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# \*\*\*A2 Solvency\*\*\*

## Solvency- NEG

### The AFF authors are just blasting empty rhetoric.

LSN, 2010 Longshore and Shipping News, The Case Against Short Sea Shipping Despite the hype and false promises, SSS is an attack on our union jobs This article was published in the Winter 2010 issue of the Coast Longshore Division Newsletter. http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/2011/02/the-case-against-short-sea-shipping/

Most longshore workers, particularly those of us registered in small ports, have heard the rhetoric associated with short sea shipping (SSS), sometimes referred to as marine highways. The United States government and many small public port authorities are championing the concept of SSS. Why? The United States government wants to undermine our position in the cargo transportation industry. Ports want a piece of the free money that the current administration is irresponsibly throwing around. Wannabe freight moving entrepreneurs and underutilized ports are telling all of us up and down the West Coast that there are jobs in it for us and our communities.

### Government investment not sufficient- can’t compete with market advantages to surface transportation.

LSN, 2010 Longshore and Shipping News, The Case Against Short Sea Shipping Despite the hype and false promises, SSS is an attack on our union jobs This article was published in the Winter 2010 issue of the Coast Longshore Division Newsletter. http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/2011/02/the-case-against-short-sea-shipping/

The Coast Committee, supported by the Coast Longshore Division Caucus, opposes the United States government’s usage of scarce tax dollars to promote and subsidize SSS in the north/south movement of containers on the West Coast of the Americas. Such water trade movement, by its very nature, cannot compete economically with truck and rail (even if subsidized) and will only serve to further drive down our sector’s wages and our working conditions. It will establish the framework for non-union and non-ILWU predatory union challenges to the Coast Longshore Division’s jurisdiction. Just what is short sea shipping? Simply put, it is the movement of containers between points along the North American coasts of the United States, Canada and Mexico (Hawaii excluded). Today, this type of marine traffic is regulated, in part, by cabotage laws, the Jones Act, and the fact that it’s less efficient than truck and rail. On the United States West Coast, SSS functions, unsubsidized, in four trade routes: between Seattle and Anchorage; between Tacoma and Anchorage; between Alaskan ports; and between the Columbia upriver ports and Portland. In Seattle, not a single registered longshoreman handles the cargo associated with SSS. It is all handled on the Duwamish River, either by non-union workers or Inlandboatmen’s Union (IBU) represented longshoremen under a PCLCD substandard agreement. In Alaska, some ports are union, like the ILWU in Dutch Harbor, and the Teamsters longshore in Anchorage. But outside of those union ports, cargo is handled by other maritime unions or non-union crews associated with the towboat crew. In the upriver ports of the Columbia River, the containers are handled exclusively by non-union dockworkers. Operators in non-union upriver Columbia River ports are requesting government subsidies to build barges designed to bypass ILWU longshoremen in Portland and transport commodities directly to the non-union Duwamish, where the barge can be unloaded for the short truck transport to Seattle’s International Port. Even the boats towing the barges have crews that are a mix of union and non-union, depending on company. Many towboat companies in the trade are double breasted. Why is the SSS industry dominated by cheap labor? The answer is simple. With trucking deregulation and the efficiencies associated with its door-to-door service, no other transportation mode can compete unless wages and working conditions are markedly deflated. Even with government subsidy, wages and working conditions must be pushed below PCL&CA standards. No amount of government subsidy can counterbalance this reality.

## Solvency- NEG

### Costs with inland transportation is TOO high- it trades off with more efficient surface transportation.

LSN, 2010 Longshore and Shipping News, The Case Against Short Sea Shipping Despite the hype and false promises, SSS is an attack on our union jobs This article was published in the Winter 2010 issue of the Coast Longshore Division Newsletter. http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/2011/02/the-case-against-short-sea-shipping/

In addition, short distance barge service for standardized commodities (containers) does not and cannot offer same day delivery. Large numbers of containers must be collected in a central location over days before being loaded to a barge. The container must be double- and triple-handled after leaving its source location. All this and more adds to the cost of handling. A shipper such as Wal-Mart will not pay more just for the environment or to limit congestion so your commute drive will be easier. Government is trying to put just enough subsidies out there to bait a potential operator into squeezing the rest of the necessary cost reductions from labor and ports. Already, the Coast Committee is being approached with requests for manning and wage reductions that would be unique to SSS. Potential operators are seeking advantages from non-Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) member public port authorities to lease blocks of property for the purpose of establishing container yards (CY) with no ILWU Coast Longshore Division presence. Other unions, including non-Longshore Divisions in our own ILWU family, are clamoring to fill the gap in the leased yards. The irony is that even they cannot agree to work cheaply enough to make the truck/barge economics work. In ports like Eureka and Coos Bay, where private docks are the norm, we don’t even have a historical relationship that we can rely on to protect our jurisdiction. Other maritime unions, like the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (MEBA), International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), Seafarers International Union (SIU) and our own IBU, see SSS as more work for them, despite the fact that in some cases the work may be that which is traditionally assigned to Coast Longshore Division longshoremen. MEBA represents dockworkers handling cargo to and from barges in Alaska as we speak. MEBA has even cut a substandard deal with Horizon on the East Coast for the trade. The AFL-CIO’s Transportation Trade Department (TTD) wants to support SSS, but the Coast Longshore Division is blocking any formal endorsement. Solidarity among these unions suddenly becomes important when the Jones Act is attacked or the cabotage laws are jeopardized, and these unions fail to see the connection between SSS and the fact that they’re under attack, and they ask the Coast Longshore Division for help. Subsidy and promotion of SSS by the governments of the United States, Canada and Mexico, is an effort, one of several fronts, to deregulate maritime transportation and drive organized labor consequentially from the Industry. SSS is not a panacea for additional union jobs. It is just the opposite. Scarce government tax dollars should be used for land-based infrastructure designed to efficiently move containers to and from established ports. We need dedicated freight corridors, bridges, rail enhancements and dredging that bring stability to the industry — not the funding, promotion, and blind acceptance of a concept that even with subsidy will fail, and drag organized labor down with it.

## Waterways investment fails - timeframe

### Waterways investment fails – bad cost forecasting and long construction time.

Stef Proost & Saskia van der Loo, July 2010, is currently professor at the Catholic University of Leuven, at the K.U.Leuven he teaches environmental economics and transport economics, his main activity is directing a research group of 18 researchers at the Department of Economics that deals with environment, energy and transport topics, Saskia van der Loo is a Prof. in the Department of Economics, Catholic University of Leuven, Journal Of Intelligent Transportation Systems, Vol. 14 No. 3, p. 129, Ebsco Host

Transport infrastructure is known as a lumpy investment with long lead times. The construction of a new motorway, a new high-speed rail line, or a new canal may take 10 years or more. Whether to take on a new project and to choose the right capacity, one needs demand forecasts for the next 10 to 30 years. Studies of past large transport infrastructure projects have shown that demand has been systematically overestimated and that costs have often been underestimated (Flyberg et al., 2003). There are many sources of uncertainty in infrastructure projects. In this article, we concentrate on only one possible source of uncertainty: the level of future demand. Given that future demand is uncertain and that one needs to decide on the capacity level now, is there a justification to overinvest rather than to underinvest in infrastructure capacity? To discuss this question, we use two analytical models: a one-mode model and a two-mode model. In the one-mode model, we analytically showed that choosing overinvestment is, under certain conditions, a better strategy than choosing the capacity in function of the expected level of demand. These conditions are surprisingly simple: The demand elasticity has to be smaller than 1. This one-mode model makes more sense when there are no easy transport alternatives for a given trip. In the second model, we dealt with two modes that can easily be substituted and where one mode has long lead times in capac-ity additions, but the other mode can easily adjust its capacity. Examples are the competition between high-speed rail (long lead times) and air transport for passengers and the competi-tion between inland waterways (long lead times) and trucks for freight. In this case, it is no longer possible to show that over-investment is systematically optimal because the other mode serves as an escape route for high demands.

## A2 Congestion

### Traffic projections are exaggerated

Stern, 2012 Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012, Congressional Research Service, google

The Corps has in the past noted that the justification for most new navigation alternatives depends greatly on traffic forecasts from future trade scenarios, which can themselves be difficult to predict. These forecasts often depend on a number of interrelated variables, such as commodity prices, the overall price sensitivity of shippers, and outside factors such as increases or decreases in the efficiency of other modes of freight transit. The Corps has noted that total domestic freight traffic is expected to increase by approximately 70% by 2020, but recently has avoided projections specific to inland waterway freight traffic.55 The Department of Transportation projects that the majority of this increase in freight traffic will be on freight rail and highway traffic, with annual waterway traffic projected to increase 2% per year between 2010 and 2035.56 Shipping interests point out that an overall increase in the efficiency of inland waterways could lessen anticipated pressure on highway and rail shipments, or at least maintain viability of inland waterways compared to these other forms of freight shipping. Future lock upgrades or new construction would likely increase demand for inland waterways. However, the extent to which these upgrades would have an effect on demand would likely also depend on a number of other external factors. Some groups have countered industry requests for new lock construction based on traffic projections by noting that traffic has been flat or decreasing at some individual locks on hightraffic portions of the inland waterway system.57 Observers, including former Corps employees, have also criticized previous projections of traffic increases by the Corps and as overly optimistic.58 To date, the Corps has avoided use of projected future traffic increases as a basis for changes to the overall level of investments on inland waterways.

## A2 Environment

### Environmental benefits are wrong- net harmful to the environment.

Stern, 2012 Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012, Congressional Research Service, google

Taxpayer and environmental groups have questioned studies citing environmental benefits as a basis for new investments in barge shipping. For instance, groups have disagreed with industry fuel-efficiency calculations, noting that many industry studies have not taken into account technical factors such as the directional constraints of river flow, or “circuity.”61 They argue that the use of a conversion factor to account for circuity creates a more accurate picture of fuel efficiency among various modes. They have also noted that using the fuel efficiency for “unit grain trains” instead of an average for all rail shipping would allow for a more accurate comparison of fuel efficiency between barge and rail shipping.62 Environmental groups also note that inland waterway projects can negatively affect riparian habitat and species by altering natural flows.63 Structural changes to rivers such as locks and dams (which can create sedimentation, increase turbidity, and lead to other reservoir-like effects) and levees (which separate rivers from flood plains) affect the natural state of these bodies of water. Additionally, waterway traffic may also cause bank erosion through wave action. Thus, increased construction and expansion of inland waterways can have negative environmental effects.

# \*\*\*A2 Economy Advantage\*\*\*

## Can’t compete

### US can’t compete – education standards & lack of immigrants

BARTLETT 8 – 23 - 06 president of the Global Economics Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota [David L., “Building A Competitive Workforce: Immigration And The US Manufacturing Sector,” http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0823-bartlett.shtm]

Shortages of skilled labor constitute the foremost challenge confronting U.S. manufacturers who face growing competition from manufacturers in Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Demand for professionals with university degrees is rising as manufacturing becomes increasingly high tech. But the U.S. educational system is not producing enough highly educated native-born manufacturing workers to meet this growing demand. Moreover, the pending retirements of Baby Boom generation workers will further constrain the growth of the manufacturing labor force. Bridging this gap between the supply and demand for skilled workers requires new investments in the U.S. educational system and the formulation of immigration policies that respond to the labor needs of the U.S. economy. Yet current immigration policies, especially since 9/11, have made it more difficult for highly skilled professionals from abroad to enter the United States.

## A2 Economic Collapse

### No impact to economic decline – empirically proven

Ferguson, 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### US economy doesn’t affect the rest of the world – EU/Sino trade

Bangkok Post, 1/25/08 (HOW IMMUNE IS ASIA, http://www.bangkokpost.com/Business/26Jan2008\_biz33.php

Mr Casali said that despite the global turmoil and worries about the US economy, Asia in recent years has become better insulated through a higher proportion of intra-regional trade and trade with Europe. Today, he says, Chinese exports to the European Union are far more than those to the United States and therefore fears that a US economic setback will hurt regional economies are overblown. ''If you look at the percentage of exports from China into Europe and the US last year, you will see a marked rise and the decline to the US, but in overall terms the percentage of exports from China rose and that is what is the key.''

## A2 Jobs

### Employment is the last economic indicator to improve after a recession – it’s not key to recovery

Rosemary Peavler 5-14-09 How economic indicators help, 5-14-9, http://bizfinance.about.com/od/currentevents/a/Economic\_Indicators\_2.htm

If you look back at these economic indicators, you will see a mixed picture for our economy. We have a Gross Domestic Product that fell hard in first quarter 2009 and a Consumer Price Index that also fell in March, after an increase in the previous month. Neither of those statistics are good news. The Producer Price Index also fell so manufacturers are having trouble selling their products. These numbers mean that deflation could be on the horizon. Deflation, or falling prices, during a recession is a troubling sign and could lengthen the recession. We have to look at unemployment, which is still rising. We know from past recessions, however, that unemployment often keeps rising even after a recession reaches its peak and the economy starts to turn around. We need to look at stock prices. We’ve seen an uptick in stock prices in April and May which is always good news. When stock prices go up, it signifies investor confidence. We have to hope that this isn’t a “sucker’s rally,” but a real rally. Stock prices go right along with consumer confidence. The best news in these economic indicators is that consumers are becoming more confident that we are nearing the bottom of this recession and perhaps the economy is going to start getting better. There are other important economic indicators released by a variety of agencies including the Federal Reserve, the Conference Board, the Census Bureau and others, but these are the most important ones.

## No impact to trade (1)

### Increased trade has no effect on decreasing risk of conflict between nations

Gelpi and Greico 05, Associate Professor and Professor of Political Science, Duke University (Christopher, Joseph, “Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace”, Journal of Peace Research)

As we have already emphasized, increasing levels of trade between an autocratic and democratic country are unlikely to constrain the former from initiating militarized disputes against the latter. As depicted in Figure 1, our analysis indicates that an increase in trade dependence by an autocratic challenger on a democratic target from zero to 5% of the former's GDP would increase the probability of the challenger’s dispute initiation from about 0.31% to 0.29%. Thus, the overall probability of dispute initiation by an autocratic country against a democracy is fairly high (given the rarity of disputes) at 23 nearly .3% per country per year. Moreover, increased trade does little or nothing to alter that risk. Increases in trade dependence also have little effect on the likelihood that one autocracy will initiate a conflict with another. In this instance, the probability of dispute initiation remains constant at 0.33% regardless of the challenger’s level of trade dependence.

### Alternate causality – the US anti-dumping law violates free trade laws.

Ikenson 10/6/05 CATO Free Trade Institute since 1990, Co-founded the Library of International Trade Resources (Daniel, Co-author of [Antidumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law](http://www.catostore.org/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&method=cats&scid=13&pid=1441160), “Abuse of Discretion: Time to Fix the Administration of the US Antidumping Law,” Trade Policy Analysis No. 31, <http://www.freetrade.org/node/30>)

Administration of the U.S. antidumping law has been a significant source of friction in international trade in recent years. Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, various aspects of U.S. antidumping practice have been subject to dispute settlement in 26 different cases. Most of the issues raised in those cases concern the discretionary practices of the U.S. Import Administration, an agency within the Department of Commerce that administers part of the antidumping law. At present, the United States remains noncompliant with several WTO determinations that certain U.S. antidumping methodologies violate the rules established by WTO members. Compliance in some of those cases could be achieved simply by changing the offending discretionary practices and would require no actions by the U.S. Congress. IA routinely exploits gray areas in the law to favor the domestic interests that seek protection--and, according to the verdicts of U.S. courts, sometimes violates the law in the process. In the 18-month period ending in June 2005, IA published 19 antidumping redeterminations pursuant to court orders to revise its assumptions or calculations to become compliant with the law. In 14 of those redeterminations, the revised antidumping rates were lower than those originally calculated. The imposition of antidumping orders and the inflation of antidumping duty rates based on erroneous judgments have profound adverse effects on trade and trade relations. It is time for U.S. antidumping policy to be brought into the fold of broader U.S. trade policy objectives. Its administration must be disciplined and calibrated with the efforts of other U.S. agencies to open markets abroad and to demonstrate that the United States believes in the merits of free trade. Accordingly, policymakers should consider the merits of establishing an oversight board, comprising representatives from various agencies with jurisdiction over trade policy, to review IA's antidumping determinations before they are published. Such a body could help buffer antidumping decisions from the results orientation and politicization to which they are currently so prone.

## No impact to trade (2)

### Globalized free trade will cause global nuclear war.

STAPLES 2K Chair of the International Network on Disarmament and Globalization (Steven, “The Relationship Between Globalization and Militarism”, Social Justice magazine, Vol. 27, No. 4, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Globalization/Globalization\_Militarism.html)

Proponents of global economic integration argue that globalization promotes peace and economic development of the Third World. They assert that "all boats rise with the tide" when investors and corporations make higher profits. However, there is precious little evidence that this is true and substantial evidence of the opposite. The United Nation's Human Development Report (U.N. Development Programme, 1999: 3) noted that globalization is creating new threats to human security. Economic inequality between Northern and Southern nations has worsened, not improved. There are more wars being fought today-mostly in the Third World-than there were during the Cold War. Most are not wars between countries, but are civil wars where the majority of deaths are civilians, not soldiers. The mainstream media frequently oversimplify the causes of the wars, with claims they are rooted in religious or ethnic differences. A closer inspection reveals that the underlying source of such conflicts is economic in nature. Financial instability, economic inequality, competition for resources, and environmental degradation-all root causes of war-are exacerbated by globalization. The Asian financial meltdown of 1997 to 1999 involved a terrible human cost. The economies of Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia crumbled in the crisis. These countries, previously held up by neoliberal economists as the darlings of globalization, were reduced to riots and financial ruin. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to rescue foreign investors and impose austerity programs that opened the way for an invasion by foreign corporations that bought up assets devalued by capital flight and threw millions of people out of work. Political upheaval and conflict ensued, costing thousands of lives. Meanwhile, other countries watched as their neighbors suffered the consequences of greater global integration. In India, citizens faced corporate recolonization, which spawned a nationalistic political movement. Part of the political program was the development of nuclear weapons-seen by many as the internationally accepted currency of power. Nuclear tests have put an already conflict-ridden region on the brink of nuclear war.

## A2 Fertilizer/food prices add-on

### Too many causes—climate change, biofuels, and speculation

Emerging Markets, 6/17

Emerging Markets , Calls grow for global food price action, 17/06/2012 | Phil Thornton, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3047619/News/Calls-grow-for-global-food-price-action.html

Oxfam called on the G20 to fix what it called “the broken food system”. “The G20 persists in failing to address the most important drivers of the food price crisis: increased demand for biofuels, financial speculation on commodities, and climate change,” it said. Mexico has prioritized improving food security, decreasing food price volatility, and increasing agricultural productivity under its G20 presidency. A report, commissioned by President Felipe Calderon, last week urged the G20 to show leadership in multilateral negotiations, strengthen rules on import and export restrictions, as well as on domestic support schemes that distort production incentives.

### Not solve-trade barriers—jumpstarting Doha is the only way to solve price spikes

Emerging Markets, 6/17

Emerging Markets , Calls grow for global food price action, 17/06/2012 | Phil Thornton, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3047619/News/Calls-grow-for-global-food-price-action.html

Glenn Hall, a partner at the global law firm Norton Rose that this year published a study of the agribusiness sector, said the priority of the G20 should be to reduce trade barriers. “This will make it easier to export agricultural products from the developing markets to developed nations and to give emerging countries the huge agricultural potential they have,” he told Emerging Markets. Negotiations to open up Western markets are a key element of the so-called Doha trade negotiations that were launched in 2001 but which have since run into the sand.

### Multiple causes-ethanol and speculation 🡪spikes

Emerging Markets, 6/17

Emerging Markets , Calls grow for global food price action, 17/06/2012 | Phil Thornton, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3047619/News/Calls-grow-for-global-food-price-action.html

He called on the G20 to take action to curb speculation and limit the amount of corn diverted to ethanol production, which he said was the driving factors behind food prices rises. “It is possible for the G20 to make stronger statements about the need for changes in biofuel policy and for the need to confine speculative activity to levels that are consistent with well-behaving markets,” he said. “But it is surely important for the G20 to come out clearly on these matters. It would help and one might hope it will become part of the momentum towards both understanding these issues and acting on them.”

# \*\*\*A2 Terrorism Advantage\*\*\*

## No waterway terror attack

### Terrorists won’t conduct a maritime attack – scarce targets and easier land options.

Breanne Wagner, November 2007, staff writer, National Defense, “License to Boat?,” Vol. 92 Issue 648, p. 24, Ebsco Host

\*\*\*cites CRS analysts Paul Pariomak & John Frittelli, experts on maritime terrorism\*\*\*

In the CRS report, analysts Paul Pariomak and John Frittelli said that increased govern-ment efforts, along with specific challenges to terrorists on U.S. seas, might prevent per-petrators from attempting a waterborne attack. Terrorists face more obstacles to maritime attacks than land attacks, the report said. This is because sea targets are more scarce than land targets , surveillance at sea provides less cover and ocean conditions make an attack scenario somewhat unpredictable , said Navy Capt .James Pelkofski, according to the report." Although a successful attack on U.S. mar-itime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetra –tors such as al-Qaida, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere," Parfomak and Frittelli wrote. They point out that since1997, less than one percent of global attacks involved sea targets .

### It’s not visible enough – no motivation.

Catherine Z. Raymond, 2-9-2006, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits," Global Terrorism Analysis, Vol. 4 Issue 3, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369896>

ASG and MILF traditionally operate within their locality of the Philippines and its surrounding archipelagic waters; it would be uncharacteristic of them to carry out an attack on shipping in the Malacca Straits. This is related to the fact that they are both separatist groups, with the aim of establishing an independent Islamic state in the Philippines. Therefore, their targets tend to be either located within the country, or closely associated with it. GAM is also a separatist group and while there may be some overlap in terms of its area of operations and the Malacca Straits, its targets have traditionally included the Indonesian military and security forces. In addition, GAM has just signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government, which includes the disarmament and demobilization of its 3000 fighters (PNG Post-Courier, August 23, 2005). Through this process of elimination, the group that would appear to be the only real threat to shipping in the Malacca Straits is JI. The group has shown an interest in attacking shipping in the Straits and vessels visiting Changi Naval Base in Singapore and is suspected of developing more expertise in this area. Its maritime capability, however, remains underdeveloped when compared to its land capability. Attacks against targets in the maritime domain would require specialized equipment and skills; depending on the target, they may also require knowledge of shipping patterns, boat operation and maintenance, and boarding techniques. This explains the predictions of a piracy-terrorism nexus, of which there is still no evidence. Various explanations have been proffered as to why there is still no sign of any cooperation between pirates and terrorists. One explanation is that the majority of those committing acts of piracy in the Malacca Straits are largely un-organized petty-criminals who use piracy as a way of supplementing their inadequate income. These small groups and individuals may not be willing to cooperate with terrorists who, through their high-profile activities, may trigger a complete crackdown on all maritime crime. Carrying out an attack in the maritime domain also presents a number of difficulties that are not encountered on land. First, if the aftermath of an attack is to be captured by the media, which is often the wish of a terrorist group, then the attack needs to be carried out close to land. This then considerably compresses the theater of operations, as only coastal areas and ports would be suitable. Second, surveillance at sea of potential targets offers less cover and concealment than on land and entails the same environmental challenges as any maritime activity.

### No means for large attack – it’s all speculation.

Janes Intelligence Review, 2006 “maritime Terrorism: the threat in context”

Does the concern about the potential for large-scale maritime terrorism match the reality of the threat? A lack of necessary skills and the practical difficulties facing terrorists attempting to operate in the maritime sphere may render many of the nightmare scenarios feared by governments and port authorities unlikely. Martin Murphy reports. An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the global maritime terrorist threat should be driven by an assessment of what is probable, rather than merely possible. However, sober analysis of this issue has been clouded amid the anxiety created by the current global security climate, with much discussion turning on the notion that terrorists could potentially strike any target with virtually any means available. While the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US demonstrated the willingness of a new generation of Islamist militants to conduct mass-casualty attacks, conceptually it was not very different from other terrorist 'spectaculars'. There was no fundamental innovation in terrorist methods and the attacks did not herald a significant change of direction. Rather, they built on the steady standards of terrorist tactics: surprise and simplicity, executed by means of known and straightforward technology. In the 11 September 2001 attacks, it was the scale, audacity and, once it became apparent, the international reach of the group behind it, which surprised many. These elements led observers to look for other possible scenarios where acts on a similar scale could be carried out. The sea certainly offers scale, and it is not surprising that some of this speculation has focused on the maritime domain. Two main reasons are put forward as to why terrorists might mount attacks on water: the high seas are an unregulated space that, in the case of weak states that are unable to police their territorial waters effectively, extends right up to coast; and that few terrorist incidents have occurred at sea and therefore it is the turn of ships and seafarers to provide the next vehicle and set of victims. Such speculation has fallen into two broad categories: large ships as weapons, and ships as delivery vehicles for weapons.

## No nuclear terrorism (1)

### No nuclear terrorism – statistically insignificant cumulative probability.

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 187-90

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

## No nuclear terrorism (2)

### Too many obstacles to overcome – even if overcoming isn’t impossible – even generous odds ensure the chances of success are 1 in 3 billion statistically – small enough to vote on presumption

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 197-8

As Allison appropriately points out, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their likelihood is small.33 At some point, however, probabilities, become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it begins to make sense to ignore, or at least to backburner, them: the risk becomes "acceptable:' Consider the odds that a wheel on a speeding automobile will suddenly shear off. That horror is surely"not impossible;' yet legions of motorists effectively find it so improbable that they are routinely willing to risk their lives that it will not happen-it is, in short, an acceptable risk. The British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans-far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential (and fully possible) calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially, it is "accepted:' Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States enjoys a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that goes substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls "a case for fear," Cass Sunstein notes that if there is a yearly probability of one in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to one in 10,000 over 10 years and to one in 5,000 over 20 years. These odds, he suggests, are "not the most comforting:'34 Comfort, ofcourse, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably h~ difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at some of the levels suggested here: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt. The same consideration holds for Vice President Dick Cheney's "one percent doctrine:' A top CIA analyst late in 2001 told him that al-Qaeda probably did not have a nuclear weapon, but that he couldn't "assure yoo that they don't:' To this, Cheney replied, "If there's a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true:'35 Cheney'S observation : is a somewhat confused, but effective, way of saying that one should t:ake low probability events that could have an exceedingly high impact very seriously indeed. And a one percent chance of a terrorist atomic attack would dearly fit into that category. It's just that the chances, while perhaps not zero, .:: do not seem to be anywhere remotely near one percent. It's not that they are necessarily one in 3.5 billion, but they aren't anything like one in ten, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand. Perhaps, in fact, they are comparable to, or even lower than, those for a thermonuclear attack from Russia.’

## No terrorist motivation

### This ensures terrorists won’t have the motivation.

Michael A. Levi, 4-19-2007, Fellow for Science and Technology, “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/>

Yet from a terrorist perspective the prospect of a fizzle or a dud might change things. Let me start by revisiting the question of terrorist aversion to failure—terrorist motivations are central to the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, and we seem to disagree on what they are. I have never asserted that terrorists will not attempt anything but “foolproof” plots. But there is a lot of territory in between foolproof and a 90 percent (or even 50 percent or 30 percent) chance of failure. Why might a group decide against a course of action with a 10 percent chance of killing tens or hundreds of thousands? A group might have better alternatives. An attack on public transportation that has a ninety-five percent chance of killing forty people is a straw man alternative to nuclear terrorism—certainly terrorist groups have intermediate and perhaps, from their perspectives, more compelling options, like suicide aircraft attacks, Madrid and London style bombings, and plots like the one using liquid explosives that failed last summer. Here is another possibility: In the wake of a full-blown nuclear plot, the international campaign against terrorism would likely step into a much higher gear. Would al-Qaeda accept a ninety percent chance of failing to kill more than a massive conventional bomb would while incurring a large risk of provoking a response that might cripple its ability to initiate other plots, nuclear or non-nuclear, in the future? We can’t know the answer, but there is no reason to assume that al-Qaeda would choose such a course.

## Can’t purchase nuke

### They can’t get it from anyone else.

John Mueller, 2010, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda,” p. 163-5

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. This is highly improbable, however, because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered. As one prominent analyst, Matthew Bunn, puts it, "A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense risk of transferring such a devastating capability to terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present possibility that the material would be traced back to its origin." Important in this last consideration are deterrent safeguards afforded by "nuclear forensics;' the rapidly developing science (and art) of connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been exploded.6 An indication of the natural sensitivity of governments on this issue can be found in the experience of the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. In an interview conducted as al-Qaeda's position in Afghanistan was about to be overrun, Osama bin Laden contended to Mir that al-Qaeda possessed chemical and nuclear weapons (this episode is assessed more fully in chapter 14). According to Mir, the Pakistani government told him "not to mention the nuclear weapon under any circumstance because the Americans might think Pakistan had sold it" to bin Laden.7 Although the Pakistanis appear to have gotten the point on their own, it was presumably hammered home a bit later in that year when CIA Director George Tenet flew to the country in part to inform Pakistan's president, with a notable absence of diplomatic subtlety, "You cannot imagine the outrage there would be in my country if it were learned that Pakistan is coddling scientists who are helping Bin Ladin acquire a nuclear weapon. Should such a device ever be used. the full fury of the American people would be focused on whoever helped al-Qa'ida in its cause."8 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve-including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.9 It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state, thus far at least, has ever given another state-even friendly allies-a nuclear weapon (or a chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently, though there have been cases of state-to-state assistance with nuclear programs. For example, during the cold war, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused. 10 There could be some danger that terrorists would be aided by private (or semiprivate) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, Khan's activities were easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time. And although the Khan case is understandably unsettling, it did not, as analyst Michael Levi notes, "involve nuclear weapons or explosive materials, the most sensitive part of the Pakistani nuclear program." Moreover, the aid he tendered was entirely to states with return addresses whose chief aim in possessing nuclear weapons would be to deter (or to gain prestige). As with previous examples of state-to-state assistance, Khan did not aid stateless terrorist groups whose goal presumably would be actually to set the weapons off. 11 In addition, al-Qaeda-the chief demon group and the only one that has claimed to see value in striking the United States-is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along aU that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the TaIiban government. And, although there is concern that a re-Talibanized Afghanistan would facilitate an al-Qaeda bomb program, the main TaIiban elements are strongly opposed to foreign fighters like al-Qaeda and have reportedly sought to distance themselves from the terrorist group, in part to ingratiate themselves with bin Laden's numberone enemy, Saudi Arabia, whose support they would need if they ever tried again to run Afghanistan.12

## No retaliation

### No public pressure – they accept terrorism as inevitable no pressure – crackdown would be domestic.

Ian Bremmer, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new 9/11 hit America”

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

### Any move for retaliation is posturing – Obama won’t follow through.

Michael Crowley, January 2010, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence,” <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

## A2 Bioterrorism

### Bioterrorism is exaggerated – won’t cause extinction.

Arms Control Center, 1-26-2010, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, report in response to the Graham-Talent Commission report on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Biological threats: a matter of balance,” Lexis Nexis

• The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. • New bioweapons assessments are needed that take into account the complex set of social and technical issues that shape bioweapons development and use by state and non-state actors, and that focus on more plausible threats than the worst-case scenarios that have largely driven discussion to date. • Continuing to emphasize and spend billions of dollars on measures to specifically counter bioterrorist threat scenarios distorts our national understanding of the important issues in public health, and diverts scarce scientific talent and resources away from more pressing public health and natural disease threats. • While it has been argued that spin-offs from biodefense programs contribute to countering natural diseases, the converse is more likely: direct targeting of effort and expenditure on natural disease threats would provide much greater public health benefit, and spin-offs from these programs would significantly strengthen resistance to bioterrorism. • Bioterrorist threats need to be seen and addressed within a wider public health context--as just one of the many possible ways in which infectious agents may harm human, animal, and plant health How Serious is the Bioterrorist Threat? • Beginning in the early 1990s, an increasing amount was written about the threat of bioterrorism. Prior to 2001 most examples of “bioterrorism” were in fact hoaxes or were only tenuously related to actual threats, with the single exception of the use of Salmonella to contaminate salad bars in Oregon in 1984. Much was made of the Japanese group Aum Shinrykio’s unsuccessful attempts to use anthrax and botulinum toxin without drawing the simple and obvious lesson that achieving success in such attempts is difficult. The 2001 anthrax letters were seen as validating large scale and catastrophic threat scenarios, despite the very real difficulties that isolated individuals or small groups would have had in making such material. By the time the source of those letters was identified in August 2008 as a government laboratory with capabilities vastly in excess of those of any terrorist organization, biodefense programs costing tens of billions of dollars were already established, producing a potent and vocal constituency for continued and increased funding. • Offensive, including terrorist, use of biological agents presents major technical problems. This is why the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and others needed to spend vast sums for decades in order to research and develop biological weapons. Even then the results were considered an unreliable form of warfare, and there was little opposition to their elimination by international agreement (indeed the US unilaterally eliminated its biological weapons stockpiles). • Fictional bioterrorism exercises such as Atlantic Storm and Dark Winter routinely used unrealistic values for critical parameters and were unrealizable by putative perpetrators. They tended to gloss over the very real problems involved in acquiring, growing and disseminating smallpox virus on a sufficient scale to represent a major threat. They also posited unreasonable assumptions about issues such as the rate of disease spread, which skewed the outcomes towards inflated and unlikely results.

# \*\*\*Disad Links\*\*\*

## Politics- links (1)

### The plan costs capital- funding concerns.

Cochran, 2009 Bipartisan Senate Group Outlines Case Against Plan to Fund Inland Waterways Trust Fund

Chris Gallegos, September 22, 2009, http://www.cochran.senate.gov/press/pr092209a.html

U.S. Senators Thad Cochran and Roger Wicker, both R-Miss., today reiterated their opposition to a proposed lock usage fee sought by the Obama Administration to raise revenue for the Inland Waterways Trust Fund. The Mississippi Senators are among a bipartisan group of 20 Senators who object to the proposed fee and who issued letters to the leadership of the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, asking them not to move forward with legislation to implement the lock usage fee. “There is a clear recognition that the Inland Waterways Trust Fund cannot keep up with the demands placed on it. The lock usage fee, which Congress has rejected in the past, is not a fair or efficient tool for fixing the financial problems facing the Trust Fund,” Cochran said. “I think the Congress should work to find a more suitable solution that will keep the Trust Fund solvent and enable the Army Corps of Engineers to address the backlog of improvement projects on our waterways, ”Cochran continued. “The Inland Waterways Trust Fund’s solvency must be addressed, but proposing a solution that has been rejected by Congress in the past is not the way to go,” Wicker said. “Lockage fees represent a highly inequitable fix to this problem. The lockage fee idea should be abandoned and Congress should be allowed to continue working toward a better solution.”

### The plan is unpopular.

Paul Davidson, May 20th, 2012 USA TODAY, “USA’s creaking infrastructure holds back economy” http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2012-05-20/creaking-infrastructure/55096396/1

Yet, there's little prospect for more infrastructure investment as a divided Congress battles about how to cut the $1.3 trillion federal deficit, and state and local governments face their own budget shortfalls. Government investment in highways, bridges, water systems, schools and other projects has fallen each year since 2008. IHS Global Insight expects such outlays to drop 4.4% this year and 3% in 2013. The U.S. is spending about half of the $2.2 trillion that it should over a five-year period to repair and expand overburdened infrastructure, says Andrew Herrmann, president of the American Society of Civil Engineers. Inland waterways, for example, carry coal to power plants, iron ore to steel mills and grain to export terminals. But inadequate investment led to nearly 80,000 hours of lock outages in fiscal 2010, four times more than in fiscal 2000. Most of the nation's 200 or so locks are past their 50-year design life.

### Politics link.

Farm Futures, 2011 Funding for Modernization of Inland Waterways Faces an Uphill Battle New obstacles are in the way of river upgrades. Compiled by staff Published: Aug 8, 2011, google

Upper Mississippi and Illinois River Locks modernization faces new funding hurdles amid enactment of major debt reduction. Congress authorized Upper Mississippi and Illinois River Locks modernization over former President Bush's veto in 2007, but never appropriated any dollars for the effort. Now, in 2011, Waterways Council Spokeswoman Debra Colbert says the fight to secure funding faces the new obstacle of debt reduction. "It is a fiscally difficult environment and a politically difficult environment as well," Colbert said. "The government is going to be looking for cuts in as many places as they can find. From our point of view however an investment in inland waterways infrastructure is just about the best return on investment you have going." That investment in infrastructure would help jobs, the environment, safety, and farm exports, which just got a boost with Hill leaders agreeing on a way to move free trade deals ahead in September. "When we hear President Obama say he wants to double exports, I think it's within the next four years, it's very frustrating when 60% of the nation's grains are moved on our inland waterways," Colbert said. "You cannot double exports and trade in the way that he prescribes if you don't have the right infrastructure and the efficient infrastructure to make that happen." Colbert says much of the problem lies on Capitol Hill where a 20-year Inland Waterway Capital Development Plan by private industry and the Army Corps is moving at a crawl. "Unfortunately we haven't made as much headway as we'd like to just given the political and fiscal environment that we're dealing with, but we continue to press on," Colbert said. "We would hope to have something included in a potential House Transportation and Infrastructure bill that has a maritime title. We continue to talk to those folks about the importance of having a proposal like the Capital Development Plan." That is another option rather than including it in another water resources and development act that has now slowed way down in the Senate Environment Committee. The Capital Plan also calls for raising the tax paid by commercial users of the waterway system, but with objections from politically-strengthened anti-tax Republicans, Colbert says that too may be a tough sell.

## Politics- links (2)

### Obama is opposed to spending on waterways

Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012 “Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41430.pdf

The user industry (including the barge industry and agricultural groups) argues that changes are necessary to shore up the trust fund, improve deteriorating inland waterway infrastructure, and distribute costs more equitably among those who benefit from the system (e.g., more funding by federal taxpayers for dams). They also note that waterways support jobs and are a vital component of the nation’s transportation mix. The Obama Administration generally agrees that major changes are needed to meet infrastructure needs, but argues against increased costs for the federal government. Some groups also argue that an increased share of waterway costs should be borne by users (i.e., a decreased share for the federal government), and have suggested that operations and maintenance costs (currently a 100% federal cost) should also be a user responsibility.

# \*\*\*Counterplans\*\*\*

## Fees CP

### The United States Federal Government should increase user fees for inland waterway infrastructure.

### The CP saves money (spending net benefit) and solves the AFF.

Stern, 2012 Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012, Congressional Research Service, google

In the past, some have advocated for changes that would shift costs away from the federal government and increase the user-financed share of inland waterway costs, by decreasing the federal share of either O&M (currently 100% federal) or construction (currently 50% federal). Those arguing for these changes point to inequalities in spending relative to the value of certain segments of the inland waterway system. An analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the early 1990s found that the current uniform tax throughout the inland waterway system failed to cover fixed operational costs and thus distorted the actual costs of maintaining the system. CBO concluded that a user fee structure that recovered the true costs for inland waterway operations would increase economic efficiency of the system.44 Such a fee would result in increased costs for waterways with low traffic-to-expense ratios, since federal costs for maintaining these waterways are greater than fuel tax receipts generated. Figure 5 provides a comparison of current tax revenues on inland waterway segments relative to O&M costs and ton miles on these waterways. Several entities have pushed for significant increases to inland waterway fees as a means to achieve savings to the federal government. Recent proposals include the following: • A coalition of taxpayer watchdog and environmental nongovernmental organizations recommended in its 2011 “Green Scissors” report that Congress increase user contributions for inland waterway expenditures. The report estimated savings from this proposal to be $1 billion over the next five years.45 • The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform included in its initial list of illustrative savings a proposal to make the inland waterways “selffunding.” The commission estimated $500 million in savings from this proposal over the next five years.46 • In its 2011 budget options report, CBO included a proposal to increase user fees on inland waterways to a level sufficient to cover the costs of construction, operations, and maintenance. CBO projected that such a change would save approximately $4 billion over a 10-year horizon.47 These proposals, which would all institute significant increases in the user share of inland waterways financing, have generally stopped short of providing specific recommendations regarding the exact structure of the user fees that would raise new revenues. The aforementioned 1992 CBO report noted that new user fees could take a variety of forms beyond an increase to the fuel tax, but should better reflect the price to operate individual segments of inland waterways. Such a fee could take one or more forms, including annual licensing fees, congestion pricing, tolls, and/or lockage fees.

## Fees CP- extensions

### User fees solve.

Stern, 2012 Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012, Congressional Research Service, google

In addition to deciding whether additional investment is needed, Congress may also consider changes to the system that finances these investments, including options for additional revenue that were recently proposed to Congress. These options are the IWUB’s proposal (an increase to the fuel tax), the White House’s proposal to the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction (new annual fees in addition to the current fuel tax), or other options such as a lock usage fee or some kind of toll system. The IWUB-proposed increase to the existing fuel tax would be somewhat in keeping with the current system for user fees and revenue collection. Combined with increased federal responsibility for some inland waterway costs, the IWUB argues, this proposal would rebuild the trust fund balance and also fund new investments. While the tax would generate additional revenue, some taxpayer and environmental groups argue that the associated increases to federal cost-share responsibilities tied to this proposal are unacceptable. The user industry has not indicated whether it would accept increases to the fuel tax without the proposed changes to costsharing arrangements. The user fees proposed by the Obama Administration in 2011 would address the issue of inadequate revenues by raising new fees from commercial users operating on the inland waterway system. Under the proposed new system of fees, all commercial users would continue to pay costs to utilize the inland waterway system in the form of fuel taxes and new fees for non-lock users, while lock users would also continue to pay the fuel tax, but would pay an even greater fee. The Administration also proposes to add new waterway segments to the list of fuel-taxed waterways on the inland waterway system, further raising revenues.

## Fees CP- politics net benefit

### The CP may have been unpopular in the past, but budget pressures changes things.

Stern, 2012 Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress Charles V. Stern Analyst in Natural Resources Policy April 12, 2012, Congressional Research Service, google

As previously noted, some have argued in favor of shifting cost shares away from the federal government and increasing user responsibility not only for construction, but also for operations and maintenance of inland waterways. These groups, including some of the aforementioned environmental and taxpayer interest groups, have argued that waterway users should not only pay for 50% of construction and major rehabilitation costs, but also pay for some or all operations and maintenance costs, which are currently fully funded by the general treasury revenues. While Congress has in the past rejected these proposals, they may once again be considered in the context of overall government cost-cutting efforts.

## Private investment CP

### Public investment in waterways doesn’t solve for the environment – use of disincentives.

J. Brian Phillips & Alan Germani, Spring 2010, owns a contracting company based in Houston, Texas, he helped defeat zon-ing ordinances in Houston in 1993' and in Hohhs, New Mexico in 2007, and has actively fought other violations of property rights, Alan Germani is the associate editor of The Objective Stand, p. 52-3, Ebsco Host

Although some claim that still more government regulations are required to combat the ongoing problems of pollution and depleted fish populations, any such coercive measures are in principle doomed to failure because they attempt to treat problems in the waterways while ignoring their actual cause: "public ownership." Government force may provide a disincentive for certain behaviors, but this disin-centive does not motivate the users of waterways to maintain or enhance the life-serving value of these resources. As a result, America's waterways remain largely and significantly polluted, and fish populations, even where they are stabilizing, remain at levels insufficient to meet the growing demand for seafood. If "public" waterways offer little incentive for users to mitigate pollution and increase fish populations, then how do waterways fare when privately owned? Although "public" waterways are overwhelmingly the norm, the few instances of private waterways that do exist demonstrate that, to the extent that their right to property is recognized and protected, the owners of these resources have a strong incentive to maintain and enhance their life-serving value. Although nearly every state in the United States prohibits private owner-ship of streams, streams in a small section of Montana's Yellowstone Valley re –mark ably have not been subjected to the "public trust " doctrine. In this section of Yellowstone, streams are owned by individuals who profit from their property by leasing fishing rights to sports fishermen.^^ Stream owners have an incentive to keep their streams clean and well-stocked for their customers, which they ac-complish by voluntarily limiting both access to their property and the grazing of livestock nearby. The owners set these limits according to their own best judgment and toward the goal of long-term profits. Their streams, which are clean and teem –ing with fish, are in sharp contrast to "public" streams in the United States, many of which are too polluted for swimming or fishing ''and in which populations of such freshwater species as trout and bullheads are declining.^"

### Private investment in waterways is the best option – incentive to maintain and improve.

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"Public" waterways are inherently impractical: By denying men the ability to es-tablish property in waterways, the "public trust” doctrine reduces their incentive to maintain and improve waterways. By contrast, private waterways are entirely practical: By recognizing the creation of and right to use values in the waterways, private property and the principle of property rights enable men to profit by creat-ing, maintaining, and enhancing values in the waterways. Those concerned with the cleanliness of water, the health and viability of fish populations, and, more importantly, each man's right to use his creations, must ad-vocate the privatization of waterways and the protection of property rights there -in. If the government—through a legislature that passed laws protecting value creation in the waterways and a judiciary that applied the principle of property rights when adjudicating disputes—recognized and protected private ownership in the waterways, then men could pursue value-creation there in, confident that they would have legal recourse should another violate their right to do so. The only alternative to such a system is the kind of system we already have: a legal and political frame work that violates individual rights and quashes the incentive for men to maintain and improve the value of waterways. If we care about the health and viability of waterways, we must advocate their privatization.