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While the aff may withdraw military presence, they do not get to the core question of how the US maintains imperial power. Exercises in military and economic power go hand-in-hand. Imperial power expands through the presentation of US goals as universally good.

MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Women’s Studies, Syracuse

University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent, <http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf>)

In a May 2003 interview the writer and activist Arundhati Roy identifies the checkbook and the cruise missile as the tools of corporate led globalization. If the checkbook (read economic control) doesn’t work, as in Argentina, then the cruise missile will—as in Iraq (Barsamian, 2004): an apt description of unilateral, corporatist, US empire. This combination of economic control and physical violence and destruction has a centuries old legacy of colonialism and imperialism. In 2006, however, it is important to specify how the colonial traffics in the imperial. Post-cold war, and post-1989, we enter an era of accelerated forms of corporate and militarized rule, with the US emerging as the lead bully on the block, ably assisted of course by the UK. If, as a rather incisive 1942 Fortune magazine editorial claimed, the representatives of the British empire were ‘salesmen and planters’, and of the post-WWII American empire were ‘brains and Bulldozers, technicians and machine tools’,1 the current representatives of US empire may be corporate executives and military and security personnel—those who wield the checkbook and the cruise missile. Each of these groups of imperial actors—the salesmen and planters, the brains and technicians, and the executives and military/security personnel tell very particular stories—not just of political economy and territorial control but also of the gender and color of empire, of racialized patriarchies and heteronormative sexualities of empire at different historical junctures. These stories (and others like them) necessitate mapping a landscape where corporate cultures of power, domination and surveillance coincide with a politics of complicity in the academy and elsewhere. One way to address the politics of complicity is to analyze the languages of imperialism and empire deployed explicitly by the US State, and sometimes adopted uncritically by progressive scholars and activists alike. In a provocative essay called ‘Imperial Language’, Marilyn Young argues that the languages of imperialism and empire are distinct, even contradictory (Young, 2005). She distinguishes between the language of empire and the language of imperialism whereby the former is ‘benign, nurturing, polysyllabic’, and the latter, the language of ‘the act of creating and sustaining empire. . .immediate. direct, often monosyllabic’. She goes on to claim that at this time both languages dovetail in the recreation of an Anglo-American ‘colonizing, warrior past’ (p. 40)—a clear instance then of the colonial trafficking in the imperial. What role have US feminists who supported the Bush administration’s war in the name of ‘rescuing’ Afghan and Iraqi women played in this narrative of empire and imperialism? This is one of the questions we need to pose to address the politics of complicity and dissent within contemporary feminist projects.

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US imperialist practices result in racism, sexism, and violence on the population. This militarization of daily life is vital to the maintenance of empire.

MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Women’s Studies, Syracuse

University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent, <http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf>)

The clearest effects of US empire building in the domestic arena are thus evident in the way citizenship has been restructured, civil rights violated and borders repoliced since the commencement of the war of drugs, and now the war on terrorism and the establishment of the homeland security regime. While the US imperial project calls for civilizing brown and black (and now Arab) men and rescuing their women outside its borders, the very same state engages in killing, imprisoning, and criminalizing black and brown and now Muslim and Arab peoples within its own borders. Former political prisoner Linda Evans (2005) calls the US a ‘global police state’ one that has adopted a mass incarceration strategy of social control since the Reagan years. Analyzing the militarization of US society, Evans argues that the new definition of ‘domestic terrorism’ heralds the now legal return of the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that conducted illegal covert operations in the 1960s and 1970s against the Black Panther party, the American Indian movement, the Puerto Rican Independence movement, and left/socialist organizations. Racial profiling, once illegal, is now legitimated as public policy, including a requirement that Arab and Muslim men from over 25 countries register and submit to INS interrogation. Similarly, Julia Sudbury analyzes the global crisis and rise in the mass incarceration of women, suggesting that we must be attentive to ‘the ways in which punishment regimes are shaped by global capitalism, dominant and subordinate patriarchies and neocolonial, racialized ideologies’ (see Sudbury, 2005, p. xiii). This prison industrial complex is supported by the militarization of domestic law enforcement. As Anannya Bhattacharjee (2002) suggests, there have been dramatic increases in funding, increasing use of advanced military technology, sharing of personnel and equipment with the military, and the general promotion of a war-like culture in domestic law enforcement and also in a range of public agencies (welfare, schools, hospitals—and now universities?) that are subjected to an accelerated culture of surveillance and law enforcement (see Silliman & Bhattacharjee, 2002). The effects of these conjoined economic/military policies of the US imperial state represents an alarming increase of violence against women, children and communities bearing the brunt of US military dominance around the world. In the US, policies clearly target poor and immigrant communities. In her new work, Jacqui Alexander (2005) analyzes the primacy of processes of heterosexualization in the consolidation of empire. She suggests that the mobilization of the loyal heterosexual citizen patriot is achieved through the collapse of constructions of the enemy, the terrorist and the sexual pervert. Similarly, Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai (2002) analyze the ‘terrorism’ industry since 9/11, exploring the production of the monster, the fag, and the terrorist as figures of surveillance and criminalization. This clearly gendered, sexualized, and racialized culture of militarism and surveillance is buttressed by a hegemonic culture of consumption and neo-liberal conservatism wherein discourses of advancement and technological superiority, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiments dovetail with ideologies of patriotism, and faith-based initiatives and ideologies to justify the war at home and the war abroad. Take Abu Ghraib for instance.

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Vote negative to question the epistemological foundations of empire. US neo-imperialism sustains itself by controlling the boundaries of knowledge. Only exposing the epistemic violence of imperialism can offer ways of knowing that counteract the violence and elitism of US empire.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

In this context, it is important to note that **we understand** a **social theory as a** map or a **guide to the social sphere**. In a research context, **it** does not determine how we see the world but **helps us devise** questions and **strategies for exploring it**. **A critical** social **theory is concerned** in particular **with issues of power and justice and the ways** that the economy; matters of race, class, and gender; **ideologies; discourses**; education; religion **and other** social **institutions**; and cultural dynamics **interact to construct a social system** (Beck-Gernsheim, Butler, & Puigvert, 2003; Flccha, Gomez, & Puigvert, 2003). Thus, in this context we seek to provide a view of an evolving criticality or a reconceptualized critical theory. Critical theory is never static; it is always evolving, changing in light of both new theoretical insights and new problems and social circumstances. The list of concepts elucidating our articulation of critical theory indicates a criticality informed by a variety of discourses emerging after the work of the Frankfurt School Indeed, some of the theoretical discourses, while referring to themselves as critical, directly call into question some of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Thus, diverse theoretical traditions have informed our understanding of criticality and have demanded understanding of diverse forms of oppression including class, race, gender, sexual, cultural, religious, colonial, and ability-related concerns. The evolving notion of criticality we present is informed by, while critiquing, the post-discourses—for example, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. In this context, critical theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life and human experience. In this context, criticality and the research it supports are always evolving, always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. Operating in this way, an evolving criticality is always vulnerable to exclusion from the domain of approved modes of research. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. In the epistemological domain, white, male, class elitist, heterosexist, imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality. Indeed, the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics. Such proponents assert that critical theory is well-served by drawing upon numerous liberatory discourses and including diverse groups of marginalized peoples and their allies in the nonhierarchical aggregation of critical analysts {Bello, 2003; Clark, 2002; Humphries, 1997). In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue—as we do in more detail later in this chapter—that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments from Iran (Kincheloe, 2004), Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to Liberia (when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham (McLaren, 2003a, 2003b; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2002; McLaren & Martin, 2003). Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that is shamefully using the terrorist attacks of September 11 to advance a ruthless imperialist agenda fueled by capitalist accumulation by means of the rule of force (McLaren & Farahmandpur,2003). Chomsky (2003), for instance, has accused the U.S. government of the "supreme crime" of preventive war (in the case of its invasion of Iraq, the use of military force to destroy an invented or imagined threat) of the type that was condemned at Kuremburg. Others, like historian Arthur Schlesinger (cited in Chomsky, 2003), have likened the invasion of Iraq to Japan's "day of infamy'' that is, to the policy that imperial Japan employed at the time of Pearl Harbor. David G. Smith (2003) argues that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire. Thus, in the 21 st century, critical theorists

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must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods about countries such as Iraq and Iran. U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes. Obviously, an evolving criticality does not promiscuously choose theoretical discourses to add to the bricolage of critical theories. It is highly suspicious—as we detail later—of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory—no matter how fashionable—that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure. The following is an elastic, ever-evolving set of concepts included in our evolving notion of criticality. With theoretical innovations and shifting Zeitgeists, they evolve. The points that are deemed most important in one time period pale in relation to different points in a new era. <P306-307>

\*\* Links\*\*

Link – State

State action requires a build up of empire through the militarization of daily life. This ratchets up racist, sexist, and directly violent policies on the population.

MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Women’s Studies, Syracuse

University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent, <http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf>)

In an earlier essay charting the colonial legacies and imperial practices of the late twentieth century US State, Jacqui Alexander and I (1997) argued that the US State facilitates the transnational movement of capital within its own borders as well as internationally. We referred to the US State as an ‘advanced capitalist’ state with an explicit imperial project, engaged in practices of re-colonization, prompting the reconfiguration of economic, political, and militarized relationships globally. We argued that postcolonial and advanced capitalist states had specific features in common. They own the means of organized violence, which is often deployed in the service of national security. Thus, for instance, the USA Patriot Act is mirrored by similar post-9/11 laws in Japan and India. Second, the militarization of postcolonial and advanced capitalist states essentially means the re-masculinization of the state apparatus, and of daily life. Third, nation-states invent and solidify practices of racialization and sexualization of their peoples, disciplining and mobilizing the bodies of women, especially poor and third world women, as a way of consolidating patriarchal and colonizing processes. Thus the transformation of ‘private’ to ‘public’ patriarchies in multinational factories, and the rise of the international ‘maid trade’, the sex tourism industry, global militarized prostitution, and so on. Finally, nation-states deploy heterosexual citizenship through legal and other means. Witness the US ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’/gays in the military debate in the Clinton years, and decade-long national struggles over the Defense of Marriage Act of 1993, as well as similar debates about sexuality and criminalization in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago.3 The deployment of race, gender, sexuality, and class in the internal and external disciplining of particular groups evident in the Bush/Cheney war state necessitates looking at these analytic and experiential categories simultaneously, and, since 9/11, the acceleration of the project of US empire necessitates developing a feminist antiimperialist frame. US feminists have always engaged the US nation-state, but it was always the ‘democratic’ nation-state that merited such attention—not the ‘imperialist’ US State. Feminist engagement in the latter context requires making the project of empire visible in the gendered and sexualized state practices of the US, looking simultaneously at the restructuring of US foreign and domestic policy. It also requires an explicit analysis of the complicities and potentially imperialist complicities of US feminism. And it requires examining feminism’s own alternative citizenship projects in relation to racialized stories of the nation, of home and belonging, insiders and outsiders. Both US foreign policy and domestic policy at this time are corporate and military driven. Both have led to the militarization of daily life around the world and in the US—specifically for immigrants, refugees, and people of color—and militarization inevitably means mobilizing practices of masculinization and heterosexualization.4 Both can be understood through a critique of the racialized and gendered logic of a civilizational narrative mobilized to create and recreate insiders and outsiders in the project of empire building. Thus, for instance, as Miriam Cooke (2002) argues, ‘saving’ brown women in Afghanistan justifies US imperial aggression (the rescue mission of civilizing powers), just as the increased militarization of domestic law enforcement, the border patrol, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration) can be justified in the name of a War on Drugs, a War on Poverty, and now a War on Terrorism.

Link – Soft Power

The benevolence of the United States is another form of imperialism.

Kaplan in 4 (Amy, President of the American Studies Association, American Quarterly, Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, 56(1), p. 4-5)pl

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the “reluctant imperialist.”10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in “Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World”: “The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society.”11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image.

Usage of soft power is the basis of imperialism.

Mabee in 4 (Bryan, Sr. lecturer at Oxford Brookes Institute, Third World Quarterly, Discourses of Empire: The US 'Empire', Globalisation and International Relations, 25(8), p. 1365-1366)pl

In terms of the first, the present system of economic globalisation is often compared to the open international economy of the late-nineteenth century: as Krugman puts it, 'it is a late twentieth-century conceit that we invented the global economy yesterday'.43 This has been primarily discussed in terms of the level of international trade, the mobility of capital and the overall high interdependence of the era of the Gold Standard. As Hirst and Thompson summarise, 'the level of autonomy under the Gold Standard up to the First World War was much less for the advanced economies than it is today. This is not to minimise the level of that integration now ... but merely to register a certain scepticism over whether we have entered a radically new phase in the internationalisation of economic activity' .4 However, narrowly focusing on the economic openness misses the connection between economic power and globalisation. Ferguson has described the period as 'Anglobalisation', pointing specifically to the connection between empire and an open international economy.45 While similar arguments have been made within international relations regarding the development of hegemonic power, these arguments tend to avoid the questions concerning the imperial nature of Britain's hegemony in comparison to today.46 While it is certainly not the case that all historical empires were 'empires of trade', the comparison between the present system and the nineteenth century is useful for the parallels with the global economy and the ideology surrounding the pursuit of an open economy. The guiding role of British informal rule in the nineteenthc entury was to 'open up' states to British commerce47 A nd the role of this facet of globalisation is no different, according to both proponents and critics. Along these lines as well, the force of American 'soft power', as Nye has described it, should not be seen as detrimental to empire, but conducive of it.48 Soft power, in essence, also forms one part of a drive to gain a legitimate basis for imperial rule.

Link – Soft Power

Diplomatic measures of the US disguise neo-imperialism.

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam and Scott, Dir. of the Clinton Institute for American Studies and dir. Of Center for US foreign policy, American Quarterly, Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy, 57(2), p. 310-311)pl

“Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”5 In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.6 However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire. The term “public diplomacy” was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to “describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda” under control of the U.S. government.7 As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both “public” and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through emphasis on its role as “an applied transnational science of human behaviour.”8 The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundations and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-established laboratory for the study of public opinion and of cross-cultural knowledge in service of the state.9 American studies, of course, has had a particularly dramatic entanglement with public diplomacy and the cold war contest for “hearts and minds,” and legacies of that entanglement still haunt the field imaginary today.10 We do not intend to directly revisit that history here, but we do contend that the current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic for critical study by American studies scholars, in particular as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism. In this essay we posit a need to retheorize the modes and meanings of public diplomacy in order to reconsider the ways in which the power of the American state is manifested in its operations beyond its national borders, and to examine the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking shaped by the operations of this power. At issue is not so much the way in which American studies has been shaped internationally through diplomatic patronage (though this remains an important and underexamined issue) but rather the articulation of field identities in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures.

Link – Soft Power

Imperialism has been masked by soft power and new ideologies.

Mooers in 6 (Colin, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 2-3)pl

Because of this fact, contemporary imperialism has had to drape itself in new ideological clothes; its defenders must now speak the language of democracy and human rights; of freedom and dignity; of inclusiveness and respect for difference; of gender equality and the alleviation of poverty; of good governance and sustainable development. Alongside these decidedly modernist tropes, others have appealed to the timeless verities of human nature or culture to justify the inevitability of war and empire. Still others have touted the supposedly beneficent legacy of older imperialisms. Such juxtapositions are in keeping with “a deep and perplexing doubleness” of the new imperialism: a primal military atavism reminiscent of older forms of empire combined with the “spectacular” deployment of up-to-the-minute technologies of mass deception and distraction.4 Taken as a whole, the new ideologies of empire express the same contradictory combination of the retrogressive and the modern: of civilizational clashes and democratic ideals; of virulent racism and postmodern multiculturalism; of gender equality and religious oppression; of old-fashioned propaganda and newfangled forms of “soft power”; of torture and human rights. Against this backdrop, it would be easy to lose sight of the difference between ideologies and lies. However, ideologies are different from lies even if they are sometimes (as in the case of Iraq) bolstered by lies. For ideologies to work, they must speak to some genuine longing on the part of those who believe in them, however distorted these desires have become by the realities of exploitation and domination. Hence the talk of democracy and freedom. But, like lies, ideologies often involve a good deal of self-delusion on the part of those who traffic in them – how else to explain the debacle of post-invasion Iraq? The systematic character of imperial self-delusion is perhaps best captured in U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s tortured explication of military ignorance: As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also the unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.5 As Slavoj Zizek observes, the one category that Rumsfeld failed to mention were the “unknown knowns”: beliefs or practices – like the horrors of Abu Ghraib – which must be quickly repressed since their knowledge is too much for consciousness to bear. Zizek contends that the real danger for the American empire lies not in the threats which lie undiscovered, but “in the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about.”6 Be that as it may, a good deal of conscious effort has been expended to justify and normalize the “new imperialism.” It is a mark of the times in which we live that the discourse of empire and imperialism – not so long ago considered an antique preoccupation of the Left – has been embraced by mainstream intellectuals from across the political spectrum. But, before examining these apologias in detail in the essays that follow, we need to ask: what has prompted this sudden desire to reclaim the language of empire? What changes in the global balance of forces account for this momentous ideological shift?

Link – Soft Power

Softpower is not benign-the expansion of influence through seemingly harmless institutions is still intertwined with an oppressive form of power. It limits the scope of what constitutes legitimate knowledge and allows oppression to seem natural and inevitable.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 2k5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

A Reconcept utilized Critical Theory of Power; Hegemony. Our conception of a reconceptualized critical theory is intensely concerned with the need to understand the various and complex ways that power operates to dominate and shape consciousness. Power, critical theorists have learned, is an extremely ambiguous topic that demands detailed study and analysis. A consensus seems to be emerging among criticalists that power is a basic constituent of human existence that works to shape the oppressive and productive nature of the human tradition. Indeed, we are all empowered and we are all unempowered, in that we all possess abilities and we are all limited in the attempt to use our abilities. Because of limited space, we will focus here on critical theory's traditional concern with the oppressive aspects of power, although we understand that an important aspect of critical research focuses on the productive aspects of power—its ability to empower, to establish a critical democracy, to engage marginalized people in the rethinking of their sociopolitical role (Apple, 19%; Fiske, 1993; A.M.A. Freire. 2000; Giroux, 1997; Macedo, 1994; Nicholson & Seidman, 1995). In the context of oppressive power and its ability to produce inequalities and human suffering, Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony is central to critical research. Gramsci understood that dominant power in the 20th century was not always exercised simply by physical force but also was expressed through social psychological attempts to win people's consent to domination through cultural institutions such as the media, the schools, the family, and the church. Gramscian hegemony recognizes that the winning of popular consent is a very complex process and must be researched carefully on a case-by-case basis. Students and researchers of power, educators, sociologists, all of us are hegemonized as our field of knowledge and understanding is structured by a limited exposure to competing definitions of the sociopolitical world. The hegemonic field, with its bounded sociopsychological horizons, garners consent to an inequitable power matrix—a set of social relations that are legitimated by their depiction as natural and inevitable. In this context, critical researchers note that hegemonic consent is never completely established, as it is always contested by various groups with different agendas (Grossberg, 1997; Lull, 1995; McLaren. 1995a, 1995b; McLaren, Hammer, Reilly, & Shollc, 1995; West, 1993). We note here that Gramsci famously understood Marx's concept of laws of tendency as implying a new immanence and a new conception of necessity and freedom that cannot be grasped within a mechanistic model of determination (Bensaid.2002). A Reconceptualized Critical Theory of Power: Ideology. Critical theorists understand that the formation of hegemony cannot be separated from the production of ideology. If hegemony is the larger effort of the powerful to win the consent of their "subordinates," then ideological hegemony involves the cultural forms, the meanings, the rituals, and the representations that produce consent to the status quo and individuals' particular places within it. Ideology vis-a-vis hegemony moves critical inquirers beyond explanations of domination that have used terms such as "propaganda" to describe the ways media, political, educational, and other sociocultural productions coercively manipulate citizens to adopt oppressive meanings. A reconceptualized critical research endorses a much more subtle, ambiguous, and situationally specific form of domination that refuses the propaganda model's assumption that people are passive, easily manipulated victims. Researchers operating with an awareness of this hegemonic ideology understand that dominant ideological practices and discourses shape our vision of reality (Lemke, 1995,1998). Thus, our notion of hegemonic ideology is a critical form of epistemological constructivism buoyed by a nuanced understanding of powers complicity in the constructions people make of the world and their role in it (Kincheloc, 1998). Such an awareness corrects earlier delineations of ideology as a monolithic unidirectional entity that was imposed on individuals by a secret cohort of ruling-class czars. Understanding domination in the context of concurrent struggles among different classes, racial and gender groups, and sectors of capital, critical researchers of ideology explore the ways such competition engages different visions, interesls, and agendas in a variety of social locales—venues previously thought to be outside the domain of ideological struggle (Brosio, 1994; Steinberg, 2001). <309-310>

Link – Soft Power

Soft power disguises the US' cultural imperialism.

Mirrlees in 6 (Tanner, member of York and Ryerson Uni.’s Joint Program of Communication and Culture, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 208-209)pl

Second, Nye describes soft power as the noncoercive means through which the U.S. state struggles to organize the consent of non-American states, organizations, and populations to the values associated with American national identity (soft power in the first instance). Soft power “is the ability [of the American state] to get what it want[s] through attraction rather than coercion or payments,”29 “co-opts people rather than coerces,”30 and has “the ability to attract.”31 The U.S. state’s central instruments of soft power are government communication and cultural agencies and corporate media industries. Government soft power apparatuses include: the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy, the radio station Voice of America, the universities, the military (including psychological warfare operations), and the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). Corporate industries of American soft power include: Hollywood and television, news media, nongovernmental organizations (N.G.O.’s), U.S. corporations and their commodities, and the art market. In Nye’s third description, soft power refers to something akin to U.S. ideological dominance or global hegemony. Soft power describes the extent to which America is perceived as a morally legitimate global leader by non-American states, organizations, and populations: “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its domestic and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”32 Here, soft power (as consent to America’s morally legitimate global leadership) appears as the desired effect or outcome of soft power in the second sense: the U.S. state’s strategies and means of ideological suasion, its struggle on the terrain of communication and media culture to manufacture and organize international consent to the values of America’s national identity. Nye rationalizes American soft power by investing it with two moral functions. American soft power’s first moral obligation is to rid the world of the evils of terrorist networks,33 and thus is aligned with the Bush administration’s national and global security imperatives. Soft power’s second moral duty is to help the Middle East to modernize more efficiently,34 and thus bestows America with a new white man’s burden, a civilizing mission. Nye’s political solution to the apparent problem of Middle Eastern anti-modernity is soft power, which must educate people there about the just and benevolent intentions of America. Nye recommends that the public diplomacy missionaries of American soft power work with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya to respond to what he feels is distorted coverage of U.S. intervention, explain U.S. foreign policies more effectively, and “develop a long term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges that develop a richer and more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries.”35 Like the colonialist intelligentsia of the British Empire that rationalized cultural imperialism as part of a civilizing mission to bring a backward Other into modernity, Nye imagines America and American soft power as bringing enlightenment to the Middle East. The process and effect to which Nye’s soft power discourse refers resembles the process and effect once described by the critical discourse of U.S. cultural imperialism. Government communication apparatuses and corporate media globally export and legitimize American values to international audiences. The ideal effect of this process is the organization of international consent to American values, the establishment of America’s moral legitimacy as a global superpower, and the realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives (which entails the remaking of different social formations in America’s image).However, by denying the existence of an American empire and universalizing American multiculturalism as reflective of an emergent global culture, Nye attempts to differentiate his soft power discourse from the discourse of U.S. cultural imperialism.

Link – Soft Power

Soft power is a means by which the US masks its imperialism and increases its hegemony.

Mirrlees in 6 (Tanner, member of York and Ryerson Uni.’s Joint Program of Communication and Culture, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 222-223)pl

Writing from prison, Antonio Gramsci considered the relation between intellectuals and their concepts and politics and political struggles.104 Organic intellectuals fought for and attempted to represent the struggles and experiences of oppressed groups while bourgeois intellectuals worked on behalf of and represented the struggles and world-view of dominant groups. Intellectuals, organic or bourgeois, articulated the ideological terrain on which struggles for political hegemony between social groups were organized. With the discourse of American soft power, bourgeois intellectuals like Nye, Armistead, and Fraser represent the beliefs, values, and ideas that are functional or intrinsic to U.S. imperial hegemony. Their discourse on soft power defends and advocates the instrumentality of government communication apparatuses and corporate media to U.S. foreign policy. Soft power serves U.S. foreign policy interests, which Nye, Armistead, and Fraser construe as universally applicable, morally righteous, and contextually necessary. The ideal effect of soft power is the extension of U.S. imperial hegemony, the universalization of American culture, and the establishment of infrastructures and cultural ideologies that are amenable to a U.S.-led global capitalist system. Thus, the bourgeois discourse of American soft power normalizes the processes that were once criticized by organic Marxist intellectuals as cultural imperialism. As much as the discourse on soft power can be understood as an intellectual contribution to U.S. imperial hegemony, it should also be read as an imaginary political solution to the crisis and contradictions of U.S. imperial hegemony at the present time. The very historical existence of the discourse of American soft power, which seeks to redress the violent excesses of neoconservative power politics with better propaganda, which seeks resolve the global failure of neoliberalism with more ideological fixes, and which seeks to remedy American conceit with a contemporary dosage of public diplomacy, is a reminder that U.S. imperial hegemony is not complete. This symptom, which points to and attempts to resolve the cultural contradictions of the U.S. empire today, gives the world’s organic media alliances and networks good reason to challenge American soft power as U.S. cultural imperialism.

Link – Soft Power

New imperialism takes the form of soft power

Betts 7 (Paul, Reader in Modern German History at the University of Sussex, “The Rise and Fall of the American 'Soft' Empire” Pg 336

But not everyone is rewriting the ‘American Century’ as a story of the renaissance of Old World imperialism. A very important alternative view is presented in Victoria DeGrazia’s Irresistible Empire, published in 2005. In it she makes a very strong case for interpreting America’s twentieth-century global dominion as not based on coercion, but rather on persuasion and its ability to deliver a certain notion of the good life. This, she contends, distinguished the American ‘Market Empire’ from its nineteenth-century European forerunners. As DeGrazia put it her introduction, America ‘ruled by the pressure of its markets, the persuasiveness of its models, and, if relatively little by sheer force of arms in view of its wide power, very forcefully by exploiting the peaceableness of its global project in a century marked by others’ as well as its own awful violence’ (p. 3). As such DeGrazia is primarily concerned with chronicling the rise of the US as the world’s first ‘informal empire’ that won over its adherents by peddling an attractive package of political peace, commercial prosperity and ‘material civilization’. Not for nothing does she begin her book with a remarkable speech by President Woodrow Wilson at the World’s Salesmanship Congress in Detroit in 1916, in which he insisted ‘that statecraft could find leverage in the physical needs, psychic discomforts, and situations of social unease being unleashed by the new material civilization of mass consumption’ (p. 2). This was the American remake of the nineteenth-century imperial ‘civilizing mission’. A clutch of books in the last decade or so has recounted the rise of American consumer culture, showing how this dream of the good life eventually became its guiding ideology and even national identity. American historians and European cultural critics alike have long taken seriously the revolutionary power of consumerism as social re-engineering, radically transforming the lives, dreams and communities of modern citizens in fundamentally novel ways. What distinguishes DeGrazia’s work from theirs, however, is the way that she locates the modernization of Europe in a transatlantic setting. In particular she advances the provocative thesis that the cultural conquest of Europe was in many ways the main test ground for America’s ‘Market Empire’. ‘In the process of challenging Europe’s bourgeois commercial civilization and overturning its old regime’, she asserts, the United States established its legitimacy as the world’s first regime of mass consumption . . . It also established an alternative to the foundering 336 History Workshop Journal effort of European societies, both to satisfy their own citizens’ mounting demands for a decent level of living and, building on the legacy of earlier revolutionary traditions, to champion such a standard for the larger world (p. 5).

Link – Softpower 🡪 Cultural Imperialism

Neoliberalists advocate the usage of soft power to universalize American ideals. "Threats" are co-opted by cultural imperialism.

Mirrlees in 6 (Tanner, member of York and Ryerson Uni.’s Joint Program of Communication and Culture, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 219-220)pl

First, America, which fights the most wars, overconsumes world resources more than any other country, and requires the underdevelopment of other nations to sustain its growth, is not a sustainable model for global cultural development. Fraser’s argument that the rest of the world could one day be just like American culture, and that America could allow this to happen, is naïve. Second, Fraser ridicules all paths to global development that provide an alternative to America’s neoliberal prescriptions for culture. Struggles for national cultural sovereignty and the decolonization of culture undertaken by many non-Americans in postcolonial countries through the late twentieth century are reduced to the economic opportunism of bloated union bureaucracies and the political interests of corrupt party elites. Multilateral approaches to global communicational and cultural development are also unacceptable. The cultural aspirations of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s at U.N.E.S.C.O. are reduced to irrational anti-Americanism and Marxist diatribe. In sum, Fraser reductively dismisses alternative paths to global cultural development that fail to abide by the principles of his neoliberal ideology. But Fraser’s praise for the universalization of American culture does not stop here. He advocates the aggressive use of soft power to assimilate cultures that are hostile to American and Western values.91 American soft power must be strategically deployed to pre-empt the end of Western civilization, save the world from the possibility of global anarchy, and defend the U.S. empire and global capitalism from attacks by terrorists.92 The final paragraph of Fraser’s text typifies the Americacentrism that guides his moralistic rationalization of American soft power: “America’s weapons of mass destruction are not only necessary for global stability, but also should be built up and deployed more assertively throughout the world. The world needs more M.T.V., McDonald’s, Microsoft, Madonna, and Mickey Mouse. Yes, things really do go better with Coke.”93

**US imperialism causes cultural rifts.**

Layne 2 (Christopher, “Offshore Balancing Revisited”, associate professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington\_quarterly/v025/25.2layne.html) JL

The U.S. role in the Gulf has rendered it vulnerable to a hegemonic backlash on several levels. First, some important states in the region (including Iran and Iraq) aligned against the United States because they resented its intrusion into regional affairs. Second, in the Gulf and the Middle East, the self-perception among both elites and the general public that the region has [End Page 240] long been a victim of "Western imperialism" is widespread. In this vein, the United States is viewed as just the latest extraregional power whose imperial aspirations weigh on the region, which brings a third factor into play. Because of its interest in oil, the United States is supporting regimes--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirates--whose domestic political legitimacy is contested. Whatever strategic considerations dictate that Washington prop up these regimes, that it does so makes the United States a lightning rod for those within these countries who are politically disaffected. Moreover, these regimes are not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power. Because they are concerned about inflaming public opinion (the much talked about "street"), both their loyalty and utility as U.S. allies are, to put it charitably, suspect. Finally, although U.S. hegemony is manifested primarily in its overwhelming economic and military muscle, the cultural dimension to U.S. preeminence is also important. The events of September 11 have brought into sharp focus the enormous cultural clash, which inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations," between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology.

Cultural Imperialism k 2 Empire

Cultural imperialism fuels damaging use of capital for the sake of even more power

Harvey 3, (David, The New Imperialism, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, PHD, 2003l [http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf](http://web.me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf))

It is, of course, the populations of those vulnerable territories who then must pay the inevitable price, in terms of loss of assets, loss of jobs, and loss of economic security, to say nothing of the loss of dignity and hope. And by the same logic that has it thatthe most vulnerable territories get hit first, so it is typically the most vulnerable populations within those territories that bear the brunt of any burden. It was the rural poor of Mexico, Thailand, and Brazil who suffered most from the depredations that flowed from the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The very idea that those who irresponsibly lend might also be held responsible is, of course, dismissed out of hand by ruling elites. That would require calling the wealthy property-owning classes everywhere to account and insisting that they look to their responsibilities rather than to their inalienable rights to private property and a satisfactory rate of profit. But, as Joseph Chamberlain found, it is far easier politically to pillage and debase far-away populations (particularly those who are racially, ethnically, or culturally different), than to confront overwhelming capitalist class power at home. The sinister and destructive side of spatial-temporal fixes to the overaccumulation problem becomes just as crucial an element within the historical geography of capitalism as does its creative counterpart in building a new landscape to accommodate both the endless accumulation of capital and the endless accumulation of political power.

Cultural Imperialism becomes a tool of the government to expand its own power, at the sake of serious global damage

Harvey 3, (David, The New Imperialism, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, PHD, 2003l [http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf](http://web.me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf))

Critical engagement over the years with Marx's account of primitive accumulation—which in any case had the quality of a sketch rather than a systematic exploration—suggests some lacunae that need to be remedied. The process of proletarianization, for example, entails a mix of coercions and of appropriations of precapitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of mind, and beliefs on the part of those being proletarianized. Kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations (including those exercised through religion and its institutions) all have their part to play. In some instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exist to suggest that they are just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to forge some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation. Primitive accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession. The conditions of struggle and of working-class formation vary widely and there is, therefore, as Thompson among others has insisted, a sense in which a working class 'makes itself though never, of course, under conditions of its own choosing.7 The result is often to leave a trace of pre-capitalist socialrelations in working-class formation and to create distinctive geographical, historical, and anthropological differentiations in how a working class is denned. No matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the result is not the creation of a homogeneous proletariat.8

Link – Preemption

Preemptive measures come from US imperialism.

Kuang and Bonk in 5 (Xinnian and Jim, prof. of modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University and prof. of East Asian studies at Princeton, Duke University, Preemptive War and a World Out of Control, 13(1), p. 160-161)pl

America’s invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States could withdraw from the United Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism, along with new interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America’s abandonment of both traditional Western international regulatory systems and the principle of rule by law as established under the U.N. charter. Instead, America is bringing about the return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on this shift: “Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody, and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace.” On a visit to Ireland on June 20, 2003, he went on to say, “Any organization, any country, any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations.”4 The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos. The United States’ adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the IraqWar, a deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now frequently affix the label “Old Europe.” Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired theUnited States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order. Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.

Link – Hegemony

US hegemony contributes to imperialism.

Foster in 3 (John, editor of Monthly Review, Monthly Review, The New Age of Imperialism, 55(3), https://www.monthlyreview.org/0703jbf.htm)pl

Imperialism is meant to serve the needs of a ruling class much more than a nation. It has nothing to do with democracy. Perhaps for that reason it has often been characterized as a parasitic phenomenon—even by critics as astute as John Hobson in his 1902 classic, Imperialism: A Study. And from there it is unfortunately all too easy to slide into the crude notion that imperialist expansion is simply a product of powerful groups of individuals who have hijacked a nation’s foreign policy to serve their own narrow ends. Numerous critics of the current expansion of the American empire—both on the U.S. left and in Europe—now argue that the United States under the administration of George W. Bush has been taken over by a neoconservative cabal, led by such figures as Paul Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of defense), Lewis Libby (the vice president’s chief of staff), and Richard Perle (of the Defense Policy Board). This cabal is said to have the strong backing of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney, and, through them, President Bush. The rise to prominence of the neoconservative hegemonists within the administration is thought to have been brought on by the undemocratic 2000 election, in which the Supreme Court appointed Bush as president, and by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which suddenly enlarged the national security state. All of this has contributed, we are told, to a unilateralist and belligerent foreign policy at odds with the historic U.S. role in the world. As the Economist magazine raised this question in its April 26, 2003 issue: “So has a cabal taken over the foreign policy of the most powerful country in the world? Is a tiny group of ideologues using undue power to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, create an empire, trash international law—and damn the consequences?” The Economist’s own answer was “Not really.” Rightly rejecting the cabal theory, it argued instead that “the neo-cons are part of a broader movement” and that a “near-consensus [among U.S. policy elites] is found around the notion that America should use its power vigorously to reshape the world.” The system is polarized at every level into center and periphery. From its beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even more so in the monopoly stage, capital within each nation-state at the center of the system is driven by a need to control access to raw materials and labor in the periphery. In the monopoly stage of capitalism, moreover, nation-states and their corporations strive to keep as much of the world economy as possible open to their own investments, though not necessarily to those of their competitors. This competition over spheres of accumulation creates a scramble for control of various parts of the periphery, the most famous example of which was the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century in which all of the Western European powers of the day took part. Imperialism, however, continued to evolve beyond this classic phase, which ended with the Second World War and subsequent decolonization movement, and in the 1950s and 1960s a later phase presented its own historically specific characteristics. The most important of these was the United States replacing British hegemony over the capitalist world economy. The other was the existence of the Soviet Union, creating space for revolutionary movements in the third world, and helping to bring the leading capitalist powers into a Cold War military alliance reinforcing U.S. hegemony. The United States utilized its hegemonic position to establish the Bretton Woods institutions—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank—with the intention of consolidating the economic control exercised by the center states, and the United States in particular, over the periphery and hence the entire world market. In Magdoff’s conception, the existence of U.S. hegemony did not bring to an end the competition between capitalist states. Hegemony was always understood by realistic analysts as historically transitory, despite the constant references to the “American century.” The uneven development of capitalism meant continual interimperialist rivalry, even if somewhat hidden at times. “Antagonism between unevenly developing industrial centers,” he wrote, “is the hub of the imperialist wheel” (p. 16). U.S. militarism, which in this analysis went hand in hand with its imperial role, was not simply or even mainly a product of the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, by which it was conditioned. Militarism had deeper roots in the need of the United States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world economy, to keep the doors open for foreign investment by resorting to force, if necessary. At the same time, the United States was employing its power where possible to advance the needs of its own corporations—as for example in Latin America where its dominance was unquestioned by other great powers. Not only did the United States exercise this military role on numerous occasions throughout the periphery in the post–Second World War period, but during that period it was also able to justify this as part of the fight against Communism. Militarism, associated with this role as global hegemon and alliance-leader, came to permeate all aspects of accumulation in the United States, so that the term industrial complex,” introduced by Eisenhower in his departing speech as president, was an understatement. Already in his day there was no major center of accumulation in the United States that was not also a major center of military production. Military production helped prop up the entire economic edifice in the United States, and was a factor holding off economic stagnation. In mapping contemporary imperialism, Magdoff’s analysis provided evidence demonstrating how directly beneficial imperialism was to capital within the core of the system (showing, for example, that earnings on U.S. foreign investments, as a percentage of all after-tax profits on operations of domestic nonfinancial corporations, had risen from about 10 percent in 1950 to 22 percent in 1964). The siphoning of surplus from the periphery (and misuse of what surplus remained due to distorted peripheral class relations characteristic of imperial dependencies) was a major factor in perpetuating underdevelopment. Unique and less noticed, however, were two other aspects of Magdoff’s assessment: a warning regarding the growing third world debt trap and an in-depth treatment of the expanding global role of banks and finance capital in general. It wasn’t until the early 1980s that an understanding of the third world debt trap really surfaced when Brazil, Mexico, and other so-called “new industrializing economies” were suddenly revealed to be in default. And the full significance of the financialization of the global economy did not really dawn on most observers of imperialism until late in the 1980s. In this systematic historical approach to the subject of imperialism, as depicted above all by Magdoff, U.S. military interventions in places like Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, were not about “protecting U.S. citizens” or fighting the expansion of the Communist bloc. Rather they belonged to the larger phenomenon of imperialism in all of its historical complexity and to the U.S. role as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world. However, this interpretation was directly opposed by liberal critics of the Vietnam War writing at the same time, who sometimes acknowledged that the United States had been engaged in the expansion of its empire, but saw this, in line with the whole history of the United States, as a case of accident rather than design (as defenders of the British Empire had argued before them). American foreign policy they insisted was motivated primarily by idealism rather than material interests. The Vietnam War itself was explained away by many of these same liberal critics as the result of “poor political intelligence” on the part of powerful policy makers, who had taken the nation off course. In 1971, Robert W. Tucker, professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, wrote The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy in which he argued that the “saving grace” for the United States in Vietnam was the “essentially disinterested character” with which it approached the war (p. 28). Tucker’s perspective was that of a liberal opponent of the war who nonetheless rejected radical interpretations of U.S. militarism and imperialism. Tucker’s main targets in his book were William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Harry Magdoff. Magdoff was attacked specifically for arguing that control of raw materials on a global basis was crucial to U.S. corporations and the U.S. state that served them. Tucker went so far as to claim that the error of Magdoff’s view was shown where the issue of oil arose. If the United States were truly imperialist in its orientation to third world resources, he argued, it would attempt to control Persian Gulf oil. Defying both logic and history, Tucker declared that this was not the case. As he put it: Given the radical view, one would expect that here [in the Middle East], if anywhere, American policy would faithfully reflect economic interests. The reality, as is well known, is otherwise. Apart from the increasing and successful pressures oil countries have employed to increase their royalty and tax income (pressures which have not provoked any notable countermeasures), the American government has contributed to the steady deterioration of the favorable position American oil companies once enjoyed in the Middle East. A New York Times correspondent, John M. Lee, writes: “The remarkable thing to many observers is that the oil companies and oil considerations have had such little influence in American foreign policy toward Israel” (p. 131). The case of Persian Gulf oil, then, according to Tucker, disproved Magdoff’s insistence on the importance of controlling raw materials to the operation of U.S. imperialism. The U.S. political commitment to Israel was counter to its economic interests, but had overridden all concerns of U.S. capitalism with respect to Middle East oil. Today it is hardly necessary to emphasize how absurd this contention was. Not only has the United States repeatedly intervened militarily in the Middle East, beginning with Iran in 1953, but it has also continually sought to promote its control over oil and the interests of its oil corporations in the region. Israel, which the U.S. has armed to the teeth and which has been allowed to develop hundreds of nuclear weapons, has long been part of this strategy of controlling the region. From the first, the U.S. role in the Middle East has been openly imperialistic, geared to maintaining control over the region’s oil resources. Only an analysis that reduced economics to commodity prices and royalty income while ignoring the political and military shaping of economic relations—not to mention the flows of both oil and profits—could result in such obvious errors. Nothing in fact so reveals the new age of imperialism as the expansion of the U.S. Empire in the critical oil regions of the Middle East and the Caspian Sea Basin. U.S. power in the Persian Gulf was limited throughout the Cold War years as a result of the Soviet presence. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, to which the United States was seemingly helpless to respond, was the greatest defeat of U.S. imperialism (which had relied on Shah of Iran as a secure base in the region) since the Vietnam War. Indeed, prior to 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet bloc, a major U.S. war in the region would have been almost completely unthinkable. This left U.S. dominance in the region significantly constrained. The 1991 Gulf War, which was carried out by the United States with Soviet acquiescence, thus marked the beginning of a new age of U.S. imperialism and expansion of U.S. global power. It is no mere accident that the weakening of the Soviet Union led almost immediately to a full-scale U.S. military intervention in the region that was the key to controlling world oil, the most critical global resource, and thus crucial to any strategy of global domination. It is essential to understand that in 1991 when the Gulf War occurred the Soviet Union was greatly weakened and subservient to U.S. policy. But it was not yet dead (that was to occur later on that year) and there was still the possibility, although dim, of a coup or upset and a turnaround in Soviet affairs unfavorable to U.S. interests. At the same time the United States was still in a position where it had lost economic ground to some of its main competitors and hence there was a widespread sense that its economic hegemony had seriously declined, limiting its course of action. Although the administration of George H. W. Bush declared a “New World Order” no one knew what this meant. The collapse of the Soviet bloc had been so sudden that the U.S. ruling class and the foreign policy elites were unsure of how to proceed. During the first Gulf War the U.S. elites were split. Some believed that the U.S. should go on and invade Iraq, as the Wall Street Journal advised at the time. Others thought that an invasion and occupation of Iraq was not then feasible. Over the course of the next decade the dominant topic of discussion in U.S. foreign policy, as witnessed, for example, by the Council on Foreign Relations publication, Foreign Affairs, was how to exploit the fact that the United States was now the sole superpower. Discussions of unipolarity (a term introduced by the neoconservative pundit Charles Krauthammer in 1991) and unilateralism were soon coupled with open discussions on U.S. primacy, hegemony, empire, and even imperialism. Moreover, as the decade wore on, the arguments in favor of the United States exercising an imperial role became more and more pervasive and concrete. Such issues were discussed from the beginning of the new era not in terms of ends but in terms of efficacy. A particularly noteworthy example of the call for a new imperialism could be found in an influential book, entitled The Imperial Temptation, again by Robert W. Tucker, along with David C. Hendrickson, published by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1992. As Tucker and Hendrickson forthrightly explained, The United States is today the dominant military power in the world. In the reach and effectiveness of its military forces, America compares favorably with some of the greatest empires known to history. Rome reached barely beyond the compass of the Mediterranean, whereas Napoleon could not break out into the Atlantic and went to defeat in the vast Russian spaces. During the height of the so-called Pax Britannica, when the Royal Navy ruled the seas, Bismarck remarked that if the British army landed on the Prussian coast he would have it arrested by the local police. The United States has an altogether more formidable collection of forces than its predecessors among the world’s great powers. It has global reach. It possesses the most technologically advanced arms, commanded by professionals skilled in the art of war. It can transport powerful continental armies over oceanic distances. Its historic adversaries are in retreat, broken by internal discord. Under these circumstances, an age-old temptation—the imperial temptation—may prove compelling for the United States....The nation is not likely to be attracted to the visions of empire that animated colonial powers of the past; it may well find attractive, however, a vision that enables the nation to assume an imperial role without fulfilling the classic duties of imperial rule (pp. 14–15). The “imperial temptation,” these authors made clear, was to be resisted less because of the fact that this would have constituted a renewal of classic imperialism, but because the United States was only willing to go half way, unleashing its military force while neglecting to take on the more burdensome responsibilities of imperial rule associated with nation building. Proceeding from a nation-building perspective reminiscent of Kennedy-style Cold War liberalism, but also attractive to some neoconservatives, Tucker and Hendrickson presented the case that the United States, having fought the Gulf War, should have immediately proceeded to invade, occupy, and pacify Iraq, removing the Ba’ath Party from power, thus exercising its imperial responsibility. “The overwhelming display of military power,” they wrote, “would have provided the United States with time to form and recognize a provisional Iraqi government consisting of individuals committed to a broadly liberal platform....Though such a government would undoubtedly have been accused of being an American puppet, there are good reasons for thinking that it might have acquired considerable legitimacy. It would have enjoyed access, under UN supervision, to Iraq’s oil revenues, which surely would have won it considerable support from the Iraqi people” (p. 147). Tucker and Hendrickson—in spite of Tucker’s argument decades earlier against Magdoff, that the failure to seize control of Persian Gulf oil was evidence that the U.S. was not an imperialist power—were under no illusions about why an occupation of Iraq would be in U.S. strategic interest, in one word: “oil.” While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.” Even before September 11, therefore, the ruling class and its foreign policy elites (including those outside neoconservative circles) had moved towards an explicit policy of expanding the American empire, taking full advantage of what was regarded as the limited window brought on by the demise of the Soviet Union—and before new rivals of scale could arise. The 1990s saw the U.S. economy, despite the slow-down in the secular growth trend, advance more rapidly than that of Europe and Japan. This was particularly the case in the bubble years of the latter half of the 1990s. The Yugoslavian civil wars meanwhile demonstrated that Europe was unable to act militarily without the United States. Hence, by the end of the 1990s, discussions of U.S. empire and imperialism cropped up not so much on the left as in liberal and neoconservative circles, where imperial ambitions were openly proclaimed.\* Following September 2001, the disposition to carry out massive military interventions to promote the expansion of U.S. power, in which the United States would once again put its “boots on the ground,” as neoconservative pundit Max Boot expressed it in his book on The Savage Wars of Peace on early U.S. imperialist wars, became part of the dominant ruling class consensus. The administration’s National Security Strategy statement, transmitted to Congress in September 2002, promoted the principle of preemptive attacks against potential enemies and declared: “The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy...to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends....Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” In At War with Ourselves: Why America is Squandering its Chance to Build a Better World (2003), Michael Hirsh, senior editor for Newsweek’s Washington bureau, presents the argument of political liberals that while it is proper for the United States as the hegemonic power to intervene where failed states are concerned, and where its vital strategic interests are at stake, this has to be coupled with nation building and a commitment to broader multilateralism. However, in reality this may only be a “unipolarity...well disguised as multipolarity” (p. 245). This is not a debate about whether the United States should extend its empire, but rather whether the imperial temptation will be accompanied by the assertion of imperial responsibility, in the manner raised by Tucker and Hendrickson. What have been called “nation-building interventions,” originally rejected by the Bush administration, are no longer in question. This can be seen in the Council on Foreign Relations report, Iraq: The Day After, published shortly before the U.S. invasion, and addressing nation building in Iraq. One of the task force members in the development of that report was James F. Dobbins, Director of the Rand Corporation Center for International Security and Defense Policy, who served as the Clinton administration’s special envoy during the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and also as special envoy for the Bush II administration following the invasion of Afghanistan. Dobbins, an advocate for “nation-building interventions”—the diplomacy of the sword—in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, declared definitively in the Council on Foreign Relations report: “The partisan debate over nation-building is over. Administrations of both parties are clearly prepared to use American military forces to reform rogue states and repair broken societies” (p. 48). All of this relates to the question that Magdoff raised more than a third of a century ago in The Age of Imperialism and that is more than ever with us today. “Is the [Vietnam] war,” he asked, “part of a more general and consistent scheme of United States external policies or is it an aberration of a particular group of men in power?” There is now a general agreement within the establishment itself that objective forces and security requirements are driving U.S. expansionism; that it is in the general interest of the high command of U.S. capitalism to extend its control over the world—as far and for as long as possible. According to the Project for the New American Century report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, it is necessary to seize the “unipolar moment.” The wider left’s tendency over the last two years to focus on this new imperialist expansion as a neoconservative project involving a small sector of the ruling class not reaching beyond the right wing of the Republican Party—resting on particular expansive interests in the military and oil sectors—is a dangerous illusion. At present there is no serious split within the U.S. oligarchy or the foreign policy establishment, though these will undoubtedly develop in the future as a result of failures down the road. There is no cabal, but a consensus rooted in ruling class needs and the dynamics of imperialism. There are, however, divisions between the United States and other leading states—intercapitalist rivalry remains the hub of the imperialist wheel. How could it be otherwise when the United States is trying to establish itself as the surrogate world government in a global imperial order? Although the United States is attempting to reassert its hegemonic position in the world it remains far weaker economically, relative to other leading capitalist states, than it was at the beginning of the post–Second World War period. “In the late 1940s, when the United States produced 50 percent of the world’s gross national product (GNP),” James Dobbins stated in Iraq: The Day After, “it was able to perform those tasks [of military intervention and nation-building] more or less on its own. In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Cold War, America was able to lead much broader coalitions and thereby share the burden of nation building much more widely. The United States cannot afford and does not need to go it alone in building a free Iraq. It will secure broader participation, however, only if it pays attention to the lessons of the 1990s as well as those of the 1940s” (pp. 48–49). In other words, for a stagnating U.S. economy that, despite its relative economic gains in the late 1990s, is in a much weaker economic position vis-á-vis its main competitors than in the years following the Second World War, outright hegemonism is beyond its means, and it remains dependent on “coalitions of the willing.” At the same time, it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests. The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly increasing proportion of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United States to gain greater control of these resources—at the expense of its present and potential rivals. But U.S. imperial ambitions do not end there, since they are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in “asymmetric” forms of warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generating a new “Pax Americana” the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances lies in a rising tide of revolt from below, both in the United States and globally. This more than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own—we hope not the world’s—undoing.

Link – Hegemony

Diplomatic measures combined with US hegemony leads to militarism.

Mann in 3 (Michael, Prof. of Sociology at Cambridge, Verso, Incoherent Empire, p. 9)pl

Inside the American military / strategic community – thought not yet in the High Command – it also seemed that the US now had the military wizardry to achieve victory followed by moral good without risking the lives of American soldiers or civilians. Since we now could do these things, they reasoned, why not give it a try? That was the military temptation underlying the shift toward the new imperialism. The new imperialists in charge of the Department of Defense how had the mobilizing power and the budgetary resources to lure the more cautious armed forces into their plans. The notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists. We will see that the so-called new imperialism actually because something much simpler and much nastier – the new militarism. But the new imperialists see their goals as entirely benign. These have been spelled out most fully by neo-conservative journalists and scholars close to the White House. They tend to avoid terms like "militarism" and "imperialism," but they do like the resonance of the noun "Empire" and its adjective "imperial." These terms suddenly seem full of noble, civilizing, even humanitarian sentiments. The Empire will bring peace, freedom and democracy to the world! They will save oppressed peoples from their own "rogue" leaders! Some hark back to the days of the British Empire. This is why I have styled the twoPresidents Bush the Elder and Bush the Younger, recalling the titles of the two Pitts, father and son, the British Prime Ministers who led their country at the height of its imperial greatness. But for most Americans the British analogy raises uncomfortable images of redcoats and taxes.

Hegemony is the backbone of the US imperialist project

Robinson in 5 (Eric, Prof. of classical studies at Indiana University, Classical World, American Empire? Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power, 99(1), p. 35-36)pl

The American Empire, or, more properly, whether America has an empire, is a fiercely debated topic these days. You see the issue arise in newspaper editorials, magazine articles, television discussions, and prominent new books. Historians in particular have taken up the question. The short term cause, of course, is the controversial U.S. invasion and ongoing occupation of Iraq, which has dominated headlines ever since its beginning. But for years before this second U.S.-Iraq war, talk about the United States as Empire had been on the rise, stemming from the fact that since the fall of the Soviet Union the United States has been seen as “the world’s lone superpower.” This phrase is a cliché by now, but it points to an undeniable truth: no other nation on earth comes close to matching America’s combination of military power, military reach, alliances, advanced technology, and economic strength. And since the psychologically devastating attacks on the country on September 11, 2001, American policy has changed regarding the use of its unrivalled power around the globe. In 2002 the president boldly announced a new strategic doctrine of preemption, whereby the United States reserves the right to launch attacks against perceived foes anywhere in the world at any time simply because the government thinks a hostile act might be in the offing somewhere, at some time. In the official U.S. government policy statement “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” one reads: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.1 Combining such ominous policy statements with America’s vast power and especially the campaigns launched in recent years in distant Afghanistan and Iraq—both stunning initial military successes with as yet uncertain long-term political outcomes—one understands how and why many observers have come to see America’s place in the world as increasingly imperial and have sought to compare the “American Empire” with previous empires.

Link – Hegemony

US hegemony is imperialist and contributes to the US empire.

David and Grondin in 6 (Charles-Philippe and David, Raoul Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, prof. of political studies at University of Ottawa, Ashgate, Hegemony or Empire?, p.8-9)pl

Numerous Cold War historians, as well as International Relations (IR) scholars, that have now taken a more historical-materialist approach have suggested that considering the US as an empire through the use of the literature on globalization would provide some better historical and conceptual bases for both areas of thought, as well as providing some insight for the overall context of the present imperial discourse. Furthermore, combining an American empire with globalization could give us a more historicized version of globalization, one that firmly brings power back into the equation, instead of taking globalization as a neutral and/or natural phenomenon. It could also give a more adequate concept of the place of the US in the contemporary international system, and some basis for comparison with the past. This historical sociology argument this makes bringing the US as an empire back into the IR discourse even more relevant, even if it may still be rejected afterwards. In truth, when comparing the United States with other empires one must not forget the context of global capitalism, and especially of globalization. Another thing to be aware of is that in so doing, in comparing US imperialism with other imperialisms from the 19th century onwards, the role of the world order producer of the United States in the prevalent globalized neoliberal hegemony must be accounted for. In many respects, there seems to be intricate relations to be deciphered from the nexus of globalization, security and hegemony/empire that characterizes American power in our time. In effect, the identity politics of the US could diminish the added value of comparative historical analysis. As asserts Martin Coward ,"Often this has been in the unhelpful form of generalizations drawing upon models of imperialism that were designed to explain the colonialist expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And yet it is clear that such models are poorly suited to the analysis of American power in the early twenty-first century – not least because America has always insisted, in its self identity, in that it is an anti-imperial, anti-colonial power." Drawing on the recent literature on a 'new American imperialism/empire', it would consequently become possible to undertake a critique of the new-found US imperial hegemony by way of taking cues from Hardt and Negri's Empire as a deterritorialized and borderless entity. Entering the terrain of this Empire could indeed prove to be a good intellectual strategy if one wishes to understand the complexities of the networks of command and power relations that play in the reordering of global politics that has generally been subsumed under the title of 'globalization'.

Hegemony enables the US to achieve its imperial goals.

Mooers in 6 (Colin, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 5-6)pl

The current round of imperialism, therefore, has as its goal the export and entrenchment of capitalist social-property relations throughout the world; it is about the universalization of capitalism. And just as in earlier phases of capitalism, state military power has been central to the imposition of this new stage of primitive accumulation and enclosure. However, if state military power is still essential for the imposition of capitalism in some parts of the world, and if its spectacular display remains vital to U.S. global hegemony, there is an important sense in which the dynamics of imperialism have changed markedly. Unlike its earlier forms, imperialism today no longer relies on direct colonization. Nor does military rivalry between states over resources and territory exist on the scale that it did in the time of Lenin and Bukharin. But if imperialism is no longer defined by formal empire and military competition, how have militarism and capitalist imperatives become so closely linked in the new imperialism? The simple answer is that in a world comprised of limited territorial states and the global reach of capital, the use of overwhelming military might becomes the only way of policing capitalist interests. When terrorist violence beyond the state is thrown into the mix, the problem becomes even more intractable. For these reasons, a more or less permanent state of warfare – war without end – has become definitive of twenty-first-century capitalism: “Boundless domination of a global economy, and of the multiple states that administer it, requires military action without end, in purpose or time.”12 If a state of permanent war has become the “new normal” of our time, it is clear why the discourse of empire has become so vital to those who defend this new order of things: the domestication of war and imperial conquest has become an urgent ideological imperative.

Link – Economic Growth

Economic success is key to strengthening global influence and soft power.

Jancarik No Date (Peter, MA in Poli-Sci, “On American Imperialism: Position Paper for Globalization and the State”, <http://www.jancarik.net/academic/glob_pospaper1_imperialism_upload.pdf>) MAT

The leitmotif of the article entitled Empire, imperialism and the Bush doctrine does not lie in the question whether United States is or is not an empire, but rather in a more appropriate issue of what kind of empire is it. Not accidentally is United States (US) perceived as an empire: its predecessor can be quite easily traced in Great Britain during its Victorian age (*Pax Britannica)*. An overwhelming success and rise of American economy and military power after the World War II had inevitably led to what is called Pax Americana. A period shorter than fifty years after the end of the war could be defined as an age of two superpowers (US and the Soviet Union) competing for influence in the bipolar world. This age characterized by oscillation of tension and détente had one indisputable advantage: there was a clear and well- organized political, ideological, economic and military enemy embodied in what Ronald Reagan called the evil empire.\* This era, however, had come to an end in the beginning of the 1990s, especially after the sudden implosion of USSR. This had also been the end to the bipolarity and the search for a ‘new world order’ has started. Anyway, the Cold War is over for more than one decade and the role of US in the world has come to a debate. The end of the latent conflict gave way to American optimism and a few writers started to discuss the role of US as a hegemon (Cox, 2004: 588). Cox praises President Clinton for his economic successes that made the United States the most influential country in the world, but on the other hand, he criticizes him for failing to exploit its full potential (Cox, 2004: 591), given the fact that there was no other serious rival in the world.

Link – Economic Growth

Economic principles and diplomacy build upon the image of American soft power. This is used to expand US imperial goals

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, Scott, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, *American Quarterly*, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 57(2)) MAT

Fulbright educational and cultural exchanges, and pointed toward the development of new activities. (We use the term “state-private network” to refer to the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between “official” U.S. agencies and “private” groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy from the early cold war period to today.)13 Legislative backing was obtained in 1948 with the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, for “the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the U.S., its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad . . . to provide a better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and to increase mutual understanding.”14 With these mandates, public diplomacy could carry forth the rhetorical command of the Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” In an expansion supporting, but also constructed as distinct from, the extension of U.S. political and economic influence, U.S. projects by early 1951 covered ninety-three countries, broadcasting in forty-five languages and disseminating millions of booklets, leaflets, magazines, and posters. Touring exhibitions, already established by the late 1940s, received more coherent if often contested support and were common throughout the 1950s.15 In 1953 the organization of public diplomacy moved beyond the State Department with the formation of the autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA) “to tell America’s story to the world.”16 The modern history of U.S. public diplomacy is often focused on the USIA, telling the story of its contributions to the winning of the cold war and of its “decline” as the agency was downsized in the 1990s. This story tends to separate public diplomacy from the system of political warfare that emerged in the late 1940s, limiting understanding of the intersections between overt and covert practices. The overt measures of sponsored media production and cultural exhibitions, though central to the formation of cold war public diplomacy, need, however, to be understood as part of a broader restructuring of the national security state and of a strategic framework designed to promote an “America” that would win a total campaign for “hearts and minds.” The authority granted to the State Department by NSC 4, forged in the immediacy of a crisis in which the NSC feared communists might legitimately take power in France and Italy through elections, was complementary and potentially secondary to another mandate, NSC 4-A, which directed the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.”17 With the threat of French and Italian communism always at the forefront in the wider American objective of securing Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, NSC 4-A, like its more mundane counterpart, was the cornerstone of a regional and indeed global strategy. A special clause in the Marshall Plan, when it was passed in April 1948, set aside 5 percent of “counterpart funds” for undefined operations under NSC 4-A. This translated into hundreds of millions of dollars for propaganda and covert action.18 Thus public diplomacy, beyond providing the informational overlay for “containment,” was already part of a broader operational conception for a more ambitious objective. In May 1948, George Kennan, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, drafted a proposal for “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” against the Soviet Union. The national security state would support “liberation committees” and “underground activities behind the Iron Curtain” as well as “indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World.”19 Victory over the Soviets, achieved with the “liberation” of captive peoples, which went beyond “containment,” would come not only through the reality of American economic and diplomatic superiority but also through the projection of that superiority as inherent to the American system and way of life. The sanction of NSC 4-A and the testing grounds of France and Italy were only the first stages of this campaign. The NSC endorsed Kennan’s plan in November 1948, and within months the Policy Planning Staff, CIA, and Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a new agency created to carry out covert operations, converted the proposal for “a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees” into the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE). The NCFE’s guidelines came from the State Department and 75 percent of its funding from the CIA; its chief executive officers were psychological warfare veterans from the army and the CIA’s forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its best-known operation, Radio Free Europe, was on air in 1951, but even before that, the NCFE was already promoting the idea of liberation from communism through pamphlets, magazines, books, and a Free European University in Strasbourg, France.20

Link – Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a key tool in achieving greater political and hegemonic success. This expands US empire and imperial domination to other countries through a seemingly benign act

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, Scott, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, *American Quarterly*, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 57(2)) MAT

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ignited media discussions about the merits and failings of American public diplomacy and hastened a political review of its role in the planning and execution of foreign policy. U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde, chair of the House International Relations Committee, underlined this role in introducing the Freedom Promotion Act of 2002: “Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”5 In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.6 However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire.

Link – Democracy

US influence is primarily influenced and spread through diplomatic means in order to “sell democracy”

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, Scott, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, *American Quarterly*, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 57(2)) MAT

A week before the terrorist attacks of September 11, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared to a State Department audience: “What are we doing? We’re selling a product. The product we are selling is democracy. It’s the free-enterprise system, the American value system. It’s a product very much in demand. It’s a product that is very much needed.”38 Powell’s assertive promotion of “Brand America” confirmed that the confluence of public relations and public diplomacy in the post–cold war period was now an official platform for strategic communications. The post–9/11 “revival” of public diplomacy was embodied by the appointment in October 2001 of Charlotte Beers as the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. Beers, the former head of the J. Walter Thompson and Ogilvy and Mather advertising agencies, led the “rebranding” of America to counter what she termed “the myths, the biases, the outright lies” being presented about the United States throughout the Muslim world.39 Testifying in her confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she declared that she would communicate “not only the facts but also emotions and feelings” of what it means to be American: “We promote U.S. interests not only through our policies but also in ourbeliefs and values. Never have these intangibles been more important than right now.”40 In speeches and other communications she reiterated this approach, arguing that public diplomacy must present a “total communication effort” by “putting the U.S. in whole context” with “communication that includes rational and logical discourse but also evokes our deepest emotions.” With Beers’s invocation of “the emotional and rational dimensions” of cultural diplomacy, the “hearts and minds” rhetoric of cold war cultural politics had been burnished with the language of public relations.41 At the same time, Beers supported programs using newer technologies and marketing techniques drawn from public relations fields. An Internet campaign to reach Muslims overseas supported the Shared Values initiative, while the State Department revamped its international Web site, seeking to mirror cultural and national concerns in selected regions and to support educational and informational outreach missions across the world. The International Information Programs (IIP) office coordinated the circulation of information as older styles of communications and exchange programming were supplemented and restyled by more “flexible” forms of virtual diplomacy to speed up the delivery and collapse the distance of gathering and dissemination of information. This included, for example, plans to “develop tracking mechanisms for monitoring placement of media products in foreign markets . . . Expand the use of digital video conferencing technology to widen the reach of its newsmaker briefings, linking posts in countries with no U.S.-based journalists to allow their media to ask questions . . . Initiate a new service of thirty-second audio clips from major briefings, web-delivered for posts to market the material to local radio broadcasters and reporters for placement.”44 Beers announced the growing department intent to bring public diplomacy into the cyber age, promising to “continue the premise of the information centers and libraries, many of which were closed in the last ten years. . . . we can do this in a way that is actually an improvement because we can make these a virtual reality. . . . We can ask universities or local libraries or shopping malls to take these rooms. . . . You will walk in, and not only will you get the scholarly references, the computer banks, all of which are made more possible by technology, but you can also use virtual reality to see a small town in America, to have an interview, to listen to someone recite the Declaration of Independence, to hear a beautiful piece of music. That’s the goal.45” The goal was to virtualize the role of public diplomacy “to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves,” reaching beyond the more rarefied spaces of embassy diplomacy to the imaginary sphere of “the Muslim street.”46

Link – Democracy

**The method of promoting democracy is imperialist and undermines democracy**

Monten 5 (Jonathan, Research Fellow, International Security Program“The Roots of The Bush Doctrine” Pg 124 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v029/29.4monten.html) JL

Exemplarists argue that the United States should promote democracy by offering a benign model of a successful liberal-democratic state. The United States should focus on perfecting its own domestic political and social order, and close the gap between the ideals of the American Creed and the actual performance of U.S. political institutions. By this logic, the mechanism of change in international politics is the moral force of the U.S. example. Exemplarism appears to be a more passive and less ambitious approach to democracy promotion. Nonetheless, it advances the overtly strategic claim that the United States can "better serve the cause of universal democracy by setting an example rather than by imposing a model."39 Two corollary arguments tend to be grouped with the nationalist concept ofmission as example. First, exemplarism makes the causal claim that an activist foreign policy undermines liberal domestic political culture and institutions. The external pressures generated by international political and security competition tend to concentrate power in the state, as the processes and mechanisms of creating military power—those institutions that connect the state to its society and enable it to transform societal resources into military capabilities—are also those that tend to promote strong, centralized states.40 Because of its geographic insularity and the absence of immediate military threats, the United States was able to avoid these state-centralizing tendencies in its early political development, and a national political community developed around a set of liberal-democratic principles that necessarily conflicted with the functional, state-centralizing requirements of security and foreign policy institutions. Consequently, exemplarists acknowledge a paradox in which those security and power-creating institutions necessary to project power and advance liberalism abroad are precisely those that threaten liberalism and the American Creed at home, undermining the attraction of the U.S. example. A second corollary is that improving the quality of the U.S. domestic political and social order, in addition to the intrinsic value of reducing the gap [End Page 124] between the American Creed in principle and in practice, serves the strategic purpose of strengthening the attraction of the U.S. liberal example. Exemplarists have historically been more skeptical toward U.S. institutions, or at least more cognizant of the capacity for reform and improvement. Rather than spreading U.S. institutions abroad, exemplarists counsel the somewhat indirect foreign policy strategy of strengthening them at home. The United States has a strategic interest in preserving and improving its own institutions, making its example more compelling. Exemplarism also contains a claim about the efficacy of democracy promotion and the limits to U.S. power. Exemplarists have been comparatively skeptical toward the U.S. capacity to produce liberal change in the world. Because democracy is fragile and difficult to propagate, the ability of the U.S. government to directly promote and consolidate democratic institutions is limited and constrained.

Promotion of democracy is imperialist.

Monten 5 (Jonathan, Research Fellow, International Security Program“The Roots of The Bush Doctrine” Pg 140 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v029/29.4monten.html) JL

That what can informally be called the "Bush Doctrine"—for our purposes [End Page 140] an operationalization of neoconservatism—defines U.S. security interests in terms of the expansion of U.S.-style liberalism is not unique, and its nationalist vision of the United States as a redeeming force in international politics provides an essential point of continuity with preceding generations of grand strategy. Where the Bush Doctrine and its underlying neoconservative disposition diverge from tradition, however, is in the particular vehemence with which it adheres to a vindicationist framework for democracy promotion, in which the aggressive use of U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument of liberal change. The United States' nationalist obligation to the world is discharged, and its security and political interests defended, through the policy mechanism of mission, and not example.

Link – Democracy

Democracy promotion is used as a tool and means to disguise imperialism

McFaul 5, (Michael, PHD, Stanford Professor of Political Science; Democracy Promotion as a World Value <http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_mcfaul.pdf>) WDK

The correlation between Bush’s rhetoric about democracy promotion and the U.S. fall from favor within the international community has created the false impression that other governments and peoples do not support democratic ideals or the foreign policies that seek to advance them. Europe’s foreign policy elites consider Bush’s presidential statements about democracy and human rights proof of a new virulent form of U.S. imperialism. Iranian officials argue that Bush’s rhetoric about democracy camouflages an ulterior U.S. motive of seizing Iraqi oil. China’s government leaders cite U.S. unilateralism and inattention to world public opinion as evidence of a lack of a real U.S. commitment to the advancement of democratic practices.1

The promotion of democracy is a tool through which the imperialist agenda is furthered

Lieven 4, (Anatol, True cost of imperialism, Critical Analyzer, Peer Reviewed Critic, http://www.ca rnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1560) WDK

“Colossus” is formulated as a plea for a more determined strategy of American “liberal imperialism”, involving the invasion and occupation of more rogue states and the “imposition of democracy”. To that extent, it resembles similar arguments which have emerged in recent years from the neo-conservative right in the United States. At least until the occupation of Iraq began to go so thoroughly pear-shaped, comparisons of the United States with the British or Roman empires were becoming increasingly common in this part of the US political spectrum.

The very first promoters of worldwide democracy, Kant and Rousseau, included imperialism and its spread in their utopian democracies.

Doyle 3, (Michael, Professor of Liberalism Oxford University, Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-829678-9.pdf>) WDK

Nor were the liberals the first to conceive of the value of democracy, as either a means or an end. Indeed, for two millennia between Thucydides and Machiavelli, democracy was the great imperial model of government. But in the modern liberal version it becomes the great engine of peace. Thucydides, Rousseau, Kant, and Schumpeter are all advocates- and theorists- of popular, or democratic, or representative republican government. Yet they expect democratic foreign relations to be-variously-imperialist, isolationist, internationalist, and pacific. How can we explain their differences and understand the multiple legacies of democratic foreign affairs? Thucydides’ citizens, unlike Schumpeter’s, are splendidly diverse in their goals, both at home and abroad. Their characters are shaped in varying proportions by courage, ambition, fear, profit, caution, glory, and patriotism. Although they are equal before the law and all citizens have a right to vote, their circumstances greatly differ, divided as they are among rich and poor, urban and rural. Internationally, their states are driven by fear, honour, and self-advantage. States, too, are radically unequal in size, resources, and power. Such a people and such a state find imperialism useful, feasible, and valued. In a dangerous world, empire adds to the security, profit and glory of the powerful majority, even if not of all the citizens. The demos makes naval power effective and cheap.

**Military Withdrawal 🡪 Soft Power**

US withdrawal from Iraq will open the flood gates to American soft power

Kroenig, Mcadam, Weber in 9 (Matthew, Melissa, Steven, TAKING SOFT POWER SERIOUSLY Word count: 15,161 Draft date: February 23, 2009. University of California, Berkeley, http:// www.matthewkroenig.com/Taking%20Soft%20Power%20Seriously02242009.pdf) WDK

The content of one of the dominant American messages may have been conducive to persuasion in that it aroused fear. The United States repeatedly sought to portray itself as a source of stability in the country and threatened that a withdrawal of U.S. forces would lead to greater sectarian violence.68 The other competitors in this marketplace of ideas also drew on fear-based messages to persuade the Iraqi public however. Critics of the U.S. occupation maintained that the presence of U.S. troops actually fueled interethnic violence and attracted international terrorists to Iraq.69 Those arguing that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would improve the security situation may have been more persuasive. According to opinion polls conducted in 2006, 56% of Shiites and 81% ofSunnis Arabs said that violence would decrease following a U.S. troop pullout.70 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. efforts to use soft power to win hearts and minds in Iraq also failed because support for the U.S.-led occupation clashed with the core material interests of the Iraqi population. Simply put, the U.S. occupation was in direct conflict with Iraq’s core material interest of regaining control of its lost sovereignty.

Kuwait invasion proves, military withdrawal leads to soft power

Taheri in 3, (Amir, December 8, 2003, The Perils of Soft Power, New York Post, [http:// www.nypost.com/theperilsofsoftpower/taheri](http://www.nypost.com/theperilsofsoftpower/taheri)) WDK

Another example: For 12 years ,Turkey used soft power to persuade Syria to close the bases of Kurdish terrorists on its soil. The Syrians simply mocked the Turks. Then one day in 1999 a Turkish army appeared on the Syrian border with the mission to go and close those bases. The Syrian rulers instantly backed down, closed the bases and expelled the Kurdish Marxist rebel leaders. The anti-war crowd forget that soft power was used on both Saddam Hussein and Afghanistan's Taliban. In 1990 when Saddam invaded and annexed Kuwait, he was offered a range of soft power goodies in exchange for withdrawal. One formula worked out by French President Francois Mitterrand and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev was to extend the Iraqi coastline on the Persian Gulf by 25 kilometers at the expense of Kuwait. Saddam was also to receive the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan plus the entire Kuwaiti part of the Rumailah oilfields.

**\*\* Impacts\*\***

!- Devalues Life

Cultural imperialism fuels damaging use of capital for the sake of power

Harvey in 3 (David, PHD, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf)

It is, of course, the populations of those vulnerable territories who then must pay the inevitable price, in terms of loss of assets, loss of jobs, and loss of economic security, to say nothing of the loss of dignity and hope. And by the same logic that has it that the most vulnerable territories get hit first, so it is typically the most vulnerable populations within those territories that bear the brunt of any burden. It was the rural poor of Mexico, Thailand, and Brazil who suffered most from the depredations that flowed from the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The very idea that those who irresponsibly lend might also be held responsible is, of course, dismissed out of hand by ruling elites. That would require calling the wealthy property-owning classes everywhere to account and insisting that they look to their responsibilities rather than to their inalienable rights to private property and a satisfactory rate of profit. But, as Joseph Chamberlain found, it is far easier politically to pillage and debase far-away populations (particularly those who are racially, ethnically, or culturally different), than to confront overwhelming capitalist class power at home. The sinister and destructive side of spatial-temporal fixes to the overaccumulation problem becomes just as crucial an element within the historical geography of capitalism as does its creative counterpart in building a new landscape to accommodate both the endless accumulation of capital and the endless accumulation of political power.

Cultural Imperialism becomes a tool of the government to expand its own power, at the sake of serious global damage

Harvey in 3, (David, The New Imperialism, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, PHD, 2003l [http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf](http://web.me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf))

Critical engagement over the years with Marx's account of primitive accumulation—which in any case had the quality of a sketch rather than a systematic exploration—suggests some lacunae that need to be remedied. The process of proletarianization, for example, entails a mix of coercions and of appropriations of precapitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of mind, and beliefs on the part of those being proletarianized. Kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations (including those exercised through religion and its institutions) all have their part to play. In some instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exist to suggest that they are just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to forge some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation. Primitive accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession. The conditions of struggle and of working-class formation vary widely and there is, therefore, as Thompson among others has insisted, a sense in which a working class 'makes itself though never, of course, under conditions of its own choosing.7 The result is often to leave a trace of pre-capitalist socialrelations in working-class formation and to create distinctive geographical, historical, and anthropological differentiations in how a working class is denned. No matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the result is not the creation of a homogeneous proletariat.8

Devalue life = ZPHC

Calculating life allows it to be devalued-this justifies the worst atrocities in history and has real effects on populations

Dillon 99 (Michael, Professor of International Relations at the University of Lancaster, “Another Justices” Political Theory, Vol 27, No. 2, 164-5)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for mono, It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular invaluable and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism'. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.” Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, unit, of amount are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without deaf either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted. the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds whatever exceeds measure. But how do that necessity present itself? Another Justice answer: as the surplus of the duty to answer to One claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality. What also means is that the human is not decided. lt is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in position of having so decide without having already been fully determined end without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

!- Environment

US imperialism creates the most environmental destruction.

Buell in 1 (Frederick, professor of English at Queens College “Globalization without Environmental Crisis:

The Divorce of Two Discourses in U.S. Culture”, Pg 64 http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/journals/symploke/v009/9.1buell.html) JL

The global biodiversity crisis is another multi-source crisis, created by a wide variety of local actors acting as a part of an extended global system; but the damage these actors do is to local systems, not to the biosphere as a whole. It becomes global in its accumulation not just of individual actions (primarily habitat destruction), but localized effects. Many other new global problems resemble the biodiversity crisis in being globalized through the bootstrapping of local actions and instances of local damage into a global nightmare. Many of John Bellamy Foster's [End Page 62] long list of "urgent problems" are global today, thanks to the spread of industrial systems and practices and the worldwide accumulation of small impacts this creates. These include: loss of genetic diversity, acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of climax forests, wetland destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of lakes, streams and rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of coastal waters and estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding landfills, toxic wastes, the poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on the job, urban congestion, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources. (Foster 11-2) But environmental crisis has taken on an even more contemporary global feel as it has begun to share in the contemporary topos of the trans(-): the evocation of the transnational, transcultural, and (a necessary part of this, though less commonly added) the transgenic. One sign is that environmental crisis has become hyperaware of global interactions occurring painfully and even riskily in real time. These days, lungs in the U.S. contract as fearfully at information about the deforestation of the Amazon as they do at disputes over national clean air standards. In 1932, Aldo Leopold complained that "when I go birding in my Ford, I am devastating an oil field and re-electing an imperialist to get me rubber"; he meant this, Lawrence Buell notes, as "a reductio ad aburdam of purist thinking" (2001, 302). Contemporary globalization, in the meantime, has institutionalized such discourse as a part of our normality, not something ridiculous. 7 It is now a staple of social justice rhetoric and global activism, as when Noam Chomsky points out that American children use baseball bats hand-dipped in toxic chemicals by Haitian women and corporations are scrutinized for their overseas labor practices. It is equally a staple of environmental crisis thought, expressed in several ways. For example, environmental imperialism by a resource-hogging, pollution-generating North is now a commonplace perception ("a baby born in the United States creates thirteen times as much environmental damage over the course of its lifetime as a baby born in Brazil, and thirty-five times as much as an Indian baby") (Hertsgaard 196); the huge environmental footprints of consumer items purchased by innocent consumers extend well across the world, as environmentalists chart these effects; and linkages between apparently innocent first world choices are exposed as having drastic effects-at-a-distance [End Page 63] (as when Theordore Roszak unhappily discovers that "the material from which my eyeglass frames are made comes from an endangered species, the hawksbill turtle" and is told that whenever he turns on a light bulb powered by nuclear energy, he is "adding to the number of anecephalic babies in the world" (Rozak 36).

!- Environment

US imperialism threatens to throw the world into deepening environmental crisis.

Foster in 6 (John Bellamy, head of the Dept of Sociology at the UO and editor of the Socialist Review, “Naked Imperialism” http://www.zcommunications.org/naked-imperialism-by-john-bellamy-foster) JL

"[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planetâ€”no matter how largeâ€”putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means”even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones”at its disposal." The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administrationâ€™s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled "Apocalypse Soon" in the Mayâ€“June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: "The United States has never endorsed the policy of â€˜no first use,â€™ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weaponsâ€”by the decision of one person, the presidentâ€”against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so." The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fitâ€”setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the worldâ€™s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the worldâ€™s growing environmental problemsâ€”raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China, that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuelaâ€™s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo ChÃ¡vez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the "nuclear club." Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism.

US military power prevents efforts to slow climate change

Dalby 8 (Simon, PhD Dept of Geography and Environmental Studies at Carleton Univ, “IMPERIALISM, DOMINATION, CULTURE: THE RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS”Pg 11, April 30 http://montreal2008.ipsa.org/site/images/PAPERS/section3/RC%2015%20-%20Dalby%20-%203.1.pdf) JL

Thus to follow David Harvey‟s rendition of the question Iraq is symptomatic of a much larger imperial ambition, one that he poses as “whoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future.” 46 But more so than this it is important to note that the military operations in the Middle East are also tied into a particular part of the American political economy, what Nitzan and Bichler call the weapon-dollar petro-dollar complex; arms companies and logistics firms that provide both military and oil field services and security. 47 But, and here the argument once again supports Agnew's case that these recent attempts to assert military control are against the long term thrust of American practice, it is fairly easy to say that this is fraction of capital that has had its day, new innovations in high tech, biotech and renewable energy systems are nonetheless delayed and thwarted by this backward looking policy of trying to maintain control over petroleum in the Middle East. In Bichler and Nitzan's terms, war in the Middle East facilitates differential accumulation in this sector of the economy. Thus the struggles within the United States about climate change and the adoption of new energy strategies, are also an important part of the larger matter of resisting imperial domination in its more overt military forms in South West Asia.

!- Environment

Neoliberal forms of government allow for massive destruction of nature.

Peck et al in 9 (Jamie, in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia & Center for Urban Economic Development ,“Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations” Vol 29 No 1 http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/journals/sais\_review/v029/29.1.peck.html) JL

In light of this, neither deep forms of neoliberalization, nor the ecological dominance or tendential hegemony of neoliberalism at the global scale,7 necessitate simple convergence in regulatory forms and institutional structures. Instead, neoliberalization is both predicated on and realized through uneven spatial development—its ‘natural state’ is characterized by an intensely variegated and persistently unstable topography.8 Convergence on a unified and monolithic neoliberal end state should not be anticipated, let alone held up as some kind of litmus test for determining the extent of neoliberal transformation. Likewise, the long-run sustainability of any given neoliberal policy project (such as trade liberalization or welfare reform) is not required for there to be a neoliberalization of policy regimes; neoliberalization operates through trial-and-error experimentation, more often than not under conditions of crisis, leading in turn to deep regulatory failures and highly dysfunctional, disruptive consequences. Congruence and coherence across policy domains, therefore, are not prerequisites for an active program of neoliberalization to be under way. Rather, the critical signifiers of deep neoliberalization include: the growing ecological dominance of neoliberal structures, discourses, routines, and impulses within state formations; the intensification of regulatory re-structuring [End Page 52] efforts and crisis-driven responses within neoliberal parameters; and the mutual interpenetration, heightened congruence, and increased complementarity of neoliberal reforms.

Preserving hegemony empirically results in the degradation of nature.

Shrair in 10 (Jamal, MSc in High Energy Physics & PhD in Surface Physics and Electron Devices at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics ,“Environmental Crisis and Self-Destructive Imperialism” 1/22 http://wondersofpakistan.wordpress.com/2010/01/22/environmental-crisis-and-self-destructive-imperialism/) JL

The present environmental crisis was triggered by the industrial revolution. As the industrial age started to progress the problem became visible, but it was simply ignored. From the beginning of the industrial revolution until the last two decades of the 20th century, we paid no attention to the pollution of our common home. The only important things were maximum profit and minimum loss, industrial expansion, especially that of the military industries which served the aims of colonialism, irrational ideological struggle, hegemony, power politics, etc. The lack of a rational economic order is certainly the primary cause of the problem: The resources of the planet are unwisely exploited, the motivation being to make as much profit as possible within the shortest possible time, while waste is being dumped wherever it is the cheapest to do so, such as in the oceans. There is no doubt that with a small fraction of what we have already wasted from the resources of the planet, the entire present world population could have prospered and enjoyed a very high standard of living if only we possessed – and practised – a higher level of social consciousness than we have done in the past one hundred years. As an example, the total military expenditure in the USA and former USSR in the 1980s alone (!) reached one trillion USD.

**!- Environment**

**Neoliberalism prevents actions against climate change in exchange for market-based incentives which don’t generate change.**

Okereke 8 (Chukwumerije, Senior Research Associate at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, “Equity Norms in Global Environmental Governance” August, Vol 8 No 3 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global\_environmental\_politics/v008/8.3.okereke.html) JL

The foregoing analysis suggests that the limited impact of CDR and CHM norms—and, indeed, the general responsibility deficit that characterizes the current global environmental governance system—are fundamentally due to the co-option of global equity norms by neoliberalism. The analysis supports the works of many other scholars who have rigorously argued that in the years leading up to Rio, and thereafter, there has been a general global shift towards the neoliberal order with what Mansfield calls the predominant “focus on markets as the central form of governance.”104 As a result of the hegemony of neoliberalism, even the Southern states, according to these scholars, have also begun to endorse market-based approaches as the best route to global environmental management. In his account of the dynamics of norm uptake in global environmental governance, Bernstein is emphatic that it is the “new realities of the international political economy” as expressed in the neoliberal order that have “made the success of the more radical redistributional proposals of the WCED unlikely.”105 Similarly, Paterson, in one of the first comprehensive accounts of global climate politics, notes that “the effect of neoliberalism has been to narrow available options” and to weaken the capabilities of states to respond effectively to issues of responsibility and North-South distributive justice notably implicated in global climate change. It is instructive, for example, that despite the unambiguous mention of CDR in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, significant portions of these documents nevertheless read as though they are an [End Page 44] appendix to a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. One such paragraph is Article 3 (5) of the UNFCCC where Parties affirms the need to promote an “open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth,” insisting that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of . . . restriction on international trade.”106 In general, it is safe to assert that the relative success of CDR in global environmental governance is for the most part due to its resilience and particularly because it generates less specific, and somewhat more localized obligations than CHM. Crucially, whatever the duties and responsibilities that are generated by CDR, the unspoken ultimate imperative is that such obligations must not amount to a fundamental challenge to the prevailing rules of international commerce and global economic power structures. Accordingly much of the early hope that CDR would lead to globally responsible environmental policies has been abandoned for minimalist and voluntaristic (often free market based) gestures which benefit a very limited number of developing countries (mostly China and India). The new order is reflected in the Montreal Protocol where China and India are the main beneficiaries of an essentially localized Ozone Fund. This effect is also manifest in the Climate Change Convention where, in the words of Paterson, “the advantages of ‘market mechanisms’ over ‘command and control’ regulation [are] often regurgitated, rather in the form of a mantra.”107 Bodansky108 echoes this sentiment, aptly observing that whilst a commitment for OECD transfer exists, neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol actually requires “any particular country to contribute any particular amount.” Even the much acclaimed equity policy in the UNFCC—the Clean Development Mechanism—has apparently only succeeded because it is (rightly or wrongly) perceived as an innovative construct which allows justice to be dispensed by the market and without violating the sacred canons of the neoliberal order.

!- Economy

Imperialist policies have empirically resulted in massive economic crashes which creates tension in East Asia.

Johnson 7 (Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of American Empire: Is America in Decline?” May 6 http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/chalmers-johnsons-blowback-the-costs-and/page-6/) JL

The economic policies dictated by imperial ambition expose the US to blowback. The classic example of this is its relationship with East Asian client states. In the case of Japan, in order to further its cold war strategy of proving to the world that free market capitalism is the only mode of economic development, the US ‘treated Japan as a beloved ward, indulging its every economic need and proudly patronising it as a star pupil.’ The US used its influence to admit Japan into many International Institutions. The US transferred its crucial technology to Japan on concessionary terms and opened its markets to Japanese goods while tolerating Japan’s protection of its domestic market. This led to the hollowing out of key American Industries such as steel, consumer electronics, robotics, automotive, camera, and semi-conductor industries. This suicidal economic policy was also continued as a trade off to maintain US military bases in Japan. The long-term impact was that soon the American industries became uncompetitive vis-à-vis Japanese industries. With the huge US export market made available to them, Japan, becoming a five trillion-dollar economy, pursued an aggressive export led growth. It followed its own brand of state guided capitalism steering clear of market capitalism and the command economy of the Soviets. Increasingly, it expanded its production capacity. What was hidden from economic planners was that Japan generated industrial over capacity that threatened the health of the economy. The over capacity reached crisis point when other Asian countries such as South Korea, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, emulated the fast catch up strategy of Japan. ‘There were too many factories,’ writes Johnson, ‘turning out athletic shoes, automobiles, television sets, semi-conductors, petrochemicals, steel and ships for too few buyers.’ The ripple effect of the over capacity is the increased competition between American and European MNC. This has resulted in corporations cutting costs by transferring the high paid jobs from the advanced economy to low wage developing countries. The global demand is on the verge of collapse, as rich countries do not generate demand on account of market saturation or stagnant or falling income of its people. In countries like China, Vietnam and Indonesia the workers who earn low wages cannot buy the goods produced by them. In East Asian economies financial capitalism spearheaded by the US played an important role in destabilising the economies. US played an aggressive role in making the East Asian economies to deregulate the capital market. The Wall Street Treasury Complex thrust the concept of capital mobility upon the East Asian countries. The nature of money pumped into the economy of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines was hot money. The financial inflows were short term, speculative, highly liquid and could easily leave the economy. The US accumulated vast funds (around 3 trillion dollars) especially in the mutual funds. These pools of capital were invested and transferred out of the Asian economies. The result was catastrophic: East Asian economies collapsed. Big American companies bought factories and businesses for a song. Proctor & Gamble picked up several South Korean state of art Companies at a fraction of the price. In Thailand, American Investment firms bought service, steel, and energy companies at throw away prices. The Carlyle Group sent Bush senior to Bangkok to evaluate opportunities to buy real estate at low prices. The economic meltdown resulted in the largest transfer of wealth in the history of the world. The smoldering anger of East Asians against US predatory capitalism is a potential source of retaliatory strikes against US interests in the region.

!- Economy

Imperialist doctrine has empirically caused economic cave-ins and a resulting apartheid government, India model proves

Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK

That is why the shift toward a more apartheid-like form of indirect rule was made in the aftermath of the 1857 uprising. In India and elsewhere there was a hardening of racial attitudes toward all sectors of the local population but especially “a revulsion occurred against educated and Westernized members of indigenous societies who threatened to overturn the ‘difference’ sustainingBritishsuperiority.**”72** Thereafter, physicaldistancing and the invention of imperial traditions like the Indian durbarwhich drew in equalmeasure from imagined English and Indian feudal ceremonies andcustoms, became the order of the day**.** As Lytton cynically observed in 1877, “the further east you go, the greater becomes the importance of a bit of bunting.”73

**!-** Ethics

Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over collateral damage

McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University “The new imperialists – Ideologies of Empire” Ch 5 Pg 92) JL

Yet, even on Ignatieff ’s narrow definition, in which human rights are about stopping unmerited cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means to this ostensible end – say, a military invasion – can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands of civilian casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff ’s doctrine of human rights provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard. Instead, he offers a pragmatic judgement – and a highly dubious one – that only U.S. military power can be expected to advance human rights in the zones where “barbarians” rule. But note: this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect can it be said to flow from any of his reflections on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from the same principle of limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff ’s myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the chasm between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations of real human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a better place without Saddam, never so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000 Iraqis killed as a result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably more than 100,000 dead as a result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24 Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens of thousands of deaths are ethically justified. Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are offered up without even countenancing the scale of human suffering that Ignatieff ’s preferred course of action – war and occupation – has entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the zones of military conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating about America’s new “vulnerability” in the world, for instance, he writes, When American naval planners looked south from the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling stops – Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen – are dangerous places for American warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the governments in these strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee the safety of their imperial visitors.25

!- Racism/Sexism/Violence

The aff’s attempt to secure economic growth/democratic principles globally is a form of militarized globalization. It leads to the direct ratcheting up of racism, sexism, and violence on other countries.

MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Women’s Studies, Syracuse

University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent, <http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf>)

A number of scholars including Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2004) conclude that since the last decades of the twentieth century, the US rules through the mechanisms of ‘informal empire’ managing the flow of corporate capital globally across and through the borders of nation/states, as well as through military interventions in countries that resist this form of capitalist globalization.2 However, I would argue that these mechanisms of informal and not violently visible empire building are predicated on deeply gendered, sexualized, and racial ideologies that justify and consolidate the hypernationalism, hypermasculinity, and neo-liberal discourses of ‘capitalist democracy’ bringing freedom to oppressed third world peoples—especially to third world women. The US war state mobilizes gender and race hierarchies and nationalist xenophobia in its declaration of internal and external enemies, in its construction and consolidation of the ‘homeland security’ regime, and in its use of the checkbook and cruise missile to protect its own economic and territorial interests. It mobilizes both languages of empire and imperialism to consolidate a militarized regime internally as well as outside its territorial borders. Bringing ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ (or more precisely the free market) to Afghanistan and Iraq most recently, then, has involved economic devastation, de-masculinization, destruction of cultural, historical, natural and environmental resources, and, of course, indiscriminate massacres in both countries. Similarly, ‘making the homeland safe’ has involved the militarization of daily life, increased surveillance and detention of immigrants, and a culture of authoritarianism fundamentally at odds with American liberal democratic ideals. If the larger, overarching project of the US capitalist state is the production of citizens for empire, then the citizens for democracy narrative no longer holds. Where US liberal democratic discourse posed questions about democracy, equality, and autonomy (the American dream realized), neo-liberal, militarist discourse poses questions about the free market, global opportunity, and the protection of US interests inside and outside its national borders. Capitalist imperialism is now militarist imperialism. Capitalist globalization is militarized globalization.

**!-** Racism

US imperialism follows the logic of exclusion which justifies racism

Flanagan et al 8 (John, Fellow at the University of Washington, “Representing Permanent War” Vol 8 No 2 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new\_centennial\_review/v008/8.2.feldman.html) JL

The concept “imperial formation,” recently distilled by Ann Laura Stoler, captures the mobile terrain on which these battles for an anti-racist historical legibility have been waged. Imperial formation suggests the shifting degrees of rights, scale, rule, and violence through which the state projects sovereignty both within and outside internationally agreed upon borders. They are “macropolities whose technologies of rule thrive on the production of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation.” They “thrive on turbid taxonomies that produce shadow populations and ever-improved coercive measures to protect the common good against those deemed threats to it. Finally, imperial formations give rise both to new zones of exclusion and new sites of—and social groups with—privileged exemption” (2006, 128). This theory of the shifting cartography of empire as one built on differential forms of exclusion and exemption that operate through racist social structures begins to help us see how SNCC and, increasingly, many others involved in the black freedom movement began to see in Palestine “facts . . . that pertain to our struggle here.” A critique of the widespread discourse of U.S. support for Palestine’s occupation could challenge the staid exceptionalist arguments that the United States and Israel were somehow unique in achieving their philosophical commitments and political practices of freedom and democracy. Indeed, U.S. exceptionalist discourse, as Stoler and David Bond cogently note—and the black freedom movement’s post-1967 engagement with Palestine gives depth, complexity, and specificity to—“has historically constructed places exempt from scrutiny and peoples partially excluded from rights” (2006, 95), what Etienne Balibar calls “a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and ‘internal exclusion’”

!- Violence

US imperialism justifies violence in the name of progress.

McNally in 6 (David, Professor of political science at York Universit “The new imperialists – Ideologies of Empire” Ch 5 Pg 103) JL

This, then, is the end point of our thinking person’s imperialism. Starting from flowery platitudes about ethics and human rights, it leaves us with banal defences of an empire that practises torture, uses lies and deception to justify war, tramples on human rights, and launches a new arms race. In the process, our imperial apologist fractures logic, evades evidence, claims moral superiority for his kind, and demonizes imperialized Others. And so we return to Joseph Conrad. For all the shortcomings of Heart of Darkness, Conrad intuited the metamorphosis of imperial identity that characterizes the likes of Michael Ignatieff. Key to Conrad’s depiction is that the imperialist begins by lying to himself – he spurns reality in favour of his fetish. However much Ignatieff believes his own mutterings about ethics and human rights, his pronouncements must be measured against the murders and the torture carried out by those he nominates as humanity’s benefactors – and whose crimes he both evades and backhandedly defends. Ignatieff ’s talk of morality is an exercise in imperial fantasy of a sort with which Conrad was familiar. Describing the conversation among colonial agents in Africa, for instance, Conrad’s protagonist, Marlow, proclaims: “It was as unreal as everything else – as the philanthropic pretence of the whole concern, as their talk, as their government.” In fact, explains Marlow, notwithstanding their soaring proclamations, “there was no more moral purpose at the back of it than there is in burglars breaking into a safe.”63 The same, of course, is true of U.S. imperialism today. Its agents too have the morality of burglars breaking into a safe. But their crimes, just like those of an earlier era of colonialists, are of an exponentially higher order. Of course, they produce reports, make speeches, and utter declarations about civilization, freedom, and democracy.Where they differ fromConrad’s obsessive colonialist, Kurtz, is that they never arrive at the truth. For Kurtz, after devoting seventeen pages to a report on behalf of the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs, finally records a truthful horror. It occurs at the end of his report, his “moving appeal to every altruistic sentiment,” as Marlow describes it. Suddenly, the final words appeared and their message “blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a flash of lightning in a serene sky: ‘Exterminate all the brutes!’”64 At the moment when he wrote those words, shortly before his death, Kurtz finally “looked within himself,” to discover that “his soul was mad.”65 And this Conradian truth might well be applied to Ignatieff. Defence of empire – of murder, pillage, torture, and deception – transforms the defenders themselves. Whatever values they might have once professed, the reality of what they defend takes possession of them, turns them into something other than what they intended. This is a central theme of Heart of Darkness, which, as I have noted, is a warning to the Western apologist for empire that he is an accomplice of madness and horror.

Imperialism necessitates violent military backing.

Barkawi 4 (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies “Globalization, Culture, and War On the Popular Mediation of "Small Wars"”Pg 120 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural\_critique/v058/58.1barkawi.html) JL

The association between liberalism in politics and economy and peace drew on core Enlightenment themes and their construction of war. For classical liberalism, wars were essentially atavistic, "the relics of a dying age that had not yet been illuminated by the dawn of the Enlightenment" (Joas 2003, 30). As "reform" and "progress" overcame despots and the warrior castes of the aristocracy, and free trade fuelled prosperity, wars civil and foreign would pass into history. Easily obscured from view in this vision of a pacific liberal modernity is the role of force in making liberal the illiberal as well as specifically liberal tendencies to war, that is, those tendencies to war generated in a world being made liberal and modern in diverse and important ways. In particular, European imperial expansion, which involved widespread use of force, was fundamental to the creation of the modern international economy. Imperialism set in train modernization [End Page 120] processes that generated, and continue to generate, social and political tensions that often take violent form. Creating and maintaining a free-trading world required, and continues to require, repeated and sustained use of force. These forceful processes provided the essential social, political, and cultural contexts of modern globalizations, and their consequences were quite different from the expectations of classical liberalism.

!- Genocide/Famine

Imperialism encourages economic underdevelopment in colonized countries which leads to famine and imperial genocide, India model proves

Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK

But it was not for lack of ideological commitment that India failed to overcome its essentially pre-capitalist dynamic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Colonial officials both at home and in the colonies saw their “civilizing mission” as imparting the benefits of economic “improvement” and Christian piety. The “gentlemanly capitalism”57 that dominated in the colonial administration sought to link the socialproperty relations which lay at the heart of England’s seventeenth- and eighteenth-century agrarian capitalist revolution with the newer forms of financial and service capital that came to prominence in the later nineteenth century. These officials had read their Locke on property, enclosure, and “improvement.” They were also avid proponents of the latest principles of political economy espoused by Malthus, Bentham, and Mill. It was the liberal empire – so vaunted by Ferguson – which encouraged not just chronic economic underdevelopment, but which bears responsibility for the deaths of millions due to starvation during the two great waves of famine which swept India in 1876–79 and 1896–1900. Between 5.5 and 12 million died in the famine of 1876–79 and mortality rates were highest in areas best served by railways. As Mike Davis has shown in painful detail, it was the fanatical commitment to free-market and Malthusian dogmas which made famine a death sentence for millions while British officials railed against “enthusiastic prodigality” as they shipped huge grain exports out of the country. Malthus’s injunctions against feeding the poor and hungry because “mother nature had not set enough places at her table” were taken up by British viceroys from Lytton to Curzon with methodical and murderous abandon. Just as in England, poor relief in times of poor harvest was considered a slippery slope leading to more permanent forms of relief. In India, Lytton reasoned, “The doctrine that in time of famine the poor are entitled to demand relief . . . would probably lead to the doctrine that they are entitled to demand relief at all times, and thus the foundation would be laid for a system of general poor relief, which we cannot contemplate without serious apprehension.”58 Ferguson devotes a scant few lines to the disastrous policies pursued by British officials during the famine years, admitting that free-market policies may have made things worse than they might have been, but dismissing criticism that the British did nothing to avert starvation. He rejects the view that their actions can be likened to other modern genocides on the grounds that Lytton never planned to kill millions of Indians whereas the Nazi genocide was intentional.63 However, it is difficult to imagine a more intentional outcome than that pursued by Lytton and Temple: they knew that other measures were available and that mass starvation could be averted (as Temple had done previously in Bengal and Bihar) and yet they proceeded to do the opposite. Indeed, even byMalthusian standards, it was hardly a situation of letting “nature” run its course. The reduction of rations, insistence on hard labour, and collection of the land tax could have no other outcome than drastically increasing mortality rates. Instead of viewing such actions for what they were – intentional acts of imperial genocide – the most that Ferguson can muster is the rhetorical query: “But would Indians have been better off under the Mughals? Or for that matter, under the Dutch – or the Russians?”64 In fact, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Moguls and Marathas did attempt to tailor their rule to fluctuating ecological and climactic conditions, especially in drought-prone regions. Moreover, as Davis asserts, There is persuasive evidence that peasants and farm laborers became dramatically more pregnable to natural disaster after 1850 as their local economies were violently incorporated into the world market. What colonial administrators and missionaries perceived as the persistence of ancient cycles of backwardness were typically modern structures of formal and informal imperialism.65

!- War

US imperialism threatens to spur major world conflict

Kuang et al 5 (Xinnian, teaches modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University, “Preemptive War and a World Out of Control” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/positions/v013/13.1kuang.html) JL

The existing world order was constructed under the leadership of the United States following World War II. The United Nations, the representative of this order, is certainly not an entirely democratic organization. Since its inception, the United Nations has been controlled by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers used the United Nations as a stage on which to vie for power. But it is important to note that [End Page 159] neither the United States nor the Soviet Union doubted the significance or efficacy of the United Nations—and the United States, in particular, used the United Nations to export its values to the rest of the world. Both their confrontations and their mutual hold on power gave the second half of the twentieth century a long peace. However, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the surviving hegemon, the United States, no longer had the patience to use the United Nations to put forward its own values, but rather pursued what might be referred to as peace under imperial domination (diguo tongzhi xia de heping). America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States could withdraw from the United Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism, along with new interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America's abandonment of both traditional Western international regulatory systems and the principle of rule by law as established under the U.N. charter. Instead, America is bringing about the return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on this shift: "Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody, and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace." On a visit to Ireland on June 20, 2003, he went on to say, "Any organization, any country, any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations."4 [End Page 160] The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos. The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the Iraq War, a deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now frequently affix the label "Old Europe." Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order. Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.

!- War

The use of “informal” imperialism allows concealment of true motives, fueling dozens of regional conflicts around the world which can grow into major world wars

Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK

The demise of the formal territorial empires in the second half of the twentieth century and the consequent decoupling of political power from the extensive reach of capital accumulation has posed special advantages and problems of its own. For the American empire, from Woodrow Wilson onward, it was taken for granted that economic prosperity could be secured without territorial aggrandizement.5 The lack of a formal empire has allowed the American state to present itself to the world as a non- or even anti-imperialist power. It has been able to “conceal its imperial ambition in an abstract universalism . . . to deny the significance of territory and geography altogether in the articulation of imperial power.”6 But policing U.S. interests has had its own costs and perils. The dogma of economic “openness”7 was dependent on either the cooperation of compliant local regimes or, failing that, an increasing number of “small wars” which, as one recent champion of such conflicts admits, “might as well be called imperial wars.”8 In the twentieth century alone, it is estimated that the United States sent troops or sponsored local forces to fight in sixty such “small wars.” The hazard of “small wars” of empire is that they can turn into major ones, resulting in the perennial danger of “imperial overreach” as happened most spectacularly for the U.S. in Vietnam. American defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese famously established the conditions for the “Vietnam syndrome” – the belief that the U.S.A. could not and should not fight wars it could not guarantee it would win. And winning in military terms meant the deployment of overwhelming force, preferably against much weaker enemies as in the Grenada or Panama invasions. The same guiding principle was in force in the 1991 Gulf War. It may have been premature for George Bush Sr. to declare an end to the Vietnam syndrome after that conflict since the very small number of allied deaths had not yet sufficiently tested the American public’s willingness to accept a larger number of casualties. The Vietnam syndrome proved alive and well in the aftermath of the Somalian debacle of 1993 where 1,200 U.S. troops were routed by local warlords and forced to withdraw. The “Clinton Doctrine,” which dominated military policy for the rest of the 1990s, sought to avoid U.S. casualties at all costs. Economic “openness,” now enshrined under the equally euphemistic ideology of “globalization,” would be secured by means of “a modern equivalent of old-fashioned ‘gunboats’ in cruise missiles and aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions.”9

!- War/Violence

Imperialism legitimizes baseless invasions in the name of fighting “terror”

Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK

American efforts at informal rule have been largely inept: initial military success based on a strategy of limited war, usually followed by an escalation of military force due to a flawed reading of indigenous support, has inevitably led to domestic disillusionment and ultimate withdrawal.34 Far more successful have been direct annexations or periods of prolonged occupation as occurred in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War Two.35 The United States has failed in its imperial ambitions when it has attempted to fight limited wars of occupation and when public support – as in Vietnam – begins to wane and a sufficiently strong-willed leadership is lacking.36 The loss of Iran in 1979 to theocratic fundamentalism was “a calamity whose ramifications were and remain incalculable.”37 The Khomeini regime legitimated terrorism for the next generation of “Islamo-bolshevism”38 – the term Ferguson prefers to describe bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Bin Laden “is the offspring of the Middle East’s distinctive civilization of clashes, a retarded political culture in which terrorism has long been a substitute for both peaceful politics and conventional warfare.”39 The Bush administration was therefore correct in claiming there was a connection between the sponsorship of terrorism and the policies of countries such as Afghanistan, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Iraq. They were right to claim that weapons of mass destruction were being produced by Saddam Hussein; right to claim that further U.N. inspections would be ineffective in finding them and, therefore, right in invading Iraq: “the only mystery is why Iraq was not invaded before 2003.”40

Imperialism Fails

US imperialism creates tension world-wide and hinders the US’ ability to promote democracy.

Ottoway 3 (Marina, Senior Associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v023/23.2ottaway.html) JL

The evolution of international interventions suggests that U.S. unilateralism, as expressed in the doctrine of preemptive intervention, is in part an extension of ideas and trends that emerged in the 1990s. The UN's increasing reliance on partnerships with other multilateral organization and member country forces, for example, led individual countries to take on responsibilities traditionally reserved for the UN, albeit with UN consent. U.S. unilateralism is also a reaction against the frustrating delays and compromises required to obtain Security Council decisions. But the ideas set forth in the doctrine of preemptive intervention, and the U.S. attitude toward the UN on display before and during the Iraq war, break with that trend in significant ways. First, the United States is seeking to shift final authority for authorizing internal interventions away from the UN and toward itself, relegating the UN to a position of secondary importance, to be called upon when convenient as a marginal contributor to essentially American undertakings. Second, by arguing that the United States has the right to intervene not only to eliminate threats to itself and international peace, but also to put in place new regimes, the doctrine of preemptive intervention poses a new threat to the principle of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the debate on imperialism has intensified—unilateral American interventionism constitutes a far greater threat to the foundations of the international system than even the most aggressive multilateral missions of the 1990s. In [End Page 86] Namibia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone multilateral interventions supported regime change, but these cases have been justified as the return of legally recognized powers in place of an illegal de facto regime. The unilateralist American project appears to go much further. It justifies regime change not simply as a means of restoring a legitimate government, but as a means of removing threats to U.S. security interests as defined by the U.S. administration. Though all states have the right to defend their security interests, U.S. unilateral interventions, based on preemption of vaguely defined threats and undertaken without an international process of legitimization, would provoke widespread international resentment against the United States, as the war in Iraq already has. U.S. unilateralism may also furnish a license for unilateral interventions by other states, and thus become a source of instability. In addition to the threat unilateral interventions pose to the international system and U.S. moral credibility, the experience of multilateral post-conflict reconstruction during the 1990s should be a major check on such a project. That experience demonstrates that interventions, even those with imperial characteristics and significant resources, often result in very little change to internal power dynamics. Even the tremendous military power and financial resources of the United States cannot necessarily keep its attempts to rebuild states and support stable, benign, and democratic regimes from being thwarted by local political realities. Rapidly transforming rogue and failed states will prove a daunting task, and unilateral intervention, shackled by international resentment and charges of imperialism, is especially unlikely to prove an effective tool.

Imperialism Fails

Imperialism destroys democracy and results in the downfall of the US

Johnson 7 (Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, “Empire vs Democracy” http://www.antiwar.com/engelhardt/?articleid=10439) JL

By the time I came to write Nemesis, I no longer doubted that maintaining our empire abroad required resources and commitments that would inevitably undercut, or simply skirt, what was left of our domestic democracy and that might, in the end, produce a military dictatorship or – far more likely – its civilian equivalent. The combination of huge standing armies, almost continuous wars, an ever growing economic dependence on the military-industrial complex and the making of weaponry, and ruinous military expenses as well as a vast, bloated "defense" budget, not to speak of the creation of a whole second Defense Department (known as the Department of Homeland Security) has been destroying our republican structure of governing in favor of an imperial presidency. By republican structure, of course, I mean the separation of powers and the elaborate checks and balances that the founders of our country wrote into the Constitution as the main bulwarks against dictatorship and tyranny, which they greatly feared. We are on the brink of losing our democracy for the sake of keeping our empire. Once a nation starts down that path, the dynamics that apply to all empires come into play – isolation, overstretch, the uniting of local and global forces opposed to imperialism, and in the end bankruptcy. History is instructive on this dilemma. If we choose to keep our empire, as the Roman republic did, we will certainly lose our democracy and grimly await the eventual blowback that imperialism generates. There is an alternative, however. We could, like the British Empire after World War II, keep our democracy by giving up our empire. The British did not do a particularly brilliant job of liquidating their empire and there were several clear cases where British imperialists defied their nation's commitment to democracy in order to hang on to foreign privileges.

Imperialism Fails

Imperialism breaks down democratic ideals with a warped set of values that limit individual liberties

Van Elteren 3 (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, “US Cultural Imperialism Today” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v023/23.2elteren.html) JL

In light of the previous discussion, the idea of U.S. cultural imperialism contains a granule of truth today. However, it is not the spread of uniformity as such—the focus of early theorists of cultural imperialism—whether U.S.-style or not, that is the basic problem here, but rather the kind of culture that capitalist modernity brings. The global dissemination of Americanized cultural goods and practices involves the spread of social visions of U.S.-style development, with its heavy emphasis on "progress" in the form of unlimited, quantitative growth and economic-technological expansion. It also diffuses a culture of performance and expressive individualism, so strongly articulated in U.S. society, which may be harmful for democracy in specific local contexts. 35 American culture has always been characterized by an aesthetic of performance. 36 This is a culture whose primary sources of attraction and gratification are the sensational spectacle, the outstanding performance, the extraordinary physical and acrobatic achievement, or the intense emotional thrill. This tendency is clear in film from the earliest days of silent movies to today's Hollywood blockbusters, in which narrative has become less relevant than the performance features and the emphasis lies on body language and action. Even the "high culture" of American literature displays this character, including self-conscious strategies of impression-management by certain authors and celebrity cults around them. 37 The transnationalization of the U.S. culture of performance fits into a more general shift of emphasis from narrative to performance as the primary source of meaning and gratification in [End Page 180] contemporary Western culture. It is one of the driving forces behind a larger dehierarchization and democratization on the aesthetic level that has resulted in the breakdown of the strict dichotomy between "high" and popular culture, and eliminated the idea of moral and social guardianship. This ongoing process of democratization in the aesthetic-cultural sphere must not, however, be confused with democracy. While the latter evokes ideals of social equality and justice, the former basically refers to an increase in individual freedom and, associated with it, freedom of self-expression—a tendency that can lead to extreme civil privatism with no links to any community life or common good whatsoever. 38 "In this sense of a continuous dehierarchization and an ever-increasing freedom of self-expression we may speak of a global Americanization of culture," Winfried Fluck contends in his analysis of the culture of performance. 39 Depending on the particular context, a culture of performance and self-expression may be either helpful for or harmful to democracy—and sometimes both. In specific instances it may have detrimental effects in terms of equality, justice, and social cohesion. "The victory of mood over moral structure in contemporary society" that accompanies the shift from narrative to performance may also result in a weakened resilience in the face of oppression and cultural imposition and an emphasis on the rewards of "immediate experience" 40 —what some analysts of contemporary life have called the "experience economies" of the most developed countries in the world. 41 All of this amounts to a marginalization of the cultural space for alternative versions of the good life and a better society. In this regard a critique like Benjamin Barber's about the spread of U.S. capitalist consumerism through the globalization of trade and industry ("McWorld") rings true indeed. 42 The McWorld market system will lead to the standardization of cultures and consumption practices, which, in turn, will bring other dangers. Transnational corporations raise people's expectations through advertising, making consumers believe that their purchases will open avenues to a better life of freedom and opportunity, which generally prove false. McWorld threatens local democracy [End Page 181] and, more generally, civil society: transnational corporations have no interest at all in improving people's quality of life or strengthening civil society. Neither do they promote the kind of transnational solidarity that might empower global citizens to cooperate in dealing with common problems. Capitalist culture cannot really satisfy people's needs for community involvement, personal development, and meaningful relationships. 43

**!- Militarism**

Imperialism encourages the use of military force to secure industries and profits

McDonald et al 7 (Patrick, professor in the department of government at UT, “The Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre–World War I Era”  
 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world\_politics/v059/59.3mcdonald.html) JL

The economic incentives for conflict do not stem solely from the latter's ability to restrict trade and drive up domestic prices. Classic writings about imperialism suggest another mechanism that focuses on the use of military force to defend existing external markets or secure new outlets for domestic production.30 Because protected sectors rely on the state to enact barriers to make their products more competitive in the domestic market, their opportunities for capturing new global markets [End Page 380] are relatively restricted. If they already rely on tariffs to survive in the domestic economy, they will be unable to survive in more competitive international markets without this assistance. To capture larger profits, they may be willing to pay some of the costs of the larger defense burdens necessary to open new markets with military force—including higher taxes. The conquest of another economy offers economic rewards by enlarging the size of the protected domestic market. Alternatively, military force can be deployed to prevent foreign firms from penetrating third-party markets. Protected firms that have the potential to accrue economic gains from the use of military force can be contrasted with more competitive firms that do not need regulatory assistance to remain profitable. The goods of the latter group penetrate new markets because they are produced more efficiently and at lower costs. Consequently, firms that do not rely on protection to remain profitable lack any economic incentive to pay the costs associated with war.

US imperialism leads to militarism.

Johnson 7 (Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of American Empire: Is America in Decline?” May 6 http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/chalmers-johnsons-blowback-the-costs-and/page-4/) JL

Tom Plate, a columnist for the Los Angles Times, once described United States as "a muscle bound crackpot with little more than cruise missiles for brains.” US media glorify the warrior roles and justify the use of military force in world affairs. The reported statement of Madeleine Albright best exemplifies this: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are an indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see farther into the future.” Echoing his concern Johnson observes, “In the decade following the end of the cold war, the US largely abandoned a reliance on diplomacy, economic aid, international law, and multilateral institutions in carrying out its foreign policies and resorted much of the time to bluster, military force, and financial manipulation.” In pursuit of its imperial dreams US maintains its elaborate military bases all over the world. Its military expenditure dwarfs imagination. Conservative estimate places the US military expenditure in the region of four hundred billion dollars a year. According to Brookings Institution study, it costs US $5.5 trillion to build and maintain its nuclear arsenal. The Pentagon Industrial Complex sets its own agenda and it has a voracious appetite for more and more resources. The military system has become an autonomous system. With corporate interests permeating the military, the civilian control over the military is at best tenuous. Policymaking is dominated by militarism, ‘a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purpose’ which is the defense of its realm.

Militarism !- Environment

US military operations create massive ecological destruction even without conflict.

Jorgenson et al in 10 (Andrew,PhD Dept of Sociology Univ of Utah, “Militarization and the Environment” Vol 10 No 1 Feb. http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/journals/global\_environmental\_politics/v010/10.1.jorgenson.html) JL

A notable theoretical exception comes from Hooks and Smith,11 who characterize the expansionary dynamics and profound environmental impacts associated with militarism as the “treadmill of destruction.” Treadmill of destruction theory is, in part, inspired by the treadmill of production perspective, which argues that an economic system predicated on constant growth generates ever increasing environmental degradation.12 However, Hooks and Smith13 note that the military is not simply a derivative of the economic system but has its own expansionary dynamics with unique environmental impacts. Drawing from various perspectives within political sociology,14 Hooks and Smith15 argue that, primarily for geopolitical reasons, states—not classes or firms—declare and wage wars. At the same time, military development—influenced by geopolitics and domestic pressures—generates various forms of environmental degradation. Thus, the fundamental logic of the treadmill of destruction undermines environmental protection concerns. This was clearly articulated by a US military base commander during a community hearing in Virginia: “We are in the business of protecting the nation, not the environment.”16 Warfare causes significant environmental harms, including the chemical contamination of ecosystems and devastation of landscapes that result directly from military weaponry. Moreover, military campaigns consume enormous amounts of fossil and nuclear fuels in planes, ships, and tanks.17 Michael T. Klare18 notes that the US military consumes at least 1.3 billion gallons of oil annually in the Middle East alone—more than the annual consumption of Bangladesh.19 Such levels of fossil fuel use are a major source of carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to climate change.20 Treadmill of destruction theory contends that the expansionary dynamics of militarism are not limited to periods of war. Vested geopolitical and military [End Page 9] interests as well as constant preparation for future conflicts escalate the scale

and operations of militaries. As a result, even in the absence of armed conflict military institutions and their activities consume vast amounts of nonrenewable energy and other resources for research and development, maintenance, and operation of the overall infrastructure.21 At the same time, they generate large amounts of toxic substances and waste, which contribute to the contamination of land and water. While some contamination occurs through the testing of weapons,22 militaries also use a broad range of thinners, solvents, lubricants, degreasers, fuels, pesticides, and propellants as part of the everyday operation and maintenance of military equipment. As a result, militaries “produce the greatest amount of hazardous waste in the world.”23 Further, “the most ecologically devastated locations on Earth” are found wherever “military production facilities” operate, given that they are often “exempt from environmental protection legislation in the name of national security.”24 According to the United Nations’ Centre for Disarmament,25 armed forces have used a steadily increasing amount of land for bases, other installations, and training exercises over the last century. Even the end of the Cold War has not reduced the use of public lands for military operations, training, testing, and exercises.26 The United States alone has hundreds of military bases in almost sixty countries.27 A network of military bases encompasses the globe, requiring a vast amount of resources—especially fossil fuels—to staff, operate, and transport equipment and personnel between destinations. Collins28 notes that even with advanced technologies, military operations require bases close to theaters of action to supply energy and personnel needs. To a significant extent military power remains dependent upon access to land. In order to support operations and personnel, militaries must have ready supplies of raw materials and energy as well as the infrastructure to meet specific needs. Consequently, military-oriented resource use involves strategic stockpiling of fuels and other materials, with resource consumption further increased by industries that produce marginal equipment for the armed forces and their support economies. The production of such marginal equipment and stockpiling of fuels places greater demands upon the environment. The populations of armed forces also use large quantities of materials for uniforms and specialized forms of clothing that would not otherwise be consumed. Further, the labor intensity of militaries increases the resources required for training, armaments, transportation, and the housing of troops and support personnel. [End Page 10] The peacetime activities of the military generate different forms of waste. During regular operations, the armed forces consume large amounts of fossil fuels.29 Renner30 estimates that the petroleum products used for land vehicles, aircrafts, sea vessels, and other military machinery account for approximately 75 percent of all energy use by the armed forces worldwide. Further, the US Pentagon operates “the world’s largest fleet of modern aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks, armored vehicles, and support systems,” which is almost entirely fueled by oil.31 As a result, the Department of Defense is “the world’s leading consumer of petroleum.”32

\*\*Global Uq\*\*

Empire Collapse Inevitable

The US empire cannot be sustained 🡪 There is an imbalance of hegemony and political force.

Ikenberry in 4 (G. John, Prof. of Politics and Intl. Affairs at Princeton University, Council on Foreign Relations, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59727/g-john-ikenberry/illusions-of-empire-defining-the-new-american-order?page=show)pl

Benjamin Barber's Fear's Empire presents a case against the recent unilateral impulses in U.S. foreign policy. According to Barber, empire is not inherent in U.S. dominance but is, rather, a temptation -- one to which the Bush administration has increasingly succumbed. In confronting terrorism, Washington has vacillated between appealing to law and undermining it. Barber's thesis is that by invoking a right to unilateral action, preventive war, and regime change, the United States has undermined the very framework of cooperation and law that is necessary to fight terrorist anarchy. A foreign policy oriented around the use of military force against rogue states, Barber argues, reflects a misunderstanding of the consequences of global interdependence and the character of democracy. Washington cannot run a global order driven by military action and the fear of terrorism. Simply put, American empire is not sustainable. For Barber, the logic of globalization trumps the logic of empire: the spread of McWorld undermines imperial grand strategy. In most aspects of economic and political life, the United States depends heavily on other states. The world is thus too complex and interdependent to be ruled from an imperial center. In an empire of fear, the United States attempts to order the world through force of arms. But this strategy is self-defeating: it creates hostile states bent on overturning the imperial order, not obedient junior partners. Barber proposes instead a cosmopolitan order of universal law rooted in human community: "Lex humana works for global comity within the framework of universal rights and law, conferred by multilateral political, economic, and cultural cooperation -- with only as much common military action as can be authorized by common legal authority; whether in the Congress, in multilateral treaties, or through the United Nations." Terrorist threats, Barber concludes, are best confronted with a strategy of "preventive democracy" -- democratic states working together to strengthen and extend liberalism. Barber's overly idealized vision of cosmopolitan global governance is less convincing, however, than his warnings about unilateral military rule. Indeed, he provides a useful cautionary note for liberal empire enthusiasts in two respects. First, the two objectives of liberal empire -- upholding the rules of the international system and unilaterally employing military power against enemies of the American order -- often conflict. As Barber shows, zealous policymakers often invoke the fear of terrorism to justify unilateral exercises of power that, in turn, undermine the rules and institutions they are meant to protect. Second, the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are not enough to legitimate America's liberal empire. During the Cold War, the United States articulated a vision of community and progress within a U.S.-led free world, infusing the exercise of U.S. power with legitimacy. It is doubtful, however, that the war on terrorism, in which countries are either "with us or against us," has an appeal that can draw enough support to justify a U.S.-dominated order. Michael Mann also warns of a dangerous, and ultimately unsustainable, imperial turn in U.S. foreign policy. This "new imperialism," he argues in Incoherent Empire, is driven by a radical vision in which unilateral military power enforces U.S. rule and overcomes global disorder. Mann believes that this "imperial project" depends on a wildly inflated measure of American power; the United States may have awesome military muscle, but its political and economic capabilities are less overwhelming. This imbalance causes Washington to overemphasize the use of force, turns the quest for empire into "overconfident and hyperactive militarism." Such militarism generates what Mann calls "incoherent empire," which undermines U.S. leadership and creates more, not fewer, terrorists and rogue states. In his distinguished scholarly work on the history of social power, Mann, a sociologist, has argued that four types of power drive the rise and fall of states, nations, empires, regions, and civilizations: military, political, economic, and ideological. Applying these categories to the United States, Mann concludes that it is, in a jumble of metaphors, "a military giant, a back-seat economic driver, a political schizophrenic, and an ideological phantom." Mann acknowledges that the United States is a central hub of the world economy and that the role of the dollar as the primary reserve currency confers significant advantages in economic matters. But the actual ability of Washington to use trade and aid as political leverage, he believes, is severely limited, as was evident in its failure to secure the support of countries such as Angola, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, and Pakistan in the Security Council before the war in Iraq. Moreover, Washington's client states are increasingly unreliable, and the populations of erstwhile allies are inflamed with anti-Americanism. American culture and ideals, meanwhile, hold less appeal than they did in previous eras. Although the world still embraces the United States' open society and basic freedoms, it increasingly complains about "cultural imperialism" and U.S. aggression. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism have forged deep cultures of resistance to an American imperial project. Mann and Barber both make the important point that an empire built on military domination alone will not succeed. In their characterization, the United States offers security -- acting as a global leviathan to control the problems of a Hobbesian world -- in exchange for other countries' acquiescence. Washington, in this imperial vision, refuses to play by the same rules as other governments and maintains that this is the price the world must pay for security. But this U.S.-imposed order cannot last. Barber points out that the United States has so much "business" with the rest of the world that it cannot rule the system without complex arrangements of cooperation. Mann, for his part, argues that military "shock and awe" merely increases resistance; he cites the sociologist Talcott Parsons, who long ago noted that raw power, unlike consensus authority, is "deflationary": the more it is used, the more rapidly it diminishes. The French essayist Emmanuel Todd believes that the long-term decline predicted by Mann and Barber has already started. In a fit of French wishful thinking, he argues in After the Empire that the United States' geopolitical importance is shrinking fast. The world is exiting, not entering, an era of U.S. domination. Washington may want to run a liberal empire, but the world is able and increasingly willing to turn its back on an ever less relevant United States. Todd's prediction derives from a creative -- but ultimately suspect -- view of global socioeconomic transformation. He acknowledges that the United States played a critical role in constructing the global economy in the decades after World War II. But in the process, Todd argues, new power centers with divergent interests and values emerged in Asia and Europe, while the United States' own economy and society became weak and corrupt. The soft underbelly of U.S. power is its reluctance to take casualties and to pay the costs of rebuilding societies that it invades. Meanwhile, as U.S. democracy weakens, the worldwide spread of democracy has bolstered resistance to Washington. As Todd puts it, "At the very moment when the rest of the world -- now undergoing a process of stabilization thanks to improvements in education, demographics, and democracy -- is on the verge of discovering that it can get along without America, America is realizing that it cannot get along without the rest of the world." Two implications follow from the United States' strange condition as "economically dependent and politically useless." First, the United States is becoming a global economic predator, sustaining itself through an increasingly fragile system of "tribute taking." It has lost the ability to couple its own economic gain with the economic advancement of other societies. Second, a weakened United States will resort to more desperate and aggressive actions to retain its hegemonic position. Todd identifies this impulse behind confrontations with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Indeed, in his most dubious claim, Todd argues that the corruption of U.S. democracy is giving rise to a poorly supervised ruling class that will be less restrained in its use of military force against other democracies, those in Europe included. For Todd, all of this points to the disintegration of the American empire. Todd is correct that the ability of any state to dominate the international system depends on its economic strength. As economic dominance shifts, American unipolarity will eventually give way to a new distribution of power. But, contrary to Todd's diagnosis, the United States retains formidable socioeconomic advantages. And his claim that a rapacious clique of frightened oligarchs has taken over U.S. democracy is simply bizarre. Most important, Todd's assertion that Russia and other great powers are preparing to counterbalance U.S. power misses the larger patterns of geopolitics. Europe, Japan, Russia, and China have sought to engage the United States strategically, not simply to resist it. They are pursuing influence and accommodation within the existing order, not trying to overturn it. In fact, the great powers worry more about a detached, isolationist United States than they do about a United States bent on global rule. Indeed, much of the pointed criticism of U.S. unilateralism reflects a concern that the United States will stop providing security and stability, not a hope that it will decline and disappear.

Empire Collapse Inevitable

The US empire is on its way to collapse 🡪 The Roman Empire and USSR prove.

Johnson in 3 (Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, The American Empire Project, Interview with Chalmers Johnson, http://www.americanempireproject.com/johnson/johnson\_interview.htm)pl

The United States is embarked on a path not so dissimilar from that of the former Soviet Union a little more than a decade ago. The Soviet Union collapsed for three reasons -- internal economic contradictions, imperial overstretch, and an inability to reform. In every sense, we are by far the wealthier of the two Cold War superpowers, so it will certainly take longer for similar afflictions to do their work. But the equivalent of the economic sclerosis of the former USSR is to be found in our corrupt corporations, the regular looting by insiders of workers' pension funds, the revelations that not a single financial institution on Wall Street can be trusted, and the massive drain of manufacturing jobs to other countries. Imperial overstretch is implicit in our empire of 725 military bases abroad, in addition to the 969 separate bases in the fifty states. Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform the Soviet system before it collapsed but he was stopped by entrenched interests in the Cold War system. The United States is not even trying to reform, but it is certain that vested interests here would be as great or greater an obstacle. It is nowhere written that the United States, in its guise as an empire dominating the world, must go on forever. The blowback from the second half of the twentieth century has only just begun. The few optimistic trends in the U.S. include the development of the powerful anti-globalization coalition that came into being in Seattle in November 1999 and that has subsequently evolved into an anti-war movement. The percentage of the public that does not get its information from network television but from the Internet and foreign newspapers is growing. Our wholly volunteer armed forces are composed of people who see the military as an opportunity, but they do not expect to be shot at. Now that the president and his advisers are ordering them into savagely dangerous situations, it is likely that many soldiers will not reenlist. And civil society in the United States remains strong and influential. Nonetheless, it is only prudent to estimate that these trends may not be sufficient to counter the forces of militarism and imperialism in the country. The main prospect for the future of the world is that perpetual war waged by the United States against small countries it declares to be "rogue states" will lead to the slow growth of a coalition of enemies of the United States who will seek to weaken it and hasten its inevitable bankruptcy. This is the way the Roman Empire ended. The chief problem is that the only way an adversary of the United States can even hope to balance or deter the enormous American concentration of military power is through what the Pentagon calls asymmetric warfare ("terrorism") and nuclear weapons. American belligerence has deeply undercut international efforts to control the nuclear weapons that already exist and has rendered the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty more or less moot (the U.S., in particular, has failed to take any actions it contracted to do under article 6, the reduction of stockpiles by the nuclear armed nations). The only hope for the planet is the isolation and neutralization of the United States by the international community. Policies to do so are underway in every democratic country on earth in quiet, unobtrusive ways. If the United States is not checkmated and nuclear war ensues, civilization as we know it will disappear and the United States will go into the history books along with the Huns and the Nazis as a scourge of human life itself.

Empire Collapse Inevitable

The US Empire will collapse due to economic weakness.

Ismi in 5 (Asad, Contributor to Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Monitor, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Monitor, Is the U.S. Empire Collapsing?, http://www.asadismi.ws/usempire.html)pl

Empires collapse usually due to a combination of military overreach and economic weakness, and, judged by these criteria, the U.S. imperial order seems headed for an imminent fall. Washington's occupation of Iraq has been a disaster. Even after two years, the U.S. military has failed to subdue the Iraqi resistance. A recent report by Knight Ridder Newspapers declared the war "unwinnable." Developments on the economic front are even more dangerous for the U.S. Its power rests on two main buttresses: 1) military superiority, and 2) the role of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. Iraq is making a mockery out of the first, and the second is in jeopardy. The U.S. massive trade and budget deficits ($630 billion and $500 billion, respectively) are driving down the dollar to such an extent that its status as the global reserve currency is imperilled. Since world trade is largely conducted in U.S. currency, most countries have to export goods and services in order to earn these dollars, but all the U.S. has to do is print more dollars. As economist James K. Galbraith explains: "[The U.S. gets] real goods and services, the product of hard labour by people much poorer than ourselves, in return for chits that require no effort to produce." The purchase of massive amounts of dollars by the rest of the world allows Washington to borrow cheaply, keep interest rates low, and run up a trade deficit that no other country could get away with. The world thus pays for U.S. overconsumption and underproduction. This arrangement, as economist Andre Gunder Frank puts it, is "a global confidence racket" -- a racket that can continue as long as other countries keep on buying dollar assets such as U.S. Treasury bills, thus financing Washington's enormous deficits. But, if the value of the dollar keeps going down, why should anyone continue to invest in it? The dollar has dropped by 47% against the euro since 2001, and by 24% against the yen. The greenback hit a record low of $1.37 against the euro in December 2004. There is no end in sight to the dollar's fall, since the Bush administration is content to let it drop (in the hope of reducing the trade deficit) and has shown no inclination to rein in overall spending. The dollar is expected to shrink by another 30% during the second Bush term, which, according to one observer, "will wipe out anyone holding dollar assets and bury the dollar as a global reserve currency." With these dire prospects, surely anyone in possession of a lot of dollars would be inclined to sell. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned in November 2004, "foreigners may tire of financing the record U.S. current account deficit and diversify into other currencies or demand higher U.S. interest rates." He repeated this warning last March. Currently, Washington needs to borrow $2.6 billion a day -- 90% of it from foreigners -- to finance its trade deficit and to prevent a dollar collapse. The main lenders are Japan and China, whose central banks hold the largest amount of U.S. dollars ($720 billion and $600 billion, respectively). Taiwan owns $235 billion and South Korea $200 billion. If these countries were to move away from the dollar, the U.S., with its immense borrowing needs, would face bankruptcy. Yet this is precisely what is happening. On January 26, 2005, prominent Chinese economist Fan Gang announced at the World Economic Forum that China had lost faith in the U.S. dollar. "The U.S. dollar is no longer in our opinion...(seen) as a stable currency, and is devaluating all the time, and that's creating trouble all the time," Fan said. He added: "So the real issue is how to change the regime from a U.S. dollar pegging... to a more manageable reference, say euros, yen -- those kinds of more diversified systems... If you do this, in the beginning you will have some kind of initial shock, you have to deal with some devaluation pressures... Now people understand the dollar will not stop devaluating." Fan is director of the state-run National Economic Research Institute in Beijing. He is not a government official, but for traders the connection was close enough and they found "great relevance" in his statement. As Paul Donovan, senior global economist at UBS AG, said, "This in fact is a scenario we consider to be highly likely." And the dollar promptly dropped. Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, also made clear in March that "diversification is necessary" when a parliamentary committee questioned him about the dangers of holding too much of one currency. China and Japan have lost hundreds of billions of dollars during the past two years because of the greenback's decline. According to the Financial Times, "Central banks are shifting reserves away from the U.S. and towards the Eurozone in a move that looks set to deepen the Bush administration's difficulties in financing its ballooning current account deficit." The Asia Times (Hong Kong) confirms that Asian central banks have been replacing their dollar reserves with regional currencies for the past three years. A report by the Bank of International Settlements states that the ratio of dollar reserves held in Asia declined from 81% in the third quarter of 2001 to 67% in September 2004. China reduced its dollar holdings from 83% to 68%, India from 68% to 43%, and Thailand from 80% to 50%. A January 2005 report sponsored by the Royal Bank of Scotland states that 39 nations out of 65 interviewed were increasing their euro holdings, while 29 were reducing the amount of dollars they owned. Significantly, the move from the dollar to the euro has spread to the central banks of OPEC countries, which own the most valuable traded resource: oil. The Bank for International Settlements reported in December 2004 that OPEC members' dollar-denominated deposits fell to 61.5% of their total deposits in the second quarter of 2004, from 75% in 2001. During the same period, euro deposits increased from 12% to 20%. Russia, the biggest non-OPEC oil producer, has switched 25% to 30% of its currency reserves from dollars to euros. At the end of February, comments by South Korea's central bank sparked another round of dollar declines. The bank announced its intention to move away from the U.S. dollar and increase holdings of Canadian and Australian dollars. The New York Times described the impact of this "innocuous" statement: "As the Korean comment ping-ponged around the world, all hell broke loose, with currency traders selling dollars for fear that the central banks of Japan and China, which hold immense dollar reserves... might follow suit. That would be the United States' worst economic nightmare. If it appeared that the flow of investment from abroad was not enough to cover the nation's gargantuan deficits, interest rates would soar, the dollar would plunge, and the economy would stall." The global move away from the dollar portends economic devastation for the U.S. Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, one of the world's leading investor firms, has told clients that the U.S. does not have more than a 10% chance of avoiding "economic Armageddon." He points out that the $2.6 billion the U.S. has to import every day to finance its trade deficit constitutes an incredible 80% of the world's net savings. Obviously it's an unsustainable situation. According to Roach, the dollar will keep falling due to the U.S.'s record trade deficit. To attract foreign capital and check inflation, the Federal Reserve's Greenspan will be forced "to raise interest rates further and faster than he wants." U.S. consumers, already deep in debt, "will get pounded." The record U.S. household debt is now equal to 85% of the economy [the U.S. national debt is $7.7 trillion, while total U.S. debt is an unfathomable $43 trillion]. Americans already spend a record proportion of their income on interest payments, and interest rates have not even substantially increased yet. Thus the stage appears set for massive national bankruptcy. According to the Los Angeles Times, higher interest rates "would be disastrous for a country weaned on cheap credit." A rise in interest rates would particularly affect a real estate market built on low interest and mortgage rates. This market is now the main engine of U.S. consumption. Millions of Americans have taken out loans against the rising value of their homes and use them (in Roach's words) as "massive ATM machines." As Andre´ Gunder Frank explains, higher interest rates threaten "a collapse of the housing price bubble [which] with increased interest and mortgage rates would drastically undercut house prices, thereby having a domino effect on their owners' enormous second and third re-mortgages and credit-card and other debt, their consumption, corporate debt and profit, and investment." Echoing Roach, Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker puts the likelihood of a financial disaster at 75%, while the U.S. Comptroller-General (head auditor), David Walker, "makes no bones about the fact that the situation is dire." For Martin Wolf, associate editor of the Financial Times (U.K.), "The U.S. is now on the comfortable path to ruin. It is being driven along a road of ever-rising deficits and debt... that risk destroying the country's credit and the global role of its currency." Paul Krugman, economics professor at Princeton University who writes a column for the New York Times, told Reuters in January: "We've become a banana republic... If you ask the question, do we look like Argentina, the answer is a whole lot more than anyone is willing to admit at this point." Argentina defaulted on a $100 billion in debt in 2001, with catastrophic effects: its currency plunged and the economy collapsed, bankrupting thousands of businesses within weeks. National income plummeted by 67%, pushing half the population below the poverty line. Professor Laurence Kotlikoff, chairman of the economics department at Boston University, agrees with Krugman, saying: "This administration [Bush] and previous administrations have set us up for a major financial crisis on the order of what Argentina experienced a couple of years ago." Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin similarly warns that "the traditional immunity of advanced countries like America to the Third World-style crisis is not a birthright," and that the U.S. faces "a day of serious reckoning." Peter Schiff, CEO of Euro Pacific Capital, also thinks that the falling dollar could mean major financial disaster. According to him, "This looming dollar crisis cannot be prevented, only delayed, and only at the expense of exacerbating the collapse." Schiff told Forbes magazine" in January that he expects the dollar to drop by 50% against the Chinese and Japanese currencies. This will wreck U.S. consumption. As Schiff states: "Spending on cars, clothing, and electronics will all drop dramatically -- perhaps right out of the economy." An abrupt drop in the dollar could cause a stock market crash and make the real estate market dive. "When the dollar collapses," says Professor Immanuel Wallerstein, "everything will change geopolitically... it will be a vastly different U.S--no longer able to live far beyond its means, to consume at the rest of the world's expense. Americans may begin to feel what countries in the Third World feel when faced with IMF-imposed structural readjustment: a sharp downward thrust of their standard of living." The weakness of the dollar and the huge deficits are symptoms of the decline of U.S. manufacturing. "Americans don't produce enough and don't save enough," says Schiff. U.S. manufacturing is only 13% of GDP and, according to Roach, "Manufacturing employment currently stands at only about 13% of the U.S.' private non-farm workforce--down sharply from 23%...in the mid-1980s." Since 2000, the U.S. has lost close to three million manufacturing jobs. Between 1989 and 2004, the U.S. savings rate fell from 6% to 1%. Foreigners now produce most of the goods Americans are consuming and lend Washington the money to buy these goods, leading to skyrocketing deficits. An important factor behind the manufacturing decline is the abandonment of the U.S. by its own corporations, many of which have relocated operations to Asia from where they export to the U.S. John Chambers, Chairman of Cisco, said recently: "What we're trying to do is outline an entire strategy of becoming a Chinese company." Cisco is the leading U.S. supplier of networking equipment for the Internet. The company manufactures $5 billion worth of products in China, where it employs 10,000 people. In fact, the U.S. economy has been in decline for more than three decades, accounting for a plummeting share of world economic output. The first dollar crisis occurred at the end of the 1960s when U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam war led to increasing public deficits. This coincided with the rise of Western Europe and Asia as strong exporters, to whom Washington lost its manufacturing lead. To retain its global domination, the U.S. then depended on its military superiority and the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. As the U.S. deficits rose due to the Vietnam war, France demanded gold in exchange for the dollars it held, since at the time the greenback was backed by Washington's gold reserves. Other countries followed suit and, as U.S. gold reserves were drained, President Richard Nixon delinked the dollar from gold and floated it against other currencies. This coincided with the oil crisis of the 1970s, when crude prices shot up 400%. Suddenly, oil became the most important traded resource, and Nixon linked the dollar to it. In June 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a deal with Saudi Arabia (the biggest OPEC oil producer) stipulating that oil could only be bought in dollars. In return, the U.S. agreed to militarily protect the Saudi regime. In 1975, OPEC (following the Saudi lead) officially agreed to sell oil only in dollars. The age of the petrodollar was thus born. As long as oil was traded in dollars, so would other goods, and the dollar would remain the world's reserve currency. This arrangement allowed the U.S. to continue its dominant imperial role despite its crucial economic weakness: the inability to compete with the European and Asian countries in manufacturing and export capacity. But now the U.S. position became highly vulnerable to the whims of the oil-producing countries and to the fate of the resource itself. The first challenge to the petrodollar system came with the Third World debt crisis. Awash in petrodollars, Western banks loaned hundreds of billions of these to developing countries, which could not repay the loans when Washington raised interest rates to nearly 20% in 1979 to save the falling dollar. It was crucial for the future of the petrodollar system that this money be recycled back to the West, and so the U.S. used the World Bank and IMF to ensure this would happen. The loans were repaid several times over (the payments continue), and the petrodollar system was saved -- but at the cost of decimating Third World economies with structural adjustment programs that devastated their industry, employment, and health and education sectors. As F. William Engdahl perceptively points out, the U.S.'s petrodollar hegemony "was based on ever-worsening economic decline in living standards across the world as IMF policies destroyed national economic growth." The second challenge to the petrodollar system came from Iraq when it started trading oil in euros in November 2000. If other OPEC countries followed suit, that would be the end of the reserve role of the dollar. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was partly aimed at staving off this possibility by forcibly returning Iraq to the dollar, warning other OPEC members not to switch to the euro, and starting the process of physically controlling Iraqi and Middle Eastern oil in order to gain leverage over European countries. This strategy has clearly failed, and it now appears that in the military arena, too, the U.S. cannot prevail, not even against lightly armed Iraqis. The petrodollar system is falling apart as the world rejects a U.S. imperialism in which it expects other countries to not only supply it with a massive amount of consumer goods in exchange for increasingly worthless bits of paper, but also wants them to pay for its gigantic military machine with which it attacks or threatens them. As American journalist Seymour Hersh said in a recent interview: "The minute the rest of the world gets tired of our belligerence, they can turn us off economically as easily as flicking a light switch." The collapse of the dollar and that of the U.S. economy will end American superpower status as Washington becomes incapable of financing a colossal military machine that currently occupies 725 bases around the world with 446,000 troops. Economic power will centre around the European Union, China and India, which are already creating new global structures that exclude the U.S. These endeavors show that the U.S. is already, to some extent, a "has-been" global power whose desperate military aggression only makes it weaker on the world stage. The Financial Times explains: "A new world order is indeed emerging -- but its architecture is being drafted in Asia and Europe at meetings to which the Americans have not been invited." In contrast to Washington's endless military ventures, Europe and China emphasize economic might as the main instrument of foreign policy. As Newsweek points out, "the strongest tool for both is access to huge markets." In April 2004, 10 new countries joined the European Union and six more are expected to in the near future. Newsweek lauded this development by emphasizing that "no single policy has contributed as much to Western peace and security." This is a highly important statement. It recognizes that Europe has changed the very definition of security. After two world wars, the Europeans appear to have realized that the best guarantor of security is economic inclusion, not mass murder. And now the EU is considering Turkey's membership, which would actually make Europe part of the Middle East, and vice versa. According to Newsweek, "When historians look back, they may see this policy as being the truly epochal event of our time, dwarfing in effectiveness the crude power of America." Similarly, China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are creating an Asian trade bloc to rival the EU. The ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) summit meeting in December 2004 laid the groundwork for an East Asian Community (EAC) that "should build a free trade area, cooperate on finance ,and sign a security pact... that will transform East Asia into a cohesive economic block." This is a significant defeat for the U.S., which scuttled a similar intiative in 1990. The Asian agreement creates a market zone of two billion people, the largest global trading bloc "dwarfing the EU and NAFTA." India has also become an ASEAN summit partner and wants an economic zone stretching from its borders to Japan. No single country has posed more of a challenge to Washington than China, which recently replaced the U.S. as the leading consumer market in the world. Beijing has economically displaced the U.S. all over Asia and is now doing so in the latter's so-called back-yard, Latin America. China is now Chile's largest export market and Brazil's second biggest trading partner. In November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao went on a tour of Latin America and agreed to invest $30 billion in the region. Most importantly, China and Venezuela signed a bilateral energy pact in December 2004, under which the latter agreed to supply Beijing with 120,000 barrels of fuel oil a month. China pledged to invest in 15 Venezuelan oil-fields. China has become the world's second largest importer of oil after the U.S. Venezuela is the U.S.'s fourth largest oil supplier, and the deal with China cuts into one of Washington's "few remaining relatively stable sources of crude." China intends to make a similar move towards Canada, the U.S.'s biggest oil supplier. What can Washington do about such incursions into its "vital interests"? Not much, since Beijing could cripple the U.S. economy simply by stopping its purchase of American Treasury bills. The demise of the United States as a superpower will be particularly beneficial for the Third World -- the 80% of humanity that has suffered most under Washington's economic and military heel. Since 1945, the U.S. has unleashed a reign of death, destruction and plunder on developing countries, killing more than 20 million people through wars, coups, bombings, assassinations, massacres, embargoes, and economic destabilization. The purpose was to ensure that 80% of the world's wealth was owned by 20% of its people. Third World countries have fought back, inflicting significant defeats on Washington. It was the Vietnam war that started the U.S.'s economic downslide, and today Iraq is an important nail in Washington's financial coffin. Third World resistance has made it impossible for the U.S. to continue dominating the world economically and militarily. Without U.S. muscle behind them, Washington's client states all over the South will have to give way to nationalist regimes that want to use their countries' resources for the benefit of their own people: A wave of Venezuelas is likely, leading to a redistribution of global wealth in the developing world's favour. The European Union will have to come to a new arrangement with a resurgent South, and the result could lay the basis for an egalitarian world.

\*\*Alt\*\*

Alt Solves – Everyday Resistance

Our critical approach can provide the tools needed to emancipate individuals in their day to day lives.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

Critical Emancipation. **Those who seek emancipation attempt to gain the power to control their own lives in solidarity with a justice-oriented community. Here, critical research attempts to expose the forces that prevent individuals and groups from shaping the decisions that crucially affect their lives. In this way, greater degrees of autonomy and human agency can be achieved.** In the first decade of the 21st century, **we are cautious in our use of the term "emancipation" because,** as many critics have pointed out, **no one is ever completely emancipated from the sociopolitical context that has produced him or her**. Concurrently, many have used the term "emancipation" to signal the freedom an abstract individual gains by gaining access to Western reason—that is, becoming reasonable. Our use of "emancipation" in an evolving criticality rejects any use of the term in this context In addition, **many have rightly questioned the arrogance that may accompany efforts to emancipate "others."** These are important caveats and must be carefully taken into account by critical researchers. **Thus**, as critical inquirers who search for those forces that insidiously shape who we are, **we respect those who reach different conclusions in their personal journeys** (Butler, 1998; Cannella, 1997; Kellogg, 1998; Knobel, 1999; Steinberg & Kinchcloe, 1998; Weil, 1998).

Alt Solves – Everyday Resistance

Individual resistance to the discourse of empire is the only strategy. Even if it fails to collapse imperialism, it promises the individual can carve out a space for freedom

Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr in 2k3 (University Professor and professor of English at DePauw University, Science Fiction Studies #90 = Volume 30, Part 2 = July 2003, http://fs6.depauw.edu/~icronay/empire.htm)

This is the imperial Sprawl, ruled not through decrees and armies (well, mostly not through armies) but through communication/control networks that distribute virtual power. This power is internalized by imperial citizens as surely as if they had chips embedded in their brains. In Empire, subjectivity is multicentered, produced through institutions that are terminally unstable, always breaking down. As the integrity of social institutions (such as schools, families, courts, and prisons) fragments, and the once-clear subject-positions associated with them weaken, the call for imperial comprehensiveness is strengthened, inaugurating a comprehensive ideology, a finely distributed pragmatic myth of networked, globally interlocking power. This is the twenty-minutes-into-the-future of Philip K. Dick, J.G. Ballard, William Gibson, Pat Cadigan, and Mamoru Oshii, where computerized communications operate 24/7, generating a mindscape of consuming subjects into which capitalist ideology feeds directly. It perpetually breaks down and reconstructs human consciousness, as in a Cadigan novel, into provisional target-identities to which the nostalgic, utopian dream of wholeness can be sold and resold perpetually in variant, sometimes mutually contradictory forms, and which can be hired to convey its fictions of sovereignty ever deeper into the self that once imagined it was itself sovereign. In this empire, there are infinite possibilities of projection, but only one reality. The most natural thing in the world is that the world appears to be politically united, that the market is global, and that power is organized throughout its universality. Imperial politics articulates being in its global extension—a great sea that only the winds and the current move. The neutralization of the transcendental imagination is thus the first sense in which the political in the imperial domain is ontological. (354) Since contemporary imperial power does not emanate from one center, but rather from the cyberspatial ganglia of postmodern metropoli, resistance manifests itself in the daily refusal on the part of "the multitude" to follow commands. For Hardt and Negri, revolution is neither possible nor desirable, since no class can act as the self-conscious agent of history. Freedom rests, as in Gibson’s world, in finding one’s own uses for things. In contrast with sabotage, the resistance strategy of national modernism, resistance under Empire consists of withdrawing consent, of desertion (212). Even the greatest rebels are refuseniks, choosing to withdraw, leaving behind them, like the fused AIs in Neuromancer (1984), a world in which "things are things" (270). Although this strategy hardly promises much as a way of landing blows against the empire, it is a dominant motif in the countercultural "Lost in Space" (or alternatively, "Lost in the Urban Labyrinth") subgenre. (Ironically, Lost in Space [tv series, 1965-68; film 1998] itself is as hysterically conservative as Robinson Crusoe.) Where the overtly imperial mode accepts the hierarchical network of administration—Starfleet commanders still representing the Federation—even mainstream popular works such as Farscape (1999-2003) and Star Trek: Voyager (1995-2001) try to establish a de-centralized web of relationships in the uncharted territories, now just a wormhole away from the past (and the politics of empire).

\*\*Framing\*\*

Epistemology key

Epistemology must be the starting point-Empire is maintained by excluding alternate ways of knowing throw a reliance on political science “experts” that naturalize the American way of life as good.

Wedeen in 2k7 (Lisa, Professor of Political Science Lisa Wedeen specializes in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, feminist theory, and qualitative methods, Scientific Knowledge, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, June 14-15, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

The late Edward Said (1978) famously underscored the connections between empire and distinct forms of knowledge, and in the spirit of his book Orientalism, this essay also specifies the normative conditions, in this case in political science, that have helped make possible distinct visions of the Arab and Muslim Middle East. I want to argue that these visions are not simply embellishments of an imperial domination independently existing; they are an integral part of the project itself.4 Such a claim is not meant to suggest that all political scientists participate in reproducing possibilities for empire, or that they do so single-handedly and deliberately. Thus this essay also takes issue with approaches that attribute political power to scholarly discourses without attending to the ways in which scholarship operates within broader discursive and institutional frameworks. Admittedly, it is by no means self-evident how political science’s complicities with U.S. empire would jibe with the two aspects of political science I argue above are currently defining the discipline—the convergence, or perhaps more historically accurate, the continuing coalescence in new forms, of science and liberalism. This essay is devoted to fleshing out those links while considering how scholarly convictions, combined with the realities of U.S. foreign policy, have structured the terms in which the Middle East is understood and studied today. Part one explores the discipline’s seemingly contradictory commitments to value-neutrality and liberal values. Part two foregrounds the constitutive relationship among science, liberalism, and empire in the making of modern Middle Eastern politics as an area of academic inquiry. One caveat worth noting from the outset: the words “empire” and “imperialism” are politically charged nouns these days. By empire I simply mean, following the Oxford English Dictionary, a state with extensive political and military dominion. In the age of nation-states, imperial states generally exercise this dominion over populations that are perceived (by conqueror and conquered) as different from (in the sense of ineligible for incorporation into) the dominant state exercising control. From the inception of the American Political Science Association in 1903 until the present, there have been repeated attempts within the association to “transform the study of politics into an independent science” (Ross 1991: 288; see also Heaney and Hansen 2006). Despite important variations among positivists and significant disagreements between positivists and nonpositivists (including what “positivism” means), efforts to make political science a science have generally entailed separating facts from values, identifying law-like principles governing political action, and subjecting these rules to empirical tests. In this context, objectivity enjoys an “aura of self-evidence”—practical agreement about what counts as a fact and the modes through which knowledge about facts are produced (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 13-14). Committed to objectivity and value-free scholarship, dominant political science’s applications of positivist principles find expression in causal explanations that rely on a nomothetical understanding of what causation entails. Formulated by Hume and formalized by the prominent positivist, Carl Hempel, the task of science, in this view, is to discover a “covering law” that, in the context of observable initial conditions, can be said to produce the observed event (Hempel 1965; on positivism see Hacking 1983; Cederman 1997; Johnson 2006). Yet contrary to scientific commitments to objectivity and value-free scholarship, much research in “mainstream” political science has also historically presupposed the value of liberal politics (Ross 1991; Ricci 1984; Gunnell 1993). Like positivism, liberalism has embodied divergent ideas and been identified variously in different geographical and historical locations. Despite these variations, the liberal tradition in political science can nevertheless be characterized by four interrelated assumptions about the connection between human subjectivity and good government (Ricci 1984, 72-73). First, human beings are born as rights-bearing individuals. A good government is one that protects an individual’s inalienable rights. Second, human beings are capable of thinking clearly and rationally. Good institutions are ones that cultivate human proclivities to reason. Third, individuals naturally come together and form groups in order to promote their interests and check those of rival factions. Good institutions are ones that encourage pluralistic interests while dampening potentially incendiary conflicts. Fourth, individuals are capable of creating governments that operate democratically, namely, that are responsive to the will of the people.5 Good democratic governments are those that provide procedural mechanisms, such as elections, that enable people to exercise their will as individuals. Of course, liberalism’s values, like those of any ideology, have never been borne out fully in practice. But whereas Marxism and other variants of socialism could be criticized for finding political expression in totalizing systems, liberalism’s tenets have been treated as separate from people’s experiences in liberal polities. Political scientists have helped make this separation secure by sequestering normative political theory from empirical studies, and by appealing to the authority of scientific discovery to justify commitments to piecemeal reforms. I am not arguing for better science, however. Nor am I claiming that positivist social science is bad. Rather, I want to bracket the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the enterprise and consider how the insistence on separating fact from value, in particular, has contributed to three persistent disciplinary moves. First, the division has excluded viewing science as a value in and of itself, indeed as a metaphysic. Political scientists do not tend to ask how scientific knowledge operates to cultivate passionate belief or why science is inherently the most valuable form of knowledge. Second, the split between fact and value has prevented thinking through how epistemological assumptions and nationalpolitical commitments coalesce to defend the stability of a liberal politics—how liberalism is itself ideological or “hegemonic,” and how political science helps to make it so. Or to put it differently, epistemologies have a politics, and knowledge production in political science tends to shore up certain liberal assumptions and aspirations even while overt prescription and “bias” are seen to be outside the objectivist goals of science. Third, the split between fact and value allows methodology, in particular, to be viewed as value neutral, as a technique devoid of normative assumptions. This view enables positivist political science to occupy the position of authorized (because disinterested) discoverer, teacher, and enforcer of what counts as true or justified statements about politics. The ultimate effect of this sequestering of fact-finding from rigorous philosophical examination has been that dominant epistemological communities are maintained by institutional and practical-discursive means rather than by any exclusive purchase such conceptual frameworks could have on the truth. Disciplinary strategies (such as writing a methodological textbook designed to unify the discipline) and powerbrokering practices (such as dismissing out of hand arguments that are epistemologically reflexive) help establish the rules and devise the evaluative criteria by which statements about the world are considered knowledge or not. At the same time, these activities supply and enforce norms about what may and may not be asked. They generally discourage scrutiny into the practices that bound and normalize a discipline, enabling certain kinds of knowledge to thrive while foreclosing or de-authorizing other ways of knowing. In other words, in addition to the tasks of socializing student-citizens and advising government officials, political science, not surprisingly, operates as a discipline, reproducing the norms, prohibitions, conventions, and constraints that generate standards for identifying expertise. In political science, this expertise affirms the possibility and importance of pursuing value-free science, on the one hand, and the vision of a rationalist liberal politics, on the other.

Discourse Key

Discourse is a key site for understanding how power legitimates itself-in determining what can and cannot be said norms are created.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

Reconceptualized Critical Theory of Power: Linguistic/Discursive Power. Critical researchers have come to understand that **language is not a mirror of society. It is an unstable social practice whose meaning shifts, depending upon the context** in which it is used. Contrary to previous understandings, critical researchers appreciate the fact that **language is not a neutral and objective conduit of description of the "real world." Rather**, from a critical perspective, **linguistic descriptions are not simply about the world but serve to construct it. With these linguistic notions in mind**, **criticalists begin to study the way language in the form of discourses serves as a form of regulation and domination. Discursive practices are defined as a set of tacit rules that regulate what can and cannot be said**, who can speak with the blessings of authority and who must listen, whose social constructions are valid and whose are erroneous and unimportant. In an educational context, for example, legitimated discourses of power insidiously tell educators what books may be read by students, what instructional methods may be utilized, and what belief systems and views of success may be taught In all forms of research, discursive power validates particular research strategies, narrative formats, and modes of representation. In this context, power discourses undermine the multiple meanings of language, establishing one correct reading that implants a particular hegemonic/ideological message into the consciousness of the reader. This is a process often referred to as the attempt to impose discursive closure. Critical researchers interested in the construction of consciousness are very attentive to these power dynamics. Engaging and questioning the use value of particular theories of power is central to our notion of an evolving criticality (Blades, 1997; Gee, 1996; Lcmke, 1993; McWilliam & Taylor, 1996; Morgan, !996;Steinberg,2001).

Discourse Key/Poli Sci Link

Discourse is key-political science’s obsession with objective data closes off space for alternate ways of knowing and perpetuates an exclusionary liberal order

Wedeen in 2k7 (Lisa, Professor of Political Science Lisa Wedeen specializes in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, feminist theory, and qualitative methods, Scientific Knowledge, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, June 14-15, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

This essay takes up Michel Foucault’s invitation to “question ourselves about our aspirations to the kind of power that is presumed to accompany…science” (Foucault 1980: 84). It investigates the contemporary fascination with science in political science; it also shows how basic assumptions and oft-repeated terms have operated to instantiate liberal values by making them seem self-evident. An epistemological community has been produced at the intersection of two sets of norms—belief in the inherent value of science as a method of producing objective truth about the real world, on the one hand, and a commitment to the value of preserving liberalism, on the other. Not simply a fortuitous coming together of two separate sets of norms, the intersection between science and liberalism speaks to a longstanding reciprocity and, as we shall see, an elective affinity between logics.2 Contemporary practitioners of science in political science not only validate scientific methods as value neutral, but also tend to accept the same basic assumptions (about human nature, the good life, proper government, and acceptable forms of evidence). They deploy a vocabulary—a set of terms, juxtapositions, metaphors, and phrases—that describe their findings while also specifying which debates count as intelligible, meaningful, and worthy of scholarly attention.

At: Consequentialism

Reliance on empirics and cost benefit analysis props up a specific, liberal view of the world. This epistemology closes off alternate views and props up the view that US political views are necessary and inevitable.

Wedeen in 2k7 (Lisa, Professor of Political Science Lisa Wedeen specializes in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, feminist theory, and qualitative methods, Scientific Knowledge, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, June 14-15, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

In the wake of the poor performance of science in anticipating the demise of the Soviet Union and as versions of the “cultural turn” came to inspire other social sciences, an increasing focus on methodology operated to reinvigorate political science. As methodology became a field in its own right, and as formalized methods, in particular gained ground (“second only to quantification” in the APSR, according to Sigelman, and dominating the esteemed American Journal of Political Science),21 the circulation of formal methodologies and game theoretic arguments could have the indirect effect of working on behalf of an undertheorized elision between science and liberalism. By combining empirical research with nonempirical techniques of logic and pure mathematics, even abstract formal models required practitioners to hold assumptions (about the individual, cognition, and what democracy is) that were congenial to both projects. Terms like “trade-offs,” “cost-benefit analysis,” and “equilibria” could appear as neutral variables or consensually accepted standards rather than the product of a distinct political context. Sharing these assumptions has helped constitute a community that is epistemological (in the sense that it directs how we know what we know), methodological (in the sense that members adhere to the same sets of processes in producing and evaluating results), and ontological (members of the group self-identify as participants in a community of argument whose conditions make questioning basic assumptions seem irrelevant, if not silly or embarrassing). Agreement on the procedures for research seems to entail distinguishing between descriptive and causal inferences and according the latter greater prestige; treating the individual as the unit of analysis and identification; presupposing a world in which it is sufficient to depict agents as if they act only instrumentally; and taking initial interpretations as descriptive facts or raw data, rather than information mediated through the experience of a particular researcher. To conclude this section: Epistemological assumptions and liberal political commitments get constituted in and through the workings of political science.22 Dominant scholarly production in political science rests on particular views of science as the ultimate form of knowledge and liberalism as the desirable kind of politics. The positivist insistence on separating fact from value, moreover, obscures how science is itself an exalted value. Deciding what results political scientists want to explain (e.g., contested elections and procedures in place to ensure them, peace among democracies, conflict avoidance) can be seen in current texts as simultaneously politically relevant and devoid of value. As political science has become more scientific, liberal values have seemed to retreat into the background or been partially concealed by an emphasis on methods over content. Yet political science remains implicated in reproducing the liberal moral-political world in which practitioners live, in part by enacting the norms of proceduralism through which political projects are selected for inquiry, imagined into existence, and sustained. And scholars’ everyday enmeshments in institutional relationships—the pleasures of status, funding, approval, inclusion, prominence, job security and respect—have also worked to foreclose alternative political visions, while defining what is valid, good, and praiseworthy.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

Imperialism Good

An imperialist hegemon in society is a necessity, without it our world would see civilization reduce itself to anarchic and barbaric ways of life

Ferguson 4 (Niall, Prof of History at NYU Stern, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power>) MAT

Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world—and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new rivals. “[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century,” contends Mearsheimer. “[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead.” China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too has the potential to become “a formidable rival.” Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipolarity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers—whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states—they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

Imperialism Good

History proves that any future without a dominant expansionist nation acting within global society spurs on a world in which chaos and discontinuity pervades all parts of the globe

Ferguson 4 (Niall, Prof of History at NYU Stern, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power>) MAT

Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservative hubris is humbled in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal, going from empire to decolonization in less than two years. Suppose also that no aspiring rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums—not only in coping with Iraq but conceivably also Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The nearest approximation in modern times could be the 1920s, when the United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security centered on the League of Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 1922. And by 1936, German revanche was already far advanced. One must go back much further in history to find a period of true and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries. In this era, the remains of the Roman Empire—Rome and Byzantium—receded from the height of their power. The leadership of the West was divided between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who divided up his short-lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was dealing with the Bulgar rebellion to the north. By 900, the Abbasid caliphate initially established by Abu al-Abbas in 750 had passed its peak; it was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T'ang and Sung dynasties. Both these empires had splendid capitals—Baghdad and Ch'ang-an—but neither had serious aspirations of territorial expansion. The weakness of the old empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 957 when she converted to the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks—forebears of the Ottoman Turks—carved the Sultanate of Rum as the Abbasid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections between these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition was the antithesis of globalization. It was a world broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations. One feature of the age was that, in the absence of strong secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, religious institutions often set the political agenda. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema (clerics) who truly ruled. This atmosphere helps explain why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 1095. Yet, this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just another example of the apolar world's susceptibility to long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the ninth century—Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, to name just two. One Frankish chronicler lamented “the endless flood of Vikings” sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed “no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring sea … destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small, defensible, political units: the Venetian republic—the quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy by 840—or Alfred the Great's England, arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886.

Hegemony Good

The lack of a unipolar system with a stable, hegemonic power at its core would lead to apolarity, a state of being described by conflict, plagues, piracy, and nuclear war

Ferguson 4 (Niall, Prof of History at NYU Stern, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power>) MAT

Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers—the United States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony—its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

A2: US is Imperialist

Generalizing the US as an empire is untrue; doing so would allow many others to be characterized similarly.

Motyl in 6 (Alexander J., Prof of Poli-Sci at Rutgers Univ, Foreign Affairs, “Empire Falls”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61764/alexander-j-motyl/empire-falls>, p. 1) MAT

Matthew Connelly begins his contribution to the SSRC's Lessons of Empire with a puzzle: "Scholars of empire have to ask themselves why, after several decades of research and teaching, almost all of it critical of imperialism and its legacies, we seem not to have had the slightest impact." One good answer can be found in the conclusion to George Steinmetz's essay in the same volume: "A preferable way of avoiding having one's work functionalized for empire, to avoid the 'ear of the prince,' is to try to create accounts that are ontologically and epistemologically adequate to the processual, conjunctural, contingent nature of social life, and hence irreducible to simple policy statements." Ontological and epistemological adequacy may not do the trick, but stylistic opacity and intentional irrelevance will surely kill a putative prince's interest in academic writing. Sheldon Pollock's piece wanders even further into academic obscurantism, arguing that "contemporary discussions of the lessons past empires may have for present ones make several assumptions that must come as a surprise to anyone who has followed the debates on historical knowledge over the past few decades. One is that we really can acquire true knowledge of history; another is that this knowledge is useful to us, that we will benefit by acting upon its truth." Oddly enough, the book's editors share some of this skepticism about the relevance of history to the present, writing that "the lessons of studying past empires reinforce a cautious attitude toward claims made about the present." That may be so, but if historians really believe that they have little to say to policymakers, why write such books in the first place? One can draw lessons from the past only if one believes that history is real, that knowledge of history is possible, and that such knowledge can be packaged appropriately. Assuming one accepts these propositions, one then has to identify conceptual similarities between the objects to be compared and the contexts within which they exist and then develop meaningful theories of causality. Lessons of empire can be drawn, in other words, only if the United States is or has an empire and only if the foreign policy environment in which it pursues its supposedly imperial aims is comparable to that of past empires. It is that simple. If the United States is not an empire, or does not have one, there is nothing more to say about this particular subject. In Among Empires, Maier tries to sidestep this problem by claiming that "the United States reveals many, but not all -- at least not yet -- of the traits that have distinguished empires." But if the United States does not share all the defining characteristics of empires, then it is not an empire, and there is little reason to believe that valid lessons of imperial history will apply to it. After all, the United States shares "many, but not all" traits (such as bigness, multiethnicity, and arrogance) with non-empires such as Brazil, Canada, France, and Indonesia, so why not draw lessons from their experiences with equal justification?

A2: US is Imperalist

The US isn’t characterized as an empire now, and it would be conceptually impossible to attempt to become one

Motyl 6 (Alexander J., Prof of Poli-Sci at Rutgers Univ, Foreign Affairs, “Empire Falls”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61764/alexander-j-motyl/empire-falls>, p. 3) MAT

Not only is the United States not an empire, but it probably could not become one today. Several decades ago, the political scholar Rein Taagepera -- who, distressingly, is not mentioned by any of the authors in the books under review -- plotted the life spans of empires, graphically demonstrating what is now the conventional wisdom: empires have been among the most durable, stable, and successful political entities of all time. Empire actually works -- or, rather, worked -- quite well. Despite empire's long and venerable track record, however, there are strong reasons to think that empire building is no longer a viable political project. Imperial states have acquired territory in three ways: by marriage, by purchase, and by conquest. Marriage no longer works, as no contemporary ruler (not even a dictator) claims to own the territory he rules. Purchase is a dead end, as all the world's land is divided among jealous states and oftentimes empowered populations. Conquest is still possible in principle, and the twentieth century is full of instances in which it was attempted in practice. But the limits of conquest are clear, in the aftermath of Iraq if not before. International and most national norms, for example, now hold that the conquest of foreign nations and states almost certainly involves violations of human rights and the principles of self-determination and cultural autonomy, and is therefore illegitimate. Moreover, nation-states are unusually effective vehicles of mass mobilization and resistance, making sustained conquest harder now than in the past. And a growing aversion to violence militates against the ruthlessness that overcoming resistance requires. The international community may look the other way if mass murder is confined to a localized area of the developing world, such as Darfur, but it is hard to imagine that repeated genocidal policies in the service of imperialist expansion would not provoke severe condemnation and some countermeasures. In sum, while history suggests that being or having an empire is a guarantee of longevity, it also shows that acquiring an empire is probably no longer possible. What has caused the empire vogue recently has been not the sudden appearance of imperially structured U.S. power, but the seemingly arbitrary use of that power. The invasion of Afghanistan did not provoke talk of a U.S. empire, because most people in most countries believed that it was a reasonable response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and because it was the Taliban, not the United States, that was arbitrarily violating widely held norms about human rights, cultural autonomy, democracy, and national self-determination. It was the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration's tub-thumping unilateralist rhetoric that made the difference. Empire talk made sense not because the United States suddenly had an empire, but because the exercise of the United States' vast power seemed imperial to some in its potential beneficence and wisdom and imperious to others in its arrogance and arbitrariness. Seen in this light, it comes as no surprise that the authors who are cited the most in Lessons of Empire are Niall Ferguson and the writing team of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Ferguson is an enthusiastic proponent of empire, whereas Hardt and Negri are self-declared foes of it. All three have written books that have been as popular as they are weakly argued and incoherent. The empire talk such authors promote may be of interest to students of "discourses" or intellectual fads, but policy analysts and officials would do well to abandon the term "empire" instead of fetishizing it. Fortunately, that should not be difficult. Before there was empire talk, it was perfectly possible to discuss U.S. foreign policy in nonimperial terms. Michael Mandelbaum has recently shown in his book The Case for Goliath that it still is. Once President George W. Bush leaves office and the United States withdraws from Iraq, empire talk may well go the way of empires themselves. The issues it purported to clarify will remain.

A2: US is Imperalist

The US doesn’t fall under the definition of an empire, and it can’t be characterized as possessing an empire either

Motyl 6 (Alexander J., Prof of Poli-Sci at Rutgers Univ, Foreign Affairs, “Empire Falls”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61764/alexander-j-motyl/empire-falls>, p. 2) MAT

So does the United States qualify? It would be absurd to say that the 50 states are an empire. Does the United States have an empire? It is too soon to say whether occupied Iraq will become a U.S. colony, although from the way the war has been going, the chances are that it will not. Afghanistan is hardly a U.S. periphery. Puerto Rico's relationship with the mainland might be "colonial," as might Samoa's and Guam's, but a few minor islands make for a pretty dull empire. The United States and its institutions, political and cultural, certainly have an overbearing influence on the world today, but why should that influence be termed "imperial," as opposed to "hegemonic" or just "exceptionally powerful"? McDonald's may offend people, but it is unclear how a fast-food chain sustains U.S. control of peripheral territories. U.S. military bases dot the world and may facilitate Washington's bullying, but they would be indicative of empire only if they were imposed and maintained without the consent of local governments. Hollywood may promote Americanization -- or anti-Americanism -- but its cultural influence is surely no more imperial than the vaunted "soft power" of the European Union. Ronald Grigor Suny thus sensibly concludes his essay in the SSRC volume by noting that if "empire" is defined rigorously, the United States cannot be said to have one. Appropriate lessons might therefore be drawn from comparisons with other polities that have had vast power in the international system, some of which might have been empires, some of which might not. This point is not just academic. If the United States is not an empire, then the lessons of empire are the wrong ones for U.S. policymakers to heed. Maier implicitly acknowledges that "empire" is a dispensable term when he says he wants to investigate U.S. ascendancy without "claiming that the United States is or is not an empire." And indeed, his history of U.S. power could easily have been written without reference to empire. Imagine, then, that policy analysts and scholars stopped applying the label to the United States. Would it make any difference? I think not. The challenges facing the country -- war in Iraq, nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea, rising authoritarianism in Russia, growing military power in China, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, avian flu, climate change, and so forth -- would be exactly the same, as would U.S. policy options. Allies would still be allies; foreign critics would still express outrage at what they perceive to be American stupidity, arrogance, unilateralism, and the like. Life would go on, and no one -- except for scholars of empire -- would notice the difference.

Alt Fails

The ideology of imperialism is so deeply entrenched in society that the State has been entirely corrupted and prevents any real alternative

Van Elteren 3 (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, “US Cultural Imperialism Today” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v023/23.2elteren.html) JL

To the extent that advertising constitutes a pervasive public "art form," however, it has become the dominant mode in which thoughts and experiences are expressed. This trend is most evident in U.S. society. While alternative values and ideologies do exist in this culture, it is harder to find representations for them. Advertising distorts and flattens people's ability to interpret complex experiences, and it reflects the culture only partially, and in ways that are biased toward a capitalist idealization of American culture. 47 At this level, goods are framed and displayed to entice the customer, and shopping has become an event in which individuals purchase and consume the meanings attached to goods. The ongoing interpenetration and crossover between consumption and the aesthetic sphere (traditionally separated off as an artistic counter-world to the everyday aspect of the former) has led to a [End Page 182] greater "aestheticization of reality": appearance and image have become of prime importance. Not only have commodities become more stylized but style itself has turned into a valuable commodity. The refashioning and reworking of commodities—which are themselves carefully selected according to one's individual tastes—achieve a stylistic effect that expresses the individuality of their owner. 48 This provides the framework for a more nuanced and sometimes contradictory second order of meaning. The dynamics of cultural change therefore entail both processes of "traveling culture," in which the received culture (in this case globalizing capitalist culture) is appropriated and assigned new meaning locally, and at the same time a "first order" meaning that dominates and delimits the space for second order meanings—thus retaining something of the traditional meaning of cultural imperialism. The latter is, ultimately, a negative phenomenon from the perspective of self-determination by local people under the influence of the imperial culture. Traditional critiques of cultural globalization have missed the point. The core of the problem lies not in the homogenization of cultures as such, or in the creation of a "false consciousness" among consumers and the adoption of a version of the dominant ideology thesis. Rather, the problem lies in the global spread of the institutions of capitalist modernity tied in with the culturally impoverished social imagery discussed above, which crowd out the cultural space for alternatives (as suggested by critical analysts like Benjamin Barber and Leslie Sklair). The negative effects of cultural imperialism—the disempowerment of people subjected to the dominant forms of globalization—must be located on this plane. It is necessary, of course, to explore in more detail how the very broad institutional forces of capitalist modernity actually operate in specific settings of cultural contact. The practices of transnational corporations are crucial to any understanding of the concrete activities and local effects of globalization. A state-centered approach blurs the main issue here, which is not whether nationals or foreigners own the carriers of globalization, but whether their interests are driven by capitalist globalization.

**Alt Fails**

Imperialism doesn’t allow for the space of alternatives to exist

Ali 6 (Tariq, novelist, historian, and commentator on the

current situation in the Middle East, “The new imperialists – Ideologies of Empire”, Ch 3 Pg 51)JL

Then came the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of a peculiar form of gangster capitalism in the world. Did the triumph of capitalism and the defeat of an enemy ideology mean we were in a world without conflict or enemies? Both Fukuyama and Huntington produced important books as a response to the new situation. Fukuyama, obsessed with Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capitalism as the only embodiment of the “world-spirit” that now marked the “end of history,” a phrase that became the title of his book.3 The long war was over and the restless world-spirit could now relax and buy a condo in Miami. Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, politics, and economics of the Other – each and every variety of socialism/Marxism – had disappeared under the ocean, a submerged continent of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irreversible. It was a universal triumph. Huntington was unconvinced, and warned against complacency. From his Harvard base, he challenged Fukuyama with a set of theses first published in Foreign Affairs (“The Clash of Civilizations?” – a phrase originally coined by Bernard Lewis, another favourite of the current administration). Subsequently these papers became a book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. The question mark had now disappeared. Huntington agreed that no ideological alternatives to capitalism existed, but this did not mean the “end of history.” Other antagonisms remained. “The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. . . . The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.”4 In particular, Huntington emphasized the continued importance of religion in the modern world, and it was this that propelled the book onto the bestseller lists after 9/11. What did he mean by the word civilization? Early in the last century, Oswald Spengler, the German grandson of a miner, had abandoned his vocation as a teacher, turned to philosophy and to history, and produced a master-text. In The Decline of the West, Spengler counterposed culture (a word philologically tied to nature, the countryside, and peasant life) with civilization, which is urban and would become the site of industrial anarchy, dooming both capitalist and worker to a life of slavery to the machine-master. For Spengler, civilization reeked of death and destruction and imperialism. Democracy was the dictatorship of money and “money is overthrown and abolished only by blood.”5 The advent of “Caesarism” would drown it in “blood” and become the final episode in the history of theWest.Had the Third Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk, and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or in the Ardennes), Spengler’s prediction might have come close to realization. He was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism, and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not its language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage: I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a number of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, will and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and stonepines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return.6 In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive cycle of civilization:Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built petrifying world city following motherearth . . . they are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again. . . . Imperialism is civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the West is now irrevocably set. . . . Expansionism is a doom, something daemonic and intense, which grips forces into service and uses up the late humanity of the world-city stage.7

Imperialism Reps Flawed

Describing an empire as a powerful state is flawed: it allows for too broad of a spectrum.

Motyl 6 (Alexander J., Prof of Poli-Sci at Rutgers Univ, Foreign Affairs, “Empire Falls”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61764/alexander-j-motyl/empire-falls>, p. 1-2) MAT

There is thus no avoiding the definitional question that bedevils all such discussions. One common mistake is to conflate empire and imperialism, even though the first is a type of polity and the second is a type of policy. The distinction gets lost in Jack Snyder's argument, in the SSRC volume, that overexpansion destabilizes the states that practice it. Such a statement is plausible, but why is it a lesson of empire? Overexpansion, after all, is not usually a weakness of established empires, which are exceptionally durable and not necessarily expansionist. Another mistake is to think of empires simply as "big multinational states." But by this definition, the category would have to include Canada. "Big and powerful multinational states" is better, but still too broad, as it would have to include India. Even "great power" does not work, because some empires, such as that of the Hapsburgs, were not terribly strong and because many great powers lack the structural features of empires. Many scholars agree that empires should be defined as polities with a peculiar kind of relationship between a dominant "core" and subordinate and distinctive "peripheries." The core is not simply larger or more powerful than the peripheries, nor does it simply influence them in some heavy-handed manner. It actually rules them, either directly or indirectly, through local surrogates. No less important is the absence of significant relations between or among peripheries. In empires, the peripheries almost exclusively interact through the core. The resulting arrangement resembles a rimless wheel, consisting of a hub and spokes. The idea of all roads leading to Rome accurately describes the imperial structure.

At: Empire Collapse Inevitable

Only a miracle could set the US off its path of global dominance in any conceivable future

Mainland 3 (Grant, Research Specialist at Belfer Center, Harvard University, “American Primacy is a Lesser Evil”, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1273/american_primacy_is_a_lesser_evil.html>) MAT

Since the U.S.-led war in Iraq, politicians and pundits alike have called increasingly for a return to a "balance of power" or "multipolar world." At the G-8 summit in Evian, French President Jacques Chirac said, "I have no doubt whatsoever that the multipolar vision of the world that I have defended for some time is certainly supported by a large majority of countries throughout the world." Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao spoke similarly in Moscow, declaring that "Russia and China stand for a multipolar, just and democratic world order." But a return to multipolarity is as undesirable as it is impractical. Take the question of practicality first. When asked in an interview with The Wall Street Journal about Jacques Chirac's multipolar vision, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice responded with her own question: "A multipolar world? What does that mean?" Of course, Rice knows that a multipolar world means one in which at least a few states have roughly equal power - the very antithesis of today's America-dominated structure. But her real question was, what would a return to multipolarity look like? What are Chirac and others really proposing? It's a reasonable question. Would Europe radically ramp up its defense spending? In 2002, the European Union spent about $145 billion on defense in aggregate. The Bush administration's latest budget requests about $400 billion. Even factoring in the impending accession of 10 new states to the EU, could Europe really bridge a $255 billion gap? An alternative path to multipolarity would have the United States slash, say, $200 billion from its defense spending. This scenario strains common sense. Even if some hypothetical U.S president wanted to cut America's military budget in half, would Congress allow it? Would the American people support it? Why would the United States move toward military parity with countries that might not wish us well? It isn't going to happen. But even if it could, a multipolar world would not be a better place. As Rice put it to a British think tank, "Multipolarity is a theory of rivalry. It led to the Great War."

At: Empire Collapse Inevitable

US imperialism can be sustained because of its strong reliance on fair international relations

Ikenberry 4 (John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order” March http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59727/g-john-ikenberry/illusions-of-empire-defining-the-new-american-order?page=show) JL

The term "empire" refers to the political control by a dominant country of the domestic and foreign policies of weaker countries. The European colonial empires of the late nineteenth century were the most direct, formal kind. The Soviet "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe entailed an equally coercive but less direct form of control. The British Empire included both direct colonial rule and "informal empire." If empire is defined loosely, as a hierarchical system of political relationships in which the most powerful state exercises decisive influence, then the United States today indeed qualifies. If the United States is an empire, however, it is like no other before it. To be sure, it has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial policies, most notably in Latin America and the Middle East. But for most countries, the U.S.-led order is a negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three respects. First, the United States has provided public goods -- particularly the extension of security and the support for an open trade regime -- in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the U.S. system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, but arbitrary and indiscriminate power is reigned in. Finally, weaker states in the U.S.-led order are given "voice opportunities" -- informal access to the policymaking processes of the United States and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. It is these features of the post-1945 international order that have led historians such as Charles Maier to talk about a "consensual empire" and Geir Lundestad to talk about an "empire of invitation." The American order is hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and military power, but it is put at the service of an expanding system of democracy and capitalism.

At: Empire Collapse Inevitable

US power will go uncontested – lack of capable rivals and strong US force

Kagan 2 (Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “End of Dreams, Return of History” June 1 No 144 http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136) JL

Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11 The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ’s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach.

At: Empire Collapse Inevitable

**US hegemony won’t decline – popular hypotheses are incorrect**

Brooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen, William, Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College “World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy” http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8784.html) JL

Scholars stress that the shift from the bipolarity of the Cold War to the current unipolarity is not an unalloyed benefit for the United States because it comes with the prospect of counterbalancing, increased dependence on the international economy, a greater need to maintain a favorable reputation to sustain cooperation within international institutions, and greater challenges to American legitimacy. The conventional wisdom is that these systno ccquiesce to U.S. hegemony if the [End Page 150] United States displays self-restraint by exercising its predominance multilaterally through international institutions.12 Moreover, the United States’ “soft power”—the purportedly singular attractiveness of its political and economic institutions, and its culture—draws other states into Washington’s orbit.

Consequences > Epistemology

Even if our epistemology is suspect, the presence of impacts large in magnitude requires a default to consequentialism

TYLER COWEN in 2006 The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute George Mason University Consequentialism Utilitas, Dec2006, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p383-399

Consider this scenario where we have a slight (rational) sense of which beach is better for the invasion. Assume we know that if a windstorm comes that day, beach A is better for the military campaign against Hitler. It so happens that the chance of a windstorm is very small in France at that time of the year, but still the chance of the windstorm is not zero. Otherwise, if no windstorm comes, we have no idea which beach is better for the invasion, although one beach will turn out to be much better than the other beach, ex post. (If we wish, we could stipulate also that beach A also avoids the dog's hroken leg, although we no longer need this henefit to reach a conclusion.) Given that all other matters are held equal, we should invade the beach that will turn out to be better in the windstorm. **Lenman's example assumes that we know literally nothing about the major consequences of our acts; we know only the minor consequence** concerning the dog. **In contrast, the windstorm example assumes that we know a small amount about the major consequences of our acts, albeit not very much. Once we know a small amount about major consequences, however, the case for counting consequences appears more robust**. **And in most real world cases, no matter how great our uncertainty, we do know at least a small amount about major consequences,** if only in stochastic terms. **So the epistemic critique does not much weaken consequentialism when we have some information about some consequences of major importance**.^®

Consequences > Epistemology

Epistemological critique may decrease our ability to know the future with certainty, but this only supports defaulting to any risk of impacts large in magnitude-these are more important than small structural factors

TYLER COWEN in 2006 The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute George Mason University Consequentialism Utilitas, Dec2006, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p383-399

**The epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call 'big event consequentialism'**. In this view, **we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important** and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. **This includes stopping the use of nuclear weapons**, saving children from smallpox, **making progress against** global **poverty**, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. **Big events**, as I define them, **typically are of significant practical importance,** involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast, consider 'small events'. Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. **We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in refiective equilibrium**. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are relevant. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior**.** In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, **not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits**. **Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all** or some) **other values**. For instance **arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison**. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures." **A very large number of** 'muzak and **potato' lives do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization**.^^ Rawls put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons.^^ For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to matter. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead **the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons.** Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. **We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance**, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.^" To sum up these pointsz**, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: 'We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much**, **relative to** other **factors, such as deontology** or virtue ethics. **We should abandon consequentialist morality.' But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those which carry values with some lexical properties**, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.