## Iran Strikes Answers

#### Obama won’t strike Iran- he won the Nobel Peace Prize, obviously wouldn’t attack a country to win the election

#### No Iran strikes- Obama knows the consequences

**MacInnis and Hafezi 2-5**-12 [Laura MacInnis and Parisa Hafezi, Reuters, “Obama says risky to attack Iran, wants diplomatic fix,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/us-iran-idUSTRE81501820120206>]

President Barack **Obama said on Sunday there were important risks to consider before any military strike against Iran and made clear he does not want to see more conflict in the oil-producing Gulf region**. In a television interview, **Obama also said he did not believe Tehran had the "intentions or capabilities" to attack the United States, playing down the threats from Tehran and saying he wanted a diplomatic end to the nuclear standoff. "Any kind of additional military activity inside the Gulf is disruptive and has a big effect on us. It could have a big effect on oil prices. We've still got troops in Afghanistan, which borders Iran. And so our preferred solution here is diplomatic**," Obama said. His comments echoed concerns expressed by earlier by Iran's neighbor Turkey that an attack on Iran would be disastrous. **Obama**, who is up for re-election in November, **has ended the U.S. war in Iraq and is winding down combat in Afghanistan amid growing public discontent about American war spending at a time when the economy remains shaky**.

#### Obama won’t strike Iran- fearful of gas price increases

**Horing 3-12**-12 [Shoula, staff writer for yNet News, “Obama is bluffing on Iran,” [http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4201618,00.html](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-4201618%2C00.html)]

Israel should realize by now that **Obama will never attack Iran or support an Israeli attack before the elections because a war in the oil-rich region would send gasoline prices even higher than they are now, exacerbating the economic situation and hurting his chance for reelection. The price of gasoline has been rising daily in the past month**, averaging $3.79 a gallon. Since 1976, **there has been a correlation between rising oil prices and falling presidential approval ratings in the US. Jimmy Carter lost the presidency when gas averaged $3.37 per gallon when adjusted to the current value of the dollar**.

## Iran Strikes Answers- AT: Israel strikes Iran

#### Iran unwilling to go to war with Israel—they’re deterred, risk averse, and will back down:

Shmuel Bar, 2011 (“Can Cold War Deterrence Apply to a Nuclear Iran?” Strategic Perspectives, http://www.jcpa.org/text/cold\_war\_deterrence\_nuclear\_iran.pdf)

Some analysts maintain that for the foreseeable future, Iran will not dare confront Israel with nuclear weapons in the light of the latter’s quantitative and qualitative nuclear superiority and formidable missile defenses. It is argued that a nuclear Iran will be risk averse and hence deterrable.7 This is based on the premise that “the Iranians are a rational people” and are not “suicidal” and that the ostensibly “irrational” apocalyptic Mahdivist elements are either projecting an image of irrationality as a means of deterrence or alternatively – to the extent that they believe in the narrative they profess – are effectively controlled by the rational “Supreme Leader” who represents a traditional risk-averse tradition. Some8 even argue that the ascendancy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in itself bodes well for the prospective “rationality” of the regime, as the organization has material interests which it will strive to preserve, and hence will shy away from potentially devastating conflict. Others, such as James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh,9 downplay the implications of a nuclear Iran and argue that such an Iran can be contained by American statesmanship. Lindsay and Takeyh argue that the record of Iran has been pragmatic, that the regime prefers power to ideological purity, and that this pragmatism will continue to define it even after it acquires a nuclear weapon. The danger that Iran would use its proxies – first and foremost Hizbullah – to deliver nuclear weapons in order to maintain deniability is ruled out on the basis of historic precedent (Iran has not provided chemical weapons to its proxies). Similarly, the possibility of a cascade of regional proliferation resulting from a nuclear Iran is presented as not likely – again in the light of historic precedent in the Cold War. By minimizing this possibility, the authors free themselves from the need to examine a scenario of inadvertent nuclear confrontation between more than two nuclear powers.

#### Israel will never attack Iran- no US support:

Joshua Mitnick, 12/9/2011 (“ Air strikes against Iran nuclear program? Israel reconsiders.” <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Air-strikes-against-Iran-nuclear->program-Israel-reconsiders)

Israel’s stance toward archrival Iran, which it suspects of developing nuclear weapons, relies largely on deterrence: The Jewish state has a decades-old reputation for carrying out risky surprise attacks against targets deemed as existential threats. But the ability of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to embark on a new preemptive strike may have been significantly curtailed after a pair of warnings from US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and an ex-Israeli spymaster about the potential negative fallout from such an attack. Such predictions raise the political stakes for Israeli leaders contemplating such a move, making it less likely Mr. Netanyahu would lead Israel into battle against Iran without the support of Washington, say analysts. "If something goes wrong, Netanyahu will be in deep trouble, because he will not be able to argue that he wasn’t warned," says Akiva Eldar, a columnist for the liberal newspaper Haaretz. "To take the risk of a confrontation with Iran without clear American support is a big risk; this is something that every Israeli understands."

#### Chance of Israeli strikes against Iran very low—political elites prefer sanctions:

David Gordon, 2/17/2011 (head of research at Eurasia Group, “Odds are Israel won't attack Iran,”

<http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/17/odds_are_israel_wont_attack_iran>)

"You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a journalist in 2009, in reference to Iran's nuclear program. He wasn't the first or last Israeli official to use such inflammatory rhetoric. References to Iran as an existential threat or to the country's nuclear program as raising the specter of another Holocaust have been typical among Israeli officials. But on a recent research trip to Israel, we heard surprisingly little anxiety. No official spoke about a threshold beyond which Iran's program would be unstoppable -- a deadline that in the past was always one year off. And elites across the political spectrum for now favor sanctions and covert action, rather than military force, to deter Iran. As a result, the chance of Israeli strikes in the next eighteen months is very low.

#### Fears of alienating the US check Israeli strikes against Iran:

Judith Miller, 8/19/2010 ( Manhattan Institute scholar, “ More Than 5 Reasons Why Israel Won't Strike Iran Anytime Soon,”

<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/08/19/judith-miller-iran-nuclear-reactor-bushehr-strike-middle-east-israel-america/>)

Finally, putting aside the wisdom (or dangerous folly) of such a military strike, conservatives and liberals alike tend to agree, Israeli military action against Iran before Washington concludes that its sanctions policy is not working IS likely to poison already tense U.S.-Israel relations, which as John Bolton acknowledges, “are more strained now than at any time since the 1956.” A rupture with the U.S. may not be an existential threat. But as Anton writes, “it would be dire enough that it’s not worth risking unless the consequences of inaction truly are existential. That’s a hard and unenviable call to have to make.” For all these reasons, history may not repeat itself in the Middle East. Israel may not strike Iran as it did Iraq and Syria.

#### No Israeli strike against Iran—five reasons:

Judith Miller, 8/19/2010 ( Manhattan Institute scholar, “ More Than 5 Reasons Why Israel Won't Strike Iran Anytime Soon,”

<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/08/19/judith-miller-iran-nuclear-reactor-bushehr-strike-middle-east-israel-america/>)

Avner Cohen, whose new book “The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb,” is being published in October, tells me that “any pretense to predict or even to assess the likelihood of war against Iran is really the pretense of knowing something we truly do not know.” He fears, as I do, that a confrontation with Iran might start inadvertently, over a non-nuclear issue. But I also doubt that Israel is likely to move against Bushehr before it goes critical -- or anytime soon, for that matter. First, and not foremost, Israel and America are both far more concerned about Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities than the Bushehr reactor. Why? Because Moscow is not only supplying, but charged with removing the spent, or used fuel rods at Bushehr and getting them out of Iran. This agreement, plus monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear watchdog, gives some modest assurance that the reactor’s nuclear fuel won’t be secretly diverted to make a bomb. Also, as Anton notes, even if Iran manages to divert some spent fuel, it’s not clear Teheran has the technology, or the capability, to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods for a bomb. No, this is not perfect. Russia’s behavior, too, leaves much ground for suspicion. But altogether, it suggests that Bushehr is not as grave a danger as Iran’s dogged determination to develop an independent fuel cycle with a nuclear enrichment capability at existing and planned new facilities, despite more than a dozen United Nations Security Council resolutions warning it not to do so. For better or worse, the Obama administration does not see the Bushehr reactor as a grave proliferation risk. In fact, as The Wall Street Journal reported last week, the administration agreed not to oppose Russian help to Bushehr to help secure Russia’s vote for the latest round of U.N. sanctions in June. Second, attacking Iranian nuclear facilities is obviously a far tougher military challenge – to say nothing of the likely political ramifications -- than demolishing a single nuclear reactor in Iraq or Syria. Iran’s facilities, as we have been repeatedly told, are widely dispersed, buried, and hidden. Third, Iran has the ability to strike back – using its proxy, Hezbollah to Israel’s north, and Iranian-assisted Hamas in Gaza, to Israel’s south. Nor would such retaliation likely be directed solely at Israel. Hezbollah has long tentacles and has previously struck in South America, Europe, and even Egypt. As American intelligence agencies have also warned, it also has a network of agents and supporters inside the United States. Fourth, the Obama administration thinks that its sanctions, though nowhere nearly as tough as those imposed against Iraq, are already hurting Iran. Even Iranian economists complain that sanctions are making it more expensive and difficult for Iran to do business abroad, modernize its nuclear and oil sectors, and attract foreign investment. No one knows, however, whether sanctions will bite sufficiently to change Iranian behavior. Fifth, Israeli leaders still suspect that Washington will strike Iran so that it doesn’t have to, when and if it becomes clear that Iran is not changing its nuclear policies. This may be a false hope. Many Obama officials agree with Robert Kaplan, who argues, also in The Atlantic, that containing a nuclear Iran is the least-bad of all the bad policy options available.

#### Strikes in the next year and a half are unlikely:

David Gordon, 2/17/2011 (head of research at Eurasia Group, “Odds are Israel won't attack Iran,”

<http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/17/odds_are_israel_wont_attack_iran>)

It would be wrong to read the shift in the Israeli approach as a rejection of military action, though. While no sitting politician said so, there is a widespread belief among the country's elite that the government still considers force a viable option: Netanyahu would not stomach a nuclear Iran. But unless sanctions and covert action lose their credibility in the eyes of this (or a similarly inclined) Israeli government, strikes in the next year and a half will remain unlikely.