\*\*Iran DA Core\*\*

\*\*Iran DA Core\*\* 1

1NC Shell (1/2) – General 4

1NC Shell (2/2) – General 5

\*UQ- Generic\* 6

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now 7

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/K2 Stable Middle East 8

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad 9

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad 10

UQ- Generic- A2 – No Iranian Influence 11

UQ- Generic- A2 – “Iran Not Influence Iraq” 12

UQ- Generic- A2 – Iran ≠ Expansionary 13

\*\*Links- Generic\*\* 14

Link- Generic- Influence=Zero Sum 15

Link- Generic- Iran Pushing Influence 16

Link- Generic- Security Assurances 17

Link- Generic- Presence 🡪 Iran Backlash 18

Link- Generic- US Presence Key 19

Link- Generic- US Withdraw Bad – Iran Influence 20

Link- Generic- Withdrawal 🡪 Iran Influence 21

Link- Generic- A2 Iran Backlash 22

Link- Generic- A2: Khalilzad Link Turn 23

\*\*Impacts- Generic\*\* 24

Impacts- Generic- Arms Race 25

Impacts -Generic- Expansion 🡪 Arms Race 26

Impacts- Generic- I-Law/Human Rights 27

Impacts- Generic- Israeli Strikes Module (1/2) 28

Impacts- Generic- Israeli Strikes Module (2/2) 29

Impacts- Generic- ME Econ/Terrorism/Security 30

Impacts- Generic- Presence K2 Check Prolif 31

Impacts- Generic- Regional Conflict 32

Impacts- Generic- Terrorism 33

Impacts- Generic- War/Prolif 34

\*\*\*Afghanistan\*\*\* 35

Afghanistan Shell (1/2) 36

Afghanistan Shell (2/2) 37

\*\*UQ- Afghanistan\*\* 38

UQ- Afghanistan- Presence Checks Now 39

\*\*Links- Afghanistan\*\* 40

Link- Afghanistan-Withdrawal 🡪 Iran Influence 41

\*\*Impacts- Afghanistan\*\* 42

Impacts- Afghanistan- Indo/Pak War 43

Impacts- Afghanistan- Instability – Nuclear War 44

Impacts- Afghanistan- Instability – Nuclear War 45

\*\*\*Iraq\*\*\* 46

Iraq Shell (1/3) 47

Iraq Shell (2/3) 48

Iraq Shell (3/3) 49

\*\*UQ- Iraq\*\* 50

UQ- Iraq- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad 51

\*\*Links- Iraq\*\* 52

Link- Iraq—Influence=Zero Sum 53

Link- Iraq—Influence=Zero Sum 54

\*\*Impacts- Iraq\*\* 55

Impacts- Iraq- Instability/ HR Abuse 56

\*\*\*\*\*Kuwait\*\*\*\*\* 57

\*\*Links- Kuwait\*\* 58

Link- Kuwait- Relations On The Brink 59

\*\*Impacts- Kuwait\*\* 60

Impacts- Kuwait- Iran Destabilizes Kuwait 61

Impacts- Kuwait- Iran Destabilizes 62

\*\*\*\*\*Turkey \*\*\*\*\* 63

\*\*UQ- Turkey\*\* 64

UQ- Turkey- Presence Checks Now 65

\*\*Links- Turkey\*\* 66

Link- Turkey- TNWs 67

\*\*Impacts- Turkey\*\* 68

Impacts- Turkey- Terrorism, regional instability 69

\*\*\*\*\*AFF Answers\*\*\*\*\* 70

\*\*Afghanistan\*\* 71

Aff- Afghanistan- Presence 🡪 US-Iran Conflict 72

\*\*Generic\*\* 73

Aff- Generic- N/ UQ- US ≠ Check 74

Aff- Generic- Relations Resilient 75

Aff- Generic A2 – No Iran Influence 76

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Iran Influence 77

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Expansionism 78

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense – Iran is Strong 79

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iran Expansionism 80

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iranian Proliferation 81

Aff Impacts- Generic- Offense- Econ Collapse/ WOT/ Destabilize 82

\*\*Turkey\*\* 83

Aff- Turkey- US Relations Brink/Iran Relations Up 84

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influencing now 85

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influence Up- Turkey 86

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Relations Up 87

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Relations Resilient 88

Aff Impacts- Turkey- Offense- Turkey Econ 89

1NC Shell (1/2) – General

A) US presence checks Iran influence now

Zambelliz 6/19 (Chris, an author and researcher with [Helios Global, Inc](http://www.heliosglobal.com/), specializes in Middle East politics, 6/19/10, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LF19Ak03.html) JPG

The heavy US military presence in the greater Middle East has also profoundly shaped Tehran's strategic calculus when it comes to its strategy toward the Americas. The existence of a US-led alliance network composed of a nuclear-armed Israel and pro-US Arab regimes has left Iran, for all intents and purposes, hemmed in and potentially vulnerable to attack. Iran's eastern and western frontiers, for instance, are flanked by tens of thousands of US troops in Afghanistan and [Iraq](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF19Ak03.html), respectively, as well as a growing US military footprint in neighboring Pakistan. The regional landscape is also dotted by US military bases and a robust deployment of naval forces in the Gulf. United States security guarantees for Iran's neighbors add another level of anxiety in Tehran. United States strategy toward Iran is designed to contain and ultimately undermine Iranian influence through a policy of strategic encirclement. With this in mind, Iran's inroads into the Americas represent a form of forward defense diplomacy, essentially a means through which the Islamic Republic can counter the United States by effectively employing soft power in a region considered by Washington to be in its own exclusive sphere of influence.

B) Its’ zero-sum—Iran wants the U.S. out to exert its’ influence

The Korea Herald 8(October 24, “Iraq troop deal running out of time”, Lexis)jn

Iraq has been regarded as such a success story in recent months that many have forgotten that all the old cleavages still exist - Sunni vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Arab, regional autonomy vs. central government. With growing uncertainty about the future of U.S. forces in the country, these tensions are returning with a vengeance. Mistrust between Kurds and Arabs almost led to a military confrontation in the Khanaqin area northeast of Baghdad in August. The Kurds had moved their "pesh merga" militia into the mixed Kurdish-Arab area, prompting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to deploy Iraqi army troops and order the Kurdish forces to leave. Crocker admonished both sides not to make stupid miscalculations, and U.S. commanders warned they wouldn't come to Maliki's rescue. The overmatched Iraqi army retreated, but the crisis left bitter feelings on all sides. "The Kurds still see things as a zero-sum game, as does everyone else," grumbles another senior U.S. official who has been deeply involved in the negotiations. Jockeying among the Shiite parties has been especially intense, he says, with none of the Shiite leaders wanting the potential stigma of supporting the SOFA deal. Iran is waging an aggressive covert-action campaign to derail the agreement, U.S. officials say. The new commander of U.S. forces, Gen. Ray Odierno, highlighted Tehran's push last week when he said Iranian operatives had been seeking to bribe Iraqi members of parliament to reject the pact when it comes up for a vote. This public allegation of Iranian meddling drew a rebuke from Maliki, but U.S. officials say they have recently intercepted Iranian couriers carrying suitcases full of money to pay bribes and political subsidies to pro-Iranian parties. It isn't clear whether the U.S. is mounting a covert effort of its own to counter the Iranian campaign. The Iranians obviously want to limit U.S. influence in the new Iraq by defeating the SOFA agreement, and in the process hand America a strategic defeat. But some top U.S. officials think the Iranians have a more fundamental goal in pushing U.S. forces out before the Iraqis are ready to take over - namely, bringing a final, decisive resolution to the Iraq-Iran War that ended in a 1988 truce. "Now, 20 years later, they have an opportunity to win that war," the official argued. "My one-word definition of Iraq is 'fear,'" says Crocker. "Everybody is afraid of everybody. They're afraid of the past, present and future. They're afraid of the consequences of signing an agreement. But they should be even more afraid of the consequences of not signing." A final complicating factor in the deadlock is the expectation among many Iraqi politicians that Barack Obama will be elected president on Nov. 4, and that they'll be able to get a better deal from him. If Obama does indeed win, he could make an early show of leadership by telling Baghdad not to expect any sweetheart concessions - and make clear that he backs the agreement Crocker is working so hard to pin down.

1NC Shell (2/2) – General

Expanded Iranian influence is bad – 4 Reasons – abolishment of the jewish state, Sunni genocide, sectarian warfare and increases the risk of nuke use

Hitchens 10 (Christopher, columnist for Vanity Fair and Slate, The Australian, 5/20/10, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/irans-goal-of-regional-hegemony/story-e6frg6zo-1225868866287) JPG

On May 15, we were subjected to a tirade by Ayatollah Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, leader of Iran's Hezbollah party and proprietor of the newspaper of the same name, which carried his incendiary article. The need of the hour, intoned the ayatollah, was for a "Greater Iran" that would assume hegemonic control over much of the Middle East and Central Asia (stretching from Afghanistan to Palestine, according to the broad-brush ambitions disclosed by his polemic). This new imperialism would, he urged, possess two very attractive attributes. It would abolish the Jewish state, and it would assist in the arrival of the long-awaited Mahdi, or hidden imam, whose promised reign of perfection has been on hold since his abrupt disappearance in the 9th century. The second development took place in the material world and in the here and now. Iran's Kurdish population managed to bring off a well-organised general strike in all the major cities of their long-oppressed region. Schools and shops and bazaars were closed, and the claim that the strike was pretty solid seems to be well-supported by the evidence. The occasion for the strike was the brutal execution of five anti-regime activists, four of them Kurdish. This is the only tactic that the Islamic Republic of Iran seems to have left at its disposal. Just as the Revolutionary Guard is actually the embodiment of a vicious counter-revolution and an unstable dictatorial status quo, so is Ayatollah Kharrazi's call for a Shia imperialism profoundly reactionary. (Nothing, however, will stop our media from referring to him, and to people like him, as "radical".) His call for the abolition of Israel is what one might call routine in nature - as is his ardent wish for the advent of the Mahdi - but what's of more immediate interest is his railing against the "cancerous tumors" of Sunni Islam, especially as represented by Iran's Arab neighbours in the Gulf. Nor is this a new noise, or something to be explained away by mere crowd-pleasing demagogy. It isn't very long since the quasi-official Tehran newspaper Kayhan declared that the nearby island state of Bahrain was in reality a province of Iran, a position more or less openly held by several members of the hardline wing of the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime. It is true that a large proportion of Bahrain's population is ethnically Persian or Shia, or both. But it is also true that a large proportion of Iran's Kurdish population is Sunni and by definition not Persian. These war-like statements from the ultra-Right in Tehran, then, invite a possible carnival of sectarian warfare, instigated by Iran both at home and beyond its borders. One might dismiss it as raving, were it not for the fact that any future Iranian government - and Ahmadinejad has said he expects that his successors will be "10 times more revolutionary" - will have possession and control of nuclear weapons and of the means to deliver them.

\*UQ- Generic\*

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now

US presence checks Iran-Iraq conflicts

Gatehouse 10 (Gabriel, journalist @ BBC news, 3/2/10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544896.stm) JPG

Iyad Jamal Aldin is a Shia cleric and a candidate in the upcoming election. He is also a fierce critic of Tehran's involvement in Iraq. At the end of last year, Iranian forces seized an Iraqi oil field near the Iranian border, an area that has never been properly defined since the Iran-Iraq war. The dispute was eventually resolved peacefully: Iran's flag was lowered and its forces withdrew. But Aldin cites the incident as one of many reasons why Iraq should be wary of its neighbour. And, he says, the wholesale dismantling of the Iraqi army by the United States following the invasion of 2003 is partly to blame. "Americans opened the door for Iranians to occupy the country," he said during a recent meeting at his home in central Baghdad. "And now they want to withdraw. The Americans have to stay until we have a proper army."

US presence checks Iran influence – wins the public, ends religious conflict, and eliminates enemy targets

Buchanan 6/29 (Paul, studies issues of strategic, comparative and international politics, writes regularly for [www.kiwipolitico.com](http://www.kiwipolitico.com) weblog, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1006/S00208.htm) JPG

The first version, championed by General David Petreus (who accepted a demotion from US Central Command leader to assume McChrystal’s role in Afghanistan), is a US version of the traditional “hearts and minds” counter-insurgency campaigns in which a so-called “inkblot” or “seize-hold-and-build” strategy is used whereby conventional forces roughly divided equally into combat and civilian assistance units fan out into disputed territory to establish secure control of designated localities, then provide humanitarian and nation-building assistance to local populations while driving insurgents further away from areas previously under their control. As each “inkblot” secures its territory the conventional force expands its reach outwards in terms of combat and governance capability, eventually overlapping and saturating the countryside with its presence amid an increasingly supportive population. That denies the insurgent enemy the support and cover it needs to continue effective insurgent combat operations, which forces it to surrender or negotiate a peaceful settlement with US-backed authorities. The British campaign against Malaysian insurgents in the 1950s is considered to be the exemplar case from which Petreus and other Western commanders have drawn inspiration. The inkblot strategy relies heavily on non-combat reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, to include civilian nation-building assistance once effective security has been established in the original focal points. Because it is “population-centric,” it requires a “surge” in troops not for combat operations but in order to undertake the force protection, good governance development and civilian assistance projects vital to the “hearts and minds” component of the strategy. Special operations troops are used to eliminate or degrade enemy leadership targets, obtain intelligence and disrupt insurgent logistical flows as well as provide mentoring and training to local security (especially counter-insurgency) forces. The overall emphasis, however, is on building trust and making allies, not on large-scale kinetic operations. This strategy was evident in Iraq, where Petreus trialed his approach in Sunni-controlled areas so as to deny al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) safe haven. Although this meant forming alliances with Baathists and other remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime as well as Sunni militants responsible for the killing of US personnel in places like Falluja and Ramadi, it did result in a pacification of the Sunni countryside, decimation of AQI (as a result of adroit exploitation of Iraqi Sunni resentment of foreign jihadists in their midst), and a subsequent re-balancing of post-Saddam Shiia-Sunni conflict in ways that mitigated Iranian influence in the Iraqi political process. Although the eventual outcome of this strategy is still uncertain and subject to reversal, it has worked well enough to allow for a timetable for gradual withdrawal of US troops to be drawn up in parallel with Iraqi central government assumption of primary security responsibility for the country.

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/K2 Stable Middle East

US presence solves Iranian influence – that destabilizes Iraq

Gatehouse 10 (Gabriel, journalist @ BBC news, 3/2/10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544896.stm) JPG

"We do know that a lot of the arms, ammunitions and explosives that we find here, being used against the Iraqi security forces, our forces and against the Iraqi people clearly have originated from Iran," says Col David Funk. Col Funk is the officer in charge of US forces in Diyala province, an area of eastern Iraq that shares a long border with Iran. The Americans believe that their presence there, and their training of the Iraqi border force, is at least partly responsible for a drop in weapons smuggling. But rockets and other ordnance are still coming through, and the US military believes that some of it is being supplied by the al-Quds force, a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. "There are those in the Iranian government who clearly do not want Iraq to become a strong nation," says Col Funk. "It suits Iran if Iraq is a sort of puppet neighbour as opposed to the very strong nation that it has the potential of becoming. It suits their needs because it keeps a weak neighbour on their western flank."

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad

Presence checks Iran now – US withdrawal weakens the institutions which prevent Iranian influence

Kissinger 6/24 (Henry, former Secretary of State (73-77), 6/24/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062302193.html) JPG

All this leaves only a narrow margin for the American effort. We are needed to bring about the space in which non-jihadist authorities can be established. But if we go beyond this into designing these political authorities, we commit ourselves to a process so prolonged and obtrusive as to risk turning even non-Taliban Afghans against us.

The facile way out is to blame the dilemma on Karzai's inadequacies or to advocate a simple end of the conflict by withdrawing from it.

Yet America needs a strategy, not an alibi. We have a basic national interest to prevent jihadist Islam from gaining additional momentum, which it will surely do if it can claim to have defeated the United States and its allies after overcoming the Soviet Union. A precipitate withdrawal would weaken governments in many countries with significant Islamic minorities. It would be seen in India as an abdication of the U.S. role in stabilizing the Middle East and South Asia and spur radical drift in Pakistan. It would, almost everywhere, raise questions about America's ability to define or execute its proclaimed goals. A militant Iran building its nuclear capacity would assess its new opportunities as the United States withdraws from both Iraq and Afghanistan and is unable to break the diplomatic stalemate over Iran's nuclear program. But an obtrusive presence would, in time, isolate us in Afghanistan as well as internationally.

UQ- Generic- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad

US support checks Iranian influence – without it the region will turn to violence

Erickson 10 (Amanda, journalist @ Washington post, Jeffrey D. Feltman Bio @ Whorunsgov.com, Feltman is Assistant Secretary of State for [Near Eastern Affairs](http://www.whorunsgov.com/Near_Eastern_Affairs),

http://www.whorunsgov.com/Profiles/Jeffrey\_D.\_Feltman) JPG

Feltman has said he is “deeply concerned” with the Iranian government’s treatment of its citizens and its “malign” influence in the region. "Iran poses multiple, multiple threats to U.S. interests,” he said at a 2008 Congressional hearing. “It destabilizes its neighbors, it is the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism, [it] continues the oppression of Iranian civil society, and I add [that] Iranian-funded militias, Iranian-funded weaponry are killing our troops and diplomats in Iraq.” Feltman is, like most U.S. officials, opposed to Iran’s attempts to procure nuclear weapons. He supports a two-track strategy towards Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stressing diplomacy along with sanctions. However, for the talks to succeed, Feltman believes the U.S. must have the support of its Persian Gulf allies and a clear agenda.“[Addressing Iran's Nuclear Ambitions,](http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=6e509d37-d669-4fe2-a436-589b47bc9bf7)” Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, April 24, 2008(10)“[Addressing Iran's Nuclear Ambitions,](http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=6e509d37-d669-4fe2-a436-589b47bc9bf7)” Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, April 24, 2008 Feltman also called Iran a major threat to stability in Iraq, saying that Tehran undermines Iraq’s elected officials by supporting violent Shiite militias.Feltman, Jeffrey, “[Remarks by Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman At the Dinner Hosted by Dr. Samir Geagea,](http://lebanon.usembassy.gov/speeches/remarks012408.html)” January 24, 2008(8)

US troop presence is checking Iran now – withdrawal allows Iran to expand its influence in Iraq

Beehner and Bruno 8 (Lionel and Greg, Lionel – term member and former senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations and Geg – staff writer @ Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CFR, 3/3/8,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/irans\_involvement\_in\_iraq.html) JPG

The White House has sought to limit Iran’s interference in Iraq’s political and military situation but has not sought to disrupt the two countries’ economic ties. U.S. forces have received authorization to capture or kill Iranian operatives based in Iraq. Juan Cole of the University of Michigan warns in Salon.com this measure “[raises the risk of open warfare](http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/01/30/iran_ashura/),” given the large presence of Iranian pilgrims in Iraq who may accidentally be ensnared by U.S. forces. U.S. troops have also raided an Iranian consulate in northern Iraq, detained a number of Iranian operatives, and seized a trove of documents. The U.S. Air Force has also intensified its patrols of the Iran-Iraq border. President Bush, in a January 2007 interview with NPR, warned the United States would “[respond firmly](http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7056082)” if Iran continued to endanger U.S. personnel in Iraq, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters he felt the standoff with Iran could still be solved “diplomatically.” Making good on such promises, the U.S. military in November 2007 released nine detainees originally thought to be Quds Force members. The move followed a pledge by Tehran that it [would stop arming, funding, and training](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/06/AR2007110600853.html) extremists in Iraq, according to the Washington Post. How solid is the U.S. evidence on Iran’s involvement in Iraq? U.S. officials have said they can trace serial numbers on mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and EFPs to sources across the border, but have resisted blaming the Iranian leadership. "We don't assess necessarily that the central government of Iran is behind this but we are certain there are elements, including the Quds Force (of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard), who continue to train, finance and equip these people," a military spokesman told the Chicago Tribune in February 2008. But some experts remain [skeptical of U.S. intelligence](http://www.cfr.org/publication/12721/) on Iran and stress it is difficult to track the flow of funds, arms, and personnel across Iraq’s porous border with Iran, especially given Washington’s lack of consular presence in Tehran. Is Iraq in danger of becoming a puppet state of Iran? Experts say there is potential, particularly in parts of Iraq’s religious south that lean heavily toward Iran, but they discount perceived threats that Iraq’s Shiite majority-led government will fall under the thumb of Tehran. Instead they say Iraq, despite being primarily Shiite, identifies itself as an Arab state, as opposed to Iran, which is predominantly Persian. “We should remember that the Shiite militias and the Shiites [in Iraq] really don’t like the Iranians,” says Pollack. “So it’s difficult for the Iranians to buy their influence.” Yet others say Iran’s strategy is focused longer term and for the eventual day when U.S. forces exit Iraq. “The Iranians [will always be there](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june07/iran_01-29.html),” Salameh Nematt of Al-Hayat newspaper tells PBS. “And they feel that, once the Americans leave, the Iraqi government is going to be more willing to cooperate on matters that serve Iran’s regional policies andIran's regional domination.”

UQ- Generic- A2 – No Iranian Influence

Iranian influence expanding now – elections

Gatehouse 10 (Gabriel, journalist @ BBC news, 3/2/10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544896.stm) JPG

Many of those Shia politicians have now returned from Iran to positions of power in the new Iraq. Movement and links between the two countries, once virtually impossible, are now blossoming. Nowhere is this new relationship more apparent than in the city of Najaf, home to the shrine of the Imam Ali. The city is a magnet for Shia pilgrims. They flock here from across the Islamic world, arriving in their millions every year. The biggest groups come from Iran.

UQ- Generic- A2 – “Iran Not Influence Iraq”

Iran indirectly manipulates Iraqi politics

Gatehouse 10 (Gabriel, journalist @ BBC news, 3/2/10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544896.stm) JPG

The Americans have accused Iran of trying to influence the outcome of the poll - masterminding a controversial blacklist of candidates seen as targeting Sunni politicians unsympathetic to Tehran. Maj Gen Steve Lanza, the chief spokesman for US forces in Iraq, says that Iran is now moving from what he calls "direct influence" in Iraq to using "indirect" means. "What we've seen in some cases is what we call a malign influence. And that influence in some cases has come from Iran, by money and by resources that are being applied within the state, money that is coming in to influence and shape the elections." In the past few weeks, accusations of foreign funding have flown back and forth between the various political parties. In the absence of a legal paper-trail, the allegations are hard to prove. In any case, such financial contributions would not be illegal. Iraq's laws covering the financing of political parties are vague. But Western diplomats in Baghdad believe that millions of dollars of Iranian money have been flowing into the country to fund Shiite parties.

UQ- Generic- A2 – Iran ≠ Expansionary

Iran will expand into Iraq – religious, political and economic interests

Alani 6 (Dr Mustafa, senior adviser and Director of the Security and Terrorism Programme at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, 10/24/6,

http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=opinion&xfile=data/opinion/2006/october/opinion\_october77.xml) JPG

IRAN’S interventionist policy in Iraq has a long history. Teheran’s objective to influence developments in Iraq is motivated by a number of strategic factors, as well as cultural and religious interests. The most important factor is that the history of the two nations has been characterised by a near permanent state of rivalry and political-military conflict. In terms of the cultural, religious and ethnic dimensions, Iraq represents the outer perimeter and the final frontiers of the Arab nation and culture confronting the Persian nation and culture. From a cultural, religious and ethnic dimension, Iraq represents a perfect setting for Arab-Persian confrontation. Iraq also represents the point where Sunnis and Shias converge as well as confront each other. Therefore, Iraq-Iran rivalry has always had wider Arab national and historical dimensions, besides narrow local ones. In terms of strategic considerations, Iraq always represented the power that acted as a counterbalance to Iran and effectively fulfilled the task of Arab containment of Iran. A Sunni-led Iraq has been the main instrument of the containment of Shia influence beyond the sect’s Iraq-Iran heartland. In the Gulf region and the wider Middle East, the balance of power between Iraq and Iran is the key to regional stability. Each of them has tried to alter this delicate balance and taken advantage of the other’s weakness at one point or other. Iran’s present plan to intervene in Iraq has its roots in the Iranian government’s decision to lend full support — overt and covert — to Iraqi Shia opposition groups shortly after the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. Then came the adoption of a plan to help the pro-Iranian Shia religious and political groups topple Iraq’s Baáthist regime and seize power. But after more than 20 years of operation, and despite unlimited Iranian and Syrian political, financial and military support and propaganda, none of these Iraqi Shia groups proved capable of posing any serious threat to the Iraqi regime.

\*\*Links- Generic\*\*

Link- Generic- Influence=Zero Sum

Zero-sum game

Afrasiabi 8(Kaveh, PhD, February 5, “Iran tries to make up lost ground”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JB05Ak01.html, accessed 7/2/10)jn

The conventional wisdom, particularly in the United States, is that Iran has gained from the US's invasion of Iran's neighbors since the events of September 11, 2001. Yet, a careful reading of the changing security calculus caused by the exponential increase in the US's military presence in Iran's vicinity leads to the opposite conclusion. Sure, Iran has gained from the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein and his dreaded Sunni Ba'athist regime in Iraq, yet the problem with the standard analyses, for example by the US's ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, is that even though they are couched in the language of "balance of power", nonetheless these analyses are tainted by a major gap. That is, forgetting the US superpower's role in the equation that, on balance, has tipped the scales away from Iran, in a word, amounting to a net loss for the country. Until now, no one in the US has questioned what has become an article of faith in the US media and a kind of self-evident truth to so many US politicians, such as former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Link- Generic- Iran Pushing Influence

Iran is pushing for influence--they oppose U.S. influence

Odierno 10(General Raymond, Commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq, June 5, “Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq underlines Iranian regime influence in Iraq”, http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/8269/1/, accessed 7/1/10)jn

In terms of Iran, you know, they continue to be very much involved inside of Iraq.  We understand that they're a neighbor, and we want them to be -- have a positive influence on Iraq, not one that we believe to be negative influence inside of Iraq.  We know that, you know, they will do -- their goals are that they don't want to see the U.S. have a long-term relationship with Iraq.  You know, they don't -- that -- they don't want to see that.  So they'll continue to fund surrogates and others who will attack U.S. forces and attack Iraqi security forces who are working with U.S. forces. Just yesterday, there was a rocket attack in southern Iraq near Amarah, where they killed three Iraqi security forces.  And these were Iranian surrogates who conducted these attacks. So they are not just attacking U.S. forces.  They are -- they continue to infiltrate some of their security architecture into Iraq.    The Iraqis are doing -- are stepping up their work at the borders.  But they're trying to infiltrate, so they can continue to try to influence outcomes inside of Iraq.     So they make all the positive statements in the press saying, we just want to see a legitimate government, we're for Iraq moving forward.  But behind the scenes, they continue to interfere in my mind both from a political, economic and a military perspective.

Link- Generic- Security Assurances

American security assurances in Middle Eastern countries are key to check Iran

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

Part of America's strategy regarding regional allies needs to focus on assuring individual states that as long as Iran is contained, the United States will not take any preventive military action. While the Gulf States certainly would prefer that Iran not develop nuclear weapons, it is also important to recognize that they fear any US-Iranian conflict more than they fear the prospect of a nuclear Iran. (16) America's most promising strategy toward a nuclear-armed Iran should be the development of a security architecture based on deterrence and containment.The United States should be under no illusions regarding the problems that a nuclear-armed Iran would present. The challenges that development would pose for American interests in the region would be monumental and lasting. The strategy of deterrence, containment, engagement, and reassurance provides the framework for achieving America's long-term regional objectives. Such a strategy would minimize disruptions to the international flow of oil, blunt Iran's attempts at regional hegemony, stabilize US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and aid in countering the global war on terrorism. Ultimately, it will provide the time that reformers in Iran need to recast the Iranian government from within. It is this reformation of Iran's government that will offer the best guarantee for preserving America's interests in the region.

Link- Generic- Presence 🡪 Iran Backlash

US bases are seen as attempts by the US to intimidate Iran

Capaccio 2010 (Tony, May, Aletho News, http://alethonews.wordpress.com/2010/05/21/pentagon-plan-to-beef-up-afghan-base-near-iran-may-rile-regime/, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK A U.S. plan to upgrade its airbase in southwestern Afghanistan just 20 miles from Iran’s border will likely rile the Islamic regime, bolstering suspicions the West is trying to pressure it with military might, analysts say. The Defense Department is requesting $131 million in its fiscal year 2011 budget to upgrade Shindand Air Base so it can accommodate more commando helicopters, drone surveillance aircraft, fuel and munitions. Plans to expand the base come as the U.S. works to strengthen the militaries and missile defenses of allies in the region and presses at the United Nations for a new round of sanctions aimed at forcing Iran to curb its nuclear program. U.S. military officials say the base is only to support U.S. and Afghan military operations in Afghanistan. Iran will likely view the Shindand buildup as another step to squeeze it, said Kenneth Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Whatever U.S. intentions, the Iranian regime will see it as a threat — as another American effort to surround Iran with U.S. military forces,” Pollack said in an interview. “The Iranians are almost certainly going to assume that a beefed-up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance presence is really about spying on them,” he said. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, shares that view. “The positioning of the base gives us the opportunity to monitor any efforts by Iran to serve as a sanctuary for anti- government Taliban and allied forces, and to support operations in Iran itself if that were to become necessary,” he said.

US troops in Afghanistan are a national security threat for Iran

Institute for the Study of War 9 (<http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/iran-and-afghanistan>, date accessed: 7/3/2010) AJK  
The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan ushered in a fresh chapter in relations between Iran and Afghanistan. Iran participated in the formation of the post-Taliban government in the Bonn Conference in December 2001 and contributed to reconstruction efforts, with the aim of establishing friendly ties with Kabul. While the Iranian leaders welcomed the fall of the Taliban, they also saw the presence of American troops in neighboring Afghanistan as a national security threat. Tehran’s support for insurgent groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, has been a source of great anxiety for the ISAF and Afghan forces struggling to stabilize Afghanistan.

Link- Generic- US Presence Key

Only a US military commitment In Kuwait can deter Iran regional interest and achieve stability

Terrill 07 (W. Andrew, Sept. Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments

Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Strategic Studies Report, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf page 64 accessed 7/2)) CM

The Iranians are extremely interested in ensuring that Kuwait refuses to cooperate with any potential U.S. plan to bomb or otherwise attack Iran. On an April 2006 visit to Kuwait, former Iranian president Rafsanjani stated, “We are certain the Gulf countries will not back the United States in waging an attack on Iran.”206 Various other Iranian leaders have also reassured the public that the position of the Kuwaiti government is that it will not allow its bases to be used against Tehran for a military strike again their nuclear facilities. Kuwaiti officials let these public statements pass without direct comment, although they have publicly stated their opposition to a U.S. attack on Iran. It is not clear what they would do to try to prevent it or to distance themselves from the United States if such an attack occurs. Mostly, Kuwait spokesmen such as Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem al Khorafi have stressed that “[t]he region cannot bear the serious consequences of military action.”207 Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are also worried about appearing too confrontational with Tehran.208 The concern about an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not surprising given that such a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a more assertive regional role with conventional and unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is a serious threat that may be employed more readily if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from “regime change” by the United States.209 Moreover, the Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the central ways in which they have done this is to treat the Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular, they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would have dramatic implications for their own countries if massive amounts of radiation were released into the atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence.210 The Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination plants which are their primary source of fresh water. This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy program is also a nuclear weapons program.

Link- Generic- US Withdraw Bad – Iran Influence

Withdraw of troops allows for Iranian infuence troops are neded for regional political stability

Terrill 7 (W. Andrew, Sept. Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments

Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Strategic Studies Report, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf page xii accessed 7/2)) CM

Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq’s political crisis. Kuwait, as a small country, has little desire to offend a major regional power such as Iran, and has occasionally sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait’s Shi’ite community and therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaiti national unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will never fully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, like other Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, although they also oppose U.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they will be placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regional violence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomatic and economic options for dealing with the crisis were thoroughly explored and exhausted first. The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku- wait has also shown a commitment to expanding de- mocracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspir- ations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this monarchy and the history of democratic expression are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity. Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned about maintaining their democratic image abroad because of their continuing need for international support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves as an important if still incomplete example to the region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular vitality over the last year, and the United States needs to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain aware that democracy and moderation are not the same thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic to U.S. goals for the region.

Link- Generic- Withdrawal 🡪 Iran Influence

Troop withdrawal allows Iran to expand its influence

Schreck 6/15 (Adam, journalist @ AP, BusinessWeek, 6/15/10, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GBKNFG0.htm) JPG

Trade with longtime rival Iran is bringing Iraq investments it sorely needs. Billion-dollar pacts are being signed. Branches of Iranian banks blacklisted by the United States are opening. But the growing ties also frame a political imbalance the U.S. is loath to see in a country struggling to rebuild after years of war. As America's influence wanes in Iraq, and its troops withdraw, Iran is capitalizing on centuries-old religious and cultural ties to secure greater leverage in the country -- even as Washington works to dissuade others from dealing with Tehran over its nuclear program. It's a political and economic tug-of-war the U.S. risks losing, if only because Iraq's reconstruction needs open the door for a marriage of convenience. Iran, squeezed elsewhere by sanctions, finds in Iraq a rare and ready market at a time when lingering security fears continue to discourage Western investments in the country. "Iran would like to have a stronger presence in Iraq ... primarily because so many other places have been closed off to it. It's partly necessity," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor at Britain's Durham University. "Iran doesn't want to lose its footing again in Iraq."

Link- Generic- A2 Iran Backlash

US forces in Afghanistan serve as a deterrent to Iran

MEPC 3 (Middle East Policy Council, <http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/3-7-03.asp>, date accessed: 7/3/2010) AJK  
Were the United States to continue efforts to reduce Iran's threat to Iraq and other Gulf states through traditional counter/nonproliferation efforts, the question would arise as to whether an increased US military and economic presence in the region would dissuade Iran from pursuing WMD, or conversely, whether it would drive Iran to accelerate its alleged weapons program. At present, Iran perceives a threat in the growing US military presence at its borders. US forces are currently based in Afghanistan, Bahrain Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen and elsewhere in Central Asia.5 Iran is also sensing increasing isolation. According to many experts, Iran is experiencing a pivotal political year. It is difficult to predict the outcome of the many on-going internal political battles. However, changes in Iran's domestic political situation may have only a minimal impact on its conduct of foreign and security policy given the internal Iranian consensus on the threats to the country's security and on its response options (such as the alleged development of WMD).

Link- Generic- A2: Khalilzad Link Turn

Khalilzad is wrong—military presence trumps any strength we’ve given Iran—it’s a zero-sum game

Afrasiabi 8(Kaveh, PhD, February 5, “Iran tries to make up lost ground”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JB05Ak01.html, accessed 7/2/10)jn

So with Iran's "success story", which, according to Khalilzad recently addressing a group of faculty and students specializing in international affairs at Columbia University, implies that the US may send a "large bill" to Iran for services rendered. This in dislodging Iran's "number one and number two enemies", to paraphrase Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University, who was in Iran recently. According to Khalilzad, the US's invasion "helped Iran's relative position in the region, because Iraq was a rival of Iran ... and the balance there has disintegrated or weakened. And so one of the objectives of Iran, in my view, is to discourage a reemergence of Iraq as a balancer. And Afghanistan, too, the change was helpful to Iran." Again, no doubt Iran has benefited from the regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad, stepping into the power vacuum to some extent. But the problem is precisely the US's perceived threat of Iran and Iranian expansionism, fueling Cold War-style politics of containment. This, in turn, translates into the US itself assuming the role of "balancer" and thus replicating the story on the Korean Peninsula of an indefinite US military presence. Further, Iran faces a third round of United Nations sanctions over its uranium-enrichment activities, in addition to sanctions imposed unilaterally by the US. Last month, the five permanent Security Council members - the US, Britain, France, Russia and China - along with Germany, agreed on the basic terms of a new resolution calling for more sanctions against Iran, including travel bans and freezing assets. The details have not yet been finalized. A net loss for Iran Hence, strictly from the prism of balance of power, Iran has suffered a net loss due to the US's invasions bearing the marks of a long-term military presence and constant national security pressure at Iran's borders. And this not to mention the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization's parallel post-September 11 presence, such as in Afghanistan, and or US's base-building in Central Asia. Given the continuing international standoff over Iran's nuclear program, volatility in the Persian Gulf waters, rife with potential triggers between the US and Iran, and the US military's accusations of Iran's meddling with Shi'ite militias in Iraq, the overwhelming power of the US has caused a national security syndrome for Iran that in all likelihood will remain for the foreseeable future.

\*\*Impacts- Generic\*\*

Impacts- Generic- Arms Race

Iran’s hegemony causes Gulf Regional arms escalation

Charbel 10 **(**Bechara Nassar, June 4**,** taught @ American University @Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Second, we are confronted with Iranian hegemony over the region. With its nuclear program, Iran could be encouraged to follow a more hard-line and active foreign policy in the region. From observation, it has become evident that the Islamic Republic has gained place in new negotiations in the region—ranging from Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, because of its large presence in the Arab region, through its alliances with Hezbollah and Hamas in Damascus. It has gained this influence at the expense of the role of Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia—that always played an influential role in the process of forming Middle East policies. There is also the likelihood of a military strike. In case a military strike is carried out against Iran, Gulf countries in alliance with the United States would find themselves at the forefront of this conflict because of the presence of military bases on their lands. In addition, there is concern for oil security, which is the main artery for Gulf countries. In this regard, recent exercises by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Arab Gulf and Strait of Hormuz deserve to be noticed. In addition to direct threat of war or sanctions on Iran, the above-mentioned reasons could also lead to a scenario of an escalation in arms race in the Gulf. However, it is not farfetched that a nuclear race ensues, if Iran is able to continue with its nuclear project due to lack of international resolve and its exceptional capabilities in negotiating to the very brink of the abyss. A nuclear race of this kind would drain the potential of Gulf Arab countries and Iran alike. It will impede development in countries, where most of the population is young and in need of jobs. It will pit the region in the face a dangerous sectarian division that would make the mission of the moderate forces impossible and would make the calls for dialogue futile and useless. (ECSSR Impacts- Generic- US Presence K2 Check Iran

US presence is key to check a nuclear Iran

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

The choices America would face if Iran developed nuclear weapons are not simply between preventive military action and doing nothing. The calculations America would face are not between the costs of action versus the costs of inaction. A nuclear-armed Iran will certainly pose a number of challenges for the United States. Those challenges, however, can be met through an active policy of deterrence, containment, engagement, and the reassurance of America's allies in the region.

The United States has three strategic interests in the Persian Gulf: maintaining the flow of oil onto world markets, preventing any hostile state from dominating the region, and minimizing any terrorist threat. Given these interests, the challenges posed by a nuclear-armed Iran need to be addressed by a policy that minimizes the threat to key oil production and transportation infrastructure and negates any Iranian bid for regional hegemony. Additionally, any action taken toward Iran has to be weighed against the potential impact it may have with regard to the global war on terrorism and ongoing US initiatives related to nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, such a policy needs to be executed in a manner that avoids any nuclear threat to the United States or its allies.

Impacts -Generic- Expansion 🡪 Arms Race

Iran’s hegemony causes Gulf Regional arms escalation

Charbel 10 **(**Bechara Nassar, June 4**,** taught @ American University @Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Second, we are confronted with Iranian hegemony over the region. With its nuclear program, Iran could be encouraged to follow a more hard-line and active foreign policy in the region. From observation, it has become evident that the Islamic Republic has gained place in new negotiations in the region—ranging from Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, because of its large presence in the Arab region, through its alliances with Hezbollah and Hamas in Damascus. It has gained this influence at the expense of the role of Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia—that always played an influential role in the process of forming Middle East policies. There is also the likelihood of a military strike. In case a military strike is carried out against Iran, Gulf countries in alliance with the United States would find themselves at the forefront of this conflict because of the presence of military bases on their lands. In addition, there is concern for oil security, which is the main artery for Gulf countries. In this regard, recent exercises by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Arab Gulf and Strait of Hormuz deserve to be noticed. In addition to direct threat of war or sanctions on Iran, the above-mentioned reasons could also lead to a scenario of an escalation in arms race in the Gulf. However, it is not farfetched that a nuclear race ensues, if Iran is able to continue with its nuclear project due to lack of international resolve and its exceptional capabilities in negotiating to the very brink of the abyss. A nuclear race of this kind would drain the potential of Gulf Arab countries and Iran alike. It will impede development in countries, where most of the population is young and in need of jobs. It will pit the region in the face a dangerous sectarian division that would make the mission of the moderate forces impossible and would make the calls for dialogue futile and useless. (EC

Impacts- Generic- I-Law/Human Rights

Tehran regional hegemony shreds international law and violates multiple fundamental human rights

Hitchens 10 (Christopher, columnist for Vanity Fair and Slate, The Australian, 5/20/10, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/irans-goal-of-regional-hegemony/story-e6frg6zo-1225868866287) JPG

When the day comes that Tehran can announce its nuclear capability, every shred of international law will have been discarded. The mullahs have publicly sworn - to the UN and the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency - that they are not cheating. As they unmask their batteries, they will be jeering at the very idea of an "international community". How strange it is that those who usually fetishise the UN and its inspectors do not feel this shame more keenly. In the meantime, the very force in Iran that holds the keys to the secret nuclear sites is also the force that rapes its prisoners, humiliates its women, represses its "voters", empties its universities, and murders its national minorities. The urgent task of statecraft is to evolve a policy that synchronises the disarmament demand with the idea that all Iranians, Kurdish and Azeri as well as Persian and Armenian and Jewish, can have a say in their own "internal affairs". No sign of such statecraft exists. Welcome, then, to a world in which we will have to be fawningly polite to men like Ayatollah Kharrazi.

Impacts- Generic- Israeli Strikes Module (1/2)

Expansion of Iran leads to Israeil air strikes – Ahmadinajed threats and Hizbollah funding

Atlas 6 (Pierre, asst. prof of Poli Sci @ Franciscan Center for Global Studies @ Marian College, 10/31/6, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/10/are\_israel\_and\_iran\_on\_a\_colli.html

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is on temporary hold, but the issues that led to war this summer have not been resolved. Iran continues to be the primary external source of arms, training, and ideological inspiration for Hezbollah, Lebanon's Shiite Islamist guerrilla force. Should Israel launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran might use Hezbollah to create a "second front" by restarting the Lebanon war--with devastating consequences for Israeli and Lebanese civilians. The Iranians have stated repeatedly that their uranium enrichment program is for peaceful purposes only. But their refusal to allow IAEA inspections (as called for in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed) and their rejection of reasonable alternatives offered by the European Union and Russia have convinced many in the international community that Iran's nuclear ambitions are strategic. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long sought to become a major player in the region. According to Dr. Uzi Rabbi, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Center for Iranian Studies, "nuclear power is but a tool by which to turn Iran into a hegemonic power." This week, an Iranian news organization announced that the Islamic Republic has started a second cascade of centrifuges, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brazenly declared that "today, the [nuclear] capability of our nation has multiplied tenfold over the same period last year." Iran's nuclear ambitions make the words of its president sound all the more ominous, especially to Israel. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Israel does not have the right to exist and should be "wiped off the map." Israeli security experts and elected leaders view Iran as Israel's greatest existential threat, and the government is moving to address it. On the same day that Iran's president boasted of his country's nuclear progress, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced that the Russian immigrant party Israel Beiteinu, led by ultra-right winger Avigdor Lieberman, would be joining the governing coalition. Lieberman's 11 Knesset seats will shore up Olmert's government, weakened and shaken by the Lebanon war. In exchange, Lieberman--a man with no experience in military or strategic planning--has been appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs, assigned to direct Israel's response to Iran.

Impacts- Generic- Israeli Strikes Module (2/2)

Israel attack of Iran would draw US into nuclear conflict

Hirsch 05 (Jorge , Oct, 27, a professor of physics at the University of California, San Diego, United States. www.antiwar.com/hirsch/?articleid=7649 accesed 7/2) CM

The stage is set for a chain of events that could lead to nuclear war over chemical weapons in the immediate future. If these events unfold, the trigger will be Israel, the target Iran, the nuclear aggressor the U.S. These are the reasons: The U.S. State Department determined in August 2005 that "Iran is in violation of its CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] obligations because Iran is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW infrastructure to include an offensive CW R&D capability and dispersed mobilization facilities." According to the CIA, "Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents – and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them – which it previously had manufactured." According to (then undersecretary for arms control and international security, now U.S. ambassador to the UN) John Bolton's testimony to the House of Representatives (June 24, 2004), "We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons," and on Iran's ballistic missiles, "Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction," and "The 1,300-km range Shahab-3 missile is a direct threat to Israel, Turkey, U.S. forces in the region, and U.S. friends and allies." In the IAEA resolution of Sept. 24 [.pdf], Iran was found to be in "noncompliance" with its NPT safeguards agreements. Members of the Israeli parliament from across the political spectrum are urging the United States to stop Iran's nuclear programs, or Israel will "act unilaterally." Statements of grave concern about Iran's nuclear program have been made by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, and Mossad chief Meir Dagan (Iran poses an "existential threat" to Israel). Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter accuses Iran of plotting relentlessly to attack Israeli targets. According to the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Organization, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia will ship the first cargo of nuclear fuel for Iran's Bushehr's reactor at the end of 2005 or early 2006. Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor (which was under IAEA supervision) in 1981 just before nuclear fuel was loaded into it (to prevent nuclear fallout). President Bush has said that "all options are on the table" if diplomacy fails to halt Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. House of Representatives on May 6, 2004, by a vote of 376-3, called on the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the recently released draft document "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" [.pdf], the Pentagon states that it will respond to the threat of WMD (which includes chemical and biological weapons) with nuclear weapons. Conclusion: according to Israel, the U.S. administration, and 99.2 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives, Iran will not be allowed to have access to any nuclear technology. No diplomatic options to achieve that goal will remain when Russia and China veto Security Council sanctions, or if the IAEA refuses on Nov. 24 to refer Iran to the Security Council. Military action will occur before Russia ships uranium fuel to Iran, and will inevitably lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against Iran. How will it all get started? No matter how much Bush and Cheney want it, the U.S. Senate is unlikely to authorize the bombing of Iranian installations out of the blue. Unless there is some major disturbance in Iraq that can be blamed on Iran, Israel is likely to pull the trigger. It knows how to and has every motivation to do so. Once Israel drops the first bomb on an Iranian nuclear facility, as it did with Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, there is no return. Bushehr is likely to be the first target; other installations will follow. Iran will respond – how can it not? At a minimum, it will shoot missiles at Israel. It may or may not shoot Iran will respond – how can it not? At a minimum, it will shoot missiles at Israel. It may or may not shoot at U.S. forces in Iraq initially, but given the U.S.-Israel "special relationship," there is no way the U.S. will stay out of the conflict. Many of Iran's targeted facilities are underground, and U.S. bombs will be needed to destroy them all. Once the U.S. enters the conflict, 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq will be at risk of Iranian missiles with chemical warheads, or of being overrun by Iran's conventional forces streaming into Iraq. According to the Pentagon planning [.pdf], nuclear weapons will be used: "To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD." "Against an adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations…" "[O]n adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies" "[T]o counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces…" "For rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms…" "To ensure success of U.S. and multinational operations…"

Impacts- Generic- ME Econ/Terrorism/Security

Iranian influence in the Middle East is bad – fuels terrorism, economic instability and undermines state security

Wunderle & Lajeunesse 9 (William and Gabriel, William – Joint Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff as a Political Military Planner, analyst @ RAND, Gabriel – Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air, 4/28/9 AmericanDiplomacy.org, Forcehttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0406/comm/wunderlelajeunesse\_counter.html) JPG

In the Arabian Gulf, the IRGC-QF have supported Gulf Shi’a militant groups that seek to advance extremist agendas that threaten regional economic stability, key energy infrastructure, and state security forces.  Though the current nature and scope of Tehran’s relationship with Gulf Shi’a suggests Tehran probably does not seek to overthrow these governments, they seem to be cultivating ties to local militants for use in future conflicts. Additionally, according to declassified USG information, a Qods Force officer in the Persian Gulf was in charge of the bombing of Khobar Towers in eastern Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 and wounded more than 500 others, including 240 U.S. military personnel.  Here Iran tried and tested its cell based methodology, utilizing members of Saudi Hezbollah[21](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot21)who studied and trained in Iran to carry out this attack under the direction of the IRGC-QF.  Iranian actions within the Sunni heartland clearly demonstrate Iran’s capability to carry out terrorist operations in the Gulf States.

Impacts- Generic- Presence K2 Check Prolif

US presence in the middle east is key to check an arms race and middle eastern proliferation

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

The final portion of a US strategy toward a nuclear-armed Iran should focus on convincing Iran's neighbors that the American commitment to their security remains strong. If the United States wants regional powers to resist Iranian attempts at expanding its influence, then Washington needs to bolster security ties in the region. Improving security cooperation with Iran's neighbors could advance a number of American interests beyond simple containment. Such efforts could also help increase the security of the oil infrastructure in the region, as well as expand intelligence cooperation related to international terrorism.A more definite US security commitment to Iran's neighbors may also decrease the chance that the development of a nuclear weapon would increase the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region. Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have been cited as states likely to respond to any Iranian nuclear capability with increased nuclear programs. Egypt, however, has been able to tolerate a nuclear Israel for more than 30 years, as well as accommodate Libya's weapons programs. Given that historical precedent, it is unlikely that an Iranian bomb would dramatically change Cairo's calculations. Similarly, Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its desire to join the European Union are likely to dissuade Ankara from attempting to join the nuclear fraternity. Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, however, would more than likely attempt to strengthen security ties with the United States in an effort to bolster their position against a nuclear Iran.

Middle Eastern Instability leads to nuclear war

Steinbach 2 (John, March 3, nuclear specialist at the Center for Research on Globalization, Center for Research on Globalization, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html> accessed 7/2) CM

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Impacts- Generic- Regional Conflict

US troop withdraw leads to Iranian expansion – this makes conflicts with Israel and fellow Arab states more likely

Darling 10 (Daniel, int’l military markets analyst @ Forecast International, Faster Times, 4/28

http://thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/04/28/iranian-smoke-and-mirrors/) JPG

Whether through the thinly-veiled threat of conventional capabilities or the use of soft power and asymmetric means, Iran’s ambition is to attain a dominant position in the Middle East. Although regional hegemony remains an elusive goal due to the presence of American forces, the military strength of Israel, and the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy from West to East, Iran nonetheless represents a powerful local actor whose specter looms throughout the region. Iran’s military arm is divided into three main components: the regular army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Order Forces (or Law Enforcement Force). While the regular army is charged with national defense and the Order Forces oversee border security and the national police, the IRGC is the Praetorian Guard of the Islamic Revolution, outfitted with its own army, air force, navy and Special Forces units, as well as an internal intelligence branch. The IRGC controls Iranian missile production, the nation’s chemical and biological weapons, and [is believed](http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100415/FOREIGN/704149839/1002/NEWS) to oversee the nuclear developmental program. The politically-powerful IRGC not only serves as the Islamic regimes right arm, but as purveyor of its external interests. Through the use of the Guards’ special Qods Force the Iranian regime is able to nurture its proxies in the Levant, which include Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These elements are important to Iran as an indirect means through which to strike at Israel - in the process ensuring Israeli military attention is fixated foremost on immediate threats emanating from Gaza and southern Lebanon. The Qods Force is charged with providing arms, training and financial support for these groups, while in the process gathering intelligence on Israeli military tactics and capabilities. The Qods Force has also been active in Iraq, where its [Ramazan Corps](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/irans_ramazan_corps.php) has aided Iraqi Shiite militants and been linked by the U.S. military to the flow of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) into Iraq and the proliferation there of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Spreading its reach further abroad, the Qods Force is now believed to have [placed operatives in Venezuela](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/), adroitly posting them in embassies and cultural/charitable institutions. Such actions are worrisome not only for the U.S. and Israel, but for the Arab states in the Middle East - many of whom view the Islamic regime unfavorably. These countries, including the Gulf Arab nations and Egypt, fret over an Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis they fear will gain stature in Iraq as the U.S. troop presence there winds down. They note the manpower and artillery advantages Iran holds over their own armies and grow apprehensive over Iranian [threats to shut down shipping](http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8902061586) through the Strait of Hormuz choke-point, thereby disrupting some 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade in the process. And of course there remains the elephant in the room, the ongoing Iranian nuclear enrichment program.

Impacts- Generic- Terrorism

Iran fuels terrorism via arms exchanges

Wunderle & Lajeunesse 9 (William and Gabriel, William – Joint Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff as a Political Military Planner, analyst @ RAND, Gabriel – Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air, 4/28/9 AmericanDiplomacy.org, Forcehttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0406/comm/wunderlelajeunesse\_counter.html) JPG

During the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, IRGC aided senior al-Qa’ida leaders in fleeing to Iran from Afghanistan to escape the fighting.  Today, Iran still harbors a number of these senior al-Qa’ida operatives.[19](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot19)  Iran has resisted numerous calls to extradite these al-Qa’ida criminals to their countries of origin or third countries for trial. Iran also provides material support to Taliban terrorists seeking to derail the fledgling Afghan democracy.  According to recently declassified USG information, between mid-2006 and June 2007, Iran arranged dozens of shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and possibly MANPADS to the Taliban.  In April and May 2007, Coalition forces intercepted and seized two weapons convoys in southern Afghanistan.  These shipments included plastic explosives, small arms ammunition, several RPG antitank grenades, mortar rounds, artillery rockets, and rocket fuses.  Iran provided the weapons and arranged the shipments.  The convoys were suspected to be supplying the Taliban.  These allegations are supported by the fact that a March 2007 raid on a Taliban compound in Afghanistan netted an Iranian manufactured copy of an Austrian .50 caliber anti-materiel sniper rifle with a probable 2005 production date.  Further, Taliban weaponry, ordnance, and explosives seized in Afghanistan in early September 2007 were of Iranian origin.

Impacts- Generic- War/Prolif

An expansionist Iran destabilizes the region and creates multiple scenarios for war and a nuclear arms race

Rachman 6 (Gideon, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, journalist at Financial Times,November 14, 2006 http://blogs.ft.com/rachmanblog/2006/11/dangers-of-iranhtml/) JPG

This is what he really said: “In my opinion we are heading into really dark times,” with a momentum towards further wars that he regards as “unstoppable”. He sees the major destabilising force in the region as an expansionist and over-confident Iran, that is bidding for regional dominance. In his opinion the war in Lebanon over the summer was the “first Israel-Iran war in all but name.” He believes that there will be further Iranian-Israeli wars – perhaps next year. The Iranians and Syrians he believes are very confident at the moment, since they regard the Lebanese war as a major setback for Israel. He is one of those who believes that Hizbollah unleashed the fighting, more or less on the direct orders of Tehran. Under pressure because of their nuclear plans, “the Iranians wanted to show that they could destabilise the region just like that”. The Iranians are also using their nuclear programme to further their regional ambitions. A regional nuclear arms race is already beginning.My interlocutor has met President Ahmadi-Nejad and describes him as “truly scary”. He adds that he is used to dealing with populist Arab leaders, “but when you talk to them in private, they are usually quite reasonable and rational. Ahmadi-Nejad is not like that.” His impression is that Ahmadi-Nejad is now calling the shots in Iran, and has intimidated the moderates into silence: “They are all scared of him.”He believes that Iran is currently stirring up trouble in many different areas including Lebanon, the Israeli occupied territories and Iraq. Iraq he believes is becoming the “arena for a regional power struggle”, pitting Sunnis against Shia. The Sunni Arab states see themselves as engaged in an ancient struggle with the Persians for dominance of the region. Syria has become detached from its natural Arab allies and is now firmly in the Iranian camp. But it is also the “weak link” in the Iranian alliance and can expect to come under enormous pressure as a result.As for the moderate Arab states – the Saudis, the Jordanians and the Egyptians – “they have all told me they expect this to end in war”. They are also much more concerned about Iran than Israel, because “they know that Israel is not really an expansionist power”. Indeed the moderate Arab states would like to form a de facto alliance with Israel to contain Iran – but opinion on the “Arab street” prevents them from doing it.

\*\*\*Afghanistan\*\*\*

Afghanistan Shell (1/2)

1) US is using Afghanistan to check Iran

Trade Arabia 2010 (<http://www.tradearabia.com/news/INTNEWS_176274.html> , date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK  
Iran opposes the US military presence on its borders in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf, saying western military intervention is the root of insecurity in the region. "We warn the countries in the region over the presence of bullying powers ... they have not come here to restore security or to counter drug trafficking," Ahmadinejad said in a speech during a visit to the southern province of Hormuzgan.    The hardline president accused the West of planning to dominate energy resources in the Gulf and said: "People in the region will cut off their hands from the Persian Gulf's oil."     Tension between Iran and the West has risen over the Islamic state's nuclear programme, with Western powers calling for a fourth round of UN sanctions over Tehran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment.    The West suspects Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Tehran says it plans only civilian nuclear facilities.    Washington and its western allies say they want a diplomatic solution but have not ruled out military action against the Islamic republic.    "Iran's message to the countries in the region is nothing but the message of friendship and brotherhood," Ahmadinejad told a crowd in the provincial capital, Bandar Abbas.    The United States said in January it had expanded missile defence systems in and around the Gulf -- a waterway crucial for global oil supplies -- to counter what it sees as Iran's growing missile threat. Iran condemned the move and accused Washington of seeking to stoke "Iran-phobia". Ahmadinejad questioned the reasons behind sending troops to Afghanistan after the attack on the New York's World Trade Center in September 2001 and said: "They sent troops to Afghanistan under the name of fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

2) Presence in Afghanistan key to contain Iran

Rubin 8 (Michael, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK  
If U.S. forces are to contain the Islamic Republic, they will require basing not only in GCC countries, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Without a sizeable regional presence, the Pentagon will not be able to maintain the predeployed resources and equipment necessary to contain Iran, and Washington will signal its lack of commitment to every ally in the region. Because containment is as much psychological as physical, basing will be its backbone. Having lost its facilities in Uzbekistan, at present, the U.S. Air Force relies upon air bases in Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Oman, and the isolated Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia.

3) Iran influence in Afghanistan destabilizes the country and fuels bitterness between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Morici 7 (Elisa, MA in Poli Sci @ Università degli Studi di Torino, 8/31, IntelliBriefs.com, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/08/iran-regional-alliances-and-dilemma-of.html) JPG

Accused of fuelling instability in Afghanistan, expelling refugees and selling weapons to rebel groups, Iran's strategy in the war-torn country could seriously deteriorate relations with its neighbours and catapult an unpredictable crisis that would trigger the destabilisation of Afghanistan and pitting Pakistan as a future enemy in the process. The recognition of the Taliban's illegitimacy and the consequential expulsion of the central Afghan government have led Tehran's diplomacy along a noticeably different path in collaborating with its neighbours, as it seeks to establish greater presence in Afghanistan and maintain its historic alliance with Pakistan. The Islamic Republic has succeeded in becoming the centrepiece of the region's two opposing forces (Afghanistan and Pakistan) by earning itself political and economic benefits as well as an insulation from potential US interference. In the context of the latter, neither General Musharraf nor the government of President Karzai are willing to let go of Iran's alliance in favour of a US military invasion that could see the region plunge into instability.

Afghanistan Shell (2/2)

4) Instability in Afghanistan leads to nuclear war.

Wesley 10 (Michael, Exec. Director of the Lowy Institute for Int. Policy. Professor of Int. Relt’s @ Griffith U, Feb. 25 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A–stable–Afghanistan–Why–we–should–care.aspx)IM

We do have an interest in the future of domestic stability within Afghanistan, but we need to think much more clearly about which countries build and guarantee that stability. An Afghan state built just by the US and its allies will be inherently unstable because, as we demonstrated after the Soviet Union withdrew, we have little stomach for any continued strategic involvement in the region. Pakistan, India and China, on the other hand, have deep and enduring strategic interests there, and their competition would soon undermine anything ISAF and NATO leave behind. Understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among Asia's rising behemoths has to be the first step in trying to figure out how to mitigate it. Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self–sufficient and more vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting national ruin.The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war, intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own efforts to exert influence and control, leading to a vast, very likely nuclear, conflict. To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.

\*\*UQ- Afghanistan\*\*

UQ- Afghanistan- Presence Checks Now

US presence in Afghanistan is intended to check Iran

Lefebvre 8 (Vincent, <http://us-foreign-affairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/obamas_foreign_policy_objectives_in_afghanistan>, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK  
However, what Obama has not really made clear is the question of his main objective in Afghanistan. Does he sincerely want to [bring peace to Afghanistan](http://afghanistan.suite101.com/article.cfm/how_to_bring_peace_to_afghanistan) and look at all possible solutions toward that goal, which will eventually mean to politically engage sections of the insurgency and bring China, India, Iran and Russia on board of a multilateral security initiative? Otherwise, does he want to pursue mainly geopolitical objectives of American power projection under the guise of the “war on terror” in which a prolongation of the war becomes of goal in itself? The war in Afghanistan then becomes a strategy to maintain a long-term US and NATO military presence in Central and South Asia, extend NATO partnerships to Caucasus and Central Asian countries, contain Chinese, Iranian and Russian influence, access Caspian oil and gas and keep an eye on India and Pakistan. Considering Obama's “outsider” status and lack of links to the US security establishment, Big Oil and other Washington lobbies as well as his general message of change, humanism and multilateralism, it could go the first way. But considering his national security and foreign policy team in addition to the immense pressure from powerful vested interests that comes with the world's most powerful job, it could also go the second way.

US presence in Afghanistan is intended to check Iran

Lefebvre 8 (Vincent, <http://us-foreign-affairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/obamas_foreign_policy_objectives_in_afghanistan>, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK  
However, what Obama has not really made clear is the question of his main objective in Afghanistan. Does he sincerely want to [bring peace to Afghanistan](http://afghanistan.suite101.com/article.cfm/how_to_bring_peace_to_afghanistan) and look at all possible solutions toward that goal, which will eventually mean to politically engage sections of the insurgency and bring China, India, Iran and Russia on board of a multilateral security initiative? Otherwise, does he want to pursue mainly geopolitical objectives of American power projection under the guise of the “war on terror” in which a prolongation of the war becomes of goal in itself? The war in Afghanistan then becomes a strategy to maintain a long-term US and NATO military presence in Central and South Asia, extend NATO partnerships to Caucasus and Central Asian countries, contain Chinese, Iranian and Russian influence, access Caspian oil and gas and keep an eye on India and Pakistan. Considering Obama's “outsider” status and lack of links to the US security establishment, Big Oil and other Washington lobbies as well as his general message of change, humanism and multilateralism, it could go the first way. But considering his national security and foreign policy team in addition to the immense pressure from powerful vested interests that comes with the world's most powerful job, it could also go the second way.

\*\*Links- Afghanistan\*\*

Link- Afghanistan-Withdrawal 🡪 Iran Influence

The US intends to use its presence in Afghanistan vs. Iran

Rubin and Batmanglich 8 (Barnett and Sara, MIT Center for International Studies scholars, http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick\_rubin08\_audit.html, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK

The Afghan government responded to the growing threat, which it saw as mainly coming from Pakistan, by asking the U.S. to sign a Declaration for Strategic Partnership, which Presidents Karzai and Bush did in Washington in May 2005. Tehran responded by asking President Karzai to sign a declaration of strategic partnership with Iran that, among its provisions, committed Afghanistan not to permit its territory to be used for military or intelligence operations against Iran. The message was clear: Iran would accept Afghanistan's strategic partnership with the United States, but only if it is not directed against Iran. President Karzai responded that he would like to sign such a declaration, but that his government was not in a position to prevent the United States from using its territory against Iran. The Iranians said that they knew that, but would like such a statement anyway, and that without such a declaration, President Karzai would not be welcome in Tehran for the August 2005 inauguration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A phone call to President Karzai from a cabinet officer in Washington forbade the Afghan President from signing any such declaration or attending the inauguration. A few months later, in January 2006, another phone call forbade Karzai to travel to Tehran to sign economic agreements. In early 2007, Washington reported that Iran had started to supply sophisticated arms to the Taliban in western Afghanistan.7 Iran had also increased political and military support to the former Northern Alliance, which had formed the core of the opposition National Front in parliament.

\*\*Impacts- Afghanistan\*\*

Impacts- Afghanistan- Indo/Pak War

Iran influence in Afghanistan destabilizes the country and fuels bitterness between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Morici 7 (Elisa, MA in Poli Sci @ Università degli Studi di Torino, 8/31, IntelliBriefs.com, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/08/iran-regional-alliances-and-dilemma-of.html) JPG

Accused of fuelling instability in Afghanistan, expelling refugees and selling weapons to rebel groups, Iran's strategy in the war-torn country could seriously deteriorate relations with its neighbours and catapult an unpredictable crisis that would trigger the destabilisation of Afghanistan and pitting Pakistan as a future enemy in the process. The recognition of the Taliban's illegitimacy and the consequential expulsion of the central Afghan government have led Tehran's diplomacy along a noticeably different path in collaborating with its neighbours, as it seeks to establish greater presence in Afghanistan and maintain its historic alliance with Pakistan. The Islamic Republic has succeeded in becoming the centrepiece of the region's two opposing forces (Afghanistan and Pakistan) by earning itself political and economic benefits as well as an insulation from potential US interference. In the context of the latter, neither General Musharraf nor the government of President Karzai are willing to let go of Iran's alliance in favour of a US military invasion that could see the region plunge into instability.

Impacts- Afghanistan- Instability – Nuclear War

Failure in Afghanistan means Indo–Pak nuclear war.

Steve Coll NOVEMBER 16, 2009 “WHAT IF WE FAIL IN AFGHANISTAN?” http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/11/what–if–we–fail–in–afghanistan.html

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear–armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan—a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen–nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first–draft straw–man forecast: The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids: Even if the international community gave up on Afghanistan and withdrew, as it did from Somalia during the early nineties, it is inconceivable that the Taliban could triumph in the country completely and provide a regime (however perverse) of stability. About half of Afghanistan’s population is Pashtun, from which the Taliban draw their strength. Much of the country’s non–Pashtun population ardently opposes the Taliban. In the humiliating circumstances that would attend American failure, those in the West who now promote “counterterrorism,” “realist,” and “cost-effective” strategies in the region would probably endorse, in effect, a nineties redux—which would amount to a prescription for more Afghan civil war. A rump “legitimate” Afghan government dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks would find arms and money from India, Iran, and perhaps Russia, Europe and the United States. This would likely produce a long–running civil war between northern, Tajik–dominated ethnic militias and the Pashtun–dominated Taliban. Tens of thousands of Afghans would likely perish in this conflict and from the pervasive poverty it would produce; many more Afghans would return as refugees to Pakistan, contributing to that country’s instability. Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan: If the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar’s outfit, the former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, now in exile in Pakistan) regained power in Kandahar or Kabul, it would undoubtedly interpret its triumph as a ticket to further ambition in Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s leaders, if they survived American drone attacks, would encourage this narrative and support it as best they could. The Pakistani Taliban would likely be energized, armed and financed by the Afghan Taliban as they pursued their own revolutionary ambitions in Islamabad. In response, the international community would undoubtedly fall back in defense of the Pakistani constitutional state, such as it is. However, the West would find the Pakistan Army and its allies in Riyadh and perhaps even Beijing even more skeptical than they are now about the American–led agenda. In this scenario, as in the past, Pakistan’s generals would be tempted to negotiate an accommodation with the Taliban, Afghan and Pakistani alike, to the greatest possible extent, in defiance of Washington’s preferences. The net result might well be an increase in Islamist influence over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, if not an outright loss of control. Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War: The Taliban and Al Qaeda are anti–American, yes. But they are equally determined to wage war against India’s secular, Hindu–dominated democracy. The Pakistani Taliban, whose momentum would be increased by Taliban success in Afghanistan, consist in part of Punjab–based, ardently anti-Indian Islamist groups, such as Lashkar–e–Taiba, which carried out the spectacular raid on Mumbai a year ago. The probable knock–on effect of a second Taliban revolution Afghanistan would be to increase the likelihood of irregular Islamist attacks from Pakistan against Indian targets—not only the traditional target set in Indian–held Kashmir, but in New Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities, as has occurred periodically during the last decade. In time, democratic Indian governments would be pressed by their electorates to respond with military force. This in turn would present, repetitively, the problem of managing the role of nuclear weapons in a prospective fourth Indo-Pakistani war.

Impacts- Afghanistan- Instability – Nuclear War

Afghan failure leads to Al-Qaeda nukes – Most likely scenario and it swamps alt causes

Biddle 9 (Stephen Biddle senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. July - August 2009 issue: Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=617 TBC 6/24/10)

The more important U.S. interest is indirect: to prevent chaos in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan. With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan’s), a GDP of more than $160 billion (more than ten times Afghanistan’s) and a functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps twenty to fifty warheads, Pakistan is a much more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the likelihood of government collapse in Pakistan, which would enable the establishment of such a sanctuary, may be in the same ballpark as Afghanistan, at least in the medium to long term. Pakistan is already at war with internal Islamist insurgents allied to al-Qaeda, and that war is not going well. Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or even just in toppling the current civilian government, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into al-Qaeda’s hands would rise sharply. In fact, given the difficulties terrorists face in acquiring usable nuclear weapons, Pakistani state collapse may be the likeliest scenario leading to a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda. Pakistani state collapse, moreover, is a danger over which the United States has only limited influence. We have uneven and historically fraught relations with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and our ties with the civilian government of the moment can be no more efficacious than that government’s own sway over the country. The United States is too unpopular with the Pakistani public to have any meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily (and routinely) diverted to purposes other than countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against India. U.S. assistance to Pakistan can—and should—be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but if these conditions are too harsh, Pakistan might reject the terms, thus removing our leverage in the process. Demanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only sets the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding. If we cannot reliably influence Pakistan for the better, we should at least heed the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. With so little actual leverage, we cannot afford to make the problem any worse than it already is. And failure in Afghanistan would make the problem in Pakistan much harder. The Taliban are a transnational Pashtun movement active on both sides of the Durand Line and are closely associated with other Pakistani insurgents. They constitute an important threat to the regime in Islamabad in rough proportion to the regime’s inherent weaknesses (which are many and varied). If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state’s resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

\*\*\*Iraq\*\*\*

Iraq Shell (1/3)

A) Iranian expansion leads to abolishment of the jewish state, Sunni genocide, sectarian warfare and increases the risk of nuke use

Hitchens 10 (Christopher, columnist for Vanity Fair and Slate, The Australian, 5/20/10, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/irans-goal-of-regional-hegemony/story-e6frg6zo-1225868866287) JPG

On May 15, we were subjected to a tirade by Ayatollah Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, leader of Iran's Hezbollah party and proprietor of the newspaper of the same name, which carried his incendiary article. The need of the hour, intoned the ayatollah, was for a "Greater Iran" that would assume hegemonic control over much of the Middle East and Central Asia (stretching from Afghanistan to Palestine, according to the broad-brush ambitions disclosed by his polemic). This new imperialism would, he urged, possess two very attractive attributes. It would abolish the Jewish state, and it would assist in the arrival of the long-awaited Mahdi, or hidden imam, whose promised reign of perfection has been on hold since his abrupt disappearance in the 9th century. The second development took place in the material world and in the here and now. Iran's Kurdish population managed to bring off a well-organised general strike in all the major cities of their long-oppressed region. Schools and shops and bazaars were closed, and the claim that the strike was pretty solid seems to be well-supported by the evidence. The occasion for the strike was the brutal execution of five anti-regime activists, four of them Kurdish. This is the only tactic that the Islamic Republic of Iran seems to have left at its disposal. Just as the Revolutionary Guard is actually the embodiment of a vicious counter-revolution and an unstable dictatorial status quo, so is Ayatollah Kharrazi's call for a Shia imperialism profoundly reactionary. (Nothing, however, will stop our media from referring to him, and to people like him, as "radical".) His call for the abolition of Israel is what one might call routine in nature - as is his ardent wish for the advent of the Mahdi - but what's of more immediate interest is his railing against the "cancerous tumors" of Sunni Islam, especially as represented by Iran's Arab neighbours in the Gulf. Nor is this a new noise, or something to be explained away by mere crowd-pleasing demagogy. It isn't very long since the quasi-official Tehran newspaper Kayhan declared that the nearby island state of Bahrain was in reality a province of Iran, a position more or less openly held by several members of the hardline wing of the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime. It is true that a large proportion of Bahrain's population is ethnically Persian or Shia, or both. But it is also true that a large proportion of Iran's Kurdish population is Sunni and by definition not Persian. These war-like statements from the ultra-Right in Tehran, then, invite a possible carnival of sectarian warfare, instigated by Iran both at home and beyond its borders. One might dismiss it as raving, were it not for the fact that any future Iranian government - and Ahmadinejad has said he expects that his successors will be "10 times more revolutionary" - will have possession and control of nuclear weapons and of the means to deliver them.

Iraq Shell (2/3)

B) Its’ zero-sum—Iran wants the U.S. out to exert its’ influence

The Korea Herald 8 (October 24, “Iraq troop deal running out of time”, Lexis)jn

Iraq has been regarded as such a success story in recent months that many have forgotten that all the old cleavages still exist - Sunni vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Arab, regional autonomy vs. central government. With growing uncertainty about the future of U.S. forces in the country, these tensions are returning with a vengeance. Mistrust between Kurds and Arabs almost led to a military confrontation in the Khanaqin area northeast of Baghdad in August. The Kurds had moved their "pesh merga" militia into the mixed Kurdish-Arab area, prompting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to deploy Iraqi army troops and order the Kurdish forces to leave. Crocker admonished both sides not to make stupid miscalculations, and U.S. commanders warned they wouldn't come to Maliki's rescue. The overmatched Iraqi army retreated, but the crisis left bitter feelings on all sides. "The Kurds still see things as a zero-sum game, as does everyone else," grumbles another senior U.S. official who has been deeply involved in the negotiations. Jockeying among the Shiite parties has been especially intense, he says, with none of the Shiite leaders wanting the potential stigma of supporting the SOFA deal. Iran is waging an aggressive covert-action campaign to derail the agreement, U.S. officials say. The new commander of U.S. forces, Gen. Ray Odierno, highlighted Tehran's push last week when he said Iranian operatives had been seeking to bribe Iraqi members of parliament to reject the pact when it comes up for a vote. This public allegation of Iranian meddling drew a rebuke from Maliki, but U.S. officials say they have recently intercepted Iranian couriers carrying suitcases full of money to pay bribes and political subsidies to pro-Iranian parties. It isn't clear whether the U.S. is mounting a covert effort of its own to counter the Iranian campaign. The Iranians obviously want to limit U.S. influence in the new Iraq by defeating the SOFA agreement, and in the process hand America a strategic defeat. But some top U.S. officials think the Iranians have a more fundamental goal in pushing U.S. forces out before the Iraqis are ready to take over - namely, bringing a final, decisive resolution to the Iraq-Iran War that ended in a 1988 truce. "Now, 20 years later, they have an opportunity to win that war," the official argued. "My one-word definition of Iraq is 'fear,'" says Crocker. "Everybody is afraid of everybody. They're afraid of the past, present and future. They're afraid of the consequences of signing an agreement. But they should be even more afraid of the consequences of not signing." A final complicating factor in the deadlock is the expectation among many Iraqi politicians that Barack Obama will be elected president on Nov. 4, and that they'll be able to get a better deal from him. If Obama does indeed win, he could make an early show of leadership by telling Baghdad not to expect any sweetheart concessions - and make clear that he backs the agreement Crocker is working so hard to pin down.

C) Iran influence in Iraq is bad – human rights abuses, political instability, and Iraqi internal conflict

Wunderle & Lajeunesse 9 (William and Gabriel, William – Joint Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff as a Political Military Planner, analyst @ RAND, Gabriel – Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air, 4/28/9 AmericanDiplomacy.org, Forcehttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0406/comm/wunderlelajeunesse\_counter.html) JPG

Iran seeks a weakened and Shia-dominated Iraq that is incapable of posing a threat to Iran.  Iranian involvement in Iraq is extensive, and poses a serious threat to U.S. national interests and U.S. and coalition forces.  Iran provides training, funds, and weapons to a variety of Shia militias in Iraq which have been linked to assassinations, human rights abuses, and the planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) designed to maim and kill U.S. and coalition troops, while actively interfering in Iraqi politics.[14](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot14)  Iran’s lethal support to these groups has clearly intensified the conflict in Iraq.  In Iraq, the Qods Force has provided lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, including secret cells referred to as Special Groups from Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).  Weapons supplied by Iran, including small arms, mortars, battlefield rockets, explosives, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS),[15](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot15)have been used by Shia militants in attacks against Iraqi citizens, Iraqi security forces, senior Iraqi leaders, and Coalition forces.  The United States government (USG) has learned a good deal about Iranian support to Special Groups through the capture of Special Groups leaders, Lebanese Hizballah operatives, and Iranian Qods Force officers, as well as the recovery and exploitation of Special Group weapons caches.  Coalition Forces and Iraqi government security forces, for example, discovered Iranian-origin mortar rounds with packing materials dated 2008.  Declassified USG information indicates that in March 2007, Coalition forces detained Qais Khazali, a former senior aide and spokesperson to radical Iraqi Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, and his brother Laith Khazali.  Qais was in charge of Special Groups throughout Iraq since June 2006, and his brother Laith was a member of the Special Groups networks.  The Khazali brothers ran an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)[16](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot16)network in Iraq

Iraq Shell (3/3)

D) Instability in Iraq spread throughout the middle east causing multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

Oppenheimer et al 7(Michael, August  clinical associate prof. @  the Center for Global Affairs @NYU, Center for Global Affairs, http://www.scps.nyu.edu/areas-of-study/global-affairs/cga-scenarios/ accesed 7/2) CM

**Iraq has descended into outright civil war. Instability spreads throughout the Middle East**. The regional players, competing and insecure, fail to cooperate on matters of defense and counter-terrorism and prove unable to contain the fighting within Iraq. **While US pressure and the limited military capacity of local actors have succeeded in preventing all-out regional conflict between Sunni and Shi'a-led states, the proxy war fought on Iraqi territory** (Scenario 2) **spreads to adjoining states through refugee flows, growing radicalization of Arab populations, escalating non-state terrorism**, **and the deliberate efforts of regional rivals to destabilize each others’ governments.**   Existing regimes in the region cling to power, but with insufficient domestic political support or acquiescence to create coalitions and pursue effective balance of power strategies necessary to contain the Iraq civil war. Because their appetite for direct state-to-state conflict is limited, many regimes use sub-state actors to strike at their enemies. Regional rivalries flare up as various players vie for influence and control. Radicalization of Arab populations increases as sectarian strife radiates from Iraq. In these circumstances, unforeseen events—such as an Iranian-style revolution in a major Arab country—could radically alter the political landscape and reorder foreign policy priorities in the region.   **Events could easily globalize this regional conflagration. A serious disruption to the oil supply, as the result of an attack on an important oil installation in the Gulf, is a likelihood in this scenario. Such an attack could come in various guises. Terrorists might target the energy infrastructure, with the US retaliating against Iran as a target. The US or Israel could also react to any number of Iranian provocations, including its imminen**t (by 2010) **development of nuclear weapons, leading toward a major war.**

\*\*UQ- Iraq\*\*

UQ- Iraq- Presence Checks Now/Withdrawal Bad

Troop presence allows Iraq to develop – withdrawal gives Iran an opportunity to expand

Blankley 6/23 (Tony, reporter @ Real Clear Politics, 6/23/10, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/06/23/obamas\_weak\_diplomacy\_a\_world\_up\_for\_grabs.html) JPG

Speaking recently, however, at the [U.S. Military Academy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/us-military-academy/) at West Point, [Mr. Obama](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/barack-obama/) said that the [U.S.](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-of-america/) commitment to [Iraq](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iraq/) endures and that as [U.S.](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-of-america/) troops depart, "a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress." Well, we can hope so.

However, a senior Israeli military adviser last week described to me what [Israel](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/israel/) expects to see as the [United States](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-of-america/) pulls most of its remaining troops out of [Iraq](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iraq/). [Iran](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/islamic-republic-of-iran/) will start to reassert her claim to oil-rich southern [Iraq](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iraq/) (populated mostly by Shia Iraqis) - the cause of the [Iraq](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iraq/)-[Iran](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/islamic-republic-of-iran/) war of the 1980s.

\*\*Links- Iraq\*\*

Link- Iraq—Influence=Zero Sum

Iraq is a zero-sum game—withdrawal of U.S. influence emboldens Iran

Francona 8(Rick, Lieutenant Colonel, June 17, “Iran right in concern about Iraq-U.S. relations”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25144626/37937035, accessed 7/1/10)jn

U.S. and Iraq are drafting an agreement that will determine the role of American forces in Iraq after the current United Nations authorization expires at the end of 2008. Not surprisingly, the most vocal critics of this agreement are Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and even the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. All have strongly condemned any agreement between Washington and Baghdad as the groundwork for the permanent presence of thousands of American forces on their western border. It is the possible long-term presence of American troops that has the Iranians concerned — and rightfully so. From the Iranian perspective, the ability to influence events in Iraq is a zero-sum game. If the American forces are there in large numbers, it follows that the U.S. will exercise substantial influence over the government in Baghdad, at the expense of Iran’s ability to influence events in Iraq. The more influence Washington has, the less Tehran has. Iraq is of national interest to Iran. The last thing the Iranian leadership wants is a strong American military presence next door limiting their freedom to do as they wish in the neighboring country. Iran fought a devastating, bloody, eight year war with Iraq, and is rightfully concerned about stability in Iraq. Iran wants a stable Iraq to be sure, but a stable Iraq that responds to its influence, not the influence of the U.S. When stability finally does come to Iraq, Iran wants to ensure that it emerges as the key power broker in the region. Since they view this as a zero-sum game, that primacy will come at the expense of the U.S. To meet its objectives, Tehran needs an acquiescent government in Baghdad. Given the demographics of Iraq, this is eminently possible. Shiites comprise about 60 percent of the population and will likely dominate the Iraqi government. Despite the losses suffered by many Shiite families in the Iran-Iraq war, most Shiites have a favorable view of Iran, one the few majority Shiite countries in the world. What stands in the way of having an acquiescent government in Baghdad, in the Iranian view, is the presence of tens of thousands of American troops in Iraq. Prime Minister al-Maliki has recently acted against Shiite groups in al-Basra and Baghdad’s Sadr City, demonstrating that he is not a Shiite leader, but an Iraqi leader. His willingness to take on Shiite groups, virtually all of which are supported by Iran, is bolstered by the presence of U.S. forces. In the absence of that military power, al-Maliki might be forced to agree to Iranian demands that he not pursue their proxy groups in the country.

Influence is zero-sum—Iran is capitalizing off of troop reductions

Schreck 10(Adam, AP writer, June 15, “Iraqis feel Iran's growing clout in their wallets”, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GBKNFG0.htm, accessed 7/1/10)jn

Trade with longtime rival Iran is bringing Iraq investments it sorely needs. Billion-dollar pacts are being signed. Branches of Iranian banks blacklisted by the United States are opening. But the growing ties also frame a political imbalance the U.S. is loath to see in a country struggling to rebuild after years of war. As America's influence wanes in Iraq, and its troops withdraw, Iran is capitalizing on centuries-old religious and cultural ties to secure greater leverage in the country -- even as Washington works to dissuade others from dealing with Tehran over its nuclear program. It's a political and economic tug-of-war the U.S. risks losing, if only because Iraq's reconstruction needs open the door for a marriage of convenience. Iran, squeezed elsewhere by sanctions, finds in Iraq a rare and ready market at a time when lingering security fears continue to discourage Western investments in the country. "Iran would like to have a stronger presence in Iraq ... primarily because so many other places have been closed off to it. It's partly necessity," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor at Britain's Durham University. "Iran doesn't want to lose its footing again in Iraq." Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq fought a ruinous eight-year war with Iran beginning in 1980 that killed hundreds of thousands of people and devastated both countries' economies. Many of Iraq's majority Shiites, persecuted by Saddam, sought sanctuary in Iran, only to return after the Iraqi dictator's fall in 2003. Some now hold key government posts. Many others have bought homes and set up businesses in places like Karbala, relying on Farsi learned in exile to cater to Iranians. That allows the trade links to keep growing -- quadrupling to $4 billion last year compared to three years earlier, according to Iranian government figures. Senior Iraqi and Iranian officials meet frequently. The visits have netted a series of economic cooperation agreements, including power supply deals for Iraq and pledges to create cross-border free trade zones. Iran has offered its neighbor a $1 billion loan to buy Iranian goods.

Link- Iraq—Influence=Zero Sum

Iraq is a zero-sum game—withdrawal of U.S. influence emboldens Iran

Francona 8(Rick, Lieutenant Colonel, June 17, “Iran right in concern about Iraq-U.S. relations”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25144626/37937035, accessed 7/1/10)jn

U.S. and Iraq are drafting an agreement that will determine the role of American forces in Iraq after the current United Nations authorization expires at the end of 2008. Not surprisingly, the most vocal critics of this agreement are Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and even the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. All have strongly condemned any agreement between Washington and Baghdad as the groundwork for the permanent presence of thousands of American forces on their western border. It is the possible long-term presence of American troops that has the Iranians concerned — and rightfully so. From the Iranian perspective, the ability to influence events in Iraq is a zero-sum game. If the American forces are there in large numbers, it follows that the U.S. will exercise substantial influence over the government in Baghdad, at the expense of Iran’s ability to influence events in Iraq. The more influence Washington has, the less Tehran has. Iraq is of national interest to Iran. The last thing the Iranian leadership wants is a strong American military presence next door limiting their freedom to do as they wish in the neighboring country. Iran fought a devastating, bloody, eight year war with Iraq, and is rightfully concerned about stability in Iraq. Iran wants a stable Iraq to be sure, but a stable Iraq that responds to its influence, not the influence of the U.S. When stability finally does come to Iraq, Iran wants to ensure that it emerges as the key power broker in the region. Since they view this as a zero-sum game, that primacy will come at the expense of the U.S. To meet its objectives, Tehran needs an acquiescent government in Baghdad. Given the demographics of Iraq, this is eminently possible. Shiites comprise about 60 percent of the population and will likely dominate the Iraqi government. Despite the losses suffered by many Shiite families in the Iran-Iraq war, most Shiites have a favorable view of Iran, one the few majority Shiite countries in the world. What stands in the way of having an acquiescent government in Baghdad, in the Iranian view, is the presence of tens of thousands of American troops in Iraq. Prime Minister al-Maliki has recently acted against Shiite groups in al-Basra and Baghdad’s Sadr City, demonstrating that he is not a Shiite leader, but an Iraqi leader. His willingness to take on Shiite groups, virtually all of which are supported by Iran, is bolstered by the presence of U.S. forces. In the absence of that military power, al-Maliki might be forced to agree to Iranian demands that he not pursue their proxy groups in the country.

Influence is zero-sum—Iran is capitalizing off of troop reductions

Schreck 10(Adam, AP writer, June 15, “Iraqis feel Iran's growing clout in their wallets”, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GBKNFG0.htm, accessed 7/1/10)jn

Trade with longtime rival Iran is bringing Iraq investments it sorely needs. Billion-dollar pacts are being signed. Branches of Iranian banks blacklisted by the United States are opening. But the growing ties also frame a political imbalance the U.S. is loath to see in a country struggling to rebuild after years of war. As America's influence wanes in Iraq, and its troops withdraw, Iran is capitalizing on centuries-old religious and cultural ties to secure greater leverage in the country -- even as Washington works to dissuade others from dealing with Tehran over its nuclear program. It's a political and economic tug-of-war the U.S. risks losing, if only because Iraq's reconstruction needs open the door for a marriage of convenience. Iran, squeezed elsewhere by sanctions, finds in Iraq a rare and ready market at a time when lingering security fears continue to discourage Western investments in the country. "Iran would like to have a stronger presence in Iraq ... primarily because so many other places have been closed off to it. It's partly necessity," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor at Britain's Durham University. "Iran doesn't want to lose its footing again in Iraq." Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq fought a ruinous eight-year war with Iran beginning in 1980 that killed hundreds of thousands of people and devastated both countries' economies. Many of Iraq's majority Shiites, persecuted by Saddam, sought sanctuary in Iran, only to return after the Iraqi dictator's fall in 2003. Some now hold key government posts. Many others have bought homes and set up businesses in places like Karbala, relying on Farsi learned in exile to cater to Iranians. That allows the trade links to keep growing -- quadrupling to $4 billion last year compared to three years earlier, according to Iranian government figures. Senior Iraqi and Iranian officials meet frequently. The visits have netted a series of economic cooperation agreements, including power supply deals for Iraq and pledges to create cross-border free trade zones. Iran has offered its neighbor a $1 billion loan to buy Iranian goods.

\*\*Impacts- Iraq\*\*

Impacts- Iraq- Instability/ HR Abuse

Iran influence in Iraq is bad – human rights abuses, political instability, and Iraqi internal conflict

Wunderle & Lajeunesse 9 (William and Gabriel, William – Joint Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff as a Political Military Planner, analyst @ RAND, Gabriel – Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air, 4/28/9 AmericanDiplomacy.org, Forcehttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0406/comm/wunderlelajeunesse\_counter.html) JPG

Iran seeks a weakened and Shia-dominated Iraq that is incapable of posing a threat to Iran.  Iranian involvement in Iraq is extensive, and poses a serious threat to U.S. national interests and U.S. and coalition forces.  Iran provides training, funds, and weapons to a variety of Shia militias in Iraq which have been linked to assassinations, human rights abuses, and the planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) designed to maim and kill U.S. and coalition troops, while actively interfering in Iraqi politics.[14](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot14)  Iran’s lethal support to these groups has clearly intensified the conflict in Iraq.  In Iraq, the Qods Force has provided lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, including secret cells referred to as Special Groups from Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).  Weapons supplied by Iran, including small arms, mortars, battlefield rockets, explosives, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS),[15](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot15)have been used by Shia militants in attacks against Iraqi citizens, Iraqi security forces, senior Iraqi leaders, and Coalition forces.  The United States government (USG) has learned a good deal about Iranian support to Special Groups through the capture of Special Groups leaders, Lebanese Hizballah operatives, and Iranian Qods Force officers, as well as the recovery and exploitation of Special Group weapons caches.  Coalition Forces and Iraqi government security forces, for example, discovered Iranian-origin mortar rounds with packing materials dated 2008.  Declassified USG information indicates that in March 2007, Coalition forces detained Qais Khazali, a former senior aide and spokesperson to radical Iraqi Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, and his brother Laith Khazali.  Qais was in charge of Special Groups throughout Iraq since June 2006, and his brother Laith was a member of the Special Groups networks.  The Khazali brothers ran an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)[16](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot16)network in Iraq.

\*\*\*\*\*Kuwait\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*Links- Kuwait\*\*

Link- Kuwait- Relations On The Brink

Tensions are reaching a breaking point between Kuwait and Iran

Johnston 10 (Cynthia ,Jun 11, 2010 writer for Reuters Middle Eastern Correspondent, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65A1VY20100611 accessed 7/2) CM

Gulf Arab states, hosts to U.S. and Western military bases, fear the discovery of a purported Iranian spy ring in Kuwait will make it harder to stay out of the fray of any conflict over Iran's nuclear program. The ensuing tensions following the Kuwaiti arrests, details of which remain scant, may further polarize Gulf states against non-Arab rival Tehran as a global row over Iran's nuclear ambitions heats up. News of the round-up, if proven, could also prompt security clampdowns by Gulf states aimed at ferreting out any more potential spies governments fear may be scouring their land for retaliatory targets in the event of a U.S. strike on Iran. "What they are searching for is not being caught in the crossfire of a potential military strike on Iran," said Theodore Karasik of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis. "When you have the presence of spy rings and this drifting more toward the western position, it makes the situation a little more dangerous," he said. Tehran denies running spies in Kuwait, whose ties with the Islamic Republic have improved after turning poisonous during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war over Kuwait's backing of Iraq. The West suspects Iran, just across the water from the Western-allied Gulf states, is seeking nuclear weapons capability. The United Nations imposed this week new sanctions against Iran, which says it wants only to generate electricity. But if diplomacy fails, neither the United States nor Israel, the only assumed nuclear power in the Middle East, have ruled out military action. That spells danger for oil-exporting Gulf states, as Iran has threatened to hit back at Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf if attacked. The United States has already grown its land- and sea-based missile defense systems in several Gulf countries to counter what it sees as Iran's growing missile threat. "These (Gulf Arab) countries now are assuming that definitely the (Iranian) revolutionary guard is already there in their country," Mustafa Alani of the Gulf Research Center said. "If it (the Kuwait accusation) is proven ... I think we are going to witness a major close look by intelligence in each country," he added. The United States has myriad air and naval installations in Gulf Arab states, some of which are little more than 200 km (124 miles) from Iran's coast. The U.S. Central Command keeps its forward headquarters in Qatar, and Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan, a vast U.S. logistics base in the desert south of the capital that serves as a staging ground for U.S. forces deploying in Iraq.

\*\*Impacts- Kuwait\*\*

Impacts- Kuwait- Iran Destabilizes Kuwait

Iranian influence destabilizes Kuwait

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf page 3 accessed 7/2) CM

For some of Iran’s neighbors, Iran’s regional influence is a domestic political concern. For example, Bahrain and Kuwait—Gulf states with signification Shiite populations—often express concerns that Iran is fomenting unrest among Shiites, highlighting fears about their own internal stability. In recent years, Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen have expressed similar concerns. Iran also uses proxies that at times are a destabilizing force, as is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Others view Iran’s regional aspirations in a broader sense. Saudi Arabia, for example, criticizes Iran’s interference in what it perceives as “Arab causes,” like the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and reportedly confronts Iran’s proxies in Lebanese politics with material support of Sunni political parties and candidates.

Iran is undermining Kuwait by supporting Kuwait’s Shiites attempting to create internal strife

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdfpage 15 accessed 7/2)CM

Some Kuwaiti strategists, such as former Ambassador to the United States Shaykh Saud al Nasser Al Sabah, have questioned Kuwait’s stance as naive and potentially dangerous.34 These observers question Iran’s motives and believe that Kuwaiti leaders mistakenly do not perceive that Iran is slowly seeking to establish hegemony in the Gulf. Kuwait has not publicly accused Iran of attempting to support Kuwaiti Shiites (who are about 30% of Kuwait’s population) as a potential internal opposition in Kuwait, but some believe Iran is looking for opportunities to strengthen Shiites in Kuwait to ensure that Kuwait maintains a relatively friendly posture towards Iran. Others say that Iran has no opportunity to support Shiites in Kuwait as an opposition movement because Kuwaiti Shiites are relatively well integrated into Kuwait’s society and economy, and have fewer grievances than do Shiites in other states of the Gulf. On July 18, 2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a retired general. Momen is a Shiite Muslim, and his appointment signaled Kuwait’s acceptance that Iraq is now dominated politically by Shiites.

Impacts- Kuwait- Iran Destabilizes

Iran influence causes political instability in Kuwait recent revolutionary guard capture proves

Charbel 10 **(**Bechara Nassar, June 4**,** taught @ American University @Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Iran–Gulf relations further worsened after the Islamic Republic announced the resumption of its nuclear programs, which Gulf countries see as a direct threat to its security and oil installations, and as a pointer to growing Iranian influence in the region that could lead to a major imbalance in power. What do Gulf countries fear from a nuclear Iran? First, we find an upsurge in Shiite influence. There is growing concern among Arab leaders over Iran’s influence and its effects on Shiite minorities in Gulf countries—like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. These minorities live in complete harmony in their countries but foreign interference and instigation could fuel disturbance and instability. In the recent past, we witnessed the removal of a Bahraini minister of state, Mansour bin Rajab, in wake of charges of money laundering for Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a means to foil sanctions imposed on it. Although details of the investigations have not been revealed, the issue ranges from money laundering to the sale of banned Iranian drugs to countries like Azerbaijan and Columbia, and to other less serious concerns that are linked to influential parties in Tehran. In Kuwait, security agencies have arrested a network of spies that worked for Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The mission of these spies was to keep tabs on Kuwait’s vital military facilities and locations of US forces in the country, in addition to sending reports on the political situation in Kuwait. Although Kuwaiti public prosecution issued a circular against the publication of the incident because it is sub-judice, the real concern was that national unity could be affected. The concern was legitimate as some Shiite media sources—sympathetic to Tehran—launched a counter attack by calling the news on the busting of the network as mere hearsay that was aimed at sectarian instigation and was in the interest of Israel. It is certain that when Iran gets a nuclear bomb it would further embolden these elements and increase the influence of Iran, if it continues with its current behavior. This attitude is deepening the contradictions in society and making a sizeable portion of Gulf citizenry believe that Iran is their protector and that it is capable of supporting them by participating in politics, economy and decision-making.

Iran influence causes political instability in Kuwait recent revolutionary guard capture proves

Charbel 10 **(**Bechara Nassar, June 4**,** taught @ American University @Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Iran–Gulf relations further worsened after the Islamic Republic announced the resumption of its nuclear programs, which Gulf countries see as a direct threat to its security and oil installations, and as a pointer to growing Iranian influence in the region that could lead to a major imbalance in power. What do Gulf countries fear from a nuclear Iran? First, we find an upsurge in Shiite influence. There is growing concern among Arab leaders over Iran’s influence and its effects on Shiite minorities in Gulf countries—like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. These minorities live in complete harmony in their countries but foreign interference and instigation could fuel disturbance and instability. In the recent past, we witnessed the removal of a Bahraini minister of state, Mansour bin Rajab, in wake of charges of money laundering for Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a means to foil sanctions imposed on it. Although details of the investigations have not been revealed, the issue ranges from money laundering to the sale of banned Iranian drugs to countries like Azerbaijan and Columbia, and to other less serious concerns that are linked to influential parties in Tehran. In Kuwait, security agencies have arrested a network of spies that worked for Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The mission of these spies was to keep tabs on Kuwait’s vital military facilities and locations of US forces in the country, in addition to sending reports on the political situation in Kuwait. Although Kuwaiti public prosecution issued a circular against the publication of the incident because it is sub-judice, the real concern was that national unity could be affected. The concern was legitimate as some Shiite media sources—sympathetic to Tehran—launched a counter attack by calling the news on the busting of the network as mere hearsay that was aimed at sectarian instigation and was in the interest of Israel. It is certain that when Iran gets a nuclear bomb it would further embolden these elements and increase the influence of Iran, if it continues with its current behavior. This attitude is deepening the contradictions in society and making a sizeable portion of Gulf citizenry believe that Iran is their protector and that it is capable of supporting them by participating in politics, economy and decision-making.

\*\*\*\*\*Turkey \*\*\*\*\*

\*\*UQ- Turkey\*\*

UQ- Turkey- Presence Checks Now

Turkey is balancing Iran—no risk of alliance

Javedanfar 10( Me'ir, Iranian-Israeli Middle East analyst, June 21, “Turkish, Iranian roles in the Middle East - Israeli comment”, *Jerusalem Post*, LexisNexis)jn

"If we view the option of war as a possibility, we have to pay attention to the conduit for the imposition of such a war. Where is the country which has the suitable human resources? Which country can hope for the entry of its European and American friends into the arena of war, if it enters into war against us? Will NATO be considered as the supporter of our future enemy or the Arab League? The answer is clear. Turkey is the only option for the advancement of the West's ambitions." Iran's relations with Turkey were in fact improving greatly at the time the piece was published. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had visited Teheran on October 28, in what was a very successful visit during which he met Iran's supreme leader as well as President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad. These factors, plus Hadad Adel's reputation as someone who received his post as head of the political council of the popular Hamshahri Javan magazine (Hamshahri for Youth) because of his family connections and not his skill set, led many to dismiss Hadad Adel's controversial prognosis. But actually, he may have had a point. While some in the West are worried about a new Iran-Turkey alliance being formed, they should also be aware that despite the seemingly close relations between the two, there are people in Iran who view Turkey with suspicion. Turkey may be a friend of today, but to the Islamic Republic, it's the rival of tomorrow. The evidence is there for all to see. The Iranian government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on support for Hamas. However, these days, the most popular foreign flag in Gaza is that of Turkey, not Iran. People are naming their children Erdogan (and no one seems to be calling their child Ahmadinezhad). To some Iranians, the Turkish flotilla shouldn't be interpreted as an attack on the Israeli blockade of Gaza, but first and foremost as an assault on their influence in Gaza. Iran's efforts to send its own flotilla are testimony to that. Its main goal is not to help Palestinians who are suffering the consequences of the blockade -that's maybe a second or third consideration. Its number one goal is actually to save its standing and influence in Gaza vis-a-vis the Turks, and to improve its image in the Islamic world as the defender of the Islamic cause. It's the same with Syria. For years, Iran has been trying to capture the Syrian market. Iranian officials have reportedly been greasing the palms of corrupt Syrian oligarchs such as Rami Makhlouf and the Asad family with bribes. They were also investing in the country when it was considered a pariah and no one else would invest there. This was especially true after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Now the Turks have arrived, and with their free trade agreement are penetrating the Syrian economy and grabbing market share from Iran. The fact that both countries share a land border (unlike with Iran) makes Turkey an even more attractive destination. Erdogan's recent policies suggest that he's on the path towards making Turkey the leader of the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East -something Iran has been trying to do for the past 32 years. This reality is ultimately going to see the two countries compete and clash over spheres of influence. Between them, Turkey has a bigger and more advanced economy. Its relations with the US and EU are far better than those of Iran. So are its relations with Sunni countries as well as Shi'i ones. As a consequence, improving relations with Turkey offers much better prospects and returns for many Middle Eastern countries and groups. And although they won't break off relations with Iran, the increasing presence of Turkey is likely to come at a high cost for Teheran.

\*\*Links- Turkey\*\*

Link- Turkey- TNWs

Removing TNW’s fractures the U.S. Turkey alliance

Sariibrahimoğlu 9 (Lale, Anakara Correspondent for *Today’s Zaman,* May 4, “Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil”, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100, accessed 7/2/10)jn

According to the US-based Arms Control Association, under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal. Canada and Greece ended their participation in nuclear sharing. At this stage Turkish diplomatic sources decline to comment on what Ankara's policy will be if NATO presses and finally agrees on a unanimous decision to withdraw the weapons from Turkish soil, too. But Mustafa Kibaroğlu, an associate professor at Ankara's Bilkent University and an expert on arms control issues, told Today's Zaman that Turkish decision makers, i.e., both the political and the military leadership, are for maintaining those weapons on Turkish soil to continue their deterrence capabilities in the region, which includes the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Second, Turkey sees the US as the backbone of deterrence in the region and does not favor the idea of scrapping the nukes from its soil. Kibaroğlu, in an article he had published by the Routledge publishing house in December 2005 under the headline "Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?," gives an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the Turkish reluctance over the idea to scrap US nukes on its territory. Kibaroğlu states in his article that the attitude of Turkish officials toward US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. "However, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with reducing the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries, including Turkey," he asserts. Turkey's possible reluctance to agree on the withdrawal of nukes from its soil sets another example of the Turkish state's inability to adjust itself to the new realities of the world following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, recalled a Turkish security analyst. Neighboring Iran's possible attempts to acquire nuclear weapons may also harden the Turkish policy of agreeing to the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from its soil, asserted the same analyst. In a major speech delivered in Prague on April 5, US President Barack Obama outlined his vision for strengthening the global effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, moving forward on long-overdue disarmament measures and preventing nuclear terrorism. He stated "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." Obama's major call on curbing nuclear weapons in the world also hints at a divergence of opinion emerging between the two close NATO allies -- Turkey and the US -- since the latter has reportedly not opposed the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from five NATO states, including Turkey. Despite speculated Turkish opposition to withdrawing the nukes on its soil, fresh debates in the parliaments of NATO countries, such as Germany, signal that Ankara is to face increased pressure from the alliance over their removal. According to the Arms Control Association, the US has withdrawn more than 90 percent of the 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons it had deployed in Europe at the end of the Cold War. It mainly did so to implement the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) announced in 1991 by then-presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. The nuclear weapons remain in US custody during peacetime, but an estimated 180 such weapons can be released to US allies for delivery in times of war, it added.

\*\*Impacts- Turkey\*\*

Impacts- Turkey- Terrorism, regional instability

Iranian regional hegemony is bad for Turkey – terrorism, ethnic conflict, and regional security

Wunderle & Lajeunesse 9 (William and Gabriel, William – Joint Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff as a Political Military Planner, analyst @ RAND, Gabriel – Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air, 4/28/9 AmericanDiplomacy.org, Forcehttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0406/comm/wunderlelajeunesse\_counter.html) JPG

In 2000, Turkish authorities disrupted the terrorist activities of Turkish Hizballah and arrested members of the group who were trained by Iran.  According to public statements by Turkish officials, Iran directed the group to undertake subversive activities with the goal of creating an Islamic state in Turkey.  According to official Turkish Government reports, members of the group admitted receiving weapons and training in small arms and bomb-making from the Revolutionary Guard – at camps in Iran.[22](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot22)According to declassified USG information, Azerbaijan has long been a target of the IRGC-QF because of its shared border with Iran, large Shi’a population, close relationship with the United States, and Iran’s problems with its own ethnic Azeri population.  Its primary goal is to export the ideals of the Iranian Shi’a revolution into Azerbaijan, as well as to monitor the Azeri population and government.  For example, in 1997, Azerbaijan authorities disrupted Iran’s sponsorship of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA).  IPA members had signed an agreement with high-ranking IRGC official Mansur Haqiqat-Pur, who was responsible for military and intelligence operations in Azerbaijan and pledged to work with the IRGC to create an Islamic state in Azerbaijan modeled on Iran.  At the behest of Iran, the IPA formed armed detachments to conduct terrorist attacks in Azerbaijan, and – according to arrested cell members – received military training at bases in Iran.  While only a small sampling of Iranian malign activities in the Middle East Region, these examples demonstrate how Iranian Qods Force activities pose significant threats to the region, and show that the strategic implications of Iranian behavior on regional security are extremely problematic.  Defeating this asymmetric, net-centric threat requires a coordinated regional response.[23](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/test/up_0904/foot23)

\*\*\*\*\*AFF Answers\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*Afghanistan\*\*

Aff- Afghanistan- Presence 🡪 US-Iran Conflict

Presence creates instability which makes Afghanistan a flashpoint for war

Mir 8 (Haroun, http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=121&Itemid=50, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK

The US and Iran have locked horns, undermining political and economic stability in countries throughout the greater Middle East, especially Afghanistan. Most countries in the region have the resources to absorb the impact of any eventual military confrontation in the Persian Gulf, but Afghanistan does not. The growing US-Iran enmity is affecting Afghanistan’s fragile economy and worsening the political situation. Iran has historically enjoyed great political and economic influence over Afghanistan. Unlike Pakistan, Iran does not have any territorial disputes with Afghanistan. However, the dispute over the use of water from the Hirmand River remains unresolved and could prove a flashpoint for any future conflict between the two countries. Iran’s Afghan policy over the past three decades has been consistent with its geo-strategic interest. Iran considers Afghanistan its backyard and so Iranian authorities assisted mujahideen fighters, particularly the Shia groups, during the Soviet invasion. They provided assistance to anti-Taliban groups and, since the fall of the Taliban, have been positively engaged with the Afghan government, although they have resented the presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Iran has kept close ties with former mujahideen leaders and commanders. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e-Islami and on the UN’s list of individuals belonging to or are associated with the Taliban, has enjoyed special relations with Iran, where he received safe-haven from 1996 to 2001. After the collapse of the Taliban, he was allowed to secretly re-enter Afghanistan, regroup his militia, and create a base in the tribal zone in Pakistan. From there, he declared a new “Holy War” against the presence of coalition forces in the country. In the past three decades, more than two million Afghan refugees have lived in Iran. According to the UN’s refugee commission, close to one million Afghan refugees still live there. There are also a considerable number of illegal refugees, who return back to Iran every year. While a small number of Afghan refugees have integrated into Iranian society, the majority live in precarious conditions and under tremendous pressure from Iranian authorities. Iran, after Pakistan, has become the second major trade partner of Afghanistan, and its trade volume with the country has been increasing steadily over the course of the last several years. Iran is a large source of private investment in Afghanistan, with a number of Iranian companies involved in major construction projects throughout the country. Iran wants to invest more but Afghan authorities are sceptical about Iranian economic influence. Most of the time, Iranian companies partner with Afghans in joint investments in order to avoid US and Afghan scrutiny. Afghanistan, after Iraq, has become another field for possible military confrontation between the US and Iran. Recently, US military officials accused Iran of delivering arms and ammunitions to the Afghan insurgents through the countries’ 936 km border. Iranian intelligence services have conducted covert intelligence and military activities for almost three decades.

\*\*Generic\*\*

Aff- Generic- N/ UQ- US ≠ Check

US Cant check Iranian influence – border sharing, economics, and religion

Beehner and Bruno 8 (Lionel and Greg, Lionel – term member and former senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations and Geg – staff writer @ Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CFR, 3/3/8,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/irans\_involvement\_in\_iraq.html) JPG

Military. The Quds Force, a special operations wing of [Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps](http://www.cfr.org/publication/14324/), is accused by U.S. officials of [furnishing Shiite militias (USA Today)](http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070131/1a_offlede31_dom.art.htm) with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), or roadside bombs, as well as rocket-propelled grenades and Katyusha rockets. Specifically, the United States alleges that it supports, trains, and finances militias like the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of one of Iraq’s most religious Shiite parties whose base is in southern Iraq. “The Quds Force is to the Shiite militias as al-Qaeda in Iraq is to the Sunni insurgent groups,” [writes Rick Francona](http://hardblogger.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/01/26/42746.aspx), a retired military intelligence official and former U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, on MSNBC.com. Some experts estimate as many as thirty-thousand Iranian operatives may be in Iraq. In October 2007 the U.S. State Department designated the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force supporters of terrorism, and imposed [sweeping economic sanctions](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/10/94133.htm) on both. Religious. Iran has sent more than two thousand religious students and scholars to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. One-third of them belong to [Iranian intelligence (PDF)](http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-IranContributionIraq.pdf) and some are operatives sent to Shiite shrines to influence voters ahead of elections, writes Mounir Elkhamri, a military analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There is also a booming cross-border religious tourism business. Tens of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis cross borders to visit holy sites each year; Iran is even building an airport in Najaf to facilitate this exchange of religious visitors. Economic. Iran has emerged as one of Iraq’s largest trading partners, with Iranian exports to Iraq [topping $1.8 billion (PDF)](http://87.107.85.223/documents/document/12429/12430/Exportation-According-to-Country-of-Destination-Part-1.aspx) in 2006, according to the Iranian Custom Administration, up from $800 million in 2004. A free-trade zone in southern Iraq has brought a surge of Iranian goods into shops in Basra, including kerosene and cooking gas. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, a professor of international relations at Britain’s University of Durham, says southern Iraq is the only place outside of Iran where Iranian currency—the rial—is used. “That demonstrates Tehran's economic influence on its neighbor,” Ehteshami told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Iran is constructing a highway to link Basra with Iranian commercial centers across the border. Tehran also plans to build a branch of its national bank in Baghdad and provide assistance for Iraq’s economic reconstruction, according to Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq. Social. Many powerful Shiite political parties made Iran their home base during the reign of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni Baath Party. One of the most prominent was Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of Iraq’s largest Shiite political party and commander of the Badr Brigade, its military wing. After a brief uprising by Iraq’s Shiites in the southern port city of Basra in 1991, the group returned to Iran and competed for influence with other exiles. When Saddam was ousted in 2003, Iraqi Shiites returned, followed by Iranian leaders seeking to [cement ties (PDF)](http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr156.pdf) with a new era of Iraqi politicians. Those relationships continue to dominate Iraqi politics in Baghdad.

US doesn’t check Iran influence

Alani 6 (Dr Mustafa, senior adviser and Director of the Security and Terrorism Programme at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, 10/24/6,

http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=opinion&xfile=data/opinion/2006/october/opinion\_october77.xml) JPG

Iran’s interventionist policy in Iraq has already attained a significant part of its objectives. In fact, despite US forces occupying the country, Iran has more influence over developments in post-Saddam Iraq than ever before.

Aff- Generic- Relations Resilient

Relations resilient—both sides see each other as indespensible

Yeni Sefak 9 (Website, February 9, “Columnist upbeat about prospects for Turkish-US cooperation” LexisNexis)jn

We often see superficial approaches that disregard the importance and the multiple dimensions of Turkish-US relations. Groups that raise objections to the effect that "we may lose the United States" whenever Turkey levels some criticism; those who think that the United States would write off Turkey as soon as the Armenian and Jewish lobbies go into action; and those who are looking for opportunities to bash the United States fail to see the dimensions of the alliance between the two countries. Those who raised a storm after the [ 1 March 2003] authorization bill affair also made the same mistake. Any arguments that the United States might favour the Kurds over Turkey in the region or that it might be pressured by Israel to take a different posture with regard to Turkey are largely dissociated from reality. The alliance with the United States has always been very important for Turkey. The role the United States has played in Turkey's Westernization process is no less than that played by Europe. Nor was Turkey's importance and value [for the United States] associated with the Cold War period only. Those who thought that Turkey's importance would decline after the end of the Cold War and that the [Turkish-US] alliance relationship would lose its significance were proven wrong. Today, Turkey occupies a more important place than it did in the past. Obama needs to analyse Turkey's importance well and echo this in his policies. Think about it: If President Obama went to any European, Balkan, or Middle Eastern country today, how many issues would he have on his agenda? Which of these issues would he discuss and how long would such a meeting last? Most probably, the agenda items could be counted on the fingers of one hand and most of them would be related to the expectations of that country from the United States. Now, if President Obama came to Turkey how many files would have in his briefcase? How many items would he have on his agenda? How many of these would be Turkish expectations and how many would be US requests?

Aff- Generic A2 – No Iran Influence

Iran influencing Turkey now

Steiner 10(Tommy, June 25, senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy , “Exploiting the Mideast power vacuum”, http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-end/exploiting-the-mideast-power-vacuum-1.298271, accessed 7/2/10)jn

To appreciate the shifting tectonic plates in the politics of the Middle East, it might be useful to invoke the NATO Istanbul summit, which took place six years ago this month. The summit was intended to herald the recovery of the transatlantic partnership from the tensions caused by the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and to underscore NATO's primary global role, by having allies on both sides of the Atlantic commit to promoting a stable, more democratic and socioeconomically developed Middle East. Turkey was to be the paradigm of this endeavor. Standing beside Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president George W. Bush claimed: "Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world." Bush also took upon himself to actively advocate Turkey's admission to the EU, stating: "America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both." Now, a mere six years later, the dwindling influence of the transatlantic powers and their decision to relinquish their efforts to promote progress in the Middle East are molding a new regional balance of power. Mired by overwhelming economic crises and other domestic concerns, the United States and Europe have been scaling down their international roles. The new American course is far more significant than Europe's. American officials and opinion-shapers justify the apparent U.S. scaling down in terms of a "post-imperialist pragmatic realism." The desire to achieve more substantial results with far fewer resources, and to concentrate efforts on the domestic agenda for the sake of rebuilding U.S. power, has led engagement to become the epicenter of U.S. strategy. Yet, this strategy can't help but adversely affect the perception of American political and strategic prowess in the region. This not only entices America's adversaries to raise their stakes; it also drives U.S. allies to fend for themselves. Enter, Turkey. The power vacuum created by dwindling Western influence in the Middle East, far more than its realization that EU membership is not on the cards, is guiding Turkey in shaping a neo-Ottoman regional strategy. To be sure, this strategy has not emerged overnight; it was, rather, based on an incremental build-up of Turkey's own economic power and a warming of relations with two states it previously regarded as adversaries, Iran and Syria. Turkey and Iran now share extensive commercial ties. For instance, Iran accounts for 30 percent of energy-resource imports to Turkey, while the latter is becoming a major investor in the former's gas sector. Turkey has also sought to cultivate closer relations with Syria, marked by a high-profile joint military exercise in 2009. Furthermore, the future of Iraq appears to have solidified this triangular relationship into a strategic partnership: With the upcoming departure of U.S. troops, Iran's, Turkey's and Syria's complementary interests and aspired-to spheres of influence in Iraq are encouraging the formation of a political crescent of allies, stretching across the northern periphery of the Middle East, with Iraq's future to be determined. Emboldened, the two more powerful partners seek to jointly enhance their projection of power across the Middle East - hence their respective involvement in allegedly supporting the Palestinian cause. However, the Iranian and Turkish pro-Palestinian campaigns are at odds with the Palestinian Authority, and are, rather, aimed at supporting Hamas, an Iranian proxy backed by Syria. As the U.S. is viewed in the neighborhood as incapable of containing the expanding power of the northern crescent, the two main Arab regional powers, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are forming a southern crescent to protect their vital interests - from Iraq, through the Arabian Peninsula to Gaza - and to contain a potentially nuclear-backed northern alliance.

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Iran Influence

Presence expands Iranian influence

Zambelliz 6/19 (Chris, an author and researcher with [Helios Global, Inc](http://www.heliosglobal.com/), specializes in Middle East politics, 6/19/10, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LF19Ak03.html) JPG

Iran's push into the Americas would have never have materialized without the active encouragement of eager partners in the region. Yet how did the Islamic Republic manage to win so much goodwill from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone? Iran's diplomatic achievements cannot be understood without taking into account the tectonic shift to the left that saw an eclectic mix of leftist populists of various stripes take over the reins of power throughout the hemisphere beginning in the late 1990s. United in their skepticism toward US foreign policy and eagerness to [charter](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF19Ak03.html) independent paths for their countries away from the neo-liberal economic orthodoxies preached by Washington, the rise of a new revolutionary politics determined to defy the US-led status quo in the region has provided Iran with a receptive audience for its overtures and an ample supply of friends.

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Expansionism

Presence is THE impetus for Iranian expanionism

MEPC 3 (Middle East Asian Policy, 3/7/3, MEPC Policy Breif # 10, http://www.mepc.org/forums\_briefs/3-7-03.asp) JPG

Were the United States to continue efforts to reduce Iran's threat to Iraq and other Gulf states through traditional counter/nonproliferation efforts, the question would arise as to whether an increased US military and economic presence in the region would dissuade Iran from pursuing WMD, or conversely, whether it would drive Iran to accelerate its alleged weapons program. At present, Iran perceives a threat in the growing US military presence at its borders. US forces are currently based in Afghanistan, Bahrain Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen and elsewhere in Central Asia.5 Iran is also sensing increasing isolation. According to many experts, Iran is experiencing a pivotal political year. It is difficult to predict the outcome of the many on-going internal political battles. However, changes in Iran's domestic political situation may have only a minimal impact on its conduct of foreign and security policy given the internal Iranian consensus on the threats to the country's security and on its response options (such as the alleged development of WMD). Iran's role in any future regional security framework is critical. Iran and North Korea could eventually gravitate towards each other, especially given their present status as pariahs in the view of US foreign policy.6 Proliferation on the part of either or both countries has the potential to be seriously destabilizing. This said, the nature of Iran's geo-strategic environment is helpful in understanding its alleged desire to pursue a policy of WMD development. In particular, the existence of unresolved issues between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, alongside a possible long-term US military occupation in Iraq provide arguments for those in Iran who advocate accelerated plans to develop a nuclear weapons option. Such arguments are reinforced by fear that the United States has designs to force regime change in Tehran. Therefore, priority should be placed on engaging in dialogue with Iran. Countries in the Gulf should involve Iran in multilateral frameworks, especially those that promote specific confidence-building measures. International agencies could engage Iran by encouraging increased transparency regarding any undeclared nuclear facilities, or by accepting Iran's offer of inspections "anytime, anywhere."7 As a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran could be encouraged to allow greater monitoring of its dual-use chemical facilities and programs. In order to alleviate fears of possible US/Iraqi border incursions, international monitors could be placed on the Iraq-Iran border. Involving Iran in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly with UN humanitarian relief agencies that work with Afghan refugees is an example of a cooperative initiative that could help mitigate Iran's sense of isolation. At the bilateral level, the United States should be mindful of the threats Iran perceives to its security, especially following the war with Iraq and in view of the likely long-term US presence in the region. In addition to reassessing its current sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) - given the measure's questionable effectiveness - US strategy should focus on making the bilateral relationship more predictable through the creation of consistent expectations of each side's role in regional security. The United States could make it clear that its intentions are not to impose WMD disarmament by force, but rather to encourage countries to abide by the WMD-related agreements to which they are parties, which should simultaneously make regional and bilateral relationships more predictable. More predictable relationships are desirable as they allow for improved political relations, which ultimately lead to greater security for both sides. Predictability in the US-Iranian bilateral relationship can be attained in a number of ways. First, the United States could calm Iran's fears through declaratory policies, i.e. by stating that Iraq will not become a staging ground for incursions into Iran. It could also give Iran the negative security assurance that there will be no US attacks on a country that neither possesses nor seeks to possess WMD. Second, the United States could seek to establish functional security relationships, for example increasing contacts between the US and Iranian armed forces. Although normalization is not likely to occur in the near future, functional contacts can diminish the prospects for armed conflict. Any future framework for regional security must address Iran's growing concern with the security threats it senses around its borders. Otherwise, it is doubtful that Iran will become committed to meaningful regional cooperation on nonproliferation or other vital issues.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense – Iran is Strong

Irans military capabilities are lie – Iran wont go on the offensive

Darling 10 (Daniel, int’l military markets analyst @ Forecast International, Faster Times, 4/28

http://thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/04/28/iranian-smoke-and-mirrors/) JPG

But Iran’s impressive manpower strength belies underlying military weaknesses, including outdated and atrophying equipment, substandard technologies and a lack of both airborne early-warning and air- and naval-power-projection capabilities. While Iran has plenty of combat aircraft, many are aging American platforms (F-4 Phantoms, F-5Es and F-14s) dating back to the pre-Revolution era of the Shah. Against this array of jet fighters the Gulf nations hold a numerical advantage of nearly two-to-one - plus they have the added benefit of flying advanced platforms such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, F-18 Hornet and F-16E/F Block 60. The Gulf Arab states also spend roughly $60 billion on defense versus around $9 billion for Iran, with Saudi Arabia alone allocating $41 billion for military/security purposes in 2009. Though militarily capable enough to match its Arab neighbors, an Iranian first-strike against these countries is at best a remote possibility, particularly with U.S. forces stationed in the region. There are also economic concerns that render direct aggression unlikely, including the [$12 billion](http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8702110574) in trade conducted between the UAE and Iran. And despite its provocative statements about blocking the Strait of Hormuz, such an action - if Iran could indeed [pull it off](http://defensetech.org/2010/04/22/iran-begins-military-exercises-in-the-gulf/#more-6698) - would itself damage the Iranian economy by choking off the channel through which most of its own oil exports pass. Instead Iranian conventional military strength is publicly amplified for intimidation purposes through martial displays and military exercises, while serpentine measures are used to expand Iran’s regional influence. This bifurcated strategy has ably served Iran, allowing it to extend its reach beyond its immediate borders while intimidating its Gulf neighbors. Its ballistic missile capabilities notwithstanding, in truth the Iranian military is better suited to play defense than to launch an offensive against its neighbors. On its own turf the IRGC presents a formidable foe whose use of asymmetrical warfare would prove damaging to any invader. But outside its own boundaries Iran seems content to stick to its game plan, which is to bleed its adversaries through use of proxies and to promote itself as the implacable foe of Western interference in the Muslim world.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iran Expansionism

Iran wont expand – US deterrence, weak economy, and national interests

Newby 10 (Vanessa, PhD candidate @ Griffith Asi Inst., published @ Lowy Inst. For Intl Policy,

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/19/Reader-riposte-Iran-as-regional-power.aspx) JPG

Raoul Heinrichs [makes a good point](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/12/Between-Iraq-and-a-hard-place.aspx) about the potential for Iran to extend its power in the region after a US troop withdrawal. But at this stage it should only be seen as potential and nothing more.

He should be clearer about exactly what influence he thinks Iran plans to project into Iraq. He mentions military incursions, but it's hardly likely that Iran is going to risk reinvigorating military confrontations with Iraqi forces, unless the Supreme Leader has a breakdown and decides it's the only way to recover his political legitimacy. It's no secret that maintaining the security of oil supplies in the Gulf is a key US priority, so it's unlikely Iran is under the impression that US troops are going very far away. If we are talking about the 'invisible threads' of influence that Iran can weave in Iraq through its Shi'ite connections, recent works by [Rodger Shanahan](http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=961) and [Laurence Louer](http://www.amazon.com/Transnational-Shia-Politics-Religious-Political/dp/0231700407/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1268953350&sr=1-1) have demonstrated that national concerns predominate over religious networks in most cases. In terms of political influence, Shi'ite Iraqi political parties might maintain good relations with Iran, but getting too close is not a domestically popular move. As for the nuclear threat, [Stephen Walt's comments](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/05/how_not_to_contain_iran) in Foreign Policy succinctly sum up Iran's potential for regional hegemony: Iran's population and economic potential raise the possibility that it might one day be the dominant power in the Gulf, but it is nowhere near that capacity now. Getting a nuclear weapon won't change that fact, because nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrence and confer little positive leverage over others. Finally, in order to influence others, the hard power of a good economy comes in handy, and as Iran's economy is in a pretty poor state right now, it's unlikely that Iran will have a lot of economic leverage over Iraq in the future.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iranian Proliferation

Iran wont spread nukes

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

There has also been a good deal of international media reports related to the fear that Iran might provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. Ironically, the very use by Iran of surrogate terrorist organizations, rather than more overt attacks, is evidence that Tehran is sensitive to the calculations associated with the strategy of deterrence. It is also an affirmation that the Iranian leadership is attempting to minimize the risks to its foreign policy objectives. Such acts argue strongly against any possibility that Iran might provide terrorist organizations with nuclear weapons. Any move of this nature carries with it a great amount of risk; Iranians would lose control over the employment of the weapons while still having to worry that they might be blamed and targeted for response. (10)

Aff Impacts- Generic- Offense- Econ Collapse/ WOT/ Destabilize

US engagement of Iran leads to economic collapse, failure in the war on terror, and destabilize the region

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

Any attempt to disarm Iran through the use of military options would in all likelihood damage America's interests in the region. While a military option might inflict significant damage on Iran's infrastructure by damaging or destroying its nuclear weapons program, disrupting its regional ambitions, and possibly serving as a deterrent to future proliferators, the likely costs would far outweigh the benefits. First, any military action against Iran would send seismic shocks through global energy markets at a time when the price of oil is already at record highs. Since Iran relies heavily on the income derived from oil exports, it is unlikely that it would withhold petroleum from global markets. Iran may, however, threaten to disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz or sponsor attacks on key oil infrastructure on the territory of America's Gulf allies. Such actions could hurt the US economy and potentially bolster Iranian revenue by raising the price of oil. While it is true that the world market would eventually adjust to such actions, as James Fallows has noted, that is a bit like saying eventually the US stock market adjusted to the Great Depression. (2) Any direct military action against Iran could also have a significant impact on America's war on terrorism. Such action would only serve to confirm many of Osama bin Laden's statements that the United States is at war with the world of Islam. This charge would be difficult to counter, given the fact that the United States has looked the other way for years with regard to Israel's nuclear program, accepted India as a legitimate nuclear-state, and is negotiating with North Korea regarding its nuclear ambitions. Any military action against Iran would also undermine America's nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to possible Iranian retaliation in both countries. While Iranian efforts toward stabilizing these two states have been sporadic at best, and purposively obstructive at worst, there is little reason to doubt that Iran could make achieving US objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan far more difficult. Although mostly bluster, there is some truth to former Iranian President Ali Rafsanjani's argument that as long as American troops maintain a formidable presence on Iran's borders, "it is the United States that is besieged by Iran." (3) The same holds true regarding Iran's ties to Hezbollah and its presence in Lebanon. By targeting Iran's nuclear program the United States would unwisely encourage Iranian escalation in a number of these arenas.

\*\*Turkey\*\*

Aff- Turkey- US Relations Brink/Iran Relations Up

U.S. Turkey relations are on the brink—Turkey is succumbing to Iranian influence

Zacharia 10(Janine, Staff Writer at the Washington Post, April 8, “Turkey works to build economic ties, influence in Middle East”, *The Washington Post,* A Section, Page A-11, Lexis)jn

The thriving trade is a sign of Turkey's rising influence with Syria, part of its effort to reach out to neighboring countries to build economic ties it hopes will also stabilize political relationships and expand its influence in the region. Those efforts, which include business ventures with Iran, illustrate to some extent how futile U.S. efforts to isolate those countries with sanctions have become. They've also raised concerns in Washington and in Israel about whether this key Muslim member of NATO is undergoing a fundamental realignment. Turkey's efforts, however, seem as much about economic expansion as they do about foreign policy, with an aggressive strategy of seeking new markets for Turkish businessmen, many of them backers of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. "We want to have an economic interdependency between Turkey and neighbors and between different countries in these regions. If you have an economic interdependency, this is the best way to prevent any crisis," said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The push has included an effort to broker a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks, easing tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia -- the main power brokers in Lebanon -- to help avert a political crisis there, and trying to mediate an end to the West's dispute with Iran over its nuclear program. With wealth garnered in emerging markets and growing self-confidence as a new member of the G-20, Turkey is reaching out as much to former European enemies, such as Greece, as to its Muslim neighbors. In the past year and a half, Davutoglu and his predecessor made roughly twice as many trips to Europe as they did to the Middle East. A Turk serves as president of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. To some analysts, Erdogan doesn't seem as much of an ideologue as a pragmatic capitalist trying to make money and create markets. When he visited Tehran in October, he described the Iranian nuclear program as "peaceful,'' causing U.S. officials to bristle. Less noticed was Erdogan's push for a free-trade agreement. Accompanying the Turkish leader on the trip was Rizanur Meral, chief executive of Sanko Holding's Automotive Group and president of TUSKON, a Turkish business association representing 50,000 small and medium-size Turkish companies. Business leaders are playing an important role in Turkey's foreign policy, serving as unofficial ambassadors and advisers. Syrian businessmen in Gaziantep pushed for the relaxation of the visa requirements. When President Abdullah Gul visited Cameroon last month to sign a free-trade accord and open a new embassy, he was accompanied by three cabinet ministers, four members of parliament -- and 147 businessmen. Erdogan took similar-size delegations to India, Iran and Libya. "The business consideration is very important for this government," said Ismail Hakki Kisacik, general coordinator of Turkey's Taha Group, which controls the country's largest clothing chain and joined government officials on the recent Africa trip. "If you're developing your business with countries, it means your relations improve.'' The United States may be an exception. Washington's relations with Turkey took on a sour tone in February when the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution calling Turkey's killing of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 "genocide." Turkey recalled its ambassador, Namik Tan. The Obama administration has insisted that it does not support the panel's move. Over the past year, U.S. officials have shown muted tolerance toward Turkey's outreach to Syria and outright disapproval of Turkey's rhetoric on Iran. The United States has openly chastised Turkey -- which is heavily dependent on Iranian-supplied energy sources -- for undercutting the U.S. push to isolate Iran internationally over its nuclear program. "It seems, to me at least, that Turkey is contemplating a fundamental realignment,'' said Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.), a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Phil Gordon, the assistant secretary of state for Europe, said recently that the United States doesn't necessarily believe that Turkey is turning away from its Western allies. He said Turkey's move to improve relations with its neighbors was understandable, but warned that that effort "should not be pursued uncritically or at any price," especially at the expense of its relationship with Israel. Relations between Israel and Turkey were good until Israel launched a military offensive in the Gaza Strip in December 2008. Erdogan's popularity soared after he lectured Israeli President Shimon Peres about the attacks in January last year. His criticism, which has continued, contributes "negatively to the way Israel is perceived in Turkey," said an Israeli diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between the two nations. "It's not clear which direction Erdogan is taking Turkey." But to Turkish officials, the direction is obvious. As their nation has grown economically, it is only natural for Turkey seek a bigger role in global affairs. Turkey, meanwhile, is also looking to export some of its cultural influence. In recent years, the country has had about 30 television shows broadcast across the Arab world.

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influencing now

U.S. Turkey relations are on the brink—Turkey is succumbing to Iranian influence

Zacharia 10(Janine, Staff Writer at the Washington Post, April 8, “Turkey works to build economic ties, influence in Middle East”, *The Washington Post,* A Section, Page A-11, Lexis)jn

The thriving trade is a sign of Turkey's rising influence with Syria, part of its effort to reach out to neighboring countries to build economic ties it hopes will also stabilize political relationships and expand its influence in the region. Those efforts, which include business ventures with Iran, illustrate to some extent how futile U.S. efforts to isolate those countries with sanctions have become. They've also raised concerns in Washington and in Israel about whether this key Muslim member of NATO is undergoing a fundamental realignment. Turkey's efforts, however, seem as much about economic expansion as they do about foreign policy, with an aggressive strategy of seeking new markets for Turkish businessmen, many of them backers of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. "We want to have an economic interdependency between Turkey and neighbors and between different countries in these regions. If you have an economic interdependency, this is the best way to prevent any crisis," said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The push has included an effort to broker a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks, easing tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia -- the main power brokers in Lebanon -- to help avert a political crisis there, and trying to mediate an end to the West's dispute with Iran over its nuclear program. With wealth garnered in emerging markets and growing self-confidence as a new member of the G-20, Turkey is reaching out as much to former European enemies, such as Greece, as to its Muslim neighbors. In the past year and a half, Davutoglu and his predecessor made roughly twice as many trips to Europe as they did to the Middle East. A Turk serves as president of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. To some analysts, Erdogan doesn't seem as much of an ideologue as a pragmatic capitalist trying to make money and create markets. When he visited Tehran in October, he described the Iranian nuclear program as "peaceful,'' causing U.S. officials to bristle. Less noticed was Erdogan's push for a free-trade agreement. Accompanying the Turkish leader on the trip was Rizanur Meral, chief executive of Sanko Holding's Automotive Group and president of TUSKON, a Turkish business association representing 50,000 small and medium-size Turkish companies. Business leaders are playing an important role in Turkey's foreign policy, serving as unofficial ambassadors and advisers. Syrian businessmen in Gaziantep pushed for the relaxation of the visa requirements. When President Abdullah Gul visited Cameroon last month to sign a free-trade accord and open a new embassy, he was accompanied by three cabinet ministers, four members of parliament -- and 147 businessmen. Erdogan took similar-size delegations to India, Iran and Libya. "The business consideration is very important for this government," said Ismail Hakki Kisacik, general coordinator of Turkey's Taha Group, which controls the country's largest clothing chain and joined government officials on the recent Africa trip. "If you're developing your business with countries, it means your relations improve.'' The United States may be an exception. Washington's relations with Turkey took on a sour tone in February when the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution calling Turkey's killing of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 "genocide." Turkey recalled its ambassador, Namik Tan. The Obama administration has insisted that it does not support the panel's move. Over the past year, U.S. officials have shown muted tolerance toward Turkey's outreach to Syria and outright disapproval of Turkey's rhetoric on Iran. The United States has openly chastised Turkey -- which is heavily dependent on Iranian-supplied energy sources -- for undercutting the U.S. push to isolate Iran internationally over its nuclear program. "It seems, to me at least, that Turkey is contemplating a fundamental realignment,'' said Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.), a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Phil Gordon, the assistant secretary of state for Europe, said recently that the United States doesn't necessarily believe that Turkey is turning away from its Western allies. He said Turkey's move to improve relations with its neighbors was understandable, but warned that that effort "should not be pursued uncritically or at any price," especially at the expense of its relationship with Israel. Relations between Israel and Turkey were good until Israel launched a military offensive in the Gaza Strip in December 2008. Erdogan's popularity soared after he lectured Israeli President Shimon Peres about the attacks in January last year. His criticism, which has continued, contributes "negatively to the way Israel is perceived in Turkey," said an Israeli diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between the two nations. "It's not clear which direction Erdogan is taking Turkey." But to Turkish officials, the direction is obvious. As their nation has grown economically, it is only natural for Turkey seek a bigger role in global affairs. Turkey, meanwhile, is also looking to export some of its cultural influence. In recent years, the country has had about 30 television shows broadcast across the Arab world.

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influence Up- Turkey

Iran influencing Turkey now

Steiner 10(Tommy, June 25, senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy , “Exploiting the Mideast power vacuum”, http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-end/exploiting-the-mideast-power-vacuum-1.298271, accessed 7/2/10)jn

To appreciate the shifting tectonic plates in the politics of the Middle East, it might be useful to invoke the NATO Istanbul summit, which took place six years ago this month. The summit was intended to herald the recovery of the transatlantic partnership from the tensions caused by the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and to underscore NATO's primary global role, by having allies on both sides of the Atlantic commit to promoting a stable, more democratic and socioeconomically developed Middle East. Turkey was to be the paradigm of this endeavor. Standing beside Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president George W. Bush claimed: "Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world." Bush also took upon himself to actively advocate Turkey's admission to the EU, stating: "America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both." Now, a mere six years later, the dwindling influence of the transatlantic powers and their decision to relinquish their efforts to promote progress in the Middle East are molding a new regional balance of power. Mired by overwhelming economic crises and other domestic concerns, the United States and Europe have been scaling down their international roles. The new American course is far more significant than Europe's. American officials and opinion-shapers justify the apparent U.S. scaling down in terms of a "post-imperialist pragmatic realism." The desire to achieve more substantial results with far fewer resources, and to concentrate efforts on the domestic agenda for the sake of rebuilding U.S. power, has led engagement to become the epicenter of U.S. strategy. Yet, this strategy can't help but adversely affect the perception of American political and strategic prowess in the region. This not only entices America's adversaries to raise their stakes; it also drives U.S. allies to fend for themselves. Enter, Turkey. The power vacuum created by dwindling Western influence in the Middle East, far more than its realization that EU membership is not on the cards, is guiding Turkey in shaping a neo-Ottoman regional strategy. To be sure, this strategy has not emerged overnight; it was, rather, based on an incremental build-up of Turkey's own economic power and a warming of relations with two states it previously regarded as adversaries, Iran and Syria. Turkey and Iran now share extensive commercial ties. For instance, Iran accounts for 30 percent of energy-resource imports to Turkey, while the latter is becoming a major investor in the former's gas sector. Turkey has also sought to cultivate closer relations with Syria, marked by a high-profile joint military exercise in 2009. Furthermore, the future of Iraq appears to have solidified this triangular relationship into a strategic partnership: With the upcoming departure of U.S. troops, Iran's, Turkey's and Syria's complementary interests and aspired-to spheres of influence in Iraq are encouraging the formation of a political crescent of allies, stretching across the northern periphery of the Middle East, with Iraq's future to be determined. Emboldened, the two more powerful partners seek to jointly enhance their projection of power across the Middle East - hence their respective involvement in allegedly supporting the Palestinian cause. However, the Iranian and Turkish pro-Palestinian campaigns are at odds with the Palestinian Authority, and are, rather, aimed at supporting Hamas, an Iranian proxy backed by Syria. As the U.S. is viewed in the neighborhood as incapable of containing the expanding power of the northern crescent, the two main Arab regional powers, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are forming a southern crescent to protect their vital interests - from Iraq, through the Arabian Peninsula to Gaza - and to contain a potentially nuclear-backed northern alliance.

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Relations Up

Iran-Turkey relations building—economic ties  
Pupkin 10 (David, correspondent for Bloomberg, “Iran-Turkey Economic Relations: What Their Rapid Growth Means for Iran’s Nuclear Program”, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iran-turkey-economic-relations-what-their-rapid-growth-means-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program, accssed 7/2/10)jn

According to Turkish and Iranian sources, since the beginning of 2009, cross-border trade has continued its upward trend. According to Iranian media reports, non-energy trade between the two nations climbed to $2.7 billion in 2009. Iran exports industrial products – such as cathodes, polymers, propylene – and consumer goods to Turkey while Turkey exports textiles, machinery, steel, and chemicals to Iran.[13] This trade represents for Iran an 11 percent increase over the same period from the year before in non-energy exports to Turkey, making Turkey the sixth largest consumer of Iran’s non-oil goods.[14] Beyond non-energy trade, there have been many other signs of increased economic cooperation since January of 2010. In February of 2010, the Central Bank of Iran approved the establishment and operation of a Turkish-owned bank in Bandar Abbas.[15] In that same month, Iran signed a customs memorandum of understanding with Turkey that opened up the Bazergan, Khoy, Saro, and Maku border points for trade. This agreement has also mandated the revival of the joint border markets in Kuzrosh and Salmas. [16] Several days later, a second round of talks produced agreements about the creation of a joint industrial town on the border of the two nations, a project that appears to be moving forward.[17] Finally, Turkey was one of just twelve nations with which Iran signed preferential and free trade agreements, highlighting the Islamic Republic’s desire to further improve trade relations.[18]

Turkey has positive relation with Iran

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf page 21 accessed 7/2) CM

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey has Islamist roots and a foreign policy doctrine of seeking “zero problems” with neighbors and of nurturing beneficial relations with all, including Iran. Powered by a robust economy, the AKP government has continued the realistic pragmatism or pronounced self-interest of its predecessors toward Iran. Since AKP came to power in 2002, Turkish-Iranian relations have expanded markedly. Officials have exchanged numerous visits, culminating in Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008. The AKP government hosted him in Istanbul, thereby working around Ahmadinejad’s antipathy to Turkish secularism by enabling him to avoid a usually obligatory visit in the capital of Ankara to the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Turkish President Abdullah Gul reciprocated by visiting Iran for a regional summit in March 2009, when he met both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i and President Ahmadinejad. Turkey’s pragmatism or realpolitik was evident in official reactions to Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election as President Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were among the first international leaders to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his re-election. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu later declared controversies over the outcome to be an internal Iranian affair. AKP’s domestic critics charged that these “reflexive and premature” actions may have undermined Turkey’s stature and credibility as an interest in stability embodied in the status quo appeared to trump values.50 Prior to visiting Iran in October 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan told the British newspaper, *The Guardian*, “There is not doubt he (Ahmadinejad) is our friend…. As a friend, so far we have good relations and have no difficulty at all.”51

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Relations Resilient

Turkey will align will Iran – Kurds and regional interests

Wehrey et al 10 ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

Although recent U.S. support for Turkish actions against the PKK in northern Iraq is certainly welcome in Ankara, the Kurdish challenge is likely to continue to be a source of friction in U.S.–Turkish relations in years to come. The Kurdish issue also aligns Turkish inter- ests with those of key American adversaries, particularly Iran. As dis- cussed earlier, Turkey shares fundamental security and extensive eco- nomic interests with Iran (as well as Syria) that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring Turkey into a firmly pro-Western camp.84 As Turkey asserts greater interest and activism in the Middle East arena, U.S. policymakers will need to contend with what some analysts view as a more independent- aminded and nationalist Turkish orientation (see Larrabee, 2008).

Aff Impacts- Turkey- Offense- Turkey Econ

Iranian influence is key to the Turkish economy

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf page 23 accessed 7/2) CM

Turkish-Iranian relations have a very strong economic component. About 1.5 million Iranian tourists visit Turkey annually, visa-free. Trade is growing and reached $10 billion annually in 2008, with Iranian exports of oil, oil products, and gas to Turkey accounting for $7.2 million of the total.56 Officials of both governments have said that they hope to increase trade to $30 billion a year in the next few years.57 A pipeline commissioned in 2001 carries natural gas from Tabriz to Ankara. In 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the state-run Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to be granted the right to develop natural gas fields in South Pars, to extract up to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) of additional gas, and to transport it via a new 1,850 kilometer pipeline to Turkey. Turkey is to invest an estimated $3.5 billion and receive 50% of the gas produced. Both governments hope that the new pipeline will eventually link with the planned 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline. Scheduled to be completed in 2014, Nabucco is intended to carry natural gas from the Caspian/Central Asian region via Georgia and Turkey to Austria, bypassing Russia. Iranian gas has the potential to make Nabucco more viable especially if Russia dissuades the Central Asian states from using it and China competes for their resources as well. Turkey and Iran have formed a joint company to transfer the gas to Europe. However, the European partners in Nabucco (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, and Austria) have declared, “No Iranian gas will be accepted unless the nuclear problem is solved” and U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Ambassador Richard Morningstar has stated, “At present, we do not support Iran’s participation in the project.”58 Turkey opposes all energy-related sanctions on Iran mainly because of its energy needs. In addition, in 2007, Turkey signed an MOU to build three natural gas-fired power plants in Iran and to import 3 to 6 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually. The two neighbors also have plans for an ambitious new road and rail transportation network to link the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon and the Iranian Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas, and to establish a free industrial zone on their border. In private, Turkish officials have voiced some security concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran and about the impact that such a development would have on the regional balance of power. They note that Turkey is Iran’s closest neighbor and easily within range of its missiles -- even though Iran has not threatened Turkey. These concerns may have prompted Turkey’s possible purchase of U.S. Patriot air defense missiles.59 As noted above, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul have criticized the West’s policy on the issue and charged it with “double standards,” suggesting that Iran is being judged more harshly than presumed nuclear power Israel. In November 2008, Erdogan told a Brookings Institution audience, “We do not find it correct to tell just one country to scrap nuclear weapons. We do not think this is an honest approach. Whoever has nuclear weapons should scrap them first then let us all be rid of them.”60 The two leaders have repeatedly put Turkey forward as a possible mediator between Iran and the United States and Turkey accepted an IAEA suggestion that it act as a repository for Iran’s uranium, but Iran rejected the