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\*\*\*NEG – REFUGEES\*\*\*

1NC 1/4

US troops are the only force that can take on reconstruction efforts

Donnelly 7 (John, Global Staff, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/12/03/military\_deep\_into\_civilian\_duties/?page=1, AD: 6/27/10) jl

WASHINGTON - The US military, deeply immersed in reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, has almost overnight become a major player in the traditionally civilian work of helping poor countries develop. It now spends more than 21 percent of all US overseas aid, nearly a fourfold percentage increase in just three years.

The growth in military involvement in projects such as digging wells in western Kenya and building schools in Afghanistan, which are designed to win hearts and minds, has been so fast that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned last week that his department is doing work that should be done by the State Department.

Gates told an audience in Kansas last week that he had no problem with the Pentagon getting more taxpayer dollars to help civilians rebuild war zones or broken states. But he said the number of State Department officials dedicated to rebuilding efforts has shrunk to dangerously low levels and needs to be bolstered.

The entire US corps of foreign service officers - about 6,600 people - is smaller than the personnel in one aircraft-carrier strike group, Gates said.

The shift toward more military involvement in humanitarian efforts, analysts believe, results from two major factors: simultaneous US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created vast "no-go" areas too unstable and violent for civilian relief agencies; and big increases in the Pentagon's budget since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks gives the military more leeway for humanitarian operations than the cash-strapped State Department and US Agency for International Development.

But the Pentagon also has quietly approved internal policy changes that embrace nation-building tasks in fragile states and conflict areas, duties that were once scorned by President Bush and his top team of military advisers before the Sept. 11 attacks as going beyond the scope of US national security interests.

In November 2005, an internal Pentagon document, Directive 3000.05, called for reconstruction projects to become a core part of combat operations, extending the military's reach into areas of governance, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring areas of commerce.

US rebuilding infrastructure allows displaced Iraqi refugees to return home

Bacon and Younes 9 (Kenneth H - President, Refugees international, Kristele - Senior Advocate, Refugees International, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/testimony/return-and-resettlement-displaced-iraqis, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Assistance by the international community and the resettlement of vulnerable Iraqis to the US and elsewhere remain critical components of a comprehensive response to the Iraqi displacement crisis. However, with such a large segment of the population displaced, the solution for most displaced Iraqis will be to return home.
As security in Iraq seems to be improving, it is essential that the Government of Iraq, the US and the United Nations (UN) work together to create conditions suitable for returns.
Earlier this month, we conducted a mission to Iraq to survey work in the main areas of displacement and return in the center of the country. We visited several areas of Baghdad, as well as Eskanderia, in the former “Sunni triangle of death”, Fallujah in the Anbar Governorate, Karbala and Hilla in the Babel Governorate.
I very much appreciate your invitation to brief you on our findings.  Unfortunately, a medical emergency has forced us to present our testimony in writing.  I hope you will make this entire statement part of the hearing record and that you will not hesitate to submit questions in writing.
Here are our major findings:
• As security in Iraq improves, refugees and internally displaced Iraqis are starting to return home, but the returns are slow and tentative.
• While security remains the major factor in a family’s decision to return home, other factors play a role—infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, employment opportunities and health care.  The government of Iraq (GOI), the U.S. and the United Nations have to do a better job of working together provide the services necessary to support returning Iraqis.

1NC 2/4

US presence in Iraq is key to stabilizing the refugee crisis

Bukay 10 (David, School of Political Science in the University of Haifa, http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq\_1855460?sort=date, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Iraq is a mosaic of ethnic, sectarian and tribal subgroups. Baghdad and other major cities include significant intermingling of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans and other Christians. Instability and civil war would put many of these people to flight, creating a vast humanitarian crisis that would dwarf those seen in Bosnia and Kosovo and rival the scenes of horror and privation witnessed in Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda and Sudan. Not only would Iraqis again be put at risk of disease, starvation, and violence, but with the government unable to meet their basic needs, the Iraqi refugees would fall under the control of the sectarian militias, turning Iraq into Lebanon on steroids.
A continued U.S. military presence cannot ensure success in Iraq unless Iraqis cooperate in building an effective government. But a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. support would unquestionably reintroduce the potential for failure, with disastrous results for Iraq, its neighbors and U.S. national interests.
The alternative is to finish the job by completing the training of Iraqi security forces, supporting Iraq’s new democratic government, beginning the disciplined reduction of American forces, and turning the future of Iraq over to the only people who can ensure the nation’s long-term success -- the Iraqis.
While Iraq has made remarkable progress over the past year in virtually every category, including security, economic growth, humanitarian issues and governance, the outcome is still in doubt. The U.S. military presence remains, for the moment, an indispensable stabilizing force; its effective employment in training and supporting Iraqi security forces, defeating al-Qaeda, and improving security conditions so that refugees can return to their homes is important in helping the Iraqis achieve peace and stability. While the long-term presence of American combat troops is not in the interests of the United States or the Iraqi government, how U.S. troops leave Iraq (when the country is clearly on the path to peace and stability) is much more important than when the troops come home.

1NC 3/4

That instability is rapidly increasing tension and marginalizing an entire population in this result in violence throughout the region.

Senanayake 7 (Sumedha, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty staff , http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077719.html, AD: 6/27/10) jl

According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 2.2 million Iraqis are currently internally displaced and an additional 2 million have fled to neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Syria.
With Iraq experiencing such massive displacement, the situation may soon become a regional crisis with major security implications.
Rising Resentment In Jordan, Syria
The influx of Iraqi refugees into neighboring Jordan and Syria has created a huge burden on the resources of both.
In Jordan, which is hosting up to 700,000 Iraqi refugees, some officials as well as economists have claimed that the prices of basic commodities such as well as housing have tripled over the past three years because of the Iraqis. According to the International Monetary Fund, Jordan's consumer price index rose 6.3 percent in 2006, the highest increase since 2003.
In addition, with an unemployment rate of 15.4 percent and with 30 percent of the population living below the poverty line, the flood of refugees has increased the competition for unskilled labor. Iraqi refugees have allegedly driven wages down across the board by working for significantly less than the previously prevailing rate, thereby sowing resentment among the local population.
Syria has taken in some 1.4 million Iraqis and by UNHCR estimates the number is growing by 30,000 a month. While Syria has continued to abide by an "open-door" policy towards the refugees, the tremendous goodwill displayed by the Syrians has begun to show signs of strain. The sheer number of refugees has created a huge strain on Syria's education, health, and housing infrastructure. Schools and hospitals are flooded with Iraqis. Housing costs and prices for basic goods have increased, leading to bitterness among many Syrians.
"Little by little, the attitude of the Syrian population to the Iraqis is changing," Laurens Jolles, a UNHCR representative based in Damascus, said at press conference on May 13. "While there still is a degree of empathy, they are also starting to feel the consequences of this very large number of Iraqis in terms of schooling and access to clinics."
Marginalized Population
Many Iraqis who have fled the violence in Iraq to neighboring countries have been left in limbo. Both Jordan and Syria have refused to officially label the Iraqis refugees, instead referring to them as "visitors."
Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and it has no asylum procedures. According to the UNHCR, Iraqis are treated as guests and allowed entry via temporary visas, but those who cannot renew them become illegal and are either asked to leave or are sent back to Iraq.

Are the Iraqi refugees ripe for radicalization? (AFP file photo)

Furthermore, Jordan has put in place more stringent security measures for Iraqis who want to enter. Since the November 2005 suicide bombings in Amman that killed 60 people, Iraqis seeking to enter Jordan now must be over 40 or under 20 and have sufficient funds to support themselves while staying in the kingdom. Those who do not meet these criteria are turned away.
Those Iraqis who manage to stay in Jordan are often stigmatized and treated as second-class citizens. With violence showing no sign of abating, the overwhelming image of Iraq is a state caught up in a vortex of sectarian bloodshed. Among the local populations, Iraqi refugees are viewed with suspicion and could be unfairly labeled as "carriers of conflict," potentially marginalizing an entire population.
In fact, a Congressional Research Services report on Iraqi refugees released on March 23 warned that Sunni-Shi'a tensions may have followed the refugees into Jordan and are simmering below the surface.
'Security Time Bomb'
While Iraq's neighbors struggle with the flood of refugees, humanitarian organizations bemoan the lack of funding from the international community to help them. The creation of a so-called "humanitarian assistance vacuum" potentially opens the door for armed groups to establish a foothold within the refugee populations.
If the Gaza Strip is any indication, then these are legitimate concerns. The Islamist organization Hamas emerged as the preeminent movement among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, not only for its vigor in fighting the Israeli occupation, but also for providing much needed social services that the Palestinian government did not or could not. In fact, Hamas's 2006 election victory may have had less to do with broader ideological goals of the movement than the basic services they provided to people on the ground.
Although, Hamas has moved into the political mainstream, it is still considered a terrorist organization by many Western states, and it is currently in a power struggle with Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas.
Indeed, there are concerns that today's Iraqi refugees could end up like the Palestinians: a large population of displaced and disenfranchised people with the potential to become radicalized. And such a large and radicalized population would not only be potentially destabilizing force for the host country, but by extension the entire region.

1NC 4/4

That escalates to world war

Reuters 7 (http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL2719552620070827, AD: 6/27/10) jl

VIENNA (Reuters) - Upheaval in the Middle East and Islamic civilization could cause another world war, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was quoted as saying in an Austrian newspaper interview published on Monday.

Politics

Zalmay Khalilzad told the daily Die Presse the Middle East was now so disordered that it had the potential to inflame the world as Europe did during the first half of the 20th century.

"The (Middle East) is going through a very difficult transformation phase. That has strengthened extremism and creates a breeding ground for terrorism," he said in remarks translated by Reuters into English from the published German.

"Europe was just as dysfunctional for a while. And some of its wars became world wars. Now the problems of the Middle East and Islamic civilization have the same potential to engulf the world," he was quoted as saying.

WMDs mean this war goes nuclear and causes extinction

Steinbach 2 (John, Researcher for the Centre for Research on Globalisation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, AD: 6/26/10) jl

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Links – Troops

Humanitarian aid for refugees in Iraq depends on US Military presence – Withdrawal hampers aid

Refugees International 10 (03/17/2010, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/iraq-humanitarian-needs-persist)KFC

On the one hand the U.S., the UN, and the entire international community often champion the considerable security progress inside Iraq. On the other hand, these same entities continue to be extremely constrained by highly restrictive security protocols. These protocols no longer reflect the realities in the country, and the lack of access continues to severely hamper the humanitarian response of the UN and the U.S. The zero-risk mentality of the burgeoning security industry has hijacked more rational and creative thinking that might help guarantee staff safety while allowing for greater mobility in a more low-profile manner. The UN Department for Safety and Security and the Resident Security Officers for the U.S. must adapt their security protocols to the new and changing realities and allow greater access for humanitarian workers. The northern and southern governorates of Iraq are widely recognized as being safe. Many parts of the central governorates can also be accessed daily for field visits. Refugees International staff was able to travel alone without security escorts throughout most of Baghdad and multiple locations within Diyala, Salah al-Din and Babel. Iraqis of all types and backgrounds interviewed by Refugees International expressed a strong desire to see the UN and international actors return and fully function in the country. Currently the U.S. government and the UN are completely dependent upon the U.S. military to provide access outside of the international zone. Access to Iraqi communities occurs irregularly and in a very limited fashion. Plans have to be made months in advance to coordinate trips. This already limited access will be further reduced with the impending U.S. military withdrawal. Furthermore, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), often does not prioritize humanitarian issues. They tend to take a back seat to UNAMI’s political agenda. Political affairs officials are often given priority over humanitarian actors when it comes to dividing the limited number of slots available for staff to travel outside of the international zone. While international UN staff and diplomatic missions have limited access to Iraqi communities, an increasing number of international NGOs are accessing vulnerable Iraqis in Baghdad and other parts of the country. There is also a plethora of Iraqi NGOs who are making significant humanitarian contributions, without which much of the work could not take place. UNHCR’s efforts to enhance the capacity of over 100 national NGOs should be supported.

US Military presence eases the difficulties of humanitarian aid

Refugees International 10 (03/17/2010, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/iraq-humanitarian-needs-persist)KFC

As the U.S. continues to draw down its military forces and eventually end its occupation in Iraq, the U.S. and other donors must increase their humanitarian and development assistance and commitment to finding long-term solutions for displaced Iraqis. Millions of people are still displaced without access to shelter, food, health care or other basics. It is too soon for the U.S. government and other donors to abandon the needs of the Iraqi people. Likewise, the UN must seek to increase its presence and resources inside the country and throughout the region, ensuring that Iraq’s most vulnerable are protected and assisted until durable solutions are available.

Links – Troops

Troops are key to reconstruction efforts

Ackerman 9 (Spencer - Staff Writer for The Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/33361/iraq-diplomacy-program-to-change, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Since 2005, small groups made of U.S. diplomats, military officers, development experts and legal advisers called Provincial Reconstruction Teams have worked with Iraqi leaders at the province and district levels around the country to bolster their capacity to govern. In an application of untraditional diplomatic work that some in and outside the State Department see as vital in weak or failed states, the teams help Iraqis write and execute budgets and aid in the development of their judicial systems. While the drawdown and eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq will ultimately mean the end of the PRTs, “the PRT program is not going to disappear anytime soon,” said Wade Weems, the Department of State’s Director of Provincial Reconstruction, Transition and Stabilization for Iraq. “We’re not leaving more quickly than the military.”

But the PRT program will change between now and August 2010, when the U.S. combat mission ends. In addition to the 14 PRTs, there are also ten teams that work at the district level, known as Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or ePRTs, owing to their status as embedded units within the U.S. Army’s Brigade Combat Teams. Over the course of the next 15 months, the Brigade Combat Teams will leave Iraq or transition into [Advisory and Assistance Brigades](http://washingtonindependent.com/32094/key-iraq-training-units-still-being-developed). Weems said the ePRTs’ personnel — a smaller team than the 15 to 25 members of an average PRT — will probably be absorbed into a regular PRT. Regular PRTs rely on partner relationships with the military to move around Iraq, which will continue to be the case.

Links – Refugees – Signal

The US military creates the security for refugees to return home.

Refugees International 9 (03/31/2009, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/testimony/return-and-resettlement-displaced-iraqis)KFC

Thank you, Senator Casey, for holding this hearing today. As President Obama noted in his February 27 speech on responsibly ending the war in Iraq, "millions of displaced Iraqis…are a living consequence of this war and a challenge to stability in the region, and they must become part of Iraq’s reconciliation and recovery." This hearing and legislation such as the Casey-Cardin "Support for Vulnerable Iraqis Act" will play an important role in addressing the security and stability challenges presented by Iraqi displacement. Refugees International has been working on the plight of displaced Iraqis for three years. In 2006 and 2007, we called the Iraqi displacement crisis "the fastest growing" in the world. Although the rates of displacement have since slowed, about 20% of the Iraqi population remains displaced. The Governments of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and other host countries say that they are sheltering almost 2 million Iraqi refugees, while the International Organization for Migration notes that another 2.6 million are internally displaced in Iraq. The latter are known as IDPs. Throughout the past three years, Refugees International has advocated increased assistance to displaced Iraqis, as well as increased resettlement of Iraqi refugees in the US and other countries. Our efforts have led the United Nations to significantly increase their presence and work in the region and the US Government to step up efforts to respond to the crisis. In 2008, the US Government provided $400 million in assistance to displaced Iraqis. To date, in 2009, the US has contributed $150 million and expects to contribute more. As for resettlement, the US welcomed more than 13,000 Iraqis in 2008 and plans to resettle at least 17,000 in the current fiscal year. More needs to be done, but these improvements in the humanitarian response are encouraging and demonstrate the willingness of the US government to address some of the humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq. Assistance by the international community and the resettlement of vulnerable Iraqis to the US and elsewhere remain critical components of a comprehensive response to the Iraqi displacement crisis. However, with such a large segment of the population displaced, the solution for most displaced Iraqis will be to return home. As security in Iraq seems to be improving, it is essential that the Government of Iraq, the US and the United Nations (UN) work together to create conditions suitable for returns. Earlier this month, we conducted a mission to Iraq to survey work in the main areas of displacement and return in the center of the country. We visited several areas of Baghdad, as well as Eskanderia, in the former “Sunni triangle of death”, Fallujah in the Anbar Governorate, Karbala and Hilla in the Babel Governorate. I very much appreciate your invitation to brief you on our findings. Unfortunately, a medical emergency has forced us to present our testimony in writing. I hope you will make this entire statement part of the hearing record and that you will not hesitate to submit questions in writing. Here are our major findings: • As security in Iraq improves, refugees and internally displaced Iraqis are starting to return home, but the returns are slow and tentative. • While security remains the major factor in a family’s decision to return home, other factors play a role—infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, employment opportunities and health care. The government of Iraq (GOI), the U.S. and the United Nations have to do a better job of working together provide the services necessary to support returning Iraqis. • The capacity of the GOI to provide protection and services to returning Iraqis is weak. A vibrant civil society sector, including increasingly competent local non-government organizations, is beginning to develop in Iraq, but the government often sees the civil society movement as a threat rather than a potential partner. The U.S. and the UN should concentrate on helping to develop a better partnership between the GOI and civil society organizations. • Returns tend to ratify the ethnic cleansing that took place during the worst years of sectarian violence, when many mixed neighborhoods became all Shi’a or all Sunni. The GOI needs to do a better job of convincing Iraqis that rule of law applies equally to all Iraqis and that the government is nonsectarian.

Links – Refugees – Signal

US troop withdraw hams the refugees.

Sieh 9 (Maureen, http://blog.syracuse.com/metrovoices/2009/07/iraqi\_refugees\_ponder\_the\_futu.html, ad: 6/27/10) KFC

Last Tuesday, thousands of Iraqis celebrated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from its cities, but the celebration was dampened by a deadly car bombing in the northern city of Kirkuk that killed 33 people. The violence continues. Thursday, 41 people were wounded and dozens more injured in two suicide bombings in Baghdad and another northern city. This week, I asked some Iraqis to share their thoughts on the withdrawal of U.S. troops and what it means for the future of Iraq. Read my story in today's Post-Standard. In the last year, 130 Iraqi refugees have been settled in Syracuse by refugee programs run by Catholic Charities and Interfaith Works Center for New Americans. The majority of them came after the U.S. invasion in March 2003. The Iraqi refugees support the withdrawal of American troops, but worry about the future of Iraq. Some have the same mixed feelings they experienced when the U.S. invaded Iraq six years ago to overthrow Saddam Hussein. They welcomed the invasion because they knew they were going to be liberated. But then the violence escalated and the U.S. troops stayed for six years. We lost more than 4,000 U.S. troops and thousands of innocent Iraqis were killed. More Iraqi refugees fled to Jordan, Syria and other neighboring countries. Now, the refugees are concerned about the escalating violence that's been occurring in the country since the troops began leaving last week. "When the troops came, we had the feeling that it would be better for us,'' said Majeed Alali, who settled in Syracuse nearly four months ago. "But there were a lot of killings in the street. Iraqis started having hard feelings against the American troops.'' People gather at the site of a car bomb attack in Kirkuk, Iraq, Tuesday, June 30. 2009. The bombing comes as Iraqis celebrate what the government is calling "National Sovereignty Day" to mark the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraqi cities. Adnan Jabri, who arrived in Syracuse in May with his wife and five daughters, said he's glad the U.S. troops got rid of Hussein. But Iraqis don't want their country to be occupied by foreign troops, he said. He welcomes the troops withdrawal, but he's worried about the future. "You feel sad because you don't know what's going to happen,'' Adnan, 48. "Nobody likes their country to be occupied by foreign troops.'' Adnan left Iraq in 1999 to escape Hussein's oppressive policies. He lived in Yemen. He taught English and his wife worked as a science teacher. In Iraq, his mother and sister were forced out of the family's home after the U.S. invasion. Men dressed in Iraqi police uniforms arrested his brother in December 2005. His family hasn't seen him since, he said. "After they took my brother, my family told me to never go back,'' he said. But Adnan worries about his family's safety and the future of Iraq.

Links – Refugees – Signal

US withdrawal sends the signal of approaching destabilization – causes massive influx of refugees into neighboring countries

RT 10 (News Organization, http://rt.com/Top\_News/2010-05-19/jordan-iraqi-refugees-struggle.html, AD: 6/27/10) jl

“I suffer in Jordan. The Jordanians don’t treat me properly because I am a Shia. I barely survive. Each month I go to the UN HCR offices, but they keep saying ‘You need to wait, you need to be patient.’ I’m supposed to get help from them, but they give me nothing,” Atya says.

Like other Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Fares survives on illegal jobs which come his way sporadically – no more than two or three days a month.

There are at least 250,000 other young men like him ­ most of whom are also survivors of torture.

Once a week ­ for two hours ­ they meet on a football pitch. It does not help them get work, but it is an escape from lives they are desperate to leave behind.

It is the brainchild of Fusayo Irikura, who contacts wealthy Iraqis and asks them to donate the funds that the United Nations agency does not. She also gets help from an American woman who fundraises in the States.

“American government did something wrong to the Iraq country [and] because of that she feels responsible to compensate the Iraqi people. Of course UN HCR are helping with the cash assistance, but the amount is limited. The organization has its regulations, criteria – sometimes it¹s very difficult to help urgent cases, so what we are doing for Iraqis, is helping urgent cases,” Irikura says.

And those urgent cases are on the increase as more and more countries close their borders to people fleeing Iraq. Pledges to resettle thousands of them have not materialized. And in the last year, the UN HCR’s budget to has been slashed in half.

“We’ve had to essentially reduce levels of service and assistance. At the moment, yes, I would say it is a crisis,” Jordanian UN HCR Representative Imran Riza says.

And Jordan is already frustrated ­ its economy is struggling and it has its own Palestinian refugee problem.

Unlike a football game, in which you can plan your next move, these refugees are rooted to the spot ­ no country in the world wants them.

Some of these players have been here for nine years already and are as uncertain of their future as when they left Iraq.

They were forced to flee because of threats to their lives and most of them are here alone. They spend their days doing nothing, losing their dreams and ambition.

And soon there will be even more like them. Fleeing from Iraq where politicians have so far been unable to form a government and tensions are climbing ahead of the planned American withdrawal in August.

Impact Calc – Transition

DA turns case – Transition causes worse intervention

Bukay 10 (David, School of Political Science in the University of Haifa, http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq\_1855460?sort=date, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Had the US not entered Iraq, it would not have exacerbated the regional strategic situation and the balance of power in the Persian Gulf subsystem. Since it carried out the avoidable, it has no real alternative to pull out without endangering its strategic assets in the Middle East. Running away is not an option for the US. The Vietnam case is not similar to Iraq. For those who endorse it, its appealing short-term results will culminate in disaster, when the US will be forced to intervene militarily after Iran makes its move to take over the region.

Internals – Rebuilding Solves Refugees

Continuing rebuilding allows Iraqi refugees to come home

Refugees International 9 (http://www.refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/middle-east/iraq, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Though there have been some returns of both internally displaced and refugees, the majority have not been able to access their original homes and properties. Their properties have been occupied or destroyed. Ongoing violence, especially in the central provinces, coupled with a lack of jobs, basic social services, and opportunities, makes voluntary return impossible for most.  While Refugees International hopes that Iraqis will be able to return to their homes in the future, the necessary conditions for returns to take place in safety and dignity still do not exist.  Local integration of IDPs may be a solution for some and should be actively considered by the Government of Iraq.

Internals – Iraq Refugees Collapse ME

Increased refugee flows into Syria and Jordan place collapse the countries and destabilize the region – the impact is wide spread conflict and terrorism

Hastings 7 (Alcee, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a U.S. Government agency that monitors progress in the implementation of the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords) <http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SJHG-76A43X?OpenDocument>, AD: 6/27/10) jl

As Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs for the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, I write with grave concern regarding the massive displacement of Iraqis and the impending humanitarian crisis rapidly ensuing in the region. I have traveled extensively to the region, including a visit to Jordan in May of this year where I learned first hand of the plight of the refugees and their impact on the society and government of Jordan, and I believe the United States has a moral obligation to spearhead efforts to assist the growing Iraqi refugee populations.
As you know, Madam Secretary, continuing sectarian violence in Iraq has forced a mass migration of Iraqis from their homes. Iraqis are now the third-largest displaced population in the world and the fastest-growing refugee population globally. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are some 2.2 million Iraqis displaced internally and at least another 2.5 million Iraqis have sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Jordan and Syria.
The flood of Iraqi refugees has created a huge burden on the resources of primarily the Jordanian and Syrian governments, while Lebanon, Egypt and other neighboring countries are impacted as well. Jordan currently hosts an estimated Iraqi refugee population of 750,000. This influx is alarming in a country of just 6 million people, especially considering the increasing presence of Islamic militants in Jordan over the last decade. While Jordanian leaders and many local and international non-governmental groups are taking significant steps to respond to the refugees’ basic needs, education, health care and even water access remain limited. As you know, in January, Jordan closed its borders to Iraqis because it cannot absorb more people into this resource-poor kingdom. Despite this, Jordan has not seen significantly increased economic assistance from its top ally – the United States – to fund its schools, hospitals, and public infrastructure.
Syria, as well, is straining under the pressure of hosting 2.5 million Iraqi refugees, as it is the only country which has kept its border open. According to the Syrian government, Syria spends more than $830,000,000 per year for registered Iraqi students to attend school, and receive medical treatment and food. In addition, according to the government, Syria spends approximately $1.8 billion per year to subsidize food, heating oil, gasoline, electrical power and water for the Iraqi refugees. As a result of soaring rent costs, overcrowded schools, rising crime, health problems, and concerns about the vulnerability of young, unemployed Iraqis to extremist influences, Syria is now struggling to absorb these refugees.
The security situation in Jordan, Syria, and other host countries is rapidly deteriorating. Tension is rising among host communities, oversaturated with displaced populations, who, themselves, lack access to basic services, and Iraqi refugees angered by their deteriorating life circumstances. The destabilizing nature of large refugee flows, the need to enroll children in school so they won’t remain idle, and the skewing of sectarian balances in host countries may very well lead to a breakdown of law and order in the host countries.

Nuclear Terrorism Impact Module

Resolving the crisis in Iraq is critical to soft power

Nye 4 (Joseph S, Harvard professor, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4302>, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Of course, even the best advertising cannot sell a poor product. We will need to improve our policy product as well. Recovery of American soft power will depend on policy changes such as finding a political solution in Iraq, investing more heavily in advancing the Middle East peace process, and working more closely to involve allies and international institutions.

More specifically, we will have to deal with the abuses that were exposed at Abu Ghraib. Fortunately, we have begun to do that. Whatever our flaws as an occupying power, the symbolism of Abu Ghraib did not reduce the United States to the moral equivalent of the tyrant it replaced. Democracy matters. American abuses were widely published and criticized in our free press for all to see. Congressional hearings have made officials testify in public. And the American Supreme Court has asserted its independence from the executive branch by recently ruling that detainees at Guantanamo Bay and in military brigs in the United States must have access to legal representation.

One of the greatest sources of American soft power is the openness of our democratic processes. Even when mistaken policies reduce our attractiveness, our ability to openly criticize and correct our mistakes makes us attractive to others at a deeper level. Vietnam is a good example. When protesters overseas were marching in the streets against the Vietnam War, they did not sing “The Internationale”, but rather Martin Luther King’s “We Shall Overcome.” And that remains the best hope for those of us who believe that the United States can recover its soft power even after Iraq and Abu Ghraib.

Middle East soft power is vital to winning the war on terror

Nye 6 (Joseph S., Harvard professor, http://theinnercircle.wordpress.com/2009/07/15/joseph-s-nye-jr-s-explanation-of-smart-power-in-the-middle-east/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Lebanon provides larger lessons for the United States about how to conduct a war against jihadist terrorism. The current struggle is not a clash of Islam vs. the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of more moderate believers. America cannot win unless the mainstream wins, and needs to use hard power against the hard core like Al Qaeda because soft power will never attract them. But soft power is essential to attract the mainstream and dry up support for the extremists.

As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said, the measure of success in this war is whether the number our side is killing and deterring is larger than the number that the terrorists are recruiting. By his measure, we are doing badly. In November 2003, the official number of terrorist insurgents in Iraq was 5,000. This year it was 20,000.

The manner in which we use our hard military power affects Rumsfeld’s ratio. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding around the world for the American military response against the Taliban government that had provided bases for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Our invasion of Iraq, which was not connected to 9/11, squandered that good will, and the attractiveness of the United States in Muslim countries such as Indonesia plummeted from 75 percent approval in 2000 to 15 percent in May 2003. As we have found in Iraq, occupation of a divided nation is messy and bound to lead to episodes, such as Abu Ghraib and Haditha, that undercut our soft power.

By failing to be smart about how we combine our hard and soft power in the struggle against jihadist terrorism, we fall into the trap set by Al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, who want to cast the conflict as a clash of civilizations. But Islamists, much less all Muslims, have a diversity of views. America needs to be wary of strategies that help its enemies by uniting disparate forces behind one banner.

The United States has a good narrative, but its failure to combine hard and soft power into a smart strategy means that, too often, it steps on its own story, and that can be fatal.

Nuclear Terrorism Impact Module

A nuclear terror attack is coming before 2014 – it collapses the economy

Allison 8 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18230/nuclear\_attack\_a\_worstcase\_reality.html, AD: 6/27/10) jl

In "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe," published in 2004, I present the evidence for the proposition that on the current trajectory, a successful terrorist nuclear attack devastating one of the great cities of the world is inevitable. I offer my own considered judgment that if all the governments stay on autopilot, doing no more and no less than they are doing today, a nuclear 9/11 is more likely than not within a decade — that is, by 2014.
Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb, was called by Nobel laureate Enrico Fermi "the only true genius I had ever met." Testifying to Congress in March 2007, Mr. Garwin estimated a "20 percent per year probability of a nuclear explosion with American cities and European cities included."
My Harvard colleague, Matthew Bunn, created a model that estimates the probability of a terrorist nuclear attack over a 10-year period to be 29 percent — identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Indiana Republican, in 2005.
Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry has expressed that my work underestimates the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is "inevitable." As he has stated: "I don't see any way that it won't happen." Are there real and serious adversaries of the United States intent on conducting a terrorist nuclear attack on the homeland? Yes.
Al Qaeda remains a formidable enemy with clear nuclear ambitions. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that obtaining weapons of mass destruction was "a religious duty" for al Qaeda. According to the final report of the 9/11 commission, "Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least 10 years ... and continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability." Al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith announced the group's objective — "to kill 4 million Americans — 2 million of them children," in retaliation for the deaths the group thinks the United States and Israel have inflicted on Muslims.
As former CIA Director George J. Tenet reveals in his memoir, "the most senior leaders of al Qaeda are still singularly focused on acquiring [weapons of mass destruction]... . The main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where Osama bin Laden and his operatives desperately want to go."
Homeland Security Undersecretary Charles Allen confirmed Mr. Tenet's view in his Senate testimony earlier this month. He told lawmakers: "Our post-9/11 successes against the Taliban in Afghanistan yielded volumes of information that completely changed our view of al Qaeda's nuclear program. We learned that al Qaeda wants a weapon to use, not a weapon to sustain and build a stockpile. ... A terrorist group needs only to produce a nuclear yield once to change history." Would a nuclear 9/11 be a game-changer? You bet.
Consider the consequences of even a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one U.S. city. Researchers at the Rand Corp., a U.S. government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Long Beach, Calif., would cause immediate indirect costs worldwide of more than $3 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 10 percent.
The negative economic repercussions would reverberate well beyond the developed world. As former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned, "Were a nuclear terrorist attack to occur, it would cause not only widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing world."

US economic collapse causes extinction

Friedberg and Schoenfield 8 (Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

Nuclear Terrorism Impact Module

Retaliation from a nuclear terrorist attack would cause extinction

Corsi 5 (Columnist, Worldnet Daily, Phd in Political Science at Harvard, (Jerome, “Atomic Iran: How the Terrorist Regime Bought the Bomb and American Politicians,”April 20th  Excerpted at,  [http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/ar...TICLE\_ID=43817](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/ar...TICLE_ID%3D43817))

In the span of less than one hour, the nation's largest city will have been virtually wiped off the map. Removal of debris will take several years, and recovery may never fully happen. The damage to the nation's economy will be measured in the trillions of dollars, and the loss of the country's major financial and business center may reduce America immediately to a second-class status. The resulting psychological impact will bring paralysis throughout the land for an indefinite period of time. The president may not be able to communicate with the nation for days, even weeks, as television and radio systems struggle to come back on line. No natural or man-made disaster in history will compare with the magnitude of damage that has been done to New York City in this one horrible day. The United States retaliates: 'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America. Many of the great egos in Europe have never fully recovered from the disgrace of World War II, when in the last century the Americans a second time in just over two decades had been forced to come to their rescue. If the French did not start launching nuclear weapons themselves, they might be happy to fan the diplomatic fire beginning to burn under the Russians and the Chinese. Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to the world calculation. Muslims around the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had no positive proof that the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be unacceptable to the American people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would be the question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a politician. The political party in power at the time of the attack would be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike against somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.

Nuclear Terrorism Impact Calc

Nuclear terrorism is the most serious existential threat – causes US retaliation and collapses the economy

Diamond 8 (John, fellow of the Saga Foundation and former national security reporter for USA Today, http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/5550/149/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Nuclear terrorism, the most serious existential threat to our homeland, has fallen off our priority list. The startling crisis on Wall Street, and the threat it poses to Main Street, has relegated national security to an afterthought — when it should be anything but.
Four years ago, during the presidential campaign, President Bush and Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., agreed that the possibility that a terrorist group could obtain fissile material, fashion a crude nuclear weapon and set it off in an American city was our greatest threat.
This year, the topic barely got a mention in the presidential debates. Go to the websites of Barack Obama and John McCain and click on the "Issues" buttons. In neither case does the drop-down list include a separate category called "terrorism." Once you click through enough layers, you discover that they both agree on the importance of securing nuclear weapons material. Both have endorsed the concept of "a world without nuclear weapons." And they both support gradual but significant reductions in the U.S. and Russian arsenals.
The absence of a sharp disagreement between the candidates on responding to the nuclear terror threat might explain why it has all but disappeared from view as the fall campaign approaches. Yet perhaps our leaders and their constituents have not fully grasped the consequences of such an attack beyond the grim image of a mushroom cloud over an American city.
The aftershocks
As the Saga Foundation — a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction — argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would be dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almost certainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack.
Assuming, as the experts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days.
The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 military response. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people.
Think your 401(k) hurts now?
The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues — economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism — as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a U.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences.

Misc Impact Turns – Oil Shocks

US withdrawal causes oil shocks

Bukay 10 (David, School of Political Science in the University of Haifa, http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq\_1855460?sort=date, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Anarchy in Iraq and the possible breakup of the country into autonomous regions would severely affect Iraq’s oil exports. In 2005, Iraq produced about 1.9 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil and exported about 1.4 MBD. By June 2006, Iraqi oil production had risen to 2.5 MBD, and it has been on the rise ever since. A U.S. withdrawal would undermine the security of oil pipelines and other facilities and increase the vulnerability of Iraqi oil production to sabotage. The resulting drop in Iraqi oil exports would increase the upward pressure on world oil prices in an already tight oil market. Energy uncertainty would be increased further if Iraq splintered and Iran gained domination over a Shia-dominated rump state in the oil-rich south.

Oil shocks crush the global economy

Clayton 8 (Mark, Staff Writer for The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0512/p13s01-wmgn.html, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Two years ago a leading economist published a study provocatively titled: "What would $120 oil mean for the global economy?" Answer: a global recession, if the price stayed there for a year. Now the future has arrived, with the United States and other nations getting a double whammy from both the mortgage crisis and oil futures hovering at $120 per barrel. If oil prices stay stratospheric, the cost of fueling cars and planes could slash US economic growth up to 2.3 percent and global growth by 3.6 percent, says Robert Wescott, former chief economist of the president's council of economic advisers and author of the $120 oil report. While many energy-security experts worry about a terrorist attack that suddenly crimps global oil supplies and hammers the US economy, Dr. Wescott and other experts say a terror attack is hardly the only, or even the worst, oil threat the nation now faces. "What we are seeing today is more of a slow-motion, rolling oil crisis rather than a sharp shock, yet ultimately we end up with the same sorts of impacts [as a terror attack]," says Wescott, now president of Keybridge Research, a Washington economic-consulting firm. Unlike the 1970s, when an oil embargo left Americans waiting in long lines at gasoline stations and paying higher prices, today's oil crisis has been stealthy. Its economic impact has been masked by consumers tapping credit cards and home equity to cover the rising cost of energy and some consumer goods. "We're having a replay of the 1970s without the Arab oil embargo part, so it's been hard for many people to see," says Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy scholar at the Baker Institute at Rice University in Houston. Even with US airlines cutting flights and SUV sales now tanking, the effects of expensive oil on the American family could be stark, Wescott's report says. In 2003, with oil approaching $40 per barrel, the average US family spent about $1,900 (4.8 percent of its income) on natural gas, heating oil, and gasoline. But today at the $120 per barrel level, a family will spend about $6,000 a year or about 15 percent of total annual income, Wescott's report predicts. Compared with the oil crises of the 1970s, the US paradoxically is in a bit better, yet also worse, position. The good news is the US economy is less energy intensive – using only about half the energy it did in the 1980s to produce a dollar of economic growth. That should make it more resilient. But the bad news is that imported oil has risen to about 12 million barrels a day, about 60 percent of the 21 million barrels the US consumes daily. That financial drain at $120 per barrel is jamming the brakes on the US economy and inflating the trade deficit, economists agree. "The question now isn't whether we're going into recession, it's whether there will be a soft landing ... or we have a hard landing," Ms. Jaffe says. Nariman Behravesh, chief economist at Global Insight, Lexington, Mass., has done economic projections with oil at even higher prices. While oil at $120 a barrel "makes a mild recession a little deeper," the results of oil at $150 would be much worse with the nation "looking at a fairly serious recession."

Misc Impact Turns – Hegemony

Abandoning Iraq undermines US leadership

Bukay 10 (David, School of Political Science in the University of Haifa, http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq\_1855460?sort=date, AD: 6/27/10) jl

The chief beneficiary of a rapid U.S. pullout would be Iran, which still has considerable influence over the dominant Shiite political parties, which represent most Iraqi Shiites (about 65 percent of the population). If Iraq imploded, Iran quickly could gain dominance over an emerging “Shiastan” rump state endowed with the bulk of Iraq’s oil reserves. This would give Iran additional resources and a staging area to escalate subversive efforts targeted at the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Shiite minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other countries look to the United States to serve as a guarantor against an aggressive Iran. If the United States fails to follow through on its commitment to establish a stable government in Iraq, it will severely undermine its credibility. Abandoning Iraqi allies would erode the confidence of other allies in U.S. leadership (particularly in Pakistan where they eye U.S. calls to take on the Taliban with some degree of skepticism) and further fuel conspiracy theories about American plots to carve up Iraq to keep Arabs weak and divided.

\*\*\*AFF – REFUGEES\*\*\*

Aff – Refugees No Return

Iraqi refugees don’t return home

Dawn 9 (01 May, 2009, http://beta.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/18-iraqi-refugees-wont-go-home-sa-03)KFC

The trends, uncovered on the basis of scores of interviews by The Associated Press and confirmed by Iraqi government and United Nations figures, raise the possibility that countries like Syria and Egypt- poor themselves- could face a significant refugee problem for years to come. Iraq may never, or at least not for years, recover much of the urban, educated, predominantly Sunni Muslim and Christian middle-class whose skills would be vital to its rebuilding. The ranks of doctors and other medical professions have been particularly hard-hit by the refugee flight. ‘'Life here is better. My children can play outside and I know they'll come back. You never know what's going to happen there,’ said Taghrid Hadi, who fled Iraq in September 2006 after gunmen kidnapped and killed her husband, dumping his mutilated body outside their home just north of Baghdad. Hadi, 34, has no intention of returning home. She and other relatives are waiting for word on their applications to be resettled in a third country. Where? ‘Anywhere but Iraq, I don't care where,’ she said. More than 2 million refugees remain outside Iraq, mostly in the Sunni countries of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, according to the International Organization of Migration and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Only about 16,000 refugees- less than 1 percent- have returned from abroad, said Karim al-Saedi, an Iraqi Migration Ministry official. Besides Iraqis who fled abroad, approximately 1.6 million people have left their homes to take refuge in other parts of Iraq since 2006. They too have been slow to return: About 297,000, or 18 percent, are believed to have gone back, according to an April report by the International Organization of Migration. In Syria, which has the greatest refugee population- estimated by the government at 1.2 million- only 670 people have asked to benefit from the UN's Voluntary Repatriation Program launched in October to help Iraqis return home, says Philippe Leclerc, acting representative for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Damascus. 'The situation in Iraq is still extremely fragile,' making many reluctant to return, Leclerc said. While violence is dramatically down from its height in 2007-2007, the fragility has been clear in the past week, with a string of suicide bombings targeting Shiite areas of Baghdad. In the latest, two car bombs tore through a crowded commercial district, killing 51 people on Wednesday. Refugees say the lack of basic services and continuing unemployment in Iraq are also reasons they prefer to stay put in neighboring countries, where- even if their savings are running low and their status uncertain-many can find schools and under-the-table jobs. Also, Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions remain deep in Iraq. Some refugees have returned home only to find the hatreds too strong, prompting them to leave again.

Refugees aren’t returning.

Dickinson 6/15 (Elizabeth, June 15, 2010, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/15/the\_refugees\_wont\_go\_home)KFC

What happens when a refugee is no longer temporary? What does it mean when 6.6 of the world's citizens reside in no country? And what is the world to make of the 5.5 million people whose countries are in protracted conflict -- meaning they won't go home anytime soon? Those are among the questions raised by the United Nations' High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR, in its Global Trends report released today. The main findings? The number of refugees returning home was the lowest it has been for two decades last year. Meanwhile, the number of forcibly displaced refugees hit its highest level since the 1990s -- a whopping 43.3 million. In other words, it was a bad year for refugees -- the worst since the bad old days of the 1990s. Much of the unfortunate news comes from stories that are all too familiar: Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo. They've been bad before, but they're not getting better. Even more forgiving situations, such as in Iraq, are not attracting voluntary returns, as UNHCR calls them. And the number of people sent out into this growing abyss of refugeehood has grown each year. It's a humbling inflection point. In this Westaphalian world where the state is still the most important piece of international capital, we now have a world in which million of people are -- perhaps permanently -- stateless. How do we imagine their human rights, their legal status, and our negotiation with and about them? On top of the protracted situation in the Middle East, conflicts in Africa, Asia, and across the world are now producing people of no less conclusive status. UNHCR was meant to be a stop-gap mechanism until a better solution could be found. But we might soon reach a point where we can't keep up that story.

Aff – Troops = Instability

US military presence causes instability and terrorism

Bowman 8 (Bradley - Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, assistant professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\_bowman.pdf, AD: 6/27/10) jl

The U.S. military presence in the Middle East has represented one of the leading sources of radicalization and terrorism directed against the United States. Yet, protecting U.S. interests in the region does not require an obtrusive U.S. military footprint characterized by sprawling bases occupied by large numbers of permanently stationed ground troops. In fact, a large U.S. military presence in the region is unnecessary and often counterproductive. If policymakers ignore the role of the U.S. military presence in the radicalization process and fail to assess the actual necessity of a large U.S. military presence, the United States will find itself in a needless predicament not unlike the Herculean struggle against the mythological hydra. For every Abu Musab al- Zarqawi that the United States kills, the continuing sources of radicalization will generate a virtually limitless pool of replacements

Troops are counter-productive – causes instability

Ackerman 7 (Spencer - Staff Writer American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=in\_iraq\_forever, AD: 6/27/10) jl

The U.S. has real interests in Iraq -- ensuring a stable flow of oil, preventing a regional conflagration, and arresting the spread of al-Qaeda, among others. Yet the U.S. presence in Iraq has consistently proven counterproductive to its aims. American interests, says Paul Pillar, are "not served enough to a degree that outweighs the negatives of our presence: continuing Iraqi casualties, the image of the U.S. occupying a foreign land unjustly, and U.S. troops being caught in the crossfire."

Empirics go aff – military presence only increases instability and conflict

Bowman 8 (Bradley - Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, assistant professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\_bowman.pdf, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Not only is a large U.S. military presence in the Middle East unnecessary, but it is also frequently counterproductive. A look at the rise of al Qaeda as a threat to the United States in the 1990s illustrates the radicalizing effect that often accompanies a U.S. military presence. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia represents the primary reason Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda began to target the United States in the 1990s. As early as 1994, bin Laden publicly decried the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.27 He followed these initial public condemnations with a message in 1996 entitled “Declaration of Jihad,” stating that “the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad—is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone of the Islamic world, place of revelation, source of the Prophetic mission, and home of the Noble Ka’ba where Muslims direct their prayers. Despite this, it was occupied by the armies of the Christians, the Americans, and their allies.”28 Two years later, in February 1998, bin Laden joined Ayman al Zawahiri and three other Islamist leaders from Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan in issuing a formal declaration regarding the religious duty of Muslims to wage jihad against U.S. military personnel and civilians. After a paragraph of the requisite salutations and religious formalities, the authors immediately cite the preeminent reason for the jihad against the Americans: “Firstly, for over seven years America has occupied the holiest part of the Islamic lands, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its wealth, dictating to its leaders, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases there into a spearhead with which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.”29

The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia certainly did not justify al Qaeda’s tragic and immoral slaughter of nearly 3,000 innocent Americans, but it did largely explain it. From the perspective of bin Laden and a large segment of the Arab world, the United States was an occupying power in Saudi Arabia, and the only way to compel it to leave was for al Qaeda to use the only effective tool at its disposal: terrorism. Not only did bin Laden consistently cite the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia as the paramount justification for jihad in the years leading up to the September 11 attacks, but 15 of 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two from the UAE, one from Egypt, and one from Lebanon. In a poll of Saudis taken after the September 11 attacks, 95 percent of Saudis agreed with bin Laden’s objection to U.S. forces in the region.30 The centrality of the Hejaz, the area encompassing Mecca, Medina, and its surrounding areas, in the Muslim faith makes the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia significantly more offensive compared to a troop presence in countries on Saudi Arabia’s periphery.31 Consequently, the 2003 reduction of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia represented a step in the right direction for the United States to address this source of radicalization.

Aff – AT: Nuclear Terrorism

Even if they attempted a nuclear terror attack, it has too a high a probably of failure

Levi 7 (Michael, CFR Fellow for Science and Technology, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how\_likely\_is\_a\_nuclear\_terrorist\_attack\_on\_the\_united\_states.html, AD: 6/27/10) jl

We should not, however, underestimate the odds of terrorist failure. There isn’t enough space here to make that point comprehensively, but I’ll try to convince you that simple arguments for why failure is highly unlikely may be weaker than they seem.

The case for the ease of building a gun-type weapon provides a good example of how we often overestimate how easy a terrorist task may be. I certainly won’t debate the fact that Manhattan Project scientists “were so confident about this design that they persuaded military authorities to drop the bomb, untested, on Hiroshima.” But we should parse the word “untested” carefully.

During the Manhattan Project, scientists and engineers spent years testing the gun itself; testing their casting and machining of the uranium metal to avoid fires and criticality accidents during production, and impurities in the product; testing the initiator that would trigger the chain reaction; and testing how different configurations of materials would behave, a project that led to the death of one physicist. No one conducted a full-scale test explosion, but that hardly means that building the weapon was trivial.

A terrorist group would have to do many of the same things (though technological progress would make some steps easier) all while attempting to hide from law enforcement and intelligence. This doesn’t mean that terrorists couldn’t build a gun-type bomb, but it suggests that their chances of failure aren’t negligible.

This takes on special importance in the context of a broader defense. Imagine a terrorist group faces only a twenty percent chance of failure while building a bomb. But imagine it also faces a similarly small chance of failure while attempting to purchase nuclear materials, while attempting to recruit scientists and engineers, while raising money for its plot, while smuggling materials into the United States, while purchasing non-nuclear components for its weapon, while assembling the bomb in a safehouse, and in other elements of its plot. If we combine, for example, ten such hurdles, we get a ninety percent chance of failure. We can debate the numbers, but this suggests that we shouldn’t be too quick to ignore small chances of terrorist failure.

A final note on the question of failure-aversion, a quality most terrorism analysts still, even after 9/11, attribute to most terrorist groups. I agree that al-Qaeda is patient and plans carefully. But that does not mean that after careful and methodical consideration, and facing a properly designed defense, al-Qaeda might not decide that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try.

\*\*\*NEG – EODs\*\*\*

1NC Shell

Only the Armies EOD personnel can solve IEDs

GREER 4 (STEVEN J., USA Ret., Jan. 1, teaches courses on special operations strategy, low-intensity conflict, and insurgency at American Military University http://www3.ausa.org/webint/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSBN TBC 6/27/10)

It is prudent to reason that the average Iraqi soldier has little or no knowledge of IEDs or electromagnetic firing devices. Similarly, a typical U.S Army infantry battalion will not have many skilled at this type of demo set-up. Only specially trained soldiers in our Army (Special Forces teams, Rangers who have been to master breacher courses, explosive ordnance disposal personnel) possess this knowledge. In Iraq, it is obvious that Islamic extremist have crossed the porous borders, linked up with guerrillas and are providing a train-the-trainer program to teach these unique skills. This union of terrorist and guerrilla forces is an increasingly deadly combination for the coalition; to counter it requires knowledge of guerrilla warfare strategy.

EOD teams key to Election safety, Aff leaves Iraq without election protection

FONTAINE 3/7 (SCOTT, STAFF WRITER, 03/07/10, <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2010/03/07/1099532/lewis-mcchord-troops-behind-scenes.html>)KFC

“If they are secure, legit, credible elections, and the people come out and vote – and there’s every indication right now they’re going to vote across all sectors of society – and then that government is seated, that’s a huge step forward for Iraq,” Brig. Gen. Peter Bayer, the I Corps chief of staff, said in February. I Corps and its roughly 1,000 soldiers are in the midst of returning home to Lewis-McChord, a\

\lthough the headquarters is still officially in charge of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq for the election. The Americans will provide assistance to Iraqi security forces in areas of expertise where the latter are lacking, such as aerial reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, close-air support, explosive ordnance disposal and medical evacuation. U.S. troops are positioned throughout the country, far enough from polling sites so Iraqi civilians won’t notice but close enough to respond to an attack.

Safe elections are key to Iraqi democracy

Hooper 10 (Simon CNN March 5 http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/03/05/iraq.elections.kurds/index.html TBC 6/27/10)

The PUK hoped that Iraq could develop into a "24-carat democracy" but safety remained the main issue for voters even in the Kurdish region, Jamal Talabani told CNN. At least 11 people have been injured in recent street-fighting in the town, according to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, while journalists have also complained of intimidation and violence, the international press freedom watchdog Reporters Without Borders said. Yet despite the unrest, Azad Amin said the choice of a genuine alternative to a decades-old duopoly in Sunday's election marked a leap forward in the Kurdish region's democratic development by opening up government to scrutiny and making political leaders more accountable. "People are pushing open the door," he said. "There is a sense that we are capable of doing better and deserve better. This is how democracy develops -- not through fear, but through ideas."

1NC Shell

Iraqi democracy key to Middle East stability

Byman and Pollack 3 (Daniel L. Kenneth M. assistant professor at the Georgetown University Security Studies program, the former director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council April 15 http://www.dlc.org/ndol\_ci.cfm?kaid=124&subid=158&contentid=251480 TBC 6/27/10)

We should not delude ourselves: Building democracy in Iraq will be difficult and expensive and will take years. But there is no reason that Iraq cannot join the ranks of democratic nations if the United States is willing to take on the burdens of helping Iraq build a democracy, and to create a coalition of other nations willing to help. Moreover, we must remember that our goal in Iraq is not merely to rid the world of the menace of Saddam Hussein, but to bring stability to the Gulf region. If the United States is not committed to building good government in Iraq, we are liable to be simply substituting one set of problems for another. Democracy in Iraq is not just a nice bonus of a war, it is a necessary component of victory.

WMDs mean instability goes nuclear and causes extinction

Steinbach 2 (John, Researcher for the Centre for Research on Globalisation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, AD: 6/26/10) jl

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

US key

Army key – Tech

Shachtman 5 (Noah Issue 13.11 - November Wired http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.11/bomb.html?pg=3&topic=bomb&topic\_set= TBC 6/27/10)

So US bomb squads have transformed themselves from technologically backward units into some of the most advanced in the Army. They brought in sophisticated radio-frequency jammers when the guerrillas switched to triggers made from short-range radios and kids' remote-controlled toys. They turned to forensic techniques worthy of CSI to keep up with the bomb makers. And when insurgents started targeting the guys trying to defuse the bombs, the Army answered with a legion of advanced robots.

Army key – Jamming tech

Shachtman 5 (Noah Issue 13.11 - November Wired http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.11/bomb.html?pg=3&topic=bomb&topic\_set= TBC 6/27/10)

Staring at the bomb in the road, Palmer and his team aren't sure why they're still alive. The Death X bomber might have gotten cold feet. More likely, one of the radio frequency jammers in Mayhem's Humvee prevented the enemy from detonating the weapon. The jamming devices, called Warlock Reds and Warlock Greens, have become some of the US military's most critical - and most secret - assets. "I can't even begin to say the first fucking thing about 'em," Palmer says. In the early days of the war, when IEDs were simple - sometimes just cans filled with gunpowder, hardwired to a simple trigger - bombers had to stay close to their explosives, making them easy targets for US forces. To get farther away, the guerrillas switched to radio triggers. Jamming those signals became essential. In late 2003, the Army sent 92 jammers to Iraq and Afghanistan; today there are several thousand in the field, and the Pentagon has funded 10,000 personal-size Warlock Blues.

Army needed for EOD training

ARDOLINO 9 (BILL October 18 http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/security\_requirements\_and\_exte\_1.php TBC 6/27/10)

I've argued that beyond the political patina of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) withdrawal deadline, training and equipment requirements will demand extended US involvement in Iraq. This relationship can be a boon for Iraq's stability and American interests. For one example, a Reuters piece highlights US Explosive Ordnance Disposal advisors training their Iraqi counterparts in disarming bombs: "I never feel nervous or scared. I work as if it's not a bomb, just a stone," said one Iraqi soldier who was practising controlling a bomb investigation robot. The wobbly waist-high device, consisting of cameras and a mechanical arm mounted on mini tank treads, struggled to grip a piece of metal, the arm's claw snapping at the air. "If I think about the dangers I wouldn't be able to work ... one mistake and it's all over," added the soldier. Despite the article's mention of acceleration due to impending withdrawal, training EOD personnel and updating them with sophisticated and rapidly improving equipment is one of the necessities that will likely persist past 2011. This concept is also emphasized in quotes buried at the end of a story about a Utah Army National Guard Aviation Battalion deploying to support Iraqi Army operations:

Experienced and trained bomb specialists key

Moniz 5 (Dave 7/31 http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-07-31-bomb-specialists\_x.htm TBC 6/27/10)

The lack of trained specialists makes it harder to train the new troops Bartos gets and adds to the burden of the few experienced technicians assigned to the 744th. "I've got plenty of younger guys, but I can't use them alone," Bartos says, explaining that only team leaders are qualified for the most dangerous missions, including using remote-controlled robots to blow up improvised explosive devices, commonly known as IEDs. To be a team leader, an EOD soldier must have reached the rank of staff sergeant, a midcareer position that can take six to eight years for a newly minted recruit. Bartos has plenty of younger soldiers entering the unit, but they typically are low-ranking privates or specialists and are years away from becoming qualified as team leaders.

IEDs Impact Calc

IEDs are the leading cause of casualties – Every war is worse w IED

Lam 9 (Derek September 13 http://cryptome.org/0001/counter-ied-biz.htm TBC 6/27/10)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a significant threat in many conflict zones, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq this decade. These makeshift bombs can be presented surreptitiously and used without warning, to devastating effect, especially against patrolling troops. The IED countermeasures market is an increasingly important defence sector that will exhibit growth over coming years. Our new study examines both commercial and technological aspects of the counter-IED sector analytically. Importantly, IEDs have accounted for a majority of the casualties among coalition forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs also cause death and injuries to civilians there and in other conflict zones. In this new report you will see how IEDs remain a frequent, deadly threat to US and other coalition personnel in combat zones, especially in Afghanistan at present. Consequently, there remains a large, growing market for IED countermeasures and defence, with many countries investing steadily in those products. Increased deployment and development of those technologies from 2009 onwards will reduce casualties. There is high potential in that sector for both public and private-sector developments.

IEDs undermine the Iraqi government – Escalates every war

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

The ammunition strewn all over Iraq provides insurgents with easily accessible materiel to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used to kill coalition forces, Iraqi security personnel and civilians in an attempt to discredit Iraq’s new government and weaken the coalition and world support for it. Use of these devices was rare until the summer of 2003. Before IEDs became the weapon of choice, coalition forces were predominately attacked with small arms and RPGs, items commonly found in ammunition caches. RPG-7s were the leading casualty producer, responsible for 50 percent of U.S soldiers killed in post-war operations until use of IEDs significantly increased in 2004.9 “IEDs continue to be the greatest casualty producer among our troops in the field,” General Abizaid said during a 3 March 2004 House Armed Services Committee hearing.10 Six months later with the IED problem continually growing, General Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff, stated in an interview in September 2004 that 500 to 600 IEDs go off every month and are now responsible for about 90 percent of killed and wounded.11 The Army has what General Cody described as a “Manhattan-like project” trying to solve the IED problem by developing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to combat the IED threat. The Army led the Defense Department’s effort by standing up the IED Task Force, with the goal of transitioning the Task Force into a permanent organization, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force that would focus all counter IED efforts within DoD.

EOD are over 50% of the impact of war

Shachtman 5 (Noah Issue 13.11 - November Wired http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.11/bomb.html?pg=3&topic=bomb&topic\_set= TBC 6/27/10)

But if ordnance disposal is the military's rough equivalent of firefighting, defusing bombs in Baghdad is like doing the job in a city of arsonists. Analysts estimate that improvised bombs have caused more than half of the roughly 16,000 American casualties, and thousands more among Iraqi civilians, since the war began. So explosive ordnance disposal has become one of the most important assignments on the battlefield.

IEDs Threaten Reconstruction

IEDs and CEA threaten reconstruction and democratization

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

Many military planners would consider CEA to be a tactical or at most an operational problem, but under the circumstances and extent that CEA was encountered during Operation Iraqi Freedom, CEA can have implications that effect the obtainment of strategic goals. One of the primary lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom is that the US needs to put more emphasis on postwar security strategy and be better prepared for the complex tasks of security and nation building. Experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown that intelligence is key to identifying and planning for potential CEA and IED operations. Without intelligence notifying the coalition of the potential problems of having 650,000 tons of CEA scattered across Iraq, there was little planning before the war. This lack of information flow and predictive analysis left the coalition inadequately prepared to deal with CEA issues and delayed appropriate responses to the IED threat. IEDs are killing more coalition forces then any other means, as well as threatening almost every objective the US wants to achieve in Iraq, from maintaining the coalition, humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and democratization. Adequately securing CEA immediately after major combat operations would have significantly reduced the IED threat in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prewar identification of CEA as a possible factor influencing security and significantly impacting resources needs to be part of Phase IV planning for any future largescale operation.

Bombing destroys reconstruction, oil infrastructure, and harms democracy

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

On 19 August 2003, a truck bomb exploded at the United Nations’ headquarters in Baghdad. The attack killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nations Special Representative in Iraq and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The blast additionally killed 22 civilians of the United Nations staff and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After the attack 120 NGOs pulled at least some of their staff out of Iraq and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cut its staff by two-thirds. Oil pipelines and reconstruction projects have been consistently bombed, increasing costs and prolonging rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. Between April 2003 and September 2004, there were an estimated 123 IED attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure.15 In December of 2004, Contrack International Inc., a major US contractor pulled out of Iraq citing security cost concerns. On 10 January 2005 Ukraine, acting a day after an explosion killed eight of its soldiers in Iraq, announced that it would withdraw its 1,650 soldiers by the middle of 2005. During the 30 January 2005 Iraqi election, 44 people died mainly from terrorist bombing on voters and polling places. Voter turnout was better than many people expected but no one would disagree that more Iraqis would have voted had security not been a concern.

EOD Key to Hearts and Minds

EOD is key to hearts and minds – CEA kills children

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

One week after Baghdad fell into the hands of US troops, at least 14 civilians were killed and 10 wounded when an ammunition cache exploded in a southern suburb of the city. The US military accused unknown attackers of firing flares at the open dump in an attempt to turn the local populace against the coalition. The deadly blast triggered anti-American demonstrations because Baghdad residents blamed American troops for failing to remove the ammunition stocked so close to a populated neighborhood, even though the Iraqi Army placed it there. The explosion has been only one of many such incidents involving CEA located in populated areas. Official statistics regarding the number of civilians killed or injured by mines, UXO, or CEA since the end of major combat operations are not available, however there are numerous indications that CEA has killed and injured large numbers of civilians. “The New York Times on 1 May 2003 quoted doctors in Mosul, Iraq as saying they were treating three to five children a day wounded by abandoned munitions.” During the same period, medical sources in Kirkuk, Kifri, and Jalawlah, reported more than 150 casualties, mostly children, were injured by munitions since the war in northern Iraq ended. In most conflict-ridden areas across the world, children are the most vulnerable to being injured by land mines, UXO, and CEA and Iraq is no exception.22 Iraqis needing to put food on the table did significant looting of CEA. In a country were telephone poles are stripped of wires so people can sell the copper, many are willing to risk the danger of pilfering brass casings from artillery rounds. Others remove propellant for cooking or dump munitions on the ground to use the wooden crates for firewood. It is not rare for EOD contractors performing CEA operations to see blood and bits of body-parts among the ammunition. Hopefully they are the remains of an insurgent, but it is more probable that they belong to a hapless civilian or child. The US Army has a strong interest in preventing unintentional civilian casualties from UXO, and other explosive hazards from CEA. It directly supports US objectives in Iraq by helping to win “the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people. Additionally as an occupying power, the US has the duty to protect the Iraqi people. Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and (IV) of 1907, states that Occupying Powers have the obligation “to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the occupied territory.”23 With respect to CEA, it means securing or disposing of it in an expeditious manner. The US has repeatedly stressed its commitment to avoiding civilian casualties. Policing the battlefield of CEA and UXO as quickly as possible would demonstrate that commitment in a vivid and meaningful way.

EOD Key

Trained EOD units key to solve CEA

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

During the initial months of the invasion, coalition units tried to dispose of caches as they encountered them. Operationally this made sense and was encouraged by unit leadership. However few units were trained in CEA demolition disposal operations. Demolition training for engineer units is focused on structural demolitions and obstacle breeching. Combat Arms units are also provided limited demolition training, again focused on demolition of structures and 7 obstacles. Only EOD units are specifically trained to render safe and dispose of foreign ammunition. Many caches destroyed by U.S military units ended up producing a bigger problem by scattering the contents with the munitions “kick-outs” having been subjected to an explosion, now possibly more unsafe.

Only EOD personnel can solve IEDs

GREER 4 (STEVEN J., USA Ret., Jan. 1, teaches courses on special operations strategy, low-intensity conflict, and insurgency at American Military University http://www3.ausa.org/webint/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSBN TBC 6/27/10)

It is prudent to reason that the average Iraqi soldier has little or no knowledge of IEDs or electromagnetic firing devices. Similarly, a typical U.S Army infantry battalion will not have many skilled at this type of demo set-up. Only specially trained soldiers in our Army (Special Forces teams, Rangers who have been to master breacher courses, explosive ordnance disposal personnel) possess this knowledge. In Iraq, it is obvious that Islamic extremist have crossed the porous borders, linked up with guerrillas and are providing a train-the-trainer program to teach these unique skills. This union of terrorist and guerrilla forces is an increasingly deadly combination for the coalition; to counter it requires knowledge of guerrilla warfare strategy.

Captured Enemy Ammunition Solves

IEDs are huge – CEA key to Solve

Klingelhoefer 5 (Mark Colonel March18 www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

Some would also argue that even if adequate forces had been available for securing ammunition depots, ASPs, and caches; the insurgency would still be employing IEDs against coalition forces. “Captured documents indicate that there were approximately 500 official and unofficial border crossing points between Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran.”13 Even now two years into the war there is strong evidence that non-Iraqi foreign insurgents are coming into Iraq through borders that are not completely sealed. It stands to reason that these foreign insurgents would be smuggling the weaponry, ammunition, and explosives needed to continue the fight if they were not available in Iraq. This argument however is untenable when you compare it to the magnitude of just not the daily numbers of IEDs but also the large amount of explosives used in the construction of the IEDs. The typical IED in Iraq incorporates one or more artillery or mortar rounds. A single 122 mm artillery round which are regularly incorporated into IEDs weigh approximately 100 lbs. Often, artillery rounds are daisy-chained together and spaced over 100 meters distances along roads ensuring upon detonation that at least some vehicles are hit no matter the tactical spacing and speed of the vehicles. IEDs are built so powerful as to easily destroy Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and blow turrets off M-1 tanks. Car or truck bombs or what the military calls Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) usually incorporate dozens of artillery rounds, or aircraft bombs each weighing hundreds of pounds. Between September and December 2004 there were a total of 247 VBIEDs that were used against coalition forces in Iraq. In December 2004, insurgents lured police into a house in Baghdad and then set off an explosion that killed at least 28 Iraqi police and civilians. The US military estimated that the intensity of the damage came from 1,700 to 1,800 pounds of explosives.14 It is doubtful the insurgency could sustain this bombing operational tempo and high explosive weight IED construction if abundant ammunition was not already available within Iraq. Most probably, IED attacks would still be occurring even with early securing of CEA, but most assuredly at a much-reduced tempo and lethal construction.

IEDs Threaten Military Effectiveness

IEDs threaten military effectiveness

CASTRO 5 (RANDAL R. MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. ARMY COMMANDING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT September http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

The persistent effectiveness of the IED threat has impacted unit operations, U.S. policy, and public perception. Therefore, this deadly enemy capability is likely to be a component of war and armed conflict for the foreseeable future. This chapter provides an overview of the COE and the baseline rationale for why and how state and nonstate actors employ IEDs against a superior military force. In the complicated environment of today, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the operational environment (OE) in which IEDs might be used. Therefore, the U.S. Army must be ready to meet challenges that IEDs present within a multitude of diverse OEs. The FM 7-100 series manuals introduce the baseline for the COE and should be referred to in conjunction with this manual when training against a nonspecific capabilitiesbased enemy operating in an environment that is adaptive and asymmetrical.

Iraqi Democracy Scenario

EOD teams key to Election safety

Hwang 5 (Eui-Don, Major General Republic of Korea Army MILITARY REVIEW  November-December http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/hwang.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

Election support. Election support is one of the major tasks required for regional stabilization and the development of democracy. Increased threats before the general elections prompted close coordination among the Division, the regional government, and local security agencies. According to MNF-I guidance, the Division avoided direct election support. Instead, it provided protective materials such as barricades and, with the Independent Electoral Committee of Iraq (IECI) and local security agencies, helped coordinate convoys. During the general elections, the Division established communication networks with IECI, Osprey Assets Management, and the regional government Ministry of Interior. Quick-reaction forces, medics, and explosive ordnance disposal teams were on constant standby. The Division’s help resulted in the safest elections in Iraq’s history.

Safe elections are key to Iraqi democracy

Hooper 10 (Simon CNN March 5 http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/03/05/iraq.elections.kurds/index.html TBC 6/27/10)

The PUK hoped that Iraq could develop into a "24-carat democracy" but safety remained the main issue for voters even in the Kurdish region, Jamal Talabani told CNN. At least 11 people have been injured in recent street-fighting in the town, according to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, while journalists have also complained of intimidation and violence, the international press freedom watchdog Reporters Without Borders said. Yet despite the unrest, Azad Amin said the choice of a genuine alternative to a decades-old duopoly in Sunday's election marked a leap forward in the Kurdish region's democratic development by opening up government to scrutiny and making political leaders more accountable. "People are pushing open the door," he said. "There is a sense that we are capable of doing better and deserve better. This is how democracy develops -- not through fear, but through ideas."

Iraqi democracy key to Middle East stability

Byman and Pollack 3 (Daniel L. Kenneth M. assistant professor at the Georgetown University Security Studies program, the former director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council April 15 http://www.dlc.org/ndol\_ci.cfm?kaid=124&subid=158&contentid=251480 TBC 6/27/10)

We should not delude ourselves: Building democracy in Iraq will be difficult and expensive and will take years. But there is no reason that Iraq cannot join the ranks of democratic nations if the United States is willing to take on the burdens of helping Iraq build a democracy, and to create a coalition of other nations willing to help. Moreover, we must remember that our goal in Iraq is not merely to rid the world of the menace of Saddam Hussein, but to bring stability to the Gulf region. If the United States is not committed to building good government in Iraq, we are liable to be simply substituting one set of problems for another. Democracy in Iraq is not just a nice bonus of a war, it is a necessary component of victory.

\*\*\*AFF – EODs \*\*\*

Impact Takeouts

No Impact – however Iraq turns out, it won’t be good

Cordesman 3 (Anthony H. April 28 Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy http://aux.ciar.org/ttk/mbt/papers/papers.2007-12-21/tactics.america.csis.x.the\_instant\_lessons\_of\_the\_iraq\_war\_main\_report.cordesman\_burke.2003.pdf TBC 6/27/10)

A weak, client Iraqi democracy will do nothing more than appear to validate all of the regional conspiracy theories that see the US as an aggressive power with neoimperialist goals and the desire to take over Iraq’s oil resources. • A weak and divided Iraq, with feuding or warring Kurdish, Sunni, and Sih’ite factions will create a dangerous power vacuum which will, at a minimum, lead Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Southern Gulf states to compete for influence and control. At worst, an Iraq that tilted towards Iran and/or Syria, or towards any form of theocratic state, would create a new pattern of instability in the Middle East. • A strong and united Iraq may be willing to act as a “have power” and concentrate on internal development, but will still have to rebuild its military forces and rearm, almost certainly leading to tensions with some of its neighbors.

Alt Causes to Iraqi Democracy – Corruption, Media Crackdown

Brinkley 6/27 (Joel professor of journalism at Stanford University http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/06/26/IN0D1E0R29.DTL TBC 6/27/10

As American troops withdraw from Iraq this summer, expect the democratic freedoms Iraqis have enjoyed in recent years to recede as well. Already, the Iraqi government is restricting freedom of the press, expression and assembly. It's toying with Web censorship, torturing political prisoners and killing political opponents. Even with all of that, Iraq remains freer than every other Arab state except Lebanon. The United States wrote democratic freedoms into Iraq's constitution, including protections for women and minorities, offering as a tacit guarantee the active presence of 150,000 American troops. But now the guarantors are leaving. A large part of the problem is corruption. Under American stewardship, Iraq has become one of the half-dozen most corrupt nations on earth. "Significant widespread corruption" afflicts "all levels of government," the State Department says. Nothing can so quickly cripple a democracy as the need by the nation's leaders to protect their cash flow and hide all evidence of their thefts. That leads, at least, to electoral fraud and press censorship. How can corrupt officials survive if the press is free to report on their misdeeds? "We are controlled and censored," Faris Fadhil Sultan told me. He's a reporter for Al Arabiya television in Iraq. "The government can exert its will on reporters through criminal charges or suspension from work, even kidnapping and killing." Iraqi reporters are intimidated into compliance. Unfortunately for the government, however, foreign correspondents, among the best in the field, have been reporting in Iraq over the past seven years. They have written frequently about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's financial foibles, including his decision, 18 months ago, to fire the government's corruption monitors shortly after one of them testified in Washington that government officials had embezzled $13 billion in American reconstruction funds.

No Solvency

Not enough EOD teams to solve

Moniz 5 (Dave 7/31 http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-07-31-bomb-specialists\_x.htm TBC 6/27/10)

The problem is there aren't nearly enough EOD soldiers to go around — especially those with the experience to handle the most dangerous parts of the job. Lair and his comrades in the 744th Ordnance Company typify the personnel shortages hitting the wartime military. The Army is so short of EOD soldiers that it is paying bonuses of up to $20,000 for recruits willing to sign up and awards as high as $50,000 to keep experienced soldiers. It has also taken the unusual step of assigning two full-time recruiters to do nothing but persuade other soldiers to leave their jobs and become EOD specialists. The shortage of specialists has also led the Pentagon to hire outside contractors to dispose of the hundreds of thousands of tons of leftover munitions in Iraq. (Related story: Security spending soars) Munitions disposal is one of many hard-to-fill jobs that has left the Army scrambling to find bodies. The Army is critically short of a number of specialists, including truck drivers, petroleum supply troops, medical personnel and soldiers who prepare food, according to a report in March by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress.

Other Actors Solve

Iraq solves

Price 9 (Jayson Staff Sgt. May 29th http://lejeunedeployed.freedomblogging.com/2009/05/25/iraqi-eod-makes-iraq-safer-one-cache-at-a-time/ TBC 6/27/10)

“The Iraqi Bomb Disposal Company has been independent for almost a year and they’ve proven themselves,” said Staff Sgt. Kelli Cairns, an engineer with Military Transition Team 7, the unit primarily responsible for helping train the 7th Iraqi Army Division. Cairns is the primary advisor to the 7th IA Division’s Bomb Disposal and Military Police Companies. “They’ve recovered about 2,000 improvised explosive devices in the past two years.” Cairns went on to say that Iraqi EOD has been operating independently of Coalition support, and has even responded to calls for help from Coalition forces that have encountered IEDs or other munitions in Iraq’s Al Anbar province.

Other actors solve – British and Iraqis

Military Operations 9 (FEBRUARY 17, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/BritishSoldiersTeachIraqiEodTeam.htm TBC 6/27/10)

British soldiers based in Basra have been training soldiers from the Iraqi Army's 14 Division Engineer Battalion Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to use the latest robotic EOD technology. Their capability is being built up through the efforts of Captain Joe Brown, an Ammunition Technical Officer from the Royal Logistic Corps, and his Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Disposal team, which is part of the Multi-National Division (South East) Joint Force Engineer Group based outside Basra City. Captain Brown, advisor to 14 Division, said: "The 14 Division Engineer Battalion attach great importance to EOD work and are always very enthusiastic to take part in training."The Iraqi soldiers will soon be busy disposing of improvised explosive devices planted by insurgents as well as the piles of munitions left over from past wars.

A2: IEDs Target the US

EOD teams key to hearts and minds – IEDs are targeted at civilians

Thompson 9 (Burt Commander, First Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Multinational Division-North Col. January 12, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4338 TBC 6/27/10)

But what we do see is pretty routinely the improvised explosive devices. Generally speaking those are drop-and-pop, homemade type explosives, where they'll be set down in a market area. They'll walk away. It will be on some type of a timer. And it will explode. Generally Andrew, what you see with those are in built-up areas. Baqubah, which is the largest city here in Diyala, generally speaking is the target; the market areas there. Right now most of the targeting that we see are against civilians, believe it or not, here in Baqubah, Muqdadiyah and some of the other cities. You still will see IEDs along roadsides. Some of those will be deep-buried mines along some of the rural road. But generally speaking, within the built-up areas, the target is the civilian populace obviously to sway the hearts and minds of those who live here in Diyala province. About every week, there's some type of an incident. Not all those incidents result in death or damage. Some of those, the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi police and army specifically, and coalition forces partnering with them will find some of these IEDs. And we'll send our explosive ordnance disposal teams in to neutralize those.

\*\*NEG – Civil Capacity\*\*\*

1nc Iraq Civil Capacity (1/2)

US military directs the Multinational Corps-Iraq – key to civil capacity

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

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Civil capacity programs establish the rule of law

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

The June MNF-W situation report reinforced the need for an MNC-I civil capacity champion--a corps-level lead--to provide a broader, deeper approach to integrating civil capacity with lethal operations aimed at achieving sustainable security and developing Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capability. On 1 July 2008, the soft-power JPT convened to address the issues raised by MNF-W. Concurrently, MNC-I senior leaders and staff principals collaborated to formalize a more robust and enduring approach to synchronizing civil capacity initiatives. Complexity frustrated this process as the civil capacity LOO consisted of four prioritized objectives involving Three Primary Staff Sections: Transparent And Accountable Governance, Sustainable economic development, Provision of essential services, Firmly established rule of law.

1nc Iraq Civil Capacity (2/2)

Rule of law key to freedom; prevents nuclear extinction

Rhyne 58 (Charles, Former Prof. @ American Bar Association, May 1, <http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html>) LL

Law and courts exist to protect every citizen of the United States in his person and property and in his individual rights and privileges under the Constitution. The ultimate power to change or expand the law in our system remains with its source, the people. They can elect as lawmakers those who will vote for wise laws and vote out of office those who do not. They can also amend the Constitution as experience dictates the necessity of change. In these days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of basic concepts and principles brought on by the expansion of man’s vision to the new frontiers and horizons of outer space, we want the people of the world to know that we in America have an unshakable belief in the most essential ingredient of our way of life—the rule of law. The law we honor is the basis and foundation of our nation’s freedom and the freedom for the individual which exists here. And to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities, the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about “justice” under our rule of law, the absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about “freedom” for the individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when we talk about peace under law—peace without the bloodbath of war—we are appealing to the foremost desire of all peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people.

Military Key

Empirically, the military has been effective in civil capacity building

Silverman 9 (Alex, The Blackhorse Association - non-profit charitable organization dedicated to serving our country, Apr 5, <http://blackhorse.org/2009/04/05/notes-from-baghdad-update-from-blackhorse-trooper-mg-guy-swan-iii/>) LL

Responsible Drawdown of US Forces in Iraq - As President Obama announced in his speech at Camp Lejeune, NC on February 27, 2009, US forces will complete their combat mission in Iraq on August 31, 2010. At that point the US military mission will shift to an advise and assist role to continue the important work of developing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). A transitional force of 35,000-50,000 personnel will continue that mission through to the end of the Iraq-US Security Agreement on December 31, 2011. What all this means in real terms is that as the security situation in Iraq has stabilized, and Iraq continues to develop its own security forces, there is a decreasing need for US combat forces. There remains important work, however, in building the capacity of the ISF and that will become our primary mission. At this point in America’s involvement in Iraq this make sense. We have achieved much in reducing insurgent groups, protecting the population, and creating a security environment that enables the Government of Iraq (GoI) to work on the really tough issues of building civil capacity, providing essential services, and engaging in the political processes of a newly sovereign Iraq. As US forces draw down, there is an increasingly important role developing for our US Government interagency partners and the US Embassy here in Iraq. Supporting improvements in governance and the rule of law takes a team effort across a wide spectrum of agencies and departments. The US military will continue to assist Iraqi forces in combating terrorism, protect US citizens, and partner with Iraqi counterparts to provide a security umbrella under which other aspects of Iraqi civil life can flourish.

Military key – they direct the Multinational Corps-Iraq

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

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US troops -> Civil Capacity

Remaining US troops foster civil capacity projects; civil capacity key to stability

Silverman 9 (Alex, The Blackhorse Association - non-profit charitable organization dedicated to serving our country, Apr 5, <http://blackhorse.org/2009/04/05/notes-from-baghdad-update-from-blackhorse-trooper-mg-guy-swan-iii/>) LL

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US forces in Iraq improve civil capacity

America Forces Press Service 9 (Mar 16, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/17/18328-us-training-efforts-build-self-sufficiency-in-iraq/>)LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 - U.S. forces in Iraq are equipping Iraqis with the skills they need to assume a greater role in their nation's security. An integral part of that process is training, and U.S. forces are arming themselves with knowledge so they, in turn, can help outfit Iraqis with the tools required to move toward self-sufficiency. Earlier this month, U.S. Soldiers of the 172nd Infantry Brigade focused on training during the unit's first Blackhawk Warrior Leader Course for junior noncommissioned officers at Forward Operating Base Kalsu. The course, held March 2 to 6, comprised more than 20 topics, including civil capacity, force protection and Iraqi security professionalization. "We are training team leaders to be subject-matter experts at the squad level," said Army Sgt. Maj. Steven Spillman, course commandant and operations sergeant major for 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment. "We want to reinforce their understanding of basic warrior tasks and skills, such as casualty-evacuation procedures, lifesaving, load plans, vehicle-recovery drills, asset integration, and improvised explosive device tactics, techniques and procedures." Students also learned Iraqi rank structure and Iraqi military and police culture to further their understanding of how Iraqi security forces operate. "We wanted the students to learn more about the Iraqi way of doing things so they could better train them," Army Command Sgt. Maj. Steven W. McClaflin of the 172nd Brigade said. "Iraqi warrants and detainee operations classes were taught as well, so that our Soldiers would be knowledgeable of the system we now work under."

US troops -> Civil Capacity

US forces committed to civil capacity projects

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

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From 2007 to 2008, improved security significantly increased public expectations for government-provided services. In May 2008, XVIII Airborne Corps envisioned a conceptual framework for civil capacity development and transition in Iraq as depicted in Figure 1. XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units played a key role in providing minimum essential services such as sewer, water, electricity, trash disposal, refined fuel products, and health care to the Iraqi population while the Iraqi government steadily developed its own capability, enabled by U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). MNC-I was made acutely aware of this shift on 26 June 2008, when a Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) weekly situation report articulated the need for a comprehensive, fully integrated approach to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects in Anbar Province. The approach would require tactical- to strategic-level key leader engagement with the Iraqi government. Coordination and planning for non-lethal effects at this stage of the campaign were primarily synchronized by the soft-power joint planning team (JPT) led by MNC-I's engineer staff section (C7) and consisting of elements from the following organizations:

US troops -> Civil Capacity

US forces key to civil capacity and rule of law

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

As the Iraq campaign continued to unfold during the summer and fall of 2008, MNC-I started planning a new operations order (OPORD) to accommodate the rapidly changing operating environment. The civil capacity working group assembled in late August and began mission analysis. Several key factors influenced the planning process for the civil capacity LOO. The most compelling change was the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1754 on 31 December 2008. The new MNC-I OPORD would require coalition forces to work by, with, and through ISF and a sovereign Iraqi government under an emerging yet undefined security arrangement.  Securing the Iraqi population and training and equipping the ISF remained MNC-I's priority, but building civil capacity was steadily increasing in importance. Demand for services continued as security gains allowed displaced persons to return to their homes. Consequently, demand for essential services such as electricity and potable water was outpacing the growing supply. Ultimately, the director of MNC-I C7 assumed ownership of the civil capacity LOO for the development of MNC-I OPORD 09-01. He directed his deputy director for operations, plans, and logistics to lead the civil capacity JPT. The team quickly discovered that there was no standard definition of "civil capacity." An exhaustive search of Army field manuals (FMs), joint publications, and numerous references confirmed this assessment. Consolidating inputs from all of these sources, the team eventually developed a definition that the MNC-I commander ultimately approved:  Transparent and accountable Iraqi provincial and local governments providing essential services to their citizens, and characterized by a firmly established rule of law and sustainable, growing economy.

US troops -> Civil Capacity

US forces have successfully promoted civil capacity, security, and long-term Iraqi prosperity

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

In the final analysis, MNC-I's civil capacity-building efforts were remarkably successful. Its successful management of the postsurge security environment enabled the subsequent transition to Iraqi-led security operations as the ISF continued to grow in experience and capability. As of April 2009, attacks and casualties were down to 2003 pre-insurgency levels. The ability of Al Qaeda in Iraq to conduct sustained operations was severely degraded. The improved security also enabled MNC-I to focus on stability operations and capacity-building throughout most of the theater of operations. The provincial elections held on 31 January 2009 occurred under Iraqi control without incident, and the process to seat the new provincial governments proceeded as planned. A closer evaluation of MNC-I's civil capacity objectives confirms this assessment. With respect to improved governance, the successful provincial elections indicated the significant strides made by the Iraqis. Notwithstanding friction points such as Arab-Kurd tensions in the north and the proposed Iraq hydrocarbon law, results to date are noteworthy. Significant improvements in providing essential services during the corps's tenure, particularly in the critically important electrical sector, were also made. As of April 2009, electrical generation was at the highest point in Iraq's history, greater than 125,000 megawatt hours, and there are plans to add an additional 20 percent to the grid by the end of 2010. Other essential services improved as well, and with PRT and coalition support will transition to capable Iraqi agencies. The rule of law continues to improve throughout Iraq, particularly in judicial security, detention operations, and the investigative capacity to support criminal prosecutions. Additional effort is required to reduce cultural tolerance for corruption, reform business laws, and increase transparency, but Iraqi leadership has expressed a willingness to do all three. Economic activity continues to expand in a number of sectors other than petroleum, which is critical for a broader Iraqi economy. The hospitality and service industries show positive signs in areas supporting religious tourism, and foreign direct investment to improve oil, gas, and electrical sectors appears imminent with a relatively low global price for oil. In summary, from the tactical to strategic levels, MNC-I's full spectrum civil capacity influence set positive conditions for handover to I Corps in April 2009, and for continued civil capacity development as U.S. forces withdraw by the end of 2011. The primary tools used to facilitate civil capacity initiatives at the tactical level were the CERP and the Iraqi-funded version, I-CERP. These programs facilitated the civil capacity building projects that led to the success previously described. Iraqi answers to polling questions about their top local concerns revealed a sense of normalcy that improved greatly from February 2008 to February 2009. Employment, rather than security, was the most important issue by a wide margin. Improving a diversified economy and providing jobs will be critical tasks as Iraq moves forward in 2009 and beyond. To successfully move forward, MNC-I will continue to build on civil capacity best practices and the following key lessons learned: Ensure that non-lethal planning is fully integrated with lethal operations, Keep civil capacity projects small while security is tenuous and gradually transition to larger programs as conditions permit, Ensure that interagency planning and coordination are conducted from strategic to tactical levels, Coordinate with interagency partners to develop and maintain a civil capacity common operating picture, Expect explosive demand for essential services as soon as security is achieved, Prevent loss of momentum by ensuring a thorough civil capacity handover during and throughout transitions. The final chapters in Operation Iraqi Freedom will be written over the next 24 months. Achieving sustainable security and transitioning the civil capacity mission to fully capable Iraqi government agencies will depend heavily on efforts to train Iraqi officials and continue building on the foundations laid in part by MNC-I during Operation Iraqi Freedom 07-09. Improving security is the catalyst for continued gains, and with the assistance of the U.S. embassy, coalition forces, international organizations, foreign corporations, and Iraqis helping Iraqis, Iraq will remain free and flourish as the liberated democratic nation we set out to create.

Civil Capacity -> Security

Civil capacity programs key to stability

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

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US forces foster civil capacity and stability in Iraq

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

Sensing a need for a more permanent staff section principally dedicated to the non-lethal portion of the campaign, the MNC-I chief of staff and the operations (C3) section formed a nondoctrinal staff section called C3 Nonkinetic (non-lethal) FUOPS, or C35 NK. This emerging organization was manned by permanently assigned officers from MNC-I coordinating and special staff sections and major subordinate commands already involved in civil capacity development. These were primarily the C9, C7, SJA, and 304th Civil Affairs Brigade. The C35 NK mission was to coordinate and synchronize MNC-I's non-lethal enablers according to the priorities of the MNC-I commander to: Exploit security gains, Deny resurgence of violent extremists, Build civil capacity, Advance sustainable security in Iraq.

Civil Capacity -> Stability

Civil capacity projects re-orient traditional American-Iraq relationships, establishing foundations for peace instead of war

Arraf 9 [Jane, Correspondent, September 28, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis] LL

His brigade, which arrived early this summer, is the first fully functioning combat brigade to be given intensive specialized civil affairs training and sent into an environment where they largely rely on Iraqi security forces for protection. In an Iraq where the US military is no longer in charge, the mission marks a major shift - in mind-sets, as well as strategy - that relies on building relationships with Iraqi leaders rather than telling them what to do. The new approach, which involves sharing everything from office space to sensitive intelligence, could probably only happen now in the less volatile south. But if security continues to improve in other areas, the approach of "reengage to disengage" will be the way home - making Iraqis so self-sufficient that US troops can leave. Newell commands some of the most seasoned soldiers in the country. Up to 70 percent of the brigade have served in Iraq at least twice before, many in Mosul and Diyala provinces, the most dangerous in Iraq, where almost every Iraqi is considered a potential threat. Here in the south, some Iraqis have become friends. One US officer is even going to name his baby after an Iraqi colleague's daughter. (See story on facing page.) The tank brigade's transformation from leading combat operations to trying to help Iraqis in a fully sovereign Iraq has required not only an evolution in training but a drastic change of thinking. "After June 30," with the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraqi cities, "everything has changed," says Command Sgt. Maj. Phillip Pan­dy, of Miami, Fla., who oversees the brigade's almost 4,000 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. "Normally, with the war," he says, "you would have to train them to think 'war.' But with all this experience, it's almost the opposite.... That's my biggest challenge I see here." The tanks and Bradlee fighting vehicles lumbering onto the base come from all over Iraq, on their way out to Kuwait as the US draws down its troops from the 130,000 currently in the country to what is expected to be fewer than 35,000 one year from now. The base has swelled to 8,000 military personnel and another 3,000 contractors since the June 30 withdrawal (required by a joint US-Iraqi security agreement) and is still growing. Lt. Col. Lance Varney, the brigade operations officer, explains the difference in daily operations on previous deployments and today, as US involvement winds down: "In rotations before ... maybe 60 percent of your time you would be doing a lethal type of activity," says Varney, who is from San Diego. "You'd be kicking in doors, you'd be cordon-and-searching and doing whatever that it is to get at the bad guy. Then you'd be spending other parts of your time in partnership with Iraqi security forces, trying to bring them to your formations so you could do combined operations, and then you'd have another small percentage where you'd be doing civil capacity." Now, he says, soldiers spend most of their time building civil capa­city and training Iraqi security forces and less than 20 percent on security operations. "It's an opportunity to come in and do things in a different way, to break some of the rules we have set for ourselves," says Newell, who five years ago was commanding a battalion in the center of the battle for Fallujah. In one of the most striking differences with the past, Newell made clear to his Iraqi counterparts that outside the US bases, Iraqi security forces are responsible for keeping American soldiers safe. "I started hearing my counterparts stand up and say publicly ... 'We are responsible for the Americans' security. They are here to train us; they are here to provide us with enablers we don't have. An attack on them is an attack on us.' " The three provinces Newell's brigade operates in - Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna - are almost exclusively Shiite, with little sectarian violence, and were among the first to be turned over to Iraqis from US control. The area, though, is a stronghold of anti-American Shiite extremist groups and a "strategic support zone" for weapons and fighters crossing the Iranian border and moving north for attacks on Baghdad. When mortars or rockets are fired at US bases, as they still occasionally are, Iraqi soldiers go after the attackers while US aerial surveillance images are fed into joint tactical operations centers. Newell even rides in his Iraqi counterparts' vehicles, a practice unheard-of in more volatile areas. Among the other changes: Newell has decentralized intelligence gathering and analysis at the unit level, working closely with Iraqis and sharing information with them. Under the "clear, hold, and build" strategy emphasized during the past three years of war, US forces and their Iraqi counterparts in the north are still preoccupied with holding territory gained after clearing areas of insurgents. Here in the south, they're building. Newell's officers and senior soldiers spend their time working side by side with Iraqi police and Army officers, formally and informally. On a recent day near Amarah, noncommissioned officers held classes in crime-scene analysis for the Iraqi police while downtown, in the joint security station, US officers manned desks next to Iraqi officers. [Editor's note: The city where the crime-scene analysis class was held was misidentified.] An entire artillery battalion is tasked with working with the US State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), including going out to check on projects that State Department employees can't visit because of security restrictions. In some cases, US officers have gone through the Iraqi police force's own training certification course. In the impoverished south, a key incentive for Iraqi security and political leaders to keep Americans safe is the money the US military spends on infrastructure, which is needed to attract foreign oil firms and investors. After a drop in US willingness to fund Iraqi projects, the US officers have begun to turn on the taps again. Lt. Col. Michael Eastman is overseeing $16 million spread over 260 projects under the Commander's Emergency Response Program - discretionary funds made available to US commanders in Iraq. "We are helping this democratically elected government [of Iraq] ... meet some of the obligations it has to the people that they cannot [do] right now ... because of the budget shortfalls that they have encountered," says Eastman, a former West Point instructor from Lawton, Okla. "We are still working in an environment where if you can employ someone they're less likely to be paid to plant bombs." Nasiriyah was notorious during the war as the site of one of the first major battles during the invasion of Iraq, when 11 US soldiers were killed after their supply convoy took a wrong turn. Six years later, it's one of the calmest places in Iraq. On a recent evening, the head of the PRT here, Anna Prouse, wandered through a teahouse wearing camouflage body armor with a silk flower tucked into it, chatting with residents. Faced with the prospect of hundreds of Iraqi police being thrown off the force because they couldn't read, and with no Iraqi government program to deal with it, Ms. Prouse arranged for her interpreter to hold literacy classes. "Sometimes we think we all need to spend huge amounts of money doing something that's quite easy," says Prouse, a former journalist and an Italian citizen. The PRT is a joint US-Italian venture. "We have a lin­guist, they have classrooms. Why do I have to spend a huge amount of money to bring someone from abroad to teach the alphabet?" U.S. forces operate under the US-Iraqi security agreement, which now makes the US military very clearly guests rather than occupiers. In some cases, it's still a tenuous relationship. Among Newell's recent hiccups was the rumor in Maysan's provincial capital, Amarah, that the US military was dropping pigs (taboo under Islam) into the city to spread swine flu. Iraqi officials soon sorted it out. Now, after the June 30 agreement, there are actually more US soldiers living in cities than before in the three provinces Newell oversees. They're there to advise and train their Iraqi counterparts. Now their focus is responding to what the Iraqis say they need to learn, not what US commanders say they need. That's al­tered everything, from the kind of training Iraqis receive to the selection of intelligence targets - now they're the ones Iraqis choose, not US-chosen ones. "All of these classes, all these things didn't come from coalition forces - we asked for them," says Maysan's provincial police chief, Maj. Gen. Saad al-Harbia, sitting in his office late into the evening with his American counterparts. "I consider this the first true relationship between us because it is based on something real instead of raids and firing at people in the street."

Civil Capacity -> Stability

**Civil capacity building and rule of law contribute to stability**

Odierno 9 (Raymond, Gen, US Army, Oct 2009, <http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/october2009/Documents/Odierno.pdf>)LL

Marked by significant progress made possible by the courage, competence and commitment of the men and women of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), 2009 has been a historic year of transitions for Iraq, the Iraqi people and MNF-I. Security incidents are the lowest since Operation Iraqi Freedom began, providing the foundation for continued development across political, diplomatic, economic and rule-of-law domains. Together with the government of Iraq (GoI), we are moving towards a shared goal of a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq. By capitalizing on the security gains made possible by the surge of forces in 2007 and 2008, we continue to move forward by transitioning security responsibilities to increasingly capable Iraqi security forces (ISF). Progress has continued at a heartening pace, with the ISF now responsible for security in Iraq’s cities. Partnered with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad (USEMBB), international organizations and the government of Iraq, MNF-I continues to support a whole-of-government approach— improving security, training an effective ISF, supporting civil capacity and building rule of law—to assist Iraq’s development as a long-term strategic partner that will contribute to regional peace and security. The challenges ahead of us are real, but the opportunities are great as MNF-I helps set the conditions for the future.

Civil Capacity -> Rule of Law

Civil capacity programs establish the rule of law

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

The June MNF-W situation report reinforced the need for an MNC-I civil capacity champion--a corps-level lead--to provide a broader, deeper approach to integrating civil capacity with lethal operations aimed at achieving sustainable security and developing Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capability. On 1 July 2008, the soft-power JPT convened to address the issues raised by MNF-W. Concurrently, MNC-I senior leaders and staff principals collaborated to formalize a more robust and enduring approach to synchronizing civil capacity initiatives. Complexity frustrated this process as the civil capacity LOO consisted of four prioritized objectives involving Three Primary Staff Sections: Transparent And Accountable Governance, Sustainable economic development, Provision of essential services, Firmly established rule of law.

**US troops ensure civil capacity and ensure rule of law**

Garamone 9 (Jim, American Forces Press Service, Mar 16, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53501>) LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 – As security continues to improve in Iraq, civil affairs units and provincial reconstruction teams become more effective, the commander of the Army reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade said today. Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman, commander of the Army Reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, listens to an Iraqi officer lecture on his division’s military operations capabilities at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, March 12, 2009. The brigade assisted the Iraqi army in hosting the event, which allowed civil military operations representatives from all over Iraq to brief Iraqi and coalition forces on their projects and current state of affairs. In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman said the improved security situation allows civil affairs personnel to do more to improve governance and economic life in the country. And as U.S. combat units redeploy from Iraq, he said, the work civil affairs personnel do will be critical in ensuring progress continues. The 304th, from Philadelphia, is composed of about 100 soldiers and sailors from throughout the northeastern United States. The unit is an enabler for improving governance and the economy in the country. “We focus mostly on building government of Iraq civil capacity – enabling the government to meet those essential service needs of the people as well as economic growth to provide jobs,” Ammerman said. Building governance is an amorphous concept. Ammerman takes it to its foundation. “It’s what people expect from their government to meet their needs,” he said. “It’s putting in place essential services, it’s putting in place an economic environment so people can work, and it’s putting in place the infrastructure needed for businesses to flourish.” From a practical standpoint, it is developing the infrastructure so the government can clean streets, maintain the sewers, and build water purification plants and the piping to get the water to homes. It’s building the generating plants and the distribution network to get electricity to homes and businesses. Ammerman said it is about more than just building these facilities for the Iraqis. It also is about helping the Iraqis set up the process by which a government – local, provincial or national – can build and maintain these services. “The provincial reconstruction teams have the lead in working with city councils and provincial councils to put these in place,” Ammerman said. This entails working on budgeting, raising money, preventing corruption and ensuring the rule of law is followed, he said. The unit works with interagency partners and with Iraqi entities. The civil affairs teams are partners at the PRTs, Ammerman said. “They basically come up with a joint plan on how they are going to address the civil capacity in the province,” he said.

Civil Capacity Checks Insurgency

US troops foster civil capacity and check insurgencies

Silverman 9 (Alex, The Blackhorse Association - non-profit charitable organization dedicated to serving our country, Apr 5, <http://blackhorse.org/2009/04/05/notes-from-baghdad-update-from-blackhorse-trooper-mg-guy-swan-iii/>) LL

Responsible Drawdown of US Forces in Iraq - As President Obama announced in his speech at Camp Lejeune, NC on February 27, 2009, US forces will complete their combat mission in Iraq on August 31, 2010. At that point the US military mission will shift to an advise and assist role to continue the important work of developing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). A transitional force of 35,000-50,000 personnel will continue that mission through to the end of the Iraq-US Security Agreement on December 31, 2011. What all this means in real terms is that as the security situation in Iraq has stabilized, and Iraq continues to develop its own security forces, there is a decreasing need for US combat forces. There remains important work, however, in building the capacity of the ISF and that will become our primary mission. At this point in America’s involvement in Iraq this make sense. We have achieved much in reducing insurgent groups, protecting the population, and creating a security environment that enables the Government of Iraq (GoI) to work on the really tough issues of building civil capacity, providing essential services, and engaging in the political processes of a newly sovereign Iraq. As US forces draw down, there is an increasingly important role developing for our US Government interagency partners and the US Embassy here in Iraq. Supporting improvements in governance and the rule of law takes a team effort across a wide spectrum of agencies and departments. The US military will continue to assist Iraqi forces in combating terrorism, protect US citizens, and partner with Iraqi counterparts to provide a security umbrella under which other aspects of Iraqi civil life can flourish.

US forces offer civil capacity programs and counter-insurgency measures

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

On 14 February 2008, the United States Army's XVIII Airborne Corps assumed command of Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) from III Corps. Operation Iraqi Freedom was at a critical turning point, nearing the end of the "surge" of more than 25,000 troops. From April to August 2008, the five surge brigade combat teams (BCTs) departed the Iraqi theater of operations. With improved security and a refined approach to counter-insurgency operations, the new operational environment was characterized by vast economic growth opportunities and an explosive demand for essential services. Against this backdrop, MNC-I focused on deliberate planning and execution of its third line of operation (LOO)--building civil capacity. The holistic approach to developing civil capacity involved coordinating and synchronizing the capacity-building efforts of multiple stakeholders, including coalition forces, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs); international organizations; and most important, local, provincial, and national Iraqi government agencies. This article documents MNC-I's processes, best practices, and lessons learned in coordinating the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational initiatives necessary to successfully transition civil capacity development to a capable Iraqi government with support from PRTs and international organizations.

Civil Capacity -> Rule of Law

US forces key to civil capacity, rule of law, and stability

Kemp 10 (Jason, US Army, Mar 10, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/10/35575-stability-operations-in-iraq-making-headway/>) LL

For Lt. Col. Paul Schmidt, a civil affairs officer with 1st Infantry Division, the change over the years has been noticeable. "My last tour ended just as the surge was beginning in late 2006 so the change is primarily in the atmosphere," he said "There are still the same great, courageous people to work with, but I sense a much greater feeling of pride and hope for the future now than before." That pride is being demonstrated in the expectations of the people. "This country is becoming more and more stable because the Iraqi people are demanding it now in greater numbers," he said. And that demand is being met by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces in the provinces overseen by United States Division-South, of which 1st Infantry Division is the headquarters. "We are really at a point where stability operations and building civil capacity is extremely important," Schmidt said. "Local government officials are very effective across the USD-S AO [area of operations], but with increasing stability and effectiveness of ISF, we can really make great progress in assisting the Iraqis with providing services to the people and solving problems." In order to achieve that progress, USD-S and the U.S. Department of State's Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working together to build effective relationships that not only thrive and mature, but thoroughly benefit the country of Iraq. "The State Department is the lead for building civil capacity, but they are not resourced to do everything we need to accomplish, so it is accomplished through a partnership between DoS and DoD," Schmidt said. "They provide leadership of the PRTs as well as subject matter experts in governance, economic development, rule of law, agriculture and others, and we provide them the ability to move safely in order to perform their critical functions with Iraqi officials." The cooperation between U.S. civilian and military elements is crucial, Schmidt said. "The relationship is important and based on strong communication," he said. "I think we do a good job capitalizing on the strengths of each organization in order to maximize and synchronize our efforts to assist the Iraqis in building capacity for themselves." As Iraq has stabilized, the work done in the civilian sector has moved to the forefront, and everyone is getting involved. "With increased stability and security, the civil affairs mission becomes more important," Schmidt said. "This doesn't mean the civil affairs forces have to be the only units doing civil-military operations; just the opposite is true. U.S. forces at all levels have become very effective in conducting those missions so CA forces are being withdrawn from Iraq, with the exception of small planning teams at brigade and above." This civil affairs work includes the promotion of long-term stability, development of sound and responsive democratic institutions, development of a supportive infrastructure and promotion of a strong free-market economy, as well as civil information management in order to share details on every aspect of the relationship between civilians and military elements. In addition, Soldiers are involved with programs to assist with governance, rule of law and essential services, often helping Iraqi officials develop projects to improve those areas. CA teams even act as civil liaisons between the Iraqi officials and military commanders, and provide the same service to a wide variety of non-governmental and international organizations. With troops being pulled out of Iraq and the stability of the country in the hands of the Iraqi government, the liaisons from U.S. civil affairs teams are playing a vital role in creating a working society. "Civil affairs Soldiers made a great impact in Japan and Germany throughout and following WWII and the same is happening now in Iraq and Afghanistan," Schmidt said.

Rule of Law – Terrorism Impact

Rule of law prevents terrorism

Limsamarnphun 6 (Nophakhun, The Nation, 2006, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/08/27/opinion/opinion_30012074.php>) LL

Five root causes of terrorism - and how to solve them: Ramesh Thakur, senior vice rector of the United Nations University, recently provided a comprehensive set of underlying causes of global terrorism in a paper entitled "Peace and Social Stability: The Role of the United Nations in Defeating Terrorism by Promoting Tolerance". According to Thakur's paper, submitted at the annual World University Presidents Summit held in Bangkok in July, the root causes of terrorism can be grouped into five categories. These are the lack of democratic institutions and practices; lack of political freedoms and civil liberties; group grievances based on collective injustice; intractable conflicts, and inter-civilisation suspicions. Thakur said the campaign against terrorism must therefore be anchored in the norms of accountability, the rule of law and the non-derogation of human rights and civil liberties, since terrorism flourishes amid frustration with repressive and unresponsive regimes that spawn angry and twisted young men who take recourse to lethal violence. "Sometimes the house of worship has been the only alternative rallying point in autocratic regimes," he noted. But the war on terror must not take place at the expense of fundamental freedoms and basic dignity of individuals. Thakur cautioned: "Success in defeating terrorism can come only if we remain true to those values which terrorists eschew. In resorting to the lesser evil of curtailing liberties and using violence to defeat terrorism, we must be careful not to succumb to the greater evil of destroying the very values for which democracy stands." Thakur said grievances rooted in collective injustice against ethnic and religious groups generated anger and led to armed resistance when the weak resort to the comparative advantages of "asymmetric" warfare. "Often, the driving force behind fanatic hatred is individual despair born out of collective humiliation. If relations are based purely on power, with no concession to justice and equity, then peace and stability rest on insecure foundations, on the temporary inability of revisionists to challenge the entrenched status quo, and not on their acceptance of the status quo as the legitimate order..."

Rule of Law -> Econ Growth

Rule of law promotes economic growth

Butkiewicz 4 (James, prof of Econ @ U of Delaware, 2004, <http://www.lerner.udel.edu/economics/WorkingPapers/2004/UDWP2004-03.pdf>) LL

Evaluation of these two institutional frameworks for their effects on economic growth requires separate assessment of each. Empirical analysis of the impacts of each institutional type on growth has found that maintenance of the rule of law enhances growth, while establishing democratic political systems has no significant effect on growth. In this paper, we report findings suggesting that these conclusions are not robust to sample selection or estimation technique. Specifically, we find evidence indicating that both maintenance of the rule of law and democratic institutions increase real economic growth. The evidence also indicates that the effects of democracy are greatest for developing countries, a finding that is especially germane for development policy in these countries.

Civil Capacity -> Saves Lives

US civil capacity efforts provide basic necessities

Landry 10 (John, Capt., US Army, Apr 13, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/04/13/37277-a-look-back-at-a-year-building-civil-capacity/>) LL

At the end of any combat deployment, it is common to take a moment and assess what the Soldiers of a unit have accomplished over 12 months away from friends and family. As a battalion deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Task Force Pathfinder, 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, spent the year partnering with the U.S. State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Maysan, Dhi Qar and Muthanna Provinces, while spurring civil capacity projects in southern Iraq. In doing so, they've created a blueprint for success as combat units transition to stability roles in Iraq, all while making a lasting difference in the lives of thousands of Iraqis. In their efforts to rebuild schools, extend the electrical power grid, and provide clean drinking water, Pathfinder Soldiers have experienced firsthand the words spoken by President Barack Obama, in his inaugural address when he stated "People will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy." Although initially trained and organized as an artillery unit, Task Force Pathfinder spent its tour building civil capacity to aid in southern Iraq's reconstruction. This comprised more than 800 individual missions, the most in the entire brigade. This included building, managing, inspecting, securing, or opening more than 240 different projects with a combined value in excess of $41 million. Each of these civic projects, funded by the Commander's Emergency Response Program, were designed to improve the delivery of essential services, enable the rule of law, and stimulate economic development with the direct involvement of the Iraqi provincial governments.

US forces provide “minimum essential services”

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357)](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building%2Bcivil%2Bcapacity%2Bin%2BIraq.%28United%2BStates%2BArmy%2BMulti-National...-a0212767357%29) LL

From 2007 to 2008, improved security significantly increased public expectations for government-provided services. In May 2008, XVIII Airborne Corps envisioned a conceptual framework for civil capacity development and transition in Iraq as depicted in Figure 1. XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units played a key role in providing minimum essential services such as sewer, water, electricity, trash disposal, refined fuel products, and health care to the Iraqi population while the Iraqi government steadily developed its own capability, enabled by U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). MNC-I was made acutely aware of this shift on 26 June 2008, when a Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) weekly situation report articulated the need for a comprehensive, fully integrated approach to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects in Anbar Province. The approach would require tactical- to strategic-level key leader engagement with the Iraqi government. Coordination and planning for non-lethal effects at this stage of the campaign were primarily synchronized by the soft-power joint planning team (JPT) led by MNC-I's engineer staff section (C7) and consisting of elements from the following organizations:

Civil Capacity -> Saves Lives

**US troops offer essential amenities to Iraqis**

Garamone 9 (Jim, American Forces Press Service, Mar 16, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53501>) LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 – As security continues to improve in Iraq, civil affairs units and provincial reconstruction teams become more effective, the commander of the Army reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade said today. Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman, commander of the Army Reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, listens to an Iraqi officer lecture on his division’s military operations capabilities at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, March 12, 2009. The brigade assisted the Iraqi army in hosting the event, which allowed civil military operations representatives from all over Iraq to brief Iraqi and coalition forces on their projects and current state of affairs. In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman said the improved security situation allows civil affairs personnel to do more to improve governance and economic life in the country. And as U.S. combat units redeploy from Iraq, he said, the work civil affairs personnel do will be critical in ensuring progress continues. The 304th, from Philadelphia, is composed of about 100 soldiers and sailors from throughout the northeastern United States. The unit is an enabler for improving governance and the economy in the country. “We focus mostly on building government of Iraq civil capacity – enabling the government to meet those essential service needs of the people as well as economic growth to provide jobs,” Ammerman said. Building governance is an amorphous concept. Ammerman takes it to its foundation. “It’s what people expect from their government to meet their needs,” he said. “It’s putting in place essential services, it’s putting in place an economic environment so people can work, and it’s putting in place the infrastructure needed for businesses to flourish.” From a practical standpoint, it is developing the infrastructure so the government can clean streets, maintain the sewers, and build water purification plants and the piping to get the water to homes. It’s building the generating plants and the distribution network to get electricity to homes and businesses. Ammerman said it is about more than just building these facilities for the Iraqis. It also is about helping the Iraqis set up the process by which a government – local, provincial or national – can build and maintain these services. “The provincial reconstruction teams have the lead in working with city councils and provincial councils to put these in place,” Ammerman said. This entails working on budgeting, raising money, preventing corruption and ensuring the rule of law is followed, he said. The unit works with interagency partners and with Iraqi entities. The civil affairs teams are partners at the PRTs, Ammerman said. “They basically come up with a joint plan on how they are going to address the civil capacity in the province,” he said.

\*\*AFF – Civil Capacity\*\*\*

US Efforts Insufficient

Empirically, US efforts are misguided

US Government Accountability Office 7 (Oct 1, [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Stabilizing+and+Rebuilding+Iraq:+U.S.+Ministry+Capacity+Development...-a0173918295](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Stabilizing%2Band%2BRebuilding%2BIraq%3A%2BU.S.%2BMinistry%2BCapacity%2BDevelopment...-a0173918295)) LL

Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts, although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State, DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169 million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to other countries. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state.

Military not Key

State Department key to coordination and leadership in civil capacity building

Kemp 10 (Jason, US Army, Mar 10, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/10/35575-stability-operations-in-iraq-making-headway/) LL

 Though the U.S. has been building up the civilian infrastructure of Iraq since 2003, the sense of ownership and level interest of the people has never been as great as it is now, and that makes all the difference. For Lt. Col. Paul Schmidt, a civil affairs officer with 1st Infantry Division, the change over the years has been noticeable. "My last tour ended just as the surge was beginning in late 2006 so the change is primarily in the atmosphere," he said "There are still the same great, courageous people to work with, but I sense a much greater feeling of pride and hope for the future now than before." That pride is being demonstrated in the expectations of the people. "This country is becoming more and more stable because the Iraqi people are demanding it now in greater numbers," he said. And that demand is being met by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces in the provinces overseen by United States Division-South, of which 1st Infantry Division is the headquarters. "We are really at a point where stability operations and building civil capacity is extremely important," Schmidt said. "Local government officials are very effective across the USD-S AO [area of operations], but with increasing stability and effectiveness of ISF, we can really make great progress in assisting the Iraqis with providing services to the people and solving problems." In order to achieve that progress, USD-S and the U.S. Department of State's Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working together to build effective relationships that not only thrive and mature, but thoroughly benefit the country of Iraq. "The State Department is the lead for building civil capacity, but they are not resourced to do everything we need to accomplish, so it is accomplished through a partnership between DoS and DoD," Schmidt said. "They provide leadership of the PRTs as well as subject matter experts in governance, economic development, rule of law, agriculture and others, and we provide them the ability to move safely in order to perform their critical functions with Iraqi officials." The cooperation between U.S. civilian and military elements is crucial, Schmidt said. "The relationship is important and based on strong communication," he said. "I think we do a good job capitalizing on the strengths of each organization in order to maximize and synchronize our efforts to assist the Iraqis in building capacity for themselves."

USAID and the the DoS serve key roles in civil capacity building

Lopey 9 (Jon, Siskiyou Daily News, Sep 4, http://lopeyforsheriff.com/2009/12/04/impressions-of-iraq/) LL

Victory Base Camp, Baghdad – I am the deputy commander (XO) of the 364th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade. We are currently stationed in Baghdad. We are providing operational, administrative and logistics support to our three subordinate CA battalions, which are stationed in various locations throughout Iraq. Our main objective is to provide interface between the combatant commanders and Iraqi civilian authorities. Our main mission is to build Iraqi civil capacity in order to provide essential services and rule of law to their citizens.

For example, the United States, in partnership with our Iraqi counterparts and the United States Department of State (USDOS) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), help the Iraqis build and maintain sewage systems, water plants, electrical grids, schools, sanitation removal systems and clinics. We also assist with economic development through small businesses. Army and Marine tactical units in the field are using the Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds and the expertise of civil affairs and engineer soldiers to fund critical civil capacity projects; however, most projects during this phase of the operation are no longer being approved because we are transitioning our initiatives to the government of Iraq. We assist the Iraqi Army, and to a limited extent the police, with the development of their own civil military operational (CMO) capabilities.

Military not Key

USAID and the State Department play key roles in civil capacity projects; military not key

Rock 9 (Scott, Colonel, US Army Maneuver Support Center, 2009, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Building+civil+capacity+in+Iraq.(United+States+Army+Multi-National...-a0212767357) LL

As the Iraq campaign continued to unfold during the summer and fall of 2008, MNC-I started planning a new operations order (OPORD) to accommodate the rapidly changing operating environment. The civil capacity working group assembled in late August and began mission analysis. Several key factors influenced the planning process for the civil capacity LOO. The most compelling change was the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1754 on 31 December 2008. The new MNC-I OPORD would require coalition forces to work by, with, and through ISF and a sovereign Iraqi government under an emerging yet undefined security arrangement. Securing the Iraqi population and training and equipping the ISF remained MNC-I's priority, but building civil capacity was steadily increasing in importance. Demand for services continued as security gains allowed displaced persons to return to their homes. Consequently, demand for essential services such as electricity and potable water was outpacing the growing supply. Ultimately, the director of MNC-I C7 assumed ownership of the civil capacity LOO for the development of MNC-I OPORD 09-01. He directed his deputy director for operations, plans, and logistics to lead the civil capacity JPT. The team quickly discovered that there was no standard definition of "civil capacity." An exhaustive search of Army field manuals (FMs), joint publications, and numerous references confirmed this assessment. Consolidating inputs from all of these sources, the team eventually developed a definition that the MNC-I commander ultimately approved: Transparent and accountable Iraqi provincial and local governments providing essential services to their citizens, and characterized by a firmly established rule of law and sustainable, growing economy. That definition was derived from the: Joint campaign plan, Strategic framework., Draft unified common plan, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-07, Stability Operations. The experienced team rapidly assimilated lessons learned during previous planning efforts which helped shape the mission analysis and COA development for MNC-I OPORD 09-01. Throughout September and October 2008, the JPT met three times per week to develop the MNC-I civil capacity strategy. The planning effort also included key partners from the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These team members provided invaluable insight from the Department of State (DOS) perspective, assuring DOS and PRT objectives were fully integrated. The MNC-I commander approved the recommended COA for the civil capacity LOO on 8 November 2008. The LOO consisted of four objectives linked to, and nested with, OPA's five lines of action and Multinational Force-Iraq's (MNF-I's) five LOOs in the joint campaign plan. These objectives were similar to MNC-I's OPORD 08-02 objectives but were refined to reflect two key factors: The DOS would be the supported agency for civil capacity development in Iraq, Coalition force capacity-building efforts would focus on cementing the security gains made to date.

Military not Key

Iraq can solve development, stability, and rule of law without US intervention

Silverman 9 (Alex, The Blackhorse Association - non-profit charitable organization dedicated to serving our country, Apr 5, http://blackhorse.org/2009/04/05/notes-from-baghdad-update-from-blackhorse-trooper-mg-guy-swan-iii/) LL

Civil Service Personnel Development – As I have reported before, a big part of MNF-I’s mission, in addition to fighting extremists, insurgents, and terrorists in Iraq, has been enhancing the capabilities of the ISF. While this continues and will become an even bigger part of the mission, Iraq faces significant needs in growing a competent, professional corps of civil servants to man the ministries and keep the wheels of government turning. Iraq has embarked on such a “people development” process with the help of the US Embassy and MNF-I. Within the Ministry of Defense, for example, the GoI has established the Ministerial Training and Development Center (MTDC). In November 2008, the MoD implemented reforms to professionalize its civilian workforce. This year over 150 elective professional development classes covering 84 topic areas will be taught at the MTDC. Over 2,100 students will attend during 2009, up from just 672 in 2008 as the MTDC validates it hard-earned reputation as the center of excellence for the training and education of Iraq’s next generation of security professionals. Counter-Terrorism Forces Development – A critical component of the Iraqi Security Forces are the counter-terrorism (CT) forces. Grouped under the national Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB), Iraq’s CT forces continue their development and professionalization. With MNF-I’s assistance, the CTB recently opened a world-class training center capable of training up to a 440 person, battalion size commando force. By December 2009 two other such facilities will be added. Great emphasis has also been placed on developing a vetted process for the conduct of special operations aimed at capturing Iraq’s most dangerous and most notorious high value criminals and terrorists on the national “most wanted list.” Based in the rule of law, CT forces are building strong relationships with the Iraqi justice system to ensure that duly sworn warrants become a key component of this targeting effort. Another critical player in Iraq’s CT fight is the National Information and Investigations Agency (NIIA), “Iraq’s FBI.” The General Directorate for CT within NIIA is responsible for all CT investigations and related intelligence operations. During 2009, this key CT agency will train over 400 new investigators, including a growing number of female investigators, and expand the number of field offices operating in the provinces in support of law enforcement agencies and the CTB. Much of what I described here can be summarized as “building capacity” within Iraqi government and society. As security stabilizes it is this effort at maturing governmental institutions and encouraging good governance that is rapidly becoming a major element of MNF-I and the US Embassy’s mission and strategy in Iraq. The more we are able to get Iraqi-owned, operated, and led capabilities up and self-sustaining, the stronger they become as a viable nation in the region. Our efforts to support this are synchronized with the President’s responsible drawdown plan. However, several recent tragic events are reminders that complacency cannot be allowed to set in as the threats posed by extremist groups, terrorists, and criminals remain real and lethal.

Military not Key

PRTs used in Iraq are not managed exclusively by the US military

Landry 9 (John, Capt., 4th BCT, 1st Arm. Div., Military News, Aug 2, http://www.blackanthem.com/News/Military\_News\_1/Secretary-of-Defense-visits-Pathfinders\_printer.shtml) LL

CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASE ADDER, Iraq - It isn't every day a Soldier has the opportunity to share their experiences with the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Soldiers had that chance over lunch at Contingency Operating Base Adder, Iraq July 28. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates paid a visit to Soldiers of 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division. The "Highlander" Soldiers garnered the Pentagon's attention because they are developing future doctrine as the U.S. Army's proof of principle for the "advisory and assistance" brigade mission, spearheading the transition of U.S. forces in Iraq to a full-time advisory and civil capacity role. With Iraqi Security Forces in the lead, the Highlander brigade reorganized its artillery battalion into Task Force Pathfinder, a unit focused on developing Iraqi civil capacity with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The PRTs are staffed by civilian experts in governance, economics, culture, agriculture, education, engineering and law. The U.S. State Department operates the Maysan and Muthanna PRTs, while the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages the one in Dhi Qar. The PRTs are not new to Iraq. They have been working in the region for several years. The difference now is under the "advisory and assistance" brigade concept, nearly 600 Soldiers are assigned to support their efforts and extend their reach into more remote, outlying areas across a three-province area. To accomplish this mission, Pathfinder Soldiers have undertaken a new job they have not necessarily been trained for. In fact, a roster was created within the task force to identify anyone with "special skills" as an attempt to seek out those with previous expertise in a trade or academic field. "Our Soldiers have adapted extremely well to their new roles," said Lt. Col. Mike Eastman, commander, TF Pathfinder. "While this is very different from firing artillery, it highlights the intelligence and flexibility in our ranks today." During lunch, Gates sought information on how the new role of U.S. Soldiers is measuring up. He asked the PRTs how this new unit has been able to help their efforts toward utilizing the Commanders Emergency Response Program. Dr. Anna Prouse, team leader of the Dhi Qar PRT, said trusting the Army was met with "initial skepticism," but after the short time they've spent working together, she "could only welcome this increased role of the U.S. Soldiers, seeing how beneficial it has already been in yielding faster results." The Secretary of Defense said he was impressed with accomplishments of the Pathfinder Soldiers. "These guys are a bunch of artillery guys who, with five months of training before they got here, are taking on new missions and having a big impact," said Gates. Filling gaps like this enables the PRTs to focus more closely on current projects in development. Understanding the large undertaking this new mission entails, Gates commended the Soldiers of TF Pathfinder and conveyed the importance of their role on the deployment. "Thank you for your service," said Gates. "What you are doing here is the next phase of our progress in Iraq."

Case Turns the DA

Security is a prerequisite for effective civil capacity building

The Free Republic 9 (Mar 16, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2207890/posts>) LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 – As security continues to improve in Iraq, civil affairs units and provincial reconstruction teams become more effective, the commander of the Army reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade said today. Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman, commander of the Army Reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, listens to an Iraqi officer lecture on his division’s military operations capabilities at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, March 12, 2009. The brigade assisted the Iraqi army in hosting the event, which allowed civil military operations representatives from all over Iraq to brief Iraqi and coalition forces on their projects and current state of affairs U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class John Gonzalez (Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available. In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman said the improved security situation allows civil affairs personnel to do more to improve governance and economic life in the country. And as U.S. combat units redeploy from Iraq, he said, the work civil affairs personnel do will be critical in ensuring progress continues. The 304th, from Philadelphia, is composed of about 100 soldiers and sailors from throughout the northeastern United States. The unit is an enabler for improving governance and the economy in the country. “We focus mostly on building government of Iraq civil capacity – enabling the government to meet those essential service needs of the people as well as economic growth to provide jobs,” Ammerman said. Building governance is an amorphous concept. Ammerman takes it to its foundation. “It’s what people expect from their government to meet their needs,” he said. “It’s putting in place essential services, it’s putting in place an economic environment so people can work, and it’s putting in place the infrastructure needed for businesses to flourish.” From a practical standpoint, it is developing the infrastructure so the government can clean streets, maintain the sewers, and build water purification plants and the piping to get the water to homes. It’s building the generating plants and the distribution network to get electricity to homes and businesses. Ammerman said it is about more than just building these facilities for the Iraqis. It also is about helping the Iraqis set up the process by which a government – local, provincial or national – can build and maintain these services. “The provincial reconstruction teams have the lead in working with city councils and provincial councils to put these in place,” Ammerman said. This entails working on budgeting, raising money, preventing corruption and ensuring the rule of law is followed, he said. The unit works with interagency partners and with Iraqi entities. The civil affairs teams are partners at the PRTs, Ammerman said. “They basically come up with a joint plan on how they are going to address the civil capacity in the province,” he said. One size does not fit all, and there are differences throughout Iraq. For example, the colonel said, Ninevah and Diyala provinces are less permissive for civil affairs than other areas in the country. “The more security you have, the faster you can develop your civil capacity,” he said. “We’re still able to work in difficult provinces, but the pace will not be as fast. It’s more time-consuming and costly in less secure areas.” Civil affairs units are working with nongovernmental agencies, too. “There was recently an NGO conference in downtown Baghdad, … and there were in the neighborhood of 100 NGOs, and they had a chance to talk with each other, the Iraqi government, coalition and the United Nations,” Ammerman said. Even after the U.S. combat units redeploy, the need for civil affairs units in Iraq will continue, Ammerman said. “We will draw down, but probably not at the same rate as for maneuver units,” he said. “The need here will also decrease, because as there is more security, the government of Iraq’s ability will grow, too. You will see exponential increases in the economic activity as the security situation improves.” Private companies also are investing in Iraq, primarily in transportation and agriculture. The projects include facilities at the Baghdad International Airport, office buildings, trade shows and an oil expo. The reserve unit is scheduled to leave in April. Ammerman said the reservists bring aspects of their civilian jobs with them into the military. “We have a Navy officer at Basra who is from New Orleans and works at the port there,” the colonel said. “He saw that the port in Basra was not being used, and saw opening it as a huge economic opportunity for the region. He’s worked to open piers and the river channel. He had that expertise from his civilian job, and it has helped this country.” Ammerman thanked the families of those deployed and their employers for their sacrifices. “They have let their people serve the United States by serving as reservists in Iraq,” he said.

Case Turns the DA

War cripples civil capacity prospects

Hoeffler 10 (Anke, African Development Bank, June 11, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/00157630-FR-ERP-48.PDF>) LL

Since war-affected countries are very poor economies the task of infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction is beyond the financial capacity of the governments. The paper therefore discussed private investment in infrastructure as an alternative to public investment. However, investors perceive countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on the whole as high risk countries and risk ratings show that investors rank the risk in war-affected economies as even higher.

Insurgency precludes infrastructure building capabilities

USAID 7 ([July 7, <http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/projects/Accomplishments_and_Challenges.pdf>) LL

The single most devastating impediment to Iraq’s enjoyment of improved infrastructure, however, has been relentless sabotage by armed insurgents and black marketers. Tribal chiefs reportedly pull down transmission lines, sell materials from the downed lines, and then charge authorities for the right to repair them.16 In turn, power generation stations are stranded when transmission lines are cut or fuel pipelines are blown up. Water treatment plants have been shut down by the accumulation of dead bodies in canals. Key Iraqi operating staff are often forced to abandon their posts or face death.