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Generic – AT: Perm Do CP

The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. Severence is an independent voting issue.

1. Makes the aff a moving target- the affirmative can change any part of their plan to avoid any negative argument. This skews fairness.

2. Infinitely regressive- allowing the aff to sever out of one part of their plan justifies them severing out of all but one word.

3. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to learn from the round.

4. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills because someone objects to them. This lack of real world policymaking kills education.

Generic – AT: Perm Do Both

This perm is functionally the same as perm do the CP. The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. And severance is a reason to reject this perm because:

1. Makes the aff a moving target- the affirmative can change any part of their plan to avoid any negative argument. This skews fairness in that they could change their plan in the 2AR and we’d never be able to argue with them.

2. Infinitely regressive- allowing the aff to sever out of one part of their plan justifies them severing out of all but one word of their plan text and claiming solvency from it. The neg would never win in such a world, which kills competitive equity.

3. Strategy Skew- The affirmative speaks first, last, and has infinite prep time, while the negative has mere minutes before the 1NC. With time already limited, allowing the aff to change their advocacy after the 1AC completely kills neg strategy and makes for a wholly unfair debate.

4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to learn from a debate round because we debate over running away from arguments.

5. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills because someone objects to them. This lack of real world policymaking kills education.

\*\* Corruption Reform CP\*

1NC Shell

Text: The United States Federal Government should <plan> on the condition that Iraq implement political reforms to remedy the corruption of the Iraqi government.

Solvency Advocate – forces should be withdrawn, conditional upon corruption reforms

**Intelligence Squared 7** (Dec. 11 2007, http://www.intelligencesquared.com/events/the-future-of-iraq)IM

Arguing that the post-2007 'surge' strategy is working (proposition one) are William Shawcross and Lt. Peter Hegseth. William Shawcross hints at the chaos that would spread across Iraq if Allied troops were to pull out and leave the country at the mercy of al-Qaeda, while Lt. Peter Hegseth draws on his experiences in Iraq to suggest that the post-2007 counter insurgency tactics have brought a greater degree of security to Iraq, and led to a lessening in violence and sectarian killings. He claims that before Allied troops leave, it is necessary to establish a base level of security to ensure that political negotiations can succeed. Arguing for a withdrawal of troops as part of a negotiated settlement (quid pro quo, proposal two) are Sir Christopher Meyer and Iraqi politician Ali Allawi. Sir Christopher Meyer explains that Allied forces are logistically unable to either leave immediately or "stay the course", and that negotiated settlement, involving all religious and ethnic groups within Iraq, as well as neighbouring states, is the only possible course of action. Ali Allawi agrees, and suggests that the United States will pay a huge part in the future of Iraq because of the resources it has so far expended in waging war there. But, he says, all Allied forces must withdraw once the "architecture of peace" has been put in place, through the reform of the corrupt government.

Reforms are key to stop corruption, establish democracy, rule of law and abolish terrorist safe havens

**Kadhim 10** (Abbas, Mar. 3 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=40278)IM

Among the many challenges to establishing democracy and the rule of law, promoting economic and human development, and abolishing terrorist safe havens in Iraq, corruption ranks among the highest. According to Transparency International, Iraq ranked as the third worst country in the world for corruption in 2006, 2007, and 2008—and the fourth worst in 2009. The World Bank also placed Iraq at the bottom of the list. Political corruption and abuse of power stem from several structural deficiencies. To secure the passage of Iraq’s constitution and bring the opposition to the table, U.S. mediators encouraged Iraqis to commit two blunders. First, Iraqis agreed to pass a number of substantial changes to the constitution within a short period after its ratification, undermining the authority of the constitution and making it essentially a provisional document. Second, Iraqis abandoned the constitution following the very first election in favor of forming a “national unity government,” a euphemism for a quota system of power-sharing to appease the Sunni Arabs who opposed the political process. Accordingly, government ministries were farmed out to various parties without any significant oversight over the way the ministers conducted their daily business. Third, it is extremely difficult to prosecute Iraqi officials for corruption due to a provision of law that effectively gives ministries a veto over investigations. To combat these circumstances extensive reforms must be introduced to fix structural deficiencies causing rampant corruption.

1NC Shell

Democracy solves war and extinction

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict **95** (October 1995, http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95\_01.html, accessed on 12/11/99)IM

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Solvency Advocate

Stability is a prerequisite to troop removal

**Thompson 9** (Emily, Dec. 5th, 2009, UN Intermediate Peace Building Commission

coloradoun.org/BG\_PeacebuildingIraq.doc)IM

Recently, Iraq has witnessed the initial removal of US troops beginning on June 30th, 2009. President Obama plainly stated earlier this year, “By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end,” although around 50,000 “advisors” will remain indefinitely. However, despite the assuredness of Mr. Obama’s words, the government of Iraq still lacks stability, and it is possible that US military forces may need to be implemented again in the future. While the pledge to withdrawal of troops pleased many Iraqis, many have also become increasingly worried about the strength of their government, and its ability to stand alone without US forces. Scheduled for January 16th, 2010, Iraqis will elect new political leaders. However, debate surrounding the date of the election has emerged, notably from Kurds who feel that their political opinions have not been addressed since they were expelled by Saddam Hussein.

Solvency – Reforms

Stability is dependant on political reform hand in hand with troop withdrawal

**National Security Network 9** (Oct. 27 2009, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1446)IM

The tragic suicide bombings in Baghdad this weekend demonstrate that Iraq’s underlying political tensions and corruption, which went unresolved by President Bush’s surge strategy, must be addressed in order to achieve lasting stability. Many conservatives were quick to declare mission accomplished again following the lull in violence after the “surge.” However, the grievances and disputes that pushed Iraq into civil war and led to massive ethnic cleansing have yet to be comprehensively addressed. While overall violence has decreased since the fall of 2007, the underlying disagreements between Iraq’s three main groups – Shia, Sunni, and Kurds – have persisted. The political structure of the Iraqi state, the distribution of oil revenue, and the status of disputed territories in the north, are all issues the surge was supposed to address but did not. Though the swift creation of an election law agreement following the bombings is a hopeful sign, it remains to be seen whether this tentative progress can be translated into sustained political accommodation and reconciliation. Now the former Vice President has attacked Obama on Iraq for “rushing” to withdraw troops to meet a campaign pledge. This is way off base. First, it was President Bush who signed the status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government that set a fixed timetable for withdrawal. Second, conservatives on the Hill fully backed the President’s announcement of a withdrawal timetable last February. Finally, the Obama administration should continue to help Iraq mediate its political disputes, but their resolution ultimately depends on Iraqis, not American soldiers and Marines. The U.S. should encourage Iraqi-led solutions to the country’s political obstacles, as it continues to implement the phased-withdrawal spelled out in the Bush-brokered Status of Forces Agreement.

Solvency – Reforms

Increased Iraqi control is key to sustainable stability

**National Security Network 10** (Apr. 20 2010, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1577)IM

New challenges emerge and old ones remain, but they can only be resolved by Iraqis. While the joint U.S.-Iraqi operation against Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was a positive sign for the development of the Iraqi Security Forces, there were also troubling reports that came out this week demonstrating that many challenges remain for Iraq. As the Washington Post reported, Iraqi election officials announced that there would be a manual recount of the parliamentary election votes cast in Baghdad. According to the Post, "The recount is all but certain to delay the formation of the next government by weeks, if not more," a possibility that "concerns U.S. officials, because they want a new government in place by the time the American troop level drops to 50,000 by Sept. 1." In addition, the L.A. Times reported on a secret prison for Sunni men under the control of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, a revelation that could heighten sectarian tensions. According to the Times, "Hundreds of Sunni men disappeared for months into a secret Baghdad prison under the jurisdiction of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's military office, where many were routinely tortured until the country's Human Rights Ministry gained access to the facility, Iraqi officials say. The men were detained by the Iraqi army in October in sweeps targeting Sunni groups in Nineveh province, a stronghold of the group al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants in the north... The alleged brutal treatment of prisoners at the facility raised concerns that the country could drift back to its authoritarian past." George Washington Professor and Center for a New American Security Fellow Marc Lynch explained last month that there remain a number of other deeper and unresolved challenges: "Arab-Kurdish conflicts over Kirkuk, the distribution of oil revenues and contracts, and power in mixed areas remain exceedingly dangerous. Refugees and the internally displaced continue to live in limbo, with few prospects of return and reintegration...corruption, ineffective state institutions, unemployment and an array of social and economic problems continue to fester." But, while some analysts seize on these challenges to argue for intervention by U.S. forces or diplomats, Lynch observed that "...they miss(es) the wider picture of an Iraqi public which no longer wants or needs their supposedly stabilising role." The Center for American Progress's Brian Katulis and Peter Juul made a similar point, cautioning that "[o]ne of the worst mistakes the United States can make at this stage as Iraqis continue to reassert control over their own affairs is to get in the way of that process."

Reforms are key to control corruption

**GSDRC 8** (Robert E Looney, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3596)IM

How can corruption in Iraq be controlled? What forces are driving domestic corruption in the country? This article from the Journal of International Peacekeeping argues that corruption in Iraq is the product of three interrelated forces: political fraud, the deterioration of social capital, and the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and insurgents. Any attempt to reduce corruption in Iraq needs to place the problem in a broader historical, social and economic context. The current reconstruction strategy has emphasised market reforms, infrastructure development and private foreign investment. Focusing on trust-building and institutional reforms might have been more effective. In addition, a possible way to start to break the vicious cycle of corruption is to distribute a significant share of oil revenues to the population immediately. Although not a panacea, the policy would have several advantages: \* It would take money out of the hands of corrupt political elites and give it to the population. \* It would bolster social capital because currently one of the main barriers to a united Iraq is the ongoing controversy over the distribution of oil revenues, with each region not trusting the others to agree a fair allocation. \* It would provide an incentive to ordinary Iraqis to protect the country’s oil facilities by providing intelligence on insurgent groups attempting to disrupt production. Expansive governmental reforms would go a long way toward reducing the amount of political fraud.

Solvency – Reforms

Corruption threatens governmental stability – reforms are key stop it

**Levick 10** (Richard, CEO and President of Levick Strategic Communications, May 14 2010, http://www.bulletproofblog.com/2010/05/14/in-iraq-credibility-and-communications-are-key-to-curtailing-corruption/)IM

As Iraq seeks to rebuild its economic and societal infrastructure in the wake of one of the most violent and tumultuous periods in the country’s history, its efforts to curtail corruption in both the public and private sectors will play a crucial role. Corruption now plagues Iraq to such an extent (the nation currently sits near the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index) that it rivals sectarian violence as the foremost challenge facing the new government. To many observers, remaking a culture that views bribes and other dishonest commercial practices as “business as usual” is essential to building a new and vibrant nation. In 2004, Paul Bremer, the then-head of the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority, created the Commission on Public Integrity, an independent governmental agency tasked with combating corruption. That effort ended tragically. The head of the Commission, Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, fled Iraq in September 2007 under political pressure from the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and amid numerous death threats. Unfortunately, such threats weren’t uncommon. Glenn Ware of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) Forensic Services practice and Anti-Corruption Center of Excellence, who was involved in training Commission staff prior to joining PwC, notes that, “Many Commission staffers were targeted with violence. Some were even assassinated.” PwC’s David Jansen, also with the Forensic Services practice who is currently working in the Kurdish Region of northern Iraq assisting the Kurdistan Regional Government in implementing an anti-corruption strategy, notes the immense challenges in combating corruption on a national level. “There is no magic bullet in the war against corruption. It is so pernicious that unless you pursue it in a holistic fashion across all aspects of government and the private sector, you are destined for failure.” Mr. Jansen goes on to state that it is not enough simply to punish corrupt actors. Before that can happen, you need “laws, institutions, awareness, training, capacity, financial support, and, of course, political will, in short, Iraq needs to implement sweeping political and governmental reforms.”

Governmental reforms are key to combat corruption

**Zwaniecki 9** (Andrzej, Nov. 26 2009, http://www.afrik-news.com/article16546.html)IM

Anti-corruption reforms have a good chance of success only when they are moved by a top leader and persistent enough to overcome bureaucratic resistance and inertia, according to experts. They also have to involve civil society and be free from political manipulation. But even well-meant efforts are unlikely to meet their goals if basic democratic institutions — from judiciary systems to a civil society — are not in place, said Christiaan Poortman of Transparency International, an anti-corruption group. “Institutions must not only exist on paper, but also have an actual power to monitor and hold the government accountable,” he said. Reforms based on those principles have worked in Botswana, Tanzania, Singapore, Hong Kong, Slovenia, Latvia and Peru, all of which have made progress in the fight against corruption. For example, in Tanzania, an anti-corruption campaign was directly related to concerted efforts to improve the country’s economy, living standards and business environment. Singapore’s leaders encouraged public officials’ integrity by setting personal examples and by building a well-paid civil service. And Peru created a special anti-corruption system to investigate and prosecute cases. But anti-corruption programs that are nothing more than slogans or that are missing key elements will fail. Guido Bertucci of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations said an anti-corruption campaign is doomed to failure when the government launches it in reaction to a scandal or to external pressure from foreign donors. He said some leaders use an anti-corruption campaign as a cover to hurt their political opponents. Even governments truly committed to reforms see less success when they do not engage the private sector and civil society. Nations with the highest risk of corruption are often desperately poor and plagued by civil wars or oppressive regimes, as confirmed by the low ranking of Somalia, Burma, Iraq, Haiti and Afghanistan in Transparency’s Corruption Perception Index. (Although experts caution against looking at the index as a reliable measure of corruption, they say it does provide a rough approximation of where countries stand in relation to each other.) In addition, closed economies — isolated from the world market by trade and other barriers — are more likely to have higher levels of corruption than more open ones. In such countries, government revenues as well as foreign assistance can easily be transferred through back channels to bank accounts kept in offshore tax havens.

Solvency – Quid Pro Quo

Unconditional withdrawal fails – empirically proven

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30 2009, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf)IM

In continuation of the implementation phase of the bilateral security agreement, the United States military redeployed from urban areas on 30 June 2009, a day marked as a national holiday, Iraqi Sovereignty Day, leaving the Iraqi security forces with overall domestic security responsibilities. Al-Qaeda and other extremist elements conducted a series of high-profile mass casualty attacks across the country during the transition period. There was a series of car bomb attacks across Baghdad, including an attack on 24 June that killed 62 civilians and injured 150 others in Sadr City and several similar attacks around Kirkuk and Mosul. Those attacks are indicative of continued efforts by the extremist elements not only to test the capability of the Iraqi security forces but to undermine public confidence in the Government to enact its sovereign role in protecting its citizens.

Unconditional withdrawal leads to conflict escalation

**AP 10** (Lara Jakes, Associated Press, May 12 2010, http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/05/12/us-reconsidering-pace-of-iraq-troop-withdrawal-over-worries-of-political-instability-34764/)IM

BAGHDAD — Worries over violence fueled by Iraq’s political instability have forced U.S. commanders to reconsider the pace of a major pullout this summer without overstepping a deadline to cut the military’s presence by nearly half by the end of August. Under a plan by the top U.S. commander in Iraq, the military was to begin significant pullouts in May to meet President Barack Obama’s goal of 50,000 troops in country by August 31. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior military official at the Pentagon with knowledge of the military’s plans tell The Associated Press that the major drawdown is not expected to begin until June at the earliest. They spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. If the US removes its troops too early the Iraqi government won’t be stable enough to control conflicts, which will rapidly escalate.

Impact – Terrorism

Terrorism will escalate absent reforms

**Kadhim 10** (Abbas, Mar. 3 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=40278)IM

The result has been abysmal performance in every ministry. Generally, corrupt ministers were protected by their respective parties in the parliament and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki looked the other way. Even when ministers’ corruption was too significant to ignore, there were no prosecutions. After astounding revelations about the corruption of former Minister of Trade Abd al-Falah al-Sudani, al-Maliki still opted to protect al-Sudani (a member of Maliki’s party), who was briefly arrested, but eventually released and allowed to leave Iraq for London. Beyond the abuse of the public trust and waste of resources, corruption also can have dangerous consequences. For example, Iraqi officials continue to intercede on behalf of jailed terrorists for ideological reasons, political purposes, and sometimes for substantial monetary rewards. In one incident in October 2009, for example, Iraqi Security Forces apprehended a lawyer in Mosul for allegedly bribing officials to release jailed Islamic State of Iraq terrorists and destroy official records legitimizing such arrests. Money stolen or extorted from local companies and individuals ends up being used to bribe officials in order to secure the release of terrorists and fund terrorist activities. This stable source of funding for terrorists will only serve to worsen the movements.

Impact – Sickness

Sickness without reforms

**Kadhim 10** (Abbas, Mar. 3 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=40278)IM

Another possible example of consequences from corruption that directly harmed Iraqis was the cholera epidemic that broke out in several locations in 2008. The outbreak was reportedly due to a failure to sterilize the local drinking water because Iraqi officials were bribed to buy chlorine from Iran that was long past its expiration date. The councilman involved in the chlorine contract, a member of the Hilla City Council, was released after a short arrest, thanks to his connection with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a powerful pro-Iran party. Political reforms would create better oversight.

Impact – Ethnic Conflict

Withdrawal without reform leads to ethnic conflict

**National Security Network 9** (Oct. 27 2009, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1446)IM

Iraq continues to face challenges, but the U.S. must remain committed to a policy of withdrawal, transitioning responsibility to Iraqis. Iraq continues to face a set of daunting challenges. According to the International Crisis Group, “violence, coupled with a political situation that remains highly dysfunctional, leaves a lot of uncertainty as to Iraq’s viability following parliamentary elections in January 2010 and especially after the U.S. combat troop withdrawal, which is to be completed by August 2010. The country continues to struggle with massive corruption and deep political divisions. One of the most destabilising conflicts concerns disputed territories and hydrocarbon resources to which both the federal government and the Kurdistan regional government lay claim. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was pushed on the defensive during the post-2007 U.S. ‘surge’, remains active in some areas and is working to stoke ethnic tensions, just as it fuelled sectarian tensions several years ago.” The Crisis Group makes clear that to overcome these obstacles, the U.S. must encourage Iraqi-led solutions, as it continues to abide by the terms spelled out in the Status of Force Agreement that was signed by the Bush administration. “In order to prevent an outbreak of deadly ethnic conflict after it pulls out its forces, Washington must craft an exit strategy that encourages Iraqi leaders to reach a series of political bargains on power, resources and territory, as well as implement necessary political reforms” said the Crisis Group report. The future of Iraq is in the hands of the Iraqis; U.S. forces must continue to withdraw and transition responsibility to Iraqis on a pace that is consistent with the Status of Forces Agreement signed by President Bush – as well as Obama’s pledge at Camp Lejeune to honor his campaign pledge and remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.

Impact – Democracy

Political reform is key to regional democracy

**Al-Maliki 9** (Nuri, Prime Minister of Iraq, July 23 2009, http://www.usip.org/conversation-iraq-s-prime-minister-nuri-al-maliki/read-the-transcripted-remarks)IM

Democracy in Iraq is a unique democracy in the region. The democracy confronted severe objection from the region in Iraq and in the regional states. Nevertheless, a strong democracy in our country sets a valuable example for our neighbors and sends a strong signal to our allies in the United States. And in order to protect the democratic process in Iraq, we had to build professional systems. As we were fighting terrorism, we were building systems and we were building the army. And as we were fighting terrorism, we were campaigning towards rallying all the people of Iraq to side with the government and the security system. Nevertheless here what I mean by political reform in Iraq is to build a strong Iraqi state that is unified, strong, based on a constitutional foundation. But that does not mean that there isn't some particular issues about some vocabulary in the constitution, if you will, that we may need to look at further. We have noticed that the consensus-based system or the parliamentary system may need to -- (inaudible) -- some of the process of the state. If we reject consensus-based system, that does not mean that we're rejecting the need to have blocs and alliances among the various factions within the government. Nevertheless with the parliamentary system in Iraq, we found that when it stipulates that all those who enter the elections must be involved in the formation of the government, we saw that this may not be helpful much. Partnership is needed. Nevertheless a consensus-based system might mean in Iraq perhaps a quota system, if you will. And a quota system is a system that might breed sectarianism and other similar considerations. And when I talk about this issue, I see that whoever is elected by the people would be there and would be strong. And this might happen with a modification to the constitution, if you will. Nevertheless if this does not happen, then we will go along with the parliamentary system that is in place, until we can have some reform to that parliamentary system. And there is a document for political reform that is in place. And I invited the heads of the parliamentary blocs every week or every two weeks to meet, so we can discuss it and move forward towards reform and have it in place, if it is necessary, for Iraq to be a strong country and for Iraq to gain more democratic momentum.

Impact – Collapse

Corruption leads to the collapse of the Iraqi state

**NYT 9** (Marc Santora and Riyadh Mohammed, Oct. 28 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/middleeast/29corrupt.html)IM

BAGHDAD — As Iraqi officials work to assign blame for the deadly attacks on the heart of the government on Sunday, concern is rising that a greater security threat may come from within the system in the form of corruption, from the top leadership of ministries down to soldiers who man checkpoints. A recent internal report on corruption by the inspector general of the Interior Ministry specifically mentions the bribery of checkpoint guards: The blast on Sunday at the Justice Ministry, surrounded by checkpoints, killed nearly 160 people, while a similar attack in August on the Foreign and Finance Ministries killed at least 122. “These car bombs didn’t come from the sky!” said Judge Abdul Sattar al-Beiriqdar, spokesman for the Higher Judicial Council. “They must have been driven in streets until they reached their target. If there were no corruption, the attackers wouldn’t risk passing through these checkpoints.” But the corruption runs much deeper, endangering the fragile sense of security in Iraq as America draws down its forces, with security services that seem aimed as much at enriching themselves as protecting average Iraqis, according to dozens of interviews with police officers and officials as well as the report by the Interior Ministry. “Corruption is a phenomenon that forms a real threat to the structure of the state,” Jawad Bolani, the interior minister, said in a recent interview. His ministry is Iraq’s second largest, employing one of every four Iraqis working in the public sector, which accounts for a vast majority of the jobs in Iraq. The report details how corruption is carried out in his ministry, which he argues has still made great strides in curbing it. Money is skimmed off of salaries. Contracts are manipulated and fudged to wring personal profit. Ghost police officers are listed on payrolls so commanders can take the salaries, and other police officers are told they are fired even as commanders continue to take their pay. Criminals and insurgents are freed with a well-placed bribe, criminal records are expunged for payment, detainees are abused by guards in order to extort money from relatives. Beyond the outright financial corruption, there is also political corruption, in which the parties vying for power here look to secure the loyalty of large chunks of the security apparatus, according to Iraqi and Western officials.

Instability leads to collapse

**Arraf 10** (Jane, Christian Science Monitor, May 11 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/11/93955/latest-iraq-attacks-expose-security.html)IM

BAGHDAD, Iraq — Iraqi security forces and citizens were on edge Tuesday after a string of attacks that has raised fears of heightened instability, perhaps culminating in governmental collapse, and sparked accusations that the government has become too consumed with forming a coalition to be able to protect its citizens. Iraqi officials immediately blamed Al Qaida in Iraq for the violence Tuesday, which killed more than 100 people in the deadliest day in Iraq this year. The U.S. State Department said the attacks would "undermine the confidence the Iraqi people have demonstrated in their government and their security forces." The attacks appear to have not only undermined Iraqi confidence in their security forces but the security forces' confidence in their government. Many Iraqis, including policeman and soldiers, say they believe their own politicians are behind the attacks. "I can't speak badly about security because I don't want to spoil the image of the security services, but to tell you the truth, it is not good," said a policeman near the site of one of the checkpoint attacks. "This is a struggle for power - none of the citizens are blindfolded - we can all see and understand the situation. I blame the government for this."

Impact – Laundry List

Lack of reform leads to economic instability, insufficient health care, ethnic conflicts, failing democracy, civil war and regional conflict

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30 2009, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf)IM

To achieve stability in Iraq, political reforms must address the following concerns: to further incorporate Kurd populations into political endeavors to bring about economic stability after Hussein’s oil-controlling regime (Oil-for-Food Program) to respect Iraq’s national sovereignty without allowing the nation to fall apart to implement formal and efficient forms of health care and security reform The partition of Iraq – “advocating for a relatively weak central government with strong Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish regional administrations”, including the prevention of heightened ethnic conflicts to limit control by Iraq’s dominant Shi’a community, while still allowing for a democratic government to decrease governmental dependence on an authoritarian leader, and increase non-violent democratic institutions to reconcile Sunni and Shiite groups in a civilian government to keep a post-U. S. occupation in Iraq from descending into civil war, which would easily spillover into the surrounding countries.

Impact – Dehum

Continued instability leads to dehumanization

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30 2009, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf)IM

The ongoing humanitarian programming of the United Nations and our partners is expected to underpin these major, upstream policy initiatives by providing immediate relief to Iraq’s poor and vulnerable. The humanitarian situation in Iraq remains precarious, mainly because of insecurity and the difficulties of accessing those most in need. At the mid-year review of the 2009 consolidated appeals process for Iraq, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the strategic priorities continue to reflect current developments in the country, especially given the enduring pockets of acute vulnerability for not just the internally displaced Iraqis, but also many deprived communities that continue to lack adequate access to basic social services and protection assistance. Civilians continue to be disproportionately affected by the ongoing violence, and the issue of protection remains a serious concern, particularly for women, children and some minority groups.

Dehumanization makes nuclear war, genocide, and environmental destruction inevitable

Berube 7 (David, professor of speech communication, June/July 1997, Nanotechnology Magazine, http://www.cla.sc.edu/ENGL/faculty/berube/prolong.htm)IM

Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire resultant worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve valuing people as means. Moreover, there would always be a superhuman more super than the current ones, humans would never be able to escape their treatment as means to an always further and distant end. This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.

Impact – Genocide

Reforms are key to prevent ethnic conflict

**Smith 10** (Reid, research associate @ U of Delaware specializing on U.S. policy in the Middle East and as a political speechwriter, June 22 2010, http://iraq.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/06/22/political-deadlock-furthers-instability/)IM

Three months after international observers hailed Iraq’s parliamentary elections as a success for sovereignty and civil society, the nation’s fragile democracy is suffering a withering swell of political violence. It seems like only a short time ago we were celebrating news that the country’s Sunnis had holstered their discontent to unite with countrymen across sectarian lines. Iran’s influence seemed on the wane and a secular coalition had gained momentum after years of confessional infighting. Sadly, Iraq’s politicians have not yet proven themselves worthy of the men and women who braved car bombs and mortar fire to impart their mandate. Ayad Allawi’s Al-Iraqiya coalition was poised to win a decisive victory, but ultimately fell short of a governing majority. Now, his cross-sectarian alliance has been thoroughly undermined by the dominant Shi’a alliance – one in which the powerful Sadrists have assumed the role of political kingmakers. Sunni displeasure seems on the rise as their role is yet again reduced to “opposition bloc.” The government will never be able to protect its citizens until the corruption that wracks its policies is banished.

Instability leads to horrible violence

**Smith 10** (Reid, research associate @ U of Delaware specializing on U.S. policy in the Middle East and as a political speechwriter, June 22 2010, http://iraq.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/06/22/political-deadlock-furthers-instability/)IM

And while the 325 member parliament has been formally sworn in, it is unlikely that the governing hierarchy will be finalized for several weeks. The constitution, itself, remains riddled with legislative gaps that threaten the electoral and political processes that bind the nascent democracy. Meanwhile, external challenges continue to mount. First and foremost, the new parliament will be responsible for putting an end to the precipitious escalation in violence that has rocked the country since the March elections failed to yield a clear winner. The corruption that marginalizes the government’s ability to assure security and basic services is viewed by many U.S. military officials as being as dangerous to the country’s stability as the lingering insurgency, and providing the insurgency the opening it seeks. Just today, Iraq’s electricity minister, Kareem Wahid Hasan, announced his resignation amidst mounting frustration with the country’s terminal power shortages. The service crisis stands testament to the empty promise of a representative government that remains brittle with dishonesty and fraud. All the while, American troops can’t leave until the Iraqi government establishes a semblance of stability.

Unconditional withdrawal leaves long-lasting instability

**The National 10** (Tony Karon, Mar. 21 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AI D=/20100321/OPINION/703209926/1080/WEEKENDER)IM

And what is already abundantly clear is that the nature and armaments of the Iraqi forces that have been built from scratch by the occupation authorities after they dissolved Saddam’s military are in no position to defend the country’s sovereign border against foreign invasion by land, sea or air. Those forces that have been deployed are largely trained and configured for domestic counterinsurgency. Iraq’s fledgling air force, for example, has not a single fighter plane. So, right now, it’s a long shot that the US will ostensibly leave behind a stable Iraq at the end of next year. Either it will stay for a lot longer than it says – a difficult call given the burdens on the declining hyperpower – or it had better get on with negotiating that elusive “grand bargain” with all of Iraq’s neighbours to ground rules for stabilising regional strategic rivalry. Not exactly the new Middle East of Bush’s imagination, but without a regional understanding between the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – as well as the Iraqis themselves – Iraq could remain a perennial source, and theatre, of regional instability.

Impact – Instability

Systemic flaws breed instability and political deadlock

**The National 10** (Tony Karon, Mar. 21 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AI D=/20100321/OPINION/703209926/1080/WEEKENDER)IM

Every time Iraq goes to the polls, America beams with parental pride at the spectacle of a people once terrorised by a brutal dictatorship, now enjoying the freedom to chose their own representatives. While genuinely competitive, multiparty democracy, is all too rare in the Middle East, what the American national dialogue tends to ignore is the outcome of those elections. It treats the very fact of voting as a benchmark of Iraq’s progress towards stability, tacit confirmation of the Bush Administration’s vision of it serving as a model of democratic stability. But the election results confirm, instead, that Iraq remains a weak state in which a national consensus remains elusive, and which is plagued by sectarian and ethnic rifts that could easily revert to civil war. Domestic schisms that replicate wider Middle Eastern tensions, combined with the fact that the US has not rebuilt an Iraqi military capable of defending the country’s borders, leaves Iraq potentially facing perennial political instability, and playing the role of battle ground in others’ struggle for regional hegemony – a fate not entirely unlike Lebanon’s. The French bequeathed Lebanon an inherently dysfunctional system that allocates power on the basis of the demographic balance of sect and ethnicity of 70 years ago, which no longer represents the reality on the ground. In Iraq, the Americans – perhaps mindful of the dangers of the strong centralised government of Saddam and in an attempt at inclusivity – established that most inherently unstable of western political structures: the proportional-representation parliamentary system. Even in relatively stable societies (Israel is a good, if ironic example) proportional representation produces inherently fragile governments hamstrung by the breadth of interests they have to accommodate to maintain a ruling majority. But in an Iraq haunted by the spectre of civil war, where a majority of voters remain stubbornly inclined to cast their ballots on the basis of sect, ethnicity and tribe, it has been a recipe for political deadlock and paralysis.

Impact – Regional Conflict

Failure to implement reforms will collapse the entire region into a vortex of violence

**Carpenter 9** (Ted, Mediterranean Quarterly 2009 20(4), p. 22-31)IM

Experts both in the United States and in Iraq worry that the relative calm that Iraq has enjoyed since mid-2007 might not last once US troops depart, unless the Iraqi government steps up to take control of its rampant corruption. Indeed, there are serious questions about whether Iraq can be a viable state over the long run. If Iraq becomes a cockpit of instability again, as it was during the ﬁrst four years following the US invasion, the implications for the region are ominous. Unfortunately, the factors that might cause the country to unravel are largely beyond the control of the United States. In fact, the US ouster of Saddam Hussein and the long-governing Sunni elite was the cata- lyst that unleashed many of those forces. Indeed, we may come to regard the period between mid-2007 and mid-2009 as a relatively quiet interlude between two turbulent and violent periods. Some members of the foreign policy community fear precisely that kind of outcome, and they advocate that the Obama administration abandon, or at least postpone, its plans to withdraw US forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. Proponents of keeping US troops in Iraq indeﬁnitely would simply have America spend even more blood and treasure in pursuit of an unattainable objective. The unpleasant reality is that, regard- less of when American forces leave Iraq, both that country and the wider region are probably in for a nasty period of instability. Iraq is the vortex in a turbulent part of the world, and there is little the United States can do to prevent its destructive impact.

Continue corruption includes failure to recognize the Kurds – who will likely butt heads with Turkey, causing a regional crisis

**Carpenter 9** (Ted, Mediterranean Quarterly 2009 20(4), p. 22-31)IM

In one sense, Iraq has already ceased to be a uniﬁed state. The Bagh- dad government plays no meaningful role in the Kurdish region in the north. Indeed, Iraqi Arabs who enter the territory are treated as foreigners — and not especially welcome foreigners.1 Ofﬁcially, Kurdistan is merely a region of Iraq that Baghdad allows to exercise “autonomy,” but Iraqi Kurdistan has its own government, ﬂag, national anthem, currency, and army (the Peshmerga). The ﬂag issue is particularly revealing. Even though Kurdistan is suppos- edly part of Iraq, it was illegal there to ﬂy the Iraqi ﬂag until early 2008, and such displays are discouraged even today. When Kurdish ofﬁcials speak publicly, they typically refer to their area as merely a self-governing region of Iraq,2 but when they speak privately, that cover story often disappears. With the Kurdish population, there is seldom even the pretense of an allegiance to Iraq. Media interviews and opinion surveys show overwhelming majorities in favor of full-ﬂedged independence.3 Although the Kurds have not proclaimed an independent country, in every sense that matters Iraq’s Kurdistan region is de facto independent, and the “Kurdish regional government” is the governing body of a sovereign state.4 Moreover, it is a de facto sovereign state with far-reaching territorial goals. Within Iraq, the Kurds claim the northern city of Kirkuk and its extensive oil deposits. There have also been nasty clashes with Iraqi Arab factions in the ethnically mixed province of Nineveh, where Kurds insist that several vil- lages should be part of the Kurdish region.5 Kurdish independence would not only lead to further fragmentation of Iraq but would antagonize all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors, especially Turkey. That is a legitimate concern. The underlying problem is that the Kurds are the largest nationality in the world without an ofﬁcially recognized state. And Turkish leaders have reason to be uneasy. The Turkish military has waged a war for some two-and-a-half decades against Kurdish secessionists, led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) The potential for a major dust-up with Turkey over the PKK is not the only situation in which Kurdistan could be the catalyst for a regional crisis.

Impact – Regional Conflict

Continued corrupt government policies toward the Sunni population leads to regional instability

**Carpenter 9** (Ted, Mediterranean Quarterly 2009 20(4), p. 22-31)IM

Al Qaeda in Iraq, while weak- ened, remains a factor, and nervous Iraqi and US ofﬁcials see indications that terrorist ﬁghters are returning to some of their old haunts.22 The indigenous Sunni insurgency against the Shiite-dominated government also remains a worry. And general Shiite-Sunni sectarian tensions simmer just beneath the surface — a situation that continues to worry Obama administration ofﬁcials, in addition to their concerns about the growing Kurdish-Arab animosity.23 There is a signiﬁcant chance that the already frosty relationship between Baghdad and the Awakening Councils will worsen once the United States completes its withdrawal. It is not even out of the question that full-scale sectarian ﬁghting could erupt again. The continuing Shiite-Sunni rivalry also has regional implications Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are not at all happy about Iran’s ascendency. The potential exists for a nasty Sunni-Shiite proxy struggle with Iraq as the main arena. Given the Kurdish-Arab tensions in Iraq, the uneasy relations — to put it mildly — between Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring states, simmering Sunni-Shiite tensions within Iraq, and the potential for a regional Sunni- Shiite proxy ﬁght, the long-term prognosis for Iraq and regional stability is not good.

Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear

Steinbach 2 (John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm)IM

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Impact – Regional Conflict

Even without escalation, Middle East nuclear war guarantees extinction

Hoffman 6 (Ian, Staff Writer, December 12, 2006, “Nuclear Winter Looms, experts say”, MediaNews Group, Inc. and ANG Newspapers)IM

SAN FRANCISCO -- With superpower nuclear arsenals plummeting to a third of 1980s levels and slated to drop by another third, the nightmarish visions of nuclear winter offered by scientists during the Cold War have receded. But they haven't gone away. Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. "Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock. By dropping imaginary Hiroshima-sized bombs into some of the world's biggest cities, now swelled to tens of millions in population, University of Colorado researcher O. Brian Toon and colleagues found they could generate 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the climate-chilling smoke per kiloton of explosive power as all-out nuclear war between the United States and former Soviet Union. For most modern nuclear-war scenarios, the global impact isn't nuclear winter, the notion of smoke from incinerated cities blotting out the sun for years and starving most of the Earth's people. It's not even nuclear autumn, but rather an instant nuclear chill over most of the planet, accompanied by massive ozone loss and warming at the poles. That's what scientists' computer simulations suggest would happen if nuclear war broke out in a hot spot such as the Middle East, the North Korean peninsula or, the most modeled case, in Southeast Asia. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States and Russia mostly targeted each other's nuclear, military and strategic industrial sites, young nuclear-armed nations have fewer weapons and might go for maximum effect by using them on cities, as the United States did in 1945. "We're at a perilous crossroads," Toon said. The spread of nuclear weapons worldwide combined with global migration into dense megacities form what he called "perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of society since the dawn of humanity." More than 20 years ago, researchers imagined a U.S.-Soviet nuclear holocaust would wreak havoc on the planet's climate. They showed the problem was potentially worse than feared: Massive urban fires would flush hundreds of millions of tons of black soot skyward, where -- heated by sunlight -- it would soar higher into the stratosphere and begin cooking off the protective ozone layer around the Earth. Huge losses of ozone would open the planet and its inhabitants to damaging radiation, while the warm soot would spread a pall sufficient to plunge the Earth into freezing year-round. The hundreds of millions who would starve exceeded those who would die in the initial blasts and radiation. Popularized by astronomer Carl Sagan and Nobel prize winners, the idea of nuclear winter captured the public imagination, though nuclear-weapons scientists found nuclear winter was virtually impossible to achieve in their own computer models without dropping H-bombs on nearly every major city. Scientists on Monday say nuclear winter still is possible, by detonating every nation's entire nuclear arsenals. The effects are striking and last five times or longer than the cooling effects of the biggest volcanic eruptions in recent history, according to Rutgers' Robock.

Impact – Global Instability

Reforms are key to stop global instability

**Haass 10** (Richard, Newsweek, Feb. 26 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/25/the-weakest-link.html)IM

Global instability in the 21st century will come not from superpowers but from failed states. Instead, the central challenge will be posed by weak states—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Haiti, Mexico, Congo, and others. What they have in common (in addition to the fact that many, like Iraq, are located in the greater Middle East) are governments that lack the capacity, the will, or both to rule. They are unable to exercise what is expected of sovereign governments—namely, control over what goes on within their own territory. In the past, this would have been mostly a humanitarian concern. But as we all know, thanks to globalization, people and things travel. Terrorists, diseases, illegal migrants, weapons of mass destruction—for all of them, international boundaries are often little more than formalities. On the other hand, we cannot resolve these problems solely by using the U.S. military. As we learned in Iraq, replacing governments is easier sought than done, and in many cases there is no clear—much less preferable—alternative to the current authority. Even in a supporting role, foreign soldiers can provoke a nationalist backlash against the government they're trying to bolster, making the weak-state problem even worse. Nor is it always clear that doing more militarily will result in lasting improvements that are commensurate with the investment in blood and treasure. This could well be America's fate in Afghanistan.

Reforms are key to democracy and preventing global instability

**Haass 10** (Richard, Newsweek, Feb. 26 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/25/the-weakest-link.html)IM

Global instability in the 21st century will come not from superpowers but from failed states. Even if the March 7 elections in Iraq come off without a voter boycott or major violence, forming a new government is likely to take months of hard work. Making it function will be even more difficult. Once the most powerful country in the Arab world, Iraq is now anything but. True, even an ardent opponent of the war would have to acknowledge that Iraq has evolved dramatically from the authoritarian state it was under Saddam and the failed state it became after he was ousted. Violence is down. The economy is growing. Politics in the run-up to the elections has been intense. But clearly the country is still fragile. Deep fault lines persist, most notably between Kurds and Arabs, but also between minority Sunnis—not all of whom accept their diminished position—and majority Shia, who have yet to fully embrace Winston Churchill's dictum, "In victory: magnanimity." There is no national consensus on how to share oil revenues. Neighbors like Iran meddle at will. It is impossible to escape the irony. A principal rationale for the Iraq War was to create a model democracy that other Arab countries would be forced to emulate. Iraq has become a model, certainly, but of a different sort: it is the epitome of a weak state, one that cannot defend itself, maintain internal peace, or address many of its most pressing challenges without outside help. As such, it is a harbinger of the kind of national-security challenge the United States will confront this century. The Iraqi government now faces the intimidating challenge of implementing effective reforms to create an effective democracy and stable country.

Iraq Says Yes

Iraq will agree to implement the necessary reforms – it has proved willing

**National Security Network 9** (Oct. 27 2009, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1446)IM

Following grim suicide bombing, Iraq takes tentative step forward on election law. The Wall Street Journal reported on the aftermath of the grisly bombings in Baghdad on Sunday. “Iraqi authorities scrambled to reassure the public after the worst bombing attack in two years by increasing vigilance at checkpoints and closing off roads in the Iraqi capital,” said the Journal, which indicated that the death toll of the attacks had risen to “at least 155 people.” The Washington Post suggested that the bombings appeared to be politically motivated, reporting that “The attacks targeted the Justice Ministry, the Baghdad Provincial Council and the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, and appeared designed to portray the Shiite-led government as feeble and rudderless ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for January.” According to the New York Times, “Responsibility for the latest bombings was claimed on Monday by the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella group that includes Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi group with some foreign leadership, according to a posting on a jihadi Web site, the SITE Intelligence Group said.” The Times went on to say that “the violence appeared to have jolted members of Parliament into action: Calling the bombings an attack on the national unity government, Iraqi leaders swiftly responded with a compromise agreement on a new election law that had eluded them for weeks and threatened to delay national elections scheduled for January.” However, the Associated Press cautioned that the promises of a political settlement “held little sway with Iraqis outraged at the government's inability to maintain peace in the city.”

Iraq wants to implement reforms

**Levick 10** (Richard, CEO and President of Levick Strategic Communications, May 14 2010, http://www.bulletproofblog.com/2010/05/14/in-iraq-credibility-and-communications-are-key-to-curtailing-corruption/)IM

Simply put, Iraq now faces a significant undertaking. But with conditions improving on the ground, it seems the nation is ready for another try. On May 6 of this year, Iraq announced the launch of a comprehensive plan to combat corruption throughout the country. Again, Iraq has taken an important first step. But now, it must communicate the plan’s value and implementation as aggressively as possible. Because, after all, what good is a strong deterrent to corruption if no one knows that it exists – or worse, given the country’s recent past, if no one believes that it can truly be effective? On this front, Iraq is off to a good start – having enhanced the plan’s credibility among international observers by remaining consistent with the broad mandate of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), to which Iraq acceded in March 2008. David Jansen notes that “With more than 140 parties from all regions of the globe, UNCAC represents a global consensus on what a government should do to prevent, detect, and remediate corruption. It provides a roadmap for Iraq and the rest of the world to follow.” Essentially, Iraq has sent a powerful message that it is embarking on an effort informed by best practices and inspired by highest standards currently making a tangible difference in other regions of the world. According to David Jansen, the next step for the Iraqi government is to “buttress that message and build broad public support by communicating openly and transparently on all aspects of the plan and its results – and to involve civil society in all aspects of any planned reforms.”

Iraq Says Yes

Iraq is attempting to address corruption

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30 2009, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf)IM

The Government of Iraq continues to address issues of protection of human rights and the rule of law, despite challenges to its capacity. The scheduled examination by the universal periodic review mechanism in February 2010 presents a prime opportunity to demonstrate considerable strides in setting up a robust legal framework should the Independent National Commission for Human Rights be up and running by that time. In the meantime, I continue to urge the Government of Iraq to consider formally establishing a moratorium on the death penalty, pending a thorough review of the Iraqi legislation, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 62/149. UNAMI looks forward to continuing its work in promoting the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform in Iraq.

Iraq is interested in implementing corruption reforms

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30 2009, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf)IM

Over recent weeks, the Government of Iraq accelerated several promising initiatives to create a sustained platform for socio-economic development, through a harmonized relationship with its international partners. In this respect, I welcome Iraq’s decision to embark on a comprehensive five-year National Development Plan 2010-2014, the first step of which was launched formally in June in the presence of all United Nations funds, programmes and agencies in the United Nations country team. The Plan, developed under the leadership of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, will give new impetus not only to the internal advancement of Iraq but also to its international normalization and progress in global development partnerships under the International Compact with Iraq. Iraq is at an important juncture in its recovery and development, and it is also potentially a time of opportunity. There is momentum across the spectrum of government to tackle some of the country’s most entrenched socio-economic issues: unemployment, dilapidated infrastructure, corruption, poverty and disproportionate governance costs. As Iraq moves ahead on its most ambitious programme of reforms since 2003, I urge its leaders to ensure that the needs of all its citizens, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable, are made central to development planning. Senior Iraqi officials have stressed the need for greater international investment in Iraq and mobilization of untapped Iraqi economic and natural resources to increase the country’s revenues.

Politics – Link Shield

Obama’s plan will fail without reform – which would be a loss for him

**National Security Network 9** (Oct. 27 2009, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1446)IM

Additionally, these conservatives are not in line with the Republican leadership, the Iraqi people and government, nor the American people who all firmly support the Obama plan. In response to Obama’s withdrawal plan, House Republican leader John Boehner said, “The plan put forward by President Obama continues our strategy of bringing troops home from Iraq as they succeed in stabilizing the country. I believe he has outlined a responsible approach that retains maximum flexibility to reconsider troop levels and to respond to changes in the security environment should circumstances on the ground warrant.” Even “Sen. John McCain, who lost his White House bid to Barack Obama last fall, is supporting the president's new plan to pull most U.S. troops out of Iraq by the fall of 2010,” according to CBS. The plan also enjoys support among the American people. CNN reports that, “Seven out of ten people questioned in a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey released Thursday, the sixth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, say they support the president's announced plan to remove most U.S. troops from Iraq by August of next year but keep a force of 35,000 to 50,000 in the country.”

Reforms would be a win for Obama and his plan regarding Iraq

**CNN 10** (May 29 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/29/poll.iraq.troop.withdrawal/index.html)IM

Washington (CNN) -- Support for President Obama's planned removal of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the August could drop significantly if Iraq cannot solve its current problems in time, according to a new national poll. A CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Saturday indicates that 64 percent of Americans favor the president's plan to keep just 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the summer, with 35 percent opposed. But public approval of the plan falls to 51 percent if Iraq does not have a stable government by August and there is widespread violence at that time, with opposition rising to 48 percent. "Support drops more than 20 points among Americans with a college education and among suburbanites," said CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "But among people who never attended college, opinion barely changes. The same is true for people who live in rural areas." The survey also indicates that the conflict in Iraq remains very unpopular, with more than 6 in 10 saying they oppose the war.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

Non-Unique

Non-Unique – Iraq is gaining stability, sovereignty and self-reliance already

**VOA News 10** (Apr. 9 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-Condemns-Iraq-Bombings-90593389.html)IM

Bombs tore through apartment buildings and a market in mostly Shiite areas of Baghdad on April 5th, killing 50. The attacks appeared to be an attempt by al-Qaida in Iraq or other extremists to exploit a power vacuum during the lengthy negotiations to form a new government. About 120 people have been killed in and around the capital over the past several weeks. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Forces in Iraq strongly condemn these latest terrorist attacks against innocent civilians. The U.S. especially deplores the targeting of foreign diplomatic missions in Baghdad, and expresses its solidarity with its diplomatic colleagues who are in Iraq to help the Iraqi people. "Despite the ruthless killings of innocent Iraqis," said U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill and General Ray Odierno in a joint statement, "we feel confident that the forward progress of Iraq will continue. Notwithstanding these attempts at intimidation, we believe Iraqis will not be deterred from working towards a stable, sovereign and self-reliant Iraq. And Iraq's friends will help them." The government of Iraq and Iraq security forces have the lead in investigating these incidents and are working hard to prevent future attacks. The U.S. stands ready to provide support to the government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces as requested. Iraq has just completed a very credible election process. It is now critical that the various parties complete the challenging task of building a coalition government -- one that can respond to the needs and aspirations of the Iraqi people. The overwhelming majority of the Iraqis rejects sectarian violence and wants a democratic government that can provide peace and security. The U.S. and the Iraqi Security Forces have worked tirelessly to combat terrorism and restore stability and relative peace in Iraq. Those responsible for these attacks seek to create chaos and uncertainty to prevent Iraqis from building a peaceful and prosperous society. They must not be allowed to succeed.

The Iraqi government is already working with organizations such as USAID to gain stability, prosperity and democracy

**USAID 10** (June 11 2010, www.usaid.gov/iraq/)IM

USAID assistance helps to build a foundation for a peaceful and prosperous Iraq. It bridges the transition from the short-term provision of essential services to long-term, integrated, and Iraqi-led development. USAID's overarching goal is to contribute to the stability and development of Iraq as part of the broader U.S. government effort. USAID emphasizes responsiveness and sustainability, by supporting focused stabilization, establishing the foundation for economic growth, and building national capacity. These efforts help stabilize areas affected by terrorism while mitigating the appeal of insurgent recruitment efforts. USAID assistance to democratic institutions and sustainable economic development will form the foundations of a stable, democratic, and prosperous Iraq.

Rapid Withdrawal Key

Rapid withdrawal is key to Iraqi viability

**Nuttle 10** (David, Helium, June 16 2010, http://www.www.helium.com/items/1131677-how-to-plan-the-us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq)IM

In order for the Iraqi government to gain support from their divided population, they must call for a time-table for the U.S. to withdraw troops. No Iraqi I know of wants U.S. troops in Iraq any longer than needed to give Iraqi forces the training and means necessary to provide their nation with a reasonable degree of security. A failure to now schedule U.S. troop withdrawal would harm the political viability of the Iraq government. As Americans we should not view Iraqi actions as ingratitude. We need to keep in mind that U.S. forces have made hundreds of significant mistakes, in Iraq. For the most, part we have not made ourselves popular with the Iraqi populations. Our forces entered Iraq trained, equipped, and prepared to fight a conventional war. With the exception of a few of our special operations units, our forces were not trained, equipped, or prepared to undertake sustained counterterror, counterinsurgency, civic action, and/or homeland security efforts. All too often we countered attacks with excessive conventional military force causing damage to our rapport building efforts with local populations.

A2: Solvency – Quid Pro Quo

Unconditional withdrawal is key to long term stability and solvency

**National Security Network 10** (Apr. 20 2010, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1577)IM

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces - which remains on track - is the best vehicle for building a long-term, strategic relationship with Iraq and its people. General Odierno explained yesterday that the U.S. is on target for withdrawal, saying "I feel very comfortable with us going down to 50,000 as the Iraqi security forces significantly continue to increase their capacities and capabilities." In an interview with Fox News this weekend, Odierno went into greater detail: "...we are on target to be at 50,000 by August. We will still have formations here that are able to train combat formations. We'll still be able to conduct counterterrorism operations. We'll still be able to support provincial reconstruction teams. We're at about 95,000 today, Chris, so I - our plans are intact. I feel very comfortable with our plan. And unless something unforeseen and disastrous happens, I fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the 1st of September." The Center for American Progress's Brian Katulis explains why the withdrawal must take place, pointing out that "Iraq's leaders demanded a clear timeline for troop withdrawals in its negotiations with the Bush administration, and there are strong political actors in Iraq who are demanding an end to what they view as an ‘occupation.'" Katulis adds that, "Not moving forward with the planned troop drawdown because of protracted political negotiations in Baghdad makes little strategic sense for broader U.S. national security." Withdrawal is also the best means of solidifying a strategic relationship with the Iraqi people. As Marc Lynch wrote recently, withdrawal "doesn't mean ignoring Iraq." What it does mean, according to Lynch, is "moving to develop a normal, constructive strategic relationship with the new Iraqi government, with the main point of contact the Embassy and the private sector rather than the military, and adhering in every way possible to the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and to the drawdown timeline."

A2: Impact – Democracy

For Iraq to achieve democracy and freedom we must hand over authority and end the occupation

Kabul Press 9 (June 30 2009, kabulpress.org/World\_e1.htm)IM

There are five steps in our plan to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom. We will hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government, help establish security, continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, encourage more international support, and move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people. The occupation will end, and Iraqis will govern their own affairs. America's ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, will present his credentials to the new president of Iraq. Our embassy in Baghdad will have the same purpose as any other American embassy, to assure good relations with a sovereign nation. America and other countries will continue to provide technical experts to help Iraq's ministries of government, but these ministries will report to Iraq's new prime minister.

**Stable democracy can’t be achieved in Iraq any time soon – emerging democracies are fraught with violence, and it’s too late for it to be a quick process**

**Owen 5** (John, November/December 2005, Foreign Affairs – The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61206/john-m-owen-iv/iraq-and-the-democratic-peace)IM

The Bush administration's desire to break with its predecessors and alter the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East was admirable. But the White House got its science wrong, or at least not completely right: the democratic peace theory does not dictate that the United States can or should remake Iraq into a democracy. In Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, the veteran political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make two critical points. Not only is turning authoritarian countries into democracies extremely difficult, much more so than the administration seems to have anticipated. The Middle East could also become a much more dangerous place if Washington and the rest of the world settle for a merely semidemocratic regime in Baghdad. Such an Iraq, Mansfield and Snyder imply, would be uncommonly likely to start wars -- a bull in the Middle Eastern china shop. Unfortunately, such an Iraq alsomay be just what we end up with. At first glance, the realists' critique of the Iraq war is easier to understand than that of the democratic peace theorists. Indeed, realism -- which holds that a country's type of government has no systematic effects on its foreign policy -- is enjoying a revival in Washington these days, precisely because of the war. According to the realists, the best way to have dealt with Saddam would have been not to overthrow him but to use coercive bargaining: to have threatened him with annihilation, for example, if he ever used nuclear weapons. Even the democratic peace theory, however, does not necessarily prescribe the use of force to transform despotisms such as Iraq into democracies. Indeed, by itself, the argument that democracies do not fight one another does not have any practical implications for the foreign policymaker. It needs an additional or minor premise, such as "the United States can make Iraq into a democracy at an acceptable cost." And it is precisely this minor premise about which the academy has been skeptical. No scholarly consensus exists on how countries become democratic, and the literature is equally murky on the costs to the United States of trying to force them to be free.

A2: Impact – Terrorism

Iraq can achieve stability, regardless of terrorist violence

**Rising 9** (David, Associated Press, Sept. 16 2009, http://blog.taragana.com/n/biden-says-terrorist-violence-wont-destabilize-iraq-170401/)IM

BAGHDAD — Vice President Joe Biden expressed confidence Wednesday that attempts to destabilize Iraq through violence will fail, and said the country’s future depended on its ability to resolve its lingering political and sectarian differences. Meeting with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in his Baghdad office, Biden said the United States was “committed to the Iraqi government and people as they work to create a peaceful and prosperous Iraq.” Biden’s arrival was marred by a rocket attack against the Green Zone on Tuesday evening that killed two Iraqi civilians. The attacks took place after Biden had retired for the night following meetings with American officials on the first day of his visit. After the meeting with al-Maliki, a couple of explosions could be heard in the vicinity of the Green Zone, a fortified area in downtown Baghdad that houses government offices, agencies and the U.S. and British embassies. Although violence has declined around Iraq, deadly attacks still occur, including Aug. 19 truck bombings against the foreign and finance ministries that killed more than 100 people. On Wednesday, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle attacked a checkpoint north of Baghdad, killing three people and wounding nine, police said. Biden offered his condolences to victims of the Aug. 19 bombings and assured them “we are confident the terrorists will fail.” On the effort to reconcile political and sectarian divides, Biden said that al-Maliki “was kind enough to discuss with us some of the issues that are in need of resolution if the Iraqis are to achieve the bright future they fought for and deserve.”

A2: Impact – Instability

US disengagement would be the best strategy, and would create long-term stability in Iraq

**Luttwak 5** (Edward, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January/February 2005, Foreign Affairs – Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60424/edward-n-luttwak/iraq-the-logic-of-disengagement)IM

Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country--while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington would be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq's neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself.

**A2: Solvency – Reforms**

**Alt causes – Shiite-Sunni conflict and meddling from Iran**

**Keilani 10** (Musa, The Jordan Times, May 9 2010, http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=26368)IM

The decision by the two largest Shiite coalition parties to form the next government in Iraq indicates that the country will continue to remain a major source of instability in the region. The alliance between the State of Law group led by Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance, which includes Ahmed Chalabi and firebrand religious leader Moqtada Sadr will deprive the minority Sunnis of what they consider as their rightful share of power in the country after having voted for the secular Iraqiya coalition led by former prime minister Iyad Allawi. And that could trigger a Sunni revolt and a new wave of violence in Iraq. Iraqiya could not muster enough seats - 163 of 325 - to form the next government mainly because it could not work out an agreement with the northern Kurds. Sunni Arabs and Kurds are feuding over the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, hence a political agreement between them has proved elusive. It is clear that the Shiites of Iraq are determined to have their way at the expense of the Sunnis. Instead of working on settling differences with the Sunnis and bringing them into the circle of power, the Shiites seek domination of the country, with Iran playing its own game. Indeed, the ouster of Saddam and subsequent developments in Iraq have played into Iran's hands. And that is one of the reasons why Tehran has toughened its already hardline approach to its regional and international relations. There are no magical solution to the problems of Iraq. If the current course of events continues, we will soon be witnessing civil strife that would be more ferocious than the violence that we saw three years ago. Iran should take its hands off Iraq, but it will not do so, given the current geopolitics in the region and beyond. And that is, indeed, the biggest challenge facing everyone who is interested in a stable and secure Iraq.

\*\* Denuclearization CP\*\*

1NC Shell

Text: The United States federal government should [plan] on the condition that Iran agrees to denuclearize.

First, a quid pro quo is our best shot at denuclearizing Iran – they want us out of Iraq, and would agree to the quid pro quo

Terhalle 7 (Maximillian, expert on the Middle East, studied International Relations, Arabic and Middle East Politics, Atlantic Community, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open\_Think\_Tank\_Article/Quid\_Pro\_Quo\_is\_Best\_Deal\_For\_US\_and\_Iran)JFS

Maximilian Terhalle: I recommend that the United States offer Iran a fair deal in order to secure American interests in the Gulf region. The US needs to consider Iran’s political ambitions if it hopes to make headway with Tehran, and the international community should get involved in negotiating a mutually beneficial agreement.

Iran and the United States have finally stepped forward and begun talking, although each is still deeply suspicious of the other. But how is one to reconcile US interests in the Gulf region with the security concerns of Iran? The answer lies in a realistic quid pro quo.

On the one hand, Washington depends on Saudi oil resources, which must be kept accessible and inexpensive. Iraq no longer acts as a strategic counterweight in the region; prior to 2003, King Fahd and Saddam Hussein balanced against the Islamic Republic. When an adviser to the new King Abdullah announced in last November’s Washington Post that Riyadh would actively support her Sunni brethren in Iraq against Iran, the real reason was to hinder a premature US withdrawal from the region since the kingdom is too weak to take on the role of the region’s hegemon. Neither country can now be relied upon by the United States as a safeguard against Iran. On the other hand, Iran has pursued a nuclear program regardless of whether pragmatists or revolutionaries have ruled over Khomeini’s invention. Similarly to the former Soviet military doctrine, Iran will make any endeavor to prevent a war on its territory. The memory of the war with Iraq (1980-88) is deeply enshrined in people’s minds. The combination of US troops in the region, unforgotten regime change rhetoric and Israel’s nuclear capabilities has created a fear of foreign invasion that is being effectively exploited by Ahmadinejad’s government.

Iran is willing to cooperate in new negotiations over denuclearization, they’d say yes

Qatar Morning Post 5/20 (5/20/10, http://www.qatarmorningpost.com/news/newsfull.php?newid=370726) GAT

After several hours of intense negotiations on Monday, the trilateral meeting between Iran, Brazil and Turkey ends with Tehran agreeing to send some 1,200 kilograms of its 3.5 percent enriched uranium over to Turkey in exchange for a total of 120 kilogram of 20 percent enriched uranium, Press TV reported.  Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki read the ten-point detailed deceleration on the nuclear swap deal at a press conference held in the Iranian capital Tehran.  1. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all state parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.  2. We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation. 3. We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperate

on including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction.  4. Based on this point, the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran's rights and obligations under the NPT.

1NC Shell

Concessions are needed to solve Iran’s nuclearization problem – the only alternative is a disastrous military conflict in the Middle East

Roggeveen 9 (Sam, fmr. senior strategic analyst in Australia's Office of Natl. Assessments, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/30/Iran-Quid-pro-quo.aspx) GAT

In today's Age, Professor Amin Saikal [lays out](http://www.theage.com.au/action/printArticle?id=760772) the security fears that he thinks might be motivating Iran's nuclear program: The US military build-up in the Gulf, invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, establishment of bases in Central Asia and unqualified support for Israel - as well as the latter's treatment of Iran as the most dangerous state in the region - have provided Tehran with good reasons to develop a security paranoia. What's missing is any reference to Iran's own provocations, notably its sponsorship of regional terrorism. Saikal's article then argues for a comprehensive regional nuclear arms control agreement that would include Israel. He also wants a 'structural change' in the US-Israel relationship that would lead to a resolution to the Palestinian problem, a regional settlement of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and a marked reduction in the US military presence in the Middle East. These would all involve major concessions by the US, and there's still no suggestion at this point in the article that Iran might have to give up its support for Hizballah and Hamas in return. Then, in the closing paragraph, this warning: The alternative to such a development is a military confrontation. Iran has the capacity to curtail its oil production, to use various militant groups in the region, to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 87 per cent of the Gulf oil is exported to the outside world, to blow up oil platforms in Gulf Arab states and to rocket Israel and US bases in the region. Such actions as these could set the entire region on fire, from which no one would emerge a winner. Finally, a mention of Iran's support for 'militant groups', but only to suggest that Iran could unleash them if the US doesn't sit down and negotiate. This is not a line of argument likely to win over Americans who are wavering about the merits of talking with Iran.

Iran nuclearization causes Israeli strikes on Iran

Russell 9 (James A. is managing editor of Strategic Insights, the quarterly ejournal published by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, Spring <http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf>)JFS

As suggested by Schelling, asymmetries in actor interests can complicate the functioning of the bargaining framework for actor participants. As outlined above, the interests and objectives of the participants differ in ways that potentially undermine predictable interactions of the framework participants. Also surrounding these asymmetries in interests are the circumstances of the present, in which there is a growing perception that the “window of opportunity” for preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon may be closing.50 This perception creates conditions under which nuclear status quo powers such as the Israel or the United States may contemplate a preventive military strike. The likelihood of such a first strike attack in these circumstances is inversely related to calculations over the size of the window of opportunity.51 As long as Iran is believed to be years away from achieving operational capability, the prospect of an attack remains low. The more advanced Iran’s capabilities become, the higher the prospect of an attack. The inverse relationship is reflected in figure one below.

The most likely escalation trigger in the framework is a preventative conventional attack by the United States and/or Israel on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if either or both actors become convinced that Iran was on the verge of operationalizing a weapon. Estimates vary on when this may occur. The United States Director of National Intelligence, J. Michael McConnell, testified in February 2008 that Iran could compile sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium to build a nuclear device by 2010- 2015 – with 2009 representing the earliest date Iran could achieve this goal.52 Israel shares the basic outlines of the U.S. assessment, but takes a more alarmist view. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz stated in August 2008 that “Our estimation is that already by [2009] Iran will reach enrichment capability and as soon as 2010 will have option to reach [uranium production] at military levels.”53 Israeli plans for a preventative strike on Iranian nuclear sites appear periodically in the press,54 and Israel has undertaken a series of military exercises intended to demonstrate its military capabilities to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2008, Israel mounted an exercise using 100 F-15 and F-16 aircraft traveling over 900 miles with aerial refueling tankers and pilot recovery operations that was widely seen as a rehearsal for such an attack.55 The United States reportedly told Israel in the summer of 2008 that it would not actively support a preventative attack.56 Despite the absence of a “green light” for the attack, the United States nonetheless agreed in September 2008 to provide $77 million for 1,000 GBU-39 bunker busting smart bombs that can reportedly penetrate up to six feet of reinforced concrete. The sale bolsters Israel’s ability to threaten Iran’s nuclear sites, IRGC and Hezbollah underground bunkers.57

1NC Shell

AND, ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES WOULD ACCELERATE IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, SPARK RELENTLESS RETALIATION VIA CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE, ERADICATE ARAB RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, AND THROW THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST INTO TURMOIL

Pedatzur ‘09 [Reuven, Haaretz staff writer. Haaretz is Israel’s oldest daily newspaper in circulation. “Striking Iran – or striking out.” May 15, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085619.html]

The study also analyzes **the** possible **Iranian response to an Israeli strike.** In all likelihood the result **would be to** spur Iranians tocontinue and even **accelerate their nuclear program,** to create reliable deterrence in the face of an aggressive Israel. **Iran would also withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, which until now has enabled its nuclear program to be monitored, to a certain degree, through inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. An Israeli strike would immediately put a stop to the international community's attempts to pressure Iran into suspending development of nuclear weapons. **Iran would also, almost certainly, retaliate against Israel directly. It might attack targets** here **with** Shahab-3 **ballistic missiles, whose range covers all of Israel**. A few might **even** be equipped **with chemical warheads**. In addition, **the Iranians would use Hezbollah and Hamas to dispatch waves of suicide bombers into Israel**. The Second Lebanon War showed us Hezbollah's rocket capability, and the experience of the past eight years has been instructive regarding Hamas' ability to fire Qassams from the Gaza Strip. **Hezbollah** launched 4,000 rockets from South Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War, and their effect on northern Israel has not been forgotten: Life was nearly paralyzed for a whole month. Since then the Lebanese organization's stockpile was replenished and enhanced, and it **now has some 40,000 rockets. Israel does not have a response** to those rockets. The rocket defense systems now being developed (Iron Dome and Magic Wand) are still far from completion, and even after they become operational, it is doubtful they will prove effective against thousands of rockets launched at Israel. **An Israeli strike on Iran would also sow instability in the Middle East.** The Iranians would make use of the Shi'ites in Iraq, support Taliban fighters and improve their combat capabilities in Afghanistan. **They** also **might attack American interests in the region, especially in countries that host U.S. military forces, such as Qatar and Bahrain**. The Iranians would probably also **attempt to disrupt the flow of oil to the West from the Persian Gulf region.** **Since the United States would be perceived as having given Israel a green light to attack Iran, American relations with allies in the Arab world could suffer greatly**. Toukan and Cordesman believe, however, that Iran's ally Syria would refrain from intervening if Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities.

Solvency- Bargaining Chip

**We could use Iraq withdrawal as a bargaining chip to get Iran to denuclearize**

Dreyfuss 5/5 (Robert, investigative journalist in Alexandria, Virginia, The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/blog/tehrans-coup-iraq-part-iii)JFS

Despite calls from neoconservatives and Republican hardliners for Obama to delay or cancel the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq, it’s too late for that, too. The best hope for Obama is reopen talks about Iraq with Iran. Without doubt, Iran would like to use Iraq as a bargaining chip in the negotiations over its nuclear enrichment program, and it would make sense for the United States to broaden the talks with Iran to include Iraq, Afghanistan, and illegal drug smuggling. Feel-good stunts, such as walking out of the UN speech by President Ahmadinejad may look good on television, but they do nothing to deal with the reality, namely, that the United States is going to have to go back to the bargaining table with Iran and try to make a deal.

Solvency - Says Yes

**Iran would agree to a QPQ about its nuclear program**

Schofield 7 (Matthew, McClatchy Newspapers, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2007/11/23/22026/iran-hints-it-could-halt-nuclear.html)JFS

Diplomats said Soltanieh's remarks reflected what he'd been saying in private. "Iran is willing to deal," one said. "But they've made it clear there would have to be a quid pro quo, and they don't believe that's possible." The diplomats said they couldn't be quoted by name because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The Bush administration charges that Iran's nuclear-enrichment program is intended to produce a nuclear weapon, but Iran says its aim is peaceful nuclear energy.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is pushing for peaceful solutions to Iran’s nuclearization – puts diplomatic pressure

Ghafour 5/24 (P.K. Abdul, analyst for arabnews.com, http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article56993.ece) GAT

In a final communiqué issued by GCC foreign ministers following their meeting in Jeddah, the group emphasized the need to keep the Middle East - including Israel - free of nuclear and mass destructive weapons. "The ministers praised the efforts of Turkey and Brazil to help reach a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear program within the framework of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and related UN Security Council resolutions," the communiqué said. Iran signed an agreement on May 17 to send uranium abroad for enrichment after mediation talks in Tehran with Turkish and Brazilian leaders. Under the deal Iran would ship 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, in return for fuel for a research reactor. The GCC meeting denounced all forms of terrorism and urged the international community to establish a global counterterrorism center to exchange information and expertise in the field. The ministers from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE supported Doha's bid for World Cup 2022 and said Qatar has all the capabilities to organize the event. They also praised Bahrain for showing readiness to host the first GCC Games.

Solvency - Says Yes

Iran wants to normalize relations with the US

Hooshiyar 6 (Khashayar, Prof. of Poli. Sci. at York Univ., http://iranreview.com/Editorial s/Iran%20and%20US.pdf) GAT

While Iran has rejected subjugation, it has not ruled out ‘normalization’ of relations with the West, particularly the United States. In line with Rafsanjani’s rapprochement efforts in the 1990s, the neo-conservative government of Ahmadi-Nejad has also been showing a certain degree of willingness to engage with the US, as evident in comments made by the deputy foreign minister Mohammad-Reza Baghari. In a recent address to US civilian and military officials in Bahrain, Mr. Bagheri expressed his disappointment with Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech, especially given Iran’s cooperation with US forces in Afghanistan. Baheri restated Tehran’s willingness to assist US interests in Iraq, emphasizing that it expected a ‘sincere’ recognition of its role. In fact, all factions within the regime have shown their willingness to ‘normalize’ their relationship with anyone, even their arch-enemy, US imperialism. According to Rafsanjani, As Muslims we have no problem with resolving any of the foreign issues facing us….We have a tenet in Islam which is the precedence of the expediency of power over the expediency of weakness….In principle, the Expediency Council has been created on the basis of this need. To endanger our country and imagine that we are acting in an Islamic way is not Islamic. In his ‘religious’ justification of Iran’s efforts to establish ‘normal’ relations with the ‘Great Satan’, the survival of the regime is the main concern. The only thing Iran wants from the US in return for its *limited* compliance and cooperation (perhaps even full compliance, if it were not for certain fundamental domestic imperatives) is to be recognized and respected as a major military and political player in the politics of the region, not as merely another pawn in the American empire.

Solvency - Says Yes

Iran is willing to curb nuclearization efforts in return for US concessions – past offers prove

Porter 6 (Gareth, US foreign policy analyst, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=9040) GAT

Iran offered in 2003 to accept peace with Israel and cut off material assistance to Palestinian armed groups and to pressure them to halt terrorist attacks within Israel's 1967 borders, according to the secret Iranian proposal to the United States. The two-page proposal for a broad Iran-U.S. agreement covering all the issues separating the two countries, a copy of which was obtained by IPS, was conveyed to the United States in late April or early May 2003. Trita Parsi, a specialist on Iranian foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies who provided the document to IPS, says he got it from an Iranian official earlier this year but is not at liberty to reveal the source. The two-page document contradicts the official line of the George W. Bush administration that Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel and the sponsorship of terrorism in the region. Parsi says the document is a summary of an even more detailed Iranian negotiating proposal, which he learned about in 2003 from the U.S. intermediary who carried it to the State Department on behalf of the Swiss embassy in late April or early May 2003. The intermediary has not yet agreed to be identified, according to Parsi. The Iranian negotiating proposal indicated clearly that Iran was prepared to give up its role as a supporter of armed groups in the region in return for a larger bargain with the United States. What the Iranians wanted in return, as suggested by the document itself as well as expert observers of Iranian policy, was an end to U.S. hostility and recognition of Iran as a legitimate power in the region. Before the 2003 proposal, Iran had attacked Arab governments that had supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The negotiating document, however, offered "acceptance of the Arab League Beirut declaration," which it also referred to as the "Saudi initiative, two-states approach." The March 2002 Beirut declaration represented the Arab League's first official acceptance of the land-for-peace principle as well as a comprehensive peace with Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal to the territory it had controlled before the 1967 war. Iran's proposed concession on the issue would have aligned its policy with that of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others with whom the United States enjoyed intimate relations. Another concession in the document was a "stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad, etc.) from Iranian territory" along with "pressure on these organizations to stop violent actions against civilians within borders of 1967." Even more surprising, given the extremely close relationship between Iran and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah Shi'ite organization, the proposal offered to take "action on Hezbollah to become a mere political organization within Lebanon." The Iranian proposal also offered to accept much tighter controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange for "full access to peaceful nuclear technology." It offered "full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all further IAEA protocols)." That was a reference to protocols that would require Iran to provide IAEA monitors with access to any facility they might request, whether it had been declared by Iran or not. That would have made it much more difficult for Iran to carry out any secret nuclear activities without being detected. In return for these concessions, which contradicted Iran's public rhetoric about Israel and anti-Israeli forces, the secret Iranian proposal sought U.S. agreement to a list of Iranian aims. The list included a "Halt in U.S. hostile behavior and rectification of status of Iran in the U.S.," as well as the "abolishment of all sanctions." Also included among Iran's aims was "recognition of Iran's legitimate security interests in the region with according defense capacity." According to a number of Iran specialists, the aim of security and an official acknowledgment of Iran's status as a regional power were central to the Iranian interest in a broad agreement with the United States. Negotiation of a deal with the United States that would advance Iran's security and fundamental geopolitical political interests in the Persian Gulf region in return for accepting the existence of Israel and other Iranian concessions has long been discussed among senior Iranian national security officials, according to Parsi and other analysts of Iranian national security policy. An Iranian threat to destroy Israel has been a major propaganda theme of the Bush administration for months. On March 10, Bush said, "The Iranian president has stated his desire to destroy our ally, Israel. So when you start listening to what he has said to their desire to develop a nuclear weapon, then you begin to see an issue of grave national security concern." But in 2003, Bush refused to allow any response to the Iranian offer to negotiate an agreement that would have accepted the existence of Israel. Flynt Leverett, then the senior specialist on the Middle East on the National Security Council staff, recalled in an interview with IPS that it was "literally a few days" between the receipt of the Iranian proposal and the dispatch of a message to the Swiss ambassador expressing displeasure that he had forwarded it to Washington. Interest in such a deal is still very much alive in Tehran, despite the U.S. refusal to respond to the 2003 proposal. Turkish international relations professor Mustafa Kibaroglu of Bilkent University writes in the latest issue of Middle East Journal that "senior analysts" from Iran told him in July 2005 that "the formal recognition of Israel by Iran may also be possible if essentially a 'grand bargain' can be achieved between the U.S. and Iran." The proposal's offer to dismantle the main thrust of Iran's Islamic and anti-Israel policy would be strongly opposed by some of the extreme conservatives among the mullahs who engineered the repression of the reformist movement in 2004 and who backed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in last year's election.

Internal Link - **Concessions Needed**

**The only way to stop Iranian nuclear programs is concessions**

Gwertzman 6 (Bernard, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10438/takeyh.html)JFS

Ray Takeyh, CFR's top Iran expert, says Iran's latest uranium enrichment steps will not lead to UN Security Council sanctions against Tehran. The only way Iran might slow down or halt its nuclear program, he says, "is for the United States to become more directly engaged in negotiations with Iranians and also make an offer of some corresponding concessions." These should include economic, security, and diplomatic concessions, says Takeyh.

**Without providing concessions to Iran, the US cannot hope for Iran to listen to denuclearization demands**

Hirsch 6 (Jorge, Prof. of Physics at University of California, http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@sus.csuchico.edu/msg21360.html) GAT

Iran will not stop its enrichment program, certainly not as a precondition to negotiations. This should be obvious to Bush, as well as to Russia and China. Hence one must ask: why is Bush pursuing this approach, and why are Russia and China, albeit reluctantly, supporting it? What are Bush's intentions toward Iran? If Bush had any intention of reaching a negotiated agreement with Iran, he had plenty of opportunities to pursue such options, as recently detailed by Flynt Leverett (see complete article here) [pdf]. In the absence of any concession by the US, Iran will not submit to US demands, and weak sanctions resolutions do not exert any real pressure on Iran. This has been clear to many observers including this author for many months. The only rational explanation to understand the US push to pass resolutions against Iran, no matter how weak, is that its purpose is to lay the ground for planned military action. If the intention is to attack Iran, it was important for Bush to have this UNSC resolution ( and the preceding one of July 31st) approved unanimously, that makes a demand on Iran that Iran will not meet, to provide a fig-leaf argument that "the world" demands action, as UNSC 1441 did in the case of Iraq.

Impact – Iran Prolif

A nuclear Iran destroys the world – regional and global prolif, terrorism, ideological war, and collapses deterrence

Wimbush, 2007 (S. Enders,- senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of its Center for Future Security Strategies, “The End of Deterrence: A nuclear Iran will change everything”, January 11th, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/154auoqp.asp?pg=1>)JFS

Iran is fast building its position as the Middle East's political and military hegemon, a position that will be largely unchallengeable once it acquires nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran will change all of the critical strategic dynamics of this volatile region in ways that threaten the interests of virtually everyone else. The outlines of some of these negative trends are already visible, as other actors adjust their strategies to accommodate what increasingly appears to be the emerging reality of an unpredictable, unstable nuclear power. Iran needn't test a device to shift these dangerous dynamics into high gear; that is already happening. By the time Iran tests, the landscape will have changed dramatically because everyone will have seen it coming.The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran far exceed the prospect of using them to win a military conflict. Nuclear weapons will empower strategies of coercion, intimidation, and denial that go far beyond purely military considerations. Acquiring the bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran's mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them. With nuclear weapons, Iran will have gained the ability to deter any direct American threats, as well as the leverage to keep the United States at a distance and to discourage it from helping Iran's regional opponents. Would the United States be in Iraq if Saddam had had a few nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them on target to much of Europe and all of Israel? Would it even have gone to war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression? Unlikely. Yet Iran is rapidly acquiring just such a capability. If it succeeds, a relatively small nuclear outcast will be able to deter a mature nuclear power. Iran will become a billboard advertising nuclear weapons as the logical asymmetric weapon of choice for nations that wish to confront the United States. It should surprise no one that quiet discussions have already begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East about the desirability of developing national nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran's anticipated advantage and to offset the perceived decline in America's protective power. This is just the beginning. We should anticipate that proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift, creating nightmarish challenges. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming impossible to impede. Advanced computation and simulation techniques will eventually make testing unnecessary for some actors, thereby expanding the possibilities for unwelcome surprises and rapid shifts in the security environment. Leakage of nuclear knowledge and technologies from weak states will become commonplace, and new covert supply networks will emerge to fill the gap left by the neutralization of Pakistani proliferator A. Q. Khan. Non-proliferation treaties, never effective in blocking the ambitions of rogues like Iran and North Korea, will be meaningless. Intentional proliferation to state and non-state actors is virtually certain, as newly capable states seek to empower their friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its well known support of Hezbollah, is a particularly good candidate to proliferate nuclear capabilities beyond the control of any state as a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear politics. Arsenals will be small, which sounds reassuring, but in fact it heightens the dangers and risk. New players with just a few weapons, including Iran, will be especially dangerous. Cold War deterrence was based on the belief that an initial strike by an attacker could not destroy all an opponent's nuclear weapons, leaving the adversary with the capacity to strike back in a devastating retaliatory blow. Because it is likely to appear easier to destroy them in a single blow, small arsenals will increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis. Small, emerging nuclear forces could also raise the risk of preventive war, as leaders are tempted to attack before enemy arsenals grow bigger and more secure. Some of the new nuclear actors are less interested in deterrence than in using nuclear weapons to annihilate their enemies. Iran's leadership has spoken of its willingness--in their words--to "martyr" the entire Iranian nation, and it has even expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate an inevitable, apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West that will result in Islam's final worldwide triumph. Wiping Israel off the map--one of Iran's frequently expressed strategic objectives--even if it results in an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran, may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off. Ideological actors of this kind may be very different from today's nuclear powers who employ nuclear weapons as a deterrent to annihilation. Indeed, some of the new actors may seek to annihilate others and be annihilated, gloriously, in return. What constitutes deterrence in this world? Proponents of new non-proliferation treaties and many European strategists speak of "managing" a nuclear Iran, as if Iran and the new nuclear actors that will emerge in Iran's wake can be easily deterred by getting them to sign documents and by talking nicely to them. This is a lethal naiveté. We have no idea how to deter ideological actors who may even welcome their own annihilation. We do not know what they hold dear enough to be deterred by the threat of its destruction. Our own nuclear arsenal is robust, but it may have no deterrent effect on a nuclear-armed ideological adversary. This is the world Iran is dragging us into. Can they be talked out of it? Maybe. But it is getting very late to slow or reverse the momentum propelling us into this nuclear no-man's land. We should be under no illusion that talk alone--"engagement"--is a solution. Nuclear Iran will prompt the emergence of a world in which nuclear deterrence may evaporate, the likelihood of nuclear use will grow, and where deterrence, once broken, cannot be restored.

Impact – Iran Prolif

Iranian proliferation would escalate to a massive conflagration super-quickly

Eisenstadt 7 (Michael , senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute, July 200, “Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran,” Ed. Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #72, p. 5)

In contrast, a nuclear-armed Iran would initially have a relatively small number of weapons, and con- tacts between the armed forces of Iran and those of the United States would likely be limited to the Persian Gulf region. Nevertheless, the small size of the potential theater of operations means that relatively large num- bers of nuclear weapons could be deployed in a very small area and that events could unfold very quickly there—given the geographically confined nature of the Gulf—making management or control of developments difficult during a crisis. Moreover, developments in Iraq or Afghanistan, where both the United States and Iran are likely to have a presence for years to come, could complicate crisis decisionmaking in the Gulf. Finally, political factionalism and the politicization of elements of the Iranian armed forces (particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) could complicate efforts to control or manage Iranian forces during a crisis.

In light of such uncertainties, former secretary of defense McNamara’s revised verdict on the Cuban missile crisis is worth keeping in mind: “For many years, I considered the Cuban missile crisis to be the best-managed foreign policy crisis of the last half- century....But I now conclude that...luck also played a significant role in the avoidance of nuclear war by a hair’s breadth.”2

**2NC AT: Appeasement DA**

**Appeasement regarding Iran is neocon hackery – it solves and the alternative is worse**

Rozeff 6 (Michael, Prof of Finance @ U of Buffalo, http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff99.html)JFS

Appeasement and Munich are favored neocon themes to promote and justify more war. In a dangerous trend, they are being picked up by more columnists. Strange that the more force that the U.S. applies in the Middle East, the more that the neocons wail appeasement and the more force they demand. Strange, because repeated applications of force, the opposite of appeasement and applied in the name of avoiding appeasement, have brought no tangible gains. They have brought losses, and losses should be cut. Once again, neocons can’t think straight. One should not throw good money after bad. The U.S. can’t win in the Middle East. It should take its chips off the table. It should never have sat down at the table.

Neocons now call for armed confrontation with Iran in order to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. They want the U.S. to stand up to Iran and fight if necessary, starting a war if need be. If rhetoric and public fears launched wars, we’d already be in another one. And Congressional resolutions and sanctions have in fact moved us closer to war. This is a war that the U.S. cannot win physically. It is a war that is morally lost the instant that the first bombs are dropped on Iran. This is a war that leads to hundreds of years of future warfare setting Islamic peoples against the West.

There is no end to how much force neocons wish to apply, and anything less than total war is regarded as appeasement by them. Some take this position because they believe that anything less than overturning Iran and preventing it from obtaining nuclear weapons means the destruction of Western civilization. The neocon position has matters backwards. Trying to overturn Iran by force will itself hasten the destruction of the West.

Neocons argue that Iran wants to bring down the entire West no matter what. They infer that U.S. disengagement and negotiations are therefore useless and war is necessary. They are incorrect on all counts. Not all Iranians want to see the West destroyed, and not all are inflexible in their views. But suppose that Dr. Ahmadinejad is one of the inflexible ones. Suppose that he is indeed a "certifiable apocalyptic" (see Gary North). He can be restrained by those mullahs who do not share his beliefs or who have more realistic expectations. It makes sense to play for time and attempt to divide the Iranians. It does not make sense to play into Ahmadinejad’s hands and bring on the conflict that he might desire or believe that he is called upon to instigate.

2NC AT: AIPAC

**Non-unique – AIPAC hates us now – business deals with Iran**

Besser 10 (James, The Jewish Week, http://www.thejewishweek.com/blogs/political\_insider/new\_york\_times%27\_gift\_aipac\_eve\_policy\_conference)JFS

AIPAC policy conferences – the annual pro-Israel extravaganzas meant to spotlight the power of the pro-Israel lobby group – are always the most interesting in presidential election years, or when they're a big fight brewing over U.S. foreign policy.

It's the second category that will galvanize this year's conference, which begins on March 21 in Washington and no doubt attract an astonishing proportion of the House and Senate, not to mention Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

This week AIPAC sent an unusual letter to all members of Congress  - the “unusual” part was flagged in an AIPAC email to reporters -  expressing “outrage at the  U.S. government's continuing relationship with dozens of companies doing business with Iran. These ongoing financial dealings undermine longstanding American efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.”

2NC AT: AIPAC

Israel won’t fight against Obama – no risk of the impact

Kampeas 3/16/10 [Ron Kampeas, “On eve of AIPAC parley, pro-Israel groups want sides to make nice,” JTA, March 16, 2010, pg. http://www.jta.org/news/article/2010/03/16/1011149/pro-israel-groups-want-sides-to-make-nice-before-aipac-conference]JFS

The consensus of the pro-Israel center and right is that the argument is increasingly a distraction and should be set aside. That message was coming through Monday in statements from the unofficial Jewish caucus on Capitol Hill. And by Tuesday night, both sides appeared to be taking the message to heart, with Israel's ambassador to Washington and the White House denying remarks that have fueled the current Israel-U.S. tensions.

On Tuesday evening, Israel's ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, issued a statement flatly denying a widely cited Haaretz report claiming that he told fellow diplomats that U.S.-Israeli relations were at a 35-year-low.

"I was flagrantly misquoted about remarks I made in a confidential briefing this past Saturday," Oren said in a statement. "Recent events do not -- I repeat -- do not represent the lowest point in the relations between Israel and the United States. Though we differ on certain issues, our discussions are being conducted in an atmosphere of cooperation as befitting long-standing relations between allies. I am confident that we will overcome these differences shortly." Separately, numerous media quoted senior White House officials as denying an account in Yediot Achronot last week that Biden had told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel was endangering the lives of American troops in the region.

"He never said that, and there's no basis to assert that he did," The Atlantic quoted one official as saying. "What he did say in a meeting with the prime minister and his senior advisers and his own team was that the U.S. is doing a number of things in our national security interest, and in Israel's national security interest, and they include a strong effort to build a coalition against Iran's nuclear program; deploying 200,000 troops in conflict areas in the region; standing against efforts to delegitimize Israel in various international bodies, sometimes virtually alone; acting decisively against terrorists in very significant ways; and building probably the strongest defense cooperation relationship with Israel that we've seen, including on missile defense."

The apparent attempts to defuse the situation comes just days before 7,000 pro-Israel activists arrive in Washington for next week's American Israel Public Affairs Committee policy conference in Washington, which will culminate with them heading to Capitol Hill on Tuesday, the parley's last day and its lobbying day. he start of the annual AIPAC policy conference.

The activists will lobby for rapid final passage of a bill that would expand unilateral sanctions to target Iran's energy sector. Both houses of Congress have passed the measure, which now must be reconciled. AIPAC wants the bill to keep its substantial bite; the Obama administration reportedly wants to carve out an exception for China as a means of drawing it into expanded multilateral sanctions.

The Iran piece of the lobbying also will include an appeal to lawmakers to sign on to letters to the Obama administration encouraging its efforts to expand multilateral sanctions through the U.N. Security Council.

Otherwise, the activists will lobby, as they always do, for passage of the foreign aid budget -- it includes more than $2.7 billion in assistance for Israel, commensurate with Bush administration policies -- and a letter to the administration promoting a close U.S.-Israel relationship and urging direct Israel-Palestinian talks.

That letter was planned before last week's tough talk, but it couldn't be more timely. The Netanyahu administration has made clear that it wants to get past its embarrassment, when a planning committee announced a project for 1,600 housing units in eastern Jerusalem just as Biden was in town to express unabating U.S. support for Israel.

"We cannot afford to unravel the delicate fabric of friendship with the United States," Israeli President Shimon Peres said Tuesday at a memorial service for late prime ministers and presidents of Israel -- the latest in a litany of "mea culpa and let's move on" statements from Israeli leaders. It's not clear, however, whether the Obama administration is ready to move forward. On the one hand, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was back Tuesday to emphasizing the relationship's deep roots. "We have an absolute commitment to Israel's security," she said at a briefing with reporters, according to Reuters. "We have a close, unshakable bond between the United States and Israel." That set a considerably different tone from last Friday, when her spokesman, P.J. Crowley, appeared intent on sustaining the dispute after Biden had left Israel with a speech that underscored the closeness of the two nations.

**Obama won’t endorse Israel strikes – Israel will strike anyway – your author**

Silverstein 09 (Richard, 3-15, writes Tikun Olam, a blog dedicated to resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. He also contributed to the Independent Jewish Voices , “Aipac's hidden persuaders”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/may/13/aipac-iran-us-obama>)

The Israelis surely know that the Obama administration will never go to war against Iran. In fact, they know that Obama would not approve of Israel doing so. But I've become convinced, in doing the research and speaking to knowledgeable sources, that Israel is prepared at some date in the near future to attack Iran itself, *even against the wishes* of the US.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

AFF - Says No

Ahmadinejad puts it best – Iran will not make one iota of concessions on its nukes

Dareini 6/17 (Ali, The Chronicle Herald, The Associated Press, http://thechronicleherald.ca/World/1187652.html)JFS

TEHRAN, Iran — Defying week-old UN sanctions over its nuclear program, Iran promised to expand its atomic research Wednesday as its president vowed to punish the West and force it to "sit at the negotiating table like a polite child" before agreeing to further talks.

Tehran, which insists its nuclear work is peaceful, said it will build four new reactors for atomic medical research. The United States and some of its allies believe Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, and the Islamic Republic’s plans to expand research could encourage calls in the West for more economic pressure against the country.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran will not make "one iota of concessions." He said he will soon announce new conditions for talks with the West, but first he wants to punish world powers for imposing sanctions.

AFF - Appeasement

**Concessions to Iran accomplish nothing – only force will end the nuclear program**

Helprin 9 (Mark, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574426880110463194.html)JFS

Added to what would be the instability and potentially grave injury following upon the appearance of Iranian nuclear ICBMs are two insults that may be more consequential than the issue from which they arise. Nothing short of force will turn Iran from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, its paramount aim during 25 years of secrecy and stalling. Last fall, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set three conditions for the U.S.: withdrawal from Iraq, a show of respect for Iran (read "apology"), and taking the nuclear question off the table.

We are now faithfully complying, and last week, after Iran foreclosed discussion of its nuclear program and Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, Mr. Ahmadinejad's chief political adviser, predicted "the defeat and collapse" of Western democracy, the U.S. agreed to enter talks the premise of which, incredibly, is to eliminate American nuclear weapons. Even the zombified press awoke for long enough to harry State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, who replied that, as Iran was willing to talk, "We are going to test that proposition, OK?"

Not OK. When Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich at least he thought he had obtained something in return for his appeasement. The new American diplomacy is nothing more than a sentimental flood of unilateral concessions—not least, after some minor Putinesque sabre rattling, to Russia. Canceling the missile deployment within NATO, which Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian ambassador to that body, characterizes as "the Americans . . . simply correcting their own mistake, and we are not duty bound to pay someone for putting their own mistakes right," is to grant Russia a veto over sovereign defensive measures—exactly the opposite of American resolve during the Euro Missile Crisis of 1983, the last and definitive battle of the Cold War.

AFF - AIPAC DA

**AIPAC opposes concessions to Iran**

Remba 7 (Gidon, Executive Director of Ameinu: Liberal Values, Progressive Israel, http://www.ameinu.net/perspectives/current\_issues.php?articleid=159)JFS

But surely this highly partisan message was Cheney’s own exploitation of the AIPAC stage to peddle the Bush Administration’s line? Think again. AIPAC Executive Director Howard Kohr followed Cheney and demanded that on Iraq and Iran we American Jewish supporters of Israel should show “no divisions, no weakness.” Disagreeing with our war President makes us appear impotent to our enemies. The pro-Israel lobby which often touts its bipartisanship is in reality quite happy to throw its weight against the policy of the Democratic Party on both Iraq and Iran and to shamelessly align itself with the neocon super-hawks in the Bush Administration.   
Not a word was heard from AIPAC—whether from its leaders or in its 2007 policy statement—about attempting to engage Iran and Syria while imposing sanctions, the carrot-and-stick approach favored by most Democrats and moderate Republicans. Though AIPAC’s official focus was on the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, new legislation imposing further economic sanctions on Iran, much was heard from AIPAC’s featured plenary speakers about the need for a preemptive military strike, especially former CIA director Admiral James Woolsey and Washington Institute for Near East Policy Director Robert Satloff. Other speakers, like Israel’s UN Ambassador Dan Gillerman, implied as much by saying that Iran cannot be permitted to develop nuclear weapons. AIPAC’s leaders and official spokespersons shied away from overt threats, preferring to obliquely warn Iran of the possibility of a US attack by insisting that no options be taken off the table, and by supporting “all means necessary for the United States, Israel and their allies to prevent Iran and other nations” from developing weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. It was left mainly to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to remind the audience that diplomacy with Iran must be vigorously pursued.

**Perceived losses by the Israel lobby lead them to take control of congress**

Mearsheimer and Walt 6 (John, Prof of PolySci @ U of Chi, Stephen, Prof of IR @ Harvard, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby)JFS

In April 2002 trouble erupted again, after the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all the major Palestinian areas on the West Bank. Bush knew that Israel’s actions would damage America’s image in the Islamic world and undermine the war on terrorism, so he demanded that Sharon ‘halt the incursions and begin withdrawal’. He underscored this message two days later, saying he wanted Israel to ‘withdraw without delay’. On 7 April, Condoleezza Rice, then Bush’s national security adviser, told reporters: ‘“Without delay” means without delay. It means now.’ That same day Colin Powell set out for the Middle East to persuade all sides to stop fighting and start negotiating.

Israel and the Lobby swung into action. Pro-Israel officials in the vice-president’s office and the Pentagon, as well as neo-conservative pundits like Robert Kagan and William Kristol, put the heat on Powell. They even accused him of having ‘virtually obliterated the distinction between terrorists and those fighting terrorists’. Bush himself was being pressed by Jewish leaders and Christian evangelicals. Tom DeLay and Dick Armey were especially outspoken about the need to support Israel, and DeLay and the Senate minority leader, Trent Lott, visited the White House and warned Bush to back off.

The first sign that Bush was caving in came on 11 April – a week after he told Sharon to withdraw his forces – when the White House press secretary said that the president believed Sharon was ‘a man of peace’. Bush repeated this statement publicly on Powell’s return from his abortive mission, and told reporters that Sharon had responded satisfactorily to his call for a full and immediate withdrawal. Sharon had done no such thing, but Bush was no longer willing to make an issue of it.

Meanwhile, Congress was also moving to back Sharon. On 2 May, it overrode the administration’s objections and passed two resolutions reaffirming support for Israel. (The Senate vote was 94 to 2; the House of Representatives version passed 352 to 21.) Both resolutions held that the United States ‘stands in solidarity with Israel’ and that the two countries were, to quote the House resolution, ‘now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism’. The House version also condemned ‘the ongoing support and co-ordination of terror by Yasser Arafat’, who was portrayed as a central part of the terrorism problem. Both resolutions were drawn up with the help of the Lobby. A few days later, a bipartisan congressional delegation on a fact-finding mission to Israel stated that Sharon should resist US pressure to negotiate with Arafat. On 9 May, a House appropriations subcommittee met to consider giving Israel an extra $200 million to fight terrorism. Powell opposed the package, but the Lobby backed it and Powell lost.

AFF - AIPAC DA

That causes Israeli strikes on Iran – turns the impact to the net benefit

Silverstein 09 (Richard, 3-15, writes Tikun Olam, a blog dedicated to resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. He also contributed to the Independent Jewish Voices , “Aipac's hidden persuaders”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/may/13/aipac-iran-us-obama>)

Israel is in the midst of a massive diplomatic, political and intelligence campaign, both public and covert, that could lead – if those officials behind it have their way – towards a military strike on Iran. It is a war for the hearts and minds of Americans. Or you might call it the war before the war. In intelligence circles, this Israeli project is known as perception management and defined by the department of defence as: Actions to convey and/or deny information … to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders … ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions favourable to [US] objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception and psychological operations. The Israelis are following the template of the Bush administration's run-up to the Iraq war. First, the US government advocated half-hearted efforts at diplomatic engagement. Then it ratcheted up pressure through sanctions and UN resolutions. That is where the Israeli campaign stands now. Aipac's members carried a unified message to Capitol Hill during their lobbying of US senators and members of Congress. They demanded that Congress pass the most draconian sanctions ever proposed against Iran. They demanded that Iran be offered a limited time in which to respond to an ultimatum insisting it drop its nuclear programme. What then? If you review Aipac's literature and the various commentaries published either by Israeli diplomats or their supporters in the US media, they don't specify what comes next. But any sensible person can guess that the final step will be war: "Israeli leaders have … hinted at pre-emptive military strikes if they decide that diplomacy has failed."