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**For Your Information: Current Withdrawal Date**

**U.S. troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011**

**Mason 9 (R. Chuck, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service 7/13 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40011.pdfl) KCA**

SOFAs have been drafted in the past for specific exercises and/or events, but including a date

for the withdrawal of all forces from a foreign territory appears unique to this agreement. The

withdrawal is a two-phase process. The first requires the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces

from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than June 30, 2009; the second requires the

withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011. The JMOCC,

created to coordinate military operations, will establish the areas and facilities where U.S. forces

will be stationed between June 30, 2009, and December 31, 2011. Additionally, the agreement

recognizes the sovereign right of Iraq to request the departure of U.S. forces at any time and also

the right of the United States to withdraw its forces at any time. In an April, 2009, interview,

General Odierno, Commanding General of Multi-National Force Iraq, stated that U.S. forces may

not meet the June 30, 2009, deadline to withdraw from Iraqi cities. However, on June 30, 2009,

General Odierno announced that U.S. combat forces had completed the withdrawal from Iraqi

cities in accordance with the agreement. Even though the term of the agreement is three years,

and either party may cancel the agreement with one-year notice, both countries retain the right to

remove U.S. forces independent of the agreement. However, because the agreement requires the

removal of all U.S. forces no later than December 31, 2011, if any U.S. forces were to remain in

Iraq in support of security training, or other programs, the withdrawal agreement will need to be

extended or replaced with a peacetime SOFA.

Inherency – Withdrawal On Schedule

Withdrawal ahead of schedule – the US will fully leave in 2011

M and C News 10 (June 3, <http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/usa/news/article_1560929.php/US-general-Iraq-withdrawal-plan-on-schedule>) ELJ

The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq is on schedule for shrinking the presence to 50,000 by the end of August, the top US commander in the country said. General Ray Odierno told reporters that the withdrawal pace will not be slowed by ongoing negotiations by Iraqi leaders to form a new government following March 7 elections, or by a recent spate of al- Qaeda bombings. 'We are on our plan,' said Odierno, who plans to leave Iraq later this year to take up a new post in the Pentagon. Odierno briefed President Barack Obama on Wednesday. There are now 88,000 soldiers remaining in Iraq, Odierno said, smaller than the US contingency in Afghanistan, where the conflict has become a top priority for Obama. Obama has ordered an end to the US combat role by the end of August, which would leave behind a force of 50,000 to continue training and advising Iraqi security forces. All US troops are scheduled to depart by the end of 2011. Odierno said the military is ahead of schedule at shipping equipment out of the country and at turning bases over to the Iraqi government. The Americans currently occupy 126 bases compared to 500 a year ago, and that number will be down to 94 by the end of August, he said. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has also suffered severe setbacks in recent months, including the deaths or capture of 34 of its top 42 operatives, Odierno said. 'They're clearly now attempting to reorganize themselves,' Odierno said. 'They're struggling a little bit.' Despite the progress, there will be continued violence in Iraq and al-Qaeda and its operatives remain dangerous, Odierno said. 'There will still be bad days in Iraq. There are still violent elements that operate inside of Iraq,' he said. 'Their violence is less than it was before, but it's still violence.'

Withdrawal is AHEAD of the deadline

MacMillan 6/27 (Arthur, Writer, AFP, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hirMu7qwFrK3kKfb8r3eqz6G2ClA)ELJ

The withdrawal of American combat troops and equipment from Iraq is 60 percent complete two months ahead of a deadline that will serve as a precursor for a complete US military pullout. Camp Victory, a giant sprawling base on the edge of Baghdad airport, is one of eight sites where American soldiers are sorting through the mass of hardware and supplies that must either be taken home, sent to Afghanistan, or destroyed. Although the military is anxious to avoid accusations that it is "cutting and running" from Iraq as operations in Afghanistan take precedence, US troop numbers are steadily falling and just 50,000 will remain beyond August 31.

Will meet deadline – recent decline shows that we are on track

The herald 10 (February 17, heraldscotland.com Lexis) ELJ

The US military says the number of troops on the ground in Iraq has dropped below 100,000 for the first time since the 2003 US-led invasion. Army 1st Lt Elizabeth Feste said that as of Tuesday there are 98,000 troops in Iraq. That is a significant drop from the roughly 140,000 troops in the month after the invasion, and a decline of about 70,000 since the height of the 2007 surge in which tens of thousands were deployed. The declining number of troops signals the US is sticking by a plan to reduce its number of combat troops in Iraq to 50,000 by the end of August. The military will pull out fully by the end of 2011.

Non-inherent -- status quo plan will successfully remove troops

Middle East Policy Council 09 ( Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

I think the logistical risks are probably the most manageable. Logistically, in some ways, leaving Iraq is easier than staying. The American practice is to rotate our troops every year. So if you have 130,000 troops and you are not withdrawing, it means you have 260,000 men moving; you have 130,000 men leaving and 130,000 men arriving over the course of the year. If you are leaving, you will have only half that number of transits because you're taking out 130,000; you're not putting any in. There are, of course, complications associated with some of the heavier equipment that stays and is used by one unit after another. So I'm not suggesting there is no logistical challenge to withdrawing, and there are the challenges associated with closing bases and that sort of thing. But basically under the withdrawal plans as the administration has articulated them, this doesn't seem to be a particularly difficult risk.

Inherency – Withdrawal On Schedule

US troop withdrawal remains on schedule

CNN 10 (CNN 6.2.10 http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/02/obama-to-meet-with-top-u-s-commander-for-iraq/?iref=allsearch&fbid=6WU5IH1sOVJ)ESY

President Barack Obama will meet with U.S. Army Gen. Ray Odierno at the Oval Office Wednesday morning to get a first-hand account of conditions in Iraq from the top commander for the country. Odierno is responsible for determining the pace of withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. But the administration has said the deadline - the end of August - remains on schedule despite the recent spike in violence there.

Current plan to withdraw US troops is going well

CNN 10 (CNN Wire Staff 6.2.10 http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/06/02/obama.iraq.brief/index.html?iref=allsearch) ESY

President BZaarack Obama met Wednesday with U.S. Army Gen. Ray Odierno to get a first-hand account of conditions in Iraq from the top commander for the country. A White House spokesman said Odierno "provided a positive assessment" of security conditions and the transfer of responsibilities to Iraqi security forces ahead of completing the planned withdrawal of most U.S. troops by the end of August. In addition, Obama and Odierno discussed the recent certification of election results by Iraq's Federal Supreme Court and efforts to form an inclusive Iraqi government, according to White House deputy press secretary Bill Burton.

Non-Inherent, withdrawal plan on track

AGENCY GROUP, 09. (. "U.S. ON TRACK TO MEET WITHDRAWAL DEADLINES, ODIERNO SAYS." 4-12 FDCH Regulatory Intelligence DatabaseRegional Business News)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 2009 - The U.S. is on track to meet the terms of a timeline of withdrawal from Iraq, the top American commander in Iraq said today. Speaking on CNN's "State of the Union," Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno said he believes the U.S. is prepared to fulfill a deal requiring U.S. forces to leave major Iraqi cities by June 30 and all combat troops to depart the country by the end of 2011. "We continue to work with the government of Iraq so they can meet that timeline so that they are able to maintain stability after we leave," he said. "I still believe we're on track with that." The so-called status of forces agreement brokered by Washington and Baghdad took effect Jan. 1, 2009, and placed broad operational authority under Iraqi control. Odierno said the U.S. and Iraqi government continue to assess the security situation as the June 30 deadline approaches. He added that his recommendation for force levels would be based on the situation on the ground. "If we believe we'll need troops to maintain a presence in some of the cities, we'll recommend that," he said. "But ultimately it'll be the decision of (Iraqi) Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki."

Inherency – Withdrawal On Schedule

Biden Agrees and assumes election woes – withdrawal WILL happen on time

UPI 10 (United Press International, May 27, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/05/27/Biden-Forces-will-leave-Iraq-on-time/UPI-65731274961867/>) ELJ

U.S. combat troops will pull out of Iraq on time, Vice President Joe Biden said. Biden said the number of U.S. combat troops in Iraq will be reduced to 50,000 this summer, even if the Iraqi government remains in disarray after the March parliamentary election, The Washington Post reported Thursday. The election results are under dispute and parliamentary alliances are still being formed. "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden told the Post. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment."

Withdrawal is currently on track for the Timeline

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

While DOD’s progress since May 2009 exceeded some of its targets, a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down within the established timelines. To meet the presidential target of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by August 31, 2010, USF-I must reduce its present force by almost 50 percent by this summer. Furthermore, to meet other drawdown targets for August 31, 2010, USF-I must draw down 45 percent of its contractor personnel workforce, retrograde 46 percent of its rolling stock, and close 41 percent of its bases in Iraq. The remaining forces, contractor personnel, and equipment will have to be drawn down during the final 16 months, from August 31, 2010 to December 31, 2011, during which time some of the largest bases in Iraq will also have to be closed or transferred to the Government of Iraq, a task the commanding general of USF-I stated could take 9 to 10 months to complete. Figure 2 illustrates the numbers of U.S. forces, contractor personnel, rolling stock, containers, and bases that have already been drawn down; what must be drawn down before the August 31, 2010 change-of-mission date; and what will remain to be drawn down before December 31, 2011. 15

USFG should ensure efficient management of contracts to withdraw on time

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

To ensure DOD can efficiently execute the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with established timelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that joint and service guidance regarding operational planning for contract support is followed, that contract support requirements are identified in a timely manner, and that the roles and responsibilities of the various contract review boards in CENTCOM be clarified. Furthermore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess and develop options to mitigate risks associated with transitioning contracts in Kuwait and Iraq, analyze the benefits and costs of transitioning its major contract in Iraq, reevaluate plans for contract oversight, and clarify its planning regarding the extent to which Kuwait and other locations in southwest Asia can support the temporary staging of equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq.

Iraqi withdrawal on time

Wilson 10 (Center for a New American Security, 5/27/10, http://www.cnas.org/node/4517)

The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden, who says the U.S. military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government takes shape.  "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden said in a 40-minute interview in his West Wing office this month. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment."

Inherency – Withdrawal On Schedule

No uniqueness Iraq withdrawal on track

Wilson. 10. ("Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says." Washington Post, 5-27 sec a-1) White House correspondent for the Washington Post. correspondent in Latin America Middle East, and Jerusalem Bureau Chief.

President Obama called Iraq his predecessor's war of choice. Now it is his war to exit -- and quickly. The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden , who says the U.S. military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government takes shape. "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden said in a 40-minute interview in his West Wing office this month. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment." White House officials say Iraqis are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing the need for U.S. forces. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains fractured. Rival factions have yet to establish a new government, nearly three months after close national elections, and politicians have begun warning of a power vacuum as neighboring Iran works to influence the outcome. Adel Abdul Mahdi, one of Iraq's vice presidents, urged all parties this month to agree quickly on a new leader to head off attempts by "terrorist gangs to use the circumstances in the country to hurt the Iraqi people and the armed forces." "Leaving Iraq is not only a public relations issue, but a recovery-of-force issue," said John A. Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, who served as an Army officer in Iraq and helped write the Army's counterinsurgency field manual. "The Army has not recovered from its surge into Iraq, and now it is surging in Afghanistan, which hasn't turned the corner at all." "There are many connections between the two wars," Nagl said, "and the fact we only have one Army is one of them. We just don't have enough Army to do everything we want it to do right now."

The pull out timeline is on track. Iraq is ready for withdrawal along with the U.S.

DOD 9(Department of Defense, June 2009, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=8&hid=10&sid=684ba62c-15ae4691b98093aa0a28b2ee%40sessionmgr14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=32W3611216803) JRG

Everything is on track for the withdrawal of American troops from the cities of Iraq, Iraqi and coalition officials said this week. Iraqi security forces are set to assume responsibility for the areas, Iraqi spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said at a June 15 news conference."The step of withdrawal of American forces from the city will be a main step in this effort," he said. "And the Iraqi government is committed to receive all the security responsibility and protect security, protect its citizens and all foreigners who are working and living in Iraq."The security forces also will provide protection for embassies, foreign missions and the commercial and cultural missions working in Iraq, he added.

Iraq withdrawal on track

Huffington Post 10 (Chris Weigant, 6/30/10, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/good-news-from-iraq_b_631510.html>)

Today, a Department of Defense spokesman, when asked how many troops remained in Iraq, responded: "We are on track to drawdown U.S. forces in Iraq from approx 82,000 (where we are today) to just under 50,000 by the first of September." In response to the bigger question of how the withdrawal is proceeding, the spokesman answered: "In the coming weeks, we will see the drawdown accelerate, providing the security situation remains stable. By December 31, 2011, all U.S. forces will be out of Iraq."

US withdrawal on track

CNS News 10 (staff writer, 4/16/10, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/64332)

The planned withdrawal of nearly 45,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of August is on track in spite of a recent increase in attacks by militant forces, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq said Sunday. Army Gen. Ray Odierno said that al-Qaida's strength in Iraq is steadily degrading. Unless there's a dramatic and unforeseen change in the security situation, the U.S. troop drawdown will go ahead as scheduled, he said.There are now about 95,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, according to Odierno. The U.S. plans to cut that number to 50,000 by Aug. 31, when it will end combat operations."I fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the first of September," Odierno said on "Fox News Sunday."As part of an agreement with Iraq, the U.S. will withdraw all forces by the end of 2011.

Inherency – Withdrawal On Schedule

**U.S. troop removal from Iraq on track**

**CNN 9 (CNN 9/10 http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T9642691136&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T9642691108&cisb=22\_T9642691107&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=266325&docNo=1) KCA**

The U.S. ambassador to Iraq said Thursday that Iraq is making enough progress to stay on track for withdrawing all American troops by the end of next year. Ambassador Christopher Hill told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the timetable for withdrawing all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by next August and all troops from the country by 2011 is "absolutely achievable." Hill's congressional testimony was his first since taking the post in April. The timetable for withdrawing American troops was negotiated by the Iraqi government and the U.S. under President Bush. Also Thursday, one of the leading U.S. commanders in Iraq said it's too early to tell if military officials will greenlight an accelerated drawdown of troops there this year. Speaking to reporters via video conference from Iraq, Lt. Gen. Charles Jacoby said insurgents continue to test Iraqi security forces. "Many areas in Iraq remain dangerous, and that was made apparent again on Tuesday when four of our service members were killed while executing their mission," Jacoby said. In July, U.S Defense Secretary Robert Gates said an additional brigade, about 5,000 U.S. troops, could come out of Iraq by the end of the year on top of two brigades already scheduled. The Obama administration's plan is to keep large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq to help secure the elections in January. Both Gates and the top U.S. commander, Gen. Raymond Odierno, said additional troop reductions would depend on the security situation in the country. "It's too early to say right now whether the operational environment is going to support accelerated troop withdrawals," Jacoby said. "If the environment is looking at the end of the year like we can accelerate, then I'm sure my superiors will have us take a look at that." Jacoby said the security situation is better than it was before June 30 when American troops had to leave the major cities under an Iraqi-U.S. Agreement. Hill told the Foreign Affairs Committee that because of its oil reserves, Iraq eventually will "have the economic means to run itself." "For the first time in decades now, Iraq has a real chance to become an engine for regional stability and regional growth rather than a source of regional tension and dispute," he said. Despite a rash of insurgent attacks in recent months, Hill assured lawmakers that Iraq is not returning to sectarian violence. He said Iraq has not "risen to the bait" posed by al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups seeking to rekindle warfare between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. " The reality is that the Iraqi people have stood firm and have rejected retribution and a new cycle of violence such as the ones that brought Iraq to the brink in 2006," Hill said. Hill said high-profile bombings last month at Iraq's Foreign and Finance ministries bear the hallmark of al Qaeda in Iraq, but it is possible there is some "tactical hookup" between the Shiite militia and Baathist elements loyal to former President Saddam Hussein. Such attacks, he said, represent an effort by insurgents to lessen Iraqis' confidence in their government as U.S. troops begin to withdraw. "What is important that the Iraqi authorities and Iraqi people have understood that they can't allow them to get away with this," he said. Hill acknowledged Iran continues to meddle in Iraq, including providing "very malevolent" weapons to insurgent groups, one of which he said he found in the front yard of his residence. He added that Iran was supporting various parties in the country ahead of January's elections "There's no question that Iran and Iraq should have a longstanding relationship," Hill said. "But I think Iran needs to do a much better job of respecting Iraq's sovereignty." He said that the political process had taken root in Iraq and Iraqis were gearing up for the January elections. But he added there is concern that Sunni Arab states would seek to thwart Iran's influence by supporting Sunni parties ahead of the vote. Hill said the "fundamental question" ahead of the election is whether Sunni governments in the Middle East "are prepared to make room for a government that is Shia-led." He said the United States was closely watching simmering tensions between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds over disputed areas such as Mosul and Kirkuk and is working hard to avoid violence between Iraqi troops and the Kurdish Peshmerga force, which patrols Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

**Withdrawal Inevitable**

US Withdrawal is on inevitable, therefore the aff is unnecessary.

Reed 10 (Tucker, Chief of Staff of the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team, *The Huffington Post*, June 30th, 2010, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tucker-reed>) NK

Today marks the year anniversary of the beginning of the U.S withdrawal from Iraq. It was on June 30, 2009 that American troops withdrew from Iraq's cities fulfilling the first of our withdrawal obligations agreed to in the Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Iraq. By August, only 35,000 to 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq down from the approximately 150,000 deployed there at the height of the Surge in 2008. However, as we continue to draw down in Iraq it is important to remember that our obligations there are still far from met, the timeline for our presence in Afghanistan is still far from set, and Americans are still regularly deploying for service in these challenging environments. In April I spent two weeks out at Ft. Irwin in California, helping to train the next round of State Department Foreign Services Officers and a Brigade of U.S troops headed to Iraq. A simulated Iraq has been set up in the Mojave desert there -- an entire network of towns broken up into two provinces -- to mimic the complicated governmental structures and the political balancing act required to navigate them. The towns are populated with 2,500 role players organized into demographic and ethnic groups representative of what our troops will encounter in Iraq: Kurds, Chaldeans, Arabs; Sunnis, Shiites, Christians; Sheiks, Clerics, Government Officials. There are even "insurgents" that form cells and live amongst the everyday people to imitate the nuanced reality of counterinsurgency and development operations in Iraq. In the "sandbox", as the training area is colloquially referred to, you can quickly forget you are not in Iraq. The sand and wind can be just as invasive, impenetrable, and unforgiving. Up armored humvees and MRAPs are the only modes of transportation, 80 lbs of body armor are your constant companion. The "Iraqi" role players perform their roles masterfully: interrupting meetings for constant cell phone calls, chain smoking and playing unwitting Americans off each other in fine Machiavellian tradition. And while much of the focus for the military during this training is on lethal operations, entire scenarios devoted to governance challenges, essential service provision and political reconciliation are woven into the course. Military and civilian counterparts must work together to confront these complex issues and must draw on each others expertise to do so. Ingraining this interagency collaboration is so essential to our efforts abroad and it is long overdue. However much we would like to believe that the most sophisticated and deadly military force on earth and its counterparts in the world's most powerful government have developed systems and tools for managing interagency collaboration, in the field time and time again, it comes down to personalities, egos and temperaments. The culture of the U.S. State Department necessarily differs greatly to that of the U.S. Army, and up until the "surge" in Iraq when a premium was put on interagency collaboration and empowering development experts to take an active role in our efforts in Iraq, often these organizations tended to operate in silos: wary and dismissive of one another. The more the good people of our military and diplomatic corps are forced to get into the "sandbox" and play together, the greater our ability to take advantage of the strengths of each of our government agencies in war zones. The more we are exposed to each others cultures before deploying, the less time is wasted in the field adjusting to each others unique and valuable ways of doing business. The necessity of this "whole of government" approach is a hard won lesson of our time in Iraq and must be applied to our future efforts in Afghanistan, Haiti or the next nation-building challenge we face.

Inherency – Status Quo Solves Middle East

Peace in the Middles East will come in the next 2 years

REUTERS 6/29/2010 (News Aggregate, “Lavrov says peace in Middle East possible in two years,” RIA Novosti June 29, http://en.rian.ru/world/20100629/159624749.html) ACW

Reaching a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict in two years is a "realistic objective," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday during his visit to the West Bank. The Middle East Quartet of negotiators, comprising Russia, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, said in a statement during their meeting in March that a new peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians may be reached within 24 months. "If everyone shows good will and mutual trust, if all international negotiators actively push the sides towards reconciliation, this goal is quite realistic," Lavrov said after a meeting with PNA leader Mahmoud Abbas. The statement came several hours after Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said he saw no opportunity to settle the conflict by 2012. Abbas said, in his turn, that he believed in the peace process. "We believe in the peace process and are interested in completing it as soon as possible. A prompt peace solution is in the interests of Israelis, Palestinians and the whole world," Abbas said. He reiterated his readiness to start direct talks with Israel as soon as the two sides reach "at least some progress in questions of border and security." Israeli-Palestinian direct peace talks came to a halt in December 2008, when Israel launched an attack on the Gaza Strip in a bid to put an end to the firing of homemade rockets at southern Israel by Palestinian militants based in the enclave. The conflict left 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead. Palestinians have so far cited ongoing Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, both occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as a main obstacle to resuming peace talks. In March, the Arab League supported the U.S.-backed initiative of holding Israeli-Palestinian indirect talks. Israel, a major United States ally in the Middle East, has also welcomed the talks.

**US Will Not Create Permanent Bases**

U.S. setting up permanent bases in Iraq is untrue

Miles 8 (Donna, American Forces Press Service, United States Department of Defense 6/5 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50114) KCA

The United States is not seeking permanent military bases in Iraq as it negotiates legal and military agreements with the Iraqi government, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker said here today. Speaking at the State Department, Crocker called published reports that the United States is trying to set up permanent bases “flatly untrue.” “There clearly is going to be a need” for a U.S. and coalition military presence in Iraq beyond the end of the year, Crocker said. But the status of forces agreement, when adopted, “is not going to be forever, particularly as it related to the status and authority of coalition forces in Iraq,” he said. “So I’m very comfortable saying to you – to the Iraqis, to anyone who asks – that no, indeed, we are not seeking permanent bases, either explicitly or implicitly, by just intending to stay there indefinitely,” he said. Both the U.S. and Iraqi governments want a strategic framework agreement as quickly as possible, possibly by July, Crocker said. But he emphasized that his focus “is more on getting it done right than getting it done quick.” The agreement will be developed through a straightforward process, and will be scrutinized not only by the Iraqi parliament, but also Iraqi public opinion, Crocker said. “This will be a transparent process,” he said. “It will have a full debate. It will all be out there in the open.” Once agreed to, the agreement will have far-reaching impact, the ambassador said. “Not only will this agreement deal with the status of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq past 2008, we also intend for it to set the broad parameters of the overall bilateral relationship in every field,” Crocker said. This will include political, diplomatic and cultural aspects -- “the whole totality of the relationship,” he said.

U.S. is not building permanent bases in Iraq

Farley 9 (Robert,staff writer for PolitiFact , PolitiFact 12/7 http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/promise/132/no-permanent-bases-in-iraq/) KCA

In a speech at Camp Lejeune, N.C., on Feb. 27, 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to end the combat mission in Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010. And speaking more directly to the issue of permanent bases, he said, "I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011." The administration's position was reinforced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a Sept. 4, 2009, interview when he was asked by an Al Jazeera reporter whether the Obama administration would stick to its pledge not to build any permanent military bases in Iraq. "Absolutely," Gates said. "Unless there is some new agreement or some new negotiation, which would clearly be on Iraqi terms. But we will not have any permanent bases in Iraq. We have no interest in permanent bases in Iraq. And we are now planning on withdrawing all American military forces by the end of 2011." Lastly, it was a position clearly written into the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 passed by Congress and signed by President Obama on Oct. 28, 2009. Section 1221 states, "No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended ... to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq." It's a provision that has been included in defense authorization legislation for several years in a row, dating back to the Bush administration. Promises kept can always be broken in the future, and we'll revisit this one if things change -- particularly as we move closer toward the deadlines for troop removal -- but the Obama administration has not wavered from its pledge and the president signed a bill that specifically prohibits defense funds from being used to permanently station U.S. armed forces in Iraq.

US Will Not Create Permanent Bases

The U.S. is not planning to build permanent bases in Iraq

Stout 8 (David, veteran journalist with the New York Times, The New York 6/5 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/world/middleeast/05cnd-crocker.html) KCA

The United States ambassador to Iraq on Thursday dismissed any suggestion that the Bush administration is maneuvering to set up permanent military bases in Iraq. “I’m very comfortable saying to you, to the Iraqis, to anyone who asks, that, no indeed, we are not seeking permanent bases, either explicitly or implicitly,” Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker said at a State Department news briefing. Mr. Crocker commented at length, and sometimes disdainfully, on a London newspaper report of “a secret plan” whereby the United States would keep 50 permanent military bases in Iraq, keep control of Iraqi airspace and insist on legal immunity for American soldiers and contractors. “Is this what you’re looking for?” a journalist asked. “Well, as a matter of fact, it is not,” Mr. Crocker said, rejecting the suggestion of a hidden agenda in American negotiations with the Iraqi government on future relations between Washington and Baghdad. “That is just flatly untrue,” the envoy said, trying to swat away any implication of “secret provisions, attachments, protocols or whatever” and describing the talks between American and Iraqi officials as “a transparent process.” Nor, he said, are the negotiations taking place with an eye on the political campaign in the United States. The ambassador said he was more concerned with “getting it done right than getting it done quick” and that he was “not really keyed to the American political calendar.” Mr. Crocker said the talks on how many American troops will remain in Iraq, and for how long, will go beyond mere numbers of soldiers and touch on “the broad parameters of the overall bilateral relationship in every field: political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, the whole totality of the relationship. One guideline, he said, “is full respect for Iraqi sovereignty.” “There isn’t going to be an agreement that infringes on Iraq’s sovereignty,” he insisted. “The Iraqis are not going to accept it. And frankly, we wouldn’t want it.” Mr. Crocker turned to humor in parrying a delicate issue: Who would the Iraqis like to see in the White House next year. “Well, I haven’t really had any detailed discussions with the Iraqis on that,” he said. “Were they to bring it up, I would probably accuse them of outrageous interference in our domestic affairs.”

U.S. pledges not to have permanent bases in Iraq

UNKNOWN 8 (American Foreign Policy 2/10 http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5izKZq1GWbhgVxwahs2y-GF2atQKw) KCA

President George W. Bush acknowledged the United States would seek a military presence in Iraq for "years" but pledged in an interview aired Sunday that he would not establish permanent bases. Bush brushed aside concerns expressed by critics that a Status of Forces Agreement Washington is discussing with the Baghdad goverment would commit future US presidents to a long-term deployment in Iraq. "We won't have permanent bases," Bush told Fox New television in the interview conducted at his retreat at Camp David, Maryland. But he added, "I do believe it is in our interests and the interests of the Iraqi people that we do enter into an agreement on how we are going to conduct ourselves over the next years." While the Americans press plans to trim their forces in Iraq from the current 160,000 troops, they are negotiating a pact with Baghdad to maintain their presence beyond the end of 2008, when their UN mandate expires. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and other US officials say they have no interest in establishing permanent bases, but congressional critics are insisting any accord be submitted to the legislature. Bush, who also has 26,000 troops in Afghanistan and is planning to send 3,200 more, was non-committal on whether he would pass any Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq past the Senate. "Well, you know, we work with the Senate and the House (of Representatives) on that," he told Fox. "We didn't bring a treaty to the Senate for Afghanistan."

U.S. troop withdrawal will cause a power struggle

Keely and Ferris 9 (Jim and John, Co-editors Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewArticle/230) KCA

While broader forces seek to make Iraq an American Afghanistan, calls for a rapid US withdrawal, whether or not in favour of a more multinational force, should also be considered carefully. A precipitate withdrawal could have a variety of unwelcome consequences. If power is left lying in the streets of Iraq, there are more than enough groups willing to claim it – with potential threats to Iraq’s very existence (and for the broader region) as well as to the population as the rivalries sort themselves out. A civil war would not be an entirely unlikely outcome if sufficient outside power is not available in Iraq to “hold the ring,” or at least to give a nascent central government a decent chance to establish itself.

US Will Not Create Permanent Bases

The U.S. will not seek permanent bases in Iraq

Taylor 10 (Claire, Iraq: Multinational Forces after the Drawdown 5/12 http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05247.pdf) KCA

The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.

Obama promised no permanent bases

Burns 9 (Robert, associated press, The Huffington Post 2/6 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/06/iraq-withdrawal-obama-wei\_n\_164801.html) KCA

The White House is considering at least two troop withdrawal options as it weighs a new Iraq strategy \_ one that would preserve President Barack Obama's campaign pledge to get all combat brigades out within 16 months and a second that would stretch it to 23 months, two officials said Friday. A third, in-between option of 19 months is also being weighed, according to the officials, neither of whom would discuss the sensitive topic without being granted anonymity. One of the officials said the main focus appears to be on the 16-month and 23-month options; 23 months would run to the end of 2010. Under either timeline, the U.S. would hope to leave behind a number of brigades that would be redesigned and reconfigured as multipurpose units to provide training and advising for Iraqi security forces, one official said. These brigades would be considered noncombat outfits and their presence would have to be agreed in advance by the Iraqi government, which under a deal signed late last year insisted that all U.S. forces \_ not just combat brigades \_ be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Obama has said his Iraq policy will include leaving a residual U.S. military force of unspecified composition and size in Iraq and in the region to conduct counter-terrorism missions against al-Qaida in Iraq and to protect American diplomatic and civilian personnel. He has said they will not build permanent bases in Iraq but will continue training and supporting Iraqi security forces "as long as Iraqi leaders move toward political reconciliation and away from sectarianism."

The House passed a bill that the U.S. will not have permanent bases in Iraq

unknown 7 (Speaker Nancy Pelosi 7/25 http://www.speaker.gov/legislation?id=0066) KCA

On July 25, 2007, the House passed H.R. 2929, Banning Permanent U.S. Bases in Iraq.  This bill states that it is the policy of the United States not to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing a permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.  It also states that it is the policy of the United States not to exercise U.S. control of the oil resources of Iraq. The measure bars the use of any funds provided by any law from being used to carry out any policy that contradicts these statements of policy. The Congress has passed provisions earlier banning permanent bases in Iraq – but those provisions expire on September 30, 2007.  Congress has made clear in the last couple of years that there should be no permanent U.S. bases in Iraq.  For example, the FY 2007 Defense Appropriations bill contained provisions that bar the establishment of permanent U.S. bases in Iraq.  However, these provisions will expire on September 30, 2007.  The advantage of enacting H.R. 2929 is that there would then be a permanent ban, written into statute, against the establishment of permanent bases in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group recommended that the United States clearly state that it does not seek permanent bases or to control Iraq’s oil.  In its final report, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group recommended that the United States clearly state that our nation does not seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control Iraq’s oil.  It did so to help shape “a positive climate for… diplomatic efforts,” which are essential to ending the U.S. presence in Iraq and bringing greater stability to the Middle East. A clear statement that the U.S. will not have permanent bases sends a strong signal of support for full Iraqi national sovereignty – and weakens the appeal of extremists.  The perception that the United States intends to permanently occupy Iraq and is planning to control Iraq’s oil aids insurgent groups in recruiting supporters and fuels violent activity.  A clear statement that the United States will not have a permanent presence in Iraq or control of Iraq’s oil would send a strong signal to the people of Iraq and the international community that the U.S. fully supports Iraqi efforts to exercise full national sovereignty, including taking responsibility for their own security.

\*\*\*Impact Take-Out\*\*\*

No Chance of Nuclear Escalation

Despite predictions of nuclear terrorisms there have been zero instances of Nuclear Terrorism

Krepon 9 (Michael, Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia, “The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn't,” Foreign Affairs Volume: 88, Issue: 3 May/June 2009, ACW)

At the height of the Cold War, almost no one was bold enough or foolish enough to predict the Soviet Union's collapse, let alone without the eruption of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. One of the few who prophesied its demise, George Kennan, was deeply worried about a nuclear cataclysm. Kennan, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and the father of containment policy, warned repeatedly that unwise U.S. nuclear policies could lead to Armageddon. The Cold War is now history, but warnings of an impending nuclear catastrophe are still very much alive. Anxieties today stem not from the threat of a surprise Soviet missile attack but from the fear of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and terrorist groups seeking to carry out catastrophic attacks against soft targets in the United States. And yet, not a single death has occurred as a result of nuclear terrorism. Since 9/11, there have been more than 36,000 terrorist attacks, resulting in approximately 57,000 fatalities and 99,000 casualties. A terrible, mass-casualty attack using nuclear or biological weapons could occur at any time, and much more can be done to keep the United States safe. As the attacks that have occurred have repeatedly demonstrated, terrorists do not need weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cause grievous harm; they can do so using hijacked airplanes, fertilizer, automatic weapons, and grenades. But the situation is far from bleak. It is not easy for terrorist groups to acquire the skills and materials necessary to construct a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, Washington and Moscow have reduced their nuclear arsenals by 34,000 weapons over the past two decades, nuclear testing is now rare, the list of countries with worrisome nuclear programs is very short by historical standards, and the permanent members of the UN Security Council now have less to fight about -- and more reasons to cooperate in preventing worst-case scenarios from occurring.

Oil Dependence Turns Case

Reducing Oil Consumption Key to Middle East foreign policy

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

The dependence of the U.S. economy on oil is a key reason that the United States worries so much about the problems of the Middle East in the first place, and U.S. oil consumption also helps extremists in Iran and elsewhere. Had gasoline prices remained high, many Americans may well have changed their habits. But now that oil prices have declined dramatically, so will the perceived urgency of the problem; the Obama administration will therefore need to redouble efforts to increase energy efficiency, reduce consumption, and promote alternative energy sources. These policies would further diminish the demand for oil, slow the pace of climate change, and reduce the transfer of wealth to countries such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. It is no coincidence that when the price of oil was $10 a barrel, in the 1990s, Iran's leaders were far more circumspect in their activities abroad than they have been in this decade of high prices. Now that oil prices have dropped again, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will no longer be able to fund foreign adventures while avoiding the domestic political consequences of his mismanagement of the Iranian economy. The lesson is clear: reducing oil consumption can alter the strategic environment in the Middle East; energy policy is foreign policy.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Bad\*\*\*Withdrawal Bad – General

Quick withdrawal from Iraq can cause multiple scenarios, all bad for Iraq, the USA, and the rest of the world.

Bay 7 (Austin, Colonel & Military Affairs columnist, Austin Bay Blog, July 12th, 2007, <http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=1828>) NK

Here are seven “scenarios” sketching “potential outcomes” of a quick withdrawal from Iraq. They are not mutually exclusive. They could well “blend.” In fact, an amalgam of the first six could occur. These are speculative dramas. The US and the Iraqi governments have their own scenarios. I am certain that Iran, Al Qaeda, Syria and Turkey have also analyzed potential outcomes and made plans accordingly. THE SCENARIOS (1) THREE NEW COUNTRIES: Kurdistan in the north becomes an independent country – and immediately begins to wrestle with Turkey over the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK) which is waging a secessionist struggle in southeastern Turkey. Kurdistan has oil. Southern Iraq—a predominantly Shia – area, becomes a Shia state—with oil. Parts of Anbar province become a Sunni state (Iraqi Sunnistan) – which has few oil fields. But what becomes of Baghdad? Does it divide like a desert Berlin into Shia and Sunni sectors? Baghdad remains a source of continuing conflict. (2) REGIONAL SHIA-SUNNI WAR: Iran sees a chance to recover not only the Shaat al Arab region – the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates, but a chance to extend its border into the economically productive areas of southern Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait immediately react to Iran’s drive into southern Iraq. Iraq has served as a “buffer” between Sunni Arabs and Shia Iranians, and the buffer is dissolving . Jordan and Egypt prepare for action. The War Over Mesopotamia could last for weeks, it could grind on for years. (3) TURKEY EXPANDS :Turkey reclaims control of territory all the way to Kirkuk, creating a new Southern Turkey: The Ottoman Empire once controlled Mesopotamia. Turkey has a lingering claim to areas of northern Iraq. For almost two decades Turkey has fought with the Kurdistan Workers Party – a Kurdish secessionist group in Turkey which has bases in northern Iraq. Turkey could conclude the way to end the war with the PKK would be to absorb Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey would pay a huge political price. It would lose all chance of joining the European Union. Ties with the West would deteriorate –and as a resultTurkey might become less secular and more Islamic in both identity and in political orientation. The Iranians would be glad to see their “Kurdish issue” disappear, but would be wary of a militant Turkey. (4) SHIA DICTATORSHIP: Shia Arabs conduct an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Sunni. They create a condominium state with the Kurds. Iranian influence increases . Iraq’s Sunnis either die (a genocide) or flee to other Sunni controlled states – or move to the US. (5) CHAOS: The region becomes a cauldron. Iraq shatters into ethnic enclaves, a few “new Mesopotamian city states” managing to control oil fields. Iran and Turkey exert “regional influence” over eastern Iraq and northern Iraq, respectively, but concerned about confrontation between themselves or provoking sanctions from Europe and the US, neither send their military forces in large numbers beyond current borders . Terror attacks and intermittent fighting afflict neighborhoods throughout Iraq. Local warlords rule by fear and make money either smuggling oil, drugs, or arms. This tribal hell is a perfect disaster—the kind of disaster that allows Al Qaeda to build training facilities and base camps for operations throughout the Middle East and Europe. (6) “GANG UP”: Shia Arabs in Iraq are numerous, well armed and increasingly well organized – at least enough to expel all of the Sunni Arabs. The Shia and Kurds, who are now over 80 percent of the population, decide to eliminate their main enemy, and the source of most of the terrorism—the Sunni community. Neighboring Sunni Arab nations are kept out with the threat that Iran will intervene. Arguably, this scenario is already happening, though in slow motion. Out of seven possible “rapid withdrawal” scenarios only one –number seven– clearly benefits the majority of Iraqis. And the US. And the civilized world.

Withdrawal Bad – US-Iraqi Tension

Troop withdrawal heightens US-Iraq tensions

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

The most serious external threat to Iraqi stability in the context of a U.S. withdrawal would likely result from heightened U.S.-Iranian tensions occasioned by extraneous issues, such as the Iranian nuclear program. Although Iranian and U.S. interests largely align with respect to support for a more or less unified and stable Iraqi state, it is well documented that the Iranians have sought to use levers within Iraq (including lethal force) against the Americans, particularly during periods of high tension between the United States and Iran. A successful drawdown and a stable Iraq are much more likely in the presence of some level of U.S. cooperation with Iran. Reducing tensions throughan engagement process, perhaps beginning with the question of Iraqi stability, could reduce Tehran’s motivations to continue such dangerous intervention in Iraq or at least increase the costs of doing so.

US withdrawal leads to Iran-Iraq tensions

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

Of all of Iraq’s neighbors, Iran is the best situated and equipped to promote instability in Iraq. Tehran might view the departure of U.S. forces as an opportunity to exploit instability, and this may lead to more-aggressive attempts to destabilize Iraq. Iran still has client organizations operating in Iraq. There are several counterweights to the possibility that Iran may adopt a disruptive strategy, however: the memory of an eight-year bloody war; the fact that some historical sources of tension between the two countries—e.g., the Shat al-Arab waterway—have been reduced; and Arab national- ism and Iraqi Shi’ism. Thus, although Iran has the capability to destabilize Iraq, its decision to do so will largely be a function of the state of its relations with the United States rather than developments in Iraq.

Leaving Iraq destroys the long term US-Iraq partnership

Washington Post 10 (Editorial, 6/18/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR2010061705091.html)

IRAQ IS at a tipping point. The parliament elected in March's elections was [finally seated this week](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2010061401780.html), but the formation of a new government is still weeks or months away. Meanwhile, a big [withdrawal of U.S. forces](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html) is going forward -- the number of troops will be halved, to 50,000, by the end of the summer. If a stable government forms by then and Iraqi security forces are able to fill the gap left by American units, the U.S. mission in Iraq will be on the homestretch to a successful conclusion.

But a lot could still go wrong -- especially if Iraqis begin to perceive that what is supposed to be a transition from occupation to strategic partnership with the United States is becoming an American rush for the exits, complete with the disavowal of past commitments. That's why it's particularly concerning that the Senate has chosen this sensitive moment to slash more than $1 billion from the aid programmed for the Iraqi transition -- including critical funding for security forces.  
This position ignores a few facts: that Iraq is already covering half the cost of the military transition; that its defense spending is far higher than that of the United States as a percentage of gross national product; that it already needed bailouts from both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to fund its budget and even so "will have to issue new debt to cover its budget deficit in 2010," according to a letter signed by U.S. ambassador Christopher R. Hill and U.S. forces commander Gen. Raymond T. Odierno.

But the biggest problem with the Senate cuts is the message they send: that the long-term strategic partnership that the United States has promised Iraq is likely to be barren. As Iraqis deliberate over the nature and course of their next government, there could hardly be a worse time for Congress to give that impression.

Withdrawal Bad – Moral Obligation

The U.S. had a moral obligation to help the Iraqi’s

Fordham Panel 07 ( U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Iraqis." Oct 8America 197, no. 10: 6. Military & Government Collection)

The United States has a moral obligation to the people of Iraq that must be met regardless of when U.S. troops ultimately withdraw from that country. That was the conclusion of the panelists at a forum titled “Exit or No Exit? Morality and Withdrawal from Iraq,” held in New York Sept. 18 on the Lincoln Center campus of Jesuit-run Fordham University. It was attended by 450 people. “We must distinguish between the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit,” said Gerard F. Powers, director of policy studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and former director of the U.S. bishops’ Office of International Justice and Peace. “The U.S. intervention may have been an optional, immoral war, but the postintervention U.S. involvement is not an optional moral commitment,” he said. Quoting the U.S. Catholic bishops, Powers said that the U.S. intervention “has brought with it a new set of moral responsibilities to help Iraqis secure and rebuild their country and to address the consequences of war for the region and the world.”

The U.S. has a moral obligation to stay in Iraq

Powers 08). (Our Moral Duty in Iraq. Feb 18 America, pp. 13-16)full site

United States bears a moral burden to help Iraqis build a just peace, a burden made heavier precisely because the war is unjust. As an uninvited occupying power, the United States has assumed a whole set of moral obligations to promote the common good of the Iraqi people until Iraqis can take control of their own affairs. Legally, the United States is no longer occupying Iraq, but by almost any measure Iraq is a failed state. Morally, therefore, the United States retains significant residual responsibilities to Iraqis. The Iraq intervention may have been an optional, immoral war; but given the U.S. government’s shared responsibility for the ensuing crisis, its continued engagement is not an optional moral commitment

It is morally unethical to leave Iraq in a state of political turmoil and violence

Powers 08). (Our Moral Duty in Iraq. Feb 18 America, pp. 13-16)full site dod official

Despite the obvious difficulties involved, the original U.S. objectives of building an Iraq that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure” are closer to what the United States owes Iraqis than are the minimalist alternatives. I would state the U.S. responsibilities more robustly than the Democratic presidential candidates have outlined or the Bush administration has pursued in practice. There are four: (1) not to end all political violence, but to ensure that an Iraqi government can maintain a reasonable degree of security for the whole country and minimize the threat of chaos or civil war; (2) not to impose a Western-style democracy, but to facilitate establishment of a stable, fairly representative government that respects basic human rights, especially minority rights; (3) not to promote a U.S.-style capitalist economy, but to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and a viable economy that serves Iraqi needs, not U.S. interests, especially not U.S. oil interests; and (4) not to stay without the consent of a legitimate

Iraqi government, or, lacking that, the United Nations.

U.S. Withdrawal will lead to immoral consequences

Groves 7(Steven, Writer The Heritage Foundation, July 2007, <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/12848.pdf>) **JRG**

The common thread of these predictions is that a U.S. troop withdrawal would lead to chaos throughout Iraq and that democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and individual freedoms would be among the first casualties. A complete breakdown of the Iraqi government would lead to anarchy and place Iraqi citizens in survival mode in which the safety and survival of their families would be more important than the advancement of democratic ideals.

Withdrawal Bad – Moral Obligation

Withdrawal from Iraq is immoral.

Mauro 7 (Ryan, National Security Researcher for the Christian Action Network and a published author, Global Politician. May 7th, 2007. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq>) NK

There are 25 million Iraqis engaged in the battlefield of Iraq, and hundreds of millions of Arabs and other Muslims whose fate will be decided by Iraq and the region’s future. There can be no more selfish act than to deny the Iraqis, who have fought and died along our side, the security, freedom and optimistic future for their families which we so cherish. Withdrawal would mean watching by as millions of Iraqis were slaughtered by terrorists, insurgents, militias, and neighboring states as each struggles to take the spoils. We would also have to watch as hundreds of thousands of children die from treatable diseases, as any humanitarian effort would fail due to the violence. Advocates of withdrawal also must be willing to sacrifice the potential for freedom-loving people in the region. Democratic success in Iraq threatens nearby tyrannies and empowers those fighting them. Women who aren’t allowed to drive and are persecuted for showing skin, young girls who are stoned for being raped, homosexuals who are hung for their relationships, student activists who are tortured in jail for criticizing their leader must be looked in the face and be told, “The Americans didn’t feel your plight was a high enough priority. We wish you success in the future, but this superpower won’t be around to help you.”

Withdrawal Bad – Mission Failure

Iraq government struggling to get a grip

RTT News 10 (RTT staff writer, 6/29/10, <http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1347084&SM=1>)

The recent surge in violence in Iraq comes after a relative lull and has deepened fears that insurgents might capitalize on the prevailing political uncertainty to cause further instability in the country. Currently, Iraqi politicians are struggling to form a government after the indecisive results of the 7th March parliamentary elections, ahead of a planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in stages. The elections were widely seen as a crucial test for Iraq's national reconciliation [process](http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1347084&SM=1).

Funds for military and police low as Americans depart

NPR 10 (Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, staff writer, 6/21/10, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127986221>)

In Iraq, the pullout of U.S. troops is picking up pace. By Sept. 1, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq will be pared to about 50,000 troops, part of a massive drawdown to continue in 2011 under an agreement negotiated with Baghdad.

But many Iraqi soldiers, especially at installations recently placed in their control by the U.S. military, have come to rely on American largesse to keep the facilities running. And as U.S. troops withdraw, many Iraqis feel a growing mistrust of the Iraq security forces that are supposed to protect them. Some of the Iraqi forces behave with impunity, and as a result, Iraqis say, they are now more afraid of them than the insurgency.That has some Iraqi security officials wondering whether they can trust their government to fund the army and police as the Americans have. And the situation has some Iraqis wondering if they can rely on their own Iraqi forces.

Withdrawal from Iraq would make all of the sacrifice of American troops in vain.

Terkel 9 (Amanda, Deputy Research Director at American Progress, ThinkProgress.com, June 29th, 2009, <http://thinkprogress.org/2009/06/29/cheney-waste-iraq/>) NK

Tomorrow is the deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq, a date Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is calling a “great victory.” But in a new interview with Washington Times radio, Vice President Cheney was still pushing the U.S. to stay in Iraq, saying that withdrawal would “waste” the sacrifice of U.S. troops: Mr. Cheney told The Washington Times’ America’s Morning News radio show that he is a strong believer in Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and that the general is doing what needs to be done. “But what he says concerns me: That there is still a continuing problem. One might speculate that insurgents are waiting as soon as they get an opportunity to launch more attacks. “I hope Iraqis can deal with it. At some point they have to stand on their own. But I would not want to see the U.S. waste all the tremendous sacrifice that has gotten us to this point.“

Withdrawal Bad – Religious Fear

US withdrawal causes fear of Shi’ism in Saudi Arabia

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

Saudi officials appear to recognize that most Saudi Shi’a

are not susceptible to Iranian agitation. That said, the Saudi regime has long feared

that the political empowerment of Iraqi Arab Shi’a, whether through Iraqi elec-

tions or the reemergence of Najaf as a center for Shi’a learning, could inspire greater

demands for political rights and cultural autonomy by the Shi’a of Saudi Arabia.21

The fear of Shi’a activism is especially pronounced among the Saudi clerical estab-

lishment, not simply for doctrinal and theological reasons but because recognition

of Shi’a jurisprudence and religious rights would undermine the privileges salafi

clerics have enjoyed in their symbiotic relationship with the royal family.

**U.S. troops key to peace with the Shi'a**

Gompert 10 (David,Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG911.pdf) KCA

Shi’a. Shi’a extremism has similar ambiguities in terms of national-versus-transnational motivations and dividing lines. In the past six years, the most consistent threat of violence to coalition forces has come from JAM and associated groups. The Sadrist bloc itself is fundamentally an Iraqi nationalist group with clear political ambitions but has wavered between political engagement and rejection. Since mid-2008, however, the Sadrist bloc has officially steered away from the use of force, and, for this reason, we consider the Sadrists to be tenuously within Iraq’s political core at present. Many Shi’a groups are supported by Iran. SGs, though once associated with JAM, fall more neatly into the fringe extremist category. SGs include the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq [Leagues of the Righteous People], and the Katab e Hezbollah [Hezbollah Brigades], and are prevalent in areas where JAM has maintained an active presence: Baghdad, Al Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Al Hillah, An Najaf, Al-Kūt, and Al Diwaniyah. Although SGs have, at times, taken Muqtada al-Sadr as a source of inspiration, they have proven unruly and unresponsive to his calls for Shi’a militants to lay down arms. Al-Sadr implicitly criticized the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq for its failure to unify with the grouping he backed, the Regiment of the Promised Day. Most officials and observers believe that SGs have direct funding from Iran and other sources that do not depend on al-Sadr or his movement. Attacks on U.S. forces by SGs peaked in mid-2007. Since then, offensives by U.S. forces, the ISF, and SoI to disrupt SG networks across the country have limited their potency. In 2008, an SG network operating in Shaab and Ur run by Arkan Hasnawi was rolled up. SG activity in Al-Kūt was significantly reduced by the deployment of coalition forces to the city,15 and a GoI offensive against JAM in Al Basrah severely diminished SG strongholds in the south. This was followed by several months of Shi’a violence in Sadr City in which hundreds of militants were killed, before a cease-fire. SGs have arguably suffered more than their JAM counterparts, which were the ostensible target of GoI offensives in Al Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Baghdad, and Karbala in 2008. While mainstream JAM members have relied on their nationalist credentials to maintain influence with the local population, an upsurge of anti-Iranian sentiment among the Iraqi population has led many civilians in Shi’a areas to inform the ISF of the location of SG leaders. At the same time, Iran’s motivation for funding and equipping SGs appears to have fallen, and Tehran may well have calculated that Iranian interests are now best served by an orderly and relatively uneventful withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Nevertheless, the SG threat to the Iraqi political order and to U.S. forces cannot be dismissed. According to some sources, 5,000 Shi’a fighters retreated to Iran after the Al Basrah offensive in spring 2008 to regroup and retrain, leaving open the possibility that they could return to Al Basrah and Maysan.16 Indeed, recent reports suggest a return of SG activity in the latter province. At the same time, Iran is capable of replenishing SG weaponry and rekindling SG attacks within Iraq whenever it chooses. While its incentive to do so may not seem strong during the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Iran’s behavior in Iraq is unpredictable and subject to exogenous influences—e.g., U.S.-Iran confrontation outside Iraq. In addition, the Sadrist bloc’s current commitment to engaging in the political process is precarious, and any renewal of militant JAM strongholds in south and central Iraq would undoubtedly increase the possibility of SGs recommencing operations. To sum up, we expect that Sunni and Shi’a extremists beyond the fringe of Iraq’s political order will remain violent and will pose some threat to departing and remaining U.S. personnel. Terrorism in Iraq will persist but is unlikely to grow, destroy the new political order, induce any main factions to turn to violence, or spill beyond Iraq’s border. Of the two sources of extremist violence, AQI is currently the most dangerous because of its willingness to commit unrestrained terror, its potential to instigate wider armed Sunni opposition, and its dedication to Sunni-Shi’a civil war.

[AQI-al-Qaeda in Iraq; BCT-brigade combat team; bpd-barrels per day; CPA-Coalition Provisional Authority;CTB-Counterterrorism Bureau; EFP-explosively formed penetrator; FP-Federal Police; FPS-Facility Protection Service; GoI-government of Iraq; IDF-indirect fire; IED-improvised explosive device; IIP-Iraqi Islamic Party; IPS-Iraqi Police Services; ISCI-Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq; ISF-Iraqi Security Forces; ISI-Islamic State of Iraq;ISR-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]

Withdrawal Bad – Political Conflict

U.S. troop presence prevents large-scale conflict among political groups

**Gompert 10 (David,Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG911.pdf) KCA**

Table 2.3 summarizes the assessment of dangers to Iraq’s internal security and stability based on current conditions, using the analytic framework offered in this chapter. Each threat is categorized according to the model and is assessed in terms of the likelihood and severity of potential impact on U.S. interests. This analysis should, in turn, inform policy considerations, beginning with the pace and pattern of U.S. force withdrawal. Broadly speaking, U.S. policy in general, and withdrawal plans and risk-mitigation policies in particular, should be more concerned with keeping the main actors in the political order and away from using force than with the more likely but less consequential threats of extremism and terrorism. While the latter may endanger U.S. personnel, the former may endanger both U.S. interests and U.S. personnel. Again, on the basis of current trends, and in terms of likelihood combined with gravity of repercussions, we assess that the greatest danger area is the possibility for Kurdish/Arab conflict, followed by the risk of renewal of Sunni insurgency. The violent threat posed by JAM appears to have subsided and may even be further defused by the U.S. withdrawal. At the same time, the United States faces the sober reality that its ability to prevent large-scale conflict among the main political players has limits and will decline as the U.S. military presence does. Hence, second only to the challenge of keeping the major groups in the political process—and contributing to meeting that challenge—the most important U.S. role will be its support of the ISF, which, in turn, will pay dividends only if the ISF behave responsibly and in the interests of a unified Iraqi state rather than to advance the partisan agendas of the ruling Shi’a parties. Consequently, the next chapter examines U.S. responsibilities toward developing the capabilities and professionalism of the ISF.

[AQI-al-Qaeda in Iraq; BCT-brigade combat team; bpd-barrels per day; CPA-Coalition Provisional Authority;CTB-Counterterrorism Bureau; EFP-explosively formed penetrator; FP-Federal Police; FPS-Facility Protection Service; GoI-government of Iraq; IDF-indirect fire; IED-improvised explosive device; IIP-Iraqi Islamic Party; IPS-Iraqi Police Services; ISCI-Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq; ISF-Iraqi Security Forces; ISI-Islamic State of Iraq;ISR-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]

Withdrawal Bad – Israeli Backlash

Israel will perceive US withdrawal from Iraq as a security risk in the face of rising Iranian Powers

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Israel is not a key player with respect to the U.S. drawdown from Iraq, yet the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq poses a number of risks to Israeli security. Israelis are most worried about the prospect of an enhanced Iranian regional presence. They are also concerned that U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could allow for the spread of terrorism that in turn could threaten the stability of Jordan, both because of the potential for jihadi violence there and because of the strain posed by Jordan’s Iraqi refugee population, which numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Israel has long been concerned about Iranian regional ambitions and hostility toward the Jewish state, but the aftermath of the Iraq War has enhanced Israeli concerns over Iranian regional influence, particularly given the belligerent rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the continuing standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. drawdown from Iraq can be expected to reinforce Israeli alarm about expanding Iranian influence, but such concerns have posed an increasing challenge to Israel since the United States removed the Iraqi buffer against Iran in 2003.47 Israeli strategic analysts worry that if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon capability, such a capability could lead to even more dangerous behavior by Iranian proxy actors, such as Hezbollah, while constraining Israel’s freedom of action to operate against such groups. From the perspective of many Israelis, the erosion of and limitations on U.S. power are serious strategic consequences of the Iraq War.

Withdrawal Bad – Iran Rise

US Withdrawal From Iraq would cede regional Primacy to Iran

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Iran is likely to continue to meddle in Iraq both during the drawdown and after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. It certainly has a strong and oft-expressed view that the government in power in Baghdad should be supportive of and friendly toward Tehran, and as the drawdown proceeds, Iran will assuredly work hard to ensure that the Iraq that emerges is not hostile to Iran or Iranian interests. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has resulted in geopolitical benefits for Iran. Once confronted on its western flank by Ba’athist Iraq, Iran now faces a Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government that is friendly and considerate of Iran’s security, political, religious, and economic interests. To varying degrees, Iran protected and nurtured the sympathetic Iraqi political parties, such as al-Da’wa and ISCI, that now dominate the central government, many provincial councils, and the security forces. The removal of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq facilitated the completion of an Iranian arc of influence that runs from Iraq through Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. Thus, at first glance, the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Iraq may enable the Islamic Republic to consolidate primacy not only in the northern part of the Persian Gulf region but also in the Arab Levant. Yet, the reality is much more complex. Although Iran’s ultimate objectives are unclear, Iraq may not be as tractable as Iran first assumed, even without a sizable U.S. force presence. Iran’s central goals are to • preserve the velayat-e faqih [rule of the supreme jurisprudent], the Islamic Republic’s political/ideological foundation, in the face of internal social, political, and economic pressures • deter threats to its national security from any quarter • have a say in all regional issues that are perceived to affect these preceding two objectives.2 A relatively stable, Shi’a-ruled, and friendly Iraq will allow Iran to pursue these goals with greater ease. From Iran’s point of view, the drawdown is the denouement of the U.S. project in Iraq: Having failed to reshape the Middle East, the United States must withdraw its troops, leaving Iran’s sense of geopolitical power and purpose intact. The Iranians expect the drawdown will continue, not create, the expansion of Iranian regional influence that is already in motion.

Iran backed terror groups will attack US withdrawing forces

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Shi’a Special Groups. The Iran-backed Special Groups pose the greatest direct threat from Shi’a extremists to U.S. forces in Iraq. Attacks on U.S. forces by the Special Groups, which peaked in mid-2007, rely on indirect fire, IEDs, car bombs (known as vehicle-borne IEDs), and assassinations of key individuals. The majority of Special Group activities are concentrated in and around Baghdad, with substantial activity also noted in al-Kut, Hillah, Karbala, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Basra.41 The groups tend to consolidate their positions in rural areas outside of the cities as opposed to trying to control urban territory.42 The Special Groups suffered significantly from ISF offensives in Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Baghdad, and Karbala in 2007–2008. A surge of anti-Iranian sentiment among Iraqis has led many Shi’a to inform on the whereabouts of the Special Groups. However, in view of the groups’ ambiguous relationship with the Sadrists, who have moved toward greater political participation, and in light of the apparent decline of the quantity of Iranian technology being provided to the Iraqi insurgency, the access and capabilities of such groups have become highly uncertain. Iran’s support for the Special Groups appears to have fallen, and Tehran may well have calculated that Iranian interests are now best served by an orderly drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. This does not mean that Iranian troublemaking can be written off, however. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’s role as mediator and guarantor of the March 2008 ceasefire between JAM and the ISF in Basra demonstrated Iran’s ability to control Special Group actions, indicating that it is capable of renewing Special Group attacks in Iraq at any time. Additionally, any renewal of JAM operations in south and central Iraq would undoubtedly increase the possibility of the Special Groups renewing operations as well.43 The Special Groups may also want to claim credit for driving out the occupier and may therefore stage attacks for propaganda purposes. In any case, the Special Groups have the potential to pose a real threat to U.S. personnel, including withdrawing forces (who will be particularly vulnerable to IEDs), residual forces, and civilians. In particular, the relative isolation of U.S. personnel in Talil and the fact that Dhi Qar serves as a vital strategic base and supply route for the Special Groups should be a consideration in the structuring of the drawdown.

Withdrawal Bad – Iran Rise

US withdrawal would cause Iran to rise up and take control over Iraq, which would be undesirable for the US.

Friedman 10 (George, American political scientist and author, *Business Insider*, April 21st, 2010, <http://www.businessinsider.com/stratfor-iraq-us-iran-2010-4>) NK

All of this turned what was intended to be a short-term operation into an extended war from which the United States could not extract itself. The United States could not leave because it had created a situation in which the Iranian military was the most powerful force in the Persian Gulf region. Absent the United States, the Iranians would dominate Iraq. They would not actually have to invade (Iran’s military has a limited ability to project force far from its borders in any case) to extract massive political and economic concessions from both Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. An unchecked Iran, quite apart from its not-yet-extant nuclear capability, represents a profound strategic threat to the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Assuming the nuclear issue was settled tomorrow either diplomatically or through attacks, the strategic problem would remain unchanged, as the central problem is conventional, not nuclear.

Withdrawal Bad – Infighting

Troops key to stopping multiple parties from infighting – ensuring a better Iraq

Biddle et al 8 (Stephen, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution. Foreign affairs October/September http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63565/stephen-biddle-michael-e-ohanlon-and-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq) ELJ

If the prognosis in Iraq were hopelessly grim, it might make sense for the United States to threaten withdrawal, hold its breath, and hope for the best. But the prognosis is now much more promising than it has been in years, making a threat of withdrawal far from necessary. With a degree of patience, the United States can build on a pattern of positive change in Iraq that offers it a chance to draw down troops soon without giving up hope for sustained stability. The last 18 months have brought major changes in the underlying strategic calculus facing Iraq's main combatants -- undermining the Sunni insurgency, weakening the Shiite militias, severely degrading al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), strengthening the Iraqi security forces (ISF), and creating new, more positive political dynamics and incentives. But these developments have also brought new, if less acute, challenges to the fore -- demanding corresponding changes in U.S. and Iraqi strategy. Simply staying the course will not work under the new conditions in Iraq.

Withdrawal Bad – Middle East Resurgence

The worst thing for the U.S. to do is to withdraw from the middle east

Reeson 6 ( Greg, Senior Author GOP, October 2006, <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/14476>) **JRG**

Pulling American troops out now would give the jihadists the victory they have long been searching for, would make America look weak in the eyes of the world, would thrust Iraq into a bloody civil war, and would create a power vacuum in the Middle East that would allow Iran to establish itself as the regional hegemon. Those are the true consequences of a premature American withdrawal.

Withdrawal Bad – War

Rapid Withdrawal from Iraq could lead to Iraq becoming a terrorist hub and training facility, while causing more wars.

Rimton and Drash 7 (Hugh and Wayne, Correspondents for CNN, CNN, May 3rd, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/>) NK

"What we must prevent is central/western Iraq [from] becoming a Sunni militant state that threatens our interests directly as an international terror hub," he said. Don Shepperd, a retired Air Force major-general and military analyst for CNN, agreed that Sunni Muslim fighters who support al Qaeda would seek an enclave inside a lawless Iraq likely riven along sectarian lines into Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish regions. There would be "increasing attempts by terrorists to establish a training sanctuary in Iraq," Shepperd said. That's one of the reasons why a fast withdrawal will not happen, whatever the politicians say, the analysts predict. ([Watch why a radical Shiite cleric wants U.S. troops out](javascript:cnnVideo('play','/video/world/2007/05/02/riminton.iraq.withdrawal.debate.cnn','2009/05/01');) [Video](javascript:cnnVideo('play','/video/world/2007/05/02/riminton.iraq.withdrawal.debate.cnn','2009/05/01');)) "Everyone wants the troops home -- the Iraqis, the U.S., the world -- but no one wants a precipitous withdrawal that produces a civil war, a bloodbath, nor a wider war in an unstable Mideast," Shepperd said, adding that the image of the United States was important too.

Quick Withdrawal could cause surrounding countries to enter into a nuclear arms race and possible a nuclear war, turning case.

Rimton and Drash 7 (Hugh and Wayne, Correspondents for CNN, CNN, May 3rd, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/>) NK

On top of that, Iran could speed up its nuclear ambitions, causing a "daunting and depressing scenario" of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Turkey trying to get a nuclear bomb, Shepperd says. But Alterman also fears that an Iraq left without U.S. support could turn into a center for international terrorism and a proxy battlefield for regional powers like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. "All the surrounding countries would think their interests are much better maintained not by directly sending troops but by continuing to send money and weapons to the people fighting that war," he said. "In my judgment, it would take decades for such an insurgency to quiet down."

A war in Iraq would cause extremists to launch nuclear missiles.

Lindley 2 (Daniel, assistant professor specializing in international relations, foreign policy and security studies at the University of Notre Dame, *Notre Dame News*, <http://newsinfo.nd.edu/news/3717-chicago-tribune-war-against-iraq-a-dangerous-bet/>) NK

Many things may serve to add fuel to the extremist fire and make it hard for the U.S. to control the consequences of this war. Hezbollah militants, backed by Syria and Iran, have stockpiled thousands of surface-to-surface missiles in southern Lebanon. The most likely aim is to provoke an Israeli backlash, perhaps reimposition of a security buffer zone in Lebanon. This would inflame Arab public opinion against the U.S. and Israel on the eve of an Iraq war. Iran and Syria are highly motivated to try to stop a large U.S. presence in Iraq, as both would end up encircled by the U.S. and its allies. If a U.S. attack on Iraq did not destabilize Pakistan, the addition of an Israeli re-entry into Lebanon might.

Nuclear terrorism results in extinction

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, Political analyst, Al-Ahram weekly September 1, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) ELJ

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Withdrawal Bad – US defeat/Bloodbath

Withdrawal leads to civil war and a weakened US

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

That's one of the reasons why a fast withdrawal will not happen, whatever the politicians say, the analysts predict. (Watch why a radical Shiite cleric wants U.S. troops out ) "Everyone wants the troops home -- the Iraqis, the U.S., the world -- but no one wants a precipitous withdrawal that produces a civil war, a bloodbath, nor a wider war in an unstable Mideast," Shepperd said, adding that the image of the United States was important too. "And we do not want a U.S that is perceived as having been badly defeated in the global war on terror or as an unreliable future ally or coalition partner." Shepperd, a veteran fighter pilot of the Vietnam War, has served as a CNN analyst of the Iraq war since it began. Bergen was one of the first Western journalists to ever meet with bin Laden, and is considered a leading authority on al Qaeda.

Withdrawal Bad – African Nuclear Weapons

Withdrawal from Iraq causes nuclear weapons in Africa to come about.

Mauro 7 (Ryan, National Security Researcher for the Christian Action Network and a published author, Global Politician. May 7th, 2007. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq>) NK

The subsequent nuclear arms race may force Libya to re-start its nuclear program, having no longer to fear U.S. action but having to fear its nuclear-armed neighbors. Insurgency in North Africa would expand, as Iran would likely increase support to organizations like the GIA in Algeria, furthering the civil war there. The United States would not have the willpower to stop the genocide in Sudan. The Sudanese government, an ally of Iran (and previously of Saddam Hussein), may find hope in America’s withdrawal and increase, or at least stay focused on, their brutal activities in Darfur.

Withdrawal Bad – Foreign Conflict

The U.S. must face withdrawing presence could limit it’s abilities to prevent foreign conflicts.

RAND 10(National Defense Research Inst ,Security in Iraq, 2010,<http://gulf.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf_Security_in_Iraq.pdf>

The violent threat posed by JAM appears to have subsided and may even be further defused by the U.S. withdrawal. At the same time, the United States faces the sober reality that its ability to prevent large-scale conflict among the main political players has limits and will decline as the U.S. military presence does.

Withdrawal Bad – Genocide

Withdrawing from Iraq is not an option, violence could spark genocide.

Kissinger 7(Henry A., Nobel Peace Prize winner, Political scientist, Withdrawing is not an Option ,January 2007,

<http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KissingerTestimony070131.pdf>)

But under present conditions, withdrawal is not an option. American forces are indispensable. They are in Iraq not as a favor to its government or as a reward for its conduct. They are there as an expression of the American national interest to prevent the Iranian combination of imperialism and fundamentalist ideology from dominating a region on which the energy supplies of the industrial democracies depend. An abrupt American departure would greatly complicate efforts to stem the terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf would be tempted into preemptive concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict in Iraq to genocidal dimensions beyond levels that impelled U.S. intervention in the Balkans. Graduated withdrawal would not ease these dangers until a different strategy was in place and showed progress.

U.S. Withdrawal will lead to genocidal violence in Iraq

Reeson 6 (Greg, The New Media Journal Senior, October 2006, The American Chronicle, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/14476) JRG

His Mehdi Army has confronted U.S. and coalition troops in battle and his followers are largely responsible for the Shiite death squads attacking the Sunni minority and pushing Iraq closer to all-out civil war. Al-Sadr is closely aligned with the Shiite leadership in Iran and he has consistently called for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq. The absence of U.S. troops would allow Al-Sadr’s militia to conduct a genocide campaign against the Sunnis while providing Iran with additional leverage over the government in Baghdad.

Withdrawal Bad – Land Grab

Withdrawal leads to regional powers grabbing for Iraqi land

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

Shepperd said Iraq's neighbors would be drawn into the all-out civil war likely if U.S. forces left too quickly. Iran could move in to further strengthen its influence in southern Iraq; Turkey likely would move against the Kurds in the north; and Saudi Arabia would be inclined to take action to protect Sunnis in western Iraq, he said.

Withdrawal Bad – Asian Prolif

Withdrawal from Iraq causes nuclear weapons in Asia.

Mauro 7 (Ryan, National Security Researcher for the Christian Action Network and a published author, Global Politician. May 7th, 2007. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq>) NK

American forces would be less able to block the shipment of drugs, banned goods, and WMD technology from North Korea to the Middle East. This increased revenue would help shore up North Korea’s oppressive regime, and allow them to arm our enemies. China’s rise in power would become inevitable and accelerated, as our Asian allies doubted our commitments, and would decide on appeasement and entering China’s sphere of influence, rather than relying upon America. The new dynamics in Asia, with allies of America questioning our strength, would result in a nuclear arms race. Japan would have no option but to develop nuclear weapons (although she may do so regardless). Two scenarios would arise: China would dominate the Pacific and America’s status as a superpower would quickly recede, or there would be a region wide nuclear stalemate involving Burma, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan and Australia. The consequences of a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq are not limited to Iraqi territory, or even to the region. They are felt worldwide,

in every conflicted nation and every oppressed people.

Withdrawal Bad – US-UK Relations

Withdrawal from Iraq undermines the US-UK alliance.

Gardiner 7 (Nile, Ph. D, The Heritage Foundation, April 27th, 2007, <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/12237.pdf>) NK

The Senate’s decision to support a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq undermines and weakens the Anglo-American special relationship and U.S.-U.K. leadership on the world stage. Following a 218-208 House vote calling for a withdrawal timetable, the Senate voted by 51 to 46 this week to approve a war-spending bill that would force the exit of American forces starting in October 2007, with a target for complete withdrawal from Iraq by March 31, 2008. This vote sends the wrong message at a time when American and British personnel are engaged in defending Iraq’s fledgling democracy. Congress is sending a clear signal of defeat to America’s enemies in Iraq and across the world, which undercuts the United State’s closest ally, Great Britain, as well as the Iraqi government. This astonishing move will undermine morale in the international coalition in Iraq and, if enacted, would make Britain’s position in southern Iraq untenable.

Withdrawal Bad – Oil/Nuclear Arms Race

Withdrawal causes a grab for Iraq oil, cumulating in a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

The oil sector could also get hit hard, with Iran potentially mining the Persian Gulf and attempting to close the Straits of Hormuz, putting a stranglehold on oil flow, Shepperd says. "Oil prices would skyrocket," he said -- perhaps soaring from current prices of about $60 a barrel to more than $100 a barrel, with consequent rises at the gas pump. And that could bring further trouble, Shepperd added. "Saudi Arabia will not allow increasing Iranian dominance to endanger its regime and oil economy." On top of that, Iran could speed up its nuclear ambitions, causing a "daunting and depressing scenario" of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Turkey trying to get a nuclear bomb, Shepperd says.

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism/Proxy Wars

Premature withdrawal from Iraq makes iraq a haven for terrorist and a proxy battlefield

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

Observers such as Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, say a wider Mideast conflict could be avoided. But Alterman also fears that an Iraq left without U.S. support could turn into a center for international terrorism and a proxy battlefield for regional powers like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. "All the surrounding countries would think their interests are much better maintained not by directly sending troops but by continuing to send money and weapons to the people fighting that war," he said. "In my judgment, it would take decades for such an insurgency to quiet down." There are 120,000 Iraq soldiers now classified as trained by the U.S. military in Iraq, along with 135,000 police force members. But the head of the Iraqi ground forces, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed, recently told CNN that some of his soldiers don't even get paid, and that on any given day one quarter of the force is on vacation. For U.S. troops on the ground, the idea of withdrawal is vexing. "I think it would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq -- enemies of the government -- would take advantage of," said U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group. Staff Sgt. Matthew St. Pierre is one U.S. soldier who's come to the conclusion the United States cannot win the war, but he says he also fears the consequences of withdrawal. "We are the buffer right now and when we pull out, the people who support us are going to feel the wrath, and the people who are against us ... they're going to ultimately win. And I think that's unfortunate," he said. That is a prognosis that concerns many, though Shepperd sees a viable solution for Iraq, albeit one with a U.S. presence there for years to come. "Done properly we should be in Iraq for years, not in a combat [role], but an embedded advisory role," he said.

\*\*\*Leadership Advantage\*\*\*

Withdrawal Bad – Loss of Hegemony

U.S. Military withdrawal is appeasement for Al Qaeda, our hegemonic strength would weaken

Balanced Politics 7( Political Social Issues, September 2007,

http://www.balancedpolitics.org/iraq\_withdrawal.htm)J RG

It would give Al Qaeda a symbolic victory and become the basis of future recruiting propaganda. Osama bin Laden's own recruiting videos cite the examples of Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia as evidence of America's tendency to cut-and-run when the going gets tough. The terrorist attacks on innocent Iraqi civilians have no other purpose than to manipulate the news media and weaken the will of the American public. If we retreat once again before the job is done, it would provide the best example yet of how terrorism works. It would reinforce the Al Qaeda propaganda that America is indeed a "paper tiger" that doesn't have the will to fight.

**U.S. troop withdrawal will weaken the security the U.S. poses over alliances. U.S. security will decrease, other countries could be endangered.**

Galbraith 6(James, U.T. Economics, April 2006, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Iraq/Withdrawal_Symptoms.html>) **JRG**

But now Iraq has once again exposed what military power cannot achieve, short of nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea have taken notice. Meanwhile, our friends, the Europeans and the Japanese, must be asking themselves: Exactly what sort of security does the American alliance buy, and at what price? Bush and Cheney have done more than merely bungle a war and damage the Army. They have destroyed the foundation of the post-Cold War world security system, which was the accepted authority of American military power. That reputation is now gone. It cannot be restored simply by retreating from Iraq. This does not mean that every ongoing alliance will now collapse. But they are all more vulnerable than they were before, and once we leave central Iraq, they will be weaker still. As these paper tigers start to blow in the wind, so too will America's economic security erode. From this point of view, the fuss over whether we were misled into war-Is the sky blue? Is the grass green?-stands in the way of a deeper debate that should start quite soon and ask this question: Now that Bush and Cheney have screwed up the only successful known model for world security under our leadership, what the devil do we do?

U.S. troop withdrawal could allow just elected corruptive government officials to take control of U.S hegemony in the middle east

Schwartz 10(Michael, Socialogy New York State, April 2010, Is the U.S. losing its grip in Iraq?, <http://socialistworker.org/2010/04/02/losing-the-grip-in-iraq>) JRG

The presumptive winners want absolutely no alteration of the withdrawal process. They want radically changed government policies. And they have—at least rhetorically—registered their resistance to the oil deals because of their accommodation with international oil companies. Of course, the U.S. complains that these arrangements are not sufficiently accommodating .So it does look like the outcome of the election is going to create yet another set of problems for the U.S. ambition that Iraq become the headquarters of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. But these difficulties may not even approach what the U.S. military says it fears: a “breakdown” of order. Keep in mind that this government has almost no presence outside the Green Zone. Whatever debates occur will largely be about Green Zone policies that have only tangential impact in the rest of the country, with the exception of the policies involving oil, which could—if they produce new revenues—result in resources that could have a profound impact on daily life.

Withdrawal Bad – US Perception

Iraqis view as the US having no direction

Los Angeles Times 10 (Ned Parker, Staff Reporter, 6/25/10, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/world/la-fg-iraq-drift-20100626>)

Iraqi officials said they had detected a lack of direction even before Obama tapped Petraeus to replace his commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who stepped down this week after he and his team made disparaging comments about U.S. civilian leaders. The Iraqis describe U.S. Embassy officials in Baghdad as obsessed with bringing an end to the large-scale U.S. troop presence in Iraq. They believe the embassy's single-mindedness has often left the United States veering from crisis to crisis here. Some U.S. military officers and Western analysts have also criticized what they see as a failure to think beyond the planned drawdown to 50,000 noncombat troops by the end of August. The lack of focus may leave an opening for Iraq's neighbor and the United States' rival — Iran.

Withdrawal from Iraq will damage US relations with other countries.

Nicholson 7 (Brendan, AAP, LexisNexis, February 23rd, 2007, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

Dr Nelson, in his speech, continued to maintain that it would be wrong for coalition forces to withdraw from Iraq now. He said anyone familiar with US domestic politics would understand the risk if the US adopted an isolationist foreign policy in response to a premature retreat from Iraq. "Whatever anybody thinks about the Australia-US alliance . . . it will be damaged if the US leaves Iraq in a situation where the al-Qaeda and others are able to say they have prevailed," he said.

Withdrawing troops from Iraq is irresponsible and hurts our security.

Hallow 8 (Ralph, Editor of *Washington Post*, *Washington Post*, LexisNexis, April 8th, 2008, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

Sen. John McCain said yesterday that he doesn't want U.S. forces to stay in Iraq one minute more than necessary but that his Democratic opponents' withdrawal promises are irresponsible and threaten American security. "Some would withdraw regardless of the consequences. Others say that we can withdraw now and then return if trouble starts again," the presumptive Republican standard-bearer said in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Kansas City, Mo. "What [the Democrats] are really proposing, if they mean what they say, is a policy of withdraw and re-invade," Mr. McCain said, without naming Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois or any other specific Democrat. Mr. McCain said he wants U.S. forces withdrawn as soon as Iraq is stable. "I do not want to keep our troops in Iraq a minute longer than necessary to secure our interests there," which may be "perhaps sooner than many imagine," he said. "To promise a withdrawal of our forces from Iraq, regardless of the calamitous consequences to the Iraqi people, our most vital interests and the future of the Middle East, is the height of irresponsibility," Mr. McCain said. "It is a failure of leadership." The senator from Arizona timed his remarks to raise the curtain on testimony by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Ryan C. Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, before two Senate committees today and two House committees tomorrow.

Withdrawal Bad – US Credibility

Withdrawal from Iraq with Destroy US credibility and Middle East relations

Simon 7 (Steven, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Middle Eastern Studies, “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007 ACW)

Military disengagement will be a severe blow to the United States, which staked its prestige and defined its security on the basis of a war to disarm Iraq and transform its politics. Disengaging will signify the inability to achieve these strategic goals. American resolve will likely be questioned. In the near to medium term, this could make it harder, perhaps much harder, to influence Middle Eastern governments when Washington most needs their cooperation to stabilize Iraq and push back against Iran, without further stoking regional sectarian rivalries. The dismal irony is this: Proponents of an indefinite commitment of U.S. forces seek above all to preserve the core American interest in demonstrating resolve; but that demonstration cannot ultimately be sustained and, in any case, has been devalued by the fundamentally flawed nature of the intervention and its 10 aftermath. The jihadis already believe that they have won while Iran is convinced that it has the upper hand, despite the tenacity of U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. It is possible that neighboring countries will intensify their competition

US credibility be severely damaged whether or not we withdraw

Simon 7 (Steven, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Middle Eastern Studies, “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007 ACW)

Influential policymakers and experts argue that irrespective of whether Iraq’s root problems are external or internal, a robust and sustained U.S. military commitment to Iraq is inextricably linked to the broader credibility of the United States as a security guarantor. From this standpoint, reputation is the cornerstone of deterrence, and disengagement from Iraq before it is stabilized would inevitably invite new challenges to U.S. interests. The historical record, however, suggests that credibility is not necessarily cumulative. In reality, rivals constantly reevaluate one another’s capabilities in the overall context of the prevailing strategic environment. They do not, typically, hurl dramatic challenges toward their competitors on the basis of what their rival did or did not do in the past and under different circumstances. Admittedly, this is truer of states than of terrorist organizations of Hamas’s or al-Qaeda’s ilk, which tend to project episodes from their respective enemies’ past onto the present in a rigidly simplistic way. Whether the United States stays or goes, global jihadis and their supporters will believe that they have already won twice over: first, by virtue of the intervention, which confirmed their narrative, and second, by creating the appearance of having thwarted Washington’s allegedly imperial designs. A U.S. decision to disengage militarily from Iraq will reaffirm these beliefs. However, given the size of the propaganda victory the United States has already conferred on Islamic extremists, and the way that U.S. military operations continue to confirm the jihadi worldview, a decision to remain in Iraq so as to avoid emboldening radicals is inevitably quixotic. As to the administration’s concern that disengagement would weaken the resolve of regional states to counter the jihadi threat, the fact is that chaos in Iraq has been used by Sunni governments in the region to justify their resistance to reform and to legitimize repression. A loss of will, therefore, is scarcely the problem. The more pressing issue is the effect of backpedaling on reform on the growth of radicalism Even if rival states, such as Syria and Iran, or global jihadis, are momentarily emboldened by a managed American disengagement, the central question is whether that cost would outweigh the blow to American credibility of floundering ineffectually in Iraq while supplying the Muslim world with iconic images of seeming weakness and cruelty. If a viable Iraqi political center is unachievable in the meaningful future, the answer must be no.

Withdrawal Bad – US Credibility

**US Soft power will be held responsible for negative consequences**

Rand 10(RAND Institue, Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) dc

Substantial violence against vulnerable groups would, without question, present tremendous humanitarian concerns. In addition, it would have a variety of adverse repercussions for the United States, Iraq, and the region more broadly. As the country globally seen as responsible for the Iraq war, the United States would be held accountable for any negative humanitarian repercussions. Perceptions of the United States, at home and abroad, may be particularly eroded by failure to effectively protect and assist U.S.-affiliated Iraqis. Failure of the United States to protect and help the people who were willing to help Americans would be rightly seen as a particularly egregious moral violation. In the Middle East and around the world, this would feed into and would be used to build anti-U.S. sentiment. That, in turn, would hamper U.S. efforts on a broad range of issues as the United States seeks to rebuild its global image and influence. Importantly, such a deleterious outcome would ultimately set a poor precedent for future U.S.-led military operations, making local citizens elsewhere less likely to help the United States. Successful attacks against the truly vulnerable may also be a starting point for broader violence in Iraq if group tensions escalate into cycles of provocation and reprisal. A demonstrated failure of the Iraqi Security Forces to keep these people safe would also undermine faith in Iraq’s government more broadly, feeding violence and instability and damaging security not just in Iraq, but the broader region. The likelihood that there will be substantial violence against vulnerable people varies somewhat from group to group. Some level of violence against minorities, such as the Yazidis, and refugee groups, such as the Palestinians, who live within Iraqi communities, is fairly likely, as are some attacks against U.S. allies. Such violence is also more likely if the government of Iraq does not place a priority on the protection of the vulnerable. High levels of violence are more likely if the overall security situation worsens.

US troop withdrawal will push blame on the US for vulnerable people

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

After U.S. forces depart, long-term stability in Iraq will require accommodation of

vulnerable groups, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Although these problems

will persist regardless of the pace or modalities of the U.S. drawdown and eventual

withdrawal, there are some measures that can be taken to mitigate their risks.

Groups that may be vulnerable to attack after U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq

include Iraqis who have been affiliated with the United States or U.S. organizations who

may be targeted by extremist groups, foreign nationals working in Iraq as contractors, minority groups that have come to rely on U.S. forces for protection from extremists (and in some cases elements of the ISF), Palestinian and other refugees who came to Iraq under Saddam Hussein and

whose support for the former regime makes them targets for attack, the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a cult-like dissident group from Iran that was supported by Saddam. None of these groups has reason to believe that the ISF will protect them. Many directly depend on U.S. forces for security, and others count on the influence U.S. forces exercise over the ISF. As the country seen as responsible for the Iraq War, the United States could be held accountable for any harm that might come to vulnerable groups. Moreover, the United States would be open to accusations that the withdrawal has aggravated the security situation. If the ISF fail to keep these people safe, faith in Iraq’s government more broadly would be undermined.

Withdrawal Bad – US Credibility

US withdrawal causes loss of credibility

Wehrey 10 (Frederic Wehrey, “The Iraq Impact”, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) PG

The conventional Israeli view is that an American withdrawal could be dangerous, further eroding U.S. influence. What one Israeli analyst calls the “Israeli neo-con school” thinks a U.S. withdrawal will be a disaster for U.S. image, prestige, and influence in the region. And since what is good for the United States is good for Israel in their view, a U.S. withdrawal can be very damaging. In March 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert spoke publicly about concerns over the instability that would result if the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, and how the Americans would lose their authority in the Middle East (Rosner, Benn, and Barkat, 2007. Former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni also warned of similar consequences if “we appease the extremists . . .” (Rosner, 2007). Echoing such sentiments, an Israeli defense official and other Israeli analysts expressed several central concerns regarding a “premature” American withdrawal from Iraq, including some of the concerns outlined above: a stronger Iran; the potential for renewed civil war that

will challenge Jordanian stability as Iraqi refugees flee; a psychological victory for violent extremists leading to the export of terrorism to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Israel; and the solidification of a “loser image” for the United States and, by extension, Israel.

China and Russia become the go to nations

Wehrey 10 (Frederic Wehrey, “The Iraq Impact”, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) PG

The decline in U.S. standing in the Middle East following the Iraq War created opportunities for other extraregional actors to expand their influence in regional affairs, notably China and Russia. Although the source of this decline cannot be reduced to a single event, the Iraq coflict contributed to doubts that the United States is no longer the guarantor of regional security it once was, to say nothing of its effect on per- ceptions of U.S. moral authority. This effect can be observed in Arab public opinion, in which U.S. favorability ratings sharply declined in the years following 2003. Although views of the United States have

somewhat improved after the election of President Obama, polls in key countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, show continued negative views of the United States and its policies in the region.

No Solvency – Military Strain

Furthermore a downsized military adds to the strain

**America news;, 05 (** issued Aug. 22 http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/61987/is-the-u.s-military-overstretched%3F.htm)l

**A Downsized Military Adds to Strain**  **But policy analyst Jack Spencer of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation** reminds foreign policy critics that some stress is to be expected because the United States is on a war footing. He **says, "Certainly, the U.S. military is stressed right now. But we’re engaged in the global war on terrorism. And I would suggest that we don’t need a military so large that we’re able to take on such a huge endeavor - - one that is vital to the national interest - - without feeling a little bit of stress.”**   **Most analysts say the United States’ armed forces are still recovering from the 1990s, when troop levels and budgets were slashed even as they took on peacekeeping missions in countries like Somalia and Bosnia.**  Military sociologist David Segal of the University of Maryland says America’s armed forces are being used in ways for which they weren’t originally structured. The result, he says, has caused a disconnect between military force capabilities and national security policy. "We now have a force structure that is an artifact of decisions that were made during the Cold War to support a national security strategy of deterrence and defense. We downsized from there and moved in the 1990s from deterrence and defense to participation in contingency operations in places like Kosovo, as well as peacekeeping in places like the Sinai. **Then we sort of slipped from contingency operations to continuous operations during the period when we were downsizing without considering whether we could actually do that.** And I think the answer is that we can’t.”

No Solvency – Loss of Hegemony

US withdrawal will decrease its ability to prevent large scale conflict

Gompert 10 (David,Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>)

At the same time, the United States faces the sober reality that its ability to prevent large-scale conflict among the main political players has limits and will decline as the U.S. military presence does. Hence, second only to the challenge of keeping the major groups in the political process—and contributing to meeting that challenge—the most important U.S. role will be its support of the ISF, which, in turn, will pay dividends only if the ISF behave responsibly and in the interests of a unified Iraqi state rather than to advance the partisan agendas of the ruling Shi’a parties. Consequently, the next chapter examines U.S. responsibilities toward developing the capabilities and professionalism of the ISF.

No Solvency - Credibility

Rapid withdrawal from Iraq will damage the US’s credibility.

DefendDemocracy No Date Given (Defend Democracy, <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24946&Itemid=380>) NK

A precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would significantly damage the U.S.’s reputation, and would make regional actors very hesitant to align themselves with the U.S. in the future. At the same time, it would strengthen al-Qaeda by allowing them to claim that they have now defeated a second superpower on the battlefield.

Troop Re-Deployment

Troops removed from Iraq will be used in Afghanistan

Wilson. 10. ("Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says." Washington Post, 5-27 sec a-1) White House correspondent for the Washington Post. correspondent in Latin America Middle East, and Jerusalem Bureau Chief.

Speaking Saturday at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., Obama said that the U.S. commitment to Iraq endures and that, as U.S. troops depart, "a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress." He also reiterated his definition of success: "an Iraq that provides no haven to terrorists; a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant." On the day Obama spoke, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq dipped below the number in Afghanistan for the first time since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Biden, once a leading skeptic of U.S. involvement in Iraq, is now among the country's most ardent cheerleaders. He is seeking to balance Obama's determination to leave Iraq against growing concerns among some conservative critics that the current circumstances make a swift U.S. withdrawal too dangerous. Senior administration officials counter that Iraq's fledgling democracy, now defended by improved domestic security forces, is sturdy enough to solve the country's problems with far fewer U.S. troops on hand. But even some of the administration's supporters say that analysis is grounded more in the rising demands of the war in Afghanistan -- where U.S. troop levels are expected to reach 100,000 by the end of the summer -- than in an impartial assessment of Iraq's progress. The withdrawal plan calls for reducing U.S. troops in Iraq from 92,000 today to 50,000 by the end of August, down from a peak of about 170,000 during 2007. The last U.S. troops are scheduled to exit at the end of 2011. "Leaving Iraq is not only a public relations issue, but a recovery-of-force issue," said John A. Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, who served as an Army officer in Iraq and helped write the Army's counterinsurgency field manual. "The Army has not recovered from its surge into Iraq, and now it is surging in Afghanistan, which hasn't turned the corner at all." "There are many connections between the two wars," Nagl said, "and the fact we only have one Army is one of them. We just don't have enough Army to do everything we want it to do right now."

Troops removed from Iraq will be used in Afghanistan

Wilson. 10. ("Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says." Washington Post, 5-27 sec a-1) White House correspondent for the Washington Post. correspondent in Latin America Middle East, and Jerusalem Bureau Chief.

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\*\*\*Regional Stability Advantage\*\*\*

No Solvency

Regional Actors don’t care about withdrawal timeframes as long as the withdrawal happens

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Iraq’s neighbors (see Figure 5.1) know now that the United States will withdraw its forces from Iraq, and they have begun to assess how the withdrawal will affect their national interests. Regional players may also be calculating, as the United States is, what contingencies may occur in Iraq as a result of the withdrawal, and they may be considering how they might take advantage of possible developments and contain adverse impacts. In our judgment, key regional actors’ interests and likely strategies are not closely related to alternative drawdown timetables, but rather to the withdrawal itself and the nature of the United States’ follow-on relationship with Iraq. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, four of the six states bordering Iraq, have cultivated—and will likely continue to cultivate—proxies inside Iraq. In some cases, these countries have also supported and will likely continue to support Iraqi exile groups that may have a role in affecting developments in Iraq. Moreover, Syria hosts over 1 million Iraqi refugees. Most importantly, elites in each of these countries believe that their national interests will be affected in important ways by developments in Iraq. Compared with other regional actors, therefore, these four countries have both higher motivations to intervene and greater capabilities to do so. To the extent that Jordan and Kuwait intervene in Iraq, we expect such intervention to largely align with U.S. interests. That said, because the drawdown could exacerbate the Iraqi refugee challenge within Jordan, we consider that potential risk in Chapter Six, Risk Mitigation.

Withdrawal Bad – Middle East War

Withdrawal will cause Middle East war

Carpenter 10 (Ted, Cato Institute Vice President for defense and foreign policy Studies, *Iraq is Defenseless*, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11890)

It's obvious to everyone that post-Saddam Iraq has an array of internal weaknesses. Hatred between Sunnis and Shiites exploded into near civil war in 2006 — 2007, and animosity between those religious factions continues to roil. Relations between Arabs (both Sunnis and Shiites) and Kurds are also tense and could easily lead to armed conflict, especially over the political status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Iraq's political system borders on the dysfunctional, as evidenced by the continuing inability to form a new government months after national elections.

What is less obvious but could prove extremely troubling for the United States is Iraq's extraordinarily weak position in its region. Iraq is incapable of defending itself from the depredations of several more powerful neighbors. Worse, there is no sign that this situation will improve in the foreseeable future.

Several incidents underscore Baghdad's nearly helpless posture. In 2008, Turkey's anger boiled over regarding the ability of the domestic Kurdish insurgent group PKK to use sanctuaries in Iraqi Kurdistan to launch attacks into southeastern Turkey. Ankara then conducted a military offensive to disrupt those enclaves. There was little that either Baghdad or the Kurdish regional government could do in response to that contemptuous violation of Iraq's sovereignty.

The reality is that Iraq is a weak player surrounded by neighbors who do not especially wish it well.

Apparently taking a page from Ankara's playbook, Iran launched punitive assaults in May and June of this year against another Kurdish group that is waging an insurgency against the Tehran regime. Not only have Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory and killed rebel fighters there, but Iran has now reportedly established a fort on Iraq's side of the border. That step suggests that those troops plan to stay a while. As in the case of Turkey's earlier incursion, Baghdad could do little except issue a mewling diplomatic protest.

The U.S. Military is skeptical of a pullout due to the possibility of middle east resurgence

World Socialist 9( World Social Issues Organization, June 2009, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/pers-j30.shtml) **JRG**

American commanders, while outwardly optimistic, have not been able to hide their apprehension over the withdrawal from the cities. To shore up the Iraqi army, some 10,000 US troops are currently embedded as “trainers” in its ranks—a number that will increase to over 50,000 over the coming months. Baghdad’s western suburbs have been creatively categorised as “outside” the urban area. Aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery and rapid response units are on constant standby to assist Iraqi forces when needed.

The concerns are not only that insurgent groups will take advantage of the US withdrawal to regroup in Iraq’s cities and resume significant resistance to both the Maliki government and American troops. Both Washington and its puppet government are worried that the social plight of the Iraqi working class and popular opposition to the concessions Maliki is making to US imperialism and foreign capital could give rise to large-scale protests and unrest.

Withdrawal Bad – Middle East War

A Fast withdraw by the U.S. military could lead to terroristic resurgence in the middle east.

Susman 9( Tina, National Correspondent and Foreign Correspondent, June 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/23/world/fg-iraq23>) **JRG**

BAGHDAD — U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker on Thursday warned against a hasty withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and offered a sobering assessment of the country despite what he called its "remarkable transition" in the last two years….Obama would like to have all the troops out by spring 2010. An agreement forged by the Bush administration and the Iraqi government calls for the last troops to leave by the end of 2011, though it is subject to change. Whatever happens, the ambassador said that if it were to be a "precipitous withdrawal, that could be very dangerous." Crocker said he was confident that was not the direction Obama was going. However, the president campaigned on a promise to end the war in Iraq, and with violence at its lowest level since 2003 and commanders in Afghanistan saying they need more troops, Obama will face pressure to move quickly on his campaign vow. In a conference call Wednesday night with Obama, Crocker said, he and the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, gave their assessments of the security situation in Iraq. He would not say what they told the president, though Odierno has also urged caution in reducing forces.Crocker, a career diplomat who arrived in Iraq in March 2007, when sectarian bloodshed was at its highest level, said fear remained "very pervasive" despite security improvements."Security does have to be maintained. Neither the Iraqis nor we can take our eye off that ball," he said."A precipitous withdrawal runs some very severe risks," he added, citing the possible effects "if we were to decide suddenly we're gone."Those effects could include the resurgence of Sunni Arab insurgents loyal to the Al Qaeda in Iraq militant group and increased meddling by neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria, which have been accused of smuggling fighters and weapons into Iraq to destabilize the U.S.-backed government.

Withdrawal Bad – Middle East Conflict

US withdrawal causes regional powers to battle for control over Iraq

Middle East Policy Council 09 (Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

In terms of external actors, all of Iraq's neighbors are going to interfere in one way or another. They would be foolish not to. After all, they are the ones who are going to get the refugees, the commercial disruption, the terrorism, endemic disease and the criminality that flows from having a failed state on their doorsteps. So they are going to interfere. Left to their own devices, this kind of interference often has exactly the opposite effect of what the neighboring states would ideally like. They tend to interfere by backing their own favorite champion as the factions within the country maneuver for power and influence, and thus they feed potential conflicts. Successful management of external actors requires that, to the degree they interfere, they interfere in ways that are convergent and helpful rather than divergent and unhelpful

Iraqis defenseless against neighboring countries, especially with US gone

AINA 10 (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 6/21/10, <http://www.aina.org/news/2010061120900.htm>)

What is less obvious but could prove extremely troubling for the United States is Iraq's extraordinarily weak position in its region. Iraq is incapable of defending itself from the depredations of several more powerful neighbors. Worse, there is no sign that this situation will improve in the foreseeable future. Several incidents underscore Baghdad's nearly helpless posture. In 2008, Turkey's anger boiled over regarding the ability of the domestic Kurdish insurgent group PKK to use sanctuaries in Iraqi Kurdistan to launch attacks into southeastern Turkey. Ankara then conducted a military offensive to disrupt those enclaves. There was little that either Baghdad or the Kurdish regional government could do in response to that contemptuous violation of Iraq's sovereignty. Apparently taking a page from Ankara's playbook, Iran launched punitive assaults in May and June of this year against another Kurdish group that is waging an insurgency against the Tehran regime. Not only have Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory and killed rebel fighters there, but Iran has now reportedly established a fort on Iraq's side of the border. That step suggests that those troops plan to stay a while. As in the case of Turkey's earlier incursion, Baghdad could do little except issue a mewling diplomatic protest. Iraq has trouble with other neighbors as well. Iraqi and U.S. leaders have complained for years that Syria ignores the passage of al-Qaeda's foreign fighters through its territory on their way to Iraq. There are suspicions that Damascus not only ignores such activity, but assists it. Shiite officials in Iraq have also accused Saudi Arabia of funding and otherwise aiding Sunni factions that are hostile to the Iraqi government.

Iraq’s neighbors are hostile

AINA 10 (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 6/21/10, <http://www.aina.org/news/2010061120900.htm>)

The reality is that Iraq is a weak player surrounded by neighbors who do not especially wish it well. Quantitative measures alone underscore the extent of the power disparity. According to the latest edition of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military Balance, there are 578,269 personnel in Iraq's security forces. But more than 366,000 are Ministry of Interior personnel, trained and equipped to deal with internal-security problems, not foreign military threats. Iraq's bona fide military consists of a fledgling army of 187,000, a navy of 2,000 and an air force of 3,000.

Troop presence in Iraq deters regional war and eventual economic collapse

Ricks 10 (Thomas, senior CNAS and author, 2.24.10 New York Times pg. A27)ESY

Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild.

Withdrawal Bad – Afghan Stability

The fighting would still continue, even with a withdrawal of troops

Voice of Russia 10 (Internationally Acclaimed Journal) SVK http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/31/8797239.html

The Commander of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley MacCrystal has said that it will be wrong to believe that stability will return to that country after the pull out of American troops. US President, Barack Obama has promised to begin withdrawing American soldiers from Afghanistan in July of 2011, but all those who believe that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is the cause of the country’s instability will be disappointed, declared Mac Crystal. Afghan nationals do not trust the local authorities that are unable to provide security for the nation unaided at the present timeIt is a no win situation: withdrawing U.S troops is bad and leaving them in Afghanistan will bring neither peace nor stability; 9 years of the so-called anti-terrorism operation have not produced the desired results, but the task of bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan should not be left to the US alone, said Professor Sergei Druzhilovsky of the Moscow Institute of International Affairs. "Troops from Iran, Pakistan and Turkey could be deployed in Afghanistan under a UN mandate, and stationed in different areas. Troops from Muslim countries could be more effective than dispatching servicemen from Europe, the U.S and other non-Muslim states," declared Druuzhilovsky. "The psychology of Muslim countries, which view believers of other religions not only as invaders, but precisely as civilized antipode should not be ignored. In view of this, countries professing a similar faith can do much more in Afghanistan than what Americans are trying to do at present. Americans are forced to admit their impotence; General Mac Cystal has practically admitted the failure of the much heralded winter operation in Helmand province. The Taliban who were initially driven out of the province have reappeared much stronger, and giving American servicemen a run for their money." History is repeating itself: The U.S is suffering the same fate as the Soviet Union before it. Americans soldiers are controlling certain areas only and defending and protecting themselves. The use of the military will amount to a waste of time, resources and energy for hunting down the Taliban is like looking for a needle in a haystack. Deserting Afghanistan without a restraining force is extremely dangerous; the country will be carved up into small units under the control of field commander in no time at all, triggering the flourishing of lawlessness and illegal drugs trade. But the solution of the Afghan quagmire is the responsibility of the UN Security Council and not of the U.S. and NATO.

**And, Afghan instability collapses Pakistan sparking a global nuclear war**

**Morgan, 06** (Stephen, former member of the British Labour Party Exectutive Committee, Political psychologist, researcher into Chaos/Complexity Theory, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?" http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639) SVK

Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Withdrawal Bad – Afghan Stability

Any Talk of Withdrawal is bad for Afghanistan

Smee 10 (Jess, Spiegel Online International writer, The Word from Berlin) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674806,00.html SVK

The Afghanistan conference on Thursday ended with a long list of plans and promises. But how realistic is NATO success in the war-torn country? German commentators chew over the small print on Friday. Recent international summits, not least the Copenhagen climate conference, have been slammed for side-stepping concrete pledges. But such criticism is harder to levy against Thursday's Afghanistan conference in London. The meeting of 70 global powers committed to providing further support to Afghan security forces in the hope that Afghanistan can take the lead on "the majority of operations in the insecure areas" within three years and taking full responsibility for security within five. The meeting also threw its weight behind President Hamid Karzai's scheme to reward moderate Taliban who disarm. The are to lead to "a new phase on the way to full Afghan ownership," according to the final communiqué from the talks, as released by the British Foreign Office. But while the meeting's host, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, spoke of a "decisive time" in Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai signaled that he expects the Afghan government to be standing on its own feet by 2014, meaning that international troops will likely remain in the country until then. Karzai called for an end to the violent rifts in Afghanistan, saying it was time to "reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenchanted brothers who are not part of al-Qaida." The nations attending the eight-hour talks agreed to support his plan to reach out to Taliban fighters, earmarking a €360 million fund ($500 million) to encourage insurgents to renounce violence in return for civilian jobs. Still, will the conference really make much of a difference in Afghanistan? German papers on Friday aren't so sure. The left leaning daily Die Tageszeitung writes: "It is not a new idea to make demands of the Afghan government. However, they have never before been as unrealistic as they are now. Such demands will only succeed if there are consequences should they not be met. NATO is just as dependent on Karzai as he is on NATO: It is inconceivable that Karzai would be dropped just because he failed to meet his targets. After all, the alliance needs a reasonably intact government in order to pull off a face-saving withdrawal. The fact that even a big electoral fraudster is considered good enough for this role shows just how desperate NATO is." Conservative daily Die Welt writes: "The London Afghanistan conference has achieved results. The goals agreed upon are more concrete than the minimal consensus achieved at the Copenhagen climate conference. The fact that more than 70 governments reached agreement on such a complex issue as peace in the Hindu Kush is a notable outcome in itself. But how long the London agreement will remain politically watertight is another question. Yesterday, Taliban leaders rejected outright the reconciliation policy of the 'occupiers.'" "The London conference has dodged the question of what to do if the plan does not work out. Any answer to this is not under discussion at the moment. This agreement gives the impression that none of the parties would be responsible should the project fail. If the reconciliation of Taliban sympathizers and civilian society are derailed, the participants of the London conference would draw their own conclusions. They would be able to say, to themselves and their voters, that they have tried to improve this situation using all their powers, both military and otherwise." Center-left daily Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "Any talk of a deadline for troop withdrawal is bad news for Afghanistan. Those wishing to pull out are wilting under the pressure of their own impatient public, although this is understandable, because no war can be waged without public support. The withdrawal threat was necessary to encourage the Karzai government to finally take action and it makes clear that Karzai will soon no longer be under foreign protection." "Such was President Barack Obama's intention when he specified 2011 as the year when troop withdrawals would begin. But realism is also required and it is time, both in Germany and abroad, to maintain a distance from concrete withdrawal schedules. Those who fail to do so are misleading the public." The left-leaning paper Berliner Zeitung writes: "This is capitulation, but they are calling it a change of strategy and talking about change -- which sounds much more positive. After all, who likes to own up to failure?" "The word 'withdrawal' destroys everything, both the well-intentioned and the really useful. While the word 'withdrawal' has a calming effect in Western countries, it sends a message that those in Afghanistan should stand by those who are staying: the Taliban and the drug barons. Those, in other words, who will fill the financial and power vaccuum when the allies leave." "It is an illusion to think that the Afghan police and army will develop into respected forces in the near future. There is not enough time and state wages will not rise enough to make the security forces resist corruption and the temptation to ally themselves with those making money from drugs."

Withdrawal Bad – Middle East Conflict

Withdrawal of U.S. troops doesn’t rid Iraq of foreign violence

Bergen 8(Peter, Terrorism Analysit, The Harmony Project, July 2008, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf>) JRG

US withdrawal from Iraq may not end the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq. A withdrawal that leaves swaths of Iraq ungoverned may provoke a resurgence of foreign fighter travel to Iraq. If Jihadis believe Iraq remains a viable arena for Jihad, or they sense an opportunity to humiliate the US, they will travel to Iraq even after a withdrawal, much as an earlier generation of fighters arrived in Afghanistan long after the Soviet Union withdrew.

Al-Qaeda will try to take control of the middle east when there is a withdraw of U.S. troops

Bergen 8(Peter, Terrorism Analysit, The Harmony Project, July 2008, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf>) JRG

More important is al‐Qa`ida’s desire to occupy territory. In Ayman al‐Zawahiri’s 2001 book, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, he explained: [V]ictory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies territory. Likewise, victory for Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.270 Al‐Qa`ida will continue to try to turn Iraq into a safe haven whatever the scale and timing of an American withdrawal. Iraq is in the heart of the Middle East, has a storied Islamic past, and is far more unstable than any of its neighbors.

Withdrawal from Iraq would cause neighboring states to try to take control and terrorism to flourish.

Rubin 6 (Michael, author for *Financial Times*, Middle East Forum, October 26th, 2006, <http://www.meforum.org/1037/why-withdrawal-from-iraq-is-the-worst-option>) NK

The news from Iraq is bad, but many of the recommendations coming from London and Washington are worse. Dividing Iraq would abet ethnic cleansing and break the country into morsels more easily digested by neighbouring states. Outreach to Iran and Syria is no panacea: Tehran and Damascus treat diplomatic commitment with disdain; Iran's revolutionary guards seldom abide by the promises of Iranian diplomats. Imposing a strong man to govern is easier said than done: while Iraqis support the concept, consensus quickly breaks down; Iraq is a country with 100 would-be generals for every private. There is no magical political formula. Compromise is undercut both by maximalist demands and a growing belief that violence leads to concession. Withdrawal is the worst option: it would enable terrorism to flourish not only in Iraq, but around the world.

Iranian Influence

Iranian influence grows after US withdrawal

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND) PG

The Middle East will continue to face a number of serious challenges after the United

States withdraws from Iraq. Most of these challenges are largely independent of the

pace of the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. This includes the growing rise of Ira-

nian influence, a serious concern for key U.S. allies in the region, that has occurred in

large part because of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.

Plan Upsets Saudi Arabia

**Saudi Arabia upset at US withdrawal**

Wehrey 10 (Frederic Wehrey, Senior Policy Analyst, “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam”, RAND) PG

Much focus has been directed at Iraq as an arena for “proxy” competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Saudi Arabia’s previous warnings that it will increase its involvement in Iraq following a U.S. departure should not be dismissed. But its ability to support and inﬂuence Sunni factions should not be inﬂated, and its role in containing Iranian inﬂuence in Iraq may be more limited than is realized. A key theme is Saudi Arabia’s desire to keep the United States invo slved in Iraq as a balancer and, absent this, to play a role in shaping the outcome of any trilateral Iranian-U.S.-Iraqi talks. Sensing that this strategy may be eroding, Riyadh has recently taken steps to diversify and strengthen its contacts with a range of Iraqi political actors. Meanwhile, Iran has made overtures to Saudi Arabia about a sort of cooperative power-sharing relationship over Iraq that may mirror past coordination on Lebanon but that explicitly calls for the departure of U.S. forces. Riyadh likely sees this overture for what it is: an attempt to deprive Saudi Arabia of its external patron and relegate it to the status of junior partner in the new regional order. Instead of true cooperation, the Saudi-Iranian relationship over Iraq is likely to be deﬁned as “managed rivalry,” with a modicum of coordination and contact to prevent an escalation of sectarian conﬂict, which would beneﬁt neither side.

Saudi Arabia – Iranian conflicts increase

Wehrey 10 (Frederic Wehrey, Senior Policy Analyst, “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam”, RAND) PG

In the event of a substantive U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Saudi-Iranian relations may evolve in drastically diﬀerent directions. Much of this depends on the future trajectory of the state. A fractured polity in which the central government’s control of military power has devolved

to contending factions controlling substantial blocs of territory will almost certainly invite increased Saudi and Iranian interference. At the other end of the spectrum, an authoritarian, Shi’a-dominated state with a politicized military that persecutes Sunnis will almost certainly

invite Saudi suspicions of Iranian inﬂuence and control. It is important to note here that Riyadh is probably resigned to living with a Shi’a-controlled government but wants it to be one that is relatively nationalistic in orientation, free from Iranian inﬂuence, inclusive of Sunnis, and unable to threaten its neighbors with reconstituted power projection.

\*\*\*Iran Advantage\*\*\*

Withdrawal Bad – US Perception

Troop withdrawal leaves the US looking weak in the eyes of Iran

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

A relatively stable, Shi’a-ruled, and friendly Iraq will allow Iran to pursue these goals with greater ease. From Iran’s point of view, the drawdown is the denouement of the U.S. project in Iraq: Having failed to reshape the Middle East, the United States must withdraw its troops, leaving Iran’s sense of geopolitical power and purpose intact. The Iranians expect the drawdown will continue, not create, the expansion of Iranian regional influence that is already in motion.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Power Vacuum

U.S. withdrawal would create a power vacuum that Iraq security woudn’t withstand

Carpenter 10 (Ted, Cato Institute Vice President for defense and foreign policy Studies, *Iraq is Defenseless*, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11890)

The reality is that Iraq is a weak player surrounded by neighbors who do not especially wish it well. Quantitative measures alone underscore the extent of the power disparity. According to the latest edition of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military Balance, there are 578,269 personnel in Iraq's security forces. But more than 366,000 are Ministry of Interior personnel, trained and equipped to deal with internal-security problems, not foreign military threats. Iraq's bona fide military consists of a fledgling army of 187,000, a navy of 2,000 and an air force of 3,000.

By contrast, Iran deploys nearly 350,000 active-duty army troops, 125,000 naval personnel, and 18,000 air force personnel. They are backed by 125,000 troops in the elite Revolutionary Guard Corps and 350,000 reservists who could be called up on short notice. Turkey fields some 511,000 active-duty forces, including a 402,000-strong army. Those fighters are backed by nearly 379,000 trained reserves. Syria and even Saudi Arabia are also able to deploy more numerous and substantially stronger military forces than Iraq.

A fight between Iraq and any of its neighbors would not be even remotely an equal contest. None of those countries is likely to launch a blatant, full-scale war — although what Iran might do in response to a U.S. attack on its nuclear facilities remains a disturbing uncertainty. The greater danger is that those neighbors will continue to erode Iraq's territorial integrity and prestige, and will seek to manipulate internal Iraqi rivalries for their own advantage. And whoever heads the Baghdad government will have to tread very carefully to avoid antagonizing any of those prickly states.

None of this should come as a surprise to U.S. policy makers. Iraq was once a serious political and military player in the region. It was also, specifically, the principal strategic counterweight to the ambitions of revolutionary Iran. But that ceased to be the case even before Washington finally decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Indeed, the damage to Iraq that U.S. forces inflicted during the first Gulf War rendered Baghdad largely ineffectual as a regional factor.

U.S. policy has created a massive power vacuum where a serious regional geostrategic player used to be. It is predictable that other regional actors will seek to fill that power vacuum; indeed, that have already been taking steps to do so.

Predictably, there are calls, both in Iraq and at home, to have the United States stay on past the 2011 troop withdrawal date to play the role of regional stabilizer. Otherwise, advocates warn, there will be a dangerous rivalry for power involving, at a minimum, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

U.S. withdrawal could set off a regional power vacuum if Iraq encounters domestic problems of such severity that intervention is needed.

**Rand Institute 09** (Withdrawing fromIraq. Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and

Mitigating Strategies Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98))

To the extent that destabilizing scenarios in Iraq lead to intervention by Iraq’s neighbors, we find an important distinction between the types of intervention the United States can expect. Although any Turkish intervention, should it occur, would likely be overt, conventional, and specific to the Kurdish question, the other three critical actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) are more likely to intervene in a manner that is covert, unconventional, and more broadly aimed at cultivating general influence within Iraq. To reduce the risk of intervention, the prevention of Kurdish separatism is critical. Indeed, the growing Kurdish challenge in northern Iraq has increased military cooperation between Turkey and Iran and has aligned Turkey, Iran, and Syria against this common threat because all three states are concerned about the contagion effects on their own significant Kurdish populations. U.S. policies aimed at coordination with Turkey to suppress the PKK are essential to manage this risk. U.S. attention to the Iraqi political reconciliation process and the depoliticization of the ISF will also serve to reduce the concerns of Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, particularly such countries as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, even if a Turkish intervention is more likely to be politically rather than militarily oriented.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Power Vacuum

Iraq is at risk of becoming a political power vacuum leading to civil war, and economic collapse.

Wilson. 10. ("Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says." Washington Post, 5-27 sec a-1) White House correspondent for the Washington Post. correspondent in Latin America Middle East, and Jerusalem Bureau Chief.

President Obama called Iraq his predecessor's war of choice. Now it is his war to exit -- and quickly. The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden , who says the U.S. military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government takes shape. "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden said in a 40-minute interview in his West Wing office this month. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment." White House officials say Iraqis are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing the need for U.S. forces. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains fractured. Rival factions have yet to establish a new government, nearly three months after close national elections, and politicians have begun warning of a power vacuum as neighboring Iran works to influence the outcome. Adel Abdul Mahdi, one of Iraq's vice presidents, urged all parties this month to agree quickly on a new leader to head off attempts by "terrorist gangs to use the circumstances in the country to hurt the Iraqi people and the armed forces." Some recent attacks have had sectarian hallmarks that Iraqis fear could revive the divisions within their security forces that existed during the 2006 civil war. Iraq's factions also have yet to resolve such essential long-term issues as how to share oil revenue among regions and how to settle territorial disputes rooted in history. Speaking Saturday at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., Obama said that the U.S. commitment to Iraq endures and that, as U.S. troops depart, "a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress."

U.S. Hegemony in Iraq and Afghanistan will decrease as we begin withdrawing more armed forces, creating a power vacuum

Phillips 10 (Chris, Middle East Affairs Analyst, May 2010,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) **JRG**

Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely, the region's international relations are changing. US power is waning. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower, the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions, while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere.While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate.

U.S. Withdrawal is the beginning of a power vacuum that will cause the Kurds to declare their independence, causing more war

Reeson 10( Greg, Senior Author GOP, April 2010, <http://society.ezinemark.com/ignoring-consequences-democrats-push-hard-for-iraq-withdrawal-4d2cda9ba06.html>) **JRG**

The Kurds, already pushing hard to consolidate their position of autonomy, may take advantage of the power vacuum created by a U.S. departure to declare their independence, provoking Turkey, Iran and Syria into military action to crush Kurdish terrorist elements and prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The risks to our long-term national security are potentially very grave and must be considered when discussing what course we should take in Iraq. Yet the risks that I just outlined are being dismissed out of hand by the congressional majority while Democrat leaders clamor repeatedly that Republicans will pay at the voting booth for continuing the Iraq war.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Power Vaccum

Removing US troops will leave a dangerous power vacuum in Iraq unprotected

Galen 10 (Ted, VP Cato 6.12.10 Institute http://www.aina.org/news/2010061120900.htm)

None of this should come as a surprise to U.S. policy makers. Iraq was once a serious political and military player in the region. It was also, specifically, the principal strategic counterweight to the ambitions of revolutionary Iran. But that ceased to be the case even before Washington finally decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Indeed, the damage to Iraq that U.S. forces inflicted during the first Gulf War rendered Baghdad largely ineffectual as a regional factor. U.S. policy has created a massive power vacuum where a serious regional geostrategic player used to be. It is predictable that other regional actors will seek to fill that power vacuum; indeed, that have already been taking steps to do so. Predictably, there are calls, both in Iraq and at home, to have the United States stay on past the 2011 troop withdrawal date to play the role of regional stabilizer. Otherwise, advocates warn, there will be a dangerous rivalry for power involving, at a minimum, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Creating a power vacuum is detrimental to Iraq’s stability; instead the police must be trained and troops should not be withdrawn until this happens.

Rubin 6 (Michael, author for *Financial Times*, Middle East Forum, October 26th, 2006, <http://www.meforum.org/1037/why-withdrawal-from-iraq-is-the-worst-option>) NK

Solutions in Iraq require precise treatment of the problems. One in six Iraqis fled the country under Saddam Hussein. Those who settled in the west had no cultural impediment to democracy. This suggests the problem in Iraq is not democracy, but rather rule of law. Any solution to the Iraq quagmire, therefore, requires improving security, not creating a vacuum. The greatest impediment to rule of law in Iraq is not the insurgency, still relatively localised, but the militias. These exist for one reason: to impose through force what citizens are unwilling to volunteer through the ballot box. To improve security, the coalition must improve the police and eviscerate the militias. The problems are related. The interior ministry has become a refuge for militiamen and cover for death squads. As the coalition did with the reconstituted Iraqi army, the coalition troops must embed with the police at every level. There should not be any police checkpoint that does not include coalition soldiers, nor should there be any interior ministry raid conducted without a coalition supervisor outside. This requires resolving a catch-22: the coalition does not station its troops with the police because of inadequate security, but the driving forces of this insecurity are the police. If security is the goal, there is no shortcut. violence spreads in Iraq, politicians are right to change course. But abandoning the Iraqis should not be an option. Rather, coalition strategy should address the rule of law directly, and remain cognisant that the war in Iraq has broader repercussions. While many in Britain and Europe believe war in Iraq to be illegal, they should not sacrifice ordinary Iraqis on the altar of anti-Americanism.

Troop Pullout could lead to a power vacuum hurting the security of Iraq

Ryan 10(Missy ,Deputy Bureau Chief, Iraq, April 2010

<http://www.thearynews.coms/english/articledetail.asp?nid=804> )JRG

Any prolonged failure to form a workable coalition could undermine security and create a dangerous power vacuum just as U.S. troops accelerate their departure. U.S. President Barack Obama, focused on a growing conflict in Afghanistan, plans to cut U.S. troop numbers in Iraq to 50,000 by August ahead of a full pullout by the end of 2011.

Quick withdrawal could cause a power vacuum and the US looking weak in the eyes of other countries.

Rimton and Drash 7 (Hugh and Wayne, Correspondents for CNN, CNN, May 3rd, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/>) NK

For U.S. troops on the ground, the idea of withdrawal is vexing. "I think it would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq -- enemies of the government -- would take advantage of," said U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group. Staff Sgt. Matthew St. Pierre is one U.S. soldier who's come to the conclusion the United States cannot win the war, but he says he also fears the consequences of withdrawal. "We are the buffer right now and when we pull out, the people who support us are going to feel the wrath, and the people who are against us ... they're going to ultimately win. And I think that's unfortunate," he said.

Iraqi Power Vacuum Turn

Iran Advantage turn--An Iraqi power vacuum would cause more Iranian conflicts, so the aff doesn’t solve their advantage.

Hunter 7 (Robert, Ph. D in Intl. relations, *United Press International*, Rand Corporation, April 19, 2007, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/04/19/UPI.html>) NK

The first issue is Iraq. Iran has gained significantly from America's problems there. Saddam Hussein, its bitter enemy, is gone, as is Iranian Enemy No. 2, the Taliban, in Afghanistan — and both courtesy of U.S. military power. But if the Iranians are thinking clearly, they will understand that a political and military vacuum in Iraq, following a disorderly withdrawal of American forces, could not be entirely to their liking.

Iran Terrorism Turn

US withdrawal will cause instability and terrorism in Iran [Iran advantage answer]

Qinggong 9 (Li, China Council for National Security Policy Studies, July 1st, 2009, LexisNexis, *China Daily*, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-07/01/content_8341231.htm>) NK

But the US troop withdrawal could leave Iraq with some problems and uncertainties, too. For example, Iraqi security forces have to maintain security and social order. Iraq has a 750,000 security personnel, but not the combat capability of US troops. And if the much better trained US troops couldn't wipe out insurgency in Iraq, can the Iraqi forces do so? Bombings and suicide attacks have increased since the beginning of this year, but only some of them have been targeted at US troops. Most of them have targeted the Iraqi government and people. This raises the fear that once the US troops withdraw the insurgents' war against the US could turn into a civil war, especially between Shi'ites and Sunnis. In the absence of US troops and a highly capable security force in Iraq, there is fear that the radical armed wings of the two religious factions could declare war against each other to get as much power and privileges as possible in the new dispensation. In fact, almost every domestic conflict in Iraq has the potential of snowballing into a deeper crisis, and spreading to neighboring countries. Iraq fought an 8-year-long war with Iran. Just a couple of years after the end of that war, Iraq invaded Kuwait, leading to the Gulf War in 1991. Even after the war, Iraq has had many disputes with Iran, especially over Islam. The US military presence ensured that the two countries did not clash over sectarian beliefs. But if the Shi'ite-Sunni conflict in Iraq is not controlled after the US withdraws its troops, it could escalate into a conflict with Iran.

Withdrawing from Iraq will increase terrorism from its neighbors.

Howard 4 (John, Retired Prime Minister of Australia, ABC, June 18th, 2004, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1135413.htm>) NK

A defeat for the coalition in Iraq will greatly hearten and embolden terrorists in our part of the world. What people have got to understand is that irrespective of their views about whether we should have gone there in the first place, terrorists see Iraq as the frontline in the international struggle against countries like Australia, and our friends in our region. And if the coalition fails in Iraq, if the terrorists win in Iraq, they will also win, and organisations like Jemaah Islamiah with all its reach in the Asian Pacific region will also win.

\*\*\*Iraqi Stability Advantage\*\*\*

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

Iraqi stability not ensured yet, so there is a need for US presence

PRI 9 (Public Radio International, June 30, WYNC) http://www.pri.org/world/middle-east/us-troop-withdraw-iraq-stability1458.html SVK

Iraqis celebrate the pullout of US troops, but US forces will still be the "911" for Iraqi security in tough situations. Four U.S. soldiers died last night in Baghdad, following a series of bombing last week that killed nearly 160 people. Despite Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki’s insistence that Iraqi security forces are up to the challenge, many believe that Iraq's urban areas may destabilize without U.S. support. On "The Takeaway" to discuss the US troop pullout are Nazar Janabi, former Director General for defense policy in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and Professor Gary Solis, a retired U.S. Marine with 26 years experience who teaches military law at Georgetown University, and who also formerly taught at West Point. Janabi explains the celebration by the people of Iraq: "It's very understandable that Iraqis feel very jubilant today because they have regained ... their control over their country. It has been several years now -- since the beginning of the invasion in 2003 -- and Iraqis have felt that they did not have any control over their fate. And incrementally they have increased their control over their destiny, and since [President] Maliki's government took over, we have noticed that trend of ... how Iraqis are independent, how the Iraq decision is for Iraqis only ... this was not something that could not even be discussed two years ago. Iraqis did not have the power or the confidence in their capabilities to discuss this with the Americans, and now ... Iraqis feel that they have taken control over the fate of their country." The mission for Iraqi security forces is to take over for the Americans and keep the levels of violence at minimum, says Janabi: "Although everyone is celebrating, everyone also is ... being extremely careful of what is going to happen next. How are the terrorist, how are the extremist groups going to react to the withdrawal of American forces?" Solis describes the mission for the US at this point: "I think it's a unique mission -- any time you have a counterinsurgency, the population is the prize, the objective. And so as Mr. Janabi indicated, security is the primary mission. So American forces are in effect, I believe, going to prove to be the 911 force for Iraqi security forces -- if they get into a firefight, or a situation in which they can't control the outcome, they're going to call for American reinforcements and air support. So, our mission is to provide backup, to provide additional firepower to the Iraqi forces, whose mission is to provide security for the population." Both Solis and Janabi believe that violence will flare up in Iraq in the short term after the withdrawal. Solis: "We're already seeing it of course, a spike in the bombings, a spike in the deaths -- four US [killed in action] last night -- so I think it's inevitable that we're going to see an increase in violence. But much of it is not effective -- it's for the press primarily. The question is: will we approach some tipping point in which violence flares in which the Iraqi populace looks to sectarian forces to provide security. If that happens, we can be in very serious trouble. "Both sides have such a grave stake in the success of the Iraqi forces in providing security that we're going to do everything we can to help the Iraqis. And I think we will find that US forces aren't entirely out of the picture as much as the newspapers may be indicating right now." Janabi: "There will definitely be attempts from extremist groups to flare up the violence. The question is, how capable are Iraqi forces to respond to these? The Iraqi forces lack some of the ... logistical support, the intelligence ... I'm hopeful that after the Americans have moved out of the cities, they have passed on this information to the Iraqis so they could follow up on the intelligence on the neighborhoods that were occupied by the Americans." Solis explains the rules of engagement for Iraqi security and US forces moving forward: "There has to be a level of conflict which is ... very high before Americans get involved. Because ... the political imperative is now playing as much a role as the combat imperative and there has to be a delicate balance between the two. And I think we're going to have to see that worked out on the ground ... and so this is something that over the coming weeks and probably the coming months, we're going to see mistakes made, a few mistakes; a few failures." "The Takeaway" is a national morning news program, delivering the news and analysis you need to catch up, start your day, and prepare for what’s ahead. The show is a co-production of WNYC and PRI, in editorial collaboration with the BBC, The New York Times Radio, and WGBH.

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

Iraq is at Risk Of Civil War

Priest and Jordan 6 (Dana and Mary, Washington Post Staff Writers, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/03/AR2006080300277.html) SVK

Two top U.S. generals said yesterday that the sectarian violence in Iraq is much worse than they had ever anticipated and could lead to civil war, arguing that improving the situation is now more a matter of Iraqi political will than of U.S. military strategy. "The sectarian violence is probably as bad as I've seen it," Gen. John P. Abizaid, commander of U.S. military operations in the Middle East, told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "If not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war." The testimony from Abizaid and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, was the military's most dire assessment of conditions in Iraq since the war began 40 months ago. It echoed the opinion of Britain's outgoing ambassador to Iraq, who, in a confidential memo revealed yesterday, told Prime Minister Tony Blair that a de facto partition of Iraq is more likely than a transition to democracy. Both U.S. generals said they think Iraq will be successful in maintaining a stable government in the near future, but their assessment about the possible slide into civil war is something the administration had avoided acknowledging before. "We do have the possibility of that devolving to a civil war, but that does not have to be a fact," said Pace. ". . . We need the Iraqi people to seize this moment." Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld called the Iraq violence "unfortunate" and "tragic." He said he "remains confident in the good, common sense of the American people" that running away from Iraq would amount to victory for "murderers and extremists." Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said the administration may need to seek new authorization from Congress to allow U.S. troops to fight in a civil war. Originally, the forces were authorized to topple Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. Senators from both parties questioned whether troops were adequately trained to fight in a civil war. If it comes to that, asked Sen. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), "which side are we on?" "I'm reluctant to speculate about that," Rumsfeld said. "It could lead to a discussion that suggests that we presume that's going to happen. . . . The government is holding together. The armed forces are holding together." Several times during the hearing, Rumsfeld expressed concern that the committee's back-and-forth would aid the enemy. "They're waging a psychological war of attrition," he said at one point. "They want us pointing fingers at each other rather than pointing fingers at them." The somber mood was amplified by concern about the war in Lebanon and the possibility that it will lead to instability in the region. "I've rarely seen it so unsettled or volatile," Abizaid said.

Withdrawal would cause Iraqi Instability

Biddle, Stephen, . Pollack. 08. "How to Leave a Stable Iraq." Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5: 40-58. Military & Government Collection

THE IRAQ, war has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. Most Democrats, including Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.), want large, early troop cuts; most Republicans, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), want U.S. troops to stay until Iraq's stability is guaranteed. Years of bad news from the front have hardened these divisions along partisan lines and embittered many on both sides. Today, however, there is reason to believe that the debate over Iraq can change. A series of positive developments in the past year and a half offers hope that the desire of so many Americans to bring the troops home can be fulfilled without leaving Iraq in chaos. The right approach, in other words, can partly square Obama's goal of redeploying large numbers of U.S. forces sooner rather than later with McCain's goal of ensuring stability in Iraq. If the prognosis in Iraq were hopelessly grim, it might make sense for the United States to threaten withdrawal, hold its breath, and hope for the best. But the prognosis is now much more promising than it has been in years, making a threat of withdrawal far from necessary. With a degree of patience, the United State can build on a pattern of positive change in Iraq that offers it a chance to draw down troops soon without giving up hope for sustained stability. The last 18 months have brought major changes in the underlying strategic calculus facing Iraq's main combatants--undermining the Sunni insurgency, weakening the Shiite militias, severely degrading al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), strengthening the Iraqi security forces (ISF), and creating new, more positive political dynamics and incentives. But these developments have also brought new, if less acute, challenges to the fore--demanding corresponding changes in U.S. and Iraqi strategy. Simply staying the course will not work under the new conditions in Iraq. Both to deal with the new problems and to guard against any revival of the old ones, any further troop drawdowns, now that the "surge" is over, should be modest But starting in 2011, if current trends continue, the United States may be able to start cutting back its troop presence substantially, possibly even halving the total U.S. commitment by sometime in 2012, without running excessive risks with the stability of Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region.

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

Refugees threaten to undermine Iraqi government stability

Biddle, Stephen, . Pollack. 08. ("How to Leave a Stable Iraq." Fall Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5: 40-58. Military & Government Collection)foreign relation advisors to U.N. political sicienc eprofessopr

Returning refugees and internally displaced people are another important second-order problem. The first-order problem of the civil war created about four million refugees and internally displaced people. Some of them are now starting to return home, and many more can be expected to follow if security continues to improve. The returnees often have neither jobs nor homes to return to. Although trying to put every family back in its original home would be simply impossible--in many cases, the homes of returning refugees or displaced people are occupied by others whose homes were destroyed--there need to be large-scale resettlement programs for the displaced. One solution would be a government voucher program to help people build new houses, perhaps in their original provinces but not necessarily their original cities or neighborhoods. Iraq should fund most of any such program, but American and international advisers can help design the program--and then help in the critical tasks of implementing it fairly across sectarian lines and protecting the populations trying to relocate. This approach would have the added virtue of sparking a construction boom and thereby helping reduce unemployment (one of Iraq's chief economic problems). Without such measures, considerable violence--both by and against the returnees--could ensue, perhaps resurrecting the militias as the champions of the dispossessed.

Fast withdrawal threatens Iraqi stability

Fadel,. 09. ("Crocker leaving Iraq hopeful but warns against fast pullout." *Knight Ridder Tribune Washington Bureau (DC)*, January 22. *Newspaper Source)*

BAGHDAD \_ Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker said Thursday that the greatest error the United States could make in Iraq would be a hurried withdrawal. However, he expressed confidence after talks with President Barack Obama that the new chief executive won't make that mistake. "It's one that I do not think the U.S. is going to make," Crocker said. "If it were to be a precipitous withdrawal . . . that could be very dangerous, but I think it's clear that that's not the direction in which this is trending." Crocker and Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, took part in a video conference about the war with Obama and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Wednesday, the president's first full day in office. Crocker said that Obama reiterated the words of his inaugural address, in which he said that he'd withdraw American troops from Iraq "responsibly." During his campaign, Obama pledged a 16-month withdrawal plan. That would mean pulling out U.S. forces more than a year before the Dec. 31, 2011, deadline in the long-term security agreement, which took effect Jan. 1. The agreement can be amended if the United States and Iraq agree to change it. "We're worried about a too-swift withdrawal," Crocker said. "That's when I think the spirit of compromise, of accommodation, of focus on institutional development, all of that could run the risk of getting set aside." He said the reaction in Iraq would be, "Uh, oh, we had better pull back, dig the trenches, build the berms and get ready for whatever comes next." He added: "I'm not saying that that will happen, but I think these are dangers that could happen." (EDITORS: BEGIN OPTIONAL TRIM) When Crocker arrived in Iraq in March 2007, civilians were being murdered daily and Iraqis were cowering in their homes. Bodies thrown on the sides of roads piled into the morgue at an average of 50 a day. Today, car bombs, assassinations and roadside bombs still kill dozens, but the sectarian warfare is gone. The U.S. Embassy has moved from the Republican Palace, one of Saddam Hussein's most opulent, to a sprawling 104-acre complex along the Tigris River. The palace, the former symbol of the American occupation, will go to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. (EDITORS: END OPTIONAL TRIM) This year, Iraq will hold at least four elections and very possibly a referendum on the security agreement. They could change the balance of power in the country and lead to a new political landscape and possibly a new round of violence. Crocker said that key challenges ahead included determining how much power the central government would have in relation to the regional and provincial governments. Kurdish-Arab tensions in the north remain a destabilizing and difficult problem, he said. In addition, "Security does have to be maintained. Neither the Iraqis nor we can take our eyes off that ball," he said. "Progress has been really significant, but we cannot underestimate the challenges." (EDITORS: STORY CAN END HERE) Provincial elections Jan. 31 are a key to stability, as those who fought U.S. forces and the government of mostly foreign exiles for so long now are running for seats in the provinces. Kurds and Arabs are vying for power in Nineveh province, where Kurds dominate the provincial council, and Shiite and Sunni Muslims are competing for Diyala province, where the sectarian violence once was among the worst in Iraq. Some Iraqis fear that al-Maliki has grown too strong and could become a dictator, while others worry that the country will break apart into three nations of Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds. "We're at a very encouraging, hopeful point, but it is not a culminating point by any means," Crocker said. "It's not a point at which I at least can lay claims to legacy or make any claims resembling a definitive judgment. It is still fragile, and it is still reversible."

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

Without a strategic withdrawal Iraq will be plunged into chaos

Middle East Policy Council 09( Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

In terms of strategies to reduce the risk, there are a number, most of which I think the administration cognizant of and is following. First, it is important that American combat forces leave the most volatile areas last, and the most volatile area between the Kurdish and Arab parts of the country in the disputed territories in that region. The United States is currently playing an important role in maintaining dialogue between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi security forces, containing disputes that could rise to the level of conflict if there were no mediator with embedded personnel capable of speaking to both sides. They are playing an important role in keeping that area quiet, so leaving last from those kinds of regions is one way to reduce the risk. Second, following the withdrawal of combat forces, which is scheduled to be completed by next August, make sure that there are enough American forces in the country to continue to train and partner with Iraqi security forces, and to provide adequate force protection for the American troops that remain.

**Iraq will need troops until stable**

De Atkine 6 (Norvell, reporter, U.S. Naval Institue Proceedings March http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=17&sid=26d1a1ac-33cc-4127-9e2a-635495972507%40sessionmgr14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=19948247l) KCA

A veteran Middle East hand offers his view on the impact of a hasty pull-out from **Iraq**. Political pressure on President Bush to begin withdrawing troops from **Iraq** is gathering momentum. He should resist it. Basing a pull-out on political calculations rather than the situation on the ground will have momentous and adverse effects for the United States throughout the Arab world. Would a sudden and massive **withdrawal** of American troops force Iraqi confessional groups to come together to avoid the bloodshed that almost all Iraqis dread, or would it simply precipitate a general civil war, similar to the one in Lebanon, or even the 1970 Jordanian-Palestinian conflict? Or would the massive power vacuum created invite the occupation of various parts of **Iraq** by Iranian and Turkish troops? None of these scenarios is likely. Until the new Iraqi government has attained a general legitimacy and established a degree of control over **Iraq**, any large-scale **withdrawal** of U.S. troops will result not in a sudden dramatic disintegration but in a gradual erosion of the Iraqi state and of stability throughout the Middle East. To begin with, definitions of what is meant by legitimacy and control have to be fairly specific. Legitimacy does not mean establishing a government of universal acclaim and popularity. The ferocity of the Sunni insurgent attacks on the Shi'a population and their obstructionist attitude toward the political process suggest their objective is to control **Iraq** rather than simply have an equitable part in governing. Their historical sense of superiority and widespread belief — despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary — that they are a numerical majority feeds this. They are being spurred by money and support from the outside Arab Sunni world, fearful of some sort of "Shi'a arc." King Abdullah II of Jordan used this term to express his apprehension of a swath of Shi'a-controlled territory emerging, that would extend from Iran through **Iraq**, Syria, and southern Lebanon. In actuality the Alawis of Syria (a distant offshoot of Shi'ism), who constitute about 15% of the population, are not really thought of as fellow Shi'a by the Iraqi Shi'a. This Sunni fear, combined with a general tendency among Western scholars and journalists to view Shi'a Arabs as religious fanatics and extremists, supports the mantra that without full Sunni support any government freely elected will be dead on arrival. Neither does control imply tight government presence in every village and square mile of **Iraq**. That was not true even under the draconian rule of Saddam Hussein. Kurdish and border areas near Syria and Iran will always be areas of tenuous government control. Revenge killings and sectarian strife will not be eliminated. For the U.S.-led Coalition to withdraw, an Iraqi government elected by a majority must have essential control of the major cities, especially Baghdad, and the provincial capitals. The government must also secure the transportation arteries between them, as well as the oil fields and pipelines. If the Coalition leaves before these conditions are met, then the Iraqi state will begin to erode and disintegrate.

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

Iraq needs prolonged US forces – Unclear elections cause worries

ChinaDaily 10 (March 3, ChinaDaily.com Lexis) ELJ

The Obama administration should reconsider its troop withdrawal schedule if the United States wants to ensure a successful transition to stability in Iraq, US experts said. This comes in the backdrop of the recent disputed election results and the likely delayed formation of a new government there. On the other hand, if Washington was to tinker with its drawdown schedule and maintain troops in Iraq, the president and his party may see some reversals in the mid-term elections in November at home, they said. Last week's completed count in Iraq's elections gave former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya coalition a two-seat win (91-89) over current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition. With 163 seats needed for a parliamentary majority, both blocs will soon begin coalition building and it will take months before it is clear who will head the new government. In 2005's elections, when the US was the occupying power and Iraqis were wholly dependent on Washington, it took five months to form a government. And this time, it may take even longer as the influence of the United States in Iraq is far less than before with declining troop strength and economic aid. It is estimated that the government-formation process will likely extend to August, and President Obamahas committed to halve the American forces in Iraq to just 50,000 troops by that time. According to the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated in 2008, all American troops will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Meghan O'Sullivan, the Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School, and the former deputy national security adviser on Iraq for President Bush, said that Washington should rethink pulling back all combat troops in August, when there will still be uncertainty about the newly formed government. "If I were advising the administration, I would say it's certainly a good vision to have, but I would try to maintain some flexibility given the current political uncertainties, and given the quite serious issues that may arise in the months ahead," she said in an interview conducted by the Council of Foreign Relations on Monday.

Iraq needs prolonged forces – needed to solve Iran woes

ChinaDaily 10 (March 3, ChinaDaily.com Lexis) ELJ

And a potentially far more destabilizing situation for Iraq would be an international showdown with Iran, she cautioned. "One of the reasons Iraq might find itself in a very difficult situation over the next six months has nothing to do with Iraq; it has everything to do with Iran," she said. "An international confrontation with Iran is at the very top of my list of things that could put Iraq off the current positive trajectory it is on." James Phillips, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, suggested that the United States should slow the timetable for troop draw-downs, maintain adequate US troops in sensitive and insecure areas, and start thinking about negotiating with the new Iraqi government to postpone the deadline for a final troop withdrawal if Washington wants to avoid a renewed civil war after the disputed election results.

A faster withdrawal would lead to great Iraqi instability and Turkish Movements

DNI 7 ( Director of National Intelligence, February 2007, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability, <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070202_release.pdf>) JRG

If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.

Withdrawal Bad – Instability

US Forces are key to Iraqi stability

Carafano 8 (Carafano, John, 3/8/08, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/03/Iraq-Pause-in-Troop-Drawdown-Makes-Sense>) PG

While Iraq has made remarkable progress over the past year in virtually every category including security, economic growth, and humanitarian issues, the recent troubles demonstrate that political stability at the national level is still in doubt. A proposal by General Petraeus, the military commander on the scene, to pause the reduction of U.S. troops after the surge runs its course and subsides this summer therefore makes eminent sense. The U.S. military presence is an indispensable stabilizing force; its effective employment in training and supporting Iraqi security forces, defeating al-Qaeda, and improving security conditions so that refugees can return to their homes is important in helping the Iraqis achieve peace and stability. While the long-term presence of American combat troops is not in the interests of the United States or the Iraqi government, *how* U.S. troops leave Iraq (when the country is clearly on the path to peace and stability) is much more important than *when* the troops come home. The Bush Administration and Congress should fully support the recommendation on force levels from the commander on the ground.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Civil War

Neighboring countries would become involved after a Iraqi Civil war

Edelstein 8 ( David, Head Department of Government Georgetown Univ., 2008, [http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/ Chapter05-DavidEdelstein-IraqBook.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/%20Chapter05-DavidEdelstein-IraqBook.pdf)) **JRG**

One of the great dangers of an Iraqi civil war is that it would not be possible to contain such a

conflict to Iraq. Instead, other neighboring states are likely to become involved. Some, like

Turkey, might become involved for fear of the destabilizing effects of such a conflict. Others,

like Iran, might become involved in an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of the chaos and disorganization that is likely to attend an Iraqi civil war. Just how contagious an Iraqi civil war

would be is also an uncertainty. While the reasons for other states potentially to become involved in an Iraqi civil war are logical and understandable, one could also imagine a situation in which states neighboring on Iraq prefer to sit this one out and avoid entangling themselves in a bloody and vicious fight.

Keeping troops in Iraq to prevent civil war is in the best interest of the US and Iraq

Berrigan 10 (Frida Board of The War Registers League, columnist FPIF 2.25.10 http://www.fpif.org/articles/sunrise\_or\_sunset\_for\_iraq)ESY

Against this less-than-bright-new-dawn rising, the United States military appears to be trying to remind everyone it is on its way out. Just as the Pentagon is preparing its exit plan — or at least the rhetoric for its exit plan — pressure is mounting for the military to stay. In a recent New York Times op-ed, long-time journalist and critic of Iraq War policies Thomas Ricks wrote that staying might be the new leaving. "I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come," he wrote. Kenneth Pollack of Brookings compared U.S. military forces in Iraq to a cast on a broken arm, saying "we can't know for certain when Iraq's bones have healed, we need to be very careful about how and when we remove the cast." This is a compelling argument only if one forgets that the cast broke the arm in the first place.

A withdraw is just asking for Al Qaeda to start a civil war in the heart of Iraq

Bergen 8(Peter, Terrorism Analysit, The Harmony Project, July 2008, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf>) JRG

A United States withdrawal would also be a boon to al‐Qa`ida because of the intensification in the civil war that would probably result. If a US pullout leads to increased sectarian violence in Iraq, which is likely, Iraqi Sunnis will be more disposed to support al‐Qa`ida in exchange for aid and protection.

Quick US Withdrawal from Iraq would cause a massive civil war.

Sharansky 7 (Nathan, Former Prime Minister of Israel, The Shalem Center, July 8,2007, <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24946&Itemid=380>) NK

A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by comparison. Without U.S. troops in place to quell some of the violence, Iranian-backed Shiite militias would dramatically increase their attacks on Sunnis; Sunni militias, backed by the Saudis or others, would retaliate in kind, drawing more and more of Iraq into a vicious cycle of violence.

Quick withdrawal from Iraq could cause a civil war, along with way with other countries, as well as an increase in oil prices.

Rimton and Drash 7 (Hugh and Wayne, Correspondents for CNN, CNN, May 3rd, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/>) NK

Shepperd said Iraq's neighbors would be drawn into the all-out civil war likely if U.S. forces left too quickly. Iran could move in to further strengthen its influence in southern Iraq; Turkey likely would move against the Kurds in the north; and Saudi Arabia would be inclined to take action to protect Sunnis in western Iraq, he said. The oil sector could also get hit hard, with Iran potentially mining the Persian Gulf and attempting to close the Straits of Hormuz, putting a stranglehold on oil flow, Shepperd says. "Oil prices would skyrocket," he said -- perhaps soaring from current prices of about $60 a barrel to more than $100 a barrel, with consequent rises at the gas pump. And that could bring further trouble, Shepperd added. "Saudi Arabia will not allow increasing Iranian dominance to endanger its regime and oil economy."

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Civil War

A civil war in Iraq is would turn into an international conflict.

Robbins 6 (James, senior fellow in national-security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, November 30th, 2006, <http://article.nationalreview.com/299757/civil-war-in-iraq/james-s-robbins>) NK

This points to the most important objection to the use of “civil war” with respect to Iraq — this is not a purely internal conflict between Iraqis. The Coalition forces obviously play a large role, as do the Islamist foreign fighters and al Qaeda. Syria and Iran, our putative future partners in dialogue have for years been supplying men, money, and material leading to the deaths of hundreds of Americans. (There’s a topic of conversation.) No, this is not merely a civil war; it is an international conflict with significant regional impact. Reducing the conflict in Iraq to a civil war does not clarify our options. Maybe the people who are so committed to the expression can explain what difference it makes in policy terms, that is if this is anything more than a semantic game. If it is a civil war, what then? How does that affect our over all strategy? What changes need to be made? How can we win it? Unless this word play leads to concrete policy recommendations, it is a great waste of time.

An Iraqian civil war would result in more American troops needed, gutting solvency

Ricks 10 (Thomas, Washington Post military correspondent, *Foreign Policy Magazine*, May 12th, 2010, <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/12/an_islamic_civil_war_in_iraq>) NK

US forces have no relevance to this fight, would make themselves a Christian target in an Islamic civil war and need to leave before it gets worse. Any time the Muslims fight among themselves, it strengthens the security of Israel and limits Iranian meddling in Afghanistan. There is no need for American children-soldiers to die to stop an Islamic civil war. Once democracy was instituted in Iraq, this outcome was inevitable.

Civil war in Iraq results in inhumane, indecent, unnecessary loss of life.

Shanker 6 (Thom, Pentagon correspondent for *New York Times*, *The New York Times*, August 4th, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/world/middleeast/04rumsfeld.html>) NK

“First of all, it’s true, there is sectarian conflict in Iraq, and there is a loss of life,” he said. “And it’s an unfortunate and tragic thing that that’s taking place. And it is true that there are people who are attempting to prevent that government from being successful. And they are the people who are blowing up buildings and killing innocent men, women and children, and taking off the heads of people on television. And the idea of their prevailing is unacceptable.”

Civil war in Iraq could lead to chaos and terrorism.

Shanker 6 (Thom, Pentagon correspondent for *New York Times*, *The New York Times*, August 4th, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/world/middleeast/04rumsfeld.html>) NK

“Since the time that General Casey made that statement, it’s clear that the operational and the tactical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires additional security forces, both U.S. and Iraqi,” General Abizaid said. “It’s possible to imagine some reductions in forces, but I think the most important thing to imagine is Baghdad coming under the control of the Iraqi government.” From President Bush on down through his advisers, a more sober assessment of the situation in Iraq has been presented by the administration, with officials stressing the difficulty of counterinsurgency as well as the importance of preventing Iraq from descending into chaos and becoming a haven for terrorists.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Civil War

US troop withdrawal will incite violent civil war

Edelstein 10 (David 2010, Asst. Prof. Georgetown University, author “Occupational Hazards” pg 52)ESY

Many observers expect that that probability of a large-scale civil war will be high in the aftermath of a US withdrawal from Iraq. Insurgency becomes civil war when the magnitude of the violence increases and when the two (or more sides) fighting organize themselves into effective fighting forces with distinct political goals. American withdrawal, it is thought, will simply take off whatever lid the current American presence in Iraq might be keeping on the violence. In the absence of an effectively trained Iraqi military, insurgent groups will easily be able to turn their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Iraq against the emergent Iraqi government. Such violence would most likely be dominated by volence between Sunni Arabs and Shia, though internecine Shia violence is a distinct possibility. The role of the northern Kurdish population in such a civil war remains unclear. Even before the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds had established an enclave of de facto self-governance in northern Iraq. How and on whose side the Kurdish population would be drawn into an Iraqi civil war is somewhat unclear.

Civil war caused by troop withdrawal will necessitate the redeployment of US troops

Edelstein 10 (David 2010, Asst. Prof. Georgetown University, author “Occupational Hazards” pg 52)ESY

The implications of a civil war for the future of Iraq are also a matter of some debate. An Iraqi civil war introduces the possibility of comprehensive state failure, which could potentially turn Iraq into a haven for jihadists resembling pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Thus, some insist that such a civil war would necessitate reintervention by the United States, by other states, or by the United Nations in order to stop the violence. The potential scale of such a struggle and the possible contagion to other states in the region would mandate that the war be stopped before it could reach its most malign conclusion. On the other hand, others are more optimistic that an Iraqi civil war could essentially be confined to Iraq.

Arab Kurdish conflict will lead to a major violence, potentially starting a civil war

Rand Institute 09 (Withdrawing fromIraq. Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and

Mitigating Strategies Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98))

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG’s) aspirations for greater autonomy and

its desire to incorporate more territory into the KRG endanger Iraq’s unity and could

spark serious internal conflict or provoke a response from one of Iraq’s neighbors. The

future status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories presents the most serious threat

to internal stability in Iraq. These issues are unlikely to be fully resolved by 2011, and

this area is therefore likely to remain a dangerous flashpoint after the last U.S. troops

depart.

Withdrawal of U.S. presence in Iraq will lead to large scale civil wars

Edelstein 8 ( David, Head Department of Government Georgetown Univ., 2008, [http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/ Chapter05-DavidEdelstein-IraqBook.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/%20Chapter05-DavidEdelstein-IraqBook.pdf)) **JRG**

Many observers expect that that probability of a large-scale civil war will be high in the aftermath of a US withdrawal from Iraq. Insurgency becomes civil war when the magnitude of the violence increases and when the two (or more sides) fighting organize themselves into effective fighting forces with distinct political goals. American withdrawal, it is thought, will simply take off whatever lid the current American presence in Iraq might be keeping on the violence. In the absence of an effectively trained Iraqi military, insurgent groups will easily be able to turn their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Iraq against the emergent Iraqi government. Such violence would most likely be dominated by violence between Sunni Arabs and Shia, though internecine Shia violence is a distinct possibility. The role of the northern Kurdish population in such a civil war remains unclear. Even before the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds had established an enclave of de facto self-governance in northern Iraq. How and on whose side the Kurdish population would be drawn into an Iraqi civil war is somewhat unclear.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Civil War

Withdrawing sends Iraq into civil war and destroys America’s interests

Pollack 09 (Kenneth M, Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), The Brookings Institute, Dec 21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221\_iraq\_pollack.aspx)

The mistake we are in danger of making in Iraq is that as our military steps back, our civilians are not always stepping up. Over the past six to nine months, our embassy has been inconsistent at best, and has panicked many Iraqis and many Iraqi leaders into believing that the Obama administration does not care about Iraq and is simply running for the exit as fast as they can. This isn’t true, and the President’s lieutenants have said so time and again, as has Vice President Biden, both in private and in public. But by failing to remain actively engaged with the Iraqi political process at all levels, by disdaining any further involvement in guiding Iraq’s domestic politics, and in abandoning aid programs willy-nilly, many embassy personnel have convinced a great many Iraqis of exactly the opposite. And therein lies the seeds of renewed civil war and a disaster for American interests.

Prematurely removing the security blanket would cause Iraqi citizens to rejoin militias sending Iraq into civil war.

Pollack 09 (Kenneth M, Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), The Brookings Institute, Dec 21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221\_iraq\_pollack.aspx)

The critical role that the United States plays today is that we are the peacekeepers, we are the levy holding back violence, we are Iraq’s security blanket, and we are the broker of political deals that makes Iraqis willing to keep sacrificing today because they can hope for a better tomorrow. But another way to think about the American role is that we enforce the rules: we prevent Iraqis from employing large-scale violence in pursuit of political agendas, which reassures all of them that they can take actions that would be risky in the kind of security vacuum that existed (thanks to American negligence and foolishness) in 2004-2006 and that would exist again if we withdrew prematurely. Acts like voting for the candidate you like rather than the candidate with the most thugs. If Iraqis believe that security blanket is going to be removed prematurely, they will be terrified that the militia warlords will revert back to violence (which they certainly will) and will again rule the country very soon. That would prompt ordinary Iraqis (who would gladly do the right thing if they could) to do the wrong thing, and sign on with the militias to ensure that they are protected when the Americans leave and the civil war re-ignites.

And these units are key to preventing a military coup or civil war

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Maintaining the AAB force in Iraq will likely be necessary, if the United States is to avoid the mistakes it made in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the twentieth century. These brigades retain virtually all of the personnel and much of the equipment of full combat brigades. Indeed, in an emergency, several of the AABs will be able to rapidly reequip as full-spectrum combat units. Thus, these brigades will perform a dual role: they will serve as advisors in peacetime but could quickly become combat brigades in a crisis. In many ways, the formation of the AABs is a clever way to square the circle between the president’s commitments to transition U.S. troops away from combat missions while still retaining combat capacity in Iraq to guard against crucial problems such as the propensity of COIN-trained developing armies to overthrow civilian governments.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Civil War

Without the perception of security Iraqi’s could repeat their action which lead to the civil war in 2006

Pollack 09 (Kenneth M, Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), The Brookings Institute, Dec 21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221\_iraq\_pollack.aspx)

What would be very dangerous is if Iraqis began to react to the bombings the way they reacted in 2004 and early 2005. Then they saw the violence as the work of other members from within their own society. They saw no governmental force able or willing to protect them, and so they felt it necessary to form or join militias for their own protection—even though they knew that the militia warlords would inevitably push the country into civil war. As many Iraqis said to me at the time, “You (the United States) are not giving us a choice.” Countries that slide back into civil war tend to do so when people and leaders evince this pattern, once again seeing acts of violence as harbingers of worse times to come, rather than violent interruptions of the ordinary

Immediate withdrawal could change the entire perception of Iraqi’s and their government, setting off another civil war.

Pollack 09 (Kenneth M, Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), The Brookings Institute, Dec 21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221\_iraq\_pollack.aspx)

The problem we face in Iraq is that while the country has made tremendous progress in both the security and political realms, all of those gains are fragile and could evaporate quickly if strained. What Iraq experienced was a lot like shattering the bones in your arm: with time, the bones can heal and the arm can become strong again, but if you take off the cast too soon, then any strain on the arm will cause the bones to fracture all over again. As scholars of civil war have warned, states like Iraq that have undergone a major inter-communal civil war have a terrifying rate of recidivism—especially if the state has valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold or oil. So to some extent, we and the Iraqis are fighting an uphill battle. There is no reason that we can’t succeed, but it isn’t going to be easy and it isn’t going to happen on its own. And since we can’t know for certain when Iraq’s bones have healed, we need to be very careful about how and when we remove the cast. The mistake we are in danger of making in Iraq is that as our military steps back, our civilians are not always stepping up. For that reason, the critical danger in Iraq today is not the residual violence, but the Iraqi reaction to that violence. The strings of bombings that seem to shake the capital every month or so are a nightmare for many Iraqis, but alone they are not a threat to Iraq itself. As long as the vast majority of Iraqis react to the bombings by blaming the perpetrators not one another, and see the perpetrators as marginalized elements outside the mainstream of Iraqi society, the problem they present is tragic, but not serious. In some ways they are a useful palliative, because they provide sobering evidence of just how fragile Iraq’s gains remain.

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

Withdrawal will embolden the same terrorist that caused 9/11

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

A rapid withdrawal of all U.S. troops would hurt America's image and hand al Qaeda and other terror groups a propaganda victory that the United States is only a "paper tiger," CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen said. (Send us your reaction) "It would also play into their strategy, which is to create a mini-state somewhere in the Middle East where they can reorganize along the lines of what they did in Afghanistan in the late '90s," Bergen told CNN.com. It was in Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda allied with the Taliban, and were allowed to run terror bases and plan the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Bergen says it is imperative that the United States not let that happen in Iraq. "What we must prevent is central/western Iraq [from] becoming a Sunni militant state that threatens our interests directly as an international terror hub," he said. Don Shepperd, a retired Air Force major-general and military analyst for CNN, agreed that Sunni Muslim fighters who support al Qaeda would seek an enclave inside a lawless Iraq likely riven along sectarian lines into Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish regions. There would be "increasing attempts by terrorists to establish a training sanctuary in Iraq," Shepperd said.

Terrorist groups might become violent if the US pulls out troops

Dobins (James 6.16.9 Dir DPC, RAND, Sec. of State http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.asp)ESY

The second risk is the risk associated with al-Qaida and other non-Iraqi terrorist groups that might seek to complicate the withdrawal, embarrass the United States in the course of the withdrawal, and of course plunge Iraq back into civil war. This risk too seems manageable as long as the major Iraqi groups themselves don't for one reason or another go back into conflict. The terrorist groups, al-Qaida in Iraq, seem to have been largely marginalized; they are much less active and the Iraqi security forces are probably capable of dealing with them as long as they don't find support within the Sunni community. So the major threats are threats that in the context of the American withdrawal, the major Iraqi groups themselves will for one reason or another resume the civil war, which largely, not entirely ended in 2007. And the major groups concerned are the Sunnis and in particular those associated with the Sons of Iraq, the former insurgents who were put on the U.S. payroll and whom we are now trying to transfer to the Iraqi government payroll; the Kurds; and then among the Shia there are several major groupings. There is what used to be called SCIRI, which is part of the largest of the political parties, the one - one of the ones with its own militia, the Badr Corps, and the one that historically was most closely associated with Iran. Their militia has largely been incorporated into the Iraqi security forces, and they have lost some prominence politically. The second of the major groups is the Da'wa Party headed by the current prime minister, which has gained somewhat largely due to his record and embrace of nationalism as opposed to more sectarian themes. There is the force associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, the Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, which has been largely quiescent, and thus less prominent and is not likely to make a strong comeback.

Withdrawing now will fuel terrorist activity and plunge Iraq into a civil war

Middle East Policy Council 09 ( Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

The second risk is that associated with al-Qaeda and other non-Iraqi terrorist groups that might seek to complicate the withdrawal, embarrass the United States in the course of the withdrawal, and plunge Iraq back into civil war. This risk, too, seems manageable as long as the major Iraqi groups themselves don't for one reason or another go back into conflict. The terrorist group al-Qaeda in Iraq seems to have been largely marginalized; yet without U.S. presence they may regain their power.

U.S withdrawal would cause the world wide fight against terrorism to stop

Rand Institute 10( Non Profit Politics Org., 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>) **JRG**

Finally, the humanitarian aspect of this crisis is consistently viewed around the world as a U.S. responsibility. Failure to respond not only runs the risk of generating ill will toward America, but creates a tremendous vacuum, as other states are unwilling to act if the United States does not lead. The United States has increasingly accepted this reality over the past year, accepting more Iraqi refugees itself and stepping up its funding of UNHCR appeals, although The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations resources continue to fall short of needs.

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

The war on terrorism will not go away by withdrawing U.S. troops

Kagan and Kristol 5 ( Robert and William, Foreign Policy Commentators, November 2005, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/372sueqv.asp>) **JRG**

But that would be just the beginning. If U.S. troops were withdrawn and the Iraqi people were not able to defeat the terrorists and Saddam loyalists, what would happen? What if Zarqawi and his al Qaeda allies were able to make common cause with the Baathists to turn Iraq into a terrorist state or to provide a haven for terrorists, complete with an oil supply to finance their global activities? And what of Iraq's neighbors, which include Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia? They would likely decide that they could not afford to let a vacuum develop in Iraq or allow their adversaries to establish a base there. All these nations would contemplate military intervention in Iraq, directly or indirectly through the arming of allies. The possibility of a regional conflict erupting among any or all of these powers could not be excluded. Is this is a tolerable outcome for the United States?

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

As US troops withdraw from Iraq terrorist attacks will escalate against departing troops

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

AQI. Jihadis would like to spin the U.S. drawdown as their victory and take credit for it. Attacks on departing forces would add credence to this claim in some media. This threat is confined primarily to the northern part of the country because AQI now operates mainly in Ninewah province, especially Mosul, although it has cells in the Tigris River Valley, Diyala province, and Baghdad. U.S. forces and equipment exiting northern Iraq, whether by northern or southern routes, may have the most exposure to AQI attacks.40 The primary AQI threats remain suicide bombs and roadside bombs (i.e., IEDs), and some such attacks seem likely. Although AQI may experience some tactical success against departing U.S. troops and remaining U.S. military and civilian personnel, it is unlikely to be able to sustain repeated attacks over time. Moreover, it has other targets and bigger problems in Iraq, such as the GoI, the ISF, the SoI, and Shi’a in general. AQI is unlikely to pose a major threat to or to disrupt drawdown operations. However, U.S. military and civilian personnel remaining in Iraq in advisory and development roles, for example, may be more exposed than departing forces as intelligence and protection resources decrease compared with when troop levels were high. An attack against remaining U.S. personnel that results in many casualties or the capture of U.S. personnel could have strategic effects, most notably a sharp drop in the U.S. public’s support for ongoing activities in Iraq.

Attacks on Withdrawing US Troops are at high probability

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

There is a high probability of direct attacks on withdrawing U.S. forces by extremist groups that have the most to gain from being seen as hastening the drawdown: AQI and the Shi’a Special Groups. AQI is particularly dangerous in the areas between the north and the southern Baghdad belt; the Special Groups from Baghdad to the south. AQI would favor suicide bombs. The Special Groups would rely mainly on roadside bombs. Both could attack remaining military and civilian personnel given an opening to do so. Neither AQI nor the Special Groups has the capability to sustain attacks or seriously disrupt the U.S. drawdown. To the extent that they expose themselves, both are vulnerable to high losses from U.S. forces and the ISF. Both could threaten remaining U.S. military and civilian personnel in specific areas. JAM is unlikely to attack U.S. forces as they withdraw and would be exposed to defeat if it attempted such attacks on a significant scale or in a sustained way. Other main opposition groups are even less likely to target U.S. forces. Hostilities between KRG and GoI forces could threaten any Americans caught in the middle, such as embedded advisors and civilians. At the same time, U.S. advisors to one or both forces could serve to build confidence and avert conflict.

Withdrawal of troops could lead to terroristic attacks on American soil

Balanced Politics 7( Political Social Issues, September 2007,

<http://www.balancedpolitics.org/iraq_withdrawal.htm>)J RG

If we withdraw, the terrorists currently fighting American troops will likely be dispersed to civilian Western targets. High-ranking Al Qaeda leaders have called Iraq their central and most important battle. Many of the most hateful, vicious terrorists in the world are engaged in Iraq. Which is better, having these terrorists target innocent civilians on our own soil, or having these terrorists engage armed, highly-trained soldiers in Iraq? Where do you think these terrorist insurgents will go if American troops leave Iraq? Will they start businesses, go to medical school, get 9-5 jobs, or make some other productive contribution to society? Just maybe there are some good reasons why we haven't suffered a terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. Maybe these terrorists have something else occupying their time.

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

American Military Withdrawal leads to the spread of Al Qaeda forces worldwide

RMS 9(Risk Assessment Industry, January 2009, <http://www.rms.com/Publications/RMS_Terrorism_Risk_Briefing_Jan_2009.pdf>)

The phased withdrawal of United States-led coalition forces from Iraq will create greater instability in Iraq and beyond. The Iraqi forces will fail to contain the violence. Iran will expand its covert and overt influence in Iraq. The threat from Iraq will spread to the Levant, Europe and beyond. Unless the U.S. is pragmatic in its withdrawal plans, Al Qaeda and its affiliates will use Iraq as a forward operational base to mount operations in the Middle East, North and Eastern Africa and the West.

Rapid withdrawal will cause increased terrorist attacks all around the world.

Howard 6 (John, Prime Minister of Australia, DefendDemocracy, November 14, 2006, <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24946&Itemid=380>) NK

If the coalition leaves Iraq in circumstances seen as defeat, the ramifications of that throughout the Middle East will be enormous… It will embolden the terrorists and extremists not only there but also in our own region, especially in neighbouring Indonesia… We need to remember what is at stake here, not only for Iraq and the Middle East but also for American power and prestige around the world.

Quick withdrawal from Iraq makes America look weak and encourages terrorism.

Rimton and Drash 7 (Hugh and Wayne, Correspondents for CNN, CNN, May 3rd, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/>) NK

A rapid withdrawal of all U.S. troops would hurt America's image and hand al Qaeda and other terror groups a propaganda victory that the United States is only a "paper tiger," CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen said. "It would also play into their strategy, which is to create a mini-state somewhere in the Middle East where they can reorganize along the lines of what they did in Afghanistan in the late '90s," Bergen told CNN.com. It was in Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda allied with the Taliban, and were allowed to run terror bases and plan the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Bergen says it is imperative that the United States not let that happen in Iraq. And we do not want a U.S that is perceived as having been badly defeated in the global war on terror or as an unreliable future ally or coalition partner."

If we give in to terrorists, we will be subjected to their will.

Shuman 4 (Michael, *Time* magazine writer, *Time Magazine*, August 2, 2004, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,674825,00.html>) NK

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo hasn't suffered much from her recent decision to withdraw 51 troops from Iraq to save the life of Angelo de la Cruz, a Philippine truck driver kidnapped by insurgents in Fallujah. Despite a rebuke last week by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer "If we start caving into terrorists," Downer boomed, "our foreign policy, our international relationships will be determined by terrorists" Arroyo has been flaunting her decision to grant the kidnappers' demands and bring home the soldiers as a badge of honor. She crowed about De la Cruz's homecoming in her annual State of the Nation address, saying that Philippine lives are "held more dearly than international acclaim."

Withdrawal from Iraq will cause our military to feel defeated and more terrorism.

Mauro 7 (Ryan, National Security Researcher for the Christian Action Network and a published author, Global Politician. May 7th, 2007. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq>) NK

Senator John McCain, a former POW in Vietnam, said it best this week when he stated that “the only thing worse than a stressed military, is a broken and defeated military.” Withdrawal would mean the complete collapse of morale in the military and a reluctance to support a responsible military budget. Failing to support and fund our military leaves our troops without the armor they need and our political leaders without the option of force in dealing with foreign enemies. Advocates of a withdrawal think it will end the war, but it will not. The disastrous security situation in Iraq will lead to a terrorist sanctuary that the United States will then have to confront. Our uniformed men and women who came home the first time will have to enter again under much harsher and costlier conditions.

Terrorism – Terminal Impacts

Al-Qaeda will use nukes to stop US tyranny

Ersan 9 (Inal, writer, June 22, Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40495320090621) ELJ

If it were in a position to do so, Al Qaeda would use Pakistan's nuclear weapons in its fight against the United States, a top leader of the group said in remarks aired on Sunday. Pakistan has been battling al Qaeda's Taliban allies in the Swat Valley since April after their thrust into a district 100 km (60 miles) northwest of the capital raised fears the nuclear-armed country could slowly slip into militant hands. "God willing, the nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of the Americans and the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans," Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, the leader of al Qaeda's in Afghanistan, said in an interview with Al Jazeera television. Abu al-Yazid was responding to a question about U.S. safeguards to seize control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons in case Islamist fighters came close to doing so. "We expect that the Pakistani army would be defeated (in Swat) ... and that would be its end everywhere, God willing." Asked about the group's plans, the Egyptian militant leader said: "The strategy of the (al Qaeda) organisation in the coming period is the same as in the previous period: to hit the head of the snake, the head of tyranny -- the United States.

Nuclear terrorism results in extinction

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, Political analyst, Al-Ahram weekly September 1, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) ELJ

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraq Can’t Govern Itself

Iraqi’s are stepping up and progressing yet withdrawing to quickly will make it all for nothing

AGENCY GROUP, 09.. (COMMANDER IN IRAQ CITES PROGRESS, WARNS AGAINST WITHDRAWING TOO FAST.) FDCH Regulatory Intelligence DatabaseMilitary & Government Collection

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23, 2008 - The commander of coalition troops in central Iraq said today he's dismayed that the American people aren't getting word about progress in Iraq. At the same time, he insisted it's too soon to declare victory and give Iraq's enemies an opportunity to retake it. Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of Multinational Division Central, told military analysts via teleconference that he was struck during his weekly phone call to his parents that success in Iraq has become yesterday's news. "Last Sunday, my dad asked if I was still in Iraq," Lynch said. "He's not seeing it on TV because bad things aren't happening over here. It's less publicized. That breaks my heart, because I've got 20,000 `Dog Face Soldiers' working their (butts) off every day over here making great progress for the United States of America, and we just have to get that story told." Lynch cited vast improvements since March, when his 3rd Infantry Division troops arrived in Iraq as part of the troop surge and established Multinational Division Center. Attacks that averaged 25 per day in his battle space are now down to fewer than five, most of them ineffective. Civilian casualties have dropped about 75 percent since March. U.S. and coalition casualties have dropped 60 percent. "So the indicators of progress on a secure line are clearly in an upward trend," Lynch said. Lynch attributes that success to three major factors: the early-2007 surge of additional forces into Baghdad and western Iraq, an increase in patrol bases within Iraqi neighborhoods, and the success of concerned local citizen programs. Surge forces "gave us the combat power to take the fight to the enemy," particularly to areas the enemy had controlled in the absence of coalition or Iraq forces. Coalition and Iraq troops set up 53 patrol bases within neighborhoods in the Multinational Division Center operating area and began working from them rather than the larger forward operating bases. When troops left their FOBs to conduct operations then returned to them afterward, the enemy seized the opportunity to attack Iraqi civilians who had worked with them, Lynch said. Now that troops live and work from patrol bases in the community, more Iraqis are stepping forward to cooperate, he said. "Civilians come forward and ask two questions: `Are you staying?'" Lynch said. "And if the answer is `yes,' then their second question is, `What can we do to help?'" Some 31,000 concerned local citizens within Lynch's command area are making a huge impact on coalition and Iraqi operations. During the past several months alone, they've pointed out 400 emplaced improvised explosive devices and more than 400 weapons caches, Lynch said. They've also killed or captured almost 500 insurgents themselves and turned in five of the division's high-value targets. "That's the power of the concerned local citizen program," Lynch said. Lynch said it's no surprise that Iraqi citizens are increasingly cooperating with the coalition. "I am absolutely convinced that the population of Iraq is just tired of the violence. They are tired of the intimidation. They are tired of the harassment. They are tired of not being able to send their kids to school and go to work, so now they have (risen) up to help," he said. "That's what I see every day." As the Iraqi army, and to a lesser degree, the national police, become increasingly capable, Lynch said, he supports a transfer of responsibility for some areas to Iraqi security forces. He cautioned against withdrawing too many troops too quickly, allowing enemy forces to unravel all that's been accomplished. "We've lost 126 soldiers since we've been here. One hundred twenty-six of my soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice," Lynch said. "And I'll be (darned) if I'm going to advocate giving up ground that they died for. . We are just not going to do that. The place will go back in a heartbeat." Lynch has what he calls a "96-hour rule." "If you've got an area that you've taken away and you walk away from it, 96 hours later the enemy is back -- and he's intimidating the population (and) he's killing innocent people," he said. "So we just have to manage this transition very diligently."

Withdrawal Bad – Iraq Cant Govern Itself

The U.S. can win the battle over organized crime however leaving to soon, would lead to the loss of everything gained in the course of the war.

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

These structural changes could have a major impact on organized crime, insurgency and sectarian violence. Without more effective enforcement, however, they would remain limited in their impact. Enforcement to combat ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN IRAQ 131 the kidnapping industry is critical, both symbolically and substantively. Put simply, there has to be far less tolerance of murders and kidnappings of Iraqis. The creation of a joint US–Iraqi anti-kidnapping force endowed with significant analytic and enforcement capabilities would signify US concern for Iraqis. As it became more established, it would reduce one of the main security threats to many ordinary Iraqi citizens, by turning kidnapping into a high-risk activity for the gangs. More generally, US forces, building on an enhanced intelligence capacity, could initiate a selective but highly effective targeting campaign designed not only to remove critical nodes in criminal networks but also to diminish both the criminal economy and the insurgent economy. Such initiatives, although partial rather than comprehensive, would reduce anarchy and anomie, neutralize spoilers, and enhance the authority, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Iraqi state. The difficulty is that the spoilers – including criminal organizations – seek to perpetuate state weakness – a goal facilitated in Iraq by the inherent tensions between central and local power structures, between the modern state and tribalism, and between abstract notions of collective interest and the immediate self-interest of corrupt bureaucrats, sectarian factions, and militias. Unless the United States can make up lost ground in combating organized crime, therefore, the invasion and occupation of Iraq is doomed to failure Worse however is the possibility of the United States leaving before the job is done.

Iraq will not step up to take responsibility after American withdrawal

The Obama Campaign 8(Barackobama.com, 2008, BARACK OBAMA: TURNING THE PAGE IN IRAQ, <http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_iraq.pdf>)

Iraqi Government Not Stepping Up: The goal of the troop surge was to create space for Iraq’s political leaders to reach agreement to end Iraq’s civil war. In January 2007, President Bush said the goal of the surge was to contain violence so that "Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas." Since then, more than 700 American troops have died, but the Iraqi government has not stepped up. In early September, the United States

Government Accountability Office found the Iraqi government has not enacted legislation to meet critical benchmarks on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament that are key to beginning national reconciliation.

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Deterioration

Iraq will never fully recover after withdraw.

Rand Institute 10( Non Profit Politics Org., 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>) **JRG**

The areas of most concern after U.S. drawdown and withdrawal are therefore those which

remain confessionally or ethnically mixed to some extent and those to which returns are likely.

Baghdad, the importance of which to Iraq’s security cannot be overstated,… Third, over the long term, displacement and related economic disparities pose significant dangers to Iraq’s stability. Growing resentment over inability to recover property, combined with economic and political frustration, could stoke conflict. The lack of adequate mechanisms for recovering property, resolving competing claims, and implementing decisions is likely to be a destabilizing factor for years, perhaps decades, to come. Relatedly, the risks of radicalization among youth and future generations of both the displaced and host communities may also increase, exacerbated by poverty and limited access to education.

**The U.S. needs to stay in Iraq to protect the revolution**

**De Atkine 6 (**Norvell, reporter, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings March http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=17&sid=26d1a1ac-33cc-4127-9e2a-635495972507%40sessionmgr14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=19948247) KCA

The bloody history of **Iraq**, with its constant wars and state terrorism, has engendered a culture of violence and created thousands of homeless children, the ubiquitous street children found in all Iraqi cities. The calculated policies of the Ba'ath Party to facilitate its control resulted in the diminution of the traditional family and increased emphasis on sectarian divisions. Finally, one additional factor that has sown the seeds of continuing bitterness is the "resettlement" policies of the former regime, forcing many thousands of people from their ancestral homes, destroying their culture, and creating a dependency on the government. Given these socio-political factors, one should marvel that the Iraqis have managed to hold it together thus far, particularly since our demonstrated understanding of Iraqi society and the magnitude of the tusk at hand have left much to be desired — to put it as diplomatically as possible. It is really a very simple equation. The Coalition, meaning the United States, must remain in **Iraq** to protect the revolution. It is a revolution engendered by outside intervention, but a revolution nonetheless. It is a revolution in that we are assisting the Iraqis to transform their economy, from a nanny state to one of free enterprise, the military from a coercive regime-protection instrument to one that will defend the constitution, the political environment from one of oppression to one that is representative of the people, and a society from one that was all but destroyed by the social and political engineering of the Ba'ath regime to one that is being rebuilt and renewed. We must provide the firewall behind which the Iraqi people are allowed to work their own way toward a decent, representative, non-oppressive government. One point is incontestable. If **Iraq** fails, the real losers will be the people of the Middle East. The state-controlled media will graphically demonstrate each day the evils wrought by "democracy." The cautious advance toward democracy will be set back for another generation. The general instability of the Middle East will continue and, as 9/11 so graphically illustrated, we are not immune to the socio-political convulsions that have been endemic in the modern history of that troubled region.

**Quick withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to further deterioration of Iraq**

Reuters 7 (alertnet 7/16 http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N16344029.htm) KCA

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned on Monday against an "abrupt withdrawal" by U.S. forces from Iraq and said the international community must not abandon the Iraqi people. Ban, who is due to meet U.S. President George W. Bush on a visit to Washington on Tuesday, said it was not his place to inject himself into the debate raging in Congress in recent weeks over withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq. "The international community, the United Nations, the whole international community should help (the) Iraqi people and government so that they can overcome this difficulty as soon as possible," Ban told a news conference at the United Nations. "Great caution should be taken for the sake of Iraqi people," he said. "The international community can not and should not abandon them. Any abrupt withdrawal or decision may lead to a further deterioration of the situation in Iraq." Emboldened by public opinion polls showing waning support for Bush's Iraq policy, Democrats in charge of Congress are trying to win over enough Republicans to force Bush into a shift in course and start bringing some troops home. Ban said the situation in Iraq was a problem to be dealt with by the whole world and the United Nations would continue to make every effort on the humanitarian front. Asked if he agreed with predecessor Kofi Annan that the Iraq war was illegal, he said it was important to "look to the future" and "not look back."

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Deterioration

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The US troops are the only things holding Iraq together.

Goldberg 6 (Jonah, syndicated columnist, *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* LexisNexis, May 1st, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

President Bush has said that if a democratically elected government of Iraq asked us to leave, we would. I think Bush is sincere, but the truth is that no Iraqi government is going to ask U.S. troops to withdraw anytime soon. American troops are the only thing holding the country together. The Iraqi people understand this, too. In the town of Tal Afar, for example, American troops are keeping Iraqi factions from killing each other. Sheik Abdullah al-Yawar, a leading Sunni in the province, recently told the New Republic's Lawrence Kaplan that if U.S. soldiers withdraw, "there will be rivers of blood." The Atlantic Monthly's Robert Kaplan (no relation) recently wrote in the Los Angeles Times that "my most recent searing, first-hand impression of Iraq, from last December, is this one: One town and village after another getting back on its feet, with residents telling American troops not to leave."

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi De-Unification

Iraq’s small military force would not stand a chance against much stronger neighbors if a regional war were to break out

Galen 10 (Ted, VP Cato 6.12.10 Institute http://www.aina.org/news/2010061120900.htm)

The reality is that Iraq is a weak player surrounded by neighbors who do not especially wish it well. Quantitative measures alone underscore the extent of the power disparity. According to the latest edition of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military Balance, there are 578,269 personnel in Iraq's security forces. But more than 366,000 are Ministry of Interior personnel, trained and equipped to deal with internal-security problems, not foreign military threats. Iraq's bona fide military consists of a fledgling army of 187,000, a navy of 2,000 and an air force of 3,000. By contrast, Iran deploys nearly 350,000 active-duty army troops, 125,000 naval personnel, and 18,000 air force personnel. They are backed by 125,000 troops in the elite Revolutionary Guard Corps and 350,000 reservists who could be called up on short notice. Turkey fields some 511,000 active-duty forces, including a 402,000-strong army. Those fighters are backed by nearly 379,000 trained reserves. Syria and even Saudi Arabia are also able to deploy more numerous and substantially stronger military forces than Iraq. A fight between Iraq and any of its neighbors would not be even remotely an equal contest. None of those countries is likely to launch a blatant, full-scale war--although what Iran might do in response to a U.S. attack on its nuclear facilities remains a disturbing uncertainty. The greater danger is that those neighbors will continue to erode Iraq's territorial integrity and prestige, and will seek to manipulate internal Iraqi rivalries for their own advantage. And whoever heads the Baghdad government will have to tread very carefully to avoid antagonizing any of those prickly states.

Withdrawal Bad – Destroys Progress/Violence

Withdrawal will destroy all progress and result in massive violence through Iraq

Baxter 8 (Kyle, writer, February 27, Newsvine, http://kyleb.newsvine.com/\_news/2008/02/27/1330338-obamas-iraq-withdrawal-position-is-a-disaster-)ELJ

U.S. forces have established security throughout Baghdad, and helped secure the former insurgent bastion Anbar Province, through brutal force, excellent intelligent work, and force projection. This sudden drop in violence is giving the Iraqi government vital time to not only "reconcile" sectarian differences, but solidify into a functioning government and bureaucracy, which it is doing. The more time that passes with decreased violence and increased parliamentary action and government development, the tougher it is for that government to collapse. Moreover, signs of political reconciliation abound. Al Sadr, for instance, just extended his cease fire for another six months. Besides the clear benefit that this brings another six months of lessened violence and more opportunity for reconciliation between the Shia and Sunnis, al Sadr did not do this unilaterally without behind the scenes discussion between al Sadr, other Shiite politicians and the Sunnis. These discussions, which are so central to the future of Iraq, are under way and have been for months. Al Sadr's cease fire also represents his attempt to moderate his firebrand image and reinvent himself as a politician rather than a militia leader. Al Sadr's Mahdi Army, tied with al Qaeda in Iraq, the largest cause of sectarian violence in Iraq. Sadr's decision, then, represents one of the single largest shifts in the iraq war, even if he is only positioning himself for the future of Iraq. What it indicates is that even the worst of the worst realize that the future of Iraq lies in its politics, and not in violence. Moreover, Sunni tribes, once aligned with the insurgency, are now not just supporting the U.S., but have formed militias to fight al Qaeda and secure their lands. These militias, composed of locals and even former and current insurgents, have led to an indisputably incredible decrease in violence in Sunni areas. Insurgent leaders have even met U.S. commanders to coordinate their respective forces in the fight against al Qaeda. While these groups raise many serious questions, they also promise great hope for the future of Iraq, and have begun making those hopes reality. Their alliance with the U.S. has led to a decrease in attacks on Shia, and the Iraqis plan to integrate these forces into the Iraqi army. This reconciliation and government solidification, though, is contingent upon lessened violence. Retaining and building on this newfound respite in violence depends upon U.S. presence, and the increased training and power of the Iraq National Guard. Without the surge, these gains would not have existed, and without continued U.S. presence, would have no future. Removing 2,000 to 8,000 troops a month would create chaos across Iraq. There is no "strategic" way to do that, as the Iraqi military is not sufficiently strong or trained to replace American forces at that level. They need more training.

Withdrawal Bad – Internal Conflict

Bloody internal war after US withdrawal

Ayhan 9 (Veysel Ayahn, Professor at Baysal University, 11/9/09, http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=192327)

The US withdrawal from Iraq may lead to a devastating civil war in the country and even cause a regional state of warfare. Ayhan, who is researching developments in the aftermath of a probable US withdrawal from Iraq, bases his studies on field research. Ayhan has done field research in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Syria and is regarded as a leading expert on Middle Eastern affairs in Turkey. Ayhan spoke to Sunday’s Zaman shortly after meetings Ayhan draws a pretty pessimistic sketch of the impact in 2012 of a probable withdrawal of the US from Iraq; he holds that such a withdrawal would lead to a bloody internal war and even regional warfare that will affect the entire region. “The SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] signed on Nov. 17, 2008 envisages a gradual withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by Dec. 31, 2011. Therefore, if no unexpected developments take place, the American military presence in Iraq will be over by January 2012. It is obvious that the US failed to maintain security in this country; it is also obvious that the US failed to have a political, economic or military influence in Iraq. The state of instability and chaos in Iraq may result in the emergence of the need for further American protectionism. At this point, the increase of the American military presence in Gulf countries may be taken into consideration.”

Noting that the country is becoming more instable as the time for the withdrawal approaches, Ayhan asserts that the violent groups are preparing for warfare in the aftermath of the withdrawal. “The year 2012 points to serious uncertainties and dangers; the most visible threat and danger is that the country may be dragged into a state of internal warfare in a post-US period. The primary factor that will prevent the eruption of a bloody internal war is the American military presence in the country. … Therefore, 2012 may be the start of a bloody civil war that will lead to the partition of Iraq.”and research carried out in Iran and Iraq.

Withdrawal Bad – Power Vacuum

Tension will come with withdrawal – this causes a power vacuum

Kharlamov 10 (Ilya, writer, May 11, The Voice Of Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/11/7641518.html) ELJ

The situation in Iraq is far from stable, whatever the Americans say or the Western media say. The Americans, in their desperate strive to provide at least a semblance of stabilization, are reporting fewer casualties among U.S. troops in Iraq and a drop in terrorist activities. But as soon as they pull out of Iraq, tensions may escalate sharply as the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds rush in to fill the vacuum, said Sergei Demidenko. Things are being worsened by the country’s vague economic and social prospects. Paradoxical as it may seem, the American withdrawal may prove even more dramatic for Iraq than the invasion itself.

Keeping troops after the deadline is key to stop violence in Iraq

[Phillips](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/P/James-Phillips) 10 (James Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs , March 5, The heritage foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections>)

General Odierno has reportedly requested to keep a combat brigade in the disputed northern city of Kirkuk past the Administration’s August 31 deadline for ending combat operations. This appears to be a necessary and prudent action in light of the continued potential for violence in that disputed region. U.S. troops in the past have prevented outbreaks of fighting there between the Iraqi army and Kurdish regional security forces, and a continued U.S. presence could avert a crisis and buy time for political leaders to settle disputes. Insurgent strongholds, such as the city of Baquba, also need the focused attention of U.S. military forces to backup Iraq’s increasingly effective security forces.

Withdrawal causes violence in Iraq – already being seen

PRI 9 (June 30, Public Radio International) ELJ

Both Solis and Janabi believe that violence will flare up in Iraq in the short term after the withdrawal. Solis: "We're already seeing it of course, a spike in the bombings, a spike in the deaths -- four US [killed in action] last night -- so I think it's inevitable that we're going to see an increase in violence. But much of it is not effective -- it's for the press primarily. The question is: will we approach some tipping point in which violence flares in which the Iraqi populace looks to sectarian forces to provide security. If that happens, we can be in very serious trouble. "Both sides have such a grave stake in the success of the Iraqi forces in providing security that we're going to do everything we can to help the Iraqis. And I think we will find that US forces aren't entirely out of the picture as much as the newspapers may be indicating right now." Janabi: "There will definitely be attempts from extremist groups to flare up the violence. The question is, how capable are Iraqi forces to respond to these? The Iraqi forces lack some of the ... logistical support, the intelligence ... I'm hopeful that after the Americans have moved out of the cities, they have passed on this information to the Iraqis so they could follow up on the intelligence on the neighborhoods that were occupied by the Americans." Solis explains the rules of engagement for Iraqi security and US forces moving forward: "There has to be a level of conflict which is ... very high before Americans get involved. Because ... the political imperative is now playing as much a role as the combat imperative and there has to be a delicate balance between the two. And I think we're going to have to see that worked out on the ground ... and so this is something that over the coming weeks and probably the coming months, we're going to see mistakes made, a few mistakes; a few failures."

Iran will work to destabilize Iraqi government when the US pulls out their troops, possibly causing violence

Dobins (James 6.16.9 Dir DPC, RAND, Sec. of State http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.asp)ESY

Iran is the country that probably has the greatest capacity to destabilize Iraq as the U.S. withdraws to embarrass the U.S. withdrawal and to deny America what should be its objective, which is to leave behind an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. Whether Iran does so or not will probably depend more on the state of U.S.-Iranian relations than on the state of U.S.-Iraqi relations. That is to say, Iran's interest in Iraq per se is not very inconsistent with the American interest. It doesn't want the country to break apart, but it wants the country to be governed by the majority, who happen to be Shia, and so it doesn't have an inherent interest in destabilizing Iraq. But it might see an interest, a derivative of the state of its relationship with the United States. And so that is a significant risk factor.

Withdrawal Bad – Sectarian Violence

Withdrawal leads to sectarian violence that will spill over to the rest of the middle east

Riminton and Drash 7 (Hugh, CNN Correspondent, Wayne, CNN.com Producer, May 3, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/) ELJ

Pulling U.S. forces from Iraq could trigger catastrophe, CNN analysts and other observers warn, affecting not just Iraq but its neighbors in the Middle East, with far-reaching global implications. Sectarian violence could erupt on a scale never seen before in Iraq if coalition troops leave before Iraq's security forces are ready. Supporters of al Qaeda could develop an international hub of terror from which to threaten the West. And the likely civil war could draw countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran into a broader conflict. President Bush vetoed a war spending bill Tuesday precisely because the Democrat-led Congress required the first U.S. combat troops to be withdrawn by October 1 with a goal of a complete pullout six months later. Bush said such a deadline would be irresponsible and both sides are now working on new proposals -- which may have no pullout dates.

U.S. presence is key to Iraq’s stability and preventing a regional war

Biddle, Stephen, . Pollack. 08. ("How to Leave a Stable Iraq." Fall Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5: 40-58. Military & Government Collection)

FOR NOW, U.S. troops are playing an important role in sustaining the fragile hope and security in Iraq. But current troop levels cannot be maintained forever. How soon and how deep can a drawdown be without undermining the prospects for stability? Exact projections of troop requirements are difficult to make, but current trends suggest that the United States should be able to cut its presence in Iraq substantially--perhaps by half--over the course of 2010 and 2011. Doing so would be contingent on making further progress against the insurgency, keeping the peace during the upcoming provincial and parliamentary elections, and continuing to assist the Iraqis as they work toward healing their sectarian divisions. A destabilizing election, a renewal of sectarian violence sparked by badly handed refugee returns or poor resolution of the Kirkuk dispute, or more destabilizing activity by Iran would change this timing. Any schedule for withdrawal will be subject to the inherent uncertainty of a conflict as complex as the one in Iraq. Still, one possible model if current trends continue is provided by the recent developments in Anbar Province, which has famously gone from being the worst area of the country in 2006 to nearly its best today. In 2007, the United States had 15 maneuver battalions in the province; today it has only six. Now, U.S. marines participate in less than half of all patrols, and their aim is to drop that down to only 25 percent soon. Several hundred marines remain to advise the two Iraqi army divisions in Anbar, and a sizable number of Americans are working with the Iraqi police there. They will remain necessary for some time, as will further U.S. support of efforts to patrol Anbar's border with Syria to keep out foreign terrorists (who continue to enter Iraq at the rate of about 30 a month, down by two-thirds from earlier estimates but still a worrying figure). The United States will also have to continue to provide key "combat enablers"--aerial surveillance and air, artillery, and armor support--to Iraqi forces in battle. But the ISF are now providing most of the infantry and policing manpower in Anbar themselves, and U.S. forces there will soon be less than half the size they were in 2007, without any increase in violence or instability. Another potential insight, despite the imperfect analogy, comes from the U.S. experience in Bosnia and Kosovo. A key to stability in the Balkans has been the continued presence of outside peacekeepers to enforce the deals that ended the fighting--much like U.S. forces are now doing in Iraq (but were not before). Within four years of the cease-fires in Bosnia and Kosovo, peacekeeping forces in both places had been reduced by about half without causing any resumption of violence. And over the succeeding years, the foreign troop presence fell even further, with a token force of less than ten percent of its original strength remaining in Bosnia today. Drawdowns on this scale in Iraq cannot be rushed without serious risk. For now, a substantial U.S. presence is essential to stabilize a system of local cease-fires and maintain an environment in which gradual compromise can proceed without gambling on a single grand bargain among wary rivals in Baghdad. This is not to say that today's troop count can or should be maintained until 2010--modest near-term withdrawals to below the pre-surge levels will be necessary to establish a sustainable posture. The 130,000 troops and 15 brigades of the pre-2007 force may be too large to maintain into 2009 without unacceptable damage to the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps. But if the United States can maintain a substantial force in Iraq through the critical period of the next two to three years, there is now a credible basis for believing that major drawdowns after that can be enabled by success rather than mandated by failure. Of course, much could still go wrong. And if an electoral crisis or some other event returns Iraq to civil war, it would be very hard to justify another troop surge to try to stabilize Iraq. Containment--withdrawing all U.S. troops while working to prevent the chaos in Iraq from spilling over to the rest of the region--would then become the United States' only realistic option. But today, there is a real chance that U.S. persistence in the short term can secure a stable Iraq and enable major withdrawals in 2010 and 2011 without undermining that stability. The American people--to say nothing of the servicemen and servicewomen who are fighting--have every right to be tired of this war and to question whether it should have ever been fought. But understandable frustration with past mistakes, sorrow over lives lost, anger at resources wasted, and fatigue with a war that has at times seemed endless must not blind Americans to the major change of the last 18 months. The developments of 2007 and 2008 have created new possibilities. If the United States is willing to seize them, it could yet emerge from Mesopotamia with something that may still fall well short of Eden on the Euphrates but that prevents the horrors of all-out civil war, avoids the danger of a wider war, and yields a stability that endures as Americans come home.

Alt Causes – Iraq Instability (1/2)

Alt Cause to Iraq instability – negative attitude of Arab countries towards Iraq

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring, Lexis) ELJ

The negative attitude of Arab countries towards the new Iraq and its new power structure is also another important factor behind instability and insecurity in Iraq. The continuation of the negative attitude of Arab countries towards the new Iraq, despite American and Western pressures on those countries to change their approach towards Iraq and to support that country, is a major factor for insecurity. While American pressures have apparently resulted in some degree of political and diplomatic interaction [relations] between those countries and Iraq, nevertheless, in practice the negative and hostile attitude of Arab countries towards Iraq still continues. The main goal and the major priority of Arab leaders is still to bring about the failure of the present political process in Iraq. The negative attitude of Arab countries towards the new Iraq encourages them to provide support for violent groups and organizations in Iraq. The opposition of the Arabs to the rule of the Shi'is in Iraq and its repercussions in the region - especially the growing role and influence of Iran in the region - is one of the reasons for their negative attitude towards the new Iraq. It seems that so long as there is no change in the negative attitude of Arab countries towards the new Iraq and towards its new identity, the regional support of the Arabs for insecurity and instability in Iraq would continue.

Alt Cause to Iraq instability – Iraqi Sunni population

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring, Lexis) ELJ

The type of the attitude of the Sunni population to the new Iraq and their behaviour during the past few years have been other factors in intensifying insecurity and instability in that country. During the past few decades, Sunni Arabs have had the absolute monopoly of power in that country and were in charge of the main pillars of power. However, under the new circumstances following the American invasion, their influence in Iraq has been considerably reduced, and this has resulted in their intense dissatisfaction and consequently in their opposition to the new government and their support for insecurity in Iraq. The Sunni groups in Iraq are very dissatisfied with these developments and are strongly opposed to many new power structures that have come into being following Saddam [Husayn's] downfall. Those groups are opposed to the new Iraqi constitution, to the posts and positions that have been created in the new constitution, to the provincial divisions and the non-participation of the Sunnis in political and security forces in Iraq. On the whole, they have a very negative view of the new circumstances in Iraq. Those negative outlooks have led them to want to change the present conditions in Iraq through both peaceful and violent means. The efforts of the Ba'thists to create insecurity in Iraq and their co-operation with the al-Qa'ida should be viewed in this context.

Alt Cause to Iraq instability – The social fabric of Iraq

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring, Lexis) ELJ

The social fabric in Iraq and the deep ethnic and sectarian splits in that country might lead either to national splits in Iraq or to their coming back together again. Those splits have resulted in some conflicts in the political field, and in different ethnic and sectarian interests and goals of the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shi'is in Iraq. Consequently, these differences provide the social and political potential for the intensification of domestic conflict and insecurity in Iraq. At the moment, a large part of the conflicts and disputes in Iraq has an ethnic and sectarian feature and dimension. Establishing security in Iraq requires the proper management of ethnic and sectarian challenges in that country.

Alt Causes – Iraq Instability (2/2)

Alt Cause to Iraq instability – The Ba’thists attempts to show power

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring, Lexis) ELJ

One of the variable factors behind recent insecurity has been the attempts of the Ba'thists to show their power and to present themselves on the anniversary of the founding of the Ba'thist Party. At the present stage, the Ba'thists are trying to reorganise and restructure themselves and to have an active and powerful presence in Iraq. They are also trying to attract the forces that are dissatisfied with the present situation and to intensify their attempts to create insecurity. At the same time, the Ba'thists are increasing their co-operation with the al-Qa'ida and are taking part in some joint operations, and making use of suicide bombers and terrorist elements.

Alt Cause to Iraq instability – Regional Factors

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring, Lexis) ELJ

Despite the attempts made [by America] to increase regional support for new Iraq, and especially to take part in serious security co-operation in order to establish security in that country, still one cannot see a common and joint determination to move towards that goal. Despite some regional co-operation and support for improving the security situation in Iraq, during the past year we have noticed a reverse process that has intensified the arrival of insurgents to Iraq, resulting in greater insecurity. Furthermore, those developments have neutralised some regional processes, such as the meeting of the foreign ministers of Iraq's neighbouring countries Iraq. The important point is that there is still no agreement between the Arab countries of the region, Iran and Turkey about Iraq's future. This can result in the continuation of the security challenges in that country.

Mission Failure Turn

We cannot win a war in Iraq—withdrawal will just exacerbate the violence.

Nicholson 7 (Brendan, AAP, LexisNexis, February 23rd, 2007, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

“There is no such thing as victory in Iraq," the minister said in a speech to a defence conference. He made the admission just hours before US Vice-President Dick Cheney arrived in Australia last night on an official visit, and the day after Britain announced it was cutting its Iraq troop commitment by a quarter. In his keynote speech to the conference, Dr Nelson said people should not be thinking in terms of "conventional victories or success" in Iraq. Success would "essentially mean that the democratically elected Iraqi Government, supported by its own Iraqi security forces, will be able to provide economic and defence security to its own people for the forseeable future," he said. "It will, however, be a country that will continue to be characterised by degrees of sectarian and other violence, and al-Qaeda and other terrorists who so desperately want to make sure they prevail in Iraq will do everything to frustrate and undermine it."

US victory in Iraq key to East Asian stability.

Kin 4 (Kwan Weng, writer for Strait Times, LexisNexis, June 4th, 2004, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said here yesterday that the Americans must not fail in Iraq as it would have far-reaching implications for the stability and security on which East Asia depends for its prosperity. 'I think if we all start withdrawing our troops and the Americans are left alone, that's going to be very big trouble for them. And if they fail, it's big trouble for all of us,' Mr Lee told an annual symposium here whose theme this year was on laying the groundwork for Asia's regional integration. He made the remark in the context of Spain's decision to recall its troops from Iraq after terrorists killed nearly 200 train commuters in Madrid earlier this year. He pointed out that despite the Korean and Vietnam wars and another war between Vietnam and Cambodia, East Asia had known peace and stability since 1945, thanks to the US security umbrella.

East Asian Stability Key to World Stability

Carden 10 (Michael, Army Sergeant, USA Department of Defense, June 10th, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59565>) NK

Citing the violence in Afghanistan and renewed tensions with China, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Mike Mullen last night encouraged military partnerships between the United States and all Asian nations in order to bring stability to the region. Video “From the bedrock alliances we have with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, to burgeoning relationships we foster with emerging partners like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, … we are duty bound and will remain so to dedicate our might to mutual defense,” Mullen said. “Those who need our help may depend upon it, [and] those who question our sincerity, need not.” Mullen touched on various military-to-military relationships the U.S. has in the region, articulating his concerns and explaining the need to expand Asian interaction. Security, prosperity and the future depend on such exchanges, he said. “Nothing cChief of Staff of the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team ould be more critical, in my view, than these relationships right now, especially as we ramp up our military presence in Afghanistan and begin to improve security in Kandahar and across the south,” Mullen said.

Early Withdrawal Fails

**Early withdrawal detrimental**

Engelhardt 10 (Tom Engelhardt, 4/12/10, “Premature Withdrawal in Iraq”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC12Ak01.html)

We've now been at war with, or in, Iraq for almost 20 years, and intermittently at war in Afghanistan for 30 years. Think of it as nearly half a century of experience, all bad. And what is it that Washington seems to have concluded? That in Afghanistan, where one disaster after another has occurred, we Americans can finally do more of the same, somewhat differently calibrated, and so much better. And in Iraq, we seemed to have decided that enough was enough and we should simply depart. Yet the calls from a familiar crew for us to stay in Iraq are growing louder by the week. The Iraqis, so the argument goes, need us. After all, who would leave them alone, trusting them not to do what they've done best in recent years: cut one another's throats?

Full Withdrawal Fails

A full withdrawal would remove key units such as advisory assistance brigades before the job is done

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

In turn, this arrangement highlights another critical political-diplomatic hurdle that the United States faces in Iraq: securing a new agreement with the Iraqi government that would allow U.S. military forces to remain in the country beyond 2011. At present, the security agreement governing the presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq expires on December 31, 2011. This means that every last U.S. soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be out by that date. Because this subject is politically sensitive in both the United States and Iraq, no one is willing to discuss it. But Iraqi and U.S. military and civilian leaders alike recognize that a follow-on agreement to extend the U.S. military presence beyond 2011 would be desirable and probably necessary. It is highly unlikely that Iraq will have sorted out its political and security problems by the end of 2011, including finding a solution to the propensity of COIN-trained militaries to move against the civilian leadership. Consequently, it will be critical for the United States to retain at least the AABs for at least 3—5 years after the expiration of the current security agreement to allow Iraqi civil-military relations to mature, Iraqi political institutions to strengthen, and a culture of apolitical professionalism to take root within the Iraqi military before the last U.S. combat troops (even if they are masquerading as advisors) depart.

Withdrawing American forces from Iraq fails.

Swabb 7 (Erik, US Marine Infantry Officer and veteran of Iraq war, *The Boston Globe*, March 20th, 2007, <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/20/the_us_needs_to_stay_in_iraq/>) NK

Instead of this approach, top commanders in Iraq previously focused on the assumption that the presence of US troops fueled the insurgency. The goal was thus to replace US troops with Iraqi forces. As US troops left, security would improve. While this approach had a certain logic to it, facts on the ground never bore it out because Iraqi forces proved incapable or unwilling to protect both Sunnis and Shi'ites. Previous security plans for Baghdad consisted almost wholly of Iraqi forces and were complete failures.

Quick Withdrawal Fails

General Petraeus warns of withdrawing to fast

Scully, Megan. 08. (Petraeus Warns Against Taking Troops From Iraq Too Soon." CongressDaily, April 08. 3. )Military & Government Collection

Defense The top U.S. military commander in Iraq today told lawmakers he wants to halt any troop reductions in Iraq arguing that withdrawing forces too rapidly could reverse the "fragile" successes achieved in the country in the last year. Army Gen. David Petraeus, in his first of four congressional hearings this week, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he wants to begin a 45-day period of "consolidation and evaluation" after the last of the troops deployed for the so-called surge campaign leave Iraq in July. "At the end of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions," Petraeus told the panel. The general said he could not project how long any evaluation of possible troop drawdowns would take or how many U.S. forces would be needed in Iraq by the end of the year. Several Democrats who have long argued that the significant commitment of U.S. forces takes the pressure off the nascent Iraqi government seized on Petraeus' inability to provide a more exact assessment of the United States' long-term presence in Iraq. "That is a clear, open-ended pause," Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin said of the general's plan. "It seems to me that what you've given your chain of command is a plan that has no end to it," Levin added. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., a Democratic presidential candidate, questioned whether the conditions for reducing the U.S. military presence in Iraq are too vague. "It's not a mathematical exercise," Petraeus responded. "There's not an equation" to determining U.S. presence in Iraq, he said. Petraeus argued that his strategy would provide ground commanders the needed flexibility "to preserve the still fragile security gains our troops have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve." Petraeus also cautioned against withdrawing forces too rapidly — a move that he warned could jeopardize any progress achieved in the last year. Senate Armed Services ranking member John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee who has repeatedly warned against an early withdraw from Iraq, also painted a bleak picture of the effects of ending the military campaign too soon. "Should the United States instead choose to withdraw from Iraq before adequate security is established, we will exchange for this victory a defeat that is terrible and long lasting," he said. Levin was more skeptical of those successes, arguing that recent violence in Basra and Baghdad "raises questions" about the success of the surge. "But more significantly, the purpose of the surge as announced by President Bush last year — to give the Iraqi leaders breathing room to work out a settlement — has not been achieved," Levin said. "This reality leads many of us to once again challenge President Bush's policies." Levin also questioned the United States' continued investment in Iraq reconstruction. "The Iraqi government seems content to sit by, build up surpluses and let Americans reconstruct their country and foot the bill," Levin said. Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, told the committee that Iraq is increasingly using its own resources to pay for projects, including $200 million for vocational training of residents who supported U.S. efforts to thwart al-Qaida in Anbar province. Petraeus stressed that Iraqis have assumed more responsibility for securing the country, with $8 billion from the central government to be spent on security this year and $11 billion next year.

The only way to affectively withdraw U.S. troops from the middle east is through new foreign policies

Odom and Kahl 8( William, Army General, Colin, Council of Foreign Relations, August 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64458/colin-h-kahl-and-william-e-odom/when-to-leave-iraq>) **JRG**

The only way to reduce U.S. military requirements in the region is to restore the United States' diplomatic straddle between the region's two major conflicts -- the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian-Arab conflict. The invasion of Iraq not only destroyed the balance but is now imposing additional military requirements on the United States that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

The Americans should not withdraw troops too quickly because it would make the last several years in Iraq a waste.

Swabb 7 (Erik, US Marine Infantry Officer and veteran of Iraq war, *The Boston Globe*, March 20th, 2007, <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/20/the_us_needs_to_stay_in_iraq/>) NK

The biggest danger now is that the public and Congress are so pessimistic that US forces will be withdrawn before the strategy has time to produce results. Ultimately, this view reflects a lack of understanding about how this strategy, unlike previous failed plans, is a real change in the right direction. Such skepticism is understandable considering the difficult last four years. But it risks cutting short the best hope yet for putting Iraq on the right course.

Quick Withdrawal Fails

Terrorism will continue after US withdrawal

Rand 10(RAND Institue, Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) dc

Extremist terrorism will continue, regardless of U.S. withdrawal. But it is unlikely to precipitate large-scale conflict unless one or another of the main groups reacts excessively and indiscriminately to especially provocative acts of terrorism (e.g., on mosques or leaders). Given how hard it is to prevent such acts, the United States should use its diplomatic, economic, and military influence to maintain consensus to avoid such reactions.

**The withdrawal process could be postponed due to Iraqi violence, meaning the Aff doesn’t have an immediate withdrawal.**

Bar 10(Dr. Shmuel, Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2010, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3032TrendUS_transedit.pdf>) JRG

The decision whether to keep more forces after August 2010 will be affected, among other things, from domestic Iraqi developments, mainly the elections scheduled to take place in March 2010. If the elections produce a stable government with a parliamentary majority within a reasonable period of time, there will be no reason to postpone the withdrawal. The indecisive results that prevent the establishing of a stable government may bring the US to postpone its partial withdrawal. The previous elections (2006) led to a clear coalition division of religious / ethnic nature and to an unequivocal victory of the moderate Shiites and even then it took six months to form a coalition; it seems today hat the religious coalitions on both sides - Sunni-Shia - have completely disintegrated. Therefore, the interim period until the formation of a government could last even more. In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the Obama administration to adhere to the American political schedule to hold elections in November 2010, and to ignore the Iraqi time table.

U.S. withdrawal could be delayed due to violence spurred in southern Iraq

Johnson 9(John, Lieutenant Colonel Army, October 2009, SmallWarsJournal, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/302-johnson.pdf>) JRG

As was the case during the deployment of U.S. forces into Iraq in 2003, the majority of U.S. forces will likely exit Iraq through the south, moving equipment to Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports in the northern Arabian Gulf for loading onto ships and subsequent return to U.S. bases or to other theaters of operation. There are three primary threats to the combat forces drawdown in southern Iraq including: Shia militant groups opposed to the presence of U.S. forces; Iranian influence that ranges from helpful to disruptive and deadly to U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and intra-Shia violence, where Shia political groups compete for power and resources. This paper focuses on Shia militant groups and malign Iranian influence, and also briefly addresses the potential threat of intra-Shia politically motivated violence. Additionally, while the majority of violence in Iraq over the past six years has been concentrated in Baghdad, Anbar Province in western Iraq and in northern Iraq, the environment in southern Iraq described in this paper highlights how the complex, multi-faceted nature of the southern region can affect the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Withdrawal from Iraq causes more weapons and a prolonging of the war in Iraq

Mauro 7 (Ryan, National Security Researcher for the Christian Action Network and a published author, Global Politician. May 7th, 2007. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq>) NK

Some of the scenarios above may come to pass regardless of a withdrawal, but a withdrawal would guarantee these outcomes, and certainly exasperate them. The most immediate consequence would obviously be a base for terrorists in Iraq, who would find access to the oil revenue they previously never possessed in Afghanistan. The terrorists who attacked us on September 11, 2001 would find themselves in possession of even greater resources, and would be free to finance as they wish, arm as they wish, and build any kind of weapon they wish, in order to kill innocent Americans. Withdrawing from Iraq would not end the war, it would prolong it. Some ignorant Americans argue we aren’t at war, but I’d ask such Americans to take a visit to Ground Zero, or talk to our Iraqi allies, or read any of Osama Bin Laden’s statements. Everyone wants to live in a safer, more secure world and for that reason, advocates of an immediate withdrawal from Iraq must reconsider the consequences of such an action. No compassionate American wants a soldier away from his or her family, but short-sighted, emotion-based reactions such as is being proposed would only guarantee such a scenario. The time is tough, and the President is responsible for the mistakes we have made in Iraq. Every such mistake he has made, though, would pale in comparison to the mistake of ceding victory and the future of the world to the terrorists we came to know on September 11, 2001.

Full Withdrawal Impossible

Even with a successful withdrawal, conflicts in the middle east will never allow the U.S. to withdraw entirely from the region.

Bar 10(Dr. Shmuel, Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2010, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3032TrendUS_transedit.pdf>) JRG

Even if the US is successful in the withdrawal from Iraq in a relatively dignified manner, the war in Afghanistan might be prolonged without any resolution or tangible achievements. Furthermore, a rise in American casualties could cause a shift in American public opinion concerning, which still sees the Afghanistan war as a "just war" against terrorism, as opposed to Iraq which was the “wrong war”. Such a shift, bringing public opinion to perceive it as a second “Vietnam War" may bring the administration to look for a way to "cut losses" and to initiate an early withdrawal, or alternatively, to invest further resources in order to achieve an image of success. There is also a possibility that the US will be forced to keep its troops in the region, due to circumstances and developments, taking into account that there are strategic assets (Pakistan), from which the US cannot withdraw.

Alternate Causalities – Extremist Groups

Many threats pose a problem to Iraq’s stability

Rand Institute 09 (Withdrawing fromIraq. Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and

Mitigating Strategies Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98))

U.S. drawdown plans and risk-mitigation policies should be more concerned with keeping the major actors in the political process and away from using force than with the more likely but less dire threats of extremism and terrorism. These goals must include the sober recognition that the GoI and the ISF could play harmful as well as essential roles in Iraq’s security and stability. Extremists have been weakened politically and militarily but, one can assume, will continue violent attacks, including attacks that target U.S. forces and other personnel. Less likely but far more consequential is the danger that one or more of Iraq’s main factions could abandon peaceful politics in favor of violence. The drawdown of U.S. forces could make this more likely insofar as opposition groups see a greater opportunity for or a need to resort to force, especially as the ruling regime and its forces grow in power. However, this threat will not disappear before December 2011, and the United States may be able to maintain its honest broker/mediator role without large combat forces on the ground. A more authoritarian GoI, with a more muscular ISF as its partner, puppet, or puppet master, would likely be resisted with force by the Sunni and the Kurds and, 27 The International Monetary Fund reported in August 2008 that Iraq’s growth potential was high due to high global oil prices. 28 Kirkuk contains up to 13 percent of Iraq’s known oil supplies. Internal Security and Stability 67 possibly, by excluded Shi’a factions. At the same time, the resumption of armed resistance on the part of the Sunni or stepped-up encroachment by the Kurds would be likely to motivate greater GoI seizure and abuse of power. Although it is unlikely, a spiral of more-violent opposition and harsher authoritarianism could imperil Iraq’s new order and, with it, important U.S. interests.

Alternate Causalities – Organized Crime

Organized crime runs rampant in Iraq despite our best efforts

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, organized crime and corruption were the last things policymakers in Washington were thinking about. Since then, however, criminal enterprises, criminal activities and corruption have had profoundly debilitating effects on US efforts to impose political and military stability as well as on its reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Although Iraq does not fit neatly into the classic notions of peace operations, the problems and challenges which emerged in the aftermath of the invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein are not very different from those which have bedevilled peace operations elsewhere. Organized crime (which includes criminal enterprises and systematic criminal activities) in Iraq – although only one component of a complex and highly intractable environment – emerged as a major ‘spoiler’ in the post-war security environment, helping to finance insurgency, terrorism and sectarianism, hindering the emergence of a legitimate central government, and rendering complex economic problems still more intractable.1 The initial looting of national infrastructure, economic assets and military bases had profoundly debilitating consequences, facilitating the development of organized crime and insurgency. Corruption also became endemic, undermining public trust and confidence in the new government while also facilitating much of the criminal activity. Most assessments of Iraq, however, focused on terrorism, insurgency and sectarian conflict, largely ignoring the way in which criminal activities both fed and exacerbated these other problems. There were exceptions to be sure.2 But the importance of organized crime in Iraq was not explicitly acknowledged by top-level US military officers or officials until General David Petraeus in International Peacekeeping noted that, as the violence was subsiding, an underlying mafia-like presence was becoming more discernible.

Organized crime fuels the fire of all that is wrong in Iraq from corruption to terrorism.

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

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Alternate Causalities – Organized Crime

Currently coalition forces are not specifically targeting organized crime

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

In fact, in the five years after the invasion, Iraq became a ‘perfect storm’ of organized crime and corruption. It was ‘Sicily unconstrained’, a pernicious blend of ‘prohibition Chicago’, gang warfare in Los Angeles, organized crime in Russia and the Balkans in the 1990s, and corruption in Nigeria, overlaid by sectarianism, external meddling and resource conflicts. Although organized crime and corruption undermined the efforts to impose stability, re-establish good governance and the rule of law, and facilitate economic reconstruction, their impact is largely overlooked. And when organized crime is acknowledged, it is still treated as something separate from the main fault lines in the society, even though it feeds directly into behaviour that both manifests and exacerbates these fault lines. Organized crime – like insurgency – is not a stand-alone phenomenon but is nested in complex conditions, driven by a variety of impulses, and is far-reaching in its consequences.4 Unfortunately, Coalition officials have been reluctant to target crime, insisting that it is an Iraqi responsibility.

**In order to leave a stable Iraq the U.S. must target organized crime**

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

Indeed, organized crime activities have become the funding mechanism of choice, as well as a means to consolidate local control, for most of the actors engaged in violence in Iraq. At the same time, the analysis suggests that a struggle for control over resources related to criminal activities has itself helped to foment violence among certain groups. Thus, the article argues that combating organized crime must be central to the US mission in Iraq, and the focus ought to be principally on those criminal activities that contribute most to the insecurity of Iraqi citizens. The analysis concludes by considering ways in which the power of criminal organizations can be diminished and the consequences of criminal activities mitigated.

The Iraq Government is plagued by corruption due to organized crime

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

The other unforeseen development was that the new Iraqi government became as much a part of the problem as the solution. The Iraqi state – hollowed out as it was – remained the prize of politics – albeit with benefits that were more widely distributed than under Saddam Hussein. As Shiite politicians took control of a state apparatus that had been stripped bare (both literally and figuratively) by the looting, they still saw this as an opportunity to obtain resources and benefits long denied. One result was pervasive corruption, particularly in the oil ministry, where there were many complaints about an ‘oil smuggling mafia’ that skimmed profits from the oil industry and controlled the allocation of administrative posts.22 The use of public office for private gain was not only endemic but was also buttressed by coercion and intimidation. Compounding both the internal corruption and the element of coercion was the infiltration of many government departments by Shiite militias and criminal gangs. This was particularly pronounced in the Ministry of Health, where infiltration by the Mahdi Army facilitated sectarian killings of Sunni patients – and often the doctors who treated them – and allowed the diversion and sale of large amounts of pharmaceuticals

Iran Will Fill In

Iran will reverse everything the U.S. has worked so hard for.

**Middle East Policy Council 09** ( Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

Iran is the country that has the greatest capacity to destabilize Iraq as the United States withdraws, to embarrass the United States and to deny America what should be its objective, which is to leave behind an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. Whether Iran does so or not will probably depend more on the state of U.S.-Iranian relations than on the state of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Iran's interests in Iraq per se are not inconsistent with America's interests.

Iraqi Government Corrupt

**The Iraqi government itself is corrupt, perpetuating the problem**

Williams 09. ("Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." feb 2009 International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 1: 115-135.)

One of the consequences has been that efforts to investigate corruption were either rendered impossible or undermined. As a leaked assessment by the US Embassy noted, ‘several ministries are so controlled by criminal gangs or militias as to be impossible to operate within absent a tactical force protecting the investigator’. 24 Another result was that the delivery of goods and services by the Iraqi government remaines dismal. Not surprisingly, therefore, the state continues to be seen as lacking both legitimacy and effectiveness – making militia, tribal or criminal affiliation even more important for many Iraqis looking for both physical and economic protection. This, in turn, further empoweres the militias, while simultaneously perpetuating and even exacerbating the weakness of the Iraqi state.

Current Withdrawal Timeframe Good

Iraq and US officials agree that current troop withdrawal deadline is best

Aswat al-Iraq 10 (Arbil 5.17.10 BBC)ESY

Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Rafi Hiyad al-Isawi, discussed on Monday [17 May] with the commander of the US forces in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno, the military withdrawal and security cooperation between Iraqi and US forces, according to a statement released from Isawis office. "The meeting tackled also the latest political and security developments in the country and the ongoing talks to for the coming government," said the statement received by Aswat al-Iraq news agency. "The two officials agreed on the US forces future in Iraq and the importance to abide by the agreed schedule regarding the military withdrawal in accordance with the security agreement signed between Baghdad and Washington," it added.

Iraqi Government Legitamacy

Sticking to troop withdrawal deadline is necessary for Iraqi government legitimacy

Conyers Jr. 10 (John 3.5.10 chairman House Judiciary Committee, USA Today pg 9A)

While the wisest course of action would have been to avoid this costly conflict entirely, we must, at the very least, honor the Status of Forces Agreement entered into by the U.S. and the Iraqi governments in November 2008. It states that the U.S. will remove its combat troops by the end of this August, followed by the removal of all U.S. forces from the country by Dec. 31, 2011. All parties, political and otherwise, currently operating in Iraq are relying on the U.S. to follow through on this mutually negotiated troop removal timeline. The fledgling government in Baghdad has derived much of its legitimacy from the Iraqi people by appearing to stand up to the American occupation and by providing internal security independent of U.S. forces. Moreover, various political, regional and ethnic factions have been operating under the assumption that the American presence was nearing its end. With this understanding, they have been negotiating the political arrangements that will lay the foundation for long-term stability in Iraq. The success of these efforts could be threatened by our failure to live up to the withdrawal timetable outlined in the agreement. A peaceful, stable government in Iraq can only be achieved when its citizens are focused on the future of their country instead of on an unending military occupation.

Iraqi Democracy Not Established

Iraq’s democracy is crippled

SF Chronicle (Joel Brinkely, 6/27/10, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/06/26/IN0D1E0R29.DTL>) PG

As American troops withdraw from Iraq this summer, expect the democratic freedoms Iraqis have enjoyed in recent years to recede as well. Already, the Iraqi government is restricting freedom of the press, expression and assembly. It's toying with Web censorship, torturing political prisoners and killing political opponents. A large part of the problem is corruption. Under American stewardship, Iraq has become one of the half-dozen most corrupt nations on earth. "Significant widespread corruption" afflicts "all levels of government," the State Department says. Nothing can so quickly cripple a democracy as the need by the nation's leaders to protect their cash flow and hide all evidence of their thefts. That leads, at least, to electoral fraud and press censorship. How can corrupt officials survive if the press is free to report on their misdeeds? "We are controlled and censored," Faris Fadhil Sultan told me. He's a reporter for Al Arabiya television in Iraq. "The government can exert its will on reporters through criminal charges or suspension from work, even kidnapping and killing." Iraqi reporters are intimidated into compliance. Unfortunately for the government, however, foreign correspondents, among the best in the field, have been reporting in Iraq over the past seven years. They have written frequently about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's financial foibles, including his decision, 18 months ago, to fire the government's corruption monitors shortly after one of them testified in Washington that government officials had embezzled $13 billion in American reconstruction funds. Since then, no evidence has surfaced to indicate that the corruption disease has subsided. That is a tactical problem for Iraqi democracy. A larger, strategic problem lies in the certainty of history.

Iraqi democracy fragile

Allawi 10 (Ayad Allawi, Washington Post, 6/10/10, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060903807.html?hpid=opinionsbox1>)

Unfortunately, some elements in and outside Iraq are still attempting to undermine our fragile democracy. They have resorted to intimidation, arrests, baseless claims of fraud and endless demands for recounts. Despite others' questionable motives, we accepted these recounts. The Independent High Electoral Commission confirmed the March totals last month, and the [Supreme Court of Iraq ratified the results](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060100527.html)**.** Iraqiya won 91 seats in parliament but cannot govern alone; we must build a stable and strong coalition that includes Iraqis from all groups in order to truly represent our nation.

\*\*\*50,000 Troops Key\*\*\*

50,000 Key – General Solvency

50,000 troops will serve as support troops that are key to assist the ISF, protect American interests and operate counter terror missions

Gearan 9 (Anne, Writer, Counter Currents, February 27, <http://www.countercurrents.org/gearan270209.htm>) ELJ

While there Obama is expected to outline a compromise withdrawal plan that leaves behind as many as 50,000 troops for cleanup and protection operations. Although most of the fighting forces would be withdrawn in the next 18 months, some of those units could be in Iraq for years to come. An agreement forged by the Bush administration with Iraqi officials requires removal of all U.S. forces by 2012. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that a holdover, or “residual,“ force would number in the tens of thousands. His spokesman said Wednesday that assuming there is such a force, it would have three primary functions: Training and helping Iraqi forces; protecting Americans and U.S. assets in Iraq and limited counterterrorism operations in which Iraqi forces would take the lead. “I think a limited number of those that remain will conduct combat operations against terrorists, assisting Iraqi security forces,“ Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. “By and large you’re talking about people who we would classify as enablers, support troops.“

50,000 Key – General Solvency

Iraq is not ready to protect itself – US support is still key

Economics and Politics 9 (February 25,

<http://www.economicsandpolitics.org/2009/02/25/obama-to-announce-19-month-withdrawal-timetable-for-iraq-4-us-soldiers-wounded/>) ELJ

The LAT explains this cryptic reference, based on leaks that suggest that President Obama will announce next week a 19-month timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. He had campaigned on a pledge of getting out within 16 months of his inauguration, but his military commanders had pressed for 23 months. The withdrawal timetable affects two-thirds of US troops now in Iraq, but it is expected that even after 2010 some 50,000 will remain. The Iraqi military continues to need training, and it cannot always handle difficult situations, needing US teams to come in to their aid. Iraq has no air force to speak of. Its newly ordered aircraft will not arrive until 2013 and it will take years to train the pilots. Iraq’s military will therefore need US-supplied close air support for years to come, and all the support staff required. The new Iraqi military also does occasionally get into fights it cannot finish, and so rapid response teams remain important.

The only way for political stability in Iraq is American forces

Kagan 6 (Robert, contributing editor at The New Republic, The New Republic, November 27, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18884>) ELJ

The widespread desire to get out of Iraq is producing much wishful thinking about how such a withdrawal can be accomplished and at what cost. The common theme of most proposals--including those rumored to be dominating the thinking of the Baker-Hamilton Commission--is that the only solution in Iraq is political, and perhaps also diplomatic, rather than military. The common flaw in each of these proposals is that no political solution can be achieved without a measure of military success by the combined forces of the U.S. and Iraqi armies. The problem in Iraq, until now, has not been the administration's failure to recognize the necessity of a political solution. Nor is it that the administration has set its sights in Iraq too high. For quite some time now, officials throughout the government, including the White House, would have been delighted to accept an outcome other than a perfectly unified Iraq if it could plausibly allow the country to sustain itself even for a year without descending into bloody civil war. As for the question of democracy, the administration's efforts to support democratic government in Iraq have been more pragmatic than idealistic. The alternative to democratic government in Iraq is some form of authoritarian rule. But where is the strongman who can take control of Iraq? Would he be Sunni or Shia? Placing either sectarian group in charge would only set off civil war. As a practical matter, not as an idealistic matter, no government can succeed in Iraq that is not based on a bargain between the different sectarian groups, and no bargain will be sustainable that does not in some way reflect the people's desires. No such bargain can even be reached, however, without a minimum level of order and security in Iraq. Unless the majority of Iraqi people can be protected from terrorist bombers, insurgents, and death squads, they will not be able to negotiate and sustain any political settlement. When the U.S. and Iraqi forces fail to guarantee their security, they naturally look to their own sectarian forces for protection. The expectation that a U.S. withdrawal or "phased redeployment" will force Iraqis to reach some kind of accommodation with one another has been disproved by three years of painful experience. American officials have been promising to begin drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq since the beginning of the occupation. Roughly every six months, Pentagon officials have announced their intention to cut the force levels in half within a year. Each of these drawdowns was supposed to follow various milestones of political success--an election or the establishment of a new government. But each anticipated political breakthrough has been undermined by new spikes in insurgent attacks. The problem has not been a lack of political progress, really, but a lack of military progress to sustain political advances.

50,000 Key – Civil War

Troops in Iraq will needed after 2011 to take a combat role if civil war breaks out

Strobel 10 (Warren P., Writer, McClatchy Newspapers, March 5, <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/03/06/u-s-prepares-to-leave-iraq-future-uncertain/>) ELJ

Senior U.S. officials and top generals, using football terminology, like to speak of the American effort in Iraq as being in the ‘red zone,’ close to the goal line of a reasonably stable and democratic country after years of struggle and sacrifice. Others who’ve spent significant time in Iraq, however, say that the country’s future, while vastly more hopeful than it was four years ago, is nonetheless still in doubt. ‘This can go either way. And it can go either way for a long time to come,’ said Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad from 2007 to 2009. Crocker liked to say that the important events of the Iraq war might not have even happened yet. ‘I believed it then. I believe it now,’ he said. Violence in Iraq is down markedly, but political, ethnic and secular reconciliation has remained elusive. The fault line between Sunni Muslim Arabs and Sunni Kurds still tears at the country’s northern tier. Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Shiite Muslim Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, see it as a potential regional battleground. The elections, in which 6,200 candidates are vying for 325 parliament seats, will open a months-long effort to form a new government. That path will be strewn with pitfalls and could stretch beyond the self-imposed Aug. 31 U.S. deadline for withdrawing combat brigades. The situation is so fragile that President Barack Obama is hearing more calls to consider slowing the troop withdrawal if Iraq takes a turn for the worse. During a recent visit to Washington, Army Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of American forces in Iraq, signaled that he might ask Obama to keep one combat brigade, about 3,000 troops, in the powder keg city of Kirkuk, on the Arab-Kurdish fault line, after Sept. 1. If he does need the troops, he’s expected to ask for them this summer, defense officials told McClatchy. However, Obama, who pledged during his election campaign to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, appears determined to keep to the schedule no matter what. ‘We see nothing now that affects the plan. We’re on track to move down to 50,000 troops at the end of August and to end the combat mission. And we don’t see anything that will get us off that track,’ a senior administration official, who briefed reporters on White House-imposed conditions of anonymity, said Thursday. Sometime this spring, there will be more U.S. troops in Afghanistan than there are in Iraq for the first time since March 2003. There are now 96,000 in Iraq and 78,000 in Afghanistan. A European diplomat, who asked not to be identified because he wasn’t authorized to speak for the record, said the Obama administration was hoping for the quickest possible formation of a new Iraqi government to speed the U.S. withdrawal. By contrast, he said, his government argues that taking more time will be worth it if it helps Iraq’s politicians narrow the country’s deep divides. Wayne White, the State Department’s principal Iraq analyst from 2003 to 2005, said American influence in Iraq had plummeted — he termed it ‘nil to iffy’ — and that there was little point in extending the U.S. stay. ‘If Humpty Dumpty is going to fall apart . . . there’s very little that the United States is going to be able to do about it,’ White said. What the United States will leave behind ‘is not predictable. But that shouldn’t stop us from expediting our withdrawal.’ This is the first election since 2003 that the Iraqis have organized themselves. The mere fact that Iraq is holding it, with no major sects or ethnic groups boycotting, is little short of a miracle to many current and former officials who lived through the darkest days of sectarian violence from 2005 to 2007. Political killings have dropped dramatically since the Bush administration belatedly changed course in Iraq in early 2007, adopting a counterinsurgency strategy and sending an additional 20,000 combat troops to Iraq. It remains to be seen whether those gains will outlast the U.S. military’s stay. The course change ‘basically salvaged a war that we were on the threshold of losing,’ said Michael O’Hanlon, a scholar at the Washington-based Brookings Institution who initially was skeptical of the troop ‘surge’ but became a leading public proponent. O’Hanlon said he was now optimistic, but added, ‘I’m not one of these people who’s just jumping from the rooftops these days with joy, because there’s still much that can go awry.’ For that reason, he said, the White House ‘should stay flexible’ and consider keeping troops in Iraq past December 2011. That would mean amending a U.S.-Iraqi status-of-forces agreement. Even as American combat forces leave, the United States will have to expend more treasure, time and maybe even blood to secure the gains of the last three years. The remaining 50,000 troops will be in Iraq in an advisory capacity, to train and assist Iraqi security forces, but they ‘are still going to have a combat capability, even if they’re not going to be called ‘combat brigades,’ ‘ O’Hanlon said. The State Department will assume greater powers in Iraq as the Pentagon transfers responsibilities from soldiers to diplomats and development experts. ‘We need to stay heavily and directly engaged,’ former Ambassador Crocker said. ‘Iraq is going to need that engagement . . . for quite some time to come.’ Brian Katulis of the liberal Center for American Progress said the Iraq war remained ‘a net negative’ for U.S. foreign policy. ‘We’re still trying to take a sad song and make it better,’ he told a panel organized by the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

50,000 Key – Civil War

Troops in Iraq after 2011 ensure no civil war breakout

Ricks 10 (Thomas E., senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security February 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp>) ELJ

Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild.

50,000 Key – ISF Moral

Continued presence is key – ISF moral

Ricks 10 (Thomas E., senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security February 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp>) ELJ

In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them. As a longtime critic of the American invasion of Iraq, I am not happy about advocating a continued military presence there. Yet, to echo the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, just because you invade a country stupidly doesn’t mean you should leave it stupidly. The best argument against keeping troops in Iraq is the one some American military officers make, which is that a civil war is inevitable, and that by staying all we are doing is postponing it. That may be so, but I don’t think it is worth gambling to find out.

50,000 Key – Civil war

Continued presence is key to stop a multi faction civil war

Younes 10 (Ali, political analyst, March 5, Middle East Views, <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/03/05/102239.html>) ELJ

Colonel Gary Anderson, a retired Marines and who had just returned from Iraq as consultant to the State Department, uses Lebanon’s civil war as an analogy to what might happen in Iraq if the U.S. pulls all of its forces out of Iraq. Col. Anderson is warning of having Shia-on-Shia fighting and a civil war that involves the major religious and ethnic groups in Iraq. Further, Anderson also predicts that there will be a military coup in Iraq by year’s end or next year. His reasoning was that most people with whom he had talked to were suspicious of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki’s government and accuse him of corruption and being an Iranian stooge. He adds by stating that most Shia are incensed that Iran is the biggest winner in Iraq. Another factor in Anderson’s prediction is that the Iraqi Army is the most trusted institution in Iraq now, and most Iraqis he talked to, think that the return of one man rule or a dictatorship is inevitable. This belief resonates within the halls of the White House, which will face its reality-check in the aftermath of the elections as the drawdown of troops near as agreed upon in the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA agreement stipulates that by 1 September of 2010 nearly 50,000 troops should leave Iraq, and by the end of 2011, all of the U.S. troops should be out of Iraq completely. In order to prevent an apocalyptic scenario in Iraq, Col. Anderson suggests that the U.S. should keep a permanent combat troop presence in the country in order to prevent a civil war between the different Shia factions, or Sunni vs. Shia or Arabs vs. Kurds.

50,000 Key – Kirkuk/Iran

Presence after 2011 is key to stop Kirkuk hot spot and Iran involvement

Younes 10 (Ali, political analyst, March 5, Middle East Views, <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/03/05/102239.html>) ELJ

Col. Anderson dire predictions were echoed by General Raymond Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, who, while in Washington most recently, had asked the White House for brigade level troops to keep the peace in the city of Kirkuk which is potential hot spot between Arab and Kurds. General Odierno main concern is stability of Iraq after the election and the role Iran plays in Iraq. Gen. Odierno believes that Iran is playing a subversive role in Iraq which undermines the country’s long term stability. During a talk at the Army and Navy club in Washington last month, Gen. Odierno said “Iran clearly has a strategy that goes across lethal aims, diplomatic aims and then soft-power aims — i.e., influencing people through investment in the economy” Gen. Odierno added that “We still uncover Iranian rockets and other goods that are made, and individuals that are trained, in Iran to conduct attacks against both U.S. and Iraqi security forces.” Gen. Odierno expressed the fear, while in Washington, that if the U.S. troops withdraws from Iraq on schedule, Iraq will either become a “Somalia with Oil, or a Persian Iraq.”

50,000 Key – Training (Anti-Terror)

US Forces will stay after August to train the ISF on counter terror missions

Brook 9 (Tom Vanden, writer, February 27, Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/02/27-11) ELJ

Before 2,000 Marines here on Friday, President Obama announced that the United States combat presence in Iraq will end in August 2010 after about 90,000 troops are withdrawn. "Let me say this as plainly as I can: By August 31st, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end," Obama said to applause from the Marines. The president said he plans to leave a force of 35,000 to 50,000 to advise Iraqi security forces, conduct counter-terrorism missions and protect U.S. personnel. The drawdown should signal to Iraqis that they are responsible for their country's future, he said. "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq's future is now its own responsibility," Obama said.

50,000 Key – Violence Breakout/Safe withdrawal/Training

50,000 troops are key to stop a violence breakout, train the ISF and ensure a quiet withdrawal in the future

Harwood 9 (Matthew, Writer, The Guardian, February 27, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/27/obama-iraq-troop-withdrawal>) ELJ

For one, the United States has already set a gradual timeline for its withdrawal from Iraq. Under the recently signed status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government, the United States military will pull out of Iraqi urban areas by this July and completely withdrawal from Iraq by 2011, although residual forces will remain in non-combat roles, such as training and counterterrorism missions. From the American side of things, the SOFA is a good compromise between the proponents of immediate withdrawal and perpetual occupation. What's particularly important about the SOFA is that July deadline. By mid-summer, American troops will largely be out of Iraqi cities, leaving it to Iraqi security forces to perform counterinsurgency across Iraq's divided cities. By pulling back from the cities, American troops will be, for the most part, safe from the deadly urban warfare that led Americans to abandon their faith in the Iraq war. Fewer US soldier deaths should temper the calls for rapid withdrawal from the American public and allow a strong presence of American soldiers on the periphery to give Iraqi security forces the cushion and confidence they need to slide into their roles as Iraq's rightful defenders. When Iraqi forces can maintain a modest sense of security in a particular city, then American forces in the wildernesses surrounding them can go quietly home. But most importantly, if large-scale violence once again breaks out across the country, Iraq's security forces will know they have the US military to back them up if they are not up to the task.

50,000 Key – Training

50,000 Troops are key to train the ISF

Obama 9 (Barack, President of the United States, February 27, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/>) ELJ

As we carry out this drawdown, my highest priority will be the safety and security of our troops and civilians in Iraq. We will proceed carefully, and I will consult closely with my military commanders on the ground and with the Iraqi government. There will surely be difficult periods and tactical adjustments. But our enemies should be left with no doubt: this plan gives our military the forces and the flexibility they need to support our Iraqi partners, and to succeed. After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops.

50,000 Key – Terror (No Warrents)

50,000 troops allow the US to stop al-Qaeda

Schwartz 10 (Michael, Writer, AntiWar, February 02, <http://original.antiwar.com/engelhardt/2010/02/02/will-iraqs-oil-ever-flow/>) ELJ

Despite such setbacks, the Bush administration did not abandon the idea that Iraq might remain the future headquarters for a U.S. presence in the region, nor in the 2008 presidential election did candidate Barack Obama. He, in fact, repeatedly insisted that the Iraqi government should be a strong ally of the U.S. and the most likely host for a 50,000-strong military force that would "allow our troops to strike directly at al-Qaeda wherever it may exist, and demonstrate to international terrorist organizations that they have not driven us from the region."

50,000 Key – Iran Takeover

Training is key – Stops Iranian takeover

Frie 10 (George, writer, April 21, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/stratfor-iraq-us-iran-2010-4) ELJ

An unchecked Iran, quite apart from its not-yet-extant nuclear capability, represents a profound strategic threat to the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Assuming the nuclear issue was settled tomorrow either diplomatically or through attacks, the strategic problem would remain unchanged, as the central problem is conventional, not nuclear. The United States is set to complete the withdrawal of its combat forces from Iraq this summer, leaving behind a residual force of about 50,000 support personnel. This drawdown is according to a plan former U.S. President George W. Bush laid down in 2008, and that U.S. President Barack Obama has sped up only by a few months. Therefore, this is not a political issue but one on which there has been consensus. The reason for the withdrawal is that U.S. forces are needed in Afghanistan. Even more important, the United States has no strategic reserve for its ground forces. It has fought a two-theater, multidivisional war for seven years. The Army is stretched to the limit, and should another crisis develop elsewhere in the world, the United States would lack the land power to respond decisively. Avoiding this potential situation requires drawing down U.S. forces from Iraq. But simply abandoning the Persian Gulf to Iranian military and political power also represents a dangerous situation for the Americans. Therefore, the United States must balance two unacceptable realities. The only hope the United States has of attaining this balance would be to achieve some semblance of its expectations of 2003. This would mean creating a cohesive Iraqi government with sufficient military and security capabilities to enforce its will internally and to deter an attack by an Iranian force. At the very least, the Iraqis would have to be able to hold off an Iranian attack long enough to allow the United States to rush forces back into Iraq and to suppress insurgent elements from all Iraqi communities, both Sunni and Shiite. If Iraq could do the former, the Iranians likely would refrain from an attack. Iranian rhetoric may be extreme, but the Iranians are risk-averse in their actions. If Iraq could do the latter, then they eliminate Iran’s preferred mode of operations, which is covert subversion through proxies.

\*\*\*Troop Withdrawal Slow Down Counterplan\*\*\*

Slow Down CP - Solvency

The US should withdraw gradually from Iraq, instead of quickly.

Phillips and Carafano 6 (James and James Jay, Ph D., The Heritage Foundation, December 6th, 2006, <http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/wm1278.pdf>) NK

The aim should be to gradually redeploy U.S. forces out of Iraq’s cities and out of roles best filled by Iraqis as soon as the Iraqis are able to replace Americans in those areas. U.S. military forces would retain the lead in counterterrorist operations and provide strong support to Iraqi forces fighting the insurgency, but Iraqi forces should increasingly take the lead in defending Iraqi civilians, government facilities, and economic infrastructure. Over time, American forces would act as SWAT teams, not as street cops. This would allow for a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces. However, U.S. servicemen would still be needed for expanded military training, air support, logistics support, intelligence functions and counter-terrorist operations for years to come.

\*\*\*Turkey Consultation Counterplan\*\*\*

Turkey Is Willing to Help

Turkey wants to stabilize Iraq – will help the United States.

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

Strengthen U.S. relations with Turkey, leveraging its unique role as a geopolitical bridge to mediate between Syria, Iran, and the Arab world. Another policy focus at the regional level that flows from our analysis is the need to strengthen U.S. relations with Turkey. Turkey can serve as a bridge for improving relations and modifying the behavior of current adversaries, such as Iran and Syria (as mentioned earlier, Turkey’s relationship with both countries has strengthened because of common concerns over Kurdish separatism and terrorist acts within their nations in the aftermath of the Iraq War). Turkey has already demonstrated an interest in regional mediation by facilitating indirect dialogue between Israel and Syria, and the United States should encourage such efforts. Rather than force our allies into a bloclike containment approach, we should view regional allies’ relationships with such countries as Iran and Syria as an opportunity and leverage their roles to the extent possible. Turkey’s interests in and extensive economic ties with northern Iraq also present an opportunity for assisting in U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. Indeed, unlike Iraq’s Arab neighbors, Turkey has proven far more forthcoming in contributing to Iraqi stability and reconstruction, even though, like Iraq’s other neighbors, it opposed the war. As a consequence, The U.S. Air Force should continue assisting the Turkish military with counterterrorism operations in Northern Iraq and increase security cooperation activities and training with the Turkish air force. In the current threat environment, U.S. security cooperation with Turkey may be as or more critical than security cooperation with America’s Arab allies.

Turkey CP – Solvency

The US should consult Turkey before we withdraw from Iraq.

Chorev 7 (Matan, Executive Director, Future of National Security Project, October 4th, 2007, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17543/opposing_the_kurdistan_option_for_withdrawal.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F93%2Fexperts%2F35%2Fexperts%2F146%2Fsean_m_lynnjones%3Fpage%3D3>) NK

From a strategic standpoint, allowing Iraqi Kurdistan to sink with the rest of Iraq is reckless. Morally, it is unpardonable. A temporary US presence in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of a complete withdrawal from the country could serve four major objectives. First, it would provide a secure base from which to continue the fight against radical Islamist groups in Iraq. Second, if done in consultation and cooperation with Turkey, it could protect against a regionalization of the conflict by working with the Kurdistan Regional Government to go after militants hiding in Kurdistan's mountain sanctuaries. Third, a US force presence could be made contingent on the KRG moderating its irredentist claims and working to come to terms with the central government on oil and revenue-sharing laws. Fourth, such a policy may help temper the security environment in a way conducive to a resolution on the future status of the disputed city of Kirkuk. Achieving these objectives would be a difficult task. Fighting a counterinsurgency from fixed bases has never been a particularly effective approach. Should a US presence fail to sufficiently allay Turkey's apprehensions about an emboldened, highly autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the United States could risk the loss of a strategic ally and be further embroiled in a regional entanglement. The Kurds are the only entity in Iraq that has an interest in solving Kirkuk's disputed status by referendum. The recent ghastly series of suicide attacks on the oil-rich city demonstrate that other parties will turn to more violent approaches, potentially targeting US troops.

\*\*\*Iraq Consultation Counterplan\*\*\*

Consultation is the Best Option

Consulting the Iraqis would be the best option because it would show that America is not just imposing their rule, as is currently assumed.

Goldberg 6 (Jonah, syndicated columnist, *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* LexisNexis, May 1st, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

An Iraqi referendum would counter all of that. A national debate in Iraq over the continued presence of American troops would force many Iraqis to stop taking our protection for granted. Not everyone there craves democracy, but very few of them relish the idea of a civil war. Politicians would be forced to take the responsible position if they wanted to keep their jobs. Indeed, rhetoric and interests would converge nicely for the first time in a while. Some would undoubtedly campaign for American withdrawal, but this would probably marginalize them and show the whole world where the hearts of Iraqis really lie. Obviously, if you know that a referendum on keeping U.S. troops in Iraq would not pass, my idea isn't so hot. But I think it would. The Kurds would overwhelmingly vote for it. As would, I think, a majority of the Shia. And the Sunnis have discovered that U.S. troops are the only thing keeping Shia militias from slitting their throats, so even they might vote "yes" in big numbers. If Iraqis voted to keep U.S. troops, everything would change. The "occupation" and "war for oil" rhetoric would be discredited. America would have put its vital-interest money where its principled mouth is. Iraq's anti-American factions would be further pulled into the process, even if they voted "no." The Iraqi people would "own" this project in their own right. Iraqi politicians would no longer have to worry about being called lapdogs to America. "The people have spoken," they could respond. Arab nations couldn't claim that the democratization of Iraq was inauthentic or imposed by "imperialists." Even the Europeans would be floored by the audacity of the gesture. And our own troops would have the idealism of their project reaffirmed.

We should consult the Iraqis on whether or not we should withdraw.

Goldberg 6 (Jonah, syndicated columnist, *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* LexisNexis, May 1st, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

The welcome formation of a unity government notwithstanding, the climate in Iraq remains poisonous. And now, observers lament, there are no more big "unifying events" on the calendar. America's reputation as freedom's champion is taking lumps around the globe, while public support here at home for the war is waning. Arab nations are using the situation in Iraq to push an antidemocratic and anti-American agenda. Terrorists have made the Iraq conflict the Spanish civil war of the war on terror. I have an idea to help fix all that. Let's let the Iraqi people vote on whether American troops should stay in Iraq. This is the linchpin to my idea. Having Iraqis vote on the continued presence of American troops is not some starry-eyed affair. It depends as much on fear as it does on hope.

We should consult the Iraqis as to whether or not we should withdraw because different groups have different opinions.

Miller 6 (Richard, Professor at Cornell University, Cornell University, 2006 [No specific date given], <http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/miller/pdfs/iraqwithdraw.pdf>) NK

A central, perhaps the central factual question about the continuing U.S. military presence is what Iraqis want. Because of the importance of this question, I have enclosed the complete results of the most recent extensive poll, by WorldPublicOpiinion.Org, sponsored by the Brookings Institution, which was taken from January 2 to 5 of this year. (In my experience summaries and selections always spin interpretation in one direction or other, usually a misleading one.) Here are some background facts to keep in mind. The poll was taken shortly after the parliamentary elections, a time of relative optimism. As always, Kurds (given a weight of 18% in the national totals) expressed very pro-American attitudes. Kurds nearly all live in a northern region that was a U.N. protectorate before the war, separate from Saddam-ruled Iraq, and has since been under exclusive military control of local Kurdish militias. The completion rate, 74%, suggests reluctance to disclose views which might be conveyed to the authorities. Questions 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12 are especially important to our discussion. In response to 12, most respondents express the view that violence in Iraq, including inter-ethnic violence, would decline and factions would become more cooperative if the United States were to withdraw on a six-month schedule. The violence in the wake of the recent bombing of a major Shiite shrine has elicited other responses along these lines: a New York Times dispatch by Edward Wong a day after the bombing noted "anti-American sentiments ... echoed by many Sunnis and Shiites ...'I can tell you the main reason behind all our woes -- it is America,' said Abdur-Qader Ali, a clothing merchant in Adhamiya, a Sunni stronghold here. 'Everything that is going on between Sunnis and Shiites, the troublemaker in the middle is America'"; the major organized demonstrations in the wake of the bombing (some of them unity demonstrations of both Shiites and Sunnis) have been anti-occupation, not anti-Sunni, in their thrust. Kenneth Pollack, author of a central pro-war reading for Wednesday, has described the opinions favored in responses to 12 as “ludicrous."

\*\*\*Iraqi Security Forces Conditions Counterplan\*\*\*

ISF CP – Solvency

**Prepared Iraq Security Forces are key to Iraqi stability**

**Cordesman 9** (Aug 12, *Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces*, National Security Analyst, Anthony) WM

Iraq and the United States face a critical transition through 2011 and beyond. The awkward reality is that an Iraqi-U.S. failure to properly manage the U.S. withdrawal and the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is as serious a threat to Iraq's future stability and security as any internal or external threat. Realism is a key to future success.

The improvement in ISF capabilities is very real, and Iraqi forces are experiencing growing success in combat. But they are still very much a work in progress, and many Iraqi and U.S. politicians still seem unaware of how much remains to be done. U.S. forces play a critical role in developing the effectiveness of the ISF, providing stability in areas with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions and helping Iraq achieve political accommodation and more effective governance.

Through detailed analyses of Iraqi force capabilities, augmented by on-site interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military officials, the authors conclude that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq needs to be conditions-based, not tied to political timelines. Both Iraqi and U.S. leaders need to be careful about exaggerating Iraqi capabilities and the speed with which the United States can safely withdraw its forces and advisory teams. Conditions for success include realistic and fully resourced plans for the ISF's development; candid and accurate measures of ISF capabilities; and careful assessments of the overall level of security, stability, and political accommodation in Iraq.

After years of destructive conflict, Iraq now has the chance, however tenuous, to become a stable and prosperous country. The United States, say the authors, will be judged far more by the way it leaves and what it leaves behind than by the way it entered and how it fought the counterinsurgency campaign.

ISF CP – Solvency

Washington is overly optimistic on the strength of the Iraqi security forces and their ability to handle crisis which may arise

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

One of the least acknowledged problems with the ongoing transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq is the potential for problems to arise between the Iraqi military and the civilian government. The increase in the size, capabilities, and political reliability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were important elements in the turnaround in Iraq in 2007—2008. Today, the ISF are so large (roughly 650,000 in early 2010) and relatively capable that many Iraqis and Americans believe that the U.S. military presence has become superfluous. In Baghdad and Washington, there is a growing consensus that the Iraqis can handle their internal security and the residual insurgency threat by themselves, and as a result, the United States can pull out its troops quickly. This notion is dangerously mistaken. There are many things that could still tear Iraq apart, and the future of the Iraqi security forces themselves are among those at the top of the list.

ISF CP – Troops Key

Iraqi soldiers don’t want the US to leave – Troops key to Iraqi moral

Garcia-Navarro 10 (Lourdes, writer, June 21, KPBS, <http://www.kpbs.org/news/2010/jun/21/us-troops-depart-some-iraqis-fear-their-own/> ) ELJ

In Iraq, the pullout of U.S. troops is picking up pace. By Sept. 1, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq will be pared to about 50,000 troops, part of a massive drawdown to continue in 2011 under an agreement negotiated with Baghdad. But many Iraqi soldiers, especially at installations recently placed in their control by the U.S. military, have come to rely on American largesse to keep the facilities running. And as U.S. troops withdraw, many Iraqis feel a growing mistrust of the Iraq security forces that are supposed to protect them. Some of the Iraqi forces behave with impunity, and as a result, Iraqis say, they are now more afraid of them than the insurgency.

ISF CP – Corrupt in Status Quo

Iraq’s security forces are also a risk as they have struggled with corruption

**Middle East Policy Council 09** ( Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 1, 27 pgs)

As we train and equip the Iraqi security forces, we also need to be conscious that they are another risk factor. The Iraqi security forces must not become so powerful and so autonomous that they begin to abuse that power and usurp constitutional functions or allow somebody - the prime minister, for instance - to usurp constitutional functions. The Iraqi security forces themselves are at the moment a force for stability, and one of the main objectives of American policy is to improve those forces. But that has to be done in the context of continued support for constitutional rule, for a balance among all of the ethnic and sectarian groups in the country, and for the development of the professional military that understands its limits and constraints. So the Iraqi security forces themselves are both a part of the solution, but they are also potentially a part of the problem and one has to be conscious of that.

ISF CP – Quality Uneven

ISF quality uneven

Gompert 10 (David,Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) PG

The ISF are approaching their planned end strength of approximately 650,000 in the Arab part of Iraq, which, to us, seems ample. The numerical balance between Iraqi military forces and police forces seems reasonable. However, the quality of the ISF is very uneven: Some elements, e.g., Iraqi Special Operations Force, are well trained, disciplined, and capable; others, e.g., much of the Facility Protection Service (FPS), are ill trained and ill equipped.

ISF CP – Sons of Iraq Integration

Sons of Iraq create a potentially devastating political showdown

**Biddle, Stephen, . Pollack. 08**. ("How to Leave a Stable Iraq." Fall Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5: 40-58. Military & Government Collection)

First, there is the challenge of integrating the Sons of Iraq into the ISF and the Iraqi government. The stand-down of the Sunni insurgency under the Sons of Iraq program has been a critical element in the reduction in violence. The program has not "armed the Sunnis" for renewed warfare, as American critics have often claimed--the Sons of Iraq hardly lacked weapons when they were fighting as insurgents, and they have received none from the United States. The real problem is different. Most Sons of Iraq groups want to be integrated into the government security forces--a move they see as the best guarantee that a Shiite regime will not use the ISF to tyrannize them. But Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has been dragging its feet, out of fear of empowering Sunni rivals. Some mix of security-sector and civilian employment must be found for the Sons of Iraq to satisfy their economic needs--and their security concerns vis-à-vis Iraq's Shiite majority. As with other needed intersectarian compromises in Iraq, this will require hard bargaining. But the increasing stability, along with the security that the improving ISF give to the Maliki regime, offers a reason to believe that such bargaining can eventually succeed if the United States stands firm. The Sons of Iraq system is also highly decentralized, with over 200 separate groups under contract. Many are wary and distrustful of rivals, as are most Iraqis. Violations of cease-fire terms and contract provisions are inevitable with so many actors and so much tension; active enforcement of the terms is therefore essential to keep the peace. This is typical of the early years of negotiated settlements to civil wars, which commonly require outside peacekeepers to stabilize cease-fires. Until the Sunnis fully trust the ISF, this role will largely fall to the U.S. military--and, in fact, many U.S. brigades already spend much of their time involved in peacekeeping duties to enforce the terms of Sons of Iraq contracts. This cease-fire policing function is likely to be an increasingly important mission for U.S. forces in Iraq.

US withdrawal prompts terrorist groups, namely the SoI

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

The Sunni “Awakening,” beginning in late 2006 and gathering steam in 2007, was a key factor in attenuating violence against U.S. forces and the ISF. As part of the Awakening, and on the basis of negotiations with U.S. commanders, local Sunni leaders offered to supply men to staff checkpoints and perform other security-related duties. U.S. forces provided short-term stipends to these people. Over time, these volunteers, many of whom were formerly insurgents, became known as the SoI and grew in number to 100,000 members. In 2008, Prime Minister al-Maliki agreed to bring 10 percent of the SoI into the ISF and to support vocational and other training programs for many of the others. Progress in transitioning SoI groups to Iraqi follow-on programs, including recruitment into the ISF, has been slower and more opaque than expected. However, it does appear that the GoI has picked up the ongoing stipends of most of the operational SoI units. Efforts to place significant numbers of SoI into vocational training programs have not gone well, in part because of logistical hurdles and in part because SoI mem- bers have not been enthusiastic about leavinuncertain employment futures. The progressive drawdown of U.S. combat forces, when coupled with frustration with the pace of SoI incorporation into Iraqi institutions, could lead some SoI groups to resume the insurgency. The SoI or their leaders may become convinced that, absent U.S. pressure, Baghdad will not honor its promises. They may seek to preempt the strengthening of a Shi’a-dominated ISF that could eventually turn against them. They may become embroiled in conflicts with Shi’a militia or even U.S. forces.

ISF CP – ISF Not Ready

**ISF’s are not prepared to operate independently. Withdrawal would leave Iraq vulnerable**

Ellioit 10 (April 12, *Defense Industry Daily*, DJ) WM

The Iraqi Security Forces are not going to be ready for self-defense in 2012. They were never planned to be ready in 2012. Depending on US and Iraqi politics, this is a an optimal military composition of US “Training” forces remaining in overwatch past the 2012 deadline to fill the gaps in Iraqi capabilities.

However, power politics will have its say in this. It is not in the best interests of any of the country’s regimes’ bordering Iraq for Iraq to be a strong, democratic country with a strong Kurdish representation. Almost all of the bordering countries are kingdoms or theocratic dictatorships and Turkey has a problem with the Kurds. Just the existence of such a country bordering them is a threat to their rule as their populations will ask why they cannot have what Iraq has. The increasing exports of oil from Iraq only makes this a bigger problem for those countries as it increases Iraq’s economic influence at their expense.

The current politics of the US and Iraq are such that the request for continued US presence in Iraq must come from the next Iraqi government after it forms. It is unlikely that foreign-related factions will gain enough power to outright block a request for US forces to remain but, if they do, there will be no request and the US forces will be gone in 2012. That would leave Iraq vulnerable for at least a decade.

ISF Not ready – Multiple reasons

Reese 9 (Timothy R., Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, July 30, The New Your Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/middleeast/31advtext.html>) ELJ

The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are: 1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it. 2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment. a) Corruption among officers is widespread b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system e) Laziness is endemic f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm g) Lack of initiative is legion h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams. 3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples: a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

ISF CP – ISF Not Ready

Iraq security unprepared to deter terrorism

Jakes 10 (Lara, Mar 11, Associated Press, *Iraq bombings raise insurgency fears ahead of U.S. withdrawal,* *http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/28-dead-in-suicide-attack-on-iraq-tribal-leaders )* WM

A suicide bomber struck Sunni and Shiite tribal leaders touring an outdoor market after a reconciliation meeting in a Baghdad suburb Tuesday, killing up to 33 people in the second major attack in the capital area in three days. The bombings are raising fears that Sunni insurgents may be escalating operations as the U.S. phases out its combat role in Iraq and prepares to withdraw troops from cities by the end of June.

The attacks also suggest that insurgents are capable of exploiting weaknesses in Iraqi security procedures. The Iraqis have been relatively successful in curbing huge truck bombings that were common years ago — but less so against other tactics.

More than 40 people were wounded Tuesday when the bomber detonated an explosives belt as tribal leaders, security officials and journalists strolled through the market in the town of Abu Ghraib, site of the infamous prison at the center of the 2004 detainee abuse scandal.

The leaders had just left a meeting called as part of a government campaign to reconcile local Sunni tribes and Shiites who fled the mostly Sunni town on Baghdad’s western outskirts two years ago but have been trickling back to their homes.

No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but U.S. and Iraqi officials blamed al-Qaida, suspecting the extremists want to sabotage government overtures to the Sunnis — the terror group’s support base.

“These are small al-Qaida-related cells that are conducting these attacks,” the top U.S. commander, Gen. Ray Odierno, told The Associated Press. “The unfortunate part is they’re still able to recruit people to do this.”

Iraqi police, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to release the information, said 33 people died in the blast and 46 were wounded.

A military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi, said 29 people were killed, including at least three children. He said 41 people were wounded.

The dead included two Iraqi journalists for independent Baghdadiya TV — cameraman Haidar Hashim Suhail and reporter Souhaib Adna — as well as an Iraqi battalion commander, whose troops began firing wildly after the blast.

Four staffers for government television were wounded, one of them critically — reporter Ibrahim al-Katib, the station said. It quoted its employees as saying gunmen also opened fire from nearby buildings, sending terrified survivors scurrying for cover.

Mayor Shakir Fizaa blamed al-Qaida, saying the militants “seized on today’s big meeting to carry out the attack.” He also said some of the casualties were caused by the ensuing gunfire from security forces.

“This terrorist attack was aimed at stopping reconciliation and the improvement in the security situation,” Fizaa told the AP. “But we will not be deterred by the acts of the vicious group against innocent civilians.”

The ISF still needs help – assumes recent rise in forces

CSIS 8( Centers Strategic and International Studies

August 22, 2008 Conditions-Based U.S. Withdrawals from Iraq, <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CSIS_Iraq_Conditions-BasedUSWithdrawals.pdf>) JRG

The growing numbers of Iraqi security forces are impressive, and Iraqi forces really are performing with growing effectiveness. However, there are still serious ethnic and sectarian divisions and tensions in the Army and National Police. For example, there are two Army divisions that are effectively Kurdish, Kurdish forces have recently failed to follow central government orders in Diyala, and the entire Kurdish police force operates totally independently of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and MNSTC-I advisory effort. Similarly, Shi’ite units have recently conducted rogue operations against Iraqi Sunnis in the same province. There are many severe qualitative problems in Iraqi Army forces. There are major shortages of qualified officers and NCOs, and Iraqi Army forces (174,268) are still in the process of a major expansion.

ISF CP – ISF Not Ready

US troops are key to the ISF functioning

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

For the past two years, the ISF and their U.S. trainers focused largely on increasing

end strength so that Iraq would have enough forces to address internal security prob-

lems. Training and equipping these forces are moving apace: as of this writing, more

than 600,000 Iraqis serve in uniform (see Chapter Four). Though some problems with

training and equipping remain, three larger problems that had been lesser priorities are

now emerging as key issues. First, the ISF still lack the support and enabling capabilities they need to operate independently. Few units of the Iraqi Army, the NP, or IPS possess the logistics, intelligence, and planning capacities necessary to operate on their own. The Iraqi Army faces additional shortfalls in long-range fires and air support. The ISF still rely heavily on U.S. enablers; they are only slowly starting to build their own capabilities in these areas. Second, and more important, the ISF generally lack the institutional capacity needed to oversee and sustain themselves. Institutional-capacity development is now the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq’s highest priority, but much work remains to be done. The MoD has major institutional gaps that limit its ability to oversee budgeting, procurement, modernization, and the ongoing training and profes- sional development of the Iraqi Army. The MoI faces similar challenges with the IPS, which will be further exacerbated as the provincial powers law takes effect and the governors start exerting local control over local police. Unresolved issues about the extent

of national versus provincial control may further limit the institutional capacity of the

IPS and could lead to duplicative and dysfunctional management. Third, the Iraqi Army is the strongest of the various elements of the ISF. As a result, its primary mission during the past few years has been to provide internal security. Although this has been necessary, it is not an appropriate long-term mission for military forces. Assuming that the security situation does not significantly deteriorate and that the capacity of the police continues to grow, the GoI needs to move from the use of military forces to the primacy of police in the provision of internal security.

The ISF and police forces are incapable

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) PG

The development, professionalism, and accountability of the ISF are critical to the country’s long-term stability. The Iraqi military and the police are the sine qua non of stability in Iraq, from both the national and provincial perspectives. Great strides have been made, particularly in the Army and the NP. But much remains to be done, and the success of turning these security forces into competent and professional organizations will largely

determine the course of stability in Iraq. Competence is the first challenge, and the

U.S. training teams and partner units will play a major role. But the Iraqi Army must

remain an impartial national force that is not seen as the armed wing of any faction or as an organization that wants to assume power for itself. The police are equally important, and they too must enforce and be perceived as enfthan their own agenda or that of any faction.

US military presence can be beneficial for Iraq’s politics and military

Ricks 10 (Thomas, senior CNAS and author, 2.24.10 New York Times pg. A27)ESY

In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them.

ISF CP – ISF Not Ready

**Iraq withdrawal should be postponed, ISF not ready**

AFP 10 (Apr 9, “Top US generals call for pause in Iraq troop withdrawal”, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080409072340.hm52ejs5&show\_article=1)

The top US general in Iraq has called for US troop withdrawals to be frozen for at least 45 days after July, warning military gains remained fragile and accusing Iran of seeking to stoke violence.

General David Petraeus recommended to US lawmakers that once the last of the 30,000 extra troops pumped into Iraq last year are withdrawn in July "we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation."

Dressed in his uniform with medals adorning his chest, the four-star general warned that while security has improved, "we haven't turned any corners, we haven't seen any lights at the end of the tunnel.

"The champagne bottle has been pushed to the back of the refrigerator. And the progress, while real, is fragile and is reversible."

But amid a flare-up of violence in Iraq, Democrats charged that Petraeus was seeking a blank check to commit troops indefinitely to an unpopular war which has already claimed more than 4,000 US lives and stretched into its sixth year.

"It seems to me what you have given to your chain of command is a plan which has no end to it," said Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "That is a clear, open-ended pause."

Petraeus was joined by the US ambassador to Baghdad Ryan Crocker in the grueling twin hearings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, for their first report to Congress in seven months.

The pair returns to Capitol Hill Wednesday to testify in the lower US House of Representatives.

"While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi security forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging," Petraeus warned Tuesday.

Despite improvements the Iraqi militia still is not ready to take over U.S.’s role

Biddle, Stephen, . Pollack. 08. ("How to Leave a Stable Iraq." Fall Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5: 40-58. Military & Government Collection)

The net result has been important progress, which has been reflected in improved public perception of the ISF: the percentage of Iraqis who did not believe that the Iraqi army was sectarian, according to polling conducted by the U.S.-led coalition, jumped from 39 percent in June 2007 to 54 percent in June 2008. The Iraqi National Police provides another critical example of this progress. As recently as the fall of 2006, the national police force was a disaster; a commission led by retired Marine General James Jones went so far as to recommend its dissolution. It was infested with Shiite militias as well as every variety of coward and criminal, and police units often acted as anti-Sunni hit squads. But a new commander, Major General Hussein al-Wadi, has turned the force around. He fired both division commanders, all eight brigade commanders, and 18 of 27 battalion commanders. He instituted new vetting and screening measures, enrolled every member of his forces in the massive biometric data system, recruited Sunnis and Kurds into the force, and retrained every police formation. Today, the national police officer corps has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites, and its rank and file is 25 percent Sunni--higher than the Sunnis' share of the overall population. Police units are now capable of supporting army units in combat zones, and popular trust in the police is growing. According to coalition polling, the percentage of Iraqis who believed that the Iraqi police were sectarian fell from 64 percent in June 2007 to 52 percent a year later, and the percentage who believed they were corrupt fell from 63 percent to 50 percent. Despite such steps, the Iraqis are not yet able to stand on their own. They remain dependent on U.S. and British troops to assist with planning and provide logistical and fire support. (The "tooth-to-tail ratio" for the Iraqi army--the ratio of combat to support troops--is 75-25, the reverse of what it is for the U.S. Army.) Properly advised and partnered Iraqi formations perform far better than units without such support. In the offensive against JAM in Basra this past spring, for instance, the First Brigade and the 26th Brigade, which had long fought with U.S. marines and were deployed with Marine advisers, performed well, whereas the brigades without U.S. advisers and partners did poorly, with one, the new 52nd Brigade, effectively collapsing in combat. The Basra campaign would have ended in disaster if not for support from coalition firepower and the arrival of ISF units with U.S. military- and police-training teams. In short, the ISF have improved to the point where they have become a powerful partner to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, but they will require outside support for at least some time to come.

ISF CP – ISF Not Ready

The Iraqi military is not equipped to handle insurgents

Ryan, Missy. 10 ("Imagining Iraq, Defining Its Future." World Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring2010 2010): 65-73. Academic Search Complete,) Missy Ryan is a journalist who has been reporting from Iraq since August 2008. Earlier, she had been based in Peru, Argentina,

and Washington, D.C.

In the run-up to the March elections, whatever quiet optimism might have been lurking in the hearts of Iraqis was shattered by a series of daring attacks targeting Baghdad ministries, hotels and other symbols of authority and influence—a reminder of the destructive power of Iraq’s ongoing insurgency. In northern Nineveh province and other ethnically mixed areas, Sunni insurgents continue to bomb police patrols and assassinate civilians, hoping to delegitimize the government and ignite ethnic strife. Violence has erupted in western Anbar, the Sunni desert region that came to symbolize the success of the American partnership with local tribal militias in the battle against Al Qaeda since 2006. As polls opened for the March 7 parliamentary elections, insurgents launched a series of attacks that killed dozens of people. Corruption is all but unchecked: bribes are a matter of course to obtain passports, set up a business, or get a building permit.” The large-scale attacks jarred a public just beginning to believe the worst was over. They raise questions about the vulnerability of Iraq’s security forces to bribery and insurgent infiltration and, more broadly, the government’s ability to avoid letting violence derail the political process. The uptick in bombings revealed alarming gaps in local security forces’ abilities and equipment. Iraq is investing tens of millions of dollars in rebuilding its air force, but still relies on American soldiers to collect evidence after bomb attacks. Even more embarrassing were reports this year that domestic security agencies were relying on bomb detection equipment that was pure quackery. Indeed, hundreds of Iraqi police and army checkpoints had done away with actually searching vehicles, instead scanning for explosives with what was essentially a radio antenna that emitted random chirps, costing up to $60,000.

U.S. Troops are needed to train Iraqi troops to handle conflicts

China Daily 10 (Asia Politics, March 2010, [ChinaDaily.com](file:///C:\Users\Owner\Documents\My%20Dropbox\GDI%20Evidence\AppData\Local\Temp\chinadaily.com)) JRG

"Iraq's elected leaders must resolve Iraq's problems, but in order to do so, they require substantial, continued support from the US," he said. "No expert believes that the Iraqi army and police will be ready to stand on their own by the end of 2011 Substantial US air support, logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, training, and advisory support will still be required long after that date." The challenge for the US now lies in not losing the gains from the election in the process of government formation, said Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and the Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Withdrawal doesn’t solve conflicts – US army needs to teach character to ISF

Rand 10(RAND Institue, Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) dc

The U.S. military must not become so fixated on the ISF’s capability to replace U.S. forces that it loses sight of the danger that the ISF could be misused either by the GoI or by ISF commanders. Accordingly, it should design a three-mission approach to future U.S.-Iraqi military cooperation: building capabilities, character, and confidence. In this regard, the United States, the GoI, and all the core actors should, when the time is right, address the basis for and particulars of U.S.-Iraq defense cooperation upon completion of the withdrawal.

ISF CP – US Key to Train

US troops will surface until the ISF is ready

[Cordesman](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/author/anthony_cordesman/) 9 (Anthony, national security analyst, August 3, Real Clear World, <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/08/03/iraq_a_time_to_stay_97018.html>) ELJ

US troops are scarcely the answer to all of Iraq's remaining problems with internal security and political reconciliation. They do, however, plan a key role in damping down the tensions and potential clashes between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. They still play a key role in helping Iraqi forces deal with Al Qa'ida in Iraq and other Sunni insurgent movements - which are still all too active in areas like Ninewa and Diyala. They help the Iraqi forces deal with the potential threat from Shi'ite militias, the Special Groups, and the extremist elements supported in part by Iran. This may not make them loved by the Iraqi people - and the vast majority of Iraqi Arabs want all US forces out as soon as possible - but it does make them a useful bridge that helps buy time until the Iraqi security forces are more equipped to do the job.

ISF CP – US Key to Train

[ ] Iraqi Army can not stand on its own – needs the US

[Phillips](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/P/James-Phillips) 10 (James Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs , March 5, The heritage foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections>)

No expert believes that the Iraqi army and police will be ready to stand on their own by the end of 2011, when all U.S. troops are required to leave Iraq under the 2008 SOFA. Substantial U.S. air support, logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, training, and advisory support will still be required long after that date. After a new Iraqi government is formed, the Obama Administration should quietly work with that government to reach a new agreement that will enable American trainers and advisors to give Iraqis the tools they need to defend Iraq’s fragile democratic system.

[ ] Iraq needs US troops to help Iraqi leaders need troops to assure stability

ChinaDaily 10 (March 3, ChinaDaily.com Lexis) ELJ

"Iraq's elected leaders must resolve Iraq's problems, but in order to do so, they require substantial, continued support from the US," he said. "No expert believes that the Iraqi army and police will be ready to stand on their own by the end of 2011 Substantial US air support, logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, training, and advisory support will still be required long after that date." The challenge for the US now lies in not losing the gains from the election in the process of government formation, said Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and the Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

ISF CP – ISF’s Key to Iraqi stability

Without a properly trained Iraqi security force, Iraq will face instability in the future

Cordesman 9 (Anthony H.national security analyst, CSIS, August 12, http://csis.org/publication/withdrawal-iraq-0 ) ELJ

Iraq and the United States face a critical transition through 2011 and beyond. The awkward reality is that an Iraqi-U.S. failure to properly manage the U.S. withdrawal and the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is as serious a threat to Iraq's future stability and security as any internal or external threat. Realism is a key to future success. The improvement in ISF capabilities is very real, and Iraqi forces are experiencing growing success in combat. But they are still very much a work in progress, and many Iraqi and U.S. politicians still seem unaware of how much remains to be done. U.S. forces play a critical role in developing the effectiveness of the ISF, providing stability in areas with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions and helping Iraq achieve political accommodation and more effective governance.

Withdrawal should be conditions based – not based on a time line

Cordesman 9 (Anthony H.national security analyst, CSIS, August 12, http://csis.org/publication/withdrawal-iraq-0 ) ELJ

Through detailed analyses of Iraqi force capabilities, augmented by on-site interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military officials, the authors conclude that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq needs to be conditions-based, not tied to political timelines. Both Iraqi and U.S. leaders need to be careful about exaggerating Iraqi capabilities and the speed with which the United States can safely withdraw its forces and advisory teams. Conditions for success include realistic and fully resourced plans for the ISF's development; candid and accurate measures of ISF capabilities; and careful assessments of the overall level of security, stability, and political accommodation in Iraq.

ISFs will not be ready for the 2011 withdrawal

Cordesman 10 (Anthony H.national security analyst, CSIS, May 12, http://csis.forumone.com/publication/us-withdrawal-and-iraqi-security-forces) ELJ

The report show that Iraqi Security Forces are making progress, but still face major challenges that will affect their development -- and every aspect of Iraqi and Gulf security and stability – long after US forces withdraw. It also shows that Iraq will face serious funding and force development problems regardless of what government emerges out of the recent national elections. It will take a major US effort to create the kind of military and police training and advisory program Iraq needs during the next five years. It will also require substantial US military assistance well beyond 2011 to allow Iraq to afford the equipment it needs to deal with both internal and external threats. The US country team in Iraq has developed preliminary plans, and aid requests, to deal with these issues. They require further development, and it is critical that US planning now focus more on the details of creating an effective strategic partnership, and look beyond “responsible withdrawal.” Such efforts will require an Iraqi government – and an Iraqi public – that want such support. They also, however, require a new level of understanding in the US executive branch, Congress, media, and voting public of just how critical continuing US support to the ISF will be.

ISF’s are key to peace, stopping Iran, and the global economy

Cordesman 10 (Anthony H.national security analyst, CSIS, May 12, http://csis.forumone.com/publication/us-withdrawal-and-iraqi-security-forces) ELJ

The US will not lose the war in Iraq. This is already won. However, if the US does not act to create a strong advisory effort, and does not provide Iraq with the military assistance it needs until it can generate its own funding, it will lose the peace. It will greatly strengthen Iran, increase the threat to Gulf states and Israel alike, and sharply increase the vulnerability of both Gulf oil exports and the global and US economy.

ISF CP – Other

The ISF is proven to decrease violence, but more training is needed

Biddle et al 8 (Stephen, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution. Foreign affairs October/September http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2008/09/20080901\_ForeignAffairs\_HowToLeaveAStableIraq.pdf) ELJ

As the violence declined, two big changes in the Iraqi state took place -- one military, one political. On the military side, the ISF have grown much more capable than they were in 2006. There are now some 559,000 security personnel, with about 230,000 in the Iraqi army alone, and those ranks are growing by at least 100,000 new soldiers and police a year. Some 55 percent of the units rank in the top two tiers of readiness, according to U.S. assessment methods, which have been improved to include evaluations of actual battlefield performance. (Even these units, however, still need significant coalition help in some areas, particularly for more complex operations.) The size and competence of these Iraqi forces have allowed U.S. commanders to maintain population security even as U.S. troop strength has declined significantly since the surge. With more troops to cover the battlefield, whole Iraqi battalions can be pulled off the battlefield temporarily for training, further increasing their capabilities. At the same time, the United States has greatly expanded its advisory effort. The typical Iraqi division now has over 100 U.S. Army and Marine advisers, who stay with it even in battle, and Iraqi units are often teamed up with U.S. units of comparable or smaller size. The greater availability of troops enables many of these teams to begin deployments in quiet sectors, building both skills and working relationships before being sent to high-threat areas.

The ISF needs to be politicized by the US in order to prevent sectarian conflict

Al-Jabouri 9 (Najim A, [NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC](http://www.stormingmedia.us/corpauthors/NATIONAL_DEFENSE_UNIV_WASHINGTON_DC.html), August, <http://www.stormingmedia.us/44/4493/A449305.html>) ELJ

As U.S. Armed Forces draw down in Iraq, there is increasing concern about the possibility of resurgent ethnic and sectarian tensions. Many Iraqis believe that the United States may be making a grave mistake by not fully using its remaining leverage to insulate the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the political influence of the incumbent Iraqi sectarian political parties. U.S. efforts to rebuild the ISF have focused on much needed training and equipment, but have neglected the greatest challenge facing the forces' ability to maintain security upon U.S. withdrawal: an ISF politicized by ethno-sectarian parties. These ties pose the largest obstacle to the ISF in its quest to become genuinely professional and truly national in character. U.S. leaders may not realize that by not doing more to ensure that incumbent parties stay away from influencing ISF behavior, the United States risks training and arming security forces that will be the instrument for provoking, rather than preventing, future ethno-sectarian conflict. In the end, supporting and strengthening the national character of the ISF is the best hope for a stable and integrated Iraq.

Iraq is not ready for U.S. withdraw

Rand Institute 10( Non Profit Politics Org., 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>) **JRG**

Although security in Iraq has improved substantially over the last year, Iraqis continue to face

tremendous challenges in their daily lives due to fear of violence and shortages of food, electricity,

water, and housing. Many have fled their homes for other parts of the country or to neighboring

countries. As the United States continues to draw down its forces and eventually end its

substantial military involvement in Iraq, the implications of that drawdown and withdrawal

for Iraq’s at-risk populations must be considered.

AT – ISF Does Not Need US Support

Iraq still needs US support – does not even have an air force

World Tribune 10 (February 19, <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_iraq0133_02_19.asp>) ELJ

"Fifty thousand soldiers is still a lot of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines," Odierno said. "There's still a lot of U.S. capability on the ground. And so it's not just we only have 50,000. It's that we have 50,000 on the ground. And I still think we can influence the outcome. Because I have a lot of confidence in the Iraqi security forces and their capability. They still need some support from us." Officials said the U.S. military would not further reduce its presence in Iraq until after the March 7 elections. They said the current troop level would remain stable until mid-May, when a new government could be formed in Baghdad. In 2007, the U.S. military reached a peak of 175,000 troops as part of a sustained campaign against Al Qaida. About a year later, amid the flight of Sunni and Shi'ite insurgents, Washington began reducing its military presence in Iraq, with 77,000 soldiers leaving over the last 15 months. Officials said the U.S. military, which transferred security responsibility to Baghdad in July 2009, has largely ended its counter-insurgency mission. By July 2010, they said, the U.S. military would be limited to what was termed stability operations outside Iraqi cities. "So I think this transition will be much smoother than people think on the ground," Odierno said. "It'll be smooth just like coming out of the cities was." Odierno said the U.S. military continues to mentor and train the Iraq Army and police. He cited U.S. aid to develop the Iraq Air Force, Navy, Intelligence Corps and logistics. "Everything we do is completely coordinated with the government of Iraq, and you will never see a U.S. soldier conduct an operation without an Iraqi security force with him, in fact, without an Iraqi security force in the lead of the operation," Odierno said. "But they're out every single day working with the Iraqi security force partners. So we still play a very significant role. As they build their capability, we reduce our capability." U.S. diplomats, however, expressed concern that Iraq would require up to six months to form its next government. They said the political leadership has been sharply divided along ethnic and religious lines.

\*\*\*Syria Consultation Counterplan\*\*\*

Syria CP – Solvency

Syria is starting to take a new role in the Iraqi withdrawal.

Sands 10 (Phil, Foreign Correspondent, The National, April 10th, 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011/FOREIGN>) NK

Syria has set up a new Iraq policy group to ensure its interests are safeguarded and that Iraq remains stable as US troops withdraw, according to officials and analysts in Damascus. They said the move is part of an organised effort by the Syrian authorities to take a positive and active role in Iraqi politics, at a time when intense negotiations to form a new government in Baghdad are under way and with US influence there on the wane. Saudi Arabia and Iran, two major regional powers bordering Iraq, have been a focal point for talks between competing Iraqi factions since the March 7 elections. Damascus, a crucial player in regional politics, is keen not to be overshadowed by Tehran and Riyadh. “The Syrian government has taken a decision since the [Iraq] election to be involved in the establishment of the Iraqi government,” said a Syrian official, on condition of anonymity. He compared Syria’s potential standing in Iraq to its position in Lebanon. Damascus has wielded strong influence over Beirut – controversially backing Hizbollah – and has played a central role in the formation of governments from the fractured Lebanese political landscape.

We should consult Syria before we withdraw from Iraq.

Sands 10 (Phil, Foreign Correspondent, The National, April 10th, 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011/FOREIGN>) NK

Syria has always denied the allegations and, while acknowledging that militants have crossed from its territory into Iraq, insists it too is waging a war against al Qa’eda-style radicals and has done all it can to secure the long, porous desert border. Critics accuse Damascus of playing both sides, stoking hard-line Islamist sentiment to oppose the US presence next door while trying to suppress the same trends at home. As part of a diplomatic re-engagement with Syria, launched by the Obama administration, a series of US delegations have held talks with their counterparts in Damascus on the issue of Iraqi security, hoping to enlist them in stabilisation efforts. The Syrian government’s decision to set up a new Iraq policy forum is, in part, a response to that, according to the Syrian official. “Our role in Iraq is not simply coming from a Syrian perspective, it is also a reflection of western and American requests,” he said. “The Americans and the Europeans have asked for our help to fix the situation in Iraq and to pave the way for a US withdrawal.

Syria and Iraq have a close relationship and Syria should be involved in the US withdrawal.

Sands 10 (Phil, Foreign Correspondent, The National, April 10th, 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011/FOREIGN>) NK

These hostile conditions gave Damascus every incentive to work against the Americans in Iraq, and to centre its strategic policy on the goal of having US troops withdrawn. Those advocating violent resistance maintain the United States would have effectively colonised Iraq, if not for the opposition of insurgent forces. With the Syrian regime now more confident in its own position and certain the US is trying to cut its military presence in Iraq, the policy aims of Damascus and Washington regarding Baghdad have moved into closer alignment. “Syria wants to see the US out of Iraq, but at the same time wants to safeguard Iraqi unity,” said Mazen Bilal, a Syrian journalist and political commentator. “It’s impossible for Syria to isolate itself from Iraq and now Damascus is looking to play a constructive role.”

Syria CP – Solvency

Syria IS interested in the establishment of a stable and democratic Iraq

Sands 10 (Phil, Foreign Correspondent, April 18, The National, <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011/FOREIGN>) ELJ

Syria has set up a new Iraq policy group to ensure its interests are safeguarded and that Iraq remains stable as US troops withdraw, according to officials and analysts in Damascus. They said the move is part of an organised effort by the Syrian authorities to take a positive and active role in Iraqi politics, at a time when intense negotiations to form a new government in Baghdad are under way and with US influence there on the wane. Saudi Arabia and Iran, two major regional powers bordering Iraq, have been a focal point for talks between competing Iraqi factions since the March 7 elections. Damascus, a crucial player in regional politics, is keen not to be overshadowed by Tehran and Riyadh. “The Syrian government has taken a decision since the [Iraq] election to be involved in the establishment of the Iraqi government,” said a Syrian official, on condition of anonymity. He compared Syria’s potential standing in Iraq to its position in Lebanon. Damascus has wielded strong influence over Beirut – controversially backing Hizbollah – and has played a central role in the formation of governments from the fractured Lebanese political landscape.

Syria is helping iraqs security needs now – Syria will do anything to help Iraq

Baghdadi 9 (George, writer, CBS News <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5249515-503543.html>) ELJ

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Tuesday that Damascus would do whatever it takes to help uphold security in the neighboring country, only a few days after a high-profile U.S. military delegation visited the Syrian capital to discuss curbing the infiltration of foreign fighters across the border. The United States and some Iraqi officials have repeatedly accused Damascus of allowing Islamist elements - mainly al-Qaeda militants - to sneak through its porous frontiers. Maliki's visit is his second to the Syrian capital - where he lived as a refugee during the Saddam Hussein regime - since becoming prime minister in April 2006. Iraq and Syria, which share borders, have experienced turbulent relations over the years. However, in November 2006, the two countries restored full diplomatic ties. "Assad reiterated Syria's support of Iraq in all matters that help bolster its security and stability and preserve its integrity of land and people, affirming that Syria also supports the efforts of the national reconciliation governments for ensuring the success of the political process," an official English statement said after Tuesday's talks. "Malki expressed hope that his visit to Syria will help boost cooperation between the two countries in service of their mutual interests, voicing his appreciation of Syria's positive role in supporting stability in Iraq," the statement added. With the balance of power shifting as the impending pullout of U.S. forces by the end of 2011 approaches, Maliki's trip to Syria underscored emerging strains in his relationship with the Obama administration and its decision to send the military delegation last week. The some 130,000 remaining U.S. troops face new limits on their actions in Iraq under a security pact that took effect on Jan. 1, and the Iraqi government has increasingly been asserting its sovereignty and reaching out to neighboring countries. "The prime minister's discussions with senior Syrian officials will focus mainly on security cooperation between Baghdad and Damascus, and what can Syria propose in this field without the need for a third party," Deputy Foreign Minister Labid Alawi told Al-Bayan newspaper, which is owned by a Maliki adviser, in remarks published on Sunday. "Baghdad doesn't care for any of these meetings about Iraq without its presence," he added. On Monday, General Ray Odierno said that while the "flow of foreign fighters in Iraq has decreased significantly ... we're still a little bit concerned with Syria's role in this." In recent months, Iraqi officials had hailed an improvement in security at the Syrian border. In a statement to state-run Tishrin daily published on Tuesday, Maliki said that his visit to Damascus would discuss cooperation in fighting terrorism, which is "not only a challenge for Iraq but also a threat to all countries in the region." Iraqi officials said the prime minister would ask Damascus to hand over people suspected of being linked to insurgent attacks in his country. Syria is home to a number of Iraqis who were mid-ranking and senior members of Saddam Hussein's outlawed Baath Party. Iraqi officials say Damascus allows them to live and engage in political activity in Syria. Al-Maliki's trip overlaps with a string of bombings in northern Iraq and Baghdad that have killed at least 120 people in the last several days - the worst spate of violence since U.S. troops handed over security in urban areas to Iraqi security forces on June 30. The attacks have raised fears that insurgent groups are embarking on a sustained attempt to kindle ethnic and sectarian warfare. These include the rift between Arab and Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq and the continued disenfranchisement felt by many Sunni Arabs who remain wary of the Shiite-led central government. "Assad and Maliki discussed bilateral cooperation between Syria and Iraq and the importance of bolstering it in all fields, particularly in politics, economy and security and everything that secures the interests of the two countries and their peoples and preserve the region's stability in general," the official statement said.

Syria CP – Solvency

The US should follow the path of UN peacekeeping and consult Syria about withdrawing troops from Iraq

Power 10 (Jonathan Power 5.28.10 TFF Associate http://www.transnational.org/Columns\_Power/2010/21.IraqWithdraw.html)ESY

When I talked to Zbigniew Brzezinski (a former U.S. national security advisor and a mentor to Obama), I got a very different take on the subject. He wants to see “a political conclusion without too much delay, precisely because an ongoing conflict is inherently dynamic and in the internationally unstable conditions of the Gulf it could embroil us in a collision with Iran… We must start talking to Iraqi leaders, all of them, not just those in the Green Zone, about jointly setting a date for American disengagement…” [The president should] “use the fact of an American-Iraqi dialogue termination date as the point of departure for approaching all of Iraq’s neighbors about regional talks about assisting Iraqi security problems upon our departure. Everyone of its neighbors, including Syria and Iran, has a stake in Iraq not exploding. And, beyond that, try to engage other Muslim countries - Morocco, Egypt, Algeria etc. - in being willing to assist post-occupied Iraq with some military security. And last, but not least, some major international effort, probably using the U.N. to that end, to undertake a really large-scale rehabilitation of Iraqi.” This proposal, in effect, is based on the template of a classic U.N. peacekeeping formation. Contrary to prejudiced myth, it often works, as in Congo today, in Liberia after the ouster of Charles Taylor who is now being tried by the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal and, in earlier years, in Lebanon, Cyprus and the Golan Heights

Engage Syria in withdrawal of US troops to dissuade violence

Dobbins 9 (James 6.16.9 Dir. DPC, RAND, fmr, asst, sec, of state http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.html)ESY

So they are playing an important role in keeping that area quiet and so leaving last from those kinds of regions is one way to reduce the risk. Second is, following the withdrawal of combat forces, which is scheduled to be completed by next August, make sure that there are enough American forces remaining in the country to continue to train and partner with Iraqi security forces, and also of course enough to provide adequate force protection for the American troops that remain. As we train and equip the Iraqi security forces, we also need to be cautious. We ought to be conscious that they are another risk factor. I mean, another risk is that the Iraqi security forces become so powerful and so autonomous that they begin to abuse that power, usurp constitutional functions or allow somebody, the prime minister for instance, to usurp constitutional functions. And so the Iraqi security forces themselves are at the moment a force for stability and one of the main objectives of American policy is to improve those forces, but that has to be done in the context of continued support for constitutional rule for a balance among all of the ethnic and sectarian groups in the country, and for the development of the professional military that understands its limits and restraints. And so the Iraqi security forces themselves are both a part of the solution, but they are also potentially a part of the problem and one has to be conscious of that. Other strategies for reducing the risk: first of all adhere to the SOFA, make clear to the Iraqi public that we are leaving, and that we are leaving in accordance with preagreed arrangements, and that we are following those arrangements; respect, in that regard, Iraqi sovereignty. Continue to dampen conflict in the most volatile areas, particularly those between the Arabs and the Kurds. Engage all of the neighbors as constructively as one can, and particularly engage the neighbors that are in a position to make the most trouble. So Syria and Iran are the most dangerous ones who could make the most trouble, and therefore they are the most important ones to engage.

US must consult Syria if they desire to withdraw troops with minimal casualties

Cobban 9 (Helena 6.16.9 Publisher, Author, http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.html)ESY

If the Obama administration wants to optimize, maximize the chances of the transition in Iraq going ahead satisfactorily, that is, with minimal casualties among the U.S. forces and with a maximum chance of having a stable and robust government in Iraq as we leave, then drawing on the resources of this kind of a contact group is absolutely necessary. Syria and Turkey will both be valuable participants in it as I have tried to outline here, but of course the big issues are also Iran and Saudi Arabia. Thank you

Syria CP – Solvency

Syria is willing to cooperate with US to help Iraq

Cobban 9 (Helena 6.16.9 Publisher, Author http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.html)ESY

MR. MATTAIR: Helena, there are two questions I would like to ask you. The first is about Syria. You said that Syria views stability in Iraq as its number one issue. So are they going to be willing to cooperate with us in stabilizing Iraq, irrespective of what is happening in Arab-Israeli peacemaking? And if that is - let us say that Arab-Israeli peacemaking is going nowhere; would that influence their willingness to cooperate? I know they did receive a U.S. military delegation recently to talk about cooperation along the long Syrian-Iraqi border. MS. COBBAN: I would just clarify that what I actually said was that the Foreign Minister Muallem said that Iraq was the number one issue on the agenda with the United States, not their number one issue globally, but it possibly could be. I don't think it is. But regarding whether they would be prepared to cooperate regarding Iraq even if there is no progress in their track of the Arab-Israeli peace process, I think it is possible. But what they really want to see is an improvement in U.S.-Syrian relations at the political level. And there was, as you noted - back at the beginning of June, a military delegation from this country went to Syria and talked about security issues - issues of common security concern regarding Iraq.

We should consult Syria and Iran before we withdraw from Iraq.

Phillips and Carafano 6 (James and James Jay, Ph D., The Heritage Foundation, December 6th, 2006, <http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/wm1278.pdf>) NK

Politics should end at the water’s edge. Americans need a bipartisan Iraq policy that acknowledges that there are no simple solutions and that the nation must invest the resources necessary to secure vital U.S. national interests. The report of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, formally known as the Iraq Study Group (ISG), offers that opportunity. It provides a clear-eyed, balanced assessment of the situation in Iraq and a largely practical set of recommendations to deal with the key military and political challenges facing the country. The ISG report does clarify some of the ugly dilemmas intrinsic to Iraq and will provide a useful reference point for the ongoing policy debate on Iraq. Its recommendations comprise a sensible and realistic way forward in Iraq, with one major exception: Drawing Syria and Iran into efforts to stabilize Iraq would accomplish little at great expense or even backfire, undermining stability. The ISG’s broad approach of reducing U.S. forces’ combat role while increasing their role training Iraqi troops and police would put U.S. resources where they can do the most good as Iraq’s government tackles the difficult political issues behind the country’s current violence. Conversely, as the ISG finds, an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces would lead to strategic, moral, and humanitarian disaster.

Consultation with Syria solves Middle eastern conflict after withdrawal

Jervis 7 (Robert , the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and a member of the institute,

October http://www.siwps.com/programs/SWP.attachment/no-2--/No%202%20-%20Jervis.pdf

It is hard to imagine that the withdrawal of American troops will proceed without any discussion with regional powers, including Syria and Iran. While it is far from clear that these countries could bring peace to Iraq even if they wanted to, they can make things worse and, furthermore, without extensive communication if not coordination, we are likely to see inadvertent and undesired clashes between these countries, others in the region, and the US. It is easy for the US to specify what it would like from Iran and Syria; it is much more difficult to establish priorities and decide what it is willing to give up, especially because the willingness of these countries to reciprocate any American concessions remains unclear. Nevertheless, the US needs to think through what it would be willing to offer at various stages of the bargaining process. Most obviously, is the US willing to renounce regime change? Would it support Syria's goal of regaining the Golan Heights? Even more sensitively, would it be willing to permit Iran some uranium enrichment in return for intrusive inspection and cooperation on Iraq? (These questions also raise the topic of whether "grand bargains" with Syria or Iran are feasible or whether, once the US does engage, it should work on each issue separately.)

Syria CP – Solvency

Better Iran Relations could ease tensions in the middle east, without removing troops.

Knight 8,( Charles, June 2008, <http://www.merip.org/taskforceresponsiblewithdrawal.pdf>) **JRG**

The United States must pursue a more constructive relationship with Syria and Iran based on mutual respect and traditional diplomatic principles of “give-and-take.” The scope of renewed engagement with both countries should be wide-ranging, in order to afford the United States maximum leverage in talks about the mutual benefits of principled non-interference in Iraq. Bilateral talks with Iran might encompass some of the components of a “grand bargain” that have been outlined many times before. Talks of this scope would also need to address what else Syria and Iran could do, beyond pledging non-interference in Iraq, to calm regional tensions.

\*\*\*China Counterplan\*\*\*

China CP – Solvency

[ ] China is already help Iraq alleviate insatiability problems

ChinaDaily 10 (March 16, ChinaDaily.com Lexis) ELJ

Iraq is keen to see China play a bigger role in the reconstruction of the war-torn country, the country's top envoy to Beijing has said. "After 2003, China has supported us very much and reduced Iraqi debts by 80 percent, which is greatly appreciated," Iraqi Ambassador Mohammad Sabir Ismail told China Daily in an interview last Friday, referring to a $6.8-billion debt cut announced by China last month. Ismail also rolled out the red carpet for Chinese companies, some of which, namely in the energy and retail sectors, were already operating in Iraq. "China has many giant companies qualified to participate in rebuilding Iraq, and, since our country will remain a big workshop in the next 20 years, I call on all Chinese companies to come and take up projects in rebuilding Iraq," Ismail said. On the question of US troops in Iraq, the ambassador said "at the end of the day, no one wants foreign forces to be present in their own territory," although a few Iraqis might prefer US troops to stay just for the sake of ensuring security. "The pullout of (US forces) would not be affected at all. We have already agreed with the US that their troops have to withdraw from Iraq by 2011," he said. Ismail also said the March 7 parliamentary elections had proved that the country's security forces were capable of protecting its people and reducing external threats. An internal assessment by the US military had concluded that at least 37 people were killed in 136 attacks in the violence triggered by the election. The ambassador noted that people's faith in the security apparatus had risen, as the average turnout during the election was estimated at 63 percent. "Many terrorist groups are still operating in Iraq and were trying to stop people from voting, but they didn't succeed," he said. Ismail also predicted that Iraq was likely to see a coalition government this time round, rather than being governed by a single party. "I think it is most likely that there will be a coalition in the end, namely from (current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri) Maliki, (former prime minister Iyad) Allawi, the Kurdish (parties) and so forth. None of them will overwhelm the other because it is impossible for a single party to take over more than half of the 325 seats in parliament."

\*\*\*Troop Surge Counterplan\*\*\*

Troop Surge Solves – COIN

The success of COIN operation relies upon basic services and necessities which currently are not available

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

As the endless debates over strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan should have made clear to even the casual observer, COIN operations are inherently political. The goal of any COIN campaign is to win over the proverbial hearts and minds of the populace and to convince them to back the government and oppose insurgents. This requires providing every citizen with basic services like electricity, food, and clean water; law and justice; security against arbitrary reprisals; and a functional economy in which the people are able to support themselves and their families. Of course, none of this is possible without reasonably good governance to ensure that resources are being properly allocated as well as procedures properly developed and applied to ensure the security and welfare of the people. Insurgencies are political in nature because they represent an act of armed rebellion against the political authority and are fueled by political grievances. Thus, which side will prevail is largely determined by political, economic, social, and security considerationsall of which stem from the inherent capacity, fairness, and legitimacy of the political leadership and political process to deliver.

And the military will be the actor in providing these basic services furthering weakening the political system

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Inevitably, the military is the establishment called on to take the lead in COIN operations because of its ability to fight the insurgents, provide security, and mobilize resources. Just as inevitably, the military gets sucked into the political and economic sides of counterinsurgency in its effort to defeat the insurgency. Because a competent military that understands COIN operations will quickly recognize the need to provide people with basic services, a functioning economy, an efficient legal system, and the like to win the struggle against the insurgency, they will take on part or all of these responsibilities. Like the U.S. and Iraqi militaries in Iraq, and the U.S.-led NATO forces and the ANA in Afghanistan, the armed forces end up providing much of the basic services for the population. Just as inevitably, soldiers and officers will begin to ask at some point what is wrong with the country’s political system that led to such a state of affairs. And that is where the trouble starts.

The challenges of defeating the insurgency would be too great for the government to overcome leading to a military coup

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Because the outbreak of an insurgency necessarily signals a failure of some kind in the nation’s political system, the more that a military struggles to win the COIN fight, the more that it will focus on these political problems, and rightly so. Consequently, competent COIN forces often conclude that defeating the insurgency requires political reform, and since the current crop of leaders are typically those whose failings produced the insurgency, they clearly cannot be expected to effect the necessary changes. Thus, unless there is some reason for the officer corps to expect dramatic political change, they may conclude that to fulfill their mission to defeat the insurgency, they must replace the political leadership with a new, possibly ‘‘interim’’ leadership able to do so. Not surprisingly, the result is a coup d’e´tat.

Troop Surge Solves

Troop Surge is Working

CBN News 10 (CNB World, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2010/January/McChrystal-Says-Afghan-Troop-Surge-Working-/) SVK

America's top commander in Afghanistan says the U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan is turning the tide against the Taliban. In an interview with ABC News, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal says he believes the troop surge is blunting the Taliban's momentum. A recent poll suggests that nearly seven in ten Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in the country. Sixty-one percent favor the military build-up. However, support for the U.S. and NATO forces dropped sharply in the south and east where the fighting is most intense. McChrystal says while progress is being made, the mission is not yet complete. "I believe that we have changed the way we operate in Afghanistan," he explained. "We changed some of our structures. I believe we are on the way to convincing the Afghan people that we are here to protect them." Meanwhile, President Obama is sending an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the number of U.S. troops in the region to 98,000.

Troop Surge Solves

Troop Surge solves instability

Khan 9(Simbal, Eurasia Critic, EIS, http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/troop-surge-afghanistan-perils-and-opportunities) SVK

Troop surge-Opportunities for Stabilization Despite the challenges the planned troop surge offers certain opportunities for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan and to provide security to the Afghan populations. 1. Prioritizing the provision of personal security to the Afghan civilians: Protecting the Afghan population also means minimising civilian casualties which appear to have pushed locals towards anti-state actors such as Taliban. The Deployment of thousands of new U.S. troops in Afghanistan can lessen the reliance on airstrikes that sometimes kill civilians and undermine support for the fight against the Taliban. More troops are likely to translate into more precise ground operation to lesson a dependence on air power which can reduce the costly civilian casualties and reduce the moral and strategic vulnerability of the NATO/coalition presence. 2. Protecting highways and facilitating transport and mobility: Safety of transport routes and road travel remains increasingly curtailed in most of Afghanistan as 61% of Afghans felt insecure while travelling inside Afghanistan in 2008. Incidents of kidnapping have increased as Taliban, other militant groups and criminal syndicates increasingly set up unregulated check posts all major and minor roads. Additional troops can be deputed to check and provide security along major highways. 3. Border Check Posts and monitoring: The Trans border nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan has made the Pak-Afghan border a dangerous and contentious place as the two countries often trade allegations regarding unchecked movement of insurgents and terrorists along this porous border. There is hope that with additional troops more border check posts can be set up on the Afghan side. Currently only 150 border check posts exist on the Afghan side as against 850 set up by Pakistan. Better monitoring of and tracking militant traffic across the border is less costly in terms of civilian casualties as well. 4. Facilitate the process of ‘Afghanisation'-Training Afghan Army and Police: The process of indigenization or ‘Afghanisation' of security in Afghanistan is an important element of the new policy. With the troop surge the number of trainers for the Afghan military as well as the Afghan National police force, are expected to increase significantly. The past few years there has been heavy criticism of the level and kind of training offered to the Afghan National Police whose performance has been criticized widely. Under the new plan, in the next two years, the numbers of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are expected to be raised to 134000 and 82000 respectively. However, according to Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense, Afghanistan, the much trumpeted increase in the numbers of the of the Afghan National Police is only illusory as according to his figures the police force is already 99% of its expected strength. In order to arrest a fast degrading security environment and provide effective policing to communities plagued by common criminals, narco-traffickers, the projected numbers of ANA must be increased.

Troop Surge Solves

Milband is confident that the Troop Surge will calm Afghanistan

BBC 9 (BBC World News, December 1, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\_news/politics/8387829.stm) SVK

The foreign secretary said it was important Afghans developed a "loyalty to their own state", which needed a "thoroughgoing political strategy". The UK has pledged 500 more troops to Afghanistan, with the US widely expected to promise a further 30,000. Mr Miliband said the two countries' strategies were "very consistent". Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced on Monday that the UK would be sending 500 extra troops, taking the total to 10,000. He said the Nato coalition was seeking a "major" expansion of the Afghan army from 90,000 to 134,000, with the aim that local forces would eventually assume sole responsibility. US President Barack Obama, who has held a video conference with Mr Brown, is to give details of his plans later. 'Essential' Mr Miliband told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "President Obama set out his strategy in March this year. It's very consistent with the strategy the prime minister has set out. "It's about building Afghan forces so they can defend their own country." He said the boost in overseas troop numbers and the planned expansion of the Afghan army would ensure a "a thoroughgoing campaign to ensure that the people of Afghanistan... look forward to a loyalty to their own state which is essential to any counter-insurgency." Mr Miliband stressed the need to involve other countries, particularly Pakistan, in ensuring Afghanistan's stability. He said: "The neighbours really matter in Afghanistan. We all know that Afghanistan has been a chess board for the neighbours of Afghanistan." Asked whether western leaders were trying to bypass the regime of President Hamid Karzai, in favour of talking to local leaders, in an effort to bring stability to Afghanistan, Mr Miliband said: "That wouldn't be right. We have been arguing and talking about the importance of local engagement for more than two years... "Afghanistan is a tribal society, a society of 40,000 villages." Leaders briefed He added: "We are not trying to create a colony in Afghanistan." Mr Obama will make his announcement later in a televised speech to cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point. He has already briefed military and foreign leaders on the deployment, reportedly of 30,000 additional troops. The US currently has about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan, with foreign forces overall totalling more than 100,000. Earlier this year, the US military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, warned that America risked failure in Afghanistan unless troop numbers were increased. He requested 40,000 more soldiers, but Mr Obama is expected to order around 30,000 to the country.

Troop Surge Solves

The Troop Surge has had success

The Associated Press 7 (Las Vegas Review Journal, September 9, http://www.lvrj.com/news/9676187.html) SVK

Retired Army Gen. John Abizaid said the United States must work harder on diplomatic and economic fronts for its troop surge in Iraq to succeed in bringing stability to the Middle East. In a speech Friday in Reno, the former head of Central Command who oversaw the military's deployment in the region said President Bush's surge has made some progress in Iraq. "Whether or not the effect will be lasting enough to translate into better governance in Iraq is a question we're all going to have to explore," Abizaid said. "My view has always been, go ahead and surge, but let's surge economic power, let's surge diplomatic and informational power as well. A one-dimensional surge only gains time, and that's not enough," he added. Abizaid said he didn't want to judge what's happening in Iraq ahead of Gen. David Petraeus' status report Saturday. But he stressed the military can't accomplish the mission on its own. "Do I think we've done enough in the other elements of national power? The answer is no," he said. "We need to do more. Can we do more? Yes, we can. "We should not think that there is a magic bullet that will allow us to just get up and leave. Not with all the strategic importance of that region." Before he retired, Abizaid was critical of the surge concept, saying more U.S. troops would take the responsibility from Iraqis to stabilize their own country. "My issue not only was the Iraqis have to do more, but other elements of our national power have to be brought together in a way that allows us to do less militarily," he said. In a 45-minute talk to the Nevada Council on Foreign Relations, Abizaid said stability in the Middle East will remain critical for national security. After retiring in May, Abizaid and his wife, Kathy, moved to Gardnerville, about 40 miles south of Reno. Friday marked his first public appearance since moving to Nevada.

Troop Surge Fails

Troop Surge in Iraq will deepen Quagmire

Stoyeck 9 (Richard, Approved Articles staff writer, http://www.approvedarticles.com/Article/Troop-Surge-in-Iraq-will.../2539) SVK

Somehow the current President Bush got it into his mind Saddam still represented a threat to the stability of the region, and therefore invaded again. In doing so, he has opened Pandora's Box. Once that box was opened, no one can predict with any accuracy how this is going to play out. We have certainly done a number of things, none of which play to our favor: 1) We have strengthened and emboldened Iran. We are no longer in a position to threaten Iran with invasion for continuing its nuclear program. We do not have the force structure to back up our threats. 2) We have strengthened Syria in the same way as Iran. 3) We have aggravated the Arab-Israeli situation by weakening our own image as an honest third party to the conflict. 4) We have destabilized Iraq as a country, and as a functioning state, with no endgame in mind. 5) We have placed our prestige on the line, and are at the lowest level of respect in our allies' eyes since World War II. 6) Our position as the moral guiding force of this planet is in jeopardy. 7) We have started a war that we do not know how to finish. What the President must do RIGHT NOW is recognize where we are at. This is why he lost the Congress in the last election. Americans are never sitting stay, or watch idly. We are an active nation. If the President isn't moving fast enough, the people will elect others who will? Our current troops should be used only to train Iraqi forces, both police and military, and not act as combatants in a country whose government we already defeated. If the President finds it mandatory to deploy additional troops, again these additional forces should only be used to train Iraqi forces, not to intervene. This is no CIVIL WAR, with Moslem pitted against Moslem, and sect against sect. This is not about Catholic versus Protestant, or Jew versus Arab. This is all taking place within the context of the same religion. It is even taking place within the same sects. Sunni is also killing Sunni, and Shia is killing Shia. We could never hope to be able to intervene against such wanton killing. We are after all a democracy, the beacon of light in world where there is much darkness. Our continued efforts in Iraq may weaken this country so much more that it could result in potentially nuclear Iran creating the regional hegemony that we tried to prevent Iraq from creating. Wouldn't that be a sad state of affairs? We replace one monster with another.

Troop Surge Fails

Troop Surge Fails to solve instability

Brunner 9 (Jennifer, US democrat for Senate, http://www.jenniferbrunner.com/index.php/blog/post/time\_to\_bring\_home\_the\_troops/) SVK Our clear goal in Afghanistan should be to prevent Afghanistan and the border areas such as those of northwest Pakistan from serving as a staging area for terrorist attacks against the U.S. and other nations. We must reduce instability that could lead to governmental collapse of Afghanistan and other nations of the region, and use nonmilitary means to accomplish this for long term success. We can identify two significant weaknesses of the Bush administration’s policy in Afghanistan: the designated leadership in the conflict and the use of private contractors to carry out military objectives. I doubt that General Stanley McChrystal is the leader whose advice we should follow without significant validation of his recommendations. Gen. McChrystal recommended the deployment of additional troops in a “surge” modeled after the one in Iraq. Also, General McChrystal’s previous association with the abuse of detainees and with the incident surrounding Pat Tillman give me pause as I evaluate his recommendations. Even with a surge of troops into Afghanistan, the role of private contractors in the conflict will continue by unacceptable means and at unacceptable levels. It is clear that the Bush administration’s policy of “outsourcing” the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased, rather than mitigated, a culture of corruption and instability in a country already steeped in challenges. The solution is complex and will take some time and a multi-faceted effort, but a progressive approach will best accomplish the task. Progressives are up to the task as they work to improve the lives of their fellow citizens, often with bold plans, using—and needing—government to accomplish them. Change is needed, and our nation can help lead the way, but direct responsibility for Afghanistan’s future must be placed with its people and its government. Economic development, building a robust civil society, increasing the transparency and effectiveness of Afghan governmental institutions, and increased regional diplomacy, rather than more troops, must be part of the equation. As a nation, we face a horrendous national debt that grew exponentially from the Bush administration’s failure to find an honest way to pay for a war it couldn’t afford. The American public has been fleeced by the Bush administration whose policies not only placed American lives in peril but also stood to profit from them both politically and financially. Why does the U.S. need to spend billions more in Afghanistan to act as a police force, to build schools, and to develop economic alternatives to opium production when tens of thousands of Americans can’t find jobs here at home? I do not envy President Obama in the decision he must make. I simply offer some additional thoughts that I believe are telling in how his decision will fare in the long run, if he decides to add to the number of troops who are there. If he sends more troops, he must be starkly honest with the American people about the costs—in lives, in increasing the national debt, and in slowing an economic recovery.

Troop Surge Fails

Troop Surge Prolongs Instability

Odom 8 (William E., Retired US Army General, Nieman Watchdog, April 2, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?backgroundid=237&fuseaction=Background.view&emailthis=sendtoafriend&stoplayout=true&print=true) SVK

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked. Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success. I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims. Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant in several other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province. More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic. No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities. Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey. Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight. Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq. The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime. As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran. Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation. Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses. This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the bottom up. I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to a central government except through bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense. To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over extended army. When the administration’s witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.

Surge Needed to Progress

Iraq has made great progress however if we withdraw prematurely these gains will be reversed

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Iraq has made remarkable progress since the worst days of its civil war in 2006. Security has improved enormously, democratization has gained a foothold, and democratic pressures have forced Iraqi politicians to change their methods, if not necessarily their goals. Iraq’s micro economies have begun to revive and foreign investment is beginning to pick up.But as countless policymakers and commentators have pointed out, these gains are fragile and reversible. All of the tensions that propelled the country into the maelstrom of civil war during the initial years of bungled reconstruction remain, as do the memories of the many horrific acts committed. As numerous scholars of civil war have noted, these lingering fears typically make the resumption of civil war uncomfortably likely in cases like Iraq, unless an external great power is willing to serve as peacekeeper and mediator during the critical early years when the new, fragile state must build institutions capable of providing effective governance and public safety. Indeed, candidate Obama correctly argued that when the United States prematurely turned away from Afghanistan to focus on Iraq in 2002—2003, the result was the near collapse of the new Afghan government and the resumption of widespread civil strife.3 Even if it is to focus on Afghanistan, if the United States turns away from Iraq prematurely, it would have dire consequences for Iraq, whose fragile government will be more likely to fail, and for the United States, because success in Iraq is vital to U.S. interests.

Tensions between Iraqi politicians and the Iraqi military lead to a ineffective chain of command along with the possibility of a military coup.

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Today, the ISF sees itself as a strong, modern, progressive institution, fully capable of fulfilling its national mission. More critically, most Iraqi generals see few, if any, other institutions in Iraq that can make the same claim. They view Iraqi politicians as venal and incompetent, squandering all of the gains won at such a high price by their soldiers. In and of itself, this has been the textbook recipe for a military coup throughout modern history, especially in the Middle East. Moreover, Iraq’s civilian leadership is well aware of both the army’s sentiments and the historical pattern they seem to fit, and has been working hard to ensure the political loyalty of the armed forces. To do so, the government has been employing equally typical patterns of what noted RAND analyst James Quinlivan has called ‘‘coup-proofing’’: replacing military professionals with officers personally loyal to the leader; creating multiple chains of command, some of which skirt established lines of authority to report directly to the leader or his trusted aides; establishing multiple intelligence services that can watch each other as well as the military; and creating elite military formations directly under the control of the leader.4 Naturally, the fact that the civilian leadership is showing such growing distrust of the military further antagonizes many generals, which someday may incline some (perhaps all) to act against the civilian leadership.

Surge Solves Civil-Military Relations

The U.S. needs to fix civil military relations before withdrawal in order to increase the effectiveness of Iraq’s fight against insurgency

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

As if that isn’t bad enough, there is yet another problem: it is the nature of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to politicize the militaries conducting them. The nature of COIN warfare is that the indigenous military fights an internal enemy. The history of militaries of developing countries conducting COIN campaigns is that in the absence of a large, foreign military presence with large numbers of combat troops, indigenous political—military relations often go sour as a result of the counterinsurgency effort, regardless of its effectiveness. Iraq’s current civil—military relations are fragile and fraught with distrust on both sides. This is a major problem that must be addressed before the United States implements the drawdown of U.S. combat forces and shifts the U.S. mission from combat operations to advising and training.

Only U.S. troop presence can guarantee the Iraqi military will not confront the civilian government

Pollack and Sargsyan 10 (Kenneth M, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council (1999-2001); Iran-Iraq Military Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995); and Director for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (2001-2002), Irena L, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 17-32, april 2010)

Today, the surest guarantee that the Iraqi military will not move against the civilian leadership, and that the civilian leadership will be limited in its ability to emasculate the militaryeither of which could trigger a new civil waris the presence of almost 100,000 U.S. troops. When that presence is removed in December 2011, that guarantee will depart with them. Since history in similar circumstances elsewhere warns of the risk of catastrophically bad civil-military relations, unless large numbers of the departing great power’s combat troops remain behind for years or decades, the United States may be committing de´ja` vu all over again in Iraq.

\*\*\*Troop Withdrawal Slow Down Counterplan\*\*\*

Slow Down Key to Stabilize

Currently U.S. forces are stabilizing relations between the Arabs and the Kurds, however troops lack the key time needed to end these tensions.

**Wilson. 10**. ("Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says." Washington Post, 5-27 sec a-1) White House correspondent for the Washington Post. correspondent in Latin America Middle East, and Jerusalem Bureau Chief.

FROM the market town of Khanaqin, on the Iranian border, all the way to Sinjar, near the border with Syria, a fortified line snakes across northern Iraq. To the east and north stand Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmerga, keen to reclaim land taken from them by Saddam Hussein more than two decades ago. On the other side of the line, to the west and south, are Iraqi regular-army troops sent by the central government in Baghdad to stop ancient cities along the Tigris river falling into what it fears may become a purely Kurdish sphere. The two forces have come close to flat-out fighting several times, usually outside the cities where commanders act off their own bat. Last year an Iraqi army unit drove into the disputed, though mainly Kurdish, town of Altun Kupri and took up sniper positions on rooftops. When residents, supported by armed Peshmerga, started demonstrating against their presence, the Arab soldiers were told to shoot to kill. Bloodshed was avoided at the last minute by American troops stationed nearby. Small incidents of this kind could easily spark a wider conflict. Edginess along the "trigger line", as it has become known, is now the biggest threat to Iraq's stability. Sectarian tension between Sunni and Shia Arabs further south are far from resolved, but an ethnic conflict between Arabs and Kurds is more dangerous, partly because both sides are well-armed. Hence the Americans are making one last effort to dampen tension before their combat troops leave Iraq by the end of August however it may be a little too late . Since late January, several hundred Kurdish and Arab soldiers have been patrolling parts of the disputed area together, under American tutelage. The idea, forged by General Ray Odierno, the overall American commander in Iraq, is to build trust between the two sides by bringing them into daily contact. In addition to staging joint patrols, they have started manning checkpoints together. In a few places they sleep and eat under the same roof. Americans are always around to keep the peace. Patrols are tripartite, so the Americans are now peacekeepers rather than counter-insurgents. Since they withdrew from all Iraq's cities last year, they have not been manning checkpoints outside their bases. Will this work? Tension ran high before provincial elections a year ago--and is running even higher now, as the general election on March 7th draws near. The hope is that joint checkpoints will let voters move more freely in the disputed areas and prevent incidents such as one that occurred when Kurdish soldiers stopped the Arab governor of restive Nineveh province from visiting the Kurdish-controlled town of Bashiqa, in the area he is supposed to govern. It is also hoped that the joint patrols may deter al-Qaeda's suicide-bombers, who want to exploit ethnic tension along the trigger line to reignite civil war. But trust is scarce. The Kurds regard Abdul Amir, who commands an Iraqi army division near the disputed city of Kirkuk, as a former Saddam henchman who once slaughtered their people and may be ready to do so again. In turn, many Arabs believe the Kurds will never compromise on land they occupied after Saddam's fall. Yet the two sides are co-operating well in Kirkuk, where they and the Americans jointly operate a police command-centre. But assassinations and kidnappings of officials persist. Efforts to co-operate along the trigger line can seem to make matters worse. In Khanaqin Kurdish soldiers and Iraqi interior-ministry forces run joint patrols in the town, but the commander on each side claims he is in sole charge. There is little chance that fortifications along the line in Kalar and Kifri, north-west of Khanaqin, will be dismantled soon or landmines removed. Nor are the Kurds likely to take down fortifications around Dibis, where a big oil-pumping station sits on top of one of Iraq's biggest oilfields. So the American peace effort may have come too late. The two sides, both ruthless, are engaged in what they see as an existential struggle. In the end, a solid peace will emerge only if clear regional borders are agreed. And that has yet to happen.

\*\*\*Reverse Spending D/A\*\*\*

Reverse Spending DA – Internals

The Military frivolously spends money on weapons when available

Paul 10 (Ron, US House of Reps, Antiwar Forum, June 29th) http://original.antiwar.com/paul/2010/06/28/military-spending-must-be-on-the-table/ SVK

This past week various news events once again made it abundantly clear that our foreign policy is an abject failure. Unfortunately, in spite of this, the administration is determined to stay on this destructive course, despite any past promises to change it. For Afghanistan especially, if ever there was an opportunity to admit shortcomings and change strategies along with leaders, this past week was it. There really is nothing for us to win in Afghanistan. Our mission has morphed from apprehending those who attacked us, to apprehending those who threaten or dislike us for invading their country, to remaking an entire political system and even a culture. I remain highly skeptical that, as foreign occupiers, we can ever impose Western-style democracy on another country. Our troops have debilitating restrictions on defending themselves against enemies, which are so often indistinguishable from civilians. They also face dire setbacks in winning hearts and minds when innocents are mistakenly harmed, which happens all the time. We can never make friends this way; the tactic never works. This is an expensive, bloody, endless exercise in futility. Not everyone is willing to admit this just yet. But every second they spend in denial has real costs in lives and livelihoods. Many of us can agree on one thing, however. Our military spending in general has grown way out of control. This is largely because fiscal accountability in military budgeting is seen, by many, as weak on defense. This is absolutely wrong and a dangerous way to think. It is certainly possible for the military to waste money, or to spend money counterproductively, and indeed it has. But out of political correctness, the military has been getting blank checks from the administrations and Congress for far too long. It is important to defend our soil, but let us defend our own soil instead of defending Europe’s soil. Our willingness to defend Europe enables their lavish social spending at our expense, while they criticize our model of capitalism. It is time they allocated the money for their own defense. The same goes for Korea, Japan, and other countries like Egypt and Israel. It is also important that while our troops are in combat, our soldiers have what they need to do the best they can, even if we disagree with why they are there. It is an embarrassment that some soldiers and families have had to buy body armor at their own expense when billions are awarded to politically well-connected defense contractors for weapon systems that don’t work, are over-budget, and are past deadline. This is the kind of waste that needs to end. I firmly believe that there is enough waste in the military budget that we can both save money overall and at the same time be safer. Of course, the obvious way to save money and be safer is to stop meddling in the affairs of foreign countries and just bring our troops home. This will happen eventually if our empire, like every other fallen empire, insists on spending itself into collapse. If we want to avoid this, we must look into ways to bring our costs under control. Military budgets must be on the chopping block along with everything else.

Reverse Spending DA – Impact

Spending on Nuclear Weapons is the ultimate guarantor of institutional racism and poverty

Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance 9

OREPA-; *Stop the Racism Imperialist Weapons? Building a world of peace requires making the connections.*; member of COMMUNITY SHARES; site content copyright 2006-2009; http://www.stopthebombs.org/racism.php SVK

Funny thing. Almost all the nations that have nuclear weapons are white.

All the countries in which the US has its nuclear weapons deployed are white.

India and Pakistan, who have developed nuclear arsenals since 1970, have not been allowed to become party to the Nonproliferation Treaty as nuclear weapons states. South Africa's white government dismantled its nuclear weapons and the production infrastructure before turning the government over to majority rule under Nelson Mandela.

China, and now maybe North Korea, are the only places where reality shatters the myth of racial superiority.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of institutional racism around the globe. They are, for the most part, white people's weapons. More than 95% of the world's nuclear weapons are in the control of governments dominated by white men. The role of people of color in the history of nuclear weapons has been one of exploitation - Indigenous and native populations have been used to mine nuclear materials for bombs, and poor communities have been dumped on by the wastes. But people and communities of color have never shared the power that comes with owning nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons intersect with race issues at another fundamental level. Since 1945, the United States nuclear arsenal has cost us more than 5 trillion dollars. This year alone, we will spend more than $40 billion on our nuclear arsenal. As long as we invest these enormous amounts of money on holding the world hostage to our nuclear might, we will never have enough money for the things that would provide real security for lowincome communities (disproportionately communities of color in the US).

Our nuclear arsenal means not enough money for economic development, not enough money for housing, not enough money for health care, not enough money for anti-poverty programs, not enough money for crime prevention, not enough money for food subsidy programs, not enough money for education and training.

There is enough money for these programs, but they are not priorities for our government. The government's priorities these days are programs that benefit rich people, people who have connections, people who are highly educated, who control the voting systems and our political parties. Right - white people.

We have more than 6,000 nuclear weapons in our active arsenal right now. Many are maintained on high trigger alert. They are at 12 locations in the United States, in six foreign countries, and deployed on submarines and aircraft carriers that are patrolling the oceans.

Whatever your community needs, we will not have the money for it until we reprioritize. The status quo is guaranteed by our spending priorities - by nuclear weapons.

Still not sure? Ask yourself this question: Is it possible that our government is willing to sacrifice the health, hope and future of people of color in the vain pursuit of security through military spending?

The money spent on nuclear weapons in one year by the US could build one million Habitat homes. That's one million homes every single year. Or the money could fully fund Head Start programs for every eligible child. But as long as our institutions are managed by the "haves," however well intentioned they may be, we will spend our money on nuclear weapons and not on security for our poorest children. It's called institutionalized racism.

Reverse Spending DA – Racism Impact

Racism makes nuclear war inevitable

Kovel 88 (Joel, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY, p. XXX (PDCL2452)

Thus the nuclear crisis is now the leading item on the global agenda. If it is not resolved, civilization will be exterminated, while if it is resolved, the terms of society and the state will undoubtedly be greatly altered. This will of course profoundly affect the racial situation. At the same time the disposition of racism will play a key role in the outcome of the nuclear crisis. For one thing, the effectiveness of an antinuclear movement will depend heavily on its ability to involve people of all races – in contrast to its present makeup which is almost entirely white and middle class. To achieve such mobilization and carry through, however, the moment will have to be able to make the linkages between militarization and racial oppression very clearly and forcefully. For if the third, and last world war becomes thermonuclear, it will most likely be in a place defined by racial oppositions.

Reverse Spending DA – Racism Ext.

A stance against racism is the only method to mount an anti-nuclear strategy

Kovel 83 (Joel, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst; *Against the State of Nuclear Terror;* South End Press, Boston p.118-121.) SVK

Every nation of the Western world has a specific complement of darker peoples, all of whom are as much at risk from nuclear weapons as the white majority, and who certainly suffer more from the oppressive features of the system than to whites. Logically, therefore, blacks and other Third World peoples should be represented in peace movements at least according to their proportion in the general population. Needless to say, this is not the case. A reciprocally active process of exclusion has kept disarmament movements lily-white. There are hopeful changes on the way, as the 12 June 1982 rally in New York and that of 27 August 1983 in Washington, show. However, the history of those events also reveals just how deeply racism extends and how difficult it is to forge the necessary links between antiracist and antimilitarist activity.

I do not say this to slander the peace movement but to call frank attention to the subtle and ubiquitous way that racism infects us. Like a virus that has taken up residence inside the host cell so long that it eventually becomes indistinguishable from the latter’s own substance, racism sits inside the dominant consciousness of Western peoples and divides them from each other, thus perpetuating the system of domination. Racism in this sense is simply non-recognition of the Other. Along with the system of sexual domination it is one of the two great mental divisions that have crippled the human species.

Racism differs from the gender system in that sexism is an arrangement between groups who live together. Therefore sexual distortions are primarily of self-perception-the male not recognizing the female in himself, for example. Sexism must allow both genders to share life, however unequally. Racism, however, is between peoples as a whole. It involves not just self-distortion, but tends toward the entire shunning of the Other. Thus, its mental distortion is such as to permit overt ghettoization. It becomes part of racism, therefore, to talk of the Other in an entirely abstract way. The white, in this case, thinks of the black and knows she or he is there, but cannot project self-feeling into her or him. In the vital conduct of action, the black is simply set aside (and accepts complementarity, setting her or himself aside). As black and white are two non-colors, so do the mutual relations become devoid of sensuousness.This degree of repression is unacceptable for a disarmament movement facing a weaponry that will annihilate everyone

\*\*\*Politics Disadvantage\*\*\*

**Withdrawal Decreases Political Capital**

Changing the U.S.-Iraqi Withdrawal date will destroy the capital of the Obama Adminstration.

FPIF 10(Foreign Policy in Focus, March 2010, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding_backwards_on_iraq>) **JRG**

An Obama flip-flop on the timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops would have serious consequences in the United States and Iraq. The U.S. global image will be tarnished, Obama's credibility will be called into question, and the administration will likely lose what little global political capital it gained in the last year.

Plan Bipartisan

Status quo withdrawal is bipartisan.

Friedman 10 (George, American political scientist and author, *Business Insider*, April 21st, 2010, <http://www.businessinsider.com/stratfor-iraq-us-iran-2010-4>) NK

The United States is set to complete the withdrawal of its combat forces from Iraq this summer, leaving behind a residual force of about 50,000 support personnel. This drawdown is according to a plan former U.S. President George W. Bush laid down in 2008, and that U.S. President Barack Obama has sped up only by a few months. Therefore, this is not a political issue but one on which there has been consensus. The reason for the withdrawal is that U.S. forces are needed in Afghanistan. Even more important, the United States has no strategic reserve for its ground forces. It has fought a two-theater, multidivisional war for seven years. The Army is stretched to the limit, and should another crisis develop elsewhere in the world, the United States would lack the land power to respond decisively.

Plan Partisan

Withdrawal of troops is along strict partisan lines

Biddle et al 8 (Stephen, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution. Foreign affairs October/September http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63565/stephen-biddle-michael-e-ohanlon-and-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq) ELJ

The Iraq war has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. Most Democrats, including Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.), want large, early troop cuts; most Republicans, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), want U.S. troops to stay until Iraq's stability is guaranteed. Years of bad news from the front have hardened these divisions along partisan lines and embittered many on both sides. Today, however, there is reason to believe that the debate over Iraq can change. A series of positive developments in the past year and a half offers hope that the desire of so many Americans to bring the troops home can be fulfilled without leaving Iraq in chaos. The right approach, in other words, can partly square Obama's goal of redeploying large numbers of U.S. forces sooner rather than later with McCain's goal of ensuring stability in Iraq.

Plan Unpopular

Plan to withdraw US troops is unpopular

CNN 10 (CNN 5.31.10 http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/31/cnn-poll-instability-in-iraq-could-hurt-support-for-u-s-withdrawal/?iref=allsearch&fbid=6WU5IH1sOVJ)ESY

But public approval of the plan falls to 51 percent if Iraq does not have a stable government by August and there is widespread violence at that time, with opposition rising to 48 percent. "Support drops more than 20 points among Americans with a college education and among suburbanites," said CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "But among people who never attended college, opinion barely changes. The same is true for people who live in rural areas." The survey also indicates that the conflict in Iraq remains very unpopular, with more than six in ten saying they oppose the war. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that despite the recent spike in violence and political impasse, the planned withdrawal continues. While the pace of the withdrawal is being determined by the top commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, the deadline, which was set in an agreement with the Iraqi government, remains on schedule.

**Iraq war unpopular, withdrawal timeline still on task**

**Levine 10 (Adam, former deputy press secretary, CNN 5/29 http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/29/poll.iraq.troop.withdrawal/index.html) KCA**

Support for President Obama's planned removal of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the August could drop significantly if Iraq cannot solve its current problems in time, according to a new national poll. A CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Saturday indicates that 64 percent of Americans favor the president's plan to keep just 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the summer, with 35 percent opposed. But public approval of the plan falls to 51 percent if Iraq does not have a stable government by August and there is widespread violence at that time, with opposition rising to 48 percent. "Support drops more than 20 points among Americans with a college education and among suburbanites," said CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "But among people who never attended college, opinion barely changes. The same is true for people who live in rural areas." The survey also indicates that the conflict in Iraq remains very unpopular, with more than 6 in 10 saying they oppose the war. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that despite the recent spike in violence and political impasse, the planned withdrawal continues. While the pace of the withdrawal is being determined by the top commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, the deadline, which was set in an agreement with the Iraqi government, remains on schedule. "We plan for everything. But right now, every expectation is that we will meet the 50,000 as of the first of September," said Secretary Robert Gates on May 20. With the reduction of troops, the U.S. now has more troops in Afghanistan than Iraq for the first time since 2003. According to the poll, the war in Afghanistan fares only a little better, with 56 percent now saying they oppose the war in Afghanistan, up from 49 percent in March. Support for the conflict in Afghanistan stands at 42 percent, down six points from March. "The war in Afghanistan remains popular among Republicans, with about two-thirds of them saying they favor the war," adds Holland. "But support among Democrats is only at 27 percent, and among Independents it has fallen 10 points, to just 40 percent. That is the lowest support for the war among Democrats and Independents that we have seen this year." The CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll was conducted May 21-23, with 1,023 adult Americans questioned by telephone. The survey's overall sampling error is plus or minus three percentage points.

The Iraqis do not support Withdrawal

Goldberg 6 (Jonah, syndicated columnist, *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* LexisNexis, May 1st, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) NK

Right now, various factions within Iraq decry the "occupation" knowing full well that American troops aren't going anywhere - and that Iraqis don't want them to. This injects poison directly into the political climate. Politicians who take the reasonable and realistic position that American troops should stay can be outflanked by demagogues claiming to be the greater patriots and nationalists. Murderers pretend to be the authentic voice of Iraqis and Muslims, and the European and Arab press are keen to give this storyline a "fair" hearing. Even here at home, critics of the war have come to paint Iraq as an entirely cynical and gloomy affair, launched on fraudulent rationales and continued out of hubris.

Plan Unpopular

The US is continuing withdrawal, even though it is unpopular.

Min 10 (Ji Kang, reporter for Arirang [Korean TV network], Arirang, July 5th, 2010, <http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=104618&code=Ne2&category=2>) NK

US Vice President Joe Biden says the US will stick to its plan to withdraw troops from Iraq as scheduled. Biden who made a surprise visit to Iraq reaffirmed the government's plan to reduce US troop levels to 50-thousand by August 31st. His comments come amid rising skepticism over the withdrawal plan that includes a complete exit of US troops by the end of next year. A rise in violence and continuing internal dispute among Iraqi leaders are some factors raising doubts over the plan. The US Vice President also met with Iraqi politicans and urged them to end the political impasse that has delayed the selection of the next prime minister.

Republicans Like Plan

Republicans don’t hate plan – they feel that Obama’s withdrawal is responsible

Baker 9 (Peter, writer, February 27, The New York Times,

<http://www.patsfans.com/new-england-patriots/messageboard/12/219311-republicans-support-obamas-plan-leave-50-000-troops-iraq.html>) ELJ

Republicans who backed Mr. Obama on the issue said he owed his ability to pull out to the troop buildup. “The dramatic success of the surge strategy has enabled us to move from a discussion about whether the United States could bear the catastrophic consequences of failure in Iraq, to planning the way in which to consolidate success there,” Senator John McCain of Arizona said. Mr. McCain, the former Republican presidential candidate who clashed sharply with Mr. Obama over the future of Iraq during the campaign last year, called the withdrawal “reasonable” and said he was “cautiously optimistic that the plan as laid out by the president can lead to success.” Former Bush aides called it the logical next step after his agreement to pull out by 2011. “The specific timing is only slightly different but consistent with the goal of helping Iraq become self-sufficient in providing its own security,” said Gordon D. Johndroe, Mr. Bush’s last national security spokesman. “This is possible because of the success of the surge.”

Democrats Dislike Plan

**Withdrawal unpopular within democratic party**

**Zeleny 7** (Jeff Zeleny, 3/22/10, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/washington/22dems.html)

Representative Dan Boren is a Democrat, but after visiting [Iraq](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) last week he announced a decision that puts him at odds with his party’s leaders: he intends to vote against their plan to set a deadline for troops to leave Iraq. “A timeline, in effect, is cutting off the funds,” said Mr. Boren, a conservative second-term lawmaker whose territory covers the eastern swath of Oklahoma, from the bottom of Kansas to the top of Texas. “That is not the solution.” His views have barely caused a ripple in his home district, but the House Democratic leadership has been working to keep Mr. Boren’s views from spreading through the party’s jittery conservative wing. At the same time, the leaders are trying to persuade liberals to support the legislation, even though it does not end the war nearly fast enough for their liking.

Plan Unpopular - Instability

Instability in Iraq makes withdrawal unpopular

Levine and Steinhauser 10 (Adam and Paul, CNN wire staff, *CNN*, May 26th, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/29/poll.iraq.troop.withdrawal/index.html>) NK

Support for President Obama's planned removal of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the August could drop significantly if Iraq cannot solve its current problems in time, according to a new national poll. A CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Saturday indicates that 64 percent of Americans favor the president's plan to keep just 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the summer, with 35 percent opposed. But public approval of the plan falls to 51 percent if Iraq does not have a stable government by August and there is widespread violence at that time, with opposition rising to 48 percent. "Support drops more than 20 points among Americans with a college education and among suburbanites," said CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "But among people who never attended college, opinion barely changes. The same is true for people who live in rural areas." The survey also indicates that the conflict in Iraq remains very unpopular, with more than 6 in 10 saying they oppose the war.

Plan Popular

Iraqis want the US to withdraw troops

Dobins (James 6.16.9 Dir DPC, RAND, Sec. of State http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.asp)ESY

The Iraqis feel very strongly - when they informed the U.N. last year that they really wanted to get out of Chapter VII and they wanted to no longer be under the U.N. resolution that essentially authorized American occupation of Iraq, there was still this unfinished business of had they met Kuwaiti demands and expectations.

Republicans Like the Current Plan

Republicans realize that the war was a mistake

Watson 10 (Paul Joseph Prison Planet.com June 25, <http://www.prisonplanet.com/congressman-rohrabacher-almost-all-house-republicans-think-iraq-war-illegal-immoral.html> ) ELJ

Judge Andrew Napolitano’s new Saturday show on the Fox Business Network is set to send shock waves through the political establishment this weekend when his guest – Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher – reveals that almost all House Republicans now believe that the invasion of Iraq was not only a mistake, but also illegal and immoral. “This morning when we taped our show for this weekend, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a right down the middle conservative Republican from southern California, former speech writer for Ronald Reagan, looked at me and said ‘almost all Republicans in the House of Representatives now believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake, that it was unlawful, that it was immoral, that it wasn’t worth the lives lost or the trillions that will be spent’,” Napolitano told The Alex Jones Show. “That is newsworthy that he would say it, it is newsworthy that so many Republicans would change their mind,” added Napolitano, a former New Jersey Superior Court Judge. As far back as three years ago, GOP support for the war in Iraq was beginning to waver, with a CNN poll finding that 38 percent of Republicans opposed the war. The recent primary success of anti-incumbent candidates like Rand Paul, a vocal critic of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, shows that the tide has rapidly turned.

Republicans are on board with Obama’s plan now

Baker 9 (Peter, writer, February 26, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html>) ELJ

President Obama won crucial backing Thursday for his Iraq military drawdown plan from leading Congressional Republicans, including Senator John McCain, the party’s presidential nominee who spent much of last year debating the war with Mr. Obama. As the president prepared to fly to Camp Lejenue, N.C., on Friday to announce his decision to pull combat forces out by August 2010 but leave behind a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops, he reassured Congressional leaders from both parties that his plan would not jeopardize hard-won stability in Iraq. But Republicans emerged from a White House meeting more supportive than several key Democrats, who complained earlier in the day that the president was still leaving behind too many American forces. Mr. McCain said during the private meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared, according to several people in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail Thursday night that Mr. McCain is “supportive of the plan.” Another key Republican, Representative John M. McHugh of New York, the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, said he was reassured by Mr. Obama that he would revisit his plan if circumstances on the ground change. “The president’s objective to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Iraq is one that we should pray for, plan for and work toward,” Mr. McHugh said. “However, I remain concerned that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and we should work to mitigate any risks to our troops and their mission.”

Multiple Republicans support Obama’s Plan for withdrawal

Richmond Times 9 (February 28, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/feb/28/iraq28\_20090227-222836-ar-51126/ ) ELJ

The Republican whom Obama defeated in November lauded the plan. "We are finally on a path to success. Let us have no crisis of confidence now," Sen. John McCain of Arizona said. McCain said he agrees with Obama that the U.S. should keep up to 50,000 troops in Iraq after the combat troops leave, following the recommendation of U.S. military commander. He worries, however, about pressure on Obama from Democrats urging a faster withdrawal. "I worry . . . about statements made by a number of our colleagues indicating that, for reasons wholly apart from the requirement to secure our aims in Iraq, we should aim at a troop presence much lower," McCain said. "The administration should . . . not succumb to pressures, political or otherwise, to make deeper or faster cuts in our force levels." The Republican leaders of the Senate and House of Representatives -- Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Rep. John A. Boehner of Ohio -- also issued statements praising Obama's Iraq policy.

Republicans Like the Current Plan

Republicans feel that Obama’s withdrawal plan is responsible

Johnson et al 9 (Mark, Ryan Teague Beckwith and Steven Thomma, writers, February 28, The Post and Courier,

<http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2009/feb/28/obamas_troop_withdrawal_plan_earns_cheer73390/> ) ELJ

Other prominent Democrats were more welcoming of Obama's plan. Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called it a "responsible drawdown of the great majority of American forces." He said that Obama "is correct to leave in place a sufficient residual force to complete the training of Iraqi security forces, protect our personnel, and conduct counterterrorism missions."

Democrats Dislike the Current Plan

Multiple Democrats agree – Obama’s withdrawal plan is too slow

Baker 9 (Peter, writer, February 26, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html>) ELJ

But Democrats did not like the size of it. “I have been one for a long time who has called for significant cutbacks in Iraq,” Senator Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat and the Senate majority leader, told reporters before heading to the White House briefing. “I’m happy to listen to the secretary of defense and the president, but when they talk about 50,000, that’s a little higher number than I anticipated.” Mr. Reid’s spokesman, Jim Manley, said after the meeting that Mr. Reid still held those concerns. Another person briefed on the session said Representative Nancy Pelosi, a California Democrat and the House speaker, was particularly upset at the residual force. She had kicked off the public criticism Wednesday by saying did not understand “the justification” for 50,000 troops. Others echoed her language on Thursday. “I want to hear what the president has to say about justifying whatever number it is that he has,” Senator Patty Murray of Washington State told reporters. “I do think we have to look carefully at the numbers that are there and do it as quickly as we can.” Senator Charles E. Schumer, a New York Democrat, agreed. “Fifty thousand is more than I would have thought,” he said. “We await the justification for why that would be.”

Obama’s plan for withdrawal angers numerous democrats

Richmond Times 9 (February 28, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/feb/28/iraq28\_20090227-222836-ar-51126/ ) ELJ

His plan calls for withdrawing most of the 142,000 service members now in Iraq by the end of August next year, leaving 35,000 to 50,000 in place until Dec. 31, 2011, when all U.S. forces must be out of Iraq in accordance with a status-of-forces agreement negotiated last year between the Iraqi government and the Bush administration. Obama said yesterday that he intends to honor that agreement. Numerous Democrats criticized the plan. "I am deeply troubled by the suggestion that a force of 50,000 troops could remain in Iraq," said Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Calif. "This is unacceptable." "I question whether such a large force is needed to combat any al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq or whether it will contribute to stability in the region," said Sen. Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis.

Democrats question Obama’s plan for withdrawal

Johnson et al 9 (Mark, Ryan Teague Beckwith and Steven Thomma, writers, February 28, The Post and Courier,

<http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2009/feb/28/obamas_troop_withdrawal_plan_earns_cheer73390/> ) ELJ

The controversy centers on Obama's decision to leave a force of between 35,000 and 50,000 U.S. troops to train, equip and advise Iraqi forces, help protect withdrawing forces and work on counterterrorism. They'd remain until Dec. 31, 2011, the date the Bush administration agreed to withdraw all troops under a pact with Iraq. "I question whether such a large force is needed to combat any al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq or whether it will contribute to stability in the region," said Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis. "You cannot leave combat troops in a foreign country to conduct combat operations and call it the end of the war. You can't be in and out at the same time," said Rep. Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio.

Democrats Dislike the Current Plan

High democratic officials feel that Obama’s withdrawal plan is too much too late

Johnson et al 9 (Mark, Ryan Teague Beckwith and Steven Thomma, writers, February 28, The Post and Courier,

<http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2009/feb/28/obamas_troop_withdrawal_plan_earns_cheer73390/> ) ELJ

"We must responsibly end the war in Iraq to make America more secure, and must keep in Iraq only those forces necessary for the security of our remaining troops and the Iraqi people," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. "I look forward to further discussing this plan with the president and working with him to ensure we are doing what is best for America's security interests and ensuring our military remains the strongest fighting force in history." A day earlier, he told reporters that he didn't like the idea of keeping up to 50,000 troops in Iraq. "That's a little higher number than I had anticipated," he said Thursday. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., left open the door to getting more troops out of Iraq faster. "As President Obama's Iraq policy is implemented, the remaining missions given to our remaining forces must be clearly defined and narrowly focused so that the number of troops needed to perform them is as small as possible," she said.

Democrats Like the Current Plan

Democrats feel Obama’s withdrawal plan is logical

Baker 9 (Peter, writer, February 26, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html>) ELJ

The White House declined to respond directly to Democratic criticisms before Mr. Obama’s speech. “The president asked his — the national security team — to put together a plan that they and he believed would accomplish the goal of removing our combat forces from Iraq in the most responsible way,” said Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary. Senator Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat who accompanied Mr. Obama to Iraq last summer, said a remainder force of 50,000 was appropriate. “It seems logical to me you would need a force of around that level,” he said in an interview. “The critical issue here is the missions that these troops are going to perform.”

\*\*\*Oil Prices Disadvantage\*\*\*

Oil Prices DA – Withdrawal Link

Keeping troops in Iraq is key to Oil Production and refining

Nell and Semmler 4 ( Edward Nell, Macroeconomics Theory, Willi Semmler, Economics The New School, New York 2004,<http://www.constellationsjournal.org/Semmler-Nell.pdf>)

The long-term presence of a large body of US troops in Iraq, with new ports for the US fleet in the Gulf, could encourage the integration of oil production, refining, and shipping throughout the Gulf region. This will bring the small, westernized Gulf states together, along with Kuwait and southern Iraq, into a regional union, protected by the US. (The Kurdish regions of northern Iraq might break free and develop separately, but would also be protected by American and British bases.) The new confederation of Gulf oil producers would be solidly allied with the US and the West, and would provide an important buffer should the Saudi regime be deposed and its oil fall under the control of anti-Western activists.

Iraq’s Oil Reserves are underdeveloped because Iraqi attention is on the war on terror

Revenue Watch 9( Oil Org. , No Month Given 2009, <http://www.revenuewatch.org/about-rwi/staff-and-board>) JRG

Iraq has other mineral resources, including largely unexplored reserves of natural gas, phosphates and other minerals, but these are dwarfed by its oil wealth. Iraq's oil and gas reserves have been historically underdeveloped, both by the international companies who sought to keep output and prices under control, and then by Iraqi authorities who missed many opportunities due to political unrest, wars and sanctions.

**Withdraw of the U.S. military from Iraq will only worsen the War on Terror**

**FOX POLITICS 5**(**Fox News, November 2005,**

<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176156,00.html>) **JRG**

"I disagree with his position. An immediate withdrawal of our troops from Iraq will only strengthen the terrorists' hand in Iraq, and in the broader War on Terror. That's the goal of the enemy. They want to break our will in Iraq, so that we leave and they can turn Iraq into what Afghanistan was under the Taliban, a safe haven for terror, a place where they can plot and plan attacks against America and freedom-loving countries around the world," he added.

U.S. withdrawal is causing instability and ruin to potential oil trade

Clanton 9(Brett, Energy Specialist, July 2009, <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy/6535378.html>, ) JRG

But doubts remain about the ability of outside oil companies to work safely as U.S. troops withdraw in the coming year and upcoming parliamentary elections threaten more political instability.“As long as Iraq does not have a basic legal framework to really manage and regulate energy-related activities, it will remain extremely risky for any company to really go in completely reassured. We're just not there yet,” said Rochdi Younsi, director of Middle East and Africa for the Eurasia Group in Washington.

Oil Prices DA – Withdrawal Link

U.S. Withdraw could risk oil revenues

Knight 8,( Charles, June 2008, <http://www.merip.org/taskforceresponsiblewithdrawal.pdf>) **JRG**

Some have expressed concerns that US withdrawal from Iraq would be followed by an oil and land grab on the part of Iraq’s neighbors. Others worry that the civil conflict in Iraq will spill over its borders and embroil the entire region in war. But several factors weigh against such outcomes.12 For all of Iraq’s neighbors, the cost of occupying pieces of Iraq would be prohibitive. Moreover, all the neighboring countries share with the United States and the international community a strong interest in a stable, unified Iraq—though they may have different visions for what that means.

Oil Prices DA – Internals

The world’s most oil is in the middle east, if India wants to rise above poverty oil reserves are key

Nell and Semmler 4 ( Edward Nell, Macroeconomics Theory, Willi Semmler, Economics The New School, New York 2004,<http://www.constellationsjournal.org/Semmler-Nell.pdf>)

Two-thirds of proven oil reserves are in the Middle East. The supplies in the US, Mexico, and Venezuela, and less so Canada are expected to last only one-fifth as long as those in Middle East. If China and India, let alone the rest of the Third World, are to be brought up to a decent standard of living, consumption of fossil fuels will more than double.

Food companies around the world rely upon fossil fuels for food production

Church 5( Norman, Political Analyst , 2005, <http://www.321energy.com/editorials/church/church040205.html>**)**

The systems that produce the world's food supply are heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Vast amounts of oil and gas are used as raw materials and energy in the manufacture of fertilisers and pesticides, and as cheap and readily available energy at all stages of food production: from planting, irrigation, feeding and harvesting, through to processing, distribution and packaging. In addition, fossil fuels are essential in the construction and the repair of equipment and infrastructure needed to facilitate this industry, including farm machinery, processing facilities, storage, ships, trucks and roads. The industrial food supply system is one of the biggest consumers of fossil fuels and one of the greatest producers of greenhouse gases.

India is poverty stricken because of a lack of inexpensive food

Cozay 10(Foreign Nation Evalutions, 2010, Extreme Poverty and Hunger in India, <http://cozay.com/EXTREME-POVERTY-IN-INDIA.php>)

Despite the economic growth and outsourcing of foreign jobs by western companies to India, majority of the Indian population still wallow in extreme poverty and disease. Behind India’s new-found economic strength are three hundred million poor people that live on less than $1 per day. Government figures may indicate a reduction in poverty. But the truth is, with increasing global food prices, poverty is spreading everywhere like a swarm of locust. Conditions are worst in the rural areas where close to 70% of India’s population resides. Statistics show, that 2.1 million children under 5 years old die of malnutrition yearly.

Oil Prices DA – Terminal Impact

Poverty Stricken Indian women often resort to sex trafficking and prostitution to raise out of poverty

Hong 10(Rani, Sex Trafficking Rehiblitation Expert, June 2010, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rani-hong/human-trafficking-the-hum_b_613735.html>)

Since beginning my work in human trafficking, people often ask me about the root of such a problem. What is really at the bottom of the tragedy? How don't these victims realize they are being tricked? While trafficking has many causes, one common thread that runs through every larger issue within the web of its horror is poverty. For those in the developed world, poverty can mean something very different that those in the third world. In places such as Northeast India, poverty doesn't mean defaulting on a mortgage. It doesn't mean having a car break down and not having the funds to repair it. It doesn't mean not going out to dinner anymore…And desperation brought from this kind poverty leads to desperate choices. A woman such as this mother is a prime candidate for becoming target for traffickers. "I have work for you. It is a good job, you'll be able to earn money right away and pay doctors to take care of your daughter.

Sex Trafficking is dehumanizing

The Emancipation Network NO DATE( Fighting Sex Trafficking Organ. <http://www.tencharities.org/AboutSlavery>) JRG

Victims of human trafficking are subject to gross human rights violations including rape, torture, beatings, starvation, dehumanization, and threats of murdering family members. In the case of traffficking for sexual exploitation, girls often have their virginity sold first, followed by multiple gang rape to break down their resistance. Since the bodies of young girls are not ready for sexual intercourse, this often results in abrasions, making the girls susceptible to HIV/AIDS and other diseases

Dehumanization is worse than nuclear war

Montagu and Matson 83, (.Ashley and Floyd , Authors and Professor of American at the University of Hawaii, 1983, THE DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN, preface) JRG

It neither kills outright nor inflicts apparent physical harm, yet the extent of its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record - and its potential damage to the quality of human life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the 'Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.' Its more conventional name, of course, is dehumanization.

\*\*\*US-Sino Relations Disadvantage\*\*\*

US-Sino Relations DA - Exposition

Troops inevitably lower human rights conditions in countries they occupy

Vickers 10 (George, Director of International Operations at the OSI, Joint Force Quarterly, p. 2) SVK

Reflecting changes in national security strategy, the U.S. military has played a critical role in promoting democracy and human rights. While Cold War strategy was dominated by deterring communist expansion and nuclear war, the strategy of engagement and enlargement proclaimed by the Clinton administration stressed enhanced security, prosperity at home, and democracy abroad. Rooted in a belief that there is an affinity between democratic systems and free market economies, and that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other, this strategy aimed to ensure that regimes consolidate democratic institutions and increase respect for human rights. The incorporation of democracy and human rights as national security policy objectives has been accompanied by operational changes in the role and mission of the forces deployed in the hemisphere. Human rights training has been intensified and efforts to reform military justice in Latin America have been introduced. While these initiatives have lowered the decibel level between human rights advocates and the military, there is no consensus on their effectiveness. Two crucial dilemmas arise in attempting to harmonize such efforts with other objectives. First, training has met obstacles that limit its impact. The backgrounds of many militaries have afforded them considerable freedom from civilian control while portraying them as guarantors of the state. Moreover, a legacy of repression and dictatorship continues to polarize societies and inhibit civil-military relations. Another dilemma involves threats such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. In most mature democracies responsibility for dealing with such threats falls to civilian institutions. But in much of the hemisphere these challenges have overwhelmed new democratic governments, leading to a call for the military to play a central role. The democratic transition in many nations removed the armed forces from internal security operations; thus human rights organizations and democracy activists fear that proposed roles and missions will reinforce impunity and lead to a return to violations. The distinct historical and cultural contexts from which Latin American militaries have emerged make it difficult to transfer practices developed within the unique U.S. experience. The 1950s the U.S. Armed Forces have been provided with a modicum of training on the laws of war. Alleged abuses during the Vietnam War forced a reexamination of human rights training. After the investigation of the My Lai incident by the Peers Commission, a DOD directive issued in 1974 required all military personnel to receive training in the laws of war commensurate with their responsibilities. Moreover, exercises were modified to convey the laws of war requirements such as introducing civilians into battlefield scenarios. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) did not have guidance on training until 1990 when the Commander in Chief, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), General Maxwell Thurman, USA, issued a policy memo. It required all personnel to undergo awareness training, investigate and report alleged abuses, and influence host countries to obey internationally accepted norms. In addition, it prescribed responsibilities for unit commanders, military assistance groups, and SOUTHCOM staff elements. When General George Joulwan, USA, became CINCSOUTH, he supplemented the memo with a video presentation that unequivocally laid out responsibilities for reporting violations and emphasized that the command mission included human rights.

US-Sino Relations DA - Exposition

Human Rights in Iraq are low because of Military Involvement

Human Rights Watch 9(leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights, World Report Chapter: Iraq) SVK

Human rights conditions in Iraq remain extremely poor, especially for displaced persons, religious and ethnic minorities, and vulnerable groups such as women and girls, and men suspected of homosexual conduct. Iraq marked the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of United States combat forces from its towns and cities with parades and a national holiday. In the subsequent weeks, violence shook the country as extremists launched multiple attacks in several locations. Serious tensions between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi central and provincial governments continued over control of territories lying between the mainly Kurdish- and Arab-inhabited areas in northern Iraq. Escalating conflict there worsened the human rights situation of non-Kurdish and non-Arab minority groups living in these contested areas. Political Developments In January 2009, 14 of Iraq's 18 governorates held provincial elections (the three governorates comprising the Kurdistan region had their elections in July; no elections were held in the disputed Kirkuk governorate). The participation of more political parties, in particular Sunni Arab parties, resulted in a dramatic change of power in areas where Sunni Arabs had boycotted the 2005 elections, notably in Nineveh governorate. Overall, the election results reflected sectarian divisions. On June 24, 2009, the Kurdistan National Assembly (the regional parliament) passed a draft regional constitution that laid claim to disputed areas, provoking outrage from central government leaders. The KRG insists, in the face of central and provincial government recalcitrance, that the referendum mandated by article 140 of Iraq's 2005 constitution finally be held (the constitutional deadline was December 31, 2007), confident that the referendum would endorse the incorporation of the disputed areas into the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. Iraqi security forces in July 2009 raided Camp Ashraf, an area controlled for over two decades by several thousand members of an Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. The raid, in which the government tried to assert its authority by establishing a police station inside the camp, resulted in the deaths of 11 Camp Ashraf residents, some by gunfire, and dozens injured. The government said it would conduct an investigation into the incident, but as of mid-November it had provided no information about the progress of any investigation or its results. In November Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international treaty that prohibits the use, production, and transfer of cluster bombs. Attacks on Civilians and Displacement Civilians remained the targets of attacks across the country. In the first six weeks following the June 30 withdrawal of US forces from cities to their bases, coordinated bombings and other violence killed more than 700 Iraqis, mainly Shia. On August 19, coordinated truck bombs outside the foreign and finance ministries in Baghdad killed nearly 100 people and wounded more than 600. On October 25, two vehicle bombs, driven by suicide bombers, destroyed three major government buildings, including the Ministry of Justice. That attack, the country's deadliest in more than two years, killed more than 155 people and wounded over 500. Sunni Arab insurgents appeared to have been responsible for these and other attacks, such as the January and April 2009 bombings of Baghdad's Kadhimiyya mosque, a major Shia place of worship, killing more than 100 people. The perpetrators also targeted groups of Shia refugees waiting for food rations, children gathering for handouts of candy, religious pilgrimages, weddings, funerals, mosques, and hospitals in Shia areas. Sunni leaders forcefully condemned such attacks, and Shia militias refrained from engaging in widespread reprisal attacks. Displacement caused by sectarian violence continued, but economic pressures and difficulties maintaining legal status in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt induced some refugees to return. The government remained without a workable plan for the return of Iraqis displaced internally or who had fled to neighboring countries, according to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In Baghdad returnees were seldom able to reclaim their former homes. In rural communities many returnees found their houses destroyed or in complete disrepair, and they lacked access to income and basic services including, water, electricity, and healthcare. With the resurgence of attacks in the latter half of 2009, some returnees reportedly found themselves forcibly displaced again. People mostly returned to neighborhoods or districts under the control of members of their sect; very few families returned to former home areas where they would be in a minority. Detention Conditions and Torture Reports continued of widespread torture and other abuse of detainees in detention facilities run by Iraq's defense and interior ministries and police. Government-run detention facilities struggled to accommodate almost 30,000 detainees, and serious delays in the judicial review of detention exacerbated overcrowding: Some detainees have spent years in custody without charge or trial. The situation worsened in 2009 as the US military transferred detainees to Iraqi custody (more than 1,200 in the first nine months) under the 2008 US-Iraqi security agreement. The US military's remaining detainee population stood at under 9,000 as of September 2009, from a peak of approximately 26,000 in late 2007. In June 2009 Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki set up an eight-member special committee, composed of representatives from the government's security ministries as well as human rights and judicial agencies, to investigate allegations of widespread abuse and torture in Iraq's prisons. As of mid-November the government had provided no information about the progress of any investigation or its results.

US-Sino Relations DA - Link

Withdrawal from Iraq would essentially increase human rights

Bennis 9 (Phyllis, Fellow at the IPS, IPS-DC, *Foreign Policy in Focus* 2009

http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117) SVK

Mercenaries and Contractors Ending the U.S. occupation means ending all U.S. funding for the giant contractors — Dyncorp, Bechtel, Blackwater — that serve as out-sourced private unaccountable components of the U.S. military. The contractor companies — and the mercenaries they hire — were part of what led to Abu Ghraib. (Blackwater's recent name change to "Xe" should not allow its role in killing Iraqi civilians to be forgotten.) Even as some troops may be withdrawn, we will need to mobilize for congressional hearings, independent investigations, and more on the human rights violations and misuse of taxpayer funds by the war profiteers who run these companies. President Obama's decision to close the Guantanamo prison shows his awareness of severity of the crimes committed there. Ending the funding of the contractors who carried out so many of those crimes should be a logical next step. U.S. Military Bases We've heard how long it will likely take to evacuate each of the 50+ U.S. military bases in Iraq (6 weeks for the small ones, 18 months for the biggest) but we haven't heard any indication, let alone a promise, that they will actually be turned over to the Iraqis. The issue of bases places Iraq at the centerpiece of the broad global movement challenging the network of U.S. military bases all over the world. Opposition to the impact of those bases — environmental, social and women's rights, economic and more — is rising in countries as diverse as Korea, Italy, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan and more. In fact in some countries governments are joining with civil society to reject Washington's global crusade. Kyrgyzstan decided to close the U.S. air base there, indicating they prefer Russian bribes to U.S. warplanes. (That decision may present the Obama administration with the unsavory prospect of renewing the U.S. alliance with Uzbekistan, whose government is characterized by some of the most egregious human rights violations in the world.) Ecuador has recently passed a new constitution prohibiting the presence of foreign military bases on their soil, and is in the process of ending its hosting of the U.S. airbase at Manta. As the Obama administration seeks new ways to cut military spending, closing the 50+ Iraqi bases, particularly the five mega-bases becomes an urgent necessity. And the giant embassy-on-steroids that the Bush administration built to house up to 5,000 U.S. diplomats and officials should be closed down as a relic of an illegal war launched to maintain control of the country, people and resources of Iraq.

US-Sino Relations DA – Internal Link

US-China relations high now – human rights kills them – low relations threaten world peace.

Ching 9 (Frank, Hong Kong-based journalist and commentator, 11/26/09 (“U.S.-China relations shifting,” The Japan Times, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20091126fc.html) SVK

Observers analyzing the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to China, not unnaturally, looked for signs of a shift in the world balance of power — and they found them. For one thing, the American leader was noticeably respectful of his Chinese hosts and did not attempt to lecture them, at least not in public and probably not in private as well. And the Chinese side finally got what it had wanted for 30 years — being treated as an equal by the United States. Of course, the shift in the balance of power does not mean that China is going to replace the U.S. as a global hegemon. It does mean, however, that China will play a much bigger role in world affairs. During the Bush administration, Beijing was told that it had to learn to be a responsible stakeholder. Now, it is learning that it has to pay a price for a bigger voice in world affairs — the assumption of additional responsibilities. Power and responsibility go together. A joint statement issued by the two countries shows the extent to which they now share a common world view. They reviewed global issues from the Middle East to South Asia, from the global economic recovery to climate change. Each acknowledged the right, indeed the responsibility, of the other to deal with global issues. "The two sides noted that, at a time when the international environment is undergoing complex and profound changes, the U.S. and China share a responsibility to cooperatively address regional and global security challenges," they said. In the joint statement, the U.S. "welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs," addressing China's concerns of American attempts to frustrate its rise. On its part, China declared that it "welcomes the U.S. as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region," thus ameliorating American fears that a rising China would attempt to squeeze it out of the region. In this emerging world order, both the U.S. and China will have to make adjustments. Washington, known for its predilections for unilateralism, will have to pay greater heed to the interests of China and other countries. And China will have to play a global leadership role to which it is unaccustomed. The late leader Deng Xiaoping warned his successors to keep a low profile and never take the lead, and China largely hewed to this course over the last two decades. But as the country has grown to become the world's third-largest economy — soon to become the second-largest after overtaking Japan — it will have to come to terms with an unaccustomed new role. In this new role, it will be difficult for China to be a follower in the international community, going along with majority views. Indeed, China will have to moderate its oft-stated policy of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs. This is implied in the joint statement, where the two countries agree that they "share increasingly important common responsibilities of major issues concerning global stability and prosperity" and agree to "work together to tackle challenges, and promote world peace, security and prosperity." America's and China's interests are now so intertwined that each acknowledges the right of the other to be involved in its economic affairs since what one country does will affect the other. Thus, to reassure China that its investments are safe, the U.S. promised to "take measures to increase national saving as a share of GDP and promote sustainable noninflationary growth" and return the "federal budget deficit to a sustainable path and pursuing measures to encourage private saving." And China promised to "continue to implement the policies to adjust economic structure, raise household incomes, expand domestic demand to increase contribution of consumption to GDP growth and reform its social security system." So what we have now is a framework for a bilateral relationship in which each sees the other as a partner. What remains now is to build political trust, which is clearly still lacking. While both countries say they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship in the 21st century, old problems such as Taiwan, Tibet and human rights are as intractable as ever while new problems are bound to emerge. It will not be easy for this new partnership to work. But if it doesn't, then the outlook for the resolution of world issues in the 21st century will be bleak.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

Strong US-Sino relations check Indo-Pak, Korean, and China-Taiwan nuclear war.

Conable and Lampton 93, (Barber B. Conable Jr., Chair of Nat’l Committee on US-China Relations; David M. Lampton, President of Nat’l Committee on US-China Relations (“China: The Coming Power, A Troubled Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, Dec 1992/Jan 1993) SVK

Regionally American interests are both numerous and important. The two most protracted, economically distracting and politically explosive American military commitments in the post-World War II era were Korea and Vietnam. In both cases China figured prominently. The lesson is that regional stability requires workable U.S.-China relations. Competition between Beijing and Washington takes the form of exploiting indigenous regional conflicts by both powers, resulting in local problems that expand to suck both countries into a self-defeating vortex. The most serious threats to American security and economic interests in Asia include armed conflict with nuclear potential between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan; a deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei that could lead to economic or military conflict; a re-ignition of the Cambodian conflict; and a botched transition to Beijing's sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997. None of these problems can be handled effectively without substantial Sino- American cooperation. Constructive relations with Beijing will not assure P.R.C. cooperation in all cases; needlessly bad relations will nearly ensure conflict. The Republic of Korea's formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing last August, at the expense of Taipei, is just one indication of the increasing importance the region attaches to building positive ties to the P.R.C. In Cambodia, although there is not certainty that the 1991 peace agreement to have free and open elections in 1993 will be successful, progress to date could not have occurred without China's cooperation. Further, Beijing's somewhat improved relationship with Hanoi has made progress in Cambodia more likely. It has further reduced the level of conflict in the region to the point where in 1991 Washington was able to contemplate eventual normalization of relations with Hanoi. To China's southwest, Beijing is seeking to improve relations with New Delhi while maintaining its traditionally warm ties to Islamabad. China's apparent nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and recurring reports of pending and/or actual missile technology sales to Islamabad are contrary to the U.S. interests and are regionally destabilizing. Nonetheless closer Sino-Indian relations are a trend very much in the U.S. interest. In the Taiwan Strait relations between Taipei and Beijing have their own dynamic and are not under Washington's control. Indeed Beijing-Taipei relations easily could become one of the most serious problems in Sino-American relations. Recent Chinese protest over Washington's decision to sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan is just one indication of the conflict, contradictions and policy dilemmas that lie just below the surface. The P.R.C.'s incentive to continue a policy of moderation toward Taiwan would be greatly lessened by a deterioration of its relations with the United States. Worsening China-Taiwan relations would also adversely affect U.S. interests. First, many of Taiwan's firms -- with $ 3 billion plus investments in the mainland -- are exporting to the United States. If the American market dries up for Chinese exports some of Taiwan's investment in the P.R.C. will also vanish. Second, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act charges the U.S. president with assuring that America helps maintain Taiwan's capacity to defend itself. If U.S.-P.R.C. relations deteriorate one can expect more mainland hostility toward Taiwan, which will exacerbate the dilemmas facing Washington.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

Maintaining close relations key to prevent US-China war over Taiwan.

Nye 8, Joseph S., Harvard Prof, IR expert, 1/20/08 (“Fear Factor in US-China Relations,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2008/01/137\_17603.html) SVK

Opinion polls indicate that one-third of Americans believe that China will ``soon dominate the world," while nearly half view China's emergence as a ``threat to world peace." In turn, many Chinese fear that the United States will not accept their ``peaceful rise." Americans and Chinese must avoid such exaggerated fears. Maintaining good U.S.-China relations will be a key determinant of global stability in this century. Perhaps the greatest threat to the bilateral relationship is the belief that conflict is inevitable. Throughout history, whenever a rising power creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of conflict. In such circumstances, seemingly small events can trigger an unforeseen and disastrous chain reaction. Today, the greatest prospect of a destabilizing incident lies in the complex relationships across the Taiwan Strait. China, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of its territory that has sheltered behind the U.S. navy since the days of the Chinese civil war, vows that any Taiwanese declaration of independence will be met by force. The U.S. does not challenge China's sovereignty, but it wants a peaceful settlement that will maintain Taiwan's democratic institutions. In Taiwan itself, there is a growing sense of national identity, but a sharp division between pragmatists of the ``pan-blue alliance," who realize that geography will require them to find a compromise with the mainland, and the ruling ``pan-green alliance," which aspires in varying degrees to achieve independence. The two sides in Taiwan will face off in a presidential election on March 22. Current polls suggest that former Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) leads Frank Hsieh of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). But some observers fear that the incumbent DPP President Chen Shui-bian will seek a pretext to prevent a defeat for the pro-sovereignty camp. He is currently advocating a referendum on whether Taiwan should join the United Nations, which China views as provocative. Chen replies that it is China ``that is acting provocatively today." America is clearly concerned. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a news conference that ``we think that Taiwan's referendum to apply to the U.N. under the name 'Taiwan' is a provocative policy. It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage." She also reiterated the administration policy opposing ``unilateral threat by either side to change the status quo." The same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized China for unexpectedly curtailing American ship visits to Chinese ports because of American arms sales to Taiwan. According to Gates, he had told Chinese officials that American arms sales were consistent with past policy and that ``as long as they continued to build up their forces on their side of the Taiwan Strait, we would continue to give Taiwan the resources necessary to defend itself." Gates added, however, that despite China's rising defense budget, "I don't consider China an enemy, and I think there are opportunities for continued cooperation in a number of areas." In principle, the Taiwan issue need not lead to conflict. With increasing change in China and growing economic and social contacts across the strait, it should be possible to find a formula that allows the Taiwanese to maintain their market economy and democratic system without a placard at the U.N. Thus far, the U.S. has tried to allow for this evolution by stressing two bright lines: no independence for Taiwan and no use of force by China. But, given the danger of incidents that could grow out of political competition in Taiwan or growing impatience in the Peoples' Liberation Army on the mainland, the U.S. would be wise to encourage more active contacts and negotiations by the two sides. The U.S. has a broad national interest in maintaining good relations with China, as well as a specific human rights interest in protecting Taiwan's democracy. The U.S. does not have a national interest in helping Taiwan become a sovereign country with a seat at the U.N., and efforts by some Taiwanese to do so present the greatest danger of a miscalculation that could create enmity between the U.S. and China. Already, some Chinese suspect the U.S. of seeking an independent Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for use against a future Chinese enemy. They are wrong, but such suspicions can feed a climate of enmity. If America treats China as an enemy today, it will ensure future enmity. While we cannot be sure how China will evolve, it makes no sense to foreclose the prospect of a better future. America's current policy combines economic integration with a hedge against future uncertainty. The U.S.-Japan security alliance means China cannot play a "Japan card." But, while such hedging is natural in world politics, modesty is important for both sides. If the overall climate is one of distrust, what looks like a hedge to one side can look like a threat to the other. There is no need for the U.S. and China to go to war in this century. Both sides must take care that an incident concerning Taiwan does not lead in that direction. Americans and Chinese must avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact Extinction

US-China war causes extinction.

Straits Times 0, 6/25/00 (“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” ) SVK

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

US-China relations key to US-Japan relations.

Yunling 0, Zhang, Prof of Int’l Economics, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1/21/00 (“Changing Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relations,” http://iaps.cass.cn/english/articles/showcontent.asp?id=381) SVK

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US-Japan alliance deters Korean war.

Okamoto 2, Yukio, Chairman, Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, Spring 2002 (“Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf, pg. 69) SVK

Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society, the DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of the people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of artillery—some of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheads—awaiting the signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRK’s immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan’s western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000 U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul. Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces at the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.

Korean war goes nuclear – extinction.

Chol 2, Kim Myong Chol, 2002 (“The Agreed Framework is Brain Dead, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A\_Chol.html) SVK

The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

US-China relations key to global economic stability and kills EU leadership

Hirsh 9 (Michael, contributes to Newsweek, international affairs expert, various prestigious journalism awards, “U.S.-China Relationship Is Good for the World,” Newsweek, http://mobile.newsweek.com/detail.jsp?key=82433&rc=bu&p=0&all=1) SVK

Since the end of the Cold War, big strategic thinkers have been longing for an enemy worthy of their big strategic brains. Many have tried hard to turn China into one. In the late '90s, Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's near-legendary chief of "net assessment" and the last of the Truman-era Cold Warriors, directed a study that called for a wholesale reallocation of military assets away from Europe and toward Asia. In the view of Pentagon planners, the new Fulda Gap-the region where Soviet troops were poised to invade Western Europe during the Cold War-would be the South China Sea, a key "chokepoint" that the Chinese might some day seek to control. The prominent realist scholar John Mearsheimer argued that if China continued "modernizing at a rapid pace," it "would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the western hemisphere during the nineteenth century." His potted prescription: America should not only withdraw from engagement but slow down China's growth. (). The debate, fortunately, has moved somewhat beyond those simplistic, stuck-in-the-last-war views of the U.S.-China relationship. But it hasn't moved far enough. Today's grand strategic critiques tend to focus on economics-the staggering imbalances between China's capital surpluses and America's deficits-while still using Cold War terminology. That's why, in 2004, Larry Summers, then president of Harvard, described the relationship between America and China and Japan, the largest holders of U.S. debt, as "a kind of balance of financial terror." New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, in the latest iteration of this approach, urged President Obama to talk tough to Beijing about currency during his first visit to China this week in order to avoid "a potentially ugly confrontation." Krugman said the Chinese were deliberately keeping their currency weak as part of a strategy of "beggar-thy-neighbor devaluation" that would allow China to maintain its export might. Beijing's aim is to appease its own population with continued high economic growth while doing nothing to help ease America's double-digit unemployment, and that's a "dangerous game," Krugman warned. Is it? China's game of cheating at the margins of the system by playing with its currency misses a much bigger point. Step back a moment. The larger story that has unfolded in the year since the biggest economic disaster since the Depression-an era that led to near-total breakdown and world war-is just how intact the international system remains. "We've never had a situation where we've been at such risk but at the same time the major powers have acted so responsibly as adults," says Richard Medley, who was formerly chief political adviser at Soros Fund Management and chief economist for the House Banking Committee and now manages successful hedge funds. "I'm very impressed by the Chinese, by the Americans, by the British, and even a few of the Europeans." Trade has dropped precipitously but not broken down. There is no great surge of protectionism, or virulent nationalism. On the contrary, a cautious and polite debate is taking place about reforming the global financial system (too cautious, in fact, many critics say). Most of all, Medley says, the main motor of the world economy and global system-the "G2," America and China-is a continuing source of stability. "The G2 is evolving and both sides are doing an adult job of letting it evolve," he says. So much so that the third great source of world growth, the European Union, is getting a bit jealous. In the latest of a never-ending series of calls for an always-fractious Europe to unite itself, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband warned late last month that the EU risked becoming "spectators in a G2 world shaped by the U.S. and China." A few weeks later, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini also admonished his fellow continentals: "If we do not find a common foreign policy, there is the risk that Europe will become irrelevant ... We will be bypassed by the G2 of America and China, which is to say the Pacific axis, and the Atlantic axis will be forgotten."

European leadership undermines hegemony.

Brzezinski 4, Zbigniew, Nat’l Security Advisor to Carter, Prof, American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins (“The Choice: Global Leadership or Global Domination, pg. 91) SVK

A politically powerful Europe, able to compete economically while militarily no longer dependent on the United States, would inevitably contest American preeminence in two regions that are strategically vital to America: the Middle East and Latin America. The rivalry would be felt first in the Middle East, given not only its geographic proximity to Europe, but especially Europe's greater dependence on its oil. Given Arab resentment of U.S. policies, European overtures would find a sympathetic reception ",while Israel would stand to lose the privileged position it has enjoyed as America's favored client state. A European challenge in Latin America 'would likely come next. The Spaniards, Portuguese, and French have long-standing historical and cultural connections with Latin American societies. Latin American nationalism would be quite responsive to intensified political, economic, and cultural ties with an assertive Europe, whim would diminish the traditional U.S. domination of the region. Thus a Europe that became simultaneously an economic giant: and a militarily serious power could confine the scope of U.S. preeminence largely to the Pacific Ocean.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

Leadership solves democracy, proliferation, and nuclear war

Khalilzad 95, Zalmay, Spring 1995 (Washington Quarterly, LN) SVK

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Strong US-China relations solves terrorism.

Wang 1, Hui, President of First China Capital, RAND consultant (“U.S.-China: Bonds and Tensions,” pg. 265)

The United States and China also share an interest in limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. For many years, the United States has been combating Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, whose anti-U.S. activities range from kidnapping to embassy bombing. Recently, China has become more concerned with its own terrorist related problems, having suffered bombings on city buses and in busy shopping areas in cities of Xingjiang and other areas. Some of these terrorists have been trained in traditionally anti-U.S. and anti-West terrorist camps in central and southwest Asia. Although China has traditionally had good relations with Muslim countries, it has become more alarmed by the destructive activities of Islamic fundamentalists. When U.S.-China relations are stable, the United States may find China more willing to cooperate in limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, given China’s recent terrorist experiences.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact Terrorism

Terrorism triggers full-scale nuclear war – hair-trigger response systems.

Morgan 9, Dennis Ray, Hankuk U of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus – South Korea, Dec 2009 (“World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Futures, Vol. 41, Iss. 10, pg. 683-93) SVK

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities   In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors”  In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.  In “Scenarios,” Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons.

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

US-China relations key to US-Japan relations.

Yunling 0, Zhang, Prof of Int’l Economics, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1/21/00 (“Changing Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relations,” http://iaps.cass.cn/english/articles/showcontent.asp?id=381) SVK

These three pairs of relationships interact. Developments in Sino-U.S. relations directly bear upon Sino- Japanese relations. Strong Sino-U.S. relations bode well for Sino-Japanese relations. China can advance Sino-Japanese relations through improving Sino-U.S. relations. In contrast, when Sino-U.S. relations worsen, China may try to improve Sino-Japanese relations to ease the pressure from bad Sino-U.S. relations. Japan would then be faced with difficult choice: it may, in deference to the U.S., maintain a tough attitude toward China, but this risks a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. China and Japan are close neighbors with increasingly important economic relations. Japan may instead decide to lean towards China, exerting pressure upon the U.S. Such a decision, however, would likely meet with U.S. hostility.

US-Japan alliance key to preventing Middle East war.

Okamoto 2, Yukio, Chairman, Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, Spring 2002 (“Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf) SVK

Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential intermediary between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japan’s close relations with Arab governments, Muslim oil-producing states, and the nations of Central Asia; its relatively more flexible stance on human rights policies; and the absence of a strong tie to Israel. Japan can contribute to a U.S.-Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an inconsistent U.S. commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the industrialized world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also needs to explain its reluctance to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights standards as those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.

Mideast war goes nuclear.

Steinbach ’02, John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, Mar 2002 (http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm) SVK

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).

US-Sino Relations DA – Impact War

US-China relations key to US-Japan relations.

Yunling 0, Zhang, Prof of Int’l Economics, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1/21/00 (“Changing Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relations,” http://iaps.cass.cn/english/articles/showcontent.asp?id=381) SVK

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US-Japan alliance key to prevent war over the Spratly islands.

Okamoto 2, Yukio, Chairman, Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, Spring 2002 (“Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf) SVK

The Japan-U.S. alliance also probably serves as a deterrent against any one nation seizing control of the Spratly Islands and, by extension, the sea lanes and resources of the South China Sea. Formally, the area is outside the Far East region that the United States and Japan agree is covered by Article 6 of the security treaty. For the countries vying for control of the sea, however, the proximity of two of the world’s great maritime forces must at least urge them to use caution as they pursue their competition.

Spratly conflict goes nuclear

Nikkei 95, The Nikkei Weekly, 7/3/95 (“Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being subjected to trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad,”) SVK

Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being subjected to trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. He dismisses an argument put forward by some industrialized countries that fair trade can be realized when trading conditions are the same for all countries. It is not fair when small developing countries are obliged to compete with Japan and the U.S. under the same conditions, the outspoken champion of Asian interests insists. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum originated as a loose discussion platform. But it has become an institution, and agendas are prepared ahead of meetings. However, Mahathir is dissatisfied with its management, because, he says, group policy is decided by a handful of leading nations. He is also resentful of some countries' opposition to the Malaysian-proposed East-Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), aimed at promoting economic cooperation in the region. The EAEC, which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defines as a part of APEC, doesn't stand in opposition to APEC, he says. "The EAEC and APEC can coexist," he says. The EAEC is just a conference, not a trade bloc like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF-TA), he adds. Mahathir has gone to some lengths to bring Japan on board. Without the world's No. 2 economy, the EAEC will not be taken seriously by the international community, he says. Some have suggested also sending out invitations to Australia and New Zealand. But in order to join the EAEC, those two nations should not only just call themselves Asian countries, he says. They should also share values and culture with their Asian partners, he stresses, because the caucus is a group of Asian countries. Mahathir strongly opposes the use of weapons to settle international disputes. The prime minister hails the ASEAN Regional Forum as a means for civilized nations of achieving negotiated settlement of disputes. Many members of the forum, including Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand, have problems with their neighbors, but they are trying to solve them through continued dialogue, he adds. Three scenarios Mahathir sees Asia developing in three possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.

\*\*\*Impact Take-Out\*\*\*

No Chance of Nuclear Escalation

Despite predictions of nuclear terrorisms there have been zero instances of Nuclear Terrorism

Krepon 9 (Michael, Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia, “The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn't,” Foreign Affairs Volume: 88, Issue: 3 May/June 2009, ACW)

At the height of the Cold War, almost no one was bold enough or foolish enough to predict the Soviet Union's collapse, let alone without the eruption of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. One of the few who prophesied its demise, George Kennan, was deeply worried about a nuclear cataclysm. Kennan, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and the father of containment policy, warned repeatedly that unwise U.S. nuclear policies could lead to Armageddon. The Cold War is now history, but warnings of an impending nuclear catastrophe are still very much alive. Anxieties today stem not from the threat of a surprise Soviet missile attack but from the fear of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and terrorist groups seeking to carry out catastrophic attacks against soft targets in the United States. And yet, not a single death has occurred as a result of nuclear terrorism. Since 9/11, there have been more than 36,000 terrorist attacks, resulting in approximately 57,000 fatalities and 99,000 casualties. A terrible, mass-casualty attack using nuclear or biological weapons could occur at any time, and much more can be done to keep the United States safe. As the attacks that have occurred have repeatedly demonstrated, terrorists do not need weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cause grievous harm; they can do so using hijacked airplanes, fertilizer, automatic weapons, and grenades. But the situation is far from bleak. It is not easy for terrorist groups to acquire the skills and materials necessary to construct a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, Washington and Moscow have reduced their nuclear arsenals by 34,000 weapons over the past two decades, nuclear testing is now rare, the list of countries with worrisome nuclear programs is very short by historical standards, and the permanent members of the UN Security Council now have less to fight about -- and more reasons to cooperate in preventing worst-case scenarios from occurring.

Oil Dependence Turns Case

Reducing Oil Consumption Key to Middle East foreign policy

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

The dependence of the U.S. economy on oil is a key reason that the United States worries so much about the problems of the Middle East in the first place, and U.S. oil consumption also helps extremists in Iran and elsewhere. Had gasoline prices remained high, many Americans may well have changed their habits. But now that oil prices have declined dramatically, so will the perceived urgency of the problem; the Obama administration will therefore need to redouble efforts to increase energy efficiency, reduce consumption, and promote alternative energy sources. These policies would further diminish the demand for oil, slow the pace of climate change, and reduce the transfer of wealth to countries such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. It is no coincidence that when the price of oil was $10 a barrel, in the 1990s, Iran's leaders were far more circumspect in their activities abroad than they have been in this decade of high prices. Now that oil prices have dropped again, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will no longer be able to fund foreign adventures while avoiding the domestic political consequences of his mismanagement of the Iranian economy. The lesson is clear: reducing oil consumption can alter the strategic environment in the Middle East; energy policy is foreign policy.

\*\*\*Other\*\*\*

US Will go Nuclear

The US is not afraid to use nuclear weapons against Iraq.

Arkin 3 (William, American political commentator, activist, journalist, blogger, and former United States Army soldier, *Los Angeles Times*, January 26th, 2003, <http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0126-01.htm>) NK

One year after President Bush labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea the "axis of evil," the United States is thinking about the unthinkable: It is preparing for the possible use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. At the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha and inside planning cells of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, target lists are being scrutinized, options are being pondered and procedures are being tested to give nuclear armaments a role in the new U.S. doctrine of "preemption." According to multiple sources close to the process, the current planning focuses on two possible roles for nuclear weapons: attacking Iraqi facilities located so deep underground that they might be impervious to conventional explosives; thwarting Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons have, since they were first created, been part of the arsenal discussed by war planners. But the Bush administration's decision to actively plan for possible preemptive use of such weapons, especially as so-called bunker busters, against Iraq represents a significant lowering of the nuclear threshold. It rewrites the ground rules of nuclear combat in the name of fighting terrorism. It also moves nuclear weapons out of their long-established special category and lumps them in with all the other military options -- from psychological warfare, covert operations and Special Forces to air power in all its other forms. For the United States to lower the nuclear threshold and break down the firewall separating nuclear weapons from everything else is unsettling for at least three reasons.

Withdrawal 🡪 Redeployment

To adapt to changing al-Qaida, Iraq troops will go to Afghanistan

Witcover 10 ([Jules, Writer,](http://staugustine.com/authors/jules-witcover) June 8, StAugustine.com, <http://staugustine.com/opinions/2010-06-08/witcover-sticking-iraq-withdrawal-timetable>) ELJ

"We are at war against al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates," he reiterated. "That is why the President is responsibly ending the war in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, and why he has refocused our efforts on Afghanistan, where al-Qaida continues to plot from the tribal regions along the border with Pakistan and inside of Pakistan." Brennan continued: "We have a clear mission. We will not simply degrade al-Qaida's capabilities or simply prevent terrorist attacks against our country or citizens. We will not merely respond after the fact -- after an attack has been attempted. Instead, the United States will disrupt, dismantle and ensure a lasting defeat of al-Qaida and violent extremist affiliates." At the same time, Brennan said the Obama administration will be employing a more discriminating strategy against changing terrorist tactics that have moved from large-scale model of the 9/11 attacks to individual acts seen in the Christmas Day and more recent Times Square incidents. "As our enemy adapts and evolves their tactics," he said, "so must we constantly adapt and evolve ours, not in a mad rush driven by fear but in a thoughtful and reasoned way that enhances our security and further delegitimizes the actions of our enemy."

Troops Key – Civil War

Troops are key to stop tensions that could escalate to civil war

Cocks 9 (Tim, writer, Reuters, February 27,

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/-/1068/538242/-/sfuqs3/-/index.html) ELJ

But Gen Ray Odierno, the US commander in Iraq, and Gen David Petraeus, the head of the US Central Command that oversees military operations in the Middle East, have cautioned that Iraq remains fragile and security gains over the past year can be reversed if US forces withdraw too quickly. Favoured timeline They favour a 23-month timeline, according to one official. In northern Iraq’s troubled Nineveh province, al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab insurgent groups still frequently kill, kidnap and bomb, while rising tensions between the central government and the largely autonomous Kurdish region over disputed land and oil will need US diplomatic muscle, analysts say. American officials say they have often acted as brokers to defuse knife-edge tensions between Kurds and Arabs.

Troops key – Iran/Maintain Gains

Troops are key to maintain our gains in Iraq and stop Iran from filling in a power vacuum

Hemeid 10 (Salah, writer, Al-Ahram weekly, June 9, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1001/re51.htm>) ELJ

As the deadline for the start of the US troop withdrawal nears, the government turmoil, already rattling Iraq's fragile political system, has begun to cast a shadow over US plans. About 94,000 US troops are presently in the country, and under the Iraqi-US agreement the last are to leave by the end of next year. Although Iraqi politicians publicly say they will adhere to the agreement, it is still not clear whether rival Iraqi groups want the US to stay or to leave before they settle their disagreements. Many Iraqis are worried that Iran and other neighbouring countries will try to fill a power vacuum in the country and control its fate after the US leaves. There are also signs that American officials in Iraq may not see eye to eye on the withdrawal schedule. With the end of the US's seven-year military mission in Iraq drawing closer, American military commanders are expressing concerns about a political vacuum in the country that could undermine security gains. The commanders' main concern is that the political impasse is raising obstacles to the transition they had hoped would facilitate withdrawal plans. They have suggested that the crisis has complicated planning, because they must now wait until a new government has been formed before Iraqi ministries assume control of most programmes.

Troops key – Kurdish/Arab civil war

US presence is key – stops Kurdish – Arab war

Daily Mail 9 (July 29 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1203012/U-S-troops-leave-Iraq-early--fears-Arab-Kurdish-conflict-remain.html>) ELJ

Under the current plan, the United States would draw down from 14 brigades to 12 this year. After the January election, the withdrawal pace would quicken, leaving about 50,000 forces in Iraq by September 2010. Violence is at an ebb in Iraq, and Odierno said yesterday that he has been pleasantly surprised at how few problems have arisen following a June 30 handover of control of Iraqi cities. American military commanders say friction between Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq is the greatest threat to security in the country, overtaking the old Sunni-Shiite divide that threatened to push Iraq into civil war three years ago. The relatively affluent, peaceful Kurdish North is feuding with al-Maliki's government over its borders and resources. Gates met with Barzani, who claimed victory in a re-election vote last weekend that also saw large gains by an opposition slate, in Irbil, seat of the regional government. Morrell said the U.S. military has advisers already serving as go-betweens for the Kurdish militia and Iraq's armed forces. Gates told Barzani that the U.S. backs a set of United Nations recommendations to resolve some of the major disputes. Morrell would not characterize Barzani's response, except to say that Gates left the meeting 'with the sense, just as he did in Baghdad, that the Kurds very much want to take advantage of our presence.' Odierno identified the tension in northern Iraq as the 'No. 1 driver of instability.' So far, American intermediaries are helping keep a lid on things, Odierno said. The Kurds have been locked in a dispute with Baghdad over control of oil resources and a fault line of contested territory in northern Iraq, particularly the flash-point city of Kirkuk. The disagreements have stalled a national oil law considered vital to encouraging foreign investment. U.S. officials have warned that Arab-Kurdish tensions could erupt into a new front in the Iraq conflict and jeopardize security gains elsewhere.

AT – Iraq Hates the US

Iraqi’s want US presence – they understand that the US provides stability

Guardiano 10 (John, writer, News Real Blog, March 31, <http://www.newsrealblog.com/2010/03/31/experts-wrong-soldiers-right-about-iraq/>) ELJ

Here’s something else the “experts” have been wrong about: the continuing need for U.S. troops in Iraq and the greater Middle East. The “experts” say that America must withdraw from Iraq and leave Iraq to the Iraqis. And in fact, all U.S. troops are scheduled to be out of the country by the end of 2011. President Obama himself, moreover, remains committed to this objective. The president is wrong. Leaving Iraq would be a serious mistake. Our presence there is a stabilizing influence which helps to preserve peace and stability, while deterring America’s enemies throughout the greater Middle East. Of course the United States should not impose itself in a country where it is not wanted. We should consult with and negotiate with the duly elected Iraqi government. However, I am confident that, given the choice, the Iraqi people and their elected representatives would much prefer to have American troops in their country than not: Because they know that American troops can be trusted to do the right thing, and because they know that American troops help to preserve the peace. I know that the American people are tired and would like all of our troops to come home. But the reality is that we have invested too much in Iraq to squander our hard-won victory there because of a shortsighted desire to withdraw from the world and take a new holiday from history. In truth, given the interdependent world in which we now live, and the ability of people to travel, within hours, to the far corners of the earth, America simply cannot afford to turn away from its international responsibilities. We must stay globally engaged. We must especially stay engaged in Iraq and the Middle East, which are now as vital to our national security as were Europe and Japan at the end of the Second World War. That’s why even Iraq War critics like Tom Ricks now call for keeping 30,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq well past 2011. Ricks has been, and remains, far too pessimistic about Iraq. However, he recognizes that “a continued American military presence [there] could help Iraq [to] move forward politically.” Ricks also admits that the presence of U.S. troops deters and prevents human rights abuses, and stops the outbreak of war and violence. To be sure, the Middle East will remain a center of terrorism and instability for decades. But long-term success in Iraq has the potential to decisively alter the correlation of forces in America’s favor. It would be wrong and a genuine historical tragedy were we to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by leaving Iraq prematurely. Our troops should remain there indefinitely — even if, and perhaps especially if, the “experts” say otherwise.

Kiruk Key to Iraq Stability

Kiruk key to Iraqi stability

UPI 10 (Apr 9, *University Media Alliance*, http://www.upi.com/Science\_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/09/Iraq-stability-hinges-on-fate-of-oil-city/UPI-10321270836055) WM

As Iraq's political barons scramble for power in the messy aftermath of March elections, the country's future stability may well depend on what happens in the disputed northern city of Kirkuk and its oilfields, which hold 40 percent of Iraq's reserves.

Iraq's Kurds, who comprise about 20 percent of the 22 million population, claim Kirkuk and its environs are part of their ancestral homeland.

They want it folded into their semi-autonomous enclave covering three northern provinces along the borders with Syria, Turkey and Iran.

With its oil fields, and twin export pipelines to Turkey's Ceyhan terminal on the Mediterranean coast, it would provide the economic bedrock for an eventual Kurdish state.

The central [government](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/09/Iraq-stability-hinges-on-fate-of-oil-city/UPI-10321270836055/) is Baghdad refuses to relinquish the oil fields or enhance the prospect of a breakaway Kurdish homeland that would seriously jeopardize the federal Iraqi state.

In the regional context, Syria, Iran and Turkey, all with restive Kurdish minorities, also do not want to see an independent, oil-rich Kurdish state emerge for fear it would galvanize those minorities. Iran and Turkey are already fighting Kurdish separatists.

Saddam Hussein sought to cement his grip on Kirkuk by decimating the Kurds and by Arabizing the city of some 150,000 -- kicking out Kurds who had lived there for generations and replacing them with Arab families.

Since Saddam was deposed in April 2003, the Kurds have redoubled their efforts to regain control of the city and its environs by driving out the Arabs and bringing back their own people.

Under the 2005 Iraqi postwar Constitution, a referendum to decide the city's future was to have been held, but has never taken place because of the likelihood it would trigger widespread violence, and possibly even a new civil war.

The dead-heat parliamentary elections, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-dominated State of Law coalition and former premier Iyad Allawi's secular Iraqiya alliance more or less even as the leading vote winners, looks set to make the dispute over Kirkuk even sharper.

The Kurdish parties -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani -- hold high cards that could decide which alliance gets to form a new coalition government.

In any broad analysis, the Kirkuk oil fields are critical to Iraq's future, while the Kurds view them as indispensable to their aspirations for statehood.

Baghdad's drive to more than quadruple Iraq's [oil production](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/09/Iraq-stability-hinges-on-fate-of-oil-city/UPI-10321270836055/) over the next six years to 10 million-12 million barrels per day is essential to pay for the country's reconstruction.

Losing Kirkuk would impede that objective considerably, but not necessarily cripple it. But the dispute could attract Iraq's neighbors who have their own agendas.

**Iraq Key to Middle East Stability**

**A secure Iraq is key to a secure Middle East**

**Cordseman 10** (Feb 17, *Trends in Violence, Casualties, and Iraqi Perceptions*, Anthony) WM

Many American policymakers understand these requirements, but there are political forces in the US that want to end aid to Iraq, and to avoid providing the required assistance and commitments necessary to help it survive the coming years. Moreover, no US civil-military effort in Iraq can be successful unless it has the sustained support of the American people, the Congress, the media, various think tanks, and other "influencers" of domestic public opinion. This is especially true at a time when the US is caught up in the "AfPak" conflict, a domestic/international financial crisis, Iran, North Korea, and so many other competing problems and demands.

The case for such a US effort in support of the strategic partnership is solid, but it needs to be communicated: US aid will help create a democracy that serves both Iraq’s needs and serves as an example of the reforms that can checkmate extremism and terrorism. It will counter the legacy of US invasion whose aftermath was badly planned and badly managed. Iraq will soon be a nation of over 30 million people and much of the region and the world will judge the US by whether it aids them or abandons them.

More directly, a strong and stable Iraq will be a major bulwark against Iran without threatening Iran or serving as a new source of tension in the region. Iraq will have no reason to go back to the regional ambitions that have helped destabilize the Gulf since British withdrawal in the 1960s. Iraq will have every incentive to work with the GCC states, Turkey, Jordan, and its other neighbors, as well as with the US and USCENTCOM in reshaping the US strategic posture in the Gulf. Iraq will become a moderate voice in the struggle for the future of Islam, and sectarian and ethnic struggles in the region. It will be a moderate voice in dealing in Arab-Israeli tensions and the search for a stable peace.

Making Iraq secure affects the security of the entire Gulf – a region that has nearly 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and some 40% of its gas.  Iraq has at least 9% of the world’s proven resources, and almost certainly will have a substantially higher percentage once its reserves are fully explored – after some 30 years of conflict and civil disorder.

The Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the Department of Energy projects that a stable Iraq will increase its petroleum production from 2.5 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 2010 to 2.9 MMBD in 2015 and 5.0 MMBD in 2030 in its reference case projections – projections far more conservative than many made by Iraq and various oil companies.   It also projects that Iraqi output could be as high as 6.7 MM BD by 2030.  Helping Iraq become a far larger oil producer and exporter will limit world oil prices and reduce the cost of US energy imports. More broadly, it will help ensure the stability of a global economy that is increasingly critical to US economic growth and prosperity.

US policy towards Iraq must also be honest about future US dependence on energy imports. It is easy to talk about US energy independence: every Administration since the Ford Administration has come to office talking about reducing dependence on imports. The Obama Administration is no exception, but forecasts of its efforts – and of Congressional efforts to date -- do not promise more success than the efforts of its predecessors.

Certainly, the Department of Energy’s forecasts leave the US heavily dependent on direct petroleum imports through 2030 – the furthest date any credible projections can be made.  Even in the most favorable case, the US will still be critically dependent on direct petroleum imports through 2030.  Moreover, the assumptions in the EIA estimates do not reflect two critical aspects of world US import dependence. First, the US makes major indirect imports of petroleum in the form of heavy manufactured goods that are made using petroleum imported from the Gulf. Second, the health and strength of the US economy is becoming steadily more dependent on the health and strength of a global economy where many key trading partners are projected to remain far more dependent on oil imports than the US.

In short, the levels of violence in Iraq are a warning the US must heed. “Responsible withdrawal” is not enough. The US must be ready to provide a major aid and advisory effort for years after all US forces leave at the end of 2011.  Success in achieving critical US national strategic objectives is well worth the limited cost of continued American support. Failure will mean that the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 will have turned from a military victory to a grand strategic defeat. History has shown us that nations will remember how an occupying or invading country left, and what it left behind, for decades after its departure. The United States cannot change the past, but it can help shape the future.

Prolong The Withdrawal

A delayed elections shows that the US should not withdrawal with the scheduled time

[Phillips](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/P/James-Phillips) 10 (James Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs , March 5, The heritage foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections>)

The Obama Administration wisely departed from the President’s campaign pledge to withdraw one combat brigade from Iraq every month after entering office. Another adjustment in the drawdown timetable is necessary due to the fact that current plans to pull out approximately 10,000 troops every month, beginning in late spring, were based on the assumption that the Iraqi elections would be held by the end of 2009. The delay in the election timetable also requires a delay in the schedule for troop withdrawals so that adequate forces remain available during the sensitive post-election period.

PMCs Turn

Less US troops will cause an increase the use of private contractors

Bricker and Shamoo 10 (Bonnie and Adil 5.25.10http://www.fpif.org/blog/worst\_fears\_may\_be\_realized\_in\_iraq)ESY

Now, in 2010, a drawdown of troops in the barely organized chaos of Iraq marches towards benchmark dates. But with the sharply decreased American media coverage of Iraq, much of the news has focused on random bombings around the country and partial coverage of the recent Iraqi elections. How many average Americans are aware that while troop numbers come down, contractor numbers go up? The number of troops in Iraq is supposed to go down by this August to 50,000 but with contractors the number would be 125,000. Can you imagine that candidate Obama would have campaigned on the promise of having 125,000 personnel in Iraq by the end of summer 2010? How many total U.S. personnel would be left by the end of 2011? Is the number by end of 2011 zero as promised, or 50,000 or more? Who is reporting about special operations in Iraq involving troops that are not Iraqi-based, but merely sweep in, do their work, and sweep out again?

Quick withdrawal from Iraq causes a shift to reliance on private military contractors.

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Journal representative for Iraq, AlterNet.com, March 30th, 2009, <http://www.alternet.org/world/133676/283_bases,_170,000_pieces_of_equipment,_140,000_troops,_and_an_army_of_mercenaries:_the_logistical_nightmare_in_iraq/?page=4>) NK

Then there are the facilities in Iraq currently being run by U.S. contractors. According to the GAO, Defense Contract Management Agency officials estimate "there is at least $3.5 billion worth of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq." Troops Withdrawal, Contractor Surge? Despite his much-celebrated troop withdrawal announcement, Obama has said nothing publicly about what he intends to do with the 163,000 "security contractors" deployed in Iraq, whose ranks outnumber U.S. troops. This is most likely because, as the GAO reports, there is no plan. "From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces did not include a theaterwide plan for redeploying contractors," the GAO report reveals. In fact, the GAO raises the prospect that Obama will actually increase reliance on private contractors -- including armed contractors like those who work for Blackwater -- particularly given the Obama administration's stated intention to increase diplomatic and reconstruction work in Iraq, which will create a greater need for "diplomatic security." According to the GAO, the State Department spent about $1.1 billion from 2006 to 2008 on 1,400 private security contractors in Iraq. As of January 2009, the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (the main employer of Blackwater and other armed contractors responsible for guarding U.S. diplomats and occupation officials), has already experienced a drastic increase in workload. "State's reliance on contractors may increase as the department currently depends on DOD to provide some services," says the GAO, citing the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo, where "contractors assumed responsibility for certain support functions that had been previously performed by military personnel." Of course, executives at private security companies have long suggested that a U.S. military draw down could mean a greater role for private forces in Iraq. "To what extent does State have contingency plans in place if Embassy Baghdad is unable to decrease its reliance on U.S. civilian government personnel over the next 5 years?" asks the GAO report.

PMCs Turn

Private military contractors commit many heinous crimes against the Iraqis.

Elsea 10 (Jennifer, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service, January 7th, 2010, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf>) NK

U.S. departments and agencies engaged in combat or stability operations overseas are relying on private firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case.1 Rather than relying on the U.S. Armed Forces to provide protection from insurgents and other risks inherent in such an environment, the State Department, USAID, and reportedly, the Central Intelligence Agency2 have outsourced a variety of security services. The Department of Defense (DOD) also employs civilian contractors to perform certain security services.3 The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to provide security for personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in Congress, and in the international community. Due to a spate of high-profile incidents involving contractors allegedly shooting civilians, using excessive force, committing other crimes, or otherwise behaving in a manner that may be offensive to the local population, there is concern that the reliance on contractors may be undermining U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some have questioned whether the legal framework is adequate to cover the activities of armed civilians performing roles that in previous conflicts were assigned to soldiers, or whether such activities could run counter to international law. Congress has, over the past decade, enacted legislation to close jurisdictional gaps that have made prosecution of civilian employees difficult for crimes they commit overseas. As a result, there is statutory authority to subject civilian contractor personnel to prosecution in federal and sometimes military court in many cases, largely depending on the type and seriousness of the offense alleged, where the offense occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, and the nature of the contract employment and government agency (or armed force) affiliation. The bases of jurisdiction, which remain relatively untested by the courts, may not have closed all of the gaps, and in cases they do cover, may affect agency responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the crimes as well as the venue for prosecution. While some contractor personnel have been subject to prosecution in the United States for crimes they allegedly committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears that many more investigations into possible criminal conduct have not resulted in charges, at least not yet.

Private contractors remain in Iraq even though soldiers are being withdrawn.

Byrne 9 (John, writer for *The Raw Story*, *The Raw Story*, September 9th, 2009, <http://rawstory.com/blog/2009/09/us-replacing-iraq-troops-with-private-contractors/>) NK

US forces are not withdrawing from Iraq. Well, its soldiers are. But not civilian contractors. Despite President Barack Obama's pledge to withdraw US troops from the war-torn country, the US is planning to award contracts to protect US installations at a cost to taxpayers that could near $1 billion. In fact, the Multi-National Force-Iraq just awarded $485 million in contracts just last week, while Congress enjoyed its summer recess. Five firms will handle private security deals to provide security for US bases. It's a neat rhetorical loophole that will allow US officials to say that the country has withdrawn from Iraq, while its contractors remain.

Withdrawal Decreases PMCs

Ending US troop deployment in Iraq will hurt contractors

Bennis 9 (Phyllis, 3.1.9 <http://www.voltairenet.org/article159188.html>)ESY

Ending the U.S. occupation means ending all U.S. funding for the giant contractors - Dyncorp, Bechtel, Blackwater - that serve as out-sourced private unaccountable components of the U.S. military. The contractor companies - and the mercenaries they hire - were part of what led to Abu Ghraib. (Blackwater’s recent name change to "Xe" should not allow its role in killing Iraqi civilians to be forgotten.) Even as some troops may be withdrawn, we will need to mobilize for congressional hearings, independent investigations, and more on the human rights violations and misuse of taxpayer funds by the war profiteers who run these companies. President Obama’s decision to close the Guantanamo prison shows his awareness of severity of the crimes committed there. Ending the funding of the contractors who carried out so many of those crimes should be a logical next step.

**Re-Deployment Inevitable**

Iraqi resources will always draw the U.S. back, sending troops back to Iraq is inevitable

Bar 10(Dr. Shmuel, Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2010, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3032TrendUS_transedit.pdf>) JRG

The US will probably pull out its troops from Iraq by the end of 2011; nevertheless it cannot totally disengage from the Iraqi theatre due to energy and other geostrategic interests. The decision whether to keep more troops after August 2010 will be affected, among other things, by the domestic developments in the country, and especially from the elections expected to take place in March 2010. It already seems that their results may strengthen the pro-Iranian camp, thus complicating the American disengagement from Iraq. The rise of pro-Iranian forces will force the US to engage Tehran in order to guarantee its cooperation during the withdrawal process. However, such engagement would probably impact on the willingness of other parties in the region to rely on US guarantees to contain Iranian regional aspirations, and particularly Tehran's nuclear program.

Iran-Iraq Impact

Iran will destabilize Iraq without US presence – this leads to an unstable Iraq

Frie 10 (George, writer, April 21, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/stratfor-iraq-us-iran-2010-4) ELJ

The United States plans to withdraw its combat forces by the summer. Leaving aside how well-protected the remaining 50,000 noncombat troops will be, the question persists on who will hold the country together. The Iranians certainly are not eager to see the Iraqi situation resolved in favor of a government that can block Iran’s ambitions. The Iranians have longstanding relations with any number of Iraqi Shiite groups, and even with some Kurdish and Sunni groups. Iran would have every reason to do what it can to destabilize Iraq above and beyond any indigenous destabilization of Iraq in order to help shape a government it can dominate. In our view, Tehran has the tools to do this effectively.

AT – SOFA = US can’t Stay

Iraq wants to negotiate around the SOFA so US troops can stay

Schwartz 10 (Michael, Writer, AntiWar, February 02, <http://original.antiwar.com/engelhardt/2010/02/02/will-iraqs-oil-ever-flow/>) ELJ

Since entering the Oval Office, Obama has not visibly wavered in the commitment to establish Iraq as a key Middle East ally, promising in his State of the Union Address that the U.S. would "continue to partner with the Iraqi people" into the indefinite future. In the same address, however, the president promised that "all of our troops are coming home," apparently signaling the abandonment of the Bush administration’s military plans. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, on the other hand, has recently voiced a contrary vision, hinting at the possibility that the Iraqis might be interested in negotiating a way around the SOFA agreement to allow U.S. forces to remain in the country after 2011.

**Chances of Stability Low**

The probability for Iraqi stability is extremely low—neg outweighs.

Friedman 10 (George, American political scientist and author, *Business Insider*, April 21st, 2010, <http://www.businessinsider.com/stratfor-iraq-us-iran-2010-4>) NK

Washington’s way forward depends upon what the American government believes the probabilities are at this point for a viable Iraqi government and security force able to suppress insurgencies, including those fomented by Iran. If the Americans believe a viable Iraqi government is a possibility, they should roll the dice and withdraw. But it is not clear from our point of view what Washington is seeing. If it believes the probability is low, the United States not only will have to halt the withdrawal, it will have to reverse it to convince the Iranians that the Americans are hypercommitted to Iraq. This might cause Tehran to recalculate, opening the door for discussion.

**Iraqi Civil War good**

Iraqi civil war turns our enemies against themselves

Peters 10 (Ralph, Retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel and author, April 30, Armed Forces Journal <http://www.afji.com/2006/11/2129512/>) ELJ

If we leave Iraq, there will be a civil war. We must accept that and make up our minds to profit from it. Not only would it be al-Qaida’s Vietnam (its cadres hate and fear Shiites far more than they do us), but the strife would inevitably entangle our other regional enemies. Currently aligned against us, Iran and Syria would not be able to sustain their cooperation, but would be drawn into backing opposite sides. While we should be willing to use force to prevent the cross-border involvement of Iranian or Syrian regulars, we must accept that their support for rival factions with armaments and “volunteers” is inevitable. Let us turn it to our advantage by bleeding out our opponents and trapping them in a quagmire. An Iraqi civil war would be a human tragedy. But it would be a tragedy that Iraqis, through factionalism and fecklessness, brought down on their own heads. Given that it cannot be prevented, we should avoid hand-wringing diplomacy in favor of placing no obstacles in the path of Sunni and Shiite extremists anxious to kill each other. The region is due for another of its periodic bloodbaths and, paradoxically, the exhaustion in the wake of a sectarian war may be the only long-term hope for peace.

Iran Rise Good

Iran Rise good – Rise now ensures a lesser Iran in the future

Peters 10 (Ralph, Retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel and author, April 30, Armed Forces Journal <http://www.afji.com/2006/11/2129512/>) ELJ

What if, instead of weakening Iran, we helped it become stronger? Of course, our views on Israel are in direct conflict, but the attempt to assert local hegemony would occupy Tehran and drain its resources for years to come. And, as noted above, the deep conflict in the region isn’t between Muslims and Americans or even between Muslims and Israelis, but between Muslims and Muslims. Given the chance to lord it over Sunni Arabs, Tehran might forget about Israel except for intermittent bursts of token rhetoric. And, in the end, an attempt to build a greater Iran will inevitably result in a lesser Iran. Iran’s ambitions will be self-defeating, so why not encourage them?