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**1. Perm – do the counterplan – its not severance – we never specified the branch**

**2. Agent counterplans are a voter—**

**A. Unpredictable – There’s an infinite number of agents—no solvency advocate means we can’t research answers—kills policy-making because the counterplan doesn’t actually exist**

**B. Kills education-distracts focus from the resolution and creates arbitrary debates about the agent**

**C. it’s a voter for competitive equity and education.**

3. **Congress will check Obama-preventing plan passage**

**Crenson and Ginsberg 07** Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg.  Crenson is a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University.  Benjamin Ginsberg Ph.D. was a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University.  He is now the Director of the Center for the Study of American Government and Chair of the Government Program of Advanced Academic Program at Johns Hopkins University, 2007. [Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced p. 218] [Cory Stern]

Through its general legislative powers, moreover, Congress can exercise broad influence over foreign policy.  Congress may, for example, refuse to appropriate funds for presidential actions it deems to be unwise or inappropriate.  Thus, in 1796, the House of Representatives was asked to appropriate funds to implement the Jay Treaty.  Opponents of the treaty demanded that the House be given all papers and records pertaining to the negotiating process—a demand rejected by President Washington.  The House narrowly approved funding but accompanied its acquiescence with a resolution affirming its right to refuse appropriations for the implementation of any treaty to which a majority of its members objected.  On several occasions over the years, the House has indeed refused to appropriate funds needed to implement treaties negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate.

This power of the purse also extends to military action.  Not only does Congress have the constitutional power to declare war, but under its general legislative powers it must appropriate the funds needed to support military activities.  In Federalist 69, Hamilton argues that Congress’s power of the purse provides it with an ultimate check on the president’s power as commander in chief.  This principle was illustrated during the Reagan administration when Congress enacted the so-called Boland Amendment, which prohibited the president from using any funds to provide military support for right-wing “Contra” guerilla forces in the civil war then raging in the nation of Nicaragua.  The administration’s response was to seek funds from Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Brunei, and even from private individuals.  This attempt to circumvent Congress’s authority sparked the 1986 congressional Iran-Contra investigations, which led to criminal convictions for several high-ranking administration officials.  In 2007, congressional Democrats threatened to use their power of the purse to gain some leverage over the bush administration’s Iraq policies.

**4. Global security evidence indicates that CENTCOM has control over coordinating operations-even if they organize the entire operation this does NOT mean they are exempt from executive approval for troop withdrawal**

**5.  Perm – do both – it’s not intrinsic because it limits the action of both the USFG and the DOD to the plan mandate**

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6. Plan not key-Department of Defense will do everything necessary to stay in power.

**Serwiech, 08** (Tom, State Department, December “DOD controls U.S. government” [http://www.dark](http://www.dark/) [government.com/news/dod-controls-us-government](http://government.com/news/dod-controls-us-government))

As military officers sought to take over the role played by civilian development experts abroad, Pentagon bureaucrats quietly populated the National Security Council and the State Department with their own personnel (some civilians, some consultants, some retired officers, some officers on "detail" from the Pentagon) to ensure that the Defense Department could keep an eye on its rival agencies. Vice President Cheney, himself a former secretary of defense, and his good friend Rumsfeld ensured the success of this seeding effort by some fairly forceful means. At least twice, I saw Cheney staffers show up unannounced at State Department meetings, and I heard other State Department officials grumble about this habit. The Rumsfeld officials could play hardball, sometimes even leaking to the press the results of classified meetings that did not go their way in order to get the decisions reversed. After I got wind of the Pentagon's dislike for the approved interagency anti-drug strategy for Afghanistan, details of the plan quickly wound up in the hands of foreign countries sympathetic to the Pentagon view. I've heard other, similarly troubling stories about leaks of classified information to the press.

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1. Case outweighs and turns the disad

1. Prefer systemic impacts— the plan solves for people who are continually being abused by united states colonialism that ignores their own rights and justifies endless violence with the pursuit of democracy. This is a reason why we control timeframe and probability- and those outweigh magnitude- many small extinctions in the short term ill outweigh a bigger one in the long term.
2. Aff come first-- extend our Everest evidence; the ending of colonization of Iraq is key in order to solve for the violent oppression of the other through a complete withdrawal. It is a prerequisite to their DA.
3. We will always control the terminal impact— the way we orient ourselves toward the other creates the conditions for violence- the aff is the ultimate example of how the United States otherization of Iraq has justified endless violence. The aff serves as an alternative to their securitizing discourse and eliminates the total impetus for violence, solving the impact to the disad

2. Nuclear war will not cause anything close to extinction- it’s a culturally constructed myth

Gustave le Bon “Nuclear Obliteration, Nuclear Winter, Nuclear Reality” 1999 (<http://members.tripod.com/~scenicroute/nuclear.html>

For many years the public has unquestioningly accepted the idea that any nuclear war will inevitably lead to the destruction of mankind. What is supposed to follow is deadly radioactivity spread everywhere, and even global atmospheric changes branded "nuclear winter" by the popular media. The most superficial examination of this idea causes it to collapse, because many hundreds of very powerful nuclear weapons have in fact been exploded at or near the surface of the earth, and we are all still here. Today, it is barely even detectable that these explosions ever took place. So, a limited nuclear war, with the exchange of a dozen or so nuclear bombs, might be very devastating near the explosions themselves, but the rest of the world would obviously go on with little damage. The idea that the whole world could be destroyed by this is preposterous. But, what about an all-out nuclear war?

To my knowledge, no one has ever done a calculation of the extent of destruction that would actually result from an all-out nuclear war; at least, not one which was shown to the public. All of what has been presented publically are politically motivated diatribes, purportedly giving factual conclusions. So, having a strong background in physics, I did the calculations myself.

I won't bore you with details and lists of numbers. But, at the height of the "cold war", there were about 22,000 functional sategic nuclear weapons in the posession of the Soviet Union and the United States combined (this number is supposed to be declining). Using the destructive effects measured in actual nuclear explosions (taken from the authoritative text, ***The Effect of Nuclear Weapons***), if all of these weapons, the entire world arsenal, were successfully delivered in a war, they all functioned optimally, and none of them were destroyed in flight, etc., they could completely destroy a maximum of 5% of the earth's surface, and probably much less. Another 10% or less would be considerably damaged, or radioactive for some time. This would leave 85% or more of the earth's surface undamaged and perfectly inhabitable. The 15% or less damaged or destroyed could be rebuilt within a few years by the inhabitants of the other 85% of the world, as demonstrated by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two Japanese cities which have actually been destroyed by nuclear bombs, then rebuilt and repopulated. The idea that mankind could destroy the planet with nuclear weapons outright is a myth. There has never been any factual support for it, and it flies in the face of simple mathematics. The "nuclear winter" theory has it that, in a large-scale nuclear war, huge amounts of dust and smoke would be lofted into the high atmosphere by the heat of nuclear explosions, blocking out the sun for months and depriving us of its warmth. This is supposed to cause freezing teperatures all over the planet for years, wiping out humanity. While this appears at first blush to make some kind of sense, and was touted for some years as being supported by computer modelling, a little deeper analysis shows it to be nonsense. First, the amount of debris assumed to be lofted to the upper atmosphere and the amount of time it was supposed to stay there did not match any observation of actual nuclear explosions. The rebuttal to this by the supporters of "nuclear winter" was that massive fires were supposed to create the smoke - but this ignores that there is no way for the nuclear explossions to carry this smoke to the upper atmosphere, since the fires happen *after* the explosions are over! Since massive fires happen anyway, they should provide *some* scientific evidence of this cooling effect which can be measured - but they don't. The simple reason is that clouds, moisture, dust, smoke - all of the things which block heat from the sun by day, also keep the heat from being radiated away to the sky at night. Even if nuclear explosions could loft more dust into the atmosphere than volcanos, forest fires, and dust storms

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do anyway, the expected effect would be a moderation of temperatures between day and night - cooler days, and warmer nights - not a perpetual winter.

3. They are the nuclear disciplinary machine, reducing subjects to strategic calculators that must think nuclear apocalypse into being.

William Chaloupka, Political Science @ Montana, 1992, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom. Pg 21-22

An oppositional politics, fully capable of problematizing this (hyper-) exuberant nuclearism, is possible on bases other than such suspect categories as euphemism, survival, unspeakability, and numbing. Through out this book, I am trying to reposition antinuclearism within such a defensible political practice. At the very least, this implies an intellectual project: to paraphrase Foucault, there is a struggle over issues of knowledge, set off by nuclear criticism.

The political mood of the language-and-politics position is well framed by nuclear criticism. More precisely, a political mood could yet form, one that would contrast sharply with an exiting nuclear opposition that in the United States, has adopted a paradoxical structure, as if driven to mirror that paradoxes of nukes themselves. Antinuke talk has been ponderous—so responsible and serious that it just obviously defeats itself, and must invent the defense that “people don’t really like to talk about nuclear war very much.” Paradoxically, opponents then test that humorlessness by asking citizens to become independent entrepreneurs of risk, weighing the likelihood and amplitude of possible disasters. It should not be surprising that such a politics works only intermittently if at all.

To summarize: as obvious a goal as “survival” may be, it nonetheless carries with it a series of code and a rhetoric. Survival implies a global unquestionable project- a faith really- and it therefore brings along baggage we might not wish to carry. Following Foucault’s model of the specific intellectual, intervening in the relations of power and knowledge, we can identify some of this baggage.

When we approach survival (and humanism, and liberalism in general) from that angle, we see some primary terms becoming far more problematic than we may have understood. The unspeakability of nukes—part of a characteristic liberal injunction to speak—turns out, instead, to point to a problem with the whole scheme of representation. Furthermore, our concern with technological dependence and accidents turns out to beg important issues of agency. In the wake of these discoveries, we should at least suspect that it is disciplinary power—more than technology, or reticence to speak or a too-awesome topic—that has been accumulating. And in the face of that accumulation, the injunction to aid survival and counter unspeakability by simply canceling euphemism is obviously just too limited a response.

In upcoming chapters, I will try to suggest a different sort of opposition, informed by the theoretical considerations outlined above. Even if principled renunciations of the nuke—in the name of humanity or survival—have misfired, other interventions may be possible, may even be better.

5. Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending, state-sanctioned violence.

**Coviello 2000** (Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, *Apocalypse From Now On,* 2000)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes

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on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

6. Questions of representations come first – the way we discuss policy is more important than policy itself.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1996 (*Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines Series, ISBN 0816627622, p. 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 6 In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables [end page 5] one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

AT: Consult NATO

1. **Consultation CP’s are illegit and a voting issue**

a. Reciprocity—they fiat both consultation and the implementation of the plan—taking two bites out of the fiat apple.

b. They’re unfair—the only way we can gain offense against the net benefit is to impact or link turn it—consultation CP’s all but FIAT in the link for net benefit forcing us to impact turn the net benefit BUT there are infinite number agents they could consult, which means the aff can never be ready for this type of CP.

**2. CP doesn’t compete-- If NATO says yes, the counterplan is by definition plan plus. Even if the plan is modified during consultation, the modified version doesn't compete with the 1AC plan. Justifies perm do the CP**

**3. The CP offers three options—consultation and agreement, consultation with changes, or consultation and rejection. We permute the part of the CP that genuinely consults with NATO and where NATO says yes—this permutation is conditioned on a “yes” response.**

**4. Perm: do the plan and consult on other issues; there’s no reason why consulting on *our aff* is key.**

**5. Perm—consult and do the plan anyways—if they say yes, they won’t know we we’re disingenuous.**

**6. No impact to relations**

**A. The U.S. will maintain beneficial relations with key allies even if NATO collapses**Michael **Gallagher**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Winter **2003** Houston Journal of International Law
NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The United States has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United States. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States -Europe security] partnership.”

7. Perm – Do the counterplan, consultation is a part of normal means

Peters 08 - director of the Centre for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Policy Studies at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Freie Universität Berlin (3/26/08 Ingo, *ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, “*Cooperation, Conflict and Crisis: The Impact of the Iraq War on European-American Relations", <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p254640_index.html>, MEF)

Cooperation problems have characterized the transatlantic community from its outset.17 Since its inception the alliance has been marked by power asymmetry and a master-client relationship among allies, with the US as the 'benign hegemon' defining the rules of the game. This created some concern among European partners on the superpower's readiness for regular and timely consultations to provide them opportunities to exert influence and to arrive at truly common policies. But, as the world became aware during the Suez crisis of 1956, the European partners themselves are not disinclined to unilateral action. In response to cooperation failures, the Pearson Commission established a code of conduct defining the 'normal practice of consultations' in the realm of non-military cooperation, ideally implying

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a joint consensus-building and non-hierarchical influence on the policy of the alliance.18 Though, throughout the following decades, this could not prevent numerous crises, these guidelines still acquired the status of a 'social norm,' i.e. the common understanding of appropriate behavior within the alliance proper if not also for the transatlantic relationship in general.

8. TURN – NATO is overburdened – consulting will kill the alliance

Kober 09 – Research Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and received his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. (Winter/Spring 09, Stanley, Global Dialogue, “NATO: The End of the Permanent Alliance”, <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=449>, MEF)

As if all these problems were not enough, NATO members now face the worst financial crisis since the alliance’s inception. Countries that were not meeting NATO’s target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence before are certainly not going to meet it in the future. The implications for NATO have been underlined by its operational commander, General John Craddock. “They’re expecting to be asked to do more,” he told a press briefing in Washington in January 2009, referring to US allies. “I think it’s going to be harder for them to do it because of decreasing defense budgets.”18 Precisely. NATO’s problem has been the enunciation of strategy and the assumption of commitments without any reference to capability. That is what is so unreal about the discussion of Georgian membership. Imagine that Georgia had been a member of NATO. What could the alliance have done to defend it against the Russian attack? Georgia borders Russia and is far away from the United States and the other NATO members, who have their hands full elsewhere. Even as NATO faces an existential crisis in Afghanistan, there are calls for it to return to the traditional mission of defending its members. “Nobody will be asking for a wholesale strategic rethink that reduces Nato’s commitment to Afghanistan,” an anonymous senior NATO official told the *Financial Times*. “But some states may be looking to strike a new balance between Nato’s current focus on expeditionary operations and the need to defend Nato territory.”19 But how will a new balance be struck? There are only two ways: increasing resources and devoting them to the traditional mission, or redirecting resources from “out of area” missions to the traditional one. Which will it be? Increasing resources seems near impossible in these times of financial stringency. But if resources are redirected, what happens to the “out of area” missions? What, specifically, happens to Afghanistan? “Many [NATO members] have defence budgets that are so low, and coalition governments that are so precarious, that they cannot provide the quantity or type of forces needed for this kind of fight,” US defence secretary Robert Gates has lamented.20 That is the situation *now*. It will not improve if further missions are added. Indeed, it is apparent that NATO is already overburdened.

9. Consulting NATO does nothing

McNamara 09 – Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs at Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom and Director of International Relations for the American Legislative Exchange Council

(12/3/09, Sally, The Heritage Foundation, “NATO allies in Europe must do more in Afghanistan”, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/nato-allies-in-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan>, MEF)

Despite the change in tone and style from his predecessor, President Obama has experienced exactly the same conspiracy of reluctance that President Bush faced in seeking more equitable burden sharing for the Afghanistan mission. Since October 2006, when NATO assumed full responsibility for Afghanistan's security, the U.S. has repeatedly attempted to secure greater European input for both military and civilian operations in Afghanistan. The contributing nations have had ample opportunity to make their voices heard through the countless NATO summits, ministerial meetings, bilateral discussions, strategy sessions, speeches, conferences, and compacts. It is therefore disingenuous to attribute the problems that ISAF is experiencing in Afghanistan to too few opportunities for the allies to consult. Rather, NATO has repeatedly agreed to strategies for Afghanistan but then failed to provide adequate resources. The comprehensive approach, which was endorsed at the heads-of-state level in Bucharest in April 2008, is a striking example of this disconnect.[[9]](#_ftn9) The alliance endorsed a strategy for a greater civilian-military footprint in Afghanistan, but after a short-term surge of largely American and British troops to combat the Taliban's spring offensive, ISAF's overall strength was almost the same in October as it had been in April. No additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been created since April 2008.[[10]](#_ftn10)

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**10. No unique I/L – They will never win our plan is the tipping point that makes or breaks NATO**

11. TURN - NATO hinders efficient transatlantic relations by undermining European independence

Merry 04–former State Department and Pentagon official and senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington(2/4/04, E. Wayne, New York Times, “NATO : We can't be partners with an obsolete alliance”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/04/opinion/04iht-edmerry_ed3_.html>, DW)

NATO is not the vehicle to restore trans-Atlantic partnership; the alliance today is the major impediment. For America and Europe to work together on the world stage, they must respect each other. For this, Europe must respect itself by taking full responsibility for its continental and regional security, while Washington needs a European partner worthy of its respect rather than today's reluctant subordinate. Everyone understands that the Atlantic alliance fulfilled its cold war agenda beyond the fondest dreams of its founders more than a decade ago. Everyone also knows that Europe faces no credible military threat in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the current German defense restructuring is based on this premise. It is also widely appreciated that Russia and the other non-Baltic former Soviet states pose serious, but not military challenges to Europe: imploding demographics, epidemic diseases and narcotics use, collapsing infrastructure, failed rule of law — but not tank armies. Less well understood is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in an act of institutional self-preservation, has conducted a silent political coup on the parliaments and citizens of its member states. Established in the 1940's for defensive purposes, the alliance in the 1990's decided to "'go out of area to avoid going out of business." NATO has justified nondefensive operations and even a war against Serbia by referring to the North Atlantic Treaty, which legitimizes nothing of the kind. Rather than revise the treaty and seek ratification from national legislatures, NATO simply behaves as if its political decisions carry international legitimacy on an equal footing with the United Nations Charter. The crisis in trans-Atlantic relations is less the product of differing views about Iraq than the inevitable result of a NATO which has lost its reason to exist and has ceased to be a true alliance of shared interests, let alone of shared values. NATO was created to serve a European need — to inject American power into conditions of post-World War II economic devastation and Soviet threat — and was not intended to be permanent. Today, NATO serves the non-European objectives of U.S. global policies, as a "toolbox" for engagements far afield. The new jargon reflects Washington's contempt for its European auxiliaries, who are "tools" and refueling points rather than true allies. A crisis was waiting to happen. While all European governments support the United States in some circumstances (such as pursuing Al Qaeda in Afghanistan), and some will back Washington even against the wishes of their populations, no European state shares America's global role or responsibilities, and still less our perspective on the utility of armed force. Europe lost its global ambitions through the collapse of its overseas empires and its self-destructive wars and ideologies. So Europe was bound to recoil at its "toolbox" status. Iraq was only the first instance. It is absurd to think Europe is unable to look after its regional security needs. European members of NATO already spend more on defense than the rest of the non-American world, while maintaining almost half again as many uniformed personnel as does the United States. The problem is that no aspect of public policy in Europe is organized today in such rigid and narrow national parameters as is defense, with most spending oriented to job creation and to redundant "balanced" national force structures. The result is dysfunctional: the European defense whole is much less than the sum of the parts. This failure stems from the continued existence of NATO and the outdated U.S. military presence in Europe. The failure is at heart psychological. Europeans are so accustomed to using the United States like a pair of crutches for security that they do not notice that their injury is long healed and that using crutches is artificial, awkward, and causes serious strains on the European organism. No one should expect a European superpower. Europe has neither the inclination nor the demographics for a global role. No one should expect a truly integrated trans-national European military. Nobody should imagine that defense self-sufficiency will come more easily than have other aspects of European integration over the past 50 years. Everyone should recognize that Europe will never carry its own limited weight in the world so long as Americans are willing to do it for them. The United States needs a genuine partner in Europe, but is reluctant to shed its dominant, hegemonal habits within NATO. Europe knows the end of the cold war liberated it from the "struggle for mastery in Europe," but hesitates to put aside the American crutches and subsidy. A new and genuine trans-Atlantic partnership is long overdue, but for now, politicians on both sides of the ocean confirm Lord Keynes' dictum, "The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones."

AT: Consult Japan

1. **Consultation CP’s are illegit and a voting issue**

a. Reciprocity—they fiat both consultation and the implementation of the plan—taking two bites out of the fiat apple.

b. They’re unfair—the only way we can gain offense against the net benefit is to impact or link turn it—consultation CP’s all but FIAT in the link for net benefit forcing us to impact turn the net benefit BUT there are infinite number agents they could consult, which means the aff can never be ready for this type of CP.

**2. CP doesn’t compete-- If Japan says yes, the counterplan is by definition plan plus. Even if the plan is modified during consultation, the modified version doesn't compete with the 1AC plan. Justifies perm do the CP**

**3. The CP offers three options—consultation and agreement, consultation with changes, or consultation and rejection. We permute the part of the CP that genuinely consults with Japan and where Japan says yes—this permutation is conditioned on a “yes” response.**

**4. perm: do the plan and consult on other issues; there’s no reason why consulting on *our aff* is key.**

**5. Extending the US-Japan alliance causes a violent collapse in relations
Carpenter 97 (**Ted, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Handbook For Congress: Toward a New Relationship With Japan, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html> )
U.S. policymakers ignore mounting evidence that a security relationship between America as patron and Japan as dependent is not sustainable in the long term. By clinging to the status quo, American leaders risk an abrupt and nasty rupture of the alliance that could poison American-Japanese relations and create the dangerous power vacuum in East Asia that Washington has tried so hard to prevent.
There are storm warnings in both countries. The outcry against the U.S. military presence following the rape incident in Okinawa and the results of the September referendum on the U.S. bases are only the most recent and spectacular examples of rising Japanese annoyance. Anger about escalating U.S. demands on the trade front is another, albeit less visible, manifestation
Sentiment in the United States toward Japan has likewise become more confrontational. An especially lethal danger will occur if Americans who are angry about trade matters begin to link that issue to Japanese free riding on defense. There are indications that such a linkage is already taking place, as evidenced by the widely discussed *Foreign Affairs* article by Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn that appeared in the summer of 1995.
Public discontent with alleged Japanese misdeeds on trade issues will eventually produce pressure to adopt the suggestion of Johnson, Keehn, and others to threaten the withdrawal of the U.S. military shield as bargaining "leverage.'' American advocates of a confrontational trade policy will not be content indefinitely to subsidize the defense of a nation that they believe engages in unfair trade practices. Even Takakazu Kuriyama, Japan's former ambassador to the United States, has stated that the greatest danger to the alliance is "spillover'' from economic conflict
The outbreak of an armed conflict somewhere in East Asia that did not include an attack on Japan could also fracture the alliance. Japanese officials have made it clear that their country would merely hold America's coat while U.S. forces intervened to restore the peace. Johnson and Keehn accurately judge the probable consequences of such inaction in the case of a conflict in Korea: "The Pentagon should ponder the specter of

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Japanese warships standing idly by while the United States takes major risks to defend South Korea. Popular support in the United States for any defense of Japan would instantly vanish.''
That scenario underscores the inherent fragility of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Its continued viability is contingent on the alliance's never being put to the test by a military conflict in East Asia. U.S. policymakers will of course argue that the principal purpose of the alliance is to deter such a conflict in the first place. That is undoubtedly true, and the strategic partnership probably does make the outbreak of combat in the region less likely. Nevertheless, it is dubious wisdom to invest *all* of one's hopes in the infallibility of deterrence. To be viable, an alliance must also be of unquestioned value to both parties if deterrence fails and a war has to be waged. An arrangement in which one party assumes most of the costs in blood and treasure while the other party reaps the benefits is unstable as well as unjust.
U.S. leaders need to foster a U.S.-Japanese relationship based on the realities of the post-Cold War world, not a bygone era in which Japan lacked the economic strength or the political confidence to play an assertive, independent role in international affairs and the emotional wounds of World War II were still fresh. The new goal should be a mature relationship between equals--a relationship that recognizes that Japan is a great power in every respect

**6. Permute—consult and do the plan anyways—if they say yes, they won’t know we we’re disingenuous.**

**7. Permute—do the plan then consult; If Japan says no, the plan will be rolledback.**

**8. Double-bind—**

 **Either…**

**a. We don’t consult now, which means that Japan wouldn’t get upset if we didn’t consult with them over plan, AND we’d piss them off the next time we have a policy that we didn’t consult them over**

**b. Consultation is normal means and its included in the plan.**

**9. No solvency for the NB, counterplan doesn’t set up a continuous consultative framework which their own evi says is critical to relations**

10. TURN:

A. Consultation spurs inter-branch conflict

David Newsom, Professor of Diplomacy @ the University of Virgina, 1992, *The Allies and Arms Control*, Edited by Hampson, Von Riekhoff and Roper, p. 282

The reluctance of an administration to consult fully with the Congress explains further the hesitation of U.S. presidents to lay alternatives before allies that have not similarly been presented to the Congress. Washington policymakers proceed on the assumption – whether always correct or not – that consultations, whether with allies or with the Congress, will leak. Reports of discussions of policy alternatives with allies that have not similarly been presented to the congress can cause serious executive-legislative tensions.

B. Inter-branch conflict cripples US foreign policy – turning the net benefit

Linda S. Jamison, Deputy Director of Governmental Relations @ CSIS, Spring 1993, *Executive-Legislative Relations after the Cold War,* Washington Quarterly, v.16, n.2, p. 189

Indeed there are very few domestic issues that do not have strong international implications, and likewise there are numerous transnational issues in which all nations have a stake. Environmental degradation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, population control, migration, international narcotics trafficking, the spread of AIDS, and the deterioration of the human condition in the less developed world are circumstances affecting all corners of the globe. Neither political isolation

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nor policy bifurcation is an option for the United States. Global circumstances have drastically changed with the end of the Cold War and the political and policy conditions that sustained bipartisan consensus are not applicable to the post-war era. The formulation of a new foreign policy must be grounded in broad-based principles that reflect domestic economic, political and social concerns while providing practical solutions to new situations. Toward a cooperative US Foreign Policy for the 1990s: If the federal government is to meet the new international policy challenges of the post-cold war era, institutional dissension caused by partisan competition and executive-legislative friction must give way to a new way of business. Policy flexibility must be the watchword of the 1990s in the foreign policy domain if the United States is to have any hope of securing its interests in the uncertain years ahead. One former policymaker, noting the historical tendency of the United States to make fixed “attachments,” has argued that a changing world dictates policy flexibility, where practical solutions can be developed on principles of broad-based policy objectives (Fulbright 1979). Flexibility, however, will not be possible without interbranch cooperation. The end of the Cold War and the new single-party control of the White House and Congress provide a unique opportunity to reestablish foreign policy cooperation. Reconfiguring post cold war objectives requires comprehension of the remarkable transformations in world affairs and demands an intense political dialogue that goes beyond the executive branch (Mann 1990, 28-29).

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1. Case solves the impact- wouldn’t develop space based weapons in a world where we have challenged the militaristic tendencies of the status quo.

2. Case outweighs and turns the disad

1. Prefer systemic impacts— the plan solves for people who are continually being abused by united states colonialism that ignores their own rights and justifies endless violence with the pursuit of democracy. This is a reason why we control timeframe and probability- and those outweigh magnitude- many small extinctions in the short term ill outweigh a bigger one in the long term.
2. Aff come first-- extend our Everest evidence; the ending of colonization of Iraq is key in order to solve for the violent oppression of the other through a complete withdrawal. It is a prerequisite to their DA.
3. We will always control the terminal impact— the way we orient ourselves toward the other creates the conditions for violence- the aff is the ultimate example of how the United States otherization of Iraq has justified endless violence. The aff serves as an alternative to their securitizing discourse and eliminates the total impetus for violence, solving the impact to the disad

2. NU: Defense Spending Cuts Inevitable – Overstretched Budget

**CSM 6/28**/10

(David R. Francis, weekly column writer “Cuts to US defense budget look inevitable”

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0628/Cuts-to-US-defense-budget-look-inevitable

It's bigger than Wal-Mart, employs more people than the United States Post Office, and far outspends all its competitors. It's the US Department of Defense. Next year, though, budget cutters in Congress and the White House will probably begin cutting it down to size in order to slash America's outsize budget deficit. There are related reasons: The US war effort in Iraq is winding down; President Obama may start pulling out of Afghanistan; NATO allies are moving to slash their military outlays. Most of all, budget cutters can't afford to ignore an area as vast as defense. The need for serious deficit reduction and a loss of political support for high defense spending make cuts inevitable, says Gordon Adams, a defense expert at American University. If budget deficits aren't seriously tackled, US spending on interest on the national debt will exceed its defense budget by fiscal 2018, says Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He predicts large defense cuts within three years. It won't be easy. With 2.25 million full-time civilian and military personnel (not including part-time Guard and Reserve members) and thousands of contracts with firms, the Defense Department is a major economic engine for hundreds of communities and enjoys huge political clout. Nonetheless, major defense cuts have happened before. Between 1989 and 1993, the active defense force shrank from 2.2 million to 1.5 million and civilian personnel slimmed down from 1.04 million to 700,000, Mr. Adams notes. With the end of the cold war, and by congressional budget cuts, defense spending fell 26 percent in constant dollars between 1985 and 1993 – presided over by none other than Dick Cheney, then Defense secretary, who prided himself on having ended more than 100 military acquisition programs. Today, defense expenditures amount to about 4.9 percent of US gross domestic product, the nation's total output of goods and services. That's well above the less than 2 percent of GDP spent by such allies as Canada, Germany, Britain, and France. The latest news suggests more cuts by allies are ahead. Add in what Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and the Energy departments spend on defense and total US military spending will reach $861 billion in fiscal 2011, Mr. Harrison calculates, exceeding that of all other nations combined. Already, defense outlays in Iraq are falling. The number of American military personnel in Iraq has fallen from

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a peak of 170,000 a couple of years ago to 86,000 now and perhaps 50,000 by Sept. 1. The number of bases and facilities there has been cut by nearly half since peaking at 370 in 2008. Military spending in Iraq has dropped by half – from $90.6 billion in 2009 to an expected $43.4 billion in fiscal 2011. By the end of next year, the US hopes to have only a training-size force there. By contrast, operations in Afghanistan are still growing, with some 94,000 US troops expected on the ground by late August or September. Costs are climbing rapidly – from $51 billion in 2009 to $110 billion projected for fiscal 2011. But Adams suspects that before Mr. Obama faces reelection in 2012 he will move toward ending the Afghanistan mission. "The politics are devastating," Adams says. Employment at the Defense Department probably won't shrink to the levels at Wal-Mart (1.4 million) or the post office (599,000). But a difficult switch from guns to butter – or guns to deficit reduction – is about to get under way.

3. No link: Contractors will Demand the Transformational satellite Program

Clark April 15th, 2009 (Colin Clark, editor of DoDBuzz and Pentagon correspondent for Military .com. Colin joined the Military .com team from Space News, where he covered Congress, intelligence and regulatory affairs.Before that, he founded and edited for three years the Washington Aerospace Briefing, a twice-weekly Space News publication. He covered national security issues for Congressional Quarterly and was editor of Defense News before that. His first job covering defense was with Defense Week, where he won a national award for his coverage of the first Quadrennial Defense Review, Last Hurrahs for T-Sat, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/15/last-hurrahs-for-t-sat/)

The first details about what is happening inside one of the biggest programs marked for cancellation by Defense Secretary Gates are beginning to filter out. In the days after Gates announced its planned demise, Boeing and Lockheed Martin went through what may well be the last design reviews for the Transformational Satellite program. A source familiar with the program told us that the attitude during the reviews was pretty “fatalistic,” which would certainly not be in keeping with the approach many contractors are going to take to programs targeted by Gates. While some in industry talk about the secretary’s speech last week helping things by clearing the air or introducing more stability into the fevered atmosphere surrounding the defense industry the last month or so, many defense industr6y types have been loading up for bear, preparing detailed lobbying campaigns and community outreach. But the Boeing and Lockheed teams were apparently resigned to the end of their program.

4. Iraq pull out inevitable- we just make it faster.

5. A. Constructing space as a frontier to be colonized makes weaponization and violence inevitable, turning the disad.

Raymond D. Duvall, professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change. March 25th , 2006 “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weaponization and the Production of Late-Modern Political Subjects” Prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association

Second, space control bears significantly on the production of political subjectivities. The original Star Trek series would begin with the voice of Captain Kirk describing space as the “final frontier”. While presenting the exploration of space as a largely peaceful enterprise, the TV show was also drawing upon its viewers’ “memories” of the “western frontier” of 19 th century U.S. expansion. At least since the writings of Frederick Turner, there has been the notion that the frontier represents the well-spring of U.S. ingenuity, freedom, and creativity. According to Turner, because as they expanded westward settlers in the U.S. had to continually adapt to a new environment, they became increasingly “American”. The theme of the frontier as essential for American identity has had a significant discursive role in U.S. imperialist expansion (Turner, 1962). Although Turner concluded that the American frontier had closed by the late 1890s, many Americans, most notably Theodore Roosevelt, concluded at just that time that in order to maintain the exceptional American identity new frontiers had to be opened overseas. The notion of frontiers, then, has been integral to the U.S. imperialist project since its outset. The doctrine

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of space control, seen in this light, is simply an extension of the imperial logic. By expanding into and taking control of the “final frontier” the U.S. is continuing to renew an exceptional—an exclusive—identity by adapting itself to the harsh realities of a new environment.

So, the doctrine of space control can be read as extending U.S. sovereignty into orbit. While a clear violation of international law, this de facto expansion of U.S. sovereignty will have two effects. First, it enables a process of primitive accumulation, whereby orbital spaces around earth are removed from the commons initially established by the Outer Space Treaty, and places them under the control of the U.S. for use and perhaps even ownership by businesses sympathetic to U.S. interests. The U.S. becomes even more than it is now the state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state. Second, this doctrine of space control is part of the ongoing re-production of American subjects as “Americans”. Embedded within space control is the notion that space is a new frontier. Following the Turner thesis and Roosevelt’s doctrine of imperialist expansion, there has long been a drive for Americans to seek out new frontiers as a way of renewing the American identity and promoting American values of individuality, innovation, and exceptionalism.

B. Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending, state-sanctioned violence.

**Coviello 2000** (Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, *Apocalypse From Now On,* 2000)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

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C. Questions of representations come first – the way we discuss policy is more important than policy itself.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1996 (*Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines Series, ISBN 0816627622, p. 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 6 In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables [end page 5] one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

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1. Case outweighs and turns the disad

1. Prefer systemic impacts— the plan solves for people who are continually being abused by united states colonialism that ignores their own rights and justifies endless violence with the pursuit of democracy. This is a reason why we control timeframe and probability- and those outweigh magnitude- many small extinctions in the short term ill outweigh a bigger one in the long term.
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2. Nuclear war will not cause anything close to extinction- it’s a culturally constructed myth

Gustave le Bon “Nuclear Obliteration, Nuclear Winter, Nuclear Reality” 1999 (<http://members.tripod.com/~scenicroute/nuclear.html>

For many years the public has unquestioningly accepted the idea that any nuclear war will inevitably lead to the destruction of mankind. What is supposed to follow is deadly radioactivity spread everywhere, and even global atmospheric changes branded "nuclear winter" by the popular media. The most superficial examination of this idea causes it to collapse, because many hundreds of very powerful nuclear weapons have in fact been exploded at or near the surface of the earth, and we are all still here. Today, it is barely even detectable that these explosions ever took place. So, a limited nuclear war, with the exchange of a dozen or so nuclear bombs, might be very devastating near the explosions themselves, but the rest of the world would obviously go on with little damage. The idea that the whole world could be destroyed by this is preposterous. But, what about an all-out nuclear war?

To my knowledge, no one has ever done a calculation of the extent of destruction that would actually result from an all-out nuclear war; at least, not one which was shown to the public. All of what has been presented publically are politically motivated diatribes, purportedly giving factual conclusions. So, having a strong background in physics, I did the calculations myself.

I won't bore you with details and lists of numbers. But, at the height of the "cold war", there were about 22,000 functional sategic nuclear weapons in the posession of the Soviet Union and the United States combined (this number is supposed to be declining). Using the destructive effects measured in actual nuclear explosions (taken from the authoritative text, ***The Effect of Nuclear Weapons***), if all of these weapons, the entire world arsenal, were successfully delivered in a war, they all functioned optimally, and none of them were destroyed in flight, etc., they could completely destroy a maximum of 5% of the earth's surface, and probably much less. Another 10% or less would be considerably damaged, or radioactive for some time. This would leave 85% or more of the earth's surface undamaged and perfectly inhabitable. The 15% or less damaged or destroyed could be rebuilt within a few years by the inhabitants of the other 85% of the world, as demonstrated by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two Japanese cities which have actually been destroyed by nuclear bombs, then rebuilt and repopulated. The idea that mankind could destroy the planet with nuclear weapons outright is a myth. There has never been any factual support for it, and it flies in the face of simple mathematics. The "nuclear winter" theory has it that, in a large-scale nuclear war, huge amounts of dust and smoke would be lofted into the high atmosphere by the heat of nuclear explosions, blocking out the sun for months and depriving us of its warmth. This is supposed to cause freezing teperatures all over the planet for years, wiping out humanity. While this appears at first blush to make some kind of sense, and was touted for some years as being supported by computer modelling, a little deeper analysis shows it to be nonsense. First, the amount of debris assumed to be lofted to the upper atmosphere and the amount of time it was supposed to stay there did not match any observation of actual nuclear explosions. The rebuttal to this by the supporters of "nuclear winter" was that massive fires were supposed to create the smoke - but this ignores that there is no way for the nuclear explossions to carry this smoke to the upper atmosphere, since the fires happen *after* the explosions are over! Since massive fires happen anyway, they should provide *some* scientific evidence of this cooling effect which can be measured - but they don't. The simple reason is that clouds, moisture, dust, smoke - all of the things which block heat from the sun by day, also keep the heat from being radiated away to the sky at night. Even if nuclear explosions could loft more dust into the atmosphere than volcanos, forest fires, and dust storms

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do anyway, the expected effect would be a moderation of temperatures between day and night - cooler days, and warmer nights - not a perpetual winter.

3. They are the nuclear disciplinary machine, reducing subjects to strategic calculators that must think nuclear apocalypse into being.

William Chaloupka, Political Science @ Montana, 1992, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom. Pg 21-22

An oppositional politics, fully capable of problematizing this (hyper-) exuberant nuclearism, is possible on bases other than such suspect categories as euphemism, survival, unspeakability, and numbing. Through out this book, I am trying to reposition antinuclearism within such a defensible political practice. At the very least, this implies an intellectual project: to paraphrase Foucault, there is a struggle over issues of knowledge, set off by nuclear criticism.

The political mood of the language-and-politics position is well framed by nuclear criticism. More precisely, a political mood could yet form, one that would contrast sharply with an exiting nuclear opposition that in the United States, has adopted a paradoxical structure, as if driven to mirror that paradoxes of nukes themselves. Antinuke talk has been ponderous—so responsible and serious that it just obviously defeats itself, and must invent the defense that “people don’t really like to talk about nuclear war very much.” Paradoxically, opponents then test that humorlessness by asking citizens to become independent entrepreneurs of risk, weighing the likelihood and amplitude of possible disasters. It should not be surprising that such a politics works only intermittently if at all.

To summarize: as obvious a goal as “survival” may be, it nonetheless carries with it a series of code and a rhetoric. Survival implies a global unquestionable project- a faith really- and it therefore brings along baggage we might not wish to carry. Following Foucault’s model of the specific intellectual, intervening in the relations of power and knowledge, we can identify some of this baggage.

When we approach survival (and humanism, and liberalism in general) from that angle, we see some primary terms becoming far more problematic than we may have understood. The unspeakability of nukes—part of a characteristic liberal injunction to speak—turns out, instead, to point to a problem with the whole scheme of representation. Furthermore, our concern with technological dependence and accidents turns out to beg important issues of agency. In the wake of these discoveries, we should at least suspect that it is disciplinary power—more than technology, or reticence to speak or a too-awesome topic—that has been accumulating. And in the face of that accumulation, the injunction to aid survival and counter unspeakability by simply canceling euphemism is obviously just too limited a response.

In upcoming chapters, I will try to suggest a different sort of opposition, informed by the theoretical considerations outlined above. Even if principled renunciations of the nuke—in the name of humanity or survival—have misfired, other interventions may be possible, may even be better.

5. Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending, state-sanctioned violence.

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Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes

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**7. No jobs bill—Democrats not on board**.

Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p\_id=2342]

President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits — and few options for a quick fix.

Obama’s economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill?

Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obama, who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

8. **Unemployment extensions unlikely to go through**

Deborah Tracy (writer for the Daily World, 7/4/10,

http://www.thedailyworld.com/articles/2010/07/04/local\_news/doc4c302a1f5fbcc511812301.txt)

Holidays continue to pass, but the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010 hasn’t. Three times since Memorial Day, Senate Democrats have submitted different versions of the legislation. As the Senate goes into the July 4 break, the bill has not yet received the required number of votes for passage. And, many Capitol observers aren’t optimistic about its chances to pass before the August recess. The stalling of this bill in the Senate — for eight weeks and counting — means more than 1.2 million Americans who have been out of work for six months or longer will lose their unemployment benefits, and that figure will rise to 2 million by July 10, several days before the senators return from their holiday break.

AT: Redeployment DA

1. Case outweighs and turns the disad

1. Prefer systemic impacts— the plan solves for people who are continually being abused by united states colonialism that ignores their own rights and justifies endless violence with the pursuit of democracy. This is a reason why we control timeframe and probability- and those outweigh magnitude- many small extinctions in the short term ill outweigh a bigger one in the long term.
2. Aff come first-- extend our Everest evidence; the ending of colonization of Iraq is key in order to solve for the violent oppression of the other through a complete withdrawal. It is a prerequisite to their DA.
3. We will always control the terminal impact— the way we orient ourselves toward the other creates the conditions for violence- the aff is the ultimate example of how the United States otherization of Iraq has justified endless violence. The aff serves as an alternative to their securitizing discourse and eliminates the total impetus for violence, solving the impact to the disad

2. Case solves the impact- wouldn’t increase troops in a world where there is no imperialism.

3. No risk of Indo-Pak war— both sides don’t want to risk it

DavidEnders**,** Daily News Editor for the *Michigan Daily*, 2002 “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,”

http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2002/01/30/News/Experts.Say.Nuclear.Wa

r.Still.Unlikely-1404620.shtml)

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."

The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.

"The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.

"Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political

science Prof. Paul Huth said.

Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.

"American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

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4. The conflict won’t go nuclear

Subodh ATAL, Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, 2002 April 6,

http://www.subodhatal.org/articles/war.html

 The knee-jerk reaction to any talk about an Indo-Pak war is that of raising the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe. This is based on Pakistan's oft-repeated threat of using its nuclear arsenal. But one needs to weigh the potential and dangers of such a conflagration against the interminable jehad being waged by Pakistan.

The exact size of each country's nuclear arsenal is unclear. But it is commonly accepted that India has 50-100 warheads, while Pakistan may have 20-30. According to seismological evidence of the 1998 tests, India's nuclear weapon yields were 20-40 kilotons, while Pakistani bombs ranged from 2-10 kilotons. An important aspect is the delivery systems, where Pakistan was considered to have an edge until recently. Its medium range Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, which would reach Indian targets in a matter of minutes, are based on solid fuel technology, while India's short-range Prithvis are based on liquid fuel technology. Thus the Prithvis need to be positioned close to the border, and require several hours of fueling as opposed to the Pakistani missiles. India has remedied this asymmetry recently, with the testing and induction of the modified Agni missile. The medium range Agni-II is solid-fuel based and can be based deeper in India as an effective second-strike option.

Most analysts fear that Pakistan would pull the nuclear trigger first, particularly if Indian forces make major gains, such as threatening to cut off Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Such an attack, if it did happen, would be missile-based. However, Pakistan must realize that if it did strike first, it would face massive retaliation from India. Such massive nuclear retaliation, possibly with a combination of Prithvis and Agni-IIs by India would undoubtedly end Pakistan's existence as a nation. Thus it is difficult to believe that a Pakistani first strike would happen. It is more likely that Pakistan will use ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads against Indian targets. The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s set a precedent for such an exchange. The missiles fired by each country were more of a nuisance, with few cases of mass casualties. In the case of South Asia, one can argue that use of ballistic missiles against population centres could be more deadly, however, the international community is likely to take a dim view of such attacks. It is roughly estimated that about 100,000-150,000 deaths may occur in a single nuclear attack on a large city in South Asia. With non-nuclear missiles, particularly Pakistani missiles of Chinese and North Korean origin that have suspect accuracy, the toll is likely to be several magnitudes lower, but may be more effective as a weapon of terror. India's Prithvi and Agni are considered to be more accurate. If a nuclear or ballistic missile exchange does occur, it is likely to be aimed at advancing armies to avoid international consequences. In this context, the Indian military has done recent exercises to train for a nuclear war. Thus the Indian military is likely to survive such an exchange more effectively than Pakistan's smaller and less-prepared forces.

Any preparation for a nuclear exchange would have to include protection of the central government and political officials.

In this case, Pakistan, where the political system is already decimated and disrupted, may be at a rare advantage. A sudden

attack on the Indian Parliament building when it is in session could potentially remove the entire democratic leadership of

the country. India would have to take appropriate preventive steps to ensure that its political system can continue to

function in a war with potential for nuclear exchanges. Conventional Warfare

The above discussion indicates that a nuclear war is unlikely, and thus conventional forces would decide the outcome of a war. Below is a discussion of the conventional strengths of the two nations.

5. Their discourse of danger surrounding the Middle East makes military intervention necessary and inevitable turning the disad and consuming the world in perpetual warfare.

Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.

Bush here invokes the recurrent American anxiety that Americans are too individualistic, too materialistic, and therefore lacking in solidarity and conviction. This is the worry that America has become a collection of self-centered consumers motivated by private wants rather than real agency. The war on terror allows America to show that this is not so, and to make it not so. Through the war on terror, Americans can manifest their agency and solidarity by empowering the U.S. government to fulfill their agency and solidarity by leading the world to peace. To do this, however, they must engage in the war themselves by recognizing the threat

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of terrorism and by feeling the fear for it, deeply. Only in this way can they redeem themselves from this fear through the moral struggle waged on their behalf by the government. Conversely, it is no accident that the Middle East is the source of the threat they must fear. Recall that Schmitt stipulates that the enemy is "the other, the stranger . . . existentially something different and alien" [End Page 36] (1996, 27). This is the irreducible enemy, whom one can only, if conflict arises, fight to the death. The Middle East can be cast as this sort of enemy because it can be easily endowed with characteristics that make it the antipode of the United States, intrinsically violent and irrational. But it is, at the same time, a region of peoples yearning for freedom who can be redeemed through their submission to moral order and brought into the fold of civilization. So in order to redeem the Middle East and ourselves from fear and violence, we must confront the Middle East for the foreseeable future with fear and violence. It is important to recognize that the rhetoric of security with its war on terrorism is not a program for action, but a discourse that justifies actions**.** The United States is not bound to take any specific action implied by its rhetoric. But this rhetoric gives the United States the prerogative to take whatever actions it decides upon for whatever purpose as long as these actions come within the rhetoric's purview. Judged by its own standards, the rhetoric of security is counterproductive. It increases fear while claiming that the goal is to eliminate fear. It increases insecurity by pronouncing ever broader areas of life to be in need of security. It increases political antagonism by justifying U.S. interests in a language of universalism. It increases enmity toward the United States by according the United States a special status over and above all other nations. The war against terror itself is a notional war that has no existence except as an umbrella term for various military and police actions. According to a report published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army, "the global war on terrorism as currently defined and waged is dangerously indiscriminate and ambitious" (Record 2003, 41). This assessment assumes that the actions comprehended under the rubric of the "war on terrorism" are designed to achieve a coherent military objective. The impossible "absolute security," feared by the report's author to be the "hopeless quest" of current policy (46), may be useless as a strategic objective, but it is eminently effective in organizing a rhetoric designed to justify an open-ended series of hegemonic actions. The rhetoric of security, then, provides the moral framework for U.S. political hegemony through its grounding in the idea of national agency and in the absolute opposition between the state of civility and the state of [End Page 37] war. Designating the United States as the embodiment of the world order's underlying principle and the guarantor of the world order's existence, this rhetoric places both the United States and terrorism outside the normative relations that should inhere within the world order as a whole. The United States is the supreme agent of the world's war against war; other nations must simply choose sides. As long as war threatens to dissolve the peaceful order of nations, these nations must submit to the politics of "the one, instead of the many." They must accept the United States as "something godlike," in that in questions of its own security—which are questions of the world's security—they can have no authority to influence or oppose its actions. These questions can be decided by the United States alone. Other nations must, for the foreseeable future, suspend their agency when it comes to their existence. Therefore, the rhetoric of security allows the United States to totalize world politics within itself in a manner that extends from the relations among states down to the inner moral struggle experienced by every human being.

6. Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending, state-sanctioned violence.

**Coviello 2000** (Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, *Apocalypse From Now On,* 2000)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’

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but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

6. Questions of representations come first – the way we discuss policy is more important than policy itself.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1996 (*Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines Series, ISBN 0816627622, p. 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 6 In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content

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has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables [end page 5] one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

AT: PMC’s

1. Private Military contractors will soon out number U.S. military personnel- makes your impacts non-unique

**Schwaartzkopf, 10** (Matt, Drake University “As Soldiers Scale Down, Private Contractors Flourish; What Will Contractors Do After Iraq?” April 2 9 Commission on Wartime Contracting <http://pmc.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/04/02/as-soldiers-retreat-private-contractors-boom-what-do-we-do-about-iraq/> 6/29/10)

On Monday, the Commission on Wartime Contracting held a hearing on how to handle the downsizing of private contractors in Iraq as American forces scale down and prepare to leave the country by December of 2011. Here is a link to that hearing. Past hearings relating to contracting in Iraq are also posted on the site, so be sure to look those over as well. The hearing brings up the interesting fact that while our troop numbers are decreasing, the number of contractors in Iraq are increasing. Eventually in Iraq, military contractors will outnumber military personnel. While the hearing’s chairman reminds the panel and audience that the United States went into Iraq “expecting swift victory,” which we achieved, the overarching problem with the operation was the occupation aspect. Because the United States military has decreased in size since the end of the Cold War, it makes sense that the “nation building” aspect of our armed forces was more likely to be cut than our war-fighting abilities. This cut allowed for the boom in the private contracting industry that we have seen since the Iraq War began in 2003, in regard to logistics, base upkeep and construction duties.

2. Private Military Companies are gaining troops and power

Peter W. Singer, worked for the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Department of Defense and has a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2004, *The Private Military industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?*

Just as Iraq is the single largest U.S. military commitment in more than a generation, so too is it the largest commitment for the private military industry. The numbers for the PMF presence in Iraq dwarf any past operations. Over 60 firms employ more than 20,000 private personnel carrying out military functions (as opposed to the thousands of additional civilian contractors providing reconstruction or oil services). To put this into context, such numbers mean that the private military industry has contributed more forces to Iraq than any other member of the U.S.-led coalition, being nearly equal to all the states excluding the U.S. combined. To be more accurate then, President Bush’s claim of a “Coalition of the Willing” might be renamed the “Coalition of the Billing.” With these greater numbers have come greater risks. By September 2004, private military contractors had suffered an estimated 150 killed in Iraq. More than 700 are thought to have been wounded. Again, such numbers exceed those for the rest of the coalition combined and are higher than those for any single U.S. Army division. Perhaps more important than the raw numbers is the wide scope of critical jobs that contractors carried out and which are very different from those undertaken by civilians in past wars. In addition to war-gaming and field training before the invasion, private military employees handled logistics and support for coalition troops during the build-up to war. The massive U.S. complex at Camp Doha in Kuwait, which served as the launch-pad for the invasion, was not only built by private contractors, operated by private contractors, but was even guarded by private contractors. During the invasion, contractors served in these roles and also maintained and loaded weapons on many of the most sophisticated weapons systems like the B-2 stealth bomber and the Apache helicopter. They even helped operate combat systems like the Patriot missile batteries in the Army and the Aegis defence system on board numerous U.S. Navy ships.

1. Their Isenberg evidence flows aff: It literally says that Obama has presented bills to block PMC’s and presented actions to limit their role- if this is true then sending PMC’s to new places is

AT: PMC’s

irrational. This takes out the link.

4. The Lendleman evidence that they have tagged as saying that troops get replaces with PMC’s does not say this at all. There is not a single part of the card that actually discusses this replament.

5. Their Reihan evidence says nothing about PMC’s and imperialism. It literally just says that imperialism exists.

6. their impacts are completely non-unique.

Predictions Bad

**The neg’s impact claims are very unlikely. The unchallenged USFG in the squo deliberately constructs doomsday scenarios like the aff’s in order to scare us into compliancy.**

**Yudkowsky 04.**Yudkowsky, Eleiza “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks”Forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks,* eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic Draft of August 31, 2006

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, **respectively**, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight *from* Thailand *to* the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)

Predictions Bad

**A quick reading of history will demonstrate that people have been predicting wildly unlikely cataclysmic end-of-the-world catastrophes since before the Book of Revelations was written. From the year 1000 prediction that the sky would crack across the middle and fall on humanity’s heads to the Hale-Bop comet cult that committed mass suicide before they believed that everyone would die, these predictions have uniformly NOT COME TRUE. This is because the act of predicting catastrophe performs a normative cultural function to consolidate group identity, which informs any prediction more than a drive towards accuracy.**

**O’Leary 97.**STEPHEN D. O’LEARY Associate Professor Annenberg School for Communication “Apocalyptic Argument and the Anticipation of Catastrophe: The Prediction of Risk and the Risks of Prediction” Argumentation 11: 293–313, 1997.

The comparison of modern pseudo-scientific predictions of seismological disaster with religious arguments that predict global catastrophe and redemption for the converted has revealed that predictive models of the future may accomplish a variety of ends. For scientists, predictions function as tests of theory and hence are subject to more rigorous standards of proof. For those whose interest are served by actions taken as a consequence of the predictions, they may serve as means to extrinsic ends such as prestige and resource allocation. For the general public, predications may simultaneously increase anxieties and make them more manageable by providing a convenient symbolic focus. Catastrophic predictions in public argument have the potential to build a group identity through a shared temporal conception, and hence may withstand repeated disconfirmation. Predictions of the future are never offered in a vacuum; they influence action in the present by offering both positive and negative scenarios as consequences of choices made by the audience. As the cases examined here illustrate, the normative function of catastrophic predications appear to be as significant as their accuracy.Thus, it may be beside the point to point out the recurrent fallacies that characterize this form of argument. As J. T. Fraser notes, The history of man can certainly boast of fateful utterances about individual and communal destinies which do not seem to have been derived by logico-deductive reasoning. . . . It is precisely these prophetic capacities, together with knowledge of the inevitable, which inform all levels of human civilization with a tragic sense of freedom and fate (Fraser 1990: 269–

Discourse First

**The world is entirely defined by discourse: it is how we view the world. Our point is that the affirmative’s particular way of viewing the world is violent. Far from being nihilist or oppressive, Foucault’s way of viewing the world is that we should simply preference resistance to dominant discourse to those dominant discourses—that is the nature of all human relations.**

**Bleiker 03.** (roland, professor of international relations, university of queensland ) Discourse and Human AgencyRoland Bleiker. Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003.Vol. 2, Iss. 1;  pg. 25

Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003. Vol. 2, Iss.  1;  pg. 25

'It is within discourse,' one of Foucault's much rehearsed passages (1976, 133) notes, **'that power and knowledge articulate each other**.' The work of the French historian and philosopher epitomizes what is at stake in questions of discourse and agency. For Foucault, discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain procedures. This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status, while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognize as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false. They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected (see Foucault, 1969,1971,1991, 59-60).

Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing, which we have acquired over time. Discourses render social practices intelligible and rational -- and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for, as Nietzsche (1983, 17) once expressed it, 'all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable.'

While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination, a preoccupation with discourses may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by forces that are not only impenetrable, but also elude human comprehension. In his reading of Nietzsche, for instance, Foucault portrays the emergence of things (as the concept of goodness) as taking place in a void between the energy of the strong and the reaction of the weak. Since adversaries do not meet directly in this interstice, so we read, no one is responsible for its outcome. 'Only a single drama is ever staged in this "non-place," the endlessly repeated play of dominations' (Foucault, 1984, 85).

If power and domination are so omnipresent, so invincible, how could anything every change? If, as Foucault implicitly suggests, there is no conversation, no common language, not even a visible discursive meeting between the inside and the outside, the centre and the margin, how could one explain all those challenges from below, the moments when people take to the street and shake, successfully or not, the foundations of the established order?

These questions prompted many critics to dismiss approaches that revolve around discursive explanations of social dynamics. Countless authors have criticized Foucault for putting us in a situation in which we can do nothing but express bewilderment at an overwhelming world around us -- a world in which the potential for human agency seems to have vanished altogether. Hartsock, for example, condemns this world as one in which systems move, not people, in which the subject becomes obliterated or reduced to an impotent passive object. She claims that in defining power as omnipresent, as ever expanding and penetrating all aspects of society, Foucault has made it very difficult to locate domination (Hartsock, 1990, esp 168-170). Resistance, then, becomes virtually impossible. Benhabib (1995, 20), referring to postmodern approaches in general, draws attention to their inability to speak of agents and agency. A postmodern position, she claims, mistakenly dissolves the subject into chains of signification that lie beyond human influence. We then find ourselves in a conceptual order dominated by overarching discursive systems. People are reduced to mere bystanders, passive and irrelevant. Crushed into oblivion. But is this elusive analytical spectre called discourse really so menacing that it must be warded off at any cost? Is it leading us into an apocalyptic world in which 'man would be erased,' as a famous Foucaultean passage holds, 'like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea'? (Foucault, 1966, 398).

Despite their power to frame the world, discourses are not invincible. They are not monolithic forces that subsume everything in sight, crush everything in reach. Discourses are often thin, unstable, and fragmented.

Discourse First

There are fissures, there are cracks, there are weak spots: windows of opportunity that lead to transformative pathways. And Foucault, despite the nihilistic traits attributed to him, offers us possibilities of exploring these transformative potentials, for his work can be read in more than just one way. Foucault's earlier so-called archaeological phase (see 1969) privileges systemic and discursive restraints over the individual's capacity to employ power for emancipatory objectives. His later work, however, revolves around a more affirmative core, one that sees power not just as a negative and repressive force, but at least as much as something enabling, an opportunity, an instrument of **resistance** (Foucault, 1976, 133). Indeed, Foucault (1982, 125, 223) explicitly points out that acknowledging the omnipresence of power is not to say that it is a fatality that cannot be overcome. 'Where there is power,' he says, 'there is resistance.' Patton (1994, 61), extending this line of thought, convincingly argues that Foucault can be read in ways that 'offer a surrogate for hope.' By distinguishing between power, power over and domination, Patton shows that Foucault espouses a conception of human being. Even though this conception is 'thin,' it can 'be filled out in a manner which explains both resistance to domination and the possibility of transforming existing economies of power' (Patton, 1994, 66).

AT: Burke

1. Her Burke evidence is from 98 which is pre-Iraq and doesn’t assume such blatant forms of colonialism.

2. Flows aff – we are the political action they say is necessary – we agree a sole focus on discourse is bad and combine it with political action.

3. This card doesn’t say anything.

AT: No Spillover

1. We spillover – Everest evidence indicates that withdrawing from Iraq is the starting point to combat imperialism- the wat there is a horrific cenario of US internvetion that is only the beginning- preventing now solves. Brydon evidence indicates that the aff begins a shift towards peaceful situations.
2. Iraq is the starting point. Obama perpetuates US colonialism and racism which will bring about the end of civilization.
3. 3. Santos 08 (Juan Santos, writer from LA, 2/13/08, “Barak Obama and the ‘End” of Racism” Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/02/barack-obama-and-the-%E2%80%9Cend%E2%80%9D-of-racism/)
4. The regime of Bush the Lesser was the pinnacle of this effort; he carried the agenda as far as it could go, before it began to fracture and collapse under the weight of its own madness — before it met the determined resistance of society’s most vulnerable, scapegoated and openly stigmatized targets, as they marched in their millions refusing to be victims. The combined force of the Christian fascist juggernaut, the repressive powers of the State, and the US war machine looked unstoppable until it met this opposition at home, and until it met the mad and fierce resistance of the people of Iraq who have, however chaotic and horrifying their tactics, refused to be conquered. With these events, the aura of invincibility and unstoppable momentum was destroyed, the lid of repression began to crack, and what had been suppressed in us rose again to the surface. Literally, in terms of time in office, and as a sweeping reactionary social agenda, the Bush regime is coming to an end. With its end, inevitably, comes a wave of hope and euphoria. This is the wave Obama is riding, the ocean of energy he is trying to steer into an acceptance of the same old deal, the same old wars, the same old systemic racism, packaged as if it were something new. This wave of energy is not something he’s inspired, it’s something he’s riding and that he is uniquely qualified to channel toward his own ends — which are not our ends. As we have seen, Obama doesn’t represent peace — he represents an expansion of war and the power of Empire. He’s even more extreme on this than Bush himself, except in his public rhetoric. He doesn’t represent the real and legitimate needs, desires and hopes of Black people — he refuses to speak openly of the most fundamental issues affecting Black people. He doesn’t represent the “end of racism,” but the perpetuation of oppression in a new guise. Obama doesn’t represent a new system or the new way of life we dreamed of and fought for and that has been suppressed; he represents the old one. He represents a system that is fundamentally rooted in exploitation, oppression and destruction on a global scale, and he is living proof that no fundamental change for the better can, or will, come about under the system he represents and upholds. It doesn’t work that way. To tell the truth is to betray the system, and he can’t bring himself to do it, even though he is far too conscious not to know it. Attaining authentic freedom requires, as its barest starting point, the naming of what keeps us subjugated. What keeps us subjugated is the very system Obama wants to rule. The system, even with Barack Obama as its first Black emperor, is not our hope. It’s our enemy, the enemy of the world, and, because this system is rapidly undermining the ability of the planet to foster and sustain life, it is the enemy of all Life on Earth. This is exactly the understanding that the Christian fascists like Weyrich and Heubeck wanted to crush out of our awareness, and the lack of such awareness is exactly what Barack Obama depends on if he is to remain a symbol of the impossible dream that the system can be something other than what it is.

AT: Security Means Human Emancipation

1. Hyperbolized accounts of threats in an attempt to find security create an endless politics of war and fear thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Dillon and Reed 09** (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the utile demand it makes on you, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency

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thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency

2. Their dependence on the security logic transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for truth and rationality, causing violence against the unknown and domesticating life.

**Der Derian, 93**. James Der Derian, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” *The Political Subject of Violence*, 1993, pp. 102-105

The desire for **security is** manifested as **a collective resentment of** difference **that which is not** us, not certain, not **predictable**. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, **the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable**, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" **The fear of the unknown and** the **desire for certainty** combine to **produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the** highest sign of a sovereign self, the **surest protection** against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes** identified as **evil**, and evil provokes hostility - **recycling the desire for security**. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, **creates** a **people** who are **willing to subordinate** affirmative **values to the 'necessities' of security**: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The **security** of the sovereign, rational self and state **comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile**. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

AT: Predictions Good

Calculation ensures the zero point of the holocaust—we must embrace the alternative as an attempt at the immeasurable Justice

MichaelDILLON **professor of politics and international relations at University of Lancaster, all around badass and badminton enthusiast** 1999Political Theory Vol. 27 No. 2

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global.

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Solvency Extensions

1.They say that by doing our Aff we will not be able to solve for all colonialism in the world because there will not be a spillover effect and we will still have troops in other countries. This argument is false because solving for Iraq colonialism is key in solving for worldwide colonialism. Extend our Everest 04 evidences which says:

Ending the colonization of Iraq is key. Iraq is the starting point of a deadly spiral of US intervention.

Everest 04 (Larry Everest, Common Courage Press, 2004, “Oil, Power, and Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda”)

For over 60 years, U.S. actions in Iraq and the Persian Gulf have been guided by calculations of global empire, regional domination, and overall control of Persian Gulf oil. As a result, they have never brought liberation, but have instead inflicted enormous suffering and perpetuated oppression. There are deep national, social and class divisions running through the societies of the Middle East, but foreign domination—by the U.S. in particular—remains the main obstacle to a more just social order. Second, U.S. actions have brought neither peace nor stability, but spawned a deepening spiral of resistance, instability, intervention and war. There are connections here, and a trajectory to events which we will explore, from the 1953 coup that installed the Shah in Iran to the 1979 revolution that overthrew him, to the subsequent Iran-Iraq war, to the first U.S. Gulf War in 1991, and then the second in 2003. The new U.S. National Security Strategy and its offspring—the “war on terror”—are efforts to forcibly resolve these growing impediments. Third, this war represents a further, horrific escalation of that deadly spiral of U.S. intervention and it is only the beginning. Washington has dispatched its military to conquer and occupy a country in the heart of the Arab world, perhaps for years to come, and use it as a springboard for further maneuvers and aggressions in the region. Finally, the history of foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf demonstrates that grand ambitions of conquest and control are one thing, but realizing them can be quite another. Oppression breeds resistance, actions provoke reactions, and events often careen beyond the control of their initiators in unexpected ways.

2. Even if you believe their arguments that we can't solve for worldwide colonialism you as the decision maker In today round have a moral obligation to vote to reject colonialism. Extend our Shaikh 07 evidences which states:

Resisting This Colonialism is a Decision Rule: It’s Role in the Death and Destruction of the Vast Majority of the Planet Requires its Rejections

Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source ‘7, [*Development* 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission itself was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, **even 'the most ghastly** European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium's conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery'. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized – morally, of course, but also in terms of **what would enable** the most in **human l**ife and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that English (and other colonial languages elsewhere) became the language of instruction, explicitly creating a hierarchy between the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture – in the most expansive sense of the term – of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected 'taste, opinions, morals and intellect' – all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. **Although**, as Gayatri Chakravorty

Solvency Extensions

Spivak points out, colonialism can always be interpreted as an **'enabling violation'**, it remains a violation: **the systematic eradication** of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), **remains** reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. **The enablement cannot be advanced,** therefore, **as a justification of the violation.** Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, some of the native population was taught a hegemonic – and foreign – language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear – whether we should not hear – from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost? The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences – even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state resources. The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels: on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized **within the colonized population itself**. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a 'metaphor for postcolonial political violence' (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives' genocide – akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is **sufficient to mark the** significance (and **persistence) of the colonial** antecedents to **contemporary political violence.** The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the **unintended consequences**. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about 'primordial' loyalties, the 'backwardness' of 'premodern' peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were 'native' Hindu and 'alien' Muslim (with particular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

3. (Impact)

In our 1AC we made the argument that colonialism is the root cause of global warfare. Extend our Burke 05 evidence, this states that: The Occupation of Iraq is an attempt at enforcing freedom. This colonial project is the major cause of global warfare. The US occupation ensures a endless cycle of violence in Iraq. As long as the colonial project exists there will be an endless cycle of violence both structural and non-structural as well as destruction. By solving for colonialism we solve for their impact of war while solving for our impact of dehumanization and loss of culture.

AT: Iraq Instability

1. Iraq is stable enough for U.S. troops to leave.

Schwartz, Lowell is a Political Scientist at RAND Ph.D., Department of War Studies, King's College London; M.A. in international affairs, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; B.S. in economics and history, University of Wisconsin Iraq is stable enough for U.S. troops to leave <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090311a3.html> 3-11-09

The Obama administration's decision to withdraw the bulk of U.S. troops from Iraq over the next 19 months has sparked fears that Iraq will once again plunge into the wide-scale and debilitating violence that it endured from 2004 to 2007. Those fears are, for the most part, overblown. There are good reasons to believe that the level of stability achieved in Iraq can be maintained even without a large-scale U.S. presence.

To understand why, it is important to know what else was going on inside Iraq in 2007, when U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the "surge" of 20,000 additional troops and Gen. David Petraeus shifted U.S. forces to a more aggressive strategy. For, although the surge was important, two other factors played a critical role in bringing Iraq back from the brink.

First, Baghdad had been transformed into a Shiite-dominated city. Although exact statistics are hard to come by, in 2003 approximately 35 percent of Baghdad's population was Sunni. Today, based upon the results of the recently held regional election, Baghdad is only 10 percent to 15 percent Sunni. This means that between 1 million and 1.5 million Sunnis have fled the capital. Most now are refugees in Jordan and Syria, and they are unlikely to be welcomed home anytime soon by the new Shiite elite running the country.

The ethnic cleansing of many Baghdad neighborhoods in 2006 and 2007 was deplorable. But it made it difficult for Sunni insurgents to hide or blend in with the population, and deprived them of logistic and financial support. It also provided a degree of safety and security for the Shiite-led government, which was largely the purpose of the well-organized campaign in the first place.

2. Iraq will remain stable after troops leave.

Schwartz, Lowell is a Political Scientist at RAND Ph.D., Department of War Studies, King's College London; M.A. in international affairs, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; B.S. in economics and history, University of Wisconsin Iraq is stable enough for U.S. troops to leave <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090311a3.html> 3-11-09

Both the transformation of Baghdad into a Shiite city and the recognition and support of Iraq's neighbors for the country's new political order have been instrumental in stabilizing the country. These changes are likely to be permanent, and offer hope that the wide-scale violence that afflicted the country between 2003 and 2007 will not return after U.S. forces depart.

3. Link turn - Withdrawal causes political alignment, ending sectarian violence and increasing stability

(Zaid Ad Ali, attorney at New York Bar, 1/19/07, openDemocracy, “The United States in Iraq: The Complete Case For Withdrawal”, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/withdrawal\_4264.jsp)

The explosion at Mustansiriyah University that killed more than seventy people on 16 January 2007 sent a clear message: no one is safe in today's Iraq. The Iraqi government has reacted to the atrocity in a typically lethargic and dishonest manner, offering empty promises of swift justice and increased security. Meanwhile, very few observers remain hopeful that the escalation that the George W Bush administration announced on 10 January - involving the deployment of around 21,500 additional United States troops in Iraq - will improve the desperate current situation. It is time for policymakers in the US to face up to the fact that the US occupation will never be able to achieve victory in Iraq, no matter how that goal is defined and what pattern of behaviour it entails. This article argues that there is a clear and ineluctable causal link between the mere presence of the occupation authorities and the failure to reestablish law and order in the country. The only viable course of action is therefore that the US army should withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible. The article ends by offering some suggestions as to what measures can be taken to ensure that the country's post-occupation phase will be as peaceful and successful as possible. A failure of reconstruction The prerequisite to recommending a specific course of action is to offer an honest diagnosis of what has happened in Iraq since March-April 2003. Fortunately, most commentators now agree that the US occupation of Iraq, after apparent military success in the war that preceded it, got off to a very bad start. By virtue of a series of misguided administrative decisions - including the dissolution of the Iraqi army and blanket de-Ba'athification - the occupation authorities managed to destroy the Iraqi state in one fell swoop. One of the consequences of these blunders is that the US created enough space for armed groups of all kinds to mushroom across Iraq within a short period. But this is only one part of the story. The combined effect of the US's policies in 2003 was the dismantling of the entire Iraqi state. The effect of everything that has happened since then, however, is even more disturbing. Despite all the efforts that have

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been made and all the monies that have been squandered, the US has clearly failed in the most important task that it had set itself: to put the pieces back together and rebuild a functioning state in Iraq. Baghdad is now but a shadow of its former self, resembling Mogadishu more than anything else. In many areas of the country, the state is completely absent. Where the state does make its presence felt, the services that it provides have continued to deteriorate since 2003 - as if there is a cancer eating away at the heart of the state itself. The Bush administration often cites the December 2005 parliamentary elections and the drafting of the new constitution as positive developments, but they at best represent a distraction. A combination of reasons is often cited - sabotage, insurgency, corruption - to explain the failure to reconstruct the state, but the cause is more fundamental: it can be found in the nature of the occupation itself. Whenever a society is occupied, the way in which it will interact with the occupying forces will be determined by a number of different factors. For example, it should be obvious that no occupation comes into existence in a historical vacuum. Indeed, the factual context in which an occupation comes into existence will have a major effect on the way the occupied society will react. In that sense, the fact that the US occupation of Japan took place after one of the most violent wars in human history and after the use of overwhelming force against the occupied country was one of the major reasons why there was no post-war Japanese resistance to speak of (see John Dower, "A warning from history", Boston Review, February/March 2003). By contrast, the circumstances leading up to the American occupation of Vietnam led the people of that country to assume that the US was intending to replace France as a colonial power. In that context, it is surprising how little attention observers, commentators and policymakers alike have paid to the incredibly sordid history of involvement in Iraq prior to its occupation of that country. The US has been involved in internal Iraqi affairs in different ways for at least half a century, and the more involved it has become the more disastrous the results for ordinary Iraqis. The details are often difficult to face up to, considering that we are talking about what should be the world's most important exporter of democracy and prosperity. From the start however, the US policy in relation to Iraq has been characterized by blind self-interest, inhumanity and racism. A sordid history Although it first became involved in Iraqi affairs through covert operations in the late 1950s, the US made its interests in the country abundantly clear during the Iraq-Iran war, when it offered billions of dollars in agricultural credits to the Iraqi regime, which was then able to divert monies to fund its costly war effort (1980-88) against Iran. The US also provided Iraqi generals with military support during the war. On a number of occasions it supplied them with advance warning of Iranian troop movements in order to facilitate the Iraqi war effort. This was done despite the fact that the Reagan administration was already aware at that point that the Iraqis

 were preparing to use chemical weapons on the battlefield, which is somewhat problematic considering the US's insistence that the rules of war should be respected at all times. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US seized on the opportunity to launch a full-scale war against the Iraqi people. Hussein was given five months to withdraw, and during that time, thirty countries, led by the US, massed their armies along the Saudi-Iraqi border and in the Gulf. In one of the negotiation sessions, James A Baker made the notorious announcement to Tariq Aziz that Iraq was going to be "bombed in the stone age". That is exactly what happened. In violation of just about every rule of war imaginable, the US and its allies destroyed every piece of infrastructure, every industrial plant, and every governmental institution within their reach, whether civilian or not. Within a few weeks, the Iraqi economy was utterly devastated - the US managed to knock Iraq, which had previously been considered a middle-income economy, back into third-world status. To make matters worse, and in complete contempt for the people that it supposedly cared so much for, the US military for the first time used depleted uranium (DU), a type of nuclear waste, in its munitions. DU is one of the heaviest substances known to man, and it was used in order to increase the efficiency of anti-tank shells. Southern Iraq was the main battlefield during the course of the war and it bore witness to a number of massacres: thousands of Iraqi tanks were laid to waste with DU munitions, even as they withdrew from Kuwait. The effect is that a vast swathe of southern Iraq has been transformed into a toxic wasteland. Its land and water will be contaminated for many thousands of years. In the meantime, cancer rates and the number of malformed births amongst the already poor and downtrodden indigenous people of that area have skyrocketed. Prior to 2003, US officials dismissed the appeals by local Iraqi doctors as Ba'athist propaganda; the fact that these same doctors have continued their campaign against DU in the post-Ba'athist era has apparently left officials in the US unimpressed (see Zaid Al-Ali, "Iraq: the lost generation", 7 November 2004). The next chapter of US-Iraqi relations proved even more deadly for the Iraqi people. After the initial invasion of Kuwait took place in August 1990, the United Nations Security Council imposed the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever devised on Iraq in order to coerce it to withdraw from the country. The rules of the sanctions regime were simple: Iraq could not import or export anything for whatever reason. The effect on Iraq's economy - which was heavily dependent on food imports and on revenues generated by its oil industry - was devastating. After the war, the sanctions were maintained in order to encourage the Iraqi state to destroy its arsenal of non-conventional weapons. Iraq did this within months and - contrary to allegations by US officials - Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes were never reconstructed. Nevertheless, the US decided that the sanctions should be maintained at all costs, regardless of the price that the Iraqi people would have to pay. It therefore blocked all efforts by the international community to have the sanctions lifted. It was clear from the start of the sanctions regime that it was utterly inhuman and could not continue without causing the death of hundreds of thousands of poor Iraqis. But that is precisely what happened: after the 1991 war, poverty rates continued to increase at incredible rates, and an increasing number of Iraqis were dying from preventable diseases because of a lack of access to basic medicines. After a significant amount of pressure, the US acquiesced in the creation of the oil-for-food programme. This mechanism was in theory designed to alleviate the suffering of poor Iraqis, but in fact just prolonged their misery. It allowed the Iraqi government to sell a limited amount of oil in order to purchase basic necessities for its population. These limits were set according to what was calculated to be the minimum amount that each Iraqi required to survive. After it was discovered that Iraqis were still starving despite the program, the limit on the sale of oil was doubled. Then it was found that this still meant that UN sniffer-dogs were better fed than the average Iraqi, and the limit was lifted altogether. But the decision came years too late for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who perished as a result of the hardships imposed on them. Each time, the US was the one to set the limits of the programme. The latest chapter in the story of US-Iraqi relations started in 2003, when the US launched its unprovoked and unjustified attack on Iraq. It is now commonly accepted that the occupation that followed has served to bring yet new miseries to the most

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vulnerable Iraqis. A state of corruption Most people living in the west tend to forget this history as they were never directly affected by it. Iraqis however are acutely aware of the way that they have been violently oppressed with the connivance, complicity, or direct exercise of power by successive US administrations. In light of this knowledge, and given the context that Iraqis are living through, it is worth considering what type of person would accept to collaborate with the occupation forces in Iraq. It was clear from the start, and the way the situation has played out in practice has proven beyond any shred of a doubt, that the Iraqi government is populated by officials who are morally corrupt. It is commonly accepted that what was left of Iraq in 2003 has now fallen apart, but insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that one of the main culprits behind this state of affairs is the Iraqi government itself. Most analysts, most notably the Iraq Study Group, have accepted the superficial narrative according to which the Iraqi government is a "government of national unity" that is "broadly representative of the Iraqi people". Others have realised that the government has failed to satisfy its obligations to reestablish the rule of law, but have instinctively attributed this failure to a lack of initiative on the part of senior Iraqi officials. It should be obvious from the way the Iraqi state has evolved in the past three years that this narrative is completely mistaken. If Iraq has become the most corrupt country in the middle east it is not because the government is not capable of dealing with the issue - it is because the senior government officials are actually amongst the most corrupt people in the country. If violence is increasing, it is not because the government is unable to combat it, but because it is in fact involved in promoting it. If Iraq is not rife with sectarianism, it is not because Iraqis are inherently that way - far from it. It is because it was the only system on offer by a political class that depends on sectarianism to be relevant. If the reconciliation process is failing, it is not because Iraqis are barbarians, as western commentary often suggests or implies - it is because senior politicians prefer to eliminate their opponents than to compromise. If public services are continuing to deteriorate, it is not because the government doesn't have sufficient expertise to repair them - it is because senior officials are not affected in any way, and so they don't care. And if 3,000 Iraqis continue to leave the country every day, the government fails to act not because it is incapable, but because they are disinterested - their families already live comfortably abroad anyway. What is to be done? There is clearly only one option available: the Iraqi government must go. But the solution cannot merely be to replace it with a different group of individuals, whether through elections or through an appointment process similar to what took place in 2004. It is not a coincidence that the Iraqi government has evolved in the way that it has - it was unavoidable given the presence of the US occupation. And as long as the occupation remains in place, any individual Iraqi that will accept to work in government will much more likely than not be of the same stock as the individuals currently in power. The presence of the US army in Iraq has a deeply corrosive influence on Iraqi society, and this is what policy makers in the US should come to terms with. In order for Iraq to function, the US military should withdraw from the country as soon as possible. There are many Iraqis who are competent, honest, and non-sectarian and who would be willing to rebuild their country, so long as the circumstances are correct. What this means in practice is that the US army must leave in order to create enough space for these people to contribute. Hussein al-Muayed, Jawad al-Khalissi, Abdul Hussein Sha'ban and many others have been waiting in the wings for the past four years and will continue to boycott the political process so long as the occupation remains in place. They are all household names in Iraq, respected for their integrity, their intelligence, and their non-sectarian credentials, but they remain largely unknown in the west precisely because they refuse to collaborate with the occupation. Some would no doubt argue that a withdrawal of US troops in Iraq would merely lead to an increase in violence. I would suggest that the alternative - staying the current course and maintaining the presence of US forces in Iraq - is much more likely to lead to more violence. A withdrawal will force a realignment of political forces in Baghdad. The government would probably collapse - not an unattractive proposition - and because truly competent and honest political forces would accept to participate in the post-occupation phase, there is a strong likelihood that the political wrangling that would ensue would lead to a more effective and non-sectarian government. In any event, if the US does decide to withdraw, it could do so and still play a constructive role by implementing certain measures that would reduce the potential for violence. It could start by offering to take all collaborators with them as they withdraw from Iraq, in the way that President Ford did when US forces withdrew from Vietnam. In that case, 150,000 Vietnamese were resettled in the US. In Iraq, the numbers would necessarily be far lower considering that the apparatus established in Baghdad is nowhere near the size of what it was in Saigon. This initiative could be financed merely by redirecting a small fraction of what it is costing the United States to maintain the occupation in place. Today, there are no good solutions to the catastrophe that the US has created in Iraq. There are only those options that we know will lead to a further escalation of the conflict, and those that have a chance of leading to a positive conclusion. At this stage, it is certain that the deployment of additional US troops to Iraq will merely

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lead to more death and suffering. On the other hand, a unilateral and immediate withdrawal of US troops offers the possibility and some hope that an effective and non-sectarian system of government may emerge in the aftermath. After all, and in the final analysis, what the Iraqi people need now is not more armies, more war, and more violence. What they need is to recover their independence and to be given the space to govern themselves, by themselves. What they want and what they need is to be free once and for all.

4. Impacts - our plan solves for both the underlying problem with colonialism as well as solving for their impacts on the disadvantage.