the-decline-of-us-hegemony-emerging-powers-and-the-future-of-world-politics-ecpr-grad-conference-2012-proposed-panel/]

Panel Proposal: The Decline of US Hegemony: Emerging Power(s) and the Future of World Politics Since the emergence of the US as the world’s superpower almost 50 years ago, the discourse on its imminent hegemonic decline has been ongoing for quite some time. The advent of non-traditional security threats especially after 9/11 vis-à-vis the deep-seated problems in the American homeland have casted doubts over the tenacity and persistence of US hegemony. This is further complicated, moreover, by the long-standing economic instability in the US-led global political economy. More importantly, the rapid economic growth of China and other emerging powers, traditionally considered as countries from the Global South, has also been quite suggestive of the receding power of American hegemony. Some have even argued that the days of American global dominance could be nearly over, and the most promising candidate to replace it is China (Jacques, 2009).

#### Heg low—budget cuts

Mandelbaum 11 [Michael Mandelbaum, Foreign Affairs, “America's Coming Retrenchment How Budget Cuts Will Limit the United States’ Global Role”, August 9, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment]

The acrimonious negotiation that produced legislation to raise the American debt ceiling while cutting the federal budget deficit, which President Barack Obama signed on August 2, was an early skirmish in the battle to bring deficits under control. That battle is bound to be protracted, difficult, and contentious, and one of its casualties will be spending on foreign and security policy, which will decline in the years ahead. That will impose new limits on the projection of American power around the world. What a difference a year makes. Only last year, in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, I published a review (“Overpowered?”) of three books whose common theme was that the United States was doing far too much beyond its borders. For its own sake and the sake of other countries, the three authors recommended, the country should pursue a more modest foreign policy. Now, as I forecast at the end of that essay, the fiscal condition of the United States will compel the fulfillment of that recommendation -- for better (the general sentiment of the books’ authors) or for worse (my own view). The August 2 legislation calls for $1 trillion in spending cuts over a ten-year period, about $350 billion of which is likely to come from the defense budget. The legislation also mandates a further $1.5 trillion reduction in expenditures in the next decade. If a special Congressional panel cannot agree on the targets of those reductions, an automatic trigger will impose across-the-board budget savings that will lower the Defense Department’s budget by an estimated $600 billion. Even if the triggering mechanism is avoided, spending on defense and on other aspects of U.S. foreign policy will decline over the next decade. The scale of deficit reduction required to put the country on solid fiscal footing is so large that it must involve both limits on Social Security and Medicare, despite the Democrats’ determination to preserve these programs intact, and increases in taxes in some form, despite the Republicans’ determination to prevent this. When Americans are paying more to their government and getting less from it, they will not be as generous in supporting the United States’ global role as they have been in recent decades...

#### Heg low – rise of China and economy

#### Financial Times 11

**(Lionel Barber, “The end of US hegemony: Legacy of 9/11,” 9/5/11, Financial Times Analysis,** <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6acf1a6-d54d-11e0-bd7e-00144feab49a.html#axzz217uvLMKO> /mr)

On the morning of September 11, 2001, America’s prospects appeared as bright as the clear blue sky over Lower Manhattan. The price of Brent crude oil was $28 a barrel, the Federal government was running a budget surplus, the US economy was turning (albeit imperceptibly) after the dotcom crash. The most powerful nation on earth was at peace.¶ Ten years on, the oil price hovers around $115 a barrel, the US is projected to run a budget deficit for 2011 of $1,580bn, the largest in its history; the economy remains deeply troubled after the financial crash of 2008; and America’s military and intelligence services remain at war, battling insurgency and radical Islamic terrorism, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Niger and Yemen.¶ More¶ Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has described the national debt as the greatest threat to US national security. Standard & Poor’s recent downgrade of America’s credit rating appears to confirm the superpower’s steady slippage. And while there is no linear narrative from the September 2001 attacks to America’s present economic plight, the inflation-adjusted cost of the ensuing “global war on terror” at more than $2,000bn amounts to twice the cost of the Vietnam war.¶ President George W. Bush’s response to the assault on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon was to launch two wars of choice against Afghanistan and Iraq, a pugnacious unilateralism at the expense of alliances and international law, and a near evangelical promotion of liberal democracy in the Middle East. His administration’s hard-edged policies fractured alliances in Europe and triggered a sharp fall in America’s standing abroad.¶ On the positive side of the ledger, America has so far escaped another terrorist attack on its own soil. Others have not been so fortunate. The bombings in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) did not match the scale of September 11, but they claimed several hundred victims. Al-Qaeda is down but not entirely out. Dozens of computer disks recovered from Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggest the al-Qaeda leader, killed last May during a daring raid by US Navy Seals, was planning another spectacular outrage, perhaps to coincide with the September 11 anniversary this weekend.¶ Moreover, this year’s Arab awakening has dispelled the notion that the Middle East – with the exception of Israel – is congenitally incapable of embracing democracy, One by one, the region’s autocrats, from Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, have been toppled by protesters demanding dignity, freedom and jobs. True, the fall of Muammer Gaddafi in Libya was precipitated by armed rebellions assisted by Nato warplanes; but President Bashar al-Assad of Syria may be the next leader to feel the hot breath of the Arab street.¶ Twin Towers memorial rises from rubble¶ A decade and a day after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the public will be able to return for the first time to the place where the Twin Towers stood¶ The question is whether the much-maligned Mr Bush was correct in arguing that the autocratic status quo in the Middle East created an incubator for radical Islamic terrorism and consequently a clear and present danger to the US. If the answer is yes, then his administration’s failings were due less to a flawed diagnosis and more to a matter of execution.¶ A second related question is whether the administration’s military response to September 11 amounted to a costly and disproportionate diversion of attention and resources at a time when the world was being reshaped by the rise of powerful new actors, notably China?¶ . . .¶ In the aftermath of the attack on the Twin Towers, a geopolitical re-alignment comparable to those of 1815, 1945 or 1989 appeared to take shape. The US mustered a coalition against terrorism that included rivals such as Russia and China, as well as one-time pariahs such as Cuba, Iran and Sudan.¶ The military response was equally effective. Having identified the perpetrators, the US staged a brilliant improvised campaign to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan. US special forces combined with warlords and overwhelming air-power to break the Kabul regime within weeks. Although the leaders, notably Mullah Omar and his proxy Bin-Laden, slipped away, the al-Qaeda network was relentlessly targeted and disrupted.¶ Within a year, the US had lost the moral high ground. Mr Bush’s error was to make clear that regime change in Iraq was only one step for dealing with what he described as an “axis of evil” including Iran, North Korea and potentially other adversaries suspected of harbouring or sponsoring terrorists. Overnight, the US was cast as a rogue nation.¶ Concerns rose with the publication of a revised national security doctrine in 2002, which ditched cold war concepts of containment and deterrence. In their place came a “forward-leaning” strategy of pre-emptive military action, regime change, and a new kind of warfare that justified torture and denied the rights of the Geneva Convention to suspected terrorists.¶ Thus the Iraq war was fought without the support of traditional allies such as Canada, France and Germany; without the backing of the UN Security Council; and without conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction posing an immediate threat to the US. As for allies, Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair provided loyal political cover, though Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, declared witheringly that UK forces were redundant in military terms.¶ Nato, having for the first time invoked article five to commit all members to collective defence, was similarly sidelined. Washington’s motto was “the mission determines the coalition”. But selective alliances work both ways. By the end of the decade, European allies were using caveats to opt out of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Hence outgoing US defence secretary Robert Gates’ warning this year that Nato was fast becoming irrelevant.¶ Europe, too, emerged much diminished – and not just during the Libyan conflict where Germany opted out and Britain and France ran short of munitions within weeks. At the beginning of the new century, flush with the success of launching a new monetary union, Europe’s leaders agreed plans to make the European Union the most competitive economic zone in the world. In retrospect, the much-vaunted Lisbon agenda marked the summit of ambitions coinciding with the bursting of the dotcom bubble.¶ Ten years on, the original design of European monetary union has shown itself to be fundamentally flawed. The enforcement mechanisms for budgetary discipline were ignored by big and smaller members alike, including Germany; peripheral economies in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which soared on the back of low interest rates, have been exposed as uncompetitive. Contagion in the bond markets now threatens to spread to Italy, a “core” eurozone member.¶ . . .¶ By Mr Bush’s second term, abrasive rhetoric gave way to a more tempered approach. As an occupation force in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US became sucked into the nation-building that Mr Rumsfeld had long derided. In a similar confusion, President Barack Obama and David Cameron, UK prime minister, declared either one or both of these missions to be militarily vital and then acted as if they were discretionary by setting a (political) timetable for withdrawal.¶ The accountants will tot up the collective bill for the Afghan and Iraq ventures at close to $2,000bn in inflation-adjusted terms; but Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank and a former deputy US secretary of state, argues that a country as rich as the US can well afford the cost. In 1948, says Mr Zoellick, the average gross national product per head in the US was one quarter of where it stands today. Yet Americans readily supported President Truman’s doctrine to prop up democracies in Europe and counter communism around the world to the tune of billions of dollars.¶ Whether the seeds of democratic transformation will take root in Iraq is more debatable. The much-vaunted US military “surge” rescued the country from chaos and possible break-up, but relations between Iraq’s ethnic groups – Kurds, Sunnis and the majority Shia – remain precarious. Arguably, the toppling of Saddam Hussein has allowed Iran to become the dominant regional power, exerting influence through the Shia government in Baghdad. Meanwhile, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions remain unchecked.¶ Nor did 9/11 boost efforts to tackle the other serious and unresolved threat to regional stability: the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Both Mr Bush and Mr Obama have failed to break the deadlock over the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and the status of Jerusalem. Successive Israeli prime ministers from Ariel Sharon to Benjamin Netanyahu have turned the war on terror to their own advantage, arguing that concessions jeopardise Israel’s security and entities such as Hamas – which easily won elections in Gaza in 2005 – are terrorists masquerading as legitimate representatives of the Palestinians.¶ Despite the focus on fighting terrorism, the US was still alert to broader geopolitical trends. The most important breakthrough took place between the US and India with the signing in 2008 of the“123” deal on civil nuclear co-operation. The new strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi not only offers a counterweight to the rise of China, but also to nuclear-armed Pakistan, America’s long-time but increasingly unmanageable ally in South Asia.¶ By contrast, Sino-US relations amount to not much more than an uneasy accommodation. Beijing sees Washington (at best) as “neither friend nor enemy”, while the US has belatedly woken up to China’s challenge to its dominance in the Pacific. Beijing has grudgingly applied pressure to its brooding nuclear neighbour in North Korea, but nationalist fervour means the leadership remains neuralgic over Taiwan and acutely sensitive to territorial disputes with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam.¶ . . .¶ In the final resort, the most significant geopolitical development of the past 10 years took place not on the battlefield but in the financial system. The global banking crisis stemmed from flawed regulation and perverse incentives for banks to sell mortgages to poor Americans with no ability to repay, as well as gigantic leverage in the financial system. These distortions were created, in part, by global imbalances driven by Americans living on cheap credit and Chinese exporters and savers contributing to a vast current account surplus.¶ Until the Great Crash of 2008, this financial merry-go-round spun regardless. Thanks to cheap labour costs, China exported deflation to the rest of the world. China financed the US current account deficit by recycling its own surplus into US Treasury bonds. Now, three years into the financial crisis, the world economy has been turned upside down. The US is diminished, Europe sidelined, and Asia, for now, in the ascendant.¶ Consider the broader historical trend. Developing Asia’s share of the global economy in purchasing power parity terms has risen steadily from 8 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent last year. Taken as a whole, Asian stock markets now account for 31 per cent of global market capitalisation, ahead of Europe at 25 per cent and within a whisker of the US at 32 per cent. Last year, China overtook Germany to become the world’s largest exporter. Chinese banks now rank among the biggest in the world by market capitalisation.¶ Import numbers are equally revealing: the developing world is becoming a driver of the global economy. From the consumption of cement to eggs, China leads the world; it has also just overtaken US to become the world’s largest market for cars.¶ China’s voracious appetite for commodities is creating new trade routes, especially with emerging powerhouses such as Brazil. Last year, China surpassed the US as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. Latin America, a region once best known for instability, has emerged through the crisis virtually unscathed. Poverty is falling, the middle classes are expanding and asset markets are bubbling.¶ Condoleezza Rice, Mr Bush’s national security adviser and secretary of state, once described multi-polarity as a theory of rivalry, a necessary evil. In economic terms, multi-polarity spells a new order in which interdependence is the norm and the US, while still overwhelmingly powerful, no longer occupies the role of hegemon.¶ As for the legacy of 9/11, Gerard Lyons, chief economist of Standard Chartered Bank, says the three most important words in the past decade were not “war on terror” but “made in China”. On present trends, he adds, the three most important words of this decade will be “owned by China”.¶

#### Credit downgrade

**International Policy Digest 11**

**(Dr. Jo Coghlan, “U.S. Credit Rating: American Hegemony in Decline?” 8/9/11,** <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/08/09/u-s-credit-rating-american-hegemony-in-decline/> /mr)

Standard and Poor’s (S&P) have reduced America’s sovereign credit rating from AAA to AA+. The rating puts the U.S. on par with Kuwait and Taiwan.¶ America’s $14.3 trillion debt makes “the world’s richest nation” a worse credit risk than Australia, Germany, Britain and the Isle of Man. The downgrade followed the biggest weekly selloff in U.S. stocks in 32 months.¶ S&P’s decision rested on two factors: America’s decision to raise the debt ceiling and concerns about America’s political processes. S&P were reportedly concerned about the “political brinksmanship of recent months” which had highlighted what they saw as “America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable” than what they had previously believed. S&P were “pessimistic” about the ability of Congress and the White House to reach a broader plan to rein in the deficit “any time soon.”¶ It has been widely reported that the legislation signed by Barack Obama on 2 August to reduce the fiscal deficit by $2.1 trillion over 10 years was well short of S&P expectations of US$4 trillion.¶ The rating agency is also reportedly considering the possibility of lowering the rating to AA within two years if the U.S. government does not cut spending as much as recently pledged, or if higher interest rates and new fiscal pressures worsen the state’s financial picture.¶ The Wall Street Journal has reported that the S&P decision will likely send “shock waves through global financial markets and potentially undermine world economic growth.”¶ In July, S&P had placed the United States’ rating on “credit watch with negative implications” as the debt ceiling debate devolved into partisan bickering. In the same month, Moody’s Investors Services announced it had initiated a review of America’s sterling bond rating because of the likelihood of a U.S. default on its debts. Unlike S&P, who wanted to see no increase in the debt ceiling, Moody’s concern was based on the fact that the rise in the debt ceiling would not be high enough. In both cases, however, it seemed America’s rating was in trouble last month.¶ The downgrade of America’s credit rating is the first time the U.S. was downgraded since it received an AAA rating from Moody’s in 1917 and S&P in 1941. It is the first time that S&P has issued a “negative” outlook on the U.S. government since it began rating the credit-worthiness of railroad bonds in 1860.¶ “A downgrade is uncharted territory for the U.S., but one outcome seems likely: Americans could face higher interest rates on mortgages, car loans, credit cardsand other consumer loans. Business probably will also have to pay more to borrow money,” according to MSN Money, none of which will boost the already flagging economy.¶ The likely domestic cost of the downgrading will be increased borrowing costs, which will have a drag effect on economic growth. It is predicted that the U.S. downgrade is likely to cost the U.S. economy $100 billion a year. Variable borrowing rates and mortgage rates will rise; conversely mortgage-backed bonds will face a downgrade. Money market mutual funds will come under significant pressure.¶ The downgrade will negatively impact on the borrowing capabilities of American state and municipalities and companies, particularly those with debts linked to federal payments.¶ A larger concern will be whether the appetite for U.S. debt might change among foreign investors, in particular China, the world’s largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries. In 1945, foreigners owned just 1 percent of US Treasuries. Today, they own a record high 46 percent. U.S. Treasury bonds, once undisputedly seen as the safest security in the world, are now rated lower than bonds issued by countries such as Britain, Germany, France, or Canada.¶ Prior to the S&P decision, Dagong, China’s Global Credit Rating agency, had already pushed the U.S. rating from A+ to A, and placed the rating on negative watch (indicating the potential for a further cut). Other than the U.S. Federal Reserve, China is the biggest holder of American debt, with $1.16 trillion. It maintains the value of its currency through buying U.S dollars: a monetary policy that is likely to continue if only to protect its own currency.¶ The downgrade, accompanied by a continuing weak U.S dollar, could affect Chinese exports and this will directly affect the Australian economy. Less demand for consumer goods in both the regional and global economy would directly lead to weaker demand for China’s exported goods; this then weakens demands for imports, particularly in the energy sector. If the Chinese currency appreciates as a response to the weakening U.S dollar, it will make Chinese goods more expensive. This will result in China shifting its focus away from export production to production for domestic consumption. With China continuing to buy U.S debt and shifting its focus to domestic economic production, the results will mean less Chinese currency floating in the regional and global economy. This coupled with contractions in Eurozone spending, bodes badly for any economy that is being driven by exports: as Australia currently is.¶ Prime Minister Julia Gillard has immediately responded to the downgrade saying: “Australia’s economy is strong and should not be badly affected.” She maintained the Labor mantra that the Australian economy was, and would remain strong, because of China’s demand for Australian resources. However,world stock markets had already plunged prior to the S&P decision, stripping more than $100 billion from the value of listed Australian companies. Following the downgrade decision, the Australian share market is expected to face more losses. No amount of Gillard or Swan rhetoric is likely to stop further significant domestic losses.¶ Similarly, the Canadian government is putting on a brave face in its acknowledgement of its interconnectedness with the U.S. The country’s finance minister Jim Flaherty has said that Canada is “well-positioned to face global headwinds.”¶ Apart from the economic impact of the downgrade on American and international economies, the downgrade has a political context. The world’s economic superpower has been sharply criticised for its political handling of the debt ceiling issue. S&P issued a “sharply worded critique of the American political system”.¶ There is a view that the U.S. does not deserve a triple-A rating, and the reason has nothing whatsoever to do with its debt ratios. America’s ability to pay is not the issue: the problem is its willingness to pay. It is not entirely clear that this is the position of Barack Obama and the Democrats, rather is likely being driven by those in Washington who are willing to “drive the U.S. into default.”¶ It is possible that the S&P factored in the machinations of the Republican Party, and in particular the Tea Party, that took the U.S. to the brink of default. A smaller deficit-reduction deal was on offer, but was refused by the Republicans possibly hyped up by the Tea Party, who are desperate to remain relevant is a rapidly changing political landscape. This being the case, the S&P have punished America because of the action of recalcitrant Republicans for refusing to accept any legislation that would increase taxes. The political machinations of Washington confirmed to S&P the debilitating state of American politics.¶ America emerged as the dominant, hegemonic power at the end of the Cold War. It played a preeminent role in shaping the post-war international economic system and was a key actor in many of the international organisations that now shape global economic and monetary policy. The decision to downgrade its credit rating is economic, political but also powerfully symbolic. In New Zealand, the downgrade was reported as “a dramatic reversal of fortune for the world’s largest economy.” The Australian media is reporting it as “a symbolic embarrassment for President Barack Obama, his administration and the Americans” and as a “symbolic blow.”¶ As one American commentator has said: “The symbolism is undeniable.” The downgrade is a “blow to U.S. prestige.”¶ The downgrade to America’s credit rating is a historic assault on the superpower’s prestige and a symbol of the changing world order: that is, the demise of the U.S. and the rise of China.

## High

#### Heg high

#### Farley 3/7/12

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The intellectual battle over the future of American hegemony has been joined. Andrew Bacevich argues that the American Century has ended and that further American pretentions to hegemony will lead to disaster. Michael Cohen argues that the United States suffers from critical domestic problems that undermine long-term U.S. capability. On the other side of the debate, Dan Drezner, Robert Kagan and others (.pdf) argue that U.S. military and economic advantage are likely to persist over the foreseeable future. ¶ How might we know that the American Century has actually ended? Shifts in hegemony rarely come with a herald; even when the U.S. was at its most dominant in 1945, the shape of the future was hardly clear. Indeed, the United States surpassed the United Kingdom in economic power -- and in latent military power -- around the turn of the 20th century, yet no one claims that the American Century began in 1900, or that British hegemony ended when the GDP numbers turned south. Indeed, while the United States surely played a pre-eminent role in global politics after 1945, the existence of the Soviet Union put a wide swath of the globe off limits to direct U.S. influence. In military terms, we are still many years from a replay of the kind of global military and ideological competition that characterized the Cold War, even if we accept worst-case assumptions about China’s growth and belligerence. ¶ The rise of China and India seems inevitable, and it is quite likely that both will exceed the total GDP of the United States before the end of the 21st century. However, the rise of Japan and Europe relative to the U.S. seemed inevitable 25 years ago. Moreover, while the rise of China and India might introduce uncertainty, economic power does not translate automatically into military and political influence. Recall again that the United States possessed the world’s largest economy for some 40 years before “its” century is supposed to have begun. The U.S. also benefitted from advantages that neither China nor India currently enjoy, such as a relatively high per capita GDP and a secure geographic position. Even if the United States holds only a plurality of global military and economic power, it still may remain the most influential state in the world. Russia, China, Japan and India will have more to fear from one another than from the United States, allowing the U.S. to play a critical balancing role. Moreover, the United States has weathered the financial crisis better than some, particularly the European Union. And while China and India have maintained robust growth during the past five years, social, economic and political cracks may be emerging. ¶ Intentions matter, too. The United States could have pursued, if not military hegemony, then at least military primacy in 1918. At the time, its economic power and industrial production could have overwhelmed -- albeit with some difficulty -- the combined capacity of both Japan and the United Kingdom. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty effectively allowed Japan and the U.K. to avoid a ruinous arms race with the United States, a race that the U.S. could have run and won but chose not to. As long as the United States continues to pursue the tasks associated with hegemony -- such as maintenance of the reserve currency, defense of global maritime trade and the underwriting of major international institutions -- some sort of American Century will persist. ¶ What can the U.S. do to extend the American Century? The most important step for the U.S. to take is to gain the acquiescence, grudging or not, of most of the rest of the major international players in modern global society. Accommodating Indian, Chinese or even Russian concerns within the U.S.-managed global framework demonstrates the utility and flexibility of that system, and reinforces the sense that the United States plays a unique role. The strength and resilience of a system -- and when we speak of U.S. hegemony, we really mean the system of norms and institutions that the United States has established -- depends more on its ability to co-opt competitors than to crush or isolate them. This hardly means that the United States must concede to every demand from every competitor, but we shouldn’t think of the need for careful diplomacy as weakness; rather, the ability to handle problems diplomatically reflects strength.

# \*\*\*Indo-Pak War\*\*\*

## No War

#### Indo-Pak war doesn’t escalate.

Gwynne Dyer 02, Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, serves on the Board of Governors of Canada’s Royal Military College, independent journalist, May 24, 2002, Hamilton Spectator, “Nuclear war a possibility over Kashmir,” p. Lexis

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.

#### No Indo-Pak War – International pressures

Dhanda 11 [Suresh Dhanda, Department of Political Science, S.A.Jain College,, Haryana, India, International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol 2, 2011, “Dangers of Missile Race in South Asia: an India-Pakistan Perspective” http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/view/1065/985 SS]

Fourthly, India and Pakistan will face international opprobrium if they opt to deploy nuclear weapons. Although the international community may have reluctantly accepted their possession of nuclear weapons, the transition to operational deployments will likely lead to sanctions and isolation. This factor is unique to South Asia and constrains the implementation of deterrence strategies by Pakistan and India. For example, during the Kargil conflict, reports that both countries had activated and deployed their nuclear missile forces triggered intense international pressure on both countries.6 National actions, such as signaling, that play a role in deterrence strategy may thus be constrained by international pressure. In contrast, offensive conventional force deployments do not seem to engender the same level of concern in the international community.

# \*\*\*Iran Strikes\*\*\*

## No Israel Strike

**Israel won’t strike Iran – threat of strike is to spur tougher international stance**

**Tobin** 5 – 6 – **12** (Jonathan, senior editor of Commentary magazine, columnist for the JointMedia News Service (JNS) and his writing has appeared in the New York Post, the Jerusalem Post, the Weekly Standard, the New York Times and many other publications. Over the course of his career, he has won more than 50 journalism awards for commentary, editorial writing, and arts criticism, “Iran, Obama and Bibi’s October Surprise”, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/05/06/benefits-of-bibi-october-surprise-scenario-israel-elections-netanyahu-obama-iran-nuclear/> ck)

On Friday, a commentator on Israel’s Channel 2 said aloud what others had been whispering in recent days. The Times of Israel reports that commentator Amnon Abramovich claimed today’s announcement that new Israeli elections will be scheduled for September 4 may set in motion a chain of events that could lead to an Israeli attack on Iran sometime between that date and the U.S. presidential election in November. The scenario makes sense on the surface in that if, as expected, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wins an easy victory in September, he theoretically would have two months to strike Iran while President Obama was campaigning for re-election and therefore unlikely to condemn or punish Israel for ignoring his wishes about the use of force to fend off Tehran’s nuclear threat. **That isn’t likely to happen for a number of reasons**, but the mere fact that it might is a positive development. As much as there is good reason to doubt that even under such seemingly favorable circumstances Israel would attack Iran on its own, the election announcement will have the salubrious effect of concentrating the minds of President Obama and his shaky allies in the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran. The only reason the West has stepped up its previously weak sanctions on Iran that led to the current lackluster negotiations is that they believed Israel would act unless they started behaving as if they cared about the problem. As most informed observers have noted, the chances of the talks achieving anything that would actually lessen the danger are slim. But if the Iranians as well as Obama and his partners think Israel will strike in the fall that could put tremendous pressure on both sides to do more than diplomatic game playing. For all of the hysterical criticism being aimed at Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak for their supposed messianism about dealing with Iran, they have actually gone about their business on this issue in a rational manner. By making it clear to the world that Israel would not allow the Islamist regime to pose an existential threat to its existence, they have forced Obama to ratchet up his own rhetoric and to foreswear any policy of “containing” a nuclear Iran. They have also managed to pressure the European Union to threaten an oil embargo of Iran that would have been unimaginable without their fear that an Israeli attack would overturn the entire Middle East chessboard. But Netanyahu and Barak are also keenly aware of the danger of pushing too far. That’s why it is equally **unimaginable** they would order a strike on Iran while the West was actively conducting nuclear negotiations. Though no one should think they would not use force as a last resort, they have throughout this crisis made it clear they understood it is far better for the West — whose interests are involved in this matter as much as that of Israel — to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat.

## AT Escalation/Retaliation

#### Iran retaliation will stay limited – multiple factors prevent escalation

**Kroenig, 12** (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)

SETTING THE RIGHT REDLINES The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran's nuclear program does not necessarily mean that it should. Such an attack could have potentially devastating consequences -- for international security, the global economy, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to escalate the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States' standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment. None of these outcomes is predetermined, however; indeed, the United States could do much to mitigate them. Tehran would certainly feel like it needed to respond to a U.S. attack, in order to reestablish deterrence and save face domestically. But it would also likely seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the destruction of its military or the regime itself. In all likelihood, the Iranian leadership would resort to its worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe, only if it felt that its very existence was threatened. A targeted U.S. operation need not threaten Tehran in such a fundamental way. To make sure it doesn't and to reassure the Iranian regime, the United States could first make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government. It could then identify certain forms of retaliation to which it would respond with devastating military action, such as attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, conducting massive and sustained attacks on Gulf states and U.S. troops or ships, or launching terrorist attacks in the United States itself. Washington would then need to clearly articulate these "redlines" to Tehran during and after the attack to ensure that the message was not lost in battle. And it would need to accept the fact that it would have to absorb Iranian responses that fell short of these redlines without escalating the conflict. This might include accepting token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships in the region -- several salvos over the course of a few days that soon taper off -- or the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels. To avoid the kind of casualties that could compel the White House to escalate the struggle, the United States would need to evacuate nonessential personnel from U.S. bases within range of Iranian missiles and ensure that its troops were safely in bunkers before Iran launched its response. Washington might also need to allow for stepped-up support to Iran's proxies in Afghanistan and Iraq and missile and terrorist attacks against Israel. In doing so, it could induce Iran to follow the path of Iraq and Syria, both of which refrained from starting a war after Israel struck their nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively.

#### No counter attack - air strikes and missiles solve

**Rogers, 2006**(Paul Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group “IRAN: CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR”, February)

In addition to the substantial programme of air strikes and missile attacks on nuclear, missile and defence facilities, US military operations would also be aimed at pre-empting any immediate Iranian responses. Most significant of these would be any possible retaliatory Iranian action to affect the transport of oil and liquefied natural gas through the Straits of Hormuz. On the assumption that this would be an obvious form of retaliation, it would be necessary to destroy coastal anti-ship missile batteries and Iran’s small force of warships. The main base and dockyard is at Bushehr; the operational headquarters is at Bandar Abbas which is also the base for Iran’s small flotilla of Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, although Chah Bahar is due to become the new base for these three boats. Other bases for light naval forces include Kharg Island at the head of the Gulf and islands in the Abu Musa group south-west of the Straits of Hormuz, these being heavily defended and well supplied.1 The small Iranian Navy suffered severe losses in its exchanges with the US Navy at the end of the “tanker war” in April 1988, and it is probable that the main emphasis will be on fast light forces, including speedboats crewed by those prepared to die. These would be Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) forces and they would most likely place the greatest emphasis on attacking tanker traffic rather than US naval units**.** Operating bases for these forces would be priorities for attack. It would also be assumed that IRG elements would move into some parts of Iraq to link up with sympathetic militia. To demonstrate that any such moves would incite retaliation, it is probable that military action would target forward-based ground force units both of the IRG and of the regular army.Of the numerous Iranian Army bases, those close to the border with Iraq at Abadan, Khorramshahr, Ahvaz, Dezfuland and possibly Mahabad would be the most likely targets, as would major IRG centres. A range of logistical support facilities would be targeted, with this possibly extending to destruction of bridges. Given the porous nature of the border, this latter action would be primarily symbolic.

#### The initial strike would decapitate their military

**Global Security.org, 2005** (January 1 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-strikes.htm)

One potential military option that would be available to the United States includes the use of air strikes on Iranian weapons of mass destruction and missile facilities. In all, there are perhaps two dozen suspected nuclear facilities in Iran. The 1000-megawatt nuclear plant Bushehr would likely be the target of such strikes. According to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, the spent fuel from this facility would be capable of producing 50 to 75 bombs. Also, the suspected nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak will likely be targets of an air attack. American air strikes on Iran would vastly exceed the scope of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osiraq nuclear center in Iraq, and would more resemble the opening days of the 2003 air campaign against Iraq. Using the full force of operational B-2 stealth bombers, staging from Diego Garcia or flying direct from the United States, possibly supplemented by F-117 stealth fighters staging from al Udeid in Qatar or some other location in theater, the two-dozen suspect nuclear sites would be targeted. Military planners could tailor their target list to reflect the preferences of the Administration by having limited air strikes that would target only the most crucial facilities in an effort to delay or obstruct the Iranian program or the United States could opt for a far more comprehensive set of strikes against a comprehensive range of WMD related targets, as well as conventional and unconventional forces that might be used to counterattack against US forces in Iraq.

#### Iran will play the role of the victim to appease other countries

**Roberts, 1-17** (Paul Craig, wrote the Kemp-Roth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is author or coauthor of eight books. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has contributed to numerous scholar journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions. He has been awarded the U.S. Treasury's Meritorious Service Award and the French Legion of Honor. http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/011707Roberts.shtml)

The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the “green zone” in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East.

#### No backlash – naval and airpower check

**Rogers, 2006** (Paul, Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group “IRAN: CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR”, February)

Although the United States has a major problem of overstretch affecting its Army and Marine Corps, an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would be undertaken almost entirely by the Air Force and the Navy. To have the maximum impact, it would be done by surprise, utilising land-based aircraft already in the region, long-range strike aircraft operating from the United States, the UK and Diego Garcia, and naval strike forces involving carrier-borne aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. At any one time, the US Navy keeps one aircraft carrier battle group on station in or near the Persian Gulf. Such groups rotate, and there are periods when two are on station, providing over 150 aircraft, together with several hundred cruise missiles.4 Similar numbers of land-based aircraft could be assembled with little notice, given the range of US bases in the region, and B 1B and B-2 bombers could operate from outside the region. In particular, the specialised facilities required to operate the stealth B-2 aircraft are now available at Fairford air base in Gloucestershire.5 Air strikes on nuclear facilities would involve the destruction of facilities at the Tehran Research Reactor, together with the radioisotope production facility, a range of nuclear-related laboratories and the Kalaye Electric Company, all in Tehran. The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre would be a major target, including a series of experimental reactors, uranium conversion facilities and a fuel fabrication laboratory. Pilot and full-scale enrichment plants at Natanz would be targeted, as would facilities at Arak (see Appendix 1).6 The new 1,000 MW reactor nearing completion at Bushehr would be targeted, although this could be problematic once the reactor is fully fuelled and goes critical some time in 2006. Once that has happened, any destruction of the containment structure could lead to serious problems of radioactive dispersal affecting not just the Iranian Gulf coast, but west Gulf seaboards in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. As well as the direct human effects, since these comprise the world’s most substantial concentration of oil production facilities, the consequences could be severe.7 All of the initial attacks would be undertaken more or less simultaneously, in order to kill as many of the technically competent staff as possible, therefore doing the greatest damage to longer-term prospects. This would be a necessary part of any military action and would probably extend to the destruction of university laboratories and technology centres that indirectly support the Iranian nuclear scientific and technical infrastructure. Such an aspect of the attack is not widely recognised outside of military planning circles but would be an essential component of the operation. Given that the aim is to set back Iranian nuclear potential for as long as possible, it would be essential to go well beyond the destruction of physical facilities that could be replaced quite rapidly. The killing of those with technical expertise would have a much more substantial impact on any efforts to redevelop nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, since such expertise is known to include foreign nationals, the killing of such people already working in the country would serve as a deterrent to the involvement of others in the future. Iran currently has limited air defences and a largely obsolete and small air force. Even so, defence suppression would be a major aspect of military action, primarily to reduce the risk of the killing or capture of US aircrew. It would involve the targeting of radar facilities and command and control centres, as well as Western Command air bases at Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Umidiyeh, Shiraz and Isfahan, and Southern Command air bases at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.8A particular concern for US forces is the continued deployment by Iran of 45 or more of the American F-14A Tomcat interceptors and their long-range AWG-9 radar equipment. 79 planes were originally procured before the fall of the Shah and around 30 are available operationally at any one time out of those still deployed.9 Research, development and production facilities for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile programme would be priority targets, as would bases at which these mobile missiles are deployed. Because of their mobility, surprise would once again be essential. US forces have already used reconnaissance drones to map Iranian facilities and these, combined with satellite reconnaissance and a range of forms of electronic surveillance, have provided considerable information on the nuclear infrastructure and more general defence forces.

## No War

#### Even if that fails – US can deescalate quickly and no regional war

**Kroenig, 12** (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)

Even if Tehran did cross Washington's redlines, the United States could still manage the confrontation. At the outset of any such violation, it could target the Iranian weapons that it finds most threatening to prevent Tehran from deploying them. To de-escalate the situation quickly and prevent a wider regional war, the United States could also secure the agreement of its allies to avoid responding to an Iranian attack. This would keep other armies, particularly the Israel Defense Forces, out of the fray. Israel should prove willing to accept such an arrangement in exchange for a U.S. promise to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Indeed, it struck a similar agreement with the United States during the Gulf War, when it refrained from responding to the launching of Scud missiles by Saddam Hussein.

## Inevitable

#### Conflict is inevitable, Strikes NOW prevent war – Iran can’t retaliate

**Babbin, 2006 *(***Jed, served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration “Iran Showdown”, The American Spectator, http://www.spectator.org/dsp\_article.asp?art\_id=9310)

THE WAR WITH IRAN WILL have to be foughtand we will, of course, defend Israel as best we can. But much bloodshed can be avoided, and Iran's nuclear objective put out of reach if we seize the advantage we gave up to Saddam in the UN. Surprise is a strategic advantage we must retain.The alternative to a large war, which no one speaks about, is a surprise attack against Iran mounted before Israel acts, and before the predicted Iranian nuclear test happens. Such an attack wouldemploy several unconventional weapons at once and could -- if managed properly -- be over before Iran knows it has begun. The world must know that we have done it. But after, not before. It may be that Iran's Chinese allies are doing more than helping develop its missiles. It may be that Iran's Russian trading partner is doing more than providing defenses against air attack. But neither is likely to be providing Iran with the means of effectively defending against our other capabilities. It could, and should, be made one dark night. B-2 stealth bombers, each carrying twenty ground-penetrating guided munitions, can destroy much of Iran's nuclear facilities and government centers. Some might carry reported electro-magnetic pulse weapons that can destroy all the electronic circuits that comprise Iranian missiles, key military communications and computer facilities. And it may be that we have the ability to attack Iran's military and financial computer networks with computer viruses and "Trojan horses" that will make it impossible for Iran to function militarily and economically.Our strategy must be implemented before Ahmadinejad can test his nukes. Whether that test can happen next month or next year is immaterial.The time for us to act is now.

## AT Backlash Turns

#### US can minimize political fallout and avoid international crisis

**Kroenig, 12** (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)

Washington could also reduce the political fallout of military action by building global support for it in advance. Many countries may still criticize the United States for using force, but some -- the Arab states in particular -- would privately thank Washington for eliminating the Iranian threat. By building such a consensus in the lead-up to an attack and taking the outlined steps to mitigate it once it began, the United States could avoid an international crisis and limit the scope of the conflict.

## AT Overstretch

#### Won’t Cause Overstretch – Your Evidence Only Assumes Ground Forces

**INW, ’06** (Iran Nuclear Watch, 10/18, http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/2006/10/cacnp-briefing-on-us-policy-options.html)

This is the second favorite approach of American Neoconservatives. Many mistakenly believe that the U.S. is too tied down in Iraq to carry out a successful military strike against Iran. While our ground forces may be overextended, our Navy and Air Force would have no problem carrying out this operation.

## AT Civilian Casualties

#### Civilian casualities will be limited

**Kroenig, 12** (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)

Washington would also be able to limit civilian casualties in any campaign. Iran built its most critical nuclear plants, such as the one in Natanz, away from heavily populated areas. For those less important facilities that exist near civilian centers, such as the centrifuge-manufacturing sites, U.S. precision-guided missiles could pinpoint specific buildings while leaving their surroundings unscathed. The United States could reduce the collateral damage even further by striking at night or simply leaving those less important plants off its target list at little cost to the overall success of the mission. Although Iran would undoubtedly publicize any human suffering in the wake of a military action, the majority of the victims would be the military personnel, engineers, scientists, and technicians working at the facilities

#### The alternative to strikes is prolif or strikes later, comparatively worse options

**Beres ‘07** (Louis Rene, professor @ the University of Purdue, May 8, pg. http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20070508/cm\_csm/yberes)

A more important reservation about preemption involves tactical difficulties. Due to delays, the success of strikes against certain key Iranian targets may already be in doubt. Worse, such strikes would probably entail high civilian casualties because Iran has deliberately placed sensitive military assets amid civilian populations – an international crime called "perfidy." But further delay will only multiply the number of casualties from any future operation, or – in the worst-case scenario – allow Iran to become fully nuclear.

## AT Oil Shocks

#### No economic crisis or oil shock

**Kroenig, 12** (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)

SETTING THE RIGHT REDLINES The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran's nuclear program does not necessarily mean that it should. Such an attack could have potentially devastating consequences -- for international security, the global economy, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to escalate the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States' standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment. Cont… Finally, the U.S. government could blunt the economic consequences of a strike. For example, it could offset any disruption of oil supplies by opening its Strategic Petroleum Reserve and quietly encouraging some Gulf states to increase their production in the run-up to the attack. Given that many oil-producing nations in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, have urged the United States to attack Iran, they would likely cooperate.

#### No impact - US and Europe strategic reserves check

**Akleh, 2006** (Dr. Elias, Arab writer from a Palestinian descent) “Iran is The Next Battle Field”, March 5,

http://www.amin.org/eng/uncat/2006/mar/mar5-0.html)

The US expects this invasion to take less than 100 days. To avoid the expected oil crisis due to the shut-off of Iranian oil the American administration is planning to use its strategic petroleum reserve that has a supply of oil equals to about 175 days worth of Iranian production. Europe will also use its own strategic oil reserve. These reserves would be replenished with fresh oil after controlling Khuzestan. This war would give US total control of the largest three oil resources of the world; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The Dollar’s global hegemony would be restored, and participating European countries would have some share of the cake.

#### Iran wont shut down oil facilities

**Roberts, 1-17** (Paul Craig, wrote the Kemp-Roth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is author or coauthor of eight books. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has contributed to numerous scholar journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions. He has been awarded the U.S. Treasury's Meritorious Service Award and the French Legion of Honor. http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/011707Roberts.shtml)

The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the “green zone” in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East.

## AT Straits of Hormuz

#### Iran won’t close the straits – economic suicide

**Schake ’07** (Kori,- research fellow at the Hoover Institution “Dealing with A Nuclear Iran” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848072.html)

Iran could also disrupt the flow of oil by closing the Straits of Hormuz or attacking Gulf platforms or shipping. As Edward Luttwak points out, “all of the offshore oil- and gas-production platforms in the gulf, all the traffic of oil and gas tankers originating from the jetties of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq, are within easy reach of the Iranian coast.” However, this, too, seems improbable beyond a short duration, since oil accounts for 80 percent of the Iranian economy. Attacks on gcc oil facilities are a greater likelihood, since they would increase the value of Iranian oil, but if gcc states were not involved in or supporting the strikes against Iran, such attacks would have long-term detrimental consequences for Iran’s relations with the gcc states.

#### Iran Won't Shut Off Strait Of Hormuz -That'd Guarantee The Demise Of The Regime

**Bergman 5/19/2006** (Ilan, author, "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States," and vice president of the America Foreign Policy Council, Defense Forum Foundation Luncheon Presentation: "Taking on Tehran: America's Options," Federal News Service, l/n)

I'll give you an example. Iran has the ability to shut off the flow of oil from the Strait of Hormuz through the Strait of Hormuz from the Persian Gulf. That's two-fifths of world energy traffic on any given day. That would obviously cause prices to spike through the roof, but it's also the quickest, easiest, and most efficient way to make India, Japan, the European Union, Russia, and China regime changers, because if that happens the first logical assumption that businessmen in all those places will make is this regime in its current form cannot be trusted to control oil, even if this crisis subsides. And unlike us, the Russians and the Chinese have no problem with dealing forcefully with economic meddlers. So I don't necessarily think that that's a threat. What I do think that the Iranians are gaming very well is our degree of aversion to rising prices. I think they know that if they rattle that energy saber pretty heftily, and often, and do war games, and test Russian equipment off of freighters and things like that, we get very nervous and we begin to deter ourselves from having these discussions. So like you said, there's not a lot of discussion about that, and that's precisely what they want.

#### More ev

**Hassett ’06** (Kevin A,- scholar @ American Enterprise Institute “World Economy Would Be Casualty of Mideast War” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24663,filter.all/pub\_detail.asp)

While this scenario is sobering, it remains unlikely, at least based on the economics. Oil accounts for about 10 percent of Iran's gross domestic product and comprises 80 percent of that country's exports. Take away the oil revenue in war time, and the economy would almost grind to a halt and certainly be unable to sustain a prolonged conflict. Only suicidal leaders would allow themselves to fight with Israel under such circumstances.

# \*\*\*Iraq Instability\*\*\*

## Instability Now

#### Iraqi instability now

Michael Knights 11, fellow at the Washington Institute, “Iraq's Relentless Insurgency: The Fight for Power ahead of U.S. Withdrawal”, September 22, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1703>

With the exception of anti-U.S. attacks carried out by Iranian-backed groups such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (splinters from the Sadrist movement and the Badr political party with ties to Iranian intelligence services), the vast majority of violent actions in Iraq are no longer targeted against U.S. forces. Indeed, most violent **factions are already looking well past the U.S. drawdown**; the U.S. withdrawal will probably not unleash more violence because **to many Iraqis, particularly insurgents, the U.S. military has already been gone for months, or even years in some areas**. **The main event in Iraq**, which was postponed for many years due to the U.S. presence, **is the struggle among Iraqis to control the country**. In today's Iraq, the most common forms of low-profile attacks -- far more numerous than the headline-grabbing bombings -- are drive-by shootings and bombs attached to the underside of personal vehicles. These **attacks are largely contained within sectarian communities** (Sunni against Sunni or Shia against Shia) **and reflect the ultra-local struggle for dominance that is broiling throughout Iraq**. Such attacks are by definition low-lethality: they are intended to intimidate as much as they are to kill. **They are** also **the inevitable epilogue of a violent and protracted civil war** in which some members of each community sided with the Iraqi government and the U.S.-led coalition while others backed the insurgency. **Now the scores must be settled**. The campaign of assassinations in Iraq shows that the **political parties are not immune from the temptation of violent jockeying**. After 2003, political parties and movements have been able to slide around on the fringes of the political spectrum at will, with relatively reputable parties able to reach out to affiliates in the insurgency when they needed to get tough. **The intense campaign of assassinations** in Baghdad **began in 2010** as the selective attacks of insurgent groups such as AQI and JRTN against government officials quickly became a free-for-all that drew negative energy from the stagnation of the government formation process. As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki admitted at a press conference last April, Iraq's political parties used the cover of large numbers of unsolved killings to undertake "political assassinations." This, in turn, unleashed a wave of score-settling and intimidation attacks. **Shiite political factions**, including various splinters of Muqtada al-Sadr's movement, the Badr organization, and Maliki's own Dawa party appear to have **fought** low-profile **skirmishes with one another for dominance of** various **security agencies**, **key Iraqi Army formations, and regions throughout the southern provinces**. As part of these struggles, Shia political parties have carried out a wave of Shia-on-Shia assassination attempts against Iraqi Army division commanders, political party bosses, and local representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. By this June, when the assassinations had reached their height, senior Iraqi politicians and bureaucrats were attending multiple funerals per week. Although the pace of these attacks is now slowing due to government raids against assassination gangs, the **spring** season of **assassinations cast a spotlight on the violence lurking just beneath the surface of Iraqi politics**. As the crackdown on Baghdad assassinations showed, **events can only deteriorate so far before the Iraqi government will act**. **The government has unacceptable "red lines" for general destabilization that are broadly understood by militant groups**. For example, in response to closed-door meetings with government representatives, Sadr has stepped back from his threat to mobilize his militia; Sadrists, meanwhile, have scrupulously avoided taking actions that would trigger a government offensive, such as openly carrying weapons at their parades or mounting armed patrols within their strongholds. In places such as Basra, local political pressure and operations by Iraqi security forces have curtailed armed resistance against U.S. targets, such as the heavy rocketing of the U.S. base at the airport. Likewise, **although the violent jockeying within sectarian factions has increased, the government has been sure to** take steps to **prevent any widespread conflict between sectarian communities** in Baghdad and other trouble spots. In other words, **there appear to be definite limits to how far security can deteriorate in Iraq**. The flip side, however, is that there are probably equally definite limits concerning how much better things can get in the coming years. For a while, Iraq will be stuck on this plateau: a moderate level of insecurity in which the country suffers somewhere between 300 and 500 insurgent attacks per month, including around two dozen attempted mass-casualty attacks. **A formal extension of the U.S. military presence will not shorten this period of moderate insecurity**. Today, **most Iraqis do not interact with U.S. forces, and the U.S. military is no longer the glue holding together many ISF divisions and brigades**. Indeed, **there is little that a formally extended U.S. presence on Iraq's streets could achieve at this point**. An extension would also prove contentious: Iraq's highly fragmented parliament and an equally uncertain public may not be ready to debate and approve a formal security agreement that would modify the December 31, 2011 departure date for U.S. military units.

## No Impact

#### No spillover or great power draw-in

Cook 7 – fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

Steven A., and Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) Brookings Institution, International Herald Tribune, “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,” 6-28, www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php

It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

# \*\*\*Japan Relations\*\*\*

## High

#### Senkaku dispute resolved alliance problems

Mulgan 10

(Aurelia George Mulgan, Professor of Politics at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, East Asia Forum, 10/26/10, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/10/26/us-japan-alliance-the-big-winner-from-the-senkaku-islands-dispute/> /mr)

Japan’s new DPJ government initially set out to rebalance Japan’s relations between the United States and Asia by emphasising a more independent Asia-oriented diplomacy with an East Asian Community as the centrepiece.¶ Japanese rhetoric about the alliance has also changed: There was more talk of an ‘equal’ alliance and a security stance ‘equidistant’ between the United States and China. The shift in the government’s foreign policy stance was subtle but clear: Japan was reorienting itself toward Asia and away from the United States. Difficulties over the Futenma base issue compounded the view of a troubled and tense bilateral relationship and a possible weakening of alliance commitments on both sides. Some in the DPJ, such as former leader Ozawa Ichiro, made explicit their antipathy towards the presence of US military forces in Japan.¶ The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands has changed all that. It has energised the Japan-US alliance across a number of fronts.¶ First, the United States has offered reassurance to Japan that the Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of the Japan-US Security Treaty, which obligates the United States to defend Japan. The Japanese press reported an explicit commitment from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in talks with Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji in New York in September. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have also expressed strong support for Japan, offering assurance that the US will fulfil its alliance responsibilities. These statements underline the deterrence function of the alliance, which is the chief rationale for US bases in Okinawa. The Senkaku ‘shock’ will, therefore, become a factor in the mix of considerations determining the resolution of the Futenma base issue.¶ Second, the US side is leveraging the deterioration in Japan’s security environment to apply pressure on the Japanese government to maintain, if not increase, the fiscal allocation for ‘Host Nation Support’ for US forces in Japan, which the Japanese call the ‘sympathy budget’, or omoiyari yosan. While these payments were under review to assist in budget cuts, there are indications that the funds will continue at least at the current level. This can be directly attributed to the newfound importance that the government is attaching to the alliance after the recent dispute with China.¶ Third, Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji, who is well known for his pro-US sympathies and who in the past has referred to a China ‘threat’, has proposed a review of the 1997 Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines, which enable Japan to provide logistical and rear-area support for the United States in the event of regional conflict. Such a development could conceivably see an expansion in Japan’s operational role and thus the operational capability of the alliance. There may also be developments in other areas of Japanese security policy such as the ban on exporting weapons and related technology, and participating in collective defence. Both Defence Minister Kitazawa Toshimi and Foreign Minister Maehara are in favour of reviewing the weapons export ban in order to strengthen the alliance, a move that is strongly supported by US Defense Secretary Gates.¶ Fourth, in addition to a joint SDF-USFJ exercise to reclaim a remote southwestern island in December, a joint command post exercise (CPX) will be held next January, which incorporates the defence of southwestern islands for the first time. The CPX will entail Japanese and US forces establishing a south-western barrier to bottle up Chinese naval forces in the East China Sea, simulating the deployment of military forces to one of the Amami Islands and other outlying islands, and operations to recapture islands from foreign forces.¶ The Southwest (Nansei) or Ryukyu Islands have a special value in solidifying the alliance because they are an issue on which US and Japanese strategic interests are strongly aligned. These islands are not only central to Japan’s sovereign territorial interests but are also highly relevant to US naval strategy in the region.¶ James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the Jamestown Foundation argue that if China gained possession of one or more of the islands in the Ryukyus, it would secure vital straits through which a Chinese PLAN flotilla could exit from the East China Sea into the Western Pacific as well as protecting PLAN shipping through the straits. Further, a Chinese island campaign would underpin what the US Department of Defense has called China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations against the US navy. This strategy is designed to prevent US naval reinforcements from reaching maritime Asia as well as blocking in-theatre forces from entering the Taiwan Strait and the seas off the east coast of Taiwan. Holmes and Yoshihara give the Senkakus, which lie due north of the southwestern tip of the Ryukyus, potential significance in this strategy as political, psychological and resource assets.¶ Funabashi Yoichi concurs and reports the words of a US administration official who stated: ‘I think about what will happen to the Senkaku Islands if the marine corps leave Okinawa. A Chinese flag will probably be standing on the Senkaku Islands the next day.’ Funabashi interpreted this comment as an American attempt to play the ‘Senkaku Islands card’. As it turns out, the need for such a ploy has been obviated by China itself.¶ Indeed, in a conflict scenario where the Chinese capture one or more of the Ryukyu Islands, the marines based in Okinawa could possibly play a key role. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments was quoted in the Asahi Shimbun on 5th May as saying that ‘the marine corps stationed in Okinawa could play a role in territorial disputes in the South China Sea etc’ (i.e. presumably also in the East China Sea).¶ The overall outcome of the Senkaku Islands dispute has been a Japan-US gain and a Chinese loss. The alliance is more highly valued in the region, particularly by other countries embroiled in their own maritime territorial disputes with China. The dispute also offers the Obama administration a chance to rebuild the bilateral security relationship by recruiting Japan into a strategic coalition against China. Meanwhile, the Kan administration has been handed a powerful argument in favour of maintaining a strong marine presence in Okinawa. Across a spectrum of bilateral issues including island defence, the Senkaku ‘shock’ has turned out to be a ‘Senkaku tailwind’.

**Japan alliance strong now – security and economic relations high despite Futenma**

**Sang-ho** 7 – 8 – **12** (Song, reporter for the Korean Herald, “U.S.-Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance”, <http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120708000302> ck)

As the U.S. has been shifting its military and diplomatic priorities toward the economically vibrant region, its alliance with Japan, along with its one with South Korea, will continue to be the core of its strategy to maintain primacy in the region. “Washington hopes to work with China’s neighbors to put together a balancing coalition that will contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia the way the U.S. dominates the Western Hemisphere,” said Mearsheimer. On the surface, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa. But **this would not undermine the core of the alliance** between the two countries that share security interests and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out. “**People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over** how to close **one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance**,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security

#### Relations high now – marines aren’t key

The Korea Herald 12 (July 8, 2012, “U.S. –Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance” <http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120708000302&cpv=0> /mr)

U.S.-Japan alliance deepens¶ As the U.S. has been shifting its military and diplomatic priorities toward the economically vibrant region, its alliance with Japan, along with its one with South Korea, will continue to be the core of its strategy to maintain primacy in the region.¶ “Washington hopes to work with China’s neighbors to put together a balancing coalition that will contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia the way the U.S. dominates the Western Hemisphere,” said Mearsheimer.¶ On the surface, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa.¶ But this would not undermine the core of the alliance between the two countries that share security interests and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out.¶ “People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over how to close one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security.¶ After the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, ending a half-century of almost unbroken conservative rule, the alliance appeared to have deteriorated with the Tokyo leadership pursuing a closer yet “equal” relationship. ¶ But it has apparently re-prioritized its relationship with Washington as it recognized growing security challenges from China and North Korea.¶ Amid its strategic pivot toward Asia, the U.S. is likely to escalate its calls for the Asian ally to contribute more to maintaining stability in the region. ¶ Japan also wanted to increase its military role in the region and beyond. But it has been fettered by the pacifist constitution. ¶ The law prohibits Japan from going to war and having any potential war materials, and engaging in collective defense action, which makes it difficult to help support its ally U.S. even if it is attacked. Right-wingers have sought to rewrite the law or tried to alter the interpretation of it to expand the role of the Self-Defense Forces.¶ The deepening of the military alliance is also crucial for Tokyo, which has been engaged in an increasingly strident territorial disputes with Beijing over a set of islands in the East China Sea, which are called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.¶ Japan is now considering nationalizing the islands to manage them “stably and peacefully.” This move has sparked strong opposition from China and Taiwan.¶ As the U.S. is now fleshing out the AirSea Battle concept apparently to counter China’s “anti-access/area denial” capabilities, Japan is also expected to play a crucial role in making it more concrete and viable given its close missile defense cooperation with the U.S., observers said.¶ The concept Washington put forward earlier this year is to conduct integrated aerial and naval operations across all domains such as air, maritime, space and cyberspace to neutralize increasingly sophisticated military techniques of potential adversaries.¶ “Japan’s role is expected to be crucial (for the AirSea Battle concept) given its air and naval power in addition to U.S. troops in Japan consisting mainly of marines, naval and air units,” said Nam Chang-hee, political science professor at Inha University.¶ “Japan is actively supporting America’s move to strengthen the bilateral military cooperation as it expands its naval assets such as submarines. The two countries are becoming united in the alliance.”¶ Seeking to tackle its national debt, Washington has been striving to form a security network with its allies including South Korea and Japan, and other partners such as Vietnam, which wants a greater U.S. presence due to China’s aggressive foreign policy.¶ At the same time, Washington also hopes to engage Beijing in its diplomatic activities and a variety of multilateral cooperative mechanisms to encourage it to play a “positive” role in the regional security architecture.

#### The alliance is unshakeable

Ruch 12

(Grace Ruch, 5/8/12, “US, Japan Leaders Meet on 60th Anniversary of Alliance to Talk Security, Exchanges, and Blossoms,” <http://www.japanmattersforamerica.org/2012/05/us-japan-summit-security-exchanges-and-blossoms/> /mr)

Obama-Noda Summit: “A Shared Vision for the Future”¶ Prime Minister Noda’s long-awaited visit to the White House was President Obama’s first formal meeting with Japan’s top leader since the Democratic Party of Japan came into power in 2009. Shortly after arriving in Washington, D.C., Noda met with members of the Fairfax County Search and Rescue Team that assisted with the response to the March 11, 2011, disasters in Tohoku, as well as the family of JET program English teacher, Taylor Anderson, who died after getting her students to safety. Noda later remarked that while he had “always held the conviction that our bilateral alliance is the lynchpin of Japan’s diplomacy,” after that visit he “felt anew that the U.S.-Japan alliance…is unshakeable.”¶ At a press conference following their summit meeting on Monday, April 30, Obama saluted the Prime Minister’s efforts to revitalize the US-Japan alliance and the strength and resiliency of Japan in the wake of last year’s disaster, saying to the Japanese people: “More than ever, the American people are proud to call you a friend and honored to call you an ally.” There, he and Noda announced what was referred to as “a joint vision to guide our alliance and help shape the Asia Pacific for decades to come.”¶ This US-Japan Joint Statement, the first issued since Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with President George W. Bush in 2006, described five main areas of this shared vision: that the US-Japan alliance will remain the foundation for peace and prosperity between the two nations and within the broader Asia Pacific region; that increased bilateral trade and investment will support jobs and economic growth; that America and Japan seek an Asia Pacific region built on international norms, freedom of commerce and navigation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, and as such are partners in addressing the provocations of North Korea and the democratic transition of Burma; that the US and Japan continue to act as global partners through shared values and commitment to international peace and human rights; and to deepen the ties between the people of the US and Japan.¶ Exchanges and Blossoms¶ Dogwood trees in bloom in Washington DC. After receiving the gift of 3000 cherry blossoms- sakura- in 1912, President Taft and his wife sent 50 dogwood trees to Tokyo, though few survive today; on the centennial of the sakura the US government announced it will give 3000 more dogwoods to the people of Japan. Photo by: Julia Ross, via Flickr¶ A suite of US-Japan cooperative initiatives were announced to undergird the leaders’ commitment to expanding America-Japan ties. These include the establishment of a Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation to continue the close US-Japan efforts in this area following the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, and new joint research and development initiatives under the US-Japan Clean Energy Policy Dialogue in areas such as green communities in Tohoku, innovation in clean energy, and the use, production, and recycling of critical materials such as rare earth elements. Other programs and initiatives were announced on cooperation in travel facilitation, cyber and space collaboration, and supply chain security.¶ At a dinner hosted in honor of the Prime Minister, Secretary Clinton also announced that 3,000 flowering dogwood trees, native to America, will be given to Japan as a gift from the people of the United States. The donation celebrates the centennial anniversary of Japan’s gift of the sakura cherry blossom trees to the city of Washington, D.C. Toasting Noda, who had appropriately promised the day before to make Japan-US relations “bloom,” Clinton remarked: “We hope that these dogwood trees in Japan will, like the cherry trees here, serve as a symbol of the strong relationship and friendship between our countries.”

#### Relations strong –

#### A) Military exercises

**Williamson 10 (**Tara A. Williamson, Airman 1st Class, 18th Wing Public Affairs, Kadena Air Base, 12/1/2k10, “Keen Sword exercise sharpens US-Japan alliance,” http://www.kadena.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123232979)

About 10,500 U.S. service members and their Japan Self Defense Force counterparts are participating in exercise Keen Sword 2011, Dec. 3-10, on military installations throughout mainland Japan, Okinawa and in the waters surrounding Japan. Keen Sword is a regularly scheduled exercise designed to strengthen U.S. and Japanese military interoperability and meet mutual defense objectives. “Keen Sword will cap the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. alliance as an ‘alliance of equals,’” said Maj. William Vause, chief of operational plans, training and exercises. “It is the largest bilateral exercise between the United States and Japan military forces. [The exercise] will better enhance both of our countries’ readiness to respond to varied crisis situations.” Training events include integrated air and missile defense, base security and force protection, close air support, live-fire training, maritime defense and interdiction, and search and rescue. “Guardian Angel, rescue specialists delivering combat medical care under extreme duress, has very unique ground focused rescue techniques,” said Capt. Robert L. Wilson, team commander 31st Rescue Squadron. “Throughout Keen Sword the 31st and 33rd will be employing and sharing techniques with our JSDF partners. Focused mission sets will be maritime rescue, high-angle procedures, and extrication from vehicles.” Keen Sword is also designed to allow Japan and the United States to practice and evaluate their coordination procedures and interoperability requirements. “We hope to increase both U.S. and Japanese understanding of our mutual capabilities and rescue limitations,” said Captain Wilson. “An exercise like Keen Sword is invaluable for presenting opportunities to establish closer host nation friendships and practicing interoperability for the future.” Keen Sword is not designed to respond to or mirror any actual world events, nor is it directed at any nation. This training between Japan and the United States has been a routine, recurring event for many years. “The goal of Keen Sword is to increase and improve our bilateral relationship to further enhance the Japan and U.S. alliance,” Major Vause said, “and to provide a realistic training environment that allows JSDF and U.S. forces to respond to a wide range of situations.”

#### B) Cultural and education ties

Japan Times 10 (Takashi Kitazume, Staff writer, Japan Times, 9/24/2k10, “New vision of Japan-U.S. ties needed at key turning point,” <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100924d1.html>)

Calder added that Japan and the U.S. need to move beyond the military-security dimensions and broaden their scope of cooperation to other areas including energy, environment, mass transportation and the medical field. He stressed the importance of cultural and educational ties between the two countries**.** "The alliance is something much broader than simply political-military dimensions, even if they are at the core. And these can be things that help us to create a win-win environment, rather than just a narrow focus on Futenma, where there is always a sort of scoreboard on who is winning and who is losing. I think we need to broaden our relationship beyond that," he said.

#### C) Earthquake Assistance

**Stimson Center 11** (Henry L. Stimson Center, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security, 5/9/2k11, “The US-Japan Alliance After 3/11,” http://www.stimson.org/essays/the-us-japan-alliance-after-311/)

The day opened with introductory remarks by Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Stimson's Chairman of the Board.  Ambassador Bloomfield proposed that while the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake continues to present both the Japanese government and its people a formidable challenge, the tragedy was also an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the US-Japan alliance.  Ambassador Bloomfield shared his confidence that the United States, as Japan's ally, will work closely with Japan as it tackles the formidable challenges of recovery and reconstruction in the years to come.

#### **Alliance high – perception of moving the marines solved problems**

Washington Post 4/30/12

(David Nakamura, “Obama, Japan’s Noda hail security alliance after bilateral meeting, Washington Post 4/30/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/44/post/obama-japans-noda-hail-security-alliance-after-bilateral-meeting/2012/04/30/gIQAZSYSsT_blog.html> /mr)

President Obama on Monday reaffirmed the United States’ defense commitment to Japan, calling the relationship the “linchpin” of security in the Far East.¶ Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda/ (KAZUHIRO NOGI - AFP/GETTY IMAGES)¶ Appearing with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda after their bilateral meeting, Obama hailed the recent agreement to relocate 9,000 U.S. Marines off Okinawa to other bases in the Western Pacific, saying the move will help allay concerns of Japanese residents of the island.¶ Obama pledged that the move will not compromise the long-time alliance at a time when the United States is rebalancing its commitment to Asia to counter China’s influence and renewed nuclear threats from North Korea.¶ “We think we’ve found an effective mechanism to move this process forward in a way that is respectful of the situation in Okinawa, the views of residents there,” Obama said during a joint news conference in the East Room, “but also is able to optimize the defense cooperation between our two countries and the alliance that’s the linchpin not just of our own security but also security in the region as a whole.”¶ The Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa is seen as critical to counterbalancing China’s aggression in the region, but the noisy base has caused tension with Japanese residents in the crowded urban area.¶ U.S. and Japan officials have been negotiating a relocation of some troops and the base for years. Some of the 9,000 Marines likely will be relocated to Guam, but the two sides still have not settled on a new location for the airbase inside Japan.¶ Noda, who was making his first visit to Washington since taking power seven months ago, said that he and Obama were “able to confirm that our two countries will cooperate in the context of a deepening bilateral alliance towards the realization of the optimum U.S. force posture in the region and the reduction of burden on Okinawa.”

Keen sword exercises means alliance is strong

Williamson 10

(Tara A. Williamson, Airman 1st Class, 18th Wing Public Affairs, “Keen Sword exercise sharpens US-Japan alliance,” Official Web Site of the U.S. Air Force, 12/2/2k10, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123233042> /mr)

12/2/2010 - KADENA AIR BASE, Japan (AFNS) -- About 10,500 U.S. servicemembers and their Japan Self Defense Force counterparts are participating in exercise Keen Sword 2011, Dec. 3 through 10, on military installations throughout mainland Japan, Okinawa and in the water surrounding Japan. Keen Sword is a regularly-scheduled exercise designed to strengthen U.S. and Japanese military interoperability and meet mutual defense objectives, according to exercise planners. "Keen Sword will cap the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. alliance as an 'alliance of equals,'" said Maj. William Vause, the chief of operational plans, training and exercises. "It is the largest bilateral exercise between the United States and Japan military forces. (The exercise) will better enhance both of our countries' readiness to respond to varied crisis situations." Training events include integrated air and missile defense, base security and force protection, close-air support, live-fire training, maritime defense and interdiction, and search and rescue. "Guardian Angel rescue specialists delivering combat medical care under extreme duress, have very unique ground focused rescue techniques," said Capt. Robert L. Wilson, the 31st Rescue Squadron team commander. "Throughout Keen Sword, the 31st (RS) and 33rd (RS) will be employing and sharing techniques with our JSDF partners. Focused mission sets will be maritime rescue, high-angle procedures, and extrication from vehicles." Keen Sword is also designed to allow Japanese and U.S. servicemembers to practice and evaluate their coordination procedures and interoperability requirements. "We hope to increase both U.S. and Japanese understanding of our mutual capabilities and rescue limitations," Captain Wilson said. "An exercise like Keen Sword is invaluable for presenting opportunities to establish closer host nation friendships and practicing interoperability for the future." Keen Sword is not designed to respond to, or mirror, any actual world events, nor is it directed at any nation. This training between Japan and the U.S. has been a routine, recurring event for many years, Major Vause said. "The goal of Keen Sword is to increase and improve our bilateral relationship to further enhance the Japan and U.S. alliance, and to provide a realistic training environment that allows JSDF and U.S. forces to respond to a wide range of situations," he said.

# \*\*\*Korea War\*\*\*

## No War

#### North Korea won’t attack- even if they did it wouldn’t escalate

Swami 10- Diplomatic editor of [telegraph.co.uk](http://telegraph.co.uk/) (Praveen, “Why North Korean strike will not trigger world war three,”11/23/10, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8154274/Why-North-Korean-strike-will-not-trigger-world-war-three.html>, CJC)

South Korea is one of the engines of Asian prosperity, on which the world's hopes of an early economic recovery rest on peace in the region. By attacking Yeonpyeong island, a target of no strategic value, North Korea's dysfunctional regime is telling the world how much pain it could inflict if it isn't bribed to behave itself. It hopes that its sabre-rattling will force talks where the West will agree to a substantial aid package in return for a guarantee that Pyonyang will not produce further nuclear weapons. Both sides want wealth, not world war three.  Like other weak but nuclear-armed states, North Korea believes it can use limited conventional-weapons aggression to secure its objectives, since its weapons guarantee it protection from large-scale retaliation that could threaten its existence. The first sign of North Korea's post-nuclear strategy emerged when it sank the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan in March.  Nuclear deterrence guru Glenn Snyder described the phenomenon, of which there are several examples, as the "stability-instability paradox". Beijing military hawks fought Russia over the Zhebao island on the Ussuri river in 1969 to strengthen their political position without actually risking a large-scale war that would have destroyed them. Pakistan fought a limited war with India over Kashmir in 1999, a year after both countries tested their nuclear weapons.

#### No war- and resource shortages mean war wouldn’t escalate

Edwards 10­– International development specialist and policy analyst (Michael, “Full-scale war on Korean peninsula ‘unlikely’,” 11/25/10, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/11/24/3075727.htm>)

"I actually think that they can absorb a lot of provocation because the risk of war," he said. "Given that Seoul, which represents roughly 80 per cent of their economy, is within striking distance of artillery and rockets from North Korea means that we would have to see a lot more violence at this point before the South will be willing to actually conduct military operations against the North." Professor Hayes does expect North Korea's main ally China to intervene. "I think what is much more likely at this point is that we will see the great powers lean very heavily on each other and particularly on China, which is the main backer at this point both politically and economically of North Korea," he said. "It will send a message to Pyongyang and this will probably be a military to military message between the Chinese PLA and the North Korean People's Army, that they simply can't go about business this way. "That they will pull the plug and by pulling the plug I mean turn off the oil, which goes from a pipeline from China to North Korea. Without oil, the North Korean military actually can't run for much more than a month before they actually run out of fuel."

# \*\*\*LNG\*\*\*

## No Accidents

#### -- No accidents –

#### A) Double hulls

**Quoddy 8** (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

The ships will employ both double containment of their contents and double hulls, ensuring a **very low risk of any** **spills or accidents**. This full containment ensures that if leaks or spills do occur, the LNG will be contained and isolated. The double hulls ensure a very low risk that any breach would even reach the hull containment tanks. The vessels are designed with a double hull to ensure minimization of leakage in the event of a collision or grounding, as well as separate ballast.

#### B) Safety systems

**Quoddy 8** (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

LNG facilities have extensive, state-of-the-art warning systems, including gas detectors, ultraviolet or infrared fire detectors, smoke or combustion product detectors, low temperature detectors, and detectors to monitor LNG levels and vapor pressures. Codes and standards from state, national, and international agencies and institutions insure the chances of any releases are **very small**, and if there are releases, the volume of the release is minimal. In addition to warning systems, LNG facilities have **automated firefighting systems**, including foam, dry chemical, or water dispersal and **automatic shutdown** **systems**.

## No Terrorism

#### -- Multiple checks prevent LNG terrorism

**Quoddy 8** (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

Are LNG tankers and storage facilities likely terrorist targets?

All parts of our critical energy infrastructure have been reassessed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Security consciousness throughout the United States is heightened. Shippers have redoubled their already-stringent efforts to ensure security of transportation and the safety of terminals. There is **no indication** that LNG facilities or ships are more likely terrorist targets than other cargo ships or higher visibility political targets such as federal or state landmarks, public gatherings or bridges and tunnels. Nonetheless, LNG suppliers work closely with U.S. agencies charged with national security, and many developers contract with international experts who test their plans, procedures, people, and training to ensure they are sound. First, stringent access controls exist at both the point of origin and the point of destination. Both the liquefaction and re-gasification terminals have gated security access and continuous surveillance monitoring. Next, highly specialized, well-trained personnel serve as crewmembers. Before an LNG ship enters U.S. waters, the immigration service validates the crew. There is a buffer zone required between tankers and other traffic, and tugboats control the direction of tankers as they approach a terminal. Oversight is handled by the U.S. Coast Guard and host port authority pilots. Finally, the Coast Guard boards ships before they enter U.S. waters if it deems the ship a security risk.

## No Impact

#### -- No impact to LNG explosion

**Styles 4** (Geoffrey SW, Managing Director – GSW Strategy Group, LLC, “Energy Outlook”, 5-14, http://energyoutlook.blogspot.com/2004/05/lng-disaster-movie-front-page-of-last.html)

The other remarkable feature of this situation is the degree of fear being instilled by those opposed to the LNG terminals. Although I don't fault communities for wanting a say in the kind of industrial facilities that will be in close proximity to them, those discussions should still be based on fact and not wild ravings. The Wall Street Journal cited one LNG opponent who claimed that the destructive potential of an LNG tanker was equivalent to 55 Hiroshima bombs (see analysis below). This reflects an **irrational fear**, bolstered by **junk science**. It's hard to argue with, but we cannot base the nation's energy policies on **paranoia**. Many have picked up on the explosion at the LNG plant in Skikda, Algeria (see my blog of January 21) as evidence of the risks of handling LNG, but even if that were a fair comparison--and there are good reasons why it is not--it is actually a pretty good illustration that the risks are similar to those associated with many kinds of industrial facilities and not orders of magnitude greater, as activists assert. Having recently seen prosaic and trusted objects turned into deadly weapons, it is natural to worry a bit more about LNG than we might have a few years ago. Every LNG tanker--along with every crude oil or gasoline tanker, tank truck, or rail car--has the potential for destructive misuse. Yet we have not grounded all airplanes for fear they will be turned into cruise missiles, nor can we shun every link in the energy chain on which we all rely. While we can minimize risk, we cannot eliminate it. And if you don't want the LNG terminal in your neighborhood, for reasons that seem perfectly valid to you, just exactly whose neighborhood are you proposing as an alternative? Or are you and your neighbors prepared to take your houses off the gas grid and heat them with something else?  
Finally, for anyone interested in the atomic bomb comparison, a few facts: 1. A fully loaded LNG tanker of 120,000 cubic meters capacity holds about 50,000 tons of methane. 2. The yield of the Hiroshima bomb was equivalent to 21,000 tons of TNT. 3. Conservatively assuming that TNT and methane have the same energy content gives you a ratio of 2.5, not 55, but we are not done yet. 4. An atomic bomb releases its energy (from the conversion of matter into energy, via our old friend e=mc^2) in 1/1000th of a second. This makes for a stupendous flash and explosion, with a surface temperature comparable to that of the sun. This is why every H-bomb has an A-bomb trigger.5. A chemical explosion of methane requires a narrow range of air/fuel mix (5-15%) that could not be achieved all at once for the entire volume of an LNG tanker. In the real world, it would take many seconds and probably minutes to consume all the available fuel. 6. **The difference** between points 4 and 5 above **is analogous to the difference between going from 60-0 mph by hitting a brick wall, compared to a panic stop using the brakes.** The same energy is released, but in very different ways. 7. If it were easy to liberate nuclear weapon yields from large quantities of fuel, people would be doing this routinely. The closest we get is something like this. And note that there is an **enormous distinction** between achieving A-bomb-like overpressures in a very limited radius with a fuel/air device vs. the kind of wide-scale effects of an actual nuclear explosion.

#### Accidents won’t cause LNG explosions

**Quoddy 8** (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

What is the likelihood of explosion at the storage tanks?

An explosion is **highly unlikely** because LNG is stored under atmospheric pressure. LNG is never flammable and natural gas cannot explode if it is not confined under pressure. Immediately after being released into the surrounding air, LNG starts to warm up and convert into a gas. Since initially the gas is colder and heavier than the surrounding air, it creates an icy fog - freezing the moisture in the air, as when a freezer door is opened. However, as the gas warms up, it blends with the air and begins to disperse and rise upward. The cloud could ignite close to the ground only if there is something to ignite it during a narrow window when the right mixture of gas and air exists for combustion. If released on water, LNG floats and vaporizes, leaving no residue.

# \*\*\*Mexico Collapse\*\*\*

## No Collapse

#### No collapse in Mexico, and the US can’t effect the outcome

Strategy Page 09 The Coming Collapse January 19, 2009 <http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/mexico/articles/20090119.aspx> /KG

The internet has been rife with reports that US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is predicting the collapse of Mexico. The root of this story lies in a study produced by JFCOM entitled; The Joint Operating Environment (JOE). The report appeared in November 2008, and was intended for use in "long range planning guidance." It was not meant to predict anything. Media sensationalists latched on to the comments about "rapid collapse" scenarios in the JFCOM speculative study and totally missed the point that this was a "what if?" scenario for planning purposes, not a prediction. JFCOM's long-range planners thought Pakistan and Mexico were "worst cases" of rapid collapse. Okay, this is fodder for wargaming and long-range planning excursions. No doubt a Mexican collapse would have huge effects on the US. However, the direct comparison to Pakistan was a huge stretch. For numerous reasons we will get to in a moment -- though we were glad to see JFCOM discussing Mexico and its complex security challenges. Mexico is a huge security concern for the US, but that isn't a new phenomenon. We've been covering Mexico since 1999 and have covered the Cartel War (our original name, by the way) since December 2006 when the Mexican government decided to treat the cartel threat as the serious national threat it is. But Mexico is not Pakistan. It is not collapsing. It is not a "near failed state." Mexico is a threatened state, but the country has political will to confront the threats posed by violent drug cartels and its own legacy of corrupt politics. Even accounting for Chiapas (Maya land) and numerous wannabe separatists, Mexico also has money, education, and a comparative political-social coherence the entirety of South and Central Asia should envy. Meanwhile, there are economic issues. From the Mexican perspective, NAFTA has been a means of "modernizing" the Mexican economy by evolution rather than revolution. The government, albeit slowly, has used NAFTA as a tool for streamlining the economy and reducing corruption. The government is directing a complex war that includes judicial and legal reformation ? dead serious counter-corruption drives that have put senior officials in jail. No, bliss is not around the corner, but this is a real path to real change. GEN Barry McCaffrey's recent report to the West Point social sciences department on Mexico (memo dated December 29, 2008) makes the point about political will in Mexico is very explicit, "Now is the time during the opening months of a new US Administration to jointly commit to a fully resourced major partnership as political equals of the Mexican government. We must jointly and respectfully cooperate to address the broad challenges our two nations face. Specifically, we must support the Government of Mexico's efforts to confront the ultra violent drug cartels. We must do so in ways that are acceptable to the Mexican polity and that take into account Mexican sensitivities to sovereignty. The United States Government cannot impose a solution. The political will is present in Mexico to make the tough decisions that are required to confront a severe menace to the rule of law and the authority of the Mexican state?" McCaffrey's report also noted: "President Calderon has committed his government to the "Limpiemos Mexico" campaign to "clean up Mexico". This is not rhetoric. They have energized their departments of Social Development, Public Education, and Health to be integral parts of this campaign. Finally, there is a clear understanding that this is an eight-year campaign-not a short-term surge?" The former SOUTHCOM commander and US drug czar sees the problem but sees what Calderon and his government are doing. --Austin Bay January 14, 2009: Mexican media reported that a member of the Beltran-Leyva drug cartel operating in Acapulco had "impersonated a police recruiter." The cartelista claimed he was offering police jobs but was really trawling for new gang members. Police in Tijuana (Baja California) found a weapons cache with over 500,000 rounds of ammunition, including 195,000 rounds of 5.56mm (M-16 and AR-15 ammo) and 160,000 rounds of Russian-type 7.62 mm (AK-47 ammo). The police also seized 135 sacks of assorted ammunition, including .357 caliber, .38 caliber, 10 mm, and .45 caliber ammo. January 13, 2008: Hey, it's a counter-insurgency idea that a lot of military analysts think would help: legalization of now-prohibited narcotics. The El Paso, Texas, city council toyed with the idea of recommending the US government "go for legalization" as a means of striking at the finances of Mexico's violent drug cartels. In early January the El Paso city council took a preliminary vote that requested a national U.S. "dialog on ending the prohibition of narcotics." The politics in this is, of course, very complex. Several Texas state representatives got upset by the city council's resolution (which the mayor vetoed as "unrealistic"). The state representatives said the resolution suggested El Paso had "given up" in the battle against illegal narcotics. The reps said the region could face a cut-off in police support funding from the state of Texas and the federal government. Well, maybe. The thing is, the El Paso city council had the courage to point to the problem ? an American market for illegal drugs. --Austin Bay Mexico would consider "reviewing environmental and labor provisions" in the NAFTA agreement (North American Free Trade Association agreement) with the U.S. The new U.S. president wants to make "environmental and labor"-related chances to the treaty. Trade among Canada, Mexico, and the US in 1994 was around $300 billion a year. Recent estimates put the "trilateral trade" at around a trillion dollars a year. Canada is the US's top trading partner, China number two, and Mexico is number three. The Mexican government is interested in producing a new agreement to permit, regulate and protect Mexicans working in the US. That could become part of the "NAFTA review" but would certainly involve examining the issue of illegal immigrants and undocumented Mexican workers in the US.

# \*\*\*Middle East War\*\*\*

## No War

#### No mideast war

Ferguson 06 Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard [Niall “This might not be a world war, but it still needs a sense of urgency” July 23rd, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3626545/This-might-not-be-a-world-war%2C-but-it-still-needs-a-sense-of-urgency.html>]

Such language can -- for now, at least -- safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today.  Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev.  The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this crisis may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in 1967, three weeks in 1973). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

# \*\*\*Naval Power\*\*\*

## Alt Causes

#### Alt causes to navy readiness

Ewing 11 (Philip, Staff Writer, DOD Buzz, “Surface Navy: ‘We’re not good to go’”, <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/07/12/surface-navy-were-not-good-to-go/>, Hemanth)

A pair of top Navy officials admitted Tuesday that its endemic readiness problems are basically unresolved — and may keep getting worse — before the service’s plans to fix its surface fleet finally take effect. Vice Adm. Bill Burke, the Navy’s top maintenance officer; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, head of Naval Sea Systems Command, told a House Armed Services Committee panel that it took so many years, and so many interconnected decisions, to put the surface Navy in its current state that it would take a lot of time and effort to get it right again. “We have a good plan,” McCoy told committee chairman Rep. Randy Forbes, a Virginia Republican, “We’re not good to go right now.” In fact, he said some negative indicators “may turn a little harsher.” Over the past five years and beyond, Navy inspections have found that a growing number of the Navy’s surface warships aren’t ready to fight: The ships are in bad physical shape, carry broken equipment, insufficient spare parts, and can’t even rely upon their advanced weapons and sensors. But despite years of embarrassing reports in the press and harangues from Congress and top DoD officials, the fleet has been slow to recover, given the wide range of causes for its woes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the “running government like a business” craze swept the Pentagon, top leaders rewarded commanders who could get the job done for less money, which then sparked a flurry of inter-related decisions that had the net effect of reducing the readiness of the surface Navy: The Navy fielded smaller crews, making fewer hands available for regular maintenance; it cut human-led, hands-on instruction, preferring to teach sailors their jobs using “computer-based instruction,” which meant they weren’t qualified to do their jobs at sea. And simple budget cuts meant ships didn’t get the regular maintenance or spare parts they needed. On top of all this, Navy commanders blame an increase in operational tempo, which meant more demands on their smaller, poorly maintained fleet, which meant less time and money to do the full-scale repairs ships need to keep them in service for their design lives. Crews realized all these problems at the operational level, but it has taken years to get the top brass to acknowledge the failures of initiatives such as “top 6 roll-down,” “lean manning,” and the “fleet response plan.” According to Tuesday’s hearing, all those problems are more or less still in effect, although Burke and McCoy told Forbes they acknowledge what’s wrong and they know what they have to do to fix it. The surface Navy is doing the inconvenient, expensive maintenance it has long put off, McCoy said, because it now accepts the need to keep ships around for their full lives — something the Navy traditionally has not done. McCoy gave the example of the cruiser USS Chosin, now in dry-dock in Hawaii: Initially the repair bill for that ship was estimated at $35 million, McCoy said, but when engineers did their deep inspections and discovered the state of its tanks, pipes and other equipment, they realized they would have to spend $70 million to get the ship into the best shape they could. This is why McCoy and Burke warned the Navy could continue to have bad results on its inspections, as long-hidden problems finally come into view. McCoy and Burke said that about 70 percent of the Navy’s hoped-for fleet of 313 ships is in service today, but the service can only get to that goal if all its destroyers and cruisers, for example, actually serve for their full 40 or 35 years. But Congress has heard Navy leaders give this explanation many times before, Forbes said. He pointed to statistics that showed an ever-growing number of Navy warships were being found unready each year — from 12 percent in 2009 to 24 percent last year, and 22 percent already this year. What is the Navy’s target for that number? Forbes asked. McCoy and Burke said the service is in the process of formulating one, but it’s a complicated situation. Forbes complained that defense witnesses always come before Congress with a plan for how they’ll get better, but they seldom appear to be able to act on it; as when DoD was unable to even conduct the basic audits of itself that officials promised they would. McCoy and Burke repeated that the Navy is “stretched” by the number of forces it must provide to combatant commanders, who Burke said want more carriers, aircraft and submarines than the Navy can deploy in answer. Burke, a submariner, said that combatant commanders want between 16 and 18 nuclear attack submarines at any one time, but the Navy only has enough to deploy 10. He and McCoy said the Navy wasn’t forcing commanders to miss missions, but that the rate of operations today was affecting the surface fleet’s ability to do maintenance and could hurt the service lives of its ships. Overall, the admirals warned, today’s operational tempo is “unsustainable.” But Forbes alluded to a classified report from the combatant commanders that he suggested found the Navy was forcing them to miss missions, although he said he and the witnesses couldn’t talk about it in open session. Forbes also blasted the Navy’s decision to under-fund its depot maintenance for ships and aircraft, a calculated risk by service officials to defer work in order to afford other priorities. Forbes hinted at a high “cannibalization” rate in the surface force, alluding to the practice in which crews’ swap their ships’ equipment when inspectors are due so they aren’t dinged for non-functional gear. Although surface sailors quietly talk about this practice among themselves, it’s very seldom broached publicly, and the Navy brass denies it happens.

## Status Quo Solves

#### Strategic dispersal sufficient now

Daily Press 2008 (Daily Press, “Norfolk Vs. Mayport”, <http://articles.dailypress.com/2008-11-21/news/0811200173_1_carrier-hampton-roads-navy>)

The Navy has raised the issue of security, and the advisability of what it calls "strategic dispersal": not having too many resources concentrated in a single place that might be hit by terrorists or a natural disaster. This is certainly legitimate, if hardly a comfort to Hampton Roads residents. But the risk is based on the assumption that those assets - in this case aircraft carriers - will actually all be in the place where they're based. Navy vessels fulfill their mission when they're deployed, not when they're tied up. There may be four carriers based in Norfolk, but the likelihood that they'll all be in port at the same time is slim, short of an unprecedented bliss of peace breaking out. So the analysis should consider how many vessels are actually likely to be present, as opposed to out at sea. And how well the deployment rotation can be managed to avoid having too many ships in port at one time. There are other operational issues to consider in the Norfolk vs. Mayport analysis. Such as the fact that Naval Station Norfolk has adequate capacity, recently upgraded at considerable expense. And it's close to the East Coast Master Jet Base at Oceana, Norfolk Naval Shipyard and to the carriers' birthplace and overhaul shop, the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard. The national security argument crumbles, and the budgetary argument favors Norfolk. But it's good to review the argument from regional interest, too, if that helps motivate the political powers and others in the community to make the compelling case.

#### Status quo naval operations are moving towards a positive sum world

Farley, 2010 (Robert, Assistant Professor, started at the Patterson School in 2005 as a post-doc scholar. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Washington Department of Political Science in 2004, “The Future of U.S. Naval Power”, World Politics Review, Published 9/14/2010, Accessed 07/18/2012, ZR)

The December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia helped spur reconsideration of the Navy's strategic orientation. During the tsunami, U.S. warships provided relief to stricken areas in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states. A year later, Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast, creating an eerily similar set of problems. The Navy -- and in the case of Katrina, the Coast Guard -- played the lead role in relief operations, increasing its profile at a time when its contribution to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seemed limited. ¶ Any new strategic document needed to create space for power projection, human security, and reaction to the rise of China. Katrina and the tsunami helped push the Navy toward human security as a guiding strategic principle, and helped shift the framing of deterrence and power projection from "realist" hard power to liberal internationalist soft power conceptions. ¶ From a theoretical point of view, the Cooperative Maritime Strategy was a far more ambitious document than even its framers may have realized. At its core, the cooperative strategy is about constructing a world in which naval power is positive sum. Strategic planners normally think of military power as relative and zero sum. Chinese naval power, in the traditional formulation, detracts from the ability of the U.S. Navy to do its job. CS-21, however, suggests that all naval power can contribute to the maintenance of global order. Fully realized, the Cooperative Maritime Strategy would require close cooperation between the world's navies. However, this also implies a degree of depoliticization of global naval power.

## No Impact

**No impact to naval power**

Goure 10 (Daniel, Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD, “Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, Hemanth)

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses. More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### Empirical studies prove the navy is not capable of deterring threats

Daniel 2 (Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\_2002/Globalization\_and\_Maritime\_Power\_Dec\_02/0 1\_toc.htm)

In sum, there would seem to be a special role for the U.S. Navy in contingency response along littorals, but, outside the context of a specific crisis, constant day-to-day presence does not do much to deter unwanted behavior. Thus, it would seem a raising of false expectations to argue, for example, that the “gapping of aircraft carriers in areas of potential crisis is an invitation to disaster—and therefore represents culpable negligence on the part of America’s defense decision-makers.”33 In the early 1960s, the United States maintained three aircraft carrier battlegroups in the Mediterranean Sea but later gradually found that it needed to scale back. Currently, a single battlegroup operates there for less than 9 months of the year on average. This is a significant reduction, but no one can prove that the Mediterranean region became less stable. Conversely, the Navy began to maintain a regular presence in the Arabian Gulf in 1979, but this did not prevent Iran or Iraq from attacking ships during their war. In the 1980s, attacks generally increased in number over the 8 years of the war. As for deterring the initiation of a crisis in the first place, it is essentially impossible for an outsider to prove that such deterrence was successful except in the rare case in which a deterred party admits that he was deterred and states the reasons. Adam Siegel, John Arquilla, Paul Huth, Paul Davis, and a Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy team led by Edward Rhodes have each attempted to study the effects of forward presence and general deterrence. The deficiency of such study is always in making the definitive link between them. The majority of these studies suggest that “[h]istorically seapower has not done well as a deterrent” in preventing the outbreak of conflicts, principally because land-based powers not dependent on overseas trade are relatively “insensitive” to the operations of naval forces.

#### And, continuous navy presence is unnecessary – the navy is only effective after a crisis has already occurred

Daniel 2 (Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\_2002/Globalization\_and\_Maritime\_Power\_Dec\_02/0 1\_toc.htm)

In short, then, to say that “balanced forward naval presence will be increasingly vital in shaping the peace”41 seems true only vis-à-vis friends but not potential adversaries or third parties. It would not seem to have much direct impact on the shape of a friend’s domestic politics but could affect its economy (and thus indirectly the domestic political scene) and its willingness to support U.S. foreign policy. There is no evidence, however, that presence need be continuous to achieve these effects. The Mediterranean analysis suggests that, at the end of the day, what is vital instead is that U.S. naval forces show up when needed—that is, during the run-up to and the onset of a contingency—and because of prior operations with regional friends, that it immediately act effectively in concert with them.

#### And, the United States navy cannot prevent inevitable conflict through deterrence

Daniel 2 (Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\_2002/Globalization\_and\_Maritime\_Power\_Dec\_02/0 1\_toc.htm)

force should be employed to ensure that its comparative advantages are maximized with full recognition of where limits exist. The point of the above recommendations is to emphasis that naval forces possess unique flexibility as politico-military instruments, but there are also limitations to what they can achieve as elements of conventional deterrence to regional crises. Naval forces can be effective instruments in training toward interoperability with friends, allies, and potential coalition members and do appear to have a reassuring effect on treaty allies. But this does not necessarily require the current rigorous force deployment schedule. In the globalizing world, naval forces will be critical elements in responding to crises and will have a modest role in shaping the environment, but it is not certain that they can have considerable direct effect in deterring the inevitable politico-military crises that will occur in less stable regions buffeted by the effects of globalization. U.S. Navy force structure should be optimized for what it can do, not for tasks that cannot be proven effective.

#### Naval power doesn't deter as foreign militaries don’t know US maritime force capabilities – ground forces are the only thing that is perceived

Allan, 94 (Air Force National Defense Fellow at the CSIS, Charles, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1994)

Information. As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point out (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

# \*\*\*NPT\*\*\*

## Fails

#### Heg low – rise of China and economy

#### Financial Times 11

**(Lionel Barber, “The end of US hegemony: Legacy of 9/11,” 9/5/11, Financial Times Analysis,** <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6acf1a6-d54d-11e0-bd7e-00144feab49a.html#axzz217uvLMKO> /mr)

On the morning of September 11, 2001, America’s prospects appeared as bright as the clear blue sky over Lower Manhattan. The price of Brent crude oil was $28 a barrel, the Federal government was running a budget surplus, the US economy was turning (albeit imperceptibly) after the dotcom crash. The most powerful nation on earth was at peace.¶ Ten years on, the oil price hovers around $115 a barrel, the US is projected to run a budget deficit for 2011 of $1,580bn, the largest in its history; the economy remains deeply troubled after the financial crash of 2008; and America’s military and intelligence services remain at war, battling insurgency and radical Islamic terrorism, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Niger and Yemen.¶ More¶ Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has described the national debt as the greatest threat to US national security. Standard & Poor’s recent downgrade of America’s credit rating appears to confirm the superpower’s steady slippage. And while there is no linear narrative from the September 2001 attacks to America’s present economic plight, the inflation-adjusted cost of the ensuing “global war on terror” at more than $2,000bn amounts to twice the cost of the Vietnam war.¶ President George W. Bush’s response to the assault on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon was to launch two wars of choice against Afghanistan and Iraq, a pugnacious unilateralism at the expense of alliances and international law, and a near evangelical promotion of liberal democracy in the Middle East. His administration’s hard-edged policies fractured alliances in Europe and triggered a sharp fall in America’s standing abroad.¶ On the positive side of the ledger, America has so far escaped another terrorist attack on its own soil. Others have not been so fortunate. The bombings in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) did not match the scale of September 11, but they claimed several hundred victims. Al-Qaeda is down but not entirely out. Dozens of computer disks recovered from Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggest the al-Qaeda leader, killed last May during a daring raid by US Navy Seals, was planning another spectacular outrage, perhaps to coincide with the September 11 anniversary this weekend.¶ Moreover, this year’s Arab awakening has dispelled the notion that the Middle East – with the exception of Israel – is congenitally incapable of embracing democracy, One by one, the region’s autocrats, from Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, have been toppled by protesters demanding dignity, freedom and jobs. True, the fall of Muammer Gaddafi in Libya was precipitated by armed rebellions assisted by Nato warplanes; but President Bashar al-Assad of Syria may be the next leader to feel the hot breath of the Arab street.¶ Twin Towers memorial rises from rubble¶ A decade and a day after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the public will be able to return for the first time to the place where the Twin Towers stood¶ The question is whether the much-maligned Mr Bush was correct in arguing that the autocratic status quo in the Middle East created an incubator for radical Islamic terrorism and consequently a clear and present danger to the US. If the answer is yes, then his administration’s failings were due less to a flawed diagnosis and more to a matter of execution.¶ A second related question is whether the administration’s military response to September 11 amounted to a costly and disproportionate diversion of attention and resources at a time when the world was being reshaped by the rise of powerful new actors, notably China?¶ . . .¶ In the aftermath of the attack on the Twin Towers, a geopolitical re-alignment comparable to those of 1815, 1945 or 1989 appeared to take shape. The US mustered a coalition against terrorism that included rivals such as Russia and China, as well as one-time pariahs such as Cuba, Iran and Sudan.¶ The military response was equally effective. Having identified the perpetrators, the US staged a brilliant improvised campaign to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan. US special forces combined with warlords and overwhelming air-power to break the Kabul regime within weeks. Although the leaders, notably Mullah Omar and his proxy Bin-Laden, slipped away, the al-Qaeda network was relentlessly targeted and disrupted.¶ Within a year, the US had lost the moral high ground. Mr Bush’s error was to make clear that regime change in Iraq was only one step for dealing with what he described as an “axis of evil” including Iran, North Korea and potentially other adversaries suspected of harbouring or sponsoring terrorists. Overnight, the US was cast as a rogue nation.¶ Concerns rose with the publication of a revised national security doctrine in 2002, which ditched cold war concepts of containment and deterrence. In their place came a “forward-leaning” strategy of pre-emptive military action, regime change, and a new kind of warfare that justified torture and denied the rights of the Geneva Convention to suspected terrorists.¶ Thus the Iraq war was fought without the support of traditional allies such as Canada, France and Germany; without the backing of the UN Security Council; and without conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction posing an immediate threat to the US. As for allies, Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair provided loyal political cover, though Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, declared witheringly that UK forces were redundant in military terms.¶ Nato, having for the first time invoked article five to commit all members to collective defence, was similarly sidelined. Washington’s motto was “the mission determines the coalition”. But selective alliances work both ways. By the end of the decade, European allies were using caveats to opt out of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Hence outgoing US defence secretary Robert Gates’ warning this year that Nato was fast becoming irrelevant.¶ Europe, too, emerged much diminished – and not just during the Libyan conflict where Germany opted out and Britain and France ran short of munitions within weeks. At the beginning of the new century, flush with the success of launching a new monetary union, Europe’s leaders agreed plans to make the European Union the most competitive economic zone in the world. In retrospect, the much-vaunted Lisbon agenda marked the summit of ambitions coinciding with the bursting of the dotcom bubble.¶ Ten years on, the original design of European monetary union has shown itself to be fundamentally flawed. The enforcement mechanisms for budgetary discipline were ignored by big and smaller members alike, including Germany; peripheral economies in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which soared on the back of low interest rates, have been exposed as uncompetitive. Contagion in the bond markets now threatens to spread to Italy, a “core” eurozone member.¶ . . .¶ By Mr Bush’s second term, abrasive rhetoric gave way to a more tempered approach. As an occupation force in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US became sucked into the nation-building that Mr Rumsfeld had long derided. In a similar confusion, President Barack Obama and David Cameron, UK prime minister, declared either one or both of these missions to be militarily vital and then acted as if they were discretionary by setting a (political) timetable for withdrawal.¶ The accountants will tot up the collective bill for the Afghan and Iraq ventures at close to $2,000bn in inflation-adjusted terms; but Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank and a former deputy US secretary of state, argues that a country as rich as the US can well afford the cost. In 1948, says Mr Zoellick, the average gross national product per head in the US was one quarter of where it stands today. Yet Americans readily supported President Truman’s doctrine to prop up democracies in Europe and counter communism around the world to the tune of billions of dollars.¶ Whether the seeds of democratic transformation will take root in Iraq is more debatable. The much-vaunted US military “surge” rescued the country from chaos and possible break-up, but relations between Iraq’s ethnic groups – Kurds, Sunnis and the majority Shia – remain precarious. Arguably, the toppling of Saddam Hussein has allowed Iran to become the dominant regional power, exerting influence through the Shia government in Baghdad. Meanwhile, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions remain unchecked.¶ Nor did 9/11 boost efforts to tackle the other serious and unresolved threat to regional stability: the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Both Mr Bush and Mr Obama have failed to break the deadlock over the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and the status of Jerusalem. Successive Israeli prime ministers from Ariel Sharon to Benjamin Netanyahu have turned the war on terror to their own advantage, arguing that concessions jeopardise Israel’s security and entities such as Hamas – which easily won elections in Gaza in 2005 – are terrorists masquerading as legitimate representatives of the Palestinians.¶ Despite the focus on fighting terrorism, the US was still alert to broader geopolitical trends. The most important breakthrough took place between the US and India with the signing in 2008 of the“123” deal on civil nuclear co-operation. The new strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi not only offers a counterweight to the rise of China, but also to nuclear-armed Pakistan, America’s long-time but increasingly unmanageable ally in South Asia.¶ By contrast, Sino-US relations amount to not much more than an uneasy accommodation. Beijing sees Washington (at best) as “neither friend nor enemy”, while the US has belatedly woken up to China’s challenge to its dominance in the Pacific. Beijing has grudgingly applied pressure to its brooding nuclear neighbour in North Korea, but nationalist fervour means the leadership remains neuralgic over Taiwan and acutely sensitive to territorial disputes with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam.¶ . . .¶ In the final resort, the most significant geopolitical development of the past 10 years took place not on the battlefield but in the financial system. The global banking crisis stemmed from flawed regulation and perverse incentives for banks to sell mortgages to poor Americans with no ability to repay, as well as gigantic leverage in the financial system. These distortions were created, in part, by global imbalances driven by Americans living on cheap credit and Chinese exporters and savers contributing to a vast current account surplus.¶ Until the Great Crash of 2008, this financial merry-go-round spun regardless. Thanks to cheap labour costs, China exported deflation to the rest of the world. China financed the US current account deficit by recycling its own surplus into US Treasury bonds. Now, three years into the financial crisis, the world economy has been turned upside down. The US is diminished, Europe sidelined, and Asia, for now, in the ascendant.¶ Consider the broader historical trend. Developing Asia’s share of the global economy in purchasing power parity terms has risen steadily from 8 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent last year. Taken as a whole, Asian stock markets now account for 31 per cent of global market capitalisation, ahead of Europe at 25 per cent and within a whisker of the US at 32 per cent. Last year, China overtook Germany to become the world’s largest exporter. Chinese banks now rank among the biggest in the world by market capitalisation.¶ Import numbers are equally revealing: the developing world is becoming a driver of the global economy. From the consumption of cement to eggs, China leads the world; it has also just overtaken US to become the world’s largest market for cars.¶ China’s voracious appetite for commodities is creating new trade routes, especially with emerging powerhouses such as Brazil. Last year, China surpassed the US as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. Latin America, a region once best known for instability, has emerged through the crisis virtually unscathed. Poverty is falling, the middle classes are expanding and asset markets are bubbling.¶ Condoleezza Rice, Mr Bush’s national security adviser and secretary of state, once described multi-polarity as a theory of rivalry, a necessary evil. In economic terms, multi-polarity spells a new order in which interdependence is the norm and the US, while still overwhelmingly powerful, no longer occupies the role of hegemon.¶ As for the legacy of 9/11, Gerard Lyons, chief economist of Standard Chartered Bank, says the three most important words in the past decade were not “war on terror” but “made in China”. On present trends, he adds, the three most important words of this decade will be “owned by China”.¶

#### Credit downgrade

**International Policy Digest 11**

**(Dr. Jo Coghlan, “U.S. Credit Rating: American Hegemony in Decline?” 8/9/11,** <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/08/09/u-s-credit-rating-american-hegemony-in-decline/> /mr)

Standard and Poor’s (S&P) have reduced America’s sovereign credit rating from AAA to AA+. The rating puts the U.S. on par with Kuwait and Taiwan.¶ America’s $14.3 trillion debt makes “the world’s richest nation” a worse credit risk than Australia, Germany, Britain and the Isle of Man. The downgrade followed the biggest weekly selloff in U.S. stocks in 32 months.¶ S&P’s decision rested on two factors: America’s decision to raise the debt ceiling and concerns about America’s political processes. S&P were reportedly concerned about the “political brinksmanship of recent months” which had highlighted what they saw as “America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable” than what they had previously believed. S&P were “pessimistic” about the ability of Congress and the White House to reach a broader plan to rein in the deficit “any time soon.”¶ It has been widely reported that the legislation signed by Barack Obama on 2 August to reduce the fiscal deficit by $2.1 trillion over 10 years was well short of S&P expectations of US$4 trillion.¶ The rating agency is also reportedly considering the possibility of lowering the rating to AA within two years if the U.S. government does not cut spending as much as recently pledged, or if higher interest rates and new fiscal pressures worsen the state’s financial picture.¶ The Wall Street Journal has reported that the S&P decision will likely send “shock waves through global financial markets and potentially undermine world economic growth.”¶ In July, S&P had placed the United States’ rating on “credit watch with negative implications” as the debt ceiling debate devolved into partisan bickering. In the same month, Moody’s Investors Services announced it had initiated a review of America’s sterling bond rating because of the likelihood of a U.S. default on its debts. Unlike S&P, who wanted to see no increase in the debt ceiling, Moody’s concern was based on the fact that the rise in the debt ceiling would not be high enough. In both cases, however, it seemed America’s rating was in trouble last month.¶ The downgrade of America’s credit rating is the first time the U.S. was downgraded since it received an AAA rating from Moody’s in 1917 and S&P in 1941. It is the first time that S&P has issued a “negative” outlook on the U.S. government since it began rating the credit-worthiness of railroad bonds in 1860.¶ “A downgrade is uncharted territory for the U.S., but one outcome seems likely: Americans could face higher interest rates on mortgages, car loans, credit cardsand other consumer loans. Business probably will also have to pay more to borrow money,” according to MSN Money, none of which will boost the already flagging economy.¶ The likely domestic cost of the downgrading will be increased borrowing costs, which will have a drag effect on economic growth. It is predicted that the U.S. downgrade is likely to cost the U.S. economy $100 billion a year. Variable borrowing rates and mortgage rates will rise; conversely mortgage-backed bonds will face a downgrade. Money market mutual funds will come under significant pressure.¶ The downgrade will negatively impact on the borrowing capabilities of American state and municipalities and companies, particularly those with debts linked to federal payments.¶ A larger concern will be whether the appetite for U.S. debt might change among foreign investors, in particular China, the world’s largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries. In 1945, foreigners owned just 1 percent of US Treasuries. Today, they own a record high 46 percent. U.S. Treasury bonds, once undisputedly seen as the safest security in the world, are now rated lower than bonds issued by countries such as Britain, Germany, France, or Canada.¶ Prior to the S&P decision, Dagong, China’s Global Credit Rating agency, had already pushed the U.S. rating from A+ to A, and placed the rating on negative watch (indicating the potential for a further cut). Other than the U.S. Federal Reserve, China is the biggest holder of American debt, with $1.16 trillion. It maintains the value of its currency through buying U.S dollars: a monetary policy that is likely to continue if only to protect its own currency.¶ The downgrade, accompanied by a continuing weak U.S dollar, could affect Chinese exports and this will directly affect the Australian economy. Less demand for consumer goods in both the regional and global economy would directly lead to weaker demand for China’s exported goods; this then weakens demands for imports, particularly in the energy sector. If the Chinese currency appreciates as a response to the weakening U.S dollar, it will make Chinese goods more expensive. This will result in China shifting its focus away from export production to production for domestic consumption. With China continuing to buy U.S debt and shifting its focus to domestic economic production, the results will mean less Chinese currency floating in the regional and global economy. This coupled with contractions in Eurozone spending, bodes badly for any economy that is being driven by exports: as Australia currently is.¶ Prime Minister Julia Gillard has immediately responded to the downgrade saying: “Australia’s economy is strong and should not be badly affected.” She maintained the Labor mantra that the Australian economy was, and would remain strong, because of China’s demand for Australian resources. However,world stock markets had already plunged prior to the S&P decision, stripping more than $100 billion from the value of listed Australian companies. Following the downgrade decision, the Australian share market is expected to face more losses. No amount of Gillard or Swan rhetoric is likely to stop further significant domestic losses.¶ Similarly, the Canadian government is putting on a brave face in its acknowledgement of its interconnectedness with the U.S. The country’s finance minister Jim Flaherty has said that Canada is “well-positioned to face global headwinds.”¶ Apart from the economic impact of the downgrade on American and international economies, the downgrade has a political context. The world’s economic superpower has been sharply criticised for its political handling of the debt ceiling issue. S&P issued a “sharply worded critique of the American political system”.¶ There is a view that the U.S. does not deserve a triple-A rating, and the reason has nothing whatsoever to do with its debt ratios. America’s ability to pay is not the issue: the problem is its willingness to pay. It is not entirely clear that this is the position of Barack Obama and the Democrats, rather is likely being driven by those in Washington who are willing to “drive the U.S. into default.”¶ It is possible that the S&P factored in the machinations of the Republican Party, and in particular the Tea Party, that took the U.S. to the brink of default. A smaller deficit-reduction deal was on offer, but was refused by the Republicans possibly hyped up by the Tea Party, who are desperate to remain relevant is a rapidly changing political landscape. This being the case, the S&P have punished America because of the action of recalcitrant Republicans for refusing to accept any legislation that would increase taxes. The political machinations of Washington confirmed to S&P the debilitating state of American politics.¶ America emerged as the dominant, hegemonic power at the end of the Cold War. It played a preeminent role in shaping the post-war international economic system and was a key actor in many of the international organisations that now shape global economic and monetary policy. The decision to downgrade its credit rating is economic, political but also powerfully symbolic. In New Zealand, the downgrade was reported as “a dramatic reversal of fortune for the world’s largest economy.” The Australian media is reporting it as “a symbolic embarrassment for President Barack Obama, his administration and the Americans” and as a “symbolic blow.”¶ As one American commentator has said: “The symbolism is undeniable.” The downgrade is a “blow to U.S. prestige.”¶ The downgrade to America’s credit rating is a historic assault on the superpower’s prestige and a symbol of the changing world order: that is, the demise of the U.S. and the rise of China.

# \*\*\*Nuclear Meltdown\*\*\*

## No Impact

#### Their ev only references a radioactive leak from one US power plant – radiation is not bad for you at low levels

Schulz ‘7 (Matthais, Der Spiegel, “Nuclear Exaggeration”, 11-22, http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument.html?titel=Is+Atomic+Radiation+as+Dangerous+as+We+Thought%3F&id=54059068&top=SPIEGEL&suchbegriff=Hiroshima&quellen=)

The more recent meltdown at the reactor in Chernobyl in 1986 reminded the world of the dangers of the atom. The incident was referred to as "nuclear genocide," and the press wrote of "forests stained red" and of deformed insects. The public was bombarded with images of Soviet cleanup crews wearing protective suits, bald-headed children with cancer and the members of cement crews who lost their lives in an attempt to seal off the cracked reactor with a concrete plug. Fifteen years after the reactor accident, the German newsmagazine Focus concluded that Chernobyl was responsible for "500,000" deaths. Was all this just doomsday folklore? There is no doubt that large sections of the countryside were contaminated by the accident in the Ukraine. In the ensuing decades, up to 4,000 cleanup workers and residents of the more highly contaminated areas died of the long-term consequences of radiation exposure. But the six-figure death counts that opponents of nuclear power once cited are simply nonsense. In most cases, they were derived from vague "extrapolations" based on the hearsay reported by Russian dissidents. But such horror stories have remained part of the nuclear narrative to this day. In fact, contemporaries who reported on the Chernobyl incident should have known better. Even in the 1980s, radiobiologists and radiation physicists considered the media's doomsday reports to be exaggerated. And their suspicions have become a virtual certainty today. Groups of researchers have set up shop at all of the sites of nuclear accidents or major nuclear contamination. They work at Hanford (where the United States began producing plutonium in 1944), they conduct studies in the English town of Sellafield (where a contaminated cloud escaped from the chimney in 1957), and they study the fates of former East German uranium mineworkers in the states of Saxony and Thuringia. New mortality rates have now been compiled for all of these groups of individuals at risk. Surprisingly, the highest mortality rates were found among the East German mineworkers. In Hiroshima, on the other hand, radioactivity claimed surprisingly few human lives. Experts now know exactly what happened in the first hours, days and weeks after the devastating atomic explosion. Almost all of Hiroshima's 140,000 victims died quickly. Either they were crushed immediately by the shock wave, or they died within the next few days of acute burns. But the notorious radiation sickness -- a gradual ailment that leads to certain death for anyone exposed to radiation levels of 6 Gray or higher -- was rare. The reason is that Little Boy simply did not produce enough radioactivity. But what about the long-term consequences? Didn't the radiation work like a time bomb in the body? To answer these questions, the Japanese and the Americans launched a giant epidemiological study after the war. The study included all residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who had survived the atomic explosion within a 10-kilometer (6.2-mile) radius. Investigators questioned the residents to obtain their precise locations when the bomb exploded, and used this information to calculate a personal radiation dose for each resident. Data was collected for 86,572 people. Today, 60 years later, the study's results are clear. More than 700 people eventually died as a result of radiation received from the atomic attack: 87 died of leukemia; 440 died of tumors; and 250 died of radiation-induced heart attacks. In addition, 30 fetuses developed mental disabilities after they were born. Such statistics have attracted little notice so far. The numbers cited in schoolbooks are much higher. According to Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, 105,000 people died of the "long-term consequences of radiation." "For commendable reasons, many critics have greatly exaggerated the health risks of radioactivity," says Albrecht Kellerer, a Munich radiation biologist. "But contrary to widespread opinion, the number of victims is by no means in the tens of thousands." Especially surprising, though, is that the stories of birth defects in newborns are also pure fantasy. The press has repeatedly embellished photos of a destroyed Hiroshima with those of deformed children, children without eyes or with three arms. In reality, there hasn't been a single study that provides evidence of an elevated rate of birth defects. A final attempt to establish a connection is currently underway in Japan. The study includes 3,600 people who were unborn fetuses in their mothers' wombs on that horrific day in August 1945. But it too has failed to furnish any evidence of elevated chromosomal abnormality. In Germany, where nuclear fears have coalesced with the fear of dying forests and mad cow disease into a general psychosis of threat, the degree of concern over nuclear radiation remains high. To this day, some are so fearful about the long-term effects of fallout from Chernobyl that they refuse to eat mushrooms from Bavaria. Even 20 years ago such behavior would not have made sense.

## Little Radiation Good

#### Tons of evidence proves hormetic responses to low-level radiation. It improves health and longevity.

Parsons ‘3 (Peter, La Trobe U., Biogerontology, “Energy, stress and the invalid linear no-threshold premise: a generalization illustrated by ionizing radiation”, 4: 227-231, Springer)

These various agents occur in our environment, so that evolutionary adaptation to them should give hormesis. For many agents present throughout geological time, such as the heavy metals mercury, lead and uranium, hormetic maxima occur close to the origin because they are exceedingly toxic at high exposures. Similarly, ionizing radiation should give a hormetic zone with the maximum close to the origin since all life on earth is exposed to low levels of background ionizing radiation mainly less than 10 mSv y−1. Therefore the LNT premise for ionizing radiation is conceptually impossible on evolutionary grounds since background radiation is universal, so that the hormetic zone should reflect the radiation exposure to which organisms are normally exposed in their habitats (Parsons 2000). Radiation hormesis has been documented in experimental organisms ranging from protozoans to mammals. In some early experiments with the insect Drosophila melanogaster, longevity was reduced in a lead shielding device compared with background exposures (Planel and Giess 1973; Giess and Planel 1973). This was followed by experiments on protozoans, where lower fitness was found close to zero radiation in a lead shielding device than at somewhat higher exposure levels including background (Planel et al. 1987). Furthermore, this hormetic effect can be induced artificially within the lead shielding device by adding appropriate radionuclides. A few additional suggestive examples incorporating exposures below background appear in Luckey (1991). Human demographic data are insufficiently precise to detect effects at such low exposures, hence the LNT premise is often assumed partly because of simplistic expectations for radiation protection criteria. On the other hand, there are many examples consistent with radiation hormesis at exposures greater than background to levels that are substantially above exposures from geological outliers (where no radiation-linked deleterious effects have been detected). In addition, a recent study of the life span of mice measured the survival time for 50% of mouse populations, which was 22.6% higher than the controls following trials with exposures of 70 and 140 mSv y−1 of radiation (Caratero et al. 1998). These exposures are at the lower end of the range of intense experimental exposures of up to 800 mSv found to increase fitness measured by longevity in mice, rats and guinea pigs often by more than 20% (Luckey 1991; Calabrese and Baldwin 2000). Can hormesis at these apparently stressful exposures be explained? At the time Parsons (1990) was published there were plenty of observations consistent with this conclusion, but acceptance of it was hindered by a lack of underlying models to explain it a nd which could be tested empirically. The energy approach suggests a model to explain radiation hormesis to exposures beyond background. Assume that metabolic reserves, in particular heat shock proteins, hsps, are built up to counter the energy costs of the wide array of stresses including temperature extremes to which all organisms are exposed, of which radiation is normally a minor component. That is, the hormetic response becomes part of a general stress response involving hsps adaptations across stress levels and environmental agents (Minois 2000; Le Bourg et al. 2001). Therefore hsps should underlie cross-protection among various environmental agents. For example, in adapting to extreme temperatures, cross-protection could occur with respect to other agents, including radiation. The expectation is a form of radiation hormesis which depends upon the energy consequences of the totality of all environmental stresses of natural habitats, of which background radiation is a minor component compared with temperature extremes. I define this to be stress-derived radiation hormesis (Parsons 1999, 2000). Based upon the universality of stressful environments, radiation hormesis appears therefore to have two components. The smaller component is background radiation hormesis from the direct adaptation of organisms to ionizing radiation in their habitats, and the larger is stress-derived radiation hormesis which derives from metabolic reserves evolving from and maintained as an adaptation of organisms to the extremes of the totality of environmental stresses through evolutionary time.

# \*\*\*Nuclear Terrorism\*\*\*

## Impossible

#### No nuclear terrorism – multiple reasons

Reason Foundation 12

[Reason, May 17 2012, <http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

"Death tugs at my ear and says, 'Live, I am coming.'" Were Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. alive today, he might ascribe that line not to death but to nuclear terrorism. Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands. The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war. Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen

#### Terrorists cannot acquire nuclear material – cost, security, and no transportation

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[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Procuring fissile material. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous effort on an industrial scale (Milhollin 2002, 45-46; Allison 2004; Cameron 2004, 83; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material. Although there is legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured (though things have improved considerably), it is under lock and key, and even sleepy, drunken guards, notes Langewiesche, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party. Thieves also need to know exactly what they want and where it is, and this presumably means trusting bribed, but not necessarily dependable, insiders. And to even begin to pull off such a heist, they need to develop a highly nuanced "sense for streets" in foreign lands filled with people who are often congenitally suspicious of strangers (2007, 33-48). Corruption in some areas may provide an opportunity to buy the relevant material, but purchasers of illicit goods and services would have to pay off a host of greedy confederates, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Not only could the exchange prove to be a scam, it could also prove to be part of a sting--or become one. Although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76).10 Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. Once it is noticed that some uranium is missing, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist. Thus even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the sneaky foreign terrorists might well quickly develop second thoughts and go to the authorities. It is also relevant to note that in the last ten years or so, there have been 10 known thefts of highly enriched uranium--in total less than 16 pounds or so, far less than required for an atomic explosion. Most arrestingly, notes Linzer, "the thieves--none of whom was connected to al Qaeda--had no buyers lined up, and nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions" (Linzer 2004; see also Cameron 2004, 83-84; Younger 2007, 87; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 60). Though, of course, there may have been additional thefts that went undiscovered (Bunn and Wier 2006, 137; Tenet and Harlow 2007, 276-77). If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a critical mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces (Langewiesche 2007, 48-50). Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes and, for a considerable fee, opium traders (for example) might provide expert, and possibly even reliable, assistance. But the routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of a handful of criminal and congenitally suspicious and careful regulators (Langewiesche 2007, 54-65). If they became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of these might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money likely to be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Moreover, it is not at all clear that people engaged in the routine, if illegal, business of smuggling would necessarily be so debased that, even for considerable remuneration, they would willingly join a plot that might end up killing tens of thousands of innocent people.11

Can’t detonate

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[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Transporting and detonating the device. The finished product could weigh a ton or more (Mark et al. 1987, 55, 60; Bunn and Wier 2006, 142). Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant country. This would presumably require trusting it to the tender mercies of the commercial transportation system, supplying a return address, and hoping that the employees and policing agencies, alerted to the dangers by news of the purloined uranium, would remain oblivious. Or the atomic terrorists could try to use established smuggling routes, an approach that, again, would require the completely reliable complicity of a considerable number of criminals. The enormous package would then have to be received by a dedicated and technically-proficient group of collaborators. For this purpose, it would be necessary earlier to have infiltrated such people into the country or else to have organized locals. In a still-secret 2005 report, the FBI allowed as how it had been unable to find a single true al-Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the United States after years of devoted and well-funded sleuthing (Ross 2005), something that apparently continues to be true.18 (In interesting synergy, that would be exactly the number of weapons of mass destruction uncovered by the U.S. military in Iraq over the same period.) They don’t seem to have found any since that time, either. This does not conclusively prove either that there are no such cells in the United States or that al-Qaeda is incapable of infiltrating some in when the need arises, of course. But, while absence of evidence may not be conclusive evidence of absence, it should not be taken to be evidence of existence either. And while it is conceivable that locals could be organized for the destructive enterprise, they would of necessity have to be considerably higher up on brain chain than the ones so far apprehended--higher up, for example, than those who took violent jihadist videos into a store to be duplicated or who schemed to take down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch.19 The IND would then have to be moved over local and unfamiliar roads by this crew to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. And, finally, at the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off its improvised and untested nuclear device, one that, to repeat Allison's description, would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). While doing this they would have to hope, and fervently pray, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there have been no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, doesn't prove to be a dud.

#### No nuclear terrorism – statistically insignificant cumulative probability.

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 187-90

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### Too many obstacles to overcome – even if overcoming isn’t impossible – even generous odds ensure the chances of success are 1 in 3 billion statistically – small enough to vote on presumption

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 197-8

As Allison appropriately points out, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their likelihood is small.33 At some point, however, probabilities, become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it begins to make sense to ignore, or at least to backburner, them: the risk becomes "acceptable:' Consider the odds that a wheel on a speeding automobile will suddenly shear off. That horror is surely"not impossible;' yet legions of motorists effectively find it so improbable that they are routinely willing to risk their lives that it will not happen-it is, in short, an acceptable risk. The British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans-far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential (and fully possible) calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially, it is "accepted:' Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States enjoys a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that goes substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls "a case for fear," Cass Sunstein notes that if there is a yearly probability of one in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to one in 10,000 over 10 years and to one in 5,000 over 20 years. These odds, he suggests, are "not the most comforting:'34 Comfort, ofcourse, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably h~ difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at some of the levels suggested here: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt. The same consideration holds for Vice President Dick Cheney's "one percent doctrine:' A top CIA analyst late in 2001 told him that al-Qaeda probably did not have a nuclear weapon, but that he couldn't "assure yoo that they don't:' To this, Cheney replied, "If there's a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true:'35 Cheney'S observation : is a somewhat confused, but effective, way of saying that one should t:ake low probability events that could have an exceedingly high impact very seriously indeed. And a one percent chance of a terrorist atomic attack would dearly fit into that category. It's just that the chances, while perhaps not zero, .:: do not seem to be anywhere remotely near one percent. It's not that they are necessarily one in 3.5 billion, but they aren't anything like one in ten, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand. Perhaps, in fact, they are comparable to, or even lower than, those for a thermonuclear attack from Russia.’

#### They can’t get it from anyone else.

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 163-5

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. This is highly improbable, however, because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered. As one prominent analyst, Matthew Bunn, puts it, "A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense risk of transferring such a devastating capability to terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present possibility that the material would be traced back to its origin." Important in this last consideration are deterrent safeguards afforded by "nuclear forensics;' the rapidly developing science (and art) of connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been exploded.6 An indication of the natural sensitivity of governments on this issue can be found in the experience of the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. In an interview conducted as al-Qaeda's position in Afghanistan was about to be overrun, Osama bin Laden contended to Mir that al-Qaeda possessed chemical and nuclear weapons (this episode is assessed more fully in chapter 14). According to Mir, the Pakistani government told him "not to mention the nuclear weapon under any circumstance because the Americans might think Pakistan had sold it" to bin Laden.7 Although the Pakistanis appear to have gotten the point on their own, it was presumably hammered home a bit later in that year when CIA Director George Tenet flew to the country in part to inform Pakistan's president, with a notable absence of diplomatic subtlety, "You cannot imagine the outrage there would be in my country if it were learned that Pakistan is coddling scientists who are helping Bin Ladin acquire a nuclear weapon. Should such a device ever be used. the full fury of the American people would be focused on whoever helped al-Qa'ida in its cause."8 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve-including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.9 It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state, thus far at least, has ever given another state-even friendly allies-a nuclear weapon (or a chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently, though there have been cases of state-to-state assistance with nuclear programs. For example, during the cold war, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused. 10 There could be some danger that terrorists would be aided by private (or semiprivate) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, Khan's activities were easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time. And although the Khan case is understandably unsettling, it did not, as analyst Michael Levi notes, "involve nuclear weapons or explosive materials, the most sensitive part of the Pakistani nuclear program." Moreover, the aid he tendered was entirely to states with return addresses whose chief aim in possessing nuclear weapons would be to deter (or to gain prestige). As with previous examples of state-to-state assistance, Khan did not aid stateless terrorist groups whose goal presumably would be actually to set the weapons off. 11 In addition, al-Qaeda-the chief demon group and the only one that has claimed to see value in striking the United States-is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along aU that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the TaIiban government. And, although there is concern that a re-Talibanized Afghanistan would facilitate an al-Qaeda bomb program, the main TaIiban elements are strongly opposed to foreign fighters like al-Qaeda and have reportedly sought to distance themselves from the terrorist group, in part to ingratiate themselves with bin Laden's numberone enemy, Saudi Arabia, whose support they would need if they ever tried again to run Afghanistan.12

#### Nuclear terrorism is science fiction - easier to launch Bin Laden into space. It’s not ironman where you just create high tech weapons in a hideout cave.

Adam Garfinkle, 2009 (PhD in international relations, served as a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security), May 2009, Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?", http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html

There have, of course, been several novels, dozens of action movies, and countless television shows featuring terrorists who had somehow gotten their hands on a nuclear device. But none of these dramas ever explains credibly how a bunch of ragtag dropouts and narcissists get their hands on or figure out how to build a useable nuclear weapon. This is because they can't. It is, to understate the matter, not an easy thing to build a nuclear weapon, given the physics, metallurgy, and engineering involved. It takes a fairly large space, a lot of people with different kinds of specialties, and a fair amount of time and money. The material involved is not easy to hide or move, and it certainly isn't easy to deliver a bomb to a target even if one could be fabricated or stolen. Some of the more imaginative depictions of potential catastrophe would have us believe that terrorists could put a nuclear bomb in a suitcase. This is nonsense. You've got to be very sophisticated technically to get a nuke into a suitcase. If you're al Qaeda working in a cave somewhere, even if you have some metallurgy experts and scientists trying to help you, getting a nuclear device into a suitcase is even less likely than being able to launch Osama bin Laden into orbit.

#### No nuclear terror – Terrorists cant acquire, build, or deliver a bomb

Chapman 08Steve Chapman, reporter and editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, 2/8 2008 [RealClearPolitics, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”]

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong

## No Retaliation

#### No public pressure – they accept terrorism as inevitable no pressure – crackdown would be domestic.

Ian Bremmer, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new 9/11 hit America”

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

#### Any move for retaliation is posturing – Obama won’t follow through.

Michael Crowley, January 2010, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence,” <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

# \*\*\*Oil\*\*\*

## Nuclear Replacing Oil

#### Nuclear is replacing oil

Simit Patel; Energy Geopolitics Analyzer; January 3 2012 “Oil Prices Rose 19% In 2011 - Another Sign That A Nuclear Renaissance Is Inevitable” http://seekingalpha.com/article/317065-oil-prices-rose-19-in-2011-another-sign-that-a-nuclear-renaissance-is-inevitable

Oil prices rose 19% over the course of 2011, the third consecutive year marked by a rise in the price of oil. Below is the monthly chart of Brent Crude Oil that illustrates the clear uptrend.¶ ¶ ¶ While currency devaluation, geopolitical tensions, and speculators are all forces that may be contributing to rising oil prices and greater market volatility, a growing factor that suggests the price rise will continue is the supply/demand imbalance in the oil market. In other words: demand for oil and other fossil fuels is only growing, but the supply of them is diminishing. The chart below illustrates.¶ ¶ click to enlarge¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ While I believe the world will likely be using fossil fuels as a primary source of energy for some time, we are clearly at a point where a new source of energy is needed. I believe nuclear energy is the primary candidate destined to grow, for the following reasons:¶ ¶ 1. It can provide "baseload" - meaning always on - energy¶ 2. It is emission-free¶ 3. It has high power density, which means it does not require an inordinate amount of land and thus is conducive to powering cities¶ 4. It is inexpensive¶ ¶ No other source can really make these same claims. Wind and solar are much more expensive and cannot effectively provide baseload energy, which is precisely why they remain insignificant sources of power on a global basis. Technological breakthroughs may change this, though I don't see this on the horizon, and believe renewables will have limited roles in the global energy market until this changes.¶ ¶ And so, the rise of nuclear energy is virtually inevitable -- the world will demand it for survival. Accordingly, China already has 25 nuclear power plants under construction, and realizes that nuclear will be a key part of how its nation is powered as it increasingly urbanizes. Investors can recognize China as the "smart money" -- the force driving the market's demand and sending prices higher -- in the nuclear energy market.¶ ¶ Of course, this transition will not occur overnight - nuclear power plants take a long time to build - and so oil, coal, and natural gas will continue to play an important role in providing energy to the world. Investors will need to be patient, as this market may take up to a decade to really get going. The value network is still developing and much depends on how government participates and regulates the market, as well as what innovations entrepreneurs will develop as the market grows

## High Prices --> Alt Energy

#### High oil prices cause a transition to alternative energy absent the plan

**Rivlin, 1** (Paul Rivlin has a PhD from the University of London and is a Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies, specializing in the Middle East economy and its historical development, “High Oil Prices and the Middle East Strategic Balance,” on March 16,2011 from http://www.dayan.org/pdfim/TA\_Notes\_RIVLIN\_Oil\_MAR16\_11.pdf)

Does it make sense **for the US and other Western countries to reduce oil consumption? High oil prices will do this automatically if they are maintained**, because **they will encourage the use of alternative fuels and technologies that use less fuel. Stimulating this** by government action **would reduce exposure to oil price rises/shortages and would encourage the development of new technologies. These** could help to **stimulate economic growth** and be exported to China and other fast growing, oil importing countries. They would also have beneficial environmental effects. It is too late to avoid the effects of the current predictable and predicted crisis; any measures undertaken now would only affect the demand for oil in the medium term.

#### The price of oil is what investors look to when making investment decisions

Huang et. al 11 (Alex YiHou, Department of Finance, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan, Chiao-Ming Cheng Graduate School of Management, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan, Chih-Chun Chen Graduate School of Management, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan, Wen-Cheng Hu Graduate School of Management, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan “Oil Prices and Stock Prices of Alternative Energy Companies: Time Varying Relationship with Recent Evidence” http://www.southwesternfinance.org/conf-2011/swfa2011\_submission\_30.pdf kdej)

In sum, while price uncertainty of crude oil rises and green energy gains greater deal of attention in recent years, the interrelationships between oil prices and stock performances of alternative energy companies become more significant. For Periods I and II, time before the Lebanon War from 2001 to late 2006, no causality is shown from oil prices to ECO index or vice verse, implying that the movements of crude oil prices do not affect how the investors trade with the stocks of alternative energy industry. In the most recent period, when oil prices reach historical high and crash back with volatile dynamics, oil price behavior becomes responsible for stock performances of alternative energy companies. Also only recently, the dynamics in oil trading also depend on how stocks of oil companies perform. These results add to literature showing that investors of alternative energy companies conduct their trading decisions upon observation of crude oil price shocks. The two markets, i.e. crude oil market and stock market for green energy sector, seem to be more closely interactive with each other. The full picture of how the crude oil markets react to the development of green energy, however, requires additional examinations and is certainly an area worthy of future exploration.

# \*\*\*Oil Dependence\*\*\*

## AT Oil Shocks Econ

#### Oil shocks will not cause economic collapse due to elastic markets and economic resiliency

Boston Globe 11

[Jeremy Kahn, Staff Writer, February 23, 2011, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=5>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973. These findings have led a few bold political scientists and foreign policy experts to start asking an uncomfortable question: If the United States could withstand a disruption in Persian Gulf oil supplies, why does it need a permanent military presence in the region at all? There’s a lot riding on that question: America’s presence in the Middle East exacts a heavy toll in political capital, financial resources, and lives. Washington’s support for Middle East autocrats makes America appear hypocritical on issues of human rights and democracy. The United States spends billions of dollars every year to maintain troops in the Middle East, and the troops risk their lives simply by being there, since they make tempting targets for the region’s Islamic extremists. And arguably, because the presence of these forces inflames radicals and delegitimizes local rulers, they may actually be undermining the very stability they are ostensibly there to ensureAmong those asking this tough question are two young professors, Eugene Gholz, at the University of Texas, and Daryl Press, at Dartmouth College. To find out what actually happens when the world’s petroleum supply is interrupted, the duo analyzed every major oil disruption since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that in almost all cases, the ensuing rise in prices, while sometimes steep, was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact. When there have been prolonged price rises, they found the cause to be panic on the part of oil purchasers rather than a supply shortage. When oil runs short, in other words, the market is usually adept at filling the gap. One striking example was the height of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. If anything was likely to produce an oil shock, it was this: two major Persian Gulf producers directly targeting each other’s oil facilities. And indeed, prices surged 25 percent in the first months of the conflict. But within 18 months of the war’s start they had fallen back to their prewar levels, and they stayed there even though the fighting continued to rage for six more years. Surprisingly, during the 1984 “Tanker War” phase of that conflict — when Iraq tried to sink oil tankers carrying Iranian crude and Iran retaliated by targeting ships carrying oil from Iraq and its Persian Gulf allies — the price of oil continued to drop steadily. Gholz and Press found just one case after 1973 in which the market mechanisms failed: the 1979-1980 Iranian oil strike which followed the overthrow of the Shah, during which Saudi Arabia, perhaps hoping to appease Islamists within the country, also led OPEC to cut production, exacerbating the supply shortage. In their paper, Gholz and Press ultimately conclude that the market’s adaptive mechanisms function independently of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, and that they largely protect the American economy from being damaged by oil shocks. “To the extent that the United States faces a national security challenge related to Persian Gulf oil, it is not ‘how to protect the oil we need’ but ‘how to assure consumers that there is nothing to fear,’ ” the two write. “That is a thorny policy problem, but it does not require large military deployments and costly military operations.” There’s no denying the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the US economy. Although only 15 percent of imported US oil comes directly from the Persian Gulf, the region is responsible for nearly a third of the world’s production and the majority of its known reserves. But the oil market is also elastic: Many key producing countries have spare capacity, so if oil is cut off from one country, others tend to increase their output rapidly to compensate. Today, regions outside the Middle East, such as the west coast of Africa, make up an increasingly important share of worldwide production. Private companies also hold large stockpiles of oil to smooth over shortages — amounting to a few billion barrels in the United States alone — as does the US government, with 700 million barrels in its strategic petroleum reserve. And the market can largely work around shipping disruptions by using alternative routes; though they are more expensive, transportation costs account for only tiny fraction of the price of oil. Compared to the 1970s, too, the structure of the US economy offers better insulation from oil price shocks. Today, the country uses half as much energy per dollar of gross domestic product as it did in 1973, according to data from the US Energy Information Administration. Remarkably, the economy consumed less total energy in 2009 than in 1997, even though its GDP rose and the population grew. When it comes time to fill up at the pump, the average US consumer today spends less than 4 percent of his or her disposable income on gasoline, compared with more than 6 percent in 1980. Oil, though crucial, is simply a smaller part of the economy than it once was. oil shock was bad — the stock market crashed in response to the sudden spike in oil prices, inflation jumped, and unemployment hit levels not seen since the Great Depression. The 1979 oil shock also had deep and lasting economic effects. Economists now argue, however, that the economic damage was more directly attributable to bad government policy than to the actual supply shortage. Among those who have studied past oil shocks is Ben Bernanke, the current chairman of the Federal Reserve. In 1997, Bernanke analyzed the effects of a sharp rise in fuel prices during three different oil shocks — 1973-75, 1980-82, and 1990-91. He concluded that the major economic damage was caused not by the oil price increases but by the Federal Reserve overreacting and sharply increasing interest rates to head off what it wrongly feared would be a wave of inflation. Today, his view is accepted by most mainstream economists. Gholz and Press are hardly the only researchers who have concluded that we are far too worried about oil shocks. The economy also faced a large increase in prices in the mid-2000s, largely as the result of surging demand from emerging markets, with no ill effects. “If you take any economics textbook written before 2000, it would talk about what a calamitous effect a doubling in oil prices would have,” said Philip Auerswald, an associate professor at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy who has written about oil shocks and their implications for US foreign policy. “Well, we had a price quadrupling from 2003 and 2007 and nothing bad happened.” (The recession of 2008-9 was triggered by factors unrelated to oil prices.) Auerswald also points out that when Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast in 2005, it did tremendous damage to offshore oil rigs, refineries, and pipelines, as well as the rail lines and roads that transport petroleum to the rest of the country. The United States gets about 12 percent of its oil from the Gulf of Mexico region, and, more significantly, 40 percent of its refining capacity is located there. “Al Qaeda times 1,000 could not deliver this sort of blow to the oil industry’s physical infrastructure,” Auerswald said. And yet the only impact was about five days of gas lines in Georgia, and unusually high prices at the pump for a few weeks

#### Oil shocks will have little impact on the economy

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Regardless, the departure of Saudi Arabia from world crude oil market would probably have about the same effect on domestic oil prices as the departure of Iran from world crude oil markets in 1978. The Iranian revolution reduced oil production by 8.9 percent, whereas Saudi Arabia accounts for about 13 percent of global oil production today.20 Oil prices increased dramatically after the 1978 revolution, but those higher prices set in motion market supply and demand responses that undermined the supply reduction and collapsed world prices eight years later.21 The short term macroeconomic impacts of such a supply disruption would actually be less today than they were then given the absence of price controls on the U.S. economy and our reduced reliance on oil as an input for each unit of GDP.22

So while it is possible that a radical oil-producing regime might play a game of chicken with consuming countries, producing countries are very dependent on oil revenue and have fewer degrees of freedom to maneuver than consuming countries. Catastrophic supply disruptions would harm producers more than consumers, which is why they are extremely unlikely. The best insurance against such a low-probability event is to maintain a relatively free economy where wages and prices are left unregulated by government. That would do more to protect the West against an extreme production disruption than anything else in government’s policy arsenal.

## AT Terrorism

#### Terrorism operates without oil profits due to low cost

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Does Western reliance on oil put money in the pocket of Islamic terrorists? To some degree, yes. Does that harm western security? Probably not – at least, probably not very much. Before we go on, it’s worth noting that only 15.5 percent of the oil in the world market is produced from nation-states accused of funding terrorism.23 Hence, the vast majority of the dollars we spend on gasoline do not end up on this purported economic conveyer belt to terrorist bank accounts. Regardless, terrorism is a relatively low-cost endeavor and oil revenues are unnecessary for terrorist activity. The fact that a few hundred thousand dollars paid for the 9/11 attacks suggests that the limiting factor for terrorism is expertise and manpower, not money. That observation is strengthened by the fact that there is no correlation between oil profits and Islamic terrorism. We estimated two regressions using annual data from 1983 to 2005: the first between fatalities resulting from Islamic terrorist attacks and Saudi oil prices and the second between the number of Islamic terrorist incidents and Saudi oil prices. In neither regression was the estimated coefficient on oil prices at all close to being significantly different from zero.24 Consider: Inflation-adjusted oil prices and profits during the 1990s were low.25 But the 1990s also witnessed the worldwide spread of Wahabbi fundamentalism, the build-up of Hezbollah, and the coming of age of al Qaeda. Note too that al Qaeda terrorists in the 1990s relied upon help from state sponsors such as Sudan and Afghanistan – nations that aren’t exactly known for their oil wealth or robust economies. Producer states do use oil revenues to fund ideological extremism, and Saudi financing of madrassas and Iranian financing of Hezbollah are good examples. But given the importance of those undertakings to the Saudi and Iranian governments, it’s unlikely that they would cease and desist simply because profits were down. They certainly weren’t deterred by meager oil profits in the 1990s.26 The futility of reducing oil consumption as a means of improving national / energy security is illustrated by the fact that states accused of funding terrorism earned $290 billion from oil sales in 2006.27 Even if that sum were cut by 90 percent, that would still leave $29 billion at their disposal – more than enough to fund terrorism given the minimal financial needs of terrorists.28

## AT Oil Coercion

#### Market forces prevent oil coercion

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Among the most fashionable preoccupations in foreign policy circles is “energy security.” Although it is unclear what exactly energy security means, foreign policy elites have long been concerned about reliance on foreign energy. Fear of embargoes and supply disruptions affects how Western nations deal with oil and gas producing states, what sort of policies are pursued in the Middle East, and even fundamental questions of war and peace. That’s unfortunate, because a nation that is self sufficient in energy is no more “secure” than one that relies on imports for all its energy needs. Given the global nature of oil markets and the increasing globalization of natural gas markets, willingness to pay market prices will secure all the energy a nation could possibly wish for during peacetime. Worries about producer blackmail are only a bit less far-fetched than worries about alien invasion.1 Simply put, reliance on oil and natural gas – imported or otherwise – is not the Achilles heel of the Western industrialized world.

#### No oil coercion – exporters are economically rational actors

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

The problem with this argument, however, is that its fundamental premise is incorrect. Friendly relations with producer states neither enhance access to imported oil nor lower its price. Selective embargoes by producer nations on some consuming nations are unenforceable unless (i) all other nations on Earth refuse to ship oil to the embargoed state, or (ii) a naval blockade were to prevent oil shipments into the ports of the embargoed state. That’s because, once oil leaves the territory of a producer, market agents dictate where the oil goes, not agents of the producer, and anyone willing to pay the prevailing world crude oil price can have all he wants.12 The 1973 Arab oil embargo is a perfect case in point. U.S. crude oil imports actually increased from 1.7 million barrels per day (mbd) in 1971 to 2.2 mbd in 1972, 3.2 mbd in 1973, and 3.5 mbd in 1974.13 Instead of buying from Arab members of OPEC, the United States bought from non-Arab oil producers. The customers that were displaced by the United States bought from Arab members of OPEC. Beyond the modest increase in transportation costs that followed from this game of musical chairs, the embargo had no impact on the United States.14 In short, it does not matter to consumers to whom the oil is initially sold. All that matters to consumers is how much oil is produced for world markets. Do oil producing nations allow their feelings towards oil consuming nations to affect their production decisions? Historically, the answer has been “no.” The record strongly indicates that oil producing states, regardless of their feelings toward the industrialized West, are rational economic actors. After a detailed survey of the world oil market since the rise of OPEC, oil economist M.A. Adelman concluded, “[w]e look in vain for an example of a government that deliberately avoids a higher income. The self-serving declaration of an interested party is not evidence.”15 Prof. Philip Auerswald of George Mason University agrees, stating “For the past quarter century, the oil output decisions of Islamic Iran have been no more menacing or unpredictable than Canada’s or Norway’s.”16

## AT Hormuz

#### Exporting nations will prevent Strait of Hormuz conflict

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Simple economics suggests otherwise. Oil producers will provide for their own security needs as long as the cost of doing so results in greater profits than equivalent investments could yield. Because Middle-Eastern governments typically have little of value to trade except oil, they must secure and sell oil to remain viable.3 Given that their economies are so heavily dependent upon oil revenues, Middle-Eastern governments have even more incentive than do consuming states to worry about the security of oil production facilities, ports, and shipping lanes.4 In short, whatever security our presence provides (and many analysts think that our presence actually reduces security5) could be provided by incumbent producers were the United States to withdraw. The fact that the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the Straits of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within their means.6 The same argument applies to al Qaeda threats to oil production facilities. Producer states have such strong incentives to protect their oil infrastructure that additional Western assistance to do the same is probably unnecessary. While terrorists do indeed plot to disrupt oil production in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, there is no evidence to suggest that producer-state security investments are insufficient for the job.7

## AT Human Rights

#### Oil markets prevent human rights abuses

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

It is unclear to what extent oil profits are associated with human rights abuses or militaristic activity. There are plenty examples, after all, of relatively long-lived regimes with terrible human rights records – such as North Korea – with no oil revenues to speak of, and this is the case even within the same socio-economic regions. Denuding Iran and Libya of oil revenues might produce a government that looks a lot like Syria; denuding Venezuela of oil revenues might produce a government that looks a lot like Cuba; and denuding Russia of oil revenues might produce a government that looks a lot like Russia used to be. After all, all of these “bad-acting” petro-states yielded unsavory regimes even when oil revenues were a small fraction of what they are today.

## Ev Indict

#### Their evidence relies on flawed assumptions – oil exporters are rational economic actors

Taylor and Doren 8

[Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, Summer 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obsession.pdf>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

The facts, however, indicate that the above narrative is fundamentally at odds with observable reality. Energy producers have thus far demonstrated a keen interest in near-term wealth maximization – cover stories to the contrary notwithstanding. International actors rarely if ever act irrationally as an economist would define the term (e.g., they do not act in a manner that would frustrate their self interest as they perceive it). Fears of “economic suicide bombing” by anti-Western producer states are greatly exaggerated by an overly pessimistic view of the harm said bombing could do to Western economies. And worry over embargoes demonstrates a fundamental ignorance of how international oil markets work. There are plenty of things for foreign policy elites to worry about. Energy security, however, is not one of them.

#### Be skeptical of their evidence – a wide range of political lobbies benefit from fears of oil shocks

Boston Globe 11

[Jeremy Kahn, Staff Writer, February 23, 2011, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=5>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Auerswald, who has grown frustrated by the lack of response to his own research on this topic, said that the problem is that the fear of Middle Eastern oil shocks is now politically useful to a whole spectrum of powerful interest groups. “This argument is like the familiar old jeans of American politics,” he said. “They are nice and cozy and comfortable and everyone can wear them. Because of ethanol, the farm lobby loves it; for coal, well it’s their core argument; for the offshore drilling folks, they love it.” Even the environmental movement relies on it, he said, because they use it as bogeyman to scare Americans into taking renewable energy and energy conservation more seriously. As for the US military, “The US Navy is not interested in hearing that one of their two main theaters of operation has no justification for being,” Auerswald said. The costs to US foreign policy, of course, cannot be calculated in dollars and cents alone, although certainly the cost here has been very high. But it looks even higher when one considers the lost opportunities and squandered chances — what we could be achieving if we weren’t so concerned about a threat that looks increasingly like an illusion. “If we are going to commit our troops to prevent something from happening, it should be something that would be an existential threat to the United States,” said Auerswald. “Having people wait in line for five days for gas in one part of the US is not an existential threat.”

# \*\*\*Ozone\*\*\*

## Alt Cause

**Natural variation determines ozone**

Carnacchio 97 (CJ, Staff – The Review, “The Sky Falls on Environmental Myths”, Michigan Review, 10-8, http://www.umich.edu/~mrev/archives/1997/10-8-97/environment.htm)

Myth #2: The Hole in the Ozone Layer: Contrary to the environmentalists' claims, there is no permanent hole in the ozone layer and no ozone shortage. Ozone is constantly created and destroyed. The interaction of ultraviolet radiation with oxygen molecules is what produces ozone. In the stratosphere, 10 to 40 kilometers above the earth's surface, several tons of ozone are produced every second. The amount of ozone present at any one time is influenced by many factors. For example, the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the stratosphere (and ultimately producing ozone) depends upon latitude, solar cycle, and season. Concentrations of ozone may differ drastically from one day to the next, sometimes by as much as 50 percent, depending on the weather. Ozone holes are natural reactions to these ultraviolet light variations. Ozone levels can also be affected by the amount of volcanic matter in the stratosphere. Each volcanic eruption emits roughly a thousand times the amount of ozone-depleting chemicals than all the CFCs man has ever produced. The ozone hole that appeared over Antarctica and caused all the panic is a natural and annual phenomena. The annual ozone hole was first measured in 1956-57, long before the ozone-destroying CFCs were in common use. The hole appears at the end of the dark, cold Antarctic winter, lasts about three to five weeks, and then disappears. There is no overall or permanent depletion of the ozone layer.

## No Impact

**Ozone stable – and no impact**

Lieberman 7 (Ben, Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, “Ozone: The Hole Truth”, The Washington Times, 9-19, Lexis)

Environmentalists have made many apocalyptic predictions over the last several decades. Virtually none has come to pass. Yet each time, the greens and their political allies proclaim victory, arguing their preventive prescriptions averted disaster. Such is the case with the 1987 Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). The lurid predictions of ozone depletion-induced skin cancer epidemics, ecosystem destruction and others haven't come true, for which Montreal Protocol proponents congratulate themselves. But in retrospect, the evidence shows ozone depletion was an exaggerated threat in the first place. As the treaty parties return to Montreal for their 20th anniversary meeting it should be cause for reflection, not celebration, especially for those who hope to repeat this "success story" in the context of global warming. The treaty came about over legitimate but overstated concerns that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs, a then-widely used class of refrigerants) and other compounds were rising to the stratosphere and destroying ozone molecules. These molecules, collectively known as the ozone layer, shield the Earth from excessive ultraviolet-B radiation (UVB) from the sun. The Montreal Protocol's provisions were tightened in 1990 and again in 1992, culminating with a CFC ban in most developed nations by 1996. So what do we know now? As far as ozone depletion is concerned, the thinning of the ozone layer that occurred throughout the 1980s apparently stopped in the early 1990s, too soon to credit the Montreal Protocol. A 1998 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report said: "Since 1991, the linear [downward] trend observed during the 1980s has not continued, but rather total column ozone has been almost constant." However, the same report noted that the stratospheric concentrations of the offending compounds were still increasing through 1998. This lends credence to the skeptical view, widely derided at the time of the Montreal Protocol, that natural variations better explain the fluctuations in the global ozone layer. More importantly, the feared increase in ground level UVB radiation has also failed to materialize. Keep in mind that ozone depletion, in and of itself, doesn't really harm human health or the environment. It was the concern that an eroded ozone layer will allow more of the sun's damaging UVB rays to reach the Earth that led to the Montreal Protocol. But WMO concedes no statistically significant long-term trends have been detected, noting earlier this year that "outside the polar regions, ozone depletion has been relatively small, hence, in many places, increases in UV due to this depletion are difficult to separate from the increases caused by other factors, such as changes in cloud and aerosol." In short, the impact of ozone depletion on UVB over populated regions is so small it's hard to detect. Needless to say, if UVB hasn't gone up, then the fears of increased UVB-induced harm are unfounded. Indeed, the much-hyped acceleration in skin cancer rates hasn't been documented. U.S. National Cancer Institute statistics show malignant melanoma incidence and mortality, which had been undergoing a long-term increase that predates ozone depletion, has actually been leveling off during the putative ozone crisis. Further, no ecosystem or species was ever shown to be seriously harmed by ozone depletion. This is true even in Antarctica, where the largest seasonal ozone losses, the so-called Antarctic ozone hole, occur annually. Also forgotten is a long list of truly ridiculous claims, such as the one from Al Gore's 1992 book "Earth in the Balance" that, thanks to the Antarctic ozone hole, "hunters now report finding blind rabbits; fisherman catch blind salmon."

# \*\*\*Rainforests\*\*\*

## Resilient

**Rainforests are empirically proven to be resilient – no impact**

K. J. Willis*,* and L. Gillson*,* April 2004, “How ‘Virgin’ is Virgin Rainforest?” Science Magazine, The authors are in the Oxford Long-term Ecology Laboratory,

Beyond pure interest in the antiquity of tropical rainforests and how humans may have shaped them, these studies have important implications for conservation biology. First, they indicate that it is no longer acceptable to suggest that land loss caused by previous human activities was too small to have had a major impact and therefore cannot be compared to present-day losses. This point is reinforced by current estimates suggesting that the main agent of deforestation in the tropical forests, accounting for up to two-thirds of the annual loss, is slash-and-burn farming (12). Thus, although the rate and extent of forest clearance might be much greater today, in many cases, the process is comparable to prehistoric losses. Second, in most examples of prehistoric disturbance there was subsequent forest regeneration. These tropical ecosystems are not as fragile as often portrayed and in fact are quite resilient. Left for long enough, forests will almost certainly regenerate.

## Hype

**Their evidence is hype motivated by economic and political agendas- not based in science**

Marc Morana and Kent Washburn, June 26, 2000, co-producers of Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths, World Net Daily, "Shaky science behind save-rainforest effort," http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543

The Amazon is actually the least endangered forest in the world," states Moore in American Investigator's television newsmagazine documentary, "Clear-cutting the myths," hosted by former CBS and CNN newsman Reid Collins. Moore explains that, in the 20 years of warnings about deforestation, "only 10 percent of the Amazon has been converted to date from what was original forest to agriculture and settlement." The finding that the Amazon rainforest threat is a myth based on bad science and political agendas -- especially by unlikely critics such as Moore, other scientists and inhabitants of the region -- is not expected to sit well with a movement that has enlisted schoolchildren throughout the United States and celebrities ranging from Sting to Alec Baldwin to Chevy Chase to Tom Jones and Tony Bennett. And which has also raised tens of millions of dollars for environmental activist groups. "This is where I really have a problem with modern-day environmentalism," says Moore. "It confuses opinion with what we know to be true, and disguises what are really political agendas with environmental rhetoric. The fact of the matter is: There is a larger percentage of the Amazon rain forest intact than there are most other forests in this world."

## AT Amazon

#### No impact – Amazon

**NEW YORK POST 6-9-2005** (Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)

"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years. That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests. And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science," Moore says.

**Amazonian biodiversity loss inevitable**

**Sample 12** (Ian, The Gaurdian, “Amazon's doomed species set to pay deforestation's 'extinction debt'”, 12 July 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/12/amazon-deforestation-species-extinction-debt?newsfeed=true>, ZBurdette)

The destruction of great swaths of the Brazilian Amazon has turned scores of rare species into the walking dead, doomed to disappear even if deforestation were halted in the region overnight, according to a new study. Forest clearing in Brazil has already claimed casualties, but the animals lost to date in the rainforest region are just one-fifth of those that will slowly die out as the full impact of the loss of habitat takes its toll. In parts of the eastern and southern Amazon, 30 years of concerted deforestation have shrunk viable living and breeding territories enough to condemn 38 species to regional extinction in coming years, including 10 mammal, 20 bird and eight amphibian species, scientists found. The systematic clearance of trees from the Amazon forces wildlife into ever-smaller patches of ground. Though few species are killed off directly in forest clearances, many face a slower death sentence as their breeding rates fall and competition for food becomes more intense. Scientists at Imperial College, London, reached the bleak conclusion after creating a statistical model to calculate the Brazilian Amazon's "extinction debt", or the number of species headed for extinction as a result of past deforestation. The model draws on historical deforestation rates and animal populations in 50 by 50 kilometre squares of land. It stops short of naming the species most at risk, but field workers in the region have drawn attention to scores of creatures struggling to cope with habitat destruction and other environmental threats. White-cheeked spider monkeys, which feed on fruits high in the forest canopy, are endangered largely because of the expansion of farmland and road building. The population of Brazilian bare-faced tamarins has halved in 18 years, or three generations, as cities, agriculture and cattle ranching has pushed into the rainforest. The endangered giant otter, found in the slow-moving rivers and swamps of the Amazon, faces water pollution from agricultural runoff and mining operations in the area. Writing in the journal Science, Robert Ewers and his co-authors reconstructed extinction rates from 1970 to 2008, and then forecast future extinction debts under four different scenarios, ranging from "business as usual" to a "strong reduction" in forest clearance, which required deforestation to slow down 80% by 2020. "For now, the problem is along the arc of deforestation in the south and east where there is a long history of forest loss. But that is going to move in the future. We expect most of the species there to go extinct, and we'll pick up more extinction debt along the big, paved highways which are now cutting into the heart of the Amazon," Ewers told the Guardian from Belém, northern Brazil. Under the "business as usual" scenario, where around 62 sq miles (160 sqkm) of forest are cleared each year, at least 15 mammal, 30 bird and 10 amphibian species were expected to die out locally by 2050, from around half of the Amazon. Under the most optimistic scenario, which requires cattle ranchers and soy farmers to comply with Brazilian environmental laws, the extinction debt could be held close to 38 species. Ewers said the model reveals hotspots in the Brazilian Amazon where conservation efforts should be focused on the most vulnerable wildlife. "This shows us where we are likely to have high concentrations of species which are all in trouble, and that becomes a way for directing our conservation efforts. We are talking about an extinction debt. Those species are still alive, so we have an opportunity to get in there and restore the habitat to avoid paying that debt," Ewers said. The Brazilian Amazon is home to 40% of the world's tropical forest and one of the most biodiverse regions on the planet. About 54% of the area is under environmental protection, and in the past five years, stricter controls and better compliance have driven deforestation rates down to a historical low. The trend towards less deforestation might not last though. Under pressure from the financial crisis, the Brazilian government has proposed a rapid development programme in the Amazon to fuel the economy. The move foresees the construction of more than 20 hydroelectric power plants in the Amazon basin and an extensive push into the rainforest. Environmentalists are further concerned about an overhaul to Brazil's Forest Code, which is widely expected to weaken the protection of the rainforest, and potentially speed up deforestation once more, according to an accompanying article in Science by Thiago Rangel, an ecologist at the Federal University of Goiás in Brazil. "Extinction debts in the Brazilian Amazon are one debt that should be defaulted on," he writes. Reducing the rate that extinction debts build up is not enough to preserve the Amazon's biodiversity, Rangel argues. "The existing debt may eventually lead to the loss of species. To prevent species extinctions, it is necessary to take advantage of the window of opportunity for forest regeneration. Restored or regenerated forests initially show lower native species richness than the original forests they replaced, but they gradually recover species richness, composition and vital ecosystems functions, reducing extinction debt and mitigating local species loss," he writes.

## AT Deforestation

**The status quo solves their internal link to deforestation**

**Watts 12** (Jonathan, The Gaurdian, “Amazon deforestation at record low, data shows”, 7 June 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/07/amazon-deforestation-illegal-logging-brazil>, ZBurdette)

Deforestation of the Amazon has fallen to its lowest levels since records began, according to data recently released by Brazil's National Institute for Space Research. The boost for the environment comes a week after president Dilma Rousseff was criticised for weakening the forest protection measures widely credited for the improvement, and two weeks before Brazil hosts the Rio+20 Earth summit. Using satellite imagery, the institute said 6,418 sq km of Amazon forest was stripped in the 12 months before 31 July 2011 – the smallest area since annual measurements started in 1988. The data continues an encouraging trend. Since the peak deforestation year of 2004, the rates of clearance have fallen by almost 75%. "This reduction is impressive; it is the result of changes in society, but it also stems from the political decision to inspect, as well as from punitive action by government agencies," Rousseff said. She was speaking at a ceremony on Tuesday to mark the opening of two new nature reserves: the 34,000-hectare (83,980 acres) Bom Jesus Biological Reserve in Paraná, and the 8,500-hectare (20,995 acres) Furna Feia National Park in Rio Grande do Norte. To mark World Environment Day, the Brazilian president also signed a number of other measures to expand existing parks, protect areas of biodiversity and recognise the land rights of indigenous communities. Rousseff said Brazil was "one of the most advanced countries" for sustainable development, but its impressive efforts have been undermined by new legislation that reduces requirements on farms created by illegal logging to reforest portions of cleared land. Under domestic and international pressure, Rousseff vetoed 12 of the most controversial sections of the revised Forest Code, but environmentalists are furious that many other changes will go through. The Brazilian government insists that the compromise was a realistic balance of agricultural and environmental priorities. Environment minister Izabella Teixeira says 81.2% of the country's original forest remains – one of the highest levels in the world. But 10 former environment ministers have criticised the measures as a "retrograde step". In an unusual cross-party collaboration, they jointly signed a letter opposing the change to a code that they described as "the single most relevant institutional basis for the protection afforded to forests and all the other forms of natural vegetation in Brazil." Economic and technological factors have also contributed to the slowing of clearance rates. The rise in the value of the Brazilian currency and the fall of soya and beef prices in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis eroded the incentive for land clearance for agricultural exports. Implementing regulations remains extremely difficult in the wild west-like frontiers of the Amazon and the interior forest regions. But enforcement has been strengthened by increasingly precise satellite monitoring by the National Institute for Research in the Amazon. This November, Brazil plans to launch a new satellite with a resolution of five metres, up from the current level of 250 metres. With close-to-real-time date, the central authorities are able to quickly notify federal police and environment officials about ongoing, illegal land clearance operations. The government has also responded rapidly and flexibly. After a two-month spurt of clear-cutting in Mato Grosso early last year, it established a task force to strengthen countermeasures and sent 700 inspectors to the region. This year, eight municipalities were added to the list of critical areas, bringing them under closer inspection. According to local media, the task force has apprehended 325 trucks, 72 bulldozers and 62,000 cubic metres of illegally cut timber and embargoed 79,500 hectares of land in the region. The environment ministry says further factors in the drop of deforestation are regularisation of land tenure, initiatives to encourage sustainable practices and the expansion of protected areas. According to the UN Global Biodiversity Outlook, Brazil accounts for nearly 75% of the 700,000 sq km of protected areas created around the world since 2003.

**Forest fires make deforestation inevitable**

**Butler 12** (Rhett, Deforestation in the Amazon, 20 May 2012¸<http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html>, ZBurdette)

Fires and climate change are having a dramatic impact on the Amazon. Recent studies suggest that the Amazon rainforest may be losing its ability to stay green all year long as forest degradation and drought make it dangerously flammable. Scientists say that as much as 50 percent of the Amazon could go up in smoke should fires continue. Humidity levels were the lowest ever recorded in the Amazon in 2005.

# \*\*\*Russia Relations\*\*\*

## Resilient

**Relations resilient – empirics prove we’ve overcome bigger issues.**

**Pifer 12**. [Steven, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship” Brookings Institute -- March 21 -- http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2012/0321\_arms\_control\_pifer.aspx]

By any objective measure, the U.S.-Russian relationship is stronger today than it was in 2008. Then, sharp differences over the future of strategic arms limitations, missile defense in Europe, NATO enlargement and Georgia dominated the agenda. Relations between Washington and Moscow plunged to their lowest point since the end of the Soviet Union. The bilateral relationship had become so thin that there are no indications that concern about damaging it affected in any way the Kremlin’s decisions regarding military operations against Georgia. The Russian government saw little of value to lose in its relationship with Washington. That was not a good situation from the point of view of U.S. interests. It is different today. There are things in the U.S.-Russian relationship that Moscow cares about, and that translates to leverage and even a restraining influence on Russian actions. This does not mean that all is going well on the U.S.-Russia agenda. Although the rhetoric is less inflammatory than it was four years ago, missile defense poses a difficult problem on both the bilateral and NATO-Russia agendas. The countries clearly differ over Syria. Moscow’s misguided support for Mr. Assad—which stems from the fact that he is one of Russia’s few allies and from the Russian desire to pay NATO back for what they consider the misuse of March 2011 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya—have led the Kremlin to an unwise policy. It is alienating the Arab world and will position Moscow poorly with the Syrian people once Mr. Assad leaves the scene.

**US-Russian Relations Inevitable – Laundry List.**

**BAZHANOV 10.** [Yevgeny, vice chancellor of research and international relations at the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy in Moscow “5 Barriers to a Western Partnership” Moscow Times -- Aug 20]

But despite these significant obstacles, there is still a lot of potential for strengthening Russia’s partnership with the West. The driving force behind this natural convergence is Russia’s pressing need to modernize and diversify its economy. Post-Soviet Russia is committed to build a market economy and a democratic society. As a result, for the first time in history, the Russian economic, social and political models are not antagonistic to the Western model. For its part, the West has an objective — if not self-serving — interest in seeing Russia become a well-functioning civil society with a prosperous market economy. The process of globalization and modernization necessarily means that Russia will never return to Soviet-style isolationism. The economic centers of the modern world — Europe, the United States, China, India and Southeast Asia — are becoming increasingly dependent on one another. If Russia were to reject economic ties with those power centers, the country would become so weak that it would disintegrate. In addition, common security risks and threats — mainly terrorism — will naturally bring Russia and the West together to fight the common enemies on all fronts. One other factor that will help the partnership is that Russia will gradually cure itself of its complex as a “defeated superpower” and will come to terms with its more modest geopolitical role in the global arena. For its part, the West will cease to view Moscow as a geopolitical rival.

## Tension Inevitable

**Tensions in US Russian relations inevitable.**

**Pifer 12**. [Steven, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship” Brookings Institute -- March 21 -- http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2012/0321\_arms\_control\_pifer.aspx]

U.S. and Russian interests differ in the post-Soviet space, the region that is most likely to generate a major crisis in bilateral relations. Moscow seeks to gain influence over its neighbors, using mechanisms such as the Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Russians seek deference from other states in the post-Soviet space on issues that they define as affecting critical Russian interests. One example is staunch Russian opposition to the enlargement of NATO or the European Union into the post-Soviet space. Russian policies often seem to have the effect of pushing neighboring states away from Moscow, but the Russians have not changed course. The United States takes a different approach, rejecting the notion of a sphere of influence and supporting the right of each post-Soviet state to choose its own course. Some **tension between the two approaches is inevitable**. Washington should expect the kinds of tit-for-tat exchanges that have occurred in the past, such as when a U.S. Navy ship visit to Georgia was followed by a Russian warship calling on Venezuela. Given the difference in approaches, it would be wise for Washington and Moscow to consult closely and be transparent with one another on their policies in the post-Soviet space, so as to avoid surprises and minimize the chances that a clash of interests could escalate. One other difficult issue is the democracy and human rights situation within Russia. While Russian citizens today enjoy considerably more individual freedoms than they did during the time of the Soviet Union, it is equally true that they enjoy fewer freedoms, are more subject to arbitrary and capricious state action, and have less political influence than during the 1990s, however chaotic that period was.

**Reset failed – US-Russia relation will continue to deteriorate – contradicting foreign policy initiatives, ideology, and power politics**

**Minchev** 6 – 28 – **12** (Ognyan, fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States' Balkan Trust for Democracy, “Putin relishes deteriorating US-Russia relations”, <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/2144/putin-relishes-deteriorating-us-russia-relations> ck)

The meeting of United States President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin at the G20 summit in Mexico only underscored the chill in relations between Moscow and Washington. In fact, **relations have deteriorated** steadily since Putin replaced the ailing Boris Yeltsin in 1999, despite Obama's ambitious program to improve – or 'reset' – bilateral ties. Today **the reset is over**, and the two leaders no longer disguise their differences on most important international issues. For Obama, the interment of one of his administration's signature foreign policy efforts at the outset of a re-election campaign is an unwelcome realisation. With few triumphs in the international arena, Obama undoubtedly looked forward to citing improved relations with Russia as an unqualified asset. For their part, Russian leaders have seemed contemptuous of American hopes for renewing their strained relationship. Under Putin, Moscow has steadfastly opposed western efforts to halt civilian casualties in Syria and international efforts to block Iran's nuclear program. Most pointedly, the new US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul – a key author of the reset strategy – was publicly ostracized in a series of Russian media exposés. Clearly, **Putin** and his government **welcome the rapidly deteriorating US-Russia relationship**. Some of the interests underlying Moscow's strategy appear obvious. For example, Russia rejected the establishment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation anti-missile defence shield over Europe, perceiving it as a threat. Western and US policies meant to encourage the Arab spring revolutions struck Russian authorities as part of a conspiracy aimed at – among other things – hampering Russian interests in places like Libya and Syria. Moscow sees US-led efforts to curb Tehran's nuclear programme as an attempt to provoke western or Israeli military action, with the aim of effecting regime change. This could pave the way for the US and its allies to strategically and commercially penetrate post-Soviet central Asia. The west's direct access to central Asian energy resources could cripple Russia's strategy of monopolising energy supply corridors between Europe and the east. There might also be a strong ideological element in Putin's attitudes toward the current US president. While Obama is a post-modern liberal, Putin resembles a 19th century authoritarian conservative. Curiously, most Soviet – and Chinese – orthodox communist leaders of the 20th century preferred dealing with conservative rather than liberal US statesmen. "I love the right," Mao Zedong supposedly quipped to Richard Nixon, the same ardent anti-communist with whom Leonid Brezhnev initiated détente. It was Ronald Reagan, with his vilification of the Soviet "evil empire," who ended the Cold War in partnership with perestroika leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In contrast, liberal Jimmy Carter was rewarded for his positive attitudes to Moscow with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Putin might share some of that same distrust of liberal partners and be more apt to deal with a hard-line conservative in the White House. Yet, there would almost certainly be trade-offs. A conservative president would likely engage in more assertive policies toward Moscow. A more active US policy toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, or Central Europe would risk clashing more openly with Russia's positions. Why would Putin want this, given the fragility of Russian power today? Threats have been a key driver of Russian power politics throughout the history of the empire. Putin's calculations could take many forms. A more active US policy on disputed issues might demonstrate not only American power but also reveal American weaknesses. A more assertive US presence in the spheres of Russian interest might also provoke more active opposition by China, and Russia may benefit from greater competition between Beijing and Washington. Or Putin might prefer an immediate, open rivalry with what he perceives to be a weakened United States across a range of issues. Putin's policy toward the US might be a combination of all these factors, underlining two basic tenets of Moscow's long-term geo-strategy. First, Russian strength is demonstrated through its rivalries, not through its partnerships. Moscow does enjoy partnerships – as it does today with China – but they constitute a policy of weakness, not of strength. Second, Russia's anti-western – and, in particular, anti-American – attitudes are at the core of its historic geopolitical identity. Pushing the US out of Europe and terminating the transatlantic link has been the backbone of Russia's grand strategy since 1945. Times are changing, of course, and long-term Russian interests would arguably benefit from closer cooperation with both Europe and the US given the growing threats in Russia's neighbourhood. Will a new mentality catch up with reality for Putin? Or are we in for an extended period of divergence between Moscow and Washington?

## No Impact

**Russia pockets relations – no benefit**

**Rubin 1-4. [**Jennifer, The Washington Post staff writer, "Evaluating Russian 'reset'," http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-turn/2011/01/evaluating\_russian\_reset.html]

Critics of Obama's reset policy argue that Obama has given up too much and gotten too little from Russia. A case in point is the crackdown on Russian dissidents in the wake of START ratification. Eli Lake reports: Russian authorities detained one of the country's leading opposition figures less than two weeks after the U.S. Senate ratified a key arms-control treaty that the White House promised would help reset ties with Moscow. Over the weekend, members of Russia's FSB internal security service disrupted demonstrations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, arresting nearly 130 pro-democracy activists and reversing a policy of tolerating political protests once every 60 days by a coalition of democratic opposition figures in the country. Jamie Fly of the Foreign Policy Initiative explained earlier this year that on Iran, for example, we've gotten less than advertised: To get Russian support for new sanctions, the Obama administration paid a steep price - removing U.S. sanctions against five Russian entities, and resubmitting a nuclear cooperation agreement that was previously frozen after Russia's invasion of Georgia. Despite administration denials, many observers wonder whether President Obama's cancellation of missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in September 2009 also were part of a package deal with Moscow. . . .Despite U.S. efforts to placate Russia in return for support on Iran, Russia has done little more than it did during the Bush administration to halt Tehran's march toward a nuclear weapon. And, of course, with Russian help, Iran was able to open the Bushehr nuclear reactor. On Afghanistan, Fly also contends the number of supply routes opened by Russia have been limited. Others are more generous in their assessment but nevertheless argue that we have failed to alter the underlying nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Leon Aron, a Russian scholar at AEI, in a telephone interview describes the administration as "fairly successful in achieving very limited objectives" such as the rescinding of the S-300 missile deal with Iran, agreement on sanctions (albeit watered down) against the Iranian regime, and some success on opening flights into Afghanistan. He, however, cautions "that on larger things Russia is going in the opposite direction" than we would like. He notes specifically the long sentence handed down against Mikhail Khodorkovsky gives us insight into what is going on. "Almost as in the Soviet system, Russia is largely a black box," he says. "But every now and then something comes out that it is a fairly good indicator." The lesson of the Khodorkovsky verdict, he contends, is that "we better start thinking about living with an increasingly authoritarian Russia." This suggests that Vladimir Putin is "determined to reassert the state in politics and the economy." He fully expects Putin to come back as president in 2012. That domestic oppression, Aron suggests, bodes ill for cooperation with Russia on external matters. He contends that not unlike Soviet times, the greater the internal oppression, the more "detrimental repercussions" there will be for Russian-U.S. relations. He says, "It is my sense that we are going in that direction."

## Unsustainable

#### US-Russian relations aren’t sustainable – multiple disputes destabilize it

Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is a consultant to the American Foreign Policy Council. Dr. Thomas J. Torda has been a Chinese linguist specializing in science and technology with FBIS, and a Chinese/Russian defense technology consultant with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Thursday, Jan. 31, 2002 “The Skies Are Still Threatening” <http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/31/143739.shtml>

The Viper Will Strike Again

The cheers from Moscow to America reached their highest level in mid-November 2001, during the meetings between President Bush and President Putin in Washington, D.C., and Texas. Then, step-by-step in December 2001–January 2002, the tone of the Moscow media and Moscow officials lost its sweetness and became a little harsher. In the last two weeks of January, it reminded one of a viper’s hissing. Moscow went crazy at that time for the following reasons (each item confirmable from numerous "angry” articles in the Moscow newspapers, as well as reports from international agencies, for the period Jan. 11–25): America and the West don’t want to write off Russian debts. Moscow is angry: Oh, the New Russian impunity! Moscow should be happy that it is not being punished (at least for the time being) for its role in preparations for the "9-11” attacks. Still, Moscow requires compensation. What for? Perhaps for not downing U.S. military aircraft flying through the Trans-Caucasian corridor? America withdrew from the ABM Treaty and accelerated development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Moscow is very angry. Moreover, Moscow’s anger has in effect "boiled up” in the Beijing officials too. Official and semi-official protests from the two capitals – including tough statements in the government-controlled media – could be counted in the dozens. Russia, despite all its efforts and expectations, didn’t get a decisive voice in NATO and is incapable of stopping NATO's eastward expansion. Again, Moscow is very angry.

America and the West don’t want to shut their eyes toward Russian genocidal activity in Chechnya. Moreover, U.S. and U.K. officials are meeting the representatives of Chechen President Maskhadov. Moscow is enraged. America is reluctant to issue a written obligation on the irreversible destruction of most of its nuclear warheads. By the way, is it necessary to issue obligations to a country – such as Russia – that uses any opportunity available for not fulfilling its own obligations? Still, Moscow demonstrates its anger once more. American and NATO troops entered Central Asia and don’t intend to leave it. Now Moscow becomes really mad. It would be enough to mention the Jan. 15 statements of Konstantin Totsky, director of the Federal Border Service, in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, and of the Speaker of the Russian Duma (parliament) Gennady Seleznev.

# \*\*\*Saudi Relations\*\*\*

## Resilient

#### Relations are resilient

Boucek 11

[Chrstopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, June 21 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Are U.S.-Saudi relations in decline? We have seen the emergence of greater tensions between Washington and Riyadh as a result of the Arab Spring. This comes in large part because in Saudi Arabia there is a belief that Washington has not managed this process very well, doesn’t know what it’s doing, and is putting issues of political reform ahead of security and stability in the region. This is a part of the world where personal relationships, friendship, and loyalty are more important than anything else and we’ve seen the United States support the removal of former friends, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Saudis feel that there is a likelihood that this is not going to stop. Saudi Arabia and Saudi foreign policy generally loathe instability or uncertainty and that’s exactly what we see right now. Riyadh feels that the United States is more concerned about being on the right side of history, instead of standing by its friends and working to advance stability in the region—this is very concerning to the Saudis. Whereas the United States and Saudi Arabia historically differed over domestic Saudi political issues, the two countries usually agreed on foreign and regional policy issues. But increasingly, this is not the case. Increasingly it seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interests do not overlap with the United States and Washington’s security interests. Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests. All that said, at the end of the day, the relationship remains very strong. In the region, there are several special relationships for the United States and one of them is with Saudi Arabia. Despite all of the difficulty and tensions, the relationship remains strong and it will remain strong. The two countries need each other and there is no one else who can provide for Saudi Arabia what the United States does and no one that can provide for the United States what Saudi Arabia does. The two will be forced to work together. What’s needed is better management of the relationship, especially on the American side. Washington needs to learn how to engage the Saudis in a productive way to advance mutual interests, not just American interests.

# \*\*\*Solar Storms\*\*\*

## No Impact

#### Impacts to solar flares are empirically denied

Huffington Post 9-7

Huffington Post, “Solar Flare Unlikely to Cause Problems, National Weather Service Says,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/solar-flare-national-weather-service_n_952946.html>, Sawyer

WASHINGTON -- Forecasters say a new solar flare should provide only a glancing blow on Earth on Friday and is unlikely to cause any problems. The National Weather Service's Space Weather Prediction Center says northern lights may be slightly more visible, but there should be no radio, satellite or electrical grid disruptions. They say the flare that erupted from a sunspot Tuesday is fairly big, but most of it will miss Earth, going far above the planet. Senior forecaster Norm Cohen said the flare should arrive around 1:30 p.m. EDT Friday, but is nothing to worry about.

## Status Quo Solves

#### The coming storm won’t be large and status quo measures solve

Gary 10

Stuart “Solar max claims 'overstated': expert,” <http://www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2010/08/27/2995543.htm>

Australia's leading body responsible for monitoring space weather has dismissed claims that a massive solar storm could "wipe out the Earth's entire power grid". One report quotes an Australian astronomer as saying "the storm is likely to come sooner rather than later". But Dr Phil Wilkinson, assistant director with the Australian Bureau of Meteorology's Ionospheric Prediction Service, says claims that this coming solar maximum will be the most violent in 100 years are not factual. "All this talk about gloom and doom has selling power, but I'm certain it's overstated," says Wilkinson. "[It's] going far beyond what's realistic and could be worrying or concerning for people who don't really understand the underlying science behind it all." "The real message should be that the coming solar maximum period could be equally as hazardous as any other solar maximum." 11-year cycle The Sun goes through an 11-year solar cycle moving from a period of low activity called solar minimum to a time of heightened activity called solar maximum. During solar maximum there's an increase in sun spot activity, which are dark patches on the Sun's surface caused by magnetic field lines breaking through from deep below. Because the Sun isn't a solid object like the Earth, different parts of the Sun rotate at different speeds, which cause these field lines to twist and stretch, eventually snapping like elastic bands. When they snap they produce an eruption of electromagnetic energy called a solar flare, which can be accompanied by a coronal mass ejection (CME). If directed at Earth, charged particles within the CME slam into the magnetosphere, resulting in the northern and southern auroral lights. Previous CME events have damaged spacecraft, interfered with communications systems and overloaded ground-based power grids. Aware of the problems Despite the potential threat, Wilkinson says authorities are aware of issues and are taking precautions. "We monitor solar activity and give out warnings if something is heading our way," says Wilkinson. "That will be at least a few hours [in advance], enough time to prepare." He says while some satellites could be damaged by a future CME, others could be protected by being placed in 'safe mode'. Wilkinson adds the impact on power grids would be minimal. "At worst, it's a regional thing, not a global thing as these reports imply." He says high frequency communications may also be affected, but it would be temporary. Low maximum According to Wilkinson, the Sun has been through a long solar minimum and appears to be heading into a low solar maximum. Previous observations have shown this could result in high spikes of CME activity. "It means we could see auroral activity over all of Australia rather than just the higher latitudes," says Wilkinson. "It's unusual, but not unprecedented. James Cook made mention of just such an event off Timor."

#### Prefer our evidence – studies prove

Andrew 7-25

“Are Solar Flares Easing Up?" http://www.offthegridnews.com/2011/07/25/are-solar-flares-easing-up/

This dire warning has been discounted by many other scientists. They state that the reduction in sunspot activity is a clear indicator that the cycle is winding down, and that fears of a massive flare in 2013 are unwarranted. Although they argue that a massive flare is unlikely, they have provided some data on past flares to demonstrate that even a large flare would have minimal impact on the world. After reviewing case studies on historical solar flare activity, this team of researchers advised that at worst, only small communications or electricity interruptions would occur if a massive flare erupted toward Earth. Although the interruptions may be minor, the team stated that the power grid should be outfitted with monitoring equipment to help address any potential disruptions caused by solar flare activity. The equipment, referred to as residual current devices (RCDs), act as trip switches on electricity transmission lines. RCDs break the connection when there’s a sudden increase in voltage. This would cause a temporary disruption in power, but the transformers would be protected from surges. The devices are used in domestic wiring systems and could be thought of as surge protectors for power lines.

#### SQ Solves- We Have the Tech to Predict Solar Storms Now

Kerr 10/21/11 (Richard, Wired Science, pg. http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/10/space-weather-computer-forecast/)

It took a while, but space physicists who predict immense balls of solar debris smashing into Earth have finally caught up with their brethren who forecast terrestrial weather. Rather than simply relying on rules of thumb, space weather forecasters have begun running a computer model that actually simulates the development of conditions between the sun and Earth. They’re following the lead of atmospheric weather forecasters, who have been using computer models since the 1960s. Warnings of when solar storms will strike Earth are already much improved. The better the warning of major solar storms, the better earthlings can prepare for the consequences, which can include electrically fried satellites, degraded GPS navigation, and widespread blackouts. The culprit is a magnetic bubble of tens of millions of tons of protons and the like blown off the sun at several million kilometers per hour. It might seem easy enough to keep track of something that big, but observation platforms between the sun and Earth are few and far between. And the choppy sea of magnetic fields and charged particles that the ejected bubbles plow through can slow and deflect the bubbles.

# \*\*\*Spratley Islands\*\*\*

## No War

#### Double bind – either war won’t escalate or miscalc makes it inevitable

**Branigan 7/13** (Tania, writer for the Guardian, “Chinese frigate runs aground in disputed part of South China Sea,” 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/13/chinese-frigate-runs-aground-sea)

Ian Storey of the Institute of South-east Asian Studies in Singapore said that while the grounding was in itself unlikely to escalate tensions, it indicated the growing militarisation of the waters. "Resolution of the dispute is even further out of reach," he added. "No one seriously envisages a major conflict in the South China Sea because it's not in anyone's interests. They depend on those sea lanes for the continued functioning of their economies.¶ "The real risk is that an accidental clash occurs and escalates. In my mind, it is just a matter of time before one of these standoffs gets really ugly and people get killed."¶ Tensions have been building in the area since 2007, with increasing keenness to claim¶ the¶ energy resources, and growing pressure from nationalists in several of the countries. Vietnam has seen unusual street protests over the dispute in the past few weeks.

Won’t escalate to involve the US or China

Piper 12 (David, writer for Fox News, “David against Goliath on the South China Sea,” 5/10, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/10/david-against-goliath-on-south-china-sea/#ixzz20W2KsqZ3)

China has been watching the growing presence of the U.S military in the region and analysts suggests this latest dispute is linked to the joint exercise, which involves dealing with terrorists who have taken over an oil rig in the South China Sea.¶ But the Philippines should be not expect help from the U.S. if it turns into a shooting war, says Subramaniam.¶ “Given this capability gap, the Philippines knows it has a lot to gain through alliance with the U.S. But any hope that the U.S. would provide 'cover' from China over disputed maritime borders in the South China Sea, in case of a military conflict, is unlikely to be met, as there is little for Washington to gain by openly siding with Manila in any dispute with Beijing.”¶ China has been prepared to support its claims in the South China Sea with military action in the past.¶ In 1974, China and Vietnam fought a short battle over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, a battle that China won.¶ Despite the rhetoric coming out of China at the moment of backing up its territorial claims by force, it's still questionable if it wants to cause an international crisis now while it continues to grow economically and militarily.

# \*\*\*Taiwan War\*\*\*

## Inevitable

**Unifaction make Taiwan crisis inevitable – escalates to military options**

**Shlapak 09** (David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND, et al, 2009, “A Question of Balance,” RAND, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG888.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG888.pdf" \t "_blank) )

The factors described in this chapter present something of a mixed bag, and their collective impact, in terms of the future stability of the crossstrait relationship, is somewhat unpredictable. But we believe that, in general, the “tense stability” that characterized the cross-strait confrontation prior to the mid-1990s is suffering from gradual erosion. The debate concerning sovereignty over Taiwan has evolved dramatically. Today, this dispute pits a Beijing government that insists there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part against a Taiwan that still retains many formal trappings of being a Chinese state but increas- ingly develops an independent national identity. Notwithstanding the collapse of voter support for the DPP, nearly all significant political parties in Taiwan now accept the notion that any future arrangement with China must receive the separate approval of Taiwan’s 23 million voters. For Beijing, the emerging Taiwanese national identity raises the profoundly worrisome prospect that if unification is delayed for too long, the Taiwanese people will be unwilling to accept any arrangement that subsumes them within a “Chinese” state or confederation. Gradual changes along these lines seem unlikely to provide the spark for conflict, but they could provide a backdrop for crisis if Beijing concludes that long-term trends are turning powerfully against them. The rapidly growing cross-strait economic relationship means that Beijing can now inflict significant pain on Taiwan if it so chooses. But, to date, Beijing has had difficulty translating this economic leverage into meaningful political results, other than as a device for signaling its irritation with Taipei. If Beijing loses hope that economic and social maneuvers can slow or reverse forces on Taiwan that run athwart of at least eventual reunificaton, the attractiveness, in a crisis, of military options is likely to increase. In Taiwan, meanwhile, advocates of greater independence fear that growing economic ties will mean “time is not on their side,” and they may feel the need to push more provocative measures when political circumstances give them the chance. Beijing’s anger at what it saw as Chen Shui-bian’s provocative behavior encouraged a dangerous shift in the PRC’s “red lines” for threatening force against Taiwan. Beijing sees Chen and his allies as pathological “envelope-pushers” constantly looking for ways to promote the island’s independence, and the perceived need to keep Chen boxed in caused China to shift away from the four clear, relatively easyto- follow “red lines” that it warned Taiwan not to cross in the past. Instead, China has gravitated toward more vague, ambiguous “red areas” and it is more likely to define (or redefine) these situationally and reactively during periods of crisis. This ambiguity and improvisation could become dangerous sources of misperception during a crisis. The combination of more than a decade of PRC military modernization and flat Taiwanese defense spending have transformed the balance across the strait away from one that had long favored Taiwan. In the heat of any future cross-strait crisis, this shift in the perceived balance of forces seems to remove an important impediment to Chinese use of force.

# \*\*\*Terror\*\*\*

## Hyping Threat Bad

#### Hyping threat from al Qaeda prolongs its survival

Prof. Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD, 2010, professor of strategy at the National War College, Terrorizing Ourselves, Cato Institute, "Defeating al Qaeda” http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ

The al Qaeda movement is most likely either to implode or to transition to another form of violence. Which path it takes depends at least in part on what the United States and U.S. allies do. The al Qaeda movement can still do serious damage, but treating it as a new, monolithic threat like the Communist menace is profoundly counterproductive and makes it seem stronger and more united than it is. The most effective way to nudge it towards implosion is to confound the classic strategies of leverage being employed by the leadership.

## Hype

#### Al Qaeda's objectives unachievable—it’s all hype.

Martin C. Libicki, 2008, PhD, senior management scientist at RAND, formerly of the National Defense University) and Prof. Seth G. Jones (PhD, adjunct professor of political science at Georgetown University), RAND Corporation, "How Terrorist Groups End", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\_MG741-1.pdf (page XVII)

There is reason to be hopeful. Our analysis concludes that al Qa'ida's probability of success in actually overthrowing any government is close to zero. Out of all the religious groups that ended since 1968, none ended by achieving victory. Al Qa'ida has virtually unachievable objectives in trying to overthrow multiple regimes in the Middle East. To make matters worse, virtually all governments across Europe, North America, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa consider al Qa'ida an enemy. As al Qa'ida expert Peter Bergen has noted, "Making a world of enemies is never a winning strategy."

#### Terrorists unskilled and divided

Prof. John Mueller, 2010 (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), Terrorizing Ourselves, Cato Institute, "Assessing Measures Designed to Protect the Homeland", http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ

Political scientist Michael Kenney has interviewed dozens of officials and intelligence agents and has analyzed court documents, and he finds homegrown Islamic militants to be operationally unsophisticated, short on know how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and severely hampered by a limited capacity to learn. Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten operational unity, trust, cohesion, and the ability to act collectively.

#### Minimal terrorist presence in the U.S.

Prof. John Mueller, 2010 (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), Terrorizing Ourselves, Cato Institute, "Assessing Measures Designed to Protect the Homeland", http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ

By 2005, however, after years of well funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies concluded in a secret report that they had been unable to uncover a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the United States, a finding (or nonfinding) publicly acknowledged two years later. Al Qaeda deserves special attention here because, as stated by Glenn Carle, a 23-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats, it is "the only Islamic terrorist organization that targets the U.S. homeland."

## No Impact

#### Very few terrorists and they aren't that deadly. The odds of dying are VERY low.

Mueller ‘9 (John, Prof. Pol. Sci. – Ohio State U., in “American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11”, Ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, p. 194)

Although there are some who worry that al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute itself and is now on the march (see Bergen 2007; Hoffman 2008; Mazzetti and Rohde 2008),2 estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central generally come in with numbers in the same order of magnitude as those suggested by Sageman. Egyptian intelligence, for example, puts the number at less than 200, while American intelligence estimates run from 300 to upwards of 500 (Wright 2008). One retired U.S. intelligence officer suggests it could be "as many as 2000" (Mazzetti and Rohde 2008), but that number should obviously be taken essentially to define the upper range of contemporary estimates. Another way to evaluate the threat is to focus on the actual amount of violence perpetrated around the world by Muslim extremists since 9/11 outside of war zones. Included in the count would be terrorism of the much-publicized and fearinducing sort that occurred in Bali in 2002, in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey in 2003, in the Philippines, Madrid, and Egypt in 2004, and in London and Jordan in 2005. Three think-tank publications have independently provided lists of such incidents. Although these tallies make for grim reading, the total number of people killed comes to some 200 or 300 per year. That, of course, is 200 or 300 per year too many, but it hardly suggests that the perpetrators present a major threat, much less an existential one. For comparison: over the same period far more people have drowned in bathtubs in the United States alone. Another comparison comes from the consequences of policies instituted by the Transportation Security Administration. Increased delays and added costs at airports due to new security procedures provide incentive for many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination rather than flying. Since driving is far riskier than air travel, the extra automobile traffic generated by increased airport security screening measures has been estimated to result in 400 or more fatalities per year (Ellig et al. 2006: 35). Another assessment comes from astronomer Alan Harris. Using State Department figures, he estimates a worldwide death rate from international terrorism outside of war zones of 1,000 per year—that is, he assumes in his estimate that there would be another 9/11 somewhere in the world every several years. Over an 80 year period under those conditions some 80,000 deaths would occur which would mean that the probability that a resident of the globe will die at the hands of international terrorists is about one in 75,000 (6 billion divided by 80,000). In comparison, an American's chance of dying in an auto accident over the same time interval is about one in 80. If there are no repeats of 9/11, the probability of being killed by an international terrorist becomes more like one in 120,000.

#### No risk of a terrorist attack inside the US

Mueller, 2006 (John, Professor of political science at Ohio state University, “Is there still a terrorist threat?” Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct, Vol. 85, Issue 5)

Instead, Americans are told--often by the same people who had once predicted imminent attacks--that the absence of international terrorist strikes in the United States is owed to the protective measures so hastily and expensively put in place after 9/11. But there is a problem with this argument. True, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United States in the last five years. But nor were there any in the five years before the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the United States was doing much less to protect itself. It would take only one or two guys with a gun or an explosive to terrorize vast numbers of people, as the sniper attacks around Washington, D.C., demonstrated in 2002. Accordingly, the government's protective measures would have to be nearly perfect to thwart all such plans. Given the monumental imperfection of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and the debacle of FBI and National Security Agency programs to upgrade their computers to better coordinate intelligence information, that explanation seems far-fetched. Moreover, Israel still experiences terrorism even with a far more extensive security apparatus. It may well have become more difficult for terrorists to get into the country, but, as thousands demonstrate each day, it is far from impossible. Immigration procedures have been substantially tightened (at considerable cost), and suspicious U.S. border guards have turned away a few likely bad apples. But visitors and immigrants continue to flood the country. There are over 300 million legal entries by foreigners each year, and illegal crossings number between 1,000 and 4,000 a day--to say nothing of the generous quantities of forbidden substances that the government has been unable to intercept or even detect despite decades of a strenuous and well-funded "war on drugs." Every year, a number of people from Muslim countries-perhaps hundreds--are apprehended among the illegal flow from Mexico, and many more probably make it through. Terrorism does not require a large force. And the 9/11 planners, assuming Middle Eastern males would have problems entering the United States legally after the attack, put into motion plans to rely thereafter on non-Arabs with passports from Europe and Southeast Asia. If al Qaeda operatives are as determined and inventive as assumed, they should be here by now. If they are not yet here, they must not be trying very hard or must be far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common image would suggest. Another popular explanation for the fact that there have been no more attacks asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, although it never managed to snag bin Laden, severely disrupted al Qaeda and its operations. But this claim is similarly unconvincing. The 2004 train bombings in Madrid were carried out by a tiny group of men who had never been to Afghanistan, much less to any of al Qaeda's training camps. They pulled off a coordinated nonsuicidal attack with 13 remote-controlled bombs, ten of which went off on schedule, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,800. The experience with that attack, as well as with the London bombings of 2005, suggests that, as the former U.S. counterterrorism officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, for a terrorist attack to succeed, "all that is necessary are the most portable, least detectable tools of the terrorist trade: ideas." It is also sometimes suggested that the terrorists are now too busy kilting Americans and others in Iraq to devote the time, manpower, or energy necessary to pull off similar deeds in the United States. But terrorists with al Qaeda sympathies or sensibilities have managed to carry out attacks in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the past three years; not every single potential bomb thrower has joined the fray in Iraq. Perhaps, some argue, terrorists are unable to mount attacks in the United States because the Muslim community there, unlike in many countries in Europe, has been well integrated into society. But the same could be said about the United Kingdom, which experienced a significant terrorist attack in 2005. And European countries with less well-integrated Muslim communities, such as Germany, France, and Norway, have yet to experience al Qaeda terrorism. Indeed, if terrorists are smart, they will avoid Muslim communities because that is the lamppost under which policing agencies are most intensely searching for them. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were ordered generally to stay away from mosques and American Muslims. That and the Madrid plot show that tiny terrorist conspiracies hardly need a wider support network to carry out their schemes. Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks took only about two years to prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 were conceived, planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off less than two months after the conspirators purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took less than a year to plan.) Given the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one would think that terrorists might be inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just around the corner? It was in 2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey) but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those attacks were tragic, but their sparseness could be taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and puffing

## No Retaliation

#### 9/11 was the anomaly – terrorist attacks don’t cause retaliation.

Mueller, Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science Ohio State University, 05(John, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence,* p.500-501)

Although it is often argued that it is imperative that public officials ‘‘do something’’— which usually means overreact—when a terrorist event takes place, there are many instances where no reaction took place and the officials did not suffer politically or otherwise. Ronald Reagan’s response to a terrorist bomb in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 241 American Marines was to make a few speeches and eventually to pull the troops out. Bill Clinton responded similarly after an unacceptable loss of American lives in Somalia ten years later. Although there werethe (apparently counterproductive) military retaliations after the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 as noted earlier, there was no notable response to terrorist attacks on American targets in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in 1996 or to the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. The response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 was the same as to terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995— the dedicated application of police work to try to apprehend the perpetrator—and this proved to be politically acceptable. The demands for retaliation tend to be more problematic in the case of suicide terrorists since the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act are already dead. Nonetheless, the attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and against the Cole were all suicidal, yet no direct retaliatory action was taken. Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be taken, experience suggests politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligatory (and inexpensive) expressions of outrage are issued.

## Maritime Terrorism

#### Terrorists won’t conduct a maritime attack – scarce targets and easier land options.

Breanne Wagner, November 2007, staff writer, National Defense, “License to Boat?,” Vol. 92 Issue 648, p. 24, Ebsco Host

\*\*\*cites CRS analysts Paul Pariomak & John Frittelli, experts on maritime terrorism\*\*\*

In the CRS report, analysts Paul Pariomak and John Frittelli said that increased govern-ment efforts, along with specific challenges to terrorists on U.S. seas, might prevent per-petrators from attempting a waterborne attack. Terrorists face more obstacles to maritime attacks than land attacks, the report said. This is because sea targets are more scarce than land targets , surveillance at sea provides less cover and ocean conditions make an attack scenario somewhat unpredictable , said Navy Capt .James Pelkofski, according to the report." Although a successful attack on U.S. mar-itime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetra –tors such as al-Qaida, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere," Parfomak and Frittelli wrote. They point out that since1997, less than one percent of global attacks involved sea targets .

#### It’s not visible enough – no motivation.

Catherine Z. Raymond, 2-9-2006, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits," Global Terrorism Analysis, Vol. 4 Issue 3, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369896>

ASG and MILF traditionally operate within their locality of the Philippines and its surrounding archipelagic waters; it would be uncharacteristic of them to carry out an attack on shipping in the Malacca Straits. This is related to the fact that they are both separatist groups, with the aim of establishing an independent Islamic state in the Philippines. Therefore, their targets tend to be either located within the country, or closely associated with it. GAM is also a separatist group and while there may be some overlap in terms of its area of operations and the Malacca Straits, its targets have traditionally included the Indonesian military and security forces. In addition, GAM has just signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government, which includes the disarmament and demobilization of its 3000 fighters (PNG Post-Courier, August 23, 2005). Through this process of elimination, the group that would appear to be the only real threat to shipping in the Malacca Straits is JI. The group has shown an interest in attacking shipping in the Straits and vessels visiting Changi Naval Base in Singapore and is suspected of developing more expertise in this area. Its maritime capability, however, remains underdeveloped when compared to its land capability. Attacks against targets in the maritime domain would require specialized equipment and skills; depending on the target, they may also require knowledge of shipping patterns, boat operation and maintenance, and boarding techniques. This explains the predictions of a piracy-terrorism nexus, of which there is still no evidence. Various explanations have been proffered as to why there is still no sign of any cooperation between pirates and terrorists. One explanation is that the majority of those committing acts of piracy in the Malacca Straits are largely un-organized petty-criminals who use piracy as a way of supplementing their inadequate income. These small groups and individuals may not be willing to cooperate with terrorists who, through their high-profile activities, may trigger a complete crackdown on all maritime crime. Carrying out an attack in the maritime domain also presents a number of difficulties that are not encountered on land. First, if the aftermath of an attack is to be captured by the media, which is often the wish of a terrorist group, then the attack needs to be carried out close to land. This then considerably compresses the theater of operations, as only coastal areas and ports would be suitable. Second, surveillance at sea of potential targets offers less cover and concealment than on land and entails the same environmental challenges as any maritime activity.

#### No means for large attack – it’s all speculation.

Janes Intelligence Review, 2006 “maritime Terrorism: the threat in context”

Does the concern about the potential for large-scale maritime terrorism match the reality of the threat? A lack of necessary skills and the practical difficulties facing terrorists attempting to operate in the maritime sphere may render many of the nightmare scenarios feared by governments and port authorities unlikely. Martin Murphy reports. An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the global maritime terrorist threat should be driven by an assessment of what is probable, rather than merely possible. However, sober analysis of this issue has been clouded amid the anxiety created by the current global security climate, with much discussion turning on the notion that terrorists could potentially strike any target with virtually any means available. While the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US demonstrated the willingness of a new generation of Islamist militants to conduct mass-casualty attacks, conceptually it was not very different from other terrorist 'spectaculars'. There was no fundamental innovation in terrorist methods and the attacks did not herald a significant change of direction. Rather, they built on the steady standards of terrorist tactics: surprise and simplicity, executed by means of known and straightforward technology. In the 11 September 2001 attacks, it was the scale, audacity and, once it became apparent, the international reach of the group behind it, which surprised many. These elements led observers to look for other possible scenarios where acts on a similar scale could be carried out. The sea certainly offers scale, and it is not surprising that some of this speculation has focused on the maritime domain. Two main reasons are put forward as to why terrorists might mount attacks on water: the high seas are an unregulated space that, in the case of weak states that are unable to police their territorial waters effectively, extends right up to coast; and that few terrorist incidents have occurred at sea and therefore it is the turn of ships and seafarers to provide the next vehicle and set of victims. Such speculation has fallen into two broad categories: large ships as weapons, and ships as delivery vehicles for weapons.

## AT Rogue States

#### Rouge states won’t give up WMDs – risk of discovery and backfiring

Mueller 8

[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Assistance by a state A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20; also Kamp 1996, 33; Bunn 2006, 115; Bunn and Wier 2006, 137).6 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72). In addition, al-Qaeda--the chief demon group and one of the few terrorist groups to see value in striking the United States--is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone.7 As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).

## AT Loose Nukes

#### No loose nukes – multiple barriers

Mueller 8

[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Stealing or buying a bomb: loose nukes There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badkhen 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Smith and Hoffman 1997; Langewiesche 2007, 19). By 2007, even such alarmists at Anna Pluto and Peter Zimmerman were concluding that "It is probably true that there are no 'loose nukes', transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way (2007, 56). It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by al-Qaeda, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material--and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos and director of the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency from 2001 to 2004, "regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously" (2007, 93; see also Kamp 1996, 22; Milhollin 2002, 47-48). It is conceivable that stolen bombs, even if no longer viable as weapons, would be useful for the fissile material that could be harvested from them. However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, point out that even if a weapon is not completely destroyed when it is opened, its fissile material yield would not be adequate for a primitive design, and therefore several weapons would have to be stolen and then opened successfully (2005, 502). Moreover, those weapons use (or used) plutonium, a substance that is not only problematic to transport, but far more difficult and dangerous to work with than is highly enriched uranium.

## AT Homegrown Terrorism

Homegrown terrorism is not possible – statistics prove

Brooks 11

[Risa Brooks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, December 14 2011, "The Exaggerated Threat of American Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism," <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21619/exaggerated_threat_of_american_muslim_homegrown_terrorism.html>, accessed on 7/23/12, Kfo]

LITTLE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN MUSLIMS PLOTTING ATTACKS In recent years, public officials in the United States and terrorism analysts here and abroad have warned of an increasing threat of Muslim homegrown terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 perpetrated by European homegrown terrorists have contributed to these concerns, as has the surge in terrorist-related arrests in the United States in 2009 and 2010. Among these are the high-profile arrests of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who engaged Securityin a deadly shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to bomb Times Square in May 2010. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that the threat of American Muslims engaging in lethal attacks in the United States has been frequently overstated. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, American Muslims do not appear to be increasingly motivated to commit terrorist acts in the United States. Recent studies of the "radicalization" of American Muslims accused of engaging in domestic terrorism have explored the life histories of these individuals, and they have provided insight into the extremist beliefs and changes in behavior that preceded the turn to violence. Yet these studies offer little evidence that American Muslims—even those exhibiting the danger signs of radicalization—will increasingly engage in acts of terrorism against fellow Americans. In fact, there is minimal evidence that American Muslims are becoming more radical in their beliefs. Surveys in 2011 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reveal no trend of growing support for militancy among American Muslims. In addition, a surge in the number of American Muslims arrested on terrorism-related offenses in recent years does not mean that this segment of society is more prone to engage in terrorism. As a result of expanded initiatives in domestic counterterrorism by the Department of Homeland Security and new FBI authority to undertake "assessments" and open preliminary investigations of suspect Americans, officials increasingly have the tools to detect terrorist activity in its early stages. According to theNew York Times, from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2011, the FBI initiated more than 82,000 assessments of individuals and groups suspected of being involved in terrorist activities in the United States. Combine this enhanced ability to detect aspiring terrorists with law enforcement's frequent use of sting operations to advance plots that might have otherwise gone nowhere, and one can largely account for the spike in terrorist-related arrests. For example, of the eighteen attacks attempted against U.S. targets since September 11 that reached some level of operational development (targets chosen, surveillance undertaken, and the like), twelve involved the use of federal officials at the plots' formative stages. The surge in arrests could also be the result of a clustering of arrests of those long engaged in militancy or the apprehension of large groups of individuals, such as members of the Daniel Boyd network or Somali al-Shabaab recruits. In short, improvements in detection or other actions by law enforcement could be contributing to the increase in the number of individuals charged with terrorism-related offenses independent of any larger trends in the American population. THE CHALLENGE OF AVOIDING DETECTION WHILE PLOTTING SOPHISTICATED ATTACKS Even if more American Muslims were to engage in homegrown terrorism, their attacks would likely fail either because of technical error or because authorities were able to discover their plots before they could be executed. Unlike the September 11 hijackers, American Muslim homegrown terrorists tend to be amateurs and often lack the basic skills of terrorist tradecraft. Moreover, opportunities to enhance their skills are limited. Technical information available online is often incomplete or poorly presented, and perfecting the skills to manufacture explosives and cultivate other expertise—including the ability to maintain operational security when preparing attacks and recruiting other militants—increases the risk of exposure. For these reasons, every attempted terrorist plot by American Muslims in the United States has ended in the arrests of the would-be perpetrators, with the exception of Shahzad and two others, Carlos Bledsoe and Maj. Nidal Hasan. In fact, the evidence suggests that engaging in terrorist activity in the United States carries a serious risk of exposure. First, although difficult to quantify, societal awareness about terrorism has grown considerably over the years. In October 2010, for example, members of a Hawaiian mosque reported to authorities a new member whose recent move to the area raised their suspicions. Contrast this with the hospitality and no-questions-asked reception that the Muslim community in San Diego gave to two of the September 11 hijackers in the months preceding the attacks. Additionally, over the past decade, alert citizens otherwise unacquainted with the would-be perpetrators have reported apparent terrorist activity involving American Muslims to authorities. Second, as the result of both a significant investment in grassroots counterterrorism efforts spanning the federal, state, and local levels as well as expanded prerogatives such as the availability of FBI assessments, would-be terrorists must contend with an increasingly sophisticated monitoring and investigative apparatus. Third, American Muslim communities have demonstrated a willingness to report aspiring terrorists in their midst—a dynamic that, according to several studies, has occurred in more than 20 percent of terrorism-related cases. Consider that Shahzad is the only homegrown Muslim terrorist unknown to authorities before he tried to execute his plot. Equally telling is why he failed: according to New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Shahzad purposely fabricated his bomb with inferior-grade fertilizer to evade detection. RISKS OF EXAGGERATING THE THREAT Since September 11, American Muslims have executed two successful terrorist attacks in the United States—the Fort Hood shootings by Maj. Nidal Hasan in November 2009 and a lesser-known attack by Carlos Bledsoe on a U.S. Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, in June 2009. Although both cases could be cited as evidence of the dangers of "lone wolves," the small number of such attacks, despite their operational simplicity, suggests either that there are no aspiring terrorists in the country or that even plotters of simple terrorist attacks are being detected before they can harm Americans. Based on the evidence, the fear of a coming wave of Muslim homegrown terrorist attacks against the United States is greatly exaggerated. This fact deserves serious reflection given the considerable risks that can arise from mischaracterizing the threat. As the United States enters an era of fiscal austerity, officials must evaluate the opportunity costs of investing in domestic counterterrorism against other priorities. Consider, for example, how the FBI's shift in resources from white collar crime to counterterrorism after the September 11 attacks, as documented by the national media, reduced the agency's capacity to handle cases of mortgage and securities fraud at the height of the financial crisis. Additionally, the FBI has assigned dozens of agents to participate in recent sting operations. Government officials need to seriously consider whether these investments in domestic counterterrorism are worth the cost. Equally important, overstating the threat of Muslim homegrown terrorism unnecessarily heightens tensions between American Muslim communities and federal and local officials. This potentially undermines relationships of trust that form the basis for cooperation between Muslim communities and authorities. Methods commonly employed by law enforcement in these communities, such as extensive surveillance and cultivation of informants, are inherently challenging for any segment of society to endure, even when they are handled with care and sensitivity—care and sensitivity that a false sense of urgency associated with the homegrown terrorism threat could undermine. Federal officials and local police should be commended for their outreach efforts to American Muslim communities. Yet there is evidence of questionable and counterproductive practices being employed by some members of law enforcement in monitoring these communities. One example involves the October 2011 reports by the Associated Press about the extensive surveillance of Imam Sheikh Rada Shata by the New York City police, even though he had been an invited speaker and a host of events for NYPD officers in his Bay Ridge mosque. In sum, inflating the terrorist threat could alienate Muslim communities in the United States. This would be a worrisome development, because those communities' widespread rejection of terrorism and their ongoing willingness to expose suspected militants are two reasons why the homegrown threat remains small.

## AT Allison

#### Allison is an idiot – empirically proven…

Mueller 8

[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Quoting from Governor Kean's Commission report, Allison has ascribed the fact that the United States was surprised on 9/11 to a "failure of imagination" (2006, 36). After exercising his own imagination and examining the atomic terrorism issue, he proclaims his "considered judgment" in his book: "on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not" (2004, 15). He repeats that judgment in an article published two years later without reducing the terminal interval to compensate--apparently the end date is an ever-receding target (2006, 39).3 Actually, he had been in the prediction business on this issue at least as early as 1995 when his imagination induced him boldly to pronounce, "In the absence of a determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out."

# \*\*\*Trade\*\*\*

## No Trade Conflicts

#### Trade conflicts won’t escalate

NYE ‘96 (Joseph, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government – Harvard University, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

The low likelihood of direct great power clashes does not mean that there will be no tensions between them. Disagreements are likely to continue over regional conflicts, like those that have arisen over how to deal with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery are another source of friction, as is the case over Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran, which the United States steadfastly opposes. The sharing of burdens and responsibilities for maintaining international security and protecting the natural environment are a further subject of debate among the great powers. Furthermore, in contrast to the views of classical Liberals, increased trade and economic interdependence can increase as well as decrease conflict and competition among trading partners. The main point, however, is that such disagreements are very unlikely to escalate to military conflicts.

#### Globalization short-circuits trade conflicts before they can escalate. It is self-correcting

De Jonquieres 03 Guy de Jonquieres, Senior Fellow at ECIPE and London-based writer and speaker on international economic affairs who previously worked for The Financial Times in positions that included world trade editor and Asia columnist and commentator Financial Times, May 26, 2003, <http://www.itssd.org/References/Johns%20Hopkins%20SAIS%20Ctr%20for%20Transatlantic%20Relations%20-%20highlighted.pdf>

Nonetheless, multinationals are not invulnerable. Increasingly, they rely on global supply chains; as a consequence, more than a third of world trade today is within companies. As the impact of stricter US border security after September 11 showed, those networks are highly sensitive to trade disruptions. The good news is that global integration is a potent check on governments' temptation to reach for the trade weapon. It is much easier to convince politicians that lashing out at foreigners is a bad idea if it directly imperils jobs and prosperity at home. That argument has made free-traders of governors of many US states that are home to foreign-owned companies. It also explains why protectionist US measures, such as steel tariffs, are increasingly confined to industries that produce only in their home market.

## Doesn’t Solve War

#### Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace

MARTIN et al ‘8 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

#### Increased trade has no effect on decreasing risk of conflict between nations

Gelpi and Greico 05, Associate Professor and Professor of Political Science, Duke University (Christopher, Joseph, “Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace”, Journal of Peace Research)

As we have already emphasized, increasing levels of trade between an autocratic and democratic country are unlikely to constrain the former from initiating militarized disputes against the latter. As depicted in Figure 1, our analysis indicates that an increase in trade dependence by an autocratic challenger on a democratic target from zero to 5% of the former's GDP would increase the probability of the challenger’s dispute initiation from about 0.31% to 0.29%. Thus, the overall probability of dispute initiation by an autocratic country against a democracy is fairly high (given the rarity of disputes) at 23 nearly .3% per country per year. Moreover, increased trade does little or nothing to alter that risk. Increases in trade dependence also have little effect on the likelihood that one autocracy will initiate a conflict with another. In this instance, the probability of dispute initiation remains constant at 0.33% regardless of the challenger’s level of trade dependence.

## Alt Causes

#### Tariffs and Transportation Rates Will Restrict Trade

American Commercial Lines (ACLI) ’10 Freight transportation rates for the Inland Waterways fluctuate from time to time

http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/American\_Commercial\_Lines\_%28ACLI%29/Freight\_Transportation\_Rates\_Inland\_Waterways\_Fluctuate\_Time\_Decrease

Freight transportation rates fluctuate from season-to-season and year-to-year. Levels of dry and liquid cargo being transported on the Inland Waterways vary based on several factors, including global economic conditions and business cycles, domestic agricultural production and demand, international agricultural production and demand, and foreign exchange rates. Additionally, fluctuation of ocean freight rate spreads between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Northwest affects demand for barging on the Inland Waterways. Grain, particularly corn for export, has been a significant part of our business. Since the beginning of 2006, all grain transported by us has been under spot market contracts. Spot grain contracts are normally priced at, or near, the quoted tariff rates in effect for the river segment of the move. Spot rates can vary widely from quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year. Such a decline, combined with an inability to profitably convert this business to term contracts, could negatively impact our business. The number of barges and towboats available to transport dry and liquid cargo on the Inland Waterways also varies from year-to-year as older vessels are retired and new vessels are placed into service. The resulting relationship between levels of cargoes and vessels available for transport affects the freight transportation rates that we are able to charge. Significant periods of high vessel availability relative to cargo demand could adversely affect demand for our services and the rates we are able to charge.

#### Not solve-trade barriers—jumpstarting Doha is the only way to solve price spikes

Emerging Markets, 6/17

Emerging Markets , Calls grow for global food price action, 17/06/2012 | Phil Thornton, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3047619/News/Calls-grow-for-global-food-price-action.html

Glenn Hall, a partner at the global law firm Norton Rose that this year published a study of the agribusiness sector, said the priority of the G20 should be to reduce trade barriers. “This will make it easier to export agricultural products from the developing markets to developed nations and to give emerging countries the huge agricultural potential they have,” he told Emerging Markets. Negotiations to open up Western markets are a key element of the so-called Doha trade negotiations that were launched in 2001 but which have since run into the sand.

#### Alternate causality – the US anti-dumping law violates free trade laws.

**Ikenson** 10/6/**05** CATO Free Trade Institute since 1990, Co-founded the Library of International Trade Resources (Daniel, Co-author of [Antidumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law](http://www.catostore.org/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&method=cats&scid=13&pid=1441160), “Abuse of Discretion: Time to Fix the Administration of the US Antidumping Law,” Trade Policy Analysis No. 31, <http://www.freetrade.org/node/30>)

Administration of the U.S. antidumping law has been a significant source of friction in international trade in recent years. Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, various aspects of U.S. antidumping practice have been subject to dispute settlement in 26 different cases. Most of the issues raised in those cases concern the discretionary practices of the U.S. Import Administration, an agency within the Department of Commerce that administers part of the antidumping law. At present, the United States remains noncompliant with several WTO determinations that certain U.S. antidumping methodologies violate the rules established by WTO members. Compliance in some of those cases could be achieved simply by changing the offending discretionary practices and would require no actions by the U.S. Congress. IA routinely exploits gray areas in the law to favor the domestic interests that seek protection--and, according to the verdicts of U.S. courts, sometimes violates the law in the process. In the 18-month period ending in June 2005, IA published 19 antidumping redeterminations pursuant to court orders to revise its assumptions or calculations to become compliant with the law. In 14 of those redeterminations, the revised antidumping rates were lower than those originally calculated. The imposition of antidumping orders and the inflation of antidumping duty rates based on erroneous judgments have profound adverse effects on trade and trade relations. It is time for U.S. antidumping policy to be brought into the fold of broader U.S. trade policy objectives. Its administration must be disciplined and calibrated with the efforts of other U.S. agencies to open markets abroad and to demonstrate that the United States believes in the merits of free trade. Accordingly, policymakers should consider the merits of establishing an oversight board, comprising representatives from various agencies with jurisdiction over trade policy, to review IA's antidumping determinations before they are published. Such a body could help buffer antidumping decisions from the results orientation and politicization to which they are currently so prone.

# \*\*\*US China War\*\*\*

## No War

#### No US-Sino war

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

#### No war – economic interdependence

#### Muego 7/23/12

**(Benjamin N Muego, visiting professor of Political Science to the Loyola Schools of the Ateneo de Manila University and a visiting professor of American and International Studies to De La Salle University in Manila, “US will not risk conflict with China,” 7/23/12, Business World Online,** <http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=US-will-not-risk-conflict-with-China&id=55610> /mr)

If “assistance” means sending an ultimatum to China to “cease and desist” her aggressive posturing in the disputed area, deploying military vessels to interdict or drive away Chinese ships, or perhaps act as some kind of an international gendarmerie, in support of the Philippines, then I am afraid that the answer is a resounding no. For one thing, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of which the United States is a major signatory, there is nothing in the language of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty which contemplates “automatic retaliation” in the event of an “external attack.” In contrast to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which provides for “automatic retaliation” in the event of an external attack on any NATO member country, Article 5 of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty provides that any or all assistance a signatory might choose to undertake shall be made in accordance with “their Constitutional processes.” In the case of the United States, this would mean going to Congress to seek its approval or if necessary, ask for a declaration of war (under Article I of the US Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war), a virtually impossibility at the present time, given the prevailing mood in the federal legislature especially in the House of Representatives where the balance of power is held by 89 ultra-conservative and anti-Obama Tea Party members. Moreover, given widespread public disaffection over the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq War, I suggest that there is little if any public support for any new foreign military adventures, let alone against the most populous nation on earth.¶ Does this mean that the US will tamp down on her use of soft-power diplomacy including exhorting the Philippines and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members who claim certain portions of the Spratly Archipelago to take a unified stand and “speak with one voice,” as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham-Clinton urged ASEAN heads of state during the organization’s most recent meeting in Pnom Phenh, Cambodia or symbolic gestures like the recent visit of the CINCPAC, Admiral Samuel J Locklear, to the Philippines? No. Indeed, these initiatives are bound to continue into the indefinite future. But why is the US reluctant to up the ante, as it were, and for example,dispatch elements of the Seventh Fleet to the disputed waters to disperse the flotilla of Chinese fishing, naval and quasi-military vessels that have camped out in the area for several weeks now? Because to do so would be much too risky and is clearly not in the best “national interests” of the United States. It must be noted that the US has not only become China’s major trading partner and there are hundreds of billions of US investments in China; conversely, China has hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the US in the form of bank deposits, treasury notes, bonds, stocks and other forms of commercial paper. Indeed, so extensive is the Chinese economic presence in the US that if China were to yank out a significant percentage of these investments, the US economy -- which is already in a rather precarious state -- could be sent into lethal tailspin.¶ But perhaps the major reason for the US’ reluctance to take on China in her own backyard is the fact that with her renewed economic clout -- having since dislodged Japan as the world’s second largest economic power -- China’s military capability and reach has grown dramatically in recent years as well. As the world’s dominant land power with nearly five million men and women under arms and several million more in reserve, in addition to being a full-fledged nuclear power, it would be the height of mendacity for the United States or any other country for that matter, located halfway around the globe,to engage China in a major land war in Asia. In fine, much as I would like to share the optimism of my students and friends, I am afraid that the scenario of the US coming to the rescue of the Philippines is unrealistic and a non-starter for one very simple and basic reason -- going to war with China or risking a serious rupture in Sino-American relations over the Spratly Archipelago is simply not in the “national interests” of the United States.

#### No impact – China is rising peacefully, and their military buildup is not threatening.

Straits Times 08 “Why War is Unlikely in Asia” <http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html>

But the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear.

#### China won’t go to war – no political will

Moore 6 (Scott, Research assistant, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html, dw: 10-18-2006, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

The new generation of Chinese leaders, which has risen to power in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident (liu si), has tended to consist of moderate technocrats,[10] who are unlikely to support radical policy reversals, such as the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese politics in general have also evolved into a "more pragmatic, risk-adverse" form.[11] This process was initiated by the rise of "interest group politics" during the tenure of President Jiang Zemin.[12] This new structure of decision-making involves the specialization of bureaucratic institutions, which have become more assertive, and occasionally resisted high-level decisions they believed to be ill conceived.[13] It is probable that certain institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would strongly resist the actual or threatened use of nuclear weapons against the United States in almost any situation. In a risk-adverse policy environment that seeks consensus, this kind of strong opposition may well prevail. It thus appears unlikely that any impetus for the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the United States would come from within the established Chinese policymaking apparatus. There are suggestions, however, that pressure for the actual or threatened use of nuclear weapons against the United States may come from outside China's policymaking elite, via a phenomenon that may be termed "hyper-nationalism."[14] The gradual expansion of freedom of speech in China has revealed some truly radical nationalistic perspectives, ranging from a kind of Chinese lebensraum (sheng cun kong jian)[15] to allegations of a kind of racist plot in Western policy towards China.[16] In a crisis situation, there are suggestions that such hyper-nationalism may exert significant pressure on policymakers to respond with an aggressive response, which could include nuclear weapons.

## First Strike Solves

#### First strike checks China War

Lieber and Press 6 – Keir A. Leiber, author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania ("The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006)

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses nomodern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours.) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones. Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, althoughthe forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades. Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia. Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon.The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.

## AT Trade War

#### US/Chinese trade ties are unstoppable

Xu 1 (Xianquan, Researcher – RAND, China, the United States, and the Global Economy, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1300/MR1300.ch11.pdf)

Since the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations, economic and trade relations between the two countries developed rapidly. Over the past ten years, trade volume between China and the United States has more than tripled. While differences and disputes in bilateral relations continue, the rapid growth of economic and trade relations between China and the United States **cannot be stopped**.

#### True Even if US applies Sanctions

#### Yang 4

(Jiawen, George Washington University, The World Economy, July, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00640.x/enhancedabs/)

Trade statistics seem to suggest that US economic sanctions against China have had **no significant adverse impact** on overall trade between the two countries. Both nations are considered large traders in the world, although China is far behind the United States. According to the WTO, the United States accounted for 12.3 per cent of total world exports and 18.9 per cent of total world imports in 2000, while China accounted for 3.9 and 3.4 per cent of world exports and imports, respectively. China became a major trading partner of the United States in the last decade of the twentieth century by all broad measures. According to US statistics for 2000, China was the fourth-leading supplier of US imports, the eleventh-largest purchaser of US exports, and the fourth-largest trading partner for the United States after Canada, Mexico and Japan. China surpassed Japan in 2000 as the country with which the United States has the largest trade deficit on an annual basis, although (as will be discussed shortly) trade data reported by China have differed significantly from statistics reported by the United States. The United States figures more prominently in China’s international trade. The United States was China’s top export market and third-largest import source in 2000, accounting for 20.93 and 8.98 per cent of China’s total exports and imports, respectively. Newton’s theory of gravitation has often been used for the analysis of bilateral trade flows. The gravity model predicts that trade between two countries should be proportional to the size of their economies and retarded by the geographical distance between them. On the positive side, China’s economy has grown faster than that of most countries in the last two decades and is now one of the largest in the world. Correspondingly, China has become one of the top ten countries in world trade and in trade with the United States. On the negative side, few countries in the world are farther away from the United States (China is literally on the other side of the globe). This distance, a factor often regarded as a proxy for transportation costs in international trade, should hinder trade between the two countries. The fact that China has become a major trade partner with the United States confirms that the economic size factor in the gravity model wields significant explanatory power. On the other hand, the greater trade volumes between the United States and Canada and Mexico, whose economies (as measured by GDP) are not as large as China’s, seem to suggest that distance matters. With GDP and geographical distance as explanatory variables in the gravity model, estimated US imports from China and exports to China for the years 1987 to 1998 are actually lower than the corresponding actual imports and exports (see Table 1). This seems to suggest that US economic sanctions against China have had no adverse impact on US trade with China. In fact, as Table 1 shows, gravity model residuals assume an increasing trend, particularly for US imports from China. One plausible interpretation of the positive residuals and the increasing trend is that China is relatively more open to trade than the world norm, which would explain why US-China trade has grown faster than the world average.

## AT Taiwan

**Unifaction make Taiwan crisis inevitable – escalates to military options**

**Shlapak 09** (David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND, et al, 2009, “A Question of Balance,” RAND, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG888.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG888.pdf" \t "_blank) )

The factors described in this chapter present something of a mixed bag, and their collective impact, in terms of the future stability of the crossstrait relationship, is somewhat unpredictable. But we believe that, in general, the “tense stability” that characterized the cross-strait confrontation prior to the mid-1990s is suffering from gradual erosion. The debate concerning sovereignty over Taiwan has evolved dramatically. Today, this dispute pits a Beijing government that insists there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part against a Taiwan that still retains many formal trappings of being a Chinese state but increas- ingly develops an independent national identity. Notwithstanding the collapse of voter support for the DPP, nearly all significant political parties in Taiwan now accept the notion that any future arrangement with China must receive the separate approval of Taiwan’s 23 million voters. For Beijing, the emerging Taiwanese national identity raises the profoundly worrisome prospect that if unification is delayed for too long, the Taiwanese people will be unwilling to accept any arrangement that subsumes them within a “Chinese” state or confederation. Gradual changes along these lines seem unlikely to provide the spark for conflict, but they could provide a backdrop for crisis if Beijing concludes that long-term trends are turning powerfully against them. The rapidly growing cross-strait economic relationship means that Beijing can now inflict significant pain on Taiwan if it so chooses. But, to date, Beijing has had difficulty translating this economic leverage into meaningful political results, other than as a device for signaling its irritation with Taipei. If Beijing loses hope that economic and social maneuvers can slow or reverse forces on Taiwan that run athwart of at least eventual reunificaton, the attractiveness, in a crisis, of military options is likely to increase. In Taiwan, meanwhile, advocates of greater independence fear that growing economic ties will mean “time is not on their side,” and they may feel the need to push more provocative measures when political circumstances give them the chance. Beijing’s anger at what it saw as Chen Shui-bian’s provocative behavior encouraged a dangerous shift in the PRC’s “red lines” for threatening force against Taiwan. Beijing sees Chen and his allies as pathological “envelope-pushers” constantly looking for ways to promote the island’s independence, and the perceived need to keep Chen boxed in caused China to shift away from the four clear, relatively easyto- follow “red lines” that it warned Taiwan not to cross in the past. Instead, China has gravitated toward more vague, ambiguous “red areas” and it is more likely to define (or redefine) these situationally and reactively during periods of crisis. This ambiguity and improvisation could become dangerous sources of misperception during a crisis. The combination of more than a decade of PRC military modernization and flat Taiwanese defense spending have transformed the balance across the strait away from one that had long favored Taiwan. In the heat of any future cross-strait crisis, this shift in the perceived balance of forces seems to remove an important impediment to Chinese use of force.

# \*\*\*US Russia War\*\*\*

## No War

#### Zero risk of Russian war

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### America would survive unscathed

Sharavin 7 (Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, 2007. Defense and Security, “Will America Fight Russia?” p. Lexis)

The United States may count on a mass air raid and missile strike at objects of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and, perhaps, some objects of other branches of the Russian military. Plus, of course, at the military and political planning centers. Whatever targets may escape destruction on the first try will be bombed out of existence by repeated strikes. And Russia will have nothing to answer with. Even if some elements of the strategic nuclear forces survive, they will fall prey to the American national missile defense. The American strategic missile forces in their turn will escape the war unscathed.

## AT Accidents

**Communication checks prevent accidents.**

**Ford 8.** [Chris, Senior Fellow & Director @ Center for Technology and Global Security @ Hudson Institute, “Dilemmas of Nuclear Force ‘De-Alerting’” Int’l Peace Institute Policy Forum -- October 7 -- www.hudson.org/files/documents/De-Alerting%20FINAL2%20(2).pdf]

The United States and Russia have also worked for years to improve communications, reduce misunderstandings, and develop ways to lessen the risk of inadvertent launch or other errors in their strategic relationship. Most readers will be familiar with the Direct Communications Link (the famous “hotline”) established in 1963.27 In 1971, however, Washington and Moscow also signed an agreement establishing basic procedures to increase mutual consultation and notification regarding relatively innocent but potentially alarming activities – thereby reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.28 Since 1987, the two parties have also operated securely-linked 24-hour communications centers – the U.S. node of which is the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operated by the State Department29 – which specialize in transmitting such things as the notifications required under arms control treaties. Pursuant to a 1988 memorandum, NRRC transmittals, which go directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, include ballistic missile launch notifications. This link also proved useful to help prevent strategic tensions after the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 – at which point U.S. officials used the NRRC to reassure their Russian counterparts that the sudden American security alert in the wake of the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks was not in any way an indication of impending U.S. belligerence vis-à-vis Russia.

# \*\*\*Venezuelan Instability\*

## Inevitable

**Venezuelan instability is inevitable**

José Orozco contributed reporting from Caracas, October 30, 2007, “Venezuela’s Gas Prices Remain Low, but the Political Costs May Be Rising”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/world/americas/30venezuela.html?_r=1>

Many Venezuelans consider the subsidy a birthright even though it bypasses the poor, who rely on relatively expensive and often dangerous public transportation. Economists estimate that it costs the government of President Hugo Chávez more than $9 billion a year. Critics of Mr. Chávez, and the president himself, agree that the subsidy is a threat to his project to transform Venezuela into a socialist society, draining huge amounts of money from the national oil company’s sales each year that could be used for his social welfare programs. Gasoline prices have often been a taboo subject for Venezuelan governments. There are memories of the riots in 1989, in which hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people died after protests set off by an increase in gasoline prices that resulted in higher transportation costs. That instability helped set in motion a failed coup attempt by Mr. Chávez in 1992, which first thrust him into the public eye. After his re-election to a six-year term last December, when his political capital was abundant, Mr. Chávez called the gasoline prices “disgusting” and said his government was planning to raise them with a measure “financed by those who own a BMW or a tremendous four-wheel drive.” But he turned his attention to other matters, avoiding the touchy subject. The link between social peace and gasoline so cheap it is almost given away is evident to many motorists. “If you raise gasoline, the people revolt,” said Janeth Lara, 40, an administrator at the Caracas Stock Exchange, as she waited for an attendant to fill the tank of her Jeep Grand Cherokee at a gas station here on a recent day. “It is the only cheap thing.” During an oil boom that is lifting the incomes of both rich and poor, Venezuela is grappling with Latin America’s highest inflation rate, about 16 percent. The local currency, the bolívar, has plunged almost 50 percent in unregulated trading this year, reaching a record low of about 6,000 to the dollar in October (the official rate is fixed at 2,150 to the dollar.) Gasoline is one of the few products subject to price controls here that is in relatively ample supply. Newspapers have been filled recently with tales of consumers struggling to find milk. Last month, eggs were scarce. Economic uncertainty makes it harder to tinker with fuel prices because a small increase could cascade. There could be an impact on the poor, with higher costs for food and other goods for which transportation costs are important, said Francisco Rodríguez, a former chief economist at the National Assembly.

# \*\*\*Warming\*\*\*

## No Warming

#### Recent temperatures show no increase in warming

**Happer 12**

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

#### Temperatures this decade seem to have balanced out; Earth’s climate is not continuing to change.

Michael **Totty,** 20**09** news editor in the WSJ's San Francisco bureau. reporter, editor and podcaster (<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574551303527570212>.html) Wall Street Journal, “What Global Warming?”, December 6, 2009)

But this isn't evidence of a cooling planet. Partly, it's a result of picking an exceptionally hot year—1998—as a starting point. That year experienced an unusually strong El Niño, a natural and periodic warming of the Pacific Ocean that can have powerful effects on global climate. The long-term trend since the mid-1970s shows warming per decade of about 0.18 degree Celsius (about 0.32 degree Fahrenheit). That temperatures this decade have hardly increased demonstrates how natural year-to-year variations in climate can either add to or subtract from the long-term warming trend caused by the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The '00s still have been exceptionally warm: The 12 years from 1997 through 2008 were among the 15 warmest on record, and the decade itself was hotter than any previous 10-year period. While 2008 was the coolest year since 2000—a result of the cooling counterpart of El Niño—it was still the 11th-warmest year on record. And 2009 is on track to be among the five warmest.

#### Warming slowing down; aerosols

#### Biello 11 (David Biello- award-winning online associate editor for environment and energy for Scientific American- Stratospheric Pollution Helps Slow Global Warming-July 11 2011- <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming>)

Now, research suggests that for the past decade, such stratospheric aerosols—injected into the atmosphere by either recent volcanic eruptions or human activities such as coal burning—are slowing down [global warming](http://www.scientificamerican.com/topic.cfm?id=global-warming-and-climate-change). "Aerosols acted to keep warming from being as big as it would have been," says atmospheric scientist John Daniel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Earth System Research Laboratory, who helped lead the [research published online in *Science*](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2011/07/20/science.1206027.abstract) on July 21. "It's still warming, it's just not warming as much as it would have been." Essentially, sulfur dioxide gets emitted near the surface, either by a coal-fired power plant's smokestack or a volcano. If that SO2 makes it to the stratosphere—the middle layer of the atmosphere 10 kilometers up—it forms droplets of diluted sulfuric acid, known as [aerosols](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerosol). These aerosols reflect sunlight away from the planet, shading the surface and cooling temperatures. And some can persist for a few years, prolonging that cooling. By analyzing satellite data and other measures, Daniel and his colleagues found that such aerosols have been on the rise in Earth's atmosphere in the past decade, nearly doubling in concentration. That concentration has reflected roughly 0.1 watts per meter squared of sunlight away from the planet, enough to o/ffset roughly one-third of the 0.28 watts per meter squared of extra heat trapped by [rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases](http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=a-24-degree-c-rise-by-2020-probably-2011-01-20) such as carbon dioxide. The researchers calculate that the aerosols prevented 0.07 degrees Celsius of warming in average temperatures since 2000.

**No impact to CO2 emissions-no warming for almost 15 years**

**BELL 11-3-2010** (Larry, Prof at U Houston, http://www.forbes.com/2010/11/02/global-warming-climate-change-al-gore-opinions-columnists-larry-bell.html)

More recent temperature variations have been relatively much more stable and moderate. The past century witnessed two distinct warming periods, one occurred from 1900-1945, and another from 1975-1998. About half of that total warming occurred before the mid-1940s. And while CO2 levels have continued to rise, there hasn't been statistically significant warming since 1998 (the end of a strong El Nino season). Those who pay honest attention to long-term climate patterns will note that atmospheric CO2 concentration fluctuations do not lead, but typically follow, temperature changes. That's because oceans are huge CO2 sinks, absorbing CO2 as they cool, and releasing CO2 as they warm up. (When you open a carbonated beverage you experience the same phenomenon. If the beverage is cold, it retains CO2. If it is warm, it releases CO2 and sprays all over.) These temperature shifts are heavily influenced by entirely natural ocean cycle fluctuations that affect heat transfer patterns from the tropics. In the Arctic these oscillations occur about every 60 to 70 years.

**Warming has stopped –oscillation overwhelms CO2**

**Akasofu, 08** – Former director of the Geophysical Institute and the International Arctic Research Center @ U of Alaska-Fairbanks (Syun-Ichi, “Global warming has paused”, 9/27/2008, http://newsminer.com/news/2008/sep/27/global-warming-has-paused/?opinion)

Recent studies by the Hadley Climate Research Center (UK), the Japan Meteorological Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the University of East Anglia (UK) and the University of Alabama Huntsville show clearly that the rising trend of global average temperature stopped in 2000-2001. Further, NASA data shows that warming in the southern hemisphere has stopped, and that ocean temperatures also have stopped rising. The global average temperature had been rising until about 2000-2001. The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and many scientists hypothesize rising temperatures were mostly caused by the greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide (CO2), and they predicted further temperature increases after 2000. It was natural to assume that CO2 was responsible for the rise, because CO2 molecules in the atmosphere tend to reflect back the infrared radiation to the ground, preventing cooling (the greenhouse effect) and also because CO2 concentrations have been rapidly increasing since 1946. But, this hypothesis on the cause of global warming is just one of several. Unfortunately, many scientists appear to forget that weather and climate also are controlled by nature, as we witness weather changes every day and climate changes in longer terms. During the last several years, I have suggested that it is important to identify the natural effects and subtract them from the temperature changes. Only then can we be sure of the man-made contributions. This suggestion brought me the dubious honor of being designated “Alaska’s most famous climate change skeptic.” The stopping of the rise in global average temperature after 2000-2001 indicates that the hypothesis and prediction made by the IPCC need serious revision. I have been suggesting during the last several years that there are at least two natural components that cause long-term climate changes. The first is the recovery (namely, warming) from the Little Ice Age, which occured approximately 1800-1850. The other is what we call the multi-decadal oscillation. In the recent past, this component had a positive gradient (warming) from 1910 to 1940, a negative gradient (cooling — many Fairbanksans remember the very cold winters in the 1960s) from 1940 to 1975, and then again a positive gradient (warming — many Fairbanksans have enjoyed the comfortable winters of the last few decades or so) from 1975 to about 2000. The multi-decadal oscillation peaked around 2000, and a negative trend began at that time. The second component has a large amplitude and can overwhelm the first, and I believe that this is the reason for the stopping of the temperature rise. Since CO2 has only a positive effect, the new trend indicates that natural changes are greater than the CO2 effect, as I have stated during the last several years.

## No Extinction

#### No extinction

**NIPCC 11**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**No tipping point**

McGrath 11 – 4 August 2011. “Arctic 'tipping point' may not be reached” By Matt McGrath (Science reporter, BBC World Service)http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-14408930

The team said they had found an indirect method to give a picture of the ice cover dating back 11,000 years Scientists say current concerns over a tipping point in the disappearance of Arctic sea ice may be misplaced. Danish researchers analysed ancient pieces of driftwood in north Greenland which they say is an accurate way to measure the extent of ancient ice loss. Writing in the journal Science, the team found evidence that ice levels were about 50% lower 5,000 years ago. They say changes to wind systems can slow down the rate of melting. They argue, therefore, that a tipping point under current scenarios is unlikely. While modern observations by ship and by satellite give us a very accurate picture of the recent state of the ice, historic information is limited. The ice comes and goes without leaving a permanent record. But a Danish team believes it has found an indirect method that gives a clear picture of the ice loss dating back 11,000 years. Dr Svend Funder from the Natural History Museum of Denmark led several expeditions to inhospitable regions of Northern Greenland. On these frozen shores the Danish team noticed several pieces of ancient driftwood. They concluded that it could be an important method of unlocking the secrets of the ancient ice. "Driftwood cannot float across the water, it has to be ferried across the ocean on ice, and this voyage takes several years, which means that driftwood is actually a signal of multi-year sea ice in the ocean and it is this ice that is at risk at the moment," said Dr Funder. Carbon dating was used to determine the age of the wood. And figuring out its origins also yielded important information. "It's so lovely that drift wood from Siberia is mainly larch and from North America is mainly spruce. So if we see there was more larch or spruce we can see that the wind system had changed and in some periods there was little spruce and in other periods there was lots," he said. Wind delay? As well as the driftwood, the scientists mapped beach ridges for 500km (310 miles) along the coast. This proved that at one time the waves had reached the shore unhindered by the ice. Dr Funder and his team say their data shows a clear connection between temperature and the amount of sea ice. The researchers concluded that for about 3,000 years, during a period called the Holocene Climate Optimum, there was more open water and far less ice than today - probably less than 50% of the minimum Arctic sea ice recorded in 2007. But the researcher says that even with a loss of this size, the sea ice will not reach a point of no return. "I think we can say that with the loss of 50% of the current ice, the tipping point wasn't reached." The idea of an Arctic tipping point has been highlighted by many scientists in recent years. They have argued that when enough ice is lost it could cause a runaway effect with disastrous consequences.

**warming isn’t real and the plan doesn’t solve**

Chen 10 – Xuefei Chen (People's Daily Online correspondent in Stockholm) “Swedish expert says CO2 is not the main cause of global warming”. 4-22, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6959757.html

Dr. Goldberg said that there is an urban effect around heavily populated cities in our world, for example, the gap in temperature between the suburban Stockholm and the city center can often be at least 2 degrees Celsius. And the gap between Beijing city center and Great Wall area can be six degrees Celsius. The urban effect is caused by human's construction, transportation and the density of the housing and population, but this is not a global effect. "You cannot compensate for urban effects because you don't know how much it is, it changes with cloudiness, time of day, sun position over the horizon, wind intensity and direction and winter or summer," Goldberg said. He questioned the accuracy of the measurement in Al Gore's The Inconvenient Truth. He said that in the USA about 900 stations accounting to 78 percent of the total are incorrectly located such as in the parking place or airports near the airplanes or runways where he believes it is definitely hotter than other natural areas such as mountains or rivers. About 90 percent of the places where they measured the temperature are not according to regulations and have an error of 1 to 5 degrees C, which he thinks is very big. The only accurate way to measure temperature is with satellite, Goldberg said. Another thing that matters is that climate scientist must do what they say they do," Goldberg argued. Phil Jones in Hadley Centre said he wouldn't give out the data about his 25 years of work to someone who only wants to find something wrong with it thereby violating the Freedom of Information Act, Goldberg held. How much carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere? How much CO2 is there in the air? Only 0.0387 %, it has neither odor, nor color and is not poisonous. If there isn't CO2, there will not be plant life, therefore, we must have CO2, we need it, Goldberg argued. He said that the average amount of water vapor is 30.000 ppm. So the consequence of that is that 95 percent or even up to 98 percent of the total greenhouse effect is water vapor while only one percent is CO2. The other greenhouse gases are ozone, methane and CFC, etc. Goldberg said even if human beings emit 100 ppm CO2, 98 percent of it will go into the ocean because of the chemical balance between the oceans and the atmosphere. The remaining 2 ppm will be added to the atmosphere which is negligible because there isn't enough oil and gas in the world to generate enough carbon dioxide to change the climate. Over the past 100 years, with an increase of 100 ppm CO2, the earth temperature only increased 0.7 degree. Thus it is not possible for the temperature to increase 2 degrees globally which our politicians want to prevent, Goldberg said. Why? Goldberg explained that the ocean will absorb large amount of CO2. Once it is absorbed by the ocean, it will to some extent become calcium carbonate which is the same thing as limestone. Then the limestone will be building up at the bottom of the oceans. The whole island of Gotland which is the largest island in Sweden is formed of limestone. "It was built up at the bottom of the ocean because the ocean absorbed the CO2 and when saturated it formed limestone sediments at the bottom of the ocean. The CO2 content in the atmosphere has been shrinking continuously. A billion years ago, there was 80 percent CO2 in the atmosphere, now it is 0.038 %. It ‘s been shrinking all the time, it is continuing because of the formations of limestone sediments in the oceans." Goldberg explained. He said that the transport of CO2 is controlled by ocean temperature. For example, one can send CO2 bubbles into a bottle of cold water which is about 5 degrees C, but if one opens the bottle and puts it on the table, the water temperature will increase, and the CO2 will leave the water soon. The same theory, the lakes absorb a lot of CO2 in winter and it releases the CO2 in summer when the temperature reaches 23 to 25 degrees, you won't have much CO2 in the water. Thus this is a natural process and with all the minerals in sea water, the sea water can absorbs 73 times more CO2 than fresh water. "Mount Mauna Loa in Hawaii is the world's largest live volcano which emits a lot of CO2. 87 percent of the data recorded there has to be edited. The data may therefore have been manipulated," Goldberg said. He said that in 1973 there was a big eruption and there were no measurements done for 3 months, but there is no data gap in the diagrams. Why? Asked Goldberg. "Many climate scientists are bluffing in order to please the politicians who want to put a tax on CO2. These scientists live in symbiosis with the politicians. They both depend on each other," Goldberg criticized this. Solar activity decides whether the temperature is up or down Goldberg said that solar activity has increased 3 times according to records from NASA earth observatory. This is something we can't do anything about. "The activity of the sun shows the highest activity ever recorded in 2002. Earlier history of solar activity can be seen from the distribution of isotopes in rocks and biomass which are depending on the solar activity," Goldberg explained. Sun activity heats the sea surface, and the sea releases CO2. Over the past 100 years, 100 ppm CO2 were emitted due to the warming of the sea surface. In the atmosphere, there is 750 gigaton of carbon. In the ocean there is 38.100 gigatons of Carbondioxide. That is 50 times more according to the famous Henry's Law. Henry's law says that 98 percent of CO2 stays in the ocean while about 2 percent stays in the atmosphere. It is estimated that humans today generate about 8 gigaton CO2. Thus we release approx. one percent of CO2 to the atmosphere. The biomass is absorbing 121 gigaton and the oceans 92 gigaton. That means 28 percent of the CO2 in the atmosphere is absorbed each year in a cycle. All the CO2 in the air will be absorbed in less than 5 years, which means if we emit one percent a year, that percent is also included in the absorption. So one can never find more than 4 percent of CO2 in the atmosphere coming from humans," Goldberg explained. Along the equator, the sun is heating the water. When the water is warmer, the water is releasing carbon dioxide (CO2). The colder the water is, the more CO2 it absorbs. And therefore the colder waters around the Arctic and Antarctica will absorb a lot of CO2. There is a huge cycle of CO2. If you take out the CO2 for plants, then the ocean will evaporate more to air. If you emit more, the ocean will take it up. Ocean controls the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The sun controls the ocean temperatures which in turn has a strong effect on the climate on earth. "The people of Bangladesh breaths out 75 million tons CO2 per year, Sweden generates 60 million tons per year from all its industrial activities, transports and warming of houses etc. while the people in China breathes out 700-800 million tons per year. What does it mean? It means to reduce the amount of the CO2 will have no effect on our climate at all. You cannot do anything, I mean you cannot stop the sun from coming up tomorrow morning. If we cannot stop the sun from going up in the morning, can we change the CO2 system in the atmosphere? It is self regulated and sun-controlled," Goldberg said.

## Inevitable

#### Most impacts inevitable

-Ice sheets, oceans, rainforest destruction

**Chestney 12** (Nina, writer for Reuters, “Global warming close to becoming irreversible: scientists,” 3/27 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-climate-thresholds-idUSBRE82Q18720120327)

TIPPING POINTS

For ice sheets - huge refrigerators that slow down the warming of the planet - the tipping point has probably already been passed, Steffen said. The West Antarctic ice sheet has shrunk over the last decade and the Greenland ice sheet has lost around 200 cubic km (48 cubic miles) a year since the 1990s. Most climate estimates agree the Amazon rainforest will get drier as the planet warms. Mass tree deaths caused by drought have raised fears it is on the verge of a tipping point, when it will stop absorbing emissions and add to them instead. Around 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon were lost in 2005 from the rainforest and 2.2 billion tonnes in 2010, which has undone about 10 years of carbon sink activity, Steffen said. One of the most worrying and unknown thresholds is the Siberian permafrost, which stores frozen carbon in the soil away from the atmosphere. "There is about 1,600 billion tonnes of carbon there - about twice the amount in the atmosphere today - and the northern high latitudes are experiencing the most severe temperature change of any part of the planet," he said. In a worst case scenario, 30 to 63 billion tonnes of carbon a year could be released by 2040, rising to 232 to 380 billion tonnes by 2100. This compares to around 10 billion tonnes of carbon released by fossil fuel use each year. Increased CO2 in the atmosphere has also turned oceans more acidic as they absorb it. In the past 200 years, ocean acidification has happened at a speed not seen for around 60 million years, said Carol Turley at Plymouth Marine Laboratory. This threatens coral reef development and could lead to the extinction of some species within decades, as well as to an increase in the number of predators.

#### 3 degree shift inevitable

**AFP 12** (Agence France Presse, “Shadow of 'Anthropocene' falls over Rio Summit,” 3/26 http://www.france24.com/en/20120326-shadow-anthropocene-falls-over-rio-summit)

The UN's goal of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) is already out of reach, said Bob Watson, former head of the UN's climate panel and chief advisor to Britain's environment ministry, as he presented the laureates' study. "If you look at the commitments today from governments around the world, we've only got a 50-50 shot at a 3 C (5.4 F) world, almost no chance of a 2 C (3.6 F) world, and to be quite honest I would say it's not unlikely that we will hit a 5 C (9.0 F) world," said Watson. "That is clearly a world with significant adverse consequences for ecological systems, for socio-economic systems and for human health." He added: "We have to realise that we are looking at a loss of biodiversity that is unprecedented in the last 65 million years... We are clearly entering the (planet's) sixth mass extinction."

#### Too late

**Metro 7** (Metro Magazine, “Global warming ‘irreversible'?” http://www.metro.co.uk/news/69537-global-warming-irreversible)

Climate change may have already passed the point of no return – despite earlier predictions to the contrary, an expert claimed. A UN climate change report out next month will show that greenhouse gases have reached dangerous levels, with emissions more likely to cause irreversible climate change, scientist Dr Tim Flannery warned. Greenhouse gas in the atmosphere reached 455 parts per million of carbon dioxide in 2005, the report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will show. It had not been expected to reach this level for a decade. Dr Flannery, of Macquarie University in Australia, said this was 'beyond the worst-case scenario' originally envisaged in 2001 when the last major climate change report came out. He said: 'What the report establishes is that the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere is already above the threshold that could potentially cause dangerous climate change.'

#### CO2 sticks around for a thousand years – its irreversible

**ENS 9** (Environmental News Service, “Global Warming 'Irreversible' For 1,000 Years,” http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2009/2009-01-27-01.html)

The climate change that takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide is "irreversible" and will have major consequences for agriculture, ecosystems, and coastal environments, finds a new scientific study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences today. The pioneering study was conducted by an international team led by senior scientist Dr. Susan Solomon of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Earth System Research Laboratory in Boulder. It shows how changes in surface temperature, rainfall, and sea level are irreversible for more than 1,000 years after carbon dioxide emissions are completely stopped. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide the climate would go back to normal in 100 years, 200 years. That's not true," said Solomon in a teleconference with reporters. "In the long run," said Solomon, "both carbon dioxide loss and heat transfer depend on the same physics of deep-ocean mixing. The two work against each other to keep temperatures almost constant for more than a thousand years, and that makes carbon dioxide unique among the major climate gases."

#### Global warming is irreversible; there is too much CO2 in the air.

McCarthy, 2006, Michael McCarthy, environment editor of The Independant, “Global Warming Passing the Tipping Point”, <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/global-warming-passing-the-tipping-point-466187.html>

A crucial global warming "tipping point" for the Earth, highlighted only last week by the British Government, has already been passed, with devastating consequences. Research commissioned by The Independent reveals that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has now crossed a threshold, set down by scientists from around the world at a conference in Britain last year, beyond which really dangerous climate change is likely to be unstoppable. The implication is that some of global warming's worst predicted effects, from destruction of ecosystems to increased hunger and water shortages for billions of people, cannot now be avoided, whatever we do. It gives considerable force to the contention by the green guru Professor James Lovelock, put forward last month in The Independent, that climate change is now past the point of no return. The danger point we are now firmly on course for is a rise in global mean temperatures to 2 degrees above the level before the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century. At the moment, global mean temperatures have risen to about 0.6 degrees above the pre-industrial era - and worrying signs of climate change, such as the rapid melting of the Arctic ice in summer, are already increasingly evident. But a rise to 2 degrees would be far more serious. By that point it is likely that the Greenland ice sheet will already have begun irreversible melting, threatening the world with a sea-level rise of several metres. Agricultural yields will have started to fall, not only in Africa but also in Europe, the US and Russia, putting up to 200 million more people at risk from hunger, and up to 2.8 billion additional people at risk of water shortages for both drinking and irrigation. The Government's conference on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, held at the UK Met Office in Exeter a year ago, highlighted a clear threshold in the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, which should not be surpassed if the 2 degree point was to be avoided with "relatively high certainty". This was for the concentration of CO2 and other gases such as methane and nitrous oxide, taken together in their global warming effect, to stay below 400ppm (parts per million) in CO2 terms - or in the jargon, the "equivalent concentration" of CO2 should remain below that level. The warning was highlighted in the official report of the Exeter conference, published last week. However, an investigation by The Independent has established that the CO2 equivalent concentration, largely unnoticed by the scientific and political communities, has now risen beyond this threshold. This number is not a familiar one even among climate researchers, and is not readily available. For example, when we put the question to a very senior climate scientist, he said: "I would think it's definitely over 400 - probably about 420." So we asked one of the world's leading experts on the effects of greenhouse gases on climate, Professor Keith Shine, head of the meteorology department at the University of Reading, to calculate it precisely. Using the latest available figures (for 2004), his calculations show the equivalent concentration of C02, taking in the effects of methane and nitrous oxide at 2004 levels, is now 425ppm. This is made up of CO2 itself, at 379ppm; the global warming effect of the methane in the atmosphere, equivalent to another 40ppm of CO2; and the effect of nitrous oxide, equivalent to another 6ppm of CO2. The tipping point warned about last week by the Government is already behind us. "The passing of this threshold is of the most enormous significance," said Tom Burke, a former government adviser on the green issues, now visiting professor at Imperial College London. "It means we have actually entered a new era - the era of dangerous climate change. We have passed the point where we can be confident of staying below the 2 degree rise set as the threshold for danger. What this tells us is that we have already reached the point where our children can no longer count on a safe climate." The scientist who chaired the Exeter conference, Dennis Tirpak, head of the climate change unit of the OECD in Paris, was even more direct. He said: "This means we will hit 2 degrees [as a global mean temperature rise]." Professor Burke added: "We have very little time to act now. Governments must stop talking and start spending. We already have the technology to allow us to meet our growing need for energy while keeping a stable climate. We must deploy it now. Doing so will cost less than the Iraq war so we know we can afford it." The 400ppm threshold is based on a paper given at Exeter by Malte Meinhausen of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Dr Meinhausen reviewed a dozen studies of the probability of exceeding the 2 degrees threshold at different CO2 equivalent levels. Taken together they show that only by remaining above 400 is there a very high chance of not doing so. Some scientists have been reluctant to talk about the overall global warming effect of all the greenhouses gases taken together, because there is another consideration - the fact that the "aerosol", or band of dust in the atmosphere from industrial pollution, actually reduces the warming. As Professor Shine stresses, there is enormous uncertainty about the degree to which this is happening, so making calculation of the overall warming effect problematic. However, as James Lovelock points out - and Professor Shine and other scientists accept - in the event of an industrial downturn, the aerosol could fall out of the atmosphere in a matter of weeks, and then the effect of all the greenhouse gases taken together would suddenly be fully felt.

#### Global Warming is naturally caused and not created by humans

**ScienceDaily** (June 15, 20**01**) “Global warming natural, may end within 20 years says researcher at Ohio state university.” <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases>

/2001/06/010615071248.htm

The researcher suggests that atmospheric carbon dioxide -- often thought of as a key "greenhouse gas" -- is not the cause of global warming. The opposite is most likely to be true, according to Robert Essenhigh, E.G. Bailey Professor of Energy Conservation in Ohio State's Department of Mechanical Engineering. It is the rising global temperatures that are naturally increasing the levels of carbon dioxide, not the other way around, he says. Essenhigh explains his position in a "viewpoint" article in the current issue of the journal Chemical Innovation, published by the American Chemical Society. Many people blame global warming on carbon dioxide sent into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels in man-made devices such as automobiles and power plants. Essenhigh believes these people fail to account for the much greater amount of carbon dioxide that enters -- and leaves -- the atmosphere as part of the natural cycle of water exchange from, and back into, the sea and vegetation. "Many scientists who have tried to mathematically determine the relationship between carbon dioxide and global temperature would appear to have vastly underestimated the significance of water in the atmosphere as a radiation-absorbing gas," Essenhigh argues. "If you ignore the water, you're going to get the wrong answer." How could so many scientists miss out on this critical bit of information, as Essenhigh believes? He said a National Academy of Sciences report on carbon dioxide levels that was published in 1977 omitted information about water as a gas and identified it only as vapor, which means condensed water or cloud, which is at a much lower concentration in the atmosphere; and most subsequent investigations into this area evidently have built upon the pattern of that report. For his hypothesis, Essenhigh examined data from various other sources, including measurements of ocean evaporation rates, man-made sources of carbon dioxide, and global temperature data for the last one million years. He cites a 1995 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a panel formed by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme in 1988 to assess the risk of human-induced climate change. In the report, the IPCC wrote that some 90 billion tons of carbon as carbon dioxide annually circulate between the earth's ocean and the atmosphere, and another 60 billion tons exchange between the vegetation and the atmosphere. Compared to man-made sources' emission of about 5 to 6 billion tons per year, the natural sources would then account for more than 95 percent of all atmospheric carbon dioxide, Essenhigh said. "At 6 billion tons, humans are then responsible for a comparatively small amount - less than 5 percent - of atmospheric carbon dioxide," he said. "And if nature is the source of the rest of the carbon dioxide, then it is difficult to see that man-made carbon dioxide can be driving the rising temperatures. In fact, I don't believe it does." Some scientists believe that the human contribution to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, however small, is of a critical amount that could nonetheless upset Earth's environmental balance. But Essenhigh feels that, mathematically, that hypothesis hasn't been adequately substantiated. Here's how Essenhigh sees the global temperature system working: As temperatures rise, the carbon dioxide equilibrium in the water changes, and this releases more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. According to this scenario, atmospheric carbon dioxide is then an indicator of rising temperatures -- not the driving force behind it. Essenhigh attributes the current reported rise in global temperatures to a natural cycle of warming and cooling. He examined data that Cambridge University geologists Nicholas Shackleton and Neil Opdyke reported in the journal Quaternary Research in 1973, which found that global temperatures have been oscillating steadily, with an average rising gradually, over the last one million years -- long before human industry began to release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Opdyke is now at the University of Florida. According to Shackleton and Opdyke's data, average global temperatures have risen less than one degree in the last million years, though the amplitude of the periodic oscillation has now risen in that time from about 5 degrees to about 10 degrees, with a period of about 100,000 years. "Today, we are simply near a peak in the current cycle that started about 25,000 years ago," Essenhigh explained. As to why highs and lows follow a 100,000 year cycle, the explanation Essenhigh uses is that the Arctic Ocean acts as a giant temperature regulator, an idea known as the "Arctic Ocean Model." This model first appeared over 30 years ago and is well presented in the 1974 book Weather Machine: How our weather works and why it is changing, by Nigel Calder, a former editor of New Scientist magazine. According to this model, when the Arctic Ocean is frozen over, as it is today, Essenhigh said, it prevents evaporation of water that would otherwise escape to the atmosphere and then return as snow. When there is less snow to replenish the Arctic ice cap, the cap may start to shrink. That could be the cause behind the retreat of the Arctic ice cap that scientists are documenting today, Essenhigh said. As the ice cap melts, the earth warms, until the Arctic Ocean opens again. Once enough water is available by evaporation from the ocean into the atmosphere, snows can begin to replenish the ice cap. At that point, the Arctic ice begins to expand, the global temperature can then start to reverse, and the earth can start re-entry to a new ice age. According to Essenhigh's estimations, Earth may reach a peak in the current temperature profile within the next 10 to 20 years, and then it could begin to cool into a new ice age.

#### If it’s real then it’s irreversible - it’s too late to stop the greenhouse effect

Harris 9 (Richard, Science Reporter for National Public Radio, Peabody Award Winner, American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Global Warming Irreversible, Study Says,” January 26th, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study. As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists. "We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly." That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It'**s** essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says. This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean. And that will take place for many hundreds of years.

#### Too much co2 has already been released – can’t prevent warming

**Longley 8** [Robert, as worked closely with federal agencies including the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Census Bureau, “Global Warming Inevitable This Century, NSF Study Finds”, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/technologyandresearch/a/climatetochange.htm]

Despite efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, global warming and a greater increase in sea level are inevitable during this century, according to a new study performed by a team of climate modelers at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colo. Indeed, say the researchers, whose work was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), globally averaged surface air temperatures would still rise one degree Fahrenheit (about a half degree Celsius) by the year 2100, even if no more greenhouse gases were added to the atmosphere. And the resulting transfer of heat into the oceans would cause global sea levels to rise another 4 inches (11 centimeters) from thermal expansion alone. The team's findings are published in this week's issue of the journal "Science." “This study is another in a series that employs increasingly sophisticated simulation techniques to understand the complex interactions of the Earth,” says Cliff Jacobs of NSF’s atmospheric sciences division.

## Not CO2

**Paleoclimatic data proves no impact to CO2**

SkepticalScience 10 (“Does high levels of CO2 in the past contradict the warming effect of CO2?”, http://www.skepticalscience.com/co2-higher-in-past-basic.htm, 12/24/10, Accessed 7/12/12)

Geologists refer to ancient ice-cap formations and ice-ages as "glaciations." One such glaciation that occurred during the Late Ordovician era, some 444 million years ago has captured the attention of climate scientists and skeptics alike. To get some perspective on timing, that's just over 200 million years before dinosaurs began to roam the Earth. Unlike other glaciations in the last 500 million years, this one was exceptionally brief (lasting perhaps only a million years or so) but the main reason for generating so much interest recently is because it took place when CO2 levels were apparently sky-high. As Ian Plimer notes in his book, "Heaven and Earth", pp165: "The proof that CO2 does not drive climate is shown by previous glaciations...If the popular catastrophist view is accepted, then there should have been a runaway greenhouse when CO2 was more than 4000 ppmv. Instead there was glaciation. Clearly a high atmospheric CO2 does not drive global warming and there is no correlation between global temperature and atmospheric CO2."

#### CO2 doesn’t cause warming

Chen 10 – Xuefei Chen (People's Daily Online correspondent in Stockholm) “Swedish expert says CO2 is not the main cause of global warming”. 4-22, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6959757.html

Dr. Goldberg said that there is an urban effect around heavily populated cities in our world, for example, the gap in temperature between the suburban Stockholm and the city center can often be at least 2 degrees Celsius. And the gap between Beijing city center and Great Wall area can be six degrees Celsius. The urban effect is caused by human's construction, transportation and the density of the housing and population, but this is not a global effect. "You cannot compensate for urban effects because you don't know how much it is, it changes with cloudiness, time of day, sun position over the horizon, wind intensity and direction and winter or summer," Goldberg said. He questioned the accuracy of the measurement in Al Gore's The Inconvenient Truth. He said that in the USA about 900 stations accounting to 78 percent of the total are incorrectly located such as in the parking place or airports near the airplanes or runways where he believes it is definitely hotter than other natural areas such as mountains or rivers. About 90 percent of the places where they measured the temperature are not according to regulations and have an error of 1 to 5 degrees C, which he thinks is very big. The only accurate way to measure temperature is with satellite, Goldberg said. Another thing that matters is that climate scientist must do what they say they do," Goldberg argued. Phil Jones in Hadley Centre said he wouldn't give out the data about his 25 years of work to someone who only wants to find something wrong with it thereby violating the Freedom of Information Act, Goldberg held. How much carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere? How much CO2 is there in the air? Only 0.0387 %, it has neither odor, nor color and is not poisonous. If there isn't CO2, there will not be plant life, therefore, we must have CO2, we need it, Goldberg argued. He said that the average amount of water vapor is 30.000 ppm. So the consequence of that is that 95 percent or even up to 98 percent of the total greenhouse effect is water vapor while only one percent is CO2. The other greenhouse gases are ozone, methane and CFC, etc. Goldberg said even if human beings emit 100 ppm CO2, 98 percent of it will go into the ocean because of the chemical balance between the oceans and the atmosphere. The remaining 2 ppm will be added to the atmosphere which is negligible because there isn't enough oil and gas in the world to generate enough carbon dioxide to change the climate. Over the past 100 years, with an increase of 100 ppm CO2, the earth temperature only increased 0.7 degree. Thus it is not possible for the temperature to increase 2 degrees globally which our politicians want to prevent, Goldberg said. Why? Goldberg explained that the ocean will absorb large amount of CO2. Once it is absorbed by the ocean, it will to some extent become calcium carbonate which is the same thing as limestone. Then the limestone will be building up at the bottom of the oceans. The whole island of Gotland which is the largest island in Sweden is formed of limestone. "It was built up at the bottom of the ocean because the ocean absorbed the CO2 and when saturated it formed limestone sediments at the bottom of the ocean. The CO2 content in the atmosphere has been shrinking continuously. A billion years ago, there was 80 percent CO2 in the atmosphere, now it is 0.038 %. It ‘s been shrinking all the time, it is continuing because of the formations of limestone sediments in the oceans." Goldberg explained. He said that the transport of CO2 is controlled by ocean temperature. For example, one can send CO2 bubbles into a bottle of cold water which is about 5 degrees C, but if one opens the bottle and puts it on the table, the water temperature will increase, and the CO2 will leave the water soon. The same theory, the lakes absorb a lot of CO2 in winter and it releases the CO2 in summer when the temperature reaches 23 to 25 degrees, you won't have much CO2 in the water. Thus this is a natural process and with all the minerals in sea water, the sea water can absorbs 73 times more CO2 than fresh water. "Mount Mauna Loa in Hawaii is the world's largest live volcano which emits a lot of CO2. 87 percent of the data recorded there has to be edited. The data may therefore have been manipulated," Goldberg said. He said that in 1973 there was a big eruption and there were no measurements done for 3 months, but there is no data gap in the diagrams. Why? Asked Goldberg. "Many climate scientists are bluffing in order to please the politicians who want to put a tax on CO2. These scientists live in symbiosis with the politicians. They both depend on each other," Goldberg criticized this. Solar activity decides whether the temperature is up or down Goldberg said that solar activity has increased 3 times according to records from NASA earth observatory. This is something we can't do anything about. "The activity of the sun shows the highest activity ever recorded in 2002. Earlier history of solar activity can be seen from the distribution of isotopes in rocks and biomass which are depending on the solar activity," Goldberg explained. Sun activity heats the sea surface, and the sea releases CO2. Over the past 100 years, 100 ppm CO2 were emitted due to the warming of the sea surface. In the atmosphere, there is 750 gigaton of carbon. In the ocean there is 38.100 gigatons of Carbondioxide. That is 50 times more according to the famous Henry's Law. Henry's law says that 98 percent of CO2 stays in the ocean while about 2 percent stays in the atmosphere. It is estimated that humans today generate about 8 gigaton CO2. Thus we release approx. one percent of CO2 to the atmosphere. The biomass is absorbing 121 gigaton and the oceans 92 gigaton. That means 28 percent of the CO2 in the atmosphere is absorbed each year in a cycle. All the CO2 in the air will be absorbed in less than 5 years, which means if we emit one percent a year, that percent is also included in the absorption. So one can never find more than 4 percent of CO2 in the atmosphere coming from humans," Goldberg explained. Along the equator, the sun is heating the water. When the water is warmer, the water is releasing carbon dioxide (CO2). The colder the water is, the more CO2 it absorbs. And therefore the colder waters around the Arctic and Antarctica will absorb a lot of CO2. There is a huge cycle of CO2. If you take out the CO2 for plants, then the ocean will evaporate more to air. If you emit more, the ocean will take it up. Ocean controls the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The sun controls the ocean temperatures which in turn has a strong effect on the climate on earth. "The people of Bangladesh breaths out 75 million tons CO2 per year, Sweden generates 60 million tons per year from all its industrial activities, transports and warming of houses etc. while the people in China breathes out 700-800 million tons per year. What does it mean? It means to reduce the amount of the CO2 will have no effect on our climate at all. You cannot do anything, I mean you cannot stop the sun from coming up tomorrow morning. If we cannot stop the sun from going up in the morning, can we change the CO2 system in the atmosphere? It is self regulated and sun-controlled," Goldberg said.

**Warming isn’t due to CO2– tree rings records prove**

**NIPCC 12** (The Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming and Extreme Weather Events”, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/feb/21feb2012a3.html, 2/21/2012, Accessed 7/12/12)

In the present analysis, Routson et al. used a new tree-ring record derived from living and remnant bristlecone pine wood from the headwaters region of the Rio Grande River in Colorado (USA), along with other regional records, to evaluate what they describe as "periods of unusually severe drought over the past two millennia (268 BC to AD 2009)." Results indicated, according to the three researchers, that the record they derived "reveals two periods of enhanced drought frequency and severity relative to the rest of the record," and that "the later period, AD ~1050-1330, corresponds with medieval aridity well documented in other records," while "the earlier period is more persistent (AD ~1-400), and includes the most pronounced event in the ... chronology: a multi-decadal-length drought during the 2nd century," which "includes the unsmoothed record's driest 25-year interval (AD 148-173) as well as a longer 51-year period, AD 122-172, that has only two years with ring width slightly above the long-term mean," and where "the smoothed chronology shows the periods AD 77-282 and AD 301-400 are the longest (206 and 100 years, respectively, below the long-term average) droughts of the entire 2276-year record." And they note that this 2nd-century drought "impacted a region that extends from southern New Mexico north and west into Idaho." Noting that "reconstructed Colorado Plateau temperature suggests warmer than average temperature could have influenced both 2nd century and medieval drought severity," and that "available data also suggest that the Northern Hemisphere may have been warm during both intervals," Routson et al. go on to suggest that the southwestern United States could well experience similar or even more severe megadroughts in the future, as they suspect it will continue to warm in response to continued anthropogenic CO2 emissions. However, it should be duly noted that studies from all around the globe - which depict both a Medieval Warm Period and a Roman Warm Period that were equally as warm or even warmer than the Current Warm Period has been to date, and at times when there was way less CO2 in the atmosphere than there is today (see both of these items in our Topical Archive) - suggest that there is nothing unusual, unnatural or unprecedented about Earth's current level of warmth, and, in fact, that it must be significantly cooler now than it was during those two prior multi-century warm periods, since we have not yet experienced droughts of anywhere near the severity or duration of those that were experienced in the Roman and Medieval Warm Periods, which further suggests that the planet's current level of warmth is likely not a result of historical anthropogenic CO2 emissions, but rather a result of a milder expression of whatever was the cause of those two earlier stellar warm periods.

**Methane and Nitrous Oxide Outweigh**

**GGW No Date** (“Global Warming Potential”, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/global-warming-potential.html, Date Unknown, Accessed 7/12/12)

All greenhouse gases have what is called a Global Warming Potential (GWP). This value is used to compare the abilities of different greenhouse gases to trap heat in the atmosphere. GWPs are based on the heat-absorbing ability of each gas relative to that of carbon dioxide (CO2), as well as the decay rate of each gas (the amount removed from the atmosphere over a given number of years). GWPs can also be used to define the impact greenhouse gases will have on global warming over different time periods or time horizons. These are usually 20 years, 100 years and 500 years. For most greenhouse gases, the GWP declines as the time horizon increases. This is because the greenhouse gas is gradually removed from the atmosphere through natural removal mechanisms, and its influence on the greenhouse effect declines. Some of the CFCs however, have long atmospheric lifetimes, and the 100-year GWP may be greater than the 20 year GWP. By assigning a GWP value it allows policy makers to compare the impacts of emissions and reductions of different gases. For instance, methane is a significant contributor to the greenhouse effect and has a GWP of 21. This means methane is approximately 21 times more heat-absorptive than carbon dioxide per unit of weight. By looking at the table below you can see nitrous oxide is 310 times more absorptive than carbon dioxide, and can linger in the atmosphere for over a hundred years. However, through sheer quantity carbon dioxide is the most problematic of greenhouse gases, although if the Earth warms too rapidly, methane emitted from permafrost areas could outweigh carbon dioxide.

**More ev.**

**NYT 12** ( John M. Broder, New York Times, “U.S. Caps Emissions in Drilling for Fuel”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html, 4/19/12, Accessed 7/12/12)

Methane is a potent heat-trapping gas, 20 times more powerful in its effect on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. The E.P.A. estimates that capturing methane from thousands of new wells will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by the equivalent of 28 million to 44 million tons a year, making the rule one of the federal government’s largest measures to mitigate climate change.

## Not Anthropogenic

#### Not anthropogenic – multiple warrants

**Spencer 12** (Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, “Ten Years After the Warming,” 2/26, http://www.drroyspencer.com/2012/02/)

As can be seen, in the last 10 years the estimated forcing has been the strongest. Yet, most if not all temperature datasets show little or no global-average warming recently, either in the atmosphere, at the surface, or in the upper 700 meters of the ocean. For example, here are the tropospheric temperatures up though a few days ago: So what is happening? You cannot simply say a lack of warming in 10 years is not that unusual, and that there have been previous 10-year periods without warming, too. No, we are supposedly in uncharted territory with a maximum in radiative forcing of the climate system. One cannot compare on an equal basis the last 10 years with any previous decades without warming. There are 5 possibilities for the recent cessation of warming which are most discussed: 1) cooling from anthropogenic aerosols has been cancelling out warming from more greenhouse gases 2) natural cooling from internal climate fluctuations or the sun is cancelling out the GHG warming 3) increased ocean mixing is causing the extra energy to be distributed into the deep ocean 4) the temperature ’sensitivity’ of the climate system is not as large as the IPCC assumes. 5) there is something fundamentally wrong with the GHG warming theory itself Of course, some combination of the above 5 explanations is also possible. The 1st possibility (aerosol cooling is cancelling out GHG forcing) is one of the more popular explanations with the climate modelers, and especially with NASA’s James Hansen. The uncertain strength (and even sign) of aerosol forcing allows the climate modelers to use aerosols as a tuning knob (aka fudge factor) in making their models produce warming more-or-less consistent with past observations. Using an assumed large aerosol cooling to cancel out the GHG warming allows the modelers to retain high climate sensitivity, and thus the fear of strong future warming if those aerosols ever dissipate. The 2nd possibility (natural cooling) is a much less desirable explanation for the IPCC crowd because it opens the door to Mother Nature having as much or more influence on the climate system than do humans. We can’t have that, you know. Then you would have to consider the possibility that most of the warming in the last 50 years was natural, too. Goodbye, AGW funding. The 3rd possibility (increased ocean mixing) is one of the more legitimate possibilities, at least theoretically. It’s popular with NCAR’s Kevin Trenberth. But one would need more observational evidence this is happening before embracing the idea. Unfortunately, how vertical mixing in the ocean naturally varies over time is poorly understood; the different IPCC models have widely varying strengths of mixing, and so ocean mixing is a huge wild card in the global warming debate, as is aerosol cooling. I believe much of past climate change on time scales of decades to many centuries might be due to such variations in ocean mixing, along with their likely influence on global cloud cover changing the amount of solar input into the climate system. The 4th possibility (the climate system is relatively insensitive to forcing) is the top contender in the opinion of myself, Dick Lindzen, and a few other climate researchers who work in this field. The 5th possibility (increasing GHGs don’t really cause warming) is total anathema to the IPCC. Without GHG warming, the whole AGW movement collapses. This kind of scientific finding would normally be Nobel Prize territory…except that the Nobel Prize has become more of a socio-political award in recent years, with only politically correct recipients. The self-flagellating elites don’t like the idea humans might not be destroying the Earth. The longer we go without significant warming, the more obvious it will become that there is something seriously wrong with current AGW theory. I don’t think there is a certain number of years – 5, 10, 20, etc. – which will disprove the science of AGW….unless the climate system cools for the next 10 years. Eek! But I personally doubt that will happen.

#### Warming linked to PDO, empirics prove

**Spencer 8** (Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Global Warming as a Natural Response to Cloud Changes Associated with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO)”, Roy W. Spencer, 10/20/08, <http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/global-warming-as-a-natural-response/>)

Here I present new evidence that most of the warming could be the result of a natural cycle in cloud cover forced by a well-known mode of natural climate variability: the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). While the PDO is primarily a geographic rearrangement in atmospheric and oceanic circulation patterns in the North Pacific, it is well known that such regional changes can also influence weather patterns over much larger areas, for instance North America or the entire Northern Hemisphere (which is, by the way, the region over which the vast majority of global warming has occurred).¶ The IPCC has simply ASSUMED that these natural fluctuations in weather patterns do not cause climate change. But all it would take is a small change in global average (or Northern Hemispheric average) cloudiness to cause global warming. Unfortunately, our global observations of cloudiness have not been complete or accurate enough to document such a change…until recently.¶ 2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF NATURAL GLOBAL WARMING¶ As Joe D’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, and others have pointed out for years, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) has experienced phase shifts that have coincidently been associated with the major periods of warming and cooling in the 20th Century. As can be seen in the following figure, the pre-1940 warming coincided with the positive phase of the PDO; then, a slight cooling until the late 1970s coincided with a negative phase of the PDO; and finally, the warming since the 1970s has once again coincided with the positive phase of the PDO.

#### Warming evidence skewed

**Evans 12**

(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system- Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.", 7 Apr. 2011.)

There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. Every long-lived natural system behaves this way, counteracting any disturbance. Otherwise the system would be unstable. The climate system is no exception, and now we can prove it. But the alarmists say the exact opposite, that the climate system amplifies any warming due to extra carbon dioxide, and is potentially unstable. It is no surprise that their predictions of planetary temperature made in 1988 to the U.S. Congress, and again in 1990, 1995, and 2001, have all proved much higher than reality. They keep lowering the temperature increases they expect, from 0.30C per decade in 1990, to 0.20C per decade in 2001, and now 0.15C per decade—yet they have the gall to tell us "it's worse than expected." These people are not scientists. They overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide, selectively deny evidence, and now they conceal the truth. One way they conceal is in the way they measure temperature. The official thermometers are often located in the warm exhaust of air conditioning outlets, over hot tarmac at airports where they get blasts of hot air from jet engines, at waste-water plants where they get warmth from decomposing sewage, or in hot cities choked with cars and buildings. Global warming is measured in 10ths of a degree, so any extra heating nudge is important. In the United States, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has levelled off. Why does official science track only the surface thermometer results and not mention the satellite results?

#### Global Warming is not manmade – it’s a cycle.

**Singer and Avery 07** (S. Fred Singer, Distinguished Research Professor at George Mason, and Dennis T. Avery, Director of the Center for Global Food Issues at the Hudson Institute, 2007 “Unstoppable Global Warming: Every 1,500 Years”, p. 34)

The key thing for us all to remember is that the 1,500-year climate cycle is not an unproven theory like the model-based predictions for the Greenhouse Theory. The 1,500-year climate cycle is real, based on a wide variety of physical evidence from around the globe. The ice cores were cut from real-world ice sheets built up into layers over thousands of years. The satellites actually measured the sun's varying rays. The mass spectrometers actually counted the isotopes from the cores that confirmed the pattern of solar variation. The sunspot counts of the last four hundred years are handwritten on the yellowed pages of the observers' diaries. The Armagh Observatory's solar record has been carefully kept daily for more than two hundred years. The flares on the sun are recorded on film. The tree rings are there to be counted and recounted. The sediment cores are in storage, awaiting further research. The heavy-oxygen isotopes are demonstrably different from the lighter ones. The midges whose heads are found in the sediments actually lived. The pollen grains fell from plants, recently or long ago, but the plants were alive. The stalagmites patiently built up over thousands of years. There's no 1,470-year solar cycle. However, the Holger Braun computer model run found that the sun's well-known 87-year and 210-year cycles, when superimposed, could create the longer 1,470-year cycle. None of this climate cycle evidence is as likely to mislead as the unverified computer models that have received so much funding and media attention during the "greenhouse years." Dansgaard, Lassen, and Bond all argue that the force behind the cycles is solar. Berger and von Rad argue that "internal oscillations of the climate system cannot produce" the quick-changing 1,500-year cycles. Jan Veizer and Nir Shaviv agree that the forcing producing the 1,500-year cycle is extraterrestrial, but add in the Milky Way and other galactic sources of cosmic rays. The more we learn about the 1,500-year cycle, the less likely it seems that the recent warming is man-made-or dangerous.

#### Warming not anthropogenic, two reasons

#### Lupo 10

(Anthony Lupo is science at the University of Missouri at Columbia and served as an expert reviewer for the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change- Global Warming Is Natural, Not Man-Made- February 22, 2012- <http://www.napsnet.com/pdf_archive/34/50144.pdf>)

Thus, any impartial jury should not come back with a guilty verdict convicting humanity of forcing recent climatological changes. Even the most ardent supporters of global warming will not argue this point. Instead, they argue that humans are only partially responsible for the observed climate change. If one takes a hard look at the science involved, their assertions appear to be groundless. First, carbon dioxide is not a pollutant as many claim. Carbon dioxide is good for plant life and is a natural constituent of the atmosphere. During Earth’s long history there has been more and less carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than we see today. Second, they claim that climate is stable and slow to change, and we are accelerating climate change beyond natural variability. That is also not true. Climate change is generally a regional phenomenon and not a global one. Regionally, climate has been shown to change rapidly in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Life on earth will adapt as it has always done. Life on earth has been shown to thrive when planetary temperatures are warmer as opposed to colder.

#### Warming not anthropogenic, based on Earth’s natural cycles

#### De Blij 9 (Harm, John A. Hannah Professor of Geography at Michigan State University, is author of The Power of Place: Geography, Destiny, and Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2009).

So might the greenhouse-effect-enhancing gases we are pouring into the atmosphere counter a cooling trend rather than exacerbate a warming swing? No doubt about it: the numerous cycles – axial, solar, orbital, oceanic, atmospheric – that generate nature’s environmental seesaws continue even as humanity has become a major factor in the process through massive modification of the planetary atmosphere. But supercomputer models and IPCC projections notwithstanding, no one knows the proportional contribution to the current phase of climate change from natural and human sources. Contrary to what some scientists are asserting, we do not know with any satisfactory level of confidence what form climate change would be taking today in the absence of human interference. What *is* clear is that humans have become an additional factor driving climate change, and that reducing the rate of pollution of the atmosphere should have priority as a public health as well as environmental matter. But don’t expect a reward in the form of “stopping climate change.” Ice ages will continue to come and go. Glaciers will wax and wane. Sea levels will fall and rise. Species, cultures, and civilizations will flourish and fail. Nature’s power will prevail.

#### Flawed studies - warming’s not a threat and not anthropogenic

Leake 10 (Jonathan, Times Online, Citing John Christy of the UA Huntsville, a former author for the IPCC, “World may not be warming, say scientists,” 2-14, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737>)

The United Nations climate panel faces a new challenge with scientists casting doubt on its claim that global temperatures are rising inexorably because of human pollution. In its last assessment the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said the evidence that the world was warming was “unequivocal”. It warned that greenhouse gases had already heated the world by 0.7C and that there could be 5C-6C more warming by 2100, with devastating impacts on humanity and wildlife. However, new research, including work by British scientists, is casting doubt on such claims. Some even suggest the world may not be warming much at all. “The temperature records cannot be relied on as indicators of global change,” said John Christy, professor of atmospheric science at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, a former lead author on the IPCC. The doubts of Christy and a number of other researchers focus on the thousands of weather stations around the world, which have been used to collect temperature data over the past 150 years. These stations, they believe, have been seriously compromised by factors such as urbanisation, changes in land use and, in many cases, being moved from site to site. Christy has published research papers looking at these effects in three different regions: east Africa, and the American states of California and Alabama. “The story is the same for each one,” he said. “The popular data sets show a lot of warming but the apparent temperature rise was actually caused by local factors affecting the weather stations, such as land development.” The IPCC faces similar criticisms from Ross McKitrick, professor of economics at the University of Guelph, Canada, who was invited by the panel to review its last report. The experience turned him into a strong critic and he has since published a research paper questioning its methods. “We concluded, with overwhelming statistical significance, that the IPCC’s climate data are contaminated with surface effects from industrialisation and data quality problems. These add up to a large warming bias,” he said. Such warnings are supported by a study of US weather stations co-written by Anthony Watts, an American meteorologist and climate change sceptic. His study, which has not been peer reviewed, is illustrated with photographs of weather stations in locations where their readings are distorted by heat-generating equipment. Some are next to air- conditioning units or are on waste treatment plants. One of the most infamous shows a weather station next to a waste incinerator. Watts has also found examples overseas, such as the weather station at Rome airport, which catches the hot exhaust fumes emitted by taxiing jets. In Britain, a weather station at Manchester airport was built when the surrounding land was mainly fields but is now surrounded by heat-generating buildings. Terry Mills, professor of applied statistics and econometrics at Loughborough University, looked at the same data as the IPCC. He found that the warming trend it reported over the past 30 years or so was just as likely to be due to random fluctuations as to the impacts of greenhouse gases. Mills’s findings are to be published in Climatic Change, an environmental journal. “The earth has gone through warming spells like these at least twice before in the last 1,000 years,” he said.

#### No warming and it’s not anthropogenic

Watson 9 (Steve, citing a report conducted by the Japan Society of Energy and Resources, the academic society representing scientists from the energy and resource fields, “Top Japanese Scientists: Warming Is Not Caused By Human Activity,” February 27th, <http://www.infowars.com/top-japanese-scientists-warming-is-not-caused-by-human-activity/>)

A major scientific report by leading Japanese academics concludes that global warming is not man-made and that the overall warming trend from the mid-part of the 20th Century onwards has now stopped. Unsurprisingly the report, which was released last month, has been completely ignored by the Western corporate media. The report was undertaken by Japan Society of Energy and Resources (JSER), the academic society representing scientists from the energy and resource fields. The JSER acts as a government advisory panel, much like the International Panel on Climate Change did for the UN. The JSER’s findings provide a stark contrast to the IPCC’s, however, with only one out of five top researchers agreeing with the claim that recent warming has been accelerated by man-made carbon emissions. The **government commissioned** report criticizes computer climate modeling and also says that the US ground temperature data set, used to back up the man-made warming claims, is too myopic. In the last month, no major Western media outlet has covered the report, which prompted British based sci-tech website The Register to commission a translation of the document. Section one highlights the fact that Global Warming has ceased, noting that since 2001, the increase in global temperatures has halted, despite a continuing increase in CO2 emissions. The report then states that the recent warming the planet has experienced is primarily a recovery from the so called "Little Ice Age" that occurred from around 1400 through to 1800, and is part of a natural cycle. The researchers also conclude that global warming and the halting of the temperature rise are related to solar activity, a notion previously dismissed by the IPCC. "The hypothesis that the majority of global warming can be ascribed to the Greenhouse Effect is mistaken." the report’s introduction states. Kanya Kusano, Program Director and Group Leader for the Earth Simulator at the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science & Technology (JAMSTEC) reiterates this point: "[The IPCC's] conclusion that from now on atmospheric temperatures are likely to show a continuous, monotonic increase, should be perceived as an unprovable hypothesis," Shunichi Akasofu, head of the International Arctic Research Center in Alaska, cites historical data to challenge the claim that very recent temperatures represent an anomaly: "We should be cautious, IPCC’s theory that atmospheric temperature has risen since 2000 in correspondence with CO2 is nothing but a hypothesis. " "Before anyone noticed, this hypothesis has been substituted for truth… The opinion that great disaster will really happen must be broken." Akasofu concludes. The key passages of the translated report can be found here. The conclusions within the report dovetail with those of hundreds of Western scientists, who have been derided and even compared with holocaust deniers for challenging the so called "consensus" on global warming. The total lack of exposure that this major report has received is another example of how skewed coverage of climate change is toward one set of hypotheses. This serves the agenda to deliberately whip up mass hysteria on behalf of governments who are all too eager to introduce draconian taxation and control measures that won’t do anything to combat any form of warming, whether you believe it to be natural or man-made.

#### Newest data proves the greenhouse effect is a hoax

IBT 11(International Business Times, Citing report from NASA’s Terra Satellite, “Global Warming a Hoax? NASA Reveals Earth Releasing Heat into Space,” 7/30, <http://sanfrancisco.ibtimes.com/articles/189649/20110730/global-warming-hoax-nasa-earth-releasing-heat-space.htm>)

With new data collected from a NASA's Terra satellite, the previous model may be proven as a hoax. Hypothesis based on the satellite's findings show that planet Earth actually releases heat into space, more than it retains it. The higher efficiency of releasing energy outside of Earth contradicts former forecasts of climate change. Dr. Roy Spencer, a team leader for NASA's Aqua satellite, studied a decade worth of satellite data regarding cloud surface temperatures. "The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show...There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans," said Dr. Spencer. By cross examining data with other Climate Change models, he concluded that carbon dioxide is just a minor part in global warming. His studies have garnered media attention and that the data are going against the beliefs of global warming alarmists by disproving their theory.

## Cooling

#### Cooling now - outweighs emissions

NIPCC ’10(Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, multi-national scientific coalition comprised of leading climate scientists, “Acknowledging Recent Natural Cooling,” http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/jun/25jun2010a1.html)

In a paper entitled "A strong bout of natural cooling in 2008," which was published in *Geophysical Research Letters*, Perlwitz *et al*. (2009) recount some interesting facts about which many climate alarmists would rather the public remained unaware, including the fact that there was, in Perlwitz *et al*.'s words, "a precipitous drop in North American temperature in 2008, commingled with a decade-long fall in global mean temperatures." Perlwitz *et al*. begin their narrative by noting that there has been "a decade-long decline (1998-2007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998," citing Easterling and Wehner (2009). And in further describing this phenomenon, they say that U.S. temperatures in 2008 "not only declined from near-record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference climatology (-0.2°C versus the 1971-2000 mean) and further were the coldest since at least 1996." With respect to the geographical origin of this "natural cooling," as they describe it, the five researchers point to "a widespread coolness of the tropical-wide oceans and the northeastern Pacific," focusing on the Niño 4 region, where they report that "anomalies of about -1.1°C suggest a condition colder than any in the instrumental record since 1871." So, pushing the cause of the global and U.S. coolings that sparked their original interest back another link in the chain which -- in their estimation -- connects them with other more primary phenomena, they ask themselves what caused these *latter* anomalous and significant oceanic coolings? Perlwitz *et al*. first discount *volcanic eruptions*, because they say "there were no significant volcanic events in the last few years." Secondly, they write that *solar forcing* "is also unlikely," because its radiative magnitude is considered to be too weak to elicit such a response. And these two castaway causes thus leave them with "coupled ocean-atmosphere-land variability" as what they consider to be the "most likely" cause of the anomalous coolings. In regard to these three points, we agree with the first. With respect to Perlwitz *et al*.'s dismissal of solar forcing, however, we note that the jury is still out with respect to the interaction of the solar wind with the influx of cosmic rays to earth's atmosphere and their subsequent impact on cloud formation, which may yet prove to be substantial. And with respect to their final point, we note that the suite of real-world ocean-atmosphere-land interactions is highly complex and also not fully understood. Indeed, there may even be important phenomena operating within this realm of which the entire scientific community is ***ignorant***. And some of those phenomena may well be strong enough to ***totally compensate*** for anthropogenic-induced increases in greenhouse gas emissions, so that other natural phenomena end up dictating the ever-changing state of earth's climate, as could well be what has been happening over the last decade or more. In light of these considerations, therefore, as well as the substantial *strength* and *longevity* of the planet's current cooling phase, the path of wisdom would seem to us to be to wait and see what happens next, in the unfolding biogeophysical drama of earth's ever-changing climatic path to the future, before we undertake to attempt to *change* what we clearly do not fully *comprehend*.

#### Studies show that the globe has been cooling for the last 2000 years- IPCC underestimates

Baier 7/11 (Bret Baier serves as the anchor of Fox News Channel's (FNC) "Special Report with Bret Baier," the number one news program on cable. Before assuming this role, Baier served as chief White House correspondent, where he reported on presidential activities on a national and international level from 2006-2009. Prior to being named chief White House correspondent, Baier served as national security correspondent and reported on military and national security affairs, as well as defense, military policy and the intelligence community from the Pentagon from 2001-2006. A graduate of DePauw University, Baier holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and English, Fox News, "Grapevine: New evidence for global 'cooling'", www.foxnews.com/on-air/special-report-bret-baier/2012/07/11/grapevine-new-evidence-global-cooling, 7/11/12, KW)

**Staying Cool** A new study in the journal Nature Climate Change shows a long-term cooling trend playing out over the past 2,000 years. ¶An international team of scientists used tree-ring density measurements to reconstruct temperatures going back to 138 B.C. ¶ They found cooling by a little over a half-degree Fahrenheit per millennium due to gradual changes in position between the sun and the earth. ¶ They note that -- quote -- "The large-scale climate reconstruction shown by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) likely underestimate this long-term cooling trend over the past few millennia." ¶

#### Cooling now- tree ringstudies prove

Science Reporter 7/11 (The Daily Mail, "Tree-rings prove climate was WARMER in Roman and Medieval times than it is now - and world has been cooling for 2,000 years", www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2171973/Tree-ring-study-proves-climate-WARMER-Roman-Medieval-times-modern-industrial-age.html#ixzz20KRuMgy0, 7/11/12, KW)

German researchers used data from tree rings – a key indicator of past climate – to claim the world has been on a ‘long-term cooling trend’ for two millennia until the global warming of the twentieth century. ¶ This cooling was punctuated by a couple of warm spells. ¶ These are the Medieval Warm Period, which is well known, but also a period during the toga-wearing Roman times when temperatures were apparently 1 deg C warmer than now. ¶ They say the very warm period during the years 21 to 50AD has been underestimated by climate scientists. ¶ Lead author Professor Dr Jan Esper of Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz said: ‘We found that previous estimates of historical temperatures during the Roman era and the Middle Ages were too low. ¶ ‘This figure we calculated may not seem particularly significant, however it is not negligible when compared to global warming, which up to now has been less than 1 deg C.’ ¶ In general the scientists found a slow cooling of 0.6C over 2,000 years, which they attributed to changes in the Earth’s orbit which took it further away from the Sun. ¶ The study is published in Nature Climate Change. ¶ It is based on measurements stretching back to 138BC. ¶ The finding may force scientists to rethink current theories of the impact of global warming¶ Professor Esper's group at the Institute of Geography at JGU used tree-ring density measurements from sub-fossil pine trees originating from Finnish Lapland to produce a reconstruction reaching back to 138 BC. ¶ In so doing, the researchers have been able for the first time to precisely demonstrate that the long-term trend over the past two millennia has been towards climatic cooling. ¶ Professor Esper said: 'Such findings are also significant with regard to climate policy, as they will influence the way today's climate changes are seen in context of historical warm periods.’ ¶ The annual growth rings in trees are the most important witnesses over the past 1,000 to 2,000 years as they indicate how warm and cool past climate conditions were. ¶ Researchers from Germany, Finland, Scotland, and Switzerland examined tree-ring density profiles. ¶ In the cold environment of Finnish Lapland, trees often collapse into one of the numerous lakes, where they remain well preserved for thousands of years. ¶ The density measurements correlate closely with the summer temperatures in this area on the edge of the Nordic taiga; the researchers were thus able to create a temperature reconstruction of unprecedented quality. ¶

## Alt Causes

**Can’t solve warming --- coal pollution**

Mendelson 11 – 4 11/18/2011 Joe Mendelson (serves as NWF's Director of Policy, Climate & Energy Program where he leads a team of legislative and policy professionals to develop and implement solutions to global warming) “Obama Commits to Tackle Carbon Pollution in 2012 from Wildlife Promise”http://blog.nwf.org/2011/11/obama-commits-to-tackle-carbon-pollution-in-2012/

Yesterday, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson announced plans for establishing new carbon pollution limits on the nation’s power plants. This is good news. Just last month NWF had voiced serious concerns that these efforts were going to be delayed indefinitely. Significantly, the new schedule gets the Obama Administration back on track to tackle the nation’s biggest source of air pollution that causes climate change. EPA' Administrator Jackson (image emagazine.com) These new rules will utilize section 111 of the Clean Air Act. This provision of law requires EPA to establish federal air pollution standards to control air pollutants from stationary sources (read here coal-fired power plants) which cause or contribute significantly to the air pollution that harms our health and wildlife. The standards are also intended to promote use of the most modern air pollution control technologies so our power plants stay up to date. Let’s just say the sooner we get on with this effort the better. As NWF’s Senior Scientist Amanda Staudt blogs today, a new report by the Nobel Prize winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says carbon pollution induced climate change will make the drought and flooding events that have battered the United States more frequent in years to come. Right now, our nation’s power plants can belch carbon dioxide pollution into our air without any limits. A recent piece in the New York Review of Books by Yale economist William Nordhaus aptly describes why it is urgent that we address this source of carbon pollution: [The] burning coal is very dirty, releasing both conventional pollutants and greenhouse gases. Per unit of energy, coal emits 27 percent more CO2 than oil and 78 percent more CO2 than natural gas. . . . In the aggregate, the emissions of CO2 from coal-fired electricity- generating facilities are the largest single industrial source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. They make up one third of all emissions in an industry that constitutes only about one half of one percent of the US economy! Moreover, studies indicate that reducing coal-fired generation is the least expensive way for the US to reduce its carbon emissions in the near term (emphasis added). The new pollution limits will be established into two parts. In January, the administration will propose limits that any new power plant must meet before it can be constructed. NWF expects that the critically important second part of the standards - new carbon pollution limits on the nation’s existing power plants – will be proposed later in the Spring of 2012.

#### Destruction of Rainforests pumps far more CO2 in to the atmosphere then human industry does

Daniel Howden, May 14 2007, “Deforestation: The Hidden Cause Of Global Warming”, deputy foreign editor of The Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/environment/climate_change/article2539349.ece>

Most people think of forests only in terms of the CO2 they absorb. The rainforests of the Amazon, the Congo basin and Indonesia are thought of as the lungs of the planet. But the destruction of those forests will in the next four years alone, in the words of Sir Nicholas Stern, pump more CO2 into the atmosphere than every flight in the history of aviation to at least 2025. Indonesia became the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world last week. Following close behind is Brazil. Neither nation has heavy industry on a comparable scale with the EU, India or Russia and yet they comfortably outstrip all other countries, except the United States and China. What both countries do have in common is tropical forest that is being cut and burned with staggering swiftness. Smoke stacks visible from space climb into the sky above both countries, while satellite images capture similar destruction from the Congo basin, across the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo. According to the latest audited figures from 2003, two billion tons of CO2 enters the atmosphere every year from deforestation. That destruction amounts to 50 million acres - or an area the size of England, Wales and Scotland felled annually. The remaining standing forest is calculated to contain 1,000 billion tons of carbon, or double what is already in the atmosphere. As the GCP's report concludes: "If we lose forests, we lose the fight against climate change."

## Not Caused by Transportation

#### **Transportation only accounts for 33% of fuels and massive alt causes to the plan- includes more than just highways**

Bogo ‘9 (Jennifer Bogo, PopularMechanics.com “Report Sees Dire Future for Warming's Impact on U.S. Transport”, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4254048>, October 1, 2009, LEQ)

Transportation's contribution to global warming has been well articulated. It's responsible for 33 percent of United States emissions from fossil fuel combustion--more if you count the life-cycle emissions from extracting fuel and manufacturing vehicles. Now, for the first time, the government is taking an in-depth look at the flip scenario: how global warming is affecting transportation.

#### **And more things than the plan are key to solve**

Bogo ‘9 (Jennifer Bogo, PopularMechanics.com “Report Sees Dire Future for Warming's Impact on U.S. Transport”, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4254048>, October 1, 2009, LEQ)

In the near term, taking inventory of America's most vulnerable infrastructure will be key. By outfitting it with technology to monitor its condition, as well as shifts in regional climate, officials will be able to receive advanced warning of potential failures. The report emphasizes redundant communications and power systems for restoring transportation systems quickly in the event that they do go down. To adapt to new extremes, transportation providers should work more closely with weather forecasters and emergency planners, and respond to severe weather events in ways that are more routine and proactive than ad hoc. In other words, develop emergency response and evacuation plans before emergencies occur, and make sure they are communicated clearly to the people living in high-risk areas.

## CO2 Good

#### **Increased CO2 Solves methane**

**NIPCC 9** (The Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” June, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2009/pdf/CCR2009FullReport.pdf, Accessed 7/13/12)

Another study that deals with this topic is that of Menyailo and Hungate (2003), who assessed the influence of six boreal forest species—spruce, birch, Scots pine, aspen, larch, and Arolla pine—on soil CH4 consumption in the Siberian artificial afforestation experiment, in which the six common boreal tree species had been grown under common garden conditions for the past 30 years under the watchful eye of the staff of the Laboratory of Soil Science of the Institute of Forest, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Menyailo et al., 2002). They determined, in their words, that “soils under hardwood species (aspen and birch) consumed CH4 at higher rates than soils under coniferous species and grassland.” Under low soil moisture conditions, for example, the soils under the two hardwood species consumed 35 percent more CH4 than the soils under the four conifers; under high soil moisture conditions they consumed 65 percent more. As for the implications of these findings, Pastor and Post (1988) have suggested, in the words of Menyailo and Hungate, that “changes in temperature and precipitation resulting from increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations will cause a northward migration of the hardwood-conifer forest border in North America.” Consequently, if such a shifting of species does indeed occur, it will likely lead to an increase in methane consumption by soils and a reduction in methane-induced global warming potential, thereby providing yet another biologically mediated negative feedback factor that has yet to be incorporated into models of global climate change.

#### Increased CO2 Solves Disease

**NIPCC 10** (The Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change citing Stutte et al. 4 November 2010. Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment of a Pair of Medicinal Plants. <http://nipccreport.org/articles/2010/nov/04nov2010a3.html>

As background for their study, Stutte *et al*. write that "many *Scutellaria* species are rich in physiologically active flavonoids that have a wide spectrum of pharmacological activity," noting that leaf extracts of *Scutellaria barbata* "have been used in traditional Chinese medicine to treat liver and digestive disorders and cancers (Molony and Molony, 1998)," and that "recent research has shown extracts of *S. barbata* to be limiting to the growth of cell lines associated with lung, liver, prostate and brain tumors (Yin *et al*., 2004)." In conducting their analysis, Stutte *et al*. grew *S. barbata* and *S. lateriflora* plants from seed in large walk-in controlled environment chambers -- which were maintained at atmospheric CO2 concentrations of either 400, 1200 or 3000 ppm -- to the time of flowering (35 days after planting), as well as the time of seed drop (49 days after planting), after which the plants were harvested, their fresh and dry weights were determined, and the concentrations of a host of plant flavonoides within their tissues were measured. At 49 days after planting, the shoot dry weight of *S. barbata* was found to have increased by 54% at 1200 ppm CO2 and by 57% at 3000 ppm CO2, while that of *S. lateriflora* had increased by 44% and 70%, respectively, under the same CO2 concentrations. In addition, the average concentration of the six flavonoids the researchers measured was increased by 48% at 1200 ppm CO2 and by 81% at 3000 ppm CO2 in the vegetative tissues of *S. barbata*, while it was increased by more than 2.4-fold at 1200 and 4.9-fold at 3000 ppm CO2 in *S. lateriflora*. Therefore, Stutte *et al*. report that in the case of *S. lateriflora*, "there was a 4.2-fold increase in total flavonoid content when enriching from 400 to 1200 ppm CO2, and a 13.7-fold increase at 3000 ppm." And they state that "these results are generally consistent with those of B. Schmidt, W.D. Clark and S.B. Idso (unpublished data) who grew*S. baicalensis* at 700 ppm CO2," and who found that "total dry biomass was increased significantly" and that "the overall antioxidant capacity, based on the ferric reducing antioxidant power assay, was increased." The three researchers say that "these results clearly demonstrate the potential to use controlled environments to increase the production and quality of*Scutellaria* species ... because the practice has the potential to increase the value of the product by reducing the time to harvest, increasing yield per unit area, and increasing bioactivity per gram of dry matter." Likewise, the extremely positive results hint at the likelihood that the active ingredients of many other medicinal plants may be similarly enhanced by atmospheric CO2 enrichment, and that the historical rise in the air's CO2 content may have already done much the same thing for the plants that people include in their everyday diets, which in turn may well have played a role in promoting the dramatic increase in human life span that has occurred over the past two centuries.

#### Extinction

**South China Morning Post in ‘96**

(Kavita Daswani, “Leading the way to a cure for AIDS”, 1-4, L/N)

Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg". Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. "An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen." That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow. The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the problem was "very serious and is getting worse". Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign. The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system." He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. "This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.

## AT Warming --> War

#### Climate change does not cause wars or conflict between nations.

Bruno **Tertrais** Summer 20**11** “The Climate Wars Myth” <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summertertrais.pdf>

So much for ‘‘climate wars.’’ But the idea according to which climate change is nevertheless a new, important factor to be taken into account in defense and security planning is itself questionable. Of course, nothing precludes us from including it in the growing list of non-military issues that may have a bearing on global security. But this has to be done in a realistic way. It is not unreasonable to state that climate change may be a ‘‘threat multiplier,’’ for instance. However, stating this says nothing about the probability of increased violence or instability either at the global level or for a given crisis, or about the likelihood of state failure. Such consequences depend primarily on the reaction of governments and societies a factor which is impossible to calculate in advance. There are no data to support the vague idea that climate change can have a key role in triggering collective violence that is, be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back, as argued by an alarmist study (citing once again the example of Darfur). Climate is ‘‘one of myriad factors in a complex causal web underlying conflict,’’ and the environment is just ‘‘one of manifold and nonessential causal factors’’ which may lead to war. The main causes of contemporary conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including man-made). Conflicts are borne out of human choices and mistakes. Could regional previsions of the impact of climate change at least inform policymakers and planners about the areas of the world which are more likely all things being equal to suffer from them? The answer is no. Regional effects are extremely difficult to predict with the degree of probability which can be useful for planning. The IPCC itself underscores that current models do not have the ability to deliver useful previsions at a higher scale than the continental one. Nobody knows, for instance, whether African monsoons will move northwards (with positive effects on agriculture) or southwards (with negative effects). Here, as noted by a contributor to the IPCC, ‘‘there is complete disagreement between the various models.’’

And when the IPCC attempts to give regional previsions on the evolution of agricultural output, for instance, it is in a way which does not buttress the case for alarmism. Its 2007 report mentions a possible reduction by 50 percent of rain-fed agricultural output in some African countries in 2020. But the sole source it cites to support this claim is a report produced for a Canadian non-governmental organization in which it is mentioned that (unpublished) studies evoke this scenario for three Maghreb countries. There are indeed, it seems, some causal links between climate and warfare. But they are of a seasonal nature: ‘‘nations address seasonal climate change in terms of where they fight, rather than through when or whether disputes occur. . . . Fighting moves to higher latitudes in the summer, and lower latitudes during the cooler months of the year.’’ The stakes of climate change are important and that is why this area should not be the object of intellectual fantasies or fashions. It is appropriate for defense and security planners to monitor the evolution of the scientific and political debate on its possible consequences. But there is no objective reason today to list climate change as a key issue for defense and security planning.

#### There is very little evidence that climate change results in more conflict: Many examples disprove.

Idean Salehyan 2007 (August, Assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change: Corrupt, tyrannical governments-not changes in the Earth’s climate-will be to blame for the coming resource wars”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>, Accessed 6/28/08)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

## AT Warming--> Extreme Weather

#### No link between warming and changing weather patterns – its natural variability

**NCPA 11** (National Center for Policy Analysis, a think tank, “Extreme Weather: What Role Do Humans Play?” 3/18, http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article\_ID=20447)

Tying weather extremes to global warming, or using them as "proof" that warming does not exist, is a popular rhetorical flourish by politicos of all stripes. But a string of soon-to-be-published papers in the scientific literature finds that despite all hue and cry about global warming and recent extreme weather events, natural climate variability is to blame, says Patrick J. Michaels, a senior fellow with the Cato Institute.¶ The first chink in the armor came back in the fall of 2010, when scientists from the Physical Sciences Division of the Earth System Research Laboratory of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration presented the results of their preliminary investigation.¶ They concluded that "despite this strong evidence for a warming planet, greenhouse gas forcing fails to explain the 2010 heat wave over western Russia. The natural process of atmospheric blocking, and the climate impacts induced by such blocking, are the principal cause for this heat wave."¶ What about the past two winters?¶ In a soon-to-be-released paper to appear in Geophysical Research Letters, a team of scientists from the European Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts help untangle the causes of the unusual atmospheric circulation patterns that gave rise to the harsh winter of 2009-2010 on both sides of the Atlantic.¶ They find: "neither SST [sea surface temperature] nor sea ice anomalies explain the negative phase of the NAO [North Atlantic Oscillation] during the 2009/10 winter."¶ The point is that natural variability can and does produce extreme events on every time scale, from days (e.g., individual storms), weeks (e.g., the Russian heat wave), and months (e.g., the winter of 2009-2010). Folks would do well to keep this in mind next time global warming is being posited for the weather disaster du jour, says Michaels.

## AT Warming --> Disease

#### Your impact is bad and you should feel bad

**Morano 9** (Mark, writer for Climate Depot, “Claim that 'climate change is the cholera of our era' ridiculed as 'load of garbage' by renowned disease expert,” 5/25, http://climatedepot.com/a/914/Claim-that-climate-change-is-the-cholera-of-our-era-ridiculed-as-load-of-garbage-by-renowned-disease-expert)

AMay 25, 2009 article in the UK Times warning that "climate change is the cholera of our era" has raised the ire of an internationally known disease expert formerly of the UN IPCC**.¶ "**The article is a rehash of a similar load of garbage unloaded in 1996,plus (identical wording) other writings of the past, including, I suspect, IPCC,"Dr. Paul Reiter told Climate Depot**.** Reiter is a malaria expert formerly of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and professor of entomology and tropical disease with the Pasteur Institute in Paris and a member of the World Health Organization Expert Advisory Committee on Vector Biology and Control.¶ The UK Times article, by Professor Sir Muir Gray is Public Health Director of the Campaign for Greener Healthcare, alleges that man-made global warming is a greater threat to mankind than the scourge of cholera -- an acute diarrheal illness-- which killed an nearly 3000 people in Zimbabwe alone earlier this year. A May 26, 2009 article from VOA reveals cholera cases are expected to reach 100,000 in Zimbabwe alone.¶ Muir wrote in the UK Times: "In the 19th century, cholera outbreaks that escaped from the slums to kill rich and poor alike caused the great Victorian revolution in public health. Fear of cholera ensured that vast sums were spent on building sewers and ensuring that everyone had clean water. Climate change is the cholera of our era — fear of the havoc that climate change will wreak should stimulate a new public health revolution."¶ "Smoking, Aids, swine flu? They all pale into insignificance compared to climate change's threat to health," Muir added.¶ But Reiter, was blunt in his rebuttal to Muir's article in the UK Times.¶ "They have cherry picked without remorse. I have huge response to my article in Malaria Journal. Yet these peddlers of garbage quote a 1998 model by two activists whose work is ridiculed by those of us who work in this field," Reiter continued. "What the hell can we do? I am flabbergasted that this can go on, and on, and on," Reiter, who is featured in the U.S. Senate Report of more than 700 dissenting scientists of man-made global warming, concluded.¶ Reiter was also formerly with the UN IPCC and was so appalled at UN IPCC process that he threatened legal action to get his name removed from the reports.

#### Warming won’t affect incidence of disease

**Lafferty 9** (K.D., writing for the journal *Ecology*, “The ecology of climate change and infectious diseases” *Ecology* 90: 888-900. Background available here: http://co2science.org/articles/V12/N30/B1.php)

The "conventional wisdom," in the words of the author, "is that global climate change will result in an expansion of tropical diseases, particularly vector-transmitted diseases, throughout temperate areas," examples of which include "schistosomiasis (bilharzia or snail fever), onchocerciasis (river blindness), dengue fever, lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis), African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis, American trypanosomiasis (Chagas disease), yellow fever, and many less common mosquito and tick-transmitted diseases of humans," as well as many diseases of "nonhuman hosts."¶ What was done¶ Lafferty reviews the scientific literature pertaining to: (1) how temperature drives several important biological processes, (2) how changes in climate might affect the spatial and temporal patterns of infectious disease transmission, and (3) how models predict the ways in which climate change might affect the spread of infectious diseases in the future.¶ What was learned¶ The U.S. government researcher concludes that "while climate has affected and will continue to affect habitat suitability for infectious diseases, climate change seems more likely to shift than to expand the geographic ranges of infectious diseases," and that "many other factors affect the distribution of infectious disease, dampening the proposed role of climate." In fact, he concludes that "shifts in climate suitability might actually reduce the geographic distribution of some infectious diseases." And of perhaps even greater import (because it is a real-world observation), he reports that "although the globe is significantly warmer than it was a century ago, there is little evidence that climate change has already favored infectious diseases."¶ What it means¶ So, will global warming lead to dramatic increases in the incidence of various infectious diseases, as climate alarmists claim it will? Lafferty's review of pertinent biological phenomena suggests that it need not do so, while his review of real-world observations suggests that it has not done so. Hence, in all likelihood, it probably will not do so.

## AT Kills Crops

#### Organic switch solves

**Striepe 7/12** (Becky, writer for Eat Drink Better, an advocacy and support website for sustainable farming practices, citing peer-reviewed studies and a writer for HuffPo, “Could organic farming be the key to feeding a warming world?” 2012 http://eatdrinkbetter.com/2012/07/12/could-organic-farming-be-the-key-to-feeding-a-warming-world/)

Climate change is about more than just hotter summers. As the world heats up, we’re also expected to see more extreme weather and increased incidences of drought. That presents challenges to the farmers producing our food, and according to research from the Rodale Institute, the answer may be organic farming. According to Tom Philpott at Mother Jones:

…organically managed soils deal with water better—both in conditions of drought and heavy storms (the frequency of which is also expected to increase as the climate changes). Soil rich in organic matter (well-decayed remnants of plants and other living creatures) bolster soil in weather extremes by helping store water in times of scarcity and by holding together and not eroding away during heavy rains.¶ We can argue all day about whether GMOs are healthy for our bodies, but what the GMO debate really comes down to is feeding the world. This is a major argument that pro-GMO groups use, and studies like this one call that reasoning into question. Rodale has been doing side-by-side testing of organic and GMO crops since the early 80s, and during times of drought they are finding that organics outperformed industrial farming techniques by 31 percent (you can check out the Rodale report (pdf) here). During times of more normal weather, organic and industrial yields were comparable.¶ ¶ GMO advocates often accuse folks who speak out against GMOs and industrial ag as being anti-science, but Rodale’s three decades of research looks like some pretty solid science to me.

## AT Tipping Points

#### No tipping points

**IHRR 12** (Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, “Moving beyond ‘the tipping point of climate change,’” 5/4, http://ihrrblog.org/2012/05/04/moving-beyond-the-tipping-point-of-climate-change/)

To begin, we are now observing climate change solely from the period of today or in the relatively recent past, which is a very small part of what came before it millions of years ago. Antony Long found the use of tipping point to describe climate change potentially nihilistic or disempowering for thinking about climate change when in fact we should be moving the other way. Also, tipping points may not necessarily be irreversible which is how climate change is often portrayed. While less complex than the climate problem ozone depletion was seen as veering towards a tipping point, but as production of CFCs ceased the ozone layer restored over time.

## AT Consensus

#### Scientific consensus doesn’t matter – they all use the same false assumptions and models

**Spencer 9** (Roy, former climatologist at NASA, “The MIT Global Warming Gamble,” May, http://www.drroyspencer.com/2009/05/the-mit-global-warming-gamble/)

True, there are many scientists who really do think our tinkering with the climate system through our greenhouse gas emissions is like playing Russian roulette. But the climate system tinkers with itself all the time, and the climate has managed to remain stable. There are indeed internal, chaotic fluctuations in the climate system that might appear to be random, but their effect on the whole climate system are constrained to operate within a certain range. If the climate system really was that sensitive, it would have forced itself into oblivion long ago. The MIT research group pays lip service to relying on “peer-reviewed science”, but it looks like they treat peer-reviewed scientific publications as random events, too. If 99 papers have been published which claim the climate system is VERY sensitive, but only 1 paper has been published that says the climate system is NOT very sensitive, is there then a 99-in-100 (99%) chance that the climate system is very sensitive? NO. As has happened repeatedly in all scientific disciplines, it is often a single research paper that ends up overturning what scientists thought they knew about something. In climate research, those 99 papers typically will all make the same assumptions, which then pretty much guarantees they will end up arriving at the same conclusions. So, those 99 papers do not constitute independent pieces of evidence. Instead, they might be better described as evidence that ‘group think’ still exists. It turns out that the belief in a sensitive climate is not because of the observational evidence, but in spite of it. You can start to learn more about the evidence for low climate sensitivity (negative feedbacks) here. As the slightly-retouched photo of the MIT research group shown above suggests, I predict that it is only a matter of time before the climate community placing all its bets on the climate models is revealed to be a very bad gamble.

## Negative Feedbacks

#### Scientific consensus doesn’t matter – they all use the same false assumptions and models

**Spencer 9** (Roy, former climatologist at NASA, “The MIT Global Warming Gamble,” May, http://www.drroyspencer.com/2009/05/the-mit-global-warming-gamble/)

True, there are many scientists who really do think our tinkering with the climate system through our greenhouse gas emissions is like playing Russian roulette. But the climate system tinkers with itself all the time, and the climate has managed to remain stable. There are indeed internal, chaotic fluctuations in the climate system that might appear to be random, but their effect on the whole climate system are constrained to operate within a certain range. If the climate system really was that sensitive, it would have forced itself into oblivion long ago. The MIT research group pays lip service to relying on “peer-reviewed science”, but it looks like they treat peer-reviewed scientific publications as random events, too. If 99 papers have been published which claim the climate system is VERY sensitive, but only 1 paper has been published that says the climate system is NOT very sensitive, is there then a 99-in-100 (99%) chance that the climate system is very sensitive? NO. As has happened repeatedly in all scientific disciplines, it is often a single research paper that ends up overturning what scientists thought they knew about something. In climate research, those 99 papers typically will all make the same assumptions, which then pretty much guarantees they will end up arriving at the same conclusions. So, those 99 papers do not constitute independent pieces of evidence. Instead, they might be better described as evidence that ‘group think’ still exists. It turns out that the belief in a sensitive climate is not because of the observational evidence, but in spite of it. You can start to learn more about the evidence for low climate sensitivity (negative feedbacks) here. As the slightly-retouched photo of the MIT research group shown above suggests, I predict that it is only a matter of time before the climate community placing all its bets on the climate models is revealed to be a very bad gamble.

## Model Indicts

#### Scientific evidence and data outweigh qualifications

Idso et al., 99 – \*Founder and former President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change and former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy, \*\*former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service and former adjunct professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University, \*\*\*adjunct associate in plant biology at Arizona State University (\*Craig, \*\*Sherwood, \*\*\*Keith, “Archived Book Review”, 10/15/99)

When will we learn that scientific ideas should be discussed on their own merits? Or as Santer says, that the controversy should "focus on the science itself, and not on the scientists" (p.80)? Despicable people can be right, and kind and loving parents can be wrong. Where one gets one's funding may well influence one's perspective on an issue; but if it leads him into error, or even outright fraud, that error or fraud should be readily exposed scientifically. It is well to remember that all arguments of a non-scientific nature clearly cut both ways.

#### IPCC model stinks

**Spencer 12** (Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, “McKitrick & Michaels Were Right: More Evidence of Spurious Warming in the IPCC Surface Temperature Dataset,” 3/30 http://www.drroyspencer.com/page/2/)

The supposed gold standard in surface temperature data is that produced by Univ. of East Anglia, the so-called CRUTem3 dataset. There has always been a lingering suspicion among skeptics that some portion of this IPCC official temperature record contains some level of residual spurious warming due to the urban heat island effect. Several published papers over the years have supported that suspicion. The Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect is familiar to most people: towns and cities are typically warmer than surrounding rural areas due to the replacement of natural vegetation with manmade structures. If that effect increases over time at thermometer sites, there will be a spurious warming component to regional or global temperature trends computed from the data. Here I will show based upon unadjusted International Surface Hourly (ISH) data archived at NCDC that the warming trend over the Northern Hemisphere, where virtually all of the thermometer data exist, is a function of population density at the thermometer site.

#### Flawed studies - warming’s not a threat and not anthropogenic

Leake 10 (Jonathan, Times Online, Citing John Christy of the UA Huntsville, a former author for the IPCC, “World may not be warming, say scientists,” 2-14, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737)

The United Nations climate panel faces a new challenge with scientists casting doubt on its claim that global temperatures are rising inexorably because of human pollution. In its last assessment the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said the evidence that the world was warming was “unequivocal”. It warned that greenhouse gases had already heated the world by 0.7C and that there could be 5C-6C more warming by 2100, with devastating impacts on humanity and wildlife. However, new research, including work by British scientists, is casting doubt on such claims. Some even suggest the world may not be warming much at all. “The temperature records cannot be relied on as indicators of global change,” said John Christy, professor of atmospheric science at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, a former lead author on the IPCC. The doubts of Christy and a number of other researchers focus on the thousands of weather stations around the world, which have been used to collect temperature data over the past 150 years. These stations, they believe, have been seriously compromised by factors such as urbanisation, changes in land use and, in many cases, being moved from site to site. Christy has published research papers looking at these effects in three different regions: east Africa, and the American states of California and Alabama. “The story is the same for each one,” he said. “The popular data sets show a lot of warming but the apparent temperature rise was actually caused by local factors affecting the weather stations, such as land development.” The IPCC faces similar criticisms from Ross McKitrick, professor of economics at the University of Guelph, Canada, who was invited by the panel to review its last report. The experience turned him into a strong critic and he has since published a research paper questioning its methods. “We concluded, with overwhelming statistical significance, that the IPCC’s climate data are contaminated with surface effects from industrialisation and data quality problems. These add up to a large warming bias,” he said. Such warnings are supported by a study of US weather stations co-written by Anthony Watts, an American meteorologist and climate change sceptic. His study, which has not been peer reviewed, is illustrated with photographs of weather stations in locations where their readings are distorted by heat-generating equipment. Some are next to air- conditioning units or are on waste treatment plants. One of the most infamous shows a weather station next to a waste incinerator. Watts has also found examples overseas, such as the weather station at Rome airport, which catches the hot exhaust fumes emitted by taxiing jets. In Britain, a weather station at Manchester airport was built when the surrounding land was mainly fields but is now surrounded by heat-generating buildings. Terry Mills, professor of applied statistics and econometrics at Loughborough University, looked at the same data as the IPCC. He found that the warming trend it reported over the past 30 years or so was just as likely to be due to random fluctuations as to the impacts of greenhouse gases. Mills’s findings are to be published in Climatic Change, an environmental journal. “The earth has gone through warming spells like these at least twice before in the last 1,000 years,” he said.

#### **Your evidence is based on flawed studies - warming’s not a threat and not anthropogenic**

Leake 10 (Jonathan, Times Online, Citing John Christy of the UA Huntsville, a former author for the IPCC, “World may not be warming, say scientists,” 2-14, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737)

The United Nations climate panel faces a new challenge with scientists casting doubt on its claim that global temperatures are rising inexorably because of human pollution. In its last assessment the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said the evidence that the world was warming was “unequivocal”. It warned that greenhouse gases had already heated the world by 0.7C and that there could be 5C-6C more warming by 2100, with devastating impacts on humanity and wildlife. However, new research, including work by British scientists, is casting doubt on such claims. Some even suggest the world may not be warming much at all. “The temperature records cannot be relied on as indicators of global change,” said John Christy, professor of atmospheric science at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, a former lead author on the IPCC. The doubts of Christy and a number of other researchers focus on the thousands of weather stations around the world, which have been used to collect temperature data over the past 150 years. These stations, they believe, have been seriously compromised by factors such as urbanisation, changes in land use and, in many cases, being moved from site to site. Christy has published research papers looking at these effects in three different regions: east Africa, and the American states of California and Alabama. “The story is the same for each one,” he said. “The popular data sets show a lot of warming but the apparent temperature rise was actually caused by local factors affecting the weather stations, such as land development.” The IPCC faces similar criticisms from Ross McKitrick, professor of economics at the University of Guelph, Canada, who was invited by the panel to review its last report. The experience turned him into a strong critic and he has since published a research paper questioning its methods. “We concluded, with overwhelming statistical significance, that the IPCC’s climate data are contaminated with surface effects from industrialisation and data quality problems. These add up to a large warming bias,” he said. Such warnings are supported by a study of US weather stations co-written by Anthony Watts, an American meteorologist and climate change sceptic. His study, which has not been peer reviewed, is illustrated with photographs of weather stations in locations where their readings are distorted by heat-generating equipment. Some are next to air- conditioning units or are on waste treatment plants. One of the most infamous shows a weather station next to a waste incinerator. Watts has also found examples overseas, such as the weather station at Rome airport, which catches the hot exhaust fumes emitted by taxiing jets. In Britain, a weather station at Manchester airport was built when the surrounding land was mainly fields but is now surrounded by heat-generating buildings. Terry Mills, professor of applied statistics and econometrics at Loughborough University, looked at the same data as the IPCC. He found that the warming trend it reported over the past 30 years or so was just as likely to be due to random fluctuations as to the impacts of greenhouse gases. Mills’s findings are to be published in Climatic Change, an environmental journal. “The earth has gone through warming spells like these at least twice before in the last 1,000 years,” he said.

**Temperature data proves**

**Lehr 5** (Jay, Science Director of the Heartland Institute, 1-12-2005, Yearbook of Experts)

EVIDENCE THAT THE TEMPERATURE OF THE EARTH IS NOT INCREASING SIGNIFICANTLY AS A RESULT OF MAN'S ACTIVITY ON THE PLANET 1 - Our most reliable sources of temperature data show no global warming trend. Satellite and weather balloon readings of temperatures in the lower troposphere (an area scientists predict would immediately reflect any global warming) show no warming since readings began 25 years ago, when the satellite system was first launched. Only land based temperature stations show a warming trend, and these stations do not cover the entire globe as satellite readings do, and these are often affected by heat generated by nearby urban development. 2 - All predictions of global warming are based on computer models not historical data. In order to get their models to produce predictions that are close to their designers expectations, modelers make adjustments to unknown variables that are many times greater than the effect of doubling carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. For example, knowledge of the amount of energy flowing from the equator to the poles is uncertain by an amount equivalent to 25 to 30 Watts per square meter (W/m2) of the earth's surface. the amount of sunlight absorbed by the atmosphere or reflected by the surface is also uncertain by as much as 25 W/m2. The role of clouds is uncertain by at least 25 W/m2. The heat added to the atmosphere by a doubling of CO2 is not uncertain. It is easily measured in laboratory experiments and amounts to only 4 Watts per square meter (4 W/m2) of the earth's surface. Obviously the uncertainties are many times larger than the input of energy resulting from a doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 3 - When scientists analyzed the relationship between atmospheric CO2 levels and temperatures dating back 250,000 years in ice cores from Greenland and Antarctica, they found that sometimes concentration of CO2 was high when the temperature was low and sometime CO2 was low when temperature was high. 4 - While we hear much about one or another melting glaciers, a recent study of 246 glaciers around the world between 1946 and 1995 indicated a balance between those that are losing ice, gaining ice and remaining in equilibrium. There is no global trend in any direction. 5 - The gases in the atmosphere that absorb outgoing radiation forming the greenhouse effect are water vapor (absorbing 90% of outgoing heat), methane (4%), nitrous oxide (2%), carbon dioxide (4%). Thus a doubling of CO2 would not achieve a significant change in heat retained. 6 - Temperature fluctuations during the current 300 year recovery from the Little Ice Age which ended around 1700AD, following the Medieval Warming Period correlate almost perfectly with fluctuations in solar activity. This correlation long predates human use of significant amounts of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas. 7 - In defining the tremendous impact the sun has on climate one must really understands the actual movement of the earth around the sun. There are three variables, orbit shape, tilt and wobble which profoundly affect weather patterns. The earth's orbit does not form a circle as it moves around the sun - it forms an ellipse passing further away from the sun at the one end of the orbit than at the other end. During the 100,000 year cycle the tug of other planets on the earth causes its orbit to change shape. It shifts from a short broad ellipse that keeps the earth closer to the sun to a long flat ellipse that allows it to move farther from the sun and back again. 8 - There is no consensus of scientists in favor of human caused global warming. While opinion polls do not determine truth in science, more than 17,000 American scientists signed a petition drafted by the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine which stated: "There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth's atmosphere and disruption of the Earth's climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientific evidence that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide produce many beneficial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the Earth." 9 - A modest amount of global warming, should it occur would be beneficial to the natural world. The warmest period in recorded history was the Medieval Warm Period roughly 800 to 1200AD when temperatures were 7 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than today allowing great prosperity of mankind. 10 - Carbon dioxide is NOT a pollutant. On the contrary it makes crops and forests grow faster. Mapping by satellite shows that the earth has become about 6% greener overall in the past two decades, with forests expanding into arid regions. The Amazon rain forest was the biggest gainer, despite the much advertised deforestation caused by human cutting along their edges. Certainly climate change does not help every region equally, but careful studies predict overall benefit, fewer storms (not more), more rain, better crop yields, longer growing seasons, milder winters and decreasing heating costs in colder climates. The news is certainly not all bad and on balance may be rather good. 11 - Energy is the currency of technological progress. Billions of people in the Earth's poor countries are trying to lift themselves from poverty through use of simple technology. Hundreds of millions of these people are so close to the bottom rungs of the ladder of existence that loss of hydrocarbon fuels can cause their deaths. Many international elitists understand this well as they attempt to use the myth of global warming as a means of "population control". 12 - Global warming is a major industry today. Between 1992 and 2000 the U.S. Government spent $18 Billion on climate change research and now contributes $6 billion a year. This finances jobs, grants, conferences, international travel and academic journals. It not only keeps a huge army of people in comfortable employment, but also fills them with self righteousness and moral superiority regardless of the fact that real science did not support it.

#### Studies show that the globe has been cooling for the last 2000 years- IPCC underestimates

Baier 7/11 (Bret Baier serves as the anchor of Fox News Channel's (FNC) "Special Report with Bret Baier," the number one news program on cable. Before assuming this role, Baier served as chief White House correspondent, where he reported on presidential activities on a national and international level from 2006-2009. Prior to being named chief White House correspondent, Baier served as national security correspondent and reported on military and national security affairs, as well as defense, military policy and the intelligence community from the Pentagon from 2001-2006. A graduate of DePauw University, Baier holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and English, Fox News, "Grapevine: New evidence for global 'cooling'", www.foxnews.com/on-air/special-report-bret-baier/2012/07/11/grapevine-new-evidence-global-cooling, 7/11/12, KW)

**Staying Cool** A new study in the journal Nature Climate Change shows a long-term cooling trend playing out over the past 2,000 years. ¶An international team of scientists used tree-ring density measurements to reconstruct temperatures going back to 138 B.C. ¶ They found cooling by a little over a half-degree Fahrenheit per millennium due to gradual changes in position between the sun and the earth. ¶ They note that -- quote -- "The large-scale climate reconstruction shown by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) likely underestimate this long-term cooling trend over the past few millennia." ¶

#### Arctic ice decline is natural – we indict their models

**Spencer 12** (Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, 3/27, “Could Arctic Sea Ice Decline be Caused by the Arctic Oscillation?” http://www.drroyspencer.com/page/2/)

While the IPCC claims that recent Arctic sea ice declines are the result of human-caused warming, there is also convincing observational evidence that natural cycles in atmospheric circulation patterns might also be involved. And unless we know how much of the decline is natural, I maintain we cannot know how much is human-caused. In 2002, a paper was published in the Journal of Climate entitled Response of Sea Ice to the Arctic Oscillation, where the authors (one of whom, Mike Wallace, was a co-discoverer of the AO) shows that changing wind patterns associated with the AO contributed to Arctic sea ice declines from one decade to the next: from 1979-1988 to 1989-1998. The Arctic Oscillation involves sea level pressure patterns over the Arctic Ocean, North Atlantic, and North Pacific. Since sea ice moves around with the wind (see this movie example), sea level pressure patterns can either expose or cover various sections of the Arctic Ocean. When there are many winters in a row with high (or low) pressure, it can affect sea ice cover on decadal time scales. Over time, ice can become more extensive and thicker, or less extensive and thinner. There is a time lag involved in all of this, as discussed in the above paper. So, to examine the potential cumulative effect of the AO, I made the following plot of cumulative values of the winter (December-January-February) AO (actually, their departures from the long-term average) since 1900. I’ve attached a spreadsheet with the data for those interested, updated through this past winter. Consistent with the analysis in the above-cited paper, the sea ice decline since satellite monitoring began in 1979 was during a period of persistent positive values of the AO index (note the reversed vertical scale). Since the satellite period started toward the end of a prolonged period of negative AO values, this raises the question of whether we just happened to start monitoring Arctic sea ice when it was near peak coverage. Note that back in the 1920’s, when there were reports of declining sea ice, record warmth, and disappearing glaciers, there was similar AO behavior to the last couple of decades. Obviously, that was before humans could have influenced the climate system in any substantial way. I won’t go into what might be causing the cyclic pattern in the AO over several decades. My only point is that there is published evidence to support the view that some (or even most?) of the ~20 year sea ice decline up until the 2007 minimum was part of a natural cycle, related to multi-decadal changes in average wind patterns.

## No Ocean Acidification

#### No long-term impact to ocean acidification

**Michaels, Davis and Balling 12** (Patrick J. Michaels is an American [climatologist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climatology), senior research fellow for Research and Economic Development at [George Mason University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Mason_University), and a senior fellow in environmental studies at the [Cato Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cato_Institute), Robert E. Davis is a Professor of [Climatology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climatology) at the [University of Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Virginia)'s Department of Environmental Sciences, Robert C. Balling, Jr. is a [professor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor) of geography at [Arizona State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona_State_University), and the former director of its Office of [Climatology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climatology), “[Acclimation to Ocean Acidification: Give It Some Time](http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2012/03/29/acclimation-to-ocean-acidification-give-it-some-time/)”, World Climate Report, 3/29/12, <http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2012/03/29/acclimation-to-ocean-acidification-give-it-some-time/>)

The last sentence nicely sums up the problem underlying the proclamations of impending catastrophe from “ocean acidification”—that is, there are very few long-term studies of the response of organisms to changing conditions, instead, the vast majority of results come from studies which scoop things up out of the ocean, plop them into an aquarium, jack up the acidity of the water, and watch what for a few days to see what happens. That’s about as far from the real world as you can get, and it’s little wonder that the organisms don’t tend to fare particularly well. Basically, Form and Riebesell follow this same procedure, but in addition to watching what happens over a few days, they maintain vigilance, and follow the response for about 6 months. The organism they are studying is a cold-water coral species, Lophelia pertusa, which they describe as “the most common reef framework-forming and ecosystem engineering cold-water coral with a cosmopolitan distribution.” One reason they chose to look at a cold-water coral is that “cold-water coral reefs are considered the ecosystem most vulnerable to ocean acidiﬁcation.” What they found was that in an experiment that lasted only 8 days, that the growth rate of the coral was slowed down by the dissolution of extra CO2 into the aquarium water—the more the researchers added CO2 (increasing the acidity and lowering the pH) the worse the corals fared (Figure 1). In a second experiment in which the coral specimens were exposed to lower pH levels for 178 days, the growth rate did not decline, and in fact, even appeared to increase under the lower pH (more acid) conditions (Figure 2).

#### Algae solves

**UPI 8** (United Press International, “Global warming may boost algae growth”, 4/19/08, lexis)

British researchers said global warming may increase ocean plankton calcification and boost the development of algae. Scientists at the National Oceanography Centre and the University of Oxford said increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is causing microscopic ocean plants to produce greater amounts of calcium carbonate that increase the growth of coccolithophores. The single-cell, carbonate-encased algae are an important part of the of ocean food chain, The New York Times said Friday. The report, published in the Journal Science, said the rise in carbon dioxide produced by increased calcification is mitigated by its removal through increased photosynthesis. "This work contradicts previous findings and shows, for the first time, that calcification by phytoplankton could double by the end of this century," the report said. "This is important because the majority of ocean calcification is carried out by coccolithophores such as Emiliania huxleyi and the amount of calcium carbonate produced at the ocean surface is known to have a direct influence on levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide."

#### Species resilient to climate change – coral reefs

Cote and Darling 2010 (Isabelle M., tropical marine ecologist at Simon Fraser University; Emily S., marine ecologist at Simon Fraser University; July 27, 2010. “Rethinking Ecosystem Resilience in the Face of Climate Change”. <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1000438> DA:7/11/2012)

Ecologists are increasingly aware that, in a variety of ecosystems, species loss following disturbance is non-random [3],[21],[22]. On coral reefs, selective mortality following disturbance has a direct impact of coral community structure, by changing the absolute and relative abundances of coral species [23]. Shifts in community assemblages have been observed in the aftermath of diverse natural and anthropogenic disturbances, including storms [23]–[25], pollution [26], sedimentation [27]–[31], fishing [32], disease [27], and coral predator outbreaks (e.g., crown-of-thorns sea stars, [33]).

The general trend of such community shifts is the loss of coral species with stress-sensitive life histories and increases in dominance (both in terms of absolute and relative abundance) of stress-tolerant species that survive the disturbance and of opportunistic species that rapidly colonize following a disturbance. In the Indo-Pacific region, this trend is exemplified by the replacement of stress-sensitive branching and plating coral genera, such as Acropora and Montipora, by stress-tolerant massive corals such as massive Porites, and the faviids Platygyra and Favia [26],[28],[34]. In the Caribbean, the primary reef-building corals, Acropora and Montastrea species, have been replaced by “weedy” coral species that form small colonies, grow quickly, and are short-lived [35],[36]. For example, the relative abundance of “weedy” Porites astreoides has increased significantly over the past four decades [37] as coral cover—an acknowledged sign of reef degradation—has declined across the region [38]. Disturbed Caribbean reefs have also been shown to converge to communities dominated by Agaricia, whose opportunistic life-history and high environmental tolerance have been suggested to explain its persistence in degraded reef habitats [27].

The conventional view of resilience predicts that these shifted or “degraded” coral assemblages should be more vulnerable to climate change. The fact that thermally induced coral bleaching events—currently the most visible manifestation of climate change on coral reefs—are increasing in frequency and extent [11],[39] on reefs that are globally degraded [38],[40] could be taken as supporting evidence. However, this signal is confounded by increasing sea surface temperature anomalies over time [11],[19]. To our knowledge, there is no evidence to suggest that bleaching events are now triggered by lower temperatures than they were in the past, when coral reefs were generally less degraded (Perry et al., unpublished data). Nearly “pristine” reefs can experience high bleaching-induced mortality (e.g., Phoenix Islands, [41]). In fact, isolated reefs, such as those of Palmyra in the Line Islands, can bleach as severely as more impacted reefs (e.g., in American Samoa, Fiji, and the Philippines), despite the fact that they experience temperature regimes that are not hotter (or cooler) [42]. Furthermore, the apparently higher bleaching resistance of one coral species (Montastrea faveolata) from an isolated Belizean atoll with low anthropogenic stress can also be ascribed to milder heat stress on these reefs than on more degraded reefs [43].

#### Worst impact is small

Roy **Spencer** MAY 1, 20**08** (Spencer is a Senior Scientist for Climate Studies at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center) (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/224319/more-carbon-dioxide-please/roy-spencer)

Well, plant physiologists have known for a long time that most vegetation loves more carbon dioxide. It grows faster, is more drought-tolerant, and is more efficient in its water use. While the pre-industrial CO2 concentration of the atmosphere was only about 280 parts per million (ppm) by volume, and now it is around 380 ppm, some greenhouses pump it all the way up to around 1,000 ppm. How can environmentalists claim that helping vegetation to grow is a bad thing? The bigger concern has been the possible effect of the extra CO2 on the world’s oceans, because more CO2 lowers the pH of seawater. While it is claimed that this makes the water more acidic, this is misleading. Since seawater has a pH around 8.1, it will take an awful lot of CO2 it to even make the water neutral (pH=7), let alone acidic (pH less than 7). Still, the main worry has been that the extra CO2 could hurt the growth of plankton, which represents the start of the oceanic food chain. But recent research (published on April 18 in Science Express) has now shown, contrary to expectations, that one of the most common forms of plankton actually grows faster and bigger when more CO2 is pumped into the water. Like vegetation on land, it loves the extra CO2, too! It is quite possible that the biosphere (vegetation, sea life, etc.) has been starved for atmospheric CO2. Before humans started burning fossil fuels, vegetation and ocean plankton had been gobbling up as much CO2 out of the atmosphere as they could, but it was like a vacuum cleaner trying to suck through a stopped-up hose. Now, no matter how much CO2 we pump into the atmosphere each year, the biosphere takes out an average of 50 percent of that extra amount. Even after we triple the amount of CO2 we produce, nature still takes out 50 percent of the extra amount.

#### Doesn’t cause species extinctions

#### Laughlin 10

(Robert B. Laughlin is a professor of physics at Stanford University and a co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Physics., “What the Earth Knows”, The American Scholar, Summer 2010, <http://theamericanscholar.org/what-the-earth-knows/>)

However, carbon dioxide, per se, is not responsible for most of this extinction stress. There are a handful of counterexamples, notably corals, which may be especially sensitive to acidification of the ocean surface, and amphibians, which are declining noticeably for unknown reasons. But, except in these few isolated cases, keeping carbon-based fuels in the ground a while longer won’t make much difference in mitigating the loss of biodiversity. The real problem is human population pressure generally—overharvesting, habitat destruction, pesticide abuse, species invasion, and so forth. Slowing man-made extinctions in a meaningful way would require drastically reducing the world’s human population. That is unlikely to happen.

## Coral Resilient

#### Coral is resilient – empirics prove

**Dove et. al. 9** (Sophie, researcher at the Centre for Marine Studies and Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, et. al., “Doom and Boom on a Resilient Reef: Climate Change, Algal Overgrowth and Coral Recovery,” 3/19, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0005239)

Inshore, high latitude coral reefs of the largest reef system in the world, the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), Australia, suffered severe mass bleaching of coral in early 2006. Reefs in the area exhibit low coral species diversity and are widely dominated by Acropora corals, with branching Acropora accounting for more than 90% of the coral species [21]. Sea surface temperatures in the inshore reefs of the Keppel Islands (23°10′S, 151°00′E) in the southern GBR rose rapidly in late 2005, with some locations reaching temperatures in December that are not normally found until February. The onset of high sea temperatures early in the season triggered coral bleaching by mid January 2006 [22]. Overall, bleaching damage was severe, affecting 77–95% of coral colonies [22], [23]. The purpose of this paper was to document some novel mechanisms for coral reef resilience based on changes in coral and seaweed abundance following the 2006 mass coral bleaching event that affected reefs of the Keppel Islands.¶ Results and Discussion Top¶ Abundance of corals and seaweeds showed strong dynamics in response to the warming-induced mass coral bleaching event (Figs. 1, 2). Cover of bleached but living coral (mainly branching Acropora spp.) on the reef slopes of Middle Island, Halfway Island, and Barren Island was high (77%–89%) during the bleaching event in January/February 2006. Five months after the onset of bleaching, coral cover was severely reduced, to values around 20–30% by July–August 2006. The coral mortality was followed by an extraordinary bloom of the brown seaweed Lobophora variegata, apparently unprecedented in magnitude on the GBR (GDP and LM personal observations, Fig. 2). This alga commonly grows between the branches of most Acropora colonies in the area, but under normal (i.e. undisturbed) conditions it is not able to grow beyond the base of the branches, probably due to competitive inhibition by the corals. Previous work on L. variegata growing amongst branching Porites cylindrica corals showed that the interaction is competitive, with both coral and alga inhibiting growth of the other [24], [25]. However, seaweeds and algal turfs were apparently released from space competition with the corals due to the bleaching mortality [9] and dramatically increased in cover (200–300% increase on Middle Island and Halfway Island) by August 2006. Importantly, coral bleaching preceded L. variegata overgrowth, and overgrowth only took place on bleached or dead corals at a range of spatial scales (from cm to 10 s of kilometers; careful inspection showed negligible overgrowth of healthy coral). Nonetheless, the seaweed apparently exacerbated coral mortality by overgrowing stressed coral tissue [24]–[26] (Figure S1D). Algal competitiveness may have been enhanced by uptake of nutrients and carbon generated by the coral mortality [27]. There are no previous observations of such an extensive bloom of L. variegata, or indeed any single species of fleshy alga, on the GBR, although large-scale blooms of filamentous algal turfs have occurred following coral mortality [9], [28], [29], and a small-scale bloom of a red seaweed was recorded in response to a ship-grounding [30]. Blooms of L. variegata are common in the Caribbean, particularly after the die-off of the sea urchin Diadema [14], [31] and following coral mortality [32], [33] (also personal observations in Islas del Rosario, Colombia and Flower Garden Banks, Gulf of Mexico, GDP and LM).¶ Unexpectedly, the rapid reversal and increase in coral cover did not involve settlement and recruitment of coral larvae. Coral recruitment was generally very low throughout the course of the study at all sites [recruit densities for Middle, Halfway, Barren and North Keppel Islands were 0, <1, <1 and 4 recruits m−2 respectively; Kruskal-Wallis Test indicated no increases in recruit densities through time after the bleaching event, Table 2]. Instead, coral recovery involved a rapid regeneration and regrowth of remnant coral tissue after bleaching mortality, with branches of Acropora emerging from the algal mat to reestablish high cover much faster than could occur from growth of new recruits (Figs. 2, 3). Growth rates of branching Acropora from the Keppel Islands appear unusually high, with rates of calcification nearly 100% faster than those of corals from offshore the GBR (Fig. 4). Linear extension rates of branching Acropora from other Pacific inshore reefs are also extraordinarily high, with mean values of 333 (±42 SD) mm/year [34]. This rapid, vegetative regeneration allowed the corals to out-compete and overgrow the algae settled on dead skeletons.We propose that this unusually rapid and successful regrowth stems from several key factors: i. the strong competitive ability of the corals; ii. the corals' ability to regrow from relatively small amounts of live tissue; iii. and a seasonal dieback in the single species of dominant seaweed. Although overgrowth by seaweeds probably inhibited coral growth, a natural seasonal decline in L. variegata, between December 2006 and March/April 2007 (Fig. 2), markedly reduced the apparent effects of this competitive inhibition. Cover of L. variegata decreased significantly from 50% to <20% in Middle Island and from 75% to 45% in North Keppel Island during that period of time (Table 1; P<0.005 for Tukey's comparisons of August 2006 and March/April 2007 for both islands).

# \*\*\*Water Pollution\*\*\*

## Inevitable

#### Glphosate makes air and water pollution inevitable

Barrett 12 [Mike, main researcher behind Natural Society, Studying the work of top natural health activists, and writing special reports for top 10 alternative health websites, has written hundreds of articles and pages on how to obtain optimum wellness through natural health, founder of NaturalSociety, Mike focuses on getting life-saving natural health techniques out to the world in a timely and efficient manner, syndicating his articles around the web, “Causes of Water Pollution – GMO Farming, Glyphosate Big Contributors” June 28, 2012, http://naturalsociety.com/glyphosate-causes-of-water-pollution/ SS]

Water pollution and air pollution has been and continues to be a serious issue in many nations. Both of these pollution types are successfully bringing down the health of not only humans, but also animals, plant life, and the ecosystem as a whole. While the causes of water pollution and causes of air pollution are many, research is actually pointing a straight finger at GMO farming and chemicals like glyphosate for being important culprits.¶ Causes of Water Pollution – GMO Farming, Glyphosate Big Contributors¶ One groundbreaking study found that glyphosate, the active ingredient residing in the ever-so-popular Roundup product from Monsanto, is making its way into groundwater across the nation through widespread contamination of aquifers, wells, and springs. The explosive study that confirmed the contamination effect of Monsanto’s Roundup was published in the journal Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry in late 2011, where researchers discovered that 41% of the 140 groundwater samples taken from Catalonia Spain were actually above the limit of quantification.¶ The findings indicate that glyphosate actually doesn’t break down rapidly in the environment, and is continuously building up in concerning quantities. With glyphosate growing among the causes of water pollution, it is becoming more and more apparent that the chemical is polluting groundwater in alarming quantities, enough to pose a significant threat to the purity of drinking water wherever it is used.¶ How prevalent is this issue, really? One study conducted by a German university found very high concentrations of glyphosate in all urine samples tested. The amount of the chemical found in the urine was quite alarming, with each sample containing concentrations of 5 to 20-fold the limit established for drinking water. Unfortunately, the study doesn’t clearly say how many samples were tested for, and needs to be translated using one of the many translators available.¶ In addition, the issue of water contamination is only part of the pollution problem. Other findings, published in the journal Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, came across glyphosate in 60-100% of all air and rain samples tested for. This shows that glyphosate is not only among causes of water pollution, but also resides in the air due to massive overuse.¶ While GMO farmers and other individuals using Roundup are the heavy contributors, biotechnology giant Monsanto is ultimately fueling water pollution surrounding glyphosate involvement. Monsanto is the world’s largest provider and producer of glyphosate, and dominates the genetically modified crops market. With many of Monsanto’s GM crops being resistant to glyphosate-containing Roundup, glyphosate is sprayed in massive amounts in order to function properly against the resistant crops. In fact, 88,000 tons were used in the US in 2007 alone.