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Link Wall

We’ll isolate 3 specific internal links to middle eastern war and Kurdish genocide.

A is the power consolidation link – extend O’Leary 9. With uncertain and shaky governmental boundaries, especially in the Kurdish region, as soon as the US is gone, the Iraqi regime will seek to consolidate power, leading to armed conflict with the Kurds.

**B is the regional players link – with the US gone, Turkey and Iran will seek to intervene on behalf of the factions they support. That’s also our O’Leary evidence.**

And, implementing Article 140 is the only way to create stability on the Syrian – Iranian Border.

International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers., “Iraq and the Kurds, Trouble Along the Trigger Line”, Middle East Report, July 8, 2009, http://www.aina.org/reports/iatktattl.pdf

The Kurdish leadership discussed the need for a mechanism to deal with crises in the disputed territories,90 and Barzani’s chief of staff, Fuad Hussein, suggested in February that a joint security role for the army and *peshmergas* might work.91 Indeed, joint counter-insurgency patrols were initiated in Diyala governorate in May.92 However, it is one thing to put mechanisms in place to reduce chances of small altercations escalating into major conflicts; it is quite another to address the sources of conflict directly. Referring to the Ninewa situation, Masrour Barzani insisted that “the solution is to implement Article 140. Searching for alternatives won’t work. Short-term solutions won’t work”. He refused to be drawn out on intermediary steps that could help alleviate conflict on a day-to-day basis.93 This suggests that the failure to resolve the disputed territories question could lead to endemic conflict all along the trigger line, from the Syrian to the Iranian border. While neither side stands to benefit from out- right combat, and both probably would seek to avert it, they appear unwilling to proactively put mechanisms in place to avoid inadvertent conflict. Further- more, the two may even see an interest in advancing their own agendas by taking provocative steps (such as the Ninewa governor’s foray in May), even if they risk igniting a larger conflict.

**C is the troops link – US troops act as checks and balances in maintaing the delicate balance of power that currently exists. Only ensuring a stable power base before leaving solves this.**

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Secondly, there is considerable evidence that an Iraqi consociational democracy has been accepted reluctantly by Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, because of the demands of the U.S.-led occupiers. The U.S. seeks success in Iraq, and this objective requires the co-operation and participation of all groups in reconstructing the government and the state. It is important to note that, in the post-invasion years, Iraq's remaining (nominally) as a united country has not been because of the Iraqis' willingness, but because more than 140,000 U.S.-led coalition troops have enforced this goal. The U.S. troops have acted to provide checks and balances and to provide a safety valve to prevent further sectarian conflict. The U.S. has also worked as an arbitrator between Iraqi sects, imposed its vision on different groups, and pushed the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis to compromise and negotiate with each other. Moreover, there is an absence of consensus among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis about most issues, including principles of power-sharing and what Iraq is and ought to be. Because they constitute a majority in Iraq, the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) has focused on simple majority rule against consociational power-sharing. As evidence of Sunni rejection of the powersharing arrangement, the Sunnis boycotted the first national election, and voted overwhelmingly against the constitution." Also they worked to remove those features of the constitution that had been developed in accordance with the consensus principles. The articles to which they objected were federalism, Iraq's identity, the allocation of oil income, and the question of Kirkuk. Further evidence can be seen in the demand of both Sunnis and Shiites for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. This demand is particularly emphasized by sections of both sects, which blame the Americans for their plight. The Shiites (such as the al-Sadrists) believe that the U.S. has prevented them from ruling Iraq, and the Sunnis believe that the U.S. caused them to lose power. So both sides believe that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would enable them to gain the upper hand and to unilaterally govern the country. If withdrawal were to occur, it would spell the end of power-sharing. The Kurds, too, have shown distrust of the power-sharing arrangement.12 As evidence of this, the Kurds insist that the issue of Kirkuk be resolved by the time the U.S. eventually withdraws. Nichervan Barzani13 explains that "Our fear is that Baghdad is weak today and ready to make a solution, but tomorrow it might become stronger and refuse to solve it".14 Their distrust is also apparent in that they refuse the presence of Iraqi Government institutions (including the Iraqi army) in Kurdistan. Moreover, there are few reasons for the Kurds to remain involved in the political process if the Kirkuk issue is resolved, whether Kirkuk is incorporated into Kurdistan or not. All these factors prove that the formal power-sharing arrangement has been imposed by the U.S.. Power-sharing is strongly related to the presence of the occupiers and will probably not be sustained following a U.S. withdrawal. In other words, the power-sharing arrangement is more in response to the demands of the Americans than the inherent desire of Iraqis for consensus.

AT: US military = root cause of tensions

1. Their Zunes evidence attributes violence to the creation of secterian militias. Even if the US were to withdraw, those would remain formed.

2. Zunes attributes the formation of those militias to the failure of the US-backed government, not military presence. Only the counterplan can solve for this, since it strengthens the Iraqi government.

3. Counterplan strengthens the Iraqi government by integrating Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis

O’Leary 2009 [Brendan, “Departing Responsibly”, Dissent, Volume 56, Number 2, Spring 2009, pp. 30-35, Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he directs the Penn Program on Ethnic Conflict, Pg. 33, Project Muse]

After the United States exits, an Arab civil war may re-ignite, as well as Kurdish-Arab conflict. The Baathists’ and the jihadists’ response to the U.S. intervention was to promote deliberate societal collapse. They fomented a sectarian Arab civil war rather than accept a Shia-led democratic Iraq. Americans and Kurds did not loot Arab cities, organize suicide bombings against Shiite pilgrims, or provoke sectarian expulsions. It was militants from among Sunni Arabs, Baathists, and Islamists—encouraged by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s blindly repressive military strategy—who precipitated the bloodletting. The resulting violence has only just calmed down. It could be rekindled. The calmer environment exists because the jihadists and the Baathists lost. Sunni Arab leaders realized that they could not win the restoration they sought, no matter how extreme their tactics. Some decided it was better to make an alliance with the United States, through the Awakening Councils/Sons of Iraq, rather than go down to comprehensive defeat. General David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, was able to take advantage of this opportunity. The surge stopped the Sunni Arabs from being utterly “cleansed” from Baghdad. A key question for the Obama administration is how to facilitate the re-incorporation of Sunni Arabs into the new Iraq, but without doing so at the expense of either our Kurdish allies or the Shiites in federal and provincial governments. The answer lies only in the Constitution: encouraging Sunni Arabs to take control of the provinces in which they are now formal electoral majorities and of their own security, through the development of provincial policing. That is the right message to take from recent elections. This policy need not be provocative so long as the Sunni Arabs’ boundary disputes with Kurdistan are resolved. If they are, then Sunni Arabs will be free to govern themselves without a significant Kurdish presence in their provinces. The answer to Sunni Arab disaffection does not lie in expanding federal military forces and trying to integrate large numbers of former insurgents—therein lies a recipe for a coup.

AT: CP = more colonialism (1/2)

1. The counterplan isn’t imperialistic – it’s negotiation, like the US does with all of its allies.
2. Even if we are colonialist, in this one instance, it’s acceptable because the CP is key to stopping opression of the Kurds.

Baqi Barzani, Kurdish Aspect staff writer, April 21st 2007 “Implementation of Article 140 indispensable in stabilizing Iraq”, http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc042107BB.html )

Implementation of Article 140 indispensable in stabilizing Iraq Since the formation of forged Iraq , Kurds have been subjected to brutal ethnic-cleansings, genocides and mass destructions committed by Iraqi tyrants. Depopulation of Kurdistan in an attempt to reduce the political power and presence of minority was the main goal of every consecutive government. All previous regimes primarily centered their focus to alter the demographic makeup of large Kurdish cities, especially the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk . Tens of thousands of Kurds refusing to sign self-styled "nationality correction" forms, introduced by the authorities prior to the 1997 population census, requiring members of Kurdish groups residing in these districts to relinquish their Kurdish identities and to register officially as Arabs were forcefully driven out. Their possessions were pillaged and their ration cards were withdrawn. Discrimination and persecution against the innocuous defenseless masses of Kurdistan carried on hysterically for decades without any international intrusion or denunciation. 4000 Kurdish villages were reduced to rubble. 182,000 people slain and displaced during “Anfal Operation” carried out by the former Baáth regime. Another 5000 were killed and 10000 injured during “Halabja city chemical bombardment” Tens of thousands are still reported missing.Now that the issue of determining on the fate of Kurdish city of Kirkuk draws closer, Kurds seem to be swindled all over again. Its implementation is being deferred by the opponents of peace and democracy and foreign interference continues to intensify. Kurds constitute the majority of the inhabitants, with a minor Arab minority, followed by Turkmen and Assyrian minorities. For Kurds, Kirkuk is not about oil or a territorial struggle. Kurds give the impression to have no willing to sacrifice their geographical, historical and demographic rights over Kirkuk at any price. Even Saddam had acknowledged the legitimacy of Kurdish self-rule and assured Kurdish partaking in government and Kurdish language teaching in schools during the Autonomy Agreement of March 11, 1970. The main bone of contention between the Kurdish headship and Saddam was on the subject of Kirkuk . Kurdish Regional Government has repeated again and again that it has by no means any intention of unilateral claim to the rights or revenues on the Kirkuk oil fields. It honors the constitutions and agreement that the management of those fields is to be split by the central government and the region, and the revenues shared throughout the country. Washington severely opposes any foreign interference in to the internal affairs of Kirkuk or Iraq . The US has repeatedly warned Turkey against any military incursion into Kurdistan . The former US President Bill Clinton recently said that the US administration must shield Kurds from any external attacks. The Bush administration has taken a prudent stand on the status of Kirkuk. Thousands of internally displaced Kurds, Turkmen and others have returned to Kirkuk and other Arabized regions to reclaim their homes and lands which have since been occupied by Arabs from central and southern Iraq . The unjust policies of the Saddam government in and around Kirkuk , which included the forced deportation of residents, confiscation of property and the manipulation of administrative boundaries, are being reversed. Implementation and enforcement of article 140 of the Iraqi constitution is pertinent to the overall security situation of Iraq . Approved by the Shi'a and Kurds, Article 140 calls for a three-step process to normalize Kirkuk by reversing the "Arabization" policy implemented under former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. A referendum on Kirkuk and other disputed territories will determine the will of their citizens. Kirkuk is an internal issue and it pertains to the Iraqis people to jointly resolve it. The Iraqi people want to rectify the injustices committed by the former regime to advance naturally; this includes the much looked-for referendum, based upon Article 140 of Iraq's constitution.  The tranquility and stability of Kirkuk is very essential for the American authorities, as well. Anything that is perceived as possibly imperiling this goal could be confronted with a harsh American reaction.

3. Arabs have been colonialist themselves in their treatment of the Kurds

Mala Bakhtiyar, member of kurdish parliament in Suliamiyah, 2007 (BBC Monitoring Middle East , "Kurdish party official urges focus on winning economic war with Iraq", lexis)

However we contemplate and compare it, the injustice inflicted upon the Kurdish people by the dominant Arab chauvinism has no equal in all the history of colonialism in the world. British colonialism controlled all Gulf countries and discovered and produced oil for them. It controlled oil but did not take it all. At least Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the Emirates shared the benefit equally with the colonialists. Then the oil of the Gulf became the property of Gulf peoples. And now we can witness how these countries developed. In the time of Shaykh Mahmud [during the First World War], Britain might have accepted a referendum in Kurdistan according to the Sevres treaty, but it refrained from doing this under the pressure of chauvinist Arabs. Thus Kurdistan was occupied by those who were colonized themselves. After their liberation from colonialism, no important change occurred in relation to the political equations. For backwardness is a dangerous political and social legacy, especially when it takes the shape of social norms and customs. Shallow changes cannot bring about great social transformations. These need radical changes. That is why, in the post-colonialist period, the reactionary Arab nationalist power used even more brutal methods for the looting and destruction of Kurdistan, culminating in the policy and practice of genocide.

AT: CP = more colonialism (2/2)

4. The aff ignores the Kurdish struggle – this just proves they are essentialising oppression, which makes resistance to colonialism impossible.

Aihwa Ong, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality, 1999, p. 33-4

More broadly, postcolonial theorists focus on recovering the voices of sub­jects silenced by patriarchy and colonial rule (The Empire Writes Back is the title of one popular collection); they assume that all contemporary racial, ethnic, and cultural oppressions can all be attributed to Western colonialisms. American appropriations of postcolonial theory have created a unitary dis­course of the postcolonial that refers to highly variable situations and conditions throughout the world; thus, Gayatri Spivak is able to talk about “the paradigmatic subaltern woman,” as well as “New World Asians (the old migrants) and New Immigrant Asians (often ‘model minorities’) being disciplinarized together?” Other postcolonial feminists also have been eager to seek structural similarities, continuities, conjunctures, and alliances between the postcolonial oppressions experienced by peoples on the bases of race, ethnicity, and gender both in formerly colonized populations in the third world and among immigrant populations in the United States, Australia, and England.16 Seldom is there any attempt to link these assertions of unitary postcolonial situations among diasporan subjects in the West to the historical structures of colonization, decolonization, and contemporary developments in particular non-Western countries. Indeed, the term postcolonial has been used to indiscriminately describe different regimes of economic, political, and cultural domination in the Americas, India, Africa, and other third-world countries where the actual historical experiences of colonialism have been very varied in terms of local culture, conquest, settlement, racial exploitation, administrative regime, political resistance, and articulation with global capitalism. In careless hands, postcolonial theory can represent a kind of theoretical imperialism whereby scholars based in the West, without seriously engaging the scholarship of faraway places, can project or “speak for” postcolonial situations elsewhere. Stuart Hall has warned against approaches that universalize racial, ethnic, and gender oppressions without locating the “actual integument of power…in concrete institutions.” A more fruitful strand of postcolonial studies is represented by subaltern scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, who has criticized the Indian national projects, which are based on Western models of modernity and bypass “many possibilities of authentic, creative, and plural development of social identities,” including the marginalized communities in Indian society. He suggests that an alternative imagination that draws on “narratives of community” would be a formidable challenge to narratives of capital. This brilliant work, however, is based on the assumption that both modernity and capitalism are universal forms, against which non-Western societies such as India can only mobilize “pre-existing cultural solidarities such as locality, caste, tribe, religious community, or ethnic identity.” This analytical opposition between a universal modernity and non-Western culture is rather old-fashioned it is as if Chatterjee believes the West is not present in Indian elites who champion narratives of the indigenous community. Furthermore, the concept of a uni­versal modernity must be rethought when, as Arif Dirlik observes, “the narrative of capitalism is no longer the narrative of the history of Europe; non-European capitalist societies now make their own claims on the history of capitalism.”20 The loose use of the term “the postcolonial,” then, has had the bizarre effect of contributing to a Western tradition of othering the Rest; it suggests a postwar scheme whereby “the third world” was followed by “the developing countries,” which are now being succeeded by “the postcolonial.” This continuum seems to suggest that the further we move in time, the more beholden non-Western countries are to the forms and practices of their colonial past. By and large, anthropologists have been careful to discuss how formerly colonized societies have developed differently in relation to global economic and political dominations and have repositioned themselves differently vis-a-vis capitalism and late modernity. By specifying differences in history, politics, and culture, anthropologists are able to say how the postcolonial formation of Indonesia is quite different from that of India, Nicaragua, or Zaire.

2NC Overview

Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution would demarcate the border between territories governed by the main Iraqi parliament and the Kurdish parliament. Several territories with Kurdish populations are currently not governed by the Kuridish parliament, and the problem is provoking conflict between Kurdistan and central Iraq – that’s our O’Leary 9 evidence. This civil war would lead to the breakup of Iraq – that’s our Bowen 6 evidence, which would draw first regional and then global players into the war, culminating in nuclear holocaust – that’s Steinbach 2.

The only way to ensure Article 140 is followed is to use our greatest leverage, withdrawal, to guarantee its implementation – that’s our Montgomery 8 and Nezan & Shali 8 evidence.

Impact Calc

The counterplan avoids the net benefit of the Kurdish genocide. This impact turns and outweighs any risk of a solvency deficit.

1. Probability – the risk of this specific scenario is proven and much greater than their vague “colonialism is evil all around the world” type claims.
2. Timeframe - as soon as the US withdraws, hidden tensions will errupt – that’s our Nezan evidence. The colonialism impact has been going on for a while, and the terminal impacts haven’t occurred – it could take years.
3. Turns case – perpetuates colonialist domination of the Kurds by the central Iraqi government.

Condition CP Theory

1. Counter-interpretation – The neg gets one conditions counterplan.
2. Standards:
3. Predictable on the topic, and especially for this aff – the President discusses Iraq withdrawal as conditional upon all kinds of things.

Huffington Post 8/2 (" Obama's Iraq Withdrawal Timeline ", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/obamas-iraq-withdrawal-ti\_b\_668173.html)

Disagreement then centered on a timeline for U.S. withdrawal. [Prime Minister] Maliki said that the end of 2010 was a reasonable goal, a public statement that appeared more consistent with the position of Democratic Sen. Barack Obama -- who has called for an even earlier withdrawal -- than that of Republican Sen. John McCain, who has opposed a firm timeline. During [Secretary of State] Rice's Aug. 21 visit to Baghdad, the two sides agreed on withdrawal of combat forces by the end of 2011. But U.S. officials continue to speak of an "aspirational" date depending on ground conditions, while Maliki said Saturday that the agreement is for "final withdrawal by the end of 2011." Both have said that U.S. combat troops will be drawn back from Iraqi cities by mid-2009.

1. Education – Policymakers often debate about the use multilateralism in foreign policy. Just look to the differences between Bush and Obama.
2. Best policy option – better cost benefit analysis and simulations of real policymakers – if Congress saw we should condition action on better Iraqi governance, they would do it.
3. Lit checks infinite regression – finite number of mechanisms on which to base conditional action
4. Tests resolved and the unconditional nature of the plan— conditions counterplans ensure aff upholds every word in the resolution

**Resolved indicates a fixed, unchanging thing –**

American Heritage Dictionary 2k of the English Language 4th edition, 2000 (“resolve”, http://www.bartleby.com/61/87/R0178700.html)

A determination or decision; a fixed purpose.

1. They can generate offense against net benefit—they can impact turn the condition
2. **Structural aff bias justifies neg flex—the persuasive value of the 2ar outweighs the strategic benefit of the block, they get to pick the focus of the debate, and vast aff ground from all social service programs and mechanisms—we should be able to use any means to prove an advocacy is better than the affirmative**

C. Reject the argument, not the team

AT: Perm

1. The plan immediate and unconditional passage of the plan.
2. Fiat guarantees this.
3. **Part of the resolution - resolved indicates a fixed, unchanging thing –**

American Heritage Dictionary 2k of the English Language 4th edition, 2000 (“resolve”, http://www.bartleby.com/61/87/R0178700.html)

A determination or decision; a fixed purpose.

2. The plan severs out of this unconditionality - there is always a small chance the counterplan won’t happen. This is an independent voting issue:

A. Moving target – the aff could change any part of their plan, so we could never argue fairly with them.

B. Strat skew – the aff has first and last speeches and a 60% win skew. Allowing the aff to change its advocacy after the 1AC makes for a completely unfair debate.

C. Infinitely regressive- justifies them severing out of all but one word of their plan text and claiming solvency from it, which kills competitive equity.

D. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills because someone objects to them. This kills education.