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**Plan Text:** The Unites States federal government should terminate all contracts with private military contractors operating in Iraq.

Contention 1 is Iraqi Instability:

Private Military contractors will soon out number U.S. military personnel

**Schwaartzkopf, 10** (Matt, Drake University “As Soldiers Scale Down, Private Contractors Flourish; What Will Contractors Do After Iraq?” April 2 9 Commission on Wartime Contracting <http://pmc.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/04/02/as-soldiers-retreat-private-contractors-boom-what-do-we-do-about-iraq/> 6/29/10)

On Monday, the Commission on Wartime Contracting held a hearing on how to handle the downsizing of private contractors in Iraq as American forces scale down and prepare to leave the country by December of 2011. Here is a link to that hearing. Past hearings relating to contracting in Iraq are also posted on the site, so be sure to look those over as well. The hearing brings up the interesting fact that while our troop numbers are decreasing, the number of contractors in Iraq are increasing. Eventually in Iraq, military contractors will outnumber military personnel. While the hearing’s chairman reminds the panel and audience that the United States went into Iraq “expecting swift victory,” which we achieved, the overarching problem with the operation was the occupation aspect. Because the United States military has decreased in size since the end of the Cold War, it makes sense that the “nation building” aspect of our armed forces was more likely to be cut than our war-fighting abilities. This cut allowed for the boom in the private contracting industry that we have seen since the Iraq War began in 2003, in regard to logistics, base upkeep and construction duties.

Attempts to establish Iraqi democracy have failed, despite Iraqi efforts

**Allaqi, 10,** (Ayad, Iraqi Politician “How Iraq can fortify its fragile democracy” Ya Libnan June 12, 2010 ⋅ <http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/06/12/editorial-how-iraq-can-fortify-its-fragile-democracy/> 6/28/10)

Millions of Iraqis risked their lives in March to exercise their fundamental democratic right to vote. Turnout was high — exceeding 60 percent — across the regions, ethnicities and sects that form our diverse nation. Iraqis are eager to put violence and strife behind them. Yet three months later, Iraq has no functional or stable government. This uncertainty threatens not just Iraqi society and democracy but also the region.Our political alliance, Iraqiya, won the most votes and parliamentary seats in March. Iraqis from all sides and walks of life responded to our platform of democratic inclusion of all groups in the political process; of national reconciliation based on secularism and moving away from political, ethnic and sectarian religious divides; of law and order to create the conditions for a stable and prosperous nation, in harmony with its neighbors. This is the Iraq we wish to build.

PMCs undermine democratic values-surpassing democratic checks on war

**Salzman, 10** ( Zoe, Senior Notes Editor of the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics “Private Military contractors and the taint of a mercenary reputation[http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_ journal\_of\_international \_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf](http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/%40nyu_law_website__journals__%20journal_of_international%20_law_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf)6/26/10)

79 Private contractors threaten the state’s monopoly on the use of force because they represent a clear alternative to state force—a purchasable alternative that has already proven alluring to criminal factions and other forces opposing legitimate governments—and because they generally operate outside of the control of national law. Even when private contractors are hired by a state, however, the role of the state as the primary provider of security is necessarily diminished.80 2. The Use of Private Contractors Undermines Democratic Checks on War-Making [I]t is ironic that the problems related to non-state force are actually based on its state-centric nature.81 In addition to challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the privatization of military force also threatens the democratic state because it allows governments to make war while avoiding democratic accountability. Democratic governments are entrusted with a monopoly on the use of force because their power to exercise that force is limited by the rule of law and by accountability to their citizens.83 Private contractors, however, greatly undermine democratic accountability, and in so doing circumvent the democratic reluctance for war. By undermining the public’s control over the warmaking powers of the state, private contractors threaten the popular sovereignty of the state.84 Thus, the problem with private military force may not be simply a lack of state control, as discussed above, but also too much government control, particularly executive control, at the expense of popular, democratic control.85 At an extreme, a government, even a democratic government, might use private violence as a brutal police force to ensure its control over the people.86 In reality, however, a democratic government’s outsourcing of military functions undermines the democratic process much more subtly than this far-fetched scenario. Because the executive branch is generally in charge of hiring contractors, private contractors allow the executive to evade parliamentary or congressional checks on foreign policy.87 Indeed, [t]o the extent privatization permits the Executive to carry out military policy unilaterally . . . it circumvents primary avenues through which the People are 82. See AVANT, MARKET FOR FORCE, supra note 24, at 4. 83. Newell & Sheehy, supra note 9, at 74. 84. See Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 887 (2004) (“Under a democratic constitution, popular sovereignty is nothing but the realization of democracy upon which the legitimacy of all public power rests.”); see also Michaels, supra note 68, at 1079-80; PRIVATIZATION OF SECUR- ITY, supra note 23, at 21. 85. Similar concerns were raised during the writing of the American Constitution, when some of the Founders were concerned that a professional army, instead of a citizen militia, would undermine the system of democratic government. See Kirsten S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 22-23 (1992) (quoting Samuel Adams as having reasoned: “The Militia is composed of free Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of their making use of their Power to the destruction of their own Rights.”). 86. See PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY, supra note 23, at 21. 87. Michaels, supra note 68, at 1078. 868 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 informed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through which the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings.88 Privatizing military force results in a lack of transparency and puts the military effort outside of the scope of the democratic dialogue, “obscuring choices about military needs and human implications.”89 Notably, in the United States, private contractors are not subject to the scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act,90 which greatly restricts the public’s ability to be well-informed about the government’s reliance on the private military industry. Thus, the privatization of military force allows the executive “to operate in the shadows of public attention” 91 and to subvert democratic political restraints.92 The privatization of combat duties is potentially much more problematic than the privatization of other government functions because the privatization of the use of force inherently removes many of the burdens of war from the citizenry, thereby reducing public debate about national involvement in the conflict.93 Indeed, governments may turn to private military forces not because they are cheaper, but because they are less accountable and less likely to attract political backlash.94 For example, by outsourcing military functions, the executive branch is able to evade certain forms of democratic accountability by circumventing congressional caps on the number of 88. Id. 89. Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1024 (2005). 90. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 192 (2005). 91. Michaels, supra note 68, at 1008. 92. See Avant, Mercenaries, supra note 4, at 28. 93. See Newell & Sheehy, supra note 9, at 81 (arguing that the privatiza- tion of force allows the state not simply to outsource, but to divest itself of a responsibility vested in it by its citizens); Rosky, supra note 44, at 881 (argu- ing that to speak of the privatization of force in the same terms as the privatization of schools, hospitals, and welfare systems is to miss the special problems posed by the privatization of force). 94. See Michaels, supra note 68, at 1008. 2008] PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS 869 troops approved for deployment.95 Employing private contractors also allows the executive to avoid instituting a draft, keep official casualty counts and public criticism down, and even to avoid arms embargoes.96 The government is also able to distance itself from mistakes by blaming them on the contractors. 97 By subverting public debate and by undermining the separation of powers, the privatization of military force poses a direct threat to the democratic system.

PMC removal is key to establishing a stable democratic state

**Salzman**, **09** ( Zoe, Senior Notes Editor of the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics “Private Military contractors and the taint of a mercenary reputation [http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_inter national \_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf](http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/%40nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_inter%20national%20_law_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf)6/26/10)

Just as the private military industry poses a threat to established democratic regimes, it also potentially impedes the emergence of new democratic states. When private contractors become involved in a conflict, there is necessarily a danger that security will become a commodity that only the rich can afford.105 This tendency can undermine democratic movements that aim at a redistribution of resources and power.106 Fundamentally, private contractors “serve a commercial rather than a humanitarian purpose. . . . [T]hey are not drawn towards the interests of the poor, but towards those who can pay.”107 Compounding this shortfall in public accountability, it is also unclear how privately accountable private contractors actually are. It is sometimes assumed that private contractors are accountable to the controls of the market and that a disreputable reputation will reduce a PMC’s competitive edge, making it less likely that it will be hired. In practice, however, PMCs often escape oversight through sole-source, non-competitive bids and other practices that circumvent the market (a prominent example is Halliburton’s non-competitive bid for the contract to manage logistics for the Iraq war), putting into question just how effective a control the market really provides.

PMCs create volatility and undermine Iraqi force strength – removing them ensures Iraq stability

Col. BobbyA. **Towery,** Master in Strategic Studies & Colonel in U.S. Army, **‘6** [Marh 14, U.S. Army War College, “Phasing out Private Security Contractors in Iraq,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil520.pdf, p. 5-8]

The growing presence of private security contractors operating in Iraq has also caused another problem – the shooting and intimidation of innocent Iraqi civilians. Recent shootings of Iraqi civilians, allegedly involving the legion of U.S., British, and other foreign security contractors operating in the country, are drawing increasing concern from Iraqi officials and U.S. commanders who say the private security companies undermine relations between foreign military forces and Iraqi civilians. Private security companies drive their distinctive sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) with heavily armed personnel in them up and down the highways and city streets in Iraq. The individual private security contractors wave their arms and point their rifles to clear traffic in their path in order to protect convoys they are escorting. Although these security companies are conducting some of the most dangerous jobs in the Iraq, their actions have drawn criticism from senior military officers operating in Iraq. These actions have attracted the scrutiny of Washington after allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight.20 Brigadier General Karl R. Horst, Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver (ADC (M)) for the Army’s Third Infantry Division (3ID), who was recently responsible for security in and around Baghdad, was frustrated with the private security contractors operating in his sectors of responsibility: These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place.21 No official tally of such incidents has been made public. Aegis, a British security company that helps manage contractors in Baghdad, and maintains an operations center in the city’s fortified Green Zone, declined to answer questions from the Washington Post in regards to shooting incidents.22 The shootings became so frequent in Baghdad this summer that Horst [ADC (M) for 3ID)] started keeping his own count in a white spiral notebook he uses to record daily events. Between May and July, he said, he tracked at least a dozen shootings of civilians by contractors, in which six Iraqis were killed and three wounded. The bloodiest case came on May 12 in the neighborhood of New Baghdad. A contractor opened fire on an approaching car, which then veered into a crowd.23 In the rare instances when police reports are filed, the U.S. military is often blamed for the actions of private companies, according to Adnan Asadi, the deputy interior minister who now has responsibility (but little authority) for overseeing security companies. This leads to another problem as described by Brigadier General Horst, “People always say the Army did it, and even our police don't always know the difference.” Two days after the 12 May incident mentioned above, American soldiers patrolling the same block were attacked with a roadside bomb. "Do you think that's an insurgent action? Hell no," Horst said. "That's someone paying us back because their people got killed. And we had absolutely nothing to do with it."24 Adan Asadi supported Brigadier General Horst’s explanation by stating that Iraqi civilians think private security guards are American soldiers because they generally look the same. The only difference that might be obvious to the common Iraqi is the vehicles used by the military, which are largely the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or HUMMER), while the private security contractors primarily use American made Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV).25 The Iraqi government is very limited in overseeing private security companies because Iraqi law does not apply to private security contractors. This is according to Nick Bicanic, who produced a documentary called Shadow Company that portrays nation-states paying private companies to provide armed civilians, in lieu of soldiers, on an unprecedented scale. Mr. Bicanic stated further in his interview that Iraqi laws do not apply to private security companies and as a result, the private security contractor is not liable. As a result, when something happens, like a shooting, the person responsible is usually just removed from the country.26 So in reality, the deputy interior minister has no authority to oversee the private security companies operating in his country. No wonder the Iraqi citizens are irate when a shooting occurs. Take for example the personal account of Ali Ismael as he describes in detail the circumstance surrounding the time he was shot as he conducted his morning commute in Irbil, which is regarded as one of Iraq’s safest cities.27 Ali Ismael, his older brother Bayez and their driver had just pulled into traffic behind a convoy of four Chevrolet Suburbans, which police believe belonged to an American security contractor stationed nearby. The back door of the last vehicle swung open, the brothers said in interviews, and a man wearing sunglasses and a tan flak jacket leaned out and leveled his rifle. "I thought he was just trying to scare us, like they usually do, to keep us back. But then he fired," said Ismael, 20. His scalp was still marked by a bald patch and four-inch purple scar from a bullet that grazed his head and left him bleeding in the back seat of his Toyota Land Cruiser.28 The United States conducted and investigation of Mr. Ismael’s shooting and concluded that no American contractors were responsible. While the U.S. investigation did not hold anyone accountable, the report did provide a working theory that the shooting came from insurgents executing an ambush on Mr. Ismael who is an official with the Kurdistan Democratic Party. This finding contrasts to other witness accounts of the shooting and local Iraqi politicians, who claim that it was private security contractors from DynCorp, who were securing the U.S. Agency for International Development. Mr. Abdullah Ali, director of the Irbil security police, called the U.S. report "three pages of lies to try to cover up that their company [DynCorp] was involved.” Mr. Ali claimed that their investigation showed hair and blood towards the back of Mr. Ismael’s Land Cruiser, which supports their claim that the shooting came from front.29 Unfortunately, this type of incident is not uncommon in Iraq. Some contractors have said that they would rather be “tried by twelve than carried by six.” This type of attitude can be directly attributed to the fact that private security companies and other contractors working in Iraq are frequent victims of violence. The most publicized incident came on March 31, 2004, when four employees of Blackwater were killed and their bodies dragged through the volatile western city of Fallujah.30 According to Ann Scott Thompson of The Washington Post, the number of private security contractors killed in Iraq stands at 240.31 The light can be seen at the end of the tunnel regarding Iraqis being able to take on more responsibility for their security. Vice President Dick Cheney amplified this point in a recent speech when he stated: Day after day, month after month, Iraqis have proven their determination to live in freedom, to chart their own destiny, and to defend their country. And they can know that the United States will keep our commitment to them.32 Iraq’s determination to defend itself is seen in the growing capability of the Iraqi military and police force. The Iraqi government, with significant help from the coalition, started rebuilding the Iraqi army in the summer of 2003 after Mr. Bremer, the U.S. Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, disbanded it. Also at that time, there were only about 40,000 policemen scattered across the entire country.33 A point has now been reached where reducing non- governmental security forces is feasible. In 2004, there were only a handful of combat-ready Iraqi battalions. Today there are well over 100 Iraqi combat battalions in the tactical fight, with eight operational division headquarters and 31 operational brigade headquarters. Twenty-eight battalions of special police are distributed around the country, providing a bridge between combat operations and civil police operations. Additionally, there are over 77,000 Iraqi police manning police stations across 18 provinces and patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities.34 Another indicator of the Iraqi government’s ability to take on more security responsibilities is U.S. troop deployments to Iraq have been adjusted downward. The change affects two Army brigades; the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division based in Fort Riley, KS, and the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division based in Baumholder, Germany and now in Kuwait. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division will not deploy as an intact brigade to Iraq. Some elements will be available to conduct other missions such as providing security forces and conducting training for the Iraqi Security Forces. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division will remain in Kuwait as a “call forward” force. The bottom line is that as Iraqi security capabilities increase, the number of U.S. combat brigades decreases. The latest reduction takes us from 17 combat brigades to 15, and with each reduction of a brigade, the light gets a little brighter at the end of the tunnel.35 The Solution The solution is clear; in order for the new Iraqi government to be recognized as a sovereign country, it must be responsible for every aspect of security in Iraq. With the recent increase in Iraqi security capabilities, the overall ability of the new Iraqi government to provide all aspects of security – to include that of providing security for contractors operating as part of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq – is much improved. The increasing security capability shows Iraqi citizens’ resolve for ensuring the security of their country, and also indicates the availability a large pool of potential labor from which to draw and form this new security force. While in 2003/2004 the strategy was not feasible due to a lack of qualified labor, today, this labor potential exists, and is expanding. The strategy to support this solution is the elimination of all private security personnel. This includes private security personnel operating on Iraq’s roadways for convoy security, private bodyguards, and static security operations conducted outside of United States government or coalition member controlled bases and camps.

A democratic Iraq will be modeled throughout the Middle East

**Frum, 10(**David, journalist “Will Iraq's democracy vindicate Bush?” CNN Contributor March 8, 2010 7:55 p.m. EST http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/03/08/frum.iraq.election/index.html)

A stable Western-oriented Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors would be a great prize. If that future does take hold, we'll learn the answer to another great question. Speaking on the eve of war in 2003, President George W. Bush told the guests at the American Enterprise Institute's annual dinner that he discerned "hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the 'freedom gap' so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. "Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and free trade. And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward politics reform. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region." Will he be vindicated? In the January issue of the Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond offers grounds for hope that the answer may be yes. Diamond, an expert on democracy-building who served with the Coalition Provisional Authority, itemizes the indicators of growing yearning for self-rule in the Middle East. He notes surveys in which 80 percent of Arabs across the region agree that democracy is the best form of government and would be good for their own country.

Establishment of a stable democratic Iraq is key to prevent civil war, repression, and massive refugee flows

Daniel Byman, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 2003, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities”

Now that the United States and its allies have toppled Saddam Hussein's regime, the knotty question of Iraq's future government is rising to the fore. Although the Bush administration, nongovernmental organization officials, and exiled Iraqis disagree on interim measures for governing Iraq, there is a surprising consensus on the eventual nature of Iraq's government: Almost all parties believe that Iraq must have a democratic, and highly federal, government. President George W. Bush declared that "all Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected." Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the special presidential envoy and ambassador at large for Free Iraqis, called for "a broad-based representative and democratic government" in a post-Saddam Iraq. Indeed the Bush administration's vision for democracy extends beyond Iraq. Richard Perle, an influential strategist with close ties to the administration, contends that it is plausible that "Saddam's replacement by a decent Iraqi regime would open the way to a far more stable and peaceful region." Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey similarly claims, "This could be a golden opportunity to begin to change the face of the Arab world." Yet skeptics abound. Alina Romanowski, a senior U.S. government civilian official working on the Middle East, contends that "Iraq presents as unpromising a breeding ground for democracy as any in the world." Chris Sanders, a Middle East specialist, notes that "there isn't a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy." Skeptics argue that Iraq has too many fractures, and too few important preconditions such as a strong civil society, for democracy to blossom. Despite these risks, the temptation to pursue democracy once Iraq has stabilized is consider bable. If Iraq successfully democratized, it would be more likely to pursue peace with its neighbors and to avoid repression at home. Iraq's people would receive a reprieve from a brutal dictatorship, more than a decade of sanctions, and repeated wars. Perhaps the best argument for a democratic Iraq is that the alternatives are worse. Widespread repression, civil war, massive refugee flows, or other calamities might occur if Iraq does not gain a stable and decent government. A democratic Iraq may be ideal.

Iraqi civil conflict results in global war

Nial **Ferguson,** Prof. of History @ Harvard, **'6** [Foreign Affairs 85.5, "The Next War of the World," ln]

What makes the escalating civil war in Iraq so disturbing is that it has the potential to spill over into neighboring countries. The Iranian government is already taking more than a casual interest in the politics of post-Saddam Iraq. And yet Iran, with its Sunni and Kurdish minorities, is no more homogeneous than Iraq. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria cannot be expected to look on insouciantly if the Sunni minority in central Iraq begins to lose out to what may seem to be an Iranian-backed tyranny of the majority. The recent history of Lebanon offers a reminder that in the Middle East there is no such thing as a contained civil war. Neighbors are always likely to take an unhealthy interest in any country with fissiparous tendencies. The obvious conclusion is that a new "war of the world" may already be brewing in a region that, incredible though it may seem, has yet to sate its appetite for violence. And the ramifications of such a Middle Eastern conflagration would be truly global.

Middle Easter Democracy is key to prevents nuclear war

**Muravchik 1** – Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute [Joshua, "Democracy and Nuclear Peace," 7-11-01, Presented before the NPEC/IGCC Summer Faculty Seminar, UC-San Diego, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf]

The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

Contention 2 is Hegemony:

The U.S. relies on private military services in Iraq more than any other nation

**Schwartz et al, 2008** (Mosche, analyst in defense acquisition policy, Congressional Research Service “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues” August 5, 2008 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf> 6/27/10)

The United States is relying heavily on private firms to supply a wide variety of services in Iraq, including security. From publicly available information, this is apparently the first time that the United States has depended so extensively on contractors to provide security in a hostile environment, although it has previously contracted for more limited security services in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere. In Iraq, private firms known as Private Security Contractors (PSCs) serve to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, and are training Iraqi police and military personnel. By providing security for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, many analysts and policymakers say, private contractors contribute an essential service to U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Iraq. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors raises several concerns, including transparency and accountability. The lack of public information on the terms of the contracts, including their costs and the standards governing hiring and performance, make evaluating their efficiency difficult. The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under U.S. law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern.

PMCs undermine Hegemony for 4 reasons

1. PMCs create isolationism and poor foreign policy

By Deborah Avant, @ George Washington University, ‘2 [Foreign Policy in Focus 7.6, “Privatizing Military Training,” http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol7/v7n06miltrain\_body.html]

Privatizing military training has long-term political and foreign policy implications. Employing private companies may increase the flexibility and expand the capacity of the U.S. military. Such flexibility may help impose stability in troubled regions in the short run and may avoid lengthy political debates over the proper number of U.S. troops required to support the engagement policy outlined in “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” The downside of this approach, however, could be a public increasingly disengaged from global problems; a military ever more focused on high-tech combat operations rather than military training, assistance, and other engagement activities; and significant reliance on private firms for a central part of U.S. military assistance and overseas operations.

2. Plan’s removal of PMCs is critical to prevent U.S. military destruction

P. W. **Singer**, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, **‘5** [Foreign Affiars 84.2, “Outsourcing War,” ln]

Some in the military worry, on the other hand, that the PMF boom could endanger the health of their profession and resent the way these firms exploit skills learned at public expense for private profit. They also fear that the expanding PMF marketplace will hurt the military's ability to retain talented soldiers. Contractors in the PMF industry can make anywhere from two to ten times what they make in the regular military; in Iraq, former special forces troops can earn as much as $1,000 a day. Certain service members, such as pilots, have always had the option of seeking work in the civilian marketplace. But the PMF industry marks a significant change, since it keeps its employees within the military, and thus the public, sphere. More important, PMFs compete directly with the government. Not only do they draw their employees from the military, they do so to play military roles, thus shrinking the military's purview. PMFs use public funds to offer soldiers higher pay, and then charge the government at an even higher rate, all for services provided by the human capital that the military itself originally helped build. The overall process may be brilliant from a business standpoint, but it is self-defeating from the military's perspective. This issue has become especially pointed for special forces units, which have the most skills and are thus the most marketable. Elite force commanders in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all expressed deep concern over the poaching of their numbers by PMFs. One U.S. special forces officer described the issue of retention among his most experienced troops as being "at a tipping point." So far, the U.S. government has failed to respond adequately to this challenge. Some militaries now allow their soldiers to take a year's leave of absence, in the hope that they will make their money quickly and then return, rather than be lost to the service forever. But Washington has failed to take even this step; it has only created a special working group to explore the issue. CAVEAT EMPTOR AND-- AND RENTER As all of these problems suggest, governments that use PMFs must learn to recognize their responsibilities as regulators--and as smart clients. Their failure to do so thus far has distorted the free market and caused a major shift in the military-industrial complex. Without change, the status quo will result in bad policy and bad business. To improve matters, it is first essential to lift the veil of secrecy that surrounds the private military industry. There must be **far more** openness about and public oversight of the basic numbers involved. Too little is known about the actual dollars spent on PMFs; the Pentagon does not even track the number of contractors working for it in Iraq, much less their casualties.

3. PMCs destroy military readiness which is vital to U.S. global leadership

Col. Lawrence K**. Grubbs** et al., Prof. @ National Defense University, ‘**6** [There about 20 Other National Defense University Officials that Contributed to This Report, Final Report: Privatized Military Operations , Industrial College of the Armed Forces,” http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2006/2006%20PMOIS.doc]

·Conversely, what opportunities would be missed by not using military forces in this application? Proficiency and readiness come through training. Is this application an opportunity to give the military forces needed training in a particular skill area? Taken to the extreme, it can be argued that every time a function is contracted, the military becomes less capable in that area and will ultimately be unable to perform that function in the future. ·Would using contractor services in lieu of military forces for this application ultimately reduce allowable manpower levels? Is that a desired outcome? The Army chose to contract for logistics support in lieu of maintaining Cold War force levels. As more functions are contracted, Congress and others will likely press for more reductions in the number of active and reserve military personnel. Thus, the long-term implications on force structure are worth considering for short-term decisions. Timeframe There are at least two time-related considerations with regard to whether a function should be contracted. The first is how soon personnel are needed and whether military forces can be made available in the required timeframe. This obviously includes a determination of what skills are needed, how many people will be required, what equipment is needed, and how quickly those people and equipment must be in place. With less bureaucracy in private firms as a general assumption, contractors may be able to provide equipment and personnel with the necessary skills more quickly than the military. The second consideration is how long the services will be needed, i.e., is this a short-term or long-term commitment? Given their many commitments and a limited number of forces, military forces may not be able to stay in place for the duration of an effort. Obviously that depends on what type of effort is envisioned, and military forces will stay as long as there is a perceived threat of combat. For some missions, however, contractors can provide a longer-term commitment. For stability operations and reconstruction in particular, success depends largely on relationships, and having the same people available for the duration of the effort can be beneficial. Footprint As Clausewitz said, war is an extension of politics, and certainly the size of the military footprint is a political consideration in the decision of whether to use military forces or contractors to provide services. There may be a political need for a show of military force, perhaps to project power as a means of preventing conflict. Increasingly, there are missions at the other end of the spectrum: U.S. forces are working to win hearts and minds through humanitarian efforts, and clearly the message can benefit from people in uniform, visibly helping local residents.

4. PMCS Destroy US Softpower

By Deborah Avant, @ George Washington University, ‘2 [Foreign Policy in Focus 7.6, “Privatizing Military Training,” <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol7/v7n06miltrain_body.html>]

Third, contracting private companies avoids congressional and public disclosure and debate, and this carries long-term political costs. Using private contractors may facilitate foreign operations in the short run, because politicians do not have to make the case to send “our boys (and girls)” overseas. However, as the tragic downing of the missionary plane over Peru has demonstrated, the actions of private contractors can damage U.S. foreign relations and undermine policy objectives. Public consideration of the risks and benefits of U.S. military operations is fundamental both to democracy and to the success of policy initiatives.

Soft Power solves multiple scenarios for extinction by building coalitions which solves global stability

**Reiffel**  Visiting Fellow at the Global Economy and Development Center **05** of the Brookings Institution (Lex, The Brookings Institution, Reaching Out: Americans Serving Overseas, 12-27-2005, www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf)

I. Introduction: Overseas Service as a Soft Instrument of Power The United States is struggling to define a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world that protects its vital self interests without making the rest of the world uncomfortable. In retrospect, the decade of the 1990s was a cakewalk. Together with its Cold War allies Americans focused on helping the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union build functioning democratic political systems and growing market economies. The USA met this immense challenge successfully, by and large, and it gained friends in the process. By contrast, the first five years of the new millennium have been mostly downhill for the USA. The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 changed the national mood in a matter of hours from gloating to a level of fear unknown since the Depression of the 1930s. They also pushed sympathy for the USA among people in the rest of the world to new heights. However, the feeling of global solidarity quickly dissipated after the military intervention in Iraq by a narrow US-led coalition. A major poll measuring the attitudes of foreigners toward the USA found a sharp shift in opinion in the negative direction between 2002 and 2003, which has only partially recovered since then.1 The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2

Soft Power key to hegemony-allows allies to accept our decision easily

**Nye 2004** (Joseph, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics,”)

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pickup coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created.NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow them to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. For example, initially the U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in was not very popular in Japan, but over the decades, polls show that it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction, so that other countries are not obliged continually to reexamine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the U.S. by the Japanese public “contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony” and “served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.”17 Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation’s John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue, power in the global information age will come not just from strong defenses, but from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in the information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.18 As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

U.S. leadership solves multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

**Kagan, 7** (Robert, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, web)

This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world ’s powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law,the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial.During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China’s foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass é; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. TheChinese do not share the view that power is passé; hence their now twodecades- long military buildup. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power — with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending — now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea ’s nuclear weapons. But it is alsodriven by Japan’s own national ambition to be a leader in East Asiaor at least not to play second fiddle or “little brother” to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other ’s rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a “greater China” and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe ’s past than its present. But it also looks like Asia’s past.Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition.A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the eu and nato, would not insist on predominant influence over its “near abroad,” and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia ’s international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from nato and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia’s complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia ’s relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations.India ’s regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nationor confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its “century of humiliation.” Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalistproffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on. Israel has become its living symbol. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative,Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominancein East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and thoughAmericansare loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow theUnited States Navyto be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflictbetween nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works.International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region.That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation.In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak.A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

\*\*Inherency\*\*

The U.S. has the largest amount of PMCs

By Laura Peterson, @ Center for Public Integrity, ‘2 [Oct 28, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Center for Public Integrity, “Privatizing Combat, the New World Order,” http://www.icij.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=148]

In early 2002, the British government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office released a report titled "Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation." The report argued that PMCs could actually aid in low-intensity conflicts and proposed regulating them as soon as possible rather than leaving them to operate unchecked. The British press, however, had a field day with the notion that "mercenaries" would take the place of blue-helmeted U.N. soldiers, and a public outcry ensued. The report also pointed to the United States as the only place in the world where PMCs have become "major military corporations," effectively licensed for over two decades "without apparently giving rise to major problems."

Private Military Contracts are a very large industry

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mercenary.htmepisodes.com/>

Estimates of the number of private international security personnel range from 15,000 to 20,000. That is as much as 15 percent of the total US presence of about 130,000 soldiers. These private contractors -- who most often work for corporations, diplomats, or journalists -- have no accountability to the US military. These private security contractors can earn up to $1,000 a day. NATO forces have used private soldiers for security in the Balkans. But the proportion of private security personnel to regular military soldiers was no greater than 10 percent.

Private Military Companies are gaining troops and power

Peter W. Singer, worked for the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Department of Defense and has a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2004, *The Private Military industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?*

Just as Iraq is the single largest U.S. military commitment in more than a generation, so too is it the largest commitment for the private military industry. The numbers for the PMF presence in Iraq dwarf any past operations. Over 60 firms employ more than 20,000 private personnel carrying out military functions (as opposed to the thousands of additional civilian contractors providing reconstruction or oil services). To put this into context, such numbers mean that the private military industry has contributed more forces to Iraq than any other member of the U.S.-led coalition, being nearly equal to all the states excluding the U.S. combined. To be more accurate then, President Bush’s claim of a “Coalition of the Willing” might be renamed the “Coalition of the Billing.” With these greater numbers have come greater risks. By September 2004, private military contractors had suffered an estimated 150 killed in Iraq. More than 700 are thought to have been wounded. Again, such numbers exceed those for the rest of the coalition combined and are higher than those for any single U.S. Army division. Perhaps more important than the raw numbers is the wide scope of critical jobs that contractors carried out and which are very different from those undertaken by civilians in past wars. In addition to war-gaming and field training before the invasion, private military employees handled logistics and support for coalition troops during the build-up to war. The massive U.S. complex at Camp Doha in Kuwait, which served as the launch-pad for the invasion, was not only built by private contractors, operated by private contractors, but was even guarded by private contractors. During the invasion, contractors served in these roles and also maintained and loaded weapons on many of the most sophisticated weapons systems like the B-2 stealth bomber and the Apache helicopter. They even helped operate combat systems like the Patriot missile batteries in the Army and the Aegis defence system on board numerous U.S. Navy ships.

\*\*Heg\*\*

PMCs decrease troop retention

PMCs decrease troop retention and military readiness

 **Grubbs et al, 06** (Col. Lawrence K. et al., Prof. at National Defense University, , Final Report: Privatized Military Operations , Industrial College of the Armed Forces,” http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2006/2006%20PMOIS.doc)

Finally, within the international community, one of the repeatedly stated concerns with the growth of PMFs is the potential to draw manpower from the uniformed services, particularly within the elite special operations forces. By paying salaries that may far exceed military pay scales, and particularly those of U.S. allies, these companies also offer special operators reduced deployment periods and a much greater degree of control over their lives. In the U.S., retention of senior special operators seemed a significant concern in January, 2005, when the DoD was trying to increase the size of its special operations force structure beyond the 51,000 authorized. Current contingency operations such as OIF had forced many of our most elite forces into an extremely high operational tempo. Away from family and friends for increasingly long stretches, sometimes lasting 12+ months, many were thought to be looking at PSCs as an attractive alternative. The services offered bonuses of up to $150,000 to prevent its elite personnel, already eligible for or close to retirement, from being lured away to higher-paying jobs as private security contractors. It appears that the enhanced retention programs have mitigated the threat of a more significant exodus that anticipated, but the lure of the PSC sector and its potential for hiring away the military’s highly trained special operators will continue to require scrutiny by manpower officials.

Removal of PMCs are critical to military retention

**Singer, 05** (P. W. Senior Fellow at Brookings, ‘5 [Foreign Affiars 84.2,march/april “Outsourcing War,” ln)

Some in the military worry, on the other hand, that the PMF boom could endanger the health of their profession and resent the way these firms exploit skills learned at public expense for private profit. They also fear that the expanding PMF marketplace will hurt the military's ability to retain talented soldiers. Contractors in the PMF industry can make anywhere from two to ten times what they make in the regular military; in Iraq, former special forces troops can earn as much as $1,000 a day. Certain service members, such as pilots, have always had the option of seeking work in the civilian marketplace. But the PMF industry marks a significant change, since it keeps its employees within the military, and thus the public, sphere. More important, PMFS compete directly with the government. Not only do they draw their employees from the military, they do so to play military roles, thus shrinking the military's purview. PMFS use public funds to offer soldiers higher pay, and then charge the government at an even higher rate, all for services provided by the human capital that the military itself originally helped build. The overall process may be brilliant from a business standpoint, but it is self-defeating from the military's perspective. This issue has become especially pointed for special forces units, which have the most skills and are thus the most marketable. Elite force commanders in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all expressed deep concern over the poaching of their numbers by PMFS. One U.S. special forces officer described the issue of retention among his most experienced troops as being "at a tipping point." So far, the U.S. government has failed to respond adequately to this challenge. Some militaries now allow their soldiers to take a year's leave of absence, in the hope that they will make their money quickly and then return, rather than be lost to the service forever. But Washington has failed to take even this step; it has only created a special working group to explore the issue. CAVEAT EMPTOR--AND RENTER AS ALL of these problems suggest, governments that use PMFS must learn to recognize their responsibilities as regulators--and as smart clients. Their failure to do so thus far has distorted the free market and caused a major shift in the military-industrial complex. Without change, the status quo will result in bad policy and bad business. To improve matters, it is first essential to lift the veil of secrecy that surrounds the private military industry. There must be far more openness about and public oversight of the basic numbers involved. Too fine is known about the actual dollars spent on PMFs; the Pentagon does not even track the number of contractors working for it in Iraq, much less their casualties.

Lack of skilled troops is caused by PMC competition

**Isenber, 2004** (David, PMC specialist, British-American Security Information Council “A Fistful of Contractors: the Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”)

The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to higher-paying civilian security jobs in places like Baghdad and Kabul, just as the special forces are being asked to play an increasingly pivotal role in combating terror and helping to conduct nation-building operations worldwide. Of course the same problem exists in many other areas of military specialism, such as information technology. Why work in the Army’s tech operations when you can get a job at three times the remuneration in the private sector?Reportedly, exhausted American and British special forces personnel are resigning in record numbers and taking highly-paid jobs as private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, benefits, and educationalincentives to try to retain them. “Competition with the civilian world has never been greater,” said Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, commander of the 49,000-strong U.S. Special Operations Comman**d, in congressional testimony.** Senior enlisted members of the Army Green Berets or Navy Seals with 20 years or more experience now earn about $50,000 in base pay, and can retire with a $23,000 pension. But private security companies, whose services are in growing demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, are offering salaries of $100,000 to nearly $200,000 a year to the most experienced of them.60 But there is no guarantee beyond the contracted period and it is only paid when deployed, i.e., two on, one off – only paid in effect two-thirds of the annual sum.

Private Military Contractors are untouchable to any government

Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, consultants to the DCAF, March 2005, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), [http://smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security\_pdf/2005\_Schreier\_C aparini.pdf](http://smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_C%20aparini.pdf)

Military contractors are all too often legally unaccountable. They are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as soldiers are. In general, they are subject to the laws of the country they operate in, but in Iraq, for example, the (now defunct) Coalition Provisional Authority issued an order providing immunity from Iraqi law for actions by contractors or their employees in the course of their activities. The laws under which an American civilian contractor might be prosecuted for actions abroad are restrictive and have not really been tested. Legal accountability becomes even more difficult if the contractors are not US citizens, or if the country they work in does not have a functioning legal system. Under these circumstances, contractors are accountable only to the organization that pays them and its shareholders.

Private Military Companies pay more for their soldiers than the Armed Forces pays.

Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, consultants to the DCAF, March 2005, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces (DCAF), <http://smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_Caparini.pdf>

PMC and PSC employees can currently make $500 to $1,500 per day, compared with infantry soldiers’ wages that are around $70 per day. The cost of employing contractors of any kind increases during war. For example, insurance rates for civilian contractors increased 0000000by 300 to 400 percent in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq.

PMCs undermine reliability/military strategies

PMCs undermine efficiency-chain of command and reliability

 **Grubbs et al, 06** (Col. Lawrence K. et al., Prof. at National Defense University, , Final Report: Privatized Military Operations , Industrial College of the Armed Forces,” http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2006/2006%20PMOIS.doc)

Another risk rest in the indirect chain of command. In today’s battle space, the commander does not exercise every element of command with respect to private contractor personnel. In many cases, contracts are issued through supporting commands or other agencies in the United States for specific work to be performed in a theater of operation. Therefore, field commanders may have no direct contractual relationship with the contractors providing their support-and thus little control of that contractor. In addition, the theater commander has no command authority or influence over PMFs contracted directly by coalition partners, other government entities such as the Department of State, MGOs, or other firms. The only authority left to the theater commander is the control of contractor’s access to military facilities, and control of contractors movements through the provision of convoy security and tactical movement control measures such as checkpoints.

Private Contractors undermine military strategies

**Petersohn ‘10** , (Ulrich, Harvard Research Fellow, and member of International Studies Association, and British International Studies Association Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies”2010 \http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)

Contractors with a contractual relationship to the armed forces need to be managed. This might curb the decision-making capability of the commander, since management is a weaker form of influence than commanding. First, management can be a time-consuming process. To begin with, contracting poses difficult legal questions that are beyond the daily business of a military commander. The situation becomes even more complicated if the contractor has subcontracted parts of its services. Second, PMCs cannot be used beyond their contractual obligations; when circumstances change on the battlefield, the commander has to renegotiate. Yet because contractors follow an economic rationale, I will start from the assumption that they will usually perform and that adjustments of a contract is possible in most of the cases. Nevertheless, the management process is more time consuming than commanding and therefore constricts the commander’s leeway with regard to when to launch an operation. I will assume, though, that the impact of such situations on political control is limited, since we are only discussing timing, or the “when” aspect of political control. Of course, loss of control depends also—like the loss of functional control—on the importance of the task and the scope of outsourcing. Contractors with no contractual relationship to the armed forces are more difficult to synchronize. For instance, in Afghanistan and Iraq nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and allies are using contractors in the theater. Of particular interest in this matter are the security providers operating in the area of responsibility. Their operations may have a major impact on the political control exercised by the commander. Besides the operations of the enemy forces, the commander must now take into account a third armed—though not hostile—group. The lack of influence on or coordination with such an armed group operating within the area of responsibility can cause much more substantial loss of political control for the commander than in the situation involving government contractors. It can have effects on if, when, and how to use force, as the following examples show: 39 􀂾 The operation of the contractor can force the commander to change his plan during an operation. According to one officer, contractors escorted a local Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator into Najaf without the knowledge of the local commander while a military operation was in progress. When the administrator and his guards got involved in a firefight, the military had to send troops. This had a significant impact on the operation (GAO 2005, 22). 􀂾 The operations of contractors can sometimes change a commander’s entire strategy, as happened in Fallujah in March 2004. After four contractors had been ambushed and killed (Scahill 2007, 105–15) the U.S. government and high-ranking U.S. military officials became convinced that they should respond with an assault on the city: “Their death will not go unpunished. It will be at a time and a place of our choosing. We will hunt the criminals down.”10 For the military commander on the ground, Major General James Mattis, the orders triggered by the incident meant a change in strategy. He had come to Fallujah with the goal of breaking the cycle of violence and winning over the people with a culturally sensitive approach, high-profile infrastructure-improvement projects, and lowprofile raids against individuals who posed threats (Ricks 2006, 311–20). When the ambush occurred, Mattis wanted to treat the killings as a law enforcement issue. But his leadership had other plans (Scahill 2007, 114). Thus, as a result of the failed operation of a contractor, the military commander was forced to change his strategy.

PMCs undermine military operations

**Singer, 05** (P. W. Senior Fellow at Brookings, ‘5 [Foreign Affiars 84.2,march/april “Outsourcing War,” ln)

Still more worrisome from a policy standpoint is the question of lost control. Even when contractors do military jobs, they remain private businesses and thus fall outside the military chain of command and justice systems. Unlike military units, PMFS retain a choice over which contracts to take and can abandon or suspend operations for any reason, including if they become too dangerous or unprofitable; their employees, unlike soldiers, can always choose to walk off the job. Such freedom can leave the military in the lurch, as has occurred several times already in Iraq: during periods of intense violence, numerous private firms delayed, suspended, or ended their operations, placing great stress on U.S. troops. On other occasions, PMF employees endured even greater risks and dangers than their military equivalents. But military operations do not have room for such mixed results. The second general challenge with PMFS stems from the unregulated nature of what has become a global industry. There are insufficient controls over who can work for these firms and for whom these firms can work. The recruiting, screening, and hiring of individuals for public military roles is left in private hands. In Iraq, this problem was magnified by the gold-rush effect: many firms entering the market were either entirely new to the business or had rapidly expanded. To be fair, many PMF employees are extremely well qualified. A great number of retired U.S. special forces operatives have served with PMFS in Iraq, as have former members of the United Kingdom's elite SAS (Special Air Service). But the rush for profits has led some corporations to cut corners in their screening procedures. For example, U.S. Army investigators of the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal found that "approximately 35 percent of the contract interrogators [hired by the firm CACI] lacked formal military training as interrogators." In other cases, investigations of contractors serving in Iraq revealed the hiring of a former British Army soldier who had been jailed for working with Irish terrorists and a former South African soldier who had admitted to firebombing the houses of more than 60 political activists during the apartheid era.

Inadequate management decreases military capabilities

**Petersohn ‘10** , (Ulrich, Harvard Research Fellow, and member of International Studies Association, and British International Studies Association Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies”2010 \http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)

Furthermore, the DoD has an inadequate number of personnel to oversee the contracts. In 2005 the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) was short-staffed, with 41 officers administering 6,500 contracts (Office of SIGIR 2005, 11). This level had not changed by the end of 2006, when the army’s contracting agency was downsizing its force and struggling to find the necessary expertise to provide support (GAO 2006a, 21). Without adequate personnel, management of military contractors is almost impossible and increases risk that the commander will lose influence when deciding whether to exercise force. When contracting officers have to oversee too many contracts, problems cannot be addressed on time, with certain resolutions taking more than a week (PBS interview, Hammes, 2005). This becomes worse when the contract is not managed by the regional contracting officer but instead by personnel who do not even reside within the theater. “According to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency official in Iraq, relying on support from contract oversight personnel 44 outside the theatre of operations may not meet the needs of military commanders in Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher operational tempo of a contingency operation in a deployed location” (GAO 2006a, 23). Finally the commanders being deployed lack training in how to use contractors. Without this knowledge, they are unable to incorporate the contractors in ensuring the unity of effort. In one case officers showed confusion as to the command and control of contractors (Ibid., 29).14 In other cases contractors were instructed by a military commander to perform a task outside the scope of their contract (Ibid., 30). This lack of training can also cause delays in the conduct of the mission, when the commander has to gather information while already deployed. Because of officers’ inadequate training as to the role of contractors, the instrument of sanctions is a double-edged sword. When a commander has limited knowledge about the role of contractors, such an action can have unintended repercussions. Many commanders, for example, do not want to work with contractors and want them out of their area of responsibility (GAO 2006a, 29). If they restrict contractor access, however, such a move can have serious consequences with respect to the ongoing mission. The scope of U.S. outsourcing itself—coupled with a lack of oversight—allows for even more serious problems. A high level of outsourcing in conjunction with commanders who lack management capabilities causes a greater loss of political control as compared with a situation in which fewer tasks are outsourced.

Commander’s lack of control undermines military success

**Petersohn ‘10** , (Ulrich, Harvard Research Fellow, and member of International Studies Association, and British International Studies Association Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies”2010 \http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)

Another way for the agent, or contractor, to maximize profits is by providing less service than contracted or by performing poorly. Since it is often impossible to define which services will be needed, and to what extent, in a conflict situation, the contracts give ample leeway for interpretation on quality and scope. Various factors can influence the cost-benefit analysis for contractors in a hostile environment. When, for example, the contractor compares the costs of staying in the theater versus withdrawing and violating the contract, the latter might sometimes seem more attractive (Leander 2006, 79). The more hostile an environment, 8 the greater the likelihood of “defective” behavior from the contractor. This dynamic contributes to the loss of the capability to produce security autonomously (functional control). The connection between political and functional control is noteworthy. In contrast to the role of a soldier, a contractor is not part of the military and is not integrated in the chain of command. Therefore, he or she cannot be ordered to stay in the theater and perform a duty beyond what is described in the contract. This might constrain a commander in his or her decision as to when, where, and how to use force and therefore cause a loss of political control. I will address these questions in Chapter 3.

Private Military Contractors answer only to the companies that employ them

Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, consultants to the DCAF, March 2005, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces (DCAF), <http://smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_Caparini.pdf>

A voluntary code is insufficient to regulate the private military and security industry because, lacking the force of law, it would not enable the government to prevent the activities of disreputable companies and would not give the government legal recourse if a PMC or PSC were found to have damaged national interest abroad. Thus, it would not meet one of the main objectives of regulation, namely to avoid a situation where companies might damage national interests. The lack of legal backing would mean that the government might be compelled to watch while a company pursued a course that was plainly contrary to the public interest. • Individual company codes of conduct are not sufficient to regulate the industry as a whole.

PMCs discretion in dangerous zones undermines US military strength

 **Mobley, 04 (**Blake W. MA of Public Policy candidate @ Kennedy School, [Journal of Public and International Affairs 15, “ Outsourcing Post-conflict Operations: Designing a System of Contract Management and Oversight,” p. 32-3)

Military personnel cannot order contractors to remain in the field. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, military personnel can be ordered to remain in their positions, but contractors are not subject to this regulation (Singer 2003, 161). At the CPA’s recent “information session” for contractors, the Retired Navy Admiral who oversees reconstruction contracts explained that the only consequence for a contractor leaving the work site prematurely was that the employee or company would “have to give up a large percentage of their bonus pay” (Industry Day 2003). Though the U.S. government can initiate legal action against an offending contractor on the basis of non-performance, contractors may decide that their monetary incentive is not great enough to offset the risk they incur (Singer 2003, 161). For non-profit contractors, the incentive to risk life and limb may be even lower. We would expect, thus, the greatest level of contractor failure when contracted employees face life-threatening circumstances. Contractor failure resulting from threats to employees has intermittently occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Charles Mahan, the Army’s recently-retired top logistics officer, complained in July 2003 that contractors were not dependable. Many U.S. soldiers went without fresh food, toilets, and showers for months because civilian contractors refused to deploy to dangerous regions of Iraq (Bianco 2003). One soldier deployed to Iraq from the 101st Airborne complained that a number of Bechtel employees abandoned their trucks when they came under fire (Truscott 2003). Gordon Sumner, Head of the Directorate of Contracting at the USACE, verified that contractor abandonment of worksites due to attacks and safety concerns “has been a problem” in the reconstruction effort (Sumner 2004). He asserted that it can sometimes take up to a week before the military can re-secure a worksite so that contractors can resume their construction plans (Sumner 2004). Contractor employees are indeed justified in fearing for their lives. U.S. officials and contractors contend that there have already been hundreds of attacks on contract employees, with several dozen personnel killed or wounded and numerous kidnapped (Richter 2003, Seib 2003). San Diego’s Titan Corporation is providing thousands of translators to the military in Iraq, and as of April 3 the company had already lost thirteen Outsourcing Post-conflict Operations: Designing a System for Contract Management and Oversight employees in attacks since July 2003 (Bigelow and Calbreath 2004). By early December 2003, many contractors were seeking refuge inside a U.S. stronghold in Baghdad known as the Green Zone. Interpreters, cleaning workers, and other coalition employees were “begging” for space in the Green Zone while Bechtel had reportedly barricaded its compound in Iraq with two additional layers of sandbags. Even the USACE admitted that their contractors are in danger: “Fuel trucks have been shot at, damaged, or stolen…fuel truck drivers have been mugged and had their vehicles stolen” (USACE FAQ 2003). Additionally, the fact that KBR’s first-ever combat casualty was incurred as recently as August 2003 highlights the relative unfamiliarity that many contractors may have with life and death choices in a war zone. Contractor failure is likely to become more common as terrorists and insurgents probe for the U.S. military’s “weak spots,” including the military’s reliance on contractors. Indeed, there is evidence that insurgents are already exploiting such vulnerabilities. On December 12, 2003, the Washington Post reported that anxiety among contractors was increasing as insurgents appeared to be targeting unarmed civilians that looked foreign. The same report described how a major South Korean subcontractor for Washington Group International fled Iraq due to safety concerns, consequently setting back reconstruction of Iraq’s power grid. Insurgents also successfully brought down a DHL plane with a missile in late November, which caused the military to ground all commercial flights at Baghdad International Airport (Fam 2003). In the most recent, and perhaps the most shocking, case of an attack on contractors, four American employees of Blackwater Security Consulting were ambushed, murdered, and mutilated in the city of Falluja on March 27, 2004 (Chaffin 2004).

PMCs are not screened properly—can divulge information and may have sympathies for the enemy.

Fred R. **Schreier,** Consultant for Geneva Center for Democratic Control . "PMCs." DCAF, March 2005. Web. 26 Jun 20**10.**

Security is also an issue in that contractor personnel are not necessarily subject to the same security screening and vetting as regular forces personnel, particularly foreigners and those who may be hired in theatre.145 They may have sympathies toward the enemy or, in the peace support context, with one or other of the opposing forces. They also cannot be expected to pass on any information that may contribute to the intelligence picture, and they may, in fact, be a threat to security. In hostilities, they may even pass information to the enemy on troop movements or dispositions key to the success of a future operation. In the peacekeeping context, the leaking of information on negotiations or bargaining tactics may undo a great deal of what has already been achieved. Opposing forces may also find it relatively easy to infiltrate contractor staff.146 The use of insecure commercial communications systems by contractors may also be a security concern.147

PMCs are perceived as a lesser commitment that national military forces

**Schwartz et al, 2008** (Mosche, analyst in defense acquisition policy, Congressional Research Service “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues” August 5, 2008 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf> 6/27/10)

The desire to entrust the capability to use force legally on behalf of the United States to private companies, including those employing non-U.S. citizens has foreign policy implications for the United States. Although many analysts perceive the officially sanctioned private use of force as significantly eroding the modern state’s monopoly on the use of force, whether this erosion is beneficial or detrimental to U.S. foreign policy and to the international order is a matter of dispute.217 To the extent that private companies are perceived as participating in combat operations, it may be difficult for the United States to persuade other states to recognize contractors’ rights to protection under the Geneva Conventions. On a symbolic level, the use of private companies may be perceived by some observers as signaling a lesser U.S. commitment than would the use of national military forces.

PMCs leak key intel

**Mobley, 04 (**Blake W. MA of Public Policy candidate @ Kennedy School, [Journal of Public and International Affairs 15, “ Outsourcing Post-conflict Operations: Designing a System of Contract Management and Oversight,” p. 32-3)

Military personnel in deployed areas were typically unaware of all contractors supporting their operations, and thus failed to oversee or manage them. Consequently, local combatant commanders were unable to efficiently coordinate contractor support for troops or protection support for contractor personnel. Inadequate oversight also prevented military personnel from comparing contractor service quality or determining whether services were being duplicated (GAO 2003). Poor oversight has enabled some contractors to pursue cost-cutting strategies that compromise U.S. military intelligence. In one episode, the United States hired the firm Airscan to provide live broadcasts of NATO peacekeeping and anti-terrorist operations. Airscan attempted to minimize its costs by using unencrypted commercial television relays to transmit U.S. military intelligence data. As a consequence, the contractor allowed anyone in Europe owning a commercial satellite dish to view supposedly top secret broadcasts (Singer 2003, 163).

Private Contractors undermine military strategies

**Petersohn ‘10** , (Ulrich, Harvard Research Fellow, and member of International Studies Association, and British International Studies Association Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies”2010 \http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)

Contractors with a contractual relationship to the armed forces need to be managed. This might curb the decision-making capability of the commander, since management is a weaker form of influence than commanding. First, management can be a time-consuming process. To begin with, contracting poses difficult legal questions that are beyond the daily business of a military commander. The situation becomes even more complicated if the contractor has subcontracted parts of its services. Second, PMCs cannot be used beyond their contractual obligations; when circumstances change on the battlefield, the commander has to renegotiate. Yet because contractors follow an economic rationale, I will start from the assumption that they will usually perform and that adjustments of a contract is possible in most of the cases. Nevertheless, the management process is more time consuming than commanding and therefore constricts the commander’s leeway with regard to when to launch an operation. I will assume, though, that the impact of such situations on political control is limited, since we are only discussing timing, or the “when” aspect of political control. Of course, loss of control depends also—like the loss of functional control—on the importance of the task and the scope of outsourcing. Contractors with no contractual relationship to the armed forces are more difficult to synchronize. For instance, in Afghanistan and Iraq nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and allies are using contractors in the theater. Of particular interest in this matter are the security providers operating in the area of responsibility. Their operations may have a major impact on the political control exercised by the commander. Besides the operations of the enemy forces, the commander must now take into account a third armed—though not hostile—group. The lack of influence on or coordination with such an armed group operating within the area of responsibility can cause much more substantial loss of political control for the commander than in the situation involving government contractors. It can have effects on if, when, and how to use force, as the following examples show: 39 􀂾 The operation of the contractor can force the commander to change his plan during an operation. According to one officer, contractors escorted a local Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator into Najaf without the knowledge of the local commander while a military operation was in progress. When the administrator and his guards got involved in a firefight, the military had to send troops. This had a significant impact on the operation (GAO 2005, 22). 􀂾 The operations of contractors can sometimes change a commander’s entire strategy, as happened in Fallujah in March 2004. After four contractors had been ambushed and killed (Scahill 2007, 105–15) the U.S. government and high-ranking U.S. military officials became convinced that they should respond with an assault on the city: “Their death will not go unpunished. It will be at a time and a place of our choosing. We will hunt the criminals down.”10 For the military commander on the ground, Major General James Mattis, the orders triggered by the incident meant a change in strategy. He had come to Fallujah with the goal of breaking the cycle of violence and winning over the people with a culturally sensitive approach, high-profile infrastructure-improvement projects, and lowprofile raids against individuals who posed threats (Ricks 2006, 311–20). When the ambush occurred, Mattis wanted to treat the killings as a law enforcement issue. But his leadership had other plans (Scahill 2007, 114). Thus, as a result of the failed operation of a contractor, the military commander was forced to change his strategy.

PMCs are perceived as a lesser commitment/policy failures

Private military reflects broad policy failures

**Isenber, 2004** (David, PMC specialist, British-American Security Information Council “A Fistful of Contractors: the Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”)

However, while over-reliance on private firms providing inadequately trained personnel certainly contributed to the scandal at Abu Ghraib, it is an issue that reflects broader policy failings. In short, the Bush administration has tried to fight a war and nation-build on the cheap. It has failed to commit the necessary number of trained and qualified personnel and failed to supply the necessary resources required for an occupation force under international law. In such a scenario failure and criminal behavior by both private and public actors was virtually inevitable.

PMCs decrease state power

PMCs erode state power

**Petersohn ‘10** , (Ulrich, Harvard Research Fellow, and member of International Studies Association, and British International Studies Association Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies”2010 \http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)

Anna Leander argues that outsourcing erodes the political, cultural, and symbolic foundation of states’ authority regarding the use of force. Private firms are increasingly accepted as actors in military matters. In the process, they gain more and more of a say in the use of force and are able to shape the understanding of security, threats, and national interests (Leander 2006, 137–43). Paul Verkuil (2006, 2) goes as far as to consider the trend toward privatizing and contracting of government functions as a threat to the democratic principle of accountability and a shift from public to private governance. Deborah Avant’s findings are similar. She shows that outsourcing enhances PMCs’ influence on the foreign policy process 2 and that purchasing services on the market undermines the collective monopoly of the state in controlling the use of violence.

PMCs 🡪 instability

PMCs should be phased out for stability

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

The primary reason the United States and our coalition partners are still in Iraq is to provide a secure and stable environment that allows Iraq to establish their version democracy. The United States and our coalition partners recognize Iraq as a sovereign country, and we respect Iraq’s authority and ability to provide security within its borders. In order for this respect to have relevance, the United States and our coalition partners cannot continue to allow, and in some cases hire, private security companies to operate as independent paramilitary organizations. Third country nationals waving and firing weapons indiscriminately are of little value in providing long-term stability and security for Iraq. The United States does not allow private security companies to roam our countryside, point weapons in the faces of our citizens, and discharge their weapons indiscriminately - therefore we cannot allow these practices to continue in Iraq. If we do, we will continue to undermine the sovereignty of Iraq.

**U.S. Must withdraw PMCs so the new Iraqi government can be recognized as a sovereign country**

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

The solution is clear; in order for the new Iraqi government to be recognized as a sovereign country, it must be responsible for every aspect of security in Iraq. With the recent increase in Iraqi security capabilities, the overall ability of the new Iraqi government to provide all aspects of security – to include that of providing security for contractors operating as part of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq – is much improved. The increasing security capability shows Iraqi citizens’ resolve for ensuring the security of their country, and also indicates the availability a large pool of potential labor from which to draw and form this new security force. While in

2003/2004 the strategy was not feasible due to a lack of qualified labor, today, this labor potential exists, and is expanding.

The strategy to support this solution is the elimination of all private security personnel. This includes private security personnel operating on Iraq’s roadways for convoy security, private bodyguards, and static security operations conducted outside of United States

government or coalition member controlled bases and camps. In short, all security requirements

will become the responsibility of the new Iraqi government, with the only exception being security for companies that are in direct support of U.S. military or coalition member combat operations. The U.S. military or coalition members will maintain responsibility to provide security for companies involved in supporting combat operations, such as is presently provided by U.S. troops for Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KRB).

Accountability

Lack of accountability of private military damages credibility and security of the US military

**Scahill, 2010** (Jeremy,journalist“Schakowsky” Rebel Reports January 13th, http://rebel reports.com/post/332555848/s chakowsky-prepares-legislation-to-ban-blackwater June 24th,2010)

In 2009, the U.S. government employed well over 20,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there is every indication that these figures will continue to rise in 2010.  These men and women are not part of the U.S. military or government.  They do not wear the uniform of the United States, though their behavior has, on numerous occasions, severely damaged the credibility and security of our military and harmed our relationship with other governments. In addition, legal jurisdiction over civilian contractors remains murky, leaving the very real possibility that we cannot punish contractors who commit serious crimes while serving the United States government overseas.  As illustrated by the recent dismissal of the case against the Blackwater guards accused of killing 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007, prosecution of private security contractors who commit severe abuses remains exceedingly difficult.It has been recently reported that at least two of the men killed by the New Year’s Eve suicide attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan was a contractor employed by Xe Services, the company formerly known as Blackwater.  If true, this confirms the extent to which private companies have become integrated into not just our military and State Department, but also our intelligence services.

PMC are immune from prosecution

**Isenber, 2004** (David, PMC specialist, British-American Security Information Council “A Fistful of Contractors: the Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”)

Under a public notice issued June 26, 2003 by the CPA, civilian contractors enjoy protection from local criminal prosecution. The exact language is as follows Coalition contractors who are not normally resident in Iraq may be subject to the CPA’s or Iraq’s jurisdiction, as authorized by the administrator. Additionally, some of the administrative regulations regarding contractors will not apply to their contracts with the Coalition.201 And the next day the CPA issued Order Number 17 on the “Status of The Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors.” Section 3, dealing with contractors, states that :Contractors will not be liable to Iraqi law with respect to their business and employment dealings, nor ‘with respect to acts performed by them within their official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions’. Any Iraqi or CPA legal action against a Contractor for crimes unrelated to their contract require the written consent of the CPA Administrator.202

 PMCs are operating with no accountability—U.S. Government looks other way.

**Human Rights First,** . "Overview of PMC." *Human Rights First*. N.p., 200**8**. Web. 26 Jun 2010

The U.S. government's response to private contractor violence and abuse toward local nationals seems to follow one of two patterns: To ignore it so long as it does not become a high-profile, embarrassing media issue. Or when incidents occasionally but recurringly do become known and sufficiently embarrassing, to express surprise and shock that such things could happen, as if they had never happened before. The confusion, lack of coordination, and ad hoc nature of U.S. government investigations of the September 16 Blackwater shootings in Nisoor Square follows the second pattern, and highlight the fact that the U.S. Government at this late date still has no established plan or procedure for investigating allegations of serious violent crime involving PSCs and other private contractors fielded abroad by the U.S. government. As a result - and in vivid contrast to members of the armed forces - private security contractors operate, and feel that they can operate, in a "law-free zone" in which systems of criminal accountability are absent, unused, or dysfunctional. And where there is ***no*** accountability there is a culture of impunity. Human Rights First has been examining the dramatically expanded role of PSCs at war and the U.S. government's abject failure to control their actions or to hold them criminally responsible for their actions.

Iraqi Government has no control over the PMCs operating in *their* country.

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

The Iraqi government is very limited in overseeing private security companies because Iraqi law does not apply to private security contractors. This is according to Nick Bicanic, who produced a documentary called Shadow Company that portrays nation-states paying private companies to provide armed civilians, in lieu of soldiers, on an unprecedented scale. Mr. Bicanic stated further in his interview that Iraqi laws do not apply to private security companies and as a result, the private security contractor is not liable. As a result, when something happens, like a shooting, the person responsible is usually just removed from the country. 26 So in reality, the deputy interior minister has no authority to oversee the private security companies operating in his country

E.P. that private military is not prosecuted for human rights violations

**Gómez del Prado 08** (José L, member of the UN Working Group on the Use of “Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10523

6/25/10)

PMSC personnel in Iraq are involved in exchange of fire with insurgents on a daily basis. Security provisions necessarily involve military engagement. There is no perceptible difference between regular soldiers and the private contractors protecting convoys (transporting ammunitions and fuel), material, buildings or persons. Providing security in such an environment necessitates being armed and ready to shoot, often under uncertain circumstances where combatants and civilians are difficult to separate. As observed in many incidents, PMSC employees can use excessive force and shoot indiscriminately resulting in civilian casualties. There are cases where PMSC employees have used forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by international law2. Private contractors often circulate without identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted glasses and no plates, behaving similarly to the infamous death squads. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries with the largest presence of PMSC staff, the population is confused and finds it extremely difficult to distinguish employees of different companies from state forces. Reports indicate erratic behavior of PMSCs employees in Iraq with mottos such as: “what happens here to-day, stays with us today”. It has also been alleged that “private security guards” would also detain Iraqis without authorization.3 According to coinciding different sources, on 16 September 2007, in Al-Nisour Square in the neighborhood of Mansour in Baghdad, security contractors protecting a United States Department convoy, which was allegedly attacked, opened fire on civilians killing 17 persons, using security company helicopters firing into the streets, resulting in civilian casualties and injuries. The security firm Blackwater claimed that its personnel came under attack by “armed enemies” and fired back in self-defense. Iraqi authorities and witnesses claim the security personnel opened fire unprovoked. In October 2007, an oversight panel of the United States House of Representatives released a report indicating that Blackwater employees had been involved in at least 196 firefights in Iraq since 2005, an average of 1.4 shootings per week. In 84% of those cases, the report stated, Blackwater employees opened fire first, despite contract stipulations to make use of force only in self-defense.Unfortunately, the case of Blackwater is not an exception. Other PMSC have been reported to be involved in such incidents, in particular the killing of four women in Kirkuk and the involvement in a shooting of employees of another PMSC protecting a convoy, in central Baghdad, which left two Iraqi women dead.4 This type of incidents involving PMSC has been prevalent in the reconstruction of Iraq since its 2003 occupation: other PMSC have also been involved in similar incidents.Outsourcing military and security functions has an inherent danger in losing State control over the use of force. In Iraq, by Order 17 issued by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority on 27 June 2004, contractors are immune from prosecution. PMSCs often operate outside government control and with limited effective oversight from State organs. They provide services from interrogation to strategic intelligence in a field that is a key aspect of waging war and may not only cause torture and inhumane treatment but violate rights such as freedom of movement and privacy.. When involved in crimes or human rights violations, these private security guards have not been sanctioned or brought before a court of justice, as exemplified by the involvement of contractors in torture and shootings against civilians in Iraq. The employees of two PMSCs who were involved in human rights abuses in the prison of Abu Ghraib in 2003 have never been subject to external investigations nor legally sanctioned, despite assurances given by the Government of the United States of America. U.S.

NO limit on PMCs in Iraq

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

While there are tactical risks in phasing out private security contractors, the risks in doing nothing are much greater. Currently, there are no controls on how many private security companies or contractors operate in Iraq – today, tomorrow, or two years down the road. A solid strategy to phase out private security contractors and replace them with an Iraqi special security force, manned by Iraqis, expertly trained, well equipped, and answering only to the sovereign government of Iraq, will result in a much safer, more secure, and stable Iraq.

PMCs are expensive

Private Military Companies’ costs exceed the total expense for multiple US wars

Peter W. Singer, worked for the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Department of Defense and has a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2004, *The Private Military industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?*

Private firms play even greater roles in the continuing occupation. The largest, Halliburton’s KBR division, has provided the mission’s logistics under the LOGCAP contract. In 2003, the firm charged the U.S. government $4.3 billion for work it had undertaken in Iraq. The 2004 numbers are not in yet, but Halliburton reports it made $1.7 billion from work carried out in Iraq during the second quarter. Overall, it is thought that the Iraq contracts for Halliburton will ultimately be worth as much as $13 billion. To give a sense of how significant such firms have grown to be, the amount that Halliburton will make from the war is roughly 2.5 times what it cost the U.S. government to fight the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Looking at the figures more historically, when the cost of other past wars are put into current dollar amounts, the amount that the U.S. government will pay Halliburton is almost the same as it cost to fight the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, and the Spanish American War combined. Amusingly, the $1.8 billion amount that the U.S. Army has accused Halliburton of over-billing, is actually the same amount that it cost the U.S. to fight the Mexican-American War in current dollars (a war which brought California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Utah into the Union, as well as ensured that George Bush's own home state of Texas would stay part of the U.S.). Or, the U.S. could have taken the Halliburton funds and instead paid $573.30 to each Iraqi citizen (who numbers 22,675,617), i.e. the equivalent of just under 6 month’s wages.

Private Military Companies are scamming the US

Peter W. Singer, worked for the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Department of Defense and has a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2004, *The Private Military industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?*

Firstly, when it comes to military responsibilities, the incentives of private companies to turn profit may not always be in line with the client’s interests or those of the public good. While in an ideal world there would be good competition, management, and oversight, producing cost and qualitative efficiencies, governmental contracting is not always set up to ensure this. Thus, the general concerns with any contracting handover (overcharging, over-billing hours, providing insufficiently trained personnel, quality assurance issues, etc.) cross over into the military realm. This has been at the centre of the war-profiteering allegations thrown at such firms as Halliburton and now Custer Battles. These firms were operating under cost-plus contracts that were ripe for abuse, with the Halliburton examples ranging from overpriced gasoline to charges for services not rendered (such as billing for meals not cooked or convoys shipping “sailboat fuel,” as firm truck drivers laughingly termed charging for moving empty pallets from site to site). At least $1.8 billion of Halliburton's charges for work in Iraq are presently in dispute by the U.S. Army for insufficient documentation. Just looking at the food services part of Halliburton’s contract, U.S. Army auditors have reported that KBR overcharged by an average of around 40%.

PMCs🡪 decrease of human rights

International Communities are ignoring PMCs violation of Human Rights

**Cario Institute for Human Rights Studies**, . "Closing the Loophole: PMCs in Iraq." *Jurist*. N.p., October 2009. Web.

Though most lawmakers and American citizens recognize, at least on a rational level, that Blackwater is not the beginning and end of the problem of private military and security companies (PMSCs), the indictment of the six gunmen implicated in the Nisour Square shooting seemed to bring a collective sigh of relief…and subsequent legislative stagnation. In truth, contractors are not unique to the Iraq War. They are not unique to the United States. They are not even unique to this century. Rather, PMSCs, operate in every corner of the globe, performing every conceivable support function from food service to infrastructure construction, to building security, to human resources management, to policing, interrogation, and intelligence. States have gradually surrendered their abilities to self-sufficiently perform their responsibilities in the areas of national defense and security in favor of employing private forces. Yet the international community and the individual national governments that employ contractors seem content to ignore this growing threat to human rights and state sovereignty, or at least pretend the threat has abated.

\*\*Iraq Instability\*\*

Democracy Internal Links

Using PMCs causes Democracy to destabilize

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

Vesting warmaking decisions - to authorize war, fund war, and supply and regulate the personnel involved in war - in Congress advanced, as I have intimated above, the two chief aims of the American experiment in constitutional democracy. The United States would be a limited government: its Commander-in-Chief would be constrained by sets of laws, deliberative processes, and by other, equally ambitious leaders in **[\*1051]** coordinate branches. n170 And the United States would also be a great democracy: its decisions would reflect the will of the citizenry. n171 Hence, Congress as the most direct representatives of the People, would necessarily be involved in military policy, simultaneously promoting the virtues of limited government by checking the perceived natural inclinations of the strong Executive n172 and upholding the ideals of democracy by remaining the true servants of the People. Moreover, decisions by the president to wage war could not be undertaken without first benefiting from the deliberative insights of a legislative assembly and **[\*1052]** without concomitantly securing the tacit blessings and consent of the citizenry. n173

Military privatization threatens this framework of coordinate decisionmaking. The potential to outsource combat roles necessarily carries with it opportunities for the Executive to wield powers unimaginable were it limited to the use of regular, U.S. troops. By shifting responsibilities away from America's armed forces and delegating them to private contractors, the president can circumvent constitutional obligations to share warmaking authority with Congress. Privatization, therefore, may destabilize the delicate balance of powersharing built into what Dean Harold Koh calls the National Security Constitution, n174 by weakening a critical check on presidential power - a failure of constitutional governance - and also by engendering a level of distrust and sense of disenfranchisement among the population writ large - a failure of [\*1053] democratic legitimacy. In the process, the People lose effective control over the helm of national security policy; and, institutionally speaking, once lost, such control will take time and considerable effort for Congress to regain.

Using PMCs and bypassing Democracy causes the People to lose confidence in the governmental system of the United States.

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

Privatization, accordingly, creates unprecedented opportunities for the Executive to circumvent Congress and act unilaterally in military affairs. By opting to employ private contractors - rather than members of the U.S. Armed Forces - the president can avoid triggering many of Congress's commonly exercised war powers, which are by-and-large specifically linked to constitutional authority over America's military branches. n202 Hence, the utilization of private agents has led scholars such as Professor Jules Lobel to suggest engagement without U.S. troops could be a shortcut around "democratic decisionmaking that distorts the democratic process and is fundamentally incompatible with the demands of our constitutional system." n203 Whether bypassing Congress is an intentional aim of privatization or an inadvertent byproduct (perhaps, the Executive sought to reap cost-efficiencies), this damage to the tenets of separation of powers, even if temporary - until Congress can revise its background assumptions and seek to establish formal authority over privateers - could compromise the strategic and physical security of the nation, the well-being of individuals inappropriately endangered, and the confidence of the People in the democratic practices and institutions of this nation. Below, I describe how privatization enables the Executive to bypass many of the avenues through which Congress typically exercises its constitutional authority over military affairs.

Using PMC violates two major principals associated with democracy.

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

In Part III, I commence with the inquiry's critical analysis: understanding these structural harms. In this Part, I describe how the Executive can use military contractors to direct national security policy with greater impunity and less oversight than it could if it only had U.S. troops at its disposal. To the extent that Congress's warmaking authority is tied primarily to its regulatory and war-authorizing powers over the American military qua U.S. Armed Forces, a president interested in exercising more unilateral control might hire private contractors in lieu of U.S. soldiers and hence avoid having to collaborate as closely with the legislative branch. In circumventing congressional authority, the Executive violates the two principal constitutional imperatives: limited government - by bypassing Congress and preventing it from checking the ambitions of the president - and democratic government - by acting covertly (i.e., without congressional or, by extension, the People's input) and thus failing to make inclusive policy decisions legitimated by popular consent. While a paradigm case of tactical privatization would involve executive intent to evade congressional monitoring and to avoid having to request authorization for engaging troops in hostilities, harms along these lines would nevertheless ensue even if the president had no such insidious objective - and was instead focused mainly on maximiz-ing economic efficiency. Simply and even inadvertently operating outside of the carefully arranged framework of coordinate military policymaking over the U.S. Armed Forces still has the effect of limiting Congress's formal and informal involvement in decisionmaking.

The President is bypassing Congresses warmaking powers when hiring PMCs.

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

First, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, customary practice, and statutory framework laws such as the War Powers Resolution, the president shares many warmaking powers with Congress. While retaining exclusive jurisdiction over command decisionmaking, the president must nevertheless seek, inter alia, authorization and funding from Congress to deploy U.S. troops into zones of hostility. But, many of Congress's powers over military affairs are keyed to its Article I authority over the Armed Forces per se. Congress can, for instance, regulate the use and number of servicemen and women abroad, curtail funding for operations, and withhold support for a military engagement. Hence, as it stands, the president must often seek congressional approval in some form or another. If the Executive were, however, to deploy private troops in lieu of U.S. soldiers, it might be able to evade much of Congress's oversight jurisdiction - at least temporarily. Without having to seek authorization and funds from the nation-al legislature, the president can more easily engage in unilateral policymaking and dispatch private contractors who are not part of the regular U.S. military. In so doing, objectives can perhaps be achieved more swiftly and with less political wrangling and opposition. This privatization agenda is discussed further in Part III.

Hiring PMCs and Bypassing Congress hurts our democracy and moral standing.

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

While the immediate benefits of cost-savings, economic efficiency, and greater political maneuverability provide strong incentives for policymakers to consider employing private contractors, a full accounting of the concomitant harms is also in order. In the parts that follow, I focus on structural harms and catalogue the depth and breadth of the potential dangers brought about when core governmental responsibility over military engagement is delegated to privateers. Indeed, whether explicitly seeking to evade political and legal constraints - or even inadvertently doing so in the course of trying to save money - the enhanced discretion associated with military privatization may: (1) subvert the con-stitutional imperatives of limited and democratic government, (2) diminish the effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, and (3) undermine the already weak diplomatic and ***moral standing*** of the United States abroad.

PMCs are not in line with the priorities of the people and make fewer checks on how the President conducts military affairs.

**Micheals**, John D., University of California—Los Angeles School of Law. March 200**4**

These oversight difficulties cannot be reduced to mere accountability lapses. Rather these oversight difficulties also sound in terms of structural concerns about the architecture of American government. Even if Congress insisted on more centralization in the contracting process, because of the nature and design of military contracts and because of issues of private-sector proprietary information more generally, it is still questionable whether adequate information would readily be disclosed to an oversight committee were either a private military firm or a government official subpoenaed and asked to testify about critical details of an agreement. n228 This proprietary information concern has already become a major source of executive-congressional tension in the commercial military contracting realm. One notable example involves the Air Force invoking the principle of proprietary information to fend off repeated [\*1070] requests by Congress to disclose certain information regarding its Tanker contract with Boeing. n229 Therefore, with limited congressional oversight and reporting, there are comparatively fewer political and legal checks constraining how the president conducts military affairs. The Executive's policies may not be in line with the priorities and principles of Congress and the American people, such as when, for instance, the State Department, under the AECA framework, approved requests from MPRI to perform military consulting services for the repressive regime running Equitorial Guinea as well as for the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria. n230 It is at least debatable whether such permission would have been as readily granted were congressional consent a bona fide prerequisite. And, strategic interests and prudential policymaking aside, the lack of effective oversight deprives Congress and the People of an opportunity to debate normative concerns about delegating governmental policymaking decisions to privateers in the first place.

Democracy Impacts

Democracy in Iraq solves many major problems and is the First legitimate Iraqi Government.

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Research Director of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy, “Democracy in Iraq” 2003

Full-blown democracy in Iraq offers the best prospects for solving Iraq’s problems over the long term for several reasons. Democracy would provide a means for Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups for reconciling, or at least create political mechanisms for handling, divisions by means other than force. It would create a truly legitimate Iraqi government—one that did not repress any elements of the Iraqi people but instead worked for all of them. For the first time in Iraq’s history, the government would serve to enrich its citizenry rather than enrich itself at its citizenry’s expense

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Democracy in Iraq will Politically Stabilize the region.

**Zakaria** Fareed is an author and foreign affairs analyst who hosts "[*Fareed Zakaria GPS*](http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/fareed.zakaria.gps/)" on CNN  March 5,2010

CNN: Why should Americans pay particular attention to what's happening with this election? Zakaria: Two reasons: First if Iraq is able to achieve some degree of consolidation in terms of its democracy, it will add dramatically to its political stability, which is of course the most important condition that will allow American forces to continue their withdrawal down to zero combat forces or close to zero combat forces, as President Obama has hoped. And the second is, if Iraq is able to consolidate as a democracy, it will mean there will have been some success in Iraq that we can point to for the vast investment and the vast expenditure of blood and treasure that the United States has put in. I'm not saying that you can make an easy statement that this justifies the invasion, I'm simply saying that there will be a very strong positive outcome in Iraq that will at least be set against the cost.

A2 Iraq can’t build a democracy

Iraq has the capability to build a stable democracy

Daniel Byman, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 2003, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities”

All is not doom and gloom for a democratic Iraq. The various statistics that scholars look to as possible indicators of the success of democracy also suggest that Iraq has a reasonably good set of "building blocks" to make the transition successfully. 95 As Table 2 indicates, in key categories such as per capita income, literacy, and urbanization, Iraq is comparable to a large number of other states that have made (or are making) a successful transition from autocracy to democracy such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Kenya.

Iraq also may have economic advantages over other fledgling democracies. Adam Przeworski points out that new democratic institutions are often introduced at a time of economic crisis, making it more challenging for them to survive. 96 Iraq, as its oil wealth is developed, may enjoy an economic boom in the coming decade. 97 Even a massive increase in Iraq's oil wealth, however, will not enable the country to flourish economically if its debt is not forgiven and if broader economic reform is not undertaken.

In any event, the Kurdish part of northern Iraq has already enjoyed noteworthy success, offering hope for the rest of the country. Kurdish areas have suffered tribal and factional infighting, hostile neighbors, economic dislocation, and other problems that might disrupt democracy. Nevertheless, power sharing still occurred. At local levels, elections have been free and competitive, there is considerable freedom of the press, basic civil liberties are secure, and the bureaucracies are responsive to popular concerns and surprisingly accountable. As Barham Salih, one of the Kurdish regional prime ministers notes, "If democracy can be introduced in Iraqi Kurdistan, traditionally the [End Page 70] [Begin Page 72] least politically developed part of Iraq, the prognosis for the rest of Iraq is good." 98

Iraq is also the best endowed of any of the Arab states in terms of both its physical and societal attributes. Iraq has tremendous agricultural potential as well as oil wealth. 99 Prior to the Gulf War, it had probably the best educated, most secular, and most progressive population of all of the Arab states. For decades Iraq's large professional classes have furnished Baghdad with relatively efficient and skilled bureaucrats and technicians, and while many have been forced to drive taxis, they are still there, waiting to return to their prior occupations. 100

Civilian Relations

PMC violence undermines relations with Iraqi civilians

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

The growing presence of private security contractors operating in Iraq has also caused another problem – the shooting and intimidation of innocent Iraqi civilians. Recent shootings of Iraqi civilians, allegedly involving the legion of U.S., British, and other foreign security contractors operating in the country, are drawing increasing concern from Iraqi officials and U.S. commanders who say the private security companies undermine relations between foreign military forces and Iraqi civilians. Private security companies drive their distinctive sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) with heavily armed personnel in them up and down the highways and city streets in Iraq. The individual private security contractors wave their arms and point their rifles to clear traffic in their path in order to protect convoys they are escorting. Although these security companies are conducting some of the most dangerous jobs in the Iraq, their actions have drawn criticism from senior military officers operating in Iraq. These actions have attracted the scrutiny of Washington after allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight.20

PMCs 🡪 Violence

PMCs are causing unnecessary violence.

Colonel Bobby A. Towery, United States Army, March 14, 2006, Phasing out Private Military Contractors in Iraq

The growing presence of private security contractors operating in Iraq has also caused another problem – the shooting and intimidation of innocent Iraqi civilians. Recent shootings of Iraqi civilians, allegedly involving the legion of U.S., British, and other foreign security contractors operating in the country, are drawing increasing concern from Iraqi officials and U.S. commanders who say the private security companies undermine relations between foreign military forces and Iraqi civilians. Private security companies drive their distinctive sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) with heavily armed personnel in them up and down the highways and city streets in Iraq. The individual private security contractors wave their arms and point their rifles to clear traffic in their path in order to protect convoys they are escorting. Although these security companies are conducting some of the most dangerous jobs in the Iraq, their actions have drawn criticism from senior military officers operating in Iraq. These actions have attracted the scrutiny of Washington after allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight.20

PMCs Escalate Violence

Lowel, Devin. "PMCs are counterproductive to Peace Keeping." *Kansan*. The University of Kansas, Jan. 21 2010. Web. 26 Jun 2010.

The widespread use of PMCs presents a unique dilemma in war: On the one hand, if they were to act in a responsible manner, they might have a role to play in peacekeeping around the globe. However, this never has been, and probably never will be, the case. What the use of these companies has done is to proliferate violence while creating a void of accountability, both to the contracting government and to the public. There exists a serious lack of government oversight with regard to the contracting and conduct of PMCs. This often results in gross misconduct, not just limited to murder of civilians. Just one of many past examples is last year’s assault of a female contractor in Iraq by her coworkers.

Instability Impacts Extensions

Iraqi Civil conflict results in World War III

**Corsi**, Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard & Staff Reporter for World Net Daily, 1-8-**7** (Jerome, "War with Iran is Imminent, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

**If a full scale civil war emerges in Iraq, spillover is inevitable and disastrous**

Frazier (Derrick V, Assistant Professor, Political Science; and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, Assistant Professor, Grand Valley State University, “Another Inconvenient Truth: Why a U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq Would Be a Mistake,” The Illinois International Review, 5/2/08)

Perhaps nowhere are such ripe conditions for ethnic conflict more apparent than in Iraq right now, where a repressive regime that represented and benefited the minority Sunni population has given way to a government that favors the interests of the majority Shia, as well as providing more influence for the Kurds, both of whom have withstood brutal repression and discrimination for several decades. Such transition represents an opportunity for previously disadvantaged groups to reap the benefits that they perceive as justifiably due, increasing the losses for the Sunni population so long in control of Iraq. Accentuating this loss for the Sunnis is the fact that they also happen to primarily occupy the part of Iraq that does not possess a wealth of oil resources, diminishing their ability to sustain a prosperous life by themselves in the near future. Given this, Iraq is ripe for a major sectarian conflict that exceeds the levels of violence witnessed thus far. Without the imposition of security (in physical, economic, political, and social terms), largely guaranteed by the U.S., the possibility of escalation into a full-scale civil war remains very real. As two prominent international security experts put it in 2006, “The only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into a Lebanon- or Bosnia-style maelstrom is 140,000 American troops, and even they are merely slowing the fall at this point.” Moreover, the conflict within Iraq to a large degree mirrors both the identity conflict as well as the traditional power politics game that defines the region as a whole. To be certain, this simplifies the Iraqi conflict quite a bit, given the in-fighting between sects of the same identity groups as well. However, in terms of the broader strategic interests of the regional powers, the defining fault-line in Iraq is centered on the recession of Sunni control over a core part of the Middle East, as well as the rise of Shiism, as evidenced by the changes in Iraq and the growth of Iranian power. Such a rise, if indeed led by Iran, would represent a severe threat to U.S. interests. Included in this threat is the one potentially directed toward Saudi Arabia, a regime who has lost some or all of its credibility among Sunnis and extremist Sunni groups like Al Qaeda. The overall strategic importance of the Iraq conflict is thus very high at the regional level, making it likely that without a strong U.S. presence, states like Iran and Saudia Arabia, as well as non-state actors like Al Qaeda will make greater efforts to intervene in Iraqi affairs than they are currently making. To these strategic regional considerations, we should also consider what would happen if a full scale civil war were to break out. Civil wars tend to spread in disease-like fashion to surrounding countries, particularly if these countries possess similar dynamics of ethnic unrest. Unfortunately, in the Middle East countries surrounding Iraq do exhibit characteristics that make them susceptible to civil conflicts. These characteristics include persistent economic, political, and social grievances that seem to correlate highly with ethnic identities and repressive police states that lack popular legitimacy or peaceful means through which to resolve these grievances. Thus, we would expect that escalated conflict in Iraq will lead to outright conflict in these countries or widespread destabilization. Into this dangerous mix of conditions, several important spillover effects tend to occur. First, masses of refugees flow into neighboring countries. This is already occurring in the case of Iraq but would certainly increase if hostilities escalated. These mass flows lead to two further spillover effects: a straining of the host’s resources and a potential radicalization of neighboring populations through the dissemination of information regarding grievances and tales of brutality. Both increase the likelihood of destabilization in the host country and may lead to calls for the host government to intervene, a scenario likely to create further conflict with little political change. Finally, such conditions also lead to a fourth spillover effect, increased activity of terrorist groups that organize, identify, and fight across borders

Iraqi Civil War Impacts

Children are hit hard by Civil War

AlObaidi, Abdul Kareem , Jeffrey, Linda R. , Scarth, Leslie and Albadawi, Ghazwan(2009) 'Iraqi

children's rights: building a system under fire', Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 25: 2, 148 — 165

War violates every human right of children. In recent years, the lives of Iraqi children and the livelihoods of their families have become precarious. Conﬂict has split the communities where they live and taken the lives of hundreds of their friends and family members. The literature focuses on the negative eﬀects of armed conﬂict on Iraqi children, and the steps that need to be taken to ameliorate their condition by adapting evidence based but culturally sensitive measures. A comprehensive solution to child protection problems clearly will take time. The primary need for the protection of Iraqi children is an end to conﬂict. Family and educational order and social stability are central to eﬀorts to achieve progress in child protection. Solutions to armed conﬂict and its aftermath work best when they are responsive to local cultural practices and beliefs, and are drawn from an understanding of child development. Child safety, security and well-being should be in the forefront of the national agenda to ensure a more positive future both economically and socially to achieve a healthier Iraq.

**Children are key to Iraq’s future**

AlObaidi, Abdul Kareem , Jeffrey, Linda R. , Scarth, Leslie and Albadawi, Ghazwan(2009) 'Iraqi

children's rights: building a system under fire', Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 25: 2, 148 — 165

Saving the future of Iraq by protecting its children is the responsibility of occupying forces, insurgents, politicians of all parties, the Iraqi government and the international community. By increasing accountability and attention to the harm done to children in Iraq, chaotic circumstances may slowly be replaced by a more protective environment. That should be in harmony with international humanitarian laws and children’s human rights. The future of Iraq depends on the health of its children.

Refugee Impact

To fix Iraq, the government must first address refugee problems

Sarah Lischer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University, 2009, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_middle_east_journal/v063/63.3.lischer.html>,

Since 2003, an estimated two million Iraqis have fled to neighboring countries, creating a massive humanitarian crisis and a risk of regional destabilization.[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_middle_east_journal/v063/63.3.lischer.html#f1) Overall, the international reaction to the crisis has been apathetic, stingy, and sometimes hostile. Joseph Sassoon convincingly demonstrates the pressing need to address the plight of the refugees, for both humanitarian and political reasons. His comprehensive treatment of the current Iraqi displacement crisis provides a valuable service to academics and policymakers who seek to understand and respond to this issue. Readers will benefit from the author's extensive experience and field research in the region.

Sassoon organizes Chapters one through four geographically by host country, with particular attention to Jordan and Syria, which have received the vast majority of the refugees. Chapter four deals briefly with the other countries hosting refugees in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Chapters five through seven take a more thematic approach and address the role of humanitarian organizations, the "brain drain" from Iraq, and the issue of return.

In the first four chapters, Sassoon explains that the Iraqi refugees suffer from many of the same problems that plague the various host states, including lack of access to legal employment, education, and healthcare. The majority of refugee children are now woefully behind in their education. The shortage of medical care has led to a rapid deterioration of refugees' physical and mental health. Exclusion from the legal workforce has forced refugees into poorly compensated and illegal jobs. Economic desperation also has caused a rise in prostitution and child labor. In addition, since neither Jordan nor Syria has signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the refugees live in constant fear of deportation. The thematic chapters, especially the ones on the "brain drain" and refugee return, provide more in-depth analysis and background information than the geographically organized chapters. Particularly enlightening is Sassoon's linkage of Iraq's economic conditions over the past 20 years with the current brain drain, which has seen the mass exodus of skilled professionals from the country. He asks the essential question about this phenomenon, "Can Iraq's brain drain be reversed, how does it compare with the experiences of other countries and what are the long-term implications for the country?" (p. 149) Frustratingly, he does not give sufficient attention to answering that question. The difficulty inherent in such a timely book is maintaining its relevance despite constant changes in the situation, such as shifting population flows and political circumstances. For example, rapid and unpredictable modifications can occur in host states' policies, such as visa permissions and access to social services. One important way to increase the book's staying power is by offering a thorough analysis that transcends data points. Another strategy is to provide background information that is usually missing from think tank and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports. Sassoon supplies that analysis and background to some extent; however, he could have further boosted the book's long-term significance by proposing more policy recommendations based on his extensive scholarship and first-hand experience. For example, he convincingly demonstrates the vital nature of the property issue for refugee return, but then provides only a single paragraph of comparison with the Bosnian case (p. 162).Surprisingly, the massive numbers of refugees and their potential for regional destabilization have not prompted an outpouring of attention to the Iraqi displacement crisis. Scholarly articles have begun to address the crisis, but few books have done so. Despite its shortcomings, Sassoon's book provides a solid and essential building block for future scholarship and an important tool for present-day policymakers.

\*\*Neo-liberalism\*\*

Neo-liberalism add on

Privatized Military are used to expand American neo-liberalism overseas and avoid accountability

Jan Nederveen **Pieterse,** Prof. of Sociology @ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, **‘4** [Theory, Culture & Society 21.3, “Neoliberal Empire,” p. 124-6]

The politics of privatization is that dismantling government means dismantling accountability; the politics of neoliberalism treats politics as a business proposition, or money politics, making it as unaccountable as business itself. The Bush II administration takes privatization to new heights. G.W. Bush, the only MBA to occupy the Oval Office, is described as ‘the GOP’s CEO’ with the ‘mentality of a successful CEO’ (Dumbrell, 2002: 281; see also Begala, 2002). The CEO approach to governance involves reorganizing government itself, as in Silvio Berlusconi’s CEO government in Italy. The campaign to roll back government is conducted by government, so bypassing government bureaucracies – in education, the environment, judicial process, fiscal policy, government contracts, intelligence gathering, warfare and so on – comes naturally to this kind of administration. The ‘No Child Left Behind’ education policy sets standards that schools must meet to receive accreditation and funding so high that failure rates are in the order of 20 percent (and may be as high as 70 percent); which means that students are no longer obligated to attend the schools in their district and can opt for private schools, which will then receive government funding. In effect this introduces the controversial system of ‘school vouchers’ via the back door and erodes the public education system. Logging and drilling for oil in nature reserves such as the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve also occur by bypassing existing regulations and institutions. The nation’s shift to combat mode in the wake of 9/11 facilitated the authoritarian concentration of power, silenced criticism and widened the umbrella of ‘security’. Neoliberal practices of outsourcing (to focus on core business) now extend to security and war. Business conglomerates built during the neoliberal regime cash in on empire, such as the Carlyle Group in defence contracts and Halliburton and Bechtel’s contracts for building US bases and the reconstruction of Iraq (Shorrock, 2002, 2003). Under the security umbrella, government contracts for rebuilding Iraq were allocated without public accountability, or accountability was outsourced – to the companies themselves (Baum, 2003). Bypassing the CIA, FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency, circles within the administration set up their own intelligence units such as Team B and the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Passing on the blame for intelligence failures regarding 9/11 and Iraq to the agencies – which had just been bypassed – weakens the agencies and maximizes executive privilege. The pervasive practice of cooking the books, Enron-style, now extends to policy in intelligence, security, the economy and the environment. Fudging data and deception become standard operating procedure. The judicial process in relation to suspected terrorists is politicized by reference to security. Terrorism Information Awareness means unlimited surveillance and limited accountability. Security voids the Freedom of Information Act. Security operations are increasingly outsourced to private military contractors such as DynCorp and MPRI, some of which are subsidiaries of Fortune 500 firms. The global market in private military contracts is estimated at $100 billion. These services include training foreign troops, lowintensity conflict overseas, security for President Karzai in Afghanistan, airport security and military recruitment. While these mercenary forces are paid for by American taxpayers, they don’t operate under military rules, are unaccountable and ‘allow the administration to carry out foreign policy goals in low-level skirmishes around the globe’ without attracting media attention (Wayne, 2002; cf. Singer, 2003). This turns overseas conflict into another business proposition – just as prisons in the US have been privatized and turned into a ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Dyer, 1999). Thus neoliberal empire extends profitable domestic practices overseas. The accounts of terrorism for the public and for insiders differ markedly. The media duly present terrorism as the arch-enemy of ‘freedom’ and routinely view it through the lens of Jihad and clash of civilizations (Abrahamanian, 2003). But the RAND Corporation, a Pentagon subcontractor, in testimony to congressional intelligence committees presents an entirely different view. Here Bin Laden is a ‘terrorist CEO’: . . . essentially having applied business administration and modern management techniques learned both at university and in the family’s construction business to the running of a transnational terrorist organization. . . . Just as large multinational business conglomerates moved during the 1990s to flatter, more linear, and network structures, bin Laden did the same with al- Qa’ida. . . . bin Laden has functioned like the president or CEO of a large multinational corporation: defining specific goals and aims, issuing orders and ensuring their implementation. And as a venture capitalist: soliciting ideas from below, encouraging creative approaches and ‘out of the box’ thinking . . . (Hoffman, 2002: 13) One view is a Jihad stereotype while the other assimilates al-Qa’ida into the neoliberal mindset as a decentralized transnational enterprise. The insider account of terrorism is business-like; in this view essentially two business empires compete, using similar techniques. Meanwhile both perspectives ignore the opponent’s politics. A vivid example of neoliberal empire was the plan for a futures market in political instability in the Middle East. It was set up at a Pentagon web site on the principle of using market signals as a source of information on political trends; a mutually advantageous combination of online betting and intelligence gathering, for isn’t the market the best source of information? Revoked within days under pressure of Congress, it illustrated the novel possibilities of neoliberal empire and war as business. Neoliberal empire is a tricky project. Neoliberal globalization sought to establish legitimacy transnationally, via political-economic principles (transparency, accountability, good governance); the Bush II administration shows decreasing transparency (empire requires secrecy), decreasing accountability (empire requires broad executive privilege) and decreasing good governance (civil liberties and due process impede the concentration of power).

This depoliticization of the market causes collective sacrifice in the name of utopia.

Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologist, UC Berkeley Goffman Prize & Royal Anthropological Institute Huxley Medal, ‘98

(http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu, *Le Monde diplomatique*)

As the dominant discourse would have it, the economic world is a pure and perfect order, implacably unrolling the logic of its predictable consequences, and prompt to repress all violations by the sanctions that it inflicts, either automatically or —more unusually — through the intermediary of its armed extensions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the policies they impose: reducing labour costs, reducing public expenditures and making work more flexible. Is the dominant discourse right? What if, in reality, this economic order were no more than the implementation of a utopia - the utopia of neoliberalism - thus converted into a political problem? One that, with the aid of the economic theory that it proclaims, succeeds in conceiving of itself as the scientific description of reality? This tutelary theory is a pure mathematical fiction. From the start it has been founded on a formidable abstraction. For, in the name of a narrow and strict conception of rationality as individual rationality, it brackets the economic and social conditions of rational orientations and the economic and social structures that are the condition of their application. To give the measure of this omission, it is enough to think just of the educational system. Education is never taken account of as such at a time when it plays a determining role in the production of goods and services as in the production of the producers themselves. From this sort of original sin, inscribed in the Walrasian myth (1) of "pure theory", flow all of the deficiencies and faults of the discipline of economics and the fatal obstinacy with which it attaches itself to the arbitrary opposition which it induces, through its mere existence, between a properly economic logic, based on competition and efficiency, and social logic, which is subject to the rule of fairness. That said, this "theory" that is desocialised and dehistoricised at its roots has, today more than ever, the means of making itself true and empirically verifiable. In effect, neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a "strong discourse" - the way psychiatric discourse is in an asylum, in Erving Goffman’s analysis (2). It is so strong and so hard to combat only because it has on its side all of the forces of a world of relations of forces, a world that it contributes to making what it is. It does this most notably by orienting the economic choices of those who dominate economic relationships. It thus adds its own symbolic force to these relations of forces. In the name of this scientific programme, converted into a plan of political action, an immense political project is underway, **although its status as such is denied** because it appears to be purely negative. This project aims to create the conditions under which the "theory" can be realised and can function: a programme of the methodical destruction of collectives. The movement toward the neoliberal utopia of a pure and perfect market is **made possible** by the politics of financial deregulation. And it is achieved through the transformative and, it must be said, destructive action of all of the political measures (of which the most recent is the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), designed to protect foreign corporations and their investments from national states) that aim to call into question any and all collective structures that could serve as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market: the nation, whose space to manoeuvre continually decreases; work groups, for example through the individualisation of salaries and of careers as a function of individual competences, with the consequent atomisation of workers; collectives for the defence of the rights of workers, unions, associations, cooperatives; even the family, which loses part of its control over consumption through the constitution of markets by age groups. The neoliberal programme draws its social power from the political and economic power of those whose interests it expresses: stockholders, financial operators, industrialists, conservative or social-democratic politicians who have been converted to the reassuring layoffs of laisser-faire, high-level financial officials eager to impose policies advocating their own extinction because, unlike the managers of firms, they run no risk of having eventually to pay the consequences. Neoliberalism tends on the whole to favour severing the economy from social realities and thereby constructing, in reality, an economic system conforming to its description in pure theory, that is a sort of logical machine that presents itself as a chain of constraints regulating economic agents. The globalisation of financial markets, when joined with the progress of information technology, ensures an unprecedented mobility of capital. It gives investors concerned with the short-term profitability of their investments the possibility of permanently comparing the profitability of the largest corporations and, in consequence, penalising these firms’ relative setbacks. Subjected to this permanent threat, the corporations themselves have to adjust more and more rapidly to the exigencies of the markets, under penalty of "losing the market’s confidence", as they say, as well as the support of their stockholders. The latter, anxious to obtain short-term profits, are more and more able to impose their will on managers, using financial directorates to establish the rules under which managers operate and to shape their policies regarding hiring, employment, and wages. Thus the absolute reign of flexibility is established, with employees being hiring on fixed-term contracts or on a temporary basis and repeated corporate restructurings and, within the firm itself, competition among autonomous divisions as well as among teams forced to perform multiple functions. Finally, this competition is extended to individuals themselves, through the individualisation of the wage relationship: establishment of individual performance objectives, individual performance evaluations, permanent evaluation, individual salary increases or granting of bonuses as a function of competence and of individual merit; individualised career paths; strategies of "delegating responsibility" tending to ensure the self-exploitation of staff who, simple wage labourers in relations of strong hierarchical dependence, are at the same time held responsible for their sales, their products, their branch, their store, etc. as though they were independent contractors. This pressure toward "self-control" extends workers’ "involvement" according to the techniques of "participative management" considerably beyond management level. All of these are techniques of rational domination that impose over-involvement in work (and not only among management) and work under emergency or high-stress conditions. And they converge to weaken or abolish collective standards or solidarities (3). In this way, a Darwinian world emerges - it is the struggle of all against all at all levels of the hierarchy, which finds support through everyone clinging to their job and organisation under conditions of insecurity, suffering, and stress. Without a doubt, the practical establishment of this world of struggle would not succeed so completely without the complicity of all of the precarious arrangements that produce insecurity and of the existence of a reserve army of employees rendered docile by these social processes that make their situations precarious, as well as by the permanent threat of unemployment. This reserve army exists at all levels of the hierarchy, even at the higher levels, especially among managers. The ultimate foundation of this entire economic order placed under the sign of freedom is in effect the structural violence of unemployment, of the insecurity of job tenure and the menace of layoff that it implies. The condition of the "harmonious" functioning of the individualist micro-economic model is a mass phenomenon, the existence of a reserve army of the unemployed. This structural violence also weighs on what is called the labour contract (wisely rationalised and rendered unreal by the "theory of contracts"). Organisational discourse has never talked as much of trust, co-operation, loyalty, and organisational culture as in an era when adherence to the organisation is obtained at each moment by eliminating all temporal guarantees of employment (three-quarters of hires are for fixed duration, the proportion of temporary employees keeps rising, employment "at will" and the right to fire an individual tend to be freed from any restriction). Thus we see how the neoliberal utopia tends to embody itself in the reality of a kind of infernal machine, whose necessity imposes itself even upon the rulers. Like the Marxism of an earlier time, with which, in this regard, it has much in common, this utopia evokes powerful belief - the free trade faith - not only among those who live off it, such as financiers, the owners and managers of large corporations, etc., but also among those, such as high-level government officials and politicians, who derive their justification for existing from it. For they sanctify the power of markets in the name of economic efficiency, which **requires** the elimination of administrative or political barriers capable of inconveniencing the owners of capital in their individual quest for the maximisation of individual profit, which has been turned into a model of rationality. They want independent central banks. And they preach the subordination of nation-states to the requirements of economic freedom for the masters of the economy, with the suppression of any regulation of any market, beginning with the labour market, the prohibition of deficits and inflation, the general **privatisation of public services**, and the reduction of public and social expenses.

Neo-liberalism internals

Private Militaries are used to enforce state/market ideal

Conor **O’Reilly** and Graham **Ellison,,** Instittue of Criminology @ Queen’s University Belfast School of Law**, ‘6** [British Journal of Criminology 46, “Eye Spy Private High: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory,” p. 654-6]

Private high policing embodies the dominant trend within late capitalist states towards the mutual re-enforcement of state and corporate interests (Whyte 2003: 582).18 While its role in facilitating this ‘state-business amalgamation’ (Goldstein 1978: 5) has been evident since the anti-labour activities of Pinkertonism, this status has been re-invigorated by the advent of transnational capitalism. The dual policing and economic functions of security consultancy firms—the contemporary manifestation of private high policing—have proved an efficient vehicle for the pursuit of common objectives across the state/corporate nexus as well as across borders. This process has been further accelerated by the increased outsourcing of security responsibilities in theatres of conflict and subsequent reconstruction efforts, incorporating the tendency to obfuscate responsibility already discussed. A comparison of such activities with the overlapping genre of PMCs (Whyte 2003) and more general trends within transnational commercial security (Johnston 2000a) may prove instructive. Whyte (2003), for instance, argues that the degree to which we are witnessing a one-dimensional and unproblematic usurpation of state authority by private actors (the sovereignty erosion thesis) is ‘at best empirically naive’ and has misrepresented developments more appropriately theorized as the ‘re-configuration of state-ordered power’ (Whyte 2003: 580). Essentially, the notion that there is a negativesum game being played out between state and corporate interests is misconstrued. If anything, we are in fact witnessing the mutually beneficial application of game theory to achieve proximate objectives (Whyte 2003: 579). A significant factor within security consultancy’s facilitation of state/corporate symbiosis is the so-called ‘revolving door’ of high policing, whereby there is increased movement of security operatives from the public to the private sector. The security consultancy industry has extensive ties not only with the military and security establishment but also the political establishment—a fact which is often reflected in the composition of the boardroom. For example, whilst the corporate management team of ArmorGroup includes a CEO who served with the US Air Force and the CIA and a chief operating officer who served with the British and New Zealand Special Air Services, its non-executive chairman is Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former British Secretary for Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Similar trends are even more evident in the United States, where firms such as Diligence LLC, the Steele Foundation and CACI all have senior directors with high-level experience or influence with current or former US and British 17 See Porteous (1994: 736–8) for a useful attempt to distinguish analytically between the terms economic security, economic intelligence, economic espionage, industrial espionage and so-called ‘sharp practices’. 18 Whilst this trend is broadly applicable within Western capitalist states, the situation in post-Soviet Russia has witnessed a more competitive relationship between state and corporate actors, reflected in the power struggle between President Vladimir Putin’s ‘vertical of power’ and the oligarchs who capitalized on the collapse of the Soviet Union. Downloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org at Dartmouth College Library on June 29, 2010 ‘EYE SPY PRIVATE HIGH’ 655 governments (Isenberg 2004). The ‘old boys’ club’ networks created by such public/private interaction inevitably provide significant scope for the pursuit of mutually advantageous associations. Insofar as high policing actors—whether public or private—possess similar backgrounds, they also possess a similar mentalité in the face of global security threats. Bigo’s concept of a ‘security continuum … of threats arbitrarily defined and unified in global discourse of disorder’ (2000: 93) whilst originating in the context of European policing is equally applicable to wider analysis of high policing at the transnational level. As Bigo highlights, we should be sceptical of this ‘(in)security discourse of the security field’ as ‘such knowledge comes precisely from the very people whose habitus is structured by the systematic search for the capacity to manage any threat or risk’ (2000: 93). Reverberating loudly with high policing methods and tactics, it is increasingly apparent that both public and private actors engage in mutual reinforcement of such ‘(in)security discourse’ to preserve and augment dominant state/corporate arrangements. The aforementioned relationships also impact upon proposed regulatory models for PMCs/PSCs, with the locus of regulation ‘being shifted away from the realm of international human rights law and into the realm of the state/market nexus’ (Whyte 2003: 593). This is re-iterated by both governmental emphasis on industry consultation19 as well as industry perception that regulation is achieved through a process of negotiation. Indeed, at a recent industry conference, one senior security consultant spoke of his firm’s willingness to negotiate with government for ‘the right type of regulation’.20 Much has been made of President Eisenhower’s prescient observations regarding ‘the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex’21 with speculation about similar developments in the commercial security field (Johnston 1999: 186; Lilley and Knepper 1992). Concern about the ramifications of the ‘private use of secret agents’ (Hougan 1978: 463) and the emergence of a ‘police–industrial complex’(O’Toole 1978) have existed since the late 1970s. However, it is only in the contemporary context of outsourced security services in Iraq and Afghanistan that a sufficient degree of state dependency on private contractors has emerged to justify the terminology of a security–industrial complex.22 Whilst it would be something of an overstatement to theorize such developments solely around private high policing actors, transnational security consultancy firms will nevertheless emerge as key players within any evolving security–industrial complex. Not only do they contribute to foreign and security policy formulation through lobbying and increased consultation mechanisms,23 but they are also part of the immense private security presence in Iraq, safeguarding the interests and objectives of coalition governments as well as private contractors engaged in the reconstruction process. Potentially the most serious consequence of the aforementioned developments is the risk that instances of high policing may now materialize in the form of state-corporate crime, whereby the criminally constituent components of each become blurred and ultimately indistinguishable from each other. The tendency for high policing actors to engage in illegal actions to preserve and augment the current distribution of power has already been detailed in this paper. However, the increased intersection of public/private high policing forms and state/corporate agendas greatly increases the possibility of mutual reinforcement through illegal practice. Umbilical linkage to the state ensures that these ‘new criminogenic opportunities’ are also less likely to be criminalized and punished (Whyte 2003: 582). As set out above, there is ample scope for the ‘secrecy complex’ to be extended and the corporate veil to be cynically knitted into the blanket shield of national security.

The uniting of economic and military policies is used to create neo-liberalist warfare to mask economic problems

Jan Nederveen **Pieterse,** Prof. of Sociology @ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, **‘4** [Theory, Culture & Society 21.3, “Neoliberal Empire,”]

This project is kaleidoscopic and deploys the full register of power – military, political, economic, financial and ideological. But combining economic and political-military unilateralism does not make for a stronger compound. It yields the suspicion that political-military operations are intended to make up for failures of the neoliberal project and that war is a diversion from Wall Street blues. Applying the entire arsenal of instruments of power opens up multiple fronts and as many points of contradiction. How, for instance, do freedom and democracy rhyme with the use of military force? How does the liberal use of depleted uranium ammunition square with bringing liberty?

 PMCs are a result of pressure exerted by neo-liberalist ideologies

Ortiz 04(Carlos, International Relations – U of Sussex, ‘4 “Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding

Business of Commercial Security Provision”, <http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz_2004_regulating_private_military_companies.pdf>)

The downsizing of the opposing armed forces at the end of the Cold War was not the only reason behind the rise of the PMC. The pressures exerted on governments by neo-liberal ideologies and practices must be at the centre of any explanatory scheme. Neo-liberalism has fostered fiscal auster- ity and a fundamentalist belief in the primacy of market provision. Accordingly, pressures for an 'efficient' public sector have generated gov- ernment policies which favour the maintenance of small but specialised forces in the public sector proper, and the increased outsourcing of non- strategic military and security functions to the private sector. This shift has been crucial in the consolidation of the PMC market.

The state’s delegation of power to PMCs undermine the power of the state

Ortiz 04(Carlos, International Relations – U of Sussex, ‘4 “Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding

Business of Commercial Security Provision”,[http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz\_2004\_regulating\_private\_military \_companies.pdf](http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz_2004_regulating_private_military%20_companies.pdf))

Given the complex embedding of PMC entities within the larger business structures we have seen, regulation must be focussed on the actual PMC activities and be specified by reference to the service being outsourced. This approach, while not diminishing the tensions that delegating authority generates, allows governments to determine in which form and to which extent they enable private contractors access to the management of the monopoly of legitimate violence of the state. Nossal comments that the problems associated with regulating PMCs nationally have 'led to the view that this activity could be more effectively regulated by international agree- ment than by a patchwork of national regulation' (Nossal, 2001: 468). But as long as states regard controlling the exercise of legitimate violence their prerogative, PMC regulation, too, will be devised and implemented at a national level. Given existing asymmetries of private military power across borders, changing attitudes towards the use of PMCs, and different political cultures impinging upon the legislative process, international agreement must remain an ideal, while regulation at the national level is a pragmatic responsibility that governments can neglect, but not fail to recognise in the end. National regulation is therefore the inevitable starting point if the anti-mercenary conventions are no longer seen to be applicable. If the monopoly of violence remains one of the prerogatives of the state, it seems paradoxical that states maintain authority at the same time as del- egating it. This paradox can be understood in light of the contradictory pressures state authorities are subject to, negotiating the conflicting demands for the maintenance of state power, and those implied in the neo- liberal attitudes towards public management and global markets. A flexible regulatory mechanism would be one that adequately mediates between these contradictory requirements. With this unstable resolution in mind, attempts at regulation by three of the main suppliers of PMCs are exam- ined below. These attempts illuminate the implications of regulation for the state in the post-Cold War global political economy.

PMCs operate outside the power of the state

Ortiz 04(Carlos, International Relations – U of Sussex, ‘4 “Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding

Business of Commercial Security Provision”, <http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz_2004_regulating_private_military_companies.pdf>)

The overall regulatory situation for PMCs at the global level remains bleak. Yet the licensing mechanism used by the US seems to hold out the only currently viable option to gain ground here. It achieves a good degree of flexibility through itemising activities likely to be offered by the private sector, and works with a selectivity that discriminates between firms authorised to offer and render PMC services. Zarate elaborates on the virtues of licensing mechanisms, noting that 'by regulating the interna- tional security market via licensing regimes, the international community would create a market for legitimate SCs [international security compa- nies] while ostracising rogue mercenaries and dangerous SCs' (Zarate, 1998: 153). Notwithstanding this, flexibility at the national level cannot guarantee a balance between efficiency and legitimacy to transcend the origins of its authority unless the receiving country has implemented effective regulation to monitor and control the delivery of PMC services within its own territory. This is the paradox that the bifurcation of state authority in an era of globalising capital generates. The delegation of authority that originates and is sanctioned at the national level, cannot be fully controlled abroad, or globally. Over a decade ago it was inconceiv- able to think the private sector would play a growing role in the manage- ment of the states' monopoly on legitimate violence. The new millennium demands reconsideration of conventional regulatory frameworks in order to address the role PMCs play in the global political economy as state sanctioned coercive agents, filling public and private roles. As I have shown, a myriad of actors in this sector capitalise on the increasing oppor- tunities created by the outsourcing of state authority. The state, in order to control and manage this phenomenon has not sufficiently formalised the de facto bifurcation of authority through regulation. The management of legitimate violence remains the preserve of the sovereign state, but asym- metries of power and control have motivated an uneven response by gov- ernments in the regulation of PMCs. Despite regulation at the national level, the transnational dimension of the PMC business and the global scope of the PMC labour market limit the enforceability of national legis- lation beyond the domestic domain. These contradictions and paradoxes will characterise the exercise and regulation of private military force well into the new millennium.

\*\*Politics\*\*

Republicans Like PMCs

Republicans like PMCs—they’re heavy RNC donors and republicans want to keep them around

O’Shea 3/23 Ric O’Shea, political blogger, March 23, 2010. [The Republican Party’s Private Army] [Cory Stern]

Blackwater chose to change their name to Xe in February of 2009 because of charges of murder against some of their personnel in Iraq who were not only under the influence of a license to kill, but alcohol too... in other words they felt secure enough in their roles that they could get away with murder, and obviously Blackwater was unable to keep their mercenaries under control... not good for a company who receives multimillion dollar defense contracts from the State Department, some of which are no-bid, and through the CIA. Many of Blackwater's founders and executives were employed by the CIA. In early March it was reported that the RNC and Xe would not hold a meeting for the "Young Eagles," of the Republican Party... a group of high dollar contributors under the age of 40 at their United States Training Center in Moyock, North Carolina. It seems a slide in an RNC document showed the upcoming meeting but after it was leaked out the meeting was canceled. I would assume that had it not been for the leak, the meeting would still be set for April 16th. I say this because Xe founder and President Erik Prince is a huge contributor to the RNC and has contributed to the campaigns of Tom DeLay, Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, Oliver North and many others.\* There is a bill (S.3023), making it's way through the Senate that would provide for more oversight for private military contractors but more importantly it will make the outsourcing of military services to outside contractors illegal. Think about this... we are at war in a foreign country and at the same time we have a private company of mercenaries intertwined with United States military forces. The private contractor is doing special ops for the State Department or the CIA and the enemy doesn't know the difference between military personnel and hired mercenaries ... how much more dangerous is that to the lives of our military forces? How would other countries look at/identify us? Would they think we've gone rogue and would anyone trust the United States military as long as companies like Xe exist within our military apparatus? The bill, called the Stop Outsourcing Security Act, sponsored by Rep. Jan Schakowsky, (D, Ill.) and Senator Bernie Sanders, (I-Vermont) went before hearings in early March and it will be very interesting to watch. The IPOA, The Association of the Stability Operations Industry\*\* is a lobbyist for companies like Xe with members such as DynCorp International and Burton Rands Associates... along with 50 other private contractors who are all seeking defense contracts from the State Department and other governmental agencies. IPOA founder Doug Brooks lives within a strict code of conduct, but that does not mean that the companies he represents will. He certainly does not guarantee that they will. We'll see how this one plays out, but I can guarantee you that the Republicans do not want this bill to pass and they are going to find themselves caught between an EID and a Laser Guided Bomb. Prince will find a way to get involved regardless... even if it only involves campaign contributions to wayward Republicans who seem to enjoy the companionship of former CIA agents... and as they say, once an agent, always an agent.

Obama’s Administration likes PMCs

The Obama administration heavily relies on PMCs

**Nation. (blog)** **6/28** (6/28/10, " Blackwater's New Sugar Daddy: The Obama Administration ", <http://www.thenation.com/blog/36756/blackwaters-new-sugar-daddy-obama-administration>)

Blackwater has spent heavily on Democratic lobbyists in 2010 and clearly it has paid off. Despite the investigations, the indictments, the trail of dead bodies, George W Bush’s favorite mercenary company is thriving under the Obama Administration. After its original sugar daddy left town, Blackwater has happily remarried. Over the past two weeks, the Administration has awarded nearly a quarter billion dollars in US government contracts to Blackwater to work for the State Department and CIA in Afghanistan and other hot zones globally. In an interview Sunday on ABC’s “This Week,” CIA Director Leon Panetta made it clear that the Agency is dependent upon private security companies to operate globally. But, not just any private security companies. Specifically, Panetta said, the CIA needs Blackwater.

Dems don’t like PMCs

Key Democrats want to get rid of PMCs

Stephen **Lendman**, staff writer for Dissident Voice, “PMCs: The rise in the military. January 2010.

On January 13 (on antiwar.com), Jeremy Scahill reported that Representative Jan Schakowsky (Democrat. IL and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence member): “is preparing to introduce legislation (Stop Outsourcing Security Act — SOS) aimed at ending the US government’s relationship with Blackwater and other armed contracting companies.” Originally introduced in 2007 but not passed, Schakowsky says: “The legislation would prohibit the use of private contractors for military, security, law enforcement, intelligence, and armed rescue functions unless the President tells Congress why the military is unable to perform those functions. It would also increase transparency over any remaining security contracts by increasing reporting requirements and giving Congress access to details about large contracts.”

Democrats want to prosecute and absolve PMCs

**Fox News**, “House passes legislation to prosecute PMCs” October 200**7**

 WASHINGTON - The House passed a bill Thursday that would make all private contractors working in Iraq and other combat zones subject to prosecution by U.S. courts. It was the first major legislation of its kind to pass since a deadly shootout last month involving Blackwater employees. Democrats called the 389-30 vote an indictment of the shooting incident there that left 11 Iraqis dead. Senate Democratic leaders said they planned to follow suit with similar legislation and send a bill to President Bush as soon as possible. "There is simply no excuse for the de facto legal immunity for tens of thousands of individuals working in countries" on behalf of the United States, said Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, D-Texas. The FBI is currently leading an investigation into the Sept. 16 shootout, although administration officials acknowledge they are unsure whether U.S. courts would have jurisdiction in the case or others like it. In a separate incident, a drunk Blackwater employee left a Christmas eve party in Baghdad and fatally shot the guard of one of Iraq's vice presidents. That contractor was fired, fined and returned home to the United States, but no charges have been filed.

Democrats realize they cannot let the PMCs run freely anymore

BILL SIZEMORE, 2007, The Virginian-Pilot, Democrats step up scrutiny of private military companies

In the wake of Sunday's shootings of at least 11 Iraqis by Blackwater USA contractors, Democratic senators Friday assailed what they called a climate of impunity surrounding private security contracting in Iraq. At a hearing that included testimony from eight witnesses alleging abuses by Blackwater and other companies, the senators held up the Sunday shootings as an example of a lack of accountability for contractors' actions in the war zone. The hearing was held by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, a partisan panel. It signaled a season of heightened scrutiny of Iraq contracting by the Democrat-controlled Congress in the aftermath of the Blackwater incident. Sen. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, the panel's chairman, acknowledged that the shootings are still under investigation and said, "I certainly do not want to prejudge the results." Nevertheless, he said, "we cannot ignore the fact that the Iraqi government has said that it believes that Blackwater over reacted and caused the loss of innocent life."

Administration Likes PMCs

The US government is getting sick of PMC

Anna Mulrine and Keith Whitelaw, 2007, “Private Security Contractors Face incoming Political Fire” US News & World Report

But, on Capitol Hill, more disturbing descriptions are being pinned on Blackwater personnel, such as "aggressive," "reckless," and "not accountable" to the Iraqi or U.S. government. A House committee last week was looking into allegations of serious abuses by Blackwater, which provides security for U.S. diplomats in Iraq. The committee, headed by Rep. Henry Waxman, released a Democratic staff report based on Blackwater's own documents showing that its employees were involved in at least 195 "escalation of force" incidents since early 2005--and that they fired the first shots in 80 percent of those cases.

The controversy overshadowed other news last week on the Iraq front that buoyed the Bush administration: the substantial September drop in both Iraqi and U.S. military deaths from August levels. In addition, the Senate's Democratic leaders seemed reluctant to face another run-in with the White House by taking up legislation, passed by the House 377 to 46, that would give the Bush administration two months to submit a general Iraq withdrawal plan without a timetable.

As the Waxman hearing was playing out in Washington, military officers in Baghdad offered their own long-standing complaints about Blackwater and other private security operations. While acknowledging that the private security personnel have an important job to do, some American soldiers tell U.S. News that they have witnessed aggressive behavior by Blackwater contractors that runs the spectrum from reckless driving that "runs cars off the road for no good reason" to one particular shootout with an American military convoy that resulted in the deaths of two Iraqis and one American contractor. At the U.S. military hospital where both parties took their wounded after that shooting, military officials in the convoy and Blackwater contractors "nearly came to blows," an officer present at the incident tells U.S. News.