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Colonialism 1AC (1/11)

After 9/11, The US invaded Iraq and began its policy of spreading democracy at gunpoint. This strategy of occupation is part of a geopolitical goal of creating a neoconservative Pan-America behind the guise of lady liberty.

Kramer and Michalowski 05 (Ronal C. Kramer, professor university of western Michigan, and Raymond J. Michalowski, professor northern Arizona university. “War, Aggression and State Crime” April 05, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies)

On the evening of 11 September 2001 and in the days following, unipolarists in the Bush administration advocated attacking Iraq immediately, even though there was no evidence linking Iraq to the events of the day (Clarke 2004; Woodward 2004). After an internal struggle between the ‘pragmatic realists’ led by Secretary of State Powell and the unipolarists led by Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the decision was eventually made to launch a general ‘war on terrorism’, and to begin it by attacking Al Queda’s home-base in Afghanistan and removing that country’s Taliban government (Mann 2004). The unipolarists were only temporarily delayed in so far as they had achieved agreement that as soon as the Afghanistan war was under way, the United States would begin planning an invasion of Iraq (Clarke 2004; Fallows 2004). By November, barely one month after the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush and Rumsfeld ordered the Department of Defense to formulate a war plan for Iraq (Woodward 2004). Throughout 2002, as plans for the war on Iraq were being formulated, the Bush administration made a number of formal pronouncements that demonstrated that the goals of the unipolarists were now the official goals of the US government. In the 29 January State of the Union address, Bush honed the focus of the ‘war on terrorism’ by associating terrorism with specific rogue states, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea (the ‘axis of evil’), who were presented as legitimate targets for military action (Callinicos 2003). In a speech to the graduating cadets at West Point on 1 June, the President unveiled a doctrine of preventative war—a policy that many judged as ‘the most open statement yet made of imperial globalization’ (Falk 2004: 189), soon to be followed by the new National Security Strategy. This document not only claimed the right to wage preventative war as previously discussed, it also claimed that the United States would use its military power to spread ‘democracy’ and American-style laissez-faire capitalism around the world as the ‘single sustainable model for national success’ (Callinicos 2003: 29). As Roy (2004: 56) notes: ‘Democracy has become Empire’s euphemism for neo-liberal capitalism.’ In the campaign to build public support for the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration skilfully exploited the political opportunities provided by the fear and anger over the 9/11 attacks. By linking Saddam Hussein and Iraq to the wider war on terrorism, the government was able to establish the idea that security required the ability to attack any nation believed to be supporting terror, no mater how weak the evidence. This strategy obscured the more specific geopolitical and economic goals of creating a neoconservative Pax Americana behind the smokescreen of fighting terrorism. In Falk’s (2004: 195) words: ‘the Iraq debate was colored by the dogs that didn’t bark: oil, geopolitical goals in the region and beyond, and the security of Israel.’

Colonialism 1AC (2/11)

The US policy of occupation has ongoing material effects. Over 1.3 million Iraqi civilians have died. Washington’s current strategy is a deliberate attempt to collapse national unity and resistance.

Petras 09 (“The US War against Iraq: The Destruction of a Civilization” James Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to the landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, and is co-author of Globalization Unmasked (Zed Books). Petras’ most recent book is Zionism, Militarism and the Decline of US Power (Clarity Press, 2008 August 21st, 2009 [http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/the-us-war-against-iraq/](http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/the-us-war-against-iraq/" \t "_blank))

The sustained bloody purge of Iraq under US occupation resulted in the killing 1.3 million Iraqi civilians during the first 7 years after Bush invaded in March 2003. Up to mid-2009, the invasion and occupation of Iraq has officially cost the American treasury over $666 billion. This enormous expenditure attests to its centrality in the larger US imperial strategy for the entire Middle East/South and Central Asia region. Washington’s policy of politicizing and militarizing ethno-religious differences, arming and encouraging rival tribal, religious and ethnic leaders to engage in mutual bloodletting served to destroy national unity and resistance. The ‘divide and rule’ tactics and reliance on retrograde social and religious organizations is the commonest and best-known practice in pursuing the conquest and subjugation of a unified, advanced nationalist state. Breaking up the national state, destroying nationalist consciousness and encouraging primitive ethno-religious, feudal and regional loyalties required the systematic destruction of the principal purveyors of nationalist consciousness, historical memory and secular, scientific thought. Provoking ethno-religious hatreds destroyed intermarriages, mixed communities and institutions with their long-standing personal friendships and professional ties among diverse backgrounds. The physical elimination of academics, writers, teachers, intellectuals, scientists and professionals, especially physicians, engineers, lawyers, jurists and journalists was decisive in imposing ethno-religious rule under a colonial occupation. To establish long-term dominance and sustain ethno-religious client rulers, the entire pre-existing cultural edifice, which had sustained an independent secular nationalist state, was physically destroyed by the US and its Iraqi puppets. This included destroying the libraries, census bureaus, and repositories of all property and court records, health departments, laboratories, schools, cultural centers, medical facilities and above all the entire scientific-literary-humanistic social scientific class of professionals. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi professionals and family members were driven by terror into internal and external exile. All funding for national, secular, scientific and educational institutions were cut off. Death squads engaged in the systematic murder of thousands of academics and professionals suspected of the least dissent, the least nationalist sentiment; anyone with the least capacity to re-construct the republic was marked.

Colonialism 1AC (3/11)

We currently use colonial sources in our attempt to forcibly expand democracy and American values in Iraq. The result has been a quarantine society and mass death

Said 03 (Edward Said, professor at Columbia, 4/22/03, “The Appalling consequences are now clear” http://www.counterpunch.org/said04222003.html

We avoid our solemn duty to debate the one topic on the minds of all Americans, even while scores of our sons and daughters faithfully do their duty in Iraq." Who is going to ask questions now that that Middle Western farm boy General Tommy Franks sits triumphantly with his staff around one of Saddam's tables in a Baghdad palace? I am convinced that in nearly every way, this was a rigged, and neither a necessary nor a popular war. The deeply reactionary Washington "research" institutions that spawned Wolfowitz, Perle, Abrams, Feith and the rest provide an unhealthy intellectual and moral atmosphere. Policy papers circulate without real peer review, adopted by a government requiring what seems to be rational (even moral) justification for a dubious, basically illicit policy of global domination. Hence, the doctrine of military pre-emption, which was never voted on either by the people of this country or their half-asleep representatives. How can citizens stand up against the blandishments offered the government by companies like Halliburton, Boeing, and Lockheed? And as for planning and charting a strategic course for what in effect is by far the most lavishly endowed military establishment in history, one that is fully capable of dragging us into unending conflicts, that task is left to the various ideologically based pressure groups such as the fundamentalist Christian leaders like Franklin Graham who have been unleashed with their Bibles on destitute Iraqis, the wealthy private foundations, and such lobbies as AIPAC, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, along with*its* associated think tanks and research centers. What seems so monumentally criminal is that good, useful words like "democracy" and "freedom" have been hijacked, pressed into service as a mask for pillage, muscling in on territory, and the settling of scores. The American program for the Arab world is the same as Israel's. Along with Syria, Iraq theoretically represents the only serious long term military threat to Israel, and therefore it had to be put out of commission for decades. What does it mean to liberate and democratize a country when no one asked you to do it, and when in the process you occupy it militarily and, at the same time, fail miserably to preserve public law and order? The mix of resentment and relief at Saddam's cowardly disappearance that most Iraqis feel has brought with it little understanding or compassion either from the US or from the other Arab states, who have stood by idly quarreling over minor points of procedure while Baghdad burned. What a travesty of strategic planning when you assume that "natives" will welcome your presence after you've bombed and quarantined them for thirteen years. The truly preposterous mindset about American beneficence, and with it that patronizing Puritanism about what is right and wrong, has infiltrated the minutest levels of the media. In a story about a 70 year old Baghdad widow who ran a cultural center from her house wrecked in the US raids  and is now beside herself with rage,*NY Times*reporter Dexter Filkins implicitly chastises her for having had "a comfortable life under Saddam Hussein," and then piously disapproves of her tirade against the Americans, "and this from a graduate of London University."

Colonialism 1AC (4/11)

The Occupation of Iraq is an attempt at enforcing freedom. This colonial project is the major cause of global warfare. The US occupation ensures a endless cycle of violence in Iraq.

\*\*Anthony Burke, Prof. of Politcs & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘5 [Social Identities 11.4, “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War,” p. 322-3]

Hannah Arendt recognized this instrumental, utilitarian form of action in the modern dream of historical progress, particularly in the modern transformation of the ‘unknown and unknowable ‘‘higher aims’’’ of history (which Kant, after Vico, had merely read backward into events) into future-directed, purposive action: ‘planned and willed intentions’. The result was that ‘meaning and meaningfulness were transformed into ends’: this is what happened when Marx took the Hegelian meaning of all history\*/the progressive unfolding and actualisation of the idea of freedom\*/to be an end of human action, and when he furthermore, in accordance with tradition, viewed this ultimate ‘end’ as the end-product of a manufacturing process . . . In this version of deriving politics from history, or rather, political conscience from historical consciousness\*/by no means restricted to Marx in particular, or even pragmatism in general\*/we can easily detect the age-old attempt to escape from the frustrations and fragility of human action by construing it in the image of making . . . he alone realized that if one takes history to be the object of a process of fabrication or making, there must be a moment when this object is completed, and that if one imagines that one can make history, one cannot escape the consequence that there will be an end to history. Whenever we hear of grandiose aims in politics, such as establishing a new society in which justice will be guaranteed forever, or fighting a war to end all wars or to make the whole world safe for democracy, we are moving in the realm of this kind of thinking. (Arendt, 1961, pp. 78\_/79). With hindsight, we can see that Marx was not the only thinker to understand or posit an end to history (Hegel and Koje`ve did, and Fukuyama after them) and the irony and tragedy is that this end should have been proclaimed in the defeat of socialism and the triumph of ‘liberal-democratic’ civilization based on US example and leadership (Fukuyama, 1992). This is the meaning of Fukuyama’s signature on the PNAC Statement of Principles , a document utterly infused with the ‘grandiose aims’ of an enframing technological reason masquerading as historical inevitability. Thus we can understand how George W. Bush could follow the invasion of Iraq with 332 A. Burke the announcement of a ‘forward strategy of freedom in the Middle-East’, a strategy apparently in the tradition of Wilson’s fourteen points and Roosevelt’s four freedoms that requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Bush, Remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003) This links with a further crucial feature of freedom in the American enlightenment: its Eurocentric and Orientalist nature. Freedom is something the East lacks , and it will be achieved not by the agency of its own people, or the upwelling of some genuinely universal human aspiration, but by the particular application of American pressure and force. The seeds of this view can be glimpsed in Aristotle’s distinction between Greece’s ‘love of freedom’ and Asia’s despotism, but it was given a distinctively racist and dialectical cast in Hegel’s system which declared that Africa was at the ‘mere threshold’ of history, and China at its ‘childhood’, while Europe was at its end (Hegel, 1990, pp. 104\_/05). Now America, history’s ‘future’ according to Hegel, is to bring the Middle-East into history, into the freedom that is ‘the direction of history’ and ‘the design of nature’. Yet the first act in America’s ‘forward strategy of freedom’ was to invade and subjugate Iraq, suggesting that if ‘peace’ is its object its means is war: the engine of History is violence, on a massive and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in ‘Toward a Pacific union’, a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a ‘post-historical’ world of affluent developed democracies where ‘the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance’, and a world still ‘stuck in history’ and ‘riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts’. The two worlds will maintain ‘parallel but separate existences’ and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because ‘the relationship between democracies and non-democracies will still be characterized by mutual distrust and fear’, writes Fukuyama, the ‘post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history . . . force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations’. For all the book’s Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalizes war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of ‘development’ and ‘freedom’. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the ‘traditional moralism of American foreign policy’ and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style league of truly free states . . . capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush Administration.10 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of ‘worldhistorical’ violence that stretches back to Columbus’ discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modern United States was created and then expanded\*/initially with the colonization of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. That this role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, ‘interventions’ in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive ‘strategic’ involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the US first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a fourteen-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least two-hundred thousand people) we are meant to accept as proof of America’s benign intentions, of America putting its ‘power at the service of principle’. They are merely History working itself out, the ‘design of nature’ writing its bliss on the world (quotes from Bush, Remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003). But this freedom offers us the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the awesome horror visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global anti-western terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. Osama bin Laden and his many supporters do not accept the American narrative of power in the service of principle; they see merely power in the service of power, and derive from it a lesson that it is both necessary and legitimate to respond with a commensurate violence. As Bin Laden said in his chilling 1998 interview with John Miller, who asked him if his ‘fatwa’ calling on all Muslims to kill Americans extended to all Americans: We are surprised this question is coming from Americans. Each action will solicit a similar reaction. We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from Muslims . . . America does not have a religion that prevents it from destroying all people. . . . The prophet said: ‘A woman entered hell because of a cat’. She did not feed it and blocked it from finding food on its own. She is going to hell for blocking a cat to death, but [what do you] say to those who agreed and gave reason for the hundreds of thousands of troops to blockade millions of Muslims in Iraq? (Miller, 1998b) Furthermore the rhetoric of freedom and the ‘way of life’, at both a philosophical and practical level, cannot but inflame the fundamentalist community that serves as a social and cultural basis for al-Qaeda and its associated organisations. It will do so because it is read as a confirmation of the critique\*/found in the philosophy of thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb\*/of the moral and ethical bankruptcy of western rationalism and its imperialist agenda to dominate and destroy Islam, to perpetuate a state of modern jahiliyya, the ‘conscious usurpation of God’s authority . . . [the] foundational transgression of human hubris’ (Euben, 2000). The narrative of freedom that Bush speaks (and the US armed forces enact) has already been written and interpreted in fundamentalist thought, with a starkly different meaning from that Bush seeks to convey, one further transformed by every American action in Iraq and throughout the Middle-East. The Bush Administration’s April 2004 endorsement\*/in pointed defiance of countless UN resolutions on the issue\*/of the Israeli government’s unilateral plan under the guise of ‘disengagement’ to impose a grossly unjust ‘final settlement’ on the Palestinians, one that will undermine any possibility of meaningful self-determination, is just such an example of arrogance and hubris that will deepen Islamic hatred of the West and rebound upon it in new acts of terror (MacAskill, 2004, p. 1). This US gesture, portrayed throughout the Arab world as a new ‘Balfour declaration’, is yet another example of the callous, ‘strategic’ use of instrumental reason that treats the Palestinian people as so much human cattle who can be contained and corralled, and whose destiny can be decided by a handful of men in Jerusalem and Washington (Howeidy, 2004; see also Katib, 2004; Alpher, 2004; Beilin, 2004). **The arguments of Bin Laden and Bush have one important thing in common: they betray the same deluded, claustrophobic commitment to the easy translation of means into ends, as if either of their policies could protect Muslims, ensure the security of Americans, or bring about the utterly irreconcilable ‘ends’ of history they seek** (‘Freedom’ fights the ‘Caliphate’, like Punch and Judy dolls squabbling on the arms of History). Nothing has been more detrimental to the livelihood and future of Muslims than Al-Qaeda’s campaign of terror, and nothing has been more detrimental to future global security than the invasion of Iraq, yet we are locked in a terrible hall of mirrors where each discourse makes the other meaningful, and each act precipitates the next (as the latter-day Isaac Newton says, ‘each action will solicit a similar reaction’) (Miller, 1998b). As we count the enormous toll of dead and wounded in Iraq, and ponder the abyss of violence, frustration and insecurity into which it has slipped since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the times more than ever call for the insight of a Hannah Arendt. Violence is not power, she warns us, and the very substance of violence is the means-end category, whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, is that the end is always in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it justifies and are needed to reach it. We face a choice: between a terror ‘that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate’ and a hopeful effort to eliminate the Social Identities ‘disastrous reduction of human affairs to the business of dominion’ so that they can ‘appear, or rather reappear, in their full diversity’ (Arendt, 2002, pp. 19\_/34).

Imperialism 1AC (5/11)

The Iraqi colonial project is part of the Manifest Destiny of the 21st Century. The non western other is targeted as an enemy of democracy and security.

Ray 05 (Sangeeta Ray 2005, Blackwell Publishing, “A Companion to Post Colonial Studies” p.575-6)

So to restate my opening sentiment. A short note as a postscript for the anthology that Henry and I put together in the late 1990s, now appearing in paperback, must be haunted by the cataclysmic event of 9/11. The significance of a date signifying an event is not unusual in the annals of history; however, the overshadowing by the date of the event in its repetitive recounting is perhaps less common. The one other date that seems to have a similar force, especially for those of us concerned with issues of empire, imperialism and postcolonialism is not a day or month but a year, 1492. If 1492 becomes the year demarcating the before and after of a world inevitably altered by the script of conquest, then 9/11 is the day that reintroduces forcefully the idea of a new form of Manifest Destiny as a legitimate ideal for US domination globally. A phrase coined in 1840 by politicians to justify continental expansion by the United States has revitalized a nation’s purpose again but this time extending its reach beyond the continent to the world at large. Once again America is extending the boundaries of freedom to the less fortunate, inculcating its idealism and belief in democratic institutions by any means necessary. The invasion of Iraq appears to be propelled by Manifest Destiny, certainly not weapons of mass destruction–the president himself has mocked his pursuit of these hard to find weapons on national television, wondering if they may not be like the emperor’s new clothes. It likewise motivates the successful, visually gratifying capture of Saddam Hussein and now the inevitable battle of might over right or vice versa depending on whose might and what counts as right. 9/11 is to remain remarkable in the US calendar as a date that must be nationally mourned; 9/11 is the date when the nation must gather for an unqualified reflection on the “us and them” divide; 9/11 is the date that reminds citizens of the necessity for homeland security, for the denial of civil liberties to those that refuse to become us. This latest imperial imaginary defining spaces and bodies while it carries within it traces of an earlier European colonial paradigm is different precisely because the separation of civil and non-civil spaces are being demarcated and maintained by the other despite the best efforts of a US government to maintain “world order.” In other words, if in an earlier colonial scheme “civil lines” were being drawn by the colonizer to restrict the movements of the colonized in a paradoxical attempt to enlarge the space of civility, today the writing on the wall no longer reads the West versus the rest but rather the non-West against the West (with America being more synonymous with the West than any other European country). The world has been replaced by the globe; we no longer talk about world movements so much as global movements and in this global mo(ve)ment/s the other is not invested in becoming like the West. Rather, an American imperium exercised globally is being countered by a global terrorism that is profoundly anti-national in its execution. To put it bluntly, if in an earlier colonial paradigm spaces could be imagined with the promise of a threshold, albeit a limited one as postcolonial theory has taught us, in this drama of an American imperialism there exists a profound despatialization that has little to do with the kind of global good articulated by Hardt and Negri and, paradoxically, everything to do with atavistic notions of identity and territory rero(u)oted in reterritorialized places.

Imperialism 1AC (6/11)

The importance of US troops for Iraqi Stability is not Self Evident but seeped in a Racist description of the world – This Ideological Approach Ensures genocide and unending war\*

Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, ‘7 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in *Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an **elastic construct**, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural **hegemony, and** global **domination** for **exploitation and absorption**. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into **war and annihilation and genocide** and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be **wise** to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and **reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations**. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the **annihilation of the excluded**. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but **is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection**. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, **genocide is the definitive** point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the **logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process**, that **it can conclude only in ultimate domination**. **War** **and genocide take place with** compliant efficiency to serve the **global racist ideology with dizzying** **frequency**. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

Colonialism 1AC (7/11)

Resisting This Colonialism is a Decision Rule: It’s Role in the Death and Destruction of the Vast Majority of the Planet Requires its Rejections

Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source ‘7, [*Development* 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission itself was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, **even 'the most ghastly** European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium's conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery'. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized – morally, of course, but also in terms of **what would enable** the most in **human l**ife and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that English (and other colonial languages elsewhere) became the language of instruction, explicitly creating a hierarchy between the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture – in the most expansive sense of the term – of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected 'taste, opinions, morals and intellect' – all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. **Although**, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonialism can always be interpreted as an **'enabling violation'**, it remains a violation: **the systematic eradication** of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), **remains** reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. **The enablement cannot be advanced,** therefore, **as a justification of the violation.** Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, some of the native population was taught a hegemonic – and foreign – language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear – whether we should not hear – from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost? The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences – even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state resources. The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels: on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized **within the colonized population itself**. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a 'metaphor for postcolonial political violence' (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives' genocide – akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is **sufficient to mark the** significance (and **persistence) of the colonial** antecedents to **contemporary political violence.** The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the **unintended consequences**. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about 'primordial' loyalties, the 'backwardness' of 'premodern' peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were 'native' Hindu and 'alien' Muslim (with particular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

Colonialism 1AC (8/11)

Plan: The United States Federal Government should withdrawal all of the United States Federal Government’s military and police presence from Iraq

Colonialism 1AC (9/11)

Ending the colonization of Iraq is key. Iraq is the starting point of a deadly spiral of US intervention.

Everest 04 (Larry Everest, Common Courage Press, 2004, “Oil, Power, and Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda”)

For over 60 years, U.S. actions in Iraq and the Persian Gulf have been guided by calculations of global empire, regional domination, and overall control of Persian Gulf oil. As a result, they have never brought liberation, but have instead inflicted enormous suffering and perpetuated oppression. There are deep national, social and class divisions running through the societies of the Middle East, but foreign domination—by the U.S. in particular—remains the main obstacle to a more just social order. Second, U.S. actions have brought neither peace nor stability, but spawned a deepening spiral of resistance, instability, intervention and war. There are connections here, and a trajectory to events which we will explore, from the 1953 coup that installed the Shah in Iran to the 1979 revolution that overthrew him, to the subsequent Iran-Iraq war, to the first U.S. Gulf War in 1991, and then the second in 2003. The new U.S. National Security Strategy and its offspring—the “war on terror”—are efforts to forcibly resolve these growing impediments. Third, this war represents a further, horrific escalation of that deadly spiral of U.S. intervention and it is only the beginning. Washington has dispatched its military to conquer and occupy a country in the heart of the Arab world, perhaps for years to come, and use it as a springboard for further maneuvers and aggressions in the region. Finally, the history of foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf demonstrates that grand ambitions of conquest and control are one thing, but realizing them can be quite another. Oppression breeds resistance, actions provoke reactions, and events often careen beyond the control of their initiators in unexpected ways.

Colonialism 1AC (10/11)

The Current view of international security is based on civilized/uncivilized binaries. We assume Iraq is a breeding ground for conflict. The affirmative resists colonialism by examining the historical contexts of US occupation.

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What was true of European economic and military power was also true of the constitution of European identities, which required an imaginary non-Western‘other’.109 The West is defined through a series of contrasts regarding rationality, progress, and development in which the non-West is generally found lacking. To take an example from the initial period of European expansion, Western thinkers used the notion of the ‘state of nature’ to distinguish between their civilisation and those they encountered in the Western Hemisphere after 1492. The ‘state of nature’ was itself a Eurocentric interpretation of these peoples which located civilization and law in Europe even as Europe set about destroying these peoples and their civilisations. This metaphor, a core notion in Western political thought, only became possible as a result of Europe’s imperial encounter with aboriginal peoples.110 At the same time, it enabled and legitimated European dispossession and appropriation of land, resources and populations. In this way, the ‘state of nature’ played its role in producing a world sharply divided between Western have-lots and non-Western have-nots. This idea has continuing significance in political theory and in discussions of contemporary security issues such as failed states and new wars, discussions which reproduce Eurocentric understandings of world politics.111 Contemporary violence in Africa is often explained in terms of a lack of those institutions and attributes associated with European modernity, such as sovereignty, rather than as a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the West. Part of the significance of the postcolonial rupture signaled in the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 is that it forces us to recover these processes of mutual constitution and their significance for how we make sense of security relations and world politics more generally. For many, the War on Terror is a clash between the West and the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda, bin Laden and his allies are conceived as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ with a passionate hatred of everything Western. The problem with this way of framing the conflict is that it ignores the long history of interconnection and mutual constitution out of which bin Laden’s ideas and organization were produced. Currents of Western, Arab and Islamic cultures and histories, modern technologies and communications, and the policies of various regimes and great powers combined to form crystallizations, amongst them bin Laden’s and Al-Qaeda’s particular way of being modern. Attempting to disaggregate these phenomena and squeeze them into boxes marked ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ will not aid understanding of the dynamics of the War on Terror. More importantly, policies derived from such binary understandings may create the very conditions that crystallize future bin Ladens and Al-Qaedas. Bin Laden’s ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the Al-Qaeda organization are in fact modern, hybrid creations of Islam’s encounter with the West.112 Two of the key figures behind contemporary Islamic thinking, Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad, who was bin Laden’s teacher at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, viewed the West as suffering from a ‘great spiritual famine’.113 Much of their thought is a reaction against Western modernity and an attempt to outline a new, Islamic modernity, for they did not want the same fate to befall their societies. The West was not only an initial impetus to their ideology, they also utilized a variety of quintessentially Western ideas. Qutb was influenced in particular by Marxism- Leninism, taking the concept of a revolutionary vanguard and the idea that the world could be remade through an act of will, both important intellectual bases of Al-Qaeda. His notion that Islam could serve as a universal ideology of emancipation in modern conditions is a distinctive combination of Islamic and Enlightenment thinking.114 The Al-Qaeda organization itself is even more obviously of the modern world, rather than simply a product of ‘Islam’. It is a contemporary, global and networked enterprise, with a flattened hierarchy and cellular structure. It is comfortable with computer technology and modern communications. Al-Qaeda also has direct debts to US foreign policy. Bin Laden’s central role and his organization developed out of the US supported resistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.115 It is through diverse forms of interaction between peoples and places around the world that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and Al-Qaeda **came into existence**; they were **mutually constituted out of hierarchical relations of interconnection**. Our point here is not to provide a full account of Al-Qaeda but rather to highlight in an initial way the kinds of research questions as well as the **larger research agenda opened up** for security studies by a focus on the mutual constitution of the strong and the weak, amid relations of domination and subordination. For security studies after Eurocentrism, the history and politics of warfare and struggle between what we now call the global North and the global South must become a major focus for inquiry. Especially in the age of the War on Terror, **with its avowedly colonial projects and rhetorics in Iraq**, Afghanistan and elsewhere, there needs to be greater attention **to the histories and processes** of imperial subjugation and the resistance it has so regularly generated. The imperial character of great powers – in all its dimensions – directs inquiry to the constitutive relationship between core and periphery, and in so doing to a reconceptualisation of what a great power is in security studies. This involves explicit recognition and analysis of the many ways in which political, economic and **military power** is **produced out of relations between the strong and the weak**, relations that are as necessary as they are contested. The insight of mutual constitution is no less applicable to the character and nature of the weak themselves, as for Al-Qaeda. They too are formed out of their relations with the powerful.

Colonialism 1AC (11/11)

The Aff begins a shift from Colonialism towards a peaceful and equitable societies. We should begin with the question of “Is it Just?” instead of “Is it Stable?”

Diana Brydon, University of Western Ontario, ‘6 [Postcolonial Test 2.1, “Is There a Politics of Postcoloniality?” <http://journals.sfu.ca/pocol/index.php/pct/article/viewArticle/508/175>]

This last question articulates the project that Ted Chamberlin begins in If This is Your Land, Where Are Your Stories? If we can start to become proficient within these forms of literacies, then what would change as a result? As Ivison asks: "Given the history of relations between Aboriginal peoples and the state, on what possible grounds could a liberal state ever become a postcolonial one?" (72). With these questions, we are back to where I began, with Edward Said's observations on the preconditions for political dialogue. Ivison suggests that the "[i]nvocation of reasonableness" as "a deeply contested terrain in colonial contexts" (72) will need to be rethought, as it is being rethought within postcolonial studies today. That thinking proceeds on many fronts. It will take a collective effort across disciplines and different communities of interest to shift these definitions. Its chief enemy right now may be the demand for instant solutions and easy answers. But we cannot discount the fear that such changes bring to many, either. If we are to replace modernism's command to "make it new" with the urging to "make it just," it will be hard to avoid defensive responses that confuse that demand with the politics of blame. Hardt and Negri were too hasty (in Empire) in dismissing postcolonial theory as a backward-looking study with no relevance to the challenges of globalization. **The civilizing mission remains alive and well** and must be distinguished from Balibar's attempt to reclaim the "civil" for a different kind of genuinely emancipatory project. The goal of creating **equitable and peaceful societies, beyond the dead hand of the colonial past, is worth embracing**. Politics is humanity's means for achieving such a goal, but politics itself requires an infrastructure and value system to function. At the very minimum, politics requires people **who can act collectively for the public good.** That is why Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak pays so much attention to the urgent need for developing forms of transnational literacy and unlearning those sanctioned forms of ignorance that still too often pass for common sense. That is why Len Findlay and James (Sakj) Youngblood Henderson issue their calls to indigenize. As students and teachers, we have a role to play in defining the focus of postcolonial analysis in response to changing conditions under globalization. To be effective, a politics of postcoloniality will need to keep listening to its critics, from all sides of the political spectrum, while working to create the conditions under which genuine dialogue might begin.

Inherency

Troops will remain long after withdrawal. There will be 58 permanent bases, the same model used by the British Empire to colonize Iraq.

Margolis 09 (Eric Margolis, Journalist, March 2 2009, Toronto Sun, WK)

Barack Obama won the votes of many Americans by promising to swiftly end the Iraq War and bring U.S. troops home. He denounced George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq as a "violation of international law." So will U.S. troops leave Iraq? Will those responsible for this trumped-up war face justice? No, on both counts. **President Obama says U.S. combat troops will leave Iraq by the end of 2011. However, the U.S. military occupation will not end**. What we are seeing is a public relations shell game. The U.S. has 142,000 soldiers and nearly 100,000 mercenaries occupying Iraq. Obama's plan calls for withdrawing the larger portion of the U.S. garrison but leaving 50,000-60,000 troops in Iraq. To get around his promise to withdraw all "combat" troops, the president and his advisers are rebranding the stay-behind garrison as "training troops, protection for American interests, and counterterrorism forces." At a time when the U.S. is bankrupt and faces a $1.75 trillion deficit, the Pentagon's gargantuan $664 billion budget (50% of total global military spending) will grow in 2009 and 2010 by another $200 billion to pay for the occupation of Iraq and Obama's expanded war in Afghanistan. Throw in another $40 billion to $50 billion for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Obama insists the U.S. will withdraw from Iraq. But his words are belied by the Pentagon, which continues to expand bases in Iraq, including Balad and Al-Asad, with 4,400-metre runways for heavy bombers and transports. They are key links in the U.S. Air Force's new air bridge that extends from Germany to Bulgaria and Romania, Iraq and the Gulf, then onward to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Besides Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone and U.S. embassy (the world's largest), the Pentagon reportedly wants to retain 58 permanent bases in Iraq (by comparison, there are 36 in South Korea), total control of its air space and immunity from Iraqi law for all U.S. troops. The U.S. also will retain major bases in neighbouring Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Diego Garcia. U.S. oil companies are moving in to exploit Iraq's vast energy reserves, the Mideast's second largest after Saudi Arabia. U.S. troop levels will remain high during Iraq's December elections to ensure "security," according to the Pentagon. In other words, ensuring the U.S.-selected regime "wins" the vote. Iraqi parties, notably Baath, opposing the U.S. occupation, are banned from running. Many Iraqis believe the U.S. will never leave their nation. In short, contrary to all Obama's high-blown rhetoric about pulling out of Iraq, Washington clearly intends it will remain a U.S. military, political and economic protectorate. Washington is following exactly the same control model the British Empire used to rule Iraq, and exploit its oil: Install a figurehead ruler, keep him in power using a "native" army (read today's Iraqis army and police). RAF units based in Iraq (read U.S. air bases) bomb any rebellious areas. Smaller British ground units based in non-urban areas are on call to put down attempted coups against the king. The U.S. plan for Iraq is identical. Obama made clear that officials responsible for the Iraq war, torture, kidnapping or assassination will not be prosecuted. The theft of over $50 billion in U.S. "reconstruction" funds sent to Iraq is being hushed up.

Inherency

Empirical evidence suggests there will be a PERMANENT military presence in Iraq.

Hassan 08 (Salah Hassan, “Never-Ending Occupations” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 8, Number 1, Spring 2008)

The long-term proposition that a U.S. victory in Iraq will in fact be characterized by some form of permanent military presence in Iraq is consistent with the history of U.S. occupations for which a line can now be drawn connecting the Philippines to Iraq, passing through Germany and Japan.2 It is this map of never-ending military occupations established over the last century that provides the fundamental contours of a modern U.S. imperialism that has been politically justified in terms of Kipling’s famous 1899 poem “Th e White Man’s Burden,” significantly subtitled “the United States and the Philippines.”3 From the time when Kipling wrote his now famous poem until its recent invocations by defenders of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, such as Max Boot in *Th e Savage Wars of Peace,* the United States has not ceased to take possession of parts of the globe. Kipling’s poem is a primer on imperial domination, outlining the ostensible self-sacrificing values that he associates with overseas conquests. In the first stanza, he writes: *Take up the White man’s burden— Send forth the best ye breed— Go bind your sons to exile To serve your captives’ need; To wait in heavy harness On fluttered folk and wild— Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half devil and half child.* Th e racism of the poem already suggested by the title is made explicit here. But particularly significant is the line “To serve your captives’ need,” which is echoed in a different formulation in each of the successive stanzas, reiterating the poem’s underlying principle that imperial occupation is for the good of the natives, an articulation of the all too familiar civilizing mission of modern imperialism. Kipling gives the civilizing mission a particular slant, however, by claiming that the violence of imperial conquest is experienced most directly not by those subject to foreign occupation, “Your new caught, sullen peoples,” but by the occupiers who “wait in heavy harness.” This theme is further elaborated in its most striking image of imperial sacrifice: *The ports ye shall not enter, The roads ye shall not tread, Go make them with your living, And mark them with your dead!* In addition to emphasizing a modern developmentalist agenda associated with building infrastructure necessary to garrisoning the empire, these lines dramatize the white man’s burden in terms of labor and death. Kipling contributes to a myth of the imperial worker, who will not benefit from the fruits of his sacrifices in the colonies, as if the physical labor and great loss of lives in building the rail system, canals or ports so important to ruling the colonies were suffered by white men. In the final stanza of the poem, Kipling identifies imperial conquest as a rite of passage for nations, crucial to the transition from childhood to manhood. In other words, the maturation of the United States as a nation can only occur through the conquest of childlike nations and the assertion of an imperial vocation. Here masculinism and imperialism converge as they so often do in Kipling’s poetry. Imperial conquest is not merely the work of real men; it is indeed the primary means by which men achieve manhood and nations fulfill their historical role.

Obama = Imperialist

The Colonization of Iraq can no longer be blamed on the Bush administration. Obama has yet to reform the US’s colonial role in Iraq while continuing to deliver imperialism in the region.

Frank 09 (Joshua Frank, co-editor of dissident voice 6/18/09 “These Are Obama’s Wars Now” Dissident Voice http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/06/these-are-obamas-wars-now/)

On Monday the Democrat controlled House voted 226-202 to approve a rushed $106 billion dollar war spending bill, guaranteeing more carnage in Iraq and Afghanistan (and lately Pakistan) until September 30, 2009, which marks the end of the budget year. The Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of the bill’s first draft last month, with the final vote on a compromised version to occur in the Senate sometime in the next couple of weeks. The majority of opposition in the House came from Republicans who opposed an add-on to the bill that would open up a $5 billion International Monetary Fund line of credit for developing countries. This opposition in the House led Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on Tuesday to quip, “It’ll be interesting to see what happens here. Are my Republican colleagues [in the Senate] going to join with us to fund the troops? I hope so.” No longer can the blame for the turmoil in Iraq and Afghanistan rest at the feet of George W. Bush alone. This is now Obama’s War on Terror, fully funded and operated by the Democratic Party. The bill that passed the House on Monday, once approved by the Senate, will not be part of the regular defense budget as it’s off the books entirely. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress has passed similar emergency spending bills to finance US military ventures in the Middle East. The combined “supplementals” are fast approaching $1 trillion, with 30% going to fund the war in Afghanistan. In addition to the latest increase in war funds, Obama is also asking for an additional $130 billion to be added on to the defense budget for the new fiscal year starting on October 1. The president is upholding his campaign promise to escalate the war in Afghanistan, which also means increasing the use of remote controlled drone planes in neighboring Pakistan that are to blame for hundreds of civilian deaths since Obama took office last January. Despite Obama’s historic (albeit rhetoric filled) speech in Cairo, the new Commander in Chief is still not about to radically change, let alone reform, the US’s long-standing role in the Middle East. A master of his craft, Obama is simply candy coating the delivery of US imperialism in the region. Given the lack of opposition to Obama’s policies back home, it is becoming clear that he may well be more dangerous than his predecessor when it comes to the US’s motivations internationally.

Obama = Imperialist

We must withdraw troops now because it will not end until Obama has “succeeded”

Blum 08 (William Blum, author of many books, 7/7/08 “Obama and the Empire” Counter Punch, http://www.counterpunch.org/blum08072008.html)

As to Iraq, if you're sick to the core of your being about the horrors US policy brings down upon the heads of the people of that unhappy land, then you must support withdrawal –- immediate, total, all troops, combat and non-combat, all the Blackwater-type killer contractors, not moved to Kuwait or Qatar to be on call. All bases out. No permanent bases. No permanent war. No timetables. No approval by the US military necessary. No reductions in forces. Just OUT. ALL. Just like what the people of Iraq want. Nothing less will give them the opportunity to try to put an end to the civil war and violence instigated by the American invasion and occupation and to recreate their failed state. George W. Bush, 2006: "We're going to stay in Iraq to get the job done as long as the government wants us there."[3] George W. Bush, 2007: "It's their government's choice. If they were to say, leave, we would leave."[4] Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie, 2008: "said his government was 'impatiently waiting' for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops."[5] Barack Obama, 2008: We can "redeploy combat brigades from Iraq at a pace of 1 to 2 brigades a month that would remove them in 16 months."[6] Obama's terms of withdrawal equals no withdrawal. Literally. Has he ever said that the war is categorically illegal and immoral? A war crime? Or that anti-American terrorism in the world is the direct result of oppressive US policies? Instead he calls for a troop increase and "the first truly 21st century military ... We must maintain the strongest, best-equipped military in the world."[7] Why of course, that's what the people of the United States and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan and the rest of the people in this sad world desperately desire and need -- greater American killing power! Obama is not so much concerned with ending America's endless warfare as he is with "succeeding" in them, by whatever perverted definition of that word. And has he ever dared to raise the obvious question: Why would Iran, even if nuclear armed, be a threat to attack the US or Israel? Any more than Iraq was such a threat. Which was zero. Instead, he has said things like "Iran continues to be a major threat" and repeats the tiresome lie that the Iranian president called for the destruction of Israel.[8]

Solvency

It is time to decide if it is worth it to produce a new worldview of security that addresses the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity in the middle east, or continue the decades of zero-sum thinking and practices.

Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28]

Although it is tempting always to be pessimistic (note the first sentence of this section) about the potential for the creation of a security community in this of all regions amid escalating violence in Israel/Palestine and against the background of the US air strikes campaign against Afghanistan, and the US-led war on Iraq, when one considers the alternatives (such as the ones discussed above) this clearly is the only approach that has the potential to address the security concerns of myriad actors at multiple levels.61 After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some while marginalizing others, the time has come for all those interested in building security in the ‘Middle East’ to decide whether they want to be agents of worldviews that produce more of the same, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity.

Politics itself cannot be understood by just studying literature, but we must study the historical contexts and the ideas of which they get their meaning.

Diana Brydon, University of Western Ontario, ‘6 [Postcolonial Test 2.1, “Is There a Politics of Postcoloniality?” <http://journals.sfu.ca/pocol/index.php/pct/article/viewArticle/508/175>]

I am very aware of my Canadianness as I read expressions of faith in the necessity of speaking truth to power. To move outside the systems that it takes for granted, we need to situate its politics historically for there are other ways of describing this impasse. In The Wealth of Nature, Robert Nadeau considers, for example, the remarkable hold that neoclassical economics continues to exert in defining and effectively regulating the ideological context in which these two politics function. As Nadeau explains, assumptions about part/whole relationships based on superseded forms of science continue to operate with the persistence of acts of faith within mainstream economics. These assumptions also authorize both the politics of blame and that of speaking truth to power, for each believes that separations of part from whole are not only possible but also desirable. To counter such belief with alternative arguments based on reason alone, as Nadeau illustrates, is unlikely to shake such faith. When each side in a conflict believes it holds the truth, speaking truth to power is unlikely to shake such belief. Different strategies may be needed. In his remarkable attempt to take the readers of his book, If This is Your Land, Where Are Your Stories? beyond the politics of blame, Ted Chamberlin investigates the mobilizing power of stories but does not entirely escape the seductions of prophetic power invoked by the concept of speaking truth to power. Chamberlin suggests that prophecy "transcends the category of truthtelling without rejecting it" (51), thus offering a wellspring for communal mobilization that may be more powerful than political resistance. When such speech issues from oppressed and dispossessed peoples, it must be listened to attentively, with an effort to understand it within its own terms. But eventually, Chamberlin recognizes, even such forms of speech need to be questioned. Speaking truth to power is a mythology that can work for any group. It begs the questions: whose truth? whose power? in which contexts? Chamberlin suggests that the categories of them and us "have become hard-wired into our consciousness, in ways that are both as meaningless and as meaningful as table manners" (24). In other words, they are part of our habitus but they are not part of our essential selves, if such selves in fact exist. We need to pay more attention to what sustains such deeply ingrained categories of faith, while also recognizing that the choice they pose to us is a false one, "a choice," in his words, "between being isolated or overwhelmed, between being marooned on an island or drowning in the sea" (24). The "great gift" of stories and songs, he suggests, is that they "can frustrate that choice if we let them" (32). The task of a postcolonial pedagogy, he implies, will be to learn (or relearn) how to let them work that magic. But a pedagogy is not in itself a politics. I suggest that we remain cautious about the role that literature plays "as the licenced alternative to objectivist social science" in constructing the aporias and antinomies that our knowledge systems employ to make sense of the present (Simpson 16). In his analysis of the terms that govern this license, David Simpson, in Situatedness, or, Why We Keep Saying Where We are Coming From, warns that "[t]he outcome of the literary turn in the legal, ethical, and social scientific spheres is therefore not to be predicted as necessarily positive because the conditions of its reception cannot be known in advance" (145). We all know from our teaching that postcolonial fictions may as easily elicit comfort as discomfort, smug or dismissive judgments as often as compassion or a rethinking of foundational assumptions. Literature has a role to play but cannot provide a substitute for politics. Politics cannot be understood by focusing on competing individuals and their competing versions of speaking truth to power. Neither can a postcolonial politics be understood by focusing on big names and their books instead of the substance of their ideas and the contexts out of which they make their meaning.

Troops = material violence

The ongoing effects of colonialism are apparent with millions of Iraqi civilians murdered and millions more homeless, tortured, and imprisoned.

Branfman 10 (Fred Branfman, Journalist, June 21 2010, Alternet, WK)

Do we? And if we did know about the innocent men, women and children our leaders kill, would it matter? Does it matter that those who justified the Iraqi invasion in the name of the people of Iraq have largely ignored their unimaginable suffering under U.S. occupation, as more than 5 million civilians have been murdered, maimed, made homeless, unjustly imprisoned and tortured -- and millions more impoverished? Would war supporters serve themselves and their nation if they wrote about both the humanity and suffering of, say, just 10 Iraqi victims -- and sought to convey how each represents at least 500,000 more? Is the suffering our leaders inflict on innocent civilians relevant to deciding whether to support our present war-making in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Would it matter if the N.Y. Times had run daily profiles and photos of Iraqi civilian victims since 2003, as it did of U.S. victims after 9/11? Taking seriously one's responsibility for promoting war in Iraq requires more than simply listing the war's human benefits, such as removing the genuinely evil Saddam, increased power for the long-suppressed Kurds and Shiites, limited movement toward free elections, a parliamentary democracy and free press. Such benefits must be weighed against the suffering of millionsof innocent Iraqis, including: -- **Nearly 5 million refugees:** *“Counting both internal and external refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that* nearly 5 million of Iraq’s population of 24 million have been uprooted during the conflict*,”* the [N.Y. Review of Books](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/they-fled-our-war/" \t "_blank) reported on May 13, 2010.  This is the equivalent of 60 million Americans by percentage of population. Five-hundred thousand are homeless squatters within Iraq, whose *"settlements all lack basic services, including water, sanitation and electricity and are built in precarious places -- under bridges, alongside railroad tracks and amongst garbage dumps"* according to [Refugees International](http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/iraq-humanitarian-needs-persist" \t "_blank) in March 2010. The emigration of 2-3 million Iraqis to refugee camps in Syria and other Mideast countries [decimated Iraq's educated middle class](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/they-fled-our-war/" \t "_blank), with some daughters forced to become prostitutes and sons menial laborers just to keep their families alive. Hundreds of thousands dead and wounded: Estimates of dead civilians range from 100,000 documented cases by [Iraq Body Count](http://www.iraqbodycount.org/" \t "_blank), which [acknowledged](http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/lancet100000/" \t "_blank) in October 2004 that *“our own total is certain to be an underestimate of the true position, because of gaps in reporting or recording”* to over one million by a J[ohn Hopkins University group](http://www.jhsph.edu/refugee/publications_tools/iraq/burnham_ORBpoll.html" \t "_blank). A basic rule of thumb in war is that for every person killed, two have been wounded.-- Tens of thousands of innocents imprisoned, many tortured**:** In an article headlined "[In Iraq, A Prison Full of Innocent Men,](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/05/AR2008120503906.html" \t "_blank)" the Washington Post reported that *"*100,000 prisoners have passed through the American-run detention system in Iraq*,"* that Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi says that "most of the people they detain are innocent,” but that prisoners are not permitted to prove their innocence. Conditions have been even worse in the [secret torture chambers](http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE6DD1F31F93AA25750C0A9609C8B63" \t "_blank) run for five years by General Stanley McChrystal, from which all outside observers including the Red Cross have been excluded. Salon's Glenn Greenwald recently [reported](http://www.infowars.com/72-of-guantanamo-detainees-innocent/" \t "_blank) that *"72% of Guantanamo detainees who finally were able to obtain just minimal due process -- after years of being in a cage without charges -- have been found by federal judges to be wrongfully detained."* Countless innocent Iraqis have been regularly tortured.**--** Millions more who lack jobs, electricity, water and health care**:** Reuters [reported](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/KAM733312.htm" \t "_blank) on June 6 that *"according to government statistics cited by the ICRC (the Red Cross), one in four of Iraq's people does not have access to safe drinking water."* The [unofficial unemployment rate](http://www.indexmundi.com/iraq/unemployment_rate.html" \t "_blank) is estimated to be as high as 30 percent, security is shaky, the entire non-oil economy decimated. *"As recently as the 1980s, Iraq was self-sufficient in producing wheat, rice, fruits, vegetables, and sheep and poultry products. Its industrial sector exported textiles and leather goods, including purses and shoes, as well as steel and cement. But wars, sanctions, poor management, international competition and disinvestment have left each industry a shadow of its former self,"* the N.Y. Times has [reported](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/15/world/middleeast/15dates.html" \t "_blank). It also [reported](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/world/middleeast/20iraq.html" \t "_blank) on June 20 *that “(Basra’s) poorer neighborhoods, by far the majority, often have just one hour of electricity a day, a situation not uncommon in Baghdad and other regions. The temperature in Basra on Saturday was 113 degrees.*”War advocates are correct, of course, that much of the responsibility for this suffering rests with Iraqi and Al-Qaeda extremists who have no compunction about inflicting civilian casualties. But this in no way absolves them and the U.S. of their own responsibility for Iraqi civilian suffering, both directly from U.S. war-making and indirectly by the U.S. failing to meet its legal responsibilities as an occupying power to provide security for the civilian population.

Us presence = Colonialist

The current occupation of Iraq is empirically the same as the colonialism of the 1980’s in Puerto Rico. The very same actions of the past were deployed again in the permanent military presence in Iraq.

Hassan 08 (Salah Hassan, “Never-Ending Occupations” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 8, Number 1, Spring 2008)

The U.S. occupation of Iraq is only the most recent in a long history of violent interventions. Despite developments in the international laws of war over the last 100 years, the rhetoric and modalities of the U.S. occupation of Iraq reproduce the features of previous never-ending occupations. One can see a repeating pattern from the 1890s occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the mid-twentieth-century occupation of Germany and Japan to the early twenty-first-century occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. In every one of these cases, the U.S. presence was ostensibly temporary, aimed at overthrowing an unjust dictatorship, yet quickly took the form of a permanent military presence. In each case, the occupation resulted from a formal declaration of war and was, therefore, subject to the laws of war, such as they are. These U.S. military occupations were initially explained as an administrative necessity; the end of hostilities witnessed a change of regime and created a political vacuum that was first filled by the U.S. military and its allies and then by some form of civilian administration operating always under the umbrella of the U.S. armed forces. It is precisely the convergence of these circumstances that produce the possibilities for an occupation without end.

The US Media outlets served as means of promoting western cultural imperialism

Hamm and Smandych 05 (“Cultural imperialism: essays on the political economy of cultural domination” Bernd Hamm and Russell Charles Smandych. University of Toronto Press. http://books.google.com/books?id=jF9xje5iZpMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=neo-imperialism+AND+Iraq&lr=&source=gbs\_similarbooks\_s&cad=1#v=onepage&q=iraq&f=false)

Elvira Classen shows that, while perhaps opening new opportunities for political activism. The media also continues to be used to transmit dominant cultural values. This is illustrated in her examination of media-transmitted values transfer in the post-91l, American-led -War Against Terrorism. ~ Writing from her vantage-point as a media researcher and freelance journalist based in Germany, Classen traces the global struggle for the "Hearts and Minds· of citizens that prevailed in the media between September 11. 2001. and the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in late 2003\_ She argues that during this period the role played by the Western, and predominantly American, media outlets in transmitting dominant cultural values clearly served to promote Western cultural imperialism. According to Classen, the struggle for the hearts and minds of citizens occurred not only in both the US and other coalition countries, where people were reminded or their need for patriotism and a willingness to make sacrifices, but also even more Intensely in the Arab and Islamic world, where the American government backed a media propaganda campaign aimed at convincing citizens of the need for a ~ War Against Terrorism ~ in order "to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace- {quoted from a speech by George W. Bush}. Classen argues that after 9/11 the "radicalized shape of American-style global activism as a plan for cultural imperialism aims at the creation of an interpretative vacuum, by using or threatening to use, military or other repressive means." In turn, this vacuum is then filled with "8 hyper accelerated value transfer in which desired (in this case, American) Interpretations of reality, interests, and ideals are relayed." However, Classen does not conclude that it is hopeless in the future to try to counter effects like those of the American military-political propaganda machine used to control the media for the purpose of transferring desired values during the post-9/11 "war Against Terrorism." Instead, she offers a number of recommendations aimed at providing a starting point for working toward the "demilitarization of information" in the future.

Us presence = Colonialist

The rhetoric of freedom used by Bush characterize the US as the great emancipator of the wretched of the earth.

Hassan 08 (Salah Hassan, “Never-Ending Occupations” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 8, Number 1, Spring 2008)

On a visit to the Philippines in October 2003, only five months after U.S. troops entered Baghdad, Bush addressed the Philippine Congress and claimed for the United States its share in emancipating the islands from Spanish despotism. The speech implies a parallel between the U.S. role in the Philippines and in Iraq. Early in the speech, Bush states: “America is proud of its part in the great story of the Filipino people. Together our soldiers liberated the Philippines from colonial rule. Together we rescued the islands from invasion and occupation.” This simplification of history gives expression to a classic example of Orwellian doublespeak in which the U.S. occupation of the Philippines is turned into an act of liberation. It should be no surprise that this rhetorical move has become a staple of Bush’s public statements on the occupation of Iraq. After one has dismissed the real lies about weapons of mass destruction and the Saddam Hussein al-Qaeda conspiracy, the only reasonable political rationale for the occupation of Iraq is ending the dictatorship and instituting democracy. In a move aimed at discrediting critics of the war in Iraq, Bush then goes on to assert the cross-cultural nature of democratic ideas: “Democracy always has skeptics. Some say the culture of the Middle East will not sustain the institutions of democracy. The same doubts were once expressed about the culture of Asia. These doubts were proven wrong nearly six decades ago, when the Republic of the Philippines became the first democratic nation in Asia” (Bush 2003a). **Here Bush positions opponents of the war, not only as anti-democratic, but also as racists, presenting himself, his administration, and the United States as the great emancipator of the wretched of the earth**. By late 2003, the theme of universal freedom had become the centerpiece of almost every public statement coming out of the White House in defense of the U.S. invasion and its continued presence in Iraq. In a November 2003 speech, Bush announced “a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.” He goes on to claim that “The advance of freedom is the calling of our time. It is the calling of our country . . . And we believe that freedom— the freedom that we prize—is not for us alone. It is the right and capacity of all mankind” (Bush 2003b). By emphasizing this strain of political rhetoric in its varied manifestations—such as political speeches, policy documents, and legislation—I want to underscore the way that language transforms military occupations into political obligation and an altogether intractable foreign policy. In other words, invoking freedom and democracy may make military occupations acceptable policy on humanitarian grounds, but it is impossible to achieve freedom and democracy under occupation. The effectiveness of the discourse of freedom and democracy is the fact that democracy here is emptied of signification. Moreover, if the occupation forces fail to impose order in the face of resistance and insurgencies, as was the case in the Philippines and is the case today in Iraq, less rather than more “freedom” is the result, and the army of occupation must be reinforced.

Us presence = Colonialist

Mainstream journalists agree that Iraq signifies the US’ imperial posture of the 21st century

Hassan 08 (Salah Hassan, “Never-Ending Occupations” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 8, Number 1, Spring 2008)

At its origins the United States was imperialist, violently dispossessing the Amerindian peoples of their lands; the republic has, however, long succeeded in dissimulating its imperial character behind a potent political discourse of democracy set against the tyranny of Empire, disassociating itself from the imperialist intent of Kipling’s poem, but embracing the thematics of “the white man’s burden.” Before 2003, describing the United States as imperialist often sounded like a hollow accusation, used too often by ideological critics of the United States and too easily dismissed as propaganda by apologists for the United States. Associated with the speeches of third world revolutionaries in the 1960s4 or the pamphlets of radical leftist groups,5 describing the United States as imperialist had little impact within the United States, even if the adjective imperialist does accurately describe U.S. expansionism for the last 150 years. Since the invasion of Iraq, it has, however, become almost common place, even among mainstream journalists, like John B. Judis,6 to talk of the United States’ imperial posture in the early twenty-first century. In a more politically critical and specific sense, Chalmers Johnson has argued that the United States’ extensive military reach and its uncontested domination of large parts of the earth’s surface are the signs of its imperial status. Johnson writes that the “vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire” (“America’s Empire of Bases”). These military bases, the contemporary form of U.S. imperialism, are the projection into the future of occupations that never end.

US Is Imperialist – 92 Defense Planning Guidance Document proves

Kramer and Michalowski 05 (Ronal C. Kramer, professor university of western Michigan, and Raymond J. Michalowski, professor northern Arizona university. “War, Aggression and State Crime” April 05, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies)

In 1992, aides to Secretary Cheney, supervised by neocons Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, prepared a draft document entitled Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)—a classified, internal Pentagon policy statement used to guide military officials in the planning process. The draft 1992 DPG provides a first look at the emerging neoconservative imperialist agenda. As Armstrong (2002: 78) notes, the DPG ‘depicted a world dominated by the United States, which would maintain its superpower status through a combination of positive guidance and overwhelming military might. The image was one of a heavily armed City on a Hill’. The draft DPG stated that the first objective of US defence policy should be to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. It also endorsed the use of pre-emptive military force to achieve its goal. The document called for the United States to maintain a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, and to develop a missile defence shield. The DPG was a clear statement of the neoconservative vision of unilateral use of military supremacy to defend US interests anywhere in the world, including protecting US access to vital raw materials such as Persian Gulf oil (Armstrong 2002; Halper and Clarke 2004; Mann 2004). The aggressive tone of the DPG generated a firestorm of criticism when a draft was leaked to the press. President George H. W. Bush and Secretary Cheney quickly distanced themselves from the DPG, and ordered a less obviously imperialist version prepared.

Iraq = Starting Point

Iraq is the starting point. Obama perpetuates US colonialism and racism which will bring about the end of civilization.

Santos 08 (Juan Santos, writer from LA, 2/13/08, “Barak Obama and the ‘End” of Racism” Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/02/barack-obama-and-the-%E2%80%9Cend%E2%80%9D-of-racism/)

The regime of Bush the Lesser was the pinnacle of this effort; he carried the agenda as far as it could go, before it began to fracture and collapse under the weight of its own madness — before it met the determined resistance of society’s most vulnerable, scapegoated and openly stigmatized targets, as they marched in their millions refusing to be victims. The combined force of the Christian fascist juggernaut, the repressive powers of the State, and the US war machine looked unstoppable until it met this opposition at home, and until it met the mad and fierce resistance of the people of Iraq who have, however chaotic and horrifying their tactics, refused to be conquered. With these events, the aura of invincibility and unstoppable momentum was destroyed, the lid of repression began to crack, and what had been suppressed in us rose again to the surface. Literally, in terms of time in office, and as a sweeping reactionary social agenda, the Bush regime is coming to an end. With its end, inevitably, comes a wave of hope and euphoria. This is the wave Obama is riding, the ocean of energy he is trying to steer into an acceptance of the same old deal, the same old wars, the same old systemic racism, packaged as if it were something new. This wave of energy is not something he’s inspired, it’s something he’s riding and that he is uniquely qualified to channel toward his own ends — which are not our ends. As we have seen, Obama doesn’t represent peace — he represents an expansion of war and the power of Empire. He’s even more extreme on this than Bush himself, except in his public rhetoric. He doesn’t represent the real and legitimate needs, desires and hopes of Black people — he refuses to speak openly of the most fundamental issues affecting Black people. He doesn’t represent the “end of racism,” but the perpetuation of oppression in a new guise. Obama doesn’t represent a new system or the new way of life we dreamed of and fought for and that has been suppressed; he represents the old one. He represents a system that is fundamentally rooted in exploitation, oppression and destruction on a global scale, and he is living proof that no fundamental change for the better can, or will, come about under the system he represents and upholds. It doesn’t work that way. To tell the truth is to betray the system, and he can’t bring himself to do it, even though he is far too conscious not to know it. Attaining authentic freedom requires, as its barest starting point, the naming of what keeps us subjugated. What keeps us subjugated is the very system Obama wants to rule. The system, even with Barack Obama as its first Black emperor, is not our hope. It’s our enemy, the enemy of the world, and, because this system is rapidly undermining the ability of the planet to foster and sustain life, it is the enemy of all Life on Earth. This is exactly the understanding that the Christian fascists like Weyrich and Heubeck wanted to crush out of our awareness, and the lack of such awareness is exactly what Barack Obama depends on if he is to remain a symbol of the impossible dream that the system can be something other than what it is.

Colonialism Impacts

The US’s Colonial Discourse globalizes Racial Hierarchy – This is the DECIDING FACTOR in ALL War and Genocide

Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, ‘7 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in *Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-443]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and **exclusion, and elimination**, of those considered **inferior** **through genocide**. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the framework of global antiracist confrontation. Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now **defended by individuals** who argue that they are not racist, but are **not blind** to the inherent **differences** between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “**white racial frame**,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic reproduction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been **globalized through** **conflicts** **over** immigration, **nuclear power,** and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racialized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion **were set by the institutions** that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to **segregation**, then **exclusion, then war and genocide**. Violence glued them together into **seamless continuity.** Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism **guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence** for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented **through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence** during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its **logical** **conclusion and dehumanizes**” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “**geography of** hunger” and **exploitation** (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

Colonialist Discourse

Discourse comes first – Racist representations both ensure radical elimination and are Ideologically Constructed to justify imperialism.

Roxanne Doty, Prof. of Political Science @ ASU [Woot], ’96 [Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Reprsentations in North-South Relations, p. 166-71]

One of the **deadly traces** that has been deposited in our current "reality" and that figures prominently in this study **is "race."** The inventory of this trace has been **systematically ignored** by international relations scholarship. It seems fair to suggest that most international relations scholars as well as makers of foreign policy would suggest that "race" is not even a relevant issue in global politics. Some might concede that while "race" may have been a significant factor internationally during particular historical periods-as a justification for colonialism, for example - "we" are past that now. The racial hierarchy that once prevailed internationally simply no longer exists. To dwell upon "race" as an international issue is an unproductive, needless rehash of history. Adlai Stevenson rather crudely summed up this position when he complained that he was impatiently waiting for the time "when the last black-faced comedian has quit preaching about colonialism so the United Nations could move on to the more crucial issues like disarmament" (quoted in Noer 1985: 84). This view is unfortunately, although subtly, reflected in the very definition of the field of international relations, whose central problems and categories have been framed in such a way as to preclude investigation into categories such as "race" that do not fit neatly within the bounds of prevailing conceptions of theory and explanation and the legitimate methods with which to pursue them. As Walker (1989) points out, current international relations research agendas are framed within an understanding that presumes certain ontological issues have been resolved. Having already resolved the questions of the "real" and relevant entities, international relations scholars generally proceed to analyze the world with an eye toward becoming a "real science." What has been defined as "real" and relevant has not included race. As this study suggests, however, racialized identities historically **have been inextricably** linked with power, agency, reason, morality, and understandings of "self" and "other."' When we invoke these terms in certain contexts, we also silently invoke traces of previous racial distinctions. For example, Goldberg (1993: 164) suggests that the conceptual division of the world whereby the "third world" is the world of tradition, irrationality, overpopulation, disorder, and chaos assumes a racial character that **perpetuates**, both conceptually and actually, **relations of domination, subjugation, and exclusion**. Excluding the issue of representation enables the continuation of this and obscures the important relationship between representation, power, and agency. The issue of agency in international affairs appears in the literature in various ways, ranging from classical realism's subjectivist privileging of human agents to neorealism's behavioralist privileging of the state as agent to the more recent focus on the "agent-structure problem" by proponents of structuration theory (e.g., Wendt [19871, Dessler 119891). What these accounts have in common is their exclusion of the issue of representation. The presumption is made that agency ultimately refers back to some prediscursive subject, even if that subject is socially constructed within the context of political, social, and economic structures. In contrast, the cases examined in this study suggest that the question of agency is one of how practices of representation create meaning and identities and thereby create the very possibility for agency. As Judith Butler (1990: 142-49) makes clear and as the empirical cases examined here suggest, identity and agency are both effects, not preexisting conditions of being. Such an antiessentialist understanding does not depend upon foundational categories -an inner psychological self, for example. Rather, identity is reconceptualized as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying practices that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such. For example, through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbaric "other" and the civilized, democratic "self" even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of "others." The Spector of the "other" was always within the "self." The proliferation of discourse **in times of crisis** illustrates an attempt to **expel** the "other," to make natural and unproblematic the boundaries between the inside and the outside. This in turn suggests that identity and therefore the agency that is connected with identity are inextricably linked to representational practices. It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and selfexpectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted **as "true"** and accurate **representations of "reality**." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as "uncivilized" or "unfit for self-government" is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social**,** political, and economic power **are inextricably linked**. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an **ethical imperative** that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially **urgent** in North-South relations **today**: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity **with colonial** representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to **constructions** of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before **we can even proceed** to attempt an answer-**attention must be given to the politics of representation**. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is **perpetuation of the dominant modes** of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

Colonialist Discourse

The US government’s language in evoking the threat of terrorism as omnipresent establishes the justification for a never ending military campaign. AND their attempt to distance themselves is a link in that it obscures our own responsibility in this war and the real implications it has

John Collins, Ass. Prof of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 7-8

The link between language and violence works in at least two ways which combine to create an endless cycle of justification. First, language helps to create a climate in which the need for military action appears to be self-evident. Almost immediately after September 11, supposedly “objective” journalists were echo¬ing politicians and pundits by saying, “The United States has no choice but to respond,” thereby giving the subsequent war an aura of inevitability. Administration officials and sympathetic commentators fueled the same process with similar remarks: “We must respond forcefully to terrorism,” or “If we do nothing, we will encourage more terrorism.” By the time the U.S. military began raining bombs down on Afghanistan in early October, the use of language had already prepared the groundwork, and little public opposition was heard. In terms of media coverage, the new war has made the highly managed Gulf War of 1991 look like an unrestricted festival of investigative reporting. Yet even in such a controlled information environment, the existence of vi¬olence has the potential to generate revulsion on the part of the reading and viewing public, and this is where language plays a second, related role. The military language that is so widely repeated in the media softens the visceral impact of the violence on ordinary citizens. To speak of “collateral damage” is a far cry from acknowledging the blown-off limbs, the punctured eardrums, the shrapnel wounds, and the psychological horror that are caused by heavy bombardment; even speaking of “civilian casualties” deflects at¬tention from the real effects of the bombs. Such euphemisms (“aerial sorties,” “Taliban positions,” “smart bombs”) work in two directions, both making the already committed violence more palatable and softening up the public so that future military ac¬tions will seem more like video games and less like what they are—acts of violence that result in death, injury, and destruction.

Diana Brydon, University of Western Ontario, ‘6 [Postcolonial Test 2.1, “Is There a Politics of Postcoloniality?” <http://journals.sfu.ca/pocol/index.php/pct/article/viewArticle/508/175>]

But these lines will blur. Postcolonialism is not the politics of blame, and yet the stereotype sticks. To move beyond a politics of blame was the great task of Edward Said's career, yet it remained a task undone at the time of his death. It is all too easy to confuse calls for accountability and responsibility for a politics of blame. Clearer thinking is necessary, but so is an analysis of the functions such slippage serves. Blame invokes discourses of purity that underlie divisions of us and them, implying that the guilty can be separated from the innocent, often further implying a discourse of good and evil, sin and punishment, embraced by the great religions of the Book (Christianity, Islam, Judaism). Such survivals within a supposedly secular age need to be investigated more closely, within postcolonial discourse as elsewhere. I am deliberately cautious here. Said's strategy of "speaking truth to power" did not work very well, yet too often it remains the only model for politically engaged postcolonial involvement. If postcolonial critics are to move beyond the impasse that Said described so eloquently just before his death, then we need to understand better both the powerful appeal and the limitations of a strategy that presumes to speak truth to power. Too often, speaking truth to power can be the rallying cry of U.S. patriotic individualism, a rights discourse firmly embedded within the current status quo, a discourse of certainty rather than questioning, which potentially nourishes a politics of blame. Please don't mistake me here. I think we need more room for dissent, not less. What troubles me in many current invocations of speaking truth to power is the narrow scope afforded dissent and its deep entrenchment in contexts of U.S. constructions of citizenship around a certain kind of individualist entitlement. It is this politics that authorizes speaking truth to power. The politics of blame is not threatened by such a speaking; on the contrary, it reaffirms its hold through such speech. As Rey Chow reminds us, "Defilement and sanctification belong to the same symbolic order" (141). That order constrains all postcolonial speaking but it takes particular forms within different national imaginaries. As postcolonial critics, we study these within the international circuits of our discipline and the local limits of our own areas of expertise, but we always view them from our own particular locations in culture.

Epistemology

The binary politics of the west and the Islamic world hinders understandings of the people by forcing them into self-perpetuating stereotypes.

Tarak Barkawi, Prof. in Interenational Security @ Univ. of Cambridge, Mark Laffey, Prof. in International Politics @ Univ. of London, ‘6 [*Review of International Studies* 32, “The postcolonial moment in security studies,” p. 344-6]

What was true of European economic and military power was also true of the constitution of European identities, which required an imaginary non-Western‘other’.109 The West is defined through a series of contrasts regarding rationality, progress, and development in which the non-West is generally found lacking. To take an example from the initial period of European expansion, Western thinkers used the notion of the ‘state of nature’ to distinguish between their civilisation and those they encountered in the Western Hemisphere after 1492. The ‘state of nature’ was itself a Eurocentric interpretation of these peoples which located civilization and law in Europe even as Europe set about destroying these peoples and their civilisations. This metaphor, a core notion in Western political thought, only became possible as a result of Europe’s imperial encounter with aboriginal peoples.110 At the same time, it enabled and legitimated European dispossession and appropriation of land, resources and populations. In this way, the ‘state of nature’ played its role in producing a world sharply divided between Western have-lots and non-Western have-nots. This idea has continuing significance in political theory and in discussions of contemporary security issues such as failed states and new wars, discussions which reproduce Eurocentric understandings of world politics.111 Contemporary violence in Africa is often explained in terms of a lack of those institutions and attributes associated with European modernity, such as sovereignty, rather than as a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the West. Part of the significance of the postcolonial rupture signalled in the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 is that it forces us to recover these processes of mutual constitution and their significance for how we make sense of security relations and world politics more generally. For many, the War on Terror is a clash between the West and the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda, bin Laden and his allies are conceived as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ with a passionate hatred of everything Western. The problem with this way of framing the conflict is that it ignores the long history of interconnection and mutual constitution out of which bin Laden’s ideas and organization were produced. Currents of Western, Arab and Islamic cultures and histories, modern technologies and communications, and the policies of various regimes and great powers combined to form crystallizations, amongst them bin Laden’s and Al-Qaeda’s particular way of being modern. Attempting to disaggregate these phenomena and squeeze them into boxes marked ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ will not aid understanding of the dynamics of the War on Terror. More importantly, policies derived from such binary understandings may create the very conditions that crystallize future bin Ladens and Al-Qaedas. Bin Laden’s ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the Al-Qaeda organization are in fact modern, hybrid creations of Islam’s encounter with the West.112 Two of the key figures behind contemporary Islamic thinking, Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad, who was bin Laden’s teacher at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, viewed the West as suffering from a ‘great spiritual famine’.113 Much of their thought is a reaction against Western modernity and an attempt to outline a new, Islamic modernity, for they did not want the same fate to befall their societies. The West was not only an initial impetus to their ideology, they also utilized a variety of quintessentially Western ideas. Qutb was influenced in particular by Marxism- Leninism, taking the concept of a revolutionary vanguard and the idea that the world could be remade through an act of will, both important intellectual bases of Al-Qaeda. His notion that Islam could serve as a universal ideology of emancipation in modern conditions is a distinctive combination of Islamic and Enlightenment thinking.114 The Al-Qaeda organization itself is even more obviously of the modern world, rather than simply a product of ‘Islam’. It is a contemporary, global and networked enterprise, with a flattened hierarchy and cellular structure. It is comfortable with computer technology and modern communications. Al-Qaeda also has direct debts to US foreign policy. Bin Laden’s central role and his organization developed out of the US supported resistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.115 It is through diverse forms of interaction between peoples and places around the world that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and Al-Qaeda came into existence; they were mutually constituted out of hierarchical relations of interconnection. Our point here is not to provide a full account of Al-Qaeda but rather to highlight in an initial way the kinds of research questions as well as the larger research agenda opened up for security studies by a focus on the mutual constitution of the strong and the weak, amid relations of domination and subordination. For security studies after Eurocentrism, the history and politics of warfare and struggle between what we now call the global North and the global South must become a major focus for inquiry. Especially in the age of the War on Terror, with its avowedly colonial projects and rhetorics in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, there needs to be greater attention to the histories and processes of imperial subjugation and the resistance it has so regularly generated. The imperial character of great powers – in all its dimensions – directs inquiry to the constitutive relationship between core and periphery, and in so doing to a reconceptualisation of what a great power is in security studies. This involves explicit recognition and analysis of the many ways in which political, economic and military power is produced out of relations between the strong and the weak, relations that are as necessary as they are contested. The insight of mutual constitution is no less applicable to the character and nature of the weak themselves, as for Al-Qaeda. They too are formed out of their relations with the powerful.

Epistemology

Questioning current problem/solution dichotomies is necessary to break down colonialism

Diana Brydon, University of Western Ontario, ‘6 [Postcolonial Test 2.1, “Is There a Politics of Postcoloniality?” <http://journals.sfu.ca/pocol/index.php/pct/article/viewArticle/508/175>]

At its most fundamental level, postcolonial thinking challenges the failures of imagination that led to colonialism and its aftermath, a failure that continues with globalization but is now assuming horrific new forms. It involves learning to understand the legacies of the past in all their complexity so as to provide ourselves with a sound grounding, both cautionary and inspirational, for imagining better ways of living together in the future. That is where the politics come in. The way to such learning is determined by the needs and urgencies of the present. Such learning involves the kinds of unlearning that Gayatri Spivak addresses when she speaks of "un-learning our privilege as our loss" ("Criticism" 9). So often the second part of that equation gets forgotten. It involves recognizing that structures of knowledge often contain their own sanctioned forms of ignorance (another Spivakian concept) and their own asymmetrical forms of knowing, that blindness and insight may be the Siamese twins of knowledge. But to recognize that truth is complex is not to dispense with it entirely. Here Satya Mohanty's engagements with critical realism need to be followed closely. My view, which admittedly goes against the grain of much of the new "common sense" about postcoloniality, is that postcolonial histories and stories challenge the prevalent postmodernist faith in individuality, deterritorialization and relativism and their entrenchment of special interest group and identity politics as the only politics of which people are capable. In my view, a postcolonial politics means turning away from cheap cynicisms and easy answers to enter instead into what Bonnie Honig calls, creating an adjective from the noun "dilemma," the "dilemmatic spaces" of difficult engagements. **Such dilemmatic spaces require a certain humbleness of approach, a willingness to be proven wrong, an openness to fresh ways of posing problems, a willingness to submit to the demands of "infinite rehearsal"** (Harris Infinite) **rather than to seek any kind of "final solution."** The echoes here are deliberate. My hopes are to evade "eclipses of otherness" (Harris Womb 55, 92-3); my fears are renewed forms of fascism. More questions confront the postcolonial theorist who wishes to move beyond such narrowly circumscribed rhetorics of betrayal and blame. As my quotation from Said at the beginning of this paper indicates, that is not to suggest that Palestinians have not been wronged or that these wrongs must not be recognized, but it is to argue that once such acknowledgement is made, both a will and means must be found to negotiate a better way forward. It is true, as one of this paper's readers implied, that I am suspicious of the master-narratives of politics, but that does not require embracing a relativist view that one side's truth is as good as another's. The ethical choice of adjudicating truths may not be best served, in the end, by taking one side above another. Ethically, we may well decide that one side is right and the other wrong, but politics, as the art of the possible, moves in a different sphere. Rather than a politics of winners and losers and winner take all, I prefer to adopt a politics of negotiation and compromise. Postcolonial histories must prompt us to ask how we can know what kinds of political change will work best for all of us, or at least for more of us, when as Erna Brodber puts it, "the half has never been told" (35). At the same time, Chinua Achebe reminds us of how much further we must go before we can begin to identify shared goals. He says: To those who believe that Europe and North America have already invented a universal civilization and all the rest of us have to do is hurry up and enroll, what I am proposing will appear unnecessary if not downright foolish. But for others who may believe with me that universal civilization is nowhere yet in sight, the task will be how to enter the preliminary conversations. (104) How to enter the preliminary conversations? That may indeed sound unduly timid to those more confident of the right way forward, yet I believe that postcolonial studies is still at this stage. We are still learning on what basis such a conversation may be begun because those of us inhabiting settler colonies, in any case, are still learning to listen to alternative analyses of who we are and what our accomplishments mean. We are still experimenting with devising our points of entry into alternative ways of envisioning the world. Dirlik and Harootunian believe that the conversation must begin with a critique of capitalism; Chamberlin suggests a renewed respect for ceremonies of community building through the rituals of words. We need the analyses that come from both traditions. I do not believe we have to choose between these options. Rather, we need to learn to think them through together and try to think beyond them. James (Sakj) Youngblood Henderson, in his essay, "Postcolonial Ghost Dancing: Diagnosing European Colonialism," provides one example, from an indigenous perspective, of how that might be done, wrenching the ghost dance away from Eurocentric interpretations back into the context of "a sustained vision of how to resist colonization" (57).

Epistemology

Ends Culpability – The Remaining Links Becoming Collateral Damage, Replacing Justice With Ethnic Cleansing

Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source, ‘7 [*Development* 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

And where, again, does this power for benevolent goodwill reside? In the post-war period, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is the United States that sees itself increasingly as the vanguard of human emancipation, John Winthrop's 'city upon a hill'. This is also its rightful place, having emerged from a unique tradition (political, social, cultural and religious), which has brought it to its current position of freedom and leadership. And so it is the US, sometimes in the guise of multilateralism, most recently not as much, that exercises the most power globally. The liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant. How, then, does one interrogate American intervention in the world according to its own standards? How does one hold the US accountable precisely for the goodwill it professes? Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful sense? Collateral damage One clue as to the possibility of such an auto-critique lies in a phrase that has become part of the popular political imaginary: collateral damage. This term, inaugurated during the Cold War, is perhaps the euphemism par excellence: it contains within it the **cleansing**, indeed the impossibility, **of culpability;** it must be assumed that the US is always acting with good intentions, and if events unfold in such a way as to suggest otherwise, then each instance is simply a betrayal of the original intent, which is itself beyond reproach – or at the very least, **absolved of the worst offences.** In certain readings, the various forms of oppression and exclusion that make up the collateral damage of imperial power might also be interpreted as **constitutive of the order** in which they occur. In the economic realm, Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, argues that the West has used its disproportionate share of economic power to maintain its position, most notably when it comes to determining the terms of trade as well as the limits of free trade (an essential ingredient of the present liberal-capitalist dispensation) (Stiglitz, 2002). This often, and perhaps unsurprisingly, results in a distinct advantage for richer countries. In other readings, intentions may be harder to determine, but given that the term collateral damage includes within it the possibility of its own exoneration, what can be said about the likelihood of justice in such a system? If every inequality, every abuse, every infraction is seen as an aberration, as a demonstration of the fact that the order **has not yet reached its full potential,** are we to hope that this same order will eventually be equal to its own avowed aspirations? The response to the latter question is of course widely affirmative. The problem is that it is predicated on the claims of the dispensers of benevolent intervention themselves. But it is necessary to interrogate these very claims to bring out the more **egregious and systematic forms of collateral damage** and thereby question the very possibility of justice within this order. On the one hand, as Stiglitz also points out, there is some hope: whereas previously only the radical left was critical of the World Bank and IMF, now these critiques are far more widespread. On the other hand, the possibility of a global, socialist revolution is scarcely found anywhere. Attempting to speak from the perspective of the recipients of goodwill immediately, then, begs the question: is radical structural change necessary before the possibility of justice in the realm of collateral damage can be born?

AT: Realism

“Third World” security studies disprove realist assumptions. The third world operates without the belief of the state as the primary provider of security but rather the provider of insecurity.

Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Strategic Studies @ York University, ’95 [YCISS Occasional Paper Number 28, “The Periphery As The Core: The Third World And Security Studies,” http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP28-Acharya.pdf]

The emergence of the Third World challenged the dominant understanding of security in three important respects: (1) its focus on the inter-state level as the point of origin of security threats; (2) its exclusion of “non-military phenomena” from the security studies agenda and (3) its belief in the global balance of power as a legitimate and effective instrument of international order. As noted earlier, during the Cold War, the vast majority of the world's conflicts occurred in the Third World. Most of these conflicts were intra-state in nature (anti-regime insurrections, civil wars, tribal conflicts etc). A study by Istvan Kende estimates that of the 120 wars during the 1945-76 period, 102 were internal wars (including anti-regime wars and tribal conflicts); while another study by Kidron and Segal covering the 1973-86 period found a mix of 66 internal wars and 30 border wars.12 Thus, the so-called “regional conflicts” in the Cold War period were essentially domestic in origin. Many of them were aggravation of tensions emerging from the process of state formation and regime maintenance. The proliferation of such conflicts reflected the limited internal sociopolitical cohesion of the newly-independent states, rather than the workings of the globally competitive relationship between the two superpowers. The roots of Third World instability during the Cold War period were to be found in “weak” state structures that emerged from the process of decolonization, i.e. structures that lacked a close fit between the state's territorial dimensions and its ethnic and societal composition. The concept of “national” security is of limited utility in explaining this security predicament. As Steinbach suggests, “The concept of `nation', introduced by colonial powers or by small elites who saw in it the prerequisite for the fulfillment of their own political aspirations, materialized in a way which went against territorial, ethnic, religious, geographical or culto-historical traditions”.13 As a result, to quote Mohammed Ayoob, most Third World states emerged without a “capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their inhabitants with the post-colonial structures that have emerged within colonially-dictated boundaries”.14 The most common outcome of this was, and continues to be, conflict about national identity. The relatively brief time available to Third World governments for creating viable political structures out of anti-colonial struggles as well as conditions of poverty, underdevelopment and resource scarcity limit their capacity for pursuing developmental objectives in order to ensure domestic stability. Moreover, domestic conflicts in the Third World are often responsible for a wider regional instability. Revolutions, insurgencies and ethnic separatist movements frequently spill over across national boundaries to fuel discord with neighbors. Ethnic minorities fighting the dominant elite rarely honor state boundaries, often seeking sanctuary in neighboring states where the regime and population might be more sympathetic to their cause. Weak states were more vulnerable to foreign intervention, as outside powers, including the superpowers, could take advantage of their domestic strife to advance their economic and ideological interests. These general patterns of regional instability were compounded by the particular insecurities of the ruling elite in Third World states.15 Most Third World societies exhibited a lack of consensus on the basic rules of political accommodation, power-sharing and governance. Regime-creation and regime-maintenance were often a product of violent societal struggles, governed by no stable constitutional framework. The narrow base of Third World regimes and the various challenges to their survival affected the way in which “national security” policy was articulated and pursued. In such a milieu, the regime's instinct for self-preservation often took precedence over the security interests of the society or the nation. As Buzan argues, “it is tempting to identify national security with the governmental institutions that express the state, but...governments and institutions have security interests of their own which are separate from those of the state, and which are often opposed to broader national interests as aligned with them”.16 As a result, the nature of national security as an “ambiguous symbol” is more pronounced in Third World societies than in the industrial North. In his critique of the national security paradigm, Rob Walker observes that “the state itself, far from being the provider of security as in the conventional view, has in many ways been a primary source of insecurity...it is difficult to see how any useful concept of security can ignore the participation of states in `disappearances’ and abuse of human rights in so many societies.”17 The Third World experience is particularly relevant in challenging the Realist image of the state as a provider of security.

AT: Realism

The structural realist’s understanding of international relations towards superpower contributed to the prolongation of regional wars.

Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Strategic Studies @ York University, ’95 [YCISS Occasional Paper Number 28, “The Periphery As The Core: The Third World And Security Studies,” http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP28-Acharya.pdf]

Finally, the Third World's emergence challenged the legitimacy of the dominant instrument of the Cold War international order. The anchor of that order, the global superpower rivalry, was viewed with profound mistrust throughout the Third World. This is evident from the “dissident” role of the Third World in the system of states. Hedley Bull saw the collective aim principal of the Third World to lie in its desire “to destroy the old international order and establish a new one, to shake off the rules and institutions devised by the old established forces (in Sukarno's phrase) and create new rules and institutions that will express the aspirations of the new emerging forces.”24 The role of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in demanding a speedy completion of the decolonisation process, opposing superpower non-interference in the Third World, advocating global disarmament and the strengthening of global and regional mechanisms for conflictresolution, testified to the collective resistance of Third World states to the system of international order resulting from superpower rivalry.25 While NAM's record in realising these objectives has attracted much criticism, it was able to provide a collective psychological framework for Third World states to strengthen their independence and to play an active role in international affairs.26 Membership in NAM provided many Third World states with some room to manoeuvre in their relationship with the superpowers and to resist pressures for alliances and alignment.27 The Third World's collective attitude towards superpower rivalry poses a challenge to Realist international theory. A structural Realist understanding of international relations, developed by Waltz and Mearsheimer,28 credits the Cold War and bipolarity for ensuring a “stable” international order. But this perspective was misleading insofar as the Third World was concerned. The Cold War “order”, instead of dampening conflicts in the Third World, actually contributed to their escalation. Although rarely a direct cause of Third World conflicts,29 the Cold War opportunism and influenceseeking of superpowers contributed significantly to the ultimate severity of many cases of incipient and latent strife in the Third World. It led to the internationalization of civil war and internalization of superpower competition.30 It also contributed to the prolongation of regional wars by preventing decisive results in at least some theatres, including the major regional conflicts of the 1970s and 80s: in Central America, Angola, Horn of Africa, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and in the Iran-Iraq War.31 Thus, superpower rivalry, while keeping the “long peace” in Europe, served to exacerbate the problems of regional conflict and instability in the Third World. The superpowers' shared interest in avoiding direct military confrontation (with its attendant risk of mutual nuclear annihilation) might have led them to enforce a degree of restraint on the behaviour of their more adventurous Third World clients and thereby avoid dangerous escalation of certain regional conflicts (in the Middle East and East Asia).32 But the Cold War also permitted a great deal of violence and disorder in the Third World. While nuclear deterrence prevented even the most minor form of warfare between the two power blocs in Europe, superpower intervention in regional conflicts elsewhere were “permitted” as a necessary “safety valve”.33 Some writers have argued that superpower intervention in the Third World was subject to a set of “implicit rules of the game” which contributed to order and stability in the Third World.34 But on closer examination, it becomes apparent that a great deal of the superpowers' attempts to devise a code of conduct for Third World conflicts were ad hoc, prescriptive and limited.35 It left considerable room for the escalation and prolongation of local and regional wars.36 Similarly, the Third World security experience during the Cold War explains why mechanisms for international order that reflected and were shaped by superpower balancing strategies were of limited effectiveness in promoting regional security. The limitations of balance of power arrangements lay in their limited relevance. Steven David points out that for a balance of power approach to be effective, “the determinants of alignment [must] come overwhelmingly from the structure of the international system, particularly the actual and potential external threats that states face.”37 But in the Third World, it is the “internal characteristics of the states” that usually influence alignments. Thus, no superpower-sponsored instrument of international order can be effective unless it is able to address the clients states' internal (including regime security) concerns. This factor explains the failure of outward-looking regional security alliances such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the relative success (at least initially) of more internal security oriented regional security arrangements such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).38

AT: Realism

The Colonial nature of third world countries creates conflicts based on domestic and intra-regional factors. This disproves the idea that third world conflict is a byproduct of the international system changing to multipolarity.

Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Strategic Studies @ York University, ’95 [YCISS Occasional Paper Number 28, “The Periphery As The Core: The Third World And Security Studies,” http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP28-Acharya.pdf]

The above-mentioned features of insecurity in the Third World constitute a highly relevant explanatory framework for analysing the major sources of instability in the post-Cold War era. To begin with, they help an understanding of the emergence and escalation of conflicts and instability in the new states of Europe and Central Asia, which now constitute some of the most serious threats to the post-Cold War international order. Even though one may debate whether these states should be formally recognised as forming part of the “Third World”, it is quite clear that there are striking similarities between the former's security problems and those of the existing Third World category. These include fairly low levels of socio-political cohesion and a strong element of statenation dichotomy, with consequent problems of ethnic strife and regime insecurity. As Ayoob argues, “In terms of their colonial background, the arbitrary construction of their boundaries by external powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their recent emergence into juridical statehood, and their stage of development, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as of the Balkans demonstrate political, economic and social characteristics that are in many ways akin to Asian, African, and Latin American states that have been traditionally considered as constituting the Third World.” 39 In a broader context, the Third World security experience suggests the need to view the majority of the post-Cold War conflicts and their militarization in primarily local terms, rather than as a byproduct of the changing structure of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity. Some have suggested that the Cold War had suppressed “many potential third-world conflicts”; its end will ensure that “other conflicts will very probably arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls and self-controls” exercised by the superpowers.40 But, such a view obscures the unchanged role of essentially domestic and intra-regional factors related to weak national integration, economic underdevelopment and competition for political legitimacy and control in shaping regional instability.

AT: Realism

The third world is secluded from Cold War security studies because attentions to regional instability are pushed aside in favor of “mainstream” studies focused on the east-west divide and its relationship to global politics.

Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Strategic Studies @ York University, ’95 [YCISS Occasional Paper Number 28, “The Periphery As The Core: The Third World And Security Studies,” http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP28-Acharya.pdf]

This paper looks at another, less pronounced but ultimately more significant, reason why a redefinition of security is called for. The Cold War period was marked by a preoccupation of security studies scholars with issues and problems of a particular segment of the international system. As with other key concepts of international relations, national security assumed a Westphalian universe of nation-states and dwelled primarily on the responses of Western governments and societies, particularly the US, to the problem of war. The issues and experiences within the other segment, collectively labeled as the Third World, were not fully incorporated into the discourse of security studies. Because the international system as a whole was seen as a “transplantation of the European territorial state”, the concept of national security was taken to be a general model, “reflecting the universalisation of the competitive European style of anarchic international relations.”7 This “exclusion” of the Third World from the Cold War security studies agenda was evident in both policy and academic arenas.8 Superpower diplomacy carefully distinguished the “central strategic balance” (involving superpower nuclear deterrence and their European alliances) from regional conflict and regional security (conflict and conflict-management issues arising primarily in the Third World). In the academic literature, what was considered “mainstream” focussed on “the centrality of the East-West divide to the rest of global politics”.9 Attention to problems of regional instability in the Third World was given only to the extent that it had the potential to affect the superpower relationship. Not surprisingly therefore, in surveying the state of the field of international security studies in 1988, Nye and Lynn-Jones found that, “regional security issues (apart from Western Europe)...received inadequate attention, a fact attributable to “ethnocentric biases” resulting from “the development of security studies in the United States more than in other countries”.10 The tendency of security studies to focus on a particular segment of the international system to the exclusion of another is ironic given the fact that it is in the neglected arena that the vast majority of conflicts have taken place.11 Moreover, the security predicament of the Third World states challenges several key elements of the national security paradigm, especially its state-centric and **warcentric** universe. The Third World's problems of insecurity and their relationship with the larger issues of international order have been quite different from what was envisaged under the dominant notion.