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Contention 1 is Inherency

Obama’s campaign promise is broken: He’s reversed course on Iraq withdrawal.

**Swanson, May 13 (**David Swanson, convenor of United for Peaace and Justice, and contributer to Global research, 5/13/10, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19152>) CS

So, **we elected a president who promised a withdrawal from Iraq that he**, or the generals who tell him what to do, **is now further delaying**. And, of course, the timetable he's now delaying was already a far cry from what he had promised as a candidate. What are we to think? That may be sad news, but what could we have done differently? Surely it would have been worse to elect a president who did not promise to withdraw, right? But **there's a broader framework for this withdrawal or lack thereof, namely the**SOFA (**Status of Forces Agreement), the unconstitutional treaty that Bush and Maliki drew up without consulting the U.S. Senate.**I was reminded of this **on Tuesday**when **Obama and Karzai**talked about a forthcoming document from the two of them and repeatedly **expressed their eternal devotion to a long occupation**. **The unconstitutional Iraq treaty (UIT) requires complete withdrawal**from Iraq by the end of next year, and withdrawal from all Iraqi cities, villages, and localities by last summer. Obama's latest announcement doesn't alter the lack of compliance with the latter requirement. Nor does it guarantee noncompliance with the former. **But it illustrates something else**, something that some of us have been screaming **since the**UIT [**treaty]was allowed to stand**, something **that pretty well guarantees that the US occupation of Iraq will never end.** Imagine if Congress funded, defunded, oversaw, and regulated the military and wars as required by our Constitution. Imagine if the president COULDN'T simply tell Congress that troops would be staying in Iraq longer than planned, but had to ask for the necessary funding first. Here's the lesson for this teachable moment: Persuading presidents to end wars only looks good until they change their mind. Cutting off the funding actually forces wars to end. **When the US peace movement refused to challenge the UIT, it left Bush's successor and his successors free to ignore it, revise it, or replace it. Congress has been removed from the equation. If Obama decides to inform Congress that the occupation of Iraq will go on into 2012, Congress' response will be as muted as when the Director of**National **Intelligence informed Congress that killing Americans was**now **legal**. And what can Congress say? It had no role in ratifying the UIT in the first place. And the peace movement is in large part on the same path with Afghanistan, working to pass a toothless, non-binding timetable for possible redeployment of troops to another nation. Congress sees itself as advisors whose role it is to persuade the president that he wants to cease the activity that most advances presidential power. And activists share that perspective. But what happens if the president becomes unpersuaded about ending both of these wars? What in the world are we supposed to do then? We have an alternative to painting ourselves into this corner. The alternative is to build a movement of war opponents (and advocates for spending on human needs and/or tax cuts) that can pressure the House of Representatives to cut off the funding for the wars. Of course, this isn't easy. It's much harder than collecting signatures on a toothless resolution. And it's dramatically harder than watching the president create an unconstitutional treaty (something Bush was forced into primarily by the people of Iraq) and then stepping aside to celebrate. But there is no stronger message that could be used to persuade a president than a growing caucus of congress members denying him the money. And **once a majority is reached in the caucus of war defunders, then the war simply has to end, whether the president is persuaded of anything or not.** So, the lesson to be learned from Obama scrapping his current plan for an Iraq withdrawal is not that we should phone the White House and complain. It's not that we need 20 more cosponsors of the nonbinding timetable for Afghanistan. **The lesson is that we must tell members of the House of Representatives that they can vote against war funding**or we will vote against them. Not a new lesson, I realize, but the Constitution is always less read than talked about

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The August deadline is semantic, not real. Combat operations will continue.

**New York Times, July 2**(Tim Arango,  New York Times writer, New York Times, July 2, 2010 ,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html?hp>) EH

NEAR TULUL AL-BAQ, Iraq — **President Obama has set an August deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq.**Here at this makeshift desert camp in the insurgent badlands of northern Iraq, a mission is under way that is not going to stop then: American soldiers hunting terrorists and covertly watching an Iraqi checkpoint staffed by police officers whom the soldiers say they do not trust. “They’re not checking anybody, and they’re wondering why I.E.D.’s are getting in to town,” said Staff Sgt. Kelly E. Young, 39, from Albertville, Ala., as he watched the major roadway that connects Baghdad with Mosul, regarded as the country’s most dangerous city. He referred to improvised explosive devices, the military term for homemade bombs.  **The**August**deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war**in Iraq, **but**here **it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die**, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here.  **The withdrawal**, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It **is**also **an exercise in semantics**.  **What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the U**nited **S**tates **military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions.  “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen**R. **Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.”**

**Long term geopolitical designs make the status quo a smokescreen for permanent occupation**

**Symonds, June 9**(Peter Symonds, International editor for the World Socialist Web Site, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 6/9/10, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jun2010/pers-j09.shtml>) CS

**As**the **Obama**administration **escalates**its war **in Afghanistan, Iraq is cautiously being declared a success**. The top American commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno, declared last Friday that the country had held “a legitimate and credible election”, its security forces had improved and plans were “on track” for the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq by September 1. **Speaking at**the **West Point**military academy late last month, President **Obama was**even more **upbeat, declaring that as US troops depart, “a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress**” towards establishing “a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant”. **The reality is entirely different**. Even **after the September deadline**, the **US military will maintain a huge military presence of 50,000 troops**, ostensibly in “non-combat” and “training” roles, to prop up a puppet regime in Baghdad, which, three months after the national election, is yet to be formed. **While the character of the American occupation of Iraq is changing**, **its underlying purpose—to maintain the country firmly under US domination—remains the same.** In his comments last Friday, General Odierno declared that the “drawdown” was ahead of schedule—600,000 containers of gear and 18,000 vehicles moved out; and the number of bases down from 500 last year to 126 and set to decline to 94 by September 1. **What is**actually **underway,**however, **is not a withdrawal**, **but a vast consolidation in preparation for the long-term occupation of the country by US forces.** The Stars and Stripes newspaper noted in an article on June 1 that the **ratification of the US-Iraq**security **agreement**in November 2008 **governing the drawdown was followed by a massive expansion of base construction work.**“In all, the military finished $496 million in base construction projects during 2009, the highest annual figure since the war began and nearly a quarter of the $2.1 billion spent on American bases in Iraq since 2004. An additional $323 million worth of projects are set to be

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completed this year.” While the number of US bases may be declining, **the Pentagon is establishing what are known as “enduring presence posts”**—**including four major bases:**Joint Base Balad in the north, Camp Adder in southern Iraq, Al-Asad Air Base in the west and the Victory Base Complex around Baghdad International Airport. These are sprawling fortified facilities—Balad alone currently houses more than 20,000 troops. **In addition to the 50,000 troops that will remain, there will be up to 65,000 contractors after September 1**. Under the 2008 agreement, **the US military handed over internal security functions to Iraqi forces last year, but, under the guise of “training” and “support”, retains tighter supervision of the army and police.**Moreover **the Iraqi government can always “request” US troop assistance in mounting operations.**As Odierno explained in a letter to US personnel on June 1, **even after**all US **combat troops leave, “we will continue to conduct partnered counter-terrorism operations and provide combat enablers**to help the Iraqi Security Forces maintain pressure on the extremist networks.” **The 2008 agreement sets December 31, 2011 as the deadline for all US troops to quit Iraq, but the construction of huge new US bases indicates a long-term US military presence under a Strategic Framework Agreement**that is yet to be negotiated. As Stars and Stripes pointed out, “the nascent condition of the Iraqi Air Force… could lead the Iraqi government to request that a US training force remain in the country beyond 2011, most likely at Balad.” Accompanying the troop drawdown is a buildup of civilian operations centred on the US embassy in Baghdad. The new embassy, situated in the fortified Green Zone, is the largest and most expensive in the world. Opened in January 2009, the complex includes 21 buildings, occupies 0.4 square kilometres and houses 1,000 regular employees as well as up to 3,000 additional staff. The embassy’s No 2 diplomat Cameron Munter told the Washington Post last month: “Our commitment will not be on the scale of numbers and money that the military has. But it will be extraordinarily substantial.” The Post also touched on certain sensitive projects that would not be handed over to embassy staff, including “the collection of intelligence, initiatives to counter what the military calls ‘malign Iranian influence’, and the integration of tens of thousands of former insurgents the military turned into Sunni paramilitary groups.” In other words, the US military will remain actively involved in monitoring and manipulating the sectarian divisions that Washington has exploited since the 2003 invasion to assert its control. The “ending” of the insurgency, trumpeted by the Pentagon and White House, has involved the ruthless suppression of opposition to the US occupation, resulting in the deaths of more than a million Iraqis, another two million driven into exile, and tens of thousands detained and tortured. **Iraqi “democracy” rests on a police state apparatus developed and honed by the US military. The “legitimate and credible” election in March was only open to those parties and politicians that accepted the occupation**. Seven years of war has had a devastating impact on the Iraqi people. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. According to last month’s Brookings Iraq Index, as of last year, only 20 percent of the population had access to proper sanitation, 45 percent to clean water, 50 percent to more than 12 hours a day of electricity, 50 percent to adequate housing and 30 percent to health services. A 2007 World Bank survey found that 23 percent of people were living in poverty on less than $US2.20 a day. The criminal US invasion of Iraq was not aimed at helping the Iraqi people. Rather, its purpose was to subjugate the country in order to establish control over its vast energy reserves and to transform it into a base for wider American strategic objectives in the Middle East and Central Asia. Having bloodily suppressed resistance in Iraq, the Obama administration is pulling its troops out in order to expand its neo-colonial war in Afghanistan and for new military aggression in other parts of the globe. **Being left behind is an extensive American civilian and military apparatus that will continue to control the levers of power in Baghdad**, bully the Iraqi government into line on matters concerning US interests, keep a watchful eye on the country’s festering sectarian tensions and leave the door open to a rapid return of US troops.

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Contention 2 is Instability

U.S. military forces cause both political and physical fragmentation in Iraq preventing stabilization

Englehardt 8 (Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley and co-founder of The American Empire Project, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc.

No, the U.S. military does not stand between Iraq and fragmentation: The U.S. invasion and the Bush administration's initial occupation policies decisively smashed Iraq's fragile "national" sense of self. Since then, the Bush administration, a motor for chaos and fragmentation, has destroyed the national (if dictatorial) government, allowed the capital and much of the country (as well as its true patrimony of ancient historical objects and sites) to be looted, disbanded the Iraqi military, and deconstructed the national economy. Ever since, whatever the administration rhetoric, the U.S. has only presided over the further fragmentation of the country. Its military, in fact, employs a specific policy of urban fragmentation in which it regularly builds enormous concrete walls around neighborhoods, supposedly for "security" and "reconstruction," that actually cut them off from their social and economic surroundings. And, of course, Iraq has in these years been fragmented in other staggering ways with an estimated four-plus million Iraqis driven into exile abroad or turned into internal refugees**.** According to Pepe Escobar of the Asia Times, there are now at least 28 different militias in the country. The longer the U.S. remains even somewhat in control, the greater the possibility of further fragmentation. Initially, the fragmentation was sectarian -- into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia regions, but each of those regions has its own potentially hostile parts and so its points of future conflict and further fragmentation. If the U.S. military spent the early years of its occupation fighting a Sunni insurgency in the name of a largely Shiite (and Kurdish) government, it is now fighting a Shiite militia, while paying and arming former Sunni insurgents, relabeled "Sons of Iraq." Iran is also clearly sending arms into a country that is, in any case, awash in weaponry. Without a real national government, Iraq has descended into a welter of militia-controlled neighborhoods, city states, and provincial or regional semi-governments. Despite all the talk of American-supported "reconciliation," Juan Cole described the present situation well at his Informed Comment blog: "**Maybe** the US in Iraq is not the little boy with his finger in the dike**. Maybe** we are workers with jackhammers instructed to make the hole in the dike much more huge."

Prolonged U.S. presence in Iraq makes civil war inevitable

Englehardt 8(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley and Co-founder of The American Empire Project, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc

No**,** the U.S. military does not stand between Iraq and civil war: As with fragmentation, the U.S. military's presence has, in fact, been a motor for civil war in that country. The invasion and subsequent chaos, as well as punitive acts against the Sunni minority, allowed Sunni extremists, some of whom took the name "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia," to establish themselves as a force in the country for the first time. Later, U.S. military operations in both Sunni and Shiite areas regularly repressed local militias -- almost the only forces capable of bringing some semblance of security to urban neighborhoods -- opening the way for the most extreme members of the other community (Sunni suicide or car bombers and Shiite death squads) to attack. It's worth remembering that it was in the surge months of 2007, when all those extra American troops hit Baghdad neighborhoods, that many of the city's mixed or Sunni neighborhoods were most definitively "cleansed" by death squads, producing a 75-80% Shiite capital. Iraq is now embroiled in what Juan Cole has termed "three civil wars," two of which (in the south and the north) are largely beyond the reach of limited American ground forces and all of which could become far worse. The still low-level struggle between Kurds and Arabs (with the Turks hovering nearby) for the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in the north may be the true explosion point to come. The U.S. military sits precariously atop this mess, at best putting off to the future aspects of the present civil-war landscape, but more likely intensifying it.

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Iraq civil war would escalate to Middle East war

Bowen 6 (Jeremy, Multiple award winning Journalist @ BBC, Middle East editor and war correspondent @ BBC, Rage and devotion, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4741616.stm>, 23 February 2006) CGW

In the Middle East, politics and religion are so connected that often they are the same. A lot now depends on the Shia leaders, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top religious leader, and the radical nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who broke off a trip to Lebanon to fly home as soon as he heard what had happened in Samarra. They have both called for national unity, and for Shia people to defend themselves if the authorities cannot. They live in a culture where it is natural to express rage and sadness, collectively, on the streets. But their challenge for the leaders is to control and channel the anger, to let it be expressed but not to get out of control. A civil war in Iraq would destroy the chances of the elected central government, which will be led and dominated by Shias when eventually it is formed. Civil war could lead to the break-up of the country, and would export even more instability and violence across the wider Middle East and beyond. That is why most Iraqis, of all sides, do not want one - and why some extremists do, and are trying as hard as they can to make it happen.

And that escalates to Global war

**London 6/28** (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, *Hudson New York,* 6/28/10, <http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east>) CS

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a *casus belli*. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public

accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.

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Contention 3 is Leadership

Scenario One is Hard Power

Most qualified recent studies indicate that the US military lacks the capacity to deal with new threats.

Baldor 9 (Lolita; staff writer, *The Boston Globe*, February 20, 2009, http://www.google.com/#num=100&hl=en&q=%22military+readiness%22+overstretch&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs\_rfai=&fp=f9c767f2a58c73f1) CH

WASHINGTON - For the third consecutive year, a classified Pentagon assessment has concluded there is a significant risk that the US military could not respond quickly and fully to any new crisis, the Associated Press has learned. The latest risk assessment, drawn up by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comes despite recent security gains in Iraq and plans for troop cuts there. The assessment finds that the United States continues to face persistent terrorist threats, and the military is still stretched and strained from long and repeated tours to the warfront. Senior military officials spoke about the report on condition of anonymity because it is a classified document. Prepared every year, and routinely delivered to Congress with the budget, the risk assessment paints a broad picture of the security threats and hot spots around the world and the military's ability to deal with them. Mullen has delivered it to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Because the threat is rated as significant, Gates will send an accompanying report to Congress outlining what the military is doing to address the risks. That report has not been finished. This year's assessment finds many of the same global security issues as previous years - ranging from terrorist organizations and unstable governments to the potential for high-tech cyber attacks. It also reflects the Pentagon's ongoing struggle to maintain a military that can respond to threats from other countries, while honing newer counterinsurgency techniques to battle more unconventional dangers, such as suicide bombers and lethal roadside bombs. Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute, a military policy research group in Arlington, Va., said the assessment would take into account the strains on the force, the wear and tear on aircraft and other military equipment, and a host of global flashpoints.

Continued occupation will collapse American hegemony – it overstretches our military and prevents Iraqi stability

Odom 7 (William, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Proceedings of The American Philosophical Society 151(4) pg. 409) ELJ

Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. **That invasion was never in American interests**. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. **And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries**. Many reports suggest that **al Qaeda** **was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers.** Apparently, President **Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic.** All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind. The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well.

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Even the military believes we’re bogged down in Iraq – that ruins readiness and hurts military recruiting

Gharib 8 (Ali, New York-based journalist on U.S. foreign policy with a focus on the Middle East and Central Asia, “Senior Officers Worried About Dangerously Overstretched U.S Military,” ISP News, 2/28/08 ACW)

The U.S. military is "severely strained" by two large-scale occupations in the Middle East, other troop deployments, and problems recruiting, according to a new survey of military officers published by Foreign Policy magazine and the centrist think-tank Center for a New American Security. "They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight," said the report, 'The U.S. Military Index,' which polled 3,400 current and former high-level military officers. Sixty percent of the officers surveyed said that the military is weaker now than it was five years ago, often citing the number of troops deployed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "We ought to pay more attention to quality," said retired Lt. General Gregory Newbold, who retired from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in part over objections to the invasion of Iraq, at a panel during a conference to release the data. From Republican presidential hopeful Sen. John McCain to President George W. Bush, politicians regularly speak on the military from a position of authority. They know, they contend, that despite the two ongoing wars, the U.S is ready to deal with new threats militarily if need be. "I'm sorry to tell you, there's going to be other wars," said McCain at a campaign stop last month. "We will never surrender but there will be other wars." But the officers surveyed implied that military options against future threats may not be -- as politicians from across the spectrum have intimated -- "on the table." "Asked whether it was reasonable or unreasonable to expect the U.S. military to successfully wage another war at this time," said the report, "80 percent of the officers say that it is unreasonable." When asked to grade the preparedness of the military to deal with the threat of Iran -- on which McCain's rhetoric has been especially hawkish -- respondents gave an average score of 4.5 on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing fully prepared. The difference in which civilian and military leadership are viewed also made its way into the survey results. The level of confidence in the presidency among officers averaged just 5.5 out of 10, with 16 percent having "no confidence at all in the president." The U.S. Congress scored lowest of the institutions that the survey referred with an average score of just 2.7. The low regard for politicians could arise from the officers' notion that elected officials know little about the workings of military -- 66 percent of officers responded that elected leaders are "either somewhat or very uninformed about the U.S. military." Those views are likely informed by survey respondents' opinions about the way the civilian leadership handled the war in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein. Nearly three quarters of the officers said that the goals of the civilian leadership for the military were "unreasonable". Furthermore, it appears that many officers find that the efforts of U.S. forces have sometimes been counterproductive. Asked what country had gained the "greatest strategic advantage" from the war in Iraq, 37 percent said Iran while 22 percent answered China. Just one in five of the officers answered that the U.S. had gained the most.

**Military Readiness is key to leadership**

Rice ’00 (Condoleezza, Former Secretary of State, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest”, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79(1) JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000) ACW

Now the next president will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that aªect the living conditions of the troops—military pay, housing—and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today’s missions. But even in its current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next president should refocus the Pentagon’s priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces. The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia- Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe—areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America’s military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations. Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America’s most important strategic alliance: nato. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloˇsevi´c’s rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area’s fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and even Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their diªerences from exploding. Miloˇsevi´c has been the exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

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US hegemony is key to solve economic depression, PRC collapse, terrorism, and nuke war

Ferguson ‘4 (Niall Ferguson, Prof @ NYU, 2004, “When Empires Wane”, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244)ACW

Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.

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Scenario Two is Soft Power

US occupation motivates terrorism and hurts American soft power

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007 <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

Even **the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point and inspiration for Muslim extremists**. Equally worrisome, it had also served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military and terrorist skills. An **Al Qaeda** letter intercepted by the U.S. military indicates that the organization itself **regards a continued U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon to its cause.**  A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year**.  Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of attitudes toward the United States. Even among long-standing friends and allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia**), the United States is viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those problems will become.

Soft power is key to effective hard power and solving disease and terrorism

**Nye 8**(Joseph S. Professor of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 3-7-2008, <http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351>) CM

Etzioni is correct that **a successful policy of security first will require the combi- nation of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success.**Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. **In the past,it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues.**These latter**problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics**to transnational **terrorism, pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others,**and that requires smart power—a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. **For example,American and British intelligence agen- cies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds**of mainstream Muslims,without whose sup- port success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. **There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want**. Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran

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The impact is extinction

Alexander 2003 (Yonah, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, 8/28, Washington Times)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the **international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself.Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge** to their national security concerns.It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"?There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.Unlike their historical counterparts, **contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact.The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with** its serious **implications concerning** national, regional and **global security** concerns.[continues]Thus, **it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a** cardinal **message** communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For **without victory, there is no survival."**

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Thus The Plan:

The United States Congress should mandate the complete and unconditional withdrawal of United States’ military presence from the Republic of Iraq by December 2011.

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**Contention 4 is Solvency:**

Complete and Immediate U.S. withdrawal is the only way to prevent escalating violence in Iraq

Riedel 7 (Bruce, CIA National security advisor- Financial Times certified and former presidential advisor on Middle Eastern events, July 23, 2007) CGW

A clear US commitment to a complete, irreversible withdrawal from Iraq may now be the only way to develop a regional concert of powers that could work with Iraqis to try to stabilize the country and cauterize the conflict. The continuing US and British occupation is a roadblock to that co-operation. The galvanising impact of a decision to depart unequivocally can be the last best chance at preventing the conflict from boiling over beyond Iraq to the whole region. How we design and implement our departure is our last significant remaining leverage. There is no guarantee that this will work, but geopolitical self-interest may encourage wary co-operation from Iraq's neighbors. Iran does not need to invade Iraq to have influence there. The Saudis and Jordanians do not have the military capability to invade. The Syrians are not interested and, in spite of some sabre-rattling, the Turks do not need more Kurds to try to pacify. Focusing on ending the occupation and bringing order in its wake may be the best chance left to end our involvement while keeping the civil war contained to Iraq. None of Iraq's neighbors was eager for the invasion four years ago, with the possible exception of Kuwait. All of them saw the US and UK occupation as inherently destabilizing, especially if it looked permanent. All are now worried that the civil war in Iraq will serve as a breeding ground for terror and violence that will be increasingly exported to their own countries. Iraq is already a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists who have attacked Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and for PKK terrorists who attack Turkey. Now al-Qaeda is threatening to attack Iran for meddling on the side of the Shia in Iraq against the Sunni Arab minority. But these countries cannot work constructively with an American occupation army - especially not Iran, which has the most capability to be a decisive force given its intimate ties to virtually every Shia and Kurdish politician, its geography and its economic connections. Most of all Tehran wants to see the US leave Iraq for good so it cannot be a base against Iran. The Saudis and Jordanians find it both difficult and less urgent to engage when the occupation is open-ended. The Syrians find Iraq to be a good place to keep America bogged down and less threatening. The Turks fear that a long-term American presence encourages Kurdish -separatism. These calculations may well change once there is a clear time-line for complete American and British withdrawal and the end of occupation. At that point it is in the self interest of each of the neighbors to concentrate on shaping post-occupation Iraq and especially preventing the terrorist threat that instability creates. All Iraq's neighbors will find it easier to engage when it is not in support of an occupation army. None will want to see another gain direct control of part or all of Iraq. All will want to avoid a power vacuum for al-Qaeda and other terrorists. We should seek to build on the narrow moment of time when those self-interests might be put into harmony to stabilize Iraq. For Iraqis as well it is imperative that the US make clear now what it should have been saying from day one: we plan no permanent military presence in Iraq, no bases and no special relationship. We want a fully independent Iraq, not a client state. We should abandon any thought of staying in Iraq for decades as if it were South Korea or Germany. When we suggest such it only rallies more recruits for al-Qaeda, especially foreign suicide bombers. The best way to isolate al-Qaeda is to pull the occupation out from under it. The United Nations should be invited to convene and administer a contact group of the neighbors that would address several key issues in conjunction with the Iraqi government. At the top of the list would be agreement to assist rather than exploit the peaceful and orderly withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Iraq, agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, agreement to assist the government of Iraq in controlling and stabilizing its territory and funding of a major assistance package. These are key issues for the transition from occupation to post-occupation. For the US it is obviously important to get help in making the withdrawal of our forces as smooth as possible. We should try to leave behind a regional order that has a chance for stability.

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**Only a *credible commitment to withdraw*on time stops escalating war & maintains US leadership**

**Jarrar 10**(Raed, Senior Fellow, Peace Action, The Progressive, May 26, <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/05/26-1>) SM

**While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying** or canceling **the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as "flexibility," but rather as a betrayal** of promises**.** Iraqis believe that **prolonging the** military **occupation will not fix what the** occupation has **damage**d**, and** they **don't think** that **extending the U.S. intervention will protect them** from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. **Linking**the U.S. **withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S.** military **presence.**Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it.Some **regional players, including the Iran**iangovernment**, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge**. And **other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the** current **quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation**. **Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them**. By contrast, **adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation**, **a process**that may take many years but **that cannot begin as long as Iraq's sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions.** **If** the **Obama** administration **reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country**. And **delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country**. **Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one**.

Congressional action is crucial to assure on time withdrawal

**Jarrar, 10**[Raed, Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action & Peace Action Education Fund and Iraq Consultant to the American Friends Service Committee, Counterpunch, May 17,  <http://www.counterpunch.org/jarrar05172010.html>]

Within the U.S. peace movement, two equally damaging attitudes dominate: on the one hand, there are those who think Obama will end the war, and therefore they don't need to do anything about it. And on the other hand, there are those who think the occupation will never end, and therefor it is a lost cause. I personally stand in the middle. I think **the withdrawal plan is good**enough **because it requires all U.S. armed forces and contractors to leave by the end of next year,**but **at the same time I don't think we have enough guarantees that it will become reality**. Therefore, I believe **we need to do a lot of work to make sure Obama implements the plan as promised**. It is very important to understand how we've managed to reach to the **the current plan**, which is a good plan **aimed at ending the occupation completely**. But what is more important is to understand that this plan **needs a lot of work until it becomes reality**. **We need to activate**both our **grassroots**oversight **and**the **congressional oversight to make sure**the **Obam**a Administration **will abide by the plan and fulfill its promises and obligations.** These **2 approaching deadlines are recognized and supported by existing congressional language.**Section 1227 of the defense authorization and section 9010 of the defense appropriations, both for fy10, recognize and support the deadlines and their guiding doctrines. **This language provides some congressional oversight, but more is needed.**A number of national organizations in the US, including Peace Action, are calling for more congressional oversight and White House accountability. You can learn more about Peace Action's campaigns here **The August 31st deadline is being challenged by the spike of violence**in Iraq **and by a drumbeat in Washington trying to use that violence as an excuse to justify prolonging the occupation**. Giving into skepticism will take us to no where, and **believing that Obama will do our work for us is not the answer either. We need to work hard to make sure that the plan for withdrawal becomes reality, and that this tragic war with Iraq comes to an end.**

\*\*\*\*\*Inherency\*\*\*\*\*

Inherency - no withdrawal now

**Even if US troops pull out, troops will remain in Iraq in non-combat roles.**

**Harwood 9 (**Matthew reporter for The Washington Monthly, The Huffington Post, *The Guardian*<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/27/obama-iraq-troop-withdrawal>) SM

**President Barack Obama plans to withdraw most major combat troops from Iraq by August 2010**. According to reports, Obama will remove about 90,000 combat troops of the current 140,000 soldiers in country**, leaving 50,000**. While it's nice to see a politician try to keep a core campaign promise, **the decision is an unnecessary strategic gamble that will play with both American and Iraqi lives**. For one, the United **States has already set a gradual timeline for its withdrawal from Iraq**. **Under the recently signed status of forces agreement (SOFA)**with the Iraqi government, the United States military will pull out of Iraqi urban areas by this July and completely withdrawal from Iraq by 2011, although **residual forces will remain in non-combat roles, such as training and counterterrorism missions**. From the American side of things, the SOFA is a good compromise between the proponents of immediate withdrawal and perpetual occupation.

No withdrawal. Deployments of troops match our withdrawals.

**Reed**, Tucker. June 30, 20**10**. ((Reporter for the Huffington Post) What we can learn in the sandbox”; The Huffington Post; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tucker-reed/what-we-can-learn-in-the\_b\_630662.html) 6/30/10 AW

However, as we continue to draw down in Iraq it is important to remember **that our obligations there are still far from met**, the timeline for our presence in Afghanistan is still far from set, and **Americans are still regularly deploying for service in these challenging environments**.

Obama promised to maintain 50,000 troops in Iraq

Strauss 10(Steven, staff writer, “US Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: Fortunes for Investors, Misfortunes for Everyone Else”Freedom Socialist newspaper, Vol. 31, No. 3, June 28, 2010 ACW)

The government and its European allies have long-range economic designs on Iraq. Oil companies are hammering out deals for Iraq’s vast oil reserves. Italian firms are investing huge sums to develop a southern deep-water port at Al Faw. And German railway magnates are designing major rail connections between Iraqi cities, Turkey, and Europe. They want to turn Iraq into a leading international transportation hub for capitalist business. None of these major investment plans would have been possible without first clearing away the local obstacles. This was the real goal of the current war, which continued the more than two decades of merciless pummeling, beginning with the U.S.-provoked Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), followed by the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), then a decade of U.S. bombs and blockades, finally the 2003 invasion. The results? Four million Iraqis displaced from their homes. Chronic childhood malnutrition now at 28 percent. And 70 percent of Iraqis without access to adequate water supplies. Doctors Without Borders has called Iraq one of “the worst humanitarian and medical emergencies in the world.” Too much profit is at stake to expect the big investors to behave democratically. They will not hesitate to use arms against domestic opposition. Iraqi oil workers, for example, have been struggling to keep oil under public ownership and use the revenues for people’s needs. Democracy for these workers is the last thing investors want. That’s why President Obama promised he will not pull all U.S. soldiers out of Iraq, but will maintain a presence of at least 50,000 troops. These “non-combat” forces will have one mission — to protect corporate investments. They will be stationed at over a dozen permanent military bases currently under construction.

Inherency - no withdrawal now

Construction of new bases proves that the Pentagon has no intention of Withdrawing

AllVoices 10 (World News Site, *AllVoices,* 6-3-10, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/5983575-many-constructions-projects-continue-in-iraq-despite-withdrawal-plans) CM

On Nov. 17, 2008 a deal was signed between Iraq and the U.S. that would require all U.S. troops withdraw by the end of 2011. However on the same day construction began on a 68 million dollar group of aircraft shelters at Camp Adder in southern Iraq. Within the next 14 months the U.S. started another 150 million in new base construction. During 2009 the U.S. completed 496 million in base construction the highest figure since the war began. Another 323 million are to be finished this year. About 100 bases are to be closed or turned over to the Iraqis this year so no further large scale projects are contemplated. The U.S. taxpayer will no doubt heave a great sigh of relief at that! Base construction is just a small part of the total cost of the Iraq war which the Congressional Budget Office estimates in the end will cost about 1.9 trillion dollars. It remains to be seen given the present level of violence in Iraq and the failure so far to form a government whether the timetable for withdrawal will be kept. But even if troops are withdrawn a large U.S. presence will no doubt remain centered in the humongous U.S. embassy in the Green Zone. Meanwhile private contractors are still no doubt making high profits courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer. The U.S. embassy in Iraq is the largest in the world. It is the size of 80 football fields and cost about 700 million dollars.

US Presence won’t be reduced now – troops will become trainers

Cole 10(Juan, Professor of History at University of Michigan, Informed Comment at JuanCole.com, <http://www.juancole.com/2010/05/us-troop-withdrawal-in-iraq-on-track.html>, 5/14)dc

The withdrawal isn’t entirely as advertised, of course, and won’t be as complete as the SOFA imagines. The 50,000 non-combat troops in Iraq as of September will actually be combat troops rebranded as trainers, and will include 4500 special operations forces actively tracking down and fighting guerrilla cells. But aside from the special operations guys, most of the US troops will not be doing active war fighting and will in fact mostly be training Iraqi troops, the quality and capabilities of which are definitely improving. From September 2010 until December 2011, roughly 3,000 troops on average will come out each month (though that is just an average and the departures may be more bunched up at some points). In the end, a very small force may remain, of trainers, special operations, and air force. Iraq’s air force planes and helicopters have been ordered but won’t arrive until 2013 and Iraqi pilots will need long and complicated training on them. The remaining US troops will be there, if at all, with the consent of the Iraqi government. They are unlikely to do any war fighting at all on their own. Close air support will likely be provided by the US to Iraqi infantry and armor in any pitched battles with militias from al-Udeid air force base in Qatar or from Incirlik in Turkey.

Inherency - no withdrawal now

**U.S. withdrawal plans incomplete and allow for extended Military control**

**Bennis 9** (Phyllis Bennis, a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and Journalist for the UN, *Institute for Foreign Policies, 3/6/09,* <http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/contested_terrain_obamas_iraq_withdrawal_plan_and_the_peace_movement>*) CS*

The meaning of President Obama's Iraq withdrawal speech, and its influence on real U.S. policy in Iraq, will not be determined solely by his actual words. The import of the speech — and whether its promises become real — will be determined by a fluid combination of what Obama says, his own definitions of what he says, AND the disparate ways his speech is heard, perceived, described and contested by others — the mainstream media, Congress, the military, other centers of elite power, and crucially, the peace movement. The words of the speech were quite amazing: "And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home." After eight years of reckless slaughter proudly justified in the name of a "global war on terror," it was stunning to hear the president of the United States announce what he called "a new strategy to end the war in Iraq." That moment was something we should celebrate. It was ours. The statement was a recognition of the powerful antiwar consensus in this country, a consensus that helped define the powerful constituency so key to Obama's election. Obama may not acknowledge, even to himself, that it was the organized antiwar movement that helped create and build and strengthen that consensus — but still his speech reflected the new political reality that requires him to speak to the demands of that antiwar community. Ending the War: A Definition From the vantage point of the peace movement, the speech was and remains insufficient, and shot through with wiggle room and loopholes. We know that President Obama's definition of "ending the war" is not ours. Our definition has not changed: \* Withdraw all the troops and bring them home (don't redeploy them to another illegal and unwinnable war in Afghanistan). \* Pull out all the U.S.-paid foreign mercenaries and contractors and cancel the remaining contracts. \* Close all U.S. military bases and turn them over to Iraq. \* Give up all efforts to control Iraq's oil. While he laid out partial versions of some of these issues (withdrawal and oil), others (mercenaries and bases) were left out entirely. And at the end of the day, President Obama did not make a single real commitment to meeting our definition of ending the war. As The New York Times columnist Bob Herbert described Obama's plan for Iraq and Afghanistan, "we're committed to these two conflicts for a good while yet, and there is nothing like an etched-in-stone plan for concluding them." Understanding all the problems, limitations, and dangers of President Obama's speech is crucial. (For a fuller analysis of the dangers in Obama's speech, see my February 26th talking points — http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117.) But understanding those limitations does not tell us how to respond to this new moment, a moment when the president of the United States is telling Americans that he is ending the war, that he intends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq, telling Iraqis that the U.S. "pursues no claim on your territory or your resources," and telling the world that the U.S. plans to engage with everybody in the region including Iran and Syria. We may — we must — understand all the reasons that those words don't constitute a firm commitment. But the reality is that the vast majority of people hearing those words, who already believe in what those words should mean, will assume President Obama means the same thing they do. That perception provides a huge opportunity for the peace movement. And it is for that reason that the assertions in his speech remain contested terrain. Who Opposes, Who Supports? Leading Democrats, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Leader Harry Reid, criticized Obama's plan for leaving 50,000 or more U.S. troops in Iraq after the withdrawal of "combat brigades." Their critique was powerful, public, and their first substantive break with the president — breaking to his left. Although they will likely back down, indeed they have already gone silent on this issue, their initial response opens the possibility for their greater engagement with more progressive members of Congress whom they had consistently dissed throughout the Bush years, and perhaps ultimately with the peace movement directly. The "speak with one voice" posture of the Democratic Party may be eroding with a Democrat in the White House. Perhaps not so surprisingly, it was key Republicans — including Senator John McCain — who voiced immediate support for Obama's withdrawal plan. Clearly they understand the huge loopholes inherent in the "withdrawal" strategy. They recognize the limited character of Obama's pledges. But what they have officially endorsed, on the record, is a strategy that includes the language of "remove all U.S. troops from Iraq," "our combat mission will end," etc. They will never be our allies — but they are stuck with those words. Certainly they can — and surely will — reverse themselves if partial withdrawal moves threaten to turn into a real end of U.S. occupation. But they will pay a high political price when they do — and risk being dubbed flip-floppers on the Iraq War. Military leaders, including top U.S. generals in Iraq and the region, heads of the joint chiefs of staff, and the Republican secretary of defense, have also expressed support. Of course they are the most familiar with all the wiggle room in the plan. They know the likelihood of renegotiating with a compliant Iraqi government virtually any or all of the terms in the U.S.-Iraq agreement — on which Obama based his intention to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq. But whatever their understanding, the fact that the military brass is standing publicly behind what is being touted as a complete withdrawal plan strips an important weapon away from those who oppose any withdrawal at all. On its February 28th front page, The New York Times referred to the speech as "the

Inherency - no withdrawal now

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beginning of the end of one of the longest and most divisive wars in American history." The Times went on to describe how Obama "announced that he would withdraw combat forces from Iraq by August 2010 and all remaining troops by December 2011." Not that he "intended," but that he "would" withdraw all troops. The San Francisco Chronicle headline was "Obama Makes it Plain: Troops Out by End of 2011." The Washington Post headlined "Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq." We have to recognize that even reports accurately depicting the too limited withdrawals, the too long timelines, the continuing occupation by U.S. troops, etc., will still be widely understood as consistent with what President Obama called "a new strategy to end the war." And while it's vital that as a movement we harbor no illusions, and recognize all the loopholes and wiggle room and pitfalls, our most important job is not to convince the people of this country that there is no way President Obama will end the occupation of Iraq. Our job will be to convince people that the only way President Obama will be able to overcome the powerful pro-war opposition inside and outside his administration and among his congressional allies, the only way he will be willing to even try to accomplish what he has promised, is if we all mobilize to demand it, to hold him accountable to his pledges, his promises, his speeches, and even his intentions.

Inherency - no withdrawal now

U.S. has no intentions of fully leaving Iraq

Bakhach 6/21 (Osman Bakhach, Director of the central Media Office of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Hizb-ut-Tahrir:America, 6/21/10, <http://hizb-america.org/media-center/press-releases/1008-america-plans-for-permanent-occupation-in-iraq>) CS

The Washington Times published on 16 June 2010 a report detailing a request from the state department officials to the pentagon to provide heavy military gear, including 24 Black Hawk helicopters, 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-tech surveillance systems. It also says that the state department will need substantial support from private contractors such as the infamous Houston-based KBR(Halliburton) Inc, the long time pentagon's partner in its dirty wars since Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly this report comes to expose the real agenda of the empire builder in the power corridors in the military-industrial complex in America. This report proves that all the lies of Obama and slogans of reaching out to the muslim world are no more than empty words falling on deaf ears. The naked truth is that America has attacked Iraq not because of non existing weapons of mass destruction, neither to establish peace and prosperity, but solely to expand the Pax Americana at the expense of millions of innocent civilians. The request states that "After the departure of U.S. forces, we will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life-support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of the Department of State". Neither Germany nor Japan has oil or gas, yet the American occupation still on going 6 decades after the Second World War is over. It is clear that the American policy makers have planned for open occupation in Iraq supported by the crony regimes in Syria, Iran and Turkey, who have no qualms in legitimizing the American occupation behind the façade of puppets political parties under some Islamic as well as secular fig leaf. Hizb-ut-Tahrir calls upon the Islamic nation to realize the open deception of the American occupation and the insistence of the American politicians to subject the Muslim nation to the same fate of the native Indians. The Muslims need to be aware of the complacency of their rulers who serve the American colonialism. It is time for the sincere sons of the ummah to put their hands with us to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing the Khilafah which will liberate the ummah from the American slavery.

**The U.S. goal in Iraq is to create a military post in the Middle East**

**Symonds 6/9** (Peter Symonds, International editor for the World Socialist Web Site, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 6/9/10, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jun2010/pers-j09.shtml>) CS

Seven years of war has had a devastating impact on the Iraqi people. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. According to last month’s Brookings Iraq Index, as of last year, only 20 percent of the population had access to proper sanitation, 45 percent to clean water, 50 percent to more than 12 hours a day of electricity, 50 percent to adequate housing and 30 percent to health services. A 2007 World Bank survey found that 23 percent of people were living in poverty on less than $US2.20 a day. The criminal US invasion of Iraq was not aimed at helping the Iraqi people. Rather, its purpose was to subjugate the country in order to establish control over its vast energy reserves and to transform it into a base for wider American strategic objectives in the Middle East and Central Asia. Having bloodily suppressed resistance in Iraq, the Obama administration is pulling its troops out in order to expand its neo-colonial war in Afghanistan and for new military aggression in other parts of the globe. Being left behind is an extensive American civilian and military apparatus that will continue to control the levers of power in Baghdad, bully the Iraqi government into line on matters concerning US interests, keep a watchful eye on the country’s festering sectarian tensions and leave the door open to a rapid return of US troops.

Inherency – Colonialism prevents Withdrawal

**Iraq is ready to rid itself of American occupation, but American colonialism ensures forces stay in Iraq, causing the crisis to get worse**

**BBC 10**(January 21, Iranian newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami BBC Worldwide Monitoring Lexis) ELJ

Washington-Baghdad security agreement is no exception because the Americans were to leave Iraq first at the beginning of 1387 [2008], but by paving the grounds, Iraqis were forced to surrender to the recent security agreement. Now **considering what has happened, it is improbable that American forces would ever leave Iraq at the scheduled time and it is obvious that**as long as occupiers remain in Iraq, not only the crisis in this country will not end, but its dimensions will grow on a daily basis. Barak **Obama came into power with the slogan of change and**reformation of America's policies, particularly **emphasizing on calling back American military forces from Iraq** and Afghanistan. In practice however, **what has occurred is against those promises and slogans.**  **This fact, once more proves that America's colonialism has not abandoned its policies and the aim of changes made is to enchant international public opinion and to diminish the global hatred and repulsion towards its interventionist policies.**  What is obvious is that **the Iraqi nation is after its real independence and freedom from foreign presence.** It is only through unity and solidarity that it can get rid of the ominous shadow of the occupiers. That's why it is necessary that the authorities of Iraq's Kurdistan do not surrender to colonialists in this historical period and do not turn into instruments of a historical treason. Although at present, the custodians of Iraq's Kurdistan are favoured by America and colonial powers, but they should not forget that foreign powers do not really care about tribes and nations, but only think about their own interests. As history shows, those who have become the servants of colonialists were defeated and regretful in the long run.

Obama plans to stay in Iraq

**The August deadline is semantic, not real. Combat operations will continue.**

**New York Times, July 2**(Tim Arango,  New York Times writer, New York Times, July 2, 2010 ,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html?hp>) EH

NEAR TULUL AL-BAQ, Iraq — **President Obama has set an August deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq.**Here at this makeshift desert camp in the insurgent badlands of northern Iraq, a mission is under way that is not going to stop then: American soldiers hunting terrorists and covertly watching an Iraqi checkpoint staffed by police officers whom the soldiers say they do not trust. “They’re not checking anybody, and they’re wondering why I.E.D.’s are getting in to town,” said Staff Sgt. Kelly E. Young, 39, from Albertville, Ala., as he watched the major roadway that connects Baghdad with Mosul, regarded as the country’s most dangerous city. He referred to improvised explosive devices, the military term for homemade bombs.  **The**August**deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war**in Iraq, **but**here **it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die**, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here.  **The withdrawal**, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It **is**also **an exercise in semantics**.  **What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the U**nited **S**tates **military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions.  “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen**R. **Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.”** 

Obama plans to stay in Iraq

**The Obama Administration may seem pacifistic but Military control is increasing**

**Lendman 6/9** (Stephan Lendman, Market Research Analyst and author of “The Iraq Quagmire”,*The Baltimore Chronical,*6/9/10, <http://baltimorechronicle.com/2010/060910Lendman.shtml>)

**Overall, the language and tone differ, but policy remains the same - permanent wars in a threatening world, America in the lead waging them along with willing partners offering support; that is, until they cut their losses and opt out**. Also in Foreign Policy on May 27, Will Inboden headlined, **"Obama's National Security Strategy leaves an empty feeling," saying: Continuity with Bush is evident in the context of a less than compelling grand strategy "that connects an analysis of opportunities and threats with resources, policies and goals."**It's "too heavy on process and light on strategy," much of it devoted to "engagement, cooperation and partnerships" as well as a "world we seek (for) a just and sustainable international order," not what's needed without Washington rampaging to control it. **The proof, of course, is in the implementation, and after nearly one and a half years in office, Obama is clearly pursuing imperial wars and homeland repression, like the Bush administration, by a leader who promised change.**Another way came last September when Central Command head General David Petraeus issued a secret directive to send covert US Special Operations forces to friendly and hostile states in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, and by implication anywhere in the world by his counterparts - to "penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy" terror threats and "prepare the environment" for future planned military attacks. **On June 4, Washington Post writers Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe headlined, "US 'Secret War' Expands Globally as Special Operations Forces Take a Larger Role," saying: The Obama administration "has significantly expanded a largely secret US war against al-Qaeda and other radical groups**" with Special Ops forces "in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of last year." **More is planned along with intensified use of CIA drone attacks, and according to one unnamed "senior military official," Obama has allowed "things that the previous administration did not**," including the largest ever FY 2011 Special Ops budget of $6.3 billion plus another $3.5 billion contingency funding in 2010

**Obama is pushing the U.S. militarism**

**Lendman 6/9** (Stephan Lendman, Market Research Analyst and author of “The Iraq Quagmire”,*The Baltimore Chronical,*6/9/10, <http://baltimorechronicle.com/2010/060910Lendman.shtml>)

His NSS aside, **Obama plans more war on the world than George Bush, putting a lie to his campaign promise to withdraw Iraq troops by August 2010 and begin exiting Afghanistan by July 2011**. Earlier as an Illinois State Senator, he delivered an October 2002 anti-war speech, saying: "....we ought not....travel down that hellish path blindly. Nor should we allow those who would march off and pay the ultimate sacrifice, who would prove the full measure of devotion with their blood, to make such an awful sacrifice in vain." **As president, he's waging war on the world, including Americans globally, suspected of terrorism. Explaining it, former National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair told Congress last February that Obama authorized "direct actions against terrorists," including assassinating uncharged Americans innocent of any crime, in clear violation of the law**. Law Professor Jonathan Turley cites the "Annex to the Hague Convention Number IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" with a provision stating: "**In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden....to kill or wound treacherous individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army...."** Though vague, the Pentagon interprets it as "prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead or alive.' " In other words, combatants can be targeted on the battlefield, not civilians, precisely what er international law states, Turley citing the rights of US citizens, affirmed both in law and: "in cases like Reid v. Covert, 354 US 1 (1957), American citizens have the same protections regardless of whether they are within or outside of the country."

Obama plans to stay in Iraq

**U.S.  Military Plans are geared towards permanent occupation, Imperics prove**

**Wallace 6/23**(Lt. Col. George B. Wallace, USAF, member of the National Council of the John Birch Society, *The New American*, 6/23/10, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/foreign-policy/3836-proper-use-of-the-us-military>) CS

Do you ever wonder **why we are still in Iraq after defeating Saddam Hussein’s forces in March, 2003**? **Are we peacekeeping until the Iraqis can establish “stability” and “democracy?” Will that ever come**? **Why are we in Afghanistan**?**Proving we can outlast the English and the Russians in an endless battle with Afghani tribesmen**?  **Why are we still guarding the 38th parallel in Korea, almost 57 years after a truce was declared**? More than 28,000 U.S. troops currently are stationed in South Korea. Why? Supposedly, we are there to protect our ally South Korea against attack from North Korea**. But South Korea is an economic and technological dynamo compared to its communist neighbor to the north, a centrally planned dictatorship that is such a pathetic economic basket case it can’t even feed itself**. **In fact, the North Korean regime has had to rely on foreign assistance for the past several years to prevent mass starvation of its population.** Consider the following statistical comparisons of the North and South Koreas from the CIA’s World Fact Book. With its population base, economic base, industrial base, energy, technology, infrastructure, transportation, education, agriculture — virtually every relevant measure — South Korea dwarfs North Korea, and has done so for many years. So, perhaps we should be asking, particularly in light of the recent rattling of sabers, firing of missiles, and flaring of tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang: **Why are the lives of tens of thousands of Americans still being put at risk on the Korean Peninsula? Isn’t it time for South Korea and the “economic tigers” of Asia to defend themselves**? And **with our nation trillions of dollars in debt and running annual deficits of over a trillion dollars, we have to ask ourselves, from a purely economic standpoint, why do we still have more than 35,000 troops stationed in Japan and 78,000 troops stationed in Europe?** In fact, why are hundreds of thousands of our troops stationed in some 130 countries around the world? The largest bulk of those troops, of course, is in Iraq and Afghanistan. **According to the Department of Defense, as of December 31, 2009, more than 222,000 U.S. troops (including members of the Reserves and National Guard) were deployed in and around Iraq and Afghanistan** in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These numbers, of course, tell only part of the story, since, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has reported, the number of actual uniformed troops in those areas has always been exceeded by the number of “contractors” — American and foreign civilian operatives — carrying out the Pentagon’s military objectives. According to the December 2009 CRS study, during the seven quarters from March 2008 to September 2009, contractors comprised between 55 percent and 69 percent, respectively, of the U.S. forces in the OIF/OEF theaters. **This enormous “outsourcing” of our national military operations, which is unprecedented in scope, has injected many legal, ethical, and economic problems into the mix, not to mention the serious conflicts it causes concerning military command authority when numerous “independent” contractors are acting in the name of — and in the pay of — the United States**. Little wonder that**the DOD’s accounting for the Iraq-Afghanistan operations — projected to continue at roughly $11 billion per month for Fiscal Year 2011** — has been less than sterling, and billions of dollars that simply “disappeared” in Iraq remain unaccounted for. The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as **U.S. military operations in a number of other countries, were begun during the Bush administration under the rubric of a “war on terrorism” following the 9/11 attacks — even though there was never any connection proven between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks**. After Saddam Hussein was toppled and President Bush declared “Mission Accomplished,” on May 1, 2003, **rather than withdrawing from Iraq, the Bush administration began adopting new excuses for staying, even invoking the model of Korea and suggesting U.S. troops may have to occupy Iraq for decades to com**e. Bush repeatedly invoked the need for continued U.S. military involvement for “nation building” in Iraq, a United Nations concept that President Bill Clinton had tried to implement in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, and for which Clinton was rightfully scorned and repudiated by the American military and the American electorate. **In addition to nation building, President Bush added the claim that U.S. troops would remain “to advance democracy in the broader Middle East,” and to “help transform the Middle East.”**

Obama plans to stay in Iraq

**U.S. militarism has not changed under the Obama administrations**

**Wallace 6/23**(Lt. Col. George B. Wallace, USAF, member of the National Council of the John Birch Society, *The New American*, 6/23/10, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/foreign-policy/3836-proper-use-of-the-us-military>) CS

**The Obama administration has specifically abandoned and rejected the Bush administration’s “war on terrorism” terminology. According to President Obama’s White House Advisor on counterterrorism, John Brennan, we are simply at war, globally, with al-Qaeda. “**We are at war with al Qaeda,” Brennan declared in August 2009. “We are at war with its violent extremist allies who seek to carry on al Qaeda’s murderous agenda.” **If it is true that it is al-Qaeda**, a will-o-the-wisp terrorist group, that **is our principal enemy in the world**, does it make sense to continue fighting them in the manner that we have been, with huge conventional armies occupying entire countries? Informed opinion on al-Qaeda’s numerical strength varies significantly among various experts and alleged experts, from lows of a couple hundred (according to Egyptian intelligence) to around 500 (the CIA), to highs of several thousand. According to Jack Cloonan, a 25-year FBI veteran and former member of the CIA-FBI task force tracking Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s numbers “are min-uscule.” **This is true in Iraq as well, where U.S. officials often have cited al-Qaeda as a major threat. But according to most reliable analysts, al-Qaeda is and always has been a bit player in Iraq.** “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” according to intelligence veteran, author, and Iraq hand Malcolm Nance, “is a microscopic terrorist organization.” This evaluation appears to be strongly supported by the publicly available evidence, as well as by the consensus of veteran analysts such as former CIA officers Vincent Canistrero and Larry Johnson, and DOD analysts Col. W. Patrick Lang and Alex Rossmiller — to name but a few. According to the U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, released in April 2009, al-Qaeda’s “organizational strength is difficult to determine” and “it is impossible to estimate their numbers.” So, we continue to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops abroad on foreign soil supposedly to fight an enemy whose numbers are “impossible to estimate.” **Like swatting flies with a sledgehammer, we do more harm than good, create more enemies than we kill, and spend far more blood and treasure than we can afford**. November 27, 2006 marked the day when the Iraq War became longer than the U.S. involvement in World War II. During that time in WWII, we defeated Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany and their combined allies. We have now been in Iraq three and a half years longer than we were engaged against Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo, and there is still no end in sight.**Afghanistan, of course, has gone on even longer; June 7 of this year marked the 104th month of our engagement there, surpassing the Vietnam War as the longest war in our nation’s history**. And what of the regimes that we are supporting in Baghdad and Kabul? Are they worth the price we are asking our troops (not to mention our taxpayers) to pay? Are the governments of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq and Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan exemplars of freedom and commitment to democratic rule? Hardly. Nor are they reliable guarantors of “stability.” Their popular support is dubious. To top it off, both al-Maliki and Karzai are closely allied to Iran, which **Democrats and Republicans alike acknowledge to be a chief antagonist — if not outright enemy — of the United States. And this is who we are supposed to further bankrupt our nation and continue sacrificing our sons and daughters for?**

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**Obama plans to keep 50,000 “fully combat capable” brigades in Iraq**

Wallechinsky 9 (Aaron Wallechinsky, Writer for AllGov, *AllGov, 3/5/09*,<http://www.allgov.com/ViewNews/Withdrawing_Combat_Troops_from_Iraq__Kind_of__Sort_of__Maybe_90305>) CS

**Obama said he plans to leave a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 to advise Iraqi security forces, conduct counter-terrorism missions and protect U.S. personnel**. This number was much larger than Democratic Congressional leaders had **previously expected, and a number of them, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and Sen. Chuck Schumer publicly expressed their disappointment**.    **Combat Capable Brigades** **Although Obama claims that all U.S. “combat brigades” will be removed by the 2010 deadline, there is some question as to the actual purpose and capabilities of the 35,000 to 50,000 residual forces**. CBS News Pentagon correspondent David Martin reported on February 24 that **the residual force would be organized in “training and assistance brigades” that would be capable of conducting combat operations and calling air strikes from carrier or land-based aircraft.**Martin also said **the units would be “fully combat capable**,” suggesting that they would be drawn from combat brigades. In a teleconference with reporters on Friday, **Secretary of Defense**[**Gates**](http://www.allgov.com/Official/Gates__Robert)**confirmed having discussed the possibility of keeping combat brigades in Iraq, but renaming them “non-combat” forces, or actually sending new combat brigades to Iraq from the U.S. during the drawdown of the brigades now in Iraq.**

**The Pentagon is pushing for prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq**

**Jarrar 10** (Raed Jarrar, Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action & Peace Action Education Fund and Iraq Consultant to the American Friends Service Committee, *Common Dreams.org,*2/25/10, <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/25-0)CS>

This Monday, Army **Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, asked officials in DC to approve contingency plans to delay the withdrawal of US combat forces. The next day, the New York times published an op-ed asking president Obama to delay the US withdrawal and keep some tens of thousands of troops in Iraq indefinitely. Both the Pentagon and NY times article argue that prolonging the occupation is for Iraq's own good.** According to these latest attempts to prolong the occupation, if the US were to leave Iraqis alone the sky would fall, a genocidal civil war will erupt, and Iran will takeover their nation and rip it apart. **Excuses to prolong the military intervention in Iraq have been changing since 1990. Whether is was liberating Kuwait, protecting the region from Iraq, protecting the world from Iraq's WMDs, punishing Iraq for its role in the 9/11 attacks, finding Saddam Hussien and his sons, fighting the Baathists and Al-Qaeda, or the other dozens of stories the U.S. government never ran out of reasons to justify a continuous intervention in Iraq.** Under President Bush, the withdrawal plan was linked to conditions on the ground, and had no fixed deadlines. Bush only promise what that "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down". But Iraqis never managed to stand up, and the US never had to stand down

US Won’t meet current Timeline

Escalating violence in Iraq makes current timetable unrealistic.

Chulov 10(Martin, Iraq Correspondent for The Guardian/UK, The Guardian/UK, 5/12)dc

The United States is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. The US Commanding General Ray Odierno had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. [Iraqi soldiers gather at the site of a bus explosion in Iskandiriyah, 50kms south of Baghdad. Twin car bombs at a factory, followed by a suicide blast against emergency workers, and coordinated attacks on security forces killed 70 people in Iraq's bloodiest day this year. US officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a new government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria With sectarian tensions rising, the al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremist groups have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is widely seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe. General Odierno has kept a low profile since announcing the deaths of al-Qaida's two leaders in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who were killed in a combined Iraqi-US raid on 18 April. The operation was hailed then as a near fatal blow against al-Qaida, but violence has intensified ever since. All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the US president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the prescribed deadline. However, they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. "The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." From his office in central Baghdad, destroyed in a massive explosion last August at the start of a new phase in the insurgency, Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence. "They too have been emboldened, because we haven't been able to establish a viable unified government that others can respect," he said. "In one way or another, Iran, Turkey and Syria are interfering in the formation of this government. "There is a lingering fear [among some neighbouring states] that Iraq should not reach a level of stability. The competition over the future of Iraq is being played out mostly between Turkey and Iran. They both believe they have a vested interest here." The withdrawal order is eagerly awaited by the 92,000 US troops still in Iraq – they mostly remain confined to their bases. This month, General Odierno was supposed to have ordered the pullout of 12,500, a figure that was meant to escalate every week between now and 31 August, when only 50,000 US troops are set to remain – all of them non-combat forces. US patrols are now seldom seen on the streets of Baghdad, where the terms of a security agreement between Baghdad and Washington are being followed strictly: this relegates them to secondary partners and means US troops cannot leave their bases without Iraqi permission. US commanders have grown accustomed to being masters of the land no longer, but they have recently grown increasingly concerned about what they will leave behind. Zebari said: "The mother of all mistakes that they made was changing their mission from liberation to occupation and then legalising that through a security council resolution." Earlier this week, Allawi warned that the departing US troops had an obligation enshrined in the security agreement and at the United Nations security council to safeguard Iraq's democratic process. He warned of catastrophic consequences if the occupation ended with Iraq still politically unstable.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

The situation in Iraq and the political situation in the US make the current withdrawal timetable unrealistic.

Baker et al, 10(Peter, News Analysts for New York Times, New York Times, 4/27)dc.

When President Obama approved a plan to withdraw combat forces from Iraq this summer, it was based on the assumption that a newly elected government would be in place by the time Americans headed home. Fourteen months later, that assumption is exploding but the plan remains the same. The delay and messy aftermath of the Iraqi election mean it may be months before the next government is formed, even as tens of thousands of American troops pack to leave. Yet Mr. Obama has not had a meeting on Iraq with his full national security team in months, and the White House insists that it has no plans to revisit the withdrawal timetable. The situation presents a test for Mr. Obama’s vow to end the war, perhaps the most defining promise he made when he ran for president. While Mr. Obama has proved flexible about other campaign promises and deadlines, his plan to pull out combat forces by August and the remaining 50,000 trainers and advisers by December 2011 has been the most inviolate of policies. By sticking to the deadline, Mr. Obama effectively is abandoning the thesis he adopted on the recommendation of military and civilian advisers in February 2009 that a large American military presence was needed long enough to provide stability during the post-election transition. Instead, the president is now relying on the conclusion that Iraqis are stepping up to the challenges of governing and security that for too long depended on Americans. “We see no indications now that our planning needs to be adjusted,” said Ben Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser to Mr. Obama. “We did anticipate an extended period of government formation,” and recent Iraqi-led missions that have killed leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq show “their growing capacity to provide for security, which of course is critical to ending our combat mission at the end of August.” While Mr. Obama has not convened a full-scale meeting on Iraq lately, Mr. Rhodes noted that Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who manages Iraq policy, does hold such meetings regularly and keeps Mr. Obama informed. “It’s something that he’s obviously regularly engaged in,” Mr. Rhodes said of the president. For Mr. Obama, shifting the deadline would prove complicated for both logistical and political reasons. As he pulls troops out of Iraq, he has been sending more to Afghanistan, putting pressure on the armed forces. And with his liberal base angry at the Afghan troop buildup, any delay of the Iraq drawdown could provoke more consternation on the left. But the resistance to revisiting the deadline has drawn concern from former American officials, including some who participated in formulating the Obama policy last year. The original plan anticipated Iraqi elections in December and the formation of a new government at least 60 days afterward. Instead, the elections did not take place until March and produced a near tie between the parties of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. And now the two are fighting through the courts and recounts. Ryan C. Crocker, the former American ambassador to Iraq who was appointed by President George W. Bush and later made recommendations to Mr. Obama regarding the drawdown, said the administration should consider extending the August deadline. “I am a little bit nervous,” Mr. Crocker, now dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, said in a recent interview. “The elections were later than expected and there were very close results between Maliki and Allawi, which suggest it’s going to be a very long process. We may not even have a new government until we’re at the August deadline. I’d like the U.S. to retain the original flexibility.” Meghan L. O’Sullivan, a former deputy national security adviser to Mr. Bush who oversaw Iraq policy, also said August might be too soon.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

Iraq too terrible to fend for itself – current timetable is unrealistic.

Jarrar 10(Raed, Political Analyst for Peace Action, commondreams.org, 2/25) dc

The new mission, renamed "Operation New Dawn", should end by December 31st 2011 with the last US soldier and contractor out of Iraq. Conditions on the ground in Iraq are horrible. After seven years under the US occupation, Iraqis are still without water, electricity, education, or health care. Iran's intervention and control of the Iraqi government stays at unprecedented levels. Iraq's armed forces are still infiltrated by the militias and controlled by political parties. But so far, the Obama administration has not attempted to use any of these facts as a reason to change the combat forces withdrawal plan, or to ask the Iraqi government to renegotiate the bi-lateral security agreement. This week's calls to prolong the occupation are surprising because they expose a conflict between the Pentagon on the one hand and the White House and Congress on the other hand.

**Obama’s withdrawal plans are becoming more delayed and Congress can’t help**

**Swanson 5/13 (**David Swanson, convenor of United for Peaace and Justice, and contributer to Global research, 5/13/10, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19152>) CS

So, we elected a president who promised a withdrawal from Iraq that he, or the generals who tell him what to do, is now further [delaying](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay). And, of course, the timetable he's now [delaying](http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2010/05/12/that-iraq-withdrawal-we-elected-in-2008/) was already a far cry from what he had promised as a candidate.   What are we to think? That may be sad news, but what could we have done differently? Surely it would have been worse to elect a president who did not promise to withdraw, right?   But there's a broader framework for this withdrawal or lack thereof, namely the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), the unconstitutional treaty that Bush and Maliki drew up without consulting the U.S. Senate. I was reminded of this on Tuesday when Obama and Karzai talked about a forthcoming document from the two of them and repeatedly expressed their eternal devotion to a long occupation.   The unconstitutional Iraq treaty (UIT) requires complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of next year, and withdrawal from all Iraqi cities, villages, and localities by last summer. Obama's latest announcement doesn't alter the lack of compliance with the latter requirement. Nor does it guarantee noncompliance with the former. But it illustrates something else, something that some of us have been screaming since the UIT was allowed to stand, something that pretty well guarantees that the US occupation of Iraq will never end.   Imagine if Congress funded, defunded, oversaw, and regulated the military and wars as required by our Constitution. Imagine if the president COULDN'T simply tell Congress that troops would be staying in Iraq longer than planned, but had to ask for the necessary funding first. Here's the lesson for this teachable moment:   Persuading presidents to end wars only looks good until they change their mind. Cutting off the funding actually forces wars to end.   When the US peace movement refused to challenge the UIT, it left Bush's successor and his successors free to ignore it, revise it, or replace it. Congress has been removed from the equation. If Obama decides to inform Congress that the occupation of Iraq will go on into 2012, Congress' response will be as muted as when the Director of National Intelligence informed Congress that killing Americans was now legal. And what can Congress say? It had no role in ratifying the UIT in the first place.   And the peace movement is in large part on the same path with Afghanistan, working to pass a toothless, non-binding timetable for possible redeployment of troops to another nation. Congress sees itself as advisors whose role it is to persuade the president that he wants to cease the activity that most advances presidential power. And activists share that perspective.   But what happens if the president becomes unpersuaded about ending both of these wars? What in the world are we supposed to do then?   We have an alternative to painting ourselves into this corner. The alternative is to build a movement of war opponents (and advocates for spending on human needs and/or tax cuts) that can pressure the House of Representatives to cut off the funding for the wars. Of course, this isn't easy. It's much harder than collecting signatures on a toothless resolution. And it's dramatically harder than watching the president create an unconstitutional treaty (something Bush was forced into primarily by the people of Iraq) and then stepping aside to celebrate.   But there is no stronger message that could be used to persuade a president than a growing caucus of congress members denying him the money. And once a majority is reached in the caucus of war defunders, then the war simply has to end, whether the president is persuaded of anything or not.   So, the lesson to be learned from Obama scrapping his current plan for an Iraq withdrawal is not that we should phone the White House and complain. It's not that we need 20 more cosponsors of the nonbinding timetable for Afghanistan. The lesson is that we must tell members of the House of Representatives that they can vote against war funding or we will vote against them.   Not a new lesson, I realize, but the Constitution is always less read than talked about.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**US troops are expected to stay in Iraq long term, regardless of obama’s plans.**

**Muskal 10** (Michael LA Times staff breaking US + world news reporter *Los Angeles Times*<http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dcnow/2010/07/obamas-foreign-policy-checklist.html>)

**The United States and allies invaded Iraq in 2003, toppled Saddam Hussein from power and have been fighting there ever since**. Currently, various **Iraqi groups are battling over who wil**l form what type of government that will **be responsible for security and rebuilding the nation**. **U.S. policy is based on the withdrawal of American combat troops on Aug. 31, but about 50,000 troops will remain.** They will be responsible for some fighting in conjunction with local soldiers, but the nature of the U.S. role will change from “a military lead to a civilian lead,” according to the Obama administration. **The U.S. also expects to continue to be engaged in Iraq for the long term.**The problem area for the U.S. is with whom it will partner in Iraq. Negotiations are continuing among various Iraqi parties and the U.S. position is that it favors no specific candidate or outcome to the talks. There are however, three broad goals, according to the Obama administration as explained by officials over the July 4th weekend in Baghdad. There should be no outside interference in the talks, a reference to Iran, which backs some Shiites. **The U.S. would like as broad a government as possible so that it is stable given the ethnic divisions in Iraq and wants the ministries to be run by competent individuals who get the government working and delivering services.**

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**U.S. occupation will continue long after the Obama “pullout”**

**Symonds 6/9** (Peter Symonds, International editor for the World Socialist Web Site, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 6/9/10, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jun2010/pers-j09.shtml>) CS

As the Obama administration escalates its war in Afghanistan, Iraq is cautiously being declared a success. The top American commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno, declared last Friday that the country had held “a legitimate and credible election”, its security forces had improved and plans were “on track” for the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq by September 1. Speaking at the West Point military academy late last month, President Obama was even more upbeat, declaring that as US troops depart, “a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress” towards establishing “a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant”. The reality is entirely different. Even after the September deadline, the US military will maintain a huge military presence of 50,000 troops, ostensibly in “non-combat” and “training” roles, to prop up a puppet regime in Baghdad, which, three months after the national election, is yet to be formed. While the character of the American occupation of Iraq is changing, its underlying purpose—to maintain the country firmly under US domination—remains the same. In his comments last Friday, General Odierno declared that the “drawdown” was ahead of schedule—600,000 containers of gear and 18,000 vehicles moved out; and the number of bases down from 500 last year to 126 and set to decline to 94 by September 1. What is actually underway, however, is not a withdrawal, but a vast consolidation in preparation for the long-term occupation of the country by US forces.

**Even After “Pullout” U.S. maintains permanent bases and train Iraqi Forces**

**Symonds 6/9** (Peter Symonds, International editor for the World Socialist Web Site, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 6/9/10, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jun2010/pers-j09.shtml>) CS

The *Stars and Stripes* newspaper noted in an article on June 1 that the ratification of the US-Iraq security agreement in November 2008 governing the drawdown was followed by a massive expansion of base construction work. “In all, the military finished $496 million in base construction projects during 2009, the highest annual figure since the war began and nearly a quarter of the $2.1 billion spent on American bases in Iraq since 2004. An additional $323 million worth of projects are set to be completed this year.” While the number of US bases may be declining, the Pentagon is establishing what are known as “enduring presence posts”—including four major bases: Joint Base Balad in the north, Camp Adder in southern Iraq, Al-Asad Air Base in the west and the Victory Base Complex around Baghdad International Airport. These are sprawling fortified facilities—Balad alone currently houses more than 20,000 troops. In addition to the 50,000 troops that will remain, there will be up to 65,000 contractors after September 1. Under the 2008 agreement, the US military handed over internal security functions to Iraqi forces last year, but, under the guise of “training” and “support”, retains tighter supervision of the army and police. Moreover the Iraqi government can always “request” US troop assistance in mounting operations. As Odierno explained in a letter to US personnel on June 1, even after all US combat troops leave, “we will continue to conduct partnered counter-terrorism operations and provide combat enablers to help the Iraqi Security Forces maintain pressure on the extremist networks.” The 2008 agreement sets December 31, 2011 as the deadline for all US troops to quit Iraq, but the construction of huge new US bases indicates a long-term US military presence under a Strategic Framework Agreement that is yet to be negotiated. As Stars and Stripes pointed out, “the nascent condition of the Iraqi Air Force… could lead the Iraqi government to request that a US training force remain in the country beyond 2011, most likely at Balad.”

US Won’t meet current Timeline

The Pentagon does not plan on meeting Obama’s Timetable

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Journalist and Author, The Huffington Post, 2-28-09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scahill/obamas-iraq-all-troops-ou\_b\_170765.html) CM

Obama's plan, as his advisors have often said, is subject to "conditions on the ground," meaning it can be altered at any point between now and 2011. Underscoring this point, a spokesperson for New York Rep. John McHugh, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, said on Friday that Obama "assured [McHugh] he will revisit the tempo of the withdrawal, or he will revisit the withdrawal plan if the situation on the ground dictates it. ... The president assured him that there was a Plan B." Despite Obama's declarations Friday and the celebrations they have sparked on the liberal blogosphere, the Pentagon certainly seems to believe its forces may well be in Iraq after 2011. NBC's Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki reported on Friday that "military commanders, despite this Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be out by the end of 2011, are already making plans for a significant number of American troops to remain in Iraq beyond that 2011 deadline, assuming that Status of Forces Agreement agreement would be renegotiated. And one senior military commander told us that he expects large numbers of American troops to be in Iraq for the next 15 to 20 years."

**The 2011 Timetable will not be met**

Burns 10 (Steve, Prgrm Dir of Wisconsin Network of Peace a Justice, OpEdNews, 4-9-2010) CM

Despite [President Obama's February 2009 commitment](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/washington/28troops.html) to abide by the US-Iraq agreement's requirement to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011, rumors continue to circulate that the U.S. will stay in Iraq past the 2011 deadline. In a report entitled, ["All Troops Out By 2011? Not So Fast,"](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scahill/obamas-iraq-all-troops-ou_b_170765.html) written shortly after Obama's February 2009 speech, independent journalist Jeremy Scahill cited a report by NBC Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki that "military commanders, despite this Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be out by the end of 2011, are already making plans for a significant number of American troops to remain in Iraq beyond that 2011 deadline, assuming that Status of Forces Agreement agreement would be renegotiated. And one senior military commander told us that he expects large numbers of American troops to be in Iraq for the next 15 to 20 years." Of course, no one should accept Presidential assurances at face value, given our country's long history of failing to live up to the terms of treaties it has signed (as any Native American can attest.) But the length of the U.S. stay in Iraq is no longer purely a matter for Americans to decide. As even Jim Miklaszeswki's anonymous Generals acknowledge, any stay past 2011 would require renegotiation of the withdrawal agreement with the Iraqi government. Could the U.S. successfully pressure the Iraqi government to renegotiate the 2011 withdrawal deadline?

**U.S. Withdrawal delayed due to Violence and Instability**

**The Guardian 5/12** (Martin Chulov, Iraqi correspondent for the Guardian, *The Guardian* 5/12/10*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay)* CS

The United States is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. The US Commanding General Ray Odierno had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. Iraqi soldiers gather at the site of a bus explosion in Iskandiriyah, 50kms south of Baghdad. Twin car bombs at a factory, followed by a suicide blast against emergency workers, and coordinated attacks on security forces killed 70 people in Iraq's bloodiest day this year. (AFP/Khalil al-Murshidi) US officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a new government, but now appear to have backed after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria With sectarian tensions rising, the al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremist groups have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is widely seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**Obama’s pullout plan is failing**

**AP 10** (Stephanie Gaskell, *NyDaily News,* 5/11/10, <http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/warzone/2010/05/more-than-20-attacks-across-ir.html>) CS

BAGHDAD (AP) — Worries over violence fueled by Iraq’s political instability have forced U.S. commanders to reconsider the pace of a major pullout this summer without overstepping a deadline to cut the military’s presence by nearly half by the end of August. Under a plan by the top U.S. commander in Iraq, the military was to begin significant pullouts in May to meet President Barack Obama’s goal of 50,000 troops in country by August 31. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior military official at the Pentagon with knowledge of the military’s plans tell The Associated Press that the major drawdown is not expected to begin until June at the earliest. They spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

**Any Delay Means Obama won’t make pullout date**

CBS 10 (Brian Montopoli, CBS News Politics writer, *CBS News Political Hotsheet,* 5/14/2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20005050-503544.html>) CS

The president said up to 50,000 troops would remain in a non-combat capacity after the deadline. All troops, he added, would be out of the country by the end of 2011. The U.S. military has roughly 94,000 in Iraq now; to meet the president's deadline, it must thus cut that number nearly in half by the end of August. It won't be easy. As CBS News National Security Correspondent David Martin reported Thursday, "first the delay in the Iraqi elections and then the dispute over the results has forced Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander in Iraq, to slow down his withdrawal plans." "Right now, it is still possible to move that many troops - but just barely," wrote Martin. "Any further delay in the drawdown will cause him to miss the deadline." That contention is backed up by TPMmuckraker, which crunched the numbers on meeting the president's deadline. The military would have to pull out 14,000 troops each month through August to get down to the level promised by the president (factoring in current plans to get troop levels to 91,000 by the end of May). Military observers told TPM that doing so would take a serious logistical push. "We do want to pull all their unit equipment out with them," said Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.). "That's not trivial. But major stuff like vehicles that are a bit of a challenge -- it wouldn't surprise me if we would keep some or move those out a little more slowly." Another observer sounded a note of cautious optimism. "They may be cutting it close in terms of a cut-off point where meeting the deadline becomes unfeasible from a technical perspective, but I haven't seen anything to make me think that they would be missing the deadline," military affairs researcher Peter Juul said.

**Unrest delays U.S. withdrawal in Iraq**

AP 10 (Lara Jakes, The Associated press, *Timesunion.com,* 5/12/10, <http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/Story.asp?StoryID=930215&LinkFrom=RSS#ixzz0sIThPICY>) CS

BAGHDAD -- American commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq's inconclusive elections, are now reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, U.S. officials said Tuesday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month, the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Barack Obama's goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31. More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday's bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people -- the country's bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to look at keeping as many troops on the ground, for as long as possible, without missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations requires American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq's security deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama's top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky back home -- but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back -- if only to ensure enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration's internal discussions. Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq's political instability, will likely postpone the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal "waterfall" -- sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period. In a January interview with the AP, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as a monthly average of 12,500 troops, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. He has long said he would not start the withdrawal until two months after Iraq's March 7 elections to ensure stability. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the "waterfall" is now expected to begin in June at the earliest. All cited ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence, and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly. "From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them," said one of the senior officials in Baghdad.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**The lack of an Iraqi government will postpone the withdrawal of American troops.**

McFeathers 10 (Dale; staff writer, *The Korea Times*, June 16, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/137\_67724.html) CH

Iraq's new parliament met for 18 minutes this week, just long enough for the members to be sworn in and postpone indefinitely their first order of business, choosing someone for the largely ceremonial post of president. Even so, U.S. officials counted the abbreviated session as a victory of sorts. More than three months after the elections, Iraq still does not have a government and it may be weeks, even months, before it gets one. This could greatly complicate U.S. plans for withdrawal ― all combat troops out by Aug. 31, except for 50,000 to remain as trainers of the Iraqi security forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations as needed. Those remaining troops are to be gone by the end of 2011. But absent a government, the U.S. military might be Iraq's only guarantee against anarchy and a resumption of sectarian fighting. The problem is that the March 7 elections did not produce a clear winner, only a narrow plurality. The Iraqiya party of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi won 91 seats in the 325-seat parliament. The State of Law party of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki won 89 seats. Allawi believes he should be given time to build a majority coalition. The two major Kurdish parties, with 43 seats, say they would be amenable to joining that coalition contingent on written guarantees about such issues as the division of oil revenues. But Iran brokered a coalition of the two major Shiite parties. This new National Alliance has 159 seats, enough for al-Maliki and other Shiite leaders to claim the right to form the government. The question of whether a bloc created after the election can pre-empt the party with the most votes is before the Iraqi courts.

**The number of troops withdrawing from Iraq has decreased in recent months.**

**Chulov 10** (Martin; Guardian’s Iraqi correspondent, *Guardian*, May 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay) CH

The White House is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. General Ray Odierno, the US commander, had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. American officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Late tonight seven people were killed and 22 wounded when a car bomb planted outside a cafe exploded in Baghdad's Sadr City, a Shia area, police and a source at the Iraqi interior ministry said. The latest bomb highlights how sectarian tensions are rising, as al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe. Odierno has kept a low profile since announcing the deaths of al-Qaida's two leaders in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who were killed in a combined Iraqi-US raid on 18 April. The operation was hailed then as a near fatal blow against al-Qaida, but violence has intensified ever since. All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the deadline. But they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. "The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence. "They too have been emboldened, because we haven't been able to establish a viable unified government that others can respect," he said. "In one way or another, Iran, Turkey and Syria are interfering in the formation of this government. "There is a lingering fear [among some neighbouring states] that Iraq should not reach a level of stability. The competition over the future of Iraq is being played out mostly between Turkey and Iran. They both believe they have a vested interest here." The withdrawal order is eagerly awaited by the 92,000 US troops still in Iraq – they mostly remain confined to their bases. This month Odierno was supposed to have ordered the pullout of 12,500, a figure that was meant to escalate every week between now and 31 August, when only 50,000 US troops are set to remain – all of them non-combat forces. US patrols are now seldom seen on the streets of Baghdad, where the terms of a security agreement between Baghdad and Washington are being followed strictly: this relegates them to secondary partners and means US troops cannot leave their bases without Iraqi permission. US commanders have grown accustomed to being masters of the land no longer, but they have recently grown increasingly concerned about what they will leave behind. Zebari said: "The mother of all mistakes that they made was changing their mission from liberation to occupation and then legalising that through a security council resolution." Earlier this week, Allawi warned that the departing US troops had an obligation enshrined in the security agreement and at the United Nations security council to safeguard Iraq's democratic process. He warned of catastrophic consequences if the occupation ended with Iraq still politically unstable.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

Due to political instability in Iraq, many commanders have slowed down the withdrawal process.

Jakes 10 (Lara, Pentagon reporter for the Associated Press, *Marine Corps Times,* May 13, 2010, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/05/ap\_iraqpullout\_051110/) CH

BAGHDAD — Worries over increased violence fueled by Iraq’s political instability have forced U.S. commanders to reconsider the pace of a major pullout this summer without overstepping a deadline to cut the military’s presence by nearly half by the end of August. More than two months after parliamentary elections, the next government has still not been formed, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday’s bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people, in the country’s bloodiest day of 2010. The insurgent threat has prompted military officials to figure how to keep as many troops on the ground, for as long as possible, and still withdraw all but 50,000 U.S. troops by Aug. 31, as ordered last year by President Obama. In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which would only be pushed back by Obama to deal with a severe worsening of Iraq’s security. But the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, called the withdrawal “waterfall” — that is, the sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period over the summer — could be affected. In a January interview with The Associated Press, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as a monthly average of 12,500 troops, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. At the time, there were 96,000 U.S. troops in the country. As of last week, that number was at 92,000, meaning an average of 10,500 a month would have to be pulled out. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the “waterfall” is now expected to begin in June at the earliest, instead of May. All said that was due to ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence, and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly. “From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them,” said one of the senior officials in Baghdad. “It’s really prudent, given the political conditions are unsettled, for [Odierno] to wait as long as he can.” At the Pentagon, “there’s been a renewed focus on Iraq lately,” said the senior military official there. He said all options were being considered, including later delays, adding that “we need to get out in an appropriate way ... not completely tied to a timeline.” Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said Tuesday that troops “are on track” to draw down by the president’s Aug, 31 deadline, but would not discuss whether the pace was being slowed

The Military lacks necessary resources to withdraw within the Timeline

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

While DOD Has Planned for Some Contracted Services Needed to Support the Drawdown, Challenges Remain DOD took some steps to plan for and source contracted services needed during the drawdown. For instance, DOD planned for some LOGCAP requirements needed during the drawdown, including the number of transportation systems, Army post offices, and logistics support services required at specific bases. According to DOD documentation, operational commands in Iraq validated these requirements for LOGCAP at the bases that will remain open past August 31, 2010, and communicated these requirements to the LOGCAP program office which, in turn, took steps toward awarding the LOGCAP task orders. Additionally, other supporting contracting organizations in Iraq took steps to meet the needs for non- LOGCAP services that were identified as required by military units or other deployed organizations. For example, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, an organization that manages non-LOGCAP service contracts, which comprise about 20 percent of all contracts in Iraq, plans to expand its use of theaterwide contracts to provide food services, Page 13 GAO-10-376 Operation Iraq Freedom medical support, fire protection, facilities and housing, and other base and life support needs. Despite these steps, limited operational planning for contracted support has challenged USF-I’s ability to identify the full range of its needs for contracted services to support the drawdown. According to joint doctrine and service guidance, operational personnel who plan, support, and execute military operations must also determine the contracted support needed to accomplish their missions. In Iraq and Kuwait, these operational personnel include combat force commanders, base commanders, and logistics personnel, among others, who are responsible for determining the best approach to accomplish their assigned tasks and, if the approach includes contractors, identifying the types and levels of contracted support needed. Army guidance also states that planning for contracted support must be integrated early in the deliberate planning process to ensure that it is adequately considered and that it must include specific requirements identified by operational personnel, such as the identification of the full extent of contractor involvement and how and where contracted support should be provided.16 MNF-I’s drawdown plan, however, delegated the responsibility for determining contracted support requirements to contracting agencies, such as the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, rather than to operational personnel. But according to Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan officials, they could not determine the theaterwide levels of contracted services required, or plan for mandated reductions based on those needs, because they lack sufficient, relevant information on future requirements for contracted services, information that should have been provided by operational personnel.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

Despite DoD plans to withdraw they won’t meet the timeline because the DoD has yet to plan services necessary for drawdown

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

A number of DOD organizations have issued plans outlining a phased drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set forth in the Security Agreement and presidential guidance while being responsive to security conditions on the ground. Furthermore, in accordance with these plans, DOD created several organizations to facilitate the retrograde of equipment and support unity of effort,13 and established goals and metrics to track its progress. According to DOD, these efforts to date contributed to the meeting or exceeding of targets for drawing down forces and retrograding equipment. However, while DOD has made significant progress executing the drawdown, there remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases yet to be drawn down within the established timelines. Moreover, DOD has yet to fully plan for contracted services needed during the drawdown.

Shortages in Contract Oversight Personnel will delay withdrawal in the Status Quo

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

Shortages in available contract oversight personnel may also increase the risk of wasteful practices as the drawdown progresses. For example, an Army unit in Kuwait responsible for ensuring the steady flow of equipment out of Kuwait and for conducting certain maintenance tasks has 32 government personnel but oversees more than 3,000 contractor personnel. In January 2010, Army Materiel Command requested funding to double, to approximately 800, the number of this unit’s contractor personnel that conduct retrograde-specific tasks, including receiving, accounting for, sorting, and moving equipment, necessary to prevent equipment backlogs in Kuwait. In addition, according to contracting officials, this unit has requested a concurrent increase in oversight personnel. In July 2009, this unit identified the lack of oversight personnel as a significant concern to successfully moving equipment out of Kuwait. Given that these services will transition to a new contract which has not yet been awarded, it is unclear whether the current request will represent the total increase in contractor personnel needed during the drawdown, and thus whether sufficient oversight personnel will be in place as the drawdown progresses. Further, until the current request is filled, this unit risks not having the necessary oversight personnel in place, as has been the case in the past. In January 2008, we reported that this unit did not have adequate staff to conduct oversight of an equipment maintenance contract in Kuwait.33 As a result of the vacant oversight positions, its personnel were unable to fully monitor contractor performance. Further, we noted that poor contractor performance resulted in this unit spending $4.2 million to rework items that were initially presented to the Army as meeting contract standards but subsequently failed inspection. We have reported on DOD’s inability to provide an adequate number of oversight personnel in CENTCOM’s theater since 2004.34 For example, in 2008 we reported that the Army assigned seven CORs to provide oversight for about 8,300 linguists in 120 locations across Iraq and Afghanistan. In one case, a single person provided oversight for linguists stationed at more than 40 different locations spread throughout the theater of operations. Officials responsible for the contract agreed that there were not enough CORs to effectively oversee the contract.35

US Won’t meet current Timeline

DoD will be unable to withdraw in the timeline—issuing credentials to Iraqi contractors create delays

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW)

Issuing credentials to contractor personnel was another major challenge experienced during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait. Of all contract transition issues, the need for timely credentialing, which includes badges such as common access cards and other location-specific badges, has caused some of the greatest concerns, according to DOD officials. According to those officials, DOD requires new badges for contractor personnel following contract transitions, regardless of whether a new contractor wins the award, because credentials are tied to specific contracts. According to the lessons learned document, this credentialing process can take between two and three weeks to complete. Consequently, contractors experienced delays in credentialing their employees during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait. This may be exacerbated during contract transitions in Iraq because of the planned increase in the proportion of Iraqi nationals working under contract and the fact that obtaining credentials for them typically takes more time than it does for contractor personnel of other nationalities. Moreover, the contractor responsible for operating the credentialing office in Kuwait is also transitioning as a part of the Kuwait base and life support services contract, which may, in turn, create additional delays and illustrates a potential difficulty in conducting multiple, near-simultaneous contract transitions. Although the LOGCAP transition plan includes a process for facilitating the credentialing process for contractor personnel, neither this plan nor DOD’s other planning documents address possible stresses on credentialing offices that might occur during these contract transitions. Without fully incorporating the risks inherent to conducting multiple contract transitions concurrently into its planning for each contract scheduled to transition, including options to mitigate those risks derived from key lessons learned during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait, DOD may be unable to effectively manage the timely transition of these contracts and prevent the interruption of key services needed to facilitate mission success during the drawdown. This is especially true because these transitions may need to occur within compressed time frames due to delays in awarding key contracts.

Complications of Contracting and Inventory will prevent Withdrawal from happening within the Current Timeline

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW)

Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by several challenges. First, challenges associated with the planned simultaneous transition of several key contracts may lead to the interruption of vital services and wasteful contracting practices. Second, insufficient analysis to quantify the costs and benefits of transitioning the LOGCAP contract in Iraq prevents DOD from ensuring that the transition will be beneficial to the government. Third, persistent shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. Fourth, a lack of clarity concerning the extent to which and for how long equipment retrograded from Iraq may be staged in Kuwait or other locations in southwest Asia may affect DOD’s plans for reset and equipping. And lastly, DOD lacks complete visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping containers. DOD is aware of and has begun addressing some of these issues. For example, DOD is in the process of implementing new systems and procedures to improve its equipment disposition process. In addition, units in Iraq were required to complete a 100 percent inventory of their equipment, identify equipment that can be immediately retrograded, and account for previously undocumented equipment. Despite these efforts, however, challenges remain.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

Lack of sufficient planning for contract services will delay withdrawal for months

Solis 10 (William M, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, “Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq”, United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, April 2010, GAO-10-376, ACW

Timely planning for contracted services needed to support the drawdown is also critical in order to avoid potential waste and ensure continuity of services. USF-I guidance, however, may not allow sufficient time for all contracted services needed during the drawdown to be put on contract in a responsible manner. Sound business practices specify that the full definition of requirements for contracted services should occur as early as possible to ensure the personnel responsible for putting the needed services on contract can do so on time and at the agreed-upon cost.18 If operational personnel fail to communicate their needs for contracted services with enough lead time for contracting officials to put these services on contract responsibly, DOD may incur unnecessary costs by authorizing undefinitized contract actions, as it has in the past, which allow contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract terms and conditions, including price. While a contract action remains undefinitized, the contractor has little incentive to control costs, creating the potential for waste. In addition, a lack of timely planning for contract support may lead to other poor outcomes, such as increased cost, lengthened schedules, underperformance, and service delays. According to MNF-I’s plan and the former Joint Contracting Command- Iraq/Afghanistan commander, DOD’s need for contracted services in Iraq, such as security, transportation, engineers, and materiel handling teams, may temporarily increase during the drawdown. Officials have also acknowledged that additional contractor personnel will be needed to provide services currently being provided by U.S. forces as these forces redeploy. For example, DOD officials stated that they contracted for airfield painting in Iraq and Kuwait because the servicemembers normally responsible for this task had redeployed, and that similar requirements regularly surface. As a result, senior contracting officials in Iraq expressed concern that the needs for some services may increase beyond levels available under existing contracts as the drawdown progresses. Because increasing the level of existing services or adding new ones may necessitate new contracts, additional time may be necessary to obtain these services. For example, contracting officials in Iraq stated that obtaining additional contracted security services outside of existing contracts would take about five months, compared to about three months necessary to increase the levels of services already on contract. Further, USF-I’s goal to increase the proportion of Iraqi contractors may entail greater lead time to put these vendors’ services on contract because it may take longer to review Iraqi vendor proposals. Yet USF-I’s standard operating procedures for requirements validation in Iraq only state that personnel should submit requirements for contracted services at least 90 days prior to the date funding is needed. Without directing operational personnel in Iraq to identify requirements for services with enough time for contracting officials to responsibly put them on contract, DOD increases its risk of not being able to obtain these services on time, or employing inefficient contracting practices such as undefinitized contract actions.

Violence in Iraq has caused delays in American withdrawal.

Gaskell 10 (Stephanie; staff writer, *Daily News*,May 11, 2010, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Iraq%20violence%20due%20to%20the%20US&sa=N&tab=sw) CH

BAGHDAD (AP) — Worries over violence fueled by Iraq’s political instability have forced U.S. commanders to reconsider the pace of a major pullout this summer without overstepping a deadline to cut the military’s presence by nearly half by the end of August. Under a plan by the top U.S. commander in Iraq, the military was to begin significant pullouts in May to meet President Barack Obama’s goal of 50,000 troops in country by August 31. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior military official at the Pentagon with knowledge of the military’s plans tell The Associated Press that the major drawdown is not expected to begin until June at the earliest. They spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

US Won’t meet current Timeline

**Rebel attacks will delay withdrawal**

**Chulov 10** (Martin Chulov, Guardians Iraq correspondent, has been since 2005commonDreams.org  5/12/2010)  <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/12-3> JVT

**The United States is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country.   The US Commanding General Ray Odierno had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March**, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki.  Iraqi soldiers gather at the site of a bus explosion in Iskandiriyah, 50kms south of Baghdad. **Twin car bombs at a factory, followed by a suicide blast  against emergency workers, and coordinated attacks on security forces killed 70 people in Iraq's bloodiest day this year**. (AFP/Khalil al-Murshidi) US officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a new government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria   

**American troops will remain in parts of Iraq past the 2010 goal time.**

**Robinson 10** (Matt; staff writer, *Reuters,* July 5, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6640YP20100705?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>) CH

**As other bases close, Forward Operating Base Cobra in Diyala will remain at the same strength beyond Sept 1. U.S. soldiers will continue to man checkpoints with Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, an exercise in cooperation which some observers say might not survive a U.S. departure. A recent spike in violence**, with mortar rounds lobbed at FOB Cobra and nearby Checkpoint Three, **had reinforced the need for a robust U.S. presence, said Major Robert Halvorson,**who drafted the military's report into the Jalawla attack. **The insurgents were perhaps trying to exploit a political paralysis in the capital, where** Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish **political factions have yet to form a government almost four months after an election**, officers said. "By all their activity here they're actually drawing us here," said Halvorson, "and this is where we're going to fight them so people don't have to fight them in Baghdad."

**Violence in Iraq has postponed American withdrawal.**

**Robinson 10** (Matt; staff writer, *Reuters,* July 5, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6640YP20100705?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>) CH

It was a tip-off about a weapons cache that drew the U.S. soldiers of Charlie Troop away from their Stryker armored vehicles in the densely populated Iraqi town of Jalawla one Friday morning last month. That was when the suicide bomber struck, detonating a car bomb so "catastrophic" that details of the attack that killed Sergeant Israel O'Bryan and Specialist William Yauch are still hazy, their commanding officer said. One thing was clear: **the insurgency in Jalawla won't lie down. Like other towns across Iraq's restive northern provinces of Diyala, Kirkuk and Nineveh, Jalawla defies the U.S. narrative of an end to combat operations next month under a plan to pull out of Iraq completely by the end of 2011. "I would say we're pretty far from rolling up the insurgency in Jalawla**," said Charlie Troop commander Captain Mark Adams of the 1st Squadron, 14th U.S. Cavalry. "**I don't feel we've made a whole lot of progress there."**For the ethnically and religiously-mixed arc running from Jalawla near Iraq's eastern border with [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran) to the western frontier with Syria, the transition on August 31 is less a milestone than a matter of semantics. **Operations that to outsiders will look pretty much like combat will continue in areas where a stubborn Sunni Islamist insurgency remains entrenched, despite a sharp fall in overall violence since the height of the sectarian slaughter in 2006/07. They will, however, be called "stability operations," loosely defined as advising, assisting, training and equipping Iraqi forces -- a role U.S. forces have had for some time. U.S. troops will "continue to conduct partnered counter terrorism operations to maintain pressure on extremist terrorist networks," said chief spokesman Major General** Stephen **Lanza**. U.S. troop numbers will fall to 50,000 on September 1 from around 77,000 now. Bases are closing, hardware going to Afghanistan and units flying home without replacement. In disputed territories adjacent to Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, where Arabs and Kurds wrestle over land and power, insurgent cells have regrouped after being driven out of much of Iraq's Sunni heartland. **Here, U.S. soldiers will still occasionally shoot, and be shot at after September 1.** Al Qaeda "is down but not out," said U.S. forces Division North commander Major General Tony Cucolo. "We take down a cell, but on a smaller, less capable level it re-forms." The threat "can't be handled" by Iraqi Security Forces "as they are," he said on a Blackhawk helicopter flight over Diyala.

SQ Plan Not Enough

**U.S. troops only switch job titles under the Obama withdrawal plan**

**Brinkerhoff 7/5** (Noel Brinkerhoff, a reporter for the California Journal and State Net Capitol Journal and professional Journalist for ten years, *AllGov*, 7/5/10,<http://www.allgov.com/Top_Stories/ViewNews/Iraq_Troop_Withdrawal_Really_Just_a_Rebranding_of_Operations_100705>) CS

**What’s the difference between “combat operations” and “stability operations**?” Other than **one word, not much**, when it comes to the U.S. military role in [Iraq](http://www.allgov.com/nation/Iraq).   **Next month, the U.S. will officially end combat operations in the country it invaded more than seven years ago. But it will still maintain a sizeable force of 50,000. Those remaining will engage in stability operations which, essentially, aren’t any different from what many soldiers and**[**Special Operations**](http://www.allgov.com/agency/United_States_Special_Operations_Command)**personnel are doing now: hunting down and killing insurgents.   “In practical terms, nothing will change,” Major General Stephen Lanza told The New York Times**. “We are already doing stability operations.”   By the end of 2011, the U.S. is supposed to withdraw all remaining troops from Iraq. **But don’t be surprised if American soldiers are still there come 2012, as Washington is expected to begin negotiating a new agreement with the Iraqi leadership, once a new coalition government is formed.**

**U.S. will maintain nearly the same role in Iraq post-withdrawal**

**NYT 7/2** (Tim Arango, Senor writer for Stock Market Today’s “The Street” and writer for the New York Times,*The New York Times,*7/2/10,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html>) CS

The August deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq, but here it is more complex.**American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations**. More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here.  **The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge —** is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics**.  What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the United States military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions.  “In practical terms, nothing will change**,” **said Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza**, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “**We are already doing stability operations**.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties. So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to [icasualties.org](http://icasualties.org).    
   
 

SQ Plan Not Enough

**U.S. troops will maintain power even after the deadline**

**NYT 7/2** (Tim Arango, Senor writer for Stock Market Today’s “The Street” and writer for the New York Times,*The New York Times,*7/2/10,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html>) CS

**Beyond August the next Iraq deadline is the end of 2011, when all American troops are supposed to be gone. But few believe that America’s military involvement in Iraq will end then**. **The conventional wisdom among military officers, diplomats and Iraqi officials is that after a new government is formed, talks will begin about a longer-term American troop presence.**  “I like to say that in Iraq, the only thing Americans know for certain, is that we know nothing for certain**,” saidBrett H. McGurk, a former**[**National Security Council**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_security_council/index.html?inline=nyt-org)**official in Iraq**and current fellow at the[Council on Foreign Relations](http://www.cfr.org/). “**The exception is what’s coming once there’s a new government: they will ask to amend the Security Agreement and extend the 2011 date. We should take that request seriously.**”  The mission here in the desert, **a temporary base of armored vehicles and one tent for two platoons, provided a vivid example of what American forces still do on the ground and, military officers said, would be able to do after the reduction**.  “They needed someone killed, so they sent us,” said Maj. Bryan L. Logan, squadron operations officer for the Third Squadron, Seventh Cavalry Regiment, referring to an insurgent cell that had been planting bombs near the highway.

SQ Plan Not Enough

**U.S. forces have been downplaying there involvement which makes the withdrawal successful**

**NYT 7/2** (Tim Arango, Senor writer for Stock Market Today’s “The Street” and writer for the New York Times,*The New York Times,*7/2/10,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html>) CS

**In the closing window of the American war here, commanders are still trying to kill as many militants as possible, because they say it keeps American forces and Iraqis safer. But in doing so, the United States military command sometimes plays down the American role in the killing**.  Almost daily, press releases are issued that announce the killing or capture of terrorists by the Iraqi security forces, usually noting the involvement of “U.S. advisers.” **Sometimes credit is not given when American soldiers kill militants.**  In April, **the third-ranking member of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was killed by Iraqi forces, according to a press release. But officers on the ground said he was killed by fire from an American Bradley Fighting Vehicle**. And no press release has been issued about the three insurgents who were recently killed by the American Hellfire missile**.  As the soldiers were packing up the desert camp, Major Logan,**who saw combat in Iraq in 2003, stood watching and **quoted Robert Duvall from a movie about another American war, Vietnam, one that ended badly: “Someday this war is going to end.”**

SQ Plan Not Enough

**Status Quo Withdrawal of troops won’t decrease combat operations.**

**Arango 10**(Tim, New York Times writer, New York Times, July 2,<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html?hp>) EH

NEAR TULUL AL-BAQ, Iraq — **President Obama has set a**n August **deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq.** Here at this makeshift desert camp in the insurgent badlands of northern Iraq, a mission is under way that is not going to stop then: American soldiers hunting terrorists and covertly watching an Iraqi checkpoint staffed by police officers whom the soldiers say they do not trust. “They’re not checking anybody, and they’re wondering why I.E.D.’s are getting in to town,” said Staff Sgt. Kelly E. Young, 39, from Albertville, Ala., as he watched the major roadway that connects Baghdad with Mosul, regarded as the country’s most dangerous city. He referred to improvised explosive devices, the military term for homemade bombs.  **The** August**deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war**in Iraq, **but**here**it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations.** More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here.  The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics.  **What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the U**nited **S**tates **military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions.  “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen** R. **Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties.**So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to [icasualties.org](http://icasualties.org).  As fighting involving Americans tapered off, thousands of items of Iraq war matériel were packed and shipped to Afghanistan. **The**complex and flexible **mission of cutting down forces while simultaneously keeping up the fight with a festering insurgency could prove a model for Afghanistan**, where withdrawal is scheduled to begin next year. Next summer, the Americans will begin to leave Afghanistan, too, and they probably won’t be able to halt fighting completely as they do so.

**Troop numbers won’t be decreased for a long period of time.**

**Brinkerhoff 10** (Noel; staff writer, *All Gov,*July 5, 2010, <http://www.allgov.com/Top_Stories/ViewNews/Iraq_Troop_Withdrawal_Really_Just_a_Rebranding_of_Operations_100705>) CH

**What’s the difference between “combat operations” and “stability operations?” Other than one word, not much, when it comes to the U.S. military role in Iraq**.   Next month, the U.S. will officially **end combat operations in the country** it invaded more than seven years ago. **But it will still maintain a sizeable force of 50,000. Those remaining will engage in stability operations which, essentially, aren’t any different from what many soldiers and Special Operations personnel are doing now: hunting down and killing insurgents.   “In practical terms, nothing will change,” Major General Stephen Lanza** told The New York Times. “We are already doing stability operations.”   By the end of 2011, the U.S. is supposed to withdraw all remaining troops from Iraq. But **don’t be surprised if American soldiers are still there come 2012, as Washington is expected to begin negotiating a new agreement with the Iraqi leadership, once a new coalition government is formed.**

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

**Absent the Aff’s immediate withdrawal U.S. Military bases imply a continued Military presence to the people of Iraq regardless of Obama plan**

**FCLN 8** (Friends Committee on National Legislation, 12/9/08,<http://www.fcnl.org/iraq/bases.htm>) CS

**For the third year in a row, Congress approved the FCNL-initiated proposal to ban the U.S. government from establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq**. The prohibition reads  No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended for a purpose as follows: (1) To establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq. (2) To exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.  **Yet Balad Air Base is among the world's busiest airports - in 2006 it was reported as second only to London's Heathrow Airport2. Bases like Balad are large enough to house internal bus lines, motorcycle and car dealerships, shopping malls, and even traffic- jammed roads**3. **The U.S. embassy in Iraq - the largest embassy in the world - approximates the size of the Vatican and runs its own electrical, power, and sewage plants**. As former U.S. ambassador to Iraq Edward Peck said,**"The embassy is going to have a thousand people hunkered behind sandbags.** I don't know how you conduct diplomacy in that way"4.  **These mixed signals do little to allay Iraqi fears about U.S. intentions in Iraq**. A 2006 poll revealed that 77% of the Iraqi public believed the United States was planning to leave permanent bases in Iraq, and **78% believed the United States would keep these bases even if the Iraqi government requested their removal**5. Now that the Iraqi government has asked for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops by December 31, 2011, it is imperative that the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress match the "no permanent bases" policy with a corresponding reduction of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Now is the time for U.S. to leave Iraq

Edwards 5(John, former senator from North Carolina, The Right Way in Iraq, November 13, http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/iraq/iraq\_345.pdf) eh

We also need to show Iraq and the world that we will not stay there forever. We've reached the point where the large number of our troops in Iraq hurts, not helps, our goals. Therefore, early next year, after the Iraqi elections, when a new government has been created, we should begin redeployment of a significant number of troops out of Iraq. This should be the beginning of a gradual process to reduce our presence and change the shape of our military's deployment in Iraq. Most of these troops should come from National Guard or Reserve forces. That will still leave us with enough military capability, combined with better-trained Iraqis, to fight terrorists and continue to help the Iraqis develop a stable country. Second, this redeployment should work in concert with a more effective training program for Iraqi forces. We should implement a clear plan for training and hard deadlines for certain benchmarks to be met. To increase incentives, we should implement a schedule showing that, as we certify Iraqi troops as trained and equipped, a proportional number of U.S. troops will be withdrawn. Third, we must launch a serious diplomatic process that brings the world into this effort. We should bring Iraq's neighbors and our key European allies into a diplomatic process to get Iraq on its feet. The president needs to create a unified international front. Too many mistakes have already been made for this to be easy. Yet we must take these steps to succeed. The American people, the Iraqi people and -- most important -- our troops who have died or been injured there, and those who are fighting there today, deserve nothing less. America's leaders -- all of us -- need to accept the responsibility we each carry for how we got to this place. More than 2,000 Americans have lost their lives in this war, and more than 150,000 are fighting there today. They and their families deserve honesty from our country's leaders. And they also deserve a clear plan for a way out.

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

We need to focus Withdraw Troops from Iraq Now

Parker 10 (Ned, Los Angeles Times writer, June 25, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/world/la-fg-iraq-drift-20100626) eh

The Iraqis describe U.S. Embassy officials in Baghdad as obsessed with bringing an end to the large-scale U.S. troop presence in Iraq. They believe the embassy's single-mindedness has often left the United States veering from crisis to crisis here. Some U.S. military officers and Western analysts have also criticized what they see as a failure to think beyond the planned drawdown to 50,000 noncombat troops by the end of August. The lack of focus may leave an opening for Iraq's neighbor and the United States' rival — Iran. Petraeus made his name crafting the strategy that helped calm Iraq's sectarian strife, and was then promoted to head of U.S. Central Command, overseeing American military operations throughout the region. His [Petraeus’] reassignment to focus exclusively on Afghanistan, which the Obama administration regards as the most daunting conflict it faces, could hasten a further downgrading of attention to Iraq. Iraqi officials are eager to take back control of their country. But some worry that the U.S. administration is blinding itself to the need for continued engagement. The United States for years played a role in all aspects of Iraqi governance, including developing basic services, helping revive the economy and providing security. In 2008, the U.S. negotiated the transfer of security responsibility back to the Iraqi government.

**Pull out now. If the US fails to remove troops quickly, we will lose all credibility in Iraq.**

**Jarrar 10** (Raed Political Analyst *The progressive* <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/05/26-1>) SM

**President Obama should not bow to** the Beltway **voices urging him to keep U.S. troops longer in Iraq**. At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, **Obama said: "We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer**." His statement**, which the cadets greeted with applause**, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But **Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be "flexible" and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in** what seems to be **an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans**. **While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as "flexibility," but rather as a betrayal of promises**. Iraqis believe that **prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged**, and they don't think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of **Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution**. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including **Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation**. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and **delaying it will send the wrong message to them**. By contrast, **adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq's sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions**. **If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq,** and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And **delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world,** which Obama has been trying hard to improve, **but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq**. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one.

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

US military and the Defense Department want a rapid pullout

**World Tribune 10**(National press agency, World Tribune 3/15/10)<http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_iraq0200_03_15.asp> JVT

**The United States, declaring the election a security achievement, has been preparing to accelerate its withdrawal from Iraq**.   **ShareThis      Officials said the U.S. military and Defense Department have agreed to launch efforts for a rapid pullout from Iraq**, Middle East Newsline reported. **They said the performance of Iraq's military and police during parliamentary elections on March 7 meant the United States could proceed with plans to reduce its troop presence to 50,000 by September 2010**.  "While there were a few incidents which produced casualties, and a number of noise-bottle bombs, the Iraqi **security forces secured the population and provided a secure, credible election process,**" U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Terry Wolff, commander of U.S. Division-Center, said. "**I'd emphasize that Sunday's Election Day success didn't just happen. The [ISF] owns security responsibilities in Iraq."**

**Immediate and complete withdrawal is the best withdrawal strategy**

**Odom 8**(William, Former Three Star General, AlterNet News, <http://www.alternet.org/world/81626/?page=1>, 4/7)dc

**The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq**. And progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran's policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.  No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president's policy has reinforced Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.  Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.  A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don't make sense.  First, **it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all**. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences.**Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt.** Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.  Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the "domino theory" in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it. The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders seems willing to assume.  Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This confuses cause with effect**. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran's regime are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies' interest**

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

**US troop withdrawal must be prompt and efficient.**

**Cole 9**(Juan *Nation* (228(2) )SM

**The Necessary Withdrawal The removal of US troops must be prompt, complete and coupled with smart diplomacy**. **The passage by the Iraqi Parliament in late November of the US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement**(SOFA) **adds credibility and urgency to** President-elect **Obama's pledge to get US troops out of Iraq** by the midpoint of his first term. **Bush's costly and illegal war has been a drain on the economy to the tune of a trillion dollars if hidden costs are included, a sum likely to triple in coming decades as the public pays for the care of injured veterans**. The war has left tens of thousands of military personnel wounded, suffering from brain trauma or dead. The toll on Iraqis has been monumental. **It cannot end too soon**. The general Iraqi hostility to the presence of foreign troops was apparent in the process whereby the SOFA was enacted. The fierce debates that it provoked signaled that**there are**only two **major factions in Iraqi politics: those who want the United States out within a couple of years and those who want the United States out now.**The Washington debate on withdrawal, in contrast, has been peculiarly removed from reality since the early days of the presidential campaign. Such opponents of withdrawal as **John McCain called it an act of "surrender,"** a waving of a white flag. (**To whom would we have been surrendering**?) **The US military would have to stay in Iraq forever, they implied, because it would be too embarrassing to leave**. **They demanded "victory" but**carefully **avoided defining what they meant by the word.** **They warned that parts of Iraq, or even the entire country, would become an Al Qaeda base were the United States to depart**. Even as they spoke, Shiite militias were systematically cleansing about half the Sunni Arab population from the capital and a Shiite prime minister was gathering military power into his hands. The Republican visions of Osama bin Laden occupying Saddam's palaces were paranoid fantasies. The Bush administration initially pressed on Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki a SOFA text that all but formally reduced Iraq to a colony. **The United States would control Iraq's air and water, would arrest and detain Iraqis at will and without the requirement of due process, would decide unilaterally what was a terrorist threat within the country and how to deal with it, and would initiate military action unilaterally**. Its troops and private security contractors would enjoy complete immunity from Iraqi law. Juan Cole is Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History at the University of Michigan and author of Engaging the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan), forthcoming in March. There was no timetable for US withdrawal. A year or two earlier, an Iraqi government might have had to just go along with it. Maliki had long argued that he would not need US troops past 2009. Only in March and April 2008 did he prove, however, that he had won control of the increasingly well-trained and professional Iraqi military in ways that might allow him greater independence from the United States. Despite American advice to the contrary, he moved militarily against his main internal rival, the Shiite Mahdi Army, in Basra, Amara and Sadr City last spring. With that success under his belt, the prime minister had gained the confidence to push back against the Bush/Cheney imperium. Despite his new role as commander in chief of a more confident Iraqi military, Maliki needs the support of other Shiite notables and parties to remain in power. His Islamic Dawa Party is relatively small. He depends on the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraq's Shiites, who strongly opposed any SOFA that infringed on Iraq's sovereignty. Maliki is also increasingly closely allied with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the leading Shiite party in the Iraqi Parliament, which has close links to Iran. Both ISCI and its patrons in Tehran wanted to see a timetable established for US troop withdrawals from Iraq. Not only is Iran threatened by the massive US troop presence on its borders but the occupation of Muslim countries by a non-Muslim military is anathema to the Islamic Republic. One of the grievances Ayatollah Khomeini had voiced as he made the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the 1970s was that US troops based in Iran enjoyed immunity from Iranian law. In the end, by dint of hard bargaining and brinkmanship, Maliki secured a very different sort of agreement from the lame- duck Bush. As of January 1, the US military will have to get permission from Iraqi authorities for military operations. **Off-duty, off-base US troops who commit crimes might theoretically be liable to prosecution before an Iraqi judge. Civilian security contractors will beunder Iraqi law**. US combat troops will withdraw from all Iraqi cities to bases by the end of June, ending their unilateral neighborhood patrols. By**2011 they will be out of the country altogether, and the Iraqi government can advance the deadline by a simple request**. Some US commanders may engage in foot-dragging in meeting these deadlines, setting the stage for conflicts between Washington and Baghdad. But with Obama and Maliki committed to the withdrawal of US combat troops, it is clear 24 The Nation. January 12/19, 2009 that Bush's hopes for long-term bases have been dashed.

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

**Pull out now. Surrounding countries support US troop removal.**

**Abbott 7**(Chris *The Internationalist*Issue 207) SM

**There should be a rapid withdrawal of all foreign combat troops from Iraq**. **This should be linked to** political and financial support for **a new UN or regional stabilization force, but should not be dependent on such a force**. While it is likely that such a force will still face resistance, the absence of US and British troops will help to calm many elements ofthe insurgency, leading to far more manageable levels of violence. **The withdrawal should be carried out in discussion with the Iraqi Governmen**t and the governments of other countries with troops in Iraq, **but should not be delayed because ot this**. **The withdrawal must be coupled with engagement with regional powers, s**uch as Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Iraq's other neighbours, including Syria**. These countries have a vested interest in ensuring stability in Iraq,** **with no desire for a failed state on their borders**. However potentially unsavoury to the US, these countries will play a role in the future of Iraq, and must be engaged with now.   
   
 

**All sides agree that withdrawing troops sooner is best. US credibility is only damaged further by prolonged occupation.**

**Abbott 7 (Chris The Internationalist Issue 207) SM**

**With Iraq in a state of bloody chaos**, many, from **both sides of the political divide, are calling tor an immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces.** **No matter what the consequences of withdrawal**,they argue, the Caution **presence is only making the security situation worse** and is helping to fuel the insurgency. Not everyone agrees. **Some argue that the** Coalition**forces should 'stay the course' and that withdrawal would precipitate a civil wa**r, leaving the fate of the country to be decided by violence. It could result in Iraq becoming a failed state and a haven for al- Qaeda and other terrorist groups. **They fear it would damage the US's** and Britain's 'national interests' and **international credibility by handing a victory to the terrorists**. **But Iraq is already in a civil war**. Day by day, jihadist paramilitaries are gaining experience in urban combat against arguably the best equipped and trained military in the world, the US Army and Marine Corps. Meanwhile,**the interests and credibility of the US**, Britain and other Coalition partners **are only damaged further by this prolonged and disastrous occupation**. The choice, however, is not simply between 'stay the course' or 'cut and run'. **Nor should withdrawal itself be seen as either 'surrender' or 'the answer to all of Iraq's problems'**. It is dangerous that the current debate is being thus polarized. **The simple fact is** that Coalition **troops need to be withdrawn from Iraq because most of the insurgency is actually a resistance to foreign occupation**. **The majority of Iraqis now want withdrawal**. But because a significant part of the violence is occurring between Iraq's diverse factions and communities, withdrawal on its own could have deadly consequences. It could be as disastrous as the invasion itself The countries responsible for the invasion cannot simply pull out and leave the Iraqi people to their fate. While they may not be a part of the solution, they have a grave responsibility to support the Iraqi Government in finding a way to ensure the long-term security of the country. Following George W Bush's rejection of the bi-partisan Iraq Study Group report and the lack of impact of its British

We should withdraw from Iraq Faster

Many believe that Obama’s plan for withdrawal is not happening quick enough.

Kornblut & Kane 9 (Anna & Paul; staff writers, *Washington Post*, February 26, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/02/26/obama\_tries\_to\_quell\_iraq\_crit.html?hpid=topnews) CH

President Obama has invited members of Congress to the White House for a meeting later this afternoon to discuss his plans for drawing down troops in Iraq -- a plan that has already drawn stiff criticism from his Democratic allies. After Speaker Nancy Pelosi complained that the level of troops -- 50,000 -- who would remain in Iraq is too high, other senior Democrats voiced similar concerns on Thursday. Among Democratic leaders, only Sen. Richard Durbin of Illinois is defending the new Obama plan, which will take three months longer than he promised and still leave a significant force structure on the ground. "I'm happy to listen to the secretary of defense and the president, but when they talk about 50,000, that's a little higher number than I had anticipated," Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) said. "It has to be done responsibly, we all agree, but 50,000 is more than I would have thought, and we await the justification," said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). "I do think we have to look carefully at the numbers that are there and do it as quickly as we can," said Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.). Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) issued a statement saying he was "concerned" about the level of troops that would remain in Iraq. The members are expected at the White House around 5:30 p.m. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said Obama is comfortable with his plan, which he will formally announce in a trip to Camp LeJeune, N.C., on Friday, delivering a speech shortly before noon. "The president will lay out exactly what that plan is. And I think tomorrow you'll see a president and the national security leadership comfortable with the recommendations that have been made and accepted by the commander in chief," Gibbs said. Durbin defended the plan, saying that it is not easy to to meet Obama's campaign promise of a near complete withdrawal in such a quick timeline without posing a risk to the soldiers that are left behind to help with embassy security and further training of Iraqi security forces. "I think what the administration is trying to do is strike that balance," Durbin said. While Durbin is generally the most antiwar member of leadership, he also is Obama's closest ally on Capitol Hill.

Congress Needs to Mandate Withdrawal

**Loopholes & wiggle room mean the war will not end without a strong policy to assure withdrawal.**

**Bennis 9**(Phyllis Bennis, a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and Journalist for the UN, *Institute for Foreign Policies, 3/6/09,*<http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/contested_terrain_obamas_iraq_withdrawal_plan_and_the_peace_movement>*) CS*

**The meaning of**President **Obama's Iraq withdrawal speech**, **and its influence on real U.S. policy in Iraq, will not be determined solely by his actual words**. The import of the speech — and whether its promises become real — will be determined by a fluid combination of what Obama says, his own definitions of what he says, AND the disparate ways his speech is heard, perceived, described and contested by others — the mainstream media, Congress, the military, other centers of elite power, and crucially, the peace movement. The words of the speech were quite amazing: "And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home." After eight years of reckless slaughter proudly justified in the name of a "global war on terror," it was stunning to hear the president of the United States announce what he called "a new strategy to end the war in Iraq." That moment was something we should celebrate. It was ours. The statement was a recognition of the powerful antiwar consensus in this country, a consensus that helped define the powerful constituency so key to Obama's election. Obama may not acknowledge, even to himself, that it was the organized antiwar movement that helped create and build and strengthen that consensus — but still his speech reflected the new political reality that requires him to speak to the demands of that antiwar community. Ending the War: A Definition From the vantage point of the peace movement, **the speech was and remains insufficient, and shot through with wiggle room and loopholes. We know that President Obama's definition of "ending the war" is not ours. Our definition has not changed**:     \* **Withdraw all the troop**s and bring them home (don't redeploy them to another illegal and unwinnable war in Afghanistan).      \* **Pull out all the**U.S.-paid foreign **mercenaries and contractors**and cancel the remaining contracts.      \* **Close all U.S. military bases and turn them over**to Iraq.     \* **Give up**all **efforts to control Iraq's oil**. While he laid out partial versions of some of these issues (withdrawal and oil), others (mercenaries and bases) were left out entirely. And **at the end of the day, President Obama did not make a single real commitment to meeting our definition of ending the war.**As The New York Times columnist Bob Herbert described Obama's plan for Iraq and Afghanistan, "we're committed to these two conflicts for a good while yet, and there is nothing like an etched-in-stone plan for concluding them." Understanding all the problems, limitations, and dangers of President Obama's speech is crucial. (For a fuller analysis of the dangers in Obama's speech, see my February 26th talking points — <http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117>.) But understanding those limitations does not tell us how to respond to this new moment, a moment when **the president**of the United States **is telling Americans that he is ending the war**, that he intends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq, telling Iraqis that the U.S. "pursues no claim on your territory or your resources," and telling the world that the U.S. plans to engage with everybody in the region including Iran and Syria. We may — we must — understand all the reasons that **those words don't constitute a firm commitment**. But **the reality is that the vast majority of people hearing those words, who already believe in what those words should mean, will assume President Obama means the same thing they do**. That perception provides a huge opportunity for the peace movement. And it is for that reason that the assertions in his speech remain contested terrain. Who Opposes, Who Supports? Leading Democrats, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Leader Harry Reid, criticized Obama's plan for leaving 50,000 or more U.S. troops in Iraq after the withdrawal of "combat brigades." Their critique was powerful, public, and their first substantive break with the president — breaking to his left. Although they will likely back down, indeed they have already gone silent on this issue, their initial response opens the possibility for their greater engagement with more progressive members of Congress whom they had consistently dissed throughout the Bush years, and perhaps ultimately with the peace movement directly. The "speak with one voice" posture of the Democratic Party may be eroding with a Democrat in the White House. Perhaps not so surprisingly, it was key **Republicans**— including Senator John McCain — who **voiced immediate support for Obama's withdrawal plan. Clearly they understand the huge loopholes inherent in the "withdrawal" strategy. They recognize the limited character of Obama's pledges.**But what they have officially endorsed, on the record, is a strategy that includes the language of "remove all U.S. troops from Iraq," "our combat mission will end," etc. They will never be our allies — but they are stuck with those words. Certainly they can — and surely will — reverse themselves if partial withdrawal moves threaten to turn into a real end of U.S. occupation. But they will pay a high political price when they do — and risk being dubbed flip-floppers

on the Iraq War. **Military leader**s, including top U.S. generals in Iraq and the region, heads of the joint chiefs of staff, and the Republican secretary of defense, have also expressed support. Of course they **are the most familiar with all the wiggle room in the plan**. **They know the likelihood of renegotiating with a compliant Iraqi government**virtually any or all of the terms in the U.S.-Iraq agreement — on which Obama based his intention to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq. But whatever their understanding, the fact that the military brass is standing publicly behind what is being touted as a complete withdrawal plan strips an important weapon away from those who oppose any withdrawal at all. On its February 28th front page, The New York Times referred to the speech as "the beginning of the end of one of the longest and most divisive wars in American history." The Times went on to describe how Obama "announced that he would withdraw combat forces from Iraq by August 2010 and all remaining troops by December 2011." Not that he "intended," but that he "would" withdraw all troops. The San Francisco Chronicle headline was "Obama Makes it Plain: Troops Out by End of 2011." The Washington Post headlined "Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq." We have to recognize that **even reports accurately depicting the too limited withdrawals, the too long timelines, the continuing occupation by U.S. troops, etc., will still be widely understood as consistent with what President Obama called "a new strategy to end the war."**And **while it's vital**that as a movement **we harbor no illusions, and recognize all the loopholes and wiggle room and pitfalls, our most important job is not to convince**the **people**of this country that **there is no way President Obama will end the occupation of Iraq**. **Our job will be to convince people that the only**

Congress Needs to Mandate Withdrawal

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**way**President **Obama will be able to overcome**the **powerful pro-war opposition inside and outside his administration and among his congressional allies, the only way he will be willing to even try**to accomplish **what he has promised**, **is if we**all mobilize to **demand it, to hold him accountable to his**pledges, his **promises**, his speeches, and even his intentions.

**Obama’s withdrawal allows for revision and the pentagon will exploit these to stay in Iraq**

**Scahill 9** (Jeremy Scahill, a Puffin Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute who has twice appeared before congress to testify on U.S. uses of mercenaries and won the 1998 Pol award in investigative Journalism, *AlterNet: World,*2/28/09,<http://www.alternet.org/world/129362/all_troops_out_by_2011_not_so_fast%3b_why_obama%27s_iraq_speech_deserves_a_second_look/?page=1)CS>

Some anti-war analysts find hope in President Barack Obama's address at Camp Lejuene in North Carolina on Friday, in which he appeared to spell out a clear date for withdrawal from Iraq. "I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011," Obama said in a speech that quickly generated headlines announcing that an end to the occupation is on the horizon. As far as rhetoric goes, Obama's statement seems very clear. But in reality, it is far more complicated. **Obama's plan, as his advisors have often said, is subject to "conditions on the ground," meaning it can be altered at any point between now and 2011. Underscoring this point, a spokesperson for New York Rep. John McHugh, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, said on Friday that Obama "assured [McHugh] he will revisit the tempo of the withdrawal, or he will revisit the withdrawal plan if the situation on the ground dictates it. … The president assured him that there was a Plan B**." Despite Obama's declarations Friday and the celebrations they have sparked on the liberal blogosphere, **the Pentagon certainly seems to believe its forces may well be in Iraq after 2011. NBC's Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki reported on Friday that "military commanders, despite this Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be out by the end of 2011, are already making plans for a significant number of American troops to remain in Iraq beyond that 2011 deadline, assuming that Status of Forces Agreement agreement would be renegotiated**. And **one senior military commander told us that he expects large numbers of American troops to be in Iraq for the next 15 to 20 years**." Some have suggested that such statements from the military are insubordination and contrary to Obama's orders, but they could also reflect discussions between the White House and the Pentagon to which the public is not privy.

**The Military can use the Status of Forces Agreement to stay in Iraq**

**Wallechinsky 9** (Aaron Wallechinsky, Writer for AllGov, *AllGov, 3/5/09*,<http://www.allgov.com/ViewNews/Withdrawing_Combat_Troops_from_Iraq__Kind_of__Sort_of__Maybe_90305>) CS

**Obama’s August 31 deadline also conflicts with statements made by Gates in a question and answer session with reporters after the speech which hinted at the possibility that combat brigades could remain in the country after that date.**   The President added in his speech, “I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.” But **Gates and Gen. Odierno have both indicated on the record that they planned to keep U.S. troops in Iraq even after that date, assuming that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be renegotiated**, as reported by NBC's Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki on Friday. Miklaszeswki also reported that some U.S. military commanders and Iraqis had discussed the establishment of “what could end up as a permanent air base, U.S. air base, in Kirkuk.”   The Loophole **The Status of Force Agreement, which is intended to lay out a timetable for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, contains a loophole that allows the possibility of extending U.S. occupation as a military presence beyond 2011** “**upon request by the government of Iraq.”** Article 27 of the**SOFA allows the U.S. to undertake military action, “or any other measure,” inside Iraq's borders “in the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq.”**

Congress Needs to Mandate Withdrawal

**U.S. embassy and SOFA’s loopholes predict a dangerous Iraqi occupation in the years to come**

**Scahill 9** (Jeremy Scahill, a Puffin Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute who has twice appeared before congress to testify on U.S. uses of mercenaries and won the 1998 Pol award in investigative Journalism, *AlterNet: World,*2/28/09,<http://www.alternet.org/world/129362/all_troops_out_by_2011_not_so_fast%3b_why_obama%27s_iraq_speech_deserves_a_second_look/?page=1)CS>

**Then there's the monstrous U.S. embassy unveiled last month in Baghdad, the largest of any nation anywhere in the history of the planet and itself resembling a military base**. **Maintaining this fortified city will require a sizable armed U.S. presence in Baghdad and will regularly place U.S. diplomats in armed convoys that put Iraqi civilian lives in jeopardy**. Whether this job is performed by State Department Diplomatic Security or mercenaries from the company formerly known as Blackwater (or else a corporation more acceptable to the Obama administration), **the U.S. will have a substantial paramilitary force regularly escorting U.S. VIPs around Iraq -- a proven recipe for civilian deaths and injuries.** Obama's speech on Friday did not even address the question of military contractors -- a crucial omission given that their presence rivals that of U.S. troops by a ratio of over 1-to-1. Finally, **the Status of Forces Agreement, which supposedly lays out a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, contains a gaping loophole that leaves open the possibility of a continuation of the occupation and a sustained presence of U.S. forces well beyond 2011**, "upon request by the government of Iraq." Article 27 of the SOFA allows the U.S. to undertake military action, "or any other measure," inside Iraq's borders "In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq." Could this mean an election where the wrong candidate or party wins? What is the definition of a threat?

Iraq War costs too many lives

**Costs in Blood and Treasure**

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007

<http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

The tab for the Iraq mission is already more than $350 billion, and the meter is now running at approximately $8 billion a month. Furthermore, even those appalling figures do not take into account indirect costs, such as long-term care for wounded Iraq war veterans. Except when the survival of the nation is at stake, all military missions must be judged according to a cost-benefit calculation. Iraq has never come close to being a war for America’s survival. Even the connection of the Iraq mission to the larger war against radical Islamic terrorism was always tenuous, at best. For all of his odious qualities, Saddam Hussein was a secular tyrant, not an Islamic radical. Indeed, the radical Islamists expressed nearly as much hatred for Saddam as they did for the United States. Iraq was an elective war-a war of choice, and a bad choice at that.

Presence in Iraq is too costly

Carpenter 9(Tom, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO institute, *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 20(4), pg 31)dc

Their diagnosis may well be correct, but their policy prescription is both futile and dangerous. The United States has already lost more than fortythree hundred troops (plus thousands more seriously wounded) and spent nearly $700 billion in direct expenditures in its nation-building venture. Yet crucial systemic and structural factors make it unlikely that Iraq will ever be a stable, united, democratic country. Proponents of keeping US troops in Iraq indefinitely would simply have America spend even more blood and treasure in pursuit of an unattainable objective. The unpleasant reality is that, regardless of when American forces leave Iraq, both that country and the wider region are probably in for a nasty period of instability. Iraq is the vortex in a turbulent part of the world, and there is little the United States can do to prevent its destructive impact.

Iraq War is a Failure

Our military force obviously will not be able to succeed.

**Grayson**, Alan. May 19, 20**09** ((Democratic Congressman of Florida’s 8th District) Interview With Christopher Bateman, Vanity Fair <http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/05/an-interview-with-antiwar-freshman-democratic-congressman-alan-grayson.html>) 4/25/10 AW

**But specifically, if we do want to combat al-Qaeda, keep the [and the] Taliban under control, accomplish those goals, what would you like to see done?** Bear in mind, this **is an enemy with no army**, no air force, no navy. **We didn’t have to put in this kind of effort when we were facing the Soviet Union, with over 10,000 nuclear weapons. Why do we have to put in this effort**, and bear this expense, **and lose these many lives against an enemy with no forces that it can put in the field**? The C.I.A. has said that **the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq**—not the people whom we provoked to fight against us—the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq **is 800. So now, for six years, we have had 150,000 American soldiers chasing 800 people—they haven’t found them. So what is the chance that another six years is going to solve that problem, or for that matter another 60 years? It’s fundamentally not working, and we can’t afford it anymore. So for our own sake we have to end it.**

Our current policies in Iraq and Afghanistan are atrocious. The cost of these wars in blood and capital far contradicts the fundamental goal that we had in Afghanistan that was to protect the American people.

**Grayson**, Alan. May 19, 20**09** ((Democratic Congressman of Florida’s 8th District) Interview With Christopher Bateman, Vanity Fair <http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/05/an-interview-with-antiwar-freshman-democratic-congressman-alan-grayson.html>) 4/25/10 AW

The reason why I said what I said is because **the fundamental goal of our endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan is** supposed **to** be to **protect us**. That’s why we call the Defense Department the Defense Department, because it’s supposed to defend America. And **whatever the perceived threat may be**, whether it’s al-Qaeda or the Taliban or otherwise, **only by the most incredibly convoluted Bushian logic could you possibly** get to the point where you conclude that as a result of that threat we should **spend $100 billion a year and send over 100,000 of our young men and women abroad**, 8,000 miles away, and that that is an effective **way to accomplish that goal. It doesn’t make any sense. Life does not consist of a Risk board game, where you try to occupy every space on the planet. There’s no other country that does this,** there’s no other country that seeks to occupy foreign countries 8,000 miles from their own border, **and believes that that somehow accomplishes anything useful.** It doesn’t. **If in fact it’s important to our national security to keep al-Qaeda or the Taliban under control, there are far more effective ways of accomplishing that goal**, if that is in fact the goal**, than to expend this kind of money and this kind of blood**. This is something that Democrats said when they were in the opposition repeatedly, and that truth hasn’t changed at all just because we elected a president. You can always find some kind of excuse to do what you want to do anyway, but I have to wonder why a new Democratic president wants to do something like this. This is a [**the**] **president** who **has recognized the immorality of torture**, and **I’m waiting for him to recognize the immorality of war and foreign occupation**.

**US Military presence in Iraq causes terrorism and prevents Iraqi stabilization**

**Syracuse Peace Council 6**(2006, Oldest Grass Roots Peace and Social Justice Organization,<http://www.peacecouncil.net/iraq/talkingpoints.pdf)dc>

REALITY: **The US presence fuels the insurgency. Phased withdrawal will delay transition to Iraqi control. There is no reason to believe that any continued US presence can accomplish the goals it has failed to achieve in the last 4 years. Soldiers and advisors left behind face greater risks, and no amount of training can force Iraqis to carry out US goals. The Iraqi people know best how to run their country.**

**US Presence solves nothing – people in Iraq are suffering and violence is continuing**

**Syracuse Peace Council 6**(2006, Oldest Grass Roots Peace and Social Justice Organization,<http://www.peacecouncil.net/iraq/talkingpoints.pdf)dc>

**As a result of the US invasion, Iraq is already in the middle of a brutal civil war. Innocent Iraqi civilians are caught in the crossfire while security and many basic services are worse now than before the invasion - clean water and electricity are less available, many hospitals and schools remain closed, poverty is 35% higher and unemployment is over 60%.**

Iraq War is a Failure

**US presence blocks democracy in Iraq.**

**Arnove 6**(Anthony; author of Iraq: The Logic Of Withdrawal, *AlterNet,*March 28, 2006,<http://www.alternet.org/world/34122/>) CH

**Having failed to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq -- the first big lie of the invasion -- the United States has turned to a new big lie:**George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, John Negroponte, Condoleezza Rice, John Bolton, and their friends are **bringing democracy to the Iraqi people. Democracy has nothing to do with why the United States is in Iraq. The Bush administration invaded Iraq to secure long-established imperial interests in the Middle East** -- the same reason Washington backed Saddam Hussein as he carried out the worst of his crimes against the Iraqi people, the Kurds, and the Iranians.  **By invading Iraq, Washington hoped not only to install a regime more favorable to U.S. oil interests; it hoped to use Iraq as a staging ground for further interventions to redraw the map of the Middle East.** Several U.S. bases have been established in Iraq and are likely to remain long after U.S. troops are expelled. All of this has nothing to do with democracy. In fact, **the United States has long been a major obstacle to any secular, democratic, nationalist, or socialist movements in the region that stood for fundamental change, preferring instead what is euphemistically called "stability,**" even if it meant supporting the most reactionary fundamentalist religious forces or repressive regimes.  **The U.S. government opposes genuine democracy in the Middle East for a simple reason: if ordinary people controlled the region's energy resources, they might be put toward local economic development and social needs, rather than going to fuel the profits of Western oil companies. Democracy cannot be "installed" by outside powers, at gunpoint. Genuine democracy can come about only through the struggle of people for control over their own lives and circumstances, through movements that are themselves democratic in nature.**When confronted with such movements, such as the 1991 Iraqi uprising, the U.S. government has consistently preferred to see them crushed than to see them succeed.

There is no military solution to terrorism

Rees, Hagelin, Leffler 9 (Colonel Brian M. Rees, M.D., US Army Reserve, a veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan, is a graduate of the US Army War College, and is currently Deputy Command Surgeon, 63rd RRC, Los Alamitos, California. John Hagelin, Ph.D. is a Harvard-trained Kilby Award winning quantum physicist who appeared in the feature films The Secret and What the Bleep Do We Know? David Leffler, Ph.D. a US Air Force veteran, is the Executive Director at the Center for Advanced Military Science The huffington post 2/7/09)http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/military-solution-to-terr\_b\_164889.html JVT

We agree, mostly, with Deepak Chopra's and Ken Robinson's editorial, "A military solution to a war on terrorism is doomed." However, there is one more important area that must be addressed in order for their proposed strategy to work quickly. They hinted at it when they wrote, "The chief reason to remain in Iraq and Afghanistan, once we entered and found chaos, is humanitarian..." Although the following comparison is not entirely applicable, we must remember that the US military deployed to Somalia for largely "humanitarian" reasons. Although sent in as a friendly force to restore order, later, due to the "chaos" they were reviled and persecuted by many civilians who had earlier pleaded for their help in delivering and safeguarding their lives, food, and supplies. This indicates that humans are motivated by dynamics that are beyond the ability of just our diplomatic and economic muscle to control.

\*\*\*\*\*US Leadership ADV\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*Hard Power

Iraq War causes Overstrech

The Iraq War is a failure with or without US troops it serves to Overstretch our forces and undermine readiness

Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, &Peter Juul 7(Senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of US Strategy in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007 ACW)

The fundamental premise of Bush’s surge strategy—that Iraq’s leaders will make key decisions to advance their country’s political transition and national reconciliation—is at best misguided and clearly unworkable. Neither U.S. troops in and around Baghdad nor diplomats in the Green Zone can force Iraqi leaders to hold their country together. As Major General Richard Lynch, currently commanding the Third Infantry Division, noted last month, even if the security situation does improve, there will not be significant progress on the government side. The United States cannot stabilize Iraq without serious action by Iraq’s leaders. The “no end in sight” strategy fosters a culture of dependency among Iraqis by propping up certain members of Iraq’s national government without fundamentally changing Iraq’s political dynamics. It does so at the cost of grinding down the strength of U.S. ground forces, as the readiness of these forces continues to decline. Our ground forces are so overstretched that many of our soldiers and Marines are being sent to Iraq without proper training and equipment, some multiple times; our National Guard has become an operational rather than strategic reserve. The consequences of President Bush’s stubbornness are dire. Many events that some fear would result if U.S. troops left Iraq are unfolding now just as the U.S. troop presence is getting larger—vicious ethnic and sectarian conflict, growing tensions on Iraq’s borders, increasing provocative actions by Iran, and the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since 1948. Iraq currently suffers from four major internal conflicts and tensions: Shi’a vs. Shi’a in the south; Sunni vs. Shi’a in the center and east; Sunni vs. Sunni in the west; and Arab-Kurd tensions in the north (see map on page 6 for more details).

**Continued presence in Iraq has caused military overstretch.**

**Burns 6** (Robert, Associated Press writer, Study: Army Stretched to Breaking Point, January 24) eh

WASHINGTON - **Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a "thin green line" that could snap unless relief comes soon**, according to a study for the Pentagon. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who wrote the report under a Pentagon contract, concluded that **the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency.** He also suggested that **the Pentagon's decision**, announced in December, **to begin reducing the force in Iraq** this year **was driven in part by a realization that the Army was overextended.** As evidence, Krepinevich points to the Army's 2005 recruiting slump — missing its recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 — and its decision to offer much bigger enlistment bonuses and other incentives. "You really begin to wonder just how much stress and strain there is on the Army, how much longer it can continue," he said in an interview. He added that the Army is still a highly effective fighting force and is implementing a plan that will expand the number of combat brigades available for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The 136-page report represents a more sobering picture of the Army's condition than military officials offer in public. While not released publicly, a copy of the report was provided in response to an Associated Press inquiry. Illustrating his level of concern about strain on the Army, Krepinevich titled one of his report's chapters, "The Thin Green Line." He wrote that **the Army is "in a race against time" to adjust to the demands of war "or risk `breaking' the force in the form of a catastrophic decline" in recruitment and reenlistment.** Col. Lewis Boone, spokesman for Army Forces Command, which is responsible for providing troops to war commanders, said it would be "a very extreme characterization" to call the Army broken. He said his organization has been able to fulfill every request for troops that it has received from field commanders. The Krepinevich assessment is the latest in the debate over whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have worn out the Army, how the strains can be eased and whether the U.S. military is too burdened to defeat other threats. Rep. John Murtha, the Pennsylvania Democrat and Vietnam veteran, created a political storm last fall when he called for an early exit from Iraq, arguing that the Army was "broken, worn out" and fueling the insurgency by its mere presence. Administration officials have hotly contested that view. George **Joulwan, a retired four-star Army general and former NATO commander, agrees the Army is stretched thin.** "Whether they're broken or not, I think I would say **if we don't change the way we're doing business, they're in danger of being fractured and broken**, and I would agree with that," Joulwan told CNN last month.

Iraq War causes Overstrech

US Military is overstretched: Troops are exhausted and suffering from PSTD which undermines Readiness

Murline 9 (Anna, a senior editor of the Nation & World section, covers defense for U.S.News & World Report, “Obama to Confront Limits of America's Overstretched Military”, U.S. News and World Report 1/16/2009, ACW)

With progress in Iraq still precarious and the war in Afghanistan growing ever more violent, the American military remains overburdened and, U.S. officials repeatedly point out, dangerously overstretched. Troops are also exhausted, after back-to-back tours that are leaving a growing number of military families in shambles. It's hardly an alluring recruiting scenario. But top U.S. military leaders warn that if the Pentagon is to continue to meet its responsibilities around the world, it will need more troops. "You can't do what we've been asked to do with the number of people we have," Undersecretary of the Army Nelson Ford noted in a recent interview, driving home what has long been conventional wisdom within the halls of the Pentagon: Shortages in the military ranks will be one of the chief national security challenges of the Barack Obama administration. Indeed, those demands will likely only grow greater under Obama's watch, particularly after his anticipated approval of plans to send 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan. There, troops will not only be called upon to fight hard against increasingly sophisticated Taliban forces, but they will also need to put expert-level logisticians in place to figure out how to supply this influx of soldiers and marines—what amounts to a doubling of current U.S. force levels. And even as troops leave Iraq for Afghanistan on the heels of greater stability in Baghdad, the U.S. military will need considerable forces to support the Iraqi military, including supply specialists, aviators, and intelligence officers. "As the [brigade combat teams] draw down, it means you have more people spread thin," Ford noted. "You need more logistics, more aviation, controls, and communication. "You can see a point," he added, "where it's going to be very difficult to cope." This comes as little surprise to the Pentagon, which is well underway with a plan to grow the ranks of the Army by 65,000 soldiers by next year, bringing active duty forces to a total of 547,000. The Marine Corps plans to add 27,000 to its ranks, growing to 202,000 by 2011. It's worth noting that the Pentagon recently accelerated those plans—originally the increase was slated to be complete by 2012, rather than the current goal of 2010—in the face of dire demand. Such growth is expensive. Last year, the Pentagon asked for $15 billion to add 7,000 soldiers and $5 billion to add 5,000 marines to the ranks of the Corps. Separately, the Department of Defense requested an additional $11 billion to cover the costs of retaining, training, and recruiting its forces. The area of retention is perhaps the greatest staffing concern of top military officials. Troops are tired. Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C., think tank, noted in a recent article that 27 percent of soldiers who had completed three or four tours in Iraq showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, according to a 2008 survey, versus 12 percent after one tour and 18 percent after two. The figures could be aided by more rest time between toursat least 18 to 24 months—but it will likely be at least three years, according to top military officials, before troops get more than a year to rest between deployments. Recruiting, too, has been a considerable challenge for the all-volunteer military engaged in two tough wars. When the Army fell short of its recruiting goals in 2005, it raised the maximum recruiting age to 42 years old, and added sign-up bonuses as high as $40,000. It also began enlisting more recruits with general equivalency degrees rather than high school diplomas. Just over 70 percent of new recruits had high school diplomas in 2007, for example, a 25-year low. Moral waivers for new recruits with criminal histories are also on the rise, nearly doubling from 860 waivers for marines and soldiers convicted of felonies in 2007, up by 400 from 2006. The Pentagon argues that these are modest figures relative to the size of the force, and that 97 percent of Marine Corps recruits in 2008 had high school diplomas. Even as the military grows, however, top officials are warning that the Pentagon will need still more troops. Ford recently said that the Army will need an additional 30,000 soldiers to fulfill its duties, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but around the world. Others have noted that U.S. military commands in the North and in Korea are also clamoring for more soldiers. So, too, is the new U.S. Africa Command. Then there are the demands of cyberwarfare, which will need more staff, say officials, after some recent crippling cyberattacks on U.S. computer systems at the Pentagon and at U.S. bases abroad. As if all these challenges were not enough, the Pentagon instituted new training requirements in December that will require troops to receive instruction in how to do "full spectrum combat." This means, in military parlance, drills in a host of old-school battle scenarios such as, for example, traditional tank wars. Soldiers have spent the last few years focused on counterinsurgency operations, much to the consternation of some who warn that America might one day be drawn into a land battle with another world power. But it already looks like the implementation of that new doctrine will have to be tabled for the next three years, say top military officials, because it will be at least that long before troops have 18 to 24 months between tours, the amount of time required for such training. The news for military manning isn't all bad, however. The outlook for recruiting is growing steadily sunnier in the wake of the implosion of the U.S. economy, which has been a boon for military recruiters. "We do benefit when things look less positive in civil society," said David Chu, the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness. Fiscal year 2008, which ended in September, was the best in five years for the Department of Defense. Top officials remain only cautiously optimistic, however. "Military recruiting is always a challenge," says Curt Gilroy, accession policy director for Defense, "regardless of what the unemployment rate is."

Iraq War causes Overstrech

US occupation of the Middle East causes Overstretch

Baldor 9 (Lolita; staff writer, *The Boston Globe*, February 20, 2009, http://www.google.com/#num=100&hl=en&q=%22military+readiness%22+overstretch&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs\_rfai=&fp=f9c767f2a58c73f1) CH

WASHINGTON - For the third consecutive year, a classified Pentagon assessment has concluded there is a significant risk that the US military could not respond quickly and fully to any new crisis, the Associated Press has learned. The latest risk assessment, drawn up by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comes despite recent security gains in Iraq and plans for troop cuts there. The assessment finds that the United States continues to face persistent terrorist threats, and the military is still stretched and strained from long and repeated tours to the warfront. Senior military officials spoke about the report on condition of anonymity because it is a classified document. Prepared every year, and routinely delivered to Congress with the budget, the risk assessment paints a broad picture of the security threats and hot spots around the world and the military's ability to deal with them. Mullen has delivered it to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Because the threat is rated as significant, Gates will send an accompanying report to Congress outlining what the military is doing to address the risks. That report has not been finished. This year's assessment finds many of the same global security issues as previous years - ranging from terrorist organizations and unstable governments to the potential for high-tech cyber attacks. It also reflects the Pentagon's ongoing struggle to maintain a military that can respond to threats from other countries, while honing newer counterinsurgency techniques to battle more unconventional dangers, such as suicide bombers and lethal roadside bombs. Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute, a military policy research group in Arlington, Va., said the assessment would take into account the strains on the force, the wear and tear on aircraft and other military equipment, and a host of global flashpoints.

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The war in Iraq has severely overstretch the US military and ruined our military readiness

Gharib 8 (Ali, New York-based journalist on U.S. foreign policy with a focus on the Middle East and Central Asia, “Senior Officers Worried About Dangerously Overstretched U.S Military,” ISP News, 2/28/08 ACW)

The U.S. military is "severely strained" by two large-scale occupations in the Middle East, other troop deployments, and problems recruiting, according to a new survey of military officers published by Foreign Policy magazine and the centrist think-tank Center for a New American Security. "They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight," said the report, 'The U.S. Military Index,' which polled 3,400 current and former high-level military officers. Sixty percent of the officers surveyed said that the military is weaker now than it was five years ago, often citing the number of troops deployed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "We ought to pay more attention to quality," said retired Lt. General Gregory Newbold, who retired from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in part over objections to the invasion of Iraq, at a panel during a conference to release the data. From Republican presidential hopeful Sen. John McCain to President George W. Bush, politicians regularly speak on the military from a position of authority. They know, they contend, that despite the two ongoing wars, the U.S is ready to deal with new threats militarily if need be. "I'm sorry to tell you, there's going to be other wars," said McCain at a campaign stop last month. "We will never surrender but there will be other wars." But the officers surveyed implied that military options against future threats may not be -- as politicians from across the spectrum have intimated -- "on the table." "Asked whether it was reasonable or unreasonable to expect the U.S. military to successfully wage another war at this time," said the report, "80 percent of the officers say that it is unreasonable." When asked to grade the preparedness of the military to deal with the threat of Iran -- on which McCain's rhetoric has been especially hawkish -- respondents gave an average score of 4.5 on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing fully prepared. The difference in which civilian and military leadership are viewed also made its way into the survey results. The level of confidence in the presidency among officers averaged just 5.5 out of 10, with 16 percent having "no confidence at all in the president." The U.S. Congress scored lowest of the institutions that the survey referred with an average score of just 2.7. The low regard for politicians could arise from the officers' notion that elected officials know little about the workings of military -- 66 percent of officers responded that elected leaders are "either somewhat or very uninformed about the U.S. military." Those views are likely informed by survey respondents' opinions about the way the civilian leadership handled the war in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein. Nearly three quarters of the officers said that the goals of the civilian leadership for the military were "unreasonable". Furthermore, it appears that many officers find that the efforts of U.S. forces have sometimes been counterproductive. Asked what country had gained the "greatest strategic advantage" from the war in Iraq, 37 percent said Iran while 22 percent answered China. Just one in five of the officers answered that the U.S. had gained the most.

Iraq War causes Overstrech

Iraq presence is responsible for readiness crisis. Only removal of troops solves.

Korb 7 (Lawrence S enate Armed Services Committee <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/04/pdf/korb_testimony_misuse.pdf>) SM

**Currently there are virtually no active or reserve Army combat units outside of Iraq and Afghanistan that are rated as “combat ready.” The Army has deployed 20 of its 43 available active-duty combat brigades -- meaning that virtually all its forces are either in Iraq or are preparing to return there.** In order to ensure that troops fighting in Iraq are fully equipped, units rotating out of Iraq have been leaving behind their equipment for units taking their place. **The units that return home are often so depleted that the Marines have been referring to this phase as the ‘post-deployment death spiral**.’ As a result, **combat-readiness worldwide has deteriorated to crisis levels**. **The equipment in Iraq is wearing out at four to nine times the normal peacetime rate because of combat losses and harsh operating conditions**. As we have documented in studies done in coordination with the Lexington Institute, **the total Army** -- active and reserve -- now **faces at least a $50 billion equipment shortfall** and the Marines about $15 billion. [Note 2: Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson, Caroline P. Wadhams, “Army Equipment After Iraq,” Center for American Progress and the Lexington Institute, April 2006; Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson, Max A. Bergmann, “Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq,” Center for American Progress and the Lexington Institute, August 2006.] **Without equipment, it’s extremely difficult for non-deployed units to train for combat**. Thus, one of the hidden effects of the Iraq war is that even the **troops not currently committed to Iraq are weakened because of it**. To equip those on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and the Marines have been drawing down their pre-positioned equipment stocks around the globe. These stocks are stored on ships or in strategic locations around the world to enable deploying units to be supplied rapidly. These stocks **have been extensively diminished and limit the ability of the United States to respond to possible crises around the world**. For instance, the Marine Corps has drawn down their pre-positioned reserve equipment stocks in the Pacific and Europe by up to 70 percent. **The Army and Marines have been so overstretched that the United States has almost no ready reserve of ground forces to effectively deal with a potential crisis on the Korean peninsula, in Iran, or in unstable Pakistan**, for example, or to help alleviate the grave humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The reserve component is also in tatters. Lt. General Steven Blum, the head of the National Guard Bureau, stated that the National Guard is “in an even more dire situation than the active Army but both have the same symptoms; I just have a higher fever.” The Pentagon has had to increasingly employ the National Guard and Reserve in order to meet demands on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the Army Guard and **Reserve began the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with their units short tens of thousands of soldiers, or about 15 to 20 percent, and lacking more than 30 percent of their necessary gear. Those shortages have deepened** as **people and equipment are borrowed from units staying home to fill out those about to go overseas**. According to Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Chief of the Army National Guard, what the Guard is trying to deal with right now is “a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death.” To make matters worse, the Pentagon is set to notify National Guard brigades to prepare again for duty in Iraq. Some 12,000 troops are scheduled to be deployed to Iraq early next year. This would be the first time that full Guard combat brigades would be sent to Iraq for a second tour. These deployments are becoming increasingly necessary because the regular Army is not large enough to handle the mission in Iraq on its own. Originally these Guard units were to serve no more than 24 months total. However, these units and others in the Guard have already served 18 months -- with training time and time in Iraq or Afghanistan -- and now they are looking at least another 12 months in Iraq.

Iraq Troop Deployment causes overstretch and deters new recruits

Akl 5 (Aida, writer for Voice of America News, *Military Connections*, 8-22-05 <http://www.militaryconnections.com/news_story.cfm?textnewsid=1639>) CM

Washington, August 22, 2005 -- With more than 250,000 American troops deployed in nearly 130 countries, many analysts are questioning whether the United States military is stretched in ways that could undermine its future capabilities should new threats arise. In his annual report to Congress last May, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have strained the military to a point where it runs a higher risk of not being able to quickly and easily defeat potential enemies. U.S. military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and recruitment shortfalls in some branches of the armed forces, such as the Army and National Guard, have alarmed some observers who warn that the military is overburdened and overstretched. Charles Pena, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, says the current system used to repeatedly rotate and redeploy troops serving in Iraq over extended periods of time could negatively impact America's all-volunteer armed forces. He adds, "This may be the legacy of the Iraq War, that we will have a very different army in particular, than we did before we went to war in Iraq. It's too early to say exactly what might happen. But certainly there are many troubling and worrisome signs that we may be doing real damage to the United States Army." Mr. Pena explains that the current strain may discourage new volunteers from enlisting, thereby weakening the military's future capabilities. Other analysts say that while the U.S. military is probably using all available manpower, it is not overstretched and continues to have some spare capacity.

Iraq War causes Overstrech

The repercussions of the war in Iraq has hurt U.S. status and military.

**Bandow 10** (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and James Madison Scholar with the American Legislative Exchange Council, Battling the Bipartisan Consensus for War, March 15,<http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11576>) eh

The moment economics, domestic policy, or election law came up, participants disagreed. But on the central issue of war and peace the group united. **While war might sometimes be unavoidable** -- pacifism was not on the agenda, though some of the participants might have been pacifists -- **it should be a last resort, a tragic necessity to protect a free American society.** While war sometimes brings out the finest and most sublime human values such as courage and honor, more often it looses the basest passions and destroys what we most hold dear. Despite today's constant celebration of all things military, Americans are best served by peace, allowing them to enjoy the pleasures and surmount the challenges of daily life.  **Yet today the U.S. is one of the world's most militarized states, accounting for nearly half of the globe's military outlays.**The U.S. government maintains hundreds of military installations and hundreds of thousands of troops abroad. No other country, democratic or authoritarian, comes close to matching America's aggressive military record in recent decades: nations and territories invaded or bombed include Iraq (twice), Serbia, Bosnian Serbs, Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, and Grenada. Threats have come fast and furious against North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and most recently Yemen.  It is bad enough that **Washington policymakers see war as a first resort**, a convenient tool for conducting social engineering abroad. **They seem to treat the resulting death and destruction as incidental and unimportant,** especially if concentrated on others.  Even worse, **many U.S. policymakers appear to enjoy wielding military force safely out of harm's way from their**Washington **offices.** Rather than feel reluctant at loosing the dogs of war, some American leaders, almost always ones who have never put on a military uniform let alone served in combat, joyously add new targets. "Real men go to Tehran," ran the neoconservative mantra in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, when otherwise sober analysts were filled with hubris at America's ability to remake the world at will. Never mind those who would be killed along the way.  It is this world which brought representatives from Right to Left together. Participants discussed rhetoric: criticizing "imperialism," for instance, resonates far better with the Left than the Right. But there was broad agreement on policy. Washington today has a strategy of "empire." The U.S. isn't the same as the Roman or British empires, to be sure. But American foreign and military policy could hardly be further from those one would expect from a constitutional republic with a government of limited powers intended to concentrate on protecting the safety and liberty of its citizens.  Thus, Americans need real change, not the faux variety offered by the Obama administration. The military should be configured to defend America, not client states around the globe. U.S. taxpayers should not be fleeced to subsidize wealthy allies. Washington should not use patriotic 18-year-olds to occupy Third World states, treating them like American satrapies, governed by U.S. ambassadors. Uncle Sam should stop trying to micro-manage the globe, treating every conflict or controversy as America's own, exaggerating foreign threats and inflating Washington's abilities.  The price of today's policy of empire is high. Far from being the costless adventure imagined by members of Washington's ubiquitous sofa samurai, war is the ultimate big government program, a threat to Americans' life, prosperity, and liberty.  So far **the Iraqi "cakewalk" has resulted in the death of roughly 4400 Americans and 300 other**coalition**soldiers.** Then **there are tens of thousands of maimed and injured Americans**, others suffering from PSD, and numerous broken families and communities. **At least 100,000 and probably many more Iraqis have died. Some estimates run up to a million**, a truly astonishing number. America's ivory tower warriors seem particularly unconcerned about dead foreigners. However many Iraqis died, it is treated as a small price to pay for the privilege of being liberated by Washington.  Another cost is financial. Direct military outlays this year will run over $700 billion. **Iraq is ultimately likely cost $2 or $3 trillion.**Washington spends more on "defense," adjusted for inflation, today than at any point during the Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War. The U.S. accounts for nearly half of the globe's military expenditures. American taxpayers pay to defend prosperous and populous European states. Japan devotes about a fourth as much of its economic strength to the military as does the U.S. The NATO member which makes the most military effort is crisis-prone Greece -- in response to nominal ally Turkey. For years American taxpayers spent as much as South Koreans to defend the Republic of Korea.  Such generosity might have made sense in the aftermath of World War II, when so many Asian and European states had been ruined by war and faced Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China. No longer, however. Especially with the U.S. budget deficit expected to run nearly $1.6 trillion this year alone. Over the next decade Uncle Sam likely will rack up another $10 trillion in red ink. In effect, Washington is borrowing every penny which it is spending to defend other nations.  Liberty also suffers from a policy of empire. "War is the health of the state," intoned Randolph Bourne, and it certainly is the health of the national security state. The constitutional deformations of the Bush years were legendary, yet President Barack Obama has done little to rein in his predecessor's lawless conduct. Executive aggrandizement, government secrecy, privacy violations, military arrests and trials, and constitutional violations. The U.S. is in danger of losing its republican soul.  Of course, one could imagine a truly necessary war which would have to be fought almost irrespective of cost--World War II, perhaps. However, while jihadist terrorists are ugly and murderous, they are a poor substitute for Adolf Hitler with armored divisions and Joseph Stalin with nuclear weapons. We aren't fighting World War III. We aren't fighting anything close to World War III.  And if we were in such a conflict, a policy of empire, of meddling around the globe, of engaging in international social engineering, would be about the most foolish strategy possible. Most of what the U.S. military does has nothing to do with American security: protecting European states threatened by no one, aiding a South Korea which vastly out ranges its northern antagonist, attempting to turn decrepit Third World states into liberal democracies and Western allies.  The problem of terrorism is real, but is best met by sophisticated, targeted countermeasures rather than promiscuous blunt-force intervention. **The war in Iraq has**enhanced Iran's strategic position, **weakened America's reputation, [and] stretched U.S. military forces,** spurred terrorist recruitment, and confirmed the radical terrorist narrative. A lengthy occupation of Afghanistan and overflow combat into Pakistan risk doing much the same--potentially for years. Expanded American intervention in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere would have a similar effect.

Iraq War causes Overstrech

**Straining the All-Volunteer Military**

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007

<http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

Even some hawks are concerned about the negative impact of the Iraq mission on the all- volunteer force (AVF). They should be concerned. In December 2006, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army’s chief of staff, bluntly told a House committee that the active-duty Army "will break" unless there was a permanent increase in force structure. And that is before any contemplated additional deployments to Iraq.

The military leaders are not exaggerating. Already the Army has struggled to meet its recruiting goals, even though it has diluted the standards for new recruits, including by issuing waivers in cases where there is evidence of criminal behavior or mental illness. Indeed, the Iraq occupation has been sustained to this point only through extraordinary exertions, including an unprecedented number of "stop loss" orders, preventing military personnel from returning to civilian life when their terms of enlistment are up, and recalling members of the reserves-including some people in their 40s and 50s. The AVF is straining to the breaking point already, and the longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those strains will become.

**Studies Prove – Troops stationed in Iraq suffer from PTSD**

Atkinson et al 9 (Michael P., Adam Guetz, Lawrence M. Wein, September 9, Management Science, <http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/reprint/55/9/iv>) ELJ

The tempo of deployment cycles in the Iraq War is higher than for any war since World War II, and military survey data suggest that posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is not uncommon among service members. To assure ample mental health resources to care for returning troops, it is important for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to forecast the timing and number of new PTSD cases over the coming years, which is complicated by the fact that many cases have delayed onset. We combine a dynamic mathematical model with deployment data and PTSD data from the Iraq War, and we estimate that the PTSD rate among Iraq War veterans will be approximately 35%, which is roughly double the rate from the raw survey data. This doubling is due to the time lag between the PTSD-generating event and the onset of symptoms and to the fact that many surveyed troops will do subsequent deployments. Consequently, the VA system, which is already experiencing significant delays for PTSD treatment provision, needs to urgently ramp up its mental health resource capacity.

**Patients suffering from PTSD have multiple physical and physiological effects**

Turner and Ward 7 (Hillarie and Lydia Sermons-Ward, January 1, American Psychiatric Association, <http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/07-02hogepressrelease01032007.aspx>) ELJ

The soldiers belonged to four Army combat infantry brigades, and 17 percent met screening criteria for PTSD. The AJP article, “Association of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with Somatic Symptoms, Health Care Visits, and Absenteeism Among Iraq War Veterans” by Charles W. Hoge, M.D., of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, found that injury was associated with a higher rate of PTSD. Of those wounded or injured at least once, 32 percent met PTSD criteria compared to 14 percent of those never injured. PTSD was strongly associated with all of the physical health measures in the survey. Approximately 50 percent of the soldiers with PTSD, but 20 to 25 percent of those without PTSD, stated that their health was poor or fair. Sleep problems and fatigue were reported by more than 70 percent of those with PTSD, compared to about 27 percent without PTSD. These high rates of physical health problems have important implications for the daily functioning of combat veterans and for the health care systems serving them. They also suggest that combat veterans who seek treatment for significant physical problems should be evaluated for PTSD. A relationship between PTSD and poor health has been shown in veterans of previous wars, including the 1991 Gulf War. Earlier studies generally were conducted many years after the return from combat, whereas this survey occurred one year after Iraq combat, and the soldiers were still on active duty. “The study affirms the significant mental health burden of combat, which affects nearly one in five soldiers,” stated AJP Editor in Chief Robert Freedman, M.D. “Combat-induced stress afflicts them with chronic pain, fatigue, sleeplessness and worry over their health.”

**Iraq hurts US’s military readiness**

Iraq destroys military promptness

Tyson 5 (Ann, Washington Post, Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48306-2005Mar18?language=printer March 19, 2005) CGW

Two years after the United States launched a war in Iraq with a crushing display of power; a guerrilla conflict is grinding away at the resources of the U.S. military and casting uncertainty over the fitness of the all-volunteer force, according to senior military leaders, lawmakers and defense experts. The unexpectedly heavy demands of sustained ground combat are depleting military manpower and gear faster than they can be fully replenished. Shortfalls in recruiting and backlogs in needed equipment are taking a toll, and growing numbers of units have been broken apart or taxed by repeated deployments, particularly in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. "What keeps me awake at night is, what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007?" Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army vice chief of staff, said at a Senate hearing this week. The Iraq war has also led to a drop in the overall readiness of U.S. ground forces to handle threats at home and abroad. Forcing the Pentagon to accept new risks -- even as military planners prepare for a global anti-terrorism campaign that administration officials say could last for a generation. Stretched by Iraq and Afghanistan. the United States lacks a sufficiently robust ability to put large numbers of "boots on the ground" in case of a major emergency elsewhere. Such as the Korean Peninsula, in the view of some Republican and Democratic lawmakers and some military leaders. They are skeptical of the Pentagon's ability to substitute air and naval power, and they believe strongly that what the country needs is a bigger Army. "The U.S. military will respond if there are vital threats, but will it respond with as many forces as it needs, with equipment that is in excellent condition? The answer is no," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.). Northwestern

US military overstretch undermines readiness

**Alfano 7**(Sean Alfano, Staff writer for CBS, Report: US military readiness worsens 2/27/07)<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/27/national/main2519581.shtml> JVT

**Strained by the demands of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a significant risk that the U.S. military won't be able to quickly and fully respond to yet another crisis, according to a new report to Congress.**The assessment, done by the nation's top military officer, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, represents a worsening from a year ago, when that risk was rated as moderate.Rebel attacks are delaying withdrawal

US Readiness Low now

US Readiness suffering due to military presence

**Pearson 7**(Frederic, Director of Center for Peace and Conflict studies, Iraq-itag.org, <http://iraq-itag.org/docs/ITAG_July.pdf>, 7/5)dc

The debate continues about whether the US invasion of Iraq served American national interests, whether leaving Iraq now will satisfy more important national interests than will staying, and what will result from departure. Simply put, there are two important decisions facing the United States: to leave or stay, and what to leave behind. It seems clear that an immediate exit is necessary and that a structure must be left to increase the odds of a favorable regional outcome in connection with that exit. **The toll on our national defense capabilities and on our war against al Qaeda makes leaving an important and necessary national objective. Because the toll on active duty units has been unsustainable, as evidenced by newly extended tour lengths, nearly all US National Guard units are no longer fully combat-capable. Consumption rates of munitions and equipment have required that four of our five strategic pre-positioned reserves be raided for assets. Only the reserve for forces charged with fighting off an attack by North Korea remains untouched. Over three thousand five hundred and eighty Americans have lost their lives in Iraq, and well over twenty-six thousand have been wounded. The US Army has been forced to accept people in their forties as well as felons to fill out its ranks. US defenses are significantly diminished by this war**.

US Military Overstretched Now

AP 6 (USA today, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-24-army-study_x.htm>, 1 /24/2006) CGW

Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a "thin green line" that could snap unless relief comes soon, according to a study for the Pentagon Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who wrote the report under a Pentagon contract, concluded that the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency. He also suggested that the Pentagon's decision, announced in December, to begin reducing the force in Iraq this year was driven in part by a realization that the Army was overextended. As evidence, Krepinevich points to the Army's 2005 recruiting slump — missing its recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 — and its decision to offer much bigger enlistment bonuses and other incentives. "You really begin to wonder just how much stress and strain there is on the Army, how much longer it can continue," he said in an interview. He added that the Army is still a highly effective fighting force and is implementing a plan that will expand the number of combat brigades available for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The 136-page report represents a more sobering picture of the Army's condition than military officials offer in public. While not released publicly, a copy of the report was provided in response to an Associated Press inquiry. Illustrating his level of concern about strain on the Army, Krepinevich titled one of his report's chapters, "The Thin Green Line." He wrote that the Army is "in a race against time" to adjust to the demands of war "or risk 'breaking' the force in the form of a catastrophic decline" in recruitment and re-enlistment. Col. Lewis Boone, spokesman for Army Forces Command, which is responsible for providing troops to war commanders, said it would be "a very extreme characterization" to call the Army broken. He said his organization has been able to fulfill every request for troops that it has received from field commanders. The Krepinevich assessment is the latest in the debate over whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have worn out the Army, how the strains can be eased and whether the U.S. military is too burdened to defeat other threats. Rep. John Murtha, the Pennsylvania Democrat and Vietnam veteran, created a political storm last fall when he called for an early exit from Iraq, arguing that the Army was "broken, worn out" and fueling the insurgency by its mere presence. Administration officials have hotly contested that view. George Joulwan, a retired four-star Army general and former NATO commander, agrees the Army is stretched thin. "Whether they're broken or not, I think I would say if we don't change the way we're doing business, they're in danger of being fractured and broken, and I would agree with that," Joulwan told CNN last month. Krepinevich did not conclude that U.S. forces should quit Iraq now, but said it may be possible to reduce troop levels below 100,000 by the end of the year. There now are about 136,000, Pentagon officials said Tuesday. For an Army of about 500,000 soldiers — not counting the thousands of National Guard and Reserve soldiers now on active duty — the commitment of 100,000 or so to Iraq might not seem an excessive burden. But because the war has lasted longer than expected, the Army has had to regularly rotate fresh units in while maintaining its normal training efforts and reorganizing the force from top to bottom. Krepinevich's analysis, while consistent with the conclusions of some outside the Bush administration, is in stark contrast with the public statements of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and senior Army officials. Army Secretary Francis Harvey, for example, opened a Pentagon news conference last week by denying the Army was in trouble. "Today's Army is the most capable, best-trained, best-equipped and most experienced force our nation has fielded in well over a decade," he said, adding that recruiting has picked up. Rumsfeld has argued that the experience of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the Army stronger, not weaker. "The Army is probably as strong and capable as it ever has been in the history of this country," he said in an appearance at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington on Dec. 5. "They are more experienced, more capable, better equipped than ever before." Krepinevich said in the interview that he understands why Pentagon officials do not state publicly that they are being forced to reduce troop levels in Iraq because of stress on the Army. "That gives too much encouragement to the enemy," he said, even if a number of signs, such as a recruiting slump, point in that direction. Krepinevich is executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a non-profit policy research institute. He said he concluded that even Army leaders are not sure how much longer they can keep up the unusually high pace of combat tours in Iraq before they trigger an institutional crisis. Some major Army divisions are serving their second yearlong tours in Iraq, and some smaller units have served three times. Michael O'Hanlon, a military expert at the private Brookings Institution, said in a recent interview that "it's a judgment call" whether the risk of breaking the Army is great enough to warrant expanding its size. "I say yes. But it's a judgment call, because so far the Army isn't broken," O'Hanlon said.

US Readiness Low now

**The US military is bent to the breaking point**

Borger 6 (Julian, diplomatic editor @ The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/26/usa.iraq>, 26 January 2006) CGW

The US army is being stretched, by its deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, into a "thin green line" in danger of breaking before the insurgents are defeated, claims a report commissioned by the Pentagon. Andrew Krepinevich, a former army officer who wrote the report, said that the army could not sustain the current pace of deployments - which was likely in the end to discourage recruitment. "This is the central, and as yet unanswerable, question the army must confront. Vigorous efforts should be make to enable a substantial drawdown in US force levels. The army ... cannot sustain the force levels desired to sustain the momentum needed to break the back of the insurgent movement," the report says. Mr Krepinevich, who runs a Washington thinktank, the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, also suggested the administration lacked a clear strategy. In his report presented as "an interim assessment" of the Iraq, he writes: "Without a clear strategy in Iraq it is difficult to draft clear metrics for gauging progress. This may be why some senior political and military leaders have made overly optimistic or even contradictory declarations regarding the war's progress." The secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, said he had not read the report, but said from what he heard of it, "It's just not consistent with the facts." Mr Rumsfeld said that there were 1.4 million Americans currently in active service, of which only 138,000 were in Iraq. He said the army was in the process being streamlined, to create a more agile and combat-ready force. However, a group of senior Democrats issued their own report yesterday accusing the Bush administration of putting "our ground troops under enormous strain that, if not soon relieved, will have "highly corrosive and potentially long-term effects on the force". The report, presented by Senator Jack Reed, the former secretary of state, Madeleine Albright and Bill Clinton's first defence secretary, William Perry, called for an increase in deployable army forces of at least 30,000 troops. It argued there was a danger that America's enemies could exploit its vulnerable state. "Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialised assets to deter or respond to aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces could weaken our ability to deter aggression." Mr Rumsfeld rejected that claim, saying: "The force is not broken ... It is not only capable of functioning in a very effective way. In addition it is battle hardened. It is not a peacetime force that has been in barracks or garrisons." At another point this report says the US has "only limited ground force capability ready to respond to other contingencies. The absence of a credible strategic reserve in our ground forces increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to challenge the United States." More than 70% of the troops due to be deployed in Iraq next year will be returning for their third time. Mr Krepinevich argues that such continual deployments will start to take their toll on army readiness. In a chapter in his report entitled "Thin Green Line", he writes: "If it rotates its troops too frequently into combat, the army risks having many of its soldiers decide that a military career is too arduous or too risky an occupation for them and their families to pursue." He begins the chapter with a quote from an unnamed army officer returning from Iraq who says: "Nobody in America is asked to sacrifice, except us." The Bush administration has predicted that US troop levels in Iraq will fall this year as Iraqi Security Forces (the ISF) takes their place. But Mr Krepinevich argues in his document: "Merely substituting ISF units for US forces does not address how momentum in counter insurgency operations can be maintained. Accomplishing this will require a significant shift in US strategy and organisation."

US military readiness down

O'Hanlon 99 (Michael, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy -The Brookings Institution, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1999/01defense_ohanlon.aspx>, January 99) CGW

Today's U.S. military is about one-third smaller and one-third less expensive than it was at the end of the Cold War. Even so, on a unit-by-unit basis it is as good as the U.S. armed forces of Ronald Reagan's presidency. It is far from hollow; its readiness to carry out a wide range of operations from warfighting to peacekeeping to deterrence remains quite good on the whole. But there are important gaps and holes in readiness--as well as generally downward trends that if left unchecked could seriously degrade the caliber of the U.S. armed forces within a fairly short time, particularly if the military's global workload continues unabated. Most can be resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, through carefully targeted funding increases totaling perhaps $10 billion a year for the next several years. Although that amount of money is significant by any normal measure, it would do no more than allow the Pentagon's budget to keep up with inflation, and it pales next to the $100 billion cut in annual defense spending that has been achieved since 1990. Without annual increases of $10 billion, the U.S. armed forces will not fall apart, but they will continue to decline--and the decline may not remain gradual forever.

US Readiness Low now

**Recent reports found that the military won’t be able to respond to threats.**

Baldor 9 (Lolita; staff writer, *The Boston Globe*, February 20, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/02/20/report\_casts\_doubt\_on\_militarys\_readiness/) CH

WASHINGTON - For the third consecutive year, a classified Pentagon assessment has concluded there is a significant risk that the US military could not respond quickly and fully to any new crisis, the Associated Press has learned. The latest risk assessment, drawn up by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comes despite recent security gains in Iraq and plans for troop cuts there. The assessment finds that the United States continues to face persistent terrorist threats, and the military is still stretched and strained from long and repeated tours to the warfront. Senior military officials spoke about the report on condition of anonymity because it is a classified document. Prepared every year, and routinely delivered to Congress with the budget, the risk assessment paints a broad picture of the security threats and hot spots around the world and the military's ability to deal with them. Mullen has delivered it to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Because the threat is rated as significant, Gates will send an accompanying report to Congress outlining what the military is doing to address the risks. That report has not been finished. This year's assessment finds many of the same global security issues as previous years - ranging from terrorist organizations and unstable governments to the potential for high-tech cyber attacks. It also reflects the Pentagon's ongoing struggle to maintain a military that can respond to threats from other countries, while honing newer counterinsurgency techniques to battle more unconventional dangers, such as suicide bombers and lethal roadside bombs. Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute, a military policy research group in Arlington, Va., said the assessment would take into account the strains on the force, the wear and tear on aircraft and other military equipment, and a host of global flashpoints.

**Military readiness is low.**

Murtha and Obey 6 (John & David; US Representatives, *Global Security*, September 13, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006\_rpt/060913-murtha-obey\_army-readiness.htm) CH

The U.S. Army’s preparedness for war has eroded to levels not witnessed by our country in decades. As deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan continue unabated, there is a very real prospect that Army readiness will continue to erode, undermining its ability to meet the theater commanders’ needs and foreclosing any option for the U.S. to respond to conflicts elsewhere around the globe. The degradation of Army readiness is primarily a function of unanticipated high troop deployment levels to Iraq, chronic equipment and personnel shortages, funding constraints, and Pentagon civilian mismanagement. These factors have resulted in: The likelihood that many Army combat and support units scheduled to deploy to Iraq in 2007 will have less than the required one year period for rest and re-training. This is one of the key indicators that lead many Army officials to conclude that current deployment rates cannot be sustained without breaking the force. The lowest readiness levels for the vast majority of non-deployed active-duty combat units. The situation for the Army Guard and Reserves is worse. Thousands of key Army weapons platforms – such as tanks, Humvees, Bradley Fighting Vehicles – sitting in disuse at Army maintenance depots for lack of funding. Indications of growing drug and discipline problems among the newest Army recruits. Many Army units here at home have been forced to spend much of their time and energy on managing equipment and personnel shortfalls, instead of training or spending time with their families. Commanders at all levels reporting that Army families are becoming increasingly anxious, even angry, about current and future deployments.

High interest rates have had a major impact on military readiness in the United States.

Consumer Affairs 5 (*Consumer Affairs*, August 15, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/fl\_payday\_loans.html) CH

Military organizations and Florida Attorney General Charlie Crist have organized a program of low-cost loans to servicemen and women, as an alternative to the ruinously expensive payday loans increasingly used by hard-pressed military families. The problem has become so widespread that the U.S. Department of Defense has determined that the astronomical rates have an impact on military readiness. The debt resulting from these loans places a service member at risk of losing their security clearance, or worst case, being discharged from the military. In an effort to address the problem, the Navy/Marine Corps Relief Society and counterparts serving the other branches are providing zero percent interest loans to assist servicemen and women trying to get out of debt and to those with emergency financial needs.

Overstretch Undermines Hegemony

Overstretched military and the economy contribute to the decreasing U.S. hegemony.

**Scaliger 10** (Charles, New American writer, Illusions and Empire, June 25,<http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/3838-illusions-and-empire>) eh

Where will it all end? If the verdict of history is any guide, **America**, like Britain, **may well continue to squander** her **strength** and blood **waging “savage wars of peace” across the globe until** her **resources are exhausted. Over the past two decades, America has garrisoned most of the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Central Asia**; we have yet to withdraw voluntarily from any of those places. As with Britain, our empire has become bound up with our sense of prestige; too many of us are invested in the status quo, such that withdrawal — from Iraq and Afghanistan, especially — is seen by too many as a betrayal rather than a corrective. In a word, it is not at all certain that America will ever relinquish empire until she is compelled to do so, by the brutal laws of economics, human behavior, and history — “the gods of the copybook headings,” Rudyard Kipling called them — which brook no defiance in the long run.  On the other hand, what might it take to steer America away from the destructive, debilitating, potentially suicidal path of empire? A return to constitutional government would be a tremendous start. **Merely reasserting the congressional prerogative to declare war would greatly curtail American wars of pure aggression, like the invasion and occupation of Iraq.** Illegal wars and consequent occupations, like those of Yugoslavia and the Korean Peninsula, would be nullified and occupying forces brought home. The Koreans, the Japanese,  the Europeans, Turkey, the republics of Central Asia — all these would become responsible for their own defense.  Of course, **any proposal to withdraw from our many so-called “obligations” overseas will provoke howls of protest** from the commentariat, as we have seen with the 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign. Yet ultimately we will have no choice in the matter. **American military hegemony will only last for a brief moment**, indeed, **[and] is already threatened by imperial overstretch combined with economic malaise. We will not be the world’s only superpower forever.**Unfortunately, we have never been a particularly peaceful people. We are quick to rise to anger against enemies real and perceived, and put our trust in military force to have our way with the nations of the world. This makes us vulnerable to those who would use war as an excuse to enlarge the powers of government at home and abroad.

US military is on the breaking point

BBC NEWS 6 ('Enormous strain', <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4649066.stm>, 26 January 2006) CGW

The first study, commissioned by Democratic members of Congress, listed former Defence Secretary William Perry and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright among its authors. It said the US military had performed admirably in recent operations but was under "enormous strain". The studies warn of future problems in recruitment and retention "This strain, if not soon relieved, will have highly corrosive and potentially long-term effects on the force," it stated. The report predicted problems recruiting new troops and retaining current ones in the face of repeated overseas tours and shortfalls in vital equipment. It accused the Bush administration of having failed adequately to assess the size of force and equipment needed in post-invasion Iraq, creating "a real risk of 'breaking the force'." The report also warned that the lack of a credible strategic reserve "increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to challenge the United States".

US military readiness key to US Leadership

**US Military Readiness Key to US leadership/ME stability**

Rice ’00 (Condoleezza, Former Secretary of State, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest”, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79(1) JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000) ACW

Now the next president will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that aªect the living conditions of the troops—military pay, housing—and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today’s missions. But even in its current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next president should refocus the Pentagon’s priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces. The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia- Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe—areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America’s military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations. Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America’s most important strategic alliance: nato. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloˇsevi´c’s rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area’s fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and even Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their diªerences from exploding. Miloˇsevi´c has been the exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

**Military readiness impacts the United States in both the short and long term.**

Murtha and Obey 6 (John & David; US Representatives, *Global Security*, September 13, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006\_rpt/060913-murtha-obey\_army-readiness.htm) CH

As we have come to expect, the U.S. Army is imbued with a “whatever-it-takes” spirit of commitment and hard work; it has been given a mission and it will complete that mission. Yet, it is becoming increasingly apparent that that level of commitment has not been met by the civilian officials charged with overseeing and assuring the well-being of our military. The mere fact that roughly one-half of the entire U.S. Army is reported to be at the lowest level of military readiness speaks volumes in this regard. Perhaps most troubling to many of the Army’s senior uniformed leaders is the lack of national attention to the Army’s plight. To suggest that the Global War on Terror will last for years, yet fail to even acknowledge – let alone take steps to address – the Army’s readiness, equipment, and personnel shortfalls, is viewed as short-sighted at best. At worst, the future security and deterrent power of the United States is dangerously at risk.

US’s overstretched military hurts its overall power

Korb 7 (Lawrence, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, <http://www.americanprogress.org/experts/KorbLawrence.html>, October 12, 2007)CGW

These are difficult days for America's army. It is badly overstretched and is having great difficulty recruiting and retaining the right kind of people. The army has about 160,000 troops, or more than half of its combat brigades, deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan - 135,000, or 17 brigades, in Iraq alone. It cannot keep this number of troops in these two combat zones beyond March 2008 unless it violates its social contract with its soldiers even more egregiously. According to this contract, soldiers should be deployed for no more than one year and should spend two years at home for every year in a combat zone. To maintain the surge in Iraq, soldiers are already spending 15 months there and only a year at home before being sent back

Withdrawal Good – Hegemony

**The Iraq war hurts the US strategically; the only way to preserve US preeminence is through withdrawal**

Odom 7 (William, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Proceedings of The American Philosophical Society 151(4) pg. 409) ELJ

Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic. All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind. The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well.

Iraq Troops aid Afghanistan War

Troops withdrawn from Iraq are moved to Afghanistan.

Baker et al. (Peter, News Analysts for New York Times, New York Times, 4/27) dc

. “We did anticipate an extended period of government formation,” and recent Iraqi-led missions that have killed leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq show “their growing capacity to provide for security, which of course is critical to ending our combat mission at the end of August.” While Mr. Obama has not convened a full-scale meeting on Iraq lately, Mr. Rhodes noted that Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who manages Iraq policy, does hold such meetings regularly and keeps Mr. Obama informed. “It’s something that he’s obviously regularly engaged in,” Mr. Rhodes said of the president. For Mr. Obama, shifting the deadline would prove complicated for both logistical and political reasons. As he pulls troops out of Iraq, he has been sending more to Afghanistan, putting pressure on the armed forces. And with his liberal base angry at the Afghan troop buildup, any delay of the Iraq drawdown could provoke more consternation on the left. But the resistance to revisiting the deadline has drawn concern from former American officials, including some who participated in formulating the Obama policy last year. The original plan anticipated Iraqi elections in December and the formation of a new government at least 60 days afterward.

\*\*\*Soft Power

ME credibility Low now

**Middle East isn’t confident in the United States.**

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

Uncertainty about U.S. intentions and capabilities in the region has increased local states’ receptivity to assistance from China and Russia. Post-invasion disarray in the Arab world was accompanied by a corresponding erosion of confidence in the United States as a security guarantor, stemming from the perception of U.S. entanglement in Iraq, which some viewed as limiting both U.S. capabilities and willingness to intervene elsewhere. The net effect has been the increased willingness of traditional U.S. Arab allies to consider patronage from other extraregional powers—most notably Russia and China. (See pp. 50–55.) The foreign policy of these two powers since 2003 has been marked by a new assertiveness and interest in the Middle East. Russia appears to be particularly active in challenging traditional domains of U.S. influence, claiming to be a more-balanced mediator on the Arab- Israeli front and through such symbolic gestures as its engagement with HAMAS. Yet the full potential of Russian influence is constrained by Moscow’s historical “baggage” in the region and its frequent strategic blunders, such as its decision to brand the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. (See pp. 62–73.) For its part, China appears more narrowly focused on energy security, and it remains much more economically significant than politically or militarily influential in regional affairs. (See pp. 55–62.) Our fieldwork suggests that while some Arab voices may welcome Moscow and Beijing’s activism as a check against unrestrained U.S. hegemony, Arab regimes ultimately see Russian and Chinese assistance as a way to supplement, but not supplant, the traditional U.S.-led regional security order.

**Middle East perceptions of the United States have decreased because of Iraqi occupation.**

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

The decline in U.S. standing in the Middle East following the Iraq War created opportunities for other extraregional actors to expand their influence in regional affairs, notably China and Russia. Although the source of this decline cannot be reduced to a single event, the Iraq conflict contributed to doubts that the United States is no longer the guarantor of regional security it once was, to say nothing of its effect on perceptions of U.S. moral authority. This effect can be observed in Arab public opinion, in which U.S. favorability ratings sharply declined in the years following 2003. Although views of the United States have somewhat improved after the election of President Obama, polls in key countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, show continued negative views of the United States and its policies in the region.

Human rights violations killing US soft power

**Shamoo 10**(Adil, Senior Analyst at Foreign Policy in Focus, Foreign Policy in Focus, 6/16) dc

**The United States needs to face the moral paradox that stems from the lack of regard for Afghan and Iraqi lives in comparison with the value placed on the lives and safety of those living in the United States**.  As U.S. citizens, we value the lives of our fellow countrymen many fold over the lives of other citizens. How else could we allow our government to continue this policy of killing and wounding our opponents in such disproportion to the number of casualties of U.S. troops and contractors for nearly nine years after 9/11.  I know that there this view will be protested. However, we need to remember that the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the equal worth of all human beings across the globe **The U.S. military has achieved a killing machine that is less encumbered by popular views of war than at other times in our history**. **The military has mechanized and contracted out the war machinery in order to minimize the impact on U.S. citizens. The mechanization of the war can be potentially beneficial to individuals, but also very dangerous to our democracy**.  **This mechanization of war has also resulted in treating other nations’ citizens as less than equal to citizens of the United States. U.S. military actions kill innocent civilians in a repeated and almost routine manner. However, modern communications are informing people around the world that U.S. policies value other citizens less than its own. The human instinct of herd mentality can’t serve as justification for the indiscriminate killing of civilians outside U.S. borders**

Delays in Withdrawal undermine Credibility

**Any delay will undermine credibility.**

**Jarar 10** (Raed; Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action, *RT,*May 24, 2010,<http://rt.com/Top_News/2010-05-14/iraq-us-withdrawal-delayed.html>) CH

**“The US withdrawal is not linked to the conditions on the ground**. There are some forces which are trying to challenge the deadline of the US withdrawal by increasing violence in Iraq and sabotaging the political process. But so far **the Obama administration and the Iraqi leadership have been against linking the withdrawal to conditions on the ground**,” Jarrar claimed.  “But **if the Obama administration actually delays the withdrawal – that would be rewarding these acts of terror and it will embolden them further. I think the best way to pull the rug from under their feet is to go ahead with the withdrawal plan,”** he said.

**“It is a political suicide in Iraq to say ‘keep the occupation for an additional day’ and I think it is a political suicide in the US as well. President Obama runs on the platform of ending occupation,** and I hope he will stick to his promises.”

ME occupation is Imperialist

The rationale for US military occupation of the middle east is inherently racist, colonialist, and imperialistic.

**Grayson**, Alan. May 19, 20**09** ((Democratic Congressman of Florida’s 8th District) Interview With Christopher Bateman, Vanity Fair <http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/05/an-interview-with-antiwar-freshman-democratic-congressman-alan-grayson.html>) 4/25/10 AW

Well, I think this is yet another example of what we’ve seen over and over again through the years, which is mission creep. **The original rationale for us militarily occupying Afghanistan was to remove the Taliban government, and that was accomplished. Then later justifications were to fight al-Qaeda, or to eliminate the heroin trade, or to create a bulwark against Russian expansion, or to fight Islamofascism, or now some vague, tenuous connection to the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons**, which has been true now for more than a decade. **How any of those reasons justifies a military occupation of a neighboring country is really, honestly, beyond me. What I really see is that there are people who are desperate to continue the militarization of our economy no matter what the expense to ordinary people, and they’re willing to reach for any sort of rationale to try to rationalize that**. If you’ve decided that the conclusion you want to reach is that we should invade another country, history shows there are all sorts of ways to try to rationalize that. **Rudyard Kipling rationalized it for the British Empire more than 100 years ago by talking about the White Man’s Burden, to bring what he viewed as civilized society to other parts of the world. At that point, that was considered to be a good rationale; today most people would recognize that as racism, and colonialism and imperialism. So I think that we should stop trying to struggle to find some kind of reason to invade other countries. I think we should struggle instead toward peace.**

**Troop presence spreads the idea of American imperialism, rejecting Americas ideals.**

**Zakaria 9** (Fareed *Newsweek* 153(24) 6/15) SM

"AMERICA IS NOT THE CRUDE STEREOTYPE of a self-interested empire," said President Obama in his Cairo speech. **There are many in the Muslim world** who would disagree, **convinced that America has imperial ambitions**. They should track the media coverage of the Iraq War. **America conquered and occupied an ancient land of crucial strategic import. For years, Washington has had the power to shape the destiny of 25 million Muslims**. And yet the **average American's question** about the endeavor **from the start has been: when can we leave (and still claim some degree of success)?** From 2003 to 2007, it seemed that the answer to that question was "Not for a long time," which deeply frustrated most Americans. Then came the surge. And **as levels of violence declined, so did interest in the war. Once it became clear that Iraq was reasonably--just reasonably--stable and that U.S. casualties were low, Americans promptly lost interest in the war** and the country. You would have to search long and far to find much coverage of Iraq now outside of a few elite publications. At the peak of Britain's empire, its popular culture was filled with songs and verse extolling the glories of its imperial destiny. Across the world, thousands of young Britons delighted in governing India, Malaya, Kenya and other exotic lands. Americans, by contrast, particularly **most American soldiers, cannot wait to leave the deserts of the Middle Eas**t and the mountains of Central Asia and get back to their suburban homes. As the economic crisis at home has deepened, the problems of Fallujah, Kirkuk and Mosul seem very distant.

Military Presence Hurts ME credibility

Presence in Iraq saps American influence in the middle east

(Wittes 7) Tamara Cofman, Director, Middle East Democracy and Development Project March 22, The Brookings Institute <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0322middleeast_wittes.aspx>) ELJ

Nowhere have the limits of American hegemony been more clearly on display, and with more serious results, than in the Middle East over the past four years. Iraq is the area where the real limits of American hegemony are most evident. Since the US and its allies invaded Iraq and overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein, America's position in the region has shifted from advantageous to disadvantaged, from nearly unstoppable to deeply restrained. The decline in America's ability to influence events in the Middle East has not come about because America's military capabilities or economic capacity have declined. Rather, American influence in the region has been sapped by the failure of efforts at political reconstruction in Iraq, by war-weariness at home, by relative neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and by the effect of US regional policies on the influence of Iran. The result of these developments is the emergence of a new fault line in the region.

The Middle East believes the reason for recent violent surges in Iraq is because of continued American presence.

Press TV 10 (National Iranian television network, *Press TV*, May 31, 2010, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=128480&sectionid=351020201) CH

An opinion poll suggests that the recent surge in Shia killings in Iraq stems from US efforts to prolong its presence in the oil-rich country. Fifty percent of respondents to an online Press TV poll say they blame the US, pro-Saudi Salafis, and Baath agents in Iraq for the death of 375 Shia Muslims who were killed in recent months. About 11 percent of the respondents believed that anti-US terrorist groups were responsible for the deaths and 30 percent held US agents, seeking to pressure the Iraqi government to extend their stay in the country, responsible for the violence. Nearly 11 percent of those surveyed blamed pro-Saudi Salafis, and Baath agents for the Shia killings. In 2003, Britain and the US led a campaign to win support for the invasion of the oil-rich country under the pretext that the regime of former dictator Saddam Hussein had produced weapons of mass destruction -- a claim that has been refuted by the US Army, which has continued its presence in Iraq since the attack.

Iranian officials blame US for Iraq’s problems

CBS News 8 (*CBS News*, June 9, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/06/09/iraq/main4162909.shtml) CH

Khamenei said Iraqis have to "think of a solution to free" themselves from the U.S. military. Though he did not explicitly mention the security agreement, he said Iraqis - not Americans - must decide the fate of their country. "That a foreign element gradually interferes in all Iraqi affairs and expands its domination on all aspects of life is the main obstacle in the way of progress and prosperity of the Iraqi nation," the TV quoted Khamenei as saying. Khamenei, who has the final say in Iran over government decisions, said the U.S. will fail to achieve its goals in Iraq. "We are certain that the Iraqi people, through unity and effort, will get past these difficult conditions. For sure, America's dream for Iraq will not come true," Khamenei was quoted as telling al-Maliki.

Military Presence Hurts ME credibility

Perceptions of the United States have been altered throughout the war in Iraq because of mistrust.

Telhami 7 (Shibley; non-residential senior fellow at Brookings Institute, *Brookings*, Spring 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/spring\_islamicworld\_telhami.aspx) CH

It is no secret that the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims outside Iraq strongly opposed the US-led invasion of that country. Most Arab governments shared the view of their public that the war was ill advised, but many felt they could not say 'no' to Washington. There was profound mistrust of American motives and fear that the regional consequences would be devastating. The ultimate judgement on the war would be less over the issue of weapons of mass destruction and more over the consequences of the war for Iraq and the region. Perhaps, some hoped, America could surprise them. US policymakers knew, too, that the American public would judge the George W. Bush administration's decision to go to war on the war's outcome. Had things gone well, much would have been forgiven. But aside from the removal of Saddam Hussein's ruthless regime, it is hard to claim success, even by the most modest of changing measures. The war has significantly altered the distribution of power and the calculations of governments in the region, and has widened the gap between governments and publics. In Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, central authority has been significantly weakened since the war and non-state militant actors have correspondingly been strengthened. Washington had hoped that a stable, pro-American Iraq, aided by the presence of significant American forces on its soil, would enhance America's projection of power in the region. While America retains much power in the Middle East, certainly more than any other state, there is a regional perception that the United States has been weakened. This is evident in public-opinion polls showing that Arabs believe America is now weaker than it was before the Iraq War. The sense that American forces are over-stretched in Iraq has diminished America's ability to project power elsewhere.

Staying in Iraq decimates US Credibility – US soft power will suffer.

Jarrar 10 (Raed, Political Analyst for Peace Action, The Progressive, 5/12)dc

At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, Obama said: “We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer.” His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be “flexible” and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one.

Military Presence Hurts ME credibility

Human Rights Violations violating US soft power

Jarrar 10 (Raed, Political Consultant –American Friends Service Committee, Foreign Policy in Focus, 4/13)dc

. In the last seven years, one million Iraqis have been killed and millions more injured and displaced from their homes. The country's infrastructure was destroyed and Iraq's civil society has been severely damaged. A video posted this week by WikiLeaks is not an exception to how the US occupation operated in Iraq all along, but rather an example of it. While the video is shocking and disturbing to the US public, from an Iraqi perspective it just tells a story of an average day under the occupation. But even from the Pentagon's perspective, that attack was nothing exceptional. Reuters demanded an investigation into this particular attack because two of its employees were killed in it, and the Pentagon has already conducted an investigation that cleared all soldiers who took part of the attack of any wrongdoing. The video does not show an operation that went wrong, or where "rules of engagement" were not followed. It is simply how the US military has been doing business in Iraq for seven years now. What is equally disturbing is the mainstream media coverage of the event. For example, in a piece published the day of the attack, The New York Times reported that two Iraqi Journalists were killed "as US forces clash with Militias." The New York Times' piece confirmed "American forces battled insurgents in the area" and covered the following statement from the US military: The American military said in a statement late Thursday that 11 people had been killed: nine insurgents and two civilians. According to the statement, American troops were conducting a raid when they were hit by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. The American troops called in reinforcements and attack helicopters. In the ensuing fight, the statement said, the two Reuters employees and nine insurgents were killed. ''There is no question that coalition forces were clearly engaged in combat operations against a hostile force,'' said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, a spokesman for the multinational forces in Baghdad. Now, after the video was leaked, we know that none of this is true. Iraqis killed in the attack were not "insurgents." US troops were not "hit by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades," the attack helicopters were not "called in" in response to hostilities and there was no "ensuing fight" that caused the massacre. In fact, after watching the video, there is no question that the US forces were clearly NOT engaged in combat operations against a hostile force. In addition to making the entire story up, the Pentagon has very conveniently omitted the part about the two children being injured. This story is similar to hundreds of other stories printed by The New York Times and other mainstream media during the last seven years. Imagine how many tens of thousands of Iraqis who were labeled as "insurgents" and "militias" were killed and injured the same way. Imagine how many Iraqi children were killed and injured without a mention by the Pentagon or mainstream media. A number of international organizations, including Amnesty International, are now calling for an independent and impartial investigation into the July 12, 2007, helicopter attack shown in the leaked video. But I think this leaked video tells a bigger story than the attack itself. It tells a story of systemic, cold-blooded murder, and the shameful cover up by mainstream media and silence by international organizations. Remembering the last seven years and conducting investigations is important, but what is more important and urgent is to end this occupation. This month marks both the seventh year of occupation and the beginning of the combat forces withdrawal in accordance with President Obama's plan. The current plan for US withdrawal is based on two sets of time-based deadlines. Obama's own plan to withdraw combat forces between April and August 31, 2010, and the bilateral security agreement's deadline for the withdrawal of all troops and contractors and shutting down all US bases by December 31, 2011. While the Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan based on the mantra "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down," the withdrawal doctrine under Obama has been time-based, not linked to conditions on the ground. The main problem with a condition-based withdrawal plans is that it creates an equation where deteriorating conditions lead to an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, many groups would like to see the US occupation of Iraq continue. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe the occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that is taking an enormous toll on human lives, money and global reputation. And still others, such as Iran and other regional players, fear the re-emergence of a strong independent and united Iraq that would change the power balance in the Middle East. The conditions on the ground are rapidly deteriorating in Iraq. After last month's general election, there is a dramatic spike in violence and growing threats to the security and political stability of the country. This week alone, hundreds of Iraqis were killed and injured because of car bombs, assassinations, and other armed attacks. Meanwhile, the Iraqi political establishment is struggling to form the new government. The US war machine is already trying to use this deterioration as an excuse to delay or cancel the withdrawal plan, or at least link it to conditions on the ground. Going back to a condition-based plan will cost the US hundreds of billions more, will result in the deaths of countless more US soldiers and Iraqi civilians and, most importantly, will not bring Iraq closer to being a stable and prosperous country. The US occupation has never been a part of the solution and it will never be. Delaying or canceling the US withdrawal will only diminish what's left of US credibility and will add another layer of complications to the war-torn country.

Military Presence in Iraq hursts soft power.

Nye 4 (Joseph, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, 119(2), p. 255) eh

**Anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years.** Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 "as high a zenith of anti Americanism as we've seen for a long time." Polls **show that our soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy. "A widespread and fashion able view is that the United States is a classically imperialist power.** ... That mood has been expressed in different ways by different people, from the hockey fans in Montreal who boo the American national anthem to the high school students in Switzerland who do not want to go to the United States as exchange students." An Australian observer concluded that "**the lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort."** A Gallup International poll showed that pluralities in fifteen out of twenty-four countries around the world said that American foreign policies had a negative effect on their attitudes toward the United States.

Military Presence Hurts ME credibility

US military presence undermines our soft power

**Huff  No Date**(Rory D Huff Jr., B.A. in Political Science at PSU, UP,  PHIL 298H No date) <http://www.personal.psu.edu/cpl2/blogs/powerforce/Huff%20on%20Hard%20and%20Soft%20Power.pdf> JVT

**Third, instead of reinforcing its actions with soft power**, the United State’s solitary actions, particularly the war in Iraq, have been undermining its soft power**. The U.S. faces an increasingly evident lack of legitimacy on the global stage, a direct result of its failures to balance the use of its extensive hard power resources with its soft power reserves. Not only is this lack of legitimacy damaging to U.S. image in developing countries it might wish to influence, but it risks impacting future foreign policy initiatives.**

US security agenda hurt leadership in the Middle East

**Wehrey 10**(Frederic, Senior Policy Analyst of RAND institute, RAND INSTITUTE, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After the Iraq War*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf)dc>

Iranian motivations for its growing regional assertiveness, often grounded on perceptions of vulnerability, and ambivalent Arab responses to Iran’s rise raise questions about balance-of-power strategies and the extent to which the region operates in bloclike terms. **Alarm and dislike of Iran and its regional postures does not necessarily lead regional actors to embrace the United States or its regional security agenda. Even regional U.S. allies, such as Turkey, are not finding themselves aligned in all cases with U.S. regional interests and are facing new challenges in the aftermath of this conflict that may at times require accommodation with American adversaries**.

**Damage to America’s Standing in the World**

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007 <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

Even **the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point and inspiration for Muslim extremists**. Equally worrisome, it had also served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military and terrorist skills. An **Al Qaeda** letter intercepted by the U.S. military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon to its cause. A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year. Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of attitudes toward the United States. Even among long-standing friends and allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those problems will become.

**American withdrawal would not lessen America’s credibility.**

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, members of RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

However, improved security conditions in Iraq in 2008–2009 reduced such Israeli concerns about the negative effects of a drawdown, particularly with respect to U.S. credibility. Some analysts also question whether a U.S. drawdown will significantly damage American credibility because the U.S. presence in Iraq has already eroded it. As one analyst put it, “what has happened in the last six years has created the perception of U.S. failure; withdrawal itself is not the test of the pudding, as the pudding is already sour.

US Withdrawal Key to Credibility

**U.S. leaving Iraq is best for our Political standings**

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007 <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

The United States needs to adopt a withdrawal strategy measured in months, not years. Indeed, the president should begin the process of removing American troops immediately, and that process needs to be complete in no more than six months. A longer schedule would simply prolong the agony. It would also afford various Iraq factions (especially the Kurds and some of the Shia political players) the opportunity to try to entice or manipulate the United States into delaying the withdrawal of its forces still further. Emotionally, deciding to leave under current conditions will not be easy, for it requires an implicit admission that Washington has failed in its ambitious goal to create a stable, united, democratic, secular Iraq that would be a model for peace throughout the Middle East. But that goal was unrealistic from the outset. It is difficult for any nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit failure. However, it is better to admit failure when the adverse consequences are relatively modest. A defeat in Iraq would assuredly be a setback for the United States, particularly in terms of global clout and credibility. But one of the advantages to being a superpower is that the country can absorb a setback without experiencing catastrophic damage to its core interests or capabilities. Defeat in Iraq does not even come close to threatening those interests or capabilities. Most important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than withdrawing years from now when the cost in blood, treasure, and credibility will prove far greater. The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The only troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of Special Forces personnel who would work with political factions in Iraq inclined to eradicate the Al Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must be clear to Iraqis and populations throughout the Muslim world that Washington has no intention of trying to maintain a military presence in Iraq. Above all, U.S. policymakers need to absorb the larger lesson of the Iraq debacle. Launching an elective war in pursuit of a nation-building chimera was an act of folly. It is a folly they should vow never to repeat in any other country.

**Iraq Presence Damages America’s Standing in the World**

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007 <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

Even **the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point and inspiration for Muslim extremists**. Equally worrisome, it had also served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military and terrorist skills. An **Al Qaeda** letter intercepted by the U.S. military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon to its cause. A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year. Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of attitudes toward the United States. Even among long-standing friends and allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those problems will become.

US Withdrawal Key to Credibility

**US withdrawal boosts Iraqi stability and US credibility in the Middle East**

Jarrar 10 (Raed, Iraq-born political analyst based in Washington, D.C. and Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action, “Don’t reward violence in Iraq by extending U.S. troop withdrawal deadline”, The Progressive May 25, 2010) ACW

President Obama should not bow to the Beltway voices urging him to keep U.S. troops longer in Iraq. At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, Obama said: “We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer.” His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be “flexible” and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one.

**Israeli’s see US withdrawal from Iraq as a boost to US credibility and as an opening to focus on checking Iran**

**Perry et. Al 9** (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Moreover, many Israelis also feel that the utility of the U.S. presence in Iraq is declining. But in the view of some Israelis, Iran’s growing influence, including in Arab-Israeli affairs, is occurring regardless of whether the U.S. forces are present on the ground in Iraq or not. As a consequence, some Israeli analysts see a number of opportunities in the U.S. departure. Some Israelis believe that the improved security conditions in Iraq in 2008–2009 have provided both an opportunity for the United States to depart Iraq with enhanced credibility and an opening for the United States to focus on other regional issues of greater concern to Israel (especially Iran). Most Israelis expect increased U.S. engagement and dialogue with Iran in the Obama administration, and some see the U.S. drawdown in Iraq as useful for that dialogue, but most prefer a defined timetable for talks on the nuclear issue.48

**US withdrawal from Iraq begins recovery of lost US credibility**

Knight et. Al 8(Charles, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, “The necessary steps for a responsible withdrawal from Iraq, Report of the Task force for a responsible withdrawal from Iraq June 2008, ACW)

There was also a sense of humility: the credibility of the United States is badly compromised by the Bush administration’s blunders, and, in many ways, the ability of the United States to affect what happens in Iraq will diminish upon withdrawal. Yet withdrawal also opens up possibilities that do not exist at present, and will not exist as long as the United States is in Iraq.

US Withdrawal Key to Credibility

**Entanglement in Iraq has damaged United States credibility.**

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, members of RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

The Iraq War has also strongly affected popular and official views of U.S. credibility, reliability, and maneuverability. The perception that the United States has been entangled and distracted by Iraq has potentially given new leeway to a range of actors in the neighboring countries, both hostile and supportive of U.S. goals, to “review” their previous assumptions about U.S. power.8 Among traditional allies, this may be reflected in a drift toward “security diversification,” in which long-standing security partnerships with the United States are being supplemented by support from other extraregional powers, most notably Russia and China.

Military Presence in Iraq hursts soft power.

Nye 4 (Joseph, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, 119(2), p. 255) eh

**Anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years.** Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 "as high a zenith of anti Americanism as we've seen for a long time." Polls **show that our soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy. "A widespread and fashion able view is that the United States is a classically imperialist power.** ... That mood has been expressed in different ways by different people, from the hockey fans in Montreal who boo the American national anthem to the high school students in Switzerland who do not want to go to the United States as exchange students." An Australian observer concluded that "**the lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort."** A Gallup International poll showed that pluralities in fifteen out of twenty-four countries around the world said that American foreign policies had a negative effect on their attitudes toward the United States.

**Presence in Iraq undermines US credibility.**

Kuehn 6 (John T. *US Naval Proceedings* 132(12)) SM

**The second national interest is economic**. **Regional instability** in the Arabian Gulf naturally leads **to instability in markets**. This is because a consistent flow of oil leads to confidence in a stable oil supply that in turn leads to lower prices**. Less stability not only affects market confidence but also insurance rates for means of transshipment**. A prime example might be the heightened insurance premiums for oil tankers that were passed on to global consumers at the pump because of Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz in 1987. **Instability in the supply of energy to the global economic engine erodes confidence and leads to economic stagnation, recession, and worse**. This interest is not that of the United States alone. There is a coming together of national and global interests, especially with China as an energy debtor. **Enhanced regional stability favorably serves both the United States and international entities**. Finally, **the international standing of the United States is in jeopardy**. **That this nation has lost its credibility in the eyes of both global and some domestic audiences is not in doubt.** However, regaining a measure of credibility would be most unlikely under a policy that abandons Iraq to its own devices without options for support. In Vietnam abandonment equated to a concerted policy — post-Paris Peace Accords — of military, economic, and political neglect.

Diplomacy Good

**The current US efforts in Iraq will fail, the US should shift its focus to diplomatic solutions to promote regional stability**

Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, &Peter Juul 7(Senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of US Strategy in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007 ACW)

A recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq noted that “the term ‘civil war’ does not adequately describe these multiple, overlapping conflicts in Iraq or adequately capture their complexity as they also include extensive Shi’a, Al Qaeda, and Sunni insurgent attacks on U.S. forces, and widespread criminally-motivated violence.” The United States cannot settle Iraq’s many internal conflicts even with its considerable conventional military power, particularly since the use of this military power is employed in an overall approach to the Middle East and the threat of global terrorist networks that is partial and incomplete. Instead of passively waiting for Iraq’s national leaders to make a series of political decisions that they have shown themselves fundamentally incapable of making amid multiple internal conflicts, the United States should adopt a more active stance to advance its interests throughout the Middle East. In short, the United States needs to implement a strategic reset aimed at using U.S. power to protect our core national interests. The four simultaneous steps our country must now take are: Adopt policies to accept the reality of Iraq’s fragmentation. Implement a phased military redeployment from Iraq in one year. Initiate regional security and diplomatic efforts to contain and resolve Iraq’s conflicts while reshaping the geopolitical balance in the region. Develop a realistic strategy to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and stabilize the broader Middle East.

**US should shift its role in Iraq toward neighbor negotiations to achieve regional stability**

Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, &Peter Juul 7(Senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of US Strategy in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007 ACW)

The end goal of a more realistic U.S. strategy in the Middle East is a more secure region developed without turning our backs on democratic values. In the next year, the United States needs to focus its Middle East regional strategy by: Developing crisis management strategies to address more effectively the fallout from conflicts such as the intra-Palestinian battles in the spring of 2007. Using regional and international proposals to provide a diplomatic framework to move the Arab-Israeli conflict toward resolution. Engaging in diplomacy with U.S. rivals such as Iran and Syria similar to the way the United States negotiated with the Soviet Union and China in the Cold War. Offering smartly targeted rule-of-law assistance to reduce and eliminate security vacuums and help foster democratic values from the ground up. By taking these steps, the United States will be able muster its still considerable power to advance our long-term national security interests in the region.

**Diplomacy solutions in Iraq are popular**

FPC 7(Foreign Policy Center, *The case for Democratic solutions in Iran,* 2/8/07,<http://www.pugwash.org/publication/tran/timetotalk.pdf>**)** CS

The outcome of policy choices in Washingtonwill be a key determinant of the future of this dispute. Polls indicate that only 14% of Americans believe diplomatic measures can now stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons 89 but that 59% of Americans support negotiations even if Iran refuses to suspend enrichment.90 How long the Bush administration will pursue the path of diplomacy remains unclear. The Democrats' victory in the mid-term elections of December 2006, coupled with the immediate replacement of Donald Rumsfeld with Bob Gates as Secretary of Defense, has reduced the likelihood of US- led military action in the short-term. However, with increasing Israeli pressure and mounting speculation that an Israeli-led strike is viable, those within the US administration who are petitioning for continued diplomacy may find themselves on increasingly weaker footing. If no additional efforts are made to engage, there is a danger that uncompromising demands for the unilateral suspension of uranium enrichment will back the US and the EU into a corner. Diplomacy will fail because it has not been given a real chance to succeed. If public opinion crystallises around the belief that Iran has rejected a generous and acceptable proposal, commitment to further diplomacy will be even less likely. But any genuine attempt to find non-military solutions to this conflict must include an assessment of the situation from the Iranian perspective. A suspension of enrichment without concrete and well-defined incentives leaves the Iranians with nothing. Several high-profile figures within the US political establishment have called for direct US-Iranian unconditional negotiations. These include former national Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 91 former US Defense Secretary William Perry, 92 and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger 93 and Madeline Albright.

\*\*\*Leadership Impacts

Soft Power Impacts

U.S. needs to gain closer allies to prevent future threats

**Denmark 7/1** (Abraham M. Denmark, A fellow at the center for a new American Security and Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The Washington Quarterly,*7/1/2010, <http://www.twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_Denmark.pdf>) CS

**As missions and responsibilities for the U.S. military multiply, and as its  dominance within the global commons becomes increasingly contested, the  status quoin which the United States is the sole guarantor of the openness of the  global commons while other states free ride is unsustainable.** **While the United  States should continue to develop military capabilities to ensure that it can  counter anti-access threats, it must recognize that it cannot and should not  protect the commons alone.** The 2010 QDR primarily focuses on partner capacity-  building as a tool of U.S. military assistance to local security forces in conjunction  with two ongoing wars and counterterrorism operations. Partner capacity-  building, however, should be understood in a much broader context. **Working  with and through like-minded partners will be key to the ability of the. nited States to share the responsibility of  managing the global commons**. Yet, what  this will look like remains unclear.  U.S. assistance to the littoral states sur-  rounding the Strait of Malacca, with en-  hanced local control of a strategic choke  point without increasing U.S. or foreign  military commitments, could be an impor-  tant model for future efforts to engage pivotal  actors to secure the global commons. **As one  of the world’s most important shipping lanes, the rise of piracy in 2004  threatened to undermine a significant segment of global trade. Yet, piracy attacks  have fallen drastically since then from 38 in 2004 to only 2 in 2008 due to  increased coordination of sea and air patrols and intelligence-sharing among  Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore**.19 In the background of this newfound  cooperation were Australia, Japan, and the United States, quietly facilitating  increased coordination and providing technical assistance and training. Thus,  the United States and its allies were able to help like-minded partners to  maintain the openness of a commons without violating the regional state’s sense  of autonomy or taking on additional burdens for the U.S. military.  Cooperation between like-minded partners need not be limited to the  maritime commons. Engaging responsible emerging space powers, such as  India and South Korea, could contribute to increased cooperation on  everything from space exploration to orbital debris mitigation.**Similarly,  engaging like-minded states with robust technical capabilities, from Europe to  India to South Korea, could enhance international cooperation to maintain a  clean and open cyber commons.**

**American Soft Power High now**

**Nye 03** (Joseph, Dean of the JFK school of gov’t at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003) CM

**In short, the universality of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power. The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness that are often expressed in American popular culture, higher education, and foreign policy contribute to American power in many areas.** In the view of German journalist Josef Joffe, **America’s soft power “looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, lowbrow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome’s and Soviet Russia’s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America’s soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets.”32** Of course, soft power is more than just cultural power. **The values the U.S. government champions in its behavior at home**(for example, **democracy), in international institutions** (listening to others), **and in foreign policy** (promoting peace and human rights) **also affect the preferences of others.** America can attract (or repel) others by the influence of its example.

Soft Power Impacts

**Multipolarity leads to war – European History Proves**

**Nye 03** (Joseph, Dean of the JFK school of gov’t at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003) CM

America’s power—hard and soft—is only part of the story. How others react to American power is equally important to the question of stability and governance in this global information age. **Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a balance of power at the global level today**. Already in the 1970s, **Richard Nixon argued that “the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power**. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of war arises.”34 **But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad**for the United States and **for the world is debatable**. I am skeptical. **War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power.** **The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500.35 Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.**

**Unipolarity leads to peace and stability**

**Nye 03** (Joseph, Dean of the JFK school of gov’t at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003) CM

**A good case can be made that inequality of power can be a source of peace and stability.** No matter how power is measured, some theorists argue, an equal distribution of power among major states has been relatively rare in history, and**efforts to maintain a balance have often led to war**. On the other hand, **inequality of power has often led to peace and stability because there was little point in declaring war on a dominant state.**The political scientist Robert Gilpin has argued that “**Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security**.” And the economist Charles Kindleberger claimed that “**for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.**”40 **Global governance requires a large state to take the lead**. But how much and what kind of inequality of power is necessary—or tolerable—and for how long? **If the leading country possesses soft power and behaves in a manner that benefits others, effective countercoalitions may be slow to arise.** If, on the other hand, the leading country defines its interests narrowly and uses its weight arrogantly, it increases the incentives for others to coordinate to escape its hegemony.

Soft Power Impacts

**Hard power is insufficient - Soft power is key to hegemony, the war on terror, and solving warming and disease.**

**Nye 8** (Joseph S. Professor of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 3-7-2008, <http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351>) CM

Etzioni is correct that **a successful policy of security first will require the combi- nation of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success.** Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. **In the past,it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues.**These latter**problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics**to transnational **terrorism, pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others,**and that requires smart power—a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. **For example,American and British intelligence agen- cies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds**of mainstream Muslims,without whose sup- port success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. **There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want**. Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran.

**Soft Power provides the same benefits as hard power – Canada and the Netherlands prove**

**Nye 03** (Joseph, Dean of the JFK school of gov’t at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003) CM

**Of course, hard and soft power are related and** can **reinforce each other**. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. **Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction.**31 **A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness.** And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states—witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. **But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power.**The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some **countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril.**

**Soft Power solves the need for Hard Power**

**Nye 03** (Joseph, Dean of the JFK school of gov’t at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003) CM

**Britain** in the nineteenth century **and America** in the second half of the twentieth century **enhanced their power by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and American capitalis**m—free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. **If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks.**

Soft Power impacts

**Soft Power key to American leadership**

**Shuja 8** (Sharif Shuja Honorary Research Associate at Monash University, *Contemporary Review*, 2008, <http://media.web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/31/31658803.pdf>) CM

However, it would be in the interests of the United States to create internal mechanisms for a more consistent and stable foreign policy, one that is consistent with the long-term policy goals of the State Department. Inconsistent**unilateral actions, using hard power, by the United States both caused distrust by allies and increased suspicions by many nations who believe that the United States masks evil goals behind the rhetoric of idealism**. On May 3, 2007, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in Washington that **in this tumultuous period, America's leadership and purpose has become more critical than ever.** I cannot help but fully endorse the sentiments of Prime Minister Lee. **There is an urgent need for the US to evolve and develop an overall foreign policy which has coherent principles and acknowledges the merits of soft power**. In contrast to hard power that rests on coercion and is derived from military and economic might, **soft power rests**, not on coercion, but **on the ability of a nation to co-opt others to follow its will through the attractiveness of its culture, values, ideas and institutions. When a state can persuade and influence others to aspire to aspire to share such values, it can lead by example and foster cooperatio**n. Soft power includes propaganda, but is considerably broader. It is much more than 'image, public relations and ephemeral popularity'. **It contains very real power--an ability to gain objectives.**

**Only soft power can solve democracy and human rights.**

Nye 6 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. Prof. at Harvard University, former assistant secretary of defense and author of "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 11/11/06) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1615/after\_rumsfeld\_a\_good\_time\_to\_refocus\_on\_soft\_power.html JVT

But other goals, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power. Coercive democratization has its limits, as the Bush administration has found in Iraq. If Republicans and Democrats continue to ignore soft power, and the public debate about foreign policy remains limited to a competition over who can sound tougher, America's malaise will deepen. America does not need more of the partisanship that ossified our public discourse. It needs to recognize the importance of both hard and soft power, and to debate a smart strategy aimed at integrating them. Let us hope that now that the elections are over, this process can begin.

Soft power Key to Fight Terrorism

**Soft Power solves Terrorism**

**Shuja 8** (Sharif Shuja Honorary Research Associate at Monash University, *Contemporary Review*, 2008, <http://media.web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/31/31658803.pdf>) CM

**It is argued that both hard and soft power are important in US foreign policy and in the fight against terrorism. The suppression of terrorism, and the achievement of a variety of other objectives including efforts to promote democracy overseas, require the willing assistance of other nations and peoples. There are places where the US cannot go in search of terrorist leaders. It needs broad cooperation for intelligence gathering and the restriction of terrorist finances. The hard power of military and economic strength is, of course, essential, but the use of 'carrot and stick' alone cannot achieve these objectives. America's neglect of soft power is undermining its ability to persuade and influence others.**

**Soft Power is key to solving Climate Change and Terrorism**

**Khanna 8** (Parag, senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, *Council on Foreign Relations,* 4-18,2008, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html>) CM

**To the extent that our grand strategy will involve elements of promoting good governance and democracy, we will have to become far more irresistible as a political partner, offering incentives greater than those of other powers who do not attach any strings to their relationships.** Even if you are agnostic on this issue, we are all aware that **this is a perennial plank of American diplomacy and if we want to be even remotely effective at it, we have to up our ante in this arena of rising powers.** This I believe is part of what you would call “non-military spending on national security,” a course of action I strongly advocate for the Middle East and Central Asia.  An equally important component of grand strategy will have to be a realistic division of labor with these rising powers, something both of us clearly emphasize. **Whether the issue is climate change**, public health, poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction, **or counterterrorism, we do not have the capacity to solve these problems alone—nor can any other power**. I argue that we need serious issue-based summit diplomacy among concerned powers (and other actors such as corporations and NGOs) to get moving quickly on these questions rather than (or in parallel to) allowing things to drag through their course in cumbersome multilateral fora. This last point is crucial: **the missing ingredient to a globalized grand strategy is the U.S. foreign policy community cleverly leveraging the strengths, activities, and global footprint of the U.S**. private sector and NGO communities into what I call a diplomatic-industrial complex. **It is in changing our foreign policy process, as much as some of the goals, that our success lies.**

There is no true solution for terrorism through hard power

Lugar 9 (US senator, FDCH Congressional Testimony 10/07/09) http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=3d4bffb1-686c-4e5f-83c0-1c4dace3ad20%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=32Y4291111982#db=mth&AN=32Y4291111982 JVT

In addition, thousands of virtual adherents are connected to al- Qaeda through the internet. These autonomous affiliates exist across Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. Because of this diversification, eliminating al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan would not solve the global terrorism problem. But al-Qaeda`s leadership continues to be an operational and ideological threat that requires our strongest efforts. Successes in arresting or killing terrorists and disrupting terrorist plots are essential in keeping the threat at bay, but insufficient for solving the problem.

Soft power is key to end terrorism

Nye 4 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. Prof. at Harvard, former assistant secretary of defense and author of "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics The Christian Science Monitor 4/29/04) http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0429/p09s02-coop.html JVT

But what the administration has not yet sorted out is how to go about implementing the new approach to these threats. The US has done far better on identifying the ends than the means. The means the administration has chosen have focused too heavily on "hard power," such as military force and economic suasion, and has not taken enough account of "soft power," such as persuading others to want the outcomes it wants. And that is a mistake, because terrorists stand to gain recruits and popular support if the US underestimates the importance of soft power.

Soft power Key to Fight Terrorism

**EXT. Soft Power Good**

**Soft power more effective than hard power in ending terrorism – statistics prove**

Nacos 9 (professor in political science at Columbia University Israel and Hamas: It is Time for Soft Power 1/8/09) http://www.reflectivepundit.com/reflectivepundit/2009/01/israel-against-hamas-military-force-will-not-end-terrorism-by-brigitte-l-nacos-robert-gates-the-present-and-future-us.html JVT

A recent study of all terrorist groups that were active around the world from 1968 through 2006 found that only 7% ended because of military force, 40% because of policing, 10% because they realized their typically very limited objectives. Most importantly, 43% of all these organizations terminated their violence because of political solutions or settlements. The lesson for terrorist organizations is that the likelihood of achieving their ultimate objectives by continuing their violence is very slim, that there is a far better chance to negotiate a settlement and participate non-violently in the political process. The lesson for the targets of terrorism is equally telling: Not hard power (whether in form of military action or economic sanctions/blockades) but rather soft power (political solutions) is most likely to ultimately prevail against terrorist organizations

America must increase its soft power to stop terrorism and arms races.

Ichihara 6(Maiko Ichihara Ph student at GW 26(1) pg 197-200 Winter-Spring 2006 SAIS REVIEW) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1ichihara.pdf JVT

Nye argues that the importance of soft power has been increasing. Due to what he calls as “democratization of technology,” the instruments of mass destruction are becoming available not only for states but also for non-state actors. In addition, the information revolution has reduced the cost and facilitated the ease of global communication. Nye argues that these trends have significantly increased the impact of terrorism. When international security principally concerned states, each state exerted its influence by relying on its hard power resources. However, Nye argues, as the technology improves and as non-state actors gain greater influence, the importance of soft power has grown. This book cautions the United States against continuing to rely solely on hard power, as it may undermine national security goals. There are parallels with Nye’s thesis in defensive realism, which argues that a state’s excessive arms buildup could have adverse security consequences by threatening other states and therefore encouraging an arms race.3 The principal difference between Nye’s theory of soft power and defensive realism is Nye’s recognition of non-state actors. Their inclusion is critical in this era in which even non-state actors can claim significant military capabilities, including the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. By taking into account the increased importance of non-state actors, Nye’s argument improves upon defensive realism and better explains the current state of international relations.

ME Instability Leads to War

**Any spark could set the Middle East ablaze**

London 6/28(Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute and professor of Humanities at New York University, *Hudson New York,* 6/28/10, <http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east>) CS

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a *casus belli*. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public

accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.

Middle Eastern Collapse would lead to Iranian Nuclear War

London 6/28(Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute and professor of Humanities at New York University, *Hudson New York,* 6/28/10, <http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east>) CS

Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States' policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible.

Hard Power Impact

**Effective US hard power is key to global stability**

Robert **Kagan 2000** [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Columnist for the Washington Post, and Contributing Editor at the Weekly Standard and the New Republic, and William Kristol, Editor and Publisher of the Weekly Standard, Spring 2000 (“The Present Danger” – National Interest) p. ebscohost]

A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability will attempt to alter the status quo in their favor.  It might even deter them from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves for such a challenge.  An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges.  In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending potential foes is: “Don’t even think about it.”  That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace, and it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity.

\*\*\*\*\*Iraq Instability Adv\*\*\*\*\*

Iraq Unstable Now

Iraq is unstable

Press TV 10(Press TV will be an international  press agency, Press TV 5/10)<http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=126608&sectionid=351020201> JVT

**Former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi warns that a civil war could follow the new wave of violence that has hit the country in the aftermath of the general elections**.   **Allawi, whose** al-Iraqiya **coalition won most of the seats in the parliament, said**in an interview with The Guardian that "the pressure on the judiciary, not to take any action, is strong. All this and other issues do indicate that we have a long way to go and we are not getting there."   The former premier further criticized the international community for not doing enough. "I feel that **we are not done and that the international community has failed this country,**" he said.   Since the announcement of the results of the tightly-contested March 7 elections, efforts by political groups to form a coalition government have failed to bear fruit.   Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose Rule of Law coalition won 89 seats in the Parliament, was accused by the former Saudi intelligence chief of attempting to steal the elections.   "We are watching a deliberate effort on the part of the incumbent prime minister, Mr. al-Maliki, to hijack the results of the election," Turki al-Faisal was quoted by AFP as saying.   The remarks came after Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission said it has found no evidence of fraud after manually recounting the votes cast at Baghdad's polling stations. The recount was requested by the Rule of Law coalition.

Violence is increasing in Iraq.

Levinson 10 (Charles; staff writer, *The Wall Street Journal*, March 2, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704486504575097030576529578.html) CH

U.S. commanders say they are unsure about who is responsible for the persistent violence in Iraq, underscoring the challenge they face trying to keep a lid on it amid parliamentary elections this weekend. While security has improved significantly across Iraq in recent years, in the weeks leading up to the March 7 vote, U.S. commanders have reported an increase in low-level violence: kidnappings, assassinations, and mortar attacks against Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone, the seat of government power. And since August, a series of large-scale bombings aimed at government buildings have ripped through Baghdad, killing several hundred people and shaking confidence in Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's security services, following the withdrawal of most U.S. combat forces from major Iraqi cities last summer.

The United States is trying to relieve violence in Iraq.

Sly 10 (Liz; Middle East correspondent, *The Los Angeles Times*, June 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/16/world/la-fg-iraq-north-20100617) CH

The deployment is a sign of how seriously U.S. commanders view the threat of an Arab-Kurdish conflict. An initiative of Army Gen. Ray T. Odierno, the commander of American troops in Iraq, the deployment of U.S., Arab and Kurdish forces was originally billed as a means to protect lightly guarded towns and villages on both sides of the line that were hit last summer by Al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bombings. U.S. commanders worried that the bombings were an attempt to ignite sectarian strife in an already tense area. American officials say they hope cooperation between the Kurds and Arabs in the fight against Al Qaeda can grow into a longer-term working relationship that reduces the likelihood of conflict between them. This is the first time U.S. troops have had a regular presence in many of these areas. The locations have been mostly calm through the seven years that the Americans have been in Iraq, but increasingly unstable over the last year. It is also the first time Arab and Kurdish forces have worked together in these areas. The U.S. soldiers help run checkpoints and mount patrols, while also encouraging their Arab and Kurdish counterparts to do things such as play volleyball and dominoes as a way of learning to get along. **http://articles.latimes.com/images/pixel.gif**

Iraq has many violent rebel attacks.

August 10 (Oliver; author and journalist, *The Times*, June 7, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article7145181.ece) CH

Squabbling among political leaders has delayed the formation of a new government, creating a political vacuum that is being exploited by Sunni extremists. They hope to reignite sectarian violence by provoking revenge attacks. Violence has eased in Iraq since the height of the insurgency three years ago but risen again in recent months. Fears are growing that simmering sectarian tensions could once again explode. May was the most violent month so far this year. During a countrywide wave of attacks on May 10, more than 100 people were killed. On average, Mosul and Baghdad each have at least one death a day from political violence. Yesterday, six people died in two bombings in the capital. Mr Jassem and Mr Hamid were members of Iraqiya, the non-sectarian political block led by Mr Allawi that won the largest number of votes but not enough for a majority in parliament. Mr Hamid won a seat, Mr Jassem did not. Iraqiya is locked in a dispute with Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister, over who has the right to form the next government. Mr Maliki formed an alliance with several smaller parties after the election and claims to now have the largest block of MP.

US Military Presence causes Iraqi Instability

**[ ] American occupation is the driving source for insecurity in Iraq**

BBC 9 (November 7, BBC Worldwide monitoring Lexis) ELJ

The presence of American occupation forces in Iraq is one of the constant and principal reasons for insecurity in Iraq, because many people believe that the mere presence of those forces in Iraq provides the excuse and the justification for resorting to violence and explosions in that country. Therefore, so long as American forces remain in Iraq various groups and individuals with different motivations will continue to make that country insecure. Nationalistic feeling is one of the most important motivations for insecurity and for confronting the occupying forces and the groups that collaborate with them. Religious motivations, especially in their extreme forms, which have also allowed the infiltration of some foreign fighters to Iraq in the form of various groups such as al-Qa'ida, are also very powerful reasons for violence and insecurity and for justifying their confrontation against foreign forces.

If the United States remains in Iraq, they have no chance of becoming stable again.

CBS News 8 (*CBS News*, June 9, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/06/09/iraq/main4162909.shtml) CH

Iran's supreme leader told the visiting Iraqi prime minister Monday that the U.S. military presence is the main cause of Iraq's problems, according to Iranian state television, making clear his opposition to a U.S.-Iraqi security pact. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's talks with Iranian leaders during his three-day visit here have focused on the proposed security agreement that Iran fears will keep the American military in neighboring Iraq for years. Al-Maliki has tried to push Iranian leaders to back off their fierce opposition to the proposed pact, promising that Iraq will not be a launching pad for any attack on Iran. But the agreement has become a point of contention as Baghdad tries to balance its close ties to rivals Washington and Tehran. Iran, which has repeatedly said the way to end instability in Iraq is for U.S. forces to withdraw, believes the proposed pact could lead to permanent U.S bases on its doorstep amid fears of an eventual American attack. "Occupiers who interfere in Iraq's affairs through their military and security might ... are the main problems," Iran's state television quoted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as saying Monday.

US Presence destroys Iraqi stability.

Englehardt 8(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc.

No, the U.S. military does not stand between Iraq and fragmentation: The U.S. invasion and the Bush administration's initial occupation policies decisively smashed Iraq's fragile "national" sense of self. Since then, the Bush administration, a motor for chaos and fragmentation, has destroyed the national (if dictatorial) government, allowed the capital and much of the country (as well as its true patrimony of ancient historical objects and sites) to be looted, disbanded the Iraqi military, and deconstructed the national economy. Ever since, whatever the administration rhetoric, the U.S. has only presided over the further fragmentation of the country. Its military, in fact, employs a specific policy of urban fragmentation in which it regularly builds enormous concrete walls around neighborhoods, supposedly for "security" and "reconstruction," that actually cut them off from their social and economic surroundings. And, of course, Iraq has in these years been fragmented in other staggering ways with an estimated four-plus million Iraqis driven into exile abroad or turned into internal refugees. According to Pepe Escobar of the Asia Times, there are now at least 28 different militias in the country. The longer the U.S. remains even somewhat in control, the greater the possibility of further fragmentation. Initially, the fragmentation was sectarian -- into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia regions, but each of those regions has its own potentially hostile parts and so its points of future conflict and further fragmentation. If the U.S. military spent the early years of its occupation fighting a Sunni insurgency in the name of a largely Shiite (and Kurdish) government, it is now fighting a Shiite militia, while paying and arming former Sunni insurgents, relabeled "Sons of Iraq." Iran is also clearly sending arms into a country that is, in any case, awash in weaponry. Without a real national government, Iraq has descended into a welter of militia-controlled neighborhoods, city states, and provincial or regional semi-governments. Despite all the talk of American-supported "reconciliation," Juan Cole described the present situation well at his Informed Comment blog: "Maybe the US in Iraq is not the little boy with his finger in the dike. Maybe we are workers with jackhammers instructed to make the hole in the dike much more huge."

US Military Presence causes Iraqi Instability

 US Military presence causes terrorism/rebel attacks

**Nacos 9** (professor in political science at Columbia University Israel and Hamas: It is Time for Soft Power 1/8/09) <http://www.reflectivepundit.com/reflectivepundit/2009/01/israel-against-hamas-military-force-will-not-end-terrorism-by-brigitte-l-nacos-robert-gates-the-present-and-future-us.html>) JVT

Robert Gates, the present and future U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that **“military force**will continue to play a role” in the struggle against terrorists but that the “United States **cannot kill or capture its way to victory**.” The same holds true for Israel. Just as Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah did not weaken the Lebanese group, the current military conflict in Gaza will not weaken Hamas nor the organization’s will and ability to fight on**.    States that are faced with domestic or transnational terrorism will not and should not altogether exclude military options in form of air-strikes or commando raids against terrorist hide-outs, weapon depots, training facilities, or for the purpose of freeing hostages. But even if successful, such limited measures accomplish only modest objectives (i.e., the decimation of a group’s leadership, the rescue of hostages)--they are not likely to end terrorism or destroy terrorist organizations**. Typically, terrorists and insurgents hide among civilians in cities, towns, or villages. In such situations, even limited military operations are likely to result in collateral damage. One tragic example of high risk offensive actions was an August 2008 ground operation by **U.S. Special Operation Forces backed by air strikes in the Afghan village of Azizabad**, When the dust settled, **more than 90 civilians—most of them women and children—were dead along with three dozen or so insurgents.** **The damage to America’s reputation in this Afghan village, in all of Afghanistan, and in the international community was far greater than the benefit of eliminating a few terrorists**or insurgents. **Military actions**, especially when they involve the death of innocent bystanders, **tend to rally supporters and recruit new ones**.**The** mentioned**commando operation**and surgical strikes **against al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were followed by a surge in violence by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan**.   The scope and risk of missile strikes and commando operations in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan by the U.S. military pale in comparison to the Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah in 2006 and now against Hamas in the Gaza Strip; the same is, tragically, also true with respect to the large number of innocent civilian victims. The outcry against Israel in generally hostile and friendly countries is fueled by the unspeakable “collateral damage” inflicted on the civilian population of Gaza. Ignored by the audiences of such conflicts is the fact that terrorists, by cowardly operating in the midst of civilians, put the lives of innocents at risk in the first place. But in the age of mass-mediated politics, perception trumps reality.  

**US military presence in Iraq causes and fuels rebel attacks.**

**THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 7 (9/19/07)**[**http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0907/5904.html**](http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0907/5904.html)**JVT**

Democratic **presidential candidate Bill Richardson said** Wednesday **that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has contributed to** the sectarian violence **rather than bringing stability to the war-torn nation.**    "**There's no question there's tribal and ethnic hatreds**," Richardson told The Associated Press. "**But when those tribal and ethnic hatreds are fueled by American policy of hostility, then you make the situation worse."**In an hourlong interview with AP editors and reporters, the New Mexico governor argued that all combat and noncombat troops should be removed from Iraq because their presence is only contributing to violence.

**American presence is the cause for Iraqi instability.**

**Leaver 4** (Eric; policy director for the Institute for Policy Studies' Foreign Policy In Focus project, *The Nation,*September 24, 2004, <http://www.thenation.com/article/top-10-reasons-us-get-out-iraq>) CH

**The US occupation of Iraq is the cause of, not the solution to, the violence and the mounting deaths** that followed the invasion. During the recent fighting led by Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf, as in countless other battles inside Iraq, **authorities in Washington have misread the military and political situation. The Bush Administration uses the fighting as justification for the continued presence of foreign military forces. Yet it is precisely the presence of foreign military forces that is a major cause of the instability. Ending the US occupation by bringing the troops home now is a first step toward ending Iraq's nightmare**. Most Iraqis agree. In a poll this past June, **55 percent of Iraqis opposed the presence of US forces in Iraq. While Iraqis cheered the overthrow of the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, they didn't sign up for a foreign military occupation as a replacement. Now it is time to let Iraqis themselves choose an alternative.** Here are 10 compelling reasons the United States should get out of Iraq.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

**American troops in Iraq magnify the role of Al Qaeda operations and my be causing it.**

**Jarrar 9**(Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action *Only a US Withdrawal Will Stop Al Qaeda in Iraq*<http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37861.html>) SM

**In July, three of the most prominent Sunni insurgent groups agreed to join forces in a concerted effort to end the occupation**. Abd al Rahman al Zubeidy, a spokesman for one of the groups, told the Guardian: "**Resistance isn't just about killing Americans without aims or goals. Our people have come to hate Al Qaeda, which gives the impression to the outside world that the resistance in Iraq are terrorists**. We are against indiscriminate killing, fighting should be concentrated only on the enemy." He added that "a great gap has opened up between Sunni and Shia under the occupation and Al Qaeda has contributed to that â€¦ Most of Al Qaeda's members are Iraqis but its leaders are mostly foreigners. **The Americans magnify their role**, even **though they are responsible for** a minority of **resistance operations**." The public opinion research shows that **those views are shared by overwhelming majorities of ordinary Iraqis. All of Iraq's ethnic groups oppose Al Qaeda**. They reject AQI's attacks on Iraqis, its harshly fundamentalist brand of Islam and its attempts to form a separate Sunni "caliphate" -- an independent theocratic state -- in central Iraq, but significant pluralities -- and a huge majority of Sunnis -- support AQI's attacks on occupation forces. A recent poll by the BBC found that almost half of all Iraqis backed AQI's attacks on coalition troops, but only one in 100 favored its larger separatist agenda. The narrative surrounding Al Qaeda in Iraq is just one part of the larger argument to continue the occupation indefinitely. That is: the United States must remain in Iraq because the Iraqis will murder each other if we were to depart. George W. Bush recently laid out the prevalent scare story about what would happen if the occupation were to come to an end: **If we were to leave before the job is done, chaos could ensue, innocent people would lose their life, extremists would be emboldened**â€¦ **the countries of the Middle East would be endangered, and that would cause America to be endangered, as well**.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

US Presence in Iraq increases terrorist attack

Abrahms 9 (Max, CISAC predoctoral fellow @ FSI Standard, CISAC In the News, <http://fsi.stanford.edu/news/suicide_bombers_may_await_new_us_troops_20090210/>, February 10, 2009) CGW

As president Obama prepares to approve deployment orders sending 20,000-plus troops to Afghanistan this year, he and his commanders might take note of a recent study on suicide bombings. The number of such deadly attacks rises sharply as the U.S. has increased its troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a study presented at a Washington conference on combating terrorism this month. The study by University of Chicago Professor Robert A. Pape is, in effect, a warning to commanders in Afghanistan. Pape said at the CATO Institute conference he opposes a larger U.S. footprint in favor of "off-shore" deployments "to prevent the rise of a new generation of suicide bombers trying to kill us." Pape's study, "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," compiled statistics provided by the U.S. military and other sources. The data showed that, as the Iraq troop surge of about 40,000 troops got underway in 2007, suicide bombings -- the work of al Qaeda and related Sunni Muslim groups -- more than doubled, from 150 in 2006 to 350 in 2007. What's more, in the first half of 2008, suicide bombers struck nearly 100 times, putting them on a course to exceed the 2006 level despite an otherwise big drop in overall violence in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the numbers are even more striking. As the NATO-led mission spread from a Kabul-centric structure to forward operating bases around the country, suicide bomb strikes shot up, from less than 10 in 2004 to 130 in 2008. There were 25,000 international troops in the country in 2004; about 50,000 in 2008. And this is happening in a country that repelled the Soviet occupation of the 1980s without ever resorting to suicide bombings. Iraq had never seen a suicide bombing until the 2003 allied invasion. The vast majority of targets were NATO and Afghan military. With more American troops on the way, Pape said, the U.S. must brace for an even bigger onslaught. "This obviously bodes poorly," said Pape, whose academic career has included teaching air power strategy to Air Force officers. "This is an extremely dangerous problem" he told the conference. "We simply don't want to live in this world much longer." Pape spoke on a panel of experts who examined the root causes of terrorism, an issue for which there is no consensus. But understanding what motivates people to wantonly kill civilians is seen by experts as essential to coming up with the best counter-terrorism policies. Theories include poverty, political goals, Islamic expansion, and hatred of the West. Yet, when suicide bombers are preempted, they often tell interrogators they harbor few political or religious goals. Instead, they were attracted to the social benefits of joining a terror outfit, or talked into it by a friend or relative. "There is increasing evidence people turn to terrorism for the social solidarity," said Max Abrahms, a Stanford University fellow and author of numerous papers on terrorism. Abrahms said his research shows that no group has ever obtained its ultimate political goal through terrorism, and that voters often elect candidates who advocate the hardest line against such groups. Pape noted that terrorists were able to force U.S. troops to leave Lebanon after blowing up a barracks with a truck bomb in 1983, killing 241 service members. But other panel members pointed out that Hezbollah, the Shiite terror group believed responsible, has yet to achieve its goal of a Lebanese Islamic state. In fact, Lebanese time and again opt for secular democratic rule despite Hezbollah's best efforts to destabilize the country with the help of Syria and Iran. "If you look at their success in getting allies out of Iraq, they were a stunning success," Pape said. But then again, while some countries, such as Spain, withdrew their forces in the face of al Qaeda attacks, America has remained in Iraq and in fact increased troop levels while Iraq moved closer to democracy and built a more competent military. James Forest, director of terrorism studies at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, said his research shows that communication -- what an individual hears from his cleric or family -- often determines whether the person is radicalized. On a positive note, he pointed out that Saudi Arabia, a haven for harsh Islamic teachings, now allows moderate clerics to appear on state TV to argue against violence. "Terrorism is a product of choice," Forest said. "We don't really known what causes terrorism," concluded Mia Bloom, an assistant professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia. "It's difficult to identify the cause."

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Robert Gates, the present and future U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that “military force will continue to play a role” in the struggle against terrorists but that the “United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” The same holds true for Israel. Just as Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah did not weaken the Lebanese group, the current military conflict in Gaza will not weaken Hamas nor the organization’s will and ability to fight on. States that are faced with domestic or transnational terrorism will not and should not altogether exclude military options in form of air-strikes or commando raids against terrorist hide-outs, weapon depots, training facilities, or for the purpose of freeing hostages. But even if successful, such limited measures accomplish only modest objectives (i.e., the decimation of a group’s leadership, the rescue of hostages)--they are not likely to end terrorism or destroy terrorist organizations. Typically, terrorists and insurgents hide among civilians in cities, towns, or villages. In such situations, even limited military operations are likely to result in collateral damage. One tragic example of high risk offensive actions was an August 2008 ground operation by U.S. Special Operation Forces backed by air strikes in the Afghan village of Azizabad, When the dust settled, more than 90 civilians—most of them women and children—were dead along with three dozen or so insurgents. The damage to America’s reputation in this Afghan village, in all of Afghanistan, and in the international community was far greater than the benefit of eliminating a few terrorists or insurgents. Military actions, especially when they involve the death of innocent bystanders, tend to rally supporters and recruit new ones. The mentioned commando operation and surgical strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were followed by a surge in violence by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The scope and risk of missile strikes and commando operations in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan by the U.S. military pale in comparison to the Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah in 2006 and now against Hamas in the Gaza Strip; the same is, tragically, also true with respect to the large number of innocent civilian victims. The outcry against Israel in generally hostile and friendly countries is fueled by the unspeakable “collateral damage” inflicted on the civilian population of Gaza. Ignored by the audiences of such conflicts is the fact that terrorists, by cowardly operating in the midst of civilians, put the lives of innocents at risk in the first place. But in the age of mass-mediated politics, perception trumps reality.

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Invasion and occupation give terrorist skills, recruiting powers, and money

Odom 7 (William, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Proceedings of The American Philosophical Society 151(4) pg. 409) ELJ

Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

US Occupation raises terrorist recruitment

CATO 9(CATO Institute, *CATO Handbook for Policymakers 7th Edition*, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-46.pdf>, pg 491)dc

Above all, policymakers should aim to counter the strategic logic of terrorism. Specifically, they should take great care not to expend the nation’s blood and treasure, avoiding military action if at all possible. They should not give terrorists the gift of overreactions such as violence that injures innocents, as this will aid the terrorists by driving new recruits into their ranks. Finally, they should stand by the foundational Western values of individual rights, due process, tolerance, and the rule of law. In fashioning a proactive strategy to prevent future acts of terrorism, and to mitigate terrorism’s harmful effects should prevention fail, policymakers must account for the possibility that short-term reactions might have counterproductive medium- to long-term effects.

Presence helps expands terrorist cells.

CATO 9(CATO Institute, *CATO Handbook for Policymakers 7th Edition* , <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-46.pdf>, pg 493-494)dc

Many other proposals ostensibly geared toward countering the threat of terrorism, however, will likely be irrelevant and might actually prove harmful. For example, there is strong bipartisan support for expanding the military, especially the army and marines, despite the fact that conventional military forces play only a limited role in combating terrorism. With the exception of the U.S. military operations to depose the Taliban and disrupt al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, the most successful counterterrorism operations have not involved large numbers of ground troops. The disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq—cited in a National Intelligence Estimate as the ‘‘cause ce´le`bre’’ for jihadists, ‘‘breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihad movement’’—stand in stark contrast to the successful nonmilitary operations that enabled the United States to capture such al Qaeda figures as Ramzi Binalshibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the key plotters of the 9/11 attacks. To the extent that our military, and especially our ground forces, have been stretched by the war in Iraq, ending the war in a timely fashion would immediately relieve these stresses. So long as policymakers refuse to end our military involvement and bring U.S. troops home, however, the persistent U.S. presence will likely undermine our wider counterterrorism efforts. A number of experts note that stationing conventional forces in foreign lands is not conducive to fighting terrorism. Indeed, it is often counterproductive. The University of Chicago’s Robert Pape links the presence of American troops in the Middle East to the threat of future suicide terrorism against the United States and credits the occupation of Iraq with strengthening al Qaeda. Michael Scheuer, a 22-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who served as head of the agency’s bin Laden unit from 1996 to 1999, concurs. Because of the Iraq War, Scheuer told an interviewer in 2006, ‘‘there are more people willing to take up arms against the United States, and we have less ability to win hearts and minds in the Arab world.’’

Military presence and its rhetoric incite terrorism.

CATO 9(CATO Institute, *CATO Handbook for Policymakers 7th Edition*, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-46.pdf>, pgs 495-496)dc

The intellectual ferment within Islam presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the West. On the one hand, non-Muslims have only a very limited capacity to shape the debate in a positive direction. As the 9/11 Commission report concluded: ‘‘We must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. . . . The United States can promote moderation, but cannot ensure its ascendancy. Only Muslims can do this.’’ On the other hand, and paradoxically, while we cannot ‘‘ensure the ascendancy’’ of moderate Muslims, we have a great capacity for influencing the debate within Islam in a negative direction—empowering extremists and marginalizing moderates. As radical Islamism struggles to expand its reach, our words sometimes matter as much as our actions. Thus have our enemies seized on the phrase ‘‘war on terror’’ to claim, falsely, that the United States is at war with Islam. Policymakers should take steps to differentiate their policies from those of the Bush White House and should focus particular attention on those policies that have created ill will within the Muslim community. The leading source of resentment is the U.S. war in Iraq, and policymakers should commit to swiftly ending the U.S. military presence there. Other necessary steps include closing the terrorist holding facilities at Guanta´- namo Bay, Cuba, and formally renouncing torture, including waterboarding. A series of high-profile public diplomacy and outreach initiatives is also warranted, and might include a particular focus on those predominantly Muslim countries that have managed to maintain working relationships with the United States despite some of the unfortunate excesses of the Bush administration. Above all else, however, policymakers should approach the problem of terrorism with the necessary perspective. Claims that our national survival hangs in the balance, or that the terrorists pose an existential threat comparable to that of the Nazis or the Soviets, build pressure for policies that do not increase our security but do erode the very liberties that define us as a nation. The new president should begin by recasting the discussion away from that of a war to be won and toward thinking of terrorism as a problem to be confronted and managed.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

Our Anti-terror efforts in Iraq are circular – We kill them, they kill us

Reese 9 (Timothy R., Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, July 30, The New Your Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/middleeast/31advtext.html>) ELJ

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

United States presence causes terrorism such as “al Qaeda in Iraq”.

Jarrar & Holland 7 (Raed & Joshua; Iraq consultant & staff writer and editor, *Alter Net*, October 5, 2007, http://www.alternet.org/world/64429/) CH

One of the last justifications for continuing the U.S. occupation of Iraq despite overwhelming opposition from [Iraqis](http://www.mediainfo.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003637816), [Americans](http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27532) and [the rest of humanity](http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0590665720070906) has come down to this: U.S. forces must remain in order to battle "al Qaeda in Iraq." Like so many of the arguments presented in the United States, the idea is not only intellectually bankrupt, it's also the 180-degree opposite of reality. The truth of the matter is that only the presence of U.S. forces allows the group called "al Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) to survive and function, and setting a timetable for the occupation to end is the best way to beat them. You won't hear that perspective in Washington, but according to Iraqis with whom we spoke, it is the conventional wisdom in much of the country. The Bush administration has made much of what it calls "progress" in the Sunni-dominated provinces of central Iraq. But when we spoke to leaders there, the message we got was very different from what supporters of a long-term occupation claim: Many Sunnis are, indeed, lined up against groups like AQI, but that doesn't mean they are "joining" with coalition forces or throwing their support behind the Iraqi government. Several sources we reached in the Sunni community agreed that AQI, a predominantly Sunni insurgent group that did not exist prior to the U.S. invasion -- it started in 2005 -- will not exist for long after coalition forces depart. AQI is universally detested by large majorities of Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian backgrounds because of its fundamentalist interpretation of religious law and efforts to set up a separate Sunni state, and its only support -- and it obviously does enjoy some support -- is based solely on its opposition to the deeply unpopular U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.

**US presence is causing an increase number of suicide bombings in Iraq**

Chapman 5 (Steve, columnist -Chicago Tribune, <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0606-23.htm>, June 6, 2005) CGW

The Bush administration had the fond hope that the January elections in Iraq would strike a crippling blow against the insurgents. But the slaughter has continued unabated, which is not surprising. In the first place, democracy is utterly irrelevant to the insurgents' goal of ridding Iraq of foreign invaders. And Mr. Pape notes that these campaigns are invariably aimed at democratic governments, which are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism. The dilemma the United States faces in fighting the insurgents is that military methods are not enough to solve the problem, and may make it worse. If the movement is a reaction to the U.S. military presence, keeping American troops in Iraq amounts to fighting a fire with kerosene. That explains why the longer we stay, the more suicide attacks we face. And it suggests that the only feasible strategy is to withdraw from Iraq and turn the fight over to the Iraqi government. The alternative is to stay and keep doing what we've been doing for the last two years. But that approach has shown no signs of fostering success. It only promises to raise the cost of failure.

**US military presence is responsible for terrorism**

Baldwin 6(The Times The Sunday Chief Reporter of The Times The Sunday Times Times4/29/06)[**http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us\_and\_americas/article711133.ece**](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article711133.ece)JVT

Support among the US public for the war in Iraq has been sapped by the 2,396 American combat deaths since the invasion. The Pentagon hopes to limit deaths among American troops to “one KIA (killed in action) a day” — a figure that strategists believe will be politically sustainable**. This month 68 US servicemen have died, more than double the number for last month.**There are also plans to withdraw up to 50,000 soldiers, a third of those in the country, by the end of this year as Iraq’s own forces take on more responsibility for security**. But Ambassador Henry Crumpton, the US special co-ordinator for counter-terrorism, came close yesterday to suggesting that the war was exacerbating the terrorist problem, saying that for some international recruits “Iraq is a cause**”.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

**The majority of terrorism was only seen after the United States invaded Iraq/**

**Arnove 6** (Anthony; author of Iraq: The Logic Of Withdrawal, AlterNet, March 28, 2006,<http://www.alternet.org/world/34122/>) CH

**Al-Qaeda made its first appearance in Iraq only after the invasion, a predictable outcome of the U.S. occupation. In reality, the United States engaged in state terrorism under the pretext of fighting a terrorist threat that did not exist in Iraq, and in the process greatly increased the likelihood of individual and organizational terrorist acts targeting the United States** or its proxies abroad.  **Even more circular is the idea that the United States has to stay in Iraq until it "defeats" the resistance to the occupation**. The occupation itself is the source of the resistance, a fact that even some of the people responsible for the war have been forced to acknowledge.

**US Military presence causes terrorism/rebel attacks**

Nacos 9 (professor in political science at Columbia University Israel and Hamas: It is Time for Soft Power 1/8/09) http://www.reflectivepundit.com/reflectivepundit/2009/01/israel-against-hamas-military-force-will-not-end-terrorism-by-brigitte-l-nacos-robert-gates-the-present-and-future-us.html) JVT

Robert Gates, the present and future U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that “military force will continue to play a role” in the struggle against terrorists but that the “United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” The same holds true for Israel. Just as Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah did not weaken the Lebanese group, the current military conflict in Gaza will not weaken Hamas nor the organization’s will and ability to fight on. States that are faced with domestic or transnational terrorism will not and should not altogether exclude military options in form of air-strikes or commando raids against terrorist hide-outs, weapon depots, training facilities, or for the purpose of freeing hostages. But even if successful, such limited measures accomplish only modest objectives (i.e., the decimation of a group’s leadership, the rescue of hostages)--they are not likely to end terrorism or destroy terrorist organizations. Typically, terrorists and insurgents hide among civilians in cities, towns, or villages. In such situations, even limited military operations are likely to result in collateral damage. One tragic example of high risk offensive actions was an August 2008 ground operation by U.S. Special Operation Forces backed by air strikes in the Afghan village of Azizabad, When the dust settled, more than 90 civilians—most of them women and children—were dead along with three dozen or so insurgents. The damage to America’s reputation in this Afghan village, in all of Afghanistan, and in the international community was far greater than the benefit of eliminating a few terrorists or insurgents. Military actions, especially when they involve the death of innocent bystanders, tend to rally supporters and recruit new ones. The mentioned commando operation and surgical strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were followed by a surge in violence by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The scope and risk of missile strikes and commando operations in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan by the U.S. military pale in comparison to the Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah in 2006 and now against Hamas in the Gaza Strip; the same is, tragically, also true with respect to the large number of innocent civilian victims. The outcry against Israel in generally hostile and friendly countries is fueled by the unspeakable “collateral damage” inflicted on the civilian population of Gaza. Ignored by the audiences of such conflicts is the fact that terrorists, by cowardly operating in the midst of civilians, put the lives of innocents at risk in the first place. But in the age of mass-mediated politics, perception trumps reality.

US military presence in Iraq causes and fuels rebel attacks.

AP 7 (9/19/07) http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0907/5904.html JVT

Democratic presidential candidate Bill Richardson said Wednesday that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has contributed to the sectarian violence rather than bringing stability to the war-torn nation. "There's no question there's tribal and ethnic hatreds," Richardson told The Associated Press. "But when those tribal and ethnic hatreds are fueled by American policy of hostility, then you make the situation worse." In an hourlong interview with AP editors and reporters, the New Mexico governor argued that all combat and noncombat troops should be removed from Iraq because their presence is only contributing to violence.

US Presence in Iraq boosts Terrorism/Rebel attacks

**Presence Causes Terrorist attacks**

**Pearson 7**(Frederic, Director of Center for Peace and Conflict studies, Iraq-itag.org, <http://iraq-itag.org/docs/ITAG_July.pdf>, 7/5)dc

**For bin Laden and Islamist extremists, Iraq is the central front because they can easily kill Americans there. By attracting the US-al Qaeda fight to Iraq, the total violence there may be increased by our presence, not reduced. We must leave Iraq in order to stop providing al Qaeda a fair fight**, and to put our effort into finding and arresting or killing bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership cadre on the real central front—their home base. Given enough focus and resources, his capture or death could coincide with his empty declaration of “victory” in Iraq.

**US Presence raises terrorist recruitment**

**Syracuse Peace Council 6**(2006, Oldest Grass Roots Peace and Social Justice Organization,<http://www.peacecouncil.net/iraq/talkingpoints.pdf)dc>

**The State Department acknowledges that US actions in Iraq have actually aided terrorist recruiting efforts. Terrorist actions globally have increased since the US invasion.**

**US occupation in Iraq has increased terrorism worldwide.**

**Leaver 4** (Eric; policy director for the Institute for Policy Studies' Foreign Policy In Focus project, *The Nation,*September 24, 2004, <http://www.thenation.com/article/top-10-reasons-us-get-out-iraq>) CH

**The war against Iraq is leaving US citizens more vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home and abroad. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies**, the best-known and most authoritative source of information on global military capabilities and trends, **the war in Iraq has accelerated recruitment for Al Qaeda and made the world less safe. It estimates worldwide** Al Qaeda membership now at 18,000, with 1,000 active in Iraq. **It states that the occupation has become the organization's "potent global recruitment pretext," has divided the United States and Britain from their allies and has weakened the war on terrorism.**

Withdrawal Curbs Terror.

Withdrawal will lessen terrorism in Iraq.

Englehardt 8(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc

No, al-Qaeda will not control Iraq if we leave (and neither will Iran): The latest figures tell the story. Of 658 suicide bombings globally in 2007 (more than double those of any year in the last quarter century), 542, according to the Washington Post's Robin Wright, took place in occupied Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly Iraq. In other words, the American occupation of that land has been a motor for acts of terrorism (as occupations will be). There was no al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia before the invasion and Iraq was no Afghanistan. The occupation under whatever name will continue to create "terrorists," no matter how many times the administration claims that "al-Qaeda" is on the run. With the departure of U.S. troops, it's clear that homegrown Sunni extremists (and the small number of foreign jihadis who work with them), already a minority of a minority, will more than meet their match in facing the Sunni mainstream. The Sunni Awakening Movement came into existence, in part, to deal with such self-destructive extremism (and its fantasies of a Taliban-style society) before the Americans even noticed that it was happening. When the Americans leave, "al-Qaeda" (and whatever other groups the Bush administration subsumes under that catch-all title) will undoubtedly lose much of their raison d'Ãªtre or simply be crushed.

Withdrawal isn’t going to empower Al-Qaeda.

**Carpenter 7** (Ted, Vice president for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Institute, August, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n4/cpr29n4-4.html>) eh

It is human nature to be reluctant to admit that an enterprise in which one has invested a great deal of time, effort, and money is doomed to fail. Americans have that characteristic in special abundance. We do not like to admit failure. In most aspects of life, that is a very good thing. But in foreign policy, that normal virtue can become a serious defect. It can cause a government to cling to policies long after any hope of success has evaporated. That is what we are doing in Iraq today.  **The United States needs to withdraw from Iraq and needs to do so in a matter of months, not years.**This is a venture that has failed, is failing, and has no reasonable prospect of success. Therefore, the wisest course of action is to cut our losses.  Why do we need to leave Iraq? The broadest metric is the amount of violence and chaos in that country. **In Iraq approximately 120 people a day are dying as a result of political violence.** One must put that in context: Iraq is a country of barely 26 million people. **A comparable figure for the United States would be between 1,400 and 1,500 people a day, or something close to half a million people a year.** If that were happening in the United States, there would be little discussion about whether or not we were involved in a civil war.  Another metric is the complexity of the violence. The National Intelligence Estimate that came out in early February noted that it was only partially correct to refer to the situation in Iraq as a civil war because the situation is vastly more complex than that. This was not simply a civil war in which two or three well-defined factions face off. This is almost a Hobbesian struggle of all against all—a fight among various factions within the Sunni and Shiite communities and criminal gangs that have no particular ideology but are taking great advantage of the violence.  What the United States is being asked to do militarily at this point is to referee a complex multisided civil war. I cannot think of a more utterly futile and thankless task than that. Yet that is the situation in which we find ourselves. I will be the first to concede that withdrawing from Iraq is not going to be without cost. Opponents of withdrawal constantly bring that up. They advance a variety of horrors, ranging in plausibility from the extremely unlikely to the rather likely, that are going to occur. **One allegation is that, if we leave Iraq, al- Qaeda is going to gain a safe haven**, and it will be just like Afghanistan before 9/11. **That is actually the least likely danger.**Al- Qaeda, according to the Iraq Study Group, has a grand total of about 1,300 fighters in Iraq today, compared to the thousands it had in Afghanistan before 9/11. In addition, in Afghanistan the al-Qaeda units had the protection of an entrenched friendly government.  In Iraq they will have nothing of the sort. **The government is dominated by Kurds and Shiites who are almost unanimous in their hatred of al-Qaeda.** A poll conducted by the University of Maryland in September 2006 found that better than 99 percent of Shiite and Kurdish respondents had a negative view of al-Qaeda. But what was surprising about that poll and other indications is that**al-Qaeda does not have a good reputation even among Sunnis, its supposed allies in the country.**That same poll found that 94 percent of Sunnis had a negative view of al-Qaeda.  **Where is al-Qaeda going to gain protection when the organization is so widely hated in Iraq? At best, al-Qaeda would have a harried existence in a few isolated areas of Iraq**, where it might find a handful of allies among Sunnis who are still willing to support the organization after its indiscriminate violence against Muslim civilians.

US presence Hurts Human Rights

**US presence violates the basic rights of children**

MHRI 5 (The Monitoring Network for Human Rights, consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, MHRI 2005) http://www.brusselstribunal.org/survey111105.htm JVT

• Children are suffering negative psychological effects since the beginning of occupation and military operations. Children suffer from fear and exhibit aggressive behavior. A further indicator of their suffering is their worsening performance at school. Some educational areas are still suffering from the violation of their educational rights. In Fallujah, 6 schools are still being used as headquarters for the Iraqi National Guard and the U.S. Army, despite a decree issued by the Council of Ministers, stressing the importance of clearing the schools, so that students could return. Although the fighting has ended more than 10 months ago, the school children, whose schools were destroyed in the September and October battles, are taking classes in tents under miserable health conditions. Naturally, school children should be in their school buildings, and the military should be operating from tents. Furthermore, the building of the government department for education in Fallujah is used by the Iraqi and U.S. Armies, while the department for education has to use a school building as temporary offices. • In the past two months, the military operations in the areas of west Iraq, destroyed and damaged many schools in cities such as Al-Qa'em, Haditha, Al-Karableh, Heet, and Al-Ramadi, thereby hindering students from continuing the recent school year. Furthermore, the Faculty of Agriculture – Anbar University, was occupied by the U.S. Army, thereby increasing the difficulties for students and university staff in completing their academic aims, such as forcing the classes to take place in an inadequate site within the university. • Despite the appeal by departments of education to facilitate the attendance of schools and universities for students, the procedures to enter cities such as Falluja and other cities west of the Euphrates, which have been under siege for a long time, were deliberately hardened, thus negatively effecting the attendance of schools and universities and the possibilities to take examinations. • There are cases of children being in prisons along with their parents, such as the case of two children 4 and 3 years old, who are together with their mother in the women's prison in Babel. • As some released prisoners confirm, there are cases where children are tortured in front of their parents so as to get to confessions from the latter, as has happened in the prison of Abu Ghraib. • The Director of the Department of Cancerous Diseases in the Ministry of Health has asserted that the number of children infected with hepatitis has exceeded 1750 cases. The reasons for this rising number of infected children are the environmental pollution as a consequence of war, the insufficient number of specialized hospitals, and the scarcity of necessary medication.

**US military presence destroys woman's rights**

MHRI 5 (The Monitoring Network for Human Rights, consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, MHRI 2005) http://www.brusselstribunal.org/survey111105.htm JVT

The rape of Iraqi women prisoners in the prisons of Abu Ghoreib and Buka is the most marked violation of women's rights. Many of these women committed suicide after being released because they could not live with the shame and disgrace they and their families were subjected to, and to find relief from the great psychological agony tormenting them. Many Iraqi prisoners asserted that Iraqi Forces locked up men and women together in the same cell, all of them naked, and that the screaming of women while being harassed and raped was heard. One Iraqi woman, after being released from Abu Ghoreib, reported that her cell inmate was brought back into the cell and remained unconscious for two days. After regaining conscious, she told that she had been raped by U.S. soldiers more than 17 times. Her psychological state and her health situation gravely deteriorated in the following days, nearly causing her death.

US presence Hurts Human Rights

**US military presence in Iraq is evil and commits crimes against humanity**

MHRI 5 (The Monitoring Network for Human Rights, consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, MHRI 2005) http://www.brusselstribunal.org/survey111105.htm JVT

The greatest violation in this field was the prohibition of rescue and medical teams, including the rescue teams of the Ministry of Health and those of international organisations, to enter areas of military conflicts where a great number of civilians were still living. The pretence for the prohibition was the critical security situation. Therefore, these teams were hindered from fulfilling their humanitarian assistance needed by the civilians in areas of fighting between the U.S. Army and Iraqi fighters. This by itself is a crime against humanity and a crime of war. • The occupation of Fallujah Hospital, on 17th of November 2004, during the November battle is the most prominent example for such criminal acts. Not only were the hospital staff and all patients arrested, but also was the internal central clinic of the hospital bombed, killing patients and two doctors. The Al-Ahli hospital (Khaled Al-Janabi Hospital) was first plundered and then destroyed. Furthermore, some hospitals in the cities of Hadithah, Al-Qa'em and Al-Ramadi were occupied to serve as military bases for the U.S. and Iraqi Armies, without providing alternative health care possibilities to the people of those cities. • The Office of National Drug Control reported an increase in narcotraffic; Baghdad and Karbala are the cities with the highest drug circulation. Previously, Iraq was considered to be only a corridor of drug traffic, but is now considered to be a consuming country with 2 million addicts, among them 780,000 school and university students. • In the time period between 2004 and July 2005, the cases of liver cancer have increased causing 269 deaths, according to the report of a hospital specialized in diseases of the digestive system and liver diseases. These report further states that since the year 2003 more than 10,000 citizens are suffering from liver cancer. The report relates the increasing number of these cases to the pollution of drinking water in most of the areas in Baghdad and in other governorates. • On the 19th of July 2005, more than 30 doctors in Yarmouk Hospital went on strike, demanding that they should be able to treat the patients freely, without the continuous threat by Iraqi soldiers. The strike caused more than 100 patients to remain without any medical treatment on that day. Iraqi soldiers had burst into the hospital's women ward, carrying out an inspection of the female patients. A young doctor present, showed dissatisfaction, which then caused him to be maltreated and threatened by the soldiers. The soldiers punched him in the stomach with their guns and one of them then prepared his gun, still directed at the doctor's stomach, to trigger. The patients' family members intervened, pulling the doctor away. Nevertheless, 4 soldiers followed him pointing their weapons to his head, ordering him to beg for his life. It was only then, as the doctor was on his knees begging for his life, that the soldiers left. • On the 26th of July 2005, members of the National Guard destroyed the Intensive Care Unit at the Medical City and attacked the medical staff, after one of their colleagues had died in spite of the medical attention he had received. The doctors went on strike, protesting against the violation of their right, against the insults they have been subjected to and against the destruction of the hospitals properties and facilities, due to which other patients are now deprived of intensive medical care. • In sequence of the U.S. military attacks on the city of "Heet", and the besiege of the city for more than 10 days, the General Director of Heet Hospital was arrested by the U.S. Army. • On the 18th of April 2004, the U.S. military forces and the Iraqi police stormed the Yarmouk Hospital. A patient, Abbas Medhat Mahmoud, was dragged out of a surgical operation, with the claim that he belongs to the resistance. This act is a clear violation to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and wounded

\*\*\*Iraqi Civil War Senario

US Presence Causes Iraqi Instability

US Presence spurs civil war.

Englehardt 8(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc

No, the U.S. military does not stand between Iraq and civil war: As with fragmentation, the U.S. military's presence has, in fact, been a motor for civil war in that country. The invasion and subsequent chaos, as well as punitive acts against the Sunni minority, allowed Sunni extremists, some of whom took the name "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia," to establish themselves as a force in the country for the first time. Later, U.S. military operations in both Sunni and Shiite areas regularly repressed local militias -- almost the only forces capable of bringing some semblance of security to urban neighborhoods -- opening the way for the most extreme members of the other community (Sunni suicide or car bombers and Shiite death squads) to attack. It's worth remembering that it was in the surge months of 2007, when all those extra American troops hit Baghdad neighborhoods, that many of the city's mixed or Sunni neighborhoods were most definitively "cleansed" by death squads, producing a 75-80% Shiite capital. Iraq is now embroiled in what Juan Cole has termed "three civil wars," two of which (in the south and the north) are largely beyond the reach of limited American ground forces and all of which could become far worse. The still low-level struggle between Kurds and Arabs (with the Turks hovering nearby) for the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in the north may be the true explosion point to come. The U.S. military sits precariously atop this mess, at best putting off to the future aspects of the present civil-war landscape, but more likely intensifying it.

US Presence destroys Iraq

Englehardt, 10(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley, Nation Institute’s Tom Dispatch, 4/24)dc

Of course, before our troops entered Baghdad in 2003 and the American occupation of that country began, there was no al-Qaeda in Iraq. But that’s a distant past not worth bringing up. And forget as well the fact that our invasions and wars have proven thunderously destructive, bringing chaos, misery, and death in their wake, and turning, for instance, the health care system of Iraq, once considered an advanced country in the Arab world, into a disaster zone(that -- it goes without saying -- only we Americans are now equipped to properly fix). Similarly, while regularly knocking off Afghan civilians at checkpoints on their roads and in their homes, at their celebrations and at work, we ignore the fact that our invasion and occupation opened the way for the transformation of Afghanistan into the first all-drug-crop agricultural nation and so the planet's premier narco-nation.

American presence in Iraq has made the Middle East more unstable.

**Arnove 6**(Anthony; author of Iraq: The Logic Of Withdrawal, *AlterNet,*March 28, 2006,<http://www.alternet.org/world/34122/>) CH

**The invasion of Iraq has made the world a far more unstable and dangerous place. By invading Iraq, Washington sent the message to other states that anything goes in the so-called war on terror.**After September 11, India called its nuclear rival Pakistan an "epicenter of terrorism." Israel has carried out "targeted assassinations" of Palestinians, bombed Syria, and threatened to strike Iran, using the same rationale that Bush did for the invasion of Iraq." You don't negotiate with terrorism, you uproot it. This is simply the doctrine of Mr. Bush that we're following," explained Uzi Landau, Israel's minister of public security. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq is spurring the drive for countries to develop a deterrent to U.S. power. **The most likely response to the invasion of Iraq is that more countries will pursue nuclear weapons, which may be the only possible protection from attack, and will increase their spending on more conventional weapons systems. Each move in this game has a multiplier effect in a world that is already perilously close to the brink of self-annihilation through nuclear warfare or accident.  Meanwhile, the invasion has also quite predictably increased the resentment and anger that many people feel against the United States and its allies,**therefore making innocent people in these countries far more vulnerable to terrorism, as we saw in the deadly attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and London on July 7, 2005. The United States is reviled not because people "hate our freedoms," as Bush suggests, but because people hate the very real impact of U.S. policies on their lives. As the British playwright and essayist Harold Pinter observed," People do not forget. They do not forget the death of their fellows, they do not forget torture and mutilation, they do not forget injustice, they do not forget oppression, they do not forget the terrorism of mighty powers. They not only don't forget. They strike back."

US Presence Causes Iraqi Instability

With US presence, the regional situation in the middle east has deteriorated.

**Serwer 10 (**Daniel VP of peace and stability operations at USIP <http://www.usip.org/resources/iraq-time-change>) SM

**The massive exodus of Iraqis is creating enormous economic and social problems for Iraq’s neighbors,** especially Jordan and Syria. These threaten to get significantly worse if instability in Iraq continues. Despite the signing of the Iraq Compact and regional talks that include the U.S., **Iraq’s neighbors have not taken decisive action to support its national government or assist reconstruction**. Turkey has stood down from the threat to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, but **none of Iraq’s neighbors have done all they could to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty**. Iran supports Prime Minister Maliki, but they also provide assistance to various Shia militias, contributing to sectarian division and raising the specter of Iranian dominance, a specter that haunts Iraq’s Arab neighbors, who have continued to allow support to flow to Sunni insurgents. **U.S. talks with Iran in Baghdad have not convinced Tehran to use its influence in favor of a sovereign, non-sectarian Iraq.** Sunni insurgents continue to enter Iraq from Syria. The Hezbollah/Israel war in Lebanon was not helpful to the situation in Iraq, where the conflict hardened popular opposition to the U.S. and exacerbated Sunni/Shia tensions at the leadership level. In the wake of Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, **the U.S. is trying to restart a Middle East peace** process between Israel and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas**. If successful, this move would be an important development, prodding Arab states to provide more support to U.S. efforts in Iraq**, but the odds still appear long.

US military presence is deadly to the Iraqi people

MHRI 5 (The Monitoring Network for Human Rights, consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, MHRI 2005) http://www.brusselstribunal.org/survey111105.htm JVT

In the afternoon of the 10th of July 2005, US military forces fired randomly at a civilian car in the "Alamiriya" area of Baghdad killing a citizen (Abbas Salem Abbas Al-Zawba'i) and injuring two other persons who were with him in the car. The injured were taken to "Al-Nour" Hospital in "Shu'la" City in Baghdad. When their relatives arrived to see after them, they were surprised that everyone asking about them was being arrested by members of a militant force pertaining to the Ministry of Interior called "Al- Saqer" (hawk). 12 Persons of the same family were arrested, beaten, and tortured with electro-shocks and acids, as the marks on their bodies show. At last, they were kept in a closed container for 14 hours, with temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius. 11 Persons died as a consequence of the torture, 1 person survived to be the witness of this crime

Turn – American presence is causing a civil war now

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

Would the withdrawal of U.S. troops ignite a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites? No. That civil war is already under way—in large part because of the American presence. The longer the United States stays, the more it fuels Sunni hostility toward Shiite "collaborators." Were America not in Iraq, Sunni leaders could negotiate and participate without fear that they themselves would be branded traitors and collaborators by their constituents. Sunni leaders have said this in official public statements; leaders of the resistance have told me the same thing in private. The Iraqi government, which is currently dominated by Shiites, would lose its quisling stigma. Iraq's security forces, also primarily Shiite, would no longer be working on behalf of foreign infidels against fellow Iraqis, but would be able to function independently and recruit Sunnis to a truly national force. The mere announcement of an intended U.S. withdrawal would allow Sunnis to come to the table and participate in defining the new Iraq.

US Presence Causes Iraqi Instability

**U.S. as power in Iraq splits the country and makes Iraq “break-up” possible**

**Zunes 6** (Stephen Zunes, Head of Middle Eastern Studies and Professor of Politics and International Affairs at The University of San Francisco, *Anti-War. Com,*3/7/06,<http://www.antiwar.com/orig/zunes.php?articleid=8668>) CS

**The risk of Iraq breaking up into a Sunni Kurdish state, a Sunni Arab state, and a Shi'ite Arab state is now very real.** And, given the intermixing of these populations in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and scores of other cities, the potential exists for the most violent breakup of a country since the partition of India 60 years ago. Recent weeks have shown ominous signs of what may be yet to come on a massive scale, as scores of Shi'ite families were forced to flee what were once mixed neighborhoods in and around Baghdad. Even barring a formal breakup of the country, the prospects of a stable unified country look bleak. As the *Los Angeles Times*reported on Feb. 26, "**The outlines of a future Iraq are emerging: a nation where power is scattered among clerics turned warlords; control over schools, hospitals, railroads, and roads is divided along sectarian lines; graft and corruption subvert good governance; and foreign powers exert influence only over a weak central government." Much of Iraq's current divisions can be traced to the decision of U.S. occupation authorities immediately following the conquest to abolish the Iraqi army and purge the government bureaucracy – both bastions of secularism – thereby creating a vacuum that was soon filled by sectarian parties and militias**. In addition, **the U.S. occupation authorities – in an apparent effort of divide-and-rule – encouraged sectarianism by dividing up authority based not on technical skills or ideological affiliation but ethnic and religious identity**. As with Lebanon, however, such efforts have actually exacerbated divisions, with virtually every political question debated not on its merits, but on which group it potentially benefits or harms. This has led to great instability, with political parties, parliamentary blocs, and government ministries breaking down along sectarian lines. **Even army divisions are separated, with parts of western Baghdad being patrolled by army units dominated by Sunnis while eastern Baghdad is being patrolled by Shi'ite-dominated units. Without unifying national institutions, the breakup of the country remains a real possibility.**

Delay in withdrawal exacerbates Kurdish Violence

[ ] Delay in withdrawal is a sign of Americas colonial aims, this turns the Kurdistan region into Americas puppet

BBC 10 (January 21, BBC Worldwide Monitoring Lexis) ELJ

The reality is that America is trying to maintain its presence in Iraq in any possible way and is employing all possible means at its disposal to achieve this goal. It is obvious that Washington's main goal in sending troops to Iraq was to achieve its long term colonial aims and it is a sign of naivety and superficiality if it is thought otherwise. The important point here is the role played by the custodians of Iraq's Kurdistan in paving the path for the actualization of America's illegitimate goals in the region. Recently Iraq's Kurdistan has changed into a headquarter for operating America's expansionist interventionist strategy in Iraq and the authorities of the region have turned themselves into mere operators of American policies by adopting unjustifiable policies.

[ ] That causes violence in Kurdistan spilling over to the rest of the Middle East and will cause conflict in Iraq

BBC 10 (January 21, BBC Worldwide Monitoring Lexis) ELJ

Authorities of Iraq's Kurdistan are now so committed to America that they have opened the way for the attacks of the Zionist regime and its secret intelligent organizations to please Washington. Reports which are repeatedly published recently point to Israelis' extensive moves in Kurdistan region of Iraq with the large part of these moves and activities taking place in the direction of Zionists' evil aims and other secret spying activities in the region which are definitely a serious threat to the peace and security of the region and it is necessary for the authorities of Iraq's Kurdistan to be responsible for the consequences of this dubious non-transparent dangerous policy. The approval of hosting 21 thousand American military forces by Iraq's Kurdistan authorities is a treacherous measure whose dangerous outcomes would go beyond Iraq's borders. It is like permanent occupation of Iraq which in addition to destroying Iraq's national sovereignty, can bring about very serious conflicts inside Iraq and even the disintegration of that country. According to Washington-Baghdad security agreement, the Americans should leave Iraq at the scheduled time, that is by the end of this year and any change in carrying out this agreement under any pretext implies its violation and undermining the national will of Iraqi people. Prevention of confrontations between Kurd and Arab tribes, which is America's excuse to maintain its military presence in Iraq's Kurdistan, is a ridiculous unacceptable justification because there has not been any case of conflict in recent years. On the contrary, considering recent changes, what is actually happening is that the tensions taking place over the management of Kirkuk province since sometimes ago, are instigated by occupiers in order to justify their continuing military intervention in Iraq.

Kurdish Violence leads to Iraqi Civil War

Kurds in Iraq are acting autonomously

Carpenter 9(Tom, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO institute, *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 20(4), pg 22-23)dc

In one sense, Iraq has already ceased to be a unified state. The Baghdad government plays no meaningful role in the Kurdish region in the north. Indeed, Iraqi Arabs who enter the territory are treated as foreigners — and not especially welcome foreigners.1 Officially, Kurdistan is merely a region of Iraq that Baghdad allows to exercise “autonomy,” but Iraqi Kurdistan has its own government, flag, national anthem, currency, and army (the Peshmerga). The flag issue is particularly revealing. Even though Kurdistan is supposedly part of Iraq, it was illegal there to fly the Iraqi flag until early 2008, and such displays are discouraged even today. When Kurdish officials speak publicly, they typically refer to their area as merely a self-governing region of Iraq,2 but when they speak privately, that cover story often disappears. With the Kurdish population, there is seldom even the pretense of an allegiance to Iraq. Media interviews and opinion surveys show overwhelming majorities in favor of full-fledged independence.3 Although the Kurds have not proclaimed an independent country, in every sense that matters Iraq’s Kurdistan region is de facto independent, and the “Kurdish regional government” is the governing body of a sovereign state.4 Moreover, it is a de facto sovereign state with far-reaching territorial goals. Within Iraq, the Kurds claim the northern city of Kirkuk and its extensive oil deposits. There have also been nasty clashes with Iraqi Arab factions in the ethnically mixed province of Nineveh, where Kurds insist that several villages should be part of the Kurdish region.5 Thanks to US assistance, Kurdistan has enjoyed de facto independence since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Kurdish Army is strong enough to enter a civil war

Carpenter 9(Tom, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO institute, *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 20(4), pgs 24-25)dc

When Washington began to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, the Kurds took advantage of that protection to establish and consolidate their region’s self-rule. Unable to bring his air power to bear, Saddam Hussein could not reassert Baghdad’s control, since the Peshmerga was more than a match for Iraqi ground forces. More recently, the Peshmerga have been strong enough to prevent infiltration by al Qaeda or Iraqi Arab Sunni and Shiite militias.

Kurds are willing create a civil war

Carpenter 9(Tom, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO institute, *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 20(4), pgs 26-27)dc

Barzani has no patience for such a scheme. Indeed, the Kurdish government is moving decisively in the opposite direction. In June 2009, the region’s parliament approved a draft constitution that extended Kurdish political and economic rights to all disputed territories, including Kirkuk. That constitutional provision asserted unequivocally that the disputed territories are inseparable from the “geographic and historic entity” today known as Iraq’s Kurdistan region. Barzani also issued a chilling warning: “If any regional country, or even Baghdad, interferes in an internal matter, and individuals inside the region conspire against the region’s security and well-being,” he stressed, “actions will be taken in accordance with the law against those who want to undermine the unity of the Kurdish house.”14 Whatever the result of the referendum on Kirkuk when it is finally held, there is likely to be trouble. If the Kurds lose, the resulting anger throughout Kurdistan would probably eradicate any lingering facade of loyalty to the Iraqi state. But given the ongoing ethnic cleansing, the Kurds are almost certain to win, and that result would have explosive potential on multiple fronts. The government in Baghdad understandably worries about losing the revenue from Kirkuk’s oil. Both Shiite and Sunni Arab leaders also suspect that a Kurdish regional government with a dramatically enhanced source of revenue would be even more inclined to pursue independent policies on a wide range of issues. Kurdish-Arab tensions have already grown so severe that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made an unexpected trip to Iraq to urge both sides to back away from a dangerous confrontation. General Ray Odierno, the top US commander in Iraq, admitted that the Arab-Kurdish feud — especially over the status of Kirkuk — is the “number one driver of instabilities” in the country.15

Kurdish Violence leads to Iraqi Civil War

Independent Kurdistan would seek to expand – Kurds spread throughout Middle East

Carpenter 9(Tom, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO institute, *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 20(4), pgs 24-26)dc

Despite its economic and political achievements, there is almost no prospect for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan. Washington opposes such a step, fearing that proclaiming Kurdish independence would not only lead to further fragmentation of Iraq but would antagonize all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors, especially Turkey. That is a legitimate concern. The underlying problem is that the Kurds are the largest nationality in the world without an officially recognized state. Although the British government promised the Kurds a homeland following the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, London reneged on that commitment, and Kurdish territory was divided among Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Any talk of an independent Kurdistan sets off alarm bells in Tehran, Damascus, and especially Ankara, since fully 50 percent of Kurds live in Turkey. Ankara is already less than pleased with the existence of a de facto Kurdish state in Iraq.9 And Turkish leaders have reason to be uneasy. The Turkish military has waged a war for some two-and-a-half decades against Kurdish secessionists, led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Fighting flared during 2007, with PKK fighters striking targets inside Turkey and then taking refuge across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara’s patience finally ran out in late 2007, and Turkish military forces launched attacks on some of those sanctuaries. Turkey had actually threatened a much larger operation, and Washington feared that the incursions could lead to a full-scale war between Turkish military units and the Peshmerga. US officials prevailed upon Ankara to limit its military operations in exchange for US intelligence and other assistance against the PKK and a commitment from Iraqi Kurdish leaders to take action against PKK activities in their territory.10 The situation became especially tense when Turkey delayed withdrawing its forces until March 2008. There were also indications that those troops were targeting Iraqi Kurdish installations as well as PKK enclaves, and at one point Kurdish Peshmerga forces surrounded a Turkish unit and threatened to open fire.11 After the Turkish withdrawal, angry Iraqi Kurds vowed to fight any future incursion — creating the prospect of a collision, since Ankara stated that its troops would return if the PKK establishes bases in Iraqi Kurdistan from which to attack targets inside Turkey.12 The potential for a major dust-up with Turkey over the PKK is not the only situation in which Kurdistan could be the catalyst for a regional crisis Another flash point involves the future political status of the city of Kirkuk and its oil riches.

Iraq civil war spill over

Civil war would cause Middle East instability

Bowen 6 (Jeremy, BBC Middle East editor, Rage and devotion, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4741616.stm>, 23 February 2006) CGW

In the Middle East, politics and religion are so connected that often they are the same. A lot now depends on the Shia leaders, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top religious leader, and the radical nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who broke off a trip to Lebanon to fly home as soon as he heard what had happened in Samarra. They have both called for national unity, and for Shia people to defend themselves if the authorities cannot. They live in a culture where it is natural to express rage and sadness, collectively, on the streets. But their challenge for the leaders is to control and channel the anger, to let it be expressed but not to get out of control. A civil war in Iraq would destroy the chances of the elected central government, which will be led and dominated by Shias when eventually it is formed. Civil war could lead to the break-up of the country, and would export even more instability and violence across the wider Middle East and beyond. That is why most Iraqis, of all sides, do not want one - and why some extremists do, and are trying as hard as they can to make it happen.

**Once a civil war erupts other regions will be drawn into the conflict**

**Clemons 10(Steve Clemons the director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, The Washington Note,  2/01/10)**[**http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/02/iraqs\_coming\_ci/**](http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/02/iraqs_coming_ci/)**JVT**

As Iraq tilts towards March 7th elections, there are disconcerting trends unfolding inside the Maliki-run government that portend serious problems and potentially civil war in the not distant future.  **Iraq expert and military affairs specialist Tom Ricks recently commented on Wolf Blitzer's Situation Room on CNN that he believed that there was a 50-50 chance Iraq would erupt in civil war, and a 10-15% chance that the growing tensions in and around Iraq could become a regional war involving several of the other major states around Iraq.**  Part of the growing trouble inside Iraq stems from the growing sense that politically empowered Shiites in the Iraq Government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are still carrying on campaigns against Sunni political interests.

An Iraqi civil war will draw the middle east into the conflict

**Dreyfuss 10** (Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor investigative journalist in Alexandria, Virginia, specializing in politics and national security, author of Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam, contributor to Rolling Stone, The American Prospect, and Mother Jones. Middle East Online 2-22-10)  <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37401> JVT

**And if another lethal insurgency erupts, pitting Sunnis, dissidents, Baathists and even a revived Al Qaeda in Iraq against the government, countrywide violence could draw Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others into the fight**. After all, Iran is not the only country backing allies in Iraqi politics; Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf states are, on a smaller scale, backing Allawi and various Sunni candidates, an Iraqi source reports. "The Saudis don't operate directly," he says. "They operate through a route of deniability, using Lebanese businessmen, environmental charities, an assortment of princes and so on**."   At its core, the crisis in Iraq is also a struggle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq and across the oil-rich Persian Gulf. As the United States withdraws its forces, and as Iran builds up political, military and economic influence, Iraq will likely be pulled into Iran's orbit**. "It's almost like watching gravity work," says CAP's Brian Katulis. Barring the outbreak of civil war, the most likely outcome of a rigged election in Iraq would look very much like the coalition that governs Iraq today, but it would be even more closely aligned with Tehran. "I think we'll see an increasingly authoritarian regime with close ties to Iran," says Visser.   **As the deadline for pulling US forces out of Iraq gets closer, American influence is likely to wane. The fact that Biden, Petraeus, Odierno and Hill couldn't persuade Maliki to reverse the Chalabi-imposed ban is a sign that the United States is no longer calling the shots in Baghdad**. In fact, there is rising awareness in Washington about the inevitability of Iran's growing power in Iraq, coupled with the realization that there is little or nothing the United States can do to reverse it

Iraq civil war spill over

**Iraqi instability causes spill over, Turkish intervention, and hinders Turkish progress.**

**Barkey 9**(Henri, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment,<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/preventing_conflict_kurdistan.pdf> )dc

.**Kurdish secession, resistance to Kurdish claims on Kirkuk, and other scenarios could plunge Iraq into an all-out civil war.** The second potential source involves the rising tensions in Turkey between the state and its Kurdish minority. **Ankara perceives the KRG and the Kurdish successes in northern Iraq as potential threats to its insurgent group with approximately half of its fighters based in northern Iraq. Turks were adamant in trying to prevent the emergence of a robust, autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq**. This has already emerged as a major irritant in U.S. relations with Turkey, a NATO ally; last year, Washington, under tremendous pressure from Ankara, provided Turkey with a green light to engage in cross-border military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. Since December 2007**, Turkish aircraft have been staging continuous, though contained, operations against the PKK, supplemented by one ground operation. Those operations risk escalating into a Turkish–Iraqi Kurdish conflict with a full-fledged Turkish intervention that could cause other neighbors to do the same.** The third source of conflict is the reaction of Iranian and Syrian Kurds to developments in their neighborhoods. **Tehran and Damascus have long opposed Iraqi Kurdish aspirations and have cooperated with each other and with Turkey to stymie Kurdish advances in Iraq. Although Iranian and Syrian Kurds have not received as much attention as their counterparts in Turkey and Iraq, they too have been influenced by the regional events. Increased Kurdish mobilization and instances of violence in both Syria and Iran have alarmed these two regimes. They too may choose to intervene if Iraqi developments are perceived to threaten their territorial integrity**. For the United States, all three of these potential causes of conflict give rise to a slew of problems. Political instability, violence, or all-out civil war in Iraq would certainly interfere with the plans to withdraw U.S. forces, as would intervention from neighboring states. **Civil war would have disastrous consequences for U.S. interests in the region as a whole. A Turkey that turns inward because of its inability to peacefully resolve this domestic challenge is unlikely to play either a constructive role in the Middle East or succeed in joining the EU, a goal that has had bipartisan support in Washington for more than two decades**. For those reasons, the Obama administration should view the Kurdish question, writ large, as central to a successful and responsible disengagement from Iraq and, ultimately, to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

ME instability Leads to extinction

Middle Eastern war is on the brink, just needs a spark

Freedberg 10 (Sydney J, @ National Journal, “national security”, <http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/is-war-brewing-in-the-middle-e.php>, May 3, 2010) CGW

According to some senior Israeli officials, Syria has passed Scud missiles to the Hezbollah group in Lebanon; if true, the source of the missiles would almost certainly be Iran. That represents a serious potential escalation in the arming of Hezbollah, giving the Islamic group the capability to strike any Israeli city. As pressure mounts on Tehran from the United States and Europe to curb its uranium enrichment, history suggests Iranian leaders will be looking for a means to change the subject and deflect the pressure. Conflict between Israel and any of its neighbors, or with terrorist proxies of Iran such as Hezbollah and Hamas, does the job nicely by inciting anti-Western outrage on the Arab street and forcing the United States to stand with Israel and against its regional Arab allies. So, are we seeing the early signs of another looming conflict in the Middle East? What other signs should the U.S. administration be on the watch for? What impact might such a conflict have on U.S.-Arab relations, on U.S. attempts to raise pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, on U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan, and on the war against Al Qaeda? Or are these reports overblown, and this is just another spike of rhetoric and empty threats?

The Middle East instability leads to extinction  
**Holbrooke** 6 (Richard, Former US ambassador to UN, , Guns of August, <http://www.nysun.com/article/37776>, 8/11/06) CGW

Two full-blown crises, in Lebanon and Iraq, are merging into a single emergency. A chain reaction could spread quickly almost anywhere between Cairo and Bombay. Turkey is talking openly of invading northern Iraq to deal with Kurdish terrorists based there. Syria could easily get pulled into the war in southern Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to support Hezbollah, even though the governments in Cairo and Riyadh hate that organization. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of giving shelter to Al Qaeda and the Taliban; there is constant fighting on both sides of that border. NATO's own war in Afghanistan is not going well. India talks of taking punitive action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind the Bombay bombings. Uzbekistan is a repressive dictatorship with a growing Islamic resistance. The only beneficiaries of this chaos are Iran, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Iraqi Shiite leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, who last week held the largest anti-American, anti-Israel demonstration in the world in the very heart of Baghdad, even as 6,000 additional American troops were rushing into the city to "prevent" a civil war that has already begun. This combination of combustible elements poses the greatest threat to global stability since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, history's only nuclear superpower confrontation. The Cuba crisis, although immensely dangerous, was comparatively simple: It came down to two leaders and no war. In 13 days of brilliant diplomacy, John F. Kennedy induced Nikita Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. Kennedy was deeply influenced by Barbara Tuchman's classic,"The Guns of August," which recounted how a seemingly isolated event 92 summers ago — an assassination in Sarajevo by a Serb terrorist — set off a chain reaction that led in just a few weeks to World War I. There are vast differences between that August and this one. But Tuchman ended her book with a sentence that resonates in this summer of crisis: "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit." Preventing just such a trap must be the highest priority of American policy. Unfortunately, there is little public sign that the president and his top advisers recognize how close we are to a chain reaction, or that they have any larger strategy beyond tactical actions.

**Middle East Power Vacuum**

**Middle eastern nations are preparing for power vacuum**

**The Guardian 10**(2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending)dc>

A recent arms deal  between Russia and Syria has raised the prospect of a new cold war in the Middle East. Foreign Policy's Josh Landis, for example, suggests that unconditional US support for Israel will draw Moscow back into its pre-1989 role as supporter and arms supplier for the enemies of Tel Aviv and Washington.  Yet **Russia's return to Syria, whether it be the sale of MiG-29s or building a naval dock on the Syrian coast, is not the action of a superpower challenging US hegemony as it was in 1945-89 but rather an assertive regional power taking advantage of the emerging power vacuum in the region**. Instead of a new bi-polar cold war, **regional powers such as Russia and Turkey are increasing their influence at the United States' expense**.  The idea of a new cold war has gained currency in some quarters for the wrong reasons. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad himself told La Repubblica last week that "Russia is reasserting itself. And the cold war is just a natural reaction to the attempt by America to dominate the world".  In the same interview he asserted that **there was a new triple alliance between Syria, Turkey and Iran – part of a "northern alliance" that Damascus has been trying to construct against Israel and the US – with Russia now cast in the role as superpower benefactor.**  As leader of a small power attempting to defy the global hegemon, it is in Assad's interests to exaggerate the strength of such an alliance. Yet no such cohesive united bloc actually exists. Russia is pursuing a realist regional agenda, ensuring it can maximise its influence without unnecessarily confronting the US – a cornerstone of Dmitry Medvedev's foreign policy. A recent spat with Tehran over Russian support for Washington's new UN sanctions on Iran hardly suggests a united anti-American/anti-Israeli front.  Turkey, too, is not tying itself to any camp. Damascus may regard Ankara's rekindled relationship with Iraq, Iran and Syria as crucial for any new alignment, but Turkey's "zero problems with neighbours" policy is not limited to those states on its southern border. Turkey is seeking influence and markets for its rapidly expanding economy across the region, including Israel.  Though prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rhetoric has been increasingly populist and anti-Israeli since the Gaza war of 2008-2009, the deep commercial, economic and military ties between the Turkish and Israeli establishments show no signs of receding. Like Russia, **Turkey is pursuing its own interests by asserting its influence in the whole Middle East**, not just as the lynchpin of an anti-America/Israel bloc.  Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely, **the region's international relations are changing. US power is waning.**

Troop Withdrawal Solves Iraqi Instability

Removal of troops stops Civil War and promotes Regional Stability

Riedel 7 (Bruce, National security advisor- Financial Times, July 23, 2007) CGW

A clear US commitment to a complete, irreversible withdrawal from Iraq may now be the only way to develop a regional concert of powers that could work with Iraqis to try to stabilize the country and cauterize the conflict. The continuing US and British occupation is a roadblock to that co-operation. The galvanising impact of a decision to depart unequivocally can be the last best chance at preventing the conflict from boiling over beyond Iraq to the whole region. How we design and implement our departure is our last significant remaining leverage. There is no guarantee that this will work, but geopolitical self-interest may encourage wary co-operation from Iraq's neighbors. Iran does not need to invade Iraq to have influence there. The Saudis and Jordanians do not have the military capability to invade. The Syrians are not interested and, in spite of some sabre-rattling, the Turks do not need more Kurds to try to pacify. Focusing on ending the occupation and bringing order in its wake may be the best chance left to end our involvement while keeping the civil war contained to Iraq. None of Iraq's neighbors was eager for the invasion four years ago, with the possible exception of Kuwait. All of them saw the US and UK occupation as inherently destabilizing, especially if it looked permanent. All are now worried that the civil war in Iraq will serve as a breeding ground for terror and violence that will be increasingly exported to their own countries. Iraq is already a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists who have attacked Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and for PKK terrorists who attack Turkey. Now al-Qaeda is threatening to attack Iran for meddling on the side of the Shia in Iraq against the Sunni Arab minority. But these countries cannot work constructively with an American occupation army - especially not Iran, which has the most capability to be a decisive force given its intimate ties to virtually every Shia and Kurdish politician, its geography and its economic connections. Most of all Tehran wants to see the US leave Iraq for good so it cannot be a base against Iran. The Saudis and Jordanians find it both difficult and less urgent to engage when the occupation is open-ended. The Syrians find Iraq to be a good place to keep America bogged down and less threatening. The Turks fear that a long-term American presence encourages Kurdish -separatism. These calculations may well change once there is a clear time-line for complete American and British withdrawal and the end of occupation. At that point it is in the self interest of each of the neighbors to concentrate on shaping post-occupation Iraq and especially preventing the terrorist threat that instability creates. All Iraq's neighbors will find it easier to engage when it is not in support of an occupation army. None will want to see another gain direct control of part or all of Iraq. All will want to avoid a power vacuum for al-Qaeda and other terrorists. We should seek to build on the narrow moment of time when those self-interests might be put into harmony to stabilize Iraq. For Iraqis as well it is imperative that the US make clear now what it should have been saying from day one: we plan no permanent military presence in Iraq, no bases and no special relationship. We want a fully independent Iraq, not a client state. We should abandon any thought of staying in Iraq for decades as if it were South Korea or Germany. When we suggest such it only rallies more recruits for al-Qaeda, especially foreign suicide bombers. The best way to isolate al-Qaeda is to pull the occupation out from under it. The United Nations should be invited to convene and administer a contact group of the neighbors that would address several key issues in conjunction with the Iraqi government. At the top of the list would be agreement to assist rather than exploit the peaceful and orderly withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Iraq, agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, agreement to assist the government of Iraq in controlling and stabilizing its territory and funding of a major assistance package. These are key issues for the transition from occupation to post-occupation. For the US it is obviously important to get help in making the withdrawal of our forces as smooth as possible. We should try to leave behind a regional order that has a chance for stability.

Iraqi Stability Key To Middle East Stability

Victory in Iraq is key to Middle East stability  
Wall Street Journal 6 **(**What if we lose?, <http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/what-if-we-lose/>, 3/22**/**06**)** CGW

Broader Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America’s deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit that would vanish if we left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with the aim of helping young radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Syria would feel free to return to its predations in Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new calculation of how much it could afford to support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a minimum stop aiding us in our pursuit of Islamists.

American withdrawal from Iraq will offer long term benefits to the Middle East.

Perry 9 (Walter; Senior Information Scientist at RAND, *Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies*; 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG882.pdf) CH

The withdrawal’s effect on the region need not harm U.S. interests. While the Middle East will continue to face a number of serious challenges in the wake of the U.S. drawdown from Iraq, many of these challenges will either have existed or grown with the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq or have existed independently of a U.S. presence in Iraq. Moreover, the withdrawal’s effect on key regional challenges, such as the spread of terrorism, is likely to be marginal. A U.S. drawdown may even improve the prospects for more-extensive regional and international cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. It could also enhance the development of a regional security structure that could, in time, reduce the requirement imposed on the United States to provide security. The withdrawal could also improve the prospect of garnering greater regional support, particularly from wealthy Gulf states, to contribute more resources to promote Iraqi stability and to support international organizations assisting with the Iraqi refugee populations.

US Withdrawal Key To Regional Stability

**US Withdrawal From Iraq key to stop Civil War and Regional Stability**

Riedel 7 (Bruce, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Samuel Berger, National Security Adviser, “America Must Pull Out of Iraq to Contain Civil War”, The Brookings Institute, July 23, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0723iraq\_riedel.aspx,) ACW

A clear US commitment to a complete, irreversible withdrawal from Iraq may now be the only way to develop a regional concert of powers that could work with Iraqis to try to stabilise the country and cauterise the conflict. The continuing US and British occupation is a roadblock to that co-operation. The galvanising impact of a decision to depart unequivocally can be the last best chance at preventing the conflict from boiling over beyond Iraq to the whole region. How we design and implement our departure is our last significant remaining leverage. There is no guarantee that this will work, but geopolitical self-interest may encourage wary co-operation from Iraq's neighbours. Iran does not need to invade Iraq to have influence there. The Saudis and Jordanians do not have the military capability to invade. The Syrians are not interested and, in spite of some sabre-rattling, the Turks do not need more Kurds to try to pacify. Focusing on ending the occupation and bringing order in its wake may be the best chance left to end our involvement while keeping the civil war contained to Iraq. None of Iraq's neighbours was eager for the invasion four years ago, with the possible exception of Kuwait. All of them saw the US and UK occupation as inherently destabilising, especially if it looked permanent. All are now worried that the civil war in Iraq will serve as a breeding ground for terror and violence that will be increasingly exported to their own countries. Iraq is already a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists who have attacked Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and for PKK terrorists who attack Turkey. Now al-Qaeda is threatening to attack Iran for meddling on the side of the Shia in Iraq against the Sunni Arab minority. But these countries cannot work constructively with an American occupation army - especially not Iran, which has the most capability to be a decisive force given its intimate ties to virtually every Shia and Kurdish politician, its geography and its economic connections. Most of all Tehran wants to see the US leave Iraq for good so it cannot be a base against Iran. The Saudis and Jordanians find it both difficult and less urgent to engage when the occupation is open-ended. The Syrians find Iraq to be a good place to keep America bogged down and less threatening. The Turks fear that a long-term American presence encourages Kurdish -separatism. These calculations may well change once there is a clear time-line for complete American and British withdrawal and the end of occupation. At that point it is in the self interest of each of the neighbours to concentrate on shaping post-occupation Iraq and especially preventing the terrorist threat that instability creates. All Iraq's neighbours will find it easier to engage when it is not in support of an occupation army. None will want to see another gain direct control of part or all of Iraq. All will want to avoid a power vacuum for al-Qaeda and other terrorists. We should seek to build on the narrow moment of time when those self-interests might be put into harmony to stabilise Iraq. For Iraqis as well it is imperative that the US make clear now what it should have been saying from day one: we plan no permanent military presence in Iraq, no bases and no special relationship**.** We want a fully independent Iraq, not a client state. We should abandon any thought of staying in Iraq for decades as if it were South Korea or Germany. When we suggest such it only rallies more recruits for al-Qaeda, especially foreign suicide bombers. The best way to isolate al-Qaeda is to pull the occupation out from under it. The United Nations should be invited to convene and administer a contact group of the neighbours that would address several key issues in conjunction with the Iraqi government. At the top of the list would be agreement to assist rather than exploit the peaceful and orderly withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Iraq, agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, agreement to assist the government of Iraq in controlling and stabilising its territory and funding of a major assistance package. These are key issues for the transition from occupation to post-occupation. For the US it is obviously important to get help in making the withdrawal of our forces as smooth as possible. We should try to leave behind a regional order that has a chance for stability.

**US withdrawal will promote regional stability in the middle east**

**Perry et. Al 9** (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

There are no strong indicators that point to terrorism being a serious threat to regional stability as a result of the withdrawal. Indeed, the salafi-jihadi threat is already in decline because “Iraq fatigue” has set in, and many of the most dangerous actors have already moved to other parts of the region, particularly the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. A U.S. drawdown may even improve the prospects for more-extensive regional and international cooperation on both counterterrorism efforts and efforts to build a broader regional security system. The withdrawal could also improve the prospects for greater regional support, particularly from wealthy Persian Gulf states, by, for example, encouraging such states to provide financial support to international organizations that assist Iraqi refugee populations across the region, particularly in Jordan and Syria.

US Withdrawal Key To Regional Stability

**Historical examples suggest that long term regional stability is a result of US withdrawal**

Ramberg 6/21/09 (Bennett, Ph.D Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism expert, “The Precedents for Withdrawal” Romberg, Bennett, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr2009, 88(2) ACW)

In November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq agreed that U.S. troops would leave Iraq by 2011--eight years after the U.S. invasion. For some, this is much too soon. These critics argue that events on the ground, not an artificial deadline, should govern the pull-out and that, in any case, a residual force should remain for decades. But as Washington ponders how long to stay in Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of the United States' withdrawal from other conflict-riven countries: Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, Lebanon in the 1980s, and Somalia in the 1990s. Even though Washington's commitment to these situations differed in its degree, disengagement eventually proved to be the right policy for the United States. Abandonment damaged Washington's credibility at first, but it was the best way to protect U.S. interests in the long run. The dominoes did not fall after the United States left Southeast Asia; Moscow did not fill the power vacuum in Lebanon; Washington has been largely unaffected by the failed state of Somalia. In each case, after the United States exited, its adversaries became preoccupied with consolidating power and embroiled themselves in conflicts with neighboring countries. A regional stability of sorts emerged, leaving Washington's vital interests intact. For the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, U.S. withdrawal may have been a mixed blessing. But from the United States' perspective, the costs of withdrawal were less than those of staying and lower than what had been feared. Extensive, long-term nation building paid off in Germany and Japan after 1945. But Iraq is different. Divided and unstable, it has more in common with Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia. It is those who make the case for staying in Iraq who bear the burden of proving why history would unfold differently this time.

It’s empirically proven that withdrawal from conflict-filled countries has benefited in the long run. [Repeated Card]

Ramberg 9 (Bennett; former member of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64651/bennett-ramberg/the-precedents-for-withdrawal) CH

In November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq agreed that U.S. troops would leave Iraq by 2011 -- eight years after the U.S. invasion. For some, this is much too soon. These critics argue that events on the ground, not an artificial deadline, should govern the pullout and that, in any case, a residual force should remain for decades. U.S. Withdrawl But as Washington ponders how long to stay in Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of the United States' withdrawal from other conflict-riven countries: Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, Lebanon in the 1980s, and Somalia in the 1990s. Even though Washington's commitment to these situations differed in its degree, disengagement eventually proved to be the right policy for the United States. Abandonment damaged Washington's credibility at first, but it was the best way to protect U.S. interests in the long run. The dominoes did not fall after the United States left Southeast Asia; Moscow did not fill the power vacuum in Lebanon; Washington has been largely unaffected by the failed state of Somalia. In each case, after the United States exited, its adversaries became preoccupied with consolidating power and embroiled themselves in conflicts with neighboring countries. A regional stability of sorts emerged, leaving Washington's vital interests intact. For the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, U.S. withdrawal may have been a mixed blessing. But from the United States' perspective, the costs of withdrawal were less than those of staying and lower than what had been feared. Extensive, long-term nation building paid off in Germany and Japan after 1945. But Iraq is different. Divided and unstable, it has more in common with Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia. It is those who make the case for staying in Iraq who bear the burden of proving why history would unfold differently this time.

Withdrawal Key to Iraqi Stability

Iraq will be at peace once troops are incrementally withdrawn.

Diamond 5 (Larry, coeditor of International Forum for Democratic Studies, *Journal of Democracy*, 9-23, p. 22-3) eh

Even such an incremental and partial success, however, will require rapid progress on two important fronts. First, the political arena must be widened so that all major Iraqi groups—including Sunni nationalists, Islamists, and Ba'athists not charged with a specific crime—participate in the electoral process. A stable and even partially democratic Iraq will not be possible unless all major groups decide that they have more to gain from the arena of peaceful politics than they do from violent insurgency and terrorism. Second, for violence to become a less plausible and less attractive political option, it must be met with a vigorous and vigilant response by a reconstructed Iraqi state. The most fundamental requirement of any state is a relative monopoly on the use of force. Until the army, national guard, police force, and other elements of the new security sector are sufficiently numerous, trained, armed, equipped, organized, and mobilized to establish law and order in the country, no political stability—democratic or otherwise—will be possible. Until the Iraqi state achieves that level of coherence and capacity, international (primarily U.S.) forces will need to provide the principal bulwark against a total breakdown of order and a possible descent into civil war. While fending off total chaos, however, the presence of these forces is also a constant stimulus to insurgency. Until foreign forces are fully withdrawn from its soil, Iraq will never truly be at peace. Such are the dilemmas and contradictions at the heart of the intrinsically difficult task of building democracy after conflict.

Withdrawal will mean a better environment in Iraq.

Gamel 10 (Kim, Associated Press staff writer, AP, June 14, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5h4HFnHKD2sKhm15tIt-VHbLmKSgwD9GB94O80) eh

BAGHDAD — The U.S. military is removing tens of millions of pounds of hazardous waste accumulated during seven years of war amid concerns about America's environmental legacy in Iraq, officials said Monday. Brig. Gen. Kendall Cox said the military spent $55 million last year to build two treatment centers for waste and has numerous collection centers around the country. Officials acknowledged that the effort has begun late in the conflict that started with the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 but expressed confidence in the measures being taken to eliminate dangerous materials such as contaminated soil and old oil. "The systems that are in place are recent in terms of disposal of waste materials," U.S. military spokesman Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza said. "In some cases there are seven years of materials ... that we want to make sure are accounted for properly in terms of mitigation and disposition." The waste clean up effort is part of the preparations for a massive handover efforts ahead of a deadline for a full U.S. withdrawal by the end of next year. Cox insisted the process would be completed by that time. "We have now moved an excess of 300 million pounds of hazardous waste, which has been treated and disposed of," he said at a press conference. "We averaged 1.75 million pounds of hazardous waste disposed of in the first two quarters of this year." Troop numbers have dropped to around 85,000 from a peak of more than 170,000 during the height of violence, and the U.S. has relinquished control of 373 of the 500 bases it had in January 2008, the military said. The Times of London reported Monday that some toxic waste has turned up in open dumps and affected Iraqis who came into contact with it. Cox said he had seen no evidence of that, although some Iraqis had refused to use sewage lagoons at some of the bases that were handed over. The military adjusted by making sure they cleared the lagoons before leaving, he said. The U.S. military faces a massive logistics operation as it prepares to draw down to 50,000 forces this fall after ending combat operations by the end of August. Some American troops also have alleged they were exposed to toxic fumes because of military contractors' practice of burning tires and other waste in so-called outdoor burn pits.

Withdrawal Key to Iraqi Stability

American withdrawal and diplomacy would stabilize Iraq

Luttwak5 (Edward, Senior Fellow @ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement” February 2005 <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0512luttwak.pdf>) CGW

Given allthat has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country—while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conﬂicting promises about the country’s future to different parties. But once it has declared its ﬁrm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun—the calculus of other parties will change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more expose. States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement

**Removal of US troops improves regional stability.**

Serwer 10 (Daniel VP of peace and stability operations at USIP <http://www.usip.org/resources/iraq-time-change>) SM

The modest results so far from dialogue with and among **Iraq’s neighbors should not discourage the effort. If stabilizing Iraq becomes the clear U.S. priority,** there will be prospects for a functional forum involving the important regional actors. Such **a forum will be vital to developing a coordinated approach that leads to policy convergence, in particular on preventing support from flowing to extremists.** Iran and Syria are important to regional stability. The U.S. needs to prioritize its strategic interests with these two countries and decide what price it wants to pay for their cooperation. **Iran**, **which has been greatly strengthened by the Iraq crisis**, is discussed below. Syria is in a weaker position but may ask for the re-opening of talks on the Golan Heights. This has long been foreseen as part of the Middle East peace process. Syria does not appear to have linked Iraq to the Hariri investigation or to Lebanon, issues that should not be allowed to stand in the way of dialogue between the U.S. and Syria on Iraq. **It will be impossible to prevent violence spilling over to Iraq’s neighbors if the humanitarian crisis inside Iraq gets worse, creating more displaced people and refugees**. **The U.S. must take a leadership role in ensuring food, shelter, medical care and protection of people in areas where they are minorities**, as well as in neighboring countries. **This is both a moral imperative and a security requirement**. The plight of Iraq’s Christian, Yezidi Shabak and other minority communities merits particular attention. The **U.S. should also ensure that Iraq is not a threat to its neighbors by preventing its territory from being used as a base for terrorists, including those who act against Iran**, as well as against Turkey. **Increasing international community involvement in Iraq is important to preventing spillover.** **UN and EU presence are crucial,** both for the capabilities they bring and for the signal their engagement sends. The new UN Security Council resolution (1770) is a good step, but the UN is still hesitant. More needs to be done to enable it to execute its new responsibilities and the EU to bring its state-building talents to bear. The new UN mission chief in Iraq has a vital role, as does an enlarged EU presence.

Withdrawal Key to Iraqi Stability

**US Withdrawal would stop insurgent attacks and save resources.**

**Syracuse Peace Council 6**(2006, Oldest Grass Roots Peace and Social Justice Organization,<http://www.peacecouncil.net/iraq/talkingpoints.pdf)dc>

**The US invasion of Iraq was a crime. The US had no legal or moral right to occupy Iraq and has no right to determine its future. US withdrawal is the first step in a real peace process. Reduce the violence Over 30% of violent Iraqi deaths post-US invasion are due to US/Coalition forces. Much of the insurgent violence targets US military or Iraqi civilians working with the US (such as the police). A US withdrawal would end these causes of violence. End the economic, moral and human costs • over 600,000 Iraqi civilian deaths, over 3,000 US soldier deaths and tens of thousands seriously wounded • $350 billion US tax dollars spent, with a total cost estimated to grow to $1.2 trillion dollars • loss of civil liberties at home and a foreign policy endorsing torture endanger the security and humanity of our nation** Create a space for peace and negotiations Factions in Iraq cannot begin to negotiate a future for their country as long as the US imposes its own agenda and intervenes militarily. A US withdrawal would also show other countries that it is serious about peace in the Middle East.

Turn – Withdrawal will end insurgency

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

Wouldn't a U.S. withdrawal embolden the insurgency? No. If the occupation were to end, so, too, would the insurgency. After all, what the resistance movement has been resisting is the occupation. Who would the insurgents fight if the enemy left? When I asked Sunni Arab fighters and the clerics who support them why they were fighting, they all gave me the same one-word answer: intiqaam—revenge. Revenge for the destruction of their homes, for the shame they felt when Americans forced them to the ground and stepped on them, for the killing of their friends and relatives by U.S. soldiers either in combat or during raids.

Withdrawal causes Zarqawi’s movement to lose support

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

But what about the foreign jihadi element of the resistance? Wouldn't it be empowered by a U.S. withdrawal? The foreign jihadi element—commanded by the likes of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—is numerically insignificant; the bulk of the resistance has no connection to al-Qaeda or its offshoots. (Zarqawi and his followers have benefited greatly from U.S. propaganda blaming him for all attacks in Iraq, because he is now seen by Arabs around the world as more powerful than he is; we have been his best recruiting tool.) It is true that the Sunni resistance welcomed the foreign fighters (and to some extent still do), because they were far more willing to die than indigenous Iraqis were. But what Zarqawi wants fundamentally conflicts with what Iraqi Sunnis want: Zarqawi seeks re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate and a Manichean confrontation with infidels around the world, to last until Judgment Day; the mainstream Iraqi resistance just wants the Americans out. If U.S. forces were to leave, the foreigners in Zarqawi's movement would find little support—and perhaps significant animosity—among Iraqi Sunnis, who want wealth and power, not jihad until death. They have already lost much of their support: many Iraqis have begun turning on them. In the heavily Shia Sadr City foreign jihadis had burning tires placed around their necks. The foreigners have not managed to establish themselves decisively in any large cities. Even at the height of their power in Fallujah they could control only one neighborhood, the Julan, and they were hated by the city's resistance council. Today foreign fighters hide in small villages and are used opportunistically by the nationalist resistance. When the Americans depart and Sunnis join the Iraqi government, some of the foreign jihadis in Iraq may try to continue the struggle—but they will have committed enemies in both Baghdad and the Shiite south, and the entire Sunni triangle will be against them. They will have nowhere to hide. Nor can they merely take their battle to the West. The jihadis need a failed state like Iraq in which to operate. When they leave Iraq, they will be hounded by Arab and Western security agencies.

Turn – the best chance to fix Iraq is for a US withdrawal

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

What can the United States do to repair Iraq? There is no panacea. Iraq is a destroyed and fissiparous country. Iranians and Saudis I've spoken to worry that it might be impossible to keep Iraq from disintegrating. But they agree that the best hope of avoiding this scenario is if the United States leaves; perhaps then Iraqi nationalism will keep at least the Arabs united. The sooner America withdraws and allows Iraqis to assume control of their own country, the better the chances that Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari won't face sahil. It may be decades before Iraq recovers from the current maelstrom. By then its borders may be different, its vaunted secularism a distant relic. But a continued U.S. occupation can only get in the way.

Withdrawal Key to Iraqi Stability

**Withdrawal causes stabilization.**

**Schwartz 9**(Lowell, political scientist, Is Iraq Safe Yet?, March 5, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/03/05/PS.html>) eh

**The Obama administration's decision to withdraw the bulk of U**nited **S**tates **troops from Iraq over the next 19 months has sparked fears that Iraq will**once again**plunge into the wide-scale and debilitating violence** that it endured from 2004 to 2007. **Those fears are**, for the most part,**overblown.** There are good reasons to believe that **the level of stability achieved in Iraq can be maintained even without a large-scale US presence.**To understand why, it is important to know what else was going on inside Iraq in 2007, when President George W. Bush ordered the "surge" of 20,000 additional troops and General David H. Petraeus shifted US forces to a more aggressive strategy. For, although the surge was important, **two** other **factors played a critical role in bringing Iraq back from the brink.  First, Baghdad had been transformed into a Shiite-dominated city.**Although exact statistics are hard to come by, in 2003 approximately 35% of Baghdad's population was Sunni. Today, based upon the results of the recently held regional election, Baghdad is only 10% to 15% Sunni. This means that between one million and 1.5 million Sunnis have fled the capital. Most now are refugees in Jordan and Syria, and they are unlikely to be welcomed home anytime soon by the new Shiite elite running the country.  **The ethnic cleansing of many Baghdad neighborhoods** in 2006 and 2007 was deplorable. But it **made it difficult for Sunni insurgents to hide or blend in with the population, and deprived them of**logistical and financial **support. It also provided a degree of safety and security for the Shiite-led government**, which was largely the purpose of the well-organized campaign in the first place.  **The second** critical **factor** in stabilizing Iraq **was its** regional neighbors' recognition of, and in some cases support for, **Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.** This was a major change from the 2003-2005 period, when Iraq's Sunni neighbors, fearing the country's new Shiite elite, actively opposed the US occupation.  The multiple insurgencies that developed in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 were supported at least in part by money, materiel, and fighters from abroad. Suicide bombers from all over the Arab world crossed into the country through the porous Syrian and Jordanian borders. Regional governments may not have openly supported the insurgents, but they clearly avoided cracking down on the jihadist groups operating within their borders.  Foreign governments began to change these polities after al-Qaeda in Iraq bombed three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, killing 60 people. **Frightened governments in the region realized that the type of violence occurring almost daily in Iraq was starting to spill across the country's borders.**Soon after this incident, the highly effective Jordanian intelligence service began assisting the Iraqi government in going after the al-Qaeda network in Iraq. By June 2006, this effort was paying off. Jordanian agents were instrumental in providing the intelligence that enabled US forces to kill Abu Zarqawi, the mastermind of the Amman bombing.  Slowly but surely, throughout 2006 and 2007, Jordanian intelligence, working with Iraqi Sunni tribes, chipped away at al-Qaeda. Moreover, quiet efforts were made in the Arab world to curtail the recruitment and funding of suicide bombers headed to Iraq.  Iran's role in Iraq also changed. The Iranian government had been a major backer of Shiite militia groups, including the Mahdi Army, led by radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. But the Iranians also had close ties from the beginning with elements of the Shiite-led coalition government. In 2008, following Maliki's military operation to clean out militia groups in Basra, Iran's leaders seem to have decided that this two-faced strategy had run its course.  Iran then helped broker a ceasefire that was highly favorable to Maliki, and cemented his commanding position inside the Iraqi coalition government. No doubt Maliki's hard-line stance on the need for a firm timetable for the withdrawal of US troops was critical to Iran's decision to throw its weight behind him.  **Both the transformation of Baghdad into a Shiite city and the recognition and support of Iraq's neighbors for the country's new political order have been instrumental in stabilizing the country. These changes are likely to be permanent, and offer hope that the wide-scale violence that afflicted the country between 2003 and 2007 will not return after US forces depart.**

Withdrawal Key to Iraqi Stability

**Withdrawal will have positive impacts on security and stability.**

**Wehrey 10** (Frederic, senior policy analyst with RAND, The Iraq Effect, p.21-3,<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) EH

From the perspective of many Israelis, the erosion of and limitations on American power are serious strategic consequences of the Iraq War. Because Israel’s key interest is a strong America that can credibly intervene elsewhere if necessary, **many Israeli analysts worry that a prolonged U.S. presence in Iraq reduces the “U.S. appetite or ability to go to war” anywhere else and feel that the utility of the U.S. presence in Iraq has exhausted its use.** Israelis are primarily focused on Iraq to the extent that **it affects broader U.S. power projection in the region, particularly vis-à-vis Iran.** Thus, it should not be surprising that opinions on an American drawdown from Iraq hinge largely on beliefs about whether withdrawal will weaken or strengthen U.S. capabilities and regional influence.**However, improved security conditions in Iraq in 2008–2009 reduced such Israeli concerns about the negative effects of a drawdown, particularly with respect to U.S. credibility. Some analysts** also**question whether a U.S. drawdown will**significantly **damage American credibility because the U.S. presence in Iraq has already eroded it.** As one analyst put it, “what has happened in the last six years has created the perception of U.S. failure; withdrawal itself is not the test of the pudding, as the pudding is already sour.” **Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq.**For example, **an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq.** Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, **Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial. Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria.** For example, **some**Israeli officials **believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran**, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave. Most Israelis expected some sort of U.S. engagement and dialogue with Iran in the Obama administration. **An Israeli official believes that the U.S. drawdown will allow a serious U.S. attempt at engagement with Iran, or at least improve U.S. leverage in such a dialogue.** But Israelis, regardless of their political perspective, do not want to see talks with Iran drag out in a way that would allow the nuclear issue to remain unresolved.

Iraq Will be Stable post Withdrawal

History proves withdrawal doesn’t lead to disaster.

Ramberg 9 (Bennett, foreign policy writer and served in U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 88 Foreign Affair 2, p. 2) eh

In November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq agreed that U.S. troops would leave Iraq by 20U-- eight years after the U.S. invasion. For some, this is much too soon. These critics argue that events on the ground, not an artificial deadline, should govern the pull- out and that, in any case, a residual force should remain for decades. But as Washington ponders how long to stay in Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of the United States' withdrawal from other conflict-riven countries: Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, Lebanon in the 198os, and Somalia in the 199os. Even though Washington's commitment to these situations differed in its degree, disengagement eventually proved to be the right policy for the United States. Abandonment damaged Washington's credibility at first, but it was the best way to protect U.S. interests in the long run. The dominoes did not fall after the United States left Southeast Asia; Moscow did not fill the power vacuum in Lebanon; Washington has been largely unaffected by the failed state of Somalia. In each case, after the United States exited, its adversaries became preoccupied with consolidating power and embroiled themselves in conflicts with neighboring countries. A regional stability of sorts emerged, leaving Washing- ton's vital interests intact. For the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, U.S. withdrawal may have been a mixed blessing. But from the United States' perspective, the costs of withdrawal were less than those of staying and lower than what had been feared. Extensive, long-term nation building paid off in Germany and Japan after 1945. But Iraq is different. Divided and unsta- ble, it has more in common with Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia. It is those who make the case for staying in Iraq who bear the burden of proving why history would unfold differently this time.

Iraq is ready to be independent from the U.S.

Salazar 10 (John, news writer, Central Texas News, June 26, http://www.news8austin.com/content/headlines/272088/local-soldiers-prepare-to-lead-u-s--troops-out-of-iraq) eh

The 36th Infantry Division, headquartered in Austin, will take on a historic role in Iraq. For the first time since World War II, the Texas Division will deploy in a combat arena, but before they deploy, members of the Texas National Guard are preparing. And they’re doing it with passion and faith, with help from their commander, Maj. Gen. Eddy Spurgin. "I have a wonderful team surrounding me. I have a great staff, and we have some great soldiers to deploy with. So I am very confident, feel very good about deploying with this division headquarters," Spurgin said. Spurgin will lead 800 of his local troops into Iraq for a greater mission. His division will take over the command post in the southern portion of the country. There, Spurgin will be in charge of 8,000 military personnel who are leading the exit strategy to bring home a majority of the U.S. troops serving in Iraq. Spurgin said their presence comes with good will to the Iraqi people. "We're there to help them,” he said. “Eventually we're going to turn it over to them and their government. That has already taken place." These Central Texas troops are being prepared for more than combat. They’re learning a new way of life. Middle Eastern culture, customs and language are now a major part of troop preparation. Ghassan Mohialdeen is a cultural trainer and Iraqi native, hired by the government. He offers first hand insight to the people the military encounters in Iraq. "The most important thing is for this information to be helpful to succeed with their mission," Mohialdeen said. Sgt. Maj. Wilson Early has worn the U.S. uniform for 31 years, and has served all over the world. He said showing respect to the Iraqi people is the key to success. “It’s always very important to understand the culture of the environment that you’re operating in," Early said. “In order for us to do that, we have to understand their culture and their ways of living.” For now, the 36th Infantry Division trains with a crash course of culture, while rehearsing the old methods of war. The Texas National Guardsman are set to deploy in September for 10 months.

Iraqis are eager for U.S. departure.

Daly and Elshami 8 (Brendan, Communications Director for the Speaker of the HouseNadeam, Deputy Communications director and senior adviser to the Speaker of the House, Military & Government Database, July 21, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=8&sid=fc7d438a-88c8-47cd-a191-e9cdd07db3c3%40sessionmgr10&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=32X3648720481) eh

Washington, D.C -- Speaker Nancy Pelosi issued the following statement today reacting to comments by a spokesman for the Iraqi government, following a meeting between Senator Barack Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in which the spokesman said Iraqis would like to see the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by 2010. "President Bush has long maintained that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq should be governed by the situation in Iraq. It is now clear that the situation in Iraq is that Prime Minister al- Maliki and other Iraqi leaders want the withdrawal of our combat forces to be completed within a 16-month period, as recommended by Senator Obama. "The safety of our troops demands that their withdrawal be well- planned. President Bush should direct officials of his Administration to meet immediately with their Iraqi counterparts to draft plans for the secure withdrawal of our forces within the timetable endorsed last week and today by Iraq's leaders. The honorable, responsible, and safe redeployment of our troops out of Iraq will enable us to refocus on the real war on terrorism in Afghanistan and around the world."

Iraq Will be Stable post Withdrawal

Iraqi Government is slowly stabilizing, American presence is no longer needed.

Zakaria 9 (Fareed *Newsweek* 153(24) 6/15) SM

Today, Arab regimes paint a picture of Iraq that suggests that **American-led democracy has led to chaos, collapse and**, perhaps more crucially, **to Shiite tyranny**. This is a damning indictment because for the rest of the Arab world--which is overwhelmingly Sunni--it suggests that democracy is something to be feared. It is also a convenient lesson because it means that Arab dictators can postpone indefinitely any need to open up their own political systems. But the message does resonate: opinion polls show **that large majorities view Iraq as a failure and a sham democracy**. **It isn't.** There is much going on in Iraq that is admirable. Kurds, **Shiites and Sunnis are beginning to work out their differences through negotiation, not violence. Freedom of speech abounds. A new economy is taking shape**, in which entrepreneurs are creating jobs and a civil society. Elections are punishing thugs and theocrats who cannot deliver services and rewarding more-pragmatic forces. **The appeal of radical Islam is waning**. But without active American involvement, assistance and pressure, Iraq could well follow the trajectory of so many Third World democracies, where initial promise is overwhelmed by chaos and corruption. This was not Barack Obama's war. But it might well turn out to be his greatest legacy to the Arab world. Ambassador Ryan Crocker ended his distinguished stint in Iraq with these fitting words: "**In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came."**

**Withdrawal from Iraq is key – Iraq can solve its own problems.**

**Wilson 10** (Scott; staff writer, *The Washington Post,*May 27, 2010,<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html>) CH

**White House officials say Iraqis are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing the need for U.S. forces**. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains fractured.  Rival factions have yet to establish a new government, nearly three months after close national elections, and politicians have begun warning of a power vacuum as neighboring Iran works to influence the outcome. Adel Abdul Mahdi, one of Iraq's vice presidents, urged all parties this month to agree quickly on a new leader to head off attempts by "terrorist gangs to use the circumstances in the country to hurt the Iraqi people and the armed forces." ad\_icon  Some recent attacks have had sectarian hallmarks that Iraqis fear could revive the divisions within their security forces that existed during the 2006 civil war. Iraq's factions also have yet to resolve such essential long-term issues as how to share oil revenue among regions and how to settle territorial disputes rooted in history.  Speaking Saturday at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., **Obama said that the U.S. commitment to Iraq endures and that, as U.S. troops depart, "a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress." He also reiterated his definition of success: "an Iraq that provides no haven to terrorists; a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant**." On the day Obama spoke, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq dipped below the number in Afghanistan for the first time since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  **Biden**, once a leading skeptic of U.S. involvement in Iraq, is now among the country's most ardent cheerleaders. He **is seeking to balance Obama's determination to leave Iraq against growing concerns among some conservative critics that the current circumstances make a swift U.S. withdrawal too dangerous.  Senior administration officials counter that Iraq's fledgling democracy, now defended by improved domestic security forces, is sturdy enough to solve the country's problems with far fewer U.S. troops on hand.** 

**Iraq can hold itself together without US presence.**

**Wilson 10** (Scott; staff writer, *The Washington Post,*May 27, 2010,<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html>) CH

**Biden**said he feels largely vindicated today. But he **acknowledges that Iraq has moved "beyond what I thought at the time" because, he said, the various ethnic and sectarian-based parties all see value in participating in politics.  "The glue that holds the country together is oil**," Biden said. **"There's a lot of oil, the promise of it is real, there's a lot of gas, and it's all over the country.** Everyone has figured out that getting a legitimate share of a much bigger pie is a pretty good deal."  **Biden said he is confident that Iraqi leaders will agree to a government accepted by the electorate before the end of August.  Even if the parties are unsuccessful, he said, Iraq's interim government is functioning well.**He dismissed the predictions of escalating violence as the same "sky is falling" worries that accompanied the election-law stalemate and other issues that Iraqi leaders have resolved.

Iraq Will be Stable post Withdrawal

**The Iraqi military is ready for U.S. withdrawal.**

**Gompert 10** (David, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Security in Iraq, p. 32, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) eh

**The leadership of the Iraqi armed forces**—the army in particular—**has traditionally been an identity group itself.** To pose a threat to Iraq’s political order, the army couldcapture or depose the ruling party, or establish itself as the arbiter ofpolitical power by interfering in politics (e.g., by either warning or deposing any government that strays from the army’s version of order).It could also throw its weight behind or against political actors to suitits definition of national interests and order.**The Iraqi Armed Forces are now the second-strongest armed force in the country and, as U.S. forces leave, will become the strongest. The United States is making and will continue to make great efforts to improve all** ISF **[Iraqi Security Forces].** With the Iraqi Army expanding and improving asU.S. forces leave, the generals will have a growing ability to use force,including for political purposes—a danger exacerbated by weak civilianoversight of the MoD.40 Of course, having this capability does notmean that it will be used: It depends on how professional, responsible,and accepting of legitimate political oversight the army is—somethingover which the U.S. military has some, though ebbing, influence.

**Security and stability enable the U.S. to reduce its presence in Iraq.**

**Perry 9** (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, p. 3 Preface, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG882.pdf>) eh

**Security has improved dramatically in Iraq since 2007; both the U.S. and the Iraqi governments want to see the U.S. presence reduced and have the Iraqis assume a greater role in providing for public security. These developments have brought the United States to a critical juncture in Iraq. The** emerging **challenge is to continue a withdrawal of U.S. forces while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region.**

Iraq won’t fall to terrorists

Carpenter 7 (Ted Galen, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Cato Institute, *before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, January 11, 2007 <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) CS

Administration officials and other supporters of the war have warned repeatedly that a "premature" withdrawal of U.S. forces would enable Al-Qaeda to turn Iraq into a sanctuary to plot and launch attacks against the United States and other Western countries. But Al-Qaeda taking over Iraq is an extremely improbable scenario. The Iraq Study Group put the figure of foreign fighters at only 1,300, a relatively small component of the Sunni insurgency against U.S. forces. It strains credulity to imagine 1,300 fighters (and foreigners at that) taking over and controlling a country of 26 million people. The challenge for Al-Qaeda would be even more daunting than those raw numbers suggest. The organization does have some support among the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, but opinion even among that segment of the population is divided. A September 2006 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found that 94 percent of Sunnis had a somewhat or highly unfavorable attitude toward Al Qaeda. As the violence of Al Qaeda attacks has mounted, and the victims are increasingly Iraqis, not Americans, many Sunnis have turned against the terrorists. There have even been a growing number of reports during the past year of armed conflicts between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters. The PIPA poll also showed that 98 percent of Shiite respondents and 100 percent of Kurdish respondents had somewhat or very unfavorable views of Al Qaeda. The notion that a Shiite-Kurdish-dominated government would tolerate Iraq becoming a safe haven for Al Qaeda is improbable on its face. And even if U.S. troops left Iraq, the successor government would continue to be dominated by the Kurds and Shiites, since they make up more than 80 percent of Iraq’s population and, in marked contrast to the situation under Saddam Hussein, they now control the military and police. That doesn’t suggest a reliable safe haven for Al Qaeda.

Iraq Will be Stable post Withdrawal

**Withdrawing earlier has little effect on level of danger.**

**Gompert 10** (David, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Security in Iraq, p. 36, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) eh

Finally, **it is important to understand the possible effects on the dangers to Iraq’s internal security and stability if U.S. forces were to leave considerably earlier than provided for in the U.S. administration’s schedule.** For example, **if**an Iraqi referendum rejected the U.S.-Iraq status-of-forces agreement, **U.S. forces** might **have to leave in 2010,** as opposed to the end of 2011. Again, **this is unlikely to affect the danger of extremist terror. While it could heighten all of the dangers involving the main opposition groups** and the GoI, **the effects of earlier withdrawal could vary.** Given that JAM strongly opposes U.S. military occupation and, moreover, is already overmatched by the ISF, **accelerated U.S. troop departure would have little effect on it.**At the other extreme, accelerated withdrawal from contested Sunni-Shi’a or Kurdish-Arab parts of Iraq could deepen the security gap and increase danger.

The Sunni population is not able to overthrow

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

But if American troops aren't in Baghdad, what's to stop the Sunnis from launching an assault and seizing control of the city? Sunni forces could not mount such an assault. The preponderance of power now lies with the majority Shiites and the Kurds, and the Sunnis know this. Sunni fighters wield only small arms and explosives, not Saddam's tanks and helicopters, and are very weak compared with the cohesive, better armed, and numerically superior Shiite and Kurdish militias. Most important, Iraqi nationalism—not intramural rivalry—is the chief motivator for both Shiites and Sunnis. Most insurgency groups view themselves as waging a muqawama—a resistance—rather than a jihad. This is evident in their names and in their propaganda. For instance, the units commanded by the Association of Muslim Scholars are named after the 1920 revolt against the British. Others have names such as Iraqi Islamic Army and Flame of Iraq. They display the Iraqi flag rather than a flag of jihad. Insurgent attacks are meant primarily to punish those who have collaborated with the Americans and to deter future collaboration.

Iraq is too nationalist to allow takeover

Rosen 5 (Nir, Writer, December, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/1/>) ELJ

Would Iran effectively take over Iraq? No. Iraqis are fiercely nationalist—even the country's Shiites resent Iranian meddling. (It is true that some Iraqi Shiites view Iran as an ally, because many of their leaders found safe haven there when exiled by Saddam—but thousands of other Iraqi Shiites experienced years of misery as prisoners of war in Iran.) Even in southeastern towns near the border I encountered only hostility toward Iran.

Iraq’s moderate political stability makes it easier to withdraw troops

Zakaria 10 (Fareed Zakaria 3.5.10 Foreign Affairs Analysist, CNN http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/03/05/zakaria.iraq.turning.point/index.html?iref=allsearch)ESY

CNN: What impact do you think the election will have on the Obama administration's plan to withdraw troops from Iraq? Zakaria: The greater the political stability in Iraq, the easier it will be for the withdrawal to proceed apace. Right now I don't see a major obstacle to continuing the withdrawal. But on my Sunday program, David Petraeus hinted for the first time that there could be an arrangement reached with the Iraqi government under which a small contingent of American troops stay in Iraq for a longer period of time.

Iraq Will be Stable post Withdrawal

Iran will not invade Iraq after US withdrawal.

Englehardt 8(Tom, Teaching Fellow at UC-Berkeley, Nation Report’s Tom Dispatch, 3/20)dc

But that influence would have its distinct limits. If Iran overplayed its hand even in a rump Shiite Iraq, it would soon enough find itself facing some version of the situation that now confronts the Americans. As Robert Dreyfuss wrote in the Nation recently, "[D]espite Iran's enormous influence in Iraq, most Iraqis -- even most Iraqi Shiites -- are not pro-Iran. On the contrary, underneath the ruling alliance in Baghdad, there is a fierce undercurrent of Arab nationalism in Iraq that opposes both the U.S. occupation and Iran's support for religious parties in Iraq." The al-Qaedan and Iranian "threats" are, at one and the same time, bogeymen used by the Bush administration to scare Americans who might favor withdrawal and, paradoxically, realities that a continued military presence only encourages. We’re like the famed guest who came to dinner, broke a leg, wouldn’t leave, and promptly took over the lives of the entire household. It’s a record to stand on and, evidently, to stay on, even to expand on. Only in our case, we arrived, broke someone else’s leg, and then insisted we had to stay and break many more legs, lest the world become a far more terrible place.

**Risks of extremist attacks are extremely exaggerated.**

**Gompert 10** (David, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Security in Iraq, p. 12-3 Summary, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) eh

**If extremists are committed to violence but lack the means, the major factions have ample armed capabilities to plunge Iraq** (again) **into civil war and even to threaten the survival of the new Iraqi state.** There are as many as 100,000 Sunni ex-insurgents, or Sons of Iraq (SoI), 75,000 Kurdish Peshmerga, and 40,000 members of JAM. **With all main factions now participating in the Iraqi political system,** including in the government of Iraq (GoI) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),**hostilities among them are improbable.** An order exists—shaky, but increasingly resistant to being blown up, figuratively and literally, by rejectionists and extremists outside it. Growing popular support for this non-violent order can be discerned from recent provincial elections, in which Sunnis voted in large numbers, GoI law-and-order policies were rewarded, and secular parties fared well. In sum, extremist violence appears more likely but less consequential than violence among the Iraqi groups now engaged in the political process. The country’s stability and security depend mainly on whether the main opposition groups, especially Sunni and Kurd, continue to compete within the political system and forgo force and whether the Shi’a-led GoI wields its growing political and armed power effectively, responsibly, impartially, and constitutionally. Either **a temporary security gap caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops** before ISF **can effectively replace them** or a pattern of GoI abuse of power could tempt or impel main opposition groups to choose force over peaceful politics. For these groups, the choice of peaceful politics over fighting has been a matter of strategic calculation rather than of outright defeat or transforming enlightenment. Factors that could cause any of them to re-think this choice are political disaffection, electoral failure, economic hardship or inequity, disputes over land and resources, shifts in the balance of armed power, and harsh treatment or provocation by the GoI or the ISF. **Although extremist attacks alone are unlikely to trigger fighting among Iraq’s main groups, they could fan and exploit it.**

**Iraqi economy and government is strengthening.**

**Ryan 10** (Missy, journalist and reporter from Iraq, World Policy Journal, 27(1)) EH

Still, **there are reasons to feel optimistic about Iraq’s economy and its ability to weather fluctuating oil prices. Consumption is skyrocketing. The streets of Baghdad are packed with new, imported cars and Iraqis carry flashy cell phones. The government was strengthened last year by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s success in brokering almost a dozen long-term oil contracts with leading world energy firms. The deals may bring Iraq an extra $200 billion a year in oil revenue, and should help turn the nation into the world’s second-largest oil producer**, close on the heels of Saudi Arabia.

\*\*\*\*\*SOP Add on

**Separation of power Add-on (1/2)**

A. The plan checks Presidential war power

Schenwar 9 (Maya, Executive Director @ t r u t h o u t, [**http://www.truth-out.org/011409J**](http://www.truth-out.org/011409J), 14 January 2009) CGW

Congress took little initiative to rein in Bush's excesses throughout his administration, and now, some members worry that his vast expansion of executive powers could set a dangerous precedent for generations to come. Unless Congress formally rejects Bush's generous interpretation of the role of the president, they say, the system of checks and balances could be permanently disrupted. Foremost on the list is one of Bush's most blatant unilateral actions: his recent signing, with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, of the US-Iraq security pact without consulting Congress. The pact could keep US troops in Iraq until the end of 2011. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-California) has introduced - and soon plans to reintroduce - a resolution that would delegitimize the Bush-Maliki security agreement in the eyes of Congress, according to a spokeswoman for Lee's office. It would also reaffirm Congress's role in the formation of war policy. "[The security pact] is a seriously flawed agreement which illustrates perfectly the necessity of Congressional review and approval of any agreement concerning the United States Armed Forces and the security of Iraq," said Lee in a statement on the resolution. "An agreement to commit American troops to the defense and security of another country is a major commitment that must have the support of the American people, which can only be reflected by the Congress of the United States." Bush presented the US-Iraq pact as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which does not need the approval of Congress. However, this "SOFA" goes beyond the scope of all previous SOFAs, in that it authorizes military operations. Under the Constitution, Congress has the sole power to wage war. Lee points out that the "SOFA" also subjects US military operations to the "approval of the Iraqi government" and places US contractors under the jurisdiction of Iraqi courts. Historically, the president has needed the Senate's ratification to place US troops under foreign control; Bush's action is a major breach, according to Lee. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to address Bush's overstep in signing the pact, and a notable set of hearings in the House Foreign Affairs Committee investigated the topic. Yet, responding as it did to most of the Bush administration's power grabs, Congress ultimately let the "SOFA" designation get by. "Congress and the media have generally accepted the Bush administration's categorizing of [the pact] as a SOFA," Steve Fox, director of the nonpartisan American Freedom Campaign, told Truthout. "To me, it demonstrates a complete failure on the part of Congress as an institution to defend its constitutional powers." This complacency could cost future Congresses - and future generations of American people - quite a bit of leverage, according to Fox. "A failure by Congress to signal its objection to this agreement will create a potentially irreversible shift in the balance of power to the executive branch," Fox said. "This lack of action will set a precedent with respect to what terms are allowed under a SOFA and, therefore, do not require Congressional approval. Perhaps, the Supreme Court might someday rule that the executive branch's power is not so extensive, but Congress should not create a precedent on its own that it someday needs the court to reverse. Congress must exert its power now."

B. Unchecked war power destroys SOP

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

For the past half century, Presidents have claimed constitutional authority to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war against another nation. That was precisely the power that the Framers denied to the President and vested exclusively in Congress. That allocation of power was understood by all three branches until President Harry Truman went to war against North Korea in 1950. He never came to Congress for authority before he acted or at any time thereafter. Similar false claims of authority have been made by Presidents since that time. These constitutional violations have been assisted by members of Congress, federal judges, academics, law reviews, and the media. These institutional failings have done great damage to the U.S. constitutional system, separation of powers, checks and balances, the principle of self-government, and public participation--the very values that the United States says that it wants to export to other countries

**Separation of power Add-on (1/2)**

SOP violations bad as nuclear war

Redish 91 (Martin H. professor of law at Northwestern**,** and Elizabeth J. Cisar**,** Law Clerk to Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, December 1991, Duke Law Journal, 41 Duke L.J. 449, p. 474)

In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the existence of separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question is whether we wish to take that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that might result. Given both the relatively limited cost imposed by use of separation of powers and the great severity of the harm sought to be avoided, one should not demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just as in the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, “I told you so.”

Freedom outweighs

Petro 74 (Sylvester, professor of law, Wake Forest University, Spring 1974, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, p. 480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value, and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Unchecked War Power Now

Presidential war power destroys separation power and checks and balances

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

A major figure in presidential studies was Richard Neustadt. His Presidential Power dominated the field and taught students and professors how Presidents gain and exercise political power. His book is often remembered for the theme that presidential power "is the power to persuade." n168 Also well known is his observation that the Constitutional Convention did not create a government of separated powers: "Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers." n169 Those passages suggest mutual accommodation, shared power, and a system of checks and balances. Later in the book, however, Neustadt clearly advised Presidents to take power, not give it. Power was something to be acquired and concentrated in the presidency. The power was for personal--not constitutional--use. Presidents had every right to seek power for their own use and enjoyment. Neustadt covered much of Truman's initiative in the Korean War, including his decision to fire General Douglas MacArthur and the Supreme Court's decision to strike down Truman's seizure of steel mills to prosecute [\*1226] the war. Yet whether Truman had constitutional or legal authority to go to war did not interest Neustadt at all, nor did he examine Truman's inflated definitions of executive emergency power that the judiciary and the country found so offensive. n170 Certainly Truman never used the power of "persuasion" to convince Congress and the public to support the war. In launching military force there was no talk of "shared power." Instead, Neustadt gave Presidents every incentive to push power to the maximum, regardless of ostensible constitutional and statutory limits. It was Truman's job "to make decisions and to take initiatives." n171 Among Truman's private values, "decisiveness was high upon his list." His image of the President was as "man-in-charge." n172 Operating under this theory, Truman had no obligation to persuade others or enter into a give-and-take. The overriding value was making a decision and taking the initiative. Action by itself was a virtue. Identifying constitutional or legal authority was not. Neustadt's book is written for "a man who seeks to maximize his power." n173 It would fit the needs of an American President, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, or Joseph Stalin. Success is measured by action, vigor, decisiveness, initiative, energy, and personal power. Entirely absent are constitutional checks and sources of authority. n174

**Without congress and court authorization, the President’s war power destroys separation of power and checks and balances**

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

The Federalist Society began at Harvard Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and the Yale Law School in 1982 as "a group of conservatives and libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order." n216 It is committed to "the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be." n217 The student division includes "more than 5,000 law students at approximately 180 ABA-accredited law schools, including all of the top twenty law schools." n218 Anyone who participates in a Federalist Society conference will recall the silhouette of James Madison prominently displayed on the wall behind the speakers. One would expect, therefore, the Society to be dedicated to the principles of checks and balances and the doctrine of separated powers. Not so. The Society expresses little interest in those constitutional principles. Instead, energy is devoted to building support for what is called the Unitary Executive, a doctrine that places all executive power directly under the President and leaves no room for independent commissions, independent counsels, congressional involvement in administrative details, or statutory limitations on the President's power to remove executive officials. n219 Members of the Federalist [\*1234] Society are generally uncomfortable in vesting foreign affairs and the war power in the executive branch, allowing the President to initiate military action without legislative or judicial interference. The problem with this position is that the Society also endorses with great fervor the belief in Original Intent. Federalist members believe that sound constitutional analysis requires an adherence to the intent of the Constitution as expressed through the Founding Fathers. How can the original intent of the Framers ever be squared with the concentration of the war power in the President?

Unchecked War Power Now

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**Presidents have no power to declare war; it violates federal laws and the constitution**

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

Prominent academics offered strong public support for Truman's intervention in Korea. In an article for the New York Times on January 14, 1951, the historian Henry Steele Commager insisted that Truman's critics could find "no support in law or in history." n152 Commager argued that when Congress passed the U.N. Participation Act "it made the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations law, binding on the President." n153 Commager failed to analyze the statutory text and the legislative history of the U.N. Participation Act (requiring prior approval by Congress) and ignored the [\*1224] fundamental constitutional violation that would occur if the President and the Senate, through the treaty process, stripped the House of Representatives of its prerogatives over war. In the 1960s, with the nation mired in a bitter war in Vietnam, Commager apologized for his unreserved endorsement of presidential war power. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 that there should be a reconsideration of executive-legislative relations in the conduct of foreign relations. n154 Returning to the committee in 1971, he testified that "it is very dangerous to allow the President to, in effect, commit us to a war from which we cannot withdraw, because the warmaking power is lodged and was intended to be lodged in the Congress." n155 How could a leading historian of constitutional law miss that elementary point in 1950? Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. also threw his weight behind the Korean War. In a letter to the New York Times on January 9, 1951, he attacked Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) for saying that Truman "had no authority whatever to commit American troops to Korea without consulting Congress and without Congressional approval." n156 He also rejected Taft's position that Truman, by sending troops to Korea, "simply usurped authority, in violation of the laws and the Constitution." n157 Schlesinger sharply dismissed Taft's statements as "demonstrably irresponsible" and claimed that American Presidents had "repeatedly committed American armed forces abroad without prior Congressional consultation or approval.

Unchecked War Power Now

The federal courts recognize the congress as the only actor to declare war, not the president

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

Federal courts had the same understanding about the war power. In 1801, Chief Justice John Marshall observed: "The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to [\*1208] as our guides in this inquiry." n51 That body alone. A federal circuit court in 1806 repudiated the idea that the President could authorize military adventures abroad: "[I]t is the exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war." n52 Exclusive. As President James Polk did with Mexico, Presidents could move U.S. troops into disputed territories to provoke military action, but Polk never claimed that he could go to war on his own. He needed to come to Congress, which could decide that war was necessary or that non-military, diplomatic options should be pursued. Congress opted for war. n53 That choice lay with the legislative, not the executive, branch. All three branches understood that only Congress could authorize war against another nation. In 1863, the Supreme Court upheld a blockade that President Abraham Lincoln had placed on the South during the Civil War. Justice Robert Grier emphasized that the President as commander in chief "has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State." n54 During oral argument, the attorney representing the White House took exactly the same position. Richard Henry Dana, Jr. conceded that Lincoln's action had nothing to do with "the right to initiate a war, as a voluntary act of sovereignty. That is vested only in Congress." n55 On many occasions, from 1789 to 1950, Presidents used military force abroad without first coming to Congress to seek authority. None of those actions, however, amounted to a major war. Edward S. Corwin, an eminent constitutional scholar, said that the list of those presidential initiatives consisted largely of "fights with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like." n56 Respect for constitutional principles ended in 1950 when President Harry Truman took the country to war against North Korea without ever coming to Congress, either before or after. Corwin would rebuke his academic colleagues for their careless endorsement of the legality of the Korean War and their willingness to defend the "high-flying prerogative" of presidential power c

The Constitution was made to give the Congress the power to declare war, not the President

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

Scrutinize the U.S. Constitution as carefully as you like and you will not find a single one of Blackstone's prerogatives assigned to the President. The powers to declare war, raise armies and navies, and issue letters of marque and reprisal are placed exclusively in Congress. The powers to make treaties and appoint ambassadors are shared between the President and the Senate. Thomas Jefferson expressed his satisfaction with this division of power: "We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay." The Framers rejected the British model because of their strong commitment to a republic, with citizens depending on their elected representatives and a system of one branch checking another. To assure public control, the decision to go to war against another country was vested in Congress, the branch closest to the people. At the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, where the delegates assembled to draft the Constitution, the monarchical model was rejected whenever it was raised. Charles Pinckney said he was "for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend to peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one." n10 John Rutledge wanted the executive power placed in a single person, "tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace." n11

**Congressional Withdrawal Checks War Power**

Funding cutoff checks presidential war power

Fisher 6 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, RECAPTURING THE WAR POWER, Vol. 119:1815) CGW

The most devastating criticism of proposals centered around congressional control of military action through funding is that they are not feasible because of the political difficulties of cutting defense fund- ing, especially after a conflict has already started. One such political difficulty is the “rally around the flag” effect. Votes against military funding are frequently portrayed as showing a lack of support for men and women in uniform, not as exercising the central congressional tool for shaping foreign and military policy.86 A recent example is the response to Senator John Kerry’s disastrous comments regarding his vote against supplemental funding for the invasion of Iraq after having initially voted to authorize the war effort.87 If indeed Senator Kerry’s position on the wisdom of going to war had changed, he properly voted against additional funding that would have expanded the war’s scope. Senator Kerry still left himself open to criticism, however, for having voted for such open-ended military authorization in the first place if he was unwilling to cede such discretion to the President. This example illustrates a central problem with Congress’s current two-tiered system of military funding. Congress and advocates of congressional primacy in war power seem to believe that forcing the President to seek a congressional authorization statute or a declaration of war — that is, a legal authorization — strengthens Congress’s control over presidential military initiatives. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. Statutory authorization or a declaration of war grants to the President the legal prerogative to engage in hostilities without necessarily the means to carry out that order, giving the President a political tool with which to force Congress’s purse at a subsequent date. A much more effective alternative is to authorize use of force through appropriations. Using this control mechanism, Congress authorizes only those actions it is willing to pursue fully, and through the appropriations process it can expressly limit the scope of authorization.

The plan solves

Fisher 6 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, RECAPTURING THE WAR POWER, Vol. 119:1815) CGW

The Constitution grants Congress tremendous power to shape war making and foreign policy. It is up to Congress to exercise this power through the proper constitutional channels. Although the United States’s geopolitical position has changed dramatically since the Founding, many of the concerns underlying our separated and sequenced war powers — the fear of executive overreach and provocation of conflict, as well as the need for unitary and swift decision making in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, and protection of commerce abroad — continue to be relevant today. To achieve balance between the executive and legislative branches, political strengths and weaknesses must be imposed on both sides. Congress cannot act as Commander-in-Chief, nor can the President commit to foreign policy that he does not have the resources to support. Knowledge of the sequence will allow each branch to play its proper role and to shape policy in the correct constitutional fashion. By restoring and building on these original structural processes to solve problems, rather than simply discarding them in favor of ill-considered fixes such as the War Powers Resolution, the government can develop new solutions to meet the challenges of the future.

**Congressional Withdrawal Checks War Power**

Iraq key

Fisher 5 (Louis, Specialist with the Law Library, the Library of Congress Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, 2005 Trustees of Indiana University

Indiana Law Journal, LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, fall, 2005) CGW

The second Iraq War is a reminder of how much we have ignored the Framers' concerns about the war power, the constitutional text, early judicial decisions, and such misguided military conflicts as the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Framers valued deliberation, a republican form of government, and popular control. From their study of history, the Framers had good reason to distrust executive wars. We have more than good reason. We have the Framers' understanding about political principles plus the experience of presidential wars that have been tragically misconceived and executed. [\*1254] Various administrations, Republican and Democratic, have lied their way into wars and displayed incompetence about the conduct of war. Once again an administration, this time in Iraq, has opted for military force without understanding its limits or its consequences. There is no possibility for spreading democracy abroad if there is no respect and understanding for it in the United States. Congressional debate on the Iraq Resolution of October 2002 has eerie parallels to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964. Both resolutions transferred to the President the sole decision-making authority to go to war and determine its scope and duration. Both resolutions were based on false information. Both occurred in the middle of an election year: a presidential election in 1964 and congressional elections in 2002. Both Presidents--a Democrat in 1964 and a Republican in 2002--used military operations in an effort to enhance their party's electoral chances. In each case, lawmakers chose to trust in the President rather than in themselves. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) regards the Vietnam War as a national tragedy "partly because members of Congress failed their country, remained silent and lacked the courage to challenge the administrations in power until it was too late." n363 How many times does it take to learn the same lesson?

\*\*\*\*\*Oil 2AC Addon

US Presence Promote Violence in Iraq

**U.S. causes Sectarian Violence in Iraq**

**Zunes 6** (Stephen Zunes, Head of Middle Eastern Studies and Professor of Politics and International Affairs at The University of San Francisco, *Anti-War. Com,*3/7/06,<http://www.antiwar.com/orig/zunes.php?articleid=8668>) CS

**The sectarian violence that has swept across Iraq following last month's terrorist bombing** of the Golden Mosque in Samara is **yet another example of the tragic consequences of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq**. **Until the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation, Iraq had maintained a long-standing history of secularism and a strong national identity among its Arab population despite its sectarian differences**. Not only has the United States failed to bring a functional democracy to Iraq, neither U.S. forces nor the U.S.-backed Iraqi government in Baghdad have been able to provide the Iraqi people with basic security. This has led many ordinary citizens to turn to extremist sectarian groups for protection, further undermining the Bush administration's insistence that American forces must remain in Iraq in order to prevent a civil war. **Top analysts in the CIA and State Department, as well as large numbers of Middle East experts, warned that a U.S. invasion of Iraq could result in a violent ethnic and sectarian conflict**. Even some of the war's intellectual architects acknowledged as much: In a 1997 paper, prior to becoming major figures in the Bush foreign policy team, David Wurmser, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith predicted that a post-Saddam Iraq would likely be "ripped apart" by sectarianism and other cleavages but called on the United States to "expedite" such a collapse anyway. **As a result, the tendency in the United States to blame "sectarian conflict" and "long-simmering hatreds" for the Sunni-Shi'ite violence in Iraq is, in effect, blaming the victim.**

Violence in Iraq could destroy the weak Oil Market

Continued Violence leads to a destruction of the Iraqi Oil market

**UPI 9** (Staff writers at the United Press International, *The United Press International,*8/27/10, <http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Iraq_violence_threatens_oil_deals_999.html>) CS

**The oil and gas industry, Iraq's economic mainstay, is a clear target: Destroying pipelines and other facilities, particularly if in foreign hands, would shut down much of the economy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is increasingly beleaguered as the U.S. withdrawal proceeds**. Shiite political factions that were key members of his coalition have abandoned him and formed a new alliance to run against him in the January elections. The most notable are the Iranian-backed Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and the bloc headed by firebrand cleric Moqtada Sadr. This has raised the prospect of a sharp increase in Iranian influence in Baghdad just as U.S. forces are withdrawing and could possibly point to a new oil policy. **An Iranian hand on Iraq's oil wealth would give Tehran control of a fearsome amount of the world's oil supply, surpassing even Saudi Arabia's reserves. That could scare off potential Western**[**investors**](http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Iraq_violence_threatens_oil_deals_999.html) **already chastened by U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic and heighten tension with**[**Washington**](http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Iraq_violence_threatens_oil_deals_999.html)**.**The defections leave Maliki, who rose to power in 2006, increasingly isolated and undermine his efforts to portray himself as the nation's security bulwark at a time when it is clear his forces aren't yet capable to protecting the country. If the new alliance wins in January, it would be the most pro-Iranian government that has emerged since Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003 and seriously reduce U.S. influence. **None of this is likely to convince Big Oil that it has a future in the new Iraq.**

Violence in Iraq could destroy the weak Oil Market

**Jaffe 6 (**AMY MYERS JAFFEWallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy and associate director of the Rice University Energy Program, 12/12/06, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/opinions/regional-politics-in-the-persian-gulf-a-view-related-to-oil-markets>) CS

**It goes without saying that broad regional conflict in the Middle East could have dramatic impact on the international oil marke**t. This is not to say that oil is the only reason to care what happens in Iraq (humanitarian and security considerations, to name a few, being of a higher order concern). But oil is not one to ignore either. **Let there be no mistake. A full-scale civil war in Iraq which would spread beyond its borders could cause a major disruption in world oil supplies, not just during the conflict, but in the years of recovery afterwards. In the eight-year war Iraq fought with Iran, key regional oil infrastructure was destroyed, including both Iraq’s and Iran’s main oil export terminals.** Planned oil field expansion in both countries was halted. Saudi Arabia and some other producers did a masterful job to bring on replacement supplies during this time period, ameliorating the impact to consumers, but **the years of reconstruction for these war-torn industries (still underway or in planning) is one key reason why the global oil market is still so tight today.**

**Iraqi Oil production expected to skyrocket**

**Cockburn 7/1** (Patrick Cockburn, Middle East consultant for the Financial Times,*The Independent,*7/1/10, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-looks-to-spectacular-oil-boom-to-revive-its-political-fortunes-2015156.html>) CS

**The map of the world's main energy suppliers is about to change as Iraq's oil output quadruples over the next 10 years according to new forecasts**. **Iraq will eventually displace Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest exporter**, experts predict, giving Baghdad crucial influence over the future price of oil.  **The rush to exploit Iraq's "super-giant" oilfields**, of which it has the largest concentration in the world, **has gathered**impetus with unexpected**speed in the wake of BP's disaster in the Gulf of Mexico** which has raised fears over deep-sea drilling**. Iraq's oil has the advantage of being both onshore and cheap to develop**.  The intensifying political isolation of Iran, and the latest moves by the UN Security Council to target the Islamic regime with increasingly tough sanctions in a bid to prevent its development of nuclear weapons is a second key factor influencing Iraqi production. Iran may have unexploited reserves, but its oil output is expected to fall significantly as its old oilfields are depleted and not replaced.

Sub-Advantage 1. Iraqi Oil Key to Break EU dependence on Russia

**Sub-Advantage 1. Iraqi Oil production increase key to break E.U.’s reliance on Russian Gas**

UPI 6/30 (United Press International, 6/30/10, <http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/06/30/Iraqs-17B-Shell-deal-opens-gas-drive/UPI-93621277924025/>) CS

BAGHDAD, June 30 (UPI) -- Iraq's $17 billion contract with Royal Dutch Shell, backed by Japan's Mitsubishi Corp., to produce natural gas from four southern fields launches Baghdad's plan to exploit the country's vast gas reserves in its drive to become one of the world's top energy producers. **Developing Iraq's gas reserves would also go a long way to alleviating the country's chronic shortage of electricity generation that has in recent weeks triggered violent protests, particularly in the energy-rich south**. **Power generation will be a vital component in Iraq's ambitious postwar reconstruction program**. Under the new contract, Shell will collect large amounts of gas from Iraq's southern oil fields. Output is expected to exceed domestic requirements and Shell may be able to start exporting gas in liquefied form as early as 2015 or 2016. That would fit in well with a time frame outlined by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in mid-2009. He offered to supply Nabucco, the European Union's flagship project for the development of the southern corridor energy route bypassing Russia, with 15 billion cubic meters of gas a year from 2015. **In January, his government signed a strategic energy agreement with the EU to develop Iraq's gas fields. The EU said it was ready to help Iraq produce a national**[**gas**](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/06/30/Iraqs-17B-Shell-deal-opens-gas-drive/UPI-93621277924025/)**development plan, develop its electricity grid and "identify sources and supply routes for gas from Iraq to the European Union." The Europeans are desperate to break their dependence on Russia for their gas supplies, which Moscow has in the past turned off during the winter.**Iraq has been discussing with Turkey, its northern neighbor, about joining the planned 2,000-mile Nabucco pipeline that would funnel gas westward from Central Asia and the Middle East through Turkey to Austria. **That would forge a strong energy link between**[**Europe**](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/06/30/Iraqs-17B-Shell-deal-opens-gas-drive/UPI-93621277924025/)**and Iraq. "Iraq represents a vital link for the EU's security of supply,"** EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs declared when the energy agreement was signed in Baghdad. Iraq has an estimated 111 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with much, much more yet to be tapped, industry analysts said. But as with the country's oil fields, these have never been fully explored or exploited. Only 20 percent of Iraq's oil fields have been developed. These contain the equivalent of 115 billion barrels of crude, the third largest reserves of conventional oil after Saudi Arabia and Iran, and could hold as much again. An even smaller percentage of Iraq's gas reserves has been developed. But the infrastructure has been so neglected that half of the 1.1 billion cubic feet of associated gas currently produced in the oil fields, is flared off rather than stored or utilized through domestic consumption. Under the new contract, Shell and [Mitsubishi](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/06/30/Iraqs-17B-Shell-deal-opens-gas-drive/UPI-93621277924025/) will form the Basra Gas Co, a joint venture with the state-owned South Gas Co. It will hold a 51 percent stake, with Shell, which is involved with two 20-year oil production contracts with Baghdad, holding 44 percent and Mitsubishi 5 percent. The gas will be collected from the Basra fields -- as agreed by Shell as far back as 2008 -- as well as four other oil fields that were awarded to foreign companies in two bidding rounds in June and December 2009. All told this would involve around 700 million cubic feet a day in southern Iraq, utilizing much of the gas that is now being burned off. Shell officials say that the south's associated-gas supplies may double within three years as oil production increases. **Iraq seeks to boost its current oil output of around 2.3 million barrels per day to 10 million-12 million bpd within the next 6-7 years, rivaling Saudi Arabia as the world's leading oil producer.** The Oil Ministry has invited international energy companies to bid for production deals at three natural gas fields at a gas auction scheduled for Sept. 1 in Baghdad. The fields are Akkas near the Syrian border, Mansouriya in Diyala province north of Baghdad, and Siba, near the southern border with Kuwait. Their combined reserves total 11.2 trillion cubic feet. Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani has said that some 45 foreign companies that qualified for the two 2009 oil field auctions will be eligible.  

Sub-Advantage 1. Iraqi Oil K Break EU dependence on Russia

**E.U. Reliance on Russia for Gas puts European stability and independence at risk**

**Baran 7** (Zeyno Baran, Director for the Center for Eurasian Policy and Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, *The Washington Quarterly,*Autumn 2007,<http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf>) CS

**The lack of reliable and sustainable European access to energy represents a  clear threat to the continent’s security.** Under the leadership of Putin, **the  Kremlin has pursued a strategy whereby Europe’s substantial dependence on  Russian energy is leveraged to obtain economic and political gains**. If this situ-  ation continues, the **EU will find itself in further danger, as its dependence  leaves it beholden to Russian interests.** There simply is no readily available alternative to the supplies the EU receives from Russia, particularly natural gas. **Unlike oil, gas is extremely difficult and costly to ship via tankers; pipe-  lines are the preferred method of transportation**. Thus, if a supplier refuses to provide gas or charges an unreasonable price, the consumer cannot quickly or easily turn to another source. The consumer state would have no choice but to accept the supplier’s conditions or go without natural gas, an option that is all but unacceptable for most.  **The unjust manipulation or interruption of energy supplies is as much a  security threat as military action is, especially since the EU relies on Russia  for more than 30 percent of its oil imports and 50 percent of its natural gas  imports**.1 This dependence is not distributed evenly. As one heads eastward, Russia’s share of the energy supply grows ever larger. **No fewer than seven  eastern European countries receive at least 90 percent of their crude oil im-  ports from Russia, and six EU nations are entirely dependent on Russia for  their natural gas imports**.  The Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006 catapulted energy security to theforefront of the EU agenda. On the very day it took over the presidency of the Group of Eight (G-8)—a presidency that had announced energy security as its key theme—**Russia halted natural gas deliveries to Ukraine. Because  the gas pipelines crossing Ukraine carry supplies destined for EU markets,  this shutdown resulted in significant supply disruptions for several member  states, raising awareness that dependence on Russia has increased Europe’s geopolitical vulnerability.  Several EU states have experienced the misfortune of Russian supply cuts  directly**. Disputes between Russia and the Baltic states have led to the halt of  pipeline deliveries of oil multiple times. In January 2003, Russia ceased sup-  plying oil via pipeline to Latvia’s Ventspils Nafta export facility. This embargo,  which followed Riga’s unwillingness to sell the facility to a Russian energy  company, continues to this day. In July 2006, Moscow shut down a pipeline supplying Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta refinery, which is the largest company in Lithuania and one of the biggest oil refineries in central and eastern Europe. As with Ventspils Nafta, this shutdown came after a Russian company failed to obtain the energy infrastructure it coveted.

Sub-Advantage 1. Iraqi Oil K Break EU dependence on Russia

Russia uses its Oil based power to manipulate and hurt the E.U.

**Baran 7** (Zeyno Baran, Director for the Center for Eurasian Policy and Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, *The Washington Quarterly,*Autumn 2007,<http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf>) CS

**In addition to the economic disadvantages of such dependence, the broader  foreign policy goals of EU states also suffer**. Specifically, EU members limit their criticisms of Moscow, lest they be given a raw deal at the negotiating table. **Russia’s increasingly tainted record on transparency, responsible gover-  nance, and human rights is thus allowed to stand unchallenged and unques-  tioned. Dependency also erodes EU support for key allies in Europe and Asia.**Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine—all crucial energy producers or transit countries—have each been subject to intimidation by Moscow. Instead of standing up to this harassment, Europe’s dependence compels its leaders to look the other way.  **Most disturbing of all is that this dependence even leads the EU to turn  a blind eye when Moscow utilizes these tactics against fellow EU members.  The July 2006 shutdown of the Lithuanian pipeline, for example, drew little  protest outside of Poland and the Baltic states**. **Russia claimed that this cutoff  was the result of technical difficulties yet refused all offers from third parties  to examine the damaged pipe or assist repairs  in any way**. Although this incident is suspicious enough on its own, **it becomes a clear case of  political manipulation given Russia’s status as a  repeat offender. Many times over the past decade, Moscow has utilized near-identical tactics in countries  it considers to be its near abroad. It has repeat-  edly cut off energy supplies during a political  dispute, smugly blamed technical difficulties for  the problem, and eventually shifted supplies to  another destination unless the victim acceded to the Kremlin’s demands**. Despite this history and repeated pleas from President Valdas Adamkus, the response from most western European countries was rather muted during the Lithuanian shutdown. The countries of the West have never experienced these strong-arm tactics firsthand and fail to view it as anything more than an economic dispute. Moreover, they were too concerned that standing up for Lithuania would ruin their chances to get preferential access to Russian oil and gas resources. **By design, the Russian strategy is driving a wedge be-  tween eastern and western Europe, exacerbating the challenges the EU faces  in devising a common energy policy, as was seen during the dispute between  Poland and Germany ahead of the June EU summit**. This diplomatic row was ostensibly over Russia’s failure to remove its embargo on Polish meat productsbut more broadly involved the perceived reluctance of Berlin to stand up to Moscow on a whole host of issues, not the least of which was energy.   

**Do to Russian greed the Russian Oil market may crash leaving the E.U. to suffer**

**Baran 7** (Zeyno Baran, Director for the Center for Eurasian Policy and Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, *The Washington Quarterly,*Autumn 2007,<http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf>) CS

**Due to the extremely close relationship between the energy industry and  the Kremlin, Russia’s oil and gas companies can pursue strategies that make  little economic sense but that serve the long-term interests of the Russian  state, namely, ensuring European dependence on Russian energy** supplies. For example, Russia’s undersea Nord Stream pipeline will cost at least three times more than a proposed overland route through Lithuania and Poland would have. Given the environmental sensitivity of the Baltic Sea, some industry insiders are predicting costs as high as $10 billion or even $15 billion.4  **By divorcing western Europe’s gas supply from eastern Europe’s, however,  the undersea route grants Moscow the ability to manipulate the European  energy market more effectively.** Needless to say, the unnecessarily high cost of the pipeline’s construction will be passed on to European consumers. **Many  industry experts have expressed concern that corruption and inefficiency,  coupled with Moscow’s refusal to allow significant foreign investment in the  energy sector, will soon lead the Russian oil and gas industry to burn out**.5  Instead of developing new oil and gas fields or investing in its energy infra-  structure, Russia has utilized windfall profits to pursue the aggressive policy of expansion and acquisition described above. **Unless Moscow is able to secure  additional gas supplies from fields in Central Asia, it may struggle to meet its  commitments to Europe**, which is why maintaining full control over CentralAsia’s export routes is so critical for the Kremlin.

Sub-Advantage 2:  Lack of Iraqi Energy leads to wide spread riots

**Sub-Advantage 2:  Lack of Iraqi Energy leads to wide spread riots**

**Al-Shalchi and Juhi 6/19**(HADEEL AL-SHALCHI and BUSHRA JUHI, Writers for the Associated Press, *The Huffington Post,*6/19/10,[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20100619/ml-iraq/#](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20100619/ml-iraq/)) CS

**BAGHDAD — A protest over electricity shortages in oil-rich southern Iraq turned deadly when police opened fire to disperse the crowd on Saturda**y, killing one protester in a melee that warned of growing anger over the government's failure to provide basic services. **More than 3,000 protesters marched through Basra, which suffers from searing summer temperatures that can reach 120 degrees (50 degrees Celsius) and high humidity. They carried banners and chanted angry slogans demanding a solution to the power cuts that persist despite billions of dollars in reconstruction money since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion**. It was a scene that has become more frequent across the nation as patience wears thin among Iraqis struggling to cope with less than six hours of electricity a day. But the demonstration turned violent when protesters started throwing stones and advanced on the Basra provincial council building, setting fire to a guard's cabin and prompting government security forces to fire into the air to disperse the crowd. Police and hospital officials said one man was killed and three others wounded**. The Iraqi public has become increasingly frustrated over the government's inability to provide power, clean water and other utilities despite security gains that have led to a sharp drop in war-related violence in recent years.** 

**Iraqi power cuts lead to increasing violence**

**Arraf 6/22** (Jane Arraf, Middle east correspondant, *The Christian Science Monitor,*6/22/10, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0622/A-bigger-threat-to-Iraq-than-Al-Qaeda-Power-cuts>) CS

**Iraq’s electricity minister offered to resign Monday night over power cuts that have sparked fatal protests. But the move has failed to quell anger over what Iraqis widely describe as a war being waged against them by uncaring and corrupt politician**s. On a street of small blacksmith shops in Baghdad's Karrada neighborhood, shop owner Mohammad Mahmoud al-Tikmachi says he’s had to spend more than $10,000 on a generator to keep his business going. The fuel costs for the generator have more than doubled the prices of iron window frames and gates, making them unaffordable for many homeowners.  “That’s why business has slowed down,” says Mr. Tikmachi. “Everything in our life depends on electricity. This is warfare against the citizens.” “Maybe it will be better in 300 years,” jokes a customer in Tikmachi’s shop as workers weld together iron bars in sweltering heat after sleepless nights in homes with no electricity. The Iraqi government has promised Baghdad residents two hours of electricity out of every six, but even that modest target has fallen far short. **The inability of the government to provide reliable electricity seven years after the fall of Saddam is seen as more potentially destabilizing than the continued car bombs and suicide attacks.  While the US and**[**Iraq**](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Iraq)**have invested heavily in security, the lack of electricity has denied Iraqis not only basic comforts but also the ability to rebuild their country, their economy, and their own lives**.

Sub-Advantage 2:  Lack of Iraqi Energy leads to wide spread riots

**Iraqi Oil Fields will provide relief in the future to widespread riots**

**Waleed 6/30**(Khalid Waleed, Environmental Consultant at Tebodin Middle East,*Oil Price,*6/30/10, <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Middle-East/Riots-Break-out-in-Iraq-Over-Energy-Shortages.html>) CS

**The interim Iraqi government is reeling from riots and demonstrations that have erupted across the country to protest severe electricity shortages.** **Anger has been growing for weeks over the continued power cuts and rising fuel prices**- resulting from the demand for generators - and the stalled efforts to form a new government. At least two demonstrators were killed June 19 in the southern city of Basra when security forces opened fire on a mob enraged after electricity was reduced to less than two hours per day. Seventeen police were wounded in Nasiriyah on June 22 when hundreds of protesters clashed with riot troops outside provincial administrative offices. **Protests have become an almost daily occurrence in some poor neighborhoods of Baghdad.** The crisis saw its first political casualty on June 23 when the embattled electricity minister, Karim Waheed, handed in his resignation to caretaker prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, whose own bid for a second term has now been cast in doubt. “**The fact that we still have so little electricity after all these years makes people think the government has done nothing for them. Maliki was counting on his security achievements to guarantee him the prime minister position again, but these demonstrations are a message the security alone is not enough. You have to deal with the needs of the people**,” Ibrahim al-Sumaidaei, a lawyer and political analyst in Baghdad, said. The crisis comes as Maliki and other leaders try to cobble together a coalition government, more than three months after an inconclusive national vote. As public anger intensifies, Maliki and his team have called for calm and patience. “Neither the ministry of electricity nor the government has done anything wrong; both are doing their job. All that happened is a delay in our plans to boost electricity due to lack of money because of the international financial crisis which has hit the whole world, not just Iraq,” Thamir al-Gadhban, head of -Maliki’s cabinet and the prime minister’s oil adviser, said. Another Maliki adviser, Ali al-Mosawi, said the government has taken unprecedented measures to alleviate the**blackouts that have reduced power in some parts of Baghdad to about an hour each day. Millions of Iraqis are forced to live with less than six hours per day, according to government estimates, and most cannot afford to purchase or operate a fuel-burning generator. “The government is doing its best to provide as much power as it can for Iraqi citizens. We are now cutting off electricity to all officials’ homes and government institutions in the Green Zone** (the heavily 

\*\*\*\*\*Iran ADV\*\*\*\*\*

US Leadership Addon Iran

**US Leadership in the Middle East is declining**

**Haas et al 9**(Richard, President of Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs,<http://jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2009/01/20090201_20090101_ForeignAffairs_BeyondIraq.pdf>, 1/8)dc

**Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has been the dominant power in the Middle East. But in recent years, its influence there has diminished thanks to the failure to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the protracted war in Iraq, and a lack of success in democratizing Arab authoritarian regimes. For almost a decade, the United States has done little to address the region's principal conflicts and concerns while developing a reputation for arrogance and double standards. This reduced regional influence has been reinforced by a broader decline in the relative position of the United States in the world at large**. The Bush administration has succeeded in raising serious doubts about U.S. competence and intentions, doubts that have been exacerbated by the global financial crisis. The United States seems unable to deliver on many of its promises and often to make matters worse when it tries. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Middle Eastern states still look to the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their security and the power most able to help them achieve their objectives. Many people in the region still admire and identify with American values, and Obama's election victory will do much to remind them why. His ability to gain their respect will be vital to convincing the publics in the Arab and Muslim worlds to support their leaders in working with the United States. The Obama administration should take advantage of the willingness of regional and global powers to work with the United States by renewing Washington's commitment to diplomacy

Israeli’s see US withdrawal from Iraq as a boost to US credibility and as an opening to focus on checking Iran

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

Moreover, many Israelis also feel that the utility of the U.S. presence in Iraq is declining. But in the view of some Israelis, Iran’s growing influence, including in Arab-Israeli affairs, is occurring regardless of whether the U.S. forces are present on the ground in Iraq or not. As a consequence, some Israeli analysts see a number of opportunities in the U.S. departure. Some Israelis believe that the improved security conditions in Iraq in 2008–2009 have provided both an opportunity for the United States to depart Iraq with enhanced credibility and an opening for the United States to focus on other regional issues of greater concern to Israel (especially Iran). Most Israelis expect increased U.S. engagement and dialogue with Iran in the Obama administration, and some see the U.S. drawdown in Iraq as useful for that dialogue, but most prefer a defined timetable for talks on the nuclear issue.48

China wants U.S. to engage Iran more diplomatically

**Xinhua 6/9** (Mu Xuequan, Editor for the Xinhua News, *The Xinhua News,* 6/9/10, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/09/c_13342175.htm>) CS

Chen Qiufa, chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority and director of the Chinese mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told an IAEA board meeting China noted Iran did not redirect its declared nuclear material for other uses. However, Iran had failed to implement resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA board, and needed to further enhance cooperation with the IAEA, he said. "Iran has the right for peaceful use of nuclear energy, but also has to fulfill the corresponding obligation for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the same time," Chen said. Therefore, he said, China called on Tehran to strengthen cooperation with the IAEA and implement the IAEA and Security Council resolutions. China hoped Iran would "take active measures in implementing the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and clarifying outstanding issues, so as to restore the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program," the Chinese representative said. Regarding an agreement signed recently by Iran, Turkey and Brazil for Iran to ship most of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for the 20 percent uranium fuel needed for its reactor, Chen expressed hope the swap deal "could help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations." China would continue efforts to facilitate talks among the concerned parties and help put an end to the issue through negotiations and consultations, he said. Addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, Chen reiterated China's consistent call for a nuclear-free peninsula and opposition to proliferation of nuclear weapons. "The six-party talks are an effective way to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lasting peace and stability of Northeast Asia," Chen said. In view of the current "complex and sensitive situation on the Korean Peninsula," Chen said, the relevant parties should "keep calm and restraint," focus on the overall situation and continue to promote the six-party talks process.

Iran is a Leader in the ME

Iran has become a leading power in the Middle East.

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

This conventional inferiority contributes to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Although questions remain about the pace and nature of the Iranian program, there is little doubt that Tehran is actively seeking an indigenous uranium enrichment capability that will, at the very least, allow a nuclear breakout capacity.15 Finally, Iran also exerts significant regional influence through “soft” power projection, such as reconstruction aid, infrastructure development, media, and financial investments.16 Despite these strategic gains, it is important to understand how the Iraq War may have affected Iranian threat perceptions. For example, the invasion of Iraq brought the threatening presence of U.S. ground forces to Iran’s doorstep, and despite the scheduled drawdown, Iran remains concerned about the potential reintroduction of U.S. forces into Iraq under the terms of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. And while Iran benefits from some degree of instability in Iraq to keep residual U.S. forces distracted and to dilute the ability of the central government in Baghdad to exert control over the southern provinces, it is also worried about uncontained Iraqi instability spilling over its borders (see, for example, Dehghani, 2003).17 Indeed, the Iraq War has exacerbated transnational threats that affect Iran’s internal stability, such as ethnic separatism and Sunni radicalism (Ehteshami, 2004, p. 187). Iran is particularly concerned over its increasing Kurdish challenge since the Iraq War (there are 4 million Kurds in Iran), particularly the internal threat from the resurgent Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which maintains close links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

\*\*\*Iranian Diplomacy ADV

Iran is Hostile Now

Iran is hostile now.

**Wehrey 10** (Frederic, senior policy analyst with RAND, The Iraq Effect, p.21-3,<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) EH

Iranian activism is most visible in its sponsorship of militant groups, such as Palestinian HAMAS and the Lebanese Hizballah, and through its development of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (many of which Hizballah tested during the 2006 Lebanon war). **While Iranian links to terrorist organizations are not new, regional analysts believe Iran has become bolder and more open in its support of such activity since the Iraq War.**In terms of its conventional military, **some of Iran’s capabilities are threatening to Western and allied Gulf interests, particularly on the naval front. Iran’s mining capability, antiship cruise missiles, and innovative “swarming” tactics could impede maritime access** in the Strait of Hormuz. **The IRGC also possesses a significant arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach the small Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, Israel, eastern Turkey, and most of Saudi Arabia.**

Iraq Withdrawal opens up Iran Diplomacy

**US withdrawal from Iraq Opens up diplomacy in the Middle East**

**Wehrey 10** (Frederic, senior policy analyst with RAND, The Iraq Effect, p.21-3,<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) EH

From the perspective of many Israelis, the erosion of and limitations on American power are serious strategic consequences of the Iraq War. Because Israel’s key interest is a strong America that can credibly intervene elsewhere if necessary, **many Israeli analysts worry that a prolonged U.S. presence in Iraq reduces the “U.S. appetite or ability to go to war” anywhere else and feel that the utility of the U.S. presence in Iraq has exhausted its use.** Israelis are primarily focused on Iraq to the extent that **it affects broader U.S. power projection in the region, particularly vis-à-vis Iran.** Thus, it should not be surprising that opinions on an American drawdown from Iraq hinge largely on beliefs about whether withdrawal will weaken or strengthen U.S. capabilities and regional influence. **However, improved security conditions in Iraq in 2008–2009 reduced such Israeli concerns about the negative effects of a drawdown, particularly with respect to U.S. credibility. Some analysts** also **question whether a U.S. drawdown will**significantly **damage American credibility because the U.S. presence in Iraq has already eroded it.** As one analyst put it, “what has happened in the last six years has created the perception of U.S. failure; withdrawal itself is not the test of the pudding, as the pudding is already sour.” **Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq.**For example, **an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq.** Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, **Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial. Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria.** For example, **some**Israeli officials **believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran**, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave. Most Israelis expected some sort of U.S. engagement and dialogue with Iran in the Obama administration. **An Israeli official believes that the U.S. drawdown will allow a serious U.S. attempt at engagement with Iran, or at least improve U.S. leverage in such a dialogue.** But Israelis, regardless of their political perspective, do not want to see talks with Iran drag out in a way that would allow the nuclear issue to remain unresolved.

US withdrawal opens up Foreign policy to check Iranian Nuclearization

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

For six years, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been dominated by Iraq. This need not, and should not, continue. The Obama administration will be able to gradually reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, limit their combat role, and increasingly shift responsibility to Iraqi forces. The drawdown will have to be executed carefully and deliberately, however, so as not to risk undoing recent progress. The improved situation in Iraq will allow the new administration to shift its focus to Iran, where the clock is ticking on a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear program. Obama should offer direct official engagement with the Iranian government, without preconditions, along with other incentives in an attempt to turn Tehran away from developing the capacity to rapidly produce substantial amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel. At the same time, he should lay the groundwork for an international effort to impose harsher sanctions on Iran if it proves unwilling to change course.

Iraq Withdrawal opens up Iran Diplomacy

The time is now for the US to address Iran and gain support in the ME

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

At the same time, the Obama administration needs to turn its attention toward Iran. The Bush administration succeeded in ousting the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, but in the process it removed Tehran's most threatening enemies and inadvertently opened the door to an Iranian bid for regional primacy. Arab governments feel they are seeing a historical replay of Persian efforts to dominate their region and fear that newly empowered Shiite communities in Iraq and Lebanon, backed by Iran, will inspire long-suppressed Shiite communities in other countries in the region, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Israel, Turkey, and Arab regional powers see Iran embarking on an aggressive effort to acquire a nuclear capability that the international community seems powerless to stop. And in the war of ideas, Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, have made some headway with the argument that violent radicalism is the way to liberate Palestine and achieve dignity and justice for Arabs and Muslims. At the same time, Iran's challenge has led other actors in the region to begin to work together and look to the United States for help. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have grown deeply disillusioned with U.S. leadership but would welcome an effective U.S. role. Even Syria, Iran's ally, has launched peace negotiations with Israel partly to improve its relations with Washington and partly to avoid being stuck on the Shiite side of the emerging Sunni-Shiite divide. If the Obama administration could show that there are real payoffs for moderation, reconciliation, negotiation, and political and economic reform, it would recoup considerable U.S. influence throughout the region. Should Tehran's uranium-enrichment efforts proceed at their current pace, during Obama's first year in office or soon after, Iran may have stockpiled enough low-enriched uranium to produce weapons-grade material for at least one nuclear bomb. Iran would likely still be another year or two away from having a more extensive nuclear weapons capability. But once it has the potential to produce large amounts of weapons-grade fuel, it will essentially have crossed the nuclear threshold and forced all its neighbors, as well as the United States, to change their security calculations.

The US should use Multilateralism to neutralize Iran

The US should lead negotiations in a multilateral framework to regulate Iran’s nuclear development

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

Israel is well aware of the drawbacks of a preventive military strike against Iran, especially if it has to act on its own. It prefers to support a diplomatic effort that would prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, even though it is wary of Iran's dilatory tactics. And it, too, sees the advantage of peacemaking, especially with Syria, as a means of acquiring leverage over Iran. Nevertheless, Jerusalem's tolerance for engagement is more limited than Washington's because it has a less robust deterrent and greater reason to fear Tehran's intentions. Israel has never been prepared to accept another nuclear power in its neighborhood, especially not one that directly threatens its existence: given Israel's small size and concentrated population, a first strike by Iran on any scale would have devastating consequences. To allow more time for diplomatic engagement to work, therefore, the Obama administration will have to persuade Israel not to strike Iran's nuclear facilities while U.S.-led diplomatic efforts are unfolding. That will require enhancing Israel's deterrent and defensive capabilities by providing it with a nuclear guarantee as well as additional ballistic missile defenses and early warning systems. Simultaneously providing nuclear guarantees against Iran to both Arab and Israeli allies will be a serious undertaking for Washington, but it may be the only way of preventing Iran's nuclear program from triggering a regional arms race. The first step of a new U.S. initiative toward Iran should be to lead U.S.-Iranian negotiations in a multilateral framework. The model should be the current six-party talks, in which several regional players participate and provide the umbrella for direct U.S.-North Korean engagement. Second, Washington should abandon its demand that Iran suspend its enrichment program as a precondition for formal negotiations. If Iran does suspend enrichment during the negotiations, the United Nations should suspend sanctions; if Iran does not, UN and multilateral sanctions should be intensified. Third, Washington should be willing to discuss what Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, claims is its "right" to enrich. In the end, it may be necessary to acknowledge this right, provided that Iran agrees to limit its enrichment program under enhanced safeguards to keep it from developing a "breakout capability" -- the capacity to produce significant amounts of weapons-grade uranium. However, this right must be earned by Iran, not conceded by the United States. Otherwise, Iran will pocket it and continue to insist on developing an industrial enrichment capacity, which would bring it unacceptably close to a bomb-making capability. Finally, there should be parallel bilateral negotiations over the normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations, Iran's sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah, its opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and its role in Iraq. But the United States should not insist on linking these issues. Instead, some incentives should be tied only to Iran's behavior in the nuclear realm; others could be made contingent on its overall behavior.

To check Iran, Obama should directly engage Iran in negotiations with the backing the Gulf Cooperation Council

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

Any U.S. initiative toward Iran will be complicated, if only because of the wide range of interests involved. That challenge will be increased by the dysfunctional nature of Tehran's decision-making and the regime's desire to advance both Iran's national interests and the interests of its Islamic Revolution. The Iranian state is capable of realism and compromise, but the revolution views the United States as "the Great Satan." In the past, when forced to choose, Iran's leaders have been prepared to put the state above the revolution. The Obama administration should thus try to find a way to address Iran's legitimate state interests while adamantly opposing its revolutionary impulses. An Iran initiative should aim at direct U.S.-Iranian negotiations focused on bringing Iran into a new regional order and persuading it to engage its neighbors responsibly while promoting its influence by peaceful means rather than through confrontation, subversion, and nuclear proliferation. Success will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve, and the United States will need leverage to make even modest progress. The carrots of reduced sanctions, security guarantees, and normalized relations with the United States and the international community will be important, as will be the stick of potentially increased sanctions (including more stringent financial sanctions and a ban on Iranian imports of gasoline). Before the Obama administration embarks on such an effort, however, it will need to secure Arab, Israeli, and Turkish backing. Egypt, Jordan, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council fear that their interests will be sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iranian détente. To allay these fears, Washington needs to treat these countries as full partners in its initiative, consulting with them regularly and offering them a nuclear guarantee in the event the attempt to limit Iran's nuclear programs does not succeed.

The US should use Multilateralism to neutralize Iran

U.S. can best Negotiate with Iran by Uniting with other nations

**SFRC 9** (Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/3/09, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Sadjadpour.pdf>) CS

Tehran is highly adept at identifying and exploiting rifts in the international community, and diplomatic efforts to check Iran’s nuclear ambitions will unravel if key countries approach Iran with competing redlines. A common approach by the European Union and the United States is absolutely imperative. Uniting China and Russia behind the U.S. position will prove more difficult given divergent national interests, though Moscow certainly has an interest in avoiding a nuclear-armed Iran within missile range. A more robust U.S. effort at direct dialogue with Tehran will send the signal to Brussels, Moscow and Beijing that Washington is serious about reaching a diplomatic resolution to this dispute, which should strengthen the health of the coalition.

**US-Iranian relations must address nuclear weapons first.**

**Gharagouzloo 10** (Iraj; Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army, U.S.-Iranian Relations: The Road Ahead, March 30, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi> bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519899&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) CH

**Based** **on the June 2009 polling of Iranian people, 77 percent of Iranians would like better relations with the U.S., and 60% support unconditional negotiations with the United States**.51 Iran is a challenging and complex country, both in terms of its government and its people.**Formulating a new strategy with Iran is a difficult task. Any strategy toward Iran is likely to require significant time to achieve its desired effects. The U.S. should consider several strategies for dealing with Iran. These strategic options will be influenced by the international system, U.S. foreign policy, and national/international culture and values.** However, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and support for Hamas and Hezbollah challenges the future stability of the Middle East and increases the possibility of further confrontation with the United States. **A new U.S. strategy toward Iran is needed. It should be driven by the global perception of an Iranian threat.** The United Nations has declared that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is the greatest global threat. Current UN sanctions against Iran address this threat. If Iran remains recalcitrant, further UN sanctions against Iran’s are likely. **A new U.S. strategy for Iran must acknowledge the international consensus opposing Iran’s nuclear weapons program**.

The US should negotiate with Iran in secret

The US should Negotiate with Iran in Secret

**SFRC 9** (Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/3/09, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Sadjadpour.pdf>) CS

When it comes to U.S.–Iranian interaction, the record shows that “secret” or “private” discussions out of public earshot have a greater success rate. Building confidence in the public realm will be difficult, as politicians on both sides will likely feel the need to use harsh rhetoric to maintain appearances. Moreover, the likelihood that spoilers can torpedo the process either through words or actions is more limited if they do not know what is going on. Recognizing that its regional influence derives in large measure from its defiance of the United States, Iran would likely prefer not to publicly advertise its discussions with the United States unless or until real progress has been made. Discreet discussions are also a more effective forum for Washington to raise concerns over Iranian human rights abuses, as public criticism has done little to improve Iran’ record over the last three decades.

US-Iran Relations Key To Iraqi Stability

**U.S.-Iranian cooperation key to solving Iraqi instability.**

**Serwer and Parker 8** (Daniel, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations vice president, Sam Parker, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations program officer, USI Peace Briefing, April, <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/USIPeaceBriefing.pdf>) eh

All three options for **U.S. policy in Iraq would have improved chances for success if Iraq’s neighbors would cooperate. In recent months, there appear to have been modest improvements in the behavior of both Syria and Iran**: the U.S. military seems to think that fewer insurgents are being allowed to infiltrate from Syria, and **the number of attacks on Coalition forces attributable to Iranian-origin weapons had**apparently **declined**, at least until the Iraqi government operation against JAM in Basra and the JAM’s response against the Green Zone in Baghdad. At the same time, a major Turkish incursion into Kurdistan against Kurdish guerrillas with tacit U.S. approval has unsettled the Kurds, while causing little concern among Iraq’s Arabs. **It is important that the U.S. continue to engage with all of Iraq’s neighbors, in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia.** To date, the efforts in this regard appear to have been sporadic and less than wholehearted. The U.S. needs sharper focus on what it wants from Iran and Saudi Arabia and what leverage it has with them. There simply is no way to stabilize Iraq without a minimum of cooperation from Iran, whose long and largely open border with Iraq presents multitudinous opportunities for Iranian influence, as do the cultural affinities between Iran and Shiite Iraq. Saudi Arabia has shown a friendlier face to Iraq in recent months, but it continues to hesitate in establishing substantial diplomatic relations and in settling bilateral debt issues.

**US-Iranian relations is key to Iraqi stability, fighting terrorism and oil.**

**Gharagouzloo 10** (Iraj; Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army, U.S.-Iranian Relations: The Road Ahead, March 30, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi> bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519899&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) CH

**A new and improved U.S.-Iran relationship is beneficial to both countries. Even though establishing viable diplomacy with Iran may be difficult, Iran could greatly assist U.S. efforts to stabilize both Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran sees itself as regional power** and exercises its power in the region through close relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. As a regional power, **Iran is positioned to assist in resolving or at least mitigating the Israel- Palestinian conflict and helping reduce global terrorism. Iran can also improve U.S. and allied access to the region’s oil and natural gas.** However, two key issues currently complicate building a new and better U.S.-Iran relationship: Iran’s ambition to develop nuclear weapons and Iran’s support of groups that the U.S. regards as terrorist organizations. **Although there are many issues about which the two countries disagree, the two countries share several common interests. For example, a stable Iraq and Afghanistan and the assured flow of oil and natural resources through the Persian Gulf are in both countries' national interest. Iran has come to realize that it will never achieve its full potential without positive relations with United States**.4 Background This SRP reviews key policy differences between these countries and concludes with policy recommendations to improve U.S. strategic relations with Iran.

\*\*Iranian Diplomacy Impacts

Hostile Iran speeds up ME proliferation

If the US fails to achieve global leadership and bring in Russian and China to check Iran, ME proliferation will accelerate rapidly

Haass & Indyk 9 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 88(1) Jan/Feb 09, ACW)

Israel, which has maintained a nuclear monopoly in the region through preventive military strikes on Iraq and Syria, will be sorely tempted to do the same with Iran. If Israel does strike, Iranian retaliation could spark a war in Lebanon, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, dramatic increases in the price of oil, and attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. If Israel does not strike, the two countries will be on hair-trigger alert with a high potential for miscalculation. Meanwhile, other countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, will likely accelerate their own nuclear programs. Once it has a nuclear deterrent, Iran may feel emboldened to step up efforts at subversion across the region. Tehran would also have the potential to provide nuclear materials (to serve as the core of a "dirty bomb") or even a crude fission device to one of the terrorist organizations it supports. These adverse consequences make it critical for the Obama administration to reach an early understanding with other leading powers about the need to cap Iran's nuclear advance. Unfortunately, recruiting Russia has become an even greater challenge since its use of force in Georgia in August 2008. Moscow may be tempted to revert to its Cold War approach of backing destabilizing actors in the Middle East with military support and diplomatic protection. It may not be possible to prevent Russia from playing such a spoiler role, but it is at least worth testing whether Moscow is willing to act constructively in the Middle East. Of course, getting Russia to support what the United States regards as its vital interests in the Middle East may require tradeoffs on issues that Moscow considers vital. The Obama administration will thus need to decide what its priorities are in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Although Washington cannot abandon treaty commitments it has made to eastern European states or sacrifice the independence of Georgia or Ukraine, it could offer various incentives to secure increased Russian cooperation on Iran -- such as U.S. support for Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, U.S. restraint on ballistic missile defense installations in Europe, a slowdown in the pace of NATO enlargement, or financially lucrative arrangements such as a possible Russian nuclear fuel bank or Russian involvement in an international nuclear-fuel-enrichment consortium. Enlisting Russia's support for a common approach toward Iran would, in turn, make it easier to bring China on board. Beijing will not want to be left outside an international consensus. China's interest in the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is growing alongside its energy requirements. Nevertheless, Beijing currently prefers to pursue its commercial interests with Iran rather than increase economic pressure on it. The challenge for the Obama administration will be to make Chinese leaders understand that a crisis with Iran will have adverse consequences for China's economy and, as a result, the country's political stability.

US Iranian Diplomacy Solves Terror

The U.S can prevent Terrorism with Iranian relations

**SFRC 9** (Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/3/09, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Sadjadpour.pdf>) CS

Small but powerful cliques—both within Iran and among Iran’s Arab allies—have entrenched economic and political interests in preventing U.S.-Iranian reconciliation. Within Iran these actors—including powerful septuagenarian clergymen and nouveau riche Revolutionary Guardsmen—recognize that improved ties with Washington would induce political and economic reforms and competition and undermine the quasi- monopolies they enjoy in isolation. Among Iran’s Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the prospect of U.S.-Iranian accommodation could mean an end to their primary source of funding.

\*\*\*2AC Addon to Iraq Diplomacy: Refugees

Iran Key to Iraq Political Stability

**Iran is key to Iraqi political stability.**

**Wehrey 10** (Frederic, senior policy analyst with RAND, The Iraq Effect, p.21-3,<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) EH

**In the aftermath of the Iraq War, the growing aggressiveness of Iran— from its nuclear posturing to a seemingly expanded reach from the Gulf to the Levant—has become a defining feature of the new Middle East landscape**, raising alarms in Washington and the region.**Numerous studies since the war have examined Iran’s enhanced role in Iraq, where most of the Shi‘a political factions that are emerging as the key power brokers in the evolving Iraqi political system have had long-standing ties and asylum in Iran before the war, even if Iraqi nationalism may at times trump the sectarian dimension.** On the military front, Iran’s training of militants in Iraq through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its supply of lethal improvised explosive device (IED) technology to Iraqi insurgents is well documented. But **Iran’s influence and activism have expanded beyond what is arguably its natural sphere of influence in Iraq to the core of the Levant.** Jordanian King ‘Abdullah voiced his fear over Iranian penetration into the Arab-Israeli conflict in sectarian terms by referring to a growing “Shi‘a Crescent” in the region. Indeed, there is widespread concern in Jordan regarding the growing Iranian reach into the Levant, with one former official calling this development a “fiasco,” noting “Iran is winning everywhere and the U.S. is losing.”

Iraqi Political Stability Key to Refugee Aid

Refugees can’t return to Iraq until Iraqi Politics cohere

Simon 7 (Steven, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Middle Eastern Studies, “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007 ACW)

Jordan, an important U.S. ally, has been imperiled by the war, in part because it has been the object of attacks by the Zarqawi network and, perhaps more dangerously, has emerged as the obvious destination for an estimated 750,000 refugees, over 10 percent of its indigenous population. U.S. forces, in their current numbers and configuration, are not going to solve this problem. Until Iraqi politics cohere, Jordan most needs financial aid and competent technical assistance to house, sustain, and control the second and third waves of refugees who lack resources of their own. The fact is that longterm prospects for the Sunni states friendly to the United States may be clouded, but they are unlikely to face unmanageable subversive challenges as a consequence of an orderly U.S. disengagement from Iraq over a twelve-to-eighteen-month period.

Refugee Human Rights

**Iraq war refugees are dehumanized – not provided help after losing their homes.**

Bandow 9 (Doug; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, *Cato Institute,*May 26, 2009, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/05/26/iraqs-refugee-crisis/>) CH

George W. **Bush’s misguided attack on Iraq has had catastrophic consequences for the Iraqi people.**  Although the removal of Saddam Hussein was a blessing, the bloody chaos that resulted was not.  Estimates of the number of dead in the ensuing strife starts at about 100,000 and rises rapidly.  The number of injured is far greater.  **Moreover, roughly four million people, about one-sixth of the population, have been driven from their homes.  The most vulnerable tended to be Iraq’s Christian community and Iraqis who aided U.S. personnel — acting as translators, for instance.  Yet the Bush administration resisted allowing any of these desperate people to come to America, since to resettle refugees would be to acknowledge that administration policy had failed to result in the promised paradise in Babylon.  This horrid neglect continues.**  Reports Hanna Ingber Win:      Of the millions displaced, the United States will resettle about 17,000 new Iraqis this coming fiscal year. While that is a relatively small number of arrivals compared to the number displaced, about a third of them will end up in El Cajon and Greater San Diego. More than 5,000 new Iraqis will arrive in San Diego County during the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, according to Catholic Charities in the San Diego Diocese. Getting jobs, homes and visas to reunite the families of the new arrivals — many of whom put their lives and their families’ lives at risk by helping the U.S. military — is a monumental task.      **As the Iraq War played out, the Bush administration seemed to do everything in its power to ignore the refugee crisis. Former President Bush, reluctant to admit to a failed war policy, never mentioned the plight of the refugees and for years refused to allow Iraqis fleeing the war zone to resettle in the U.S. Only after significant political pressure from members of Congress and advocacy groups did the administration’s policy begin to change, and refugees began gaining access to the United States.** 

**Iraqi refugees are denied help and basic human rights from surrounding countries.**

**Wehrey et. Al 10** (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) CH

**The influx of an estimated 2 million Iraqi refugees has created socioeconomic stresses in Syria and Jordan; the resulting public discontent and demographic changes could challenge stability in these states over the long term. The Iraq War created the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since the 1948 Arab- challenge has not transformed into a security risk to the degree anticipated.**Indeed, some studies have pointed to beneficial effects, such as the injection of capital by the mostly middle-class refugee population in Jordan following the war, which reportedly fueled Amman’s housing boom during that period. **That said, as resources run out for these refugees, their situation is becoming more dire, particularly because most are unable to find legal work and are reportedly charged inflated rates for housing. Prostitution and female trafficking have become significant problems, particularly in Syria.**Still, the Iraqi refugees have not yet carried Iraq’s political and sectarian violence to neighboring soil. Most Iraqi refugees in neighboring states appear more concerned with surviving than with fomenting instability in their host countries. Yet a strong tendency exists to scapegoat the refugees. **The refugees are increasingly blamed for the end of fuel subsidies, unemployment, inflation, and housing shortages. The effect over the long term may be pressure on regimes from key constituents to curtail and reduce services for Iraqis. The Jordanian and Syrian governments have already toughened their policies, and Jordan has largely closed its doors to new refugees.** After significant international pressure, children have been allowed to go to school in some host countries (including Jordan and Syria), but few do because parents fear that attendance may compromise their illegal or quasi-legal presence in the country and because many children work illegally to keep their families housed and fed. Another worrisome trend is the presence of unemployed college-age Iraqi males whose profile of displacement and anomie could make them vulnerable recruits to Salafi-jihadism. **Previous refugee crises in the region and globally suggest that poverty and resentment can feed radicalization among the displaced and host populations.**Finally, the long-term urban demographics of refugee settlement bear watching; thus far, the Syrian and Jordanian governments have avoided constructing any parallel institutions—schools, clinics, and camps specifically for Iraqis—to prevent a repeat of the Palestinian camp experience. But certain urban areas are nevertheless becoming increasingly Iraqi in character, displacing indigenous populations and possibly sowing the seeds of future discord. **Moreover, if future instability in Iraq led to renewed refugee flows, Jordan and Syria would be unlikely to accept them as they have done to date, and refugee camps could develop.** A large Iraqi diaspora, combined with continuing conflict in Iraq, has the potential to spread conflict to neighbors as Iraqis living abroad funnel support to Iraqi groups, are recruited to fight, or lobby governments to provide aid to combatants. If camps are indeed set up, these risks increase, as camps have often been a primary source of militant recruiting for fighting and unrest in other cases (e.g., Lebanon). (See pp. 95–101.)

Refugees Key to Regional Stability

Status Quo Apathy towards refugees grantees a path to regional instablity

Kristof 8 (Nicholas D., Pulizer Prize winning columnist for NYT, “Books not Bombs”, The New York Times 6/26, ACW)

AMMAN, Jordan The dirty little secret of the Iraq war isn’t in Baghdad or Basra. Rather, it’s found in the squalid brothels of Damascus and the poorest neighborhoods of East Amman. Some two million Iraqis have fled their homeland and are now sheltering in run-down neighborhoods in surrounding countries. These are the new Palestinians, the 21st-century Arab diaspora that threatens the region’s stability. Many youngsters are getting no education, and some girls are pushed into prostitution, particularly in Damascus. Impoverished, angry, disenfranchised, unwanted, these Iraqis are a combustible new Middle Eastern element that no one wants to address or even think about. American hawks prefer to address the region’s security challenges by devoting billions of dollars to permanent American military bases. A simpler way to fight extremism would be to pay school fees for refugee children to ensure that they at least get an education and don’t become forever marginalized and underemployed. We broke Iraq, and we have a moral responsibility to those whose lives have been shattered by our actions. Helping them is also in our national interest, for we’ll regret our myopia if we allow young Iraqi refugees to grow up uneducated and unemployable, festering in their societies. “My husband and I have decided to pull our three children out of school,” said Yussra Shaker, a college-educated English teacher who fled Iraq and went to Jordan when her 15-year-old son was shot in the leg in a kidnapping attempt. Ms. Yussra deeply believes in education, and her eyes welled with tears as she described the decision to withdraw her children because of school fees and beatings by Jordanian students. “My children are very good students, and the teachers like them,” Ms. Yussra explained, “and so the local children beat them up even more.” Ms. Yussra’s family is Christian, but most of those fleeing Iraq are Sunni Muslims — and some of them may have shot at Americans or brutalized Shiites in the ongoing sectarian conflict. One Sunni family I visited came from Falluja after their house was blown up, possibly by Americans, and they have decorated their leaking apartment with a huge poster of Saddam Hussein. This family was composed of two wives of one man (who was back in Iraq, living in a tent) and their five children. The eldest son was a surly young man in his 20s who looked as if his preferred interaction with Americans might have involved an AK-47 in his arms. Yet the family also has four small children and was nine months behind in its rent and in danger of being thrown out on to the street. I visited them at 2 p.m., and nobody in the house had eaten anything so far that day. Iraqi refugees don’t get help in part because this is a problem that almost everybody wants to hide. Syria and Jordan worry that if the refugees get assistance, then they will stay indefinitely. The U.S. doesn’t want to talk about a crisis created by our war, and Iraq’s Shiite leaders don’t much care about Sunnis or Christians displaced by Shiite militias. “It’s among the largest humanitarian crises in the world today,” said Michael Kocher, a refugee expert at the International Rescue Committee, which recently published a report on the crisis. “It’s getting very little attention from the Security Council on down, which we feel is scandalous and also bad strategy.” It’s easy to blame the surrounding countries, such as Jordan and Syria, for not being more hospitable to Iraqis. But those countries have, however grudgingly, tolerated the influx despite the burden and political risk. Iraqi refugees are hard to count but may now amount to 8 percent of Jordan’s population of six million. The average Jordanian family, which opposed the war in the first place, is now bearing a cost that may be as much as $1,000 per year for providing for the refugees. In contrast, last year the United States took in only 1,608 Iraqis. European countries have done better, but they believe that America created the refugee crisis and should take the lead in resolving it. “Apathy towards the crisis has been the overwhelming response,” Amnesty International said in a report last week. We have already seen, in the case of Palestinians, how a refugee diaspora can destabilize a region for decades. If Jordan were to collapse in part from such pressures, that would be a catastrophe — and the best way to prevent that isn’t to give it Blackhawk helicopters, but help with school fees and school construction. If we let the Iraqi refugee crisis drag on — and especially if we allow young refugees to miss an education so that they will never have a future — then we are sentencing ourselves to endure their wrath for decades to come. Educating Iraqis may not be as glamorous as bombing them, but it will do far more good.

Refugees Key to Regional Stability

Aid to Refugees K2 Regional Stability

Abramowitz 8 (Morton, former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A ‘Surge’ for Refugees”, The New York Times 4/22, ACW)

IT is a grave humanitarian crisis: 1.5 million Iraqi refugees living in deplorable and declining conditions in Syria and Jordan. They are clustered not in camps but in overcrowded urban neighborhoods, crammed into dark, squalid apartments. Many have been traumatized by extreme violence. Their savings are dwindling; many cannot afford to pay for rent, heat and food; few have proper medical care. After meeting with refugees, leaders in both Syria and Jordan and United Nations experts, we came to the inescapable conclusion that this crisis could endure for years and that much more help is needed now. There is absolutely no denying that the United States has a special responsibility to help. The sectarian violence these Iraqi refugees have fled is a byproduct of the invasion and its chaotic aftermath — yet America has paradoxically done far less than its traditionally generous response. But while the United States must lead, the scale of this humanitarian emergency and its uncertain duration require international contributions, including the active participation of European and Gulf Arab states. The refugees face three alternatives: return, remain or resettle. None is a good option. It is too dangerous to go back, they will become increasingly destitute if they remain where they are, and yet only a few will be resettled in other countries. The United States and the international community must therefore take three actions to ease the plight of displaced Iraqis until the day comes when they can safely return home. First, these refugees simply need more aid. We estimate that to serve this population a minimum of $2 billion is needed annually for at least the next two to four years and it is fitting that the United States cover at least half of this cost. Contributions from the international community have been woefully inadequate. So far this year the United States has given only $208 million in direct humanitarian assistance for displaced Iraqis. The gulf states have given $11 million since last October. And with its significant oil funds, the Iraqi government must do better in assisting its own uprooted citizens: the $25 million it has allocated in this year’s budget is grossly insufficient. Host countries must also allow nongovernmental organizations better access to Iraqi refugees and affected local communities. Second, because a sizable population of Iraqis will not return home under any circumstances, more refugees must be resettled in more third countries. Unfortunately, many doors have closed or are being closed. Again, the United States must lead, and it is failing: our government has resettled fewer than 5,000 Iraqi refugees since the war began. This year America should at a minimum meet its target of resettling 12,000 Iraqi refugees and fulfilling its commitment to admit 5,000 Iraqis (and their dependents) who have worked for the United States and are eligible for special immigrant visas. In the years ahead, the United States can realistically admit at least 30,000 Iraqis annually. European countries — especially Britain, which, like America, bears a particular responsibility — should be taking in larger numbers of vulnerable Iraqis like single women with children and those who worked for the coalition. Third, it is important to bring attention to the Iraq refugee problem. To this end, the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, should organize a high-level conference of regional countries and interested donors. The conference should examine the plight of Iraqi refugees and pledge concrete help. Because there is also an urgent need for actions that can improve conditions in Iraq and facilitate the safe, voluntary return of many refugees, the conference must include foreign ministers who can grapple with the diplomatic and political aspects of the crisis, not simply the humanitarian ones. Discussions about Iraq both here and abroad inevitably focus on the surge and on timelines for troop withdrawal. Missing is any realistic assessment of the fate of Iraqi refugees, 1.5 million people who have a crucial role to play in ensuring the long-term stability of the region.

**Jordan is supporting and helping Iraq**

**Xinhua 10** ( The Xinhua News, 4/9/210, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-04/09/c_13243174.htm>) CS

King Abdullah II of Jordan on Thursday emphasized that restoring Iraq's security and stability is a fundamental element in realizing stability in the Middle East, the state run Petra news agency reported. During a meeting with Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi in the Jordanian capital of Amman Thursday, Abdullah II stressed Jordan's full support to Iraq. The Jordanian leader and Mahdi looked into the developments of the political process in Iraq as the king extended congratulations over the success of the latest Iraqi elections. The Iraqi official, who is in Jordan as part of a regional tour, voiced his country's appreciation of Jordan's support to Iraq, stressing his country's keenness to foster ties with the Arab kingdom. Jordan hosts about 400,000 to 450,000 Iraqis who fled their country in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

USFG should aid Iraqi Refugees

The US has a moral obligation to aid fleeing Iraqi Refugee from their war strewn nation

SLAUGHTER 8 (Annie-Marrie, dean at Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. “Remember the Refugees”, NYT 5/4, ACW)

RECOMMENDATIONS for how to ensure the best outcome in Iraq are politically easy — and thus plentiful. Our moral responsibility as a nation, however, requires that we prepare for the worst even as we work and hope for the best. What we want is a peaceful political settlement among the Iraqis that will provide a stable government as we withdraw. What we may well get is local or even regional violence as part of a power struggle that will determine on what terms that settlement is reached. The possibilities include sectarian massacres, feuding warlords and attempted secession by Iraqi provinces. Staring these prospects in the face is not pessimistic; it is prudent. And those of us who did not oppose the war have an extra obligation to be as sober as we can in our assessment of the probabilities. We must begin by taking care of those Iraqis who have risked their lives for the vision of a new country that we promised them. We should drastically increase the immigration quotas for Iraqi translators and others who want to come to the United States, complete with continuing resettlement assistance once they arrive. We should work with the “coalition of the willing” and with countries in the region to do likewise. We must plan to create safe corridors for the refugees fleeing Baghdad and other areas, and we must talk to all countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, about temporary resettlement plans for these refugees. As Gen. David Petraeus reminds us, we are trying to buy time for a political settlement. In the end, that is up to the Iraqi leaders. We cannot save them from themselves. But we can do everything we can to help the millions of Iraqis who are likely to be trying to get out of the way.

The US should use Diplomacy to Aid Refugees

The USFG should focus on multilateral solutions, military reassignment, and refugee aid to promote regional stability.

Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, &Peter Juul 7(Senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of US Strategy in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007 ACW)

Iraq’s leaders are fundamentally at odds over what Iraq is, how power should be distributed, and who should control the nation’s oil wealth. To advance its own national security interests, the United States needs to come to grips with this new reality of Iraq’s fragmentation and respond by diversifying our military, diplomatic, and development presence in and around Iraq. We need to build on the efforts of the Bush administration to put more emphasis on provincial and local leadership rather than on working primarily with the national government. The United States should mitigate the increasingly violent fragmentation in Iraq by ceasing the unconditional arming and training of Iraq’s national security forces until a political consensus and sustainable political solution is reached. As the United States redeploys its military forces, it should immediately phase out its training of Iraq’s national security forces and place strict limits on arming and equipping them. Spending billions to arm Iraq’s security forces without political consensus among Iraq’s leaders carries significant risks—the largest of which is arming faction-ridden national Iraqi units before a unified national government exists that these armed forces will loyally support. Training and equipping Iraqi security forces risks making Iraq’s civil war even bloodier and more vicious than it already is today. It also increases the dangers that these weapons will one day be turned against the United States and its allies in the region. Furthermore, the United States should discard its plan to build the world’s largest embassy in Baghdad and instead make plans to reassign diplomatic and intelligence personnel throughout Iraq and neighboring countries with adequate protection. We should encourage Middle East leaders and the United Nations to continue working with Iraq’s national leaders to peacefully settle their differences over power-sharing, but the United States should not unilaterally continue to try to force an immediate resolution of Iraq’s political disputes. Where security conditions permit and where it is practically possible, the United States should reassign U.S. personnel to secure consulates around Iraq in order to assist in local efforts to address Iraq’s problems more effectively. The localities of Iraq are where politics shape Iraq’s future, not in the isolation of the Green Zone. Finally, to fulfill a key moral obligation to the Iraqi people, the United States should increase the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons it might accept annually from the current level of 7,000 to 100,000.

The US should shift the burden of reconstruction to Iraqis while acting as a leader towards aiding Iraqi Refugees

Knight et. Al 8(Charles, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, “The necessary steps for a responsible withdrawal from Iraq, Report of the Task force for a responsible withdrawal from Iraq June 2008, ACW)

The Iraq of 2008 is a deeply traumatized society. Under increasingly brutal authoritarian rule since 1968, Iraq saw its once burgeoning wealth erode and its once gleaming infrastructure crumble after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died in that war, and the regime crushed a Kurdish rebellion in the north with genocidal chemical weapons attacks upon Kurdish villagers. As a result of Saddam’s 1990 assault upon Kuwait, a US-led coalition heavily bombed water treatment facilities, power plants, bridges, and other infrastructure. Rebellions against the regime in the north and south were again bloodily suppressed. Perhaps of even greater consequence today was that the UN Security Council imposed the most comprehensive economic sanctions in history, an embargo that was not to be lifted until 2003. By the time of the US invasion, the economic and social indicators of oil-rich Iraq mirrored those of very poor countries. The incalculable suffering of Iraqis during the current war comes on top of this 35-year nightmare. The international community, chiefly the United States, owes the Iraqi people a decent chance at recovery. Moreover, efforts at bringing political stability to the country will be greatly enhanced if Iraqis believe they are on a path toward socio-economic stability. The measures below can and should be taken immediately. The shape of the future Iraqi economy is for Iraqis to decide. While the 2005 Iraqi constitution and subsequent laws have outmoded much of the ideological agenda of Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer, public renunciation of it by the United States would be an important symbolic affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty and would help to reassure Iraqis that the destabilizing effects of a rapid, uncontrolled economic opening will be avoided. The challenge of rebuilding Iraq is compounded by the fact that some 4 million Iraqis are now displaced from their homes, including some 2 million a responsible withdrawal from iraq 25 who have fled Iraq entirely. The mass displacement is a humanitarian emergency with serious political and security implications. Thus far, despite increased attention to the refugees in 2007 and 2008, the international response has been utterly inadequate.17 This paltry response reflects the low priority given the issue by the Bush administration following from a refusal to acknowledge the scope of the displacement, which reflects badly on its narrative of success in Iraq.

\*\*\*Iranian Terrorism ADV

Iran supports terrorists

Iran provides a safe haven for terrorist

Coughlin 6 (Con, The Daily Telegraph, <http://www.nysun.com/foreign/iranians-training-qaeda-terrorists-to-attack-our/43442/>, November 14, 2006) CGW

Iran's Revolutionary Guards are training hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters to carry out attacks against coalition forces throughout the Middle East. The Iranian government has been providing a safe haven for fighters loyal to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terror group since they were forced to flee Afghanistan in late 2001. But Western intelligence agencies now report that the Iranians are training Al Qaeda fighters at centers that were previously used by other Islamic militant groups, such as the Lebanese militia Hezbollah. The decision to allow Al Qaeda fighters to train in Iran was made by President Ahmadinejad as part of his policy of attempting to forge closer links with Mr. bin Laden's organization. The training of Al Qaeda operatives is part of a wider Iranian ambition: to take control of the Al Qaeda terror network by encouraging it to promote officials known to be friendly to Tehran.

Iran is supporting Iraqi terrorists

Baxter 8 (Sarah, reporter, *The Sunday Times,* 4-27-2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3822588.ece>) CM

America's top military officer has ratcheted up the pressure on Iran by issuing an unusual public warning that the Pentagon is planning for “potential military courses of action”. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, blamed the Iranian government and Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for its “increasingly lethal and malign influence” in Iraq. He said conflict with Iran would be “extremely stressing” for America’s overstretched forces, but added: “It would be a mistake to think that we are out of combat capability.” Mullen said he was increasingly concerned about Iran’s growing involvement in supplying munitions and training to rebel Shi’ite militias and “killing American and coalition soldiers in Iraq”. Speaking at a Pentagon news conference late on Friday, he said recent operations in the southern port city of Basra had revealed “just how much and how far Iran is reaching into Iraq to foment instability”. A Pentagon source said the admiral’s frankness was “extremely significant” and could pave the way for some form of attack on Iran. However, Mullen said: “The solution right now still lies in using other levers of national power, including diplomatic, financial and international pressure.”

The Iranian Government is providing Iraqi terrorists with weapons

McConnell 7 (Michael, Dir of National Intelligence, Council on Foreign Relations, 6-28-2007, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13692/mcconnell_cites_overwhelming_evidence_of_irans_support_for_iraqi_insurgents.html>) CM

There’s very clear evidence—overwhelming evidence—that Iranians are providing support and munitions and capability—the most heinous of those are referred to as EFPs, that’s shorthand for Explosively Formed Projectile. What does that mean? If your method of attack that is most effective turns out to be a roadside bomb, and the response on the part of the forces that are being attacked is to build it heavier—more armor—then what you need to be effective is some way to penetrate armor or to push through. There’s a technique in the munitions business: If you can explosively form the projectile it can penetrate many, many inches of armor. So when the Iraqi insurgents were proving to be less successful, what the Iranians provided were these specially designed machines. The Iranians today, we have clear evidence, are providing the very weapons that are causing U.S. servicemen and women to die. That’s clear, that’s not refuted, that’s not hawkish, that’s not shaded. That is the fact.

The Iranian Government is supporting Iraqi Terrorists in the SQO

Kaplan 7 (Eben, Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 6-28-2007, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13692/mcconnell_cites_overwhelming_evidence_of_irans_support_for_iraqi_insurgents.html>) CM

Admiral Michael McConnell, the U.S. director of national intelligence, says there is “overwhelming evidence” that Tehran is supporting insurgents in Iraq and “compelling” evidence that the same is happening in Afghanistan. McConnell cites insurgents’ increasing use of effective roadside bombs known as Explosively Formed Projectiles that are clearly traceable to Iran.

Iran supports terrorists

**Iran uses Hezbollah to execute its Terror agenda.**

**Byman 8**(Daniel, Analyst at Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute,<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/03_iran_byman/03_iran_byman.pdf>, 3/19)dc

**Of the many terrorist groups that Iran has sponsored, none is more important to Tehran than the Lebanese Hizballah**.13 **Their close relationship is perhaps the strongest and most effective relationship between a state sponsor and a terrorist group in history. Iran helped found, organize, and train Hizballah, eventually creating a strong and relatively independent terrorist group. In exchange, Hizballah has served Iran loyally, striking Iran’s various foreign enemies, helping assassinate Iranian dissidents, and otherwise advancing the interests of the Islamic Republic.** Iran, as noted earlier, helped build the movement from the ground up and to this day plays a major role in sustaining it and its day-to-day operations. Iranian sponsorship of Hizballah is a major reason why Iran consistently tops the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Although exact figures are difficult to verify, Tehran provides perhaps $100 million per year to Hizballah—a figure that may have increased after the summer 2006

Iran provides Training and Weapons to Iraqi Terrorists

Felter and Fishman 8 (Joseph and Brian, Army Colonel and member of the Combating Terrorism Center, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10-1308) CM

Iran provides training and weapons to various Iraqi militias, including Moqtada al‐Sadr’s Jaysh al‐Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Like the United States, Iran did not fully anticipate the role that nationalist—anti‐American and anti‐Iranian—militias like JAM and the SGCs would play in post‐invasion Iraq. Nonetheless, Iran uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Qods Force to provide extensive training programs for Iraqi militants inside Iran. Both JAM and SGC members have deep reservations about working with Iran, but they accept Iranian support because they are adamantly opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq, power‐hungry, and sometimes criminal. For Iran’s part, its support for the militias serves as a hedge against the central Iraqi government growing too powerful or too close to the U.S. Iran enjoys being able to pressure the United States militarily while simultaneously empowering its political surrogates, ISCI/Badr and parts of the Dawah Party, to work with the U.S. through the Iraqi government.

Iran supports Iraqi terrorists and is the most significant long-term threat to Iraqi security

Felter and Fishman 8 (Joseph and Brian, Army Colonel and member of the Combating Terrorism Center, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10-1308) CM

General David Petraeus, former Commanding General of MNF‐I, emphasized to U.S. lawmakers in his April 2008 Senate testimony that malign Iranian influence is the most significant long‐term threat to the security of Iraq.30 And such influence is unlikely to stop any time soon. The decline of EFP incidents after May 2008 highlights a general decline in violence, but it is very unlikely that Iran has abandoned its program to fund and support Iraqi militias. Rather, the decline is probably associated with a concerted effort to minimize violence during the SFA/SOFA negotiations. The Iraqi government has taken a firmer stand against Iranian meddling in 2008 than in previous years, but even a concerted Iraqi government effort will not staunch a dedicated program to smuggle weapons across the border. It is important to remember that Iran was able to effectively sponsor Iraqi militants even during the authoritarian Saddam era

Iran is supporting Iraqi terrorists,

Felter and Fishman 8 (Joseph and Brian, Army Colonel and member of the Combating Terrorism Center, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10-1308) CM

Iran’s training program for Iraqi Shi’a militias is robust. Iraqi militants captured by the United States describe a complex Iranian program equipped to illicitly move, train, and arm Iraqis. Classes range from basic weapons courses and paramilitary training to courses designed to create Iraqi master‐trainers that can continue military education and training inside Iraq. Iran employs Lebanese Hizballah agents as trainers inside Iran and sponsors Iraqi militants’ travel to train with Hizballah in Lebanon. Many Iraqi militants prefer the Lebanese Hizballah trainers to Iranians because they speak fluent Arabic, are deemed more polite than Iranians, and are often considered better instructors. Militants that had attended Iranian sponsored training conducted by Hizballah in Lebanon considered it to be more advanced training than the Iran‐based classes.

Iran is sending Militants into Iraq

The Iranian Government uses Iraqi terrorists to wage a proxy war against the US

Cadwell 7 (Robert, editor of The San Diego Union-Tribune's Sunday Insight section, BendWeekly, 8-3-2007, <http://www.bendweekly.com/Opinion/8747.html>) CM

Senior American commanders in Baghdad cite virtually incontrovertible evidence that Iran is stoking the violence in Iraq and contributing directly to the deaths of American troops. Weapons, including mortars, rockets and munitions bearing Iranian markings, smuggled into Iraq from Iran are helping to arm Iran's allies among the Shiite militias, including those of the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army. U.S. intelligence traces an especially lethal form of roadside bomb, known as an explosively formed penetrator, directly back to Iran. These sophisticated devices utilize precisely machined copper discs activated by a radio link and triggered by a passive infrared sensor. The semi-molten copper slug produced when the device is detonated can penetrate the armor of many Army and Marine vehicles, wreaking havoc on those inside. Iraq's industrial base lacks the technical capability to manufacture these precision anti-armor weapons. Moreover, they are identical, right down to the radio frequencies used to activate them, to anti-tank weapons used against Israeli forces last summer by the Iranian-armed Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon. U.S. commanders report that these bombs inflicted 30 percent of all American military casualties (excluding Anbar province, where the weapons have not been encountered) during the last three months of 2006. Counting combat deaths in 2006 and 2007, the American military says these bombs have killed at least 170 U.S. soldiers and Marines. In recent months, U.S. intelligence has obtained satellite photographs of three training camps for Iraqi insurgents near Iran's capital, Tehran. Prisoner interrogations plus other sources of intelligence indicate that the camps are being used to instruct Iraqi militants in weapons use, ambush techniques, kidnapping, assassination and other forms of insurgent warfare. All of these activities, from weapons supply to training to infiltration into Iraq, are being run by Iran's al-Quds force of Revolutionary Guards, originally formed as the shock troops of Iran's Islamic revolution. Any suggestion that the al-Quds force could somehow be conducting a proxy war in Iraq against the United States without the knowledge or consent of Iran's ruling Islamic Council is absurd. Al-Quds answers directly to the Islamic Council's radical clerics, holders of supreme power in the Iranian government. Thus, Iran's intervention in Iraq can be none other than a deliberate, calculated decision by the government of Iran to wage indirect war against the United States.

**Iran uses Iraq for strategic purposes against the US. Terrorism is the result.**

**Katzman 9** (Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs *Congressional Research Service*<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf>)

**With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat** to Iran, either **with or without U.S. forces present** in Iraq.**Some believe that Iran’s intentions go well beyond achieving Iraq’s “neutrality”**— that Iran wants to try to harness Iraq to Iran’s broader regional policy goals and to help Iran defend against international criticism of Iran’s nuclear program. Others believe Iran sees Iraq as providing lucrative investment opportunities and a growing market for Iranian products and contracts. While some see Iran as having accomplished many of its key objectives in Iraq, others maintain that Iran has suffered key setbacks over the past year. **Its protégé Shiite factions, formerly united, are increasingly competing with each other politically** and several are losing **support among the Iraqi public**. The most pro-Iranian factions generally fared poorly in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. **Iran has sought to achieve its goals in Iraq through several strategies: supporting pro-Iranian factions and armed militias; attempting to influence Iraqi political leaders and faction leaders; and building economic ties throughout Iraq** that might accrue goodwill to Iran. It is Iran’s support for armed Shiite factions that most concern U.S. officials. **That Iranian activity has hindered—and continues to pose a threat to—U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat perception of Iran generally**.

Iran is sending Militants into Iraq

Iran is sending militants to Iraq.

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, members of RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

In the aftermath of the Iraq War, the growing aggressiveness of Iran— from its nuclear posturing to a seemingly expanded reach from the Gulf to the Levant—has become a defining feature of the new Middle East landscape, raising alarms in Washington and the region. Numerous studies since the war have examined Iran’s enhanced role in Iraq, where most of the Shi‘a political factions that are emerging as the key power brokers in the evolving Iraqi political system have had long-standing ties and asylum in Iran before the war, even if Iraqi nationalism may at times trump the sectarian dimension.9 On the Military front **Iran’s training of militants in Iraq through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its supply of lethal improvised explosive device (IED) technology to Iraqi insurgents is well documented. 10 But Iran’s influence and activism have expanded beyond what is arguably its natural sphere of influence in Iraq** to the core of the Levant.11 Jordanian King ‘Abdullah voiced his fear over Iranian penetration into the Arab-Israeli conflict in sectarian terms by referring to a growing “Shi‘a Crescent” in the region.12 Indeed, there is widespread concern in Jordan regarding the growing Iranian reach into the Levant, with one former official calling this development a “fiasco,” noting “Iran is winning everywhere and the U.S. is losing.”13 Iranian activism is most visible in its sponsorship of militant groups, such as Palestinian HAMAS and the Lebanese Hizballah, and through its development of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (many of which Hizballah tested during the 2006 Lebanon war). **While Iranian links to terrorist organizations are not new**, regional analysts believe **Iran has become bolder and more open in its support of such activity since the Iraq War.**

Iran influences terrorist groups in Iraq.

Wehrey et. Al 10 (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) CH

Arab regimes and publics have responded to the rise of Iran in diverse and often contradictory ways. The Arab world holds two images of Iran. The “bad” Iran reflects Iran’s influence in Iraq and its challenge to Arab regimes and Arab Sunni identity, while the “good” Iran defies the West, opposes Israel, and criticizes corrupt Arab regimes.20 That said, Arab regimes and populations often have different views about the good and bad Irans.21 While official Arab postures toward Iran are more hostile than among Arab publics, RAND interviews with government officials and political elites suggest a complex understanding of the Iranian challenge, and even some appreciation for the defensive motivations that may be partly driving Iranian regional behavior. The bad Iran image is fostered by Iranian influence in Iraq and particularly its meddling with Shi‘a groups in both Iraq and the broader region, challenging not only Arab regimes but also Arab Sunni identity. This image is most prevalent at official levels but at times also appears in popular Arab opinion. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal has argued, for example, that the Iraq War had effectively “handed Iraq to Iran” (Gibbons, 2005).22 A former Jordanian official similarly suggested to RAND that “Arab Iraq has been lost to Iran.”23 Some analysts attribute Iran’s gains in Iraq not only to American missteps but also to Arab states’ neglect. A Bahraini commentator has noted that the “Arabs decided on their own accord to turn away from Iraq and remain at distance from its arena, and the result is that Iran has become, on the basis of influence, the northern neighbor of the Gulf” (al-Marhun, 2007). Because neighboring Arab states did not want to be associated with the war, they did not attempt to counter Iran in Iraq, and viewed Iraq as America’s problem.24 Indeed, dozens of RAND interviews with regional officials and analysts suggested that Iraq’s neighbors are far more concerned with “local” problems, such as Gaza and Lebanon, than with Iraq.

Terrorists will cause Iraq Collapse

Status quo proves terrorist attacks will cause collapse

Tran 7 (Mark, a reporter on international news,-guardian.co.uk, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/iraq.usa>, 17 May 2007) CGW

Iraq is in danger of becoming a failed state and faces the possibility of collapse and fragmentation, a foreign affairs think tank said today. The bleak assessment, from Chatham House in London, said Iraq was suffering from not one but many civil wars and insurgencies involving numerous communities and organizations struggling for power. With Iraq so polarized by years of conflict and violence, it was futile to rebuild the country as a unitary state with a strong and centralized government, argued the report, written by Gareth Stansfield, a Middle East expert at Exeter University. Instead, it called for a formalization of emerging regional arrangements through the constitutional provisions that enshrine federalism. "The Iraqi government is not able to exert authority evenly or effectively over the country," it said. "Across huge swathes of territory, it is largely irrelevant in terms of ordering social, economic and political life." The report will make bleak reading for Washington, which - with increasing impatience - has been pressing the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, to restore security and order, and work towards political reconciliation.

US Military Presence Fuels Iran Backed terror

Iran supports these terrorists to force the US out of Iraq

Felter and Fishman 8 (Joseph and Brian, Army Colonel and member of the Combating Terrorism Center, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10-1308) CM

Iran wants to force U.S. troops out of Iraq, but so long as Americans remain, Iran will use direct access to U.S. forces to attempt to deter a strike against its nuclear facilities. The U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan leaves Iran feeling cornered. Forcing U.S. troops out of Iraq will relieve some of that pressure and open the door to increased Iranian influence in Iraq. If unable to evict U.S. troops from Iraq, Iran will likely leverage its ability to inflict casualties on American forces and use this credible threat to deter any possible U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. By demonstrating its ability to kill U.S. troops and undermine Iraqi civil society, Iran will try to show it can strike back if its nuclear sites are threatened.

US presence cause Iran to train insurgents

American.gov 7 (Quds Force provides training, funds and arms, <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/July/20070703102256dmslahrellek0.3060114.html>, 03 July 2007) CGW

An elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard with ties to Hezbollah is training, funding and arming insurgents in Iraq to attack coalition and Iraqi forces and conduct other missions, says a senior U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, Iraq. The Quds Force, which conducts international operations for the Iranian Guard, "played key roles in the planning and execution of bombings, kidnappings, extortion, sectarian murders, illegal arms trafficking and other attacks against the Iraqi people, the police, the Iraqi army and coalition forces," Army Brigadier General Kevin Bergner said in a July 2 briefing. Bergner, speaking via teleconference, said that senior agents working for Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based terrorist organization, began training, equipping and forming Iraqi insurgent groups in 2004 under direction from Quds with the full knowledge of the senior leadership in Iran. Hezbollah instructors trained approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a time in three training centers in Iran, sending them back to Iraq to form insurgent cells, he said. "Our intelligence reveals that the senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity," Bergner said. "It shows how Iranian operatives are using Lebanese surrogates to create Hezbollah-like capabilities.

**Current aggressive tactics against Iran only fund Terrorism**

**SFRC 9** (Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/3/09, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Sadjadpour.pdf>) CS

While threatening violence against Iran has become a way for U.S. politicians to appear tough on national security, such rhetoric has empowered Tehran’s hard-liners and enhanced Iran’s stature on the streets of Cairo, Ramallah and Jakarta as the Muslim world’s only brave, anti-imperialist nation that speaks truth to power. Additionally, when oil prices jump with each threat against Iran, Iran’s nuclear program and its financial patronage of Hezbollah and Hamas become more affordable. While the Iranian government is certainly complicit in engaging in bellicose rhetoric, the United States should not take its behavioral cues from an insecure, repressive and undemocratic regime. Instead of reciprocating threats and name calling, the Obama administration should project the dignity and poise of a superpower. A hostile rhetorical line allows Iran’s leadership to paint the United States as an aggressor—both internationally and domestically.

US presence fuels Iranian Backed Terror groups in Iraq

Byman 8 (Daniel; Director for Center for Peace and Security Studies, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31:169–181) CH

Iran’s use of terrorism has changed dramatically since the 1980s. Most importantly from a U.S. point of view, Iran appears not to target Americans directly, although it still retains the capability to do so and in Iraq some groups with links to Iran have fought with coalition forces. Iran instead uses terrorism as a form of deterrence, “casing” U.S. embassies and other facilities to give it a response should the United States step up pressure.12 Tehran also dramatically cut back on operations in Europe and the Gulf states since the early 1990s. Iranian officials feared that attacks on Iranian dissidents there would lead to European support for sanctions and reduce investment in Iran’s economy. In the mid-1990s, Iran’s then President AliAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani engineered a rapprochement with theArabian Gulf states, which led Iran to stop actively trying to overthrow those regimes, though it retains ties to a number of Shi’a groups there. Taken together, these three shifts represent a dramatic change in Iran’s support for terrorism. Today, Iran uses terrorism and support for radicals in several distinct ways. Particularly important for the United States are Tehran’s close relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah; support for anti-Israel Palestinian groups; ties to various factions within Iraq; and loose contacts with Al Qaeda.

US Military Presence Fuels Iran Backed terror

Continued Military commitment in Iraq fuels terrorists, empowers Iran, overstretches the Military, damages US credibility, and prevents advancement of other US interests.

Simon 7 (Steven, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Middle Eastern Studies, “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007 ACW)

The United States has already achieved all that it is likely to achieve in Iraq: the removal of Saddam, the end of the Ba’athist regime, the elimination of the Iraqi regional threat, the snuffing out of Iraq’s unrequited aspiration to weapons of mass destruction, and the opening of a door, however narrow, to a constitutionally based electoral democracy. Staying in Iraq can only drive up the price of these gains in blood, treasure, and strategic position. Any realistic reckoning for the future will have to acknowledge six grim realities: 􀁸 The United States cannot determine political outcomes or achieve its remaining political aims via military means. American military forces have not brought the violence to an end or under control and will not do so in the future. In the absence of the understanding and the intelligence needed to operate effectively in the complex and violent political situation in Iraq, this should not be surprising. 􀁸 Leaving U.S. forces in Iraq under today’s circumstances means the United States is culpable but not capable—that is, Washington bears substantial responsibility for developments within Iraq without the ability to shape those developments in a positive direction. In consequence, Iraqi support for the U.S. presence has collapsed. Polls indicate that most Iraqis want the United States to pull out. Moreover, the Iraq war has fueled the jihad and apparently been a godsend to jihadi recruiters—and the process of self-recruitment—as indicated by the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the global war on terror. More broadly, the Iraq war has had a very damaging effect on the U.S. reputation in the Arab and wider Islamic world. Authoritative opinion surveys show this as well. The continued presence of U.S. forces is thus a severe setback in the canonical war of ideas, which the Bush administration has correctly assessed as crucial to American interests. 7 􀁸 The ongoing war has empowered and advanced the interests of the chief U.S. rival in the region, Iran. At this stage, the best way to regulate Iran’s attempts to exploit its advantages is to negotiate with Tehran either bilaterally or in a multilateral framework while protecting Americans in Iraq against Iranian attack. 􀁸 By siphoning resources and political attention away from Afghanistan, a continuing military commitment to Iraq may lead to two U.S. losses in southwest Asia. 􀁸 The Iraq war constrains the U.S. military, making it very difficult if not impossible to handle another significant contingency involving ground forces. It also damages the U.S. military, making it difficult for Washington to credibly employ coercive policies against others in the near to medium term even once the United States has disengaged from Iraq. Furthermore, the military commitment in Iraq impedes the U.S. ability to address other important international contingencies, in part because of the limitations of the U.S. military but also because of the preoccupation with Iraq at the highest decision-making levels. In short, U.S. interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region can be more effectively advanced if the United States disengages from Iraq. Indeed, the sooner Washington grasps this nettle, the sooner it can begin to repair the damage that has been done to America’s international position. Staying longer means more damage and a later start on repair. 􀁸 The implosion of domestic support for the war will compel the disengagement of U.S. forces; it is now just a matter of time. Better to withdraw as a coherent and at least somewhat volitional act than withdraw later in hectic response to public opposition to the war in the United States or to a series of unexpectedly sharp reverses on the ground in Iraq.

US Military Presence Fuels Iran Backed terror

Iran’s Terrorist connections in Iraq would escalate to violence if the US doesn’t withdraw

Byman ‘5(Dr. Daniel, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Brookings Institute September 8, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/fellows/byman20050908.pdf) ACW

Iran has a daunting array of interests in Iraq. Tehran and Baghdad have long been rivals for dominance in the Gulf region. Iran shares a long border with Iraq, and the bitter war between the two in the 1980s highlighted the security threat that a hostile regime in Baghdad can pose to Tehran. As the self-proclaimed champion of the world’s Shi’a, Iran also takes a strong interest in the fate of Iraq’s Shi’a majority: an interest reinforced by decades of intermarriage among leading clerical families of Iraq and Iran. Tehran also fears that instability in Iraq could spill over into Iran, inflaming its own Kurdish population or leading to a refugee crisis. Not surprisingly, Iran has flooded Iraq with intelligence agents, and members of the Lebanese Hizballah have also set up at least a temporary presence there. Tehran today has particularly close ties to an array of Iraqi Shi’a groups, many of which are leading actors in the new Iraqi government. Some of Iran’s proxies in the Iran-Iraq war are now major players in the government. Although they are not Iranian pawns, they have close relations with many leading figures in Iran. For the most part, Iran has tried to unite Iraqi Shi’a, recognizing that the U.S.-backed political process serves many Iranian interests. Tehran’s contacts in Iraq, however, go well beyond the Shi’a community. Tehran recognizes that in Iraq local influence is as important as influence with the central government and almost certainly has ties at a local level with various militias and tribal leaders. Iran has also tried to cultivate Shi’a leaders such as Moqtada al-Sadr, even though he is often vociferously anti-Iranian. For Iran, having ties to a wide range of groups gives it additional leverage as well as options should one proxy prove unreliable or should the situation on the ground suddenly change. 6 Although some groups tied to Iran have at times attacked Americans or pro-U.S. actors in Iraq, in general Tehran has been a force for stabilization. It is not clear if the attacks that did occur were at Iran’s behest. In part, this restraint is because the leadership that has emerged in Iraq in recent months is close to Tehran’s ideal. Iran, however, is also concerned that greater instability in Iraq could spill over into Iran and fears the potential for U.S. retaliation. Thus, while Tehran and Washington do not have the same interests in Iraq, Iran has not turned Iraq into another Lebanon. Iran’s ability to wreak havoc in Iraq is immense, however. Fortunately for the United States, violence in the Shi’a parts of Iraq has been limited. But a force of only a few hundred fighters could overturn this tenuous peace, since U.S. forces are currently overstretched as they focus on the Sunni and mixed-population parts of Iraq. This ability to affect hostilities in Iraq is risky for Iran, but it also gives Tehran additional leverage over a future Iraqi government as well as the United States. Iran might increase the violence in Iraq if it looks like the United States is trying to remove Iran’s influence, if the United States appears determined to stay indefinitely, or if the United States hardens its position in other areas, such as the standoff over Iran’s nuclear programs.

**US presence in Iraq causes Iran to sponsor terrorist**

US Department of State 1 (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441.htm>, April 30, 2001) CGW

The United States is firmly committed to removing countries from the list once they have taken necessary steps to end their link to terrorism. In fact, the Department of State is engaged in ongoing discussions with North Korea and Sudan with the object of getting those governments completely out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism list. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan continue to be the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000. It provided increasing support to numerous terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which seek to undermine the Middle East peace negotiations through the use of terrorism. Iraq continued to provide safehaven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime.

US Military Presence Fuels Iran Backed terror

**US officials fear that Iran’s support to terrorist groups is influenced by US occupation.**

**Katzman 9** (Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs *Congressional Research Service*<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf>)

**Iran’s arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq has added to U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s broader regional influence**, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian organization Hamas, which now controls the Gaza Strip. **U.S. officials feared that, by supplying armed groups in Iraq, Iran was seeking to develop a broad range of options that included: pressuring U.S**. and British **forces to leave Iraq; to bleed the United States militarily; and to be positioned to retaliate in Iraq should the United States take military action against Iran’s nuclear program**. However, as of early 2009, according to the Defense Department report on Iraq stability (March 2009), “**Tehran has selectively reduced the number of militants it supports.**” At the height of Iran’s support to Shiite militias, U.S. officials publicly discussed specific information on Qods Force and Hezbollah aid to Iraqi Shiite militias, particularly the JAM. One press report said there are 150 Qods and intelligence personnel there,2 but some U.S. commanders who have served in southern Iraq said they understood that there were perhaps one or two Qods Force personnel in each Shiite province, attached to or interacting with pro-Iranian governors in those provinces. Qods Force officers often do not wear uniforms and their main role is to identify Iraqi fighters to train and to organize safe passage for weapons and Iraqi militants between Iranand Iraq, although some observers allege that Iranian agents sometimes assisted the JAM in its combat operations. A study by the “Combatting Terrorism Center” at West Point, published October 13, 2008 (“Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ‘Other Means’”), details this activity, based on declassified interrogation and other documents.

U.S. Withdrawal solves Iranian conflicts

**The U.S. Can solve Iranian hostility and nuclear Proliferation by avoiding all Confrontation such as the War in Iraq**

The U.S. should appease Iran to reduce threats

**SFRC 9** (Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/3/09, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Sadjadpour.pdf>) CS

Once serious discussions commence, building confidence with Iran will be easier if efforts initially concentrate on areas of shared interest, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than those of little or no common interest, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nuclear issue. Constructive discussions in Kabul and Baghdad could have a positive spillover on the nuclear dispute. If Iran’s nuclear ambitions do indeed reflect a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the United States, building cooperation and goodwill in Iraq and Afghanistan could help to allay Tehran’s threat perception and compel its leaders to reassess their nuclear approach

Even though Iran supported terror groups target US troops, the attacks are likely to stop since US troop withdrawal is in Iran’s interests

Perry et. Al 9 (Walter, Senior Information Scientist, Ph.D., National Defense Research Inst, “Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies”, RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ACW)

If it did resume violence, JAM could target U.S. troops in Baghdad and the southern provinces, such as Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Karbala, although U.S. troops are required by the Security Agreement to be out of all Iraqi cities by July 2009. The relative strength of the Sadrists in Dhi Qar following the 2008 provincial elections, when they came second after al-Da’wa, could also contribute to an inhospitable environment in that province, particularly if al-Sadr renews public calls for attacks on U.S. forces. In the event of hostilities, JAM could try to interdict U.S. transport lines running from Baghdad to Kuwait using IEDs and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), a particularly deadly type of IED. Finally, residual U.S. forces and civilians may present a softer and more inviting target. If hostilities resume, JAM might kidnap U.S. civilians or soldiers for propaganda and political purposes, as did a JAM splinter group run by a close al-Sadr associate in Karbala in 2006.45 Iran may try to restrain or encourage JAM violence to suit its own needs. However, large-scale attacks seem unlikely, as uninterrupted U.S. departure is in Iran’s and al-Sadr’s interests.

Iran will stop supporting Iraqi Terrorists as soon as the US Withdrawals from Iran

Felter and Fishman 8 (Joseph and Brian, Army Colonel and member of the Combating Terrorism Center, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10-1308) CM

Iran will try to retain a non‐governmental militant capability in Iraq, no matter how friendly the Iraqi government becomes. Iran sees no contradiction in working with both the Iraqi government and continuing to sponsor violent militias capable of inflicting violence inside Iraq’s borders. Actual violence perpetrated by Iran’s surrogate militants will subside as U.S. forces leave; nevertheless, Iran will still strive to maintain a responsive capacity to “dial up” violence levels as conditions demand. Iran worries about the possibility of a Sunni uprising or power grab, will want to pressure any U.S. troops that remain in Iraq, and will seek to maintain covert networks for conveying goods and personnel across Iraq. These networks will likely be built from existing SGC networks, which tend to be more criminal in nature than JAM, which has a more ardently nationalist ideology. Iran will likely provide these personnel with advanced military training, ideological courses, and high financial compensation.

\*\*\*\*\*Iranian Politics\*\*\*\*\*

Iranian Government in Jeopardy

Corruption and economic problems are starting anti-government movements in Iran

Byman 9 (Daniel, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)- [Saban Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx), Brookings, June 18, 2009, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0618_iran_byman.aspx>) CGW

On the surface, Iran's clerical regime seems ready to collapse. Corruption is widespread, as is cynicism about the country's leadership. When oil was at more than $100 a barrel, the regime managed to have severe economic problems. Inflation ran higher than 20 percent, and unemployment was widely estimated at 20 percent, a remarkable feat of economic mismanagement. While oil prices are now increasing, they are nowhere near the levels necessary to restore vitality to Iran's economy. The regime's legitimacy is under siege from within. Iran's most senior religious scholars reject the spiritual leadership of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, seeing him, correctly, as lacking the religious credentials that are supposedly required for the job. Against this background, the fraudulent election proved too much for many Iranians. The leading challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, has demanded a revote. Like Iran's successful popular movements of the past, including the 1979 revolution that overthrew the monarchy, a mix of students, workers, intellectuals, and others are marching together in the streets. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri—once seen as the heir of Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and today Iran's most senior dissident cleric—announced on his Web site that "no sound mind" could accept the election results. Truly dramatic change in Iran requires more than an inept regime and popular disgruntlement, however. That combination is found in many quiescent autocracies. Iran's security establishment must be ordered to hold their fire, or they must choose to do so themselves. What's more, the opposition must be unified enough to ensure that the regime cannot intimidate or co-opt its supporters. There are rays of hope, but the odds are still against a velvet revolution.

Iranian Democracy inevitable

Democratization is inevitable because of civil society and economic reform.

**Amuzegar 3**(Jahangir, international economic consultant, Foreign Affairs, 82(1), p. 52) EH

**Iran's conservative clerics are now helplessly witnessing a slow but steady drive toward democratization. Despite the political crackdown, legislative deadlock, and rumors of a coup, two provocative and parallel developments are challenging the mullahs' hegemony and paving the way for the regime's eventual collapse.  The first development relates to the expansion of civil society and the use of civil disobedience to loosen the theocracy's grip on national institutions. Nongovernmental organizations are being formed by the thousands**, with and without official permission, **to deal with ongoing problems** ranging from family planning to drug addiction to pollution. Workers have formed informal (and extralegal) trade unions, and students have organized both Islamic and secular unions of their own. Despite a wave of newspaper closings and press repression, there are now 22 percent more licensed publications than there were in 1998. Furthermore, journalists have found a new haven in cyberspace beyond the authorities' reach. Currently, more than 1.75 million Iranians reportedly have access to the Internet. Even some nonestablishment ayatollahs have set up their own Web sites to connect with their flock. Their fatwas are now used by dissidents to counter the positions of the ruling clerics.  **Street demonstrations, labor strikes, teachers' boycotts, and other forms of civil disobedience** (such as taunting the morals police with un-Islamic attire) **are increasingly common.** For instance, thousands of workers demonstrating against poor working conditions managed to increase this year's official minimum wage. Strikes by teachers resulted in a substantial increase in this year's education budget. Human rights activists have also pushed the authorities to respond to foreign public opinion. According to the latest report by Human Rights Watch, the Islamic Republic may now start cooperating with foreign monitors for the first time. And in a noteworthy victory, the government shelved a bizarre, religiously sanctioned scheme to set up "temporary weddings" after women's groups, politicians, and some clerics denounced it as legalized prostitution. Most recently, several consecutive days of nationwide student protest in mid-November 2002 forced the supreme leader and the head of the judiciary to order an appeals court to expedite review of the death sentence imposed on reformist scholar Hashem Aghajari. The rahbar also recommended to judges that they avoid opening themselves up to public criticism in their rulings.  **The second important change in Iran is a series of small but significant economic measures that are likely to reduce the oligarchs' economic power and help integrate Iran's oil-dependent economy with the global marketplace. The reduction of the hard-liners' financial support is a critical factor in their declining political clout.** Indeed, more than any ideological or religious factor, it is control of the nation's economic resources that has allowed Iran's ruling clerics to hold on to power. Donations by devout Muslims, public and private monopolies in key sectors, special business licenses dispensed through patronage, privileged access to cheap credit and foreign exchange, and even widely reported bank fraud have all helped fund the clerics.  **Crucial economic reform**s, repeatedly promised by Khatami in the last five years, **have partially taken shape in the last few months.** This change has occurred largely in response to pressure from foreign institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Commission, whose approval is necessary for the government's continued access to foreign credit. **Although these reforms will not dry up all the hard-liners' sources of funding overnight, they can affect them in critical areas.** For instance, the legalization of private banking and insurance since early 2000 has opened up new venues for the mobilization and allocation of national savings -- and removed them from potential political uses by state banks. The government's efforts to consolidate the country's multiple exchange rates since March 2002 has also bottled up corruption stemming from access to cheaper dollars by privileged institutions or favored cronies. Fiscal reform in late 2001 aimed at lowering corporate income taxes and eliminating tax exemption for so-called religious charitable foundations is expected to increase private investment and level the playing field for potential investors. The government's new law to protect foreign investment and enforce some copyrights may reduce dependence on oil revenue. A successful euro bond issue this past summer has opened up another source of foreign exchange to counter volatility in oil prices.  **The government has promised to** take a number of further steps in the coming months to privatize state enterprises and **further diminish the hard-liners' control of the economy.**Replacing the inefficient subsidy system (which takes up some 20 percent of GDP and benefits mostly the urban rich) with a means-tested social safety net would substantially lighten the government's fiscal burden. In addition, further consolidation of the tax code should reduce the more than 50 different fees that various ministries and agencies impose on production and imports, thus cutting collection costs and special sources of finance for pork-barrel projects. The government's plan to enact a value-added tax in lieu of the current uncollected (and uncollectable) income taxes would likely diminish reliance on oil income and also shrink the bureaucracy.

Iranian Gov Will collapse

Iranian government will collapse

Ratzlav-Katz 9 (Nissan, Isreal national news, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/news.aspx/130695>, 03/31/09) CGW

An exiled former member of the Iranian government said this week that he foresees an Iranian regime change within two years, followed by a new government on friendly terms with the Jewish state. He also accused Germany of trading with Iran regardless of the Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons development program. Speaking at an international conference on Iran at the University of Haifa on Sunday, Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri "The only thing that preserves the regime is the military - but how long can this situation continue?" Khorshidi declared, "I guarantee that within two. years Iran's regime will collapse." The force for such a fundamental change, he explained, will come from the people - including both religious Muslims and secular democrats. "Iran has powers that can stun and even defeat the government," Khorshidi said. "There are other elements that wish to separate state and religion. They see that as long as Islamic rule forcibly clings to the government, religion is connected with all that is bad, which harms [the religion]. These elements include religious persons, university lecturers, judges and members of parliament." Khorshidi, who was a member of the first government established by Ayatollah Khomeini after the Islamist revolution in 1979, said that Iranians "need no foreign element to replace the regime for us. We can and must do it alone." Once the regime is replaced, the Ayatollah emphasized, the new government will be on friendly terms with Israel.

Iranian government about to collapse

Bangkok Post 10 (http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/30386/ex-spy-chief-says-iran-government-about-to-collapse, 3/01/2010) CGW

A former high-ranking intelligence official in Iran has called for his country to form better relations with the United States and Israel and says the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is on the verge of collapse. In an exclusive interview with the Bangkok Post Sunday, Mohammad Reza Madhi, a former officer in Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards' intelligence service, described Mr Ahmadinejad as ''crazy'' and unfit to lead his country. ''He has already destroyed international relationships with many countries and made them enemies of Iran,'' said Mr Madhi, who was forced to flee Iran in 2008 after being jailed for 73 years on what he described as ''trivial'' charges. ''This has cost the Iranian people so much. His ideas are dangerous.'' Iran's opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi said on Friday he was ready to sacrifice his life in defence of the people's right to protest peacefully against the government after the worst unrest since the disputed June presidential election. Mr Madhi, who says he was once the right-hand man of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and passed on information to respected cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who died last month, has been in regular contact with the opposition Green Path of Hope group since he left Iran. He said while his country should remain the Islamic Republic of Iran, religion and politics must be separated. ''The good clerics should help the people and the government, while the bad ones should be ousted from government,'' he said. Mr Madhi said a motivation for Iran improving international relations was the poor economic situation in the country and the need for it to be part of a globalised world economy. ''We cannot close our eyes to the United States and Europe. They are strong political and economic powerhouses. If Iran is to prosper, we need to have good relationships \_ both political and economic \_ with everyone, including Russia.'' On Israel, he said: ''It is the Iranian government which doesn't recognize its right to exist, but the Iranian people might think differently. ''Israel's internal problems are its own affairs, not ours. We shouldn't get involved. It shouldn't concern us. My view is that Israel has the right to exist. We should recognize it.'' Mr Madhi was highly critical of Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a spiritual adviser to a group of hard-line fundamentalists closely connected to senior leaders in the current Iranian government. ''He is a very crazy man who hates Israel and the United States especially. Unfortunately, President Ahmadinejad is one of his big fans as well.'' The former intelligence officer said that instead of imposing sanctions, western nations should look to supporting opposition groups and not recognize the Ahmadinejad government.

Iranian Gov Will collapse

Corruption jeopardizes the Iranian government

Khalaji 9 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061401758.html>, June 15, 2009) CGW

In the streets of Tehran and other major cities, riot police, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militias are battling reformist demonstrators who are protesting the results. The government has cut Internet connections and cellphone service and jammed foreign satellite TV and radio broadcasts. Most foreign journalists in Iran to cover the election were expelled after the voting ended. More than 100 leaders of the reform movement have been detained so far, and others are under what amounts to house arrest. Even though Khamenei asked the candidates not to dispute the results, a reformist group called the Council of Militant Clerics, led by former president Mohammad Khatami, apologized to the people for not being able to protect their votes and asked the government to overturn this result and hold new elections. In statements Sunday, two of the presidential candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, asked people to continue their "nonviolent demonstration" throughout the country and criticized the government for using violence against demonstrators. More than 80 percent of Iranian voters turned out primarily because Ahmadinejad's three challengers succeeded in mobilizing Iran's silent majority, especially in the two weeks before the election. All three warned explicitly about the risks of Ahmadinejad's domestic and foreign policies. Although Ahmadinejad enjoys the support of Iran's powerful supreme leader, in the final two weeks before the election all reputable polls inside and outside of Iran showed that Ahmadinejad's popularity had decreased significantly -- particularly following televised campaign debates -- even in rural areas and among the urban working class.

**Moderates Will get a Victory**

**Moderates will gain power in Iran**

**Russia & CIS Military Weekly 6/11** (Russia & CIS Military Weekly, 6/1110, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>) CS

The new UN Security Council sanctions on Iran are optimal because they will not paralyze the country and will allow Moscow to continue atomic energy cooperation with Tehran, Political Technologies Center First Vice-President Alexei Makarkin told Interfax on Wednesday. "It was impossible to delay the sanctions any longer. The new sanctions are not critical the way they are. Tehran is not cornered. Otherwise the Ahmadinejad regime would have announced mobilization," he said. "The sanctions aim to lead the Iranian regime into a deadlock and to force it to abandon the position, which disagrees with the world," he said. The sanctions will strengthen positions of moderate political forces in Iran, which are capable of changing the national stance, the expert said. "In fact, the Iranian political system is rather pluralistic. We have grounds to expect such events," he said. The sanctions will not cut Russia-Iran cooperation, Makarkin said. "Sanctions will not prevent Russia from building the Bushehr nuclear power plant or even delivering S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems if Moscow wishes that. However, one should hardly expect the deliveries in the light of latest events," he said. The expert noted a serious disappointment of Iran with the position of Russia and China. "President Ahmadinejad did not attend the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and thus displayed his attitude to Moscow and Beijing. Tehran thought that Russia and China would not support the sanctions," he said. The Rusanctions are an achievement of Moscow to a large extent," he said. The current situation around Iran shows that the Russian wish to settle the problem with diplomatic methods is the most promising, he concluded.

Iran Regime Take over

Hardline revolutionary guard will take over the Iranian government

Ramita 4 ( Navai, , The Sunday Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article450748.ece June 27, 2004) CGW

The corps — barred by Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the revolution, from straying into politics — may now have its eyes on the presidency. Mohammed Khatami’s second term expires next May. Ali Larijani, a former Guard commander and former head of state media, is widely believed to be considering running for president. Two other former Guard chiefs have also been tipped as possible candidates. “A glance at a number of key positions shows this group is increasingly gaining power,” Sharq, a leading reformist newspaper, warned recently. Indications of the Guard’s political ambitions came in a week in which it flexed its muscles with the arrest and detention of the eight British servicemen who strayed from southern Iraq into the Iranian part of the Shatt al-Arab waterway that divides the two countries. Although the men were released on Thursday after three days in captivity, their detention — during which they were paraded blindfolded on state television — appeared to be a sign of the Guard’s power. The Guard has been gaining influence in recent months. Scores of former members were elected to parliament last February in a controversial landslide for conservative candidates after thousands of reformists were barred by the hardline Guardian Council. A parallel organization to the military, the Guard takes its orders directly from Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. “A Revolutionary Guard president will mean all three branches of government totally under the command of the Supreme Leader without reservation or question,” said Ebrahim Yazdi, who founded the Guard while deputy prime minister under Khomeini. “The aim is to have co-operation and hegemony between three branches. It’s a way to get rid of reform.” The influence of the Guard is also reflected in Iran’s increasingly assertive stance towards attempts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate the country’s nuclear program. Washington, which accuses Tehran of trying to build a nuclear bomb, believes the Guard is in charge of that program and of efforts to make chemical and biological weapons.

A coup in Iran threats the security of the Persian Gulf

Naeymi-Rad 10 (Andrei, Chicago Government Examiner, Military Coup, <http://www.examiner.com/x-45737-Chicago-Government-Examiner~y2010m4d20-Possible-Outcomes-for-Future-of-Iran>, April 2, 2010) CGW

In the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States and her allies will become the largest influence within the state in the event of a military coup. Major targets of an Iranian Military’s coup of the government would include the capital, the Abadan Refinery, Religious Citadel at Qom, Bandar-e-Abbas naval station and its three Soviet-made Kilo Class diesel submarines and finally the airbase at Dezful . The naval base at Bandar-e-Abbas is a considerably important target for control if the onset of a military coup occurs. The naval base’s position inside the Strait of Hormuz creates a noteworthy strategic imperative as the bulk of near east oil exports flow through the Strait. Coupled with the three Kilo Class “near silent” diesel submarines currently berthed at the naval base creates a considerably tough security issue, especially if Iran gains a nuclear weapon system. Consequently all targets are in this proposed packages are within major metropolitan areas, creating a high risk for civilian casualties. As a result, a Coup might gain the support in some of the regions within Iran, but many districts which give staunch support towards the current regime will be unsuccessful in political change unless direct occupation occurs. In any case the inevitability for this possibility to occur is very small as the Islamic-political hold over the country extends to the military branches as well. The recent appointment of Mohammad Reza Naghdi as head of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution puts Basiji influence over all levels of the Iranian Military. In any case the Revolutionary Guard Corps can become a major thorn in the side of any Coup leader. Coupled with the elite urban-guerilla training the Corps provides to international terror groups around the world, any civil war will be wrought with traditional unconventional warfare (a prime example is Hezbollah's southern Lebanese war with Israel). Even though there might be a small possibility for a Coup to occur, the stranglehold the government holds over the military makes this possibility mute without immense foreign aid.

Iran Regime Take over

There could be a Coup

Kessler 10 (Glenn, Reporter, Boston.com, <http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/02/16/iran_may_be_nearing_coup_clinton_warns/>, 2-16-2010) CM

DOHA, Qatar - Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said yesterday the United States fears Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has gained enough power to potentially supplant the Tehran government. The guard’s influence is extensive and expanding, Clinton told Arab students at Carnegie Mellon’s Doha campus, and it reaches beyond the political realm into key facets of Iran’s economy. Clinton’s comments were more detailed than previous administration statements. Officials have said they planned to target new sanctions on the guard, which is heavily involved in Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, because such tactics would harm the country’s political elite - sparing many ordinary Iranians, at least in theory. Clinton suggested that the proposed sanctions were also designed to thwart the growing role of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran’s political dynamics. Clinton strongly asserted that the United States would defend Persian Gulf allies from Iranian aggression, in what appeared to be an echo of her controversial proposal for a defense umbrella for the region. “We will always defend ourselves, and we always will defend our friends and allies, and we will certainly defend countries in the gulf who face the greatest, immediate nearby threat from Iran,’’ she said. She said the Obama administration believes the Revolutionary Guard is supplanting the government of Iran. “That is how we see it. We see that the government of Iran, the supreme leader, the president, the parliament is being supplanted and that Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship,’’ said Clinton, who arrived Sunday in Qatar, where she spoke at the US-Islamic World Forum.

Iran is already taking over Iraq’s Intelligence Agencies

Ware 7 (Michael, reporter, CNN, 3-7-2007) CM

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Far from the daily warfare in the streets of the Iraqi capital, another, quieter struggle is being waged -- that for control of Iraq's intelligence agencies. It's a battle with high stakes for the United States. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service, or INIS, is funded completely by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, according to military and intelligence sources. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the CIA has placed more than 500 officers in Iraq, according to U.S. intelligence sources, making the station the CIA's largest in the world -- larger, even, than the CIA presence in Saigon during the Vietnam War. The INIS head, the secretive Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, was appointed three years ago by the United States. But now, the future of the U.S.-controlled agency appears to be in jeopardy. A document from Iraq's National Security Council lays out a blueprint for Iraq's new intelligence community. Under that plan, all intelligence gathering would be consolidated under Iraq's Iranian-friendly central government. Top Iraqi government officials claim the INIS is beyond the control of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. And Shahwani himself is under Iraqi government investigation for unspecified corruption allegations. He has not been seen in at least three months. U.S. ally and former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi said Shahwani is being unfairly targeted. "I don't know if it's an attack on U.S. intelligence, but definitely it's a political attack on Shahwani," he said. One of Shahwani's rivals is Shirwan al-Wa'eli, Iraq's minister for national security. In the past two years, al-Wa'eli's ministry has grown to some 3,000 operatives, according to U.S. intelligence. Under the new intelligence plan, it would grow even further. Al-Wa'eli applauds his relationship with Iran while distancing himself from the United States. "The multinational forces are in Iraq, and they are supportive on the security issue and we have a good relationship with them, but we do not bargain Iraq to any side," al-Wa'eli told CNN. "The Americans give us only moral support, not logistical support." The ministry has become an intelligence organization that the United States and its allies never meant it to be. "It's not a ministry per se," Allawi said. "It's a ministry I created. It's a minister, not a ministry, but things have been [spun] around."

Iran Regime Take over

**Hardliners are emerging and looking for power in Iran**

**Guo 9**(Jerry, Foreign Affairs Contributor, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-tehran-irans-new-hard-liners>, 9/30)dc

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. **More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent**.  So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)  **The real struggle**, however, **is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution**.  In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.  But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These **neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.**  This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.  Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

Iranian Internal Politics

Occupation Angers Ahmadinejad.

Al Jazeera 10(April 18, “Iran Demands US Troop Withdrawal,” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/04/201041854124873989.html)dc

The Iranian president has called on the US to withdraw its troops from the Gulf region and Afghanistan. "The region has no need for alien troops and they should return home and let the regional states take care of their own affairs," Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in a speech marking the country's annual Army Day on Sunday. "They must leave the region and this is not a request but an order, and the will of the regional nations," he said. He said the deployment of US and Nato troops in Iraq and Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism had not only failed, but also increased insecurity in both countries. Israel will 'collapse' The president also said that Israel, the "main instigator of conflict" in the Middle East, was on its way to collapse and that regional powers wanted it uprooted.

**Iranian leadership not popular with its people.**

**Amuzegar 3**(Jahangir, international economic consultant, Foreign Affairs, 82(1), p. 52) eh

**A combination of slow growth, double-digit unemployment, high inflation, declining labor productivity, and increasing dependence on oil revenue has thus defied almost all government efforts to put the economy back on track.**Although the alarming rate of population growth in the first decade after the revolution has been brought under control, both per capita income and domestic income distribution lag behind official targets. In short, **the ailing economy has helped bring the regime's legitimacy further into question.** A recent study leaked from Iran's Interior Ministry revealed that **nearly 90 percent of the public is dissatisfied with the present government.** Of this total, 28 percent wants "fundamental" changes in the regime's structure, and 66 percent desires "gradual reforms." Less than ii percent-most probably those on the government dole-is satisfied with the status quo. Other private polls show an even greater degree of unhappiness with the government. The combination of these two phenomena-the bankruptcy of Iran's ideology and the failure of its economy-now confronts the Islamic Republic with the worst challenge to its legitimacy yet.  The public and the press now openly question the role of Islam-and especially the concept of the velayat-efaqih--in a society where people want greater freedom and the rule of law.

Iran blames the U.S. for Iraqi instability

**The New York Times 8** (NAZILA FATHI and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr., Writers for the New York Times, *The New York Times June 10, 2008,* [*http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/world/middleeast/10iraq.html*](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/world/middleeast/10iraq.html)*) CS*

TEHRAN — [Iran](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)’s supreme leader told Iraq’s prime minister on Monday that the American forces in Iraq were the biggest obstacle to Iraqi stability. The message from the Iranian leader, Ayatollah [Ali Khamenei](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/ali_khamenei/index.html?inline=nyt-per), was the most authoritative public word to date on Iran’s objections to long-term security agreements currently under negotiation between the Bush administration and the government of Iraq’s prime minister, [Nuri Kamal al-Maliki](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/nuri_kamal_al-maliki/index.html?inline=nyt-per). The American military has been operating in Iraq under a [United Nations](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org) resolution that expires at the end of this year. At a meeting with Mr. Maliki as part of the Iraqi leader’s three-day visit to Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei told him that “the most fundamental problem of Iraq is the presence of the foreign forces,” according to excerpts of their meeting reported by the news agency ISNA. “The Iraqi government, Parliament and all the authorities who have been elected with public vote should take charge,” the ayatollah said. Iranian officials strongly oppose the American military presence in Iraq, which they consider a major threat on their border. Yet it was the American-led effort that overthrew their hated enemy, [Saddam Hussein](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/saddam_hussein/index.html?inline=nyt-per), and brought about a coalition government in Baghdad dominated by Shiite political leaders, including Mr. Maliki, with strong ties to Iran. “When a foreign force gradually increases its interference and domination in all the affairs of Iraq, it becomes the most important obstacle in development and prosperity of the Iraqi people,” the ayatollah said, without directly referring to the security agreements. The Iranian accounts of the meeting between Ayatollah Khamenei and Mr. Maliki did not give Mr. Maliki’s response. But he had assured Iranian authorities on Sunday that his country would not become “a platform for harming the security of Iran and its neighbors.” Tensions between the governments in Tehran and Washington have escalated under the Bush administration, which has accused the Iranians of working on a nuclear weapons program in secret and of financing and supplying deadly weapons to anti-American militants in Iraq. Iran denies the accusations. In Iraq, negotiations over the security pact have become a major political issue, further splitting Shiite allies of Mr. Maliki and the political movement of [Moktada al-Sadr](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/moktada_al_sadr/index.html?inline=nyt-per), the radical Shiite cleric. The New York Times reported last month that aides to Mr. Maliki from his Dawa Party said that American negotiators were demanding continued control of Iraqi airspace, immunity for American soldiers and security contractors, authority for more than 50 long-term bases, and the right to continue to carry out unimpeded military operations. Iraqi officials object to those terms, and are particularly insistent about limiting immunity for security contractors and ensuring that future American military operations are restricted and have the blessing of the Iraqi government, according to Ali Adeeb, a senior Dawa official close to Mr. Maliki. Some Iraqi officials have also complained that while the American military would maintain a large presence under the pact, it would not be obligated to protect the Iraqi government from aggression, either from outside or inside its borders.

Iranian Internal Politics

Iran Blames the U.S. for Terrorism

**Iran News 6** (Iran News, 8/4/06, http://payvand.com/news/06/aug/1052.html)CS

London, Aug 4, IRNA-Iran's Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, said on Thursday the United States adventurism is the reason behind escalation of insecurity and terrorism in the Middle East. In an exclusive interview with Channel 4 News of the British television, Larijani added that the war in Lebanon is not a war between Iran and the US, but a war between the US and all Islamic nations. "There is no doubt that the Americans have a role to play in this adventure," he said when asked by Jon Snow whether the Israel-Lebanon crisis was a proxy war. Referring to the so-called US initiative to create a new Middle East, he said that the US is following some "reactionary adventures and tendencies in the region." Asked whether Iran has a responsibility to engage with Israel and the international community, Larijani replied that "we have a sense of responsibility and we feel responsible when it comes to international relations and we have tried to create security in the region." He noted that in the last 27 years Iran has never acted aggressively against any of its neighbors but has suffered at the hands of the Americans in different ways either directly or indirectly or militarily. "The problem with the US is not an emotional problem. The problem is related to the behavior of Americans. Americans should change their views," he said when asked about direct negotiation with Israel and the United States. Asked about worsening situation and probability of a civil war in Iraq as well as the role of Iran in supporting the Shiites, Larijani said the issue of Iraq is not an issue of Sunnis and Shiites. "Iran has been a refuge for Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni leaders of Iraq during the rein of Saddam Hussein. We were against the occupation of Iraq because we incurred the most damage from Saddam." He noted that the problem of terrorism and insecurity has eightened since Americans went to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Opposition leader speaks out against government suppression

Payvan News 6/29(2010, http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jun/1255.html)dc

Iranian opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi responded to the Supreme Leader's call for "unity" saying: "Unity cannot be achieved through threats and pressure." Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei told a group of Basij university students last week that "keeping unity, solidarity and sympathy in society and avoiding all forms of differences and gaps is highly vital at this moment of time." Without referring to the Leader, Karroubi says: "Unity cannot be achieved with violence and pressure, with incarcerations and long imprisonments, with insults and disrespect toward senior Shiite leaders, with threats and intimidations, with shutting down newspapers and with banning the activity of political organizations." In the post-election protests to the alleged fraud in the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last June, over four thousand people were arrested. In the past year, the government has cracked down on protesters by arresting tens of journalists as well as human rights and political activists and at the same time closing down over ten newspapers and publications. According to the opposition over 70 people were killed in police confrontations with street protesters. At least three post-election detainees died under torture while in detention, according to state statistics. Two top reformist organizations, Islamic Iran Participation Front and Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution of Iran were also banned from political activity last month. Mehdi Karroubi added that the path to unity can only be found through compensating the victims of post-election violence, releasing political prisoners, confronting the perpetrators of post-election violence against the people, restoring freedom of the press, of speech as well as the activity of political parties, tolerating dissent and returning to the provisions of the constitution.

Iranian Internal Politics

**Green movement in Iran is not nationwide**

**Baer 9**(Robert, CIA Field Officer in Iran, Time.com, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904953,00.html>, 6/16)dc

There is no denying that the news clips from Tehran are dramatic, unprecedented in violence and size since the mullahs came to power in 1979. They're possibly even augurs of real change. But can we trust them? **Most of the demonstrations and rioting** I've seen in the **news are taking place in north Tehran, around Tehran University and in public places like Azadi Square. These are, for the most part, areas where the educated and well-off live** — Iran's liberal middle class. **These are also the same neighborhoods that little doubt voted for Mir-Hossein Mousavi, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rival, who now claims that the election was stolen. But I have yet to see any pictures from south Tehran, where the poor live. Or from other Iranian slums**. (See TIME's covers from the 1979 Islamic revolution.)  Some facts about Iran's election will hopefully emerge in the coming weeks, with perhaps even credible evidence that the election was rigged. But until then, we need to add a caveat to everything we hear and see coming out of Tehran. For too many years now, the**Western media have looked at Iran through the narrow prism of Iran's liberal middle class** — an intelligentsia that is addicted to the Internet and American music and is more ready to talk to the Western press, including people with money to buy tickets to Paris or Los Angeles. Reading Lolita in Tehran is a terrific book, but does it represent the real Iran? (See pictures of Iran's presidential election and its turbulent aftermath.)  Before we settle on the narrative that there has been a hard-line takeover in Iran, an illegitimate coup d'état, we need to seriously consider the possibility that**there has been a popular hard-line takeover, an electoral mandate for Ahmadinejad and his policies. One of the only reliable, Western polls conducted in the run-up to the vote gave the election to Ahmadinejad — by higher percentages than the 63% he actually received. The poll even predicted that Mousavi would lose in his hometown**of Tabriz**,** a result that many skeptics have viewed as clear evidence of fraud**. The poll was taken all across Iran, not just the well-heeled parts of Tehran.** Still, the poll should be read with a caveat as well, since some 50% of the respondents were either undecided or wouldn't answer.  No doubt, Iran will come out of last Friday's election a different country. But it would serve us well to put aside our prism that has led us to misunderstand Iran for so many years, an anticipation that there would be a liberal counter-revolution in the country. Mousavi is far from the liberal democrat that many in the West would like to believe he is. The truth is, **Ahmadinejad may be the President the Iranians want**, and we may have to live with an Iran to Iranians' liking and not to ours. (See pictures of Ahmadinejad's supporters on LIFE.com.)  The absolute worst things we could do at this point would be to declare Iran's election fraudulent, refuse to talk to the regime and pile on more sanctions. Hostility will only strengthen Ahmadinejad and encourage the hard-liners and secret police. We should never forget that Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatullah Khameinei, along with Ahmadinejad, have the full, if undeclared, backing of both the Revolutionary Guards and the army, and they are not afraid to use those resources to back up their mandate.

Iran Ready to fill Power Vacuum

Iran is reading to fill the Power Vacuum

AFP 7 (*AFP,* 8-28-2007, <http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=070828173812.btj6abce&show_article=1>) CM

Iran and neighbouring countries are ready to fill the "power vacuum" emerging in the Middle East as US power in Iraq wanes, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Tuesday. "You (the United States) cannot preserve your power over Iraq with a few tanks, artillery and weapons. Today, you are prisoners of your own quagmire. You have no choice but to accept the rights of the Iraqi people," he said. "I can tell you there will be a power vacuum in the region. We are ready with other regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and the people of Iraq to fill this vacuum." The United States has expressed its discomfort over the increasingly strong relationship between Iran and Baghdad, disapproving of comments made by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on a recent visit to Tehran. The White House said in a statement on Tuesday that US President George W. Bush wants Tehran to halt "at once" any Iranian support for fighters targeting US-led forces in Iraq. In a preview of a speech Bush was to give in Reno, Nevada, to the American Legion veterans group, Washington renewed charges that Iranian elements have provided training, support, and weapons for extremists in Iraq. "The Iranian regime must halt these actions at once," the White House statement said. Some Western analysts have argued that Iran has been the chief beneficiary of the US invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, helping Tehran to boosts its influence in the region. Ahmadinejad on Tuesday accused the United States of trying to destabilise the Shiite-dominated Maliki government, but said that such moves were doomed to failure. "Wait two or three months and the US pressure initiative on the Iraqi government will break down," he said. "The ones who came to occupy are losing their power." He also shrugged off the notion that the United States intends to label Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards a terrorist group as a "joke." US officials have said Bush is set to issue an executive order blacklisting the Guards as a terrorist group in order to block its assets. "It is unlikely that the United States would make such an irrational move," Ahmadinejad added.

Iran is ready to fill that power vaccuum

McElroy 7 (Damien, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, *Telegraph,* 8-28-2007)CM

Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said his country is prepared to step in to the emerging "power vacuum" in Iraq.  The maverick populist struck a triumphant tone in a television interview, predicting the collapse of democratic government in Iraq.  "The political power of the occupiers is being destroyed rapidly and very soon we will be witnessing a great void of power in the region," he said.  "You [America] cannot preserve your power over Iraq with a few tanks, artillery and weapons. Today, you are prisoners of your own quagmire. Today you have no choice but to accept the rights of the Iraqi people. "I can tell you there will be a power vacuum in the region. We are ready with other regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and the people of Iraq to fill this vacuum." As the Middle East’s foremost Shia Muslim power, Iran views protection of its co-religionists in Iraq as a fundamental responsibility. Saudi Arabia is equally protective of Sunni Muslim interests. Mr Ahmadinejad’s comments appear to constitute a warning to Riyadh that Teheran will directly intervene in Iraq. He also rejected criticisms of Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship made in a speech on Monday by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President.

Iran is unlikely to attack, even if US withdraws.

**Crane 9** (Keith et. al. National Defense Research Institute *Withdrawing from Iraq* http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) SM

**The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is unlikely to lead to overt Iranian military interventio**n. **Iran and Iraq appear to have settled disputes regarding the Shat al-Arab waterway, which historically has been a great source of tension between the two nations**. In any case, the **two countries would be loath to repeat a conflict** like the disastrous Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, which led to hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides.

Iran is unstable now

Civil unrest is brewing – Ahmadinejad’s supporters are threatening parliament

Payvan News 6/24(2010, <http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jun/1224.html>) dc

Iranian opposition leaders, Mir Hosein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi condemned the latest attacks by Ahmadinejad supporters on the Islamic Parliament. The leaders urged everyone to stand up against those who are trying to "escape the law" in order to reach their "illegitimate goals." The latest episode which reveals further cracks in the body of the Islamic Republic establishment revolves around an attempt by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to control Iran's largest university, Azad University. Yesterday Ahmadinejad supporters protested outside the Parliament after Ahmadinejad bill, which proposed to replace a number of Azad University board members, was voted down by the MPs. The protesters even threatened to "blast" the Parliament if the MPs did not back down from their resistance against Ahmadinejad's bill. Azad University is a private institution with 1.5 million students. It is widely regarded as a centre of support for Iranian reformists. Mousavi and Karroubi claimed that it is surprising how the government refuses to issue a permit for the "Protest of Silence" which the opposition had planned for the anniversary of the controversial presidential elections of 2009 on June 12; however, "an organized group" such as the one which was threatening MPs on Tuesday is allowed to "stage an attack" anywhere they want. The opposition's request for a permit to hold a peaceful protest on June 12 was denied by Islamic Republic authorities, and although the opposition maintains that they have the right to stage peaceful demonstrations according to the Islamic Constitution, the government warned that on June 12 all gatherings would be confronted by security forces. The two leaders cancelled the "Protest of Silence" two days before the date claiming that they had been informed that government extremists were planning to treat protesters with violence and that the opposition had no intention of causing bloodshed.

Green Movement undermined Regime legitimacy.

Cole ‘10(Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at University of Michigan, The Iranian)

The Green Movement failed in its initial goals, which were to force an aboveboard investigation of fraud in the June 12 election results, and possibly the holding of a new election. It is now sometimes forgotten that the movement did not seek the overthrow of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was about who should be president, and about insisting that the electoral institutions of that republic– the presidency and the parliament– be chosen through popular sovereignty without intervention from the appointive institutions (the supreme clerical Leader, the judiciary, the security forces). The Greens probably did, however, succeed in weakening the legitimacy of the regime. Whereas before June, 2009, few Iranians would have been willing to say that supreme clerical leader Khamenei is a crook, a significant number now doubt his probity. That number is not a majority, but it is a vocal minority. In that sense, the debacle of the 2009 election saps Khamenei’s authority just as the priest pedophile controversy has much weakened Pope Benedict among Catholics. Those analysts who discount cultural movements and the whole idea of legitimacy as underpinning authority will be unpersuaded that this change is important. But I believe it is, in the medium to long term though not in the short term. The movement failed to attain its short term primary goal for two major internal reasons: # The security establishment of the Islamic Republic remained united and rallied to Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. A split in the military or the paramilitary institutions would have created a condition of multiple sovereignty, which Tilly sees as typical of revolutionary situations. But although the political elite split, unevenly, the generals did not. # The security establishment developed tools for combating the repertoires of social action deployed by the Greens. Did they use cell phones, texting, twitter and facebook to gather flashmobs, spontaneous urban crowds? Then cellphone signals were cut, web pages were blocked and facebook pages were infiltrated. Did they assemble in large numbers? Streets were cut off and crowds were controlled. Did they mount processions? Basij civil militiamen were sent out on motorcycles to disrupt them, beat them and arrest the recalcitrant. Did they gather in rallies to denounce the regime? They were assaulted by police. The beatings and torture and occasional executions to which some protesters were subjected served to signal that the regime was willing to raise the cost of protest to the maximum. The ways in which the regime attacked family members of prominent dissidents also terrorized would-be challengers. The downside for the regime is that it must now depend more on power (i.e. imposition of rule by force) and less on authority (the likelihood that a command will be obeyed voluntarily). Regimes based on brute power are less often long-lasting than those based on authority.

Iran is unstable now

Unrest is intensifying – opposition leader was harangued by Hardliners

Payvand News 6/30( 2010, <http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jun/1267.html>) dc

Iranian opposition leader and reformist cleric Mehdi Karrubi has again been harassed by a group of apparent hard-liners who verbally assailed him at the Sharif University mosque on June 29. Karrubi was reportedly shouted down upon entering the mosque to attend a mourning ceremony for the father of former reformist official Mohammad Reza Aref A report posted on Karrubi's "Sahamnews" website says the reformist cleric was faced by "Basiji thugs" who insulted him, chanted slogans, and tried to disrupt the mourning ceremony therefore he decided to leave the mosque. Karrubi told the website that he was very sorry to see that the Basij force that defended the country during its war with Iraq has been reduced to "confronting academics at universities, beating up people in mosques, getting involved in vote rigging, killing people in the streets, attacking the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah [Ruhollah] Khomeini, and attacking the offices and homes of senior clerics." According to the report by Saham News, Karroubi said: "I am saying if during Shah's regime there was one mad thug (The Brainless Shaban, the famous thug at Shah's time who was supported by the regime to create fear, disturb protests and intimidate the opposition), now this government has trained many mad thugs, and these individuals must know that Mehdi Karroubi is standing to the very end and is ready to pay any price in this path and will not stop until reinstates people's rights." Karrubi recently came under attack by hard-liners during a visit to Qom about two weeks ago. Karrubi's wife said their son was arrested in February, beaten up, and threatened with rape. Karrubi has turned into one of the most outspoken critics of the postelection crackdown, and he's also criticized the broad power and authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni under the principle of "velayat-e faqih," or rule of the supreme jurisprudent. Karrubi recently said -- without naming Khamenei -- that he thinks the supreme jurisprudent wields more authority than that given by God to His prophets and the imams.

Iranian Regime showing weakness

Sadjadpour 10(Karim, Iran Analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, Carnegie Endowment, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24843#broad>, 2/10)dc

I think very few people, including within the U.S. government, are operating under the assumption that the Islamic Republic is on the verge of implosion. Most people recognize that the regime is facing the greatest existential threat in its 31-year history, but in the absence of some kind of internal political reconciliation with the opposition—which is made more difficult with the passage of time—I would never underestimate the leaders’ willingness to rely on terror and sheer brutality to try to retain authority. Harsh measures may buy Iran’s government more time, but I don’t believe that an even more brutal military dictatorship is sustainable over the medium or long term, given the diversity of views among even the security forces themselves. One former senior Iranian official told me recently that he thinks as many as 80 percent of the Revolutionary Guard’s rank and file voted for Mousavi. Despite the bombastic statements from Iranian officials, I think their actions often reveal a stunning lack of self-confidence. During the show-trials that were conducted last summer, they paraded a petite 23-year-old French girl, Clotilde Reiss, on state television on the grounds that she was a threat to Iran’s national security. They frequently harass and detain a group of mothers who lost their children during the post-election violence. These gestures project weakness, not strength. There are any number of possibilities in the short term, but over the long term I have no confidence that this regime will be able to ameliorate the endemic political, economic, and social malaise they’ve wrought. If the Iranian government were a publicly traded stock, I would short it.

Iran is unstable now

Iranian opposition is having a second wind – Conflict escalation is likely.

Irish Times 6/22(2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2009/0722/1224251063234.html)

REVOLUTIONS OCCUR when those above cannot rule in the old way and those below will not be ruled in the old way, according to Lenin. His remark about the Russian revolution is worth recalling after Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s warning that continuing divisions will lead to the collapse of the country’s ruling elite. He spoke after calls by one former president for a referendum on the government’s legitimacy, which another described as in crisis after it has lost the trust of millions of Iranians. This continuing fallout from last month’s disputed presidential election results reveals that it has created an unprecedented gulf between supporters of the victorious Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the defeated candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. Mr Khamenei’s decision as supreme leader to back Mr Ahmadinejad so forthrightly has opened up these divisions. They show no sign of diminishing despite the arrest of thousands of Mr Mousavi’s supporters, who he has demanded be released forthwith. The call by Mohammad Khatami for a referendum and the frank statement about the loss of political trust by Hashemi Rafsanjani show that the facade of unity carefully constructed by Iran’s clerical and security rulers over the last two decades has disintegrated. That is the significance of Mr Mousavi’s statement to his supporters at a rally with the families of post-election detainees: “You are facing something new: an awakened nation, a nation that has been born again and is here to defend its achievements.” Rejecting claims that they have been manipulated by foreign countries he asked: “Who believes these people, many of the prominent figures, would work with the foreigners and to endanger their country’s interests?” The tone of these statements indicates a renewed political confidence among opposition leaders. Their readiness to invoke an alternative view of the national interest from that put forward by Mr Ahmadinejad and Mr Khamenei shows there is now an open struggle for support from below by those fighting a political battle within the country’s rulers about the best way to proceed. This does not mean Iran is in anything like the pre-revolutionary position of Russia in 1917; but such an open political dispute can be resolved only by repression or a willingness to change the political rules of the game by revisiting the election result. Either way it will lead to more conflict over who holds power and with what objectives. Iran suddenly looks less stable.

Iranian Opposition is strong – Change is likely.

Philips 10(James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation, 1/27)dc

Iran’s Green Movement opposition has proven to be a stronger and more persistent political force than many advocates of diplomatic engagement with Iran’s dictatorship had expected. This development, as well as the regime’s continued duplicity and foot-dragging on the nuclear issue, has led some to revise their thinking about supporting regime change in Iran. For example, Richard Haass, a self-professed “card-carrying realist” who formerly opposed the Bush Administration’s support for regime change, now has changed his mind. He has written an essay in the current issue of Newsweek that assesses that “Iran may be closer to profound political change than at any time since the revolution that ousted the Shah 30 years ago.” Unfortunately, the Obama Administration remains wedded to its engagement policy, which unrealistically seeks to strike a deal with the implacably hostile regime, whose self-defined ideological legitimacy is based on unceasing hostility to the United States. Even if a diplomatic agreement could be reached on the nuclear issue, against all odds, it would be foolhardy to expect Iran’s unscrupulous dictatorship to permanently abide by such an agreement. Yet the administration continues to seek such a deal over the bloodied heads of Iran’s opposition forces. Because it continues to define its foreign policy in large part as the opposite of President Bush’s, regime change in Iran is not change that the Obama Administration can believe in.

Iran is unstable now

Iranian Regime is unstable

Telegraph 6/11(2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7822187/Iran-regime-weakened-divisions-exposed-one-year-after-disputed-presidential-election.html)dc

Factional infighting fuelled by a series of splits since the vote was exposed as rigged last year have come to a head with a row over an attack on attack on the family of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran's Islamic revolution. The dispute has further eroded support for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, who has been criticised for driving Iran into economic and diplomatic isolation by backing the extremist president. The emergence of prominent hardliners as critics has intensified pressure on a government already facing a revolt by reformists. Official results that granted an overwhelming victory to Mr Ahmadinejad last June are still hotly disputed by millions of Iranians. Mass protests in the wake of the vote pitched the country in its worst turnmoil since the Islamic revolution in 1979. A harsh clampdown has seen an estimated 5,000 Iranians jailed and hundreds killed as the regime moved crushed the popular challenge to its authority. The protest movement has been virtually forced underground as its leaders were forced to cancel protests that had been planned across Iran today. Only sporadic defiance was reported on the eve of the anniversary yesterday. Pictures of those killed in last year's clashes were hung from trees in central Tehran while an estimated 700 political prisoners at Gohardasht prison staged a hunger strike. There were also unconfirmed reports of clashes between protesters loyal to the opposition, which calls itself the Green Movement and security officials on Tehran's metro system. But while the state-sponsored oppression has succeeded in driving many protesters from the streets, significant divisions remain within the country's ruling elite. Those tensions spill into the public eye with the attack on a rally held by Hassan Khomeini, the late ayatollah's 38-year-old grandson this week. Government officials accuse Mr Khomeini of supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi, Iran's former prime minister and the defeated candidate in last year's presidential contest. A crowd of pro-government demonstrators chanted "Down with Mousavi" and jeered Mr Khomeini at at an event to commemorate the 31st anniversary of his death. The attack on the Khomeini family has shocked Iran's clerical establishment, which continues to venerate Ayatollah Khomeini for his role in leading Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. "This bitter and unprecedented event was against the very principles of the Islamic Revolution," said Ali Motahari, a conservative Iranian MP who is regarded as a loyal supporter of the regime. Other prominent members of the leadership have also split from the supreme leader over his backing for Mr Ahmadinejad. Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who was for decades the kingmaker of Iranian politics, is said to turn his back on the ayatollah whenever the two are in the same room. The divisions emerged even as hardline conservatives put in place a nationwide security alert for today's anniversary. The Basij, the people's militia responsible for safeguarding Iran's revolution, has been ordered to take to the streets to crush potential dissent. Western leaders hope that the combination of internal splits and popular pressure could drive the Iranian leadership, which was this week subjected to UN Security Council sanctions, to capitulate to reformist demands. William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, called on the regime to respect the human rights of those caught up in the post election round up. "I continue to be gravely disturbed by the deterioration in the human rights situation in Iran," he said. "The Government of Iran has further restricted freedom of expression and assembly, and protestors, journalists, students and human rights activists routinely face harassment and intimidation."

Iran Leaders

Currently, leaders in Iran support terrorists.

Burns 10 (William, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 22, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136721.htm) eh

Let me start with the obvious: a nuclear-armed Iran would severely threaten the security and stability of a part of the world crucial to our interests and to the health of the global economy. It would seriously undermine the credibility of the United Nations and other international institutions, and seriously undercut the nuclear non-proliferation regime at precisely the moment we are seeking to strengthen it. These risks are only reinforced by the wider actions of the Iranian leadership, particularly its longstanding support for terrorist groups; its opposition to Middle East peace; its repugnant rhetoric about Israel, the Holocaust, and so much else; and its brutal repression of its own citizens. In the face of those challenges, American policy is straightforward. We must prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. We must counter its other destabilizing actions in the region and beyond. And we must continue to do all we can to advance our broader interests in democracy, human rights and development across the Middle East. President Obama has made clear repeatedly, including in his statement on the adoption of resolution 1929, that we will stand up for those rights that should be universal to all human beings, and stand with those brave Iranians who seek only to express themselves freely and peacefully. We will also continue to call on Iran to release immediately Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd, and Josh Fattal, and all other unjustly detained American citizens. And we continue to call upon Iran to determine the whereabouts and ensure the safe return of Robert Levinson. We have pursued our broad policy goals over the past 18 months through a combination of tough-minded diplomacy – including both engagement and pressure – and active security cooperation with our partners in the Gulf and elsewhere. We have sought to sharpen the choices before the Iranian leadership. We have sought to demonstrate what’s possible if Iran meets its international obligations and adheres to the same responsibilities that apply to other nations. And we have sought to intensify the costs of continued defiance, and to show Iran that pursuit of a nuclear weapons program will make it less secure, not more secure.

Iran is struggling with the dealing of nuclear arms.

Burns 10 (William, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 22, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136721.htm) eh

Last year, we embarked on an unprecedented effort at engagement with Iran. We did so without illusions about whom we were dealing with, or the scope of our differences over the past thirty years. Engagement has been both a test of Iranian intentions, and an investment in partnership with a growing coalition of countries deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. We sought to create early opportunities for Iran to build confidence in its intentions. In Geneva last October, we supported -- along with Russia and France -- a creative proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide fuel for the production of medical isotopes at the Tehran Research Reactor. Unfortunately, what appeared to be a constructive beginning in Geneva was later spurned by the Iranian leadership. Instead, Iran pursued a clandestine enrichment facility near Qom; announced plans for ten new enrichment facilities; flatly refused to continue discussions with the P5+1 about international concerns about its nuclear program; provocatively expanded enrichment to 20%, in further violation of UN Security Council resolutions; and drew new rebukes from the IAEA in the Director General’s most recent report a few weeks ago. Iran’s intransigence left us no choice but to employ a second tool of diplomacy, economic and political pressure. Passage of resolution 1929 is the essential first step in that effort. The provisions of 1929 go well beyond previous sanctions resolutions. For the first time, it bans significant transfers of conventional weapons to Iran. For the first time, 1929 bans all Iranian activities related to ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear weapon. For the first time, it imposes a tough framework of cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran’s smuggling and acquisition of nuclear materials or other illicit items. It prohibits Iran from investing abroad in sensitive nuclear activities, such as uranium mining. It creates important new tools to help block Iran’s use of the international financial system to fund and facilitate nuclear proliferation. For the first time, it highlights formally potential links between Iran’s energy sector and its nuclear ambitions. And it targets directly the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran’s proliferation efforts, adding fifteen specific IRGC entities to the list of designations for asset freezes. The net result of this combination of economic pressures is hard to predict. It will certainly not change the calculations of the Iranian leadership overnight, nor is it a panacea. But it is a mark of their potential effect that Iran has worked so hard in recent months to avert action in the Security Council, and tried so hard to deflect or divert the steps that are now underway. Iran is not ten feet tall, and its economy is badly mismanaged.

Iran is unstable now

Iran leaders are unpopular in Iran.

Burns 10 (William, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 22, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136721.htm) eh

Beneath all their bluster and defiant rhetoric, its leaders understand that both the practical impact of resolution 1929 and its broader message of isolation create real problems for them. That is particularly true at a moment when the Iranian leadership has ruthlessly suppressed, but not eliminated, the simmering discontent that bubbled over so dramatically last summer. Millions of Iranians went to the streets last June, and in smaller numbers over the course of the ensuing months, with a simple but powerful demand of their leaders: that their government respect the rights enshrined within its own constitution, rights that are the entitlement of all people – to voice their opinions, to select their leaders, to assemble without fear, to live in security and peace. A government that does not respect the rights of its own people will find it increasingly difficult to win the respect that it professes to seek in the international community. Sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves. They are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still committed. We continue to acknowledge Iran’s right to pursue civilian nuclear power. But with that right comes a profound responsibility to reassure the rest of the international community about the exclusively peaceful nature of its intentions. Facts are stubborn things, and it is a striking fact that Iran is the only NPT signatory in the world today that cannot convince the IAEA that its nuclear program is intended for purely peaceful purposes.

Iran is still unclear about slowing down their nuclear program.

Carmichael 10 (Lachlan, AFP, June 9, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hwZorTOY8iuJkJTDLKeNGB9dlt2g) eh

BOGOTA — US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Iran's "diverse leadership" Tuesday that there is still an opportunity for them to return to negotiations despite new UN Security Council sanctions. Speaking during a visit to Colombia, the chief US diplomat did not rule out a negotiating role for Brazil and Turkey, which voted against the sanctions after clinching a nuclear swap deal with Tehran dismissed by Washington. "Our ultimate goal is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon," Clinton told reporters traveling with her after she discussed the sanctions vote with President Barack Obama on the phone. "We can, we believe, slow down and certainly interfere with and make much more difficult their continuing nuclear program through these sanctions," she said, adding that is in itself an "important" accomplishment. "At the same we do want them back at the negotiating table, and whether they come back with the P5-plus-1 or in some other configuration is yet to be determined," she said. The P5-plus-1 refers to the permanent five UN Security Council members -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France -- plus Germany, which have led the negotiations with Iran over the last few years. She said the new sanctions sends a "message to the entire Iranian leadership, which is quite diverse in their assessments and reactions, that there is still an opportunity for you to participate" in negotiations. Asked whether Washington is open to including Brazil and Turkey in the negotiations, she replied: "We're open to effective diplomacy." In her briefing to journalists, she said she expected that Turkey and Brazil would enforce the sanctions despite their "no" vote and that they the "will continue to play an important role" in future diplomatic overtures to Iran. In talks in the last few months with Brazil and Turkey, Clinton argued that Iran would only seriously negotiate when it feels the bite of sanctions while Brasilia and Ankara said more time was needed for diplomacy to work. Clinton said she has appointed Robert Einhorn, the State Department's special adviser for non-proliferation, to head up a team to "oversee implementation of the sanctions" rather than "leave it to chance." Clinton said she reminded Lebanon about its responsibilities at both the United Nations and in the Arab world when she had a phone call with Lebanese President Michel Sleiman earlier Wednesday before the vote took place. There were concerns among Western diplomats that Lebanon, which has pro-Iranian Hezbollah members in its government, would vote against the sanctions, but in the end it abstained. She said she told Sleiman the vote "was not just about Iran" but about Lebanon's role in "enforcing the international order" through the United Nations. Clinton also reminded him that, as the Arab member on the UN Security Council, Lebanon must be aware "there was a vocal minority within the Arab world that was siding with Iran, but a very concerned majority that was not." The chief US diplomat hailed the vote as a "very important decision by the international community to demonstrate resolve and unity in the face of Iran's continuing defiance" of international rules and norms. She said the successful sanctions vote shows how the Obama administration managed to create a unified international response by demonstrating its willingness to engage Iran. "We're gratified by the positive response that a year of engagement has produced," she said. When the administration took office in January 2009, she said, "there was no appetite in the international community" for further sanctions

Regime Hurts Iranian Econ

**Iran’s Economy hurts “Hardline” regime**

Reuters 6/30 (Reuters, “*Iran's economic woes loom larger than sanctions”* 6/30/10, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6433OE20100504>) CS

Iran's home-grown economic ills pose a knottier challenge for its hardline leaders than possible new United Nations or U.S. sanctions over its nuclear program. World Even so, the world's fifth biggest oil exporter is far from collapse, despite its economy underperforming and simmering discontent 11 months after a disputed presidential election. Sanctions raise the cost of trade for Iran and are deterring Western companies from investing or doing business there, but they also give President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a scapegoat for economic woes that his critics blame on his own mismanagement. "I do not think his team is up to the serious challenges that Iran's post-oil boom economy faces," said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, professor of economics at Virginia Tech. "Sanctions are secondary in terms of negative influence on the economy, but they do make recovery much harder." Iran's economy will grow 3 percent this year and 3.2 percent in 2011 after 1.8 percent in 2009, the International Monetary Fund says, compared to growth for the Middle East and North Africa region of 4.5 percent in 2010 and 4.8 percent in 2011. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts oil export revenue at $63.4 billion this year from output of 3.82 million barrels per day (bpd), up from $53.9 billion last year, when Iran produced 3.74 million bpd. Crude oil is trading at around $85 a barrel after averaging $62 in 2009. "With a regional recovery in oil prices and output, Iran should really be leading the way with much stronger growth," said independent Abu Dhabi-based economist Mohammed Shakeel. The United States and its European allies are seeking a fourth round of U.N. sanctions on Iran, proposing a ban on new energy sector investment, more curbs on Iranian banking and shipping, a full arms embargo and penalties against members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and firms they control. The West suspects Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Tehran says it only wants fuel for power stations and medical reactors.

Regime Supports Terrorism

Iran Revolutionary Guard Backs Terrorists and forms Militant foreign policy.

**Thaler et al. 10**( David, Senior Defense Research Analyst, RAND Institute, *Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics*, <http://www.rc.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG878.pdf>, 2010)dc

Thus, **the IRGC has**, over time, deepened its vested interests in the civilian economy. At the same time, it **has retained its primary role as defender of the revolution, a role that continues to be defined expansively as active, often clandestine, involvement in states in the region in support of militias and terrorist groups** and, increasingly, participation in domestic politics. **The Guards’ level of influence** in national decisionmaking is difficult to assess, but their intelligence activities **would seem to give them an edge over civilian institutions and clerical interests on specific issues. It would appear that the IRGC’s autonomy in some areas, such as Lebanon and Iraq, is both unchallenged and an integral part of Iran’s policies.** The Guards’ authority regarding the nuclear issue is also difficult to evaluate. Although the program was most probably civilian inspired, **key nuclear facilities are now managed by the IRGC**.47 **U.S. intelligence is reported to have intercepted the Iranian military’s objections to Iran’s 2003 “halt” in its weaponization program**.48 Growth in the Guards’ political influence is likely to keep pace with their rising involvement in national-security decisionmaking and the economy.

\*\*\*\*\*Iraqi Politics\*\*\*\*\*

US Occupation divides Iraqi Govt

American presence is causing divisions in the Iraqi government.

**Arnove 6**(Anthony; author of Iraq: The Logic Of Withdrawal, *AlterNet,*March 28, 2006,<http://www.alternet.org/world/34122/>) CH

**Perhaps the greatest fear of many antiwar activists who now support the occupation is that the withdrawal of U.S. troops will lead to civil war**. This idea has been encouraged repeatedly by supporters of the war. "Sectarian fault lines in Iraq are inexorably pushing the country towards civil war unless we actually intervene decisively to stem it," explained one U.S. Army official, making the case for a continued U.S.presence.  **But Washington is not preventing a civil war from breaking out. In fact, occupation authorities are deliberately pitting Kurds against Arabs, Shia against Sunni, and faction against faction to influence the character of the future government,** following a classic divide- and-rule strategy. Taking this idea to its logical extreme, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman argues, "We should arm the Shiites and Kurds and leave the Sunnis of Iraq to reap the wind." Such arguments are not just the fantasy of keyboard warriors like Friedman, however. As the journalist A.K. Gupta notes, "**the Pentagon is arming, training, and funding" militias in Iraq "for use in counter-insurgency operations**." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said such commandos were among "the forces that are going to have the greatest leverage on suppressing and eliminating the insurgencies."  **In addition, the Iraqi constitution, drafted under intense pressure from occupation authorities, essentially enshrines sectarian divisions in Iraqi politics**. And, finally, **despite all of its rhetoric about confronting Islamic fundamentalism in Iraq, the United States has in fact encouraged it, bringing formerly marginalized fundamentalist parties such as the Dawa Party and the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq into the Iraqi government.** 

Iraqi’s support Withdrawal

**A majority of Iraqis agree that US troops are worsening the situation and should be removed.**

**Abbott 7**(Program Coordinator and Researcher at Oxford Research Group and author*The Internationalist*Issue 207) SM

Long-term stability is dependent on all factions in the country being able to have a say in the Iraqi political process. Genuine reconciliation will need all sides to have a place at the negotiating table, including those insurgent groups who have targeted civilians or military personnel in terrorist attacks. They must all be brought into the political process wherever possible; exclusion will only cause people to turn to violence as the only course apparently available to them. Such reconciliation initiatives would be greatly aided by an apology from key Coalition governments for the mistakes that have been made during the What do the Iraqi people want? **For the first time, more Iraqis now back an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops (47%) as opposed to troops remaining until security is restored (34%). 85% of Iraqis have little or no confidence in the US and UK occupation forces. 79% oppose the presence of those forces in Iraq. 72% feel that their presence is actually making the security situation worse.** Source: BBC / ABC News / MHK. September 2007 invasion and occupation, and a public assurance that they will no longer interfere in internal Iraqi affairs. A new fund should also be established to support local, community-based conflict prevention and resolution initiatives as one of the most effective methods for ensuring peace in Iraq's diverse regions. Of course there will not be agreement with all, or perhaps any, of the above proposals. **There are,** after all**, no easy answers and no guarantees of success in Iraq**. **But that does not absolve us of our responsibility to develop and propose positive ways out of the current fiasco.** What's important is that we continue publicly to debate our involvement in Iraq and support those developing effective policies for the withdrawal of troops. Governments must be made to understand that **there are ways of withdrawing troops from Iraq that will not necessarily result in disaster. It is up to all of us to make sure this happens.**

Withdrawal Good – Iraq steps up

**Iraqis believe US occupation is the cause of Al Qaeda activity. Iraq police forces could eliminate Al Qaeda on their own.**

**Jarrar 9**(Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action *Only a US Withdrawal Will Stop Al Qaeda in Iraq*<http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37861.html>) SM

**One of the last justifications for continuing the U.S. occupation of Iraq despite overwhelming opposition from Iraqis**, Americans and the rest of humanity has come down to this: **U.S. forces must remain in order to battle "al Qaeda in Iraq.**" Like so many of the arguments presented in the United States, **the idea is not only intellectually bankrupt, it's also the 180-degree opposite of reality**. The truth of the matter is that only **the presence of U.S. forces allows the group called "al Qaeda in Iraq**" (AQI) **to survive and function**, and **setting a timetable for the occupation to end is the best way to beat them**. You won't hear that perspective in Washington, but **according to Iraqis** with whom we spoke, **it is the conventional wisdom in much of the country**. The Bush administration has made much of what it calls "progress" in the Sunni-dominated provinces of central Iraq. But when we spoke to leaders there, the message we got was very different from what supporters of a long-term occupation claim: Many Sunnis are, indeed, lined up against groups like AQI, but that doesn't mean they are "joining" with coalition forces or throwing their support behind the Iraqi government. Several sources we reached in **the Sunni community agreed that AQI, a predominantly Sunni insurgent group that did not exist prior to the U.S. invasion -- it started in 2005 -- will not exist for long after coalition forces depart**. **AQI** is universally detested by large majorities of Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian backgrounds because of its fundamentalist interpretation of religious law and efforts to set up a separate Sunni state, and its only support -- and it obviously does enjoy some support -- **is based solely on its opposition to the deeply unpopular U.S.-led occupation of Iraq**. We spoke by phone with Qasim Al-jumaili, a former member of Falluja's City Council, who was confident that his**local militias would eliminate Al Qaeda in Iraq** from **Fallujah if U.S. forces were to withdraw**. **"The U.S. presence is making our work harder,"** he said. "For example, the Anbar Salvation Front [the Sunni tribal leadership group that declared war against Al Qaeda in Iraq], is not getting a lot of public support because they think we're collaborating with the U.S. and the Al-Maliki government." Al Jumaili was confident that **Iraqis wouldn't tolerate Al Qaeda in Iraq's presence in an independent Iraq**. "**If the U.S. was to pull out** from Iraq and let Iraqis have a national government instead of the puppet one now, **Iraqis with their government and tribal leaders would quickly eliminate Al Qaeda**from all Iraq," he said. It's a credible statement -- most estimates of the terror group's strength suggest its membership is in the low thousands, no match for the larger organized militias or the fledgling security forces without the support of some of the residents of the areas in which they operate. Contrary to the neat media narrative of a unified "Sunni" leadership that has turned on AQI and joined with the Americans -- a narrative wholly fabricated by the White House and repeated without skepticism by most of the traditional media -- the Sunni community in Iraq is fragmented and divided by a variety of shifting loyalties and interests.

**Withdrawal now will make the Iraqi government become more effective**

[**Cordesman**](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/author/anthony_cordesman/) 8 (Anthony, national security analyst, August 22, Center for Strategic and international studies, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/2/) ELJ

There is nothing wrong with setting broad goals for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq. The U.S. wants to leave as soon as this is feasible, and Iraqis have long wanted us to leave. At least since 2004, Iraq’s Kurds have been the only group in Iraq that showed a consistent desire for the U.S. to stay. It also is impossible to be certain that the risks of early withdrawal will really be greater from the risks of staying. It is at least possible that acting on early timelines will force Iraqis to move towards political accommodation, to take hard decisions, and become more effective. In fact, if all goes well in Iraq, deadlines like 2011 may prove practical—particularly if such deadlines do not preclude a large number of U.S. military advisors.

Iraqi Elections

**Iraqi election still undecided**

**Pollack 6/30** ( Kenneth M. Pollack, Dir, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *The Brookings Institute,* 6/30/10, <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0630_iraq_trip_pollack.aspx>) CS

Iraqi politics are dead-locked.  The results of the March 7 elections were a resounding victory for Iraq, and for America’s interests in Iraq in that Iraqis largely voted for the two parties considered most secular, least connected with formal militias, least tied to the vicious sectarianism of the civil war, and most desirous of meeting popular demands for political, economic and social stability and progress.[[1]](http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0630_iraq_trip_pollack.aspx" \l "_ftn1)  Unfortunately, in large part because of Iraq’s reliance on a proportional representation system, the election did not hand either party a clear-cut majority.  Instead, ‘Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya took 91 seats in the 325-seat Council of Representatives and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) coalition garnered 89.  This has left them as two Gullivers surrounded by a dozen or more liliputians.  It also left them well short of the 163 votes needed to secure a majority.  Moreover, the first vote will have to be cast for president, who will then invite one of the two leading parties to form a government, and it requires a two-thirds majority to elect the president.  Since the presidency itself is hotly contested and is likely to be part of the overall “package” of the new government, it is likely that either party will have to secure an even larger coalition to take power.

**Sadrists are preventing U.S. backed campaign candidates**

**Pollack 6/30** ( Kenneth M. Pollack, Dir, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *The Brookings Institute,* 6/30/10, <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0630_iraq_trip_pollack.aspx>) CS

As things stand, most of the smaller parties remain on the fence, waiting to see which of the contenders will offer them the best deal.  They are also waiting to try to gauge which is most likely to secure the votes necessary to form the government because once it becomes clear that one of the parties can do so, all of the smaller parties will likely scramble to try to join that side in hope of being rewarded with plum cabinet and governmental posts (and avoid being shut out of the same). The problem is that neither of the two major parties has been able to convince enough of the smaller parties to declare for them.  Prime Minister Maliki has arguably done better, striking a tentative deal with the Iraqi National Accord, itself a shotgun marriage of the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).  However, this deal lacks one critical final piece: a decision over who will be the grouping’s prime ministerial candidate.  Both ISCI and the Sadrists have so far refused to accept Maliki as their prime ministerial candidate (with ISCI preferring ‘Adel ‘Abd al-Mahdi, and the Sadrists preferring Ibrahim Jaafari).  But SoL is built around the person of Nuri al-Maliki, who will not accept that anyone will be prime minister but him.  Maliki’s negotiating strategy has been to hammer out an agreement with INA in which he would be their prime ministerial candidate, and then turn to Allawi’s Iraqiyya and start bargaining with them to see if SoL and Iraqiyya could form an alternative coalition.  In these

negotiations Maliki would have the advantage because he would be able to use his commitment from the INA as leverage to extract concessions from Iraqiyya—in effect saying to Allawi, “If I go with the INA I get to remain prime minister, so if you want me to go with you, Iraqiyya, you are going to need to do even better than that.”  Thus, a firm deal with the INA would put Maliki in the

driver’s seat for all of the negotiations. But because Maliki cannot yet secure the INA’s agreement for him to be the prime minister, he cannot yet begin negotiations with Iraqiyya in earnest. Thus, a key question is whether Maliki can find a way to bribe, persuade or coerce the Sadrists (the dominant force in the INA) to agree to name him their joint prime ministerial candidate.  For now, however, the Sadrists and their candidate, former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari, seem more than content to wait and force Maliki to accept that he won’t be prime minister again.  It is not clear what it will take, if anything at all, to get them to change their position on this.  Indeed, Maliki has actually begun tentative contacts with Iraqiyya recently in part because the US and UN have been pressing him to do so.  However, of greater importance, Maliki hopes that this will frighten the Sadrists that he is about to cut a deal with Allawi that would leave the INA out in the cold, and so convince them to accept him as the prime minister in a SoL-INA government.

Iraqi Elections

**Iraq Elections will be postponed**

**Reuters 6/24** (Michael Christie and Mark Heinrich, *Reuters,* 6/24/10, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65N1YG20100624)CS

The failure to forge a government 3 1/2 months after the March 7 election is fuelling public frustration and creating a political vacuum that insurgents have sought to exploit through attacks before the end of U.S. combat operations in August. The cross-sectarian Iraqiya alliance, heavily backed by minority Sunnis, won a slim lead in the otherwise inconclusive vote, which Iraqis had hoped would set their war-scarred nation on a path to stability seven years after the U.S.-led invasion. But a merger after the election between incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), dominated by parties close to Iran like the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), had been expected to deprive Iraqiya of a chance to form the government. That Shi'ite mega merger is now under threat because of the refusal of its partners to compromise on a prime minister. A major stumbling bloc continues to be the insistence of Maliki's Dawa party that he be given a second term. An agreement by Dawa to limit Maliki's powers has not been enough to convince others to agree to his reappointment, party officials said. "ISCI, Badr organization and Sadrists have decided not to hand the government to Maliki or the Dawa party," a senior ISCI leader said, declining to be identified. Badr is ISCI's former armed wing while the Sadrists are the followers of fiery anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. All are in the INA. "The alliance is closer to breaking apart than to being welded together. It is really still being tested," he said. The Sadrists, who control around 40 of the INA's 70 seats, have been adamant about rejecting Maliki, harboring rancor against him for using the army to crush their militia in 2008. PUSHED TO THE EDGE "Honestly, we are not there yet. But we are pushing this to the edge in order to prevent Maliki from being prime minister again," a senior Sadrist said on condition he not be identified. The Sadrists have said they would support former interim prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari as a nominee. ISCI is promoting outgoing Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi as its main choice, even though he is opposed by the Sadrists. "We think our candidate Dr. Adel Abdul-Mahdi is more acceptable than anyone else to the Kurds, to Iraqiya and to regional and foreign countries," said ISCI lawmaker Kasim al-Araji, a member of the Badr organization. Under Iraq's fledging political process, the new parliament should pick a new president and the president should select the next prime minister from the largest parliamentary bloc. Iraqiya argues that means the prime minister should come from its ranks since it won the most seats in the election. The merged Shi'ite-led National Alliance argues it has that right as the largest group in parliament, a dispute yet to be resolved. ISCI is now trying to persuade others to let parliament select a prime minister from a list to be submitted by the National Alliance, ISCI leader Mohammed Mahdi al-Bayati said, while conceding the proposal was "not constitutional." Few expected coalition talks to be quick, and August has been viewed as a likely date for government formation. But the continuing discord in the National Alliance, despite progress it had made in wooing Sunni groups, means it may take even longer. A big question is whether Dawa, which controls 89 seats, will eventually decide its fate is more important than Maliki's. "I suppose flexibility will be obligatory," said senior party member Ali al-Adeeb, asked if Dawa might at some point change its candidate in order to keep the premier's position.

**Iraq pullout deadline will be extended if election violence continues**

**Dreazen 10** (Yochi J. Dreazen, Author for the Wall Street Journal, *The Wall Street Journal*,2/23/10, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704454304575081642107227292.html>) CS

WASHINGTON—The top U.S. commander in Baghdad said some American combat forces could remain in Iraq after this summer's planned withdrawal date if the country's feuding leaders are unable to quickly form a new government. The comment from Army Gen. Ray Odierno is one of the clearest indications yet of how closely senior U.S. officials will be watching Iraq's national elections next month for signs of whether the country will be capable of governing itself—and maintaining its current level of security—once American forces head for the exits. U.S. troop levels in Iraq are supposed to fall to 50,000 by the end of August as the overall American mission shifts from direct combat to supporting Iraqi security forces. The remaining U.S. forces are supposed to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. USIRAQ Associated Press Gen. Ray Odierno, right, with American troops in Iraq in January, says the U.S. could slow its pullout. USIRAQ USIRAQ Speaking at the Pentagon, Gen. Odierno said he expected all U.S. combat forces to leave Iraq by Sept. 1, reducing American troop levels—already at their lowest point since the start of the war in March 2003—to 50,000. He said the continuing withdrawal was ahead of schedule, as initial plans had estimated there would be 115,000 U.S. troops left in Iraq now instead of the current 96,000. More on Still, Gen. Odierno he said, Iraq's uncertain political future meant the next phase of the drawdown could proceed more slowly than initially planned. The commander said he had prepared contingency plans that would leave some combat troops in Iraq past Sept. 1 if the country faced serious political unrest or widespread violence after the vote. "I have contingency plans that I've briefed to the chain of command this week that we could execute if we run into problems," Gen. Odierno said. "We're prepared to execute those." The commander said he would consider slowing the withdrawal "if something happens" in Iraq over the next two to three months. He said he would pay particular attention to how long it took Iraq's political leaders to assemble a new coalition government after the March 7 balloting and to whether the political maneuvering was accompanied by any new violence. Iraq's Previous elections have been marred by significant numbers of attacks and months of political instability as the country's leaders haggled over cabinet slots. This time, U.S. officials say they are cautiously optimistic that the balloting will go smoothly. Iraq's overall level of violence has fallen dramatically from its highs in 2006 and 2007, and its security forces operate independently in many parts of the country. With Americans forces playing exclusively a supporting role, the U.S. has had only a single combat fatality there in the past three months. On Monday, eight members of one Shiite family were killed south of Baghdad, the Associated Press reported, part of a spate of attacks across Iraq that left at least 23 dead and raised fears that insurgents are trying to reignite sectarian warfare in the run-up to the vote. Gen. Odierno said he had seen no indications of an uptick inIraq's sectarian violence, which had brought the country Iraq to the brink of civil war in the years before the U.S. troop surge. He said many attacks seemed instead to be politically motivated, citing recent incidents targeting the offices of someof the country's parties and coalitions. "What this has all reminded us, as we've moved closer towards the elections, is that Iraq is still fragile," he said."It's politically fragile." Corrections & Amplifications An earlier version of this article in print and online incorrectly said that an earlier security pact between Washington and Baghdad called for American troop levels to fall to 50,000 by this summer. The troop number was announced last year as part of the Obama administration's Iraq strategy, and is not part of the security pact.

Iraqi Govt Unstable

Iraqi politics are preventing formation of government

Pollack 6/30(Kenneth, Director of Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0630_iraq_trip_pollack.aspx>, 2010)dc

Iraqi politics are dead-locked. The results of the March 7 elections were a resounding victory for Iraq, and for America’s interests in Iraq in that Iraqis largely voted for the two parties considered most secular, least connected with formal militias, least tied to the vicious sectarianism of the civil war, and most desirous of meeting popular demands for political, economic and social stability and progress.[1] Unfortunately, in large part because of Iraq’s reliance on a proportional representation system, the election did not hand either party a clear-cut majority. Instead, ‘Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya took 91 seats in the 325-seat Council of Representatives and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) coalition garnered 89. This has left them as two Gullivers surrounded by a dozen or more liliputians. It also left them well short of the 163 votes needed to secure a majority. Moreover, the first vote will have to be cast for president, who will then invite one of the two leading parties to form a government, and it requires a two-thirds majority to elect the president. Since the presidency itself is hotly contested and is likely to be part of the overall “package” of the new government, it is likely that either party will have to secure an even larger coalition to take power. As things stand, most of the smaller parties remain on the fence, waiting to see which of the contenders will offer them the best deal. They are also waiting to try to gauge which is most likely to secure the votes necessary to form the government because once it becomes clear that one of the parties can do so, all of the smaller parties will likely scramble to try to join that side in hope of being rewarded with plum cabinet and governmental posts (and avoid being shut out of the same). The problem is that neither of the two major parties has been able to convince enough of the smaller parties to declare for them. Prime Minister Maliki has arguably done better, striking a tentative deal with the Iraqi National Accord, itself a shotgun marriage of the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). However, this deal lacks one critical final piece: a decision over who will be the grouping’s prime ministerial candidate. Both ISCI and the Sadrists have so far refused to accept Maliki as their prime ministerial candidate (with ISCI preferring ‘Adel ‘Abd al-Mahdi, and the Sadrists preferring Ibrahim Jaafari). But SoL is built around the person of Nuri al-Maliki, who will not accept that anyone will be prime minister but him.

**Government Formation in Iraq is still far from complete**

**Arraf 6/30** (Jane Arraf, Christian Science Moniter political correspondent, *The Christian Science Moniter,* 6/30/10, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0630/As-US-troops-leave-Iraq-inches-toward-a-new-government>) CS

Iraq’s Shiite alliance is proposing a new, more restrictive role for the prime minister. But months after Iraqis went to the polls in a pivotal national election, who that prime minister will be is uncertain. The only thing clear about the eventual new government is that it will be shaped by the sectarianism that almost everyone condemns. "This is the bitter reality that we are talking about,” says Ali al-Adeeb, a senior adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, when asked whether the next government would retain the quota system in which government posts are divided among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. “We also don’t want to speak of it like that, but whether we want it or not, that is what it has become.” Dressed in a dark blue pinstripe suit and wingtip shoes, Mr. Adeeb explains that oppression of Shiites and Kurds under Saddam Hussein’s largely Sunni regime, and the dangers from hostile Sunni neighbors, mean that the Shiite majority must remain vigilant. “If you want to understand it you must put yourself in the place of an Iraqi,” says Adeeb, who like most Shiite leaders, spent years in exile. On Tuesday, [Iraq](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Iraq)'s prime minister held a long-awaited meeting with the man who wants his job. But Mr. Maliki’s Shiite alliance and Ayad Allawi’s secular party seem little closer to forming a coalition government. Both claim the right to be prime minister and head a government – Maliki because his alliance formed after the election now holds a majority of seats and Mr. Allawi because his Iraqiya coalition actually won the most seats in the March vote. The deadlock means the only way a coalition government will be formed is by a carefully crafted agreement between the main Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions – a process now expected to last into the fall. "I think we're still in the preliminary stage," US Ambassador Chris Hill told reporters Tuesday. "I think it's going to be fair to say that any eventual solutions are going to require hard and tough bargaining," said Mr. Hill, who might end up finishing his assignment here in September before a new government takes shape.Maliki is popular in the street but widely resented by many other political leaders, including fellow Shiites. They accuse him of behaving like a dictator in measures that included setting up separate security services during his four years in power and launching military offensives without consultation. Adeeb, reelected to parliament as a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and a firm supporter of Maliki, says their Shiite alliance had agreed on a mechanism that would clip the wings of a new prime minister to prevent such unilateral action. “We reached an agreement with the national alliance … in order to restrict or bind unilateral movement by the prime minister,” he says. “The prime minister will be the representative of this entity and therefore he should restrict himself to the strategies or the political programs of the alliance.” The Iraqi National Alliance (INA) includes the Dawa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Sadr movement – followers of hard-line cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the biggest single bloc in parliament. The coalition has made clear that it will be guided by the directives of Shiite religious leaders in Najaf. Allawi is a secular Shiite, but his Iraqiya Party includes a large number of Sunnis, which the INA says precludes him from being given a post informally reserved for a Shiite. When the US disbanded the Iraqi Army and banned former Baath Party members from government jobs, Sunnis suffered disproportionately. Disenfranchised and disillusioned, they formed the core of the insurgency and widely boycotted previous elections.

Iraqi Govt Unstable

The country is still emerging from the depths of civil war three years ago.

Iraq to side with Iran and other Global Powers over US.

Hussain 9(Safa, Iraqi National Security Council, CG News, 7/14)dc

Whether Iraq will remain in the US sphere of influence is not clear. It is alleged by journalists and retired officials that the US was behind the 1968 coup that brought the Baath Party to power. Yet by the late 1970s Baathist Iraq had developed much closer ties to the Soviet Union and to France than to the US. Iraq could easily drift back away from Washington over time. The new Iraqi elite will be pro-Hizbullah (this Lebanese Shiite party-militia was formed in some important part with the help of Iraqi expatriate members of the Da’wa or Islamic Mission Party in Beirut). Da’wa has since 2005 provided the prime minister for Iraq. In further Israeli-Hizbullah violence, Iraqi Shiites will side with Hizbullah If US-Iran tensions rise, the new Iraqi political class that Bush did so much to install might well side with Iran, at least behind the scenes. It is already clear that the new Baghdad rejects Israel just as the old one did (and for Shiites ruling in the American shadow, doing so burnishes their Arab nationalist credentials). Iraq is also clearly eager to develop strong ties with China, which will likely be a superpower by 2020. If the US is too overbearing, the Iraqis could migrate east in their political alliances.

Assassinations undermining Iraqi security.

Ricks 10(Tom, Harvard University’s Senior Advisory Council on the Project on US Civil-Military Relations, Foreign Policy, 6/14)dc

The Sahwa movement is in real trouble, and that means trouble for Iraq's security. For the past few months and with growing frequency as of late, Sahwa leaders and rank and file members have been the targets of sophisticated assassinations. Some have been killed by gunmen armed with silenced weapons and others by bombs planted on their cars or homes. This violence is not random. These are targeted attacks aimed at a critical group within Iraq's social and security fabric. And the government doesn't seem to be doing much to stop it. For background, the Sahwa -- or Awakening -- Movement, began in al-Anbar province in late 2005 when a Sunni tribe on the Syrian border got into a turf war with a neighboring al Qaeda-allied group. The tribe ran a profitable smuggling operation across the border, and its members decided working with U.S. forces (who presumably overlooked the smuggling) would get them the weapons and training they needed to clear their territory. The idea caught on, and by 2008 there were a total of over 100,000 Sahwa forces -- also known as Sons of Iraq -- in nine of Iraq's most dangerous provinces. Many of these SOIs were drawn from the ranks of the very Sunni insurgents they were tasked by the U.S. with rounding up, an arrangement that made them highly effective but won them a long list of enemies. And of course it was impossible to ensure that every SOI had actually severed ties with the insurgency -- rumors of double agents persisted. Problems for the Awakening Movement began in the fall of 2008 when the Iraqi government took control of the Sons of Iraq, promising to keep paying their US $300 monthly salaries while transitioning them into government employment or the Iraqi security forces. Both tasks proved easier said than done, and many SOIs claim the Shi'a-led government never intended to support their majority Sunni forces. Those accusations gained traction in the spring of 2009, when Iraqi security forces arrested numerous Sahwa leaders and members on charges ranging from murder to extortion to links to Sadaam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. A March arrest in Baghdad's Fadhil neighborhood developed into a dramatic standoff between Iraqi Army forces and SOIs loyal to the accused, and fighting continued for two days. However such public accusations against the Sons of Iraq soon tapered off. Now the biggest threat to the Sons of Iraq is assassination. The Guardian spoke with a Baghdad Awakening leader who put it in stark terms: We are being hunted down. It has never been worse. I have been targeted by roadside bombs six times in the past four months." The Guardian reports that every SOI leader is assigned three bodyguards by the Iraqi government. But I haven't been able to find what protection if any rank and file members receive. Even with bodyguards, the SOI leader and his family are vulnerable. His son recently spent a month in the hospital after drinking poisoned orange juice. Even his backyard fishpond was poisoned. Who does he blame? Al Qaeda. While I haven't had the chance check this out firsthand, every SOI I've seen interviewed points his finger at Sunni insurgents eager for revenge against the traitorous Sahwa forces. That same Guardian article raised the prospect that the attackers may be among the nearly 10,000 Iraqi detainees recently freed during the handover of the country's prisons from U.S. to Iraqi control.

Iraqi Politcal Instability leads to violence

Political Unrest furthers Violence in Iraq

**Smith 6/22** (Reid Smith, a research associate specializing on U.S. policy in the Middle East and at the University of Delaware’s Department of Political Science and International Relations, *The foreign Policy Association’s World Affairs Blog,*6/22/10,<http://iraq.foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/reidsmith/>) CS

**Three months after international observers hailed Iraq’s parliamentary elections as a success for sovereignty and civil society, the nation’s fragile democracy is suffering a withering swell of political violence**.  It seems like only a short time ago we were celebrating news that the country’s Sunnis had [holstered their discontent](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/middleeast/08sunnis.html?hp) to unite with countrymen across sectarian lines. [Iran’s influence](http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/iraqelection2010/2010/03/201037123914357815.html)seemed on the wane and a secular coalition had gained momentum after years of confessional infighting.  Sadly, **Iraq’s politicians have not yet proven themselves worthy of the men and women who braved car bombs and mortar fire to impart their mandate**. Ayad **Allawi’s Al-Iraqiya coalition was poised to win a decisive victory, but ultimately fell short of a governing majority. Now, his cross-sectarian alliance has been thoroughly undermined by the dominant Shi’a alliance** – one in which the powerful Sadrists have assumed the role of political kingmakers. Sunni displeasure seems on the rise as their role is yet again reduced to “opposition bloc.”  And while the 325 member parliament has been[formally sworn in](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0614/Iraq-parliament-sits-politicians-say-new-government-months-away), it is unlikely that the governing hierarchy will be finalized for several weeks. **The constitution, itself, remains riddled with legislative gaps that threaten the electoral and political processes that bind the nascent democracy.** Meanwhile, external challenges continue to mount.  First and foremost, the new parliament will be responsible for putting an end to the [precipitious escalation in violence](http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9GGGIMG0)that has rocked the country since the March elections failed to yield a clear winner.   **The country’s Kurdish minority harbors a long-standing and bitter resentment over land, oil and constitutional rights that has threatened the peace across the semi-autonomous northern territory the Kurds consider their ancestral homeland**. This antipathy has further delayed the responsible stewardship of Iraq’s multi-billion dollar oil wealth which remains hamstrung by antiquated hydrocarbon laws.  The corruption that marginalizes the government’s ability to assure security and basic services is viewed by many U.S. military officials as being as dangerous to the country’s stability as the lingering insurgency. Just today, Iraq’s electricity minister, Kareem Wahid Hasan,[announced his resignation](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062203986.html?hpid=moreheadlines) amidst mounting frustration with the country’s terminal power shortages. **The service crisis stands testament to the empty promise of a representative government that remains brittle with dishonesty and fraud.  All the while, America counts the days till her duty is done…**

\*\*\*\*\*Answers To\*\*\*\*\*

A2: Spending DA

Withdrawing from Iraq saves the US over $1.1 trillion

Heiser 9 (James, reporter, *NewAmerican,* 9-4-2009, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/health-care/1822) CM

[The Army Times is reporting](http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_troopwithdrawals_cost_090309w/) that a congressional study has once again discovered the obvious: pulling out of Iraq will save money. “A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says.” The Army Times article declares, “That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion.” The mind-boggling $7.4 trillion to be alloted for defense spending is based on continuing the status quo in Iraq, while the proposed savings would come not from pulling out of Iraq, but from cutting the presence of American soldiers to a level comparable to [**the number presently serving in South Korea**](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5167213/).  According to the Army Times: The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions: A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019. A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond.

Withdrawal saves $50 billion a year

Francis 10 (David R., column writer, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3-29-2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend)

With the withdrawal of its military forces in Iraq already under way and increasing talk of winding down operations in Afghanistan, the United States is poised to reap a "peace dividend." But it won't rival the one after the end of the cold war – a 40 percent drop in real defense spending during most of the 1990s, saving hundreds of billions of dollars. It won't even be as big as the Obama administration expects, defense budget experts say. The two wars are budgeted to cost $159 billion in fiscal 2011, which starts next October. That's down a tad from 2010. From fiscal 2012 to 2015, the administration pegs the cost at $50 billion a year. But the US won't really save $100 billion a year.

Iraq withdrawal saves the US $1.1 Trillion

Maze 9 (Rick, staff writer, *Army Times,* 9-5-2009, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_troopwithdrawals_cost_090309w/>) CM

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations.

A2: Spending DA

Pulling troops out from Iraq would save the United States billion of dollars.

Francis 10 (David; staff writer, *The Christian Science Monitor,* March 30, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T9659028764&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T9659028297&cisb=22\_T9659028296&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=7945&docNo=2) CH

With the withdrawal of its military forces in Iraq already under way and increasing talk of winding down operations in Afghanistan, the United States is poised to reap a "peace dividend." But it won't rival the one after the end of the cold war - a 40 percent drop in real defense spending during most of the 1990s, saving hundreds of billions of dollars. It won't even be as big as the [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9659028764&returnToId=20_T9659029639&csi=7945&A=0.8045262198637728&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P)  expects, defense budget experts say. The two wars are budgeted to cost $159 billion in fiscal 2011, which starts next October. That's down a tad from 2010. From fiscal 2012 to 2015, the administration pegs the cost at $50 billion a year. But the US won't really save $100 billion a year. "That's not realistic ... not likely to happen even if everything goes as well as planned," says Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank. The $50 billion is a "placeholder," a number neither the Defense Department nor outsiders can estimate given the uncertainties of war and political stabilization. Nevertheless, the election in Iraq has raised hopes that the US can shrink its military presence there to 50,000 noncombat troops by September. On March 10, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reportedly also raised the possibility that some of the 33,000 troops involved in the recent buildup in Afghanistan could leave before July 2011, the date set by [President Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9659028764&returnToId=20_T9659029639&csi=7945&A=0.8045262198637728&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=President%20Obama%20&indexType=P)  for beginning withdrawal. If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated." The [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9659028764&returnToId=20_T9659029639&csi=7945&A=0.8045262198637728&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P)  budget set 2011 defense spending at $739 billion. This amounts to 19 percent of total federal outlays. Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Mass., suspects defense spending could be cut as low as $650 billion without seriously damaging American security needs. To trim the deficit, Mr. [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9659028764&returnToId=20_T9659029639&csi=7945&A=0.8045262198637728&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P)  called for a freeze in discretionary spending but exempted defense. The US defense budget adds up, at the very least, to 47 percent of total worldwide defense spending. That reflects the US role as the sole superpower, the various US interests abroad, and the relatively high costs of the US military. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson raised defense spending almost 50 percent in constant dollars. President Reagan, with his ambition to financially clobber the Soviet Union, raised defense outlays by more than 50 percent. By contrast, US defense budgets have risen close to 100 percent since the low reached in 1998 after the end of the cold war, notes Mr. Conetta. Indeed, the [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9659028764&returnToId=20_T9659029639&csi=7945&A=0.8045262198637728&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P)  budget plans to spend more on the Pentagon over eight years than any administration has since World War II. Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean War cost $393,000 per person involved per year. The cost in Vietnam was $256,000, reckons Conetta. Today's two wars cost $792,000 per person/year - and more than $1 trillion overall so far.

**Withdrawing American troops from Iraq would save the US a significant amount of money.**

Maze 9 (Rick; staff writer, *Military Times*, September 5, 2009, http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2009/09/military\_troopwithdrawals\_cost\_090309w/) CH

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations. The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions: • A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019. • A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond. The report does not suggest what the money saved from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should be used for, but the Defense Department surely would make a bid to keep at least some of it to pay for unfunded weapons modernization programs. The budget and economic update notes that Congress has allocated $944 billion so far for Iraq and Afghanistan operations — $849 billion in direct spending by the Defense Department, $51 billion for diplomatic efforts, $42 billion to aid Iraq and Afghanistan police and military forces and $2 billion to cover costs such as increases in veterans benefits and services.

A2: Spending DA

**Withdrawals could save U.S. defense budget Billions**

**Francis 5/1** (David R. Francis, European Correspondent for the Christian Science Moniter, *The Christian Science Moniter,* 5/1/10, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend>) CS

With the withdrawal of its military forces in Iraq already under way and increasing talk of winding down operations in Afghanistan, the United States is poised to reap a "peace dividend." But it won't rival the one after the end of the cold war - a 40 percent drop in real defense spending during most of the 1990s, saving hundreds of billions of dollars. It won't even be as big as the [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9666292488&returnToId=20_T9666294145&csi=7945&A=0.2913424722048815&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%2523PE000A0BO%2523&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P) expects, defense budget experts say. The two wars are budgeted to cost $159 billion in fiscal 2011, which starts next October. That's down a tad from 2010. From fiscal 2012 to 2015, the administration pegs the cost at $50 billion a year. But the US won't really save $100 billion a year. "That's not realistic ... not likely to happen even if everything goes as well as planned," says Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank. The $50 billion is a "placeholder," a number neither the Defense Department nor outsiders can estimate given the uncertainties of war and political stabilization. Nevertheless, the election in Iraq has raised hopes that the US can shrink its military presence there to 50,000 noncombat troops by September. On March 10, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reportedly also raised the possibility that some of the 33,000 troops involved in the recent buildup in Afghanistan could leave before July 2011, the date set by [President Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9666292488&returnToId=20_T9666294145&csi=7945&A=0.2913424722048815&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%2523PE000A0BO%2523&searchTerm=President%20Obama%20&indexType=P) for beginning withdrawal. If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated." The [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9666292488&returnToId=20_T9666294145&csi=7945&A=0.2913424722048815&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%2523PE000A0BO%2523&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) budget set 2011 defense spending at $739 billion. This amounts to 19 percent of total federal outlays. Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Mass., suspects defense spending could be cut as low as $650 billion without seriously damaging American security needs. To trim the deficit, Mr. [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9666292488&returnToId=20_T9666294145&csi=7945&A=0.2913424722048815&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%2523PE000A0BO%2523&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) called for a freeze in discretionary spending but exempted defense. The US defense budget adds up, at the very least, to 47 percent of total worldwide defense spending. That reflects the US role as the sole superpower, the various US interests abroad, and the relatively high costs of the US military. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson raised defense spending almost 50 percent in constant dollars. President Reagan, with his ambition to financially clobber the Soviet Union, raised defense outlays by more than 50 percent. By contrast, US defense budgets have risen close to 100 percent since the low reached in 1998 after the end of the cold war, notes Mr. Conetta. Indeed, the Obama budget plans to spend more on the Pentagon over eight years than any administration has since World War II. Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean War cost $393,000 per person involved per year. The cost in Vietnam was $256,000, reckons Conetta. Today's two wars cost $792,000 per person/year - and more than $1 trillion overall so far. · David R. Francis writes a weekly column.

Pulling out will save trillions of dollars

Maze 9(Rick Maze Staff writer of Army Times, Army Times 9/509)<http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_troopwithdrawals_cost_090309w/> JVT

**A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says.**  **That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion.**  The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations.  The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at **two scenarios for reductions**:  • **A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings**. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019.  •**A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate.** It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond.

A2: Spending DA

We need to get out of the Iraq and Afghanistan at all costs. The foundations of this war are on pretense and the current spending we have on this war is trading off with needed infrastructure spending here at home.

Grayson, Alan. May 19, 2009 ((Democratic Congressman of Florida’s 8th District) Interview With Christopher Bateman, Vanity Fair <http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/05/an-interview-with-antiwar-freshman-democratic-congressman-alan-grayson.html>) 4/25/10 AW

I think that **we have to get out**. I think that **we should have left both these countries a long time ago. In the case of Iraq, the reasons that we were given at the time the war began were all lies**, and we all know it, and as a country **we should have been willing to learn from that mistake a long time ago. We have conducted wars without paying for them for the past seven years, and the result of that is that we have come close to destroying our national economy**. At this point I’m really not terribly concerned about the well-being of the Shiites, the Sunnis, or the Kurds. What I care about is our surviving these difficult economic times, and when **I’m asked to vote for $100 billion to extend occupations that fundamentally served no purpose that could not be accomplished any other way**—**in lieu of spending for the things that human beings need, at a time when we have schools closing in Orlando, at a time when we are laying off firefighters and police officers—I have to say, “No, there’s a better use for that money.”**

Forward Deployment is expensive.

Dancs 9 (Anita, Assistant Professor of Economics at New England College, Foreign Policy in Focus, 7/2)dc

The U.S. military's global presence is vast and costly. More than one-third of U.S. troops are currently based abroad or afloat in international waters, and hundreds of bases and access agreements exist throughout the world. At the beginning of the 21st century, the government pushed to expand this presence through a variety of mechanisms. Yet the Department of Defense's budget presentations lack enough detail to make it possible to know the precise cost. The budgets don't break down the numbers, for example, on maintaining bases at home and overseas. Nevertheless, from data on personnel, bases, and the Pentagon's budgets, it's possible to make an estimate. This number comes from the proportion of each branch's budget devoted to military personnel stationed overseas, excluding troops based in and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Since one-fourth of these military personnel are stationed overseas, the overall figure includes one-fourth of the defense-wide budget. Finally, it includes the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the amount of military assistance to other countries. The report does not include subsidies from governments that host bases, three-quarters of which come from Japan alone. The final bill: The United States spends approximately $250 billion annually to maintain troops, equipment, fleets, and bases overseas.

A2: Troop Tradeoff DA

**There is no risk of Iraqi troops being deployed elsewhere**

Dobins (James 6.16.9 Dir DPC, RAND, Sec. of State http://www.mepc.org/forums\_chcs/57.asp)ESY

Now, there is some thought that we will withdraw from Iraq but go somewhere else in the region. As a practical matter, there is nobody else in the region who is going to accept a large number of American troops. So we're not going to put 100,000 troops anywhere else in the region or anything close to that. We will continue to maintain a major offshore presence, and perhaps some headquarters and refueling and other capabilities in the region.   But this is a withdrawal not just from Iraq; it is a withdrawal from the Middle East in terms of large-scale ground combat forces, and so we do need to think about what that means for the geopolitics of the region as a whole, and this is an opportunity to engage those countries in a dialogue, perhaps a multilateral dialogue in which they talk to each other more candidly then they have to date about what things can look like.   I mean, the Iranian revolution occurred in '79; that didn't become a basis for stationing American forces in the region. It was Saddam Hussein and his invasion of Kuwait that drew America into the region. So if you fix the Iraqi situation, there isn't necessarily an inherent long- term requirement for a major American presence, and we ought to think about how one could return to that earlier situation. And we ought to at least aspire to establishing some kind of internal equilibrium in the region that doesn't require a significant

A2: Withdrawal Hurts US-Iraq Relations

Withdrawal doesn’t mean the end of the strong alliance between Iraq and the U.S.

RT 10 (RT is an international headliner, June 5, http://rt.com/Top\_News/2010-06-03/iraq-us-troops-withdrawal.html) eh

The Obama Administration has told the world the US is on the brink of pulling all combat troops out of Iraq. But many Iraqis and political analysts doubt whether it is a realistic time frame. When will American troops leave Iraq? Well, according to the President himself, the answer is “very soon.” “Let me say this as plainly as I can. By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end,” Barack Obama said. And according to the people on the ground, the US military draw-down has already started to happen, with remaining troops confining activities to base and the Iraqi government assuming more of an operational role. “I think they understand that we are on our way out. A lot of our mission here is just to train and advise them, and they have really been stepping up. I think they understand what our president said. He really wants to get us to 50,000 soldiers by August, and next year, get us out of country,” says Lt. Darryl Frost from Joint Area Support Group in Baghdad. More than just pulling out of the country, US military officials are looking for a smooth transition, and part of that process is making sure any buildings and facilities are fully operational before they pull out and before the Iraqi government takes over. But with recent elections ending with confusion over the creation of a coalition government, a smooth transition may be more difficult than first imagined. There are fears that sectarian violence may escalate in the region. In fact recent renewed violence in Baghdad has caused speculation that America may just stay a bit longer in Iraq. “He hasn't said that there will be no withdrawal whatsoever, but they have started to put out word that this partial withdrawal – getting down to 50,000 troops plus mercenaries, contractors and so forth by the end of August – won't start as soon as it was supposed to start,” says David Swanson, an author and political activist. “That has been pushed off repeatedly so now we are supposedly going to see 40 or 50,000 troops pulled out in just a couple of months.” And now Iraqis are also concerned about external influences from Iran, Turkey and Syria trying to direct the country's future. “There are many parties who are trying to sabotage the Iraqi political process and they are trying to put enough pressure on the Obama administration to cancel or delay the withdrawal because it is in their interest to continue the US occupation,” says Raed Jarrar, Iraq consultant from American Friends Services Committee. Some Iraqi leaders are calling for continued American support, even after the troops have gone home. “President Obama mentioned the withdrawal of troops does not mean the end of the engagement. We deem it logical that the troops go home from Iraq, but that the relationship with the Americans will continue,” says Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. That means America will always have some political influence long after the military has gone home.

**Withdrawal is the only way to have a strategic alliance with Iraq.**

**Hanna 10** (Michae; fellow and program officer at The Century Foundation , *Foreign Affairs,*April 4, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal>) CH

Policymakers and analysts too often measure U.S. influence in Iraq according to troop levels. In fact, **the United States has become better able to develop a productive relationship with Iraq by abiding by the terms of the security agreement in good faith -- which means reducing troop levels and withdrawing from Iraqi population centers,** as the U.S. military did last June.Because of these actions, the U.S. presence was a relatively minor issue in last month’s elections, whereas in the recent past it was the central issue that drove Iraqi politics and fueled a broad-based insurgency. U.S.-Iraqi cooperation is only sustainable if Iraqis do not fear long-term U.S. plans.**The United States will be able to play a stabilizing diplomatic role in Iraq’s ongoing political transition only if Washington and Baghdad continue along the path of normalizing bilateral relations. In this sense, it is the very act of withdrawal that will allow the United States to become a strategic partner for the emerging Iraqi state.**

A2 Withdrawal Sparks War with Iran

**US troop withdrawal won’t lead to an Iraq-Iran War.**

**Perry 9** (Walter; Senior Information Scientist at RAND, *Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies*; 2009, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG882.pdf>) CH

**The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is unlikely to lead to overt Iranian military intervention. Iran and Iraq** appear to have **settled disputes regarding the Shat al-Arab waterway**, which **historically**has been **a great source of tension between the two nations.** In any case, **the two countries would be loath to repeat a conflict like the disastrous Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, which led to hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides.**

A2: Human Right’s DA

**Non-Unique: Human Rights Pressure Now**

**US is engaging in Human Rights Talks with China**

**VOA News 6/1**(2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-China-Human-Rights-Talks-95317444.html>, )dc

**The U.S. spent 2 days raising human rights concerns with China, including religious freedom, labor rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, racial discrimination, and multilateral cooperation.  This was the first U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue conducted under the Obama administration, and was agreed to during President Obama's meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing in November of 2009**.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Posner led the delegation.   **The dialogue is a mechanism for the two governments to focus on specific human rights-related areas of concern.**  The two delegations spent one day in plenary sessions, each one on a distinct topic, and one day conducting site visits.  **Assistant Secretary Posner characterized the discussions as "candid and constructive," noting that there are areas where the two countries do not agree.  However, Mr. Posner said that "the sign of a mature relationship is that we're able to discuss our differences in an honest and detailed way."    In the press conference following the talks, Assistant Secretary Posner highlighted several key discussion points, including freedom of expression, in particular on the Internet, and the role of public interest lawyers.**He also brought up individual human rights cases of concern, including writer and activist Liu Xiaobo, and human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng.  Assistant Secretary Posner previously stated that it is "important for us to be publicly reiterating our concern" about human rights activists under fire in China.**The United States is committed to global human rights, including in China.  Assistant Secretary Posner stated that he sees the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue as "laying the foundation for me to continue to have conversations, and for these to become a more regular pattern so that we can exchange ideas and concerns, and look for ways to cooperate."**He also noted that**the United States and China will continue to discuss human rights regularly and at high levels through other diplomatic channels.**  

A2: Human Right’s DA

**Human Rights key to security**

**Human rights violations and aggression are related – improving human rights around the world is key to national security**

**Burke-White 4**( William, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Harvard Human Rights Journal, (17), Spring 04)dc

**In the post–Cold War period, every instance of aggression was either initiated by a state that systematically denied the human rights of its own citizens** or was undertaken by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the human rights of citizens in the target state. Taken in conjunction with the numerous statistical studies on the democratic peace phenomenon, these ªndings appear likely to be accurate. Both institutional constraints and social beliefs may offer causal mechanisms for this human rights peace. Additional studies, relying on political science methods of statistical regression analysis, will be necessary to isolate other variables and prove the robustness of this correlation. **The strategic linkage between a state’s domestic human rights record and its propensity for international aggression is sufªciently strong to advance the claim that the international promotion of human rights is integral to U.S. national security. By advancing the promotion of human rights around the globe, the United States can decrease the likelihood of international aggression and thereby enhance national security.** In the post–September 11 world, **it is** all the more **important that the United States reject the traditional view that human rights and national security are in competition** or mutually exclusive **and,** instead, **allow human rights to inform foreign policy. The resulting policy will not only reinvigorate the human rights movement, but will also make the United States more secure.**

A2: Human Right’s DA

**Human Rights Priority**

**Mexico/US Border Violence and Human rights violations should take priority over isolated abuse cases in Iraq**

**Bowman 9**(Tom, Pentagon Reporter for NPR, NPR.org, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101304033>, 2/27)dc.

**Drug-related violence in Mexico is escalating at an alarming rate and threatening the government of President Felipe Calderon.  CIA and U.S. military planners now fear a worst-case scenario — that the country could implode**.  The American military is quietly stepping in with more training.  **It seems that every night in Mexico there are reports of drug-related violence — murders, kidnappings, armed battles with police, narco-traffickers who outgun even the Mexican army with their rocket-propelled grenades.  "Thousands [have been] murdered this year,**" says retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who served as U.S. drug czar under President Clinton. He visited Mexico recently and painted a desperate picture.  "I mean **squad-sized units of police officers and soldiers abducted, tortured to death, decapitated. So the violence is simply shocking** and we've got to help," he says.  **The violence led the CIA to add Mexico to its list of crises to watch over the next year, alongside longstanding problems like al-Qaida**. And U.S. **military planners fear Mexico could become a failed state**.  So, **what would that mean for the United States?**  "**You have maybe unplanned or unanticipated migration of people" into the U.S. to flee the violence**, says Navy Capt. Sean Buck, a strategic planner with the Pentagon's Joint Forces Command. "**You have a humanitarian situation in which we may feel compelled to respond to with other nation states and partners."  The sort of humanitarian situation that the U.S. finds in places like Africa**.  So, the American military, including the National Guard, would find itself providing temporary shelter, and food and water both inside Mexico and for those fleeing into the United States.  Of course, that's the worst-case scenario being played out by military and intelligence officials. Analysts like Peter DeShazo, a former State Department official with extensive experience in Central America, says to prevent that from happening the United States has to do more to help President Calderon's stated campaign to "clean up Mexico."  "It's a matter of the Mexican government strengthening its capabilities to effectively enforce the law against a very well-armed and very well-financed criminal organization," he says.  But how?  McCaffrey and others say the Mexican police just aren't up to the job of fighting the drug cartels.  "Their municipal police, in many cases, are quasi-criminal organizations. Or they're intimidated or they're outgunned," he says.  Calderon has so far mobilized some 25,000 troops to fight the drug cartels.  **U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers recently started to train Mexican army commandoes. And the Marine Corps also is working on an exchange program with the Mexican Marine Corps that will include sharing experiences on urban warfare.  That's all troubling to some, who say Mexico risks more human rights abuses if it uses a powerful force like its military to fight drug gangs. Mexico's Human Rights Commission says soldiers have committed abuses, including rape.  Louise Arbour, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, recently told a Mexican television network, "The Mexican army should not be doing the job of police," calling it "frankly dangerous.**"  DeShazo, the former State Department official, says the Americans should focus more on helping the Mexican police.  "Law and order is the work of police under normal circumstances," he says. "So police reform and strengthening professionalization of the police in Mexico is very important."  But these are not normal circumstances, say Pentagon officials involved in the Mexican military training. Strengthening the police is needed. But in the short term, says McCaffrey, the Mexican government must rely on its military to take on the drug cartels.

At: Syria CP 

**Washington doesn’t trust Syria**

**Landis 7** (Joshua, co-director of the Center of Peace Studies, Samuels Family Research Fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly • 30:1 pp. 45–68, <http://www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_landis.pdf>) CGW

**Accusing Syria of supporting terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere, Washington placed a number of sanctions on Syria**in May 2004. Three months later, Syria pressured the Lebanese parliament into overriding its constitution and reappointing Emile Lahoud, a Syrian ally, to an additional three years as Lebanon’s president. In reaction, **the United States** and France **cosponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, implying Syria; the disarmament of militias, implying Syria’s Lebanese Shi‘ite ally, Hizballah; and a Lebanese presidential election free from external pressure**.4 **Washington was determined to pry Lebanon out of Syria’s sphere of influence as part of its policy to reform the broader Middle East**. Syria was just as determined not to allow Lebanon out of its control.    
 

**Syria aids many terrorist groups in the Middle East**

**Byman 5** (Daniel, assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113) CGW

**U.S. policymakers rightly blast Damascus for backing Palestinian, Lebanese, and other terrorist groups**, but they often fail to grasp the Syrian regime’s ambivalent relationship with several of its clients and the nuanced way it manages them. Over the years, **Syria has aided a daunting array of terrorist groups**, but it seldom has been an ardent supporter**.**Damascushas both bolstered and weakened the Palestinian cause, encouraged and constrained Hizballah in Lebanon, abetted and arrested Iraqi insurgents, and otherwise demonstrated considerable care and variance in how it uses terrorist groups. **Damascus has long staunchly supported various Palestinian movements and, for just as long, sought to control, limit, manipulate, and thwart them when they threatened Syria’s interests.** **This ambivalence has led Damascus to champion the Palestinian cause and provide various violent Palestinian movements with a wide array of support even as it dealt bloody blows against these same elements at other times.  Today, Syria remains an important supporter of several Palestinian terrorist movements but does not control the cause as a whole**.

At: Syria CP

**Syria endorses terrorism- history proves**

**Byman 5** (Daniel, assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113) CGW

**Hafiz al-Assad turned to terrorism in part because Syria’s armies had failed him**. **Israel’s rout of Syria in 1967**and its lesser but still decisive victories in **1973 and 1982 demonstrated that Damascus had no conventional military options against Israel**. **For Hafiz to achieve any of his strategic goals, he needed a means of inflicting pain on Israel.** **Only then, in his eyes, could Damascus force the Jewish state to make concessions on the Golan Heights or otherwise accommodate Syria**. **In addition to using the Palestinians against Israel, Syria also used Palestinian factions in its rivalry with its Arab neighbors.** Syria supported the Palestinians in their struggle against Jordan’s King Hussein in 1970. As the Syrian-Jordanian rivalry continued in the 1980s, Hafiz employed the Abu Nidal Organization, a radical and exceptionally murderous Palestinian splinter group, to intimidate King Hussein by attacking Jordanian officials in Europe. **The Syrian intimidation campaign contributed to Jordan’s decision to back away from initial efforts to work with Israel and the PLO to reach a deal on the West Bank**.3 Despite its utility in the struggle against Israel and for regional leadership, the Palestinian cause was a double-edged sword. Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel could escalate into an all-out war that Syria would **lose. In addition, enthusiasm for the Palestinian struggle could inflame the passions of the Arab world, leading to pressure on Arab regimes to act and even to popular revolts against the existing leaders**. Because these options would be disastrous for Syria, the regime had to control as well as exploit the Palestinian cause. Control was particularly important after Hafiz consolidated power and Syria gave an impressive showing in the 1973 war with Israel, becoming far more of a status quo power.    
 

**Syria backs terrorist to fight the US and Israel**

**Byman 5** (Daniel, assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113) CGW

In addition to its long-standing ties to Palestinian movements, **Syria is also a major backer of Hizballah, a terrorist and guerrilla group active in Lebanon since the early 1980s**. **Syria allows Hizballah to enjoy a sanctuary in Lebanon, where it also allows Iran to arm and train Hizballah’s members**. Using Hizballah as a proxy allows Damascus some degree of deniability, enabling it to strike at Israel or other targets without risking the confrontation that direct military action would entail. Hizballah has proven a remarkably effective force against Israel. Although the United States knows **Hizballah best as the terrorist organization responsible both for the devastating attacks on U.S. diplomats as well as military forces and for taking Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s, Hizballah in the 1990s became one of the world’s most formidable guerrilla forces.** As one Israeli officer noted, “Hizb’Allah are a mini-Israeli army. They can do everything as well as we can.”19 By 2000, **Hizballah had forced Israel out of Lebanese territory, marking the first time that Arab arms ever forced Israel to concede territory**. **Hizballah also helps Palestinian terrorist groups become more lethal**. Since the outbreak of the current Al Aqsa intifada in September 2000, **Hizballah has stepped up its support for Hamas, the PIJ, and other anti-Israeli groups. This support includes guerrilla training, bomb-building expertise, tactical tips such as how to use mines against Israeli armor, and propaganda from Hizballah’s radio and satellite television stations**. **Hizballah operatives have also been caught smuggling weapons to Arabs in Israel, and its experts have helped Palestinian groups build deadly bombs**.

At: Syria CP 

 Syria arms our enemies

**Landis 10**(Joshua Landis , ed at Swarthmore (BA), Harvard (MA), and Princeton (PhD). He has lived over 14 years in the Middle East overview on US-Syrian relationships 6/17/10)<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=6703> JVT

**Relations between the US and Syria became unusually bad during the administration of President George W. Bush. Syria objected America’s the invasion of Iraq,** placing it in Washington’s crosshairs. President Bush moved in 2004 to pull Lebanon out of Syria’s sphere of influence and bring it into that of the US. One of the casualties of this tug of war was Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon’s Prime Minister and leading statesman. The US withdrew it ambassador from Syria in 2005, following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri President for which it blamed Syria. **Obama promised to make an effort at improving relations between the two countries and promised to send back an ambassador, but his confirmation has been blocked by congress**, which **accuses Syria of arming Hizbullah and helping Israel’s enemies.**   
  
 

**Syria is a major cause of terrorism in Iraq**

**Byman 5** (Daniel, assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113) CGW

S**yria has provided a range of support for Iraqi anti-U.S. insurgents of various stripes**but has done so in a way that ensures a degree of deniability. In essence, **Damascus has acted as a passive supporter, helping former regime elements and even jihadists by not aggressively policing its borders or controlling its territory. Damascus walks the line between undermining the U.S. position in Iraq and incurring the full brunt of Washington’s wrath**. Although details are scarce, **Iraqi insurgents appear to exploit Syrian territory in several ways. Senior members of the former Iraqi regime organized and controlled parts of the insurgency from Syrian territory, with little interference from Damascus**. Although Damascus has turned over some leading insurgent leaders (Saddam Hussein’s half-brother and 29 other former regime officials, for example, in 2005) as a concession to U.S. pressure and to gain U.S. goodwill on issues such as the Syrian position in Lebanon, U.S. military leaders responsible for Iraq still characterize Syrian cooperation as “very unhelpful.” **In addition, Syria is a transit point for money and fighters, most of whom were raised outside Syria, traveling to Iraq**.22 In October 2003, **the Defense Intelligence Agency described Syria as a “major point of access” for jihadists and noted that Syrian border police gladly look the other way if they receive a bribe**.23 Although some of this access may relate to a regional tradition of smuggling, made worse by the networks developed to elude sanctions in the 1990s, **Syria has in the past demonstrated that it can exert considerable control over its territory when it chooses, something it has done at best intermittently so far. To be clear, the activities Syria tolerates are not essential to the insurgency’s survival, but they do make the anti-U.S. opposition stronger and more difficult to counter.**   
 

At: Syria CP 

**Syria is against Iraq withdrawal**

**Byman 5** (Daniel, assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113) CGW

As with the Palestinians and Hizballah, Damascus is playing a careful game. On one hand, **Syria wants the United States to get bogged down in Iraq and, more generally, to abandon regime change as a policy. Damascus also seeks to have its proxies become stronger in Iraq, fearing that rival countries, particularly those with ties to Turkey, Israel, or other Syrian enemies, might dominate the opposition**. **Finally, the Syrian leadership wants to placate domestic sentiment, which is strongly against the U.S. intervention, and even allowed demonstrations in support of the insurgents, an unusual move for a regime fearful of any popular agitation**.25 On the other hand, Syria does not want unrest, particularly Islamist unrest, to spill over into its territory. Damascus also remains fearful of a U.S. military response and recognizes that too much or too blatant support for the insurgency would be a dangerous course.

**Syria will move away from Iran if America withdraws from Iraq.**

**Wehrey et. Al 10** (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) CH

Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. For example, an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq. Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial.75 Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria. For example, some Israeli **officials believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave.**76

US-Syria Relations Good

**The US is working on creating better relations with Syria.**

**Fisher 10** (Max; associate editor and writer about foreign affairs, *The Atlantic Wire,*March 16, 2010, <http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Big-Challenges-Facing-New-Syria-Engagement-2858>) CH

**President Obama is appointing Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to Syria, a post that has been vacant for five years due to diplomatic tension.** **Ford travels to Congress**today for his confirmation hearing, **where he will be pressed on Obama's hopes for engagement with Syria and on the stakes of reopening ties to one of the most hostile nations in the region**. If the tough questions posed by pundits are any indication, Ford could have a difficult day ahead of him.      \* Rocky U.S.-Syria Relations  The Associated Press' Barry Schweid gives the history. "Bush withdrew a full-time ambassador from Syria in 2005 following terrorism accusations and to protest the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, killed in a Beirut truck bombing that his supporters blamed on Syria. Syria denied involvement," he writes. **Ford "said Syria has been a steadfast supporter of terror groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah for more than 20 years." He promised "straight talk" to Syria on these issues.** 

**US-Syrian relations are fragile, but improving.**

**Sharp 10** (Jeremy; specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, *Congressional Research Service,*April 26, 2010, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf>) CH

**Since taking office, President Obama has attempted to normalize U.S.-Syrian relations and distance U.S. policy from the harsh, anti-Syrian rhetoric expressed during the Bush Administration.** Although some critics of this approach have compared U.S. engagement with Syria to appeasement of the Asad regime, **the Administration has insisted that its more diplomatic tone does not mask U.S. firmness and insistence in seeking serious and verifiable changes in Syrian behavior in order to advance bilateral relations.** In addition, as part of its overall attempt to jumpstart the Middle East peace process, the Obama Administration has sought to enlist Syrian support for its efforts through a series of high level meetings and private, behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy between Syrian, Israeli, and other regional governments. **Nevertheless, despite the nomination of a U.S. ambassador and the dispatching of a number of diplomatic missions to Syria, there appear to have been few substantive changes in Syrian government policy over the last year. Therefore, many observers argue that the United States should await positive steps from Damascus that would warrant further improvement in bilateral relations.** Syria continues to support Hamas and Hezbollah, maintain its diplomatic alliance with Iran, harbor Iraqi Baathists (and possibly Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives as well), and obstruct the investigations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the alleged nuclear site that Israel bombed in Syria in 2007. **From Syria’s standpoint, while it has applauded the Obama Administration’s more robust diplomatic approach, the government asserts that its fundamental grievances with U.S. policy, i.e., the maintaining of U.S. sanctions, have not been addressed**. According to President Bashar al Asad, “**What has happened so far is a new approach. Dialogue has replaced commands, which is good**. But things stopped there.”1 More importantly, Israeli-Syrian peace talks remain stalled. **Although the Obama Administration would like to see the Israeli-Syrian peace track revived, both parties continue to differ over the framework for a resumption in either direct or indirect negotiations.**Israel insists that any new negotiations with Syria should be conducted without preconditions (such as an Israeli pledge to withdraw fully from the Golan Heights) and has ruled out a return to Turkish-mediated talks, several rounds of which were conducted in 2007. Syria would like Turkey to mediate indirect talks with Israel before moving on to direct talks. In the fall of 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy separately hosted the leaders of Israel and Syria in the hopes of reviving talks, but no positive results were apparent. Syria has blamed Israel for the lack of traction on the peace process. Overall, though Syria has made amends with Saudi Arabia, drawn closer to Turkey, intervened less forcefully in Lebanon, and improved relations with France, ultimately, further improvement in **U.S.-Syrian relations depends in part on positive movement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, a prospect that seems far off at the moment. Now, with new allegations surfacing that Syria may have either transferred its own modified Scud missiles or facilitated the transfer of these missiles from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Obama Administration may face increased pressure to take a more hard-line stance toward Syria and temper the frequency or tone of U.S. diplomatic engagement**. Some lawmakers may object to sending Ambassador-designate Robert S. Ford to Syria in the current climate, perceiving it as an ill-timed good-will gesture toward a rogue regime. **The Administration has argued that having an ambassador in Damascus boosts U.S. leverage with the Syrian government and provides the U.S. government access to high level Syrian officials to address sensitive issues, such as new allegations of missile transfers.**   
 

US-Syria Relations Good

**The United States is taking steps to improve the relationship with Syria.**

**Ngare 10** (Victoria; world staff writer, *The Cowl,*February 24, 2010,<http://www.thecowl.com/world/u-s-looks-to-syria-to-better-relations-with-iran-in-middle-east-1.1174088_>) CH

Over the past year, Iran has  ignored three U.N. Security Council resolutions requesting that it stop enriching Uranium. Therefore, the U.S. has taken a new route in terms of its relations with Iran. **The United States plans to improve its relations with Syria and in turn weaken the Syria Iranian relationship.  The Obama administration took steps within the past two weeks to ease tensions between the U.S. and Syria**. Last Wednesday, Feb. 17, **U.S.** **envoy** William **Burns** **met with Syrian President** Bashar **Assad**.  **According to The Wall Street Journal, the discussion centered on steps to be taken to improve U.S.-Syrian relations**. A few days before, President Obama announced his plan to nominate Robert Ford as the first U.S. ambassador to Syria since 2005**.  The Wall Street Journal reported that Syrian officials acknowledged that the visit of the U.S. envoy was a sign that Washington was ready to improve relations with Syria. Normalizing diplomatic relations with Syria is only the first step to bringing Syria into the U.S.’s corner.** Many more complicated issues, specifically that of Golan Heights, will have to be worked out in order to gain Syria’s full support of the U.S.’s attempt to bring peace to the Middle East, according to the BBC.  

**Obama is making many efforts to improve relations with Syria.**

**Richter 10** (Paul; Washington Bureau of Tribune, *The News Record,*April 18, 2010,<http://www.newsrecord.org/nation-world/obama-administration-moving-ahead-to-expand-u-s-syria-relations-1.2228084>) CH

**The Obama administration is pressing forward with a plan to expand U.S. relations with Syria and enlist Damascus in the Middle East peace effort, despite alarm in Washington and abroad over charges that Syria is providing potent new weapons to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon. Obama last year outlined plans to elevate ties to Syria** as part of an effort to improve U.S. standing in the Arab world and advance Israeli-Palestinian talks. High-level contacts were severed in 2005, when the Bush administration recalled its ambassador amid charges that Syria was involved in the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister. **Trying to rebuild U.S.-Syrian contacts, a series of Obama administration officials have traveled to Damascus over the past year. Officials also have taken other steps toward closer engagement this year, including canceling a warning to Americans about traveling to Syria**. In February, **the administration nominated career diplomat Robert** **Ford as the new U.S. ambassador.**Ford's nomination was approved by a Senate committee last week, but Republicans have raised questions about Syria's actions as the nomination reaches the full Senate. The White House is hoping that Ford will win Senate approval within days, and Senate Democratic leaders said Friday they are working with Republicans on an agreement that would let senators vote on the nomination.

US-Syria Relations Bad

**US-Syria relations are bad.**

**Antelava 9** (Natalia; staff writer, *BBC News,*March 18, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7949480.stm>) CH

**Under the Bush administration the relationship between the US and Syria was dire. Washington described Damascus as a pariah, imposed economic sanctions on the country and recalled its ambassador. Now President Barack Obama wants to change this.**But in his spacious Beirut office decorated by the portraits of the Syrian president, the **pro-Syrian politician Lebanese Weam Wahab told me why it would be so hard for the United States and Syria to find a common language.  The main problem, he said, is that Damascus is never in a hurry, while Washington always is.**  "The Iranians could take 20 years to weave a carpet," he told me.  "And the Syrians would say to them: Don't rush, we have plenty of time. But the Americans want to eat their hamburger in three minutes and move on."  **This fundamental difference to the approach in the process of policy making is the reason why Mr Wahab is sceptical about President Obama's new attempt to engage with the Middle East.**  But he does admit that to him and his allies in Damascus, Mr Obama's new efforts bring a certain sense of vindication.  "George **Bush's plan failed, Syria won and Syrians now feel that their policies were correct all along,"**he says.   

US-Syria relations are strained.

**Baghdadi 10** (George; staff writer, *CNN,*May 24, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20005716-503543.html>) CH

**Washington's ties with Damascus have been strained by Syria's three-decade alliance with Iran and U.S. allegations of meddling in the affairs of Iraq**, Syria's neighbor to the east.  Syrian support for the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, which rules Gaza, have also proved a stumbling block. **Both factions, considered terrorist organizations by the U.S. government, are seen in Syria - and the wider Arab world -- as legitimate resistance movements and political parties.**  Former President George W. Bush imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria in May 2004.  **The U.S. Embassy in Damascus has been without an ambassador since February 2005, when the Bush administration recalled** **Margaret Scobey in response to the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Syria's foes in Lebanon accused Damascus of being behind the bombing, allegations Syria has repeatedly denied.**

**US-Syria relations have been strained due to economic sanctions.**

**Black 10** (Ian; Middle East editor, *Guardian,*May 4, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/04/syria-us-barack-obama-sanctions>) CH

**Hopes of a rapprochement between the US and**[**Syria**](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/syria)**have again been dashed by Washington's decision to**[**renew, for another year, the economic sanctions**](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/04/barack-obama-extends-sanctions-syria)**Bashar al-Assad had hoped would end. The Syrian president can hardly have been surprised. In recent weeks there has been little evidence of the "outstretched hand"**[**Barack Obama**](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/barack-obama)**proffered when he came to office**. Nor has Damascus ticked the main boxes on Washington's wishlist. Not only has Assad failed to distance himself from [Iran](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iran) or loosen ties with Hamas and Hezbollah, he has also flaunted these alliances, hosting a summit with [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/mahmoud-ahmadinejad) and Hassan Nasrallah. **Divergent views on these issues go to the heart of the Middle East's great divide – Syria, supported by Iran, sees the Palestinian and Lebanese Islamist groups as being engaged in legitimate "resistance" to Israel. To the US – and, of course, to Israel – both groups are terrorist organisations.**Thus the significance of the recent public spat over [Israeli allegations that Syria has supplied advanced Scud missiles to Hezbollah](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/20/lebanon-israel-syria-hezbollah-scud). Damascus and Beirut have both denied the charge and accused Israel of warmongering. Arabs will see the missile episode as a prelude to Obama's sanctions decision, and blame Israel. But the US president did note progress in one key area: a decrease in Syrian support for foreign fighters crossing into [Iraq](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq) – traffic that, at its height, helped maintain al-Qaida suicide bombings on Shia targets.

At: Turkey CP

**Turkey is no longer an ally with US- Turkey is a Hostile Islamic Power**

**Trifkovic 10** (Srdja, Staff Writer @ The Lord Byron foundation for Balkan studies, A new "Turkish" policy is long overdue in Washington, <http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/neo-ottoman-turkey-hostile-islamic-power>,

13 March, 2010) CGW

**Turkey is not an "indispensable ally**," as Paul **Wolfowitz called her shortly before the war in Iraq, and as Obama repeated last April. It is no longer an ally at all.** It may have been an ally in the darkest Cold War days, when it accommodated U.S. missiles aimed at Russia's heartland. **Today it is just another Islamic country, a regional power of considerable importance to be sure, with interests and aspirations that no longer coincide with those of the United States**. **Both Turkey and the rest of the Middle East matter far less to American interests than we are led to believe, and it is high time to demythologize America's special relationships throughout the region**. Accepting that Mustafa Kemal's legacy is undone is the long-overdue first step.  

**Turkey isn’t key to Middle East Stability**

**Lewis 6** (Jonathan Eric, Staff Writer @ Middle East Quarterly, <http://www.meforum.org/928/replace-turkey-as-a-strategic-partner>,  Spring 2006, pp. 45-52) CGW

**The U.S.-Turkish partnership remained strong throughout the Cold War. Turkey was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member and a frontline state against the Soviet Union. Washington valued Ankara as a strategic partner. But, with the end of the Cold War, the pivotal status of Turkey receded**. Successive U.S. presidents paid heed to the importance of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, but few cultivated it. Until **the Turkish parliament shocked Washington by failing to authorize the use of Turkish facilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 1, 2003, many in Washington took the Turkish partnership for granted. The loss of Ankara as a reliable ally has forced U.S. policymakers to readjust their regional strategy**. **Turkey may no longer be a pivotal state, but the Black Sea and Caspian littoral remains a pivotal region as a bulwark against radical Islam and for energy security**. While Washington seeks to repair its once strong partnership with Ankara, increasingly, **the security and stability of the region requires a more active and engaged U.S. approach not only to Turkey, but also to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Romania**.

**Turkey doesn’t want to get involved in the Middles East**

**Lewis 6** (Jonathan Eric, Staff Writer @ Middle East Quarterly, <http://www.meforum.org/928/replace-turkey-as-a-strategic-partner>,  Spring 2006, pp. 45-52) CGW

**The Turkish National Assembly stunned U.S. policymakers by voting against participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The no vote exposed severe fault lines in the U.S.-Turkish relationship**, **exacerbated by** **the subsequent outreach of Prime Minister** **Recep** Tayyip Erdoğan **to Iran and Syria and the tendency of members of his Justice and Development Party** (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) **to engage in anti-American rhetoric.[1] Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has indicated a desire to develop further ties with Turkey. Washington's ambiguous attitude toward the Kurdistan Workers Party** (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, PKK) and Erdoğan's autocratic **tendencies further eroded bilateral confidence.[3] A July 2005 Turkish poll underlined the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. Some 50 percent of respondents held an "absolute negative view" of the United States.[4] Among U.S. policymakers—at least those outside the diplomatic service—the view toward the Turkish government was mutual.** **Turkey's growing flirtation with Islamism has also undercut U.S. confidence in its long-time ally.** Prior to becoming prime minister, Erdoğan was arrested for reciting an Islamist poem that challenged the Kemalist basis of the state.[5] **The AKP has worked to promote an Islamist agenda, seeking to empower graduates of religious schools, and facilitating the influx outside of regulatory oversight of billions of dollars from Persian Gulf and other Islamist sources**.[6] More recently, the imprisonment without charges of a Van University professor—who later committed suicide—and the unprecedented arrest of the university's secularist rector has caused mainstream Turkish society to question Erdoğan's intentions.[7]  Erdoğan's government has also undercut the West's war on terrorism. By criticizing Israel's counterterrorism operations as "state terror," Erdoğan enabled Turkey's European critics to characterize the Turkish military's operations against the PKK in the same way**. The sympathy of AKP deputies toward Iraqi insurgents also implied some forms of terrorism to be more legitimate than others, a logic which can be turned against Turkey by its longtime Islamist opponents**

At: Turkey CP

**Turkey wants to stabilize Iraq – will help the United States.**

**Wehrey et. Al 10** (Frederic, senior policy analysts at RAND, *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After The Iraq War,* June 14, 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf>) CH

Strengthen U.S. relations with Turkey, leveraging its unique role as a geopolitical bridge to mediate between Syria, Iran, and the Arab world. **Another policy focus at the regional level that flows from our analysis is the need to strengthen U.S. relations with Turkey. Turkey can serve as a bridge for improving relations and modifying the behavior of current adversaries, such as Iran and Syria** (as mentioned earlier, Turkey’s relationship with both countries has strengthened because of common concerns over Kurdish separatism and terrorist acts within their nations in the aftermath of the Iraq War). **Turkey has already demonstrated an interest in regional mediation by facilitating indirect dialogue between Israel and Syria, and the United States should encourage such efforts**. Rather than force our allies into a bloclike containment approach, we should view regional allies’**relationships with such countries as Iran and Syria as an opportunity and leverage their roles to the extent possible. Turkey’s interests in and extensive economic ties with northern Iraq also present an opportunity for assisting in U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq**. Indeed, unlike Iraq’s Arab neighbors, **Turkey has proven far more forthcoming in contributing to Iraqi stability and reconstruction, even though, like Iraq’s other neighbors, it opposed the war**. As a consequence, The U.S. Air Force should continue assisting the Turkish military with counterterrorism operations in Northern Iraq and increase security cooperation activities and training with the Turkish air force.**In the current threat environment, U.S. security cooperation with Turkey may be as or more critical than security cooperation with America’s Arab allies.**

A2: Consult Turkey CP

**Turkey will say no – They fear Kurd rebellion.**

**Bardis 9** (Georgios, Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, Journal of Global Change and Governance, 2(1), Spring 2009, <http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~gdga/JGCG/archive/Winter-Spring2009/Bardis.pdf>) EH

**The success of Iraq as a state**, whether as a single-state or three, **will greatly depend on its neighbors as well as major powers in the international community.** Iraq borders six countries, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. Each of these countries has their own interests in Iraq and particular views of what Iraq should become. In addition to Iraq’s neighbors, the United States also has a substantial interest in Iraq’s future. **Out of Iraq’s neighbours, the three biggest players in its future are Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.**So far Turkey has had the most overt role of them all. Unlike during Gulf War I and the containment campaign of the nineties, Turkey did not allow the U.S. military to use any Turkish territory for the 2003 invasion thereby facilitating the escape of Baathists into Northern Iraq and prolonging the occupation. Once the invasion began, Turkey had amassed a large military presence on its border with Iraq, ostensibly to secure its border from refugees but also to signal to the Kurdish population that Turkey will not tolerate any attacks or destabilizing tactics. Again in July 2007, Turkey began another military build-up on the Iraq border. While many Turks hoped this was election year posturing and not the beginning of a full scale invasion, the build up did lead to several cross-border strikes within Iraq, destroying supposed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) enclaves. Turkey has an obvious objective to suppress any Kurdish separatist ideas. Its main target in Iraq has been the PKK, an organization whose started goal is to create an independent Kurdistan from parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Therefore, it is Turkey’s interest in maintaining a united Iraq. Although Turkey did everything in its power to prevent the invasion in the first place, it has increasingly played a more cooperative role with the U.S. military, a sign that it wishes the United States to succeed in Iraq as soon as possible. An example of this is in 2004 when Turkey allowed the United States to use an airbase in its south in order to facilitate the military’s massive troop rotation. Like Turkey, **the question of Kurdish independence is also an important factor for Iran. Iran has a large Kurdish population which it brutally suppresses** (in addition to its Sunni population). **The idea of an independent Kurdish state is unsavoury for Iran, and would certainly lead to the fear of its eastern frontier being annexed by such a state.** At a minimum, **it would embolden the Kurdish population who live in Iran and which receive little equality with Iranian Shiites. It may be theorized that a mass exodus of Kurds would leave Iran for Kurdistan, but this may not be the case.** It would be in Kurdistan’s interest to maintain large diasporas in various countries in order to gain political clout  Robertson, 2007 from its neighbours. A consolidated Kurdistan, with no populations in other countries, could be effectively ignored or embargoed against. Whether this occurs or not is somewhat irrelevant.

A2: Consult Turkey CP

**Without U.S. presence in Turkey, Kurds will revolt.**

**Barkey 10** (Henri, served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff working on issues related to the ME, Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq, May 2010,<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR237_Turkey%27s%20New%20Engagement%20in%20Iraq.pdf>) EH

The advent of the Obama administration confirmed and accelerated the Bush Administration‘ s decision to withdraw from Iraq. This decision, taken without any assurance that the new regime in Baghdad will survive and not perish under the weight of sectarian, ethnic, and regional rivalries, is as transformative as the initial decision to invade. The regional powers, which had to anticipate the effects of an Iraq that conformed to the American imagination, now have to contend with an uncertain future in Iraq. This uncertainty is even greater because the United States may decide to pull out sooner than expected or be asked to leave earlier by the Iraqis themselves. An unstable Iraq is likely to export its instability to the region. Whether such exports take the form of fundamentalist or jihadist organization and violence or nationalist stirrings, the repercussions will create opportunities for both regional cooperation and rivalries that may exacerbate conditions on the ground. Even if Iraq managed to emerge as a stable state—albeit one with limited influence in the medium term as it rebuilds from years of war and ravage—**the fact of the matter is that the U**nited**S**tates and the countries of the region **would continue to pursue policies predicated on warding off the worst. For Turkey,** which has been consistent and insistent in defending the territorial integrity of Iraq, **the prospect of an Iraq that becomes unglued would set in motion a series of intolerable repercussions.** **First, the probability of Kurdish independence and of the expansion of the Kurdish region to encompass Kirkuk**, both the governorate and the city, **would greatly increase. Turkey has long objected to Kirkuk’s incorporation into the KRG. With Kirkuk’s oil resources, its inclusion could embolden Iraqi Kurds to declare independence and set into motion irredentist claims throughout the region.** Despite improvements in Ankara-Erbil relations, **such developments would be seen as destabilizing to Turkey and would trigger violence between Kurds and other ethnic groups**, primarily Arabs and Turkmen, **that could spill over into Turkey. Second, an unglued Iraq could allow the heavily armed groups experienced at fighting a conventional army to export many of their fighters to neighboring countries**, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and even Turkey. **The export of fighters would create further unrest that would undermine Turkish economic and diplomatic interests in the region. Third, greater unrest and instability on Turkey’s borders would serve as a disincentive for EU members to accept Turkey as a full member of that organization.** Such dire prospects have helped shift Turkey’s approach to Iraq. Ankara’s ability to influence events on the ground is greatest in northern Iraq. In Baghdad, Turkey faces fierce competition from Iran which has long-lasting and well-established networks of influence as well as**an American presence** that **will** in the medium term **continue to exercise a great deal of authority over decision making.** Ironically, any increase in Turkish influence in the KRG translates into more, say, in Baghdad, because of the Kurds’ critical role in Iraq’s capital. In short, by helping shape events in northern Iraq, **Ankara plays a role in determining the political contours of a future Iraq.**The realization that the KRG, irrespective of the disputes that continue to swirl around the Iraqi Constitution and its federalism provisions, is here to stay has also affected Turkey’s calculus. The KRG has succeeded in institutionalizing itself, not just by its very existence but also through the leadership of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani. Through his international contacts and personality, Talabani has simultaneously defended the interests of Iraq and the KRG, even when these interests have not always been in sync with each other. The KRG, as the region’s only autonomous Kurdish entity, has garnered support among Turkish Kurds. There is a new dynamic between Kurds on both sides of the border, where they each assume a protective stance vis-à-vis the other. Hence, Turkish Kurds do not take kindly to the AKP government when it engages in active hostility toward Erbil. Cooperation with the KRG has also achieved some of the Turkish goals that had been unattainable earlier, mainly the realization of Iraqi Kurdish pressure on the PKK. Finally, Turks are also beginning to appreciate that northern Iraq, which has been dominated by two large parties and ruled without much room for dissent against the Barzanis and Talabanis, has become a more differentiated society. The most recent provincial election in 2009 in the three KRG-controlled provinces witnessed an opposition party (Gorran) create a stir by riding an anticorruption wave and by making serious inroads into the dominance of these two families. Despite the conservative character of Kurdish society, especially in the Kirmanji-speaking areas of northern Iraq and Turkey, Iraqi Kurds resisted attempts, especially by Shia groups, to infuse the Iraqi constitution with religious influences. Kurds have also taken care to adopt a more secular approach with their regional institutions, potentially transforming the KRG into a buffer zone for Turkey against a potentially fundamentalist Iraq.**American acquiescence and help on air strikes went a long way in reassuring the Turkish government and military that the United States was unwilling to forsake its relations with Ankara.**It erased some of the hard feelings that had developed within the Turkish military since the events of July 4, 2003. Ironically, it may have also helped the Turks engage the Iraqi Kurds. **Without the political cover that the American help provided, the government would have faced even fiercer domestic opposition to extending any olive branch to Iraqi Kurds.**

A2: Consult Turkey CP

**Turkey would say no to the plan – they want American aid in fighting the PKK**

Seyhmus **Cakan 2010** [DIYARBAKIR, 7-6, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6653EE20100706>]

Turkey (Reuters) - Turkey's military and civilian leaders signaled growing frustration with the United States and Iraq Tuesday over their role in the fight against Kurdish rebels after a new attack on a Turkish base killed 15.  More than 80 Turkish soldiers have been killed in fighting so far this year, exceeding the death toll in 2009, most of them after Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) separatist guerrillas ended a 14-month ceasefire at the start of June.  Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's government, under pressure to contain escalating violencethat threatens to hurt its popularity in a general vote set by July 2011, has repeatedly called for greater support from Iraq and the U.S. to combat the PKK, which has bases in northern Iraq.  In the latest fighting, PKK rebels attacked an army outpost in southeast Turkey overnight, triggering a clash in which 12 rebels and three soldiers were killed, security sources said.  "These terror camps within the borders of Iraq, in northern Iraq, are unacceptable. We have demanded this from Iraq and the United States. The time for words is over. It is time for action now," Interior Minister Besir Atalay told a news conference. 

**Turkey is already cooperating on Iraqi stabilization now**

Henri J. **Barkey 2010** [Cohen Professor of international relations at Lehigh University United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, May, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan”]

By mid-2009, the Turkish government had signed agreements with the Iraqi Kurds on the importation of oil, begun an official dialogue with the KRG, and reduced its cooperation with the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC). Turkey had deemphasized its support for the Turkmen and begun to approach Iraq comprehensively, often in collaboration with the United States for purposes of influencing Iraq’s transition. Whereas Ankara had been an irritant in Wash- ington’s conduct of Iraq policy, there is much greater harmony and cooperation between the two.

No single reason explains Turkey’s policy change. It is a combination of developments within Turkey—some completely unrelated to Iraq and Iraqi Kurds—and the region at large. They include the new geopolitics of the region, such as the U.S. decision to withdraw from Iraq, the AKP’s new foreign policy conception that at its core aims to make Turkey a global power of some prominence, the evolving civil-military relationship in Turkey, efforts by key individual actors within Turkey, and the changing perceptions within Turkey of the domestic Kurdish question, such as the Turkish military’s reluctant conclusion that the insurrection will continue no matter what efforts it invests.

AT: China CP

**China doesn't trust America**

**Pomfret 10**(John Pomfret, BA and MA at Stanford in East Asian Studies, The Washington Post, 6/8/10) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704762.html>JVT

**Known among U.S. officials as a senior "barbarian handler**," which means that his job is to deal with foreigners**,** not lead troops, Guan faced about 65 American officials, part of the biggest delegation the U.S. government has ever sent to China.   **Everything,** **Guan said, that is going right in U.S. relations with China is because of China. Everything, he continued, that is going wrong is the fault of the United States**. **Guan accused the United States of being a "hegemon" and of plotting to encircle China with strategic alliances. The official saved the bulk of his bile for U.S. arms sales to China's nemesis, Taiwan -- Guan said these prove that the United States views China as an enemy.**U.S. officials have since depicted Guan's three-minute jeremiad as an anomaly. A senior U.S. official traveling on Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's plane back to the United States dismissed it, saying it was "out of step" with the rest of the two-day Strategic and Economic Dialogue. And last week in Singapore, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates sought to portray not just Guan, but the whole of the People's Liberation Army, as an outlier intent on blocking better ties with Washington while the rest of China's government moves ahead.   But interviews **in China with a wide range of experts, Chinese officials and military officers indicate that Guan's rant** -- for all its discomfiting bluster -- actually **represents the mainstream views of the Chinese Communist Party, and that perhaps the real outliers might be those in China's government who want to side with the United States.**Guan's speech underscored that 31 years after the United States and China normalized relations, there remains a deep distrust in Beijing. That the United States is trying to keep China down is a central part of the party's catechism and a foundation of its claims to legitimacy.   More broadly, **many Chinese security experts and officials view the Obama administration's policy**of encouraging Chinese participation in solving the world's problems -- including climate change, the global financial crisis and the security challenges in Iran and North Korea -- not as attempts to elevate China into the ranks of global leadership but rather **as a scheme to enmesh it in a paralyzing web of commitments.**"**Admiral Guan was representing what all of us think about the United States in our hearts," a senior Chinese official,** who deals with the United States regularly, said on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak with a reporter. "It may not have been politically correct, but it wasn't an accident."   "**It's silly to talk about factions when it comes to relations with the United States," said a general in the PLA** who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. "The army follows the party. **Do you really think that Guan did this unilaterally?"China's fear of the United States was very much on display this past weekend during the Shangri-La Dialogue, where Gates and his Chinese counterparts clashed repeatedly throughout the program.**

A2: China DA

**US Pressuring China Right now**

**Klug 10**(Foster, Staff Writer for Associated Press, Huffington Post,<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/us-china-resume-humanrigh_n_575179.html>, 5/13)dc

**The Obama administration faces a delicate balancing act in human rights talks with China that began Thursday: It looks to pressure China to improve its treatment of its citizens** while not angering a country that is crucial to U.S. international interests.  **The two-day meeting in Washington also gives the U.S. administration a chance to answer criticism that it ignores rights abuses** while pushing for Chinese support on Iranian and North Korean nuclear standoffs, climate change and other difficult issues.  This may be a difficult time, however, for the United States to take a tough position in the private meeting. The talks, which have resumed after two years, come ahead of a major gathering of top-level U.S. and Chinese officials this month in Beijing that will focus on the countries' intertwined economic and security interests.  "We hope they do more than talk," Sharon Hom, executive director of the advocacy group Human Rights in China, said about this week's meeting. "**The U.S. side must send a credible, serious human rights message**."

**China is abusing human rights – pressuring them would be good.**

**Amnesty International 8**(Nobel Prize winning Peace research Organization, Amnestyusa.org,<http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2008&c=CHN>,)dc

**Growing numbers of human rights activists were imprisoned, put under house arrest or surveillance, or harassed. Repression of minority groups, including Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongolians, continued. Falun Gong practitioners were at particularly high risk of torture and other ill-treatment in detention. Christians were persecuted for practising their religion outside state-sanctioned channels. Despite the reinstatement of Supreme People's Court review of death penalty cases, the death penalty remained shrouded in secrecy and continued to be used extensively. Torture of detainees and prisoners remained prevalent. Millions of people had no access to justice and were forced to seek redress through an ineffective extra-legal petition system. Women and girls continued to suffer violence and discrimination. Preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing were marked by repression of human rights activists. Censorship of the internet and other media intensified**.

A2: China DA

**Pressure Pointless**

**US Pressure does nothing to China – US backs down because they need Chinese support.**

**Klug 10**(Foster, Staff Writer Associated Press, Boston.com, <http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/05/14/no_breakthroughs_in_us_china_human_rights_talks/>, 5/14)dc.

WASHINGTON—**The United States and China reported no major breakthroughs Friday after only their second round of talks about human rights since 2002**. **The Obama administration wants to push Beijing to treat its citizens better, but it also needs Chinese support on Iranian and North Korean nuclear standoffs, climate change and other difficult issues.**  A senior U.S. official said that the two-day meeting lays groundwork for more regular talks to soothe an irritant in relations between the two world powers.  Michael Posner, the assistant secretary of state, told reporters that another round will happen some time next year in Beijing. The countries also plan to hold talks on legal matters soon and he said he will participate in a high-profile economic and security summit in Beijing this month.  "In two days, we're not going to change major policies or major points of view, but we laid a foundation to continue," Posner said. "The tone of the discussions was very much, `We're two powerful, great countries. We have a range of issues that we are engaged on. Human rights is part of that discussion, and it will remain so.'"  This week's talks came as the countries try to repair ties after a rough period. President Barack Obama infuriated China by recently announcing a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan, the self-ruled island claimed by Beijing as its own, and by meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan Buddhist leader China calls a separatist.  Posner said in addition to talks on freedom of religion and expression, labor rights and rule of law, officials also discussed Chinese complaints about problems with U.S. human rights, which have included crime, poverty, homelessness and racial discrimination**.**  He said U.S. officials did not whitewash the American record and in fact raised on its own a new immigration law in Arizona that requires police to ask about a person's immigration status if there is suspicion the person is in the country illegally.  The United States was represented by officials from the State Department, White House, the departments of Commerce, Justice, Homeland Security, Labor, the trade representative's office and the Internal Revenue Service. The Chinese side was led by Director General for International Organizations Chen Xu and included officials from nine agencies.  The officials discussed Tibet, the Uighur (pronounced WEE'-gur) ethnic group in the Chinese province of Xinjiang and specific dissidents the United States has worries about. Posner would not provide details, except to say the United States raised the cases of Liu Xiaobo, an author-dissident serving an 11-year prison sentence on subversion charges, and Gao Zhisheng, a crusading Chinese rights lawyer.  Todd Stein, with the International Campaign for Tibet, said political repression in China is growing. **If officials want improvement in China's human rights record**, he said**, the issue should be a focus of this month's high-profile Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing**.  "It would be a mistake if this dialogue resulted in a `check the box' exercise that sidelined substantive engagement on human rights in any other arena," Stein said in a statement.  The officials spent part of Friday traveling around Washington for meetings, including, Posner said, a visit to the U.S. Supreme Court, where they were briefed by retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on rule of law.  Jon Huntsman, U.S. ambassador to China who was in Washington, told reporters earlier Friday that the rights talks are a useful way to get results on tough issues.  "We're talking about issues that are uncomfortable, quite frankly, but it is a sign of maturity that we can talk about specific cases," Huntsman said.

A2: China DA

**China does not change under US pressure – Chinese exploit influence to continue abuses**

**Asia News 10**(5/17, <http://www.speroforum.com/a/33013/China---China-and-US-to-discuss-human-rights-as-Beijing-cracks-down-on-jailed-dissidents>,) dc.

Beijing – Sino-**US human rights talks resumed last week in Washington after a two-year hiatus following US criticism over China’s crackdown in Tibet in March 2008 and the deterioration of Beijing's record on legal protection, free speech and civil society.** The worsening human rights situation is best illustrated by the authorities’ decision to deny dissidents’ families the right to visit them. For instance, the wife of dissident writer Liu Xiaobo has been unable to see him since he lost his appeal three months ago.  The situation of activist Hu Jia, sentenced to three and half years “for inciting subversion” in 2008, is even worse. His wife Zeng Jinyan (pictured) has been unable to see him despite the fact that he might be suffering from lives cancer. She is afraid that he might not be getting proper care.  Former university professor Guo Quan, who was jailed for 10 years for setting up an online pro-democracy group, has also been deprived of visits.  Anti-abortion activist Mao Hengfeng was sentenced to 18 months of "re-education-through-labour" in March, and her husband Wu Xuewei does not even know her whereabouts**.  In the past, Beijing tended to be more respectful of human rights when it held human rights talks with other countries. It was not the case this time. Chinese authorities are well aware that the United States wants their cooperation on the nuclear issue in Iran and North Korea as well as on climate change and other delicate issues.  Some experts suggest that in exchange for support on such issues, Beijing might get the Washington to tone down its criticism of China’s treatment of human rights activists, pro-democracy dissidents and religious groups as well as its censorship of the Internet.**  Still, China slammed US President Barack Obama for a US$ 6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan and his meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan Buddhist leader.  This may explain why both sides are interested in avoiding failure this time.  On 9 May, a US State Department spokesperson said this week's talks were a chance for a conversation "about what the rule of law means in the 21st century".  Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu said in Beijing on Thursday, "dialogue is better than confrontation". However, an English-language, state-run newspaper, the Global Times, told the US not to lecture Beijing like a "schoolchild".  "China and the US should learn from each other as equals, instead of giving each other lectures, or criticising one another," its editorial said.  By contrast, **activists have said that human rights abuses have become worse in China following arrests and heavy sentences imposed on known dissidents** (like Charter 08 author Liu Xiaobo, and advocates for Sichuan quake victims Hunag Qi and Tan Zuoren). **They accuse the Obama administration of playing down human rights issues whilst seeking Beijing's co-operation on economic matters amid one of America's worst economic crises.**  However, the picture is more complex. Shiyu Zhou, of the Global Internet Freedom Consortium (GIFC), said that US State Department offered his group US$ 1.5 million last week to buy equipment and material to bypass Chinese Internet censorship.  The GIFC is run by Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that is banned in China.  Chinese Internet censorship is one of the most egregious examples of China’s human rights violations.

A2: Human Rights DA

**Human Rights improvements are key to preventing aggression.**

**Burke-White 4**( William, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Harvard Human Rights Journal, (17), Spring 04)dc

In dealing with states of concern, improving a given state’s human rights policy is almost never a primary goal of U.S. policy. **A human rights informed foreign policy would include far more active advocacy for improvement in some states’ human rights records. Such policies should be advocated not just for the traditional human rights reasons of life and human dignity,115 but also because improved human rights records may enhance national and global security by preventing states from engaging in international aggression in the future**. Even for skeptics of the universal duty to promote human rights on grounds of individual dignity, this second argument should have persuasive weight in asserting the strategic importance of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. **This**argument **would push the United States toward a far more active advocacy of human rights improvement in its bilateral relations with numerous countries. Rather than merely paying rhetorical dues to human rights, such a foreign policy would make clear to abusing states that human rights are a strategic priority of the U.S. government.** It might involve linking foreign aid, trade ties, and other beneªts to improvements in human rights records.116 In extreme cases such a policy might even suggest military intervention through U.N. mechanisms. Two brief examples—China and North Korea—are illustrative. The U.S. dialogue with China has long included human rights issues, but also made clear that human rights would not stand in the way of a mutually beneªcial economic relationship.117 Though other factors such as economics should still be considered, human rights should be higher on the bilateral agenda, and the United States might be well served to use trade and other leverage points more vigorously in pursuing that goal.

**US is engaging in Human Rights Talks with China**

**VOA News 6/1**(2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-China-Human-Rights-Talks-95317444.html>, )dc

**The U.S. spent 2 days raising human rights concerns with China, including religious freedom, labor rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, racial discrimination, and multilateral cooperation.  This was the first U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue conducted under the Obama administration, and was agreed to during President Obama's meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing in November of 2009**.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Posner led the delegation.   **The dialogue is a mechanism for the two governments to focus on specific human rights-related areas of concern.**  The two delegations spent one day in plenary sessions, each one on a distinct topic, and one day conducting site visits. **Assistant Secretary Posner characterized the discussions as "candid and constructive," noting that there are areas where the two countries do not agree.  However, Mr. Posner said that "the sign of a mature relationship is that we're able to discuss our differences in an honest and detailed way."    In the press conference following the talks, Assistant Secretary Posner highlighted several key discussion points, including freedom of expression, in particular on the Internet, and the role of public interest lawyers.**He also brought up individual human rights cases of concern, including writer and activist Liu Xiaobo, and human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng.  Assistant Secretary Posner previously stated that it is "important for us to be publicly reiterating our concern" about human rights activists under fire in China.**The United States is committed to global human rights, including in China.  Assistant Secretary Posner stated that he sees the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue as "laying the foundation for me to continue to have conversations, and for these to become a more regular pattern so that we can exchange ideas and concerns, and look for ways to cooperate."**He also noted that**the United States and China will continue to discuss human rights regularly and at high levels through other diplomatic channels.** 

A2: Human Rights DA

**Human rights violations and aggression are related – improving human rights around the world is key to national security**

**Burke-White 4**( William, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Harvard Human Rights Journal, (17), Spring 04)dc

**In the post–Cold War period, every instance of aggression was either initiated by a state that systematically denied the human rights of its own citizens** or was undertaken by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the human rights of citizens in the target state. Taken in conjunction with the numerous statistical studies on the democratic peace phenomenon, these ªndings appear likely to be accurate. Both institutional constraints and social beliefs may offer causal mechanisms for this human rights peace. Additional studies, relying on political science methods of statistical regression analysis, will be necessary to isolate other variables and prove the robustness of this correlation. **The strategic linkage between a state’s domestic human rights record and its propensity for international aggression is sufªciently strong to advance the claim that the international promotion of human rights is integral to U.S. national security. By advancing the promotion of human rights around the globe, the United States can decrease the likelihood of international aggression and thereby enhance national security.** In the post–September 11 world, **it is** all the more **important that the United States reject the traditional view that human rights and national security are in competition** or mutually exclusive **and,** instead, **allow human rights to inform foreign policy. The resulting policy will not only reinvigorate the human rights movement, but will also make the United States more secure.**

AT: Anti-Corruption Conditions CP

**Anti-corruption efforts fail**

Franklin **Steves and** Alan **Rousso 2003**[European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003, "Anti-Corruption Programmes in Post-Communist Transition Countries and Changes in the Business Environment, 1999-2002" EBRD Working Paper No. 85, December, SSRN, p. 4]

In fact, previous studies have suggested that anti-corruption agencies, ombudsman offices and similar institutions work best where they are needed least – that is, in countries where initial levels of corruption are less severe. In countries where corruption is endemic, the effect of these sameinstitutions has generally been either neutral or, in some cases, counterproductive when the agency itself becomes discredited, further deepening public scepticism about the government’s anti-corruption efforts. It has proven difficult to build anti-corruption institutions which operate independently from the weak governance structures that characterise countries with systemic corruption, including the legal system, mechanisms of political accountability and financial and regulatory institutions. Anti-corruption commissions, ombudsman offices and ethics codes have rarely functioned effectively in these environments without substantial government actions to make corresponding changes in the broader institutional context. Whether the development of a national anti-corruption programme with a comprehensive strategy, action plan and independent commission is more likely to enhance the government’s commitment to a multi-pronged reform agenda has not been studied systematically with evidence from existing anti-corruption programmes.

**Corruption is key to political stability**

**Billion 3**(Philippe Le Billon MBA Paris, PhD Oxford is Associate Professor at the University of BritishColumbia, Journal of international development, 2003) <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&hid=7&sid=08bb1062-eb6a-406b-b701-8143192870fe%40sessionmgr11> JVT

 Although illegal by international standards of good governance, **corruption is often an integral part of the political order and may even be seen as legitimate by a significant proportion of the population**. As **noted in the case of market corruption, the pervasiveness of corruption in most aspects of daily life**and its rewarding of individuals according to a condoned social order positively relate to its legitimacy. For example**, petty corruption ensures the survival of low ranking civil servants,** even if some of their bureaucratic activities are in themselves questionable. Similarly, **the corruption of politics through a system of patron–client relationships guided by private interests can ensure some degree of political stability due to the prevalence of reciprocity among political actors**. In large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, suchlegitimacy is bounded by ties of kinship and community within which redistribution isgoverned by a logic of patronage. **Corrupt behaviour is therefore not only driven by greed and structural forces, but also by informal codes of conduct associated with reciprocity ties within particularist and communitarian social networks** (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Thelegitimacy of corruption is thus bounded by the legitimacy of control over resources; withconflicts arising when this control extends beyond the mutually recognized resourceboundaries of social networks or fails rules of reciprocity.

AT: Anti-Corruption Conditions CP

**Corruption is key to prevent large scale violence**

**Billion 3**(Philippe Le Billon MBA Paris, PhD Oxford is Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia, Journal of international development, 2003) <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&hid=7&sid=08bb1062-eb6a-406b-b701-8143192870fe%40sessionmgr11> JVT

Although corruption has in itself a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, **corruption is part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflicts may arise more from changes in the pattern of corruption**, than from corruption itself. Domestic or external shocks affecting the pattern of corruption may therefore contribute to conflict, particularly when corruption is pervasive. Such **external shocks include the international delegitimization of authoritarian rule** motivated in large part by the end of the cold war together with the **enforcement of new international standards** in public finance, democracy and ‘good governance’ which have, over the last decade, resulted in a decline in public rents and a readjustment towards the private sector. While some of the resulting **conflicts**have opened dialogue and promoted positive reforms in societies, others have**degenerated into large-scale violence and even further illegitimate and predatory rule characterized by a shift from monopolistic forms of corruption to criminal and competitive ones.** In turn, **corruption played a role in the**prolongation and termination of **these conflicts**. 

A2: Iraqi Econ DA

US contracts have undermined Iraqi economy.

**Leaver 4** (Eric; policy director for the Institute for Policy Studies' Foreign Policy In Focus project, *The Nation,*September 24, 2004, <http://www.thenation.com/article/top-10-reasons-us-get-out-iraq>) CH

**The US government's Iraq reconstruction process has cost both Iraqis and Americans. Instead of boosting Iraqi self-determination by granting contracts to experienced Iraqi businesses and working to lower the huge unemployment problem inside Iraq, the US government has favored US firms with strong political ties. Major contracts worth billions of dollars have been awarded with limited or no competition.** **American auditors and the media have documented numerous cases of fraud, waste and incompetence.** The most egregious problems are attributed to Halliburton, Vice President Dick Cheney's former firm and the largest recipient of Iraq-related contracts. 

AT – ISF CP

The CP can’t solve ISF readiness – Can’t fix banking system

Bruno 8 (Greg , Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations March 27, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14112/preparedness_of_iraqi_security_forces.html>) ELJ

While some U.S. defense officials give the ISF credit for toughness and growing counterinsurgency skills, many analysts have serious doubts about the forces’ effectiveness. By the Pentagon’s own estimates, only 65 percent (PDF) of trained forces are available at any given time; others say the ratio is closer to 50 percent. The reason in part lies with Iraq’s primitive banking system, which is based solely on cash transactions. At any given time, half the country’s trained soldiers are traveling home to hand deliver paychecks to their families, a problem the U.S. Defense Department recognizes as the “greatest contributor” to undermanned units. But experts note other hurdles slowing security force development. Anthony H. Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., writes in an August 2007 report that despite some progress, Iraqi units have significant performance problems; lack resources; and suffer from sectarian divisions. Ridding the police of corruption and sectarian loyalties is considered a must (PDF).

Trained security forces will become militias, causing sectarian violence

Bruno 8 (Greg , Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations March 27, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14112/preparedness_of_iraqi_security_forces.html>) ELJ

Militias continue to pose a major threat to Iraqi security and there are persistent reports of security bodies being infiltrated by them. For example, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), originally a four-thousand member force tasked with protecting Iraqi property and the country’s ministries, has reportedly (WashPost) become a band of over one-hundred thousand armed militiamen, with no central command or oversight. U.S. officials have described FPS members as militants paying allegiance to the ministries they protect, largely run by Shiites. Authors of the Iraqi Study Group Report concluded the FPS has become complicit in sectarian violence, and is a source of “funding and jobs” for radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

**ISP is working in the status quo**

**Garamone 10** (Jim, American Forces Press Service, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/04/20/37639-iraqi-security-forces-keep-us-drawdown-on-track/Apr> 20, 2010) CGW

**Iraqi forces are doing a good job in maintaining security in the country, and the American withdrawal can proceed** as planned, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq said yesterday.  **Gen.**Raymond T. **Odierno said** on "Fox News Sunday" **that he expects it will take a couple of months for the Iraqis to form a government**based on the results of the March 7 election. In that election, the bloc headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi earned two more parliament seats than the bloc led by current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.  Odierno said he does not expect a return to sectarian violence in the country, and that all leaders understand that any new government "must include all major blocs in the government."  "And we think that's very important as we move forward, ... that they don't alienate any of the blocs, be it Sunni or Shiia or Kurd," he said.  Meanwhile, Odierno said,**American forces are assisting and advising Iraqi security forces and will continue to do so. American forces are transitioning to stability operations, and the last U.S. combat outfit will leave the country by the end of August.  This means U.S. servicemembers will continue to assist and advise Iraqi security forces and will continue to provide support to provincial reconstruction teams, United Nations organizations and "will still conduct partnered counterterrorism operations with the Iraqis**," the general said.  **Al-Qaida in Iraq continues to be degraded. In the first three months of fiscal 2010, Iraq experienced the lowest number of attacks since U.S. forces moved into the country, Odierno noted. "[Al-Qaida] is still capable of launching attacks on innocent civilians, but Iraqis have rejected the ideology of al-Qaida**," he said. "**They have rejected al-Qaida as a whole**." **The Iraqi government has developed its own capabilities to go after the terror group**. After Odierno appeared on the program, **Iraqi leaders announced that security forces had killed al-Qaida's leader in Iraq**, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, earlier in the day. Maliki also said the Iraqi team had also killed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the purported leader of al-Qaida's local affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq. U.S. officials today confirmed the deaths of the terrorist leaders.

A2: ISF DA

American withdrawal is necessary to improve the ISF.

**Hanna 10** (Michae; fellow and program officer at The Century Foundation , *Foreign Affairs,*April 4, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal>) CH

**Having held parliamentary elections on March 7 and endured a protracted period of vote counting, Iraqis are now focused on the arduous process of government formation.**As this Iraqi drama unfolds, U.S. military forces are preparing to redeploy according to the U.S.-Iraq security agreement of November 2008 and President Barack Obama’s announced timetable for withdrawal.**The**impending **drawdown**-- from 96,000 troops today to about 50,000 on September 1, 2010, and zero on January 1, 2012 -- **will require the United States to defer increasingly to Iraqis as they dictate their own future.  This**, in turn**, requires that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue their development. The increased proficiency of the ISF is a main reason why, though Iraqis will continue to endure grievous violence in coming years, there is no longer a broad-based insurgency that poses a strategic threat to the political process or the government**. But the ISF’s progress is relatively new: although President George W. Bush said in 2005 that “as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down,” the ISF has only recently achieved a substantial level of operational independence.  Over the past year, the United States has drawn down more than 40,000 troops while turning over control of Iraqi population centers to the ISF. In September 2009, the Department of Defense reported that the Iraqi army had 189 combat battalions, most of which qualified as being “in the lead” for the purposes of conducting operations. Relatively few of those battalions have achieved Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1, meaning that they are logistics-capable units with the ability to function wholly independently. The vast majority of “in the lead” battalions have achieved ORA Level 2; they can plan, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency operations -- but only with U.S. assistance.  Taking an overly pessimistic view of the current political environment and appraising the ISF’s progress stringently, some U.S. commentators have recently been urging the Obama administration to reconsider its timeline, suggesting that its implementation would destabilize Iraq at its moment of greatest vulnerability. **But this allegedly realist view of Iraq’s current predicament is decidedly unrealistic about the country it purports to describe. Indeed, for Washington to seek to abrogate its withdrawal commitments -- and thereby suggest that an extended occupation is back on the agenda -- would not enhance security but would undercut the Iraqi government and risk spurring renewed violence**. There is simply no political space for such an eventuality. Moreover, these **commentators misunderstand the role of U.S. troops in Iraq, which focuses on training, advising, and assisting the ISF -- tasks that, given the ISF’s increasing independence, can be carried out by the residual U.S. troops envisioned.**

U.S. troops are not needed in Iraq anymore.

**Cole 10** (Juan, Prof. of Modern Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University of Michigan, History News Network, July 4, <http://hnn.us/roundup/comments/128802.html>) eh

The Fourth of July celebrates the Declaration of Independence of the American colonies of Great Britain, on the grounds that they deserved representative government and popular sovereignty– something denied to them by the British crown.  Iraq was occupied by American troops in 2003 after an illegal invasion, and it is still so occupied. The viceroy appointed by George W. Bush, Paul Bremer, had no legal charter from the US Congress and represented no one, having never been elected to anything. He wrote dozens of laws for the Iraqis by fiat. They are still technically the law of the land in Iraq. He used Iraq’s oil revenue, billions of dollars worth, to run his interim government, even though no Iraqi voted to give it to him for that purpose. In subsequent years the US intervened heavy-handedly in Iraqi political affairs and still does so today. Few complaints of the Founding Fathers against Britain could not be lodged against the United States by Iraq....  The US commanders were expecting to be asked by the Iraqi officers to go on joint patrols in the major cities. They got few invitations, even though they had trained many of the Iraqi officers who now gave them the cold shoulder. **The new Iraqi military is perfectly capable of patrolling on its own now in cities such as Baghdad, and of facing down any ordinary threat from militias. The US is not needed for routine security patrols. While the Iraqi troops have not been able to establish order in Mosul or in Diyala Province, the prospect of the dwindling number of US troops doing so is slim to none.**Iraq is just going to be a little unstable for a few years, and **even if US troops stayed in numbers past the deadlines, it is highly unlikely that they could miraculously lend the place stability.**Bush knocked Iraq off balance, and it will likely remain off balance for a good long time. Bush was not authorized by the Iraqi people to destroy the country. He was acting more like his namesake, King George III, than like a president who won an election....  **For the pragmatic reason that the US cannot afford Iraq, and because it is the right thing to do, the Obama administration should withdraw in a systematic and deliberate manner from Iraq.**We owe its people their independence. It is what we used, at least, to stand for.

A2: ISF DA

The end is near for U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

**Kravetz 10** (Andy, Journal Star writer, July 5, <http://www.pjstar.com/news/x104353808/724th-near-end-of-mission-in-Iraq>) eh

BARTONVILLE —  **The end is in sight for the friends and family of the U.S. Army Reserve's 724th Transportation Company**, which, if all goes according to plan, should return home from a yearlong deployment in Iraq in early August.  **Maj. Sean Counihan, commander of the Bartonville-based unit, said the company is in the process of handing over its mission to a reserve unit from New Hampshire.  "The**724th **soldiers will be responsible to bring the new unit up to speed on the most current tactics and procedures** by conducting Relief in Place (RIP) training and missions," Counihan said by e-mail. "During these missions the soldiers from the replacement unit will be riding in the passenger seat, familiarizing themselves with (procedures) and observing the operational environment."  Halfway through the month, the seat positions will switch and the 724th will observe the new soldiers to make sure they are operating properly before departing in mid to late July.  The 160 or so reservists in the 724th will head to Kuwait, then to Camp Atterbury, Ind., for about a week while they are demobilized, or converted from full-time soldiers back to reservists.  Then it's a simple bus ride back to the Joint Reserve Training Facility in Bartonville, Counihan said. The actual arrival date depends on conditions in Iraq and the Army's ability to move the unit halfway around the world. However, their return is slated for about the first week in August, almost a year since the company of truck drivers and mechanics left.  Counihan said the 724th has done a tremendous job while in Iraq, driving more than a half million miles in the past four months and moving about 27,000 tons of cargo and equipment. **"(The) soldiers have done an incredible job and made a substantial impact on the largest withdrawal of forces in the last 40 years**," he said of the 724th. "I am very proud of their accomplishments. We have had trucks on the road every day and all missions have been accomplished safely and successfully.  **"We are all excited to be coming home soon, but we know that there are still a few missions left and we are determined to finish strong,"** he said.

**No internal link – ISF is already solving violence.**

**Nagl 9** (John, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Striking the Balance,<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2009.25.4.15>) eh

**The Iraqi military and police have demonstrated increasing competence and decreasing sectarian tendencies. Violence**, although still significant, **has dropped to its lowest levels in years**; there were days during an August 2008 visit when there were no reportable security incidents in all of Baghdad. **Two years ago, people were fleeing the city in droves. Today, they are lining up to return home.**However, this is no time for triumphal declarations of victory or rapid pullouts. Iraq will continue to be a foreign policy challenge of the first order for the next administration. **Though security gains appear increasingly durable, they must not be taken for granted.**The emerging order in Iraq remains fragile, and crucial questions about Iraq’s internal security, political system, and relationship with the United States remain unanswered. America has only begun to extricate itself from the Iraq war and “must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in,” in the words of President Obama. **The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan over the past few years was abetted by the Bush administration’s decision to focus on Iraq.**That mistake might be repeated in reverse if the next administration fails to implement a coherent and cautious strategy to help maintain Iraq’s stability while freeing up the resources desperately needed to succeed in rebuilding Afghanistan.

AT: Condition/Consult Iran/Syria

**Iran and Syria don’t want to cooperate on Iraq – they only have an incentive to bog down the US**

James **Phillips 2007**[Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage, “The Iraq Conference: Iran and Syria's Engagement Brings Unrealistic Hopes and Diplomatic Risks,” 3/2/2007,<http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/Iraq/wm1380.cfm>]

The upcoming international conference on Iraq has raised **unrealistic expectations** about the prospects of gaining the cooperation of Iran and Syria, the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism, in stabilizing Iraq. Both countries have strong reasons to continue their efforts to undermine the peace and security of their beleaguered neighbor. Both want to inflict a stinging defeat on the United States and drive Western forces out of Iraq, as they did in Lebanon in the 1980s. Little is likely to be gained by including them in the multilateral negotiations, and much could be lost. Tehran and Damascus will seek to use the Iraq talks to deflect international pressure to curb their support for terrorism and subversion of Lebanon and to rein in Iran's nuclear program. The United States must not trade concessions to Iran and Syria in exchange for promises that those counties are unlikely to keep.

AT: Condition/Consult Iran

**Iran would say no to the CP – they see Iraq as a way to challenge and contain the US**

Vali **Nasr 2006** [Professor @ Naval Postgraduate School, Adjunct Senior Fellow @ CFR, Jul/Aug

’06, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85405/vali-nasr/when-the-Shi'ites-rise.html>]

So far, Tehran has favored a policy of controlled chaos in Iraq, as a way to keep the U.S. government bogged down and so dampen its enthusiasm for seeking regime change in Iran. This strategy makes the current situation in Iraq very different from that in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, when Iran worked with the United States to cobble together the government of Hamid Karzai. Tehran cooperated with Washington at the time largely because it needed to: its Persian-speaking and Shiite clients in Afghanistan made up only a minority of the population and were in no position to protect Iran's interests. Tehran's calculus in the aftermath of the Iraq war has been different. Not only do Iran's immediate interests not align with those of the United States, but Tehran's position in Iraq is stronger than it was in Afghanistan thanks to the majority status of Shiites in Iraq. Seeing the Bush doctrine proved wrong in Iraq would be an indirect way for Iran's leaders to discredit Washington's calls for regime change in Tehran. Their recent willingness to escalate tensions with Washington over Iran's nuclear activities suggests that they believe they have largely succeeded in this goal; Iran is now stronger relative to the United States than it was on the eve of the Iraq war. And yet, in the longer term, U.S. and Iranian interests in Iraq may well converge. Both Washington and Tehran want lasting stability there: Washington, because it wants a reason to bail out; Tehran, because stability in its backyard would secure its position at home and its influence throughout the region. Iran has much to fear from a civil war in Iraq. The fighting could polarize the region and suck in Tehran, as well as spill over into the Arab, Baluchi, and Kurdish regions of Iran, where ethnic tensions have been rising. As former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki has put it, chaos in Iraq "does not help Iranian national interest. If your neighbor's house is on fire, it means your home is also in danger." Clearly wary, Tehran has braced itself for greater troubles by appointing a majority of its provincial governors from the ranks of its security officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders.

AT: Condition/Consult Iran

The CP only guarantees Iranian domination of Iraqi politics – prevents long term stability

Reidar **Visser 2009** [research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, The Century Foundation, Report, “Iran’s role In Post-occupation Iraq: enemy, Good neighbor, or overlord?”]

Secondly, any “regional conference” to deal with Iran in Iraq or acknowl- edging a “legitimate regional role” for Iran in Iraq would consolidate Iranian domination over Iraq on false premises;54 that is, unless Iraqi internal issues were dealt with separately beforehand, by a more representative conference of Iraqis than the current constitutional revision committee. But if Iran is allowed a say in internal Iraqi issues at a “regional conference,” the result will be a system of government just as artificial as the 2005 constitution, and long-term regional stability will fail to take root. The United States needs to realize that the majority of Iraqi Shiites simply will not accept Iran as a “regional” negotiator on their behalf in the same way as Serbian leaders could negotiate for Bosnian Serbs leading up to the Dayton peace accords in 1995. Similarly, when it comes to the domestic Iranian situation, the policies of regionalization (and recognition of Iranian spheres of influence) are bound to backfire. The reformist movement in Iran is specifically hostile to scenarios in which hardliners can resort to expansionist regional adventures at the expense of much-needed reforms at home, and within Shiism more generally, impor- tant currents that remain critical of Khomeinism and wilayat al-faqih would suffer setbacks.

A2: Consult Iran Counterplan

**Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Precedes De-nuclearization**  
**Duss 09** (Matthew, National Security Researcher, *The American Prospect*, 11-20-2009,<http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=irans_crisis_of_resistance>) CM  
What does this mean for U.S. policy? The Obama administration has shown in no uncertain terms that it considers the Israel-Palestine conflict as foremost among those regional realities that need to be "shaped" in order to blunt Iran's appeal. As Obama noted during the campaign -- in one interview he referred to the conflict as a "constant sore" that "infect[s] all of our foreign policy" -- he considers a peace agreement imperative to U.S. national security. In addition to ending the occupation of Palestine and securing Israel, it would deny Iran (as well as other extremist actors, including al-Qaeda) a treasured propaganda tool. On the other hand, Iran clearly recognizes that preventing that outcome is essential to preserving that propaganda tool, which has facilitated Iran's appeal to Arab publics throughout the Middle East. Peace could have some very negative consequences for Iranian hawks, and they should be expected to play spoiler. Further, with Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps now "essentially running Iranian foreign policy in the region," according to Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment, Iran could possibly seek to externalize its domestic difficulties and deflect attention from its recalcitrance on the nuclear issue, by provoking another regional crisis that again results in U.S.-made Israeli bombs falling on Muslim civilians.  
  
**Iran will not negotiate its Nuclear program**  
**AP 9** (Associated Press, 9-7-2009, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009/09/07/ahmadinejad-iran-negotiate-nuclear-rights/) CM  
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Monday Iran will neither halt uranium enrichment nor negotiate over its nuclear rights but is ready to sit and talk with world powers over "global challenges." His statements came as the international nuclear watchdog warned of a "stalemate" over Iran's nuclear program. Members of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency began meetings in Vienna that could set the stage for a toughening of sanctions against Iran. Ahmadinejad also said Iran will [present](http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009/09/07/ahmadinejad-iran-negotiate-nuclear-rights/) a package of proposals for talks to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany but rejected any deadline for such talks. He said the package would "identify challenges facing humanity ... and resolve global concerns." But he said that "from our point of view, Iran's nuclear issue is over. We continue our work within the framework of global regulations and in close interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency." But "we will never negotiate over obvious rights of the Iranian nation," he said. He said the only two aspects of the nuclear file he was willing to discuss were "creating peaceful nuclear energy for all countries" and a mechanism to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and encourage global nuclear disarmament. President Barack Obama and European allies have given Iran until the end of September to take up an offer of nuclear talks with six world powers and trade incentives should it suspend uranium enrichment activities. If not, Iran could face harsher punitive sanctions. The U.S. and some of its allies accuse Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a cover to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has denied the charges, saying its nuclear program is aimed at generating electricity, not a bomb. Iran has repeatedly vowed it will never suspend enrichment work, saying it has every right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to enrich uranium and produce nuclear fuel. The enrichment process can produce either fuel for a reactor or the material for a warhead.  
  
Iran will say no, and CP will only worsen US-Iran relations  
Walt 10 (Stephen M., [prof](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor) of [international affairs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations) at [Harvard U](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University)'s [JFK School of G](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Kennedy_School_of_Government)ov, *Foreign Policy,* 5-26-2010, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/26/sleepwalking\_with\_iran) CM  
To succeed, a foreign-policy initiative needs to have a clear and achievable objective. The strategy also needs to be internally consistent, so that certain policy steps don't undermine others. The latter requirement is especially important when you are trying to unwind a ["spiral" of exaggerated hostility](http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Political-Science/17-42Spring-2005/B50F24A5-61EB-4585-853D-A8CA9A6F6BB5/0/spiral_deter_mod.pdf), which is the problem we face with Iran. Given the deep-seated animosity on both sides, any sign of inconsistency on our part will be viewed in the worst possible light by Iran. Indeed, a combination of friendly and threatening gestures may be worse than the latter alone because tentative acts of accommodation will be seen as a trick and will reinforce the idea that the other side is irredeemably deceitful and can never be trusted. Unfortunately, the Obama administration's approach to Iran is neither feasible nor consistent. To begin with, our objective -- to persuade Iran to end all nuclear enrichment -- simply isn't achievable. Both the current government *and* the leaders of the opposition Green Movement are strongly committed to controlling the full nuclear fuel cycle, and the United States will never get the other major powers to impose the sort of "crippling sanctions" it has been seeking for years now.It's not gonna happen folks, or at least not anytime soon*.*  
 

AT: Militarism K

Turn – Withdrawal stops American militarism by stopping dehumanization of the enemy

Kirstein 5 (Peter, professor of history at St. Xavier University, May 7, http://hnn.us/articles/10422.html)ELJ

Ending the war might diminish American militarism as well. At Abu Ghraib a thousand photographs served as trophies of achievement. Photos of Iraqi prisoners hooded and slung over prison railings, tethered to leashes as animals and piled naked in human-trash heaps were digitalized and emailed to friends and family back home. The late Susan Sontag compared them to lynchings of African-Americans when pictures of corpses adorned postcards and souvenir photos. Bob Dylan begins “Desolation Row” with: “They're selling postcards of the hanging.” Soldiers were immune from compassion as defenseless, non-resistant prisoners were mercilessly tortured and killed. This is war—the dehumanization of the enemy. In Vietnam insurgents were called “gooks” and “slants.” In Iraq they are dismissively called “terrorists” and by Professor Gaddis as “gangs” without considering their grievances or vital interests.

**Plan Popular**

Public doesn’t like extra military spending

Preble 6 (Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato Institute, CATO DAILY

DISPATCH, January 17, 2005, p. http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=3526

accessed 5/18/2006.) CGW

But the question ultimately comes down to costs and benefits: Can an alternative course of action, especially a continuation of the occupation, be crafted in such a way that it has some reasonable chance of permanently pacifying Iraq? Can the U.S. nation-building project in Iraq achieve its goals at a cost that will be acceptable to the American people? Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski declared last week that the United States could never achieve its goals of a democratic, stable and peaceful Iraq unless the American people were prepared to "commit 500,000 troops, spend [US]$200 billion a year, probably have a draft," and have some form of wartime taxation. Brzezinski conceded that Americans "are not prepared to do that." I agree. Given that a continuation of the current course of action cannot achieve success, and given that the American people are unwilling to pay the costs necessary to do so, there is only one rational option: a prompt milita

**The American people believe that US presence in Iraq have been pointless.**

**Arnove 6**(Anthony; author of Iraq: The Logic Of Withdrawal, *AlterNet,*March 28, 2006,<http://www.alternet.org/world/34122/>) CH

We find ourselves in a remarkable situation today. Despite a massive propaganda campaign in support of the occupation of Iraq, **a clear majority of people in the United States now believes the invasion was not worth the consequences and should never have been undertaken.  Likewise, people strongly disapprove of the foreign policy of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, particularly their position on the war in Iraq**. In a September 2005 New York Times-CBS News poll, **support for immediate withdrawal stood at 52 percent**, a remarkable figure when one considers that very few political organizations have articulated an "Out Now" position.  **The official justifications for the war have been exposed as complete fallacies. Even conservative defenders of U.S. empire now complain that the situation in Iraq is a disaster.**

**McCain supports troop withdrawal from Iraq.**

**Baker 9** (Peter; former White House correspondent for the Washington Post, *New York Times,*February 26, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/27troops.html>) CH

But **Republicans emerged from a meeting**Thursday evening **more supportive than several leading Democrats**, who complained earlier in the day that the president was still leaving behind too many American forces.  **Mr. McCain said during the private White House meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared**, according to several people who were in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail on Thursday night that Mr. **McCain is “supportive of the plan**.” **The convergence of Mr. Obama and Mr. McCain on Iraq would have seemed highly improbable just a few months ago, when they clashed harshly on the future of the American mission there. Mr. McCain accused Mr. Obama of being naïve and opposed his withdrawal plans.**At one point, Mr. McCain said Mr. Obama “would rather lose a war than lose a campaign.” Even since the inauguration, Mr. McCain, who represents Arizona, has remained a tough opponent of Mr. Obama, at least on economic matters. But the two have come to a common ground of sorts on Iraq, the issue that once defined their rivalry.  **Mr. McCain’s views were echoed by other Republicans briefed in the State Dining Room by Mr. Obama, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**The Obama team told two dozen lawmakers from both parties that at least 90,000 of the 142,000 troops in Iraq would be withdrawn by August 2010 — 19 months after the president’s inauguration, or three months longer than the time frame he had outlined as a candidate.