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\*\*\*Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Terrorism Module

US presence key to limit Iraqi terrorism; withdrawal leads to chaos

Byman and Pollack 8 (Daniel and Kenneth, American Academy of Political and Social Science, <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/618/1/55.pdf>) LL

From a counterterrorism perspective, two things make America’s policy predicament in Iraq difficult. First, the United States and its Iraqi allies have achieved impressive successes against al Qaeda in Iraq in the past year (Ricks and DeYoung 2007). Second, the problem of terrorism emanating from Iraq will not go away if the United States abandons the country to strife. By early 2007, the conflict had already generated more than 2 million refugees who could spread instability and terrorism to neighboring states. In Iraq, Salafi extremists from around the world, who wish to unite Muslims under religious rule, are learning new skills, forging new networks, and otherwise training to fight the next war as well as to defeat the United States and its Iraqi allies. There are no easy policy answers for Iraq, even from the narrow perspective of counterterrorism. How then should the United States solve this conundrum? Of course, victory in Iraq cannot be judged entirely or even primarily in light of U.S. efforts against al Qaeda. Added to the mix are the importance of a stable oil-rich region, the human costs of a massive civil war, and the moral burden that the United States must bear in the eyes of the world for the carnage it unleashed. But just as counterterrorism was an important justification for the war, so too is it an important criterion for judging the next steps in this bloody challenge. Iraq, as President George W. Bush has declared, has indeed become a “central front” in the war on terrorism (White House 2003)—largely because of the administration’s policies, which have created a Salafi terrorist problem in Iraq where none existed. But criticism of the war does not solve the problem of what to do now in Iraq. This article looks at Iraq from a counterterrorism perspective, with a particular emphasis on the implications of a return to the chaos of 2006 (or worse), as would likely be the case if the United States were to precipitously withdraw from Iraq without leaving behind a stable security and political situation.

**Contemporary terrorism leads to extinction**

Alexander 3 (Yonah professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States, The Washington Times, Aug 25,  <http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm>) LL

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Terrorism Ext—Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Iraq pullout causes terrorism

Carafano and Phillips 6(James, Ph. D and Senior Research Fellow@The Heritage Foundation, and James, Research fellow in Middle East studies@The Heritage Foundation, “The Dangerous Consequences of Cutting and Running in Iraq”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/10/The-Dangerous-Consequences-of-Cutting-and-Running-in-Iraq, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Consequence #4: Al-Qaeda Triumphant. Osama bin Laden would trumpet an abrupt U.S. withdrawal as a victory for al-Qaeda and proof that America is a "paper tiger," just as he claimed after the U.S. with­drawal from Somalia in 1994. An unstable, failed state in Iraq would also provide al-Qaeda and other radical groups with a sanctuary for recruiting a new generation of suicide bombers and a strategically located staging area for deploying terrorists for attacks on Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere around the world. The recently declassi­fied "key judgments" of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," pointed out that a perceived victory for jihadists in Iraq would boost their strength and ability to threaten Americans.

Iraq war will deter future terrorist attack

Brookes and Phillips 6 (Peter and James, Senior Fellow National Security @ The Heritage Foundation and Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies @ The Heritage Foundation, Sept 27, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/09/NIE-Confirms-that-the-Outcome-of-the-Iraq-War-is-Critical-to-the-War-on-Terrorism>) LL

After critics of the Bush Administration's Iraq policy seized upon selective leaks from an April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," President Bush ordered the declassification of key judgments from that report to refute the misleading portrayal of it. The excerpts[1] released by Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte make clear that, while the war in Iraq is one of many sources of inspiration for terrorists seeking to kill Americans, the outcome of that war is critical to the struggle against terrorism. The Administration's critics focused on one sentence in the report, which was leaked conveniently in the run-up to the fall elections, six months after the report's release: "The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement." This conclusion should not surprise anyone. Of course, the jihadists are going to use any excuse to promote their evil agenda. They also have invoked the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the deployment of U.S. troops to protect Saudi Arabia, the Crusades, Islam's eviction from southern Spain in the Middle Ages, Danish cartoons, and the Pope's recent comments to advance their deadly cause. But even more striking were the sentences that preceded and followed the now celebrated "cause celebre" sentence: We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere. The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight. In other words, the NIE concludes that a victory against jihadists in Iraq would reduce the number of future terrorists while a defeat in Iraq would inspire more terrorists to take action. This is a very important judgment that has crucial implications for U.S. policy in Iraq. No one leaked this key judgment to the mainstream media. The leaker, of course, didn't reveal that conclusion because it undermines the case against the Administration's Iraq policy and would have diluted the political impact of the leak. After all, if the outcome of the war in Iraq will help to determine the number of terrorists who threaten the United States and its interests in the future, then the Administration is correct in arguing that Iraq is a crucial front in the war against terrorism.

Terrorism Ext—Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Iraq is a key battleground for countering terrorism

Phillips 6 (James, Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies @ The Heritage Foundation, Sept 11, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/09/Iraq-Is-a-Strategic-Battleground-in-the-War-Against-Terrorism>) LL

Some who argue for an immediate pullout from Iraq call the war in Iraq a distraction from the broader war on terrorism. This argument ignores the fact that al-Qaeda has taken root in Iraq and massacres Iraqi civilians, government forces, and coalition forces on a daily basis. As President Bush recently noted, Osama bin Laden recognizes the importance of Iraq, where, he proclaimed, the "third world war is raging." Abandoning the Iraqi government before it is able to provide for its own security would leave Iraq, its neighbors, and the United States more vulnerable to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Whatever the disagreements over the relationship between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime are, Iraq today is a strategically vital front in the war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda's Strategy Al-Qaeda leaders have proclaimed Iraq a major front in their global terrorist campaign. This was made clear in a July 9, 2005, letter from Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to Abu Musab Zarqawi, who was then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The letter was intercepted by coalition forces and subsequently published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which expressed the "highest confidence" in its authenticity. In the letter, Zawahiri underscored the centrality of the war in Iraq for the global jihad: I want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting battle in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam's history, and what is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era… Zawahiri cautioned Zarqawi to avoid the mistake that the Taliban made in Afghanistan of alienating the Afghan people, who joined the opposition and cooperated with U.S. forces to overthrow the Taliban. He reminded Zarqawi that al-Qaeda needs some semblance of popular support to realize its plans for Iraq once American forces are driven out: The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power. There is no doubt that this amirate will enter into a fierce struggle with the foreign infidel forces, and those supporting them among the local forces, to put it in a state of constant preoccupation with defending itself, to make it impossible for it to establish a stable state which could proclaim a caliphate, and to keep the Jihadist groups in a constant state of war, until these forces find a chance to annihilate them. The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity. Al-Qaeda's strategy is clear. It seeks to carve out a state-within-a-state in Iraq to use as a springboard for exporting terrorism and subversion. Iraq looms much larger in al-Qaeda's plans than Afghanistan because of its strategic location in the heart of the Arab world; Iraq's close proximity to the Persian Gulf oil fields, a high-value target for attack; Iraq's usefulness as a staging area for attacks on neighboring countries and Israel; and the fact that Baghdad was once the seat of the caliphate that al-Qaeda seeks to recreate. As an Arab-dominated movement, al-Qaeda would have a much easier time operating from bases in Sunni Arab regions in Iraq than in Afghanistan or Pakistan, where Arab travelers stand out from the local population. Bin Laden quickly grasped that Iraq was a more important front than Afghanistan in his global jihad and ordered many al-Qaeda forces to move there from Afghanistan in 2003. According to Taliban sources cited by Newsweek, bin Laden sent emissaries to meet with Taliban leaders in November 2003 to inform them that al-Qaeda was shifting resources and men from Afghanistan to Iraq. In view of the high priority that al-Qaeda accords to Iraq, the U.S. cannot discount Iraq's importance in the global struggle against terrorism. Premature withdrawal from Iraq would demoralize the Iraqi government, tempt Iraqi officials to strike deals with insurgents or defect to the insurgency, and embolden al-Qaeda and other Islamic militants to escalate their terrorist campaign using Iraq as a sanctuary. Towards Stability The United States cannot afford to leave a power vacuum in Iraq. This would be a historic mistake, similar to the abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal that allowed the Taliban to seize control and export terrorism around the world. The Bush Administration therefore is right to continue to help the Iraqis build a government that can defeat the insurgents and become an ally against terrorists, rather than a supporter of terrorism, as was Saddam's regime. If the U.S. abandons Iraq, it will become the next Afghanistan-a major source of terrorism, subversion, and warfare for decades to come. As General John Abizaid, the top commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, recently warned, "If we leave, they will follow us." James Phillips is Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

Terrorism Ext—Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Withdrawing from Iraq would embolden terrorists to attack the U.S.

Byman 7(Daniel, July, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy@the Brookings Institution, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/07iraqterrorism.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

The first counterterrorism blow would be to U.S. credibility. Foreign jihadists would tout a pullout as a victory, contending that the United States left under fire. Already, bin Ladin has taunted the United States, declaring that it is "embroiled in the swamps of Iraq."[[29]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn29) Even though their actual role in the fighting was minimal, foreign jihadists made similar claims with regard to the Soviets in Afghanistan and the United States in Somalia. Iraq is a far bigger conflict than any the United States previously waged in the Middle East. And, because jihadists have played such a significant part in Iraq, they would declare, with much fanfare, that our departure was a major victory for their cause. Bin Ladin’s "success" would prove that the United States would withdraw whenever it faces considerable resistance. Jihadists will thus be encouraged to foment unrest against other governments they oppose and against U.S. interventions such as Afghanistan and the Balkans. The lesson would be clear: push the United States and it will fold. [[30]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn30) Jihadists like Zarqawi seek to foment a civil war, both because it would hasten a U.S. departure and because of their hatred for secular and Shi’a forces. They can be counted on to fuel the fire of extremism, making it difficult for moderate voices to be heard.

US withdrawal would be perceived as a win for Iraqi terrorists

Byman and Pollack 8 (Daniel and Kenneth, American Academy of Political and Social Science, <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/618/1/55.pdf>) LL

Unfortunately, a likely scenario for Iraq in the event of a near-term American withdrawal is chaos and all-out civil war akin to that experienced by Lebanon from 1975 to 1990, Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001, the Congo from 1994 to the present, and the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999. The incompetent handling of the reconstruction between 2003 and 2006 created a security vacuum, a failed state, and a leadership void that have left Iraq a desperate and dangerous society (see, for instance, Pollack 2006). Thanks in part tothe efforts of al Qaeda and other Salafi extremist groups who systematically went about taking advantage of these American mistakes, Iraqi society has been torn apart. In the realm of counterterrorism, the first blow of such a scenario would be to U.S. credibility. Al Qaeda and other Salafi extremists would tout a withdrawal as a victory, contending that the United States left under fire. Even though their actual role in the fighting was minimal, foreign fighters made similar claims with regard to the Soviets in Afghanistan and the United States in Somalia. Iraq is a far bigger conflict than any the United States previously waged in the Middle East. And because foreign terrorists have played such a significant part in Iraq, they would declare, with much fanfare, that the U.S. departure was a major victory for their cause.

Withdrawal causes terrorism

 Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

It gives the U.S. military a chance to hunt down and kill terrorists. Whether you believe terrorists were in Iraq before the war or not, there is definitely no disputing the fact that they currently are there now. The many vicious, direct attacks on civilians are not the work of "insurgents". They are the work of bloodthirsty, heartless murderers who want nothing more than to impose their ruthless Taliban-style rule on the world. In Iraq, we have a chance to send armed, specially trained warriors to take them out where they live and breed. It would give Al Qaeda a symbolic victory and become the basis of future recruiting propaganda. Osama bin Laden's own recruiting videos cite the examples of Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia as evidence of America's tendency to cut-and-run when the going gets tough. The terrorist attacks on innocent Iraqi civilians have no other purpose than to manipulate the news media and weaken the will of the American public. If we retreat once again before the job is done, it would provide the best example yet of how terrorism works. It would reinforce the Al Qaeda propaganda that America is indeed a "paper tiger" that doesn't have the will to fight. It would invite similar terrorist/guerilla tactics in future wars since the tactics resulted in a victory that a conventional military couldn't achieve over the U.S. military. There is no military in the world that even comes close to matching the U.S. military. Our superior technology, training, and funds make it simply impossible for another conventional military to defeat us. Indeed, given the recent examples in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, it's very doubtful any country would even try. However, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have found a way that the American superpower can be defeated. If we cave once again, these brutal terrorist tactics will become the basis of all future wars. Murder and torture of innocent people will become the standard.

Terrorism Ext—Terrorism Causes Extinction

Terrorism will escalate into extinction

Morgan 9 (Dennis, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, World on Fire) LL

Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

Terrorism Ext—Terrorism Causes Extinction

**Terrorism escalates into nuclear war**

Speice 6 (Patrick, JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary, February 2006, William & Mary Law Review, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-144666195/negligence-and-nuclear-nonproliferation.html>) LL

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Terrorism Ext—Terrorism Causes Extinction

**Terrorism causes the U.S. to lash out, precipitating global war**

**Schwartz-Morgan 1** (Nicole, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10/10/2001, “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” <http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm>) LL

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.

Terrorism Ext—Terrorism Kills Econ

Terrorism kills the global economy

Allison 8 (Graham, , director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, Mar 23, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18230/nuclear_attack_a_worstcase_reality.html>) LL

Homeland Security Undersecretary Charles Allen confirmed Mr. Tenet's view in his Senate testimony earlier this month. He told lawmakers: "Our post-9/11 successes against the Taliban in Afghanistan yielded volumes of information that completely changed our view of al Qaeda's nuclear program. We learned that al Qaeda wants a weapon to use, not a weapon to sustain and build a stockpile. ... A terrorist group needs only to produce a nuclear yield once to change history." Would a nuclear 9/11 be a game-changer? You bet. Consider the consequences of even a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one U.S. city. Researchers at the Rand Corp., a U.S. government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Long Beach, Calif., would cause immediate indirect costs worldwide of more than $3 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 10 percent. The negative economic repercussions would reverberate well beyond the developed world. As former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned, "Were a nuclear terrorist attack to occur, it would cause not only widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing world."

Academic studies prove terrorism hurts the economy

Abadie and Gardeazabal 7 (Alberto: professor of public policy @ Harvard, and Javier; Gareazabal: professor of economics @ the University of Baque Country, August 2007, <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/twe.pdf>) LL

It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity, because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country (see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2001). In contrast, empirical estimates of the consequences of terrorism typically suggest large effects on economic outcomes (see, e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). The main theme of this article is that mobility of productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the difference between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic model to show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive capital across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic risk. The model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of country risks. Using a unique dataset on terrorism and other country risks, we find that, in accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5 percent of GDP. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, which suggests that the “open-economy channel" impact of terrorism may be substantial.

This paper analyzes the effects of terrorism in an integrated world economy. From an economic standpoint, terrorism has been described to have four main effects (see, e.g., US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2002). First, the capital stock (human and physical) of a country is reduced as a result of terrorist attacks. Second, the terrorist threat induces higher levels of uncertainty. Third, terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in security. Fourth, terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as tourism.1 However, this classification does not include the potential effects of increased terrorist threats in an open economy. In this article, we use a stylized macroeconomic model of the world economy and inter- national data on terrorism and the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) assets and liabilities to study the economic effects of terrorism in an integrated world economy

Terrorism Ext—Terrorism Kills Iraq Oil

Terrorists attacks of oil infrastructure hurts Iraq’s GDP

Luft 5 (Gail, Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2005, <http://www.meforum.org/736/reconstructing-iraq-bringing-iraqs-economy-back>) LL

Various spoilers have waged an all-out war against Iraq's vital economic infrastructure, first and foremost among which is the country's web of pipelines, pumping stations, wells, refineries, and terminals. Since the April 2003 end of major hostilities, insurgents have targeted oil more than 220 times.[8] They spared no part of the 4,000-mile pipeline network. Attacks on the pipeline running from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan have severely curtailed Iraq's exports. Every day that this pipeline is not operational, Iraq's tottering economy loses $7 million.[9] In March 2004, terrorists began targeting oil installations in the south near Basra where more than two-thirds of Iraq's oil is produced. There has also been a shift in insurgent focus from export lines to the complex network of pipelines feeding the refineries in and around Baghdad and the Bayji refinery complex 125 miles north of the capital. The insurgents' intention is to prevent Iraq's nascent government from providing basic services. In November and December 2004 and in January 2005, for example, insurgents simultaneously struck all three crude oil pipelines connecting the northern fields to the Dawra refinery in Baghdad, the nation's largest producer of gasoline, kerosene, and other products, and the main source of fuel to Baghdad's main power plant.[10] The campaign of oil terrorism is directed not only against infrastructure but also against those who operate it. Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi masterminded a campaign against truck drivers who import fuel from Turkey.[11] Terrorists have murdered senior members of the country's oil industry. On March 29, 2005, the head of Iraq South Oil Company, Iraq's largest state-owned oil company, narrowly escaped assassination.[12] Many firefighters, security guards, oil engineers, and workers have quit their positions because of terrorist intimidation. Altogether, the sabotage campaign has reduced Iraq's oil production by approximately one million bpd. Iraq's oil minister, Thamir Ghadban, estimated lost export revenue from sabotage at about $7 billion in 2004.[13] As oil prices continue to climb, the loss of potential revenue grows. At current oil prices of roughly $55 per barrel, this constitutes a loss to the economy of $15-$18 billion per year.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Causes Instability

Stability Module

Instability in Iraq spills over, increasing oil prices, terrorism, and drawing in Israel

Pascual 8(Carlos, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, April 3, “Iraq 2012: What Can It Look Like, How Do We Get There?”, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0403\_iraq\_pascual.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

The argument for a brokered settlement in Iraq has a strong foundation in international experience. Civil wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Haiti, South Africa, and Northern Ireland have all demonstrated that peace cannot be achieved without a political agreement among the warring parties. Military force can help induce a political settlement or create space to implement it, but force alone cannot sustain peace. Even when parties reach agreements, they often fail – and it could very well be the case that Iraqis are simply not “done fighting.” Shiias may still believe they can “win.” Sunnis are committed to making sure that Shi’a do not. Militias may be so splintered that it is difficult for any actor to rein them in, or for any group of leaders to speak credibly on behalf of the sectarian groups they claim to represent. If a settlement is not reached, the spillover from Iraq could threaten the entire region. The refugee crisis could become a new source of instability, as major refugee flows have in virtually every other part of the world. Insurgents would likely cross borders seeking support, recruits and perhaps to widen conflict. Neighbors would likely be drawn further into backing sectarian brethren. Wider instability would help Al Qaeda franchises gain stronger holds in the region, including the potential for further destabilization in Lebanon. A referendum in Kirkuk and signs of Kurdish nationalism could risk Turkey acting again in Kurdistan. All these factors would create greater instability around Israel. And beyond the region, the risks to energy production and transit would likely manifest themselves in yet higher prices – radically so if there are real disruptions to supply when there is virtually no spare short-term oil production capacity outside of the Gulf.

Middle Eastern Instability leads to nuclear war

Steinbach, 2 (John, March 3, nuclear specialist at the Center for Research on Globalization, Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html accessed 7/2) CM

Meanwhile**, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.** Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Stability Ext—Civil War

Withdrawal sends Iraq into a civil war and eventually partition

Sunday’s Zaman 9 (cites Veysel Ayhan, prof in Middle Eastern politics, 11/8, http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=192327) my

Ayhan draws a pretty pessimistic sketch of the impact in 2012 of a probable withdrawal of the US from Iraq; he holds that such a withdrawal would lead to a bloody internal war and even regional warfare that will affect the entire region. “The SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] signed on Nov. 17, 2008 envisages a gradual withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by Dec. 31, 2011. Therefore, if no unexpected developments take place, the American military presence in Iraq will be over by January 2012. It is obvious that the US failed to maintain security in this country; it is also obvious that the US failed to have a political, economic or military influence in Iraq. The state of instability and chaos in Iraq may result in the emergence of the need for further American protectionism. At this point, the increase of the American military presence in Gulf countries may be taken into consideration.” Noting that the country is becoming more instable as the time for the withdrawal approaches, Ayhan asserts that the violent groups are preparing for warfare in the aftermath of the withdrawal. “The year 2012 points to serious uncertainties and dangers; the most visible threat and danger is that the country may be dragged into a state of internal warfare in a post-US period. The primary factor that will prevent the eruption of a bloody internal war is the American military presence in the country. … Therefore, 2012 may be the start of a bloody civil war that will lead to the partition of Iraq.” Arguing that a wholesale withdrawal would not be proper, Ayhan asserts that Iraq would not be the same after such a withdrawal and adds that a UN intervention may be considered in such a case. Asked how Iraq would look if this scenario was realized , Ayhan speaks of two options: “Iraq may be divided into three, four or more parts. Or, other countries in the region may expand to conquer Iraqi territory. Obviously, this would not happen peacefully.” Noting that both scenarios will closely affect a number of countries including Turkey, Ayhan stresses that the greatest danger will be witnessed when other countries in the region seek to influence Iraq in the fulfillment of their own interests and goals. “The fact that Iraq accused Syria after a deadly wave of attacks carried out in the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iran’s influence over the Shiite groups in the country and Turkey’s attempt to open a consulate in the Kurdish region should be viewed as attempts by regional countries to maintain control and expand their sphere of influence in the country.”

Withdraw will lead to civil war and regional instability

Oliker, Grant, Kaye, 10 (Olga, Audra K. Dalia Dassa, Jan, is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, A former intelligence analyst at the U.S. State Department, is associate director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2010/RAND\_OP272.pdf ix-x accessed 6/28) CM

As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, it behooves decisionmakers to recognize that this drawdown, which started in June 2009 and continues at the time of this writing, will affect vulnerable and at-risk populations. The ways in which it does so have significant implications for the evolution of Iraq and U.S. policy interests in that country and the Middle East more broadly. Regardless of how the security situation evolves in the years to come, these issues will continue to create humanitarian challenges, and it is in U.S. interests to take steps to address them. A number of groups are at risk because of the U.S. drawdown and withdrawal, because they have depended on U.S. forces and force presence for their security over the last six years. In addition, the drawdown may e acerbate the already precarious circumstances of displaced Iraqis, both within the country and in neighboring states. That said, appropriate policies and actions can mitigate destabilizing regional scenarios and reduce the dangers faced by these populations in the years to come. Groups at particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated w ith the United States in any of a variety of ways smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces for protection1 Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces3 1 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) lists the following minority religious and ethnic groups as at particular risk: Shabak, Christians generally, Sabaean-Mandaeans, Yazidis, Baha’i, Kaka’i, Ahl i-Haq, Yarsan, Jews (of whom very few remain in Iraq), Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Roma (Kawliyah) (UNHCR, 2007). 2 These include ethnic Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Syria, ethnic Arabs from Syria, and Ahwazi Arabs from Iran. A number of Sudanese refugees have recently been resettled.

Stability Ext—Civil War

US withdraw bad – Iraqi civil war, oil vulnerability, drop in US credibility, increases in terrorism, and humanitarian crisis result

Duclos 7 (Susan, Wake Up America, Jan 15, <http://wwwwakeupamericans-spree.blogspot.com/2007/01/if-we-withdrew-today.html>) LL

From the Heritage Foundation we have five likely outcomes of an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq: Consequence #1: An Army Up for Grabs. A sudden U.S. withdrawal would raise the risks of full-fledged civil war and disintegration of the army into hostile factions. The defection of soldiers to various militias, taking with them their heavy equipment, would bolster the militias’ firepower and capacity to seize and hold terrain. The result would be a bloody and protracted civil war such as the conflict in Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Consequence #2: Energy Uncertainty. Growing anarchy in Iraq and the possible breakup of the country into autonomous regions would severely affect Iraq’s oil exports. In 2005, Iraq produced about 1.9 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil and exported about 1.4 MBD. By June 2006, Iraqi oil production had risen to 2.5 MBD, and the govern ment hopes to increase production to 2.7 MBD by the end of the year. A U.S. withdrawal would undermine the security of oil pipelines and other facilities and increase the vulnerability of Iraqi oil production to sabotage. The resulting drop in Iraqi oil exports would increase the upward pressure on world oil prices in an already tight oil market. Energy uncertainty would be increased further if Iraq splintered and Iran gained domination over a Shia-dominated rump state in the oil-rich south. Consequence #3: Allies in Jeopardy. The chief beneficiary of a rapid U.S. pullout would be Iran, which has considerable influence over the dominant Shiite political parties, which represent most Iraqi Shiites: about 60–65 percent of the population. If Iraq imploded, Iran quickly could gain dominance over an emerging “Shiastan” rump state endowed with the bulk of Iraq’s oil reserves. This would give Iran additional resources and a staging area to escalate subversive efforts targeted at the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Shiite minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other countries look to the United States to serve as a guarantor against an aggressive Iran. If the United States fails to follow through on its commitment to establish a stable government in Iraq, it will severely undermine its credibility. Abandoning Iraqi allies would erode the confidence of other allies in U.S. leadership and further fuel conspiracy theories about American plots to carve up Iraq to keep Arabs weak and divided. Consequence #4: Al-Qaeda Triumphant. Osama bin Laden would trumpet an abrupt U.S. withdrawal as a victory for al-Qaeda and proof that America is a “paper tiger,” just as he claimed after the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. An unstable, failed state in Iraq would also provide al-Qaeda and other radical groups with a sanctuary for recruiting a new generation of suicide bombers and a strategically located staging area for deploying terrorists for attacks on Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere around the world. The recently declassi fied “key judgments” of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” pointed out that a perceived victory for jihadists in Iraq would boost their strength and ability to threaten Americans. Consequence #5: A Humanitarian Catastrophe. Iraq is a mosaic of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal sub groups. Baghdad and other major cities include sig­nificant intermingling of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other Christians. Instability and civil war would put many of these people to flight, creating a vast humanitarian crisis that would dwarf those seen in Bosnia and Kosovo and rival the scenes of horror and pri vation witnessed in Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, and Sudan. Not only would Iraqis be put at risk of disease, starvation, and violence, but with the gov ernment unable to meet their basic needs, the Iraqi refugees would fall under the control of the sectar ian militias, turning Iraq into Lebanon on steroids.

Stability Ext—Ethnic Conflict

Troops key to prevent Sunni-Shia civil war

Messerli 7(Joe, Editorialist@Balanced Politics, August 21, “Should the U.S. Withdraw its Troops from Iraq?”, http://www.balancedpolitics.org/iraq\_withdrawal.htm, accessed 7/6/10)jn

A true Sunni-Shiite civil war could ensue, resulting in ten times the current bloodshed. Although there is daily bloodshed in Iraq, American troops largely keep it at a fraction of what it could be. They provide security checkpoints, enforce curfews, train Iraqi police, raid terrorist insurgent strongholds, and do countless other tasks to help maintain security. In fact, the vast majority of the country is stable. The trouble remains almost entirely focused in the Sunni-dominated Baghdad area. In any case, if we pull out now, a new and relatively inexperienced Iraqi police force must take over security for the whole country, which is a task they are likely not yet ready to handle. If they aren't, a true civil war could break out and make the current bloodshed pale in comparison. The U.S. Civil War took the lives of over a half million Americans. Imagine what a civil war with today's weapons would look like, especially in an area with so many fanatical, suicidal terrorists.

Troops are stabilizing Iraq—withdrawal risks worse ethnic instability

Pascual 8(Carlos, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, April 3, “Iraq 2012: What Can It Look Like, How Do We Get There?”, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0403\_iraq\_pascual.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

There is no doubt that General Petraeus will present an impressive array of statistics illustrating reductions of violence in Iraq when he testifies before Congress. All key indicators on insurgent attacks, bombings, and civilian and military fatalities demonstrate that violence is down, even if attacks and fatalities still remain unacceptably high. General Petraeus and the U.S. military deserve credit and praise for the ways in which they have carried out a new counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq. I would also predict that if most senior military officers were asked if this progress in security is viable without a political settlement in Iraq, their answer would be “no.” The reasons for that lie in the fragile underpinnings of the factors contributing to the reductions in violence. U.S. military spokespersons acknowledge that the military surge was necessary to reduce violence, but the surge alone was not enough. Sunni militias in Anbar and increasingly in other parts of the country decided that they hated Al Qaeda in Iraq more than the United States, and beginning in late 2006 they started cooperating with the U.S. military against Al Qaeda’s brutality. Now there are around 85,000 “concerned citizens” participating in this Sunni “Awakening.” They are paid by the U.S. military for contributions to local security. These payments have no doubt helped put food on the table for many families, and they may have also provided the cash they need to rearm. Shi’a militias, particularly Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, called a ceasefire against U.S. troops that generally held until late March. In part, the Shi’a ceasefire toward U.S. forces may reflect a calculated judgment to gauge the impact and capacity of surging U.S. forces. Meanwhile, Shi’a militias have confronted each other in Basra, with the Mahdi Army, the Badr Organization associated with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Fadhila engaged in a struggle to control the resources and power in Iraq’s wealthiest city and region. The Shi’a ceasefire toward the U.S. came apart, at least temporarily, in late March when the Iraqi Security Forces launched a campaign against what the Iraqi government deemed “outlaws” in Basra. Others argue that the Iraqi government used Iraqi forces to target Sadr’s Mahdi Army and take sides in favor of ISCI, which is reputed to have strong ties to Iran. Details are far from clear, but it is plausible that some Sadr followers retaliated against the U.S. compound in the Green Zone because the U.S. supports the Iraqi government and security forces, which are supporting Sadr’s pro-Iranian enemies in Basra. As of April 1, 2008, it appears that a new ceasefire may have been struck with Sadr, but the convoluted web of fighting and retaliation over the previous week underscored the fragility of the Shi’a ceasefire toward coalition forces. The combined development of strengthened Sunni militias and a Shi’a ceasfire would normally seem unimaginable. It has been possible because both Sunni and Shi’a have seen a strong U.S. force presence as a balancing factor that, for now, serves each of their interests. Putting aside the current conflict in Basra, one can argue that better security has facilitated incremental political progress: an improved 2008 budget, an Amnesty Law that (unsurprisingly) militia leaders support, some reversal of the de-Baathification laws, legislation to authorize provincial elections in October, and signs of improved governance in some provinces. One must see this narrow base of political progress against a wider backdrop. There is still no understanding of the core political issues dividing Iraqi society: federal-regional relations, long-term revenue allocation, disarmament and demobilization of militias, the inclusion of former Baathists in senior political positions, and protection of minority rights. We have already seen in the past month the fragility of the situation in the Kurdish areas and the potential for Turkish incursions. Iran’s role also remains a point of debate, but there is no question that Iran can be disruptive when it wants to. Iraqi Security Forces have improved, but they still cannot carry out operations effectively on their own. The Iraqi police have not succeeded in enforcing the rule of law. If U.S. forces are taken away from this equation, the results are predictable: an upsurge in violence, possibly at even greater levels than seen in the past given the regrouping of Sunni militias that have still not accepted a Shi’a-dominated national government. Yet to leave U.S. forces in the midst of this quagmire is also irresponsible if efforts are not made to address the fundamental political issues that drive the Iraqis to war.

Stability Ext—Ethnic Conflict

Withdrawal from Iraq causes instability and religious conflicts.

Luizard 9(Pierre-Jean, Iraq specialist and research fellow at the French National Scientific Research Centre, BBC, “Iraq faces permanent instability "at best" when US withdraws - French analyst”, July 1, Lexis, interviewed by Sylvain Mouillard)

[Mouillard] US troops withdraw from Iraq's major cities today. What is the security situation in the country?

[Luizard] The political system itself is a source of instability. Following the civil war of 2006-2007, which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, the Americans achieved greater calm, but in a manner that posed obstacles to any political solution in the short and medium term. They returned power to the Iraqi authorities, in exchange for their support against Al-Qa'idah. But by creating multiple Iraqi interlocutors, the Americans have enormously fragmented the political landscape. These interlocutors are now in competition with each other. Al-Maliki's government will find it hard to satisfy these conflicting powers. This is why the Americans will maintain an arbitration role and remain an essential force in the country.

[Mouillard] DO you fear a return of violence to Iraq?

[Luizard] The Americans are withdrawing too much for the calm to be able to last. They are setting the various protagonists in direct confrontation. At best, there will be permanent instability. At worst, there will be a return to the violence that we saw in 2006-2007, but in a different form, with territorial rather than religious conflicts. In the areas that are currently the most dangerous (the Baghdad-Kirkuk road and Mosul,) there is a juxtaposition of tribal and community conflicts. I can see a number of time bombs, such as the Kurds' aspiration to include the city of Kirkuk in their autonomous region, or the city of Mosul, where there are two different nationalisms in conflict. There are also the permanent rivalries within the Shi'i context over the oil zones. It should also be noted that this system based on community solidarity has not succeeded in integrating the Sunnis. The Iraqi government is now dominated by the Shi'is and Kurds.

[Mouillard] Do these difficulties call into question the commitment made by Barack Obama, who wants US forces to have left Iraq by the end of 2011?

[Luizard] The stabilization promises to be difficult and will complicate the GIs' departure as planned. The Iraqis are still dependent. No ground operations are conducted without US Army involvement, whether intelligence or bombardments. Of course, the Iraqi security forces have grown considerably stronger, partly because the Americans have worked so hard on this. But they remain subject to community conflicts. In the Sunni Arab zone, for instance, they comprise former jihadis. Because of its break-up, the Iraqi Army cannot do without US help. After 2011 there will still be GIs, even if they are not there directly in their bases in the country. There are also the mercenaries of the private security firms (who were as numerous as regular army troops in 2007.)

Withdrawal risks rebellion against the Iraqi government—causes instability

Cole 10 **(**Juan R.I. May 14, is Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History @ the University of Michigan http://www.juancole.com/2010/05/us-troop-withdrawal-in-iraq-on-track.html accessed 7/3) CM

The bulk of the 130,000 American troops in Iraq have been pulled back to heavily fortified camps on the outskirts of the cities, or to the massive air bases that have been built at places such as Balad and Tallil. The SOFA permits them to remain until December 2011, by which time new arrangements for the long-term presence of US forces will have been worked out. American commanders, while outwardly optimistic, have not been able to hide their apprehension over the withdrawal from the cities. To shore up the Iraqi army, some 10,000 US troops are currently embedded as “trainers” in its ranks—a number that will increase to over 50,000 over the coming months. Baghdad’s western suburbs have been creatively categorised as “outside” the urban area. Aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery and rapid response units are on constant standby to assist Iraqi forces when needed. The concerns are not only that insurgent groups will take advantage of the US withdrawal to regroup in Iraq’s cities and resume significant resistance to both the Maliki government and American troops. Both Washington and its puppet government are worried that the social plight of the Iraqi working class and popular opposition to the concessions Maliki is making to US imperialism and foreign capital could give rise to large-scale protests and unrest. The Obama administration is acutely conscious that a large majority of Iraqis bitterly opposes the US presence in the country. Behind the scenes, it is reportedly pressuring Maliki to abandon a promise to hold a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement, knowing that it would be overwhelming rejected. There are also sharp disputes between the rival Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish factions of the Iraqi ruling elite over the allocation of oil revenues and other sources of wealth.

Stability Ext—Ethnic Conflict

Pullout causes ethnic conflict

Carafano and Phillips 6(James, Ph. D and Senior Research Fellow@The Heritage Foundation, and James, Research fellow in Middle East studies@The Heritage Foundation, “The Dangerous Consequences of Cutting and Running in Iraq”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/10/The-Dangerous-Consequences-of-Cutting-and-Running-in-Iraq, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Consequence #5: A Humanitarian Catastrophe. Iraq is a mosaic of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal sub­groups. Baghdad and other major cities include sig­nificant intermingling of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other Christians. Instability and civil war would put many of these people to flight, creating a vast human­itarian crisis that would dwarf those seen in Bosnia and Kosovo and rival the scenes of horror and pri­vation witnessed in Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, and Sudan. Not only would Iraqis be put at risk of disease, starvation, and violence, but with the gov­ernment unable to meet their basic needs, the Iraqi refugees would fall under the control of the sectar­ian militias, turning Iraq into Lebanon on steroids.

Withdraw risks ethnic conflict

Cogan 9 (James, June 30, writer for global research, 09, Global Research, http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14176 accessed 7/3) CM

The concerns are not only that insurgent groups will take advantage of the US withdrawal to regroup in Iraq’s cities and resume significant resistance to both the Maliki government and American troops. Both Washington and its puppet government are worried that the social plight of the Iraqi working class and popular opposition to the concessions Maliki is making to US imperialism and foreign capital could give rise to large-scale protests and unrest. The Obama administration is acutely conscious that a large majority of Iraqis bitterly opposes the US presence in the country. Behind the scenes, it is reportedly pressuring Maliki to abandon a promise to hold a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement, knowing that it would be overwhelming rejected. There are also sharp disputes between the rival Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish factions of the Iraqi ruling elite over the allocation of oil revenues and other sources of wealth. The most explosive tensions centre on the insistence of the Kurdish autonomous region that it get control of the northern oilfields around the city of Kirkuk—two of which are among the six fields being offered for contract in this week’s auction. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) last week denounced the auction as “unconstitutional” and warned that companies are “ill-advised” to enter into any contract in Kirkuk to which the KRG is not also a party. The outbreak of an ethnic civil war in the north cannot be ruled out, nor can US military operations to suppress such a development.

**Withdraw leads to ethnic violence and increased conflict**

**Oliker, Grant, Kaye, 10** (Olga, Audra K. Dalia Dassa, Jan, is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, A former intelligence analyst at the U.S. State Department, is associate director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2010/RAND\_OP272.pdf page 12 Accesed 6/28) CM

If U.S. drawdown in Iraq is marked by increased conflict, it is likely to spur additional displacement, particularly from the few urban areas that remain somewhat confessionally or ethnically mixed. Violence would therefore accelerate the continuing sectarian segregation of Iraq. While more violence will likely mean more IDPs, it may not mean more refugees. First, most of those with the resources and inclination to leave Iraq have already done so. Second, Jordan and Syria will not welcome additional refugees and have already imposed significant limits, Jordan having all but closed its doors.8 Efforts to return can also spark violence. At present, U.S. forces and oversight help ensure that Iraqi Security Forces protect and assist returnees who attempt return to their homes, even in ethnically mixed areas. With less U.S. oversight, Iraqi Security Forces may not be able or willing to respond to problems, for instance if Shia police are called upon to evict Shia families in favor of Sunni families in predominantly Shia neighborhoods. This will be worse if drawdown and withdrawal spur more returns (which we deem possible, although not in high numbers). Either way, clashes over property could escalate into interethnic violence. Meanwhile, refugees who return to Iraq but cannot sustainably reclaim their homes may become displaced again within Iraq.

Stability Ext—Kurdistan Conflict

Presence limits terrorism and prevents war in Kurdistan

Phillips 10(James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs@the Heritage Foundation, March 10, “Charting U.S. Policy after Iraq’s Elections”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Iraq’s elected leaders must resolve Iraq’s problems, but in order to do so, they require substantial, continued support from the United States. A calming U.S. military presence will be needed to support Iraqi security services in combating terrorist threats, shoring up the rule of law, and mediating between rival armed factions, particularly in the north, along the disputed edges of the Kurdish territories. General Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, has correctly called for a “robust engagement” with Iraqi political and military leaders to ensure a smooth transition to the next government. In addition, the United States should: Slow the timetable for troop drawdowns. The Obama Administration wisely departed from the President’s campaign pledge to withdraw one combat brigade from Iraq every month after entering office. Another adjustment in the drawdown timetable is necessary due to the fact that current plans to pull out approximately 10,000 troops every month, beginning in late spring, were based on the assumption that the Iraqi elections would be held by the end of 2009. The delay in the election timetable also requires a delay in the schedule for troop withdrawals so that adequate forces remain available during the sensitive post-election period. Maintain adequate U.S. troops in sensitive and insecure areas. General Odierno has reportedly requested to keep a combat brigade in the disputed northern city of Kirkuk past the Administration’s August 31 deadline for ending combat operations. This appears to be a necessary and prudent action in light of the continued potential for violence in that disputed region. U.S. troops in the past have prevented outbreaks of fighting there between the Iraqi army and Kurdish regional security forces, and a continued U.S. presence could avert a crisis and buy time for political leaders to settle disputes. Insurgent strongholds, such as the city of Baquba, also need the focused attention of U.S. military forces to backup Iraq’s increasingly effective security forces. Start thinking about negotiating with the new Iraqi government to postpone the deadline for a final troop withdrawal. No expert believes that the Iraqi army and police will be ready to stand on their own by the end of 2011, when all U.S. troops are required to leave Iraq under the 2008 SOFA. Substantial U.S. air support, logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, training, and advisory support will still be required long after that date. After a new Iraqi government is formed, the Obama Administration should quietly work with that government to reach a new agreement that will enable American trainers and advisors to give Iraqis the tools they need to defend Iraq’s fragile democratic system.

Withdraw creates a resurgece of the PKK in iraq causing turkey instability

Wehrey et al 10, ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

 The most significant strategic repercussion for Turkey from the 2003 Iraq conflict relates to fears that a weak and destabilized Iraq will lead to the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey’s southern border, threatening the secession of Turkey’s own Kurdish population and providing a springboard for terrorist activities by Kurdish groups within Turkey’s borders. As Stephen Larrabee explains, From the outset Turkish leaders had strong reservations about the U.S. invasion of Iraq. . . . Turkish leaders feared that [Saddam Hussein’s] removal would lead to the fragmentation of Iraq, the growth of Kurdish nationalism, and an overall decline in Turkish security. The aftermath of the invasion has seen Turkey’s worst fears come true. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 8) Turkey remains extremely concerned about the continuing threat from the PKK, which the United States, NATO, and the European Union list as a terrorist organization.78 Violent PKK attacks have esca- lated significantly since 2003, killing more than 600 Turks (many from the Turkish security forces) in 2006 alone (Larrabee, 2008, p. 8). Such attacks have sparked a public outcry in Turkey and calls for military action against the PKK in Iraq. Turkish leaders and the Turkish public view the United States as responsible for the resurgence in Kurdish violence and have been frustrated by what they perceive as U.S. reluc- tance to deal with the PKK challenge because of Washington’s strong ties with Iraqi Kurds, who have proven to be reliable allies.79 Conse- quently, Turkey turned to unilateral military action against the PKK, beginning with military buildups on the Iraqi border in 2006 and, ultimately, incursions into northern Iraq in 2007–2008.80

Stability Ext—Iran-Saudi Conflict

Withdraw from Iraq creates a political vacuum filled by Iran and Saudi Arabia resulting in a disruption to GCC unity

Wehrey 9 (Frederic, senior policy analyst with RAND, RAND http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG840.pdf accessed 7/6)CM

Saudi Arabia’s posture has only recently shifted from one of paralysis on Iraq and passive dismay at Iran’s activism there to a more proactive engagement. Deliberations about a U.S. drawdown in Iraq have accelerated what appears to be a growing trend of introspection and self-criticism among commentators in Saudi Arabia and the broader Gulf, with many arguing that the tradition of Arab inaction on Iraq has created a power vacuum that Iran will increasingly fill after the departure of U.S. forces.54 As of October 2008, several editorials in the Saudi press appeared to hint at a shift in Saudi Arabia’s willingness to open an embassy in Baghdad, with the editor of *al-Hayat* and the general director of the Saudi-owned TV satellite channel *al-Arabiya* arguing that the Maliki government was deserving of broad Arab support.55 According to one Sharjah-based commentator: The Gulf states may continue to lament the fact that Iran is interfering in the internal issues of Iraq as they persist with their policy of two steps forward, two steps back. In fact, it is only natural that Iran steps up to assume a role in its western neighbour that is at risk of falling apart to its detriment. The GCC countries must immediately awaken from their state of suspended animation.56 In the event of a substantive U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Saudi- Iranian relations may evolve in drastically different directions. Much of this depends on the future trajectory of the state. A fractured polity in which the central government’s control of military power has devolved to contending factions controlling substantial blocs of territory will almost certainly invite increased Saudi and Iranian interference. At the other end of the spectrum, an authoritarian, Shi’a-dominated state with a politicized military that persecutes Sunnis will almost certainly invite Saudi suspicions of Iranian influence and control. It is important to note here that Riyadh is probably resigned to living with a Shi’a-controlled government but wants it to be one that is relatively nationalistic in orientation, free from Iranian influence, inclusive of Sunnis, and unable to threaten its neighbors with reconstituted power projection. Iran’s ability and willingness to back armed factions via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–Qods Force is well understood; the Saudi capacity is less evident, although there is a clear historical precedent for indirect Saudi interference in civil conflicts, whether by funding tribal elements or encouraging Arab foreign volunteers. Aside from the most commonly cited example of Afghanistan, Riyadh was an active player in the internecine conflicts of its neighbors to the south: backing anti- Egyptian, royalist troops in the Yemeni civil war of 1962–1970; supporting the Dhofar Liberation Front in starting the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1962 to 1970; and backing southern Yemen during the 1994 civil war. It should be noted that neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has an interest in seeing Iraq devolve into total chaos, but a protracted, low-intensity proxy conflict might be seen as presenting minimal risks for each side.

Stability Ext—Regional Stability

**Withdraw kills Middle East stability**

**Oliker, Grant, and Kaye 10** (Olga, Audra K. Dalia Dassa, Jan, is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, A former intelligence analyst at the U.S. State Department, is associate director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2010/RAND\_OP272.pdf ix-x accessed 6/28) CM

If violence in Iraq worsens as and after U.S. forces draw down, as it may well do in at least some disputed and multiethnic areas, displacement will increase yet again. Whether or not violence increases in the near term, however, this displacement crisis may well breed instability in its own right. Unless these problems are addressed as part of a broad development and integration agenda, displacement will not only be long term, but it may also lead to increased risk of violence in the future, as grievances over lost land combine with perceptions of social and economic inequities between the populations hosting the displaced and the newcomers, both in Iraq and in neighboring countries. This has the potential to undermine the stability of key regional states, such as Jordan, and a range of broader U.S. regional goals. Although the displacement crisis will be long term, and vulnerable populations will face increased risk as U.S. forces draw down, the dangers emanating from both of these situations can be mitigated. Indeed, the drawdown of U.S. forces can potentially create opportunities for the United States to more effectively address this crisis and gain regional and international assistance to do so. A number of specific actions and general approaches can help ensure the protection of particularly endangered populations, mitigate the destabilizing effects of mass displacement, and prevent the chronic underdevelopment that may otherwise be its result. Lower Risk of Violence Where practicable and useful, adapt troop withdrawals t 􀁴􀀁 o ensure the longest presence where violence is most likely, specifically in the regions of Baghdad, Diyala, and along the KRG border. 􀁴􀀁 Improve security for the vulnerable and those at risk of deportation in Iraq by working with Iraq, regional governments, and other key international actors.

Withdrawal kills Middle East stability

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

The bloodshed currently confined to Iraq could spread to neighboring countries, resulting in not just an Iraqi civil war, but a Sunni-Shiite regional civil war. Remember, there are plenty of fanatical Sunnis and Shiites in neighboring countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, etc. The killing could easily spill over the border as Sunnis in these countries try to help their Sunni allies in Iraq, while Shiites try to do the same. Imagine the number of deaths that would result from a regional civil war where hundreds of millions of Muslims currently live. Can you think of any way the U.S. military could re-establish stability in such a scenario?

Stability Ext—Regional Stability

Withdrawal bad—causes Middle East instability and terrorism

Carroll 8(Conn, Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications, “Morning Bell: Iraqi Stability Is in the U.S. Interest”, http://blog.heritage.org/?p=380, accessed 7/3/10)jn

The latest reports out of Basra indicate that life appears to be returning to normal even as Iraq’s central government indicates that military operations around the city would continue. The Iraqi army now claims its troops are in control of much of Basra even as security forces are going house-to-house to confiscate weapons. It is still too early to determine if the Iraqi central government accomplished its objectives in Basra, but the events of the last week did demonstrate three things: \* Iran continues to meddle in Iraq’s internal security. Reports indicate that a Friday trip by Iraqi lawmakers to the Iranian city of Qom was key in securing Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s acceptance of a cease fire. A major goal of the Iraqi delegation to Qom was to persuade Iran to stop arming Shiite militants in Iraq. \* Iraq’s army is stronger, but still not strong enough. The move against Shiite militias in Basra came from the Iraqi army and only involved limited U.S. support. The Shiite rebels are fighting mainly Iraqi soldiers, rather than Americans. Unfortunately, the Iraqi army now admits “they had underestimated militia resistance in Basra.“ \* The premature British withdrawal from Basra allowed militias to flourish. Basra is one part of Iraq the surge has never been tried. Absent a strong stabilizing force, like the U.S. troops in Baghdad, rival militias and criminal gangs have filled the security vacuum. While the long-term presence of American combat troops is not in the interests of the United States or the Iraqi government, helping the Iraqis get on the road to peace and stability is clearly in the U.S. interest. The eruption of a full-blown civil war in Iraq and a wide-spread humanitarian crisis could further destabilize the region. Abandoning the people of Iraq would enable Iran’s regional expansion and al Qaeda’s effort to establish a sanctuary in the heart of the Middle East. Turning its back on Iraq would lead America’s other friends and allies, including those trying to finish off al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to question America’s commitment and resolve. There is no way to achieve these important goals without patiently maintaining a strong American military presence on the ground for at least several years to come.

Instability in Iraq would destabilize the Middle East

Oppenheimer et al 7 (Michael, August clinical associate prof. @ the Center for Global Affairs @NYU, Center for Global Affairs, http://www.scps.nyu.edu/areas-of-study/global-affairs/cga-scenarios/ accesed 7/2) CM

 Iraq has descended into outright civil war. Instability spreads throughout the Middle East. The regional players, competing and insecure, fail to cooperate on matters of defense and counter-terrorism and prove unable to contain the fighting within Iraq. While US pressure and the limited military capacity of local actors have succeeded in preventing all-out regional conflict between Sunni and Shi'a-led states, the proxy war fought on Iraqi territory (Scenario 2) spreads to adjoining states through refugee flows, growing radicalization of Arab populations, escalating non-state terrorism, and the deliberate efforts of regional rivals to destabilize each others’ governments.   Existing regimes in the region cling to power, but with insufficient domestic political support or acquiescence to create coalitions and pursue effective balance of power strategies necessary to contain the Iraq civil war. Because their appetite for direct state-to-state conflict is limited, many regimes use sub-state actors to strike at their enemies. Regional rivalries flare up as various players vie for influence and control. Radicalization of Arab populations increases as sectarian strife radiates from Iraq. In these circumstances, unforeseen events—such as an Iranian-style revolution in a major Arab country—could radically alter the political landscape and reorder foreign policy priorities in the region.   Events could easily globalize this regional conflagration. A serious disruption to the oil supply, as the result of an attack on an important oil installation in the Gulf, is a likelihood in this scenario. Such an attack could come in various guises. Terrorists might target the energy infrastructure, with the US retaliating against Iran as a target. The US or Israel could also react to any number of Iranian provocations, including its imminent (by 2010) development of nuclear weapons, leading toward a major war.

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

Long term Presence of US Military presence is needed for the political stability of Iraq

**Pollack & Sargsyan 10**, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 14-15, accessed 6/28) CM

In turn, this arrangement highlights another critical political-diplomatic hurdle that the United States faces in Iraq: securing a new agreement with the Iraqi government that would allow U.S. military forces to remain in the country beyond 2011. At present, the security agreement governing the presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq expires on December 31, 2011. This means that every last U.S. soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be out by that date. Because this subject is politically sensitive in both the United States and Iraq, no one is willing to discuss it. But Iraqi and U.S. military and civilian leaders alike recognize that a follow-on agreement to e tend the U.S. military presence beyond 2011 would be desirable and probably necessary. It is highly unlikely that Iraq will have sorted out its political and security problems by the end of 2011, including finding a solution to the propensity of COIN-trained militaries to move against the civilian leadership. Consequently, it will be critical for the United States to retain at least the AABs for at least 3—5 years after the expiration of the current security agreement to allow Iraqi civil-military relations to mature, Iraqi political institutions to strengthen, and a culture of apolitical professionalism to take root within the Iraqi military before the last U.S. combat troops (even if they are masquerading as advisors) depart. Finally, it is worth also considering the potential implications of this phenomenon for Afghanistan. The U.S.-led NATO forces are far from achieving in Afghanistan what the United States has accomplished in Iraq. If the United States, however, succeeds in achieving in Afghanistan what it did in Iraq, Kabul will most likely evince the same problematic civil-military relations that Baghdad is now confronting\_and which has destroyed so many other nascent governments in the past. If so, the president’s notional timetable to begin withdrawal in June 2011 will have to be implemented as a reduction in U.S. troops, but by no means a complete withdrawal. Like Iraq, Afghanistan will require roughly 50,000 U.S. combat troops, probably rebadged as advisors, for many more years before it is able to stand on its feet. In the end, if Washington gets its fondest wishes, and Iraq continues to go well while Afghanistan succeeds at least as well as Iraq, then the United States will have to expect to maintain large troop commitments in both of those countries for a long time to come\_similar to those U.S. deployments in Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere around the globe. Although this recommendation may

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

**US military presenc**e **is key to maintaining stability in the Gulf**

Hajjar 2(Sami G., March, U.S. Army War College as Prof. and Director of Middle East Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy, “U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf: Challenges and Prospects” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=185

I conclude this study with a final comment speculating on the long-term role of the Army in the Gulf. For as long as Gulf oil remains vital to the interests of the United States and its allies, the presence of an Army heavy combat capability based in the region is to be expected. This capability is to prevent a cross-border invasion into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by Iraq. The possibility of an Iraqi incursion will remain for some time, even after the regime of Saddam has been replaced. As already noted, this is because of the Iraqi argument that historically Kuwait belongs to Iraq, and because future Iraqi governments are likely toblame Kuwait for the impact the sanctions have had on Iraqi society. Hence, even if Baghdad is ruled by a moderate regime that is friendly to the West, this should not mean that Iraqi national aspirations would necessarily be abandoned. In addition to Iraq, the Gulf region is likely to remain fundamentally unstable for several decades to come. Iran can be a source of instability insofar as it regards itself as the dominant Gulf power that is entitled to a commensurate role in the region. Sharing major maritime oil and gas fields with the littoral Gulf states means that Iran and the Arab sheikdoms have potential friction points. U.S. military presence, especially naval and air force capabilities, in several of the Gulf countries is a critical check to Iranian ambitions and possible adventurism.161 The uncertain prospect for the long-term stability of the traditional Gulf regimes is another issue of concern. These regimes, as this study has demonstrated, welcome American military presence. Several scenarios could be discussed as to what would happen if these regimes were to fall. I believe that, in the unlikely event this is to occur, it would not simultaneously happen in all of the Gulf states. If there were a regime change in Saudi Arabia, for example, the pressure would be more and not less on the United States to enhance its military presence, and specifically the presence of heavy combat capabilities in the other Gulf states. In other words, there is no realistic end in the foreseeable future to U.S. military engagement in the Gulf. The vital interests the United States has in the region, the desire of local governments to retain U.S. military presence, and the inability of Japan and European powers that depend on Middle East oil to project power for a long period of time, mean that U.S. engagement is there for the long haul.The Army should plan accordingly, for an over-the-horizon presence strategy is no longer valid. Air and naval power are highly effective in defeating aggression by hostile forces; land power is, in the final analysis, what will secure the worlds most precious and coveted real estate.

A immediate withdraw would result in civil war and the rise of an Iraqi dictator

**Pollack & Sargsyan 10**, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 13-14, accessed 6/28) CM

Thus, the real threat conjured by these historical patterns is not so much that a hasty U.S. withdrawal could result in a new Iraqi dictatorship. As bad as that would be, it would be preferable to the most likely outcome, which would be a resumption of all out civil war when the would-be dictator’s bid for power succeeded only in fracturing the Iraqi security forces, crippling the government, and prompting all of Iraq’s previously warring factions to resume their unfinished battles. Having made the political decision to withdraw the vast majority of U.S. troops, Washington is, to a certain extent, simply stuck with this risk. But it is a risk that can be mitigated, particularly by modulating the drawdown in accord with Iraq’s political circumstances, and being willing to show the flexibility and adaptability that Obama insisted on in his February 2009 speech on Iraq.18 Perhaps of greater importance still will be the president’s plan to leave behind 35,000—50,000 U.S. troops\_many of them combat troops rebadged as advisors in ‘‘Advisory Assistance Brigades’’ (AABs)\_until at least the end of 2011 to guard against future instability. Maintaining the AAB force in Iraq will likely be necessary, if the United States is to avoid the mistakes it made in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the twentieth century. These brigades retain virtually all of the personnel and much of the equipment of full combat brigades. Indeed, in an emergency, several of the AABs will be able to rapidly reequip as full-spectrum combat units. Thus, these brigades will perform a dual role: they will serve as advisors in peacetime but could quickly become combat brigades in a crisis. In many ways, the formation of the AABs is a clever way to square the circle between the president’s commitments to transition U.S. troops away from combat missions while still retaining combat capacity in Iraq to guard against crucial problems such as the propensity of COIN-trained developing armies to overthrow civilian governments.

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

Quick withdrawal destabilizes Iraq—we need 5 years to solve

Pascaul 8(Carlos, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy@Brookings, January 29, “Building Capacity for Stabilization & Reconstruction”, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0129\_stabilization\_pascual.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Let me just underscore a couple of key findings from the work that we've learned -- done and things that we've learned from stabilization and reconstruction. First is that it takes at least five to 10 years until it's possible to get local partners to really take the lead in stabilization and reconstruction effort. To imagine that you can build capacity and help them build capacity any faster is a fantasy and it just simply hasn't been done. Look at small states like Bosnia and Kosovo. The easiest part is up front, in the most destabilized period, because the international community is actually coming in and doing something to a country. The hardest part becomes as you start to build that capacity over time and it slows down that process of transition. And we haven't understood that. In fact, in a place like Iraq, 2003, 2004, those were the easy years. The other thing that we have to understand is that we need multilateral engagement to succeed in order to have the depth and the range and the time commitment that is necessary to undertake these missions. Afghanistan is a good example, where we have the U.N. and NATO and the United States and 30 nations. And here, we are still struggling to succeed. To imagine that we can do this alone is just simply a fantasy. If we even look at tiny Kosovo and the effort that it's taken multilaterally, we have to remember that the capacity that we build as the United States to be successful has to be leveraged with multilateral engagement. And finally, I would underscore that security is a prerequisite. There's a certain irony here that on one hand you need security as an enabling environment. If you don't get progress on stabilization and reconstruction and begin to normalize life, you can't actually sustain that security. But we shouldn't fool ourselves, that unless -- until there is some basic environment of security, it is very hard to have a sustainable stabilization and reconstruction effort.

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

Withdrawal causes middle east instability—empirically proven

Pollack & Sargsyan 10, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 8-9, accessed 6/28) CM

Iraq, and potentially Afghanistan at some later date, are not the first times that the United States has had to confront this politically vicious cycle of an indigenous military pushed into COIN operations that then poses a threat to its own civilian government, in turn prompting that government to try to prevent a military takeover by politicizing and crippling its military. The good news is that there is evidence that external military forces can prevent either or both. The bad news is that the history seems to demonstrate that such a foreign military presence needs to consist of large numbers of combat troops, not just military advisors. This is particularly salient for Iraq, both because of its importance to U.S. interests and the fact that current plans envision the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces so soon. There, the United States needs to leave behind not merely an Iraqi military capable of defeating the remnants of the insurgency, but a functional state that will remain stable and will not slide back into the kind of civil war that would threaten the stability of the wider Persian Gulf region. In 1925, the U.S. Marines finally pulled out of Nicaragua.10 They had arrived in 1912 to quell the domestic conflict between Nicaraguan liberals and conservatives, and largely succeeded in stamping out the violence itself. Unfortunately, neither the Americans nor the Nicaraguans had fully resolved the underlying problems that had led to the conflict in the first place. As a result only months after the Marines departed, the civil war resumed, fiercer than ever, in a struggle referred to as the Constitutionalist War. Immediately, the United States intervened again, forcing both sides to agree to a negotiated settlement that included provisions for new elections supervised by U.S. troops and the creation of a new national army, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

Plan leaves Iraq unstable—Iraq defenses can’t solve

The Straits Times 9(March 1, “US exit from Iraq sparks debate; Some are worried over instability but others say it's the right policy”, Lexis)

Mr Obama's announcement on the withdrawal timetable was made last Friday, in only the sixth week of his presidency. The move fulfilled a campaign pledge to wind down a war which he opposed and which unleashed sectarian bloodshed that nearly tore Iraq apart. The 100,000 combat troops will withdraw by August next year with most of them to stay until the end of this year to ensure Iraq's national elections go smoothly. Even after the drawdown, up to 50,000 US troops will stay until end-2011 to train Iraqi security forces, protect civilians and fight terrorism. Still, US commanders and experts have cautioned that Iraq remains fragile and security gains over the past year could be reversed. 'The rapid pace of withdrawal - from 12 brigades to zero - is deeply worrisome,' said Mr Thomas Donnelly, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. 'When TV screens are filled with convoy after convoy of departing American soldiers, it will be a powerful sight and will send mixed messages to Iraq's fractured society, the Al-Qaeda and to Iran.' Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said yesterday that Iraqi security forces are ready to take over from the Americans. However, Al-Qaeda and other Sunni Arab insurgent groups still frequently kill, kidnap and bomb. Pockets such as Kirkuk and Mosul remain flashpoints. 'Mr Obama's plan simply does not provide enough time to train the Iraqis for what could be dire scenarios,' Mr Donnelly said.

Withdrawal causes instability

Susman 9(Tina, LA Times Reporter, January 23, “Iraqi Envoy Warns Against Abrupt Troop Withdrawal, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/23/world/fg-iraq23, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Obama would like to have all the troops out by spring 2010. An agreement forged by the Bush administration and the Iraqi government calls for the last troops to leave by the end of 2011, though it is subject to change. Whatever happens, the ambassador said that if it were to be a "precipitous withdrawal, that could be very dangerous." Crocker said he was confident that was not the direction Obama was going. However, the president campaigned on a promise to end the war in Iraq, and with violence at its lowest level since 2003 and commanders in Afghanistan saying they need more troops, Obama will face pressure to move quickly on his campaign vow. In a conference call Wednesday night with Obama, Crocker said, he and the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, gave their assessments of the security situation in Iraq. He would not say what they told the president, though Odierno has also urged caution in reducing forces. Crocker, a career diplomat who arrived in Iraq in March 2007, when sectarian bloodshed was at its highest level, said fear remained "very pervasive" despite security improvements. "Security does have to be maintained. Neither the Iraqis nor we can take our eye off that ball," he said. "A precipitous withdrawal runs some very severe risks," he added, citing the possible effects "if we were to decide suddenly we're gone." Those effects could include the resurgence of Sunni Arab insurgents loyal to the Al Qaeda in Iraq militant group and increased meddling by neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria, which have been accused of smuggling fighters and weapons into Iraq to destabilize the U.S.-backed government.

Stability Ext—Generic Stability

Troops are stabilizing Iraq now—withdrawal causes instability

Biddle et al 8 (Stephen, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Kenneth Pollack, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, August 5, “U.S. Troops Not Quite Ready to Go Home from Iraq”, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0805\_iraq\_ohanlon.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

If the Iraqi government tells us to leave, we should go. But this would be a bad deal for both Iraqis and Americans. Iraq is indeed much more secure than it was two years ago, thus it seems safe to suggest timing goals for significant withdrawals. Yet having recently returned from a research trip to Iraq, we are convinced that a total withdrawal of combat troops any time soon would be unwise. (The American military arranged the logistics for our visit, and Foreign Affairs magazine will publish another article about our trip.) Violence in Iraq declined because the key combatants were either defeated in the field or agreed to cease-fires. These cease-fires were not accidents or temporary breathing spells. They were a systematic response to a new strategic landscape created by 2006’s sectarian bloodletting, the American surge last summer, the defeat of Al Qaeda’s forces in Anbar Province and the decision by battered Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias that fighting no longer served their interests. The underlying strategic rationale behind these stand-downs gives reason to believe that they are sustainable rather than ephemeral. But this does not make the peace inherently stable. Wary former combatants are constantly on the lookout for signs — real or imagined — that rivals mean to take advantage of them. The cease-fires, moreover, are extremely decentralized: more than 200 tribal and regional groups have reached individual agreements with the United States to stand down from fighting; in time, some will inevitably test the waters to see what they can get away with, or will misinterpret innocent behavior from neighbors as threatening and retaliate. A leader of one group of Sunni tribesmen who had switched allegiances and took up arms against Al Qaeda made this point at a meeting we had at Salman Pak, a military base south of Baghdad. He told us he was worried about encroachment onto his territory “from several directions” — apparently meaning he didn’t trust his Sunni neighbors any more than he trusted his traditional Shiite rivals. Left on their own, minor local flashpoints could easily spiral into a renewal of widespread violence. For now, the American combat presence plays a critical role in enforcing the terms of these cease-fire deals and damping escalatory incentives from spoiler violence. Iraqi government security forces, while they demonstrated improved effectiveness this spring in places like Basra and the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, cannot yet play this role themselves. In part this is because they are still not trusted by all cease-fire participants. To many Sunnis in particular, a government military commanded by a Shiite regime is not yet trustworthy enough to be tolerated without an American presence to keep it honest. To some extent, this is changing: for example, the National Police have replaced three-fourths of its leaders over the last year or so and now have more than a proportionate share of Sunnis in command positions.

Stability Ext—Stable Now

Iraq is the most stable its been in years

Pessin 10 (Al, VOA News, June 4, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/Odierno-Iraq-Moves-Toward-Stability-US-Drawdown-on-Track-95646044.html>) LL

General Odierno says the number of violent incidents, the number of casualties and the number of high-profile attacks in Iraq are all at their lowest levels since the conflict started. He attributes the change to increased competence by the Iraqi security forces and a joint operation in the town of Mosul about three months ago that broke a key al-Qaida cell and led to a series of attacks on some of the group's leaders and the arrests of several more. "We were able to get inside of this network, pick a lot of them up, and we will continue, with our Iraqi security force partners, to go after them," said General Odierno. "But there are still some very dangerous people out there. And there are some mid-and low-level leaders. We don't want them to develop into senior leadership. And that's what we're working towards now." Odierno says al-Qaida will try to overcome the setback, and he says it is still capable of carrying out attacks, particularly against undefended civilian targets. But he says the group is having more trouble recruiting fighters and leaders, and is finding it more and more difficult to destabilize the Iraqi government. The general says the plan is on track to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Iraq from 88,000 now to 50,000 by September first, and he does not expect the move to affect the security situation. "The Iraqis are in the lead," he said. "We are not. They have taken over the lead. What we're doing now is we are training, advising and assisting them. We continue to support our Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the UN for civil capacity. And we conduct partnerned counter-terrorism operations. That's what we do today. And that's what we'll do post-One September [after 09/01]" General Odierno says in addition to security, the other key to long-term stability in Iraq is politics. He called the certification of the election results a very important step, and also said he is pleased with talk of forming a government that includes all political factions. "Most of the security issues will come from what spawns out of the political realm," said Odierno. "That's why it's important to have a unity government. We don't want to see any group that feels it's been disenfranchised and even contemplates moving back to an insurgency." General Odierno also says Iran appears to have changed its strategy in Iraq in a way that contributes to the reduction in violence, but still seeks to gain influence. "They clearly moved away from a heavy lethal strategy to one that involves some lethal, and then some non-lethal, trying to almost gain monopolies in some economic areas as well as through heavy diplomatic and security collection influence inside of Iraq," he said. "So they're still doing it, but at a lower level."

Conditions in Iraq are promising and stable

AFP 10 (June 4, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iliKXlauRMdj1Uijz1Zv-WkJ7RUQ>) LL

 WASHINGTON — High-profile attacks and casualty figures in Iraq fell in 2010 to their lowest level since the US invasion, while the number of Al-Qaeda leaders captured or killed soared, the US commander in Iraq said Friday. "All of those statistics for the first five months of 2010 are the lowest we've had on record," General Ray Odierno told reporters in Washington. "Although there has been some violence -- there have been some bad days in Iraq -- every statistic continues to go in the right direction." He said US and Iraqi security forces in the past three months have detained or killed 34 of the top 42 Al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders, following a "significant" infiltration of AQI's apparent headquarters in the city of Mosul. "We've been whittling away at this for a very long time," Odierno said, adding that "we were able to get inside this network." The terror group, he said, "will attempt to regenerate themselves (but) they are finding it more difficult" in the face of persistent joint US-Iraqi security operations and what he described as a rejection of Al-Qaeda by "99.9 percent" of the Iraqi population. The steadily improving security, the intelligence boon and the new statistics -- announced by Odierno two days after his White House meeting with US President Barack Obama -- bode well for Iraq as the US prepares a drawdown from 88,000 troops on the ground today to 50,000 by the end of August. But Odierno stressed: "There are still some very dangerous people out there, and there are some mid- and low-level leaders -- we don't want them to develop into senior leadership." Iraqi security forces in late May announced the arrest of Al-Qaeda's Baghdad military chief Abbas Najem Abdullah al-Jawari, who went by the alias Abu Abdullah, as well as Mohammed Nuri Matar Yassin al-Abadi, who was in charge of Al-Qaeda's assassination units in the capital. In April, AQI's political leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the group's self-styled "minister of war" Abu Ayub al-Masri were killed in a joint US-Iraqi operation. Odierno attributed the successes to dramatic improvements in capability by the Iraqi security forces, which he said are now leading security efforts "across the country," including on most counterterrorism operations.

Stability Ext—Stable Now

**Stability in Iraq has progressed to the point that troops are being withdrawn and more civil service projects are being implemented**

Kemp 10 (Jason, USDS Public Affairs, Mar 10, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/10/35575-stability-operations-in-iraq-making-headway/>) LL

Though the U.S. has been building up the civilian infrastructure of Iraq since 2003, the sense of ownership and level interest of the people has never been as great as it is now, and that makes all the difference. For Lt. Col. Paul Schmidt, a civil affairs officer with 1st Infantry Division, the change over the years has been noticeable. "My last tour ended just as the surge was beginning in late 2006 so the change is primarily in the atmosphere," he said "There are still the same great, courageous people to work with, but I sense a much greater feeling of pride and hope for the future now than before." That pride is being demonstrated in the expectations of the people. "This country is becoming more and more stable because the Iraqi people are demanding it now in greater numbers," he said. And that demand is being met by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces in the provinces overseen by United States Division-South, of which 1st Infantry Division is the headquarters. "We are really at a point where stability operations and building civil capacity is extremely important," Schmidt said. "Local government officials are very effective across the USD-S AO [area of operations], but with increasing stability and effectiveness of ISF, we can really make great progress in assisting the Iraqis with providing services to the people and solving problems." In order to achieve that progress, USD-S and the U.S. Department of State's Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working together to build effective relationships that not only thrive and mature, but thoroughly benefit the country of Iraq. "The State Department is the lead for building civil capacity, but they are not resourced to do everything we need to accomplish, so it is accomplished through a partnership between DoS and DoD," Schmidt said. "They provide leadership of the PRTs as well as subject matter experts in governance, economic development, rule of law, agriculture and others, and we provide them the ability to move safely in order to perform their critical functions with Iraqi officials." The cooperation between U.S. civilian and military elements is crucial, Schmidt said. "The relationship is important and based on strong communication," he said. "I think we do a good job capitalizing on the strengths of each organization in order to maximize and synchronize our efforts to assist the Iraqis in building capacity for themselves." As Iraq has stabilized, the work done in the civilian sector has moved to the forefront, and everyone is getting involved. "With increased stability and security, the civil affairs mission becomes more important," Schmidt said. "This doesn't mean the civil affairs forces have to be the only units doing civil-military operations; just the opposite is true. U.S. forces at all levels have become very effective in conducting those missions so CA forces are being withdrawn from Iraq, with the exception of small planning teams at brigade and above."

Iraq is critical for US interests and is currently stable

Laipson 8( Ellen, 6/8, former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council (1993-95), National Intelligence Officer for Near and South Asia, The Century Foundation, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=644 accessed 7/4) CM

Iraq remains of great significance for the Middle East region and for America’s interests there. Iraq is intrinsically important, because of its location as a bridge between Iran and the Arab world, its oil wealth, and the potential of its people to be powerful regional players. The United States will continue to care about Iraq’s fortunes, its ability to achieve greater stability and prosperity for its people, and its relations with its neighbors. But the time is right for fresh thinking about a transition from a period of exceptional engagement to a new state of affairs. Iraq’s security situation remains volatile, even as the situation improves gradually in critical parts of the country as a result of both the U.S. surge and greater Iraqi local ownership of security matters. Violence still flares in Baghdad, in Sunni-dominant provinces, and as a result of a critical intra-Shia power struggle in the south. Iraq will remain a violent society even if the national and provincial security forces improve their capacity to impose law and order, as is likely. Iraq for some time to come will be struggling with the dramatic shift in its political demography that was caused by the U.S. decision to topple Saddam Hussein. Nonetheless, the dangers of Iraq descending to full-scale civil war or violent breakup have diminished in 2008. Iraq’s unity and stability is not to be taken for granted, and many still fear that things could deteriorate again, but a U.S. policy that is driven by fear of worst-case scenarios is not useful

Stability Ext—Iraq Key to ME Stability

Instability in Iraq spills over

UPI 10 (June 25, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/06/25/General-Middle-East-goes-as-Iraq-goes/UPI-24361277491860/>) LL

WASHINGTON, June 25 (UPI) -- A stable and self-reliant Iraq is essential to stability in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, a top military commander told U.S. lawmakers. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in his confirmation hearing to take over command of U.S. forces in Iraq from Army Gen. Ray Odierno. Austin told the Senate that the future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of the Middle East. "A sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq will contribute to the stability in the region and will be a major ally in our fight against al-Qaida and its extremist allies," he said in a statement provided by the Pentagon.

Without stability, Iraqi conflicts would be exported, regionally

Oliker et al 7 (Olga, RAND, Project Air Force, 2007, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG613.pdf>) LL

Iraq is the most pressing foreign and security policy issue that the United States faces today. Continued failure to make Iraq stable and secure threatens to disrupt the Middle East not by catalyzing the spread of democracy but by exporting instability and conflict. If violence continues, Iraq’s neighbors will use the country as a theater in which to pursue their own goals, including those at odds with Iraqi and U.S. interests. Iraq will remain a training ground for terrorist groups, threatening U.S. and allied security. Continued conflict in Iraq not only will remain extraordinarily costly in terms of U.S. lives and resources, but will also damage the credibility of the United States and the efficacy of U.S. forces. It also feeds perceptions around the world that the United States is engaged in a “war on Islam.”

Stability Ext—Instability Kills Oil Exports

Instability kills Iraq’s oil exports

Roubini 10 (Nouriel, April 8, a professor @ the Stern Business School @ NYU and chairmen of Roubini Global Economics http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/07/iraq-oil-money-opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html accessed 7/3) CM

We take a look at the energy sector prospects of Iraq, whose government aims to more than double oil production in the coming five years. While security and political constraints abound, production is inching up in Iraq, and recipients of 2009 oil-servicing contracts are beginning operations. Severe infrastructure shortfalls remain, however, and the pressure to maximize oil revenues could complicate the political and regulatory landscape. As Iraqi officials vie to form the next government and violence continues to sporadically shake the country, the quest to develop Iraq's oil riches is picking up steam. In late March the successful bidders of the first oil servicing contract (**BP** ( BP - news - people ) and China National Petroleum Co.) began subcontracting out drilling operations in the Rumaila field. While this represents incremental progress, obstacles to full-scale oil sector development remain great. As the new government emerges and the U.S. troops continue their withdrawal, the energy sector's development will likely proceed at best in fits and starts. Notably, foreign commercial interest has not been the problem. Despite the political uncertainties and deteriorating security situation, companies have flocked to invest in Iraq given the relatively low costs of production, favorable operating terms and lack of other investable oil fields in the region. International oil companies (IOCs) are eager to invest in Iraq, but the political, economic and regulatory hurdles are causing delays. The issuance of long-term servicing contracts, granted in 2009, is one way in. But the lack of clear guidelines about foreign ownership and property rights in the form of a petroleum sector may deter further development. The protracted political talks aimed at forming a coalition out of the hodgepodge of parties who won parliamentary seats in last month's elections could lead to a deadlocked government, or simply a long power vacuum, as negotiations proceed slowly. This almost certainly will expose energy contracts to challenges at the federal and local levels. The power vacuum has also prompted more attacks. It remains to be seen if a stable coalition will be able to pass key stalled legislation, including bills relating to the energy sector. Key issues for the new government to address include the governance of the resource-rich and ethnically divided northern province of Kirkuk; the sharing of oil and gas revenues between federal and regional governments; the passage of a fiscal 2011 budget; and preparations for the final U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011. Companies and investors will hope for policy continuity and the ratification of signed contracts. In our view, many of these contracts will be upheld, as all political groups in Iraq benefit from these issues. But the legal obstacles could be significant, delaying output. Iraq has the potential to be a major source of new oil in the next five to 10 years, but the process of scaling up production faces many obstacles. Modernizing and expanding the country's energy infrastructure will be costly, given Iraq's fiscal position, which may tempt Iraqi governments to extract as much revenue as possible to meet its fiscal vulnerabilities. Finally, as Iraq's oil production gradually climbs, it will face additional pressure from OPEC (Iraq is currently a nonvoting member of the bloc) to adhere to quotas. Given these uncertainties, Iraq's plans to more than double output within five years seem very optimistic.

Withdrawal from Iraq causes oil price spikes and economic collapse

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

Oil prices could skyrocket if Iraq becomes more unstable, leading to $5/gallon gas prices and a major recession of the world economy. A war should never be fought simply for economic reasons. However, any person that has contact with reality no that Iraq plays a critical role in the price of oil and the world economy. Iraq is a gigantic supplier of oil. Thus, the laws of supply and demand say anything that negatively affects supply will drive the price up. If an all-out civil war erupts, oil prices may just skyrocket to the point that we must pay $5 per gallon for gas. Setting aside the huge impact of those gas prices on the average American family, imagine what that would do to the world economy. Inflation and interest rates would go through the roof. Consumer spending would plummet. Unemployment would rise, leading to bigger government deficits. And the negative effects on the U.S. and world economy would snowball from there. Economists will tell you one of the best "leading indicators" on the state of the economy is the U.S. stock market. Watch the price drop in the stock market that happens with every uptick in the price of oil. And remember, the economies of the world are no longer isolated; they are intertwined. Thus, we would likely face not only a U.S. recession in the event of an Iraqi civil war, but a world recession.

Stability Ext—Nuclear War

Instability in Iraq escalates to nuclear war

Macwhirter 7(Iain, Political Columnist@The Sunday Herald, “Making Iraq Safe for Terrorists”, http://iainmacwhirter2.blogspot.com/2007/09/making-iraq-safe-for-terrorists.html, accessed 7/7/10)jn

So, what now? Where do we go from here? After this most disastrous mlitary adventure in modern history do we just shrug and move on? Put it down to experience? Suck our teeth and say that, well, democracy just doesn't 'take' in some cultures. Unfortunately we cannot. We will pull out of Iraq, leaving a token “overwatch” force, but the consequences of this calamity will pursue us. This war could be the prelude to a much wider crisis which could undermine our way of life and our liberties. The first obvious consequence is that Muslim extremism of the al Qaeda variety will likely increase. Bin Laden now has secure bases in Iraq and pro-Western Pakistan where he is renewing his terrorist infrastructure. His agents, the Taliban, are now inflicting withering casualty on British troops in Helmand province in some of the most sustained firefights our forces have experienced since the Second World War. We are not winning in Afghanistan, and the withdrawal from Iraq will give heart to the Afghani militias that they can dislodge the Brits from their country also. They defeated the Soviet Empire in the 1980s, so why not us? There is no way we can win the war in Afghanistan without a massive military presence, and a casualty rate that would be unacceptable to the British electorate following Iraq. But there's worse. Once we have left Iraq, and the country is carved up between Kurds, Sunnis and Shias, the largest part will be under the influence of Shi’ite Iran. President Ahmadinejad has been fighting a kind of proxy war there against the Americans and their Israeli allies. He has made clear his determination to sweep Israel "into the sea", which is why the wealthy Israeli lobby in Washington is urging a military strike against Iran's nuclear industry. Iran says it needs a nuclear “deterrent” just as much as Pakistan or Israel or Britain, and on the face of it it is hard to argue with their reasoning. An unstable Iraq will make the risk of a nuclear exchange in the Middle East all the more likely.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Kills Oil Supplies

Oil Module

US withdraw would cause Oil prices to skyrocket

Rove 8 (Karl, March 2, Senior Advisor and [Deputy Chief of Staff](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Deputy_Chief_of_Staff) to former [President](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) [George W. Bush](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush), Think Progress <http://www.infowars.com/rove-pulling-troops-out-of-iraq-will-cause-oil-prices-to-skyrocket-to-200-a-barrel/> accessed 7/6) CM

This morning on Fox News Sunday, former White House adviser Karl Rove claimed that redeployment from Iraq would cause oil prices to shoot to $200 a barrel: If we were to give up Iraq with the third largest oil reserves in the world to the control of an Al Qaida regime or to the control of Iran, don’t you think $200 a barrel oil would have a cost to the American economy? Occupying Iraq has hardly helped oil prices stay low. Last week, oil prices reached a record high of over $102 a barrel. On March 19, 2003 — the day the Iraq war commenced — oil was trading at $36 a barrel. A look at the rise in oil prices: oil prices None of this should have come as a surprise to the Bush administration; before the war, economists were widely predicting a prolonged presence in Iraq would lead to a rise in oil prices. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz recently noted in Vanity Fair, “The soaring price of oil is clearly related to the Iraq war. The issue is not whether to blame the war for this but simply how much to blame it.” Rove is also out of step with the American people, a majority of whom believes that the Iraq war is tied to the current economic downturn. A recent AP poll found that 68 percent of Americans say that redeploying from Iraq would help the economy. Transcript: WALLACE: All right. But Obama has found a clever way to link the war in Iraq to our domestic problems with the economy here at home. Let’s watch. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) OBAMA: We are spending $12 billion per month. That is money that we could be spending here in the United States, rebuilding our infrastructure, building schools, sending kids to university. (END VIDEO CLIP) WALLACE: If he’s able to define Iraq in terms of where do you spend that $12 billion, on the battlefield over there or on infrastructure and social programs here, doesn’t Obama win? ROVE: Well, Obama — it’s a good argument for Obama, but I’m wondering where it goes, because it really is a very neo-isolationist argument. It basically says, you know, We should not be involved in the world because of the consequences to the budget here at home. Well, we were not involved in the world before 9/11, and look what happened. Look at the cost to the American economy after a terrorist attack on the homeland. We lost a million jobs in 90 days after 9/11. If we were to give up Iraq with the third largest oil reserves in the world to the control of an Al Qaida regime or to the control of Iran, don’t you think $200 a barrel oil would have a cost to the American economy? So you know, it’s a cute thing in a primary. I’m not certain over an 8-month general election that you can make the argument that we ought to take a look at every foreign policy commitment in the United States and measure it on the basis of the number of dollars that we’ve got there. I happened to be in Los Angeles on Monday, and somebody had heard Obama say this to me, and they were Democrat, and at dinner they said, I’m worried about that, because does that mean he’s going to be looking at our support, for example, for the state of Israel and looking at it in terms of what could we be doing at home with those dollars? And it was a nice line, but I’m not certain how durable a line it necessarily is.

Higher Oil prices would devastate the US Economy

Roubini 9, (Nouriel, Nov 6, an economics professor @ New York University , http://www.heatingoil.com/home/economist-roubini-100-crude-oil-hurt-economic-recovery116/

Prominent economist Nouriel Roubini warned that [rising oil prices are likely to hinder economic recovery](http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/04/afx7087325.html), Reuters reported yesterday. “The price increase we have seen is too much, too fast,” Roubini said at a commodities conference in New York. “Part of the rise may be justified by global economic recovery…but going from $30 to $80 [per barrel] when demand for oil is down to 2005 levels is very difficult to justify.” Over the last several months, US crude prices have jumped nearly 150 percent to above $80 after hitting a 2009 low of $32.70 per barrel in January. While many traders happily attribute the price increase to an improving economy, others have argued that oil’s latest rally is fueled by [a weak dollar, speculation, and unjustified optimism](http://www.heatingoil.com/blog/42571027/). “Think what happened to oil last year,” Roubini said. “It went up not because of fundamental reasons like demand, but because of a bubble.” Indeed, crude inventories are approaching multi-year highs in the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer, even as demand goes down. If oil goes to $100 today, it will have the same effect on the global economy as what $147 oil had last year,” said Roubini, referring to the staggering price of oil just before the US financial crisis escalated into a global recession in 2008. “Today we have new bubbles because of a wall of liquidity created by the massive dollar carry trade,”

Oil Module

Extinction

Friedberg and Schoenfield 8 (Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html>, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

Oil Ext—**China Impact Module**

Iraqi oil is key to the Chinese economy and energy security

Osman 9 (Umberto, July 5, writer for Economy Watch [http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/iraq\_oil\_china\_wants\_iraqi\_oil\_fields\_even\_if\_they\_lose\_money\_06\_07.html accessed 7/6](http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/iraq_oil_china_wants_iraqi_oil_fields_even_if_they_lose_money_06_07.html%20accessed%207/6)) CM

The political situation in Iraq around these deals is complex. Clearly, the Iraqi government needs the funds from increased oil production to help rebuild the war-torn nation. It relies on oil for most of its revenues and yet can do little without the oil majors to reduce its deficits, currently running in the billions per year. It is negotiating an IMF loan to help tide over this period. However, there is a great deal of concern amongst Iraqis that oil will be given away to foreign interests. Most people believe the war, and indeed much of the bloodshed in the country for the last century, have been about the black gold. They now want it to be used to enrich the nation. The situation is futher complicated by the endemic corruption that Prime Minister Maliki has called 'white terrorism', and the constant friction caused by competition amongst a patchwork of political, religious and tribal interests. Even if it delays funds flowing into naitonal coffers, it is therefore politically expedient to push hard for a low or even uneconomical pricetag, as that will be seen as a victory of sorts and a source of national pride. Indeed, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani shrugged off the lackluster result, and expressed his satisfaction with the deal that was settled. "We think that the first (bidding) round didn't achieve the full objectives of the Ministry of Oil," said government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh. "At the same time, it was a good achievement especially in Rumaila oilfield ... With that level of production, we have compensated for the less(er) achievement of the first round. Generally we are happy with what we achieved," he added. China's demand for oil will only continue to grow, with many Chinese oilfields running dry. Chinese energy-security strategy is central to national interests, and includes securing access to as many primary energy sources as possible worldwide. Since this is key to overall economic growth and prosperity in the mainland, uneconomical bids make sense from a strategic perspective. There may never be an opportunity of the size of Iraq in the future as far as the Chinese are concerned, so this is just the start. One day after the close of the Iraqi oil auction, China's Sinopec offered US $7.22 billion to purchase the Swiss-Canadian firm Addax Petroleum, which operates in Kurdistan, in Iraq. Such a deal would be China's biggest international energy purchase. Addax's shareholders may approve the deal, and its board is recommending it. The latest report from Rednet.cn says that all 3 Chinese oil majors, (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) expect to compete in future bids. China's experience in volatile countries, including many in Africa, means that it has the appetite for risk needed to enter Iraq. "They may be no more competent at managing these risks than other companies, but they do seem to be prepared to accept a higher level of risk," said Philip Andrews-Speed, an expert in China's oil sector. In the short-term, most firms are not prepared to invest in Iraq's oil, but with China's incredible growth and demand for diversification, the rock-bottom prices Iraq will pay appear to be worth the risk.

World war III

Plate 3(Tom, Professor@UCLA, June 28, “Neo-cons a bigger risk to Bush than ChinaBy TOM PLATE FOR THE STRAITS TIMES”, *Straights Times*, Lexis)jn

But imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-conservatives really care about Mr Bush, they ought to find their common sense and get off his back. He has enough on his plate with Iraq. In the final analysis, neo-conservative insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China.

Oil Ext—Russian Adventurism Module

High oil prices cause Russian adventurism

Cohen & Ericson 9, (Ariel, Richard, Nov 2, Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Prof of Econ @ east Carolina http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Russias%20Economic%20Crisis%20and%20US%20Russia%20Relations%20Troubled%20Times%20Ahead

Russia's revenues from oil and natural gas are enabling its aggressive and often anti-Western foreign policy. Russia's falling economic performance has toned down Russia's rhetoric, but has not drastically changed Russia's foreign policy narrative, which remains decidedly anti- status quo and implicitly anti-American. The U.S. needs to devise incentives for steps that facilitate Russia's integration into global markets, but deny benefits if Russia continues to pursue anti-American policies or refuses to enact the needed changes. As the Obama Administration embarks on a major readjustment of U.S. policy toward Russia,[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Russias%20Economic%20Crisis%20and%20US%20Russia%20Relations%20Troubled%20Times%20Ahead%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) U.S. policymakers need to understand how the economic crisis is influencing Russia's foreign and domestic policies, and thereby affects U.S. interests. Much of Russia's assertiveness and adventurism in recent years floated on a bubble of expensive oil and natural gas exports. Today, however, the Russian elite appears to be divided between those who hope that natural resources will continue to finance Russia's assertive foreign policy, and those, like President Dmitry Medvedev, who are calling for a major reform to clean up corruption, strengthen the court system, and move away from the current resource-export model toward a knowledge-based economy that is integrated into the global economy.[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Russias%20Economic%20Crisis%20and%20US%20Russia%20Relations%20Troubled%20Times%20Ahead%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) The Obama Administration's strategy of unilateral U.S. concessions may fail. Instead, the U.S. should pursue a strategy based on a realistic assessment of Russian economic power. The White House should deny Russia economic benefits if it pursues anti-American policies. Meanwhile, the U.S. should work with its European allies to diversify their natural gas supplies, to defeat Russian hopes of blackmailing Europe into further strategic concessions, to block Russian weapons and sales to Iran and Venezuela, and to oppose Russia's attempt to reestablish its hegemony in the "near abroad." Finally, the Administration should focus U.S.-Russian strategic and economic cooperation on matters in which pursuit of mutual interests is possible.

Oil Ext—Vulnerability

US military withdraw in iraq would trigger an oil crisis and regional arms race

Riminton 7 ( Hugh May3,, CNN correspondent and writer, 3, CNN http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/

Shepperd said Iraq's neighbors would be drawn into the all-out civil war likely if U.S. forces left too quickly. Iran could move in to further strengthen its influence in southern Iraq; Turkey likely would move against the Kurds in the north; and Saudi Arabia would be inclined to take action to protect Sunnis in western Iraq, he said. The oil sector could also get hit hard, with Iran potentially mining the Persian Gulf and attempting to close the Straits of Hormuz, putting a stranglehold on oil flow, Shepperd says. "Oil prices would skyrocket," he said -- perhaps soaring from current prices of about $60 a barrel to more than $100 a barrel, with consequent rises at the gas pump. And that could bring further trouble, Shepperd added. "Saudi Arabia will not allow increasing Iranian dominance to endanger its regime and oil economy." On top of that, Iran could speed up its nuclear ambitions, causing a "daunting and depressing scenario" of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Turkey trying to get a nuclear bomb, Shepperd says. Observers such as Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, say a wider Mideast conflict could be avoided. But Alterman also fears that an Iraq left without U.S. support could turn into a center for international terrorism and a proxy battlefield for regional powers like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. "All the surrounding countries would think their interests are much better maintained not by directly sending troops but by continuing to send money and weapons to the people fighting that war," he said. "In my judgment, it would take decades for such an insurgency to quiet down." There are 120,000 Iraq soldiers now classified as trained by the U.S. military in Iraq, along with 135,000 police force members. But the head of the Iraqi ground forces, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed, recently told CNN that some of his soldiers don't even get paid, and that on any given day one quarter of the force is on vacation. For U.S. troops on the ground, the idea of withdrawal is vexing. "I think it would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq -- enemies of the government -- would take advantage of," said U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group. Staff Sgt. Matthew St. Pierre is one U.S. soldier who's come to the conclusion the United States cannot win the war, but he says he also fears the consequences of withdrawal. "We are the buffer right now and when we pull out, the people who support us are going to feel the wrath, and the people who are against us ... they're going to ultimately win. And I think that's unfortunate," he said. That is a prognosis that concerns many, though Shepperd sees a viable solution for Iraq, albeit one with a U.S. presence there for years to come. "Done properly we should be in Iraq for years, not in a combat [role], but an embedded advisory role," he said

Oil Ext—Vulnerability

Withdrawal causes instability and increase the vulnerability of our oil supplies

Carafano and Phillips 6(James, Ph. D and Senior Research Fellow@The Heritage Foundation, and James, Research fellow in Middle East studies@The Heritage Foundation, “The Dangerous Consequences of Cutting and Running in Iraq”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/10/The-Dangerous-Consequences-of-Cutting-and-Running-in-Iraq, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Consequence #1: An Army Up for Grabs. A sudden U.S. withdrawal would raise the risks of full-fledged civil war and disintegration of the army into hostile factions. The defection of soldiers to various militias, taking with them their heavy equipment, would bolster the militias' firepower and capacity to seize and hold terrain. The result would be a bloody and protracted civil war such as the conflict in Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Consequence #2: Energy Uncertainty. Growing anarchy in Iraq and the possible breakup of the country into autonomous regions would severely affect Iraq's oil exports. In 2005, Iraq produced about 1.9 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil and exported about 1.4 MBD. By June 2006, Iraqi oil production had risen to 2.5 MBD, and the govern­ment hopes to increase produc­tion to 2.7 MBD by the end of the year. A U.S. withdrawal would undermine the security of oil pipelines and other facilities and increase the vulnerability of Iraqi oil production to sabotage. The resulting drop in Iraqi oil exports would increase the upward pressure on world oil prices in an already tight oil market. Energy uncer­tainty would be increased further if Iraq splintered and Iran gained domination over a Shia-dominated rump state in the oil-rich south.

**US military presence is key to maintain Iraqi oil flow**

**Phillips 8 ( James, Feb 27,** is the Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, CFR<http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when_should_the_us_withdraw_from_iraq.html> accessed 7/6) CM

The struggle in Iraq is difficult, but winnable. With continued American support, the elected government of Iraq has a good chance to survive the disjointed insurgency, reach an accommodation with Sunni Arab moderates, and become an important ally in the war against terrorism.  The U.S. cannot afford to withdraw many of its troops until the Iraqi government has adequate time to build up its own security forces. Iraq may never become a Jeffersonian democracy, but the present government with all its warts is far preferable to what is likely to emerge if the U.S. irresponsibly abandons its Iraqi allies. Ted Carpenter is overly pessimistic about the prospects for salvaging a friendly government and surprisingly optimistic about the manifold spillover effects of an American defeat. He allows that U.S. “prestige” may suffer, but glosses over the implications of a defeat for the war against al-Qaeda [AQI], efforts to contain Iran, growing Islamic radical threats in the region, the loss of Iraqi oil exports in the tight world oil market, and the humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi people. While he is concerned about giving al-Qaeda a recruiting poster, he seems remarkably unruffled by allowing it to establish a sanctuary in the heart of the Arab world in close proximity to many of the governments it seeks to overthrow. Iraq’s dramatic drop in violence is not merely a reflection of the halt in sectarian cleansing—some of the worst violence is between rival groups of the same sect. It is due to greater realism in Iraqi politics: many Sunnis have been disabused of the notion, encouraged by Sunni Islamists and chauvinists, that they are entitled to dominate Iraq and are capable of forcibly re-imposing that domination. The backlash against AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups has been accompanied by an alienation of Shiites from the unruly militias that claim to defend them—about 20% of the 90,000 volunteers who have joined pro-government security forces in the last year have been Shiites. The weakening appeal of radical Islamists on both sides is a positive development that has opened the door to greater political progress.  The security gains attributable to the surge have made this possible and helped to amplify this trend. If the U.S. walks away from Iraq now, the Iraqis who have taken risks to fight our common enemies will face a devastating defeat. Abandoning Iraq would make a bad situation much worse.

Oil Ext—Vulnerability

Instability in Iraq risks oil price spikes

Batt 7 (Tony, April 30, journalist for Las Vegas Review, Las Vegas Review- Journal, http://www.lvrj.com/news/9466252.html accessed 7/3) CM

Gasoline prices could rise to about $9 per gallon if the United States withdraws troops from Iraq prematurely, Rep. Jon Porter said he was told on a trip to Iraq that ended this week. The Nevada Republican, who returned Tuesday from his fourth trip to Iraq, met with U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Iraqi Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh. "To a person, they said there would be genocide, gas prices in the U.S. would rise to eight or nine dollars a gallon, al-Qaida would continue its expansion, and Iran would take over that portion of the world if we leave," Porter said Wednesday in a phone interview from Las Vegas. Porter did not elaborate on the assessment that gasoline prices could spike. His spokesman, Matt Leffingwell, said afterward that the scenario "makes sense if Iran moves into Iraq." Porter "can't speculate directly on what is going to happen with gas prices, but the market prices for oil reflect the stability in that region," Leffingwell said. Petraeus and Crocker offered a "blunt" assessment of the situation, Porter said. Although Petraeus did not discuss the much anticipated Iraq status report he plans to release in September, Porter said the general told him the U.S. troop surge was working. But Porter stopped short of saying he would support Petraeus' report. "This was not unlike my trip there in January. I saw a lot of successes, and I noticed substantial improvement in Baghdad," said Porter, who has traveled to Iraq three times in the past 18 months. As lawmakers warm up for a renewal of the Iraq war debate in the fall, Porter accused Democrats of failing to offer solutions to the war and avoiding a debate on the ramifications of withdrawal. He said that some Democratic organizations, including the Searchlight Leadership Fund operated by Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., have funded anti-war groups. The Searchlight Leadership Fund made $5,000 donations to VoteVets.Org in 2006 and again earlier this year, according to federal records. "They're entitled to their opinion, but they ought to be honest with Nevadans about where they're getting their money," Porter said of the anti-war organizations. Reid spokesman Jon Summers said Porter is not "fully up to speed" with the Senate's actions on Iraq. "Democrats have put forward a number of solutions to change course in Iraq, but Republican obstructionists continue to throw up roadblocks," Summers said. As for Democrats funding anti-war groups, "did (Porter) happen to mention the Republican organizations that are funding pro-war groups?" Democrats claim that organizations defending President Bush's war strategy, such as Vets for Freedom or the newly formed Freedom's Watch, are fronts linked to the Bush administration whose aim is to attack Democrats and boost GOP fortunes in Congress. Reps. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., and Jim Moran, D-Va., joined Porter on the taxpayer-funded trip, which began Aug. 23 and included stops in Kuwait and Baghdad.

**US withdraw from Iraq will leave oil fields vulnerable to attack stopping the flow of oil**

Cole 10 (Juan R.I. May 14, is Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History @

the University of Michigan http://www.juancole.com/2010/05/us-troop-withdrawal-in-iraq-on-track.html accessed 7/3) CM

In the end, a very small force may remain, of trainers, special operations, and air force. Iraq’s air force planes and helicopters have been ordered but won’t arrive until 2013 and Iraqi pilots will need long and complicated training on them. The remaining US troops will be there, if at all, with the consent of the Iraqi government. They are unlikely to do any war fighting at all on their own. Close air support will likely be provided by the US to Iraqi infantry and armor in any pitched battles with militias from al-Udeid air force base in Qatar or from Incirlik in Turkey. I very much doubt that any remaining troops, and their numbers will likely be tiny, would be detailed to provide security for Exxon Mobil in developing the oil fields of south Iraq. If the local Iraqis don’t want the oil majors operating there, they can easily sabotage them, and no number of US troops would likely be able to stop the sabotage. (The northern pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean has been routinely sabotaged all the time the US has been in Iraq and the US military has never seemed able to do much about it). Foreign militaries do not operate effectively at the micro level, for the most part. The Iraqi military would have to provide that security, and Iraqi authorities would be best placed to offer local clans incentives to allow the work to go ahead. Iraq is in the US sphere of influence now, as the Philippines are, but in neither case does this modern form of great power politics require a big military presence. The Neocons’ dream of a division (25,000 – 30,000) US troops permanently in Iraq has been defeated by the Mahdi Army, the Baathists, and Sunni fundamentalists. But it was never a military necessity. In the case of the Neocons, they likely wanted that division as some sort of protection for Israel. It is an outmoded way of thinking.

Oil Ext—Iraq Key to Prices

Iraq’s oil supply would provide a safety valve and stabilize oil prices

Ng 10(Eileen, June 7, Associated Press Writer, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Iraq-says-its-oil-supply-will-apf-2589548117.html?x=0&.v=2 accessed 7/5) CM

Iraqi's oil minister said Monday an expected surge in his country's oil supply over the next few years will provide a "safety valve" to stabilize volatile oil prices. Hussain al-Shahristani said Iraq's oil production capacity is expected to more than quadruple to 12 million barrels a day by 2017 with up to a dozen deals with international oil companies awarded in recent years. "Our projection for the next two decades is that the world will require additional oil. There is no other source that can replace oil ... any additional demand for oil particularly in Asian markets will have to be met by Iraqi oil," he told a regional oil and gas conference. But analysts say the lack of a petrochemical law, ongoing insurgent attacks and uncertainty about who will lead the next government continue to be challenges to developing Iraqi's oil sector. They say Iraq's forecast of 12 million barrels a day in production capacity is unrealistic given continuing security issues and the condition and limits of Iraq's current oil infrastructure, including pipelines. Al-Shahristani, who has said current world crude prices were reasonable, pledged Iraq would not "flood the market" to influence oil prices. Prices have dropped to about $70 a barrel now, from more than $140 two years ago. "We will only produce what the market requires," he said. "I believe the Iraqi supply will provide a safety valve to dampen oil price volatility ... and ensure dependable long term oil supply to the energy market." Iraq, which sits atop the world's third largest proven reserves of conventional crude oil, has staked its economic recovery on developing its oil sector after years of sanctions and war. Oil revenues make up nearly 95 percent of Iraq's income. The Baghdad government is relying on 12 deals with international oil companies, 11 of which were the result of two international bidding rounds last year, to dramatically increase oil output in future years. Al-Shahristani said estimated investment in the 11 oil fields is about $150 billion, with combined production capacity of more than 60 billion barrels of oil over the next two decades. He said the government will open bidding for three gas fields in September, with combined reserves of 25 trillion cubic feet. Iraq also plans to build four new refineries that will help it become a net exporter of petroleum products in the next few years, he said. In an opening address to the conference, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak called for greater oversight of financial markets to prevent manipulation of oil prices. He said oil prices, at current levels, are bound to come under renewed pressure as the global economic recovery gains momentum. "In today's environment, unjustifiably high oil prices would risk jeopardizing the fragile recovery and undermine the stability of the global economy," he warned. U.S. giant Exxon Mobil Corp. Senior Vice-President Andrew P.Swiger told the conference that global energy demand is expected to increase by almost 35 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels with sharp growth seen in Asia. There are still abundant supplies worldwide but he said the key challenge is in marshaling massive investment, technological and management expertise to safely and effectively develop the resources

Iraqi oil is key to the oil market

Simpkins 10 (Jason, March 19, writer for Nuwire investor and money morning news, http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/china-and-iraq-will-play-key-roles-in-future-oil-54882.aspx accessed 7/6) CM

 Complicating matters further is Iraq, which is a member of OPEC, has been exempt from oil production quotas as it rebuilds its political and economic infrastructure. But as it takes its place back among the world's top oil producers, the country will have to make the transition back into OPEC compliance. The nation's oil exports reached their highest level in more than a year last month, surging 7.4% to 2.07 million bpd.  "Iraq doesn't have a formal quota and Nigeria is acting like it doesn't," said David Kirsch, director of oil markets at PFC Energy. "The potential of Iraq to substantially increase its production over the next few years has really changed the supply dynamic." Iraq offers the world's third-largest oil reserves  with about 115 billion barrels of black gold bubbling within its borders. And many analysts believe Iraq will soon leapfrog Iran, which has about 137 billion barrels of proven reserves. While the country boasts proven petroleum reserves of 115 billion barrels, the EIA estimates that up to 90% of the country remains unexplored. Only 2,000 wells have been drilled in Iraq, versus approximately 1 million in the state of Texas alone. Iraq could easily have another 100 billion barrels of oil buried beneath its uncharted territories. Indeed, the nation that currently produces just 2.5 million barrels of oil a day hopes to be pumping 12 million barrels daily within the next few years, said Hussein al-Shaharistani, Iraq's oil minister

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill U.S. Econ

High Oil prices are devastating the US economy and are killing consumer confidence and consumer spending

Barr 10, (Colin, Nov 18, senior writer @ Fortune Magazine, CNN News Money Econ, http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/18/news/economy/oil.prices.fortune/index.htm accessed 7/5) CM

NEW YORK (Fortune) -- Are cash-strapped American consumers on for another date with energy price misery? The U.S. economy remains weak and one in six Americans can't find enough work. Yet oil prices have risen steadily this year. A barrel of crude costs $79 and change, more than double its price at the end of 2008. This year's runup pales in comparison to the one that peaked last summer above $145 a barrel. Even so, some researchers warn we could once again be approaching the point at which rising energy costs will squeeze consumers. That could complicate recovery in an economy that, despite the tumult of the past two years, remains as consumer-driven as ever. "If you had to ask me what is the safe driving speed, I'd say $80 a barrel," said Steven Kopits, managing director at energy market forecaster Douglas-Westwood in New York. "We have bigger problems right now, but we shouldn't forget we're still vulnerable to rising oil prices." After last July's march to triple-digit crude, the recent increases look fairly tame. The price of a gallon of gas is $2.63 a gallon, according to the latest AAA survey. That's well below the 2008 peak of $4.11 -- but up 25% from a year ago and 63% above last December's low. What's more, the factors behind this spike seem apt to persist for some time. They include a pickup in global economic activity fueled by massive government spending, a decline in the purchasing power of the dollar as the U.S. holds interest rates near zero, and lack of new oil supplies coming online to meet future demand. While those trends hardly ensure rising fuel prices, they seem to have been doing their part so far, putting gasoline within striking distance of $3 a gallon. That's a price that could strain consumers whose spending accounts for two-thirds of economic activity. "Any time it gets above $3, it's worth watching," said James D. Hamilton, an economics professor at the University of California at San Diego. "When you get to that level, you start to see a change in behavior as budgets get squeezed." Hamilton said the $3-a-gallon price is noteworthy because it's around the level at which consumers are devoting 6% of their budgets to energy costs. Hitting that point in recent years seems to have prompted Americans to pull back. Hamilton notes that Americans largely shook off the sharp runup in energy prices earlier this decade, as energy spending remained in the 5% range and homeowners were able to tap home equity lines of credit. But that window closed when house prices stopped rising and loss-soaked banks started cutting credit. And though it's futile to single out any one trigger for the recession that started at the end of 2007, the downturn didn't start in earnest until consumers' energy budgets breached the 6% mark in November that year. As energy prices soared and incomes came under pressure, Americans first stopped buying pickup trucks and then deserted the local car dealer altogether. Car sales [plunged](http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/01/news/companies/auto_sales/index.htm?postversion=2008070119) in the spring of 2008 before falling off a cliff with the collapse of Lehman Brothers that September. "The price of oil played a bigger factor in the recession than people seem to be remembering," Hamilton said. None of this is to say a further rise in energy prices would necessarily send the economy into a tailspin. While consumers are still strapped, behavior changes should make the economy less vulnerable. U.S. oil consumption has slid 9% since 2007, Kopits notes. Americans also drove 3% fewer miles in the latest year through August than they did two years earlier, according to data from the Transportation Department. Hamilton points out that car sales reverted to depressed levels after the government's Cash for Clunkers promotion ended in August. Hillard G. Huntington, executive director at the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University, said that while oil markets remain exposed to a possible supply disruption, he believes the memory of last year's record prices is fresh enough that another oil shock is unlikely.

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill U.S. Econ

A fall of global oil supplies would devastate the US Economy

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG838.pdf Page 19-20 accessed 7/5)CM

How might an abrupt fall in oil supplies affect the U.S. economy? A sharp fall in global oil supplies would precipitate a rise in world market oil prices. The sharp increase in the price of oil and other forms of energy may make it unprofitable to produce energy-intensive or oil-intensive products. Closing plants that produce these products would contribute to a decline in output. Because the United States is a net importer of oil, an increase in the real (inflation-adjusted) price of oil would also result in a deterioration in the U.S. terms of trade, leaving U.S. consumers and businesses with less buying power than when prices are lower. These reductions in purchasing power or income effects would contribute to less economic activity. Some types of labor may also be priced too high in relation to oil. If real wages do not adjust to reflect this change, a rise in unemployment might accompany the oil price shock. Changes in demand due to changes in the real price of oil would lead to changes in the pattern of demand and adjustment costs as businesses respond to those changes. For example, as consumers shifted toward more–fuel-efficient vehicles in 2007 and 2008, U.S. automakers experienced a sharp decline in demand for full-duty pickup trucks and sport-utility vehicles. U.S. automakers have had to close or retool some of the plants designed to manufacture these vehicles. Scrapping formerly productive capital stock contributes to lower growth. A major challenge to gauging the potential magnitude of the effect of an abrupt surge in the real price of oil on the U.S economy is that oil price shocks have often been accompanied by other macroeconomic policies that have affected aggregate demand. For example, in both 1973–1974 and 1979–1980, U.S. monetary policy had been inflationary prior to the disruption. The tightening of monetary policy in 1980 affected the severity of the 1980 and 1981–1982 recessions (Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson, 1997; Barsky and Kilian, 2001, 2004).

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill World Econ

Oil disruption from Iraq would destabilize the entire oil market

BAKER 6 (PETER, 11/5/, WASHINGTON POST STAFF, THE WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110401025.html accessed 7/6) CM

Bush said extremists controlling Iraq "would use energy as economic blackmail" and try to pressure the United States to abandon its alliance with [Israel](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/israel.html?nav=el). At a stop in Missouri on Friday, he suggested that such radicals would be "able to pull millions of barrels of oil off the market, driving the price up to $300 or $400 a barrel." Oil is not the only reason Bush offers for staying in Iraq, but his comments on the stump represent another striking evolution of his argument on behalf of the war. The slogan of "no blood for oil" became a rallying cry for antiwar activists prior to the March 2003 invasion and angered administration officials. "There are certain things like that, myths, that are floating around," Rumsfeld told Steve Kroft of CBS Radio in November 2002. "It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil." White House spokesman Tony Fratto said Saturday that Bush's latest argument does not reflect a real shift. "We're still not saying we went into Iraq for oil. That's not true," he said. "But there is the realistic strategic concern that if a country with such enormous oil reserves and the corresponding revenues you can derive from that is controlled by essentially a terrorist organization, it could be destabilizing for the region”

High Oil prices would devastate the World Economy

AFP 8, (Associated Foreign Press, May 23, The Daily Star, http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=37749 accessed 7/6) CM

The feared super-spike in crude oil prices that appears to be underway could deal a crippling blow to a global economy already reeling from the US housing slump and tight credit, analysts say. Yet some argue that the surge may be a speculative bubble, and could end up self-correcting as demand softens from weaker economic growth and energy efficiency measures. Crude futures this week soared past the level of 130 dollars a barrel for the first time, having more than doubled in the past year. The jump appeared to fulfill predictions from some analysts of a super-spike that could take oil to 150 to 200 dollars a barrel. Goldman Sachs analyst Arjun Murti added to the speculative fever earlier this month with a dire prediction of higher prices, citing "a lack of adequate supply growth" and still-strong demand. "The possibility of 150-200 dollars per barrel seems increasingly likely over the next six to 24 months," he said in a research note. The reality of sky-high energy costs could mean a darker outlook for the US and global economy, by raising the price of a variety of goods and services. The notion of a quick recovery in the struggling US economy would likely be put in doubt, and the rest of the world would suffer as well. "A super-super spike would most likely put a stake in the heart of global economic growth," says Ed Yardeni, economist at Yardeni Research. "A global economic downturn would be the most likely outcome, led by a longer and deeper recession in the US." The airline industry, already reeling from the surge in the past year, is feeling even more pain. Several small US carriers have filed for bankruptcy and American Airlines, the nation's largest, announced a capacity reduction of 11 to 12 percent and other steps to deal with soaring energy costs. "The airline industry as it is constituted today was not built to withstand oil prices at 125 dollars a barrel, and certainly not when record fuel expenses are coupled with a weak US economy," said AMR Corporation chairman and chief executive Gerard Arpey. AMR is American's parent. John Kilduff, analyst at MF Global, said the world is consuming 87 million barrels per day of oil while producing only 82.6 million barrels. "This is a compelling fundamental factor," Kilduff said. But some say oil is a bubble waiting to burst and that prices could fall sharply as supply and demand come into balance. "We see many of the essential ingredients for a classic asset bubble," said Edward Morse at Lehman Brothers. Myles Zyblock of RBC Capital Markets argues that oil could be ready for a classic boom-and-bust cycle. "I am concerned about the possibility that a euphoric investment mentality is beginning to overtake the oil market," Zyblock said. Eve n so, Zyblock said the spike could do considerable damage. "An oil price mania is a particularly dangerous type of excess since it has the potential to generate severe economic, inflationary and/or political dislocation," he said. Oil prices will eventually retreat, analysts say, as the United States and other big consumers curb demand -- either by voluntary means or because of an economic slump. "What should matter and what will matter eventually is the fact that US oil imports are on a downward slope," said Phil Flynn at Alaron Trading, who notes that more fuel-efficient cars, and alternative energy is finally denting demand from the world's biggest oil consuming country. "The strain on global energy supply appears to be moderating, albeit ever so slightly," adds Zyblock. Zyblock said that other commodities such as gold have come off their peaks as the dollar has bounced back, but that oil's inexorable rise is more difficult to explain

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill Chinese Econ

Iraqi oil is key to the Chinese economy

China Daily 10 (no author, Jun 10, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-06/10/content\_9962145.htm accessed 7/6) CM

One hundred dollar-a-barrel prices for oil have shaken the U.S. and global economies. But as much as rising gasoline and heating oil prices hurt U.S. consumers, the impact is far more dire in the developing world. High oil prices hit poor people in impoverished, heavily indebted countries hard as individuals and families must pay more to meet their personal energy needs, and businesses must pay more to keep operating. They also batter the national economies of poor countries without oil resources; they must spend scarce foreign currency on increasingly expensive oil imports. There is growing evidence that impoverished nations are paying a large price — both in financial terms and in social and ecological costs — for the world’s addiction to oil.             “In sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, the oil crisis is not a vexing cost crunch,” wrote Abdoulaye Wade, president of the West African nation of Senegal, in an October 2006 column in the Washington Post. “It is an unfolding catastrophe that could set back efforts to reduce poverty and promote economic development for years.” In 2005, world leaders, under pressure from campaigners, announced a new deal to fight global poverty by agreeing to expanded international debt relief — promising more than $40 billion in debt cancellation to eligible poor nations. This debt relief — while limited to a select number of countries that comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic policies — was made on the basis that it would free up financial space for poor countries to spend money on education, health care, environmental protection and clean water. And in many nations, debt relief works.      But more than two years after the deal was struck, it is clear that soaring oil prices are undermining the benefits of debt cancellation in some countries, especially poor oil-importing nations. Take the case of Tanzania. Tanzania has invested resources freed up by debt relief to alleviate poverty. The 2005 UK Africa Commission Report found that Tanzania increased funding for poverty reduction by 130 percent between 1999 and 2005, thanks in part to debt relief But with the rise in the price of oil, according to figures from the Washington, D.C.-based Center for American Progress, the cost of Tanzania’s oil imports rose from $190 million in 2002 to about $480 million in 2006, representing an additional $290 million in payments each year for about the same amount of oil. Conversely, debt cancellation freed up roughly $140 million in 2006 in Tanzania, less than half of the additional amount that the country is paying for oil imports each year.. Shepperd Said Iraq's Neighbors Would Be Drawn Into The All-Out Civil War Likely If U.S. Forces Left Too Quickly. Iran Could Move In To Further Strengthen Its Influence In Southern Iraq; Turkey Likely Would Move Against The Kurds In The North; And Saudi Arabia Would Be Inclined To Take Action To Protect Sunnis In Western Iraq, He Said. The Oil Sector Could Also Get Hit Hard, With Iran Potentially Mining The Persian Gulf And Attempting To Close The Straits Of Hormuz, Putting A Stranglehold On Oil Flow, Shepperd Says. "Oil Prices Would Skyrocket," He Said -- Perhaps Soaring From Current Prices Of About $60 A Barrel To More Than $100 A Barrel, With Consequent Rises At The Gas Pump. And That Could Bring Further Trouble, Shepperd Added. "Saudi Arabia Will Not Allow Increasing Iranian Dominance To Endanger Its Regime And Oil Economy." On Top Of That, Iran Could Speed Up Its Nuclear Ambitions, Causing A "Daunting And Depressing Scenario" Of A Nuclear Arms Race In The Middle East With Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt And Turkey Trying To Get A Nuclear Bomb, Shepperd Says. Observers Such As Jon Alterman, Director Of The Middle East Program At The Center For Strategic And International Studies, Say A Wider Mideast Conflict Could Be Avoided. But Alterman Also Fears That An Iraq Left Without U.S. Support Could Turn Into A Center For International Terrorism And A Proxy Battlefield For Regional Powers Like Iran, Syria And Saudi Arabia. "All The Surrounding Countries Would Think Their Interests Are Much Better Maintained Not By Directly Sending Troops But By Continuing To Send Money And Weapons To The People Fighting That War," He Said. "In My Judgment, It Would Take Decades For Such An Insurgency To Quiet Down." There Are 120,000 Iraq Soldiers Now Classified As Trained By The U.S. Military In Iraq, Along With 135,000 Police Force Members. But The Head Of The Iraqi Ground Forces, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed, Recently Told Cnn That Some Of His Soldiers Don't Even Get Paid, And That On Any Given Day One Quarter Of The Force Is On Vacation. For U.S. Troops On The Ground, The Idea Of Withdrawal Is Vexing. "I Think It Would Cause A Huge Vacuum That The Enemies Of Iraq -- Enemies Of The Government -- Would Take Advantage Of," Said U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, The Commander Of The Iraq Assistance Group. Staff Sgt. Matthew St. Pierre Is One U.S. Soldier Who's Come To The Conclusion The United States Cannot Win The War, But He Says He Also Fears The Consequences Of Withdrawal. "We Are The Buffer Right Now And When We Pull Out, The People Who Support Us Are Going To Feel The Wrath, And The People Who Are Against Us ... They're Going To Ultimately Win. And I Think That's Unfortunate," He Said. That Is A Prognosis That Concerns Many, Though Shepperd Sees A Viable Solution For Iraq, Albeit One With A U.S. Presence There For Years To Come. "Done Properly We Should Be In Iraq For Years, Not In A Combat [Role], But An Embedded Advisory Role," He Said.

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill Chinese Econ

 High Oil Prices would hurt the Chinese economy

Thakkar 8 (Sara Kuepfer, journalist, “High oil prices and global power” International Relations and Security Network. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=93100) CM

**Soaring oil prices will hurt oil-importing countries with a large industrial economic base the most. Highly industrialized East Asian economic powers, including China, are expected to fare decidedly worse** than post-industrial economies and states with large services sectors.

High oil prices lead to rising production costs and thus higher export prices for manufactured goods, which will hurt international sales.

The Chinese fear that **a drop in exports would lead to the closure of production plants and a widespread loss of jobs. This could easily translate into social turmoil and political opposition. The consequence could be disastrous for China's one-party government, which justifies its monopoly on political power on its ability to keep the economy growing and maintain social peace**.

To prevent potential social and political unrest from spiraling out of control, **Beijing is subsidizing oil prices**. Moreover, many **Chinese export companies, fearing a sharp drop in sales, are reluctant to pass on the full increase in oil prices on to the consumer, which leads to reduced or negative margins. These practices are not sustainable in the long term**. If China is unable to make a profit from its exports, the country's money reserves will ultimately deplete. **China's economic vulnerability and the specter of domestic unrest leave the country in a geopolitically weakened position as a result of high oil prices.**

High oil prices hurt China’s economy by decreasing investment and hurting output.

Xinhua 8 (Economist, “China vulnerable to soaring oil price” CHINAdaily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/08/content\_467199.htm) CM

China's economy turns out to be vulnerable in dealing with challenges posed by soaring international oil price fluctuating around US$60 per barrel.

According to Zhang Guobao, vice minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, the best ways to cope are by improving energy efficiency and developing alternative energy resources.

China consumed much more energy resources than Japan in producing one unit of GDP.

Experts estimate that if it could use energy as efficiently as Japan, China would not have to increase its energy demand in the next 60 years. Chen Mian, professor of the prestigious University of Petroleum, said that depending on the market force, energy efficiency can only be improved by 20 percent.

So the government should take the crucial leading role in improving energy efficiency by taking a series of policies in production, consumption and technologies to ensure energy will be used efficiently by both producers and consumers, he said.

Ethanol gasoline, coal-liquefied oil and methanol gasoline are all alternative choices under experimentation in China. However, owing to the lack of financial, taxation or subsidy supporting polices, those new energy resources could not get accepted widely in the country.

Experts said a monopoly system in the petroleum market constitutes the fundamental reason preventing China from improving its capability in meeting challenges from soaring oil price.

According to the China Chamber of Commerce for Petroleum Industry, being held by several large state-owned petroleum corporations, the market does not leave space for competitors.

With the maturation of China's capital market, an increasing number of entities have the ability to invest in oil exploitation and development. In northern Shaanxi Province, private petroleum companies have raised the annual oil output from less than 800,000 tons to nearly 7 million tons in ten years.

Nevertheless, incapable of obtaining the mining competency, those small and medium-sized private enterprises have to enter the sector as joint ventures and find it is hard for them to develop.

Moreover ,lacking the effective supervision and management, those enterprises also have such weaknesses as indiscriminate mining. According to China's commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China will open its oil products market to foreign capital at the end of 2006.

Without forming a real market, China, however, will always find itself in a passive role in regional cooperation.

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill Chinese Econ

High oil prices hurt China’s economy by decreasing investment and hurting output.

 Tang et al 9(Economists, “Oil prices shocks and their short and long term effects on the Chinese economy” MPRA. Page 20) CM

Oil-price shocks have both the long-term and short-term effects on economic performance. The short-term effect is caused mainly by the change in capacity-utilization ratio, while the long-term effect is due to the change in capacity itself. Since investment determines the potential output capacity in the long run, the long-term impact of oil-price shock is attributed to the decrease of investment caused by higher input costs. Our ECM results clearly indicate the negative short-term relationship between oil price and output: 1% increase in oil price can reduce the output by about 0.38%. But the significance of the coefficient is relatively small, compared to that of investment in the cointegration equation. This is an illustration of the importance of investment to the long-term impact in China.

In the free market economies, producers could mark up their products to offset the increased input costs due to oil-price shock, depending on the price elasticity of demand, and their profit rate would not be severely affected. When the disadvantageous situation fades away, production can recover very quickly within the range of output capacity. In most developed countries where markets are well established, this kind of adjustment can be realized very quickly. However in China, as well as in most other developing countries, this kind of adjustment is baffled by the distorted pricing mechanism, and oil-price shock impacts the economy differently. Our in-depth study on the difference in response of CPI and PPI to oil-price shock clearly indicates this unique price transmission mechanism in China.

Oil Ext—High Prices Kill Consumption

Oil prices are on the brink a sharp rise could choke off US growth and consumption

Roubini 10 (Nouriel, April 8, a professor @ the Stern Business School @ NYU and chairmen of Roubini Global Economics http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/07/iraq-oil-money-opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html accessed 7/3) CM

Oil prices have been on a tear of late, rising almost 6% in a week to close at close to $87 per barrel on April 5. Despite a subsequent sell-off and oil's rather frothy prices, there do seem to be some short-term advantages, especially since oil market fundamentals kept prices within a narrow trading band from mid-2009 through the end of the first quarter of 2010. Strong growth in emerging market economies and accommodative monetary policy globally, as well as a more balanced oil market, should continue to provide modest support for oil prices. But if oil prices remain above $100 per barrel for long, higher prices could begin to choke off weak consumption, especially in the U.S. and in dollar-pegged commodity importers, in turn dragging oil back down.

Oil Ext—Prices Key to Consumer Confidence

Oil prices key to consumer confidence

Winning 10 (David, July 5,  News Editor, Energy, Asia-Pacific at Dow Jones Newswires, Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100705-700910.html> accessed 7/5) CM

SYDNEY (Dow Jones)--Crude oil futures rose in Asia Monday, but sentiment remained weak due to ongoing doubts about the strength of the U.S. and Chinese economies. On the New York Mercantile Exchange, light, sweet crude futures for delivery in August traded at $72.62 a barrel at 0604 GMT, up $0.48 in the Globex electronic session. Trading volumes were thin as the U.S. market will be closed Monday for a public holiday. August Brent crude on London's ICE Futures exchange rose $0.51 to $72.16 a barrel. Nymex crude's correction was expected after settling lower for the past five consecutive sessions in the U.S. Last week's 8.5% decline by the front-month contract was the worst since early May. However, many analysts said any respite was likely to be temporary, as technical charts show Nymex crude is likely to consolidate with a downward bias to at least a three-week low of $71.62 a barrel. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. expects the front-month Nymex contract to trade in a range of $65-$75 a barrel throughout July, as markets become more sensitive to any tightening in Chinese monetary policy and European sovereign debt worries. "We think the balance of crude oil price risks appears skewed towards the downside, as negative demand shocks from a sluggish economic recovery outweigh negative supply surprises such as the inconclusive six-month drilling ban and potential hurricane disruptions" in the Gulf of Mexico, ANZ said. Concerns are also now coming to a head that Iranian crude left in floating storage could be sold too quickly, adding to the pressure on benchmark oil prices, ANZ added. David Moore, chief commodity strategist at Commonwealth Bank of Australia, said the oil price probably now embodies more conservative assumptions on a U.S. economic recovery after data last week showed U.S. consumer confidence falling in June and the country's gauges of manufacturing activity tending toward the soft side. Compounding this were U.S. jobs numbers Friday, where nonfarm payrolls fell by 125,000 in June, partly due to the winding down of 225,000 temporary census jobs. Private businesses created 83,000 jobs, less than many economists expected. Barclays Capital became the latest bank to shave its medium-term oil price forecasts as a result of the slow pace of the global economic recovery, saying it now expects Nymex crude to average $87 in the fourth quarter, or $5 below its previous outlook. As risk aversion grows in the market, so investors are likely to move their assets away from commodities and into safe havens such as the U.S. dollar. Monday, the euro was at $1.2557 against the U.S. dollar, compared with $1.2543 in late New York trade Friday. But not everyone in the market is convinced that the crude price decline has much further to go. In a note Monday, Goldman Sachs said the economic outlook embedded in Nymex crude oil prices and speculative positions remain too pessimistic. Although it has cut its forecast for China's 2010 gross domestic product to 10.1% from 11.4%, this represents a reduction of just 0.1% in its world economic growth forecast. "The problem with Chinese oil demand is one of too much demand rather than too little. Despite the recent signs of a slowdown in (global) economic growth, oil demand in both the United States and China remains robust, and continues to surprise to the upside relative to our forecasts," Goldman said. At 0604 GMT, oil product futures were up. Nymex reformulated gasoline blendstock for August--the benchmark gasoline contract--rose 142 points to $1.9919 a gallon, while August heating oil traded at $1.9300, 145 points higher. ICE gasoil for July changed hands at $616.50 a metric ton, up $2.75 from Friday's settlement. -By David Winning, Dow Jones Newswires; +61-2-82724688; david.winning@dowjones.com

Oil Ext—High Prices Cause Terror

High Oil revenues support Al Qaeda terrorism efforts

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf> Page 55 accessed 7/5)CM

The primary goal of al Qaeda, the world’s most famous terrorist group, is to overthrow secular or apostate governments in the Muslim world and replace them with Islamic societies governed by the precepts of the Koran. Al Qaeda’s primary weapon to achieve this goal is terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda–sponsored terrorist attacks within the region are designed to destabilize existing governments, eventually leading to their overthrow. Terrorist attacks on the United States or U.S. citizens, facilities, or other assets abroad are intended to drive the United States out of the Muslim world. Similar attacks on U.S. allies are designed to do the same. Funding for al Qaeda and similar, less-known groups originating in the Middle East and North Africa comes from a variety of sources. Donations from groups and individuals from oil-rich countries in the Middle East have been an important source of funding. Higher oil prices may increase the pool of funds available to donors, as disposable incomes in oil exporters rise along with overall increases in economic output. Oil revenues also end up with charities that support al Qaeda and similar groups. Terrorist groups have long used charitable organizations to raise funds (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 170). Leaders of these charities may know, may not know, or may choose not to know the destination of these funds. Individuals and charities from the GCC nations have been accused of providing funding for al Qaeda and, more recently, the Taliban.

**Hamas and Hizballah are dependent of Iran’s oil revue to continue terrorist activities**

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG838.pdf Page 56-57](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf%20Page%2056-57) accessed 7/5)CM

Hamas and Hizballah are larger, more politically and socially active groups than al Qaeda, but they also use violence to achieve their goals. These groups have large budgets, on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars per year. These expenditures are used for social programs but also to pay the wages and arm militias and security forces that fall under the umbrella of these groups. Oil-exporting countries have been important sources of funding for Hizballah and Hamas. Iran has been providing as much as $200 million per year in funding for Hizballah (Wilson, 2004). Hamas obtains financial support on the order of a few hundred million dollars annually from Iran and has received assistance from many of the Arab Persian Gulf states (Katzman, 1995). The rulers or governments of these states provide grants to Hamas or affiliated groups from their national budgets or personal fortunes. Increased oil revenues imply increased availability of discretionary spending in the budget; hence, potentially more funding is available for these groups.

Oil Ext—High Prices Cause Iranian Prolif

**Iran destabilization of the Middle East and continued attempt to achieve nuclear weapons is supported by high oil revenue**

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG838.pdf Page 57](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf%20Page%2057) accessed 7/5)CM

Both Chavez and the Iranian leadership have benefited from increased oil export revenues. Without the sixfold increase in Venezuelan government revenues from oil exports, Chavez would have had to spend less on providing subsidies to his neighbors or on the Venezuelan military. Increased oil revenues have enabled the Iranian government to challenge the U.S. presence in the Middle East more assertively. Iran would have had a much more difficult time ignoring UN sanctions if oil prices had been lower. The extent and speed with which it has pursued its nuclear enrichment program would likely have been slower if it had had fewer funds. The decline in world market oil prices in the second half of 2008 has already made it more difficult for both governments to spend on activities contrary to U.S. interests. However, oil revenues provide a means, not a motivation. North Korea, a decidedly poor country that produces no oil, has developed nuclear weapons without the revenues available to Iran. It too has been one of the U.S.’s primary national security concerns. Unfortunately, launching a terrorist attack is cheap. The bombings in London and Madrid cost in the thousands, not millions, of dollars. Because of pressure from governments around the world, al Qaeda and its ilk have found it more difficult to rely on donations for their activities. Consequently, al Qaeda and its affiliates have diversified their funding sources to the countries in which they operate or turned to criminal activities for a larger share of their revenues. The terrorists on whom the United States is most focused on pursing have become much less reliant on donations from individuals and charities in oil-rich states. Increases in oil revenues have no bearing on their ability to finance operations. Higher revenues from exports of oil have helped Iran finance the activities of Hizballah. They also make it easier for Iran and some of the Persian Gulf states to provide assistance to Hamas. However, both Hamas and Hizballah have deep roots in their societies. Even without outside financing, these movements would exist, although probably not at their current strengths

Iran destabilization of the Middle East and continued attempt to achieve **nuclear weapons is supported by high oil revenue**

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG838.pdf Page 57](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf%20Page%2057) accessed 7/5)CM

Both Chavez and the Iranian leadership have benefited from increased oil export revenues. Without the sixfold increase in Venezuelan government revenues from oil exports, Chavez would have had to spend less on providing subsidies to his neighbors or on the Venezuelan military. Increased oil revenues have enabled the Iranian government to challenge the U.S. presence in the Middle East more assertively. Iran would have had a much more difficult time ignoring UN sanctions if oil prices had been lower. The extent and speed with which it has pursued its nuclear enrichment program would likely have been slower if it had had fewer funds. The decline in world market oil prices in the second half of 2008 has already made it more difficult for both governments to spend on activities contrary to U.S. interests. However, oil revenues provide a means, not a motivation. North Korea, a decidedly poor country that produces no oil, has developed nuclear weapons without the revenues available to Iran. It too has been one of the U.S.’s primary national security concerns. Unfortunately, launching a terrorist attack is cheap. The bombings in London and Madrid cost in the thousands, not millions, of dollars. Because of pressure from governments around the world, al Qaeda and its ilk have found it more difficult to rely on donations for their activities. Consequently, al Qaeda and its affiliates have diversified their funding sources to the countries in which they operate or turned to criminal activities for a larger share of their revenues. The terrorists on whom the United States is most focused on pursing have become much less reliant on donations from individuals and charities in oil-rich states. Increases in oil revenues have no bearing on their ability to finance operations. Higher revenues from exports of oil have helped Iran finance the activities of Hizballah. They also make it easier for Iran and some of the Persian Gulf states to provide assistance to Hamas. However, both Hamas and Hizballah have deep roots in their societies. Even without outside financing, these movements would exist, although probably not at their current strengths

Oil Ext—High Prices De-Stabilize Latin America

High Oil revenues Support Chavez military agenda and destabilization of Latin America

Crane et al 09 (Keith, Director of the RAND Corporation's Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, RAND institute, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf> Page 69 accessed 7/5)CM

Revenues from oil exports have enabled Chavez to pursue a number of policies that run counter to U.S. goals to create stable, peaceful, economically dynamic democracies in Latin America. Within Venezuela, he has attempted to concentrate political power in the presidency, undercutting checks and balances. Higher oil revenues permitted him to provide subsidies to his core constituencies, shoring up domestic political support. He has pursued economic policies, and encouraged other countries to do so as well, that retard economic growth and burden government finances. The decline in oil prices in the second half of 2008 is already straining the budget. The Venezuelan government is in the process of reducing some subsidies and devaluing the currency so as to restore fiscal balance. Chavez has provided campaign financing for presidential candidates in other countries in Latin America who also oppose U.S. policies. Most of these candidates have won recent elections. He has been an irritant to the United States in international forums, such as the United Nations. He has boosted military spending. He has also provided support for groups, such as FARC, that seek to overthrow neighboring governments.

Oil Ext—High Prices Fund Terrorism

**Venezuela generates its money from high Oil prices**

 Alvarez and Hanson 9, (Cesar J., Stephanie, Feb 9 researchers for Counicl on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas\_oilbased\_economy.html accessed 7/6) CM

 **Venezuela's proven oil reserves are** [**among the top ten in the world**](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Venezuela/Background.html)**. Oil generates about 80 percent of the country’s total export revenue, contributes about half of the central government’s income, and is responsible for about one-third of the country’s gross domestic product** (GDP). Increases in world oil prices in recent years have allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to expand social program spending, bolster commercial ties with other countries, and boost his own international profile. Though Chavez has threatened to stop exporting Venezuelan oil and refined petroleum products to the United States, its biggest oil-trading partner, experts say a significant short-term shift in oil relations between Venezuela and the United States is unlikely. The medium-term outlook for state oil company PDVSA is questionable, however, and analysts draw links between PDVSA's profitability and the political stability of the country. Analysts say the **recent global financial crisis and sudden drop in oil prices are adding to the oil company's financial turmoil**. Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Since then, **Venezuela’s economy has remained squarely centered on oil production**. In 2006, Chavez announced a nationalization of oil fields managed by foreign companies, which resulted in an increase of the government’s shares in these projects from 40 percent to 60 percent. Government officials argue, however, that economic growth efforts are not solely focused on oil. Venezuela’s ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, wrote in a 2006 Foreign Affairs essay that the non-oil sector, which includes mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, grew 10.6 percent in 2005, “indicating an important [diversification of the country's economy](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faresponse85417/bernardo-alvarez-herrera/a-benign-revolution.html).” Yet even if the country is working to diversify,“oil still predominates,” says [Miguel Tinker-Salas](http://www.pomona.edu/communications/media/featuredexperts/tinkersalas.shtml), a professor of Latin American history at Pomona College. In 2002, the Venezuelan economy experienced a significant downturn following a failed military coup to overthrow Chavez and a two-month strike by the state-run oil company PDVSA. The response to the strike—the dismissal of more than seventeen thousand PDVSA employees—resulted in a rapid drop in GDP between 2002 and 2003. In subsequent years, rising international oil prices helped the economy to recover. In 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, economic growth was 8.4 percent.

Chavez funds terrorist groups

Alvarez and Hanson 9, (Cesar J., Stephanie, Feb 9 researchers for Counicl on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas\_oilbased\_economy.html accessed 7/6) CM

Increased oil revenues have also given Chavez the ability to extend assistance programs outside Venezuela’s borders. For example, he provides [**oil at a preferential price**](http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html&newsid_temas=48) to many countries in the Caribbean through the Petrocaribe initiative. In 2009, a Venezuela-backed home heating program to low-income households in the United States was briefly halted, a sign that low oil prices may be [**forcing Chavez to reconsider (TIME)**](http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0%2C8599%2C1870219%2C00.html?iid=tsmodule) some of his social programs. In August 2007, the Associated Press calculated that Chavez had promised [**$8.8 billion in aid**](http://haitireborn.org/node/255), financing, and energy funding to Latin America and the Caribbean between January and August 2007, a figure far higher than the $1.6 billion of U.S. assistance for the entire year. Though it is impossible to determine how much of that funding was actually dispersed, the difference in aid is striking. Chavez is also suspected of funneling money to the [FARC](http://www.cfr.org/publication/9272/), a Colombian guerrilla group, as well as providing funds to Argentine President Cristina Kirchner’s election campaign in 2007—though he denies both charges.

Oil Ext—Production Key to Check Iran

Oil production is key to Iraqi security and a stable check on Iran

Makovsky 10*,(*Michael, January 27,Michael) foreign policy director of the Bipartisan Policy Center, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/there-will-be-oil accessed 7/3) CM

 But several U.S. senators and some in the media criticized those impending deals as lacking transparency and legitimacy, especially without passage of a national oil law. This criticism, according to a former senior State Department figure, emboldened the Iraqi opposition, and it took Shahristani another year to put forward a new arrangement. Fadhel Othman, a highly regarded former senior Iraqi oil official, argues that the use of an auction was unfortunate for Iraq because greater involvement of private oil companies would have advanced Iraqi oil production. Private companies are generally technologically superior to national companies, and their need to book reserves is an important incentive for them to perform in a timely fashion. Thus, here was an unusual instance where an emphasis on transparency was counterproductive. Still, on balance, the deals offer many advantages for Iraq and ultimately even for the United States. First, the entry of the conservative ExxonMobil, after years of an arms-length relationship with Iraq, offers promise for Iraq’s oil sector and is an expression of confidence in its postwar society. Second, any increased investment by oil companies should boost security for southern Iraq, as they seek to protect personnel. Third, Iraq’s treasury stands to benefit. If subsequent Iraqi governments and the winning bidders fulfill their commitments—a big “if”—and if Iraq improves its energy infrastructure, then oil production could jump from 2.5 million barrels per day to 12 million barrels per day within ten years. This would bring in over $200 billion per year in oil export revenue, based on current prices and adjusting for rising consumer demand, versus about $39 billion in 2009 and $62 billion in 2008. Anything that improves Iraq’s economy and security benefits the United States, especially after we have invested so much blood and treasure in the country. Our economy also benefits from more oil on the market, and thus lower prices; and it is especially advantageous to our national security when supply growth derives from a more diverse range of countries. Indeed, even if Iraq achieves only about half its stated goal, it will meet, according to Goldstein, a whopping 40 percent or more of estimated global oil demand growth over the next decade. Finally, the global oil market is a zero-sum game, and it is perhaps Iran, which threatens U.S. interests on several fronts, that stands to be hurt most by Iraqi oil growth. Whereas Iraq seeks greater energy wealth through increased production—and the Saudis through relatively moderate prices for their ample supply—Iran requires higher prices for its shrinking output. Iranian production has declined from 6 million barrels per day in 1974 under the shah to 3.8 million barrels per day recently because of the Islamic Republic’s technical deficiencies and its inability to attract sufficient foreign investment (owing partly to sanctions and partly to the government’s difficult negotiating approach). Oil revenue in 2007  accounted for over half of Iranian state revenue. This income is essential to a repressive regime’s ability to calm an increasingly restive population. Of course, while Iran may be threatened by Iraqi oil production, it can also turn the tables. Iran’s recent temporary takeover of Iraq’s Fakka oil well could be just another border dispute. Or it could be Tehran’s way of letting it be known that it could easily disrupt Iraq’s growing energy sector. So while there’s plenty of good news in the growth of Iraqi oil production, there are also reasons to be concerned—whether about the minimal role of the U.S. private sector, or the potentially large role of the country next door.

Oil Ext—Low Prices Check Iran

**The Saudis want to keep oil prices low to put pressure on Iran**

Hargreaves 10, (Steve, Feb 11, CNN staff writer, CNN http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/11/news/international/iran/index.htm accessed 7/5) CM

 NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- A desire to bring Iran to the bargaining table over its nuclear program could keep oil prices low worldwide for the next several months. Some analysts say Saudi Arabia, which has taken millions of barrels a day off world oil markets in response to falling demand, may open the taps if oil prices get too high. The Saudi's don't want high oil prices to hurt any global economic rebound. But they also don't want Iran, a rival in the region that has a nuclear program many say is designed to make weapons, to benefit from high oil prices. "They are seeking to maintain financial pressure on Iran as the U.S. seeks to build support for additional sanctions over the nuclear issue," Greg Priddy, a global energy analyst at the Eurasia group, a political risk consultancy, said in a recent research note. Lower oil prices could certainly hurt Iran. The country is the world's fourth-largest oil exporter, getting most of its revenue from oil sales, and needs prices near $100 a barrel to adequately sustain its government spending. Crude in the $70 range is thought to be enough to sustain Saudi Arabia's government spending, but not high enough for Iran. With oil prices near $70 a barrel and with its political instability, some believe it may be more willing to enter discussions about its nuclear program. Some say lower oil prices are already having an effect, contributing to the protests in the country and the government's harsh response. "[The regime] has to shoot their own kids," said Fariborc Ghadar, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of global business strategy at Penn State about the recent political upheaval in the country. "Women in the cities are angry. The economy is in terrible shape. The place is a mess." Of course it's not just lower oil prices that's driving the turmoil in Iran, but they are helping. Also helping are more targeted sanctions against investments in the country's oil infrastructure and decisions by U.S. allies to go after Iran's oil export market, said Ghadar. 0:00 /0:49BP shares slip

For example, a new refinery in China is being built by the Chinese state oil company, Exxon Mobil, and Saudi Aramco. By enlisting the Saudi's cooperation on the project, it ensures the refinery will be supplied with Saudi oil, not Iranian. The Iranians then have to go out and find someone else to buy their oil. "Third country markets may not be as economically attractive," said Ghadar. "It's causing a major burden on them." Now, whether these problems would be enough to convince the Iranian regime to give up its nuclear program is another matter. "That's a very complicated decision tree for the Iranian government," said Sharon Squassoni, a colleague of Ghadar's at CSIS and an expert on proliferation issues. "It might put on some pressure, but is it pressure enough? My guess is no." Although Squassoni acknowledged what's been tried to date hasn't really worked either. "In seven years, we haven't figured out what the right amount of pressure is." Saudi will power The real question is, when oil prices do begin to go up, will the Saudi's long term interests and strategic concerns outweigh the immediate gains that could be made in their pocketbook? One analyst who has connections inside OPEC thinks not. "Saudi Arabia would like to make as much money as it can on oil, this is the most important thing to the Kingdom," said the analyst, who asked not to be identified. "Their love of money will supercede their interest in security." Analysts that specialize in oil prices are generally split when it comes to the [direction of crude prices](http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/26/news/economy/oil_prices/index.htm?postversion=2010012608) in 2010. But those that think they're going up, like Merrill Lynch's Francisco Blanch, also don't believe Saudi Arabia will open the taps anytime soon. "We've already seen oil prices at $83," said Blanch, "and there wasn't much of a reaction from the Saudis". l. The Iraqi people are ready.

Oil Ext—Key to Iraq’s Economy

Oil is key to Iraq’s fragile economy

Makovsky 10*(*Michael, January 27,Michael) foreign policy director of the Bipartisan Policy Center, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/there-will-be-oil accessed 7/3) CM

This last development is a big deal. Oil is the key to Iraq’s economic growth and reconstruction, and, after several years of postwar stagnation, Iraqi oil production returned in 2009 to pre-war levels: 2.5 million barrels per day, of which 2 million are exported. But are these recent deals good news—for Iraq or for the United States? The Bush administration pressed hard for the enactment of petroleum laws that would encourage foreign investment, reorganize Iraq’s oil sector, and distribute oil revenue fairly across the country—to no avail. The Kurdistan Regional Government, meanwhile, boosted its economy in the north by concluding more than two dozen oil deals in the last several years, thanks to production sharing agreements, which give companies a negotiated share of production. The federal Iraqi oil minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, decided to cut some deals even without new oil laws, before the national elections slated for March. The first round of deals began last summer, the second in December. Shahristani did not offer production sharing agreements. Instead, he held an auction for less appealing 20-year service agreements under which Iraq would pay companies a very low fee—most successful bids ranged from $1 to $3 per barrel per day (before taxes and government fees)—for production beyond a specified level. This approach was a boon to state or national oil companies, such as China’s. National oil companies are less focused than private companies on profits, and were therefore better able to meet Iraq’s unattractive terms and offer lower bids. Some private oil companies did bid, although Chevron, despite its many dealings with Iraq before and after the war, did not. According to Lawrence Goldstein—a leading energy expert and member of the National Petroleum Council, which advises the U.S. Secretary of Energy—with national companies controlling up to 90 percent of global oil reserves, and with foreign opportunities scarce and the need to “book” additional reserves urgent, private companies wanted to get involved even on terms that were less than ideal. But the result of the auctions, unsurprisingly, was that only one U.S. company, ExxonMobil, was a winning bidder as a majority partner, and only one other U.S. company, Occidental Petroleum, won as a minority partner. Chinese national companies, by contrast, were part of half a dozen winning bids. What has gone largely undiscussed is American culpability in this failure to increase U.S. business, jobs, and influence. Early in the summer of 2008, Shahristani sought to award several shorter-term service contracts to mostly Western oil companies on terms far better than those offered in 2009.

Oil Ext—Prices Key to Refugees

Increasing oil wealth is key to aiding displaced Iraqi refugees

IRIN 8 (no author, June , IRIN is The humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78841 accessed 7/4) CM

“Day after day Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries are getting more frustrated by the harsh conditions in which they live. Sooner or later they are going to have a negative impact on the stability of the whole region,” said member of parliament (MP) Abdul-Khaliq Zankana, head of parliament’s Migration and Displacement Committee. “Most of them are unemployed and deprived of health care and education, even though their country is oil-rich. This situation will lead them to lose faith in their country; they could become easy prey to organised criminal gangs in their host countries or terrorist groups,” Zankana told IRIN. Zankana predicted the Iraqi refugee and displacement problem could take 8-10 years to resolve, given the security situation and the conflict in Iraq. He urged the government and the international community to adopt a comprehensive strategy to help the refugees return to their homes. **Call for oil money to help** refugees Zankana called on the government to earmark 5 percent of the country’s increasing oil revenues to help internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees with food, medical care and education, “otherwise they will be lost and this will have a negative impact on their host communities”. Iraqi oil revenues are higher than at any time since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with exports hitting a peak of 2.11 million barrels of oil per day (Financial Times, 17 June 2008). Daily production hit 2.5 million barrels a day last month, according to Oil Ministry figures. At the same time over four million Iraqis are living in difficult conditions as IDPs (2.4 million) or refugees in foreign countries (2.2 million). “We are talking about people who are growing up in wealthy environments but are stripped of the minimum benefits of life, and this, of course, will affect them psychologically,” Saad Naji Awni, a Baghdad-based psychologist, told IRIN. He called for counselling programmes to be set up to help them overcome their frustrations and sense of insecurity which, he said, could reach “dangerous levels”.  **UNHCR report** Over the past year the number of refugees worldwide rose by 2.5 million to stand at 11.4 million, with Iraq and Afghanistan contributing most to these figures, according a 17 June 2008 report by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). "In Iraq, with the sectarian divide and the lack of a comprehensive political solution, the number of internally displaced rose from 1.8 million at the start of the year to close to 2.4 million by the end of 2007," the report said.

Oil Ext—Price Increase Emboldens Russia

Oil revenue emboldens Russia leading to Russia’s defiance of the western will and power

Klein 8 (Brian P, Sept. 19, International Affairs Fellow in Japan, Japan times http://www.cfr.org/publication/17281/what\_goes\_around\_comes\_around\_for\_russia.html accessed 7/6) CM

Russia invades an eastern European republic, sends its navy to Latin America for military exercises in America’s backyard, and threatens to cut off energy supplies to western Europe. This reads like a chapter out of Cold War history. Yet 2008 has marked the re-emergence of Russia after a two-decade hiatus. Flush with cash from oil and gas revenue and a hefty grudge against perceived Western insults to its great power status, Russia has launched the opening salvo in a more muscular foreign policy. While the United States and Europe hoped that Russia would become more integrated into the world system, talk of NATO expansion, support for nascent eastern European democracies, and plans for basing missiles in Poland have heightened Russia’s sense of alienation and its perception that it must not bend to the will of Western powers. For Japan, Russia’s new power projection potentially complicates the territorial dispute over Japan’s northern islands and future peace treaty talks, making any Russian flexibility less likely. Discussions at the Group of Eight summit between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda may have provided some optimism, but domestic political uncertainty in Japan and Russia’s new aggressive posture suggest a long, slow process if future negotiations do occur. Any aggressive Russian move in Asia would certainly mark a serious shift in its foreign policy. Although the Caucasus has far more historical significance to Russia than territorial disputes with Japan, recent military maneuvers in the region, as Japan’s recent Defense White Paper points out, are cause for growing concern. Long-term export opportunities for Japanese manufacturers remain an incentive for maintaining good Japan-Russia relations. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.’s car sales in Russia surged 70 percent this spring, overtaking America as the company’s most lucrative foreign market. Potential Russian energy supplies may help diversify Japan’s energy imports away from the volatile Middle East. Still, the business climate is changing as the Russian government continues to push the interests of its government-backed companies, most notably Gazprom, in its energy deals. Possible Russian military exercises with Venezuela, while mostly symbolic, suggest a far broader goal of regaining international recognition beyond its traditional spheres of influence. Its “allies,” however, are few and weak compared to decades past. The West has a few potentially effective options in countering any further Russian forays into territorial adventurism. The flight of Western capital and a strong show of military support should raise the stakes high enough in the short term to discourage new Russian incursions. Russia’s access to the international economic system could be limited and its G8 membership suspended if it chose more aggressive action (most notably in Ukraine). Russian passports for the citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia won’t bring U.N. membership, trade, investment or international recognition. Sitting undeveloped on the edge of Russia like far-flung Soviet republics of the past, they will be reminded of the lost benefits of not integrating with the West. By contrast, U.S. support to Georgia to the tune of $1 billion (approximately 10 percent of the country’s 2007 GDP) will bring new development and jobs. The threat of energy-supply disruptions is probably Russia’s strongest leverage. It underscores that Europe must develop a broad energy policy that diversifies supply and reduces demand as a matter of national security. Russia’s coercive energy policy should put Japan on guard, especially with regard to possible codevelopment in Siberia. Ultimately a more productive relationship with Russia needs to be re-established. An appropriate incentive, after the defensive rhetorical dust has settled, would be to have serious negotiations on a new European security arrangement, codeveloped by the U.S., Europe and Russia as equal partners. The road to that end has just become longer and more tortuous. For now, a rich emboldened Russia thinks it no longer needs the West and can act against neighboring countries with minimal consequences. But commodity prices are already falling and Russia will eventually need more foreign investment and the rule of law to reach the desired economic heights and the subsequent respect that engenders in the industrialized world. For the West and Japan, this ambitious climb must be followed closely.

Oil Ext—Price Increase Emboldens Russia

Oil is the lynchpin to Russian power

Goldman 8 (Marshall, July 16, prof emeritus in the Wellesley College Department of Economics,  <http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1642> accessed 7/6) CM

**Oil, natural gas and the political power of Vladimir Putin have brought Russia back from its precipitous economic collapse in 1998 and left the former communist nation bristling with cash, pride and unprecedented global influence.** That is the richly researched and entertainingly written message of "Petrostate" by Marshall I. Goldman, a Wellesley College economics professor and a senior scholar at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian Studies. Subtitled "Putin, Power and the New Russia," Goldman's narrative documents Russia's dramatic 10-year conversion from debt-ridden den of corruption to a cash-rich nation that, still, sports an unseemly underside of brutal power politics. **The ruble roars back** **Timing has been everything as Putin, president Jan. 1, 2000, through March 2008, rode the rising tide of fossil fuel prices**. Goldman writes: "With production and exports down by almost 50 percent and crude oil prices hovering at a low of $10-$12 a barrel, Russia had trouble paying its bills, and as a consequence suffered a massive financial collapse. On August 17, 1998, the government defaulted on its debt and most of the country's private banks closed their doors and locked their vaults." But by 2005, oil was at $70 a barrel and the once-pathetic ruble was roaring back along with Putin's increasingly large footprint on world affairs, one that has increased further as fuel prices skyrocket. Putin, a former KGB spy and chief of the KGB's successor, the FSB, became prime minister on Aug. 9, 1999, under ailing President Boris Yeltsin, who appointed him president on Jan. 1, 2000 (Putin was formally elected that March). Putin just became prime minister again, since the March 2008 election of President Dmitri Medvedev. It is no coincidence that Medvedev, a former Kremlin chief-of-staff and first deputy prime minister also was board chairman of state-controlled (more than 50 percent of shares government-owned) gas giant Gazprom. Formed in August 1989 from the Ministry of the Gas Industry, Gazprom is Russia's largest corporation and the world's third largest, behind Exxon-Mobil and General Electric. Marshall writes that Putin and other KGB/FSB alumni carry a cachet of power and toughness in Russian politics; Putin used it to bolster his power at the expense of wealthy business executives and unruly regional governors, and to establish state control over the media. **Putin used his galvanized power to capitalize on rising global demand for gas and oil. "When Putin took over as prime minister in August 1999, the capitalized value of the nation's publicly traded stocks amounted to $74 billion,"** Goldman notes. "By 2006, the capitalized value exceeded $1 trillion." The result is what Goldman calls a Russian "energy superpower" that can exercise great economic and political influence over world affairs. **Waxing of Russian power** **That waxing Russian influence has come as the United States has waned because of its growing trade deficit; increasing dependence on imported fossil fuels; its deepening public debt, much of it held by creditor nations rising in financial strength; and the nearly 50-percent devaluation of the dollar since America went back into annual government deficits in 2001.** "[**Russia's] emergence as a new super energy power overlaps with the weakening of the United States as we have squandered our manpower and resources in Iraq," Goldman write**s. "Russia under Putin, on the other hand, has developed a new hubris that is not based on mere bluster." Russia's growing might, Goldman writes, is evidenced by the fact "that as of mid-2007, with more than $420 billion in the state treasury, Russia had the world's third-largest holdings of foreign currency reserves and gold, behind only China, with more than $1.4 trillion, and Japan, with $900 billion." When most people think of the world's great reserves of oil, they think of Saudi Arabia and other members of OPEC, but Goldman writes that "by 2006, Russia was out-pumping Saudi Arabia. Just as in the periods from 1898 to 1901 and 1975 to 1992, Russia once again became the world's largest producer of petroleum." As of 2006, the United States imported 3 percent of its oil from Russia, up from 2.2 percent in 2004 and likely to increase. Russia has the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Although U.S. natural gas needs are largely self-supplied, with supplemental imports from Canada, Europe is another story. Goldman describes Gazprom's gas empire as a monopoly with "a spiderweb-like maze of natural gas pipelines reaching from East Siberia west to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean south to the Caspian and Black seas." The Russians linked their gas pipeline system to Western Europe in 1985, despite the Reagan administration's failed efforts to dissuade General Electric and England's John Brown Engineering firm (President Reagan even lobbied ideological soul mate Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher) from selling the Soviets the compressor technology they lacked.

Oil Ext—Price Increase Emboldens Russia

Oil revenue emboldens Russia leading to Russia’s defiance of the western will and power

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Russia invades an eastern European republic, sends its navy to Latin America for military exercises in America’s backyard, and threatens to cut off energy supplies to western Europe. This reads like a chapter out of Cold War history. Yet 2008 has marked the re-emergence of Russia after a two-decade hiatus. Flush with cash from oil and gas revenue and a hefty grudge against perceived Western insults to its great power status, Russia has launched the opening salvo in a more muscular foreign policy. While the United States and Europe hoped that Russia would become more integrated into the world system, talk of NATO expansion, support for nascent eastern European democracies, and plans for basing missiles in Poland have heightened Russia’s sense of alienation and its perception that it must not bend to the will of Western powers. For Japan, Russia’s new power projection potentially complicates the territorial dispute over Japan’s northern islands and future peace treaty talks, making any Russian flexibility less likely. Discussions at the Group of Eight summit between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda may have provided some optimism, but domestic political uncertainty in Japan and Russia’s new aggressive posture suggest a long, slow process if future negotiations do occur. Any aggressive Russian move in Asia would certainly mark a serious shift in its foreign policy. Although the Caucasus has far more historical significance to Russia than territorial disputes with Japan, recent military maneuvers in the region, as Japan’s recent Defense White Paper points out, are cause for growing concern. Long-term export opportunities for Japanese manufacturers remain an incentive for maintaining good Japan-Russia relations. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.’s car sales in Russia surged 70 percent this spring, overtaking America as the company’s most lucrative foreign market. Potential Russian energy supplies may help diversify Japan’s energy imports away from the volatile Middle East. Still, the business climate is changing as the Russian government continues to push the interests of its government-backed companies, most notably Gazprom, in its energy deals. Possible Russian military exercises with Venezuela, while mostly symbolic, suggest a far broader goal of regaining international recognition beyond its traditional spheres of influence. Its “allies,” however, are few and weak compared to decades past. The West has a few potentially effective options in countering any further Russian forays into territorial adventurism. The flight of Western capital and a strong show of military support should raise the stakes high enough in the short term to discourage new Russian incursions. Russia’s access to the international economic system could be limited and its G8 membership suspended if it chose more aggressive action (most notably in Ukraine). Russian passports for the citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia won’t bring U.N. membership, trade, investment or international recognition. Sitting undeveloped on the edge of Russia like far-flung Soviet republics of the past, they will be reminded of the lost benefits of not integrating with the West. By contrast, U.S. support to Georgia to the tune of $1 billion (approximately 10 percent of the country’s 2007 GDP) will bring new development and jobs. The threat of energy-supply disruptions is probably Russia’s strongest leverage. It underscores that Europe must develop a broad energy policy that diversifies supply and reduces demand as a matter of national security. Russia’s coercive energy policy should put Japan on guard, especially with regard to possible codevelopment in Siberia. Ultimately a more productive relationship with Russia needs to be re-established. An appropriate incentive, after the defensive rhetorical dust has settled, would be to have serious negotiations on a new European security arrangement, codeveloped by the U.S., Europe and Russia as equal partners. The road to that end has just become longer and more tortuous. For now, a rich emboldened Russia thinks it no longer needs the West and can act against neighboring countries with minimal consequences. But commodity prices are already falling and Russia will eventually need more foreign investment and the rule of law to reach the desired economic heights and the subsequent respect that engenders in the industrialized world. For the West and Japan, this ambitious climb must be followed closely

Oil Ext—Price Increase Emboldens Russia

High Oil Prices are key to Russia economy and preventing Dutch Disease

Matthews 8 (Owen, May 7, writer for Newsweek, News Week http://www.newsweek.com/2008/05/06/economy-of-clay.html accessed 7/6) CM

On paper, Russia's basic economic indicators appear quite healthy: growth has averaged 7.5 per year for the last eight years, the country's massive debts have been replaced with a $150 billion stabilization fund, and its trade balance shows a healthy surplus of $72.5 billion last year. The Russian stock market's RTS index has grown by a staggering 1,922 percent between 2000 and 2007. But in truth, the Russian economy as a whole is an edifice with feet of clay. The bling and glitter of the capital obscures a harsh reality: the architecture of Russia's economy is no more solid than that of an inflatable children's castle at fairground, with energy and commodity prices the wind that keeps it inflated. Yes, the Russian economy has been growing fast. But little of that growth has spilled over into the real Russian economy. Rather, the boom has, in many ways, held back Russia's non-commodities economy from growing: rampant inflation, spiraling real-estate prices and higher labor costs, bureaucratic corruption, expensive credit and bad governance have combined to stifle the competitiveness of many Russian businesses. "Russia's macroeconomic performance has been stellar," says economic analyst Anders Aslund. "But Russia's oil surplus is so huge that it hides flaws in economic policy; the longer oil prices remain high, the worse economic policy will become. Booms breed complacency and corruption."

Oil Ext—High Prices Cause Poverty

High Oil prices causes global poverty especially in developing countries

Watkins 7, (Neil, Oct, is the Executive Director of Jubilee USA Network, instiution on devolping dept cancelation and third world economics Multinational Monitor (29) 4 institutions.http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2007/092007/watkins.html accessed 7/6) CM

"For China, oil security is largely about avoiding disruption to supplies and cushioning the effects of dramatic fluctuations in oil prices," said Barclays Capital oil analyst Amrita Sen. "Iraq has become an obvious target to secure the barrels of oil for future consumption." China has emerged as one of the biggest economic beneficiaries of the war, snagging five lucrative deals. While Western firms were largely subdued in their interest in Iraq's recent oil auctions, China snapped up three contracts, shrugging off the security risks and the country's political instability for the promise of oil. In the broader Middle East, China has helped develop and expand the oil industry in Sudan. It has also signed deals in Iran, where the hardline government is facing a potential fourth round of UN sanctions over its controversial nuclear program. Iran has denied claims by the US and others that its nuclear efforts are geared to weapons production. The result of its efforts is that about half of China's oil comes from the region. It has ousted the United States as OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia's top oil customer. Saudi Arabia has also set up a joint venture refinery in China. Iraq, however, has emerged as one of Beijing's best hopes for oil in a world where cheap, reliable sources of new crude are increasingly harder to obtain. Sanctions in place against Iran sharply limit investments in the country and have largely precluded Western oil majors from aggressively following up on projects there. A potential new sanctions round before the United Nations could expand those restrictions. Even so, Iran is China's third largest supplier. "Iraq is extremely important for Chinese companies' growth strategy, especially given that Iran is likely to face much of a standstill for years," said IHS Global Insight's Mideast oil analyst, Samuel Ciszuk. The country, whose oil sector has been battered by years of neglect, war, sabotage and under-investment, produces only about 2.4 million barrels per day -- well below its pre-2003 invasion production levels. But contracts awarded during two oil and gas field auctions over the past year are expected to raise output to as much as 12 million barrels per day within seven years, according to Iraqi officials. Analysts say those estimates are too ambitious. Either way, production will rise, and China will play a role and stands to benefit. While the 20-year contracts mainly gave companies a fixed price for every barrel they produce, they also carry the option of payment in crude. That affords the firms a long-term and stable supply of oil. The contracts can also be extended for five more years. China's energy needs are as obvious as they are challenging. While the world struggled with its worst recession in over six decades, China's economy expanded by 8.7 percent in 2009. The International Monetary Fund forecasts growth of 10 percent this year. A recent report by Platts, the energy information arm of McGraw-Hill Cos, found that China's demand for oil hit 8.43 million barrels per day in April, a 12.7 percent increase over April 2009 levels. Current demand is more than twice China's domestic production. Of a dozen deals the Iraqi central government awarded since 2003, four went to China. The autonomous, oil-rich Kurdish region in the north independently signed nearly two dozen oil deals with foreign companies, one of them with China. The Chinese oilmen with Al-Waha, sweating under the sweltering Iraqi sun while drilling wells and preparing the ground to build other infrastructure in the relatively peaceful Wasit province, are among the first signs of that new cooperation.

Oil Ext—Prices on the Brink

**Oil prices on the brink they current levels are critical for economic stability**

KRAUSS 10 (CLIFFORD, March 30, Edward R. Murrow fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations., http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/business/energy-environment/31oil.html accessed 7/6) CM

Memories are still fresh of the chaotic climb to $147 a barrel only two summers ago, accompanied by gasoline costing $4.11 a gallon. The spike led to accusations from drivers and politicians that oil companies were price-gouging. Then crude prices plummeted along with the economy, to around $34 a barrel just over a year ago, only to double again in a matter of months as confidence began to recover. And there the price has stayed, more or less, since August, reaching a rough stability in the $70 to $83 range. Economists and government officials say that if prices remain in that band, it could benefit the world economy, the future security of energy supplies and even the environment. The price is high enough to drive investment in future oil production and in supplies of alternative energy, they note, but low enough that consumers can bear it. “It’s a sweet spot,” said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a Harvard professor of international finance. “It’s not too low that it’s crushing demand for renewable energy sources or causing debt and fiscal crises in oil-exporting countries. And it’s not so high that it’s driving African countries deeper into poverty and threatening the recovery in the U.S. and Europe.” Gasoline prices have stabilized along with oil prices, with the average national price for a gallon of regular gasoline ranging from $2.50 to $2.80 since June. Prices are expected to go as high as $3 a gallon during this summer’s driving season. That is a relatively high price by historical standards, but it is more tolerable than in the summer of 2008, when prices exceeded $4 a gallon for weeks, and rose above $4.50 in a few states.

Oil Ext—A2: OPEC Keeps Prices High

Iraq will flood the Oil Market and Opec will be powerless to stop it

 Amies 9 (Nick Writer for Deutsche Welle, Deutsche Wells, [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5033275,00.html](http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0%2C%2C5033275%2C00.html) accessed 7/6) CM

**Iraq looks set to shake up the Middle East's oil hierarchy after the Iraqi Oil Ministry ended its second bidding round last week, awarding seven oilfields in a tender which could eventually increase the war-torn country's capacity to 12 million barrels per day**. The auction, which centered on oilfields ready for development, saw Russian and Chinese oil firms secure lucrative contracts at the expense of companies from the United **States who were largely absent from the tender for deals to tap Iraqi oil reserves, the world's third-largest**. Al-Shahristani is confident Iraq can shake up the oil industry While the lack of success for US companies caused some surprise - considering the widespread belief that the US-led invasion was based on a thirst for oil - the main topic of debate after the auction was the likelihood that **Iraq's new oil power would move Baghdad into the big league of oil producing countries and give it a strong hand** in future Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (**OPEC)** negotiations on output quotas. **OPEC countries**, particularly the world's top oil exporter and OPEC's most powerful member Saudi Arabia**, were left to consider what Iraq's new position would mean for the stability of the organization and the future price of oil**. **Iraq was exempted from OPEC's** output targets during the 1990s while the country labored under international sanctions. While its own output was compromised under the UN-brokered restrictions, **Bagdad was not subject to the rules that OPEC's** 11 other members had to adhere to while keeping to set levels of output. "**Most Iraqis understand that the reasons for their poverty and the reason for their isolation** is the regime of Saddam Hussein," Hazhir Teimourian, a Middle East expert with the Limehouse Group of strategic analysts in London, told Deutsche Welle. "Now they realize that they are no longer isolated from the world and they're going to make the most of their oil wealth." Iraq on collision course with OPEC over quotas **Once Iraq more than quadruples its output capacity**, OPEC will have to take steps to prevent Iraq from flooding the market, and force Baghdad to realign its supply policy with other members and stick to an output target. If not, the current level of supply and demand which OPEC has worked hard to achieve, which provides oil at a price it deems reasonable to producers and consumers - currently around $75 a barrel - will come under threat. "**This will certainly cause ructions within OPEC because Iraq has huge resources and we can only assume that the Iraqis are going to pump as much as possible because they need the money**," Judith Kipper, the director of the Energy Security Group of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, told Deutsche Welle. "If they get to the predicted number of barrels produced per day, this is really going to be a real issue within OPEC." The headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: OPEC members are wary of Iraq's potential power Kipper believes that **Iraq may embolden other OPEC members to act selfishly in the oil market**. "**OPEC only operates as a cartel when it's in everybody's interests to abide by whatever they decide but we have seen that individual countries act in their own national interests and not in the rulings of OPEC or the world's petroleum markets and I think that will continue and possibly get worse**," Kipper said. "**If Iraq refuses to abide by the OPEC output level rules, then there's not much OPEC can do. Iraq may be land-locked but it has a couple of major pipelines which could be restarted and if relations with Syria and Lebanon ease then we could see Iraq pumping its oil to a Syrian or Lebanese port, bypassing OPEC countries**." Hazhir Teimourian agreed: "**Iraq flooding the market will be very bad news for Saudi Arabia and OPEC and neither could do anything to stop it**,"

\*\*\*Withdrawal Bolsters Iran

Iran Module

US Military presence is key to preventing Iranian prolif.

 Schake 7, (Kori, April & May, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Hoover institute, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/60291 Page 13 accessed 7/2) CM

 To deter Iran, the U.S. doesn’t need to threaten nuclear retaliation. The Iranian government seems to fear strategic encirclement, an enduring U.S. presence in the region, the U.S. drive for democracy in the Middle East, strong U.S. relations with moderate Sunni states, and perhaps regime change. It would likely fear losing the weapons it is brandishing. It would likely fear a demonstration of its inability to protect itself from U.S. attacks. It would likely fear political circumstances that eroded its control. With conventional forces and diplomacy, the U.S. has the ability to produce those effects. Iran’s crossing the nuclear threshold has two distinct aspects that merit handling separately: the first is acquiring nuclear weapons; the second is using those weapons. An Iran preparing to use nuclear weapons is the less difficult case. Given Iran’s pious promises it was not developing nuclear weapons — even going so far as to issue a fatwa at the iaea meeting stating that development of nuclear weapons was contrary to Islam — and given its overt threat against the existence of Israel, the United States would be justified in launching on warning of an Iranian nuclear use. While nuclear facilities are difficult to spot because they are often clandestine and underground, significant operational activity surrounds preparations for missile launches. We would have a high probability of knowing Iran was preparing for nuclear-armed missile attacks. As part of deterring any Iranian use, we should be clearly conveying to the government that any indications of readiness for use will provoke us to destroy the missiles and warheads they are preparing. The message should be simple and public: You may have the weapons, but they will be of no value, because we will destroy them if you ever attempt to use them.

**Checking Iran key to prevent war**

Johnson 10 (David E., Feb25, Colonel, U.S. Army Senior political science for RAND, Providence Journal and GlobalSecurity.org on February 25, 2010. http://www.rand.org/commentary/2010/02/25/PJ.html accessed 7/2) CM

Iran's headstrong attempt to join the world's nuclear-weapons club is setting the stage for a military confrontation that nobody wants, but may happen anyway. The Obama administration has decided to ratchet up the rhetoric in its outreach with Gulf State partners. Israel's view on the matter is clear—a nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to its existence, and it has demonstrated the resolve to deal with such threats militarily. Iran's recent test firing of missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv only heightens Israel's imperative to act. The question for the United States is: What will Iran do in the wake of an Israeli attack that Iran will almost certainly assume has U.S. support? Speculation about Iran's retaliatory options has thus far focused on Iran closing the Straits of Hormuz, shutting the oil spigot and driving the price of oil far above current levels. Some also believe that Iran would increase its support of terrorist actions directly against the United States and Israel — effectively declaring war on the West. Yet Tehran's counter-punch would not have to be so bold to be effective and deadly. A less discussed, but equally dangerous, option for Iran is to dramatically step up its support of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. This response is far more likely and, consequently, more worrisome. Iran already provides financial and military support to Shiite militias in Iraq, including the most violent and extreme among them. Weapons caches that include improvised explosive devices can be traced directly to Iran. Tehran is also a likely source of mortars, short-range rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and a variety of small arms and ammunition. Iran has a history of supplying surrogates to do its fighting. Along with Syria, Iran provided Hezbollah sophisticated weapons used against Israel in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Perhaps of most concern to Israel was a variety of rockets with ranges of 20 to 100 kilometers. During that war, despite the best efforts of the Israeli Defense Force, the daily barrage of rockets did not end until the cease-fire took effect. Hezbollah also employed high-end antitank guided missiles, which took a heavy toll on the Israeli Army, as well as air-to-ground missiles, anti-ship missiles and even unmanned aerial vehicles. None of these weapons has shown up in significant numbers in Iraq or Afghanistan—yet. If Iran did introduce them, the level of violence and the risk to civilians and military installations would escalate significantly. Air-to-ground missiles and antitank guided missiles, integrated with improvised explosive devices, would dramatically increase risks for U.S. and coalition soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Particularly worrisome would be the introduction of portable air-defense missiles, commonly known as MANPADS, into Afghanistan. Mobility in Afghanistan depends upon airplanes and helicopters. Threats to flight would severely hamper current operations. In this regard, we should remember that what unhinged the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was a similar increase in enemy capability when the United States gave the Mujahedeen Stinger missiles. The battlefield, including cities, could get much deadlier. Iran can accomplish this without directly engaging coalition personnel with its own military forces. In essence, it can deliver a Lebanon-like war to Iraq and Afghanistan. It's a scenario the United States and Israel must seriously consider before pulling the trigger.

Iran Ext—Prolif

Presence puts pressure on Iran—key to prevent prolif

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

As long as we stay, Iran (the leading terrorist-sponsor state) will face the pressure of being surrounded by American troops, and Iraq will provide another launching base if we're forced to invade. Think back to before the launch of this second Iraq War. One of the main reasons for invading was that Saddam kicked out U.N. weapons inspectors for several years. In 2002, he let them back in. Did he suddenly have a change of heart and wanted to do the right thing? Or could it have been the hundreds of thousands of American troops ready to move in if he didn't comply? Iran has become as least as big of a threat to world peace as Saddam. Obviously, it would be much better if we were able to stop its nuclear program and support of terrorist groups without another war. However, Iran needs a little bit of legitimate pressure to solve things peacefully. Otherwise, what is the incentive to stop its actions? As long as U.S. troops are in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have the rogue country surrounded. Although we may currently have a limited capacity to invade, the worry is still in the back of the minds of Iranian leaders.

Iran Ext—Bolsters Iran

Iraq pullout bolsters Iran

Carafano and Phillips 6(James, Ph. D and Senior Research Fellow@The Heritage Foundation, and James, Research fellow in Middle East studies@The Heritage Foundation, “The Dangerous Consequences of Cutting and Running in Iraq”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/10/The-Dangerous-Consequences-of-Cutting-and-Running-in-Iraq, accessed 7/3/10)jn

Consequence #3: Allies in Jeopardy. The chief bene­ficiary of a rapid U.S. pullout would be Iran, which has considerable influence over the dominant Shiite political parties, which represent most Iraqi Shiites: about 60-65 percent of the population. If Iraq imploded, Iran quickly could gain dominance over an emerging "Shiastan" rump state endowed with the bulk of Iraq's oil reserves. This would give Iran additional resources and a staging area to escalate subversive efforts targeted at the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Shiite minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other countries look to the United States to serve as a guarantor against an aggressive Iran. If the United States fails to follow through on its commitment to establish a stable government in Iraq, it will severely undermine its credibility. Abandon­ing Iraqi allies would erode the confidence of other allies in U.S. leadership and further fuel conspiracy theories about American plots to carve up Iraq to keep Arabs weak and divided.

Withdraw of troops allows for Iranian influence troops are needed for regional political stability

Terrill 7 (W. Andrew, Sept. Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments

Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Strategic Studies Report, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf page xii accessed 7/2) CM

Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq’s political crisis. Kuwait, as a small country, has little desire to offend a major regional power such as Iran, and has occasionally sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait’s Shi’ite community and therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaiti national unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will never fully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, like other Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, although they also oppose U.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they will be placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regional violence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomatic and economic options for dealing with the crisis were thoroughly explored and exhausted first. The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku- wait has also shown a commitment to expanding de- mocracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspir- ations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this monarchy and the history of democratic expression are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity. Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned about maintaining their democratic image abroad because of their continuing need for international support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves as an important if still incomplete example to the region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular vitality over the last year, and the United States needs to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain aware that democracy and moderation are not the same thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic to U.S. goals for the region

Iran Ext—Bolsters Iran

The Iraq withdraw is resulting In the rise in Iranian influence and if unchecked Iran could threaten US security interests

Wehrey et al 10, ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

his overview of the regional landscape in the years following the Iraq War suggests a fluid strategic environment with complex regional threat perceptions and behavior. Despite concerns over eroding Ameri- can influence, the United States and Iran have emerged from this con- flict as the major regional powers. That non-Arab states (the United States, Iran, and to some extent Turkey) now dominate regional secu- rity dynamics underscores the continuing weakness of the Arab state system and the lack of a viable Arab balancer to counter Iran, despite some renewed inter-Arab cooperation and activism. Iranian motivations for its growing regional assertiveness, often grounded on perceptions of vulnerability, and ambivalent Arab responses to Iran’s rise raise questions about balance-of-power strat- egies and the extent to which the region operates in bloclike terms. Alarm and dislike of Iran and its regional postures does not neces- sarily lead regional actors to embrace the United States or its regional security agenda. Even regional U.S. allies, such as Turkey, are not find- ing themselves aligned in all cases with U.S. regional interests and are facing new challenges in the aftermath of this conflict that may at times require accommodation with American adversaries.

Withdraw creates Iranian Destabilization of Iraq and the US uses Gulf region influence

Friedman 10 (George ,April 20, an American political scientist and author. founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. http://www.rightsidenews.com/201004209658/global-terrorism/baghdad-politics-and-the-us-iranian-balance.html accessed 7/2) CM

 This could be a plan to halt withdrawals. The problem with that plan is that there is no assurance that in three months or a year the core divisions of Iraq could be solved. The United States could be left without forces for a strategic reserve without any guarantee that time would solve the problem. A strategy of delay calls for some clear idea of what delay would bring. Or the United States could complete the withdrawal on the assumption that the Iranians would not dare attack Iraq directly while the residual U.S. force remained. The problem with this strategy is that it is built on an assumption. This assumption is not unreasonable, but it is still an assumption, not a certainty. Moreover, Iran could covertly destabilize Iraq, putting U.S. forces without sufficient combat capability in harm's way from Iranian-supplied forces. Finally, Iran's major audience consists of the oil powers of the Arabian Peninsula. Tehran wants to show the Gulf Arabs that the United States will withdraw from Iraq regardless of potential consequences to them, reducing their confidence in the United States and forcing them to contemplate an accommodation with Iran. Halting the withdrawal therefore poses substantial challenges, and completing the withdrawal poses even more. This is particularly the case if the United States completes the withdrawal without reaching some accommodation with Iran. But negotiating with the Iranians from a position of weakness is not an attractive option. The Iranians' price would be higher than the United States wants to pay. Therefore, the United States would have to make some show of power to the Iranians that will convince the Iranians that they are at risk. Bombing Iran's nuclear facilities could fit the bill, but it has two drawbacks. First, the attacks might fail. Second, even if they succeeded, they would not have addressed the conventional problem.

Iran Ext—Bolsters Iran

Low oil prices puts pressure on the Iranian regime and undermines their economy

[**Taghavi**](http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/roshanak-taghavi) **10** (Roshanak, June 27 journalist specialising in the economics and politics of Iran and the Middle East, Guardians http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/27/iran-fears-falling-oil-demand) CM

"There's an oil glut and this is a buyers' market, so if you can buy from anyone you want at a lower price and get brownie points with the US, then it's a win-win situation," says an Iranian government adviser. If the decline in sales of Iraninan crude continues, with more "traditional" customers reducing their term contracts, Iran's National Oil Company will be forced to re-strategise how and to whom it will market its oil in the wake of tempered "eastern" oil demand and a global oil glut that has weighed down oil prices and encouraged a rise in OPEC supply to its highest level in more than a year. This is crucial for Iran, whose ailing refineries can't refine the highly sulfuric and heavier grades of oil that make up a considerable portion of the country's oil exports. Iran is attempting to close the gap between its inadequate refining infrastructure and enormously high domestic gasoline consumption, which requires importing up to 40% of gasoline demand, by making it a national policy to double refining capacity. Though Washington's drive to ramp up sanctions against the Islamic Republic's energy sector has added urgency to the country's plans to expand and construct new refineries, members of the Iranian business community with ties to the oil sector have privately said that a number of Iran's refinery expansion efforts have either significantly slowed down or arrived at a standstill due to major declines in foreign investment and low access to international financing because of sanctions. Only one refinery in Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran, can refine "Iran heavy" crude, but not other heavy grades of Iranian oil, such as Forouzan, which has a smaller market base of buyers who are able to refine it. Though Iran attempted to refine heavy grade Forouzan oil for the first time at its Bandar Abbas refinery in August 2008, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, the effort to refine the heavy oil was successful. Thus, the National Iranian Oil Company is stuck in a paradoxical situation in which it is forced to refine a large chunk of its more expensive, better quality light-grade crude oil domestically into products such as gasoline and gasoil, which are then sold nationally at cheap subsidised prices, while having to export more of its heavier grades to an international customer base with a more limited appetite for heavier crude. The rising sense of economic pragmatism within Iran's oil ministry is at odds with the free-spending policies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, which have left little money in state coffers for loans to the country's struggling private sector and increasingly appear to be made in isolation from Iran's economic realities. "The president doesn't like to hear bad news. It appears the people around him don't tell him when there's something wrong," says the government adviser. "But there are others raising alarms about the economy. The government isn't panicking yet, but it should be.

Withdraw causes the perception of Iranian hegemony

Wehrey et al 10, ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

Subsequent **Israeli leaders have similarly viewed Iran as the most serious, even existential, threat their state faces**. **Perceptions of rising Iranian influence after the Iraq War, the continued Iranian nuclear crisis, and the inflammatory rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad** (denying the Holocaust, suggesting Israel be “wiped off the map**”), has led to especially heightened Israeli alarm in recent years.** As one Israeli analyst told RAND, Israel takes Iranian threats to destroy Israel seri- ously, arguing that, even if Iran would never use a nuclear bomb against Israel, the specter of an Iranian bomb could lead Israelis to leave the country and question the future of Zionism. In his view, **Israel has never faced as serious a threat as the one a nuclear Iran poses**.5 Indeed, from many Israelis’ perspective, the United States fought the wrong war in 2003.60 According to Israeli analysts and officials, the Iraq War is nearly off the Israeli radar screen, while Israeli policymakers now view every issue through the prism of Iran.61 **Concern over Iran expands beyond the direct threat a nuclear Iran could pose to Israel.** Many Israeli analysts **believe Iran is seeking hegemony over the broader region, not just the Gulf, and that if Iran acquires a nuclear option, it will become even more aggressive in seeking regional dominance.**62 Accord- ing to analysts knowledgeable about current Israeli decisionmaking, key personalities in the Israeli government may be moderate on issues relating to the Palestinians but are hawkish when it comes to Iran.63 An Israeli defense official suggested to RAND that Iranian rhetoric and actions are reaching new heights, as Iran’s political and material links to Hizballah are growing.64 **Such concerns have only increased with the perception** among many Israeli analysts that the wars against Hizballah in 2006 and HAMAS in 2008 were as much about deter- ring Iranian aggression as deterring these nonstate actors.

Iran Ext—Impact Escalation

Escalates to nuclear war

Cordesman 7 (Anthony H., March 5 ,Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070305\_iran\_israelius.pdf page 7-8 accessed 7/2) CM

As is the case with a US strike, Iran has the capabilities to strike back against Israel. In fact, it has threatened retaliation if attacked by Israel. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, was quoted as saying that an attack by Israel or the US would have “severe consequence,” and threatened that Iran would retaliate “by all means” at its disposal. Mottaki added: “Iran does not think that the Zionist regime is in a condition to engage in such a dangerous venture and they know how severe the possible Iranian response will be to its possible audacity…Suffice to say that the Zionist regime, if they attack, will regret it.” Iran has several options to respond to an Israeli attack: 1. Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites. 2. Escalate the conflict using proxy groups such Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and missile attacks from southern Lebanon and Syria. 3. Covert attacks against Israeli interests by its intelligence and IRGC assets. This could include low- level bombings against Israeli embassies, Jewish centers, and other Israeli assets outside and inside Israel. In addition, any Israeli military option would have to include an air strike and would seriously can complicate Israel's fragile relations with Jordan and may provoke Saudi Arabia to respond. An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities may also strengthen the Iranian regime's stance to move toward nuclear capabilities, and drive many neighboring states to support Iran's bid for nuclear weapons. In addition, it could lead to further escalation of the Iraqi insurgency and increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against America interests and allies in the region. On the other hand, Israeli officials have expressed the concern that. if Iran acquires nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, this spark further proliferation in the region This would spread WMD capabilities around the Middle East, and greatly increase the threat of CBRN attacks against Israel and the entire region. Waiting also have its penalties.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Kills Iraqi Democracy

Democracy Module

Withdrawal would destabilize Iraq and destroy the Iraqi democracy

Pollack 9(Kenneth, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy@Brookings, “Could We Still Lose Iraq?”, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221\_iraq\_pollack.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

The problem we face in Iraq is that while the country has made tremendous progress in both the security and political realms, all of those gains are fragile and could evaporate quickly if strained. What Iraq experienced was a lot like shattering the bones in your arm: with time, the bones can heal and the arm can become strong again, but if you take off the cast too soon, then any strain on the arm will cause the bones to fracture all over again. As scholars of civil war have warned, states like Iraq that have undergone a major inter-communal civil war have a terrifying rate of recidivism—especially if the state has valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold or oil. So to some extent, we and the Iraqis are fighting an uphill battle. There is no reason that we can’t succeed, but it isn’t going to be easy and it isn’t going to happen on its own. And since we can’t know for certain when Iraq’s bones have healed, we need to be very careful about how and when we remove the cast. The mistake we are in danger of making in Iraq is that as our military steps back, our civilians are not always stepping up. For that reason, the critical danger in Iraq today is not the residual violence, but the Iraqi reaction to that violence. The strings of bombings that seem to shake the capital every month or so are a nightmare for many Iraqis, but alone they are not a threat to Iraq itself. As long as the vast majority of Iraqis react to the bombings by blaming the perpetrators not one another, and see the perpetrators as marginalized elements outside the mainstream of Iraqi society, the problem they present is tragic, but not serious. In some ways they are a useful palliative, because they provide sobering evidence of just how fragile Iraq’s gains remain. What would be very dangerous is if Iraqis began to react to the bombings the way they reacted in 2004 and early 2005. Then they saw the violence as the work of other members from within their own society. They saw no governmental force able or willing to protect them, and so they felt it necessary to form or join militias for their own protection—even though they knew that the militia warlords would inevitably push the country into civil war. As many Iraqis said to me at the time, “You (the United States) are not giving us a choice.” Countries that slide back into civil war tend to do so when people and leaders evince this pattern, once again seeing acts of violence as harbingers of worse times to come, rather than violent interruptions of the ordinary. It is the difference between Bosnia in 1994 or Lebanon in 1975 and Israel today. Israel, for instance, is battered by regular terrorist attacks, but Israeli society remains cohesive; Israelis blame their grief on their attackers, not on one another; and Israelis don’t see their government as unable to defend them, thereby requiring them to form militias for their own protection. The critical role that the United States plays today is that we are the peacekeepers, we are the levy holding back violence, we are Iraq’s security blanket, and we are the broker of political deals that makes Iraqis willing to keep sacrificing today because they can hope for a better tomorrow. But another way to think about the American role is that we enforce the rules: we prevent Iraqis from employing large-scale violence in pursuit of political agendas, which reassures all of them that they can take actions that would be risky in the kind of security vacuum that existed (thanks to American negligence and foolishness) in 2004-2006 and that would exist again if we withdrew prematurely. Acts like voting for the candidate you like rather than the candidate with the most thugs. If Iraqis believe that security blanket is going to be removed prematurely, they will be terrified that the militia warlords will revert back to violence (which they certainly will) and will again rule the country very soon. That would prompt ordinary Iraqis (who would gladly do the right thing if they could) to do the wrong thing, and sign on with the militias to ensure that they are protected when the Americans leave and the civil war re-ignites. The mistake we are in danger of making in Iraq is that as our military steps back, our civilians are not always stepping up. Over the past six to nine months, our embassy has been inconsistent at best, and has panicked many Iraqis and many Iraqi leaders into believing that the Obama administration does not care about Iraq and is simply running for the exit as fast as they can. This isn’t true, and the President’s lieutenants have said so time and again, as has Vice President Biden, both in private and in public. But by failing to remain actively engaged with the Iraqi political process at all levels, by disdaining any further involvement in guiding Iraq’s domestic politics, and in abandoning aid programs willy-nilly, many embassy personnel have convinced a great many Iraqis of exactly the opposite. And therein lies the seeds of renewed civil war and a disaster for American interests.

Democracy Module

That creates sustainable peace

Sharansky 1(Nathan, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, October 13, “The democratic world must not only destroy the empire of terror, it must also seek to expand the very freedom our enemies want to destroy”, http://www.aish.com/jw/me/48884587.html, accessed 7/7/10)jn

The democratic world must export freedom throughout the Middle East not only for the sake of people who live under repressive regimes, but for the sake of our own security. For only when the world is free will the world be safe. The consequences of merely eradicating an enemy rather than building a friend were made crystal clear in the decades following World War II. In Eastern Europe, the evils of Nazism were replaced with the evils of Communism. One dictatorship replaced another and the effect was continued internal repression and external belligerence. In contrast, democracy was forced on Germany and Japan and the result has been over 50 years of peace and stability – both within those states and in their relations with the outside world. For non-democratic regimes, war and terror are essential to survival. The logic of why democracies do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity. For non-democratic regimes, war and terror are essential to survival. In order to justify the internal repression that is inherent in non-democratic rule, dictators and autocrats must mobilize their nation for wars against both internal and external enemies. Democratic leaders can be corrupt, prejudiced and xenophobic. But they will not survive long in office if they impoverish their people and sacrifice their sons in wars that are not vital to their nations’ existence. That is why war is always the last option for democratic states.

Democracy Ext—Troops Key to Iraq Democracy

U.S. troops key to Iraq democracy

Pollack and O’Hanlon 10(Kenneth, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Michael, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, January 18, “Iraq’s Ban on Democracy”, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0118\_iraq\_democracy\_ohanlon\_pollack.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Before the surge of American troops in 2007 and the so-called Anbar Awakening, many Iraqi Sunnis boycotted Iraq's elections in the belief that the system was rigged against them. This created a self-fulfilling prophecy when the elections took place without them and the resulting government was dominated by Shiite and Kurdish groups. This vicious cycle helped fuel civil war. All of that changed after 2007, when American-brokered cease-fires and political shifts convinced Sunnis that they would have a fair opportunity to elect their own leaders and participate in government at no disadvantage. In the provincial elections of January 2009, Sunnis finally voted in large numbers. Their return to the political process has been a key element in the rapid erosion of sectarianism from Iraqi politics. The end of the civil war and the need to focus on political and economic reconstruction had revealed sharp differences among the various Shiite groups, which have been heightened by the emergence of Sunni parties with similarly varied views. As a result, there has been a complete reorganization of Iraqi politics over the past year, with Shiite, Sunni and even some Kurdish groups creating cross-sectarian alliances that have largely replaced the previous sectarian blocs. It was a sign of this progress that Sunni parties, particularly Mr. Mutlaq's, were being courted avidly by a number of Shiite and secular parties, including those led by Mr. Maliki and Mr. Allawi. If the ban is allowed to stand, it will do more than just throw a wrench in the works. It will persuade a great many Iraqis that the prime minister or other Shiites, like Mr. Chalabi, are using their control over the electoral mechanics to kneecap their rivals. It may also convince many Sunnis that they will never be allowed to win if they play by the rules, and that violence is their only option. That is an extraordinarily dangerous message to send right now, when the United States is trying hard to withdraw tens of thousands more American troops from Iraq and shift 50,000 or so from combat operations to advisory and training roles. If this ban remains in effect, the likelihood of electoral violence will skyrocket, and American soldiers will inevitably be called on to halt it. All is not yet lost — over the past few years, Iraqi politicians have developed a penchant for last-minute compromise that has turned a number of near-catastrophes into mere close calls. In every one of those instances, however, it required rapid and determined American pressure to avert disaster.

Presence key to democracy in Iraq

Messerli 7(Joe, Editorialist@Balanced Politics, August 21, “Should the U.S. Withdraw its Troops from Iraq?”, http://www.balancedpolitics.org/iraq\_withdrawal.htm, accessed 7/6/10)jn

The longer we stay, the more time Iraqi politicians have to work out government structure differences, and the more time Iraqi troops & police have to train. Unlike the quagmire of Vietnam, we have a plan for the future of Iraq. We're trying to build a working democracy that grows and thrives. Unfortunately, such a monumental task takes time and patience. It took hundreds of years to get our own democracy working well! And that was without terrorists and countries like Iran try to sabotage the effort at every turn. Our first attempt at a constitution (the Articles of Confederation) was such a complete and utter failure that we threw it out and started over from scratch. Iraq is simply going through the same growth process. The longer we give them to work out problems, the more stable the country will be in the future. And if we give the Iraqi troops time to train and gain experience, they'll be better prepared to face the many challenges ahead.

Democracy Ext—Troops Key to Iraq Democracy

Troops key to democratic stability in Iraq

Pollack and O’Hanlon 9(Kenneth, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Michael, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, February 26, “Iraq’s Year of Living Dangerously”, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0226\_iraq\_ohanlon.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Having just returned from a trip to the country arranged by the top American commander there, Gen. Ray Odierno, we agree that Iraq continues to make tremendous strides, thanks to American assistance and, increasingly, the efforts of Iraqi politicians and security forces. But both those ready to dust off the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner and declare victory and those who continue to see Iraq as an inherent disaster that must simply be abandoned have to realize that continued American involvement will be crucial for several more years. Young democracies are fragile entities. Political scientists generally agree that achieving a peaceful and credible second round of elections is critical in putting a new democracy on a path toward stability, because such elections test whether the country can accomplish a nonviolent transfer of power. Iraq is holding its second round of real elections this year. It just concluded extremely successful provincial votes, and national parliamentary elections are to follow. Iraq’s calendar this year is also jam-packed with other important political events. If the United States can help the Iraqis secure even modestly positive outcomes for these events, we will have gone a long way toward realizing our goals of sustainable stability in Iraq and bringing most of our troops home next year. Iraq is no longer convulsed by the chaos, sectarianism and terrorism that were driving it into all-out civil war in 2006. To be sure, friction remains, most notably in the ethnically diverse city of Mosul in the north, where coalition forces have only recently been reinforced to the point where they can conduct the kind of counterinsurgency campaign that secured the rest of the country. Unfortunately, they are racing against the clock to do so, since the recently signed security agreement between Baghdad and Washington requires American combat forces to leave Iraq’s cities by June 30. But the main challenge now is that some key political players, strengthened by Iraq’s enormous recent progress, are less interested in moving their country forward than in using every tool at their disposal to put themselves in advantageous positions after the American withdrawal. Worse still, some — perhaps many — are doing so by exploiting the immaturity of the political process and the ambiguities in Iraq’s constitution. Iraq has several important challenges that could strain its political system over the next year. They include the return of up to four million displaced people to their homes; the release of thousands of people detained by coalition forces, some of them surely dangerous; the continued search for permanent jobs for the largely Sunni Sons of Iraq, whose actions against the insurgents in Anbar Province were a key to the success of the “surge”; falling oil prices that will hamper the government’s ability to pay its workers; and the more general tasks of increasing oil exports, employment and the quality of life for Iraqis. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of the problems Iraq faces is the enormous tension brewing between the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, led by Massoud Barzani, and the central government led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. During the years of warfare between Sunni and Shiite Arabs, the Kurdish issue lay dormant. But now it has roared back to the forefront. Nearly everyone we spoke with in the area this month — Kurds, Arabs, Americans and others — described the situation as explosive and the enmity between Mr. Barzani and Prime Minister Maliki as ferocious. The Kurdish difficulties do not revolve around suicide bombers, visions of seventh-century caliphates, disdain for the United States or pure sectarian hatred as in the Sunni-Shiite civil war. They concern the cold, hard issues of land and oil and cash, as well as the distribution of power between Iraq’s center and its regions and provinces. In addition to the three provinces that are run by the Kurdish regional government, the Kurds claim lands in three other Iraqi provinces, including the emotionally charged and oil-rich region of Kirkuk. To back up these claims, and because the Iraqi government previously had been unable to secure much of northern Iraq, the Kurds deployed their pesh merga fighters in these disputed places — often originally at Baghdad’s request. They have also used their considerable political powers in much of the area to undo the effects of Saddam Hussein’s brutal policy of Arabization of Kurdish lands. Meanwhile, they have exploited ambiguities in the Constitution to strike deals with foreign firms for oil wells within their three provinces, much to the displeasure of Baghdad. These tensions nearly led to violence last summer in the ethnically mixed city of Khanaqin, which lies outside the current boundaries of Kurdistan, in Diyala Province, but was under the control of the pesh merga. Prime Minister Maliki, emboldened by recent battlefield successes of Iraq’s Army and police against Shiite militias in Basra and elsewhere, apparently decided to put the Kurds in their place as well. Mr. Maliki deployed army forces to Khanaqin, only to have them run right into a standoff with the pesh merga troops. Ultimately, cooler heads prevailed, but it should be noted that many of those cooler heads were American — the United States troops who were partnered with the Iraqi Army formations ran interference between the Iraqi Army units and the Kurdish soldiers and brokered a peaceful resolution. Today other crises loom. An oil field in Kurdistan developed by a Norwegian company is poised to begin production in March. It is not clear whether the Kurds will contribute the revenue from the field to the common Iraqi oil pot, as the central government demands, or will claim the proceeds entirely for themselves. Not only does Mr. Maliki view any Kurdish effort to go it alone on oil as unacceptable, he may also sense that inflating it as a campaign issue could help him and his Dawa Party in parliamentary voting this year. And while key leaders from Mr. Maliki’s government, various parliamentary opposition parties, and the Kurds all insist that they plan to resolve their differences peacefully, several members of the American military command for Northern Iraq warned us during conversations in Iraq last week that the officers of the newly forming Iraqi 12th Infantry Division have repeatedly stated that once their unit is ready, they plan to occupy their entire area of operations — which includes Kirkuk. The pesh merga fighters, of course, are just as adamant that this would be unacceptable. While the United Nations has been putting together a grand plan for resolving the Kurdish issues, it cannot impose a solution — and under the terms of the new security agreement, neither can the United States. <CONTINUED>

Democracy Ext—Troops Key to Iraq Democracy

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But just because Washington no longer holds viceregal authority does not mean it is powerless. America’s military forces, which increasingly serve as peacekeepers, and its commitment of nation-building tools (including provincial reconstruction teams and technical advisers in the Iraqi government) still give American officials tremendous influence. Washington must employ this leverage deftly to help Iraqi Arabs and Kurds (and Turkmens and others) overcome their differences. The Obama administration has been handling the Iraq war pragmatically so far. And while announcing a timetable poses a serious risk, the details of Mr. Obama’s plan leaked to the press this week are promising, especially leaving behind a large residual force including trainers and quick-reacting “maneuver units” and slowing the drawdown by three months relative to what he had promised on the campaign trail. Those few months are vital, as they should give the Iraqis adequate time to form their new government before the American troop levels are vastly diminished. Ideally, whatever he announces now, Mr. Obama will remain flexible, and slow the pace next year if necessary. GIVEN Iraq’s strategic significance, the mission ceased to be a “war of choice” the moment American forces crossed the border in March 2003. Now we have no choice but to see Iraq through to stability.

Withdrawal destroys Iraq democracy

Groves 7(Steven, Fellow for the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom@The Heritage Foundation, September 14, “How the Surge Advances Freedom in Iraq”, http://heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2007/09/How-the-Surge-Advances-Freedom-in-Iraq, accessed 7/6/10)jn

 An early U.S. military exit likely would result in the collapse of the Iraqi central government, its armed forces and other institutions. Concepts like democracy, human rights, the rule of law and individual freedom will fall fast in the wake of chaos and anarchy. Citizens of Tikrit, Saddam's hometown, wrote hundreds of letters of protest early this year when one NGO, the National Democratic Institute, decided to close its resource center there until violence could be quelled. But advancing democratic ideals in their towns won't be such a priority for ordinary Iraqis if a U.S. military withdrawal leaves their very survival at stake. Will Congress call for us to return to Iraq after the resulting humanitarian crisis claims hundreds of thousands of lives? Patience from Congress and the American people will permit U.S. forces to complete their mission to secure Baghdad and formerly "lost" provinces such as Anbar, where President Bush made his richly symbolic Labor Day visit to troops. Petraeus and Crocker, unflinching in acknowledging the hard road ahead, described how our forces are reclaiming turf, newly rallying local support and taking down the terrorists who want to destabilize Iraq and subjugate or kill those who thirst for freedom. The United States bears a responsibility to leave Iraq in better condition than it was before our military coalition toppled Saddam's regime. A stable and secure Iraq -- where a free and fair democracy can thrive -- can't emerge until the various Iraqi factions reconcile. The surge remains the best hope to provide a safer environment for such accommodation to take place, and that's unquestionably happening on the local level. To abandon the Iraqis in their time of need is to condemn them to chaos, an endless cycle of bloody retaliation, the rebirth of a Saddam-style authoritarian government -- or worse.

Withdrawal causes Middle Eastern instability and kills Democracy

Byman 7(Daniel, July, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy@the Brookings Institution, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/07iraqterrorism.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Outside of the counterterrorism dimension, Iraq itself would also suffer tremendously from a U.S. withdrawal. Iraqi government forces would find themselves outgunned and cooperation with government opponents or wholesale defection would be likely. Already the lack of security has led local communities to turn to warlords for protection and revenge: without the presence of U.S. forces, this trend would become the dominant force. Violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas would grow even worse. The number of refugees would surge even further, and neighbors might intervene more directly.[[28]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn28) The Kurds, who have the most organized indigenous military force in Iraq, would probably push for greater autonomy or even independence, possibly drawing Turkey into the fracas. The hopes for democracy, and possibly even for a unified Iraqi state, would dim in the absence of the security provided by the United States. Iran could exploit the power vacuum left by departing U.S. troops.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Causes Partition

Partition Module

Washington is pursuing basic partition now- withdrawal would signal Iraq to continue to divide

Mittelstadt 7 (Michelle, Director of Communications for the Migration Policy Institute, Houston Chronicle, 9/26, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/nation/5168150.html) my

WASHINGTON — Anxious for political stability in Iraq, the Senate adopted a resolution Wednesday urging the Iraqis to decentralize their federal government and hand more control to the ethnically divided regions dominated by the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. The 75-23 vote on the resolution offered by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden, D-Del., has no binding effect on the Bush administration or the Iraqi government. But Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas, a leading Republican supporter of the measure, said the bipartisan vote should send a signal to the Iraqi government — and the White House, which has opposed the Biden resolution. "I would think that the strength of the vote should cause stronger consideration of this option," said Hutchison, who for a year has been advocating a partition plan similar to the power-sharing agreement brokered for war-torn Bosnia during the 1990s. A 'sensitive issue' The administration has offered no sign of changing policy, which has focused on shoring up Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki even as sectarian violence has made national reconciliation an elusive goal. Carving Iraq into semi-autonomous regions responsible for their own educational systems, police forces and security is a "sensitive issue best left to the Iraqis to address at their own pace," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. "The United States should not be seen as taking sides on a subject such as this, which is the sovereign responsibility of the Iraqi government and the people alone to determine," Rice said, adding the resolution could "harm U.S. interests with respect to the long-term stability of Iraq."

Partition leads to ethnic cleansing- divides up Iraq by sectarian lines, empirically leads to violence

Fisk 4 (Robert, experienced journalist, 1/2, http://thirdcoastactivist.org/fiskjan0204.html) my

In no less an organ than The New York Times - the same paper which carried a plea last year that Americans should accept that US troops will commit "atrocities" in Iraq - appeared Mr Gelb's "Three State Solution", an astonishing combination of simplicity and ruthlessness. It goes like this. America should create three mini-states in Iraq - Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the centre and Shias in the south - the frontiers of these three entities drawn along ethnic, sectarian lines. The "general idea," says Mr Gelb, "is to strengthen the Kurds and Shias and weaken the Sunnis." Thus US forces can extricate themselves from the quagmire of the "Sunni triangle" while the "troublesome and domineering" Sunnis themselves - with no control over Iraq's northern or southern oil fields - will be in a more moderate frame of mind. True, the chopping up of Iraq might be "a messy and dangerous enterprise" - tens of thousands of Iraqis, after all, would be thrown out of their homes and pushed across new frontiers - but Washington should, if necessary, impose partition by force. This is the essence of the Gelb plan. Bosnia comes to mind. Or Kosovo. But if it gets us out of Iraq, who's going to complain when we - the famous "coalition of the willing" - push those recalcitrant, ungrateful Iraqis into the same kind of "divide and rule" colonial world for which the Americans always used to excoriate the British. It's important not to regard all this as the meandering of Washington think-tanks. Pipes and Gelb and their friends helped to build the foundations of this war, and their ideas are intended to further weaken Iraq as a nation - and thus the Arab world as a whole - while maintaining American military power. Already, the sectarian nature of "New Iraq" has been established by Washington's proconsul in Baghad, Paul Bremer. His "Governing Council" is made up of Shias, Sunnis and Kurds in direct proportion to their share of the population. The Shias, who form 60 per cent of the country, expect to take effective power in the Iraqi national elections this year - this, after all, is the only reason why the Shia clergy have not urged their people to join the anti-American insurgency - and the Americans and British understand this all too well. Like so many of those Arab nations created by the French and British amid the wreckage of the Ottoman empire after the First World War, Iraq is to be governed along sectarian lines.

Partition Module

Instability in Iraq escalates to nuclear war

Macwhirter 7(Iain, Political Columnist@The Sunday Herald, “Making Iraq Safe for Terrorists”, http://iainmacwhirter2.blogspot.com/2007/09/making-iraq-safe-for-terrorists.html, accessed 7/7/10)jn

So, what now? Where do we go from here? After this most disastrous mlitary adventure in modern history do we just shrug and move on? Put it down to experience? Suck our teeth and say that, well, democracy just doesn't 'take' in some cultures. Unfortunately we cannot. We will pull out of Iraq, leaving a token “overwatch” force, but the consequences of this calamity will pursue us. This war could be the prelude to a much wider crisis which could undermine our way of life and our liberties. The first obvious consequence is that Muslim extremism of the al Qaeda variety will likely increase. Bin Laden now has secure bases in Iraq and pro-Western Pakistan where he is renewing his terrorist infrastructure. His agents, the Taliban, are now inflicting withering casualty on British troops in Helmand province in some of the most sustained firefights our forces have experienced since the Second World War. We are not winning in Afghanistan, and the withdrawal from Iraq will give heart to the Afghani militias that they can dislodge the Brits from their country also. They defeated the Soviet Empire in the 1980s, so why not us? There is no way we can win the war in Afghanistan without a massive military presence, and a casualty rate that would be unacceptable to the British electorate following Iraq. But there's worse. Once we have left Iraq, and the country is carved up between Kurds, Sunnis and Shias, the largest part will be under the influence of Shi’ite Iran. President Ahmadinejad has been fighting a kind of proxy war there against the Americans and their Israeli allies. He has made clear his determination to sweep Israel "into the sea", which is why the wealthy Israeli lobby in Washington is urging a military strike against Iran's nuclear industry. Iran says it needs a nuclear “deterrent” just as much as Pakistan or Israel or Britain, and on the face of it it is hard to argue with their reasoning. An unstable Iraq will make the risk of a nuclear exchange in the Middle East all the more likely.

Partition Ext—Withdrawal Causes Divide

US troop presence precludes the possibility of a 3-state Iraq- withdrawal empowers groups to secure their territory

Galbraith 6 (Peter, former US ambassador with emphasis on Iraq, The Sunday Times, 7/16, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article688198.ece) my

The continued presence of American and British military forces in Iraq’s south can only aggravate relations with the Shi’ite authorities without any corresponding gain in what is a relatively secure part of Iraq. Last year British troops clashed on several occasions with local police and militias. One incident — where British forces attacked a police station to rescue two British special forces troops who had been arrested while working undercover — nearly escalated out of control. As long as the coalition remains in the south there is a risk of more incidents. Troops should be withdrawn in a rapid but orderly fashion. What about the Sunni-Arab heartland? Here America faces a dilemma. The US military presence among hostile Sunni Arabs seems to generate an endless supply of new suicide bombers and insurgent fighters. If America withdraws from the Sunni heartland, even more territory may fall into the hands of insurgents and terrorists. The pogroms after the destruction of the Askariya shrine served as a wake-up call to many Sunni Arabs. In a Sunni-Shi’ite civil war, Sunni Arabs realise they will lose. They may come to see the formation of a region as essential for self-protection and therefore be less worried that federalism will lead to the dissolution of Iraq. If the Sunnis establish a regional guard, it could take over security responsibilities from the Americans and the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi army. America could withdraw, making it clear that US forces would return only if the regional authorities allowed Al-Qaeda and other anti-western terrorists to operate freely from the region. It will need to keep a force nearby, ready to intervene. Kurdistan is the ideal location. It is close, the local population are friendly and it is at present still in Iraq. Even if the Sunni Arabs do not form a region, the United States should still withdraw and leave security duties to the Iraqi army, which would presumably continue to use Shi’ite forces there. In sum: partition works as a political solution for Kurdistan, the Shi’ite south and the Sunni Arab centre because it formalises what has already taken place. By contrast, the American effort to build a unified state with a non-sectarian, non-ethnic police and army has not produced that result nor made much progress towards it.

Partition Ext—Withdrawal Causes Divide

Withdrawal fragments the country and ensures collapse of the government

Al-Ali 6 (Zaid, attorney at New York Bar, 11/14, Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/road\_ahead\_4095.jsp) my

The first option is an immediate or phased withdrawal of US troops. A number of quarters, including groups that are party to the conflict, have been arguing that this is the solution to all of Iraq's problems (against other voices, such as Robert Kagan and William Kristol, and Senator John McCain, who advocate an increase in US troop deployments). Sectarian killings on a street-by-street level began with the arrival of the Americans, and so their presence is the original sin that ought to be reversed. This argument brings to light one of the main differences between the conflict in Iraq and the Vietnam war. In the latter, the communist Vietnamese government that was already governing the north of the country was waiting in the wings for the US to withdraw, with a view to taking control over the entire country. Most of the parties opposed to the presence of US forces were confident that a communist administration would benefit the entire country. In Iraq, it is anyone's guess what would happen if the US were to withdraw tomorrow, as there is no government in waiting prepared to take control. What is most likely is that at least part of the country would eventually fall in the hands of militias such as al-Qaida and the Mahdi army. The mere thought of that happening would be enough to make most Iraqis run for the hills. What is certain though is that the current Iraqi government is in no way capable of assuring any semblance of law and order in the country. A withdrawal would therefore mean that the government would collapse, and that chaos would ensue.

**Partition is on the way but US troops preclude further split**

Biden and Gelb 6 (Joe, vice president, and Leslie, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York Times, 5/1, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/opinion/01biden.html) my

As long as American troops are in Iraq in significant numbers, the insurgents can't win and we can't lose. But intercommunal violence has surpassed the insurgency as the main security threat. Militias rule swathes of Iraq and death squads kill dozens daily. Sectarian cleansing has recently forced tens of thousands from their homes. On top of this, President Bush did not request additional reconstruction assistance and is slashing funds for groups promoting democracy. Iraq's new government of national unity will not stop the deterioration. Iraqis have had three such governments in the last three years, each with Sunnis in key posts, without noticeable effect. The alternative path out of this terrible trap has five elements. The first is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions would each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security. The central government would control border defense, foreign affairs and oil revenues. Baghdad would become a federal zone, while densely populated areas of mixed populations would receive both multisectarian and international police protection. Decentralization is hardly as radical as it may seem: the Iraqi Constitution, in fact, already provides for a federal structure and a procedure for provinces to combine into regional governments. Besides, things are already heading toward partition: increasingly, each community supports federalism, if only as a last resort. The Sunnis, who until recently believed they would retake power in Iraq, are beginning to recognize that they won't and don't want to live in a Shiite-controlled, highly centralized state with laws enforced by sectarian militias. The Shiites know they can dominate the government, but they can't defeat a Sunni insurrection. The Kurds will not give up their 15-year-old autonomy. Some will say moving toward strong regionalism would ignite sectarian cleansing. But that's exactly what is going on already, in ever-bigger waves. Others will argue that it would lead to partition. But a breakup is already under way. As it was in Bosnia, a strong federal system is a viable means to prevent both perils in Iraq.

Partition Ext—Causes Civil Wars

**Independent partitioning leads to destabilizing civil war- Shia, Sunni, and Kurd factions all break into conflict**

Merritt 7 (Douglas W., grad student, Master’s Thesis, 12/14, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475503&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

If the Shia province became a reality, Horowitz believes, Abdul-Aziz-Al Hakim’s SCIRI would result in increased influence from Iran. Iranian Shia and Iraqi Shia are not the same group. Iranians are Persians and Iraqi Shi’ites are Arabian. Persian and Arab hostilities from history still exist today. The Iraqi Shia fought loyally under Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war. This is another reference to the possibility of a mini-civil war in the Shia province. Ed Blanche, author of, “Breaking Up is Hard to do,” made the same determination in reference to Hakim and Sadr. If America didn’t intervene, Hakim is likely to win, opening up a large portion of Iraq to increased Iranian influence. The Kurds in the North are closer to independence than ever before. The underlying issue is with Turkey. Turkey contains an extremely large population of Kurds, who like the Kurds in Iraq want independence. If Kurdistan becomes independent, Turkey expects their Kurds within their borders to attempt to gain its independence, expanding the borders of Kurdistan North into Turkey. In the advent of the war in Iraq, Turkey already positioned soldiers on the Iraqi border. It is safe to assume if Kurdistan becomes independent and the United States leaves, war between two of our allies, Kurdistan and Turkey, will ensue. The concern highlighted by Horowitz in the South focused on the Sunnis attempting to regain their powerbase of the country. The Ba’athist Party would take power of the area and eventually start a civil war with the Shia and Kurds in an attempt to regain control of Iraq. Furthermore, the current trend that Sunnis are decreasing their support for terrorist and insurgents would reverse. The terrorist and insurgent groups 29 would fight Sadr’s Army and hakim’s Badr Brigades. The war would elevate the hatred for the U.S. and the overall result would entail an increase in hostilities in the U.S. and against U.S. civilians and military abroad.

Partition causes war- Iran-allied Shia state forces war with Sunnis and oil shocks

Killgore 6 (Andrew, former U.S. ambassador, Iraq Updates, 7/16, http://admin.iraqupdates.net/p\_articles.php/article/9375) my

In a divided Iraq, Baghdad would have to be a separate entity—for, with a population of five million, many of its diverse inhabitants are intermarried. Turkey, with 14 million restive Kurds, would be hostile to an independent Kurdish state in neighboring Iraq. Iran, with five to six million Kurds of its own, would be uneasy as well. A serious bone of contention between the Kurds and Iraqi Arabs—Sunni and Shi’i alike—is the northern city of Kirkuk, on the edge of Kurdish-occupied territory and with a third of Iraq’s oil. The present government is doing nothing to encourage Kurdish efforts to increase its population there. Were southern Iraq to become independent, it would constitute an irresistible attraction to the 70 million overwhelmingly Shi’i Iranians. If Shi’i Iraq linked up with Iran, even loosely, the result would be a nation of 85 million, controlling at least 15 percent of the world’s oil. This new country, moreover, might well not be friendly to the United States. Sunnis make up 85 percent of the Arab world’s population, and Shi’i the rest. Because an enlarged Iran would be seen as a threat to Sunni Arabs, war would be the eventual result. In the long run the Sunnis would win, but war and instability would threaten the supply of oil to the West, and oil could rise to $100 per barrel. In summary, the Turks would not accept an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, and the Sunni Arabs would not accept a Shi’i Arab state in southern Iraq allied to Shi’i Iran. Thus it makes good sense to keep Iraq united.

Partition Ext—Causes Civil Wars

**Partitioning empirically leads to violence- India proves**

Eskow 7 (RJ, writer and public policy consultant, Huffington Post, 8/20, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/partition-iraq-over-their\_b\_61116.html)

On first listening, dividing Iraq into three separate nations based on ethnicity might seem to be a good idea. Joe Biden's been pushing the idea for a while now. So what's wrong with the concept? O'Hanlon's track record of error isn't enough reason to reject it, so here are a couple of others. For one thing, the partitioning of nations has been a human tragedy in the past. Best estimates suggest that half a million people died during the partition of India - it could have been closer to a million - and 12 million were displaced. One observer recounted what he saw as a 14-year-old on board a train taking him from his childhood home: Thousands of Muslims, men, women and children, all waiting to take a train in the opposite direction, savagely slaughtered before his eyes, killed, stabbed and beheaded. Three or four trains full of Muslims were due to leave for Pakistan that day. None did. "I saw Muslims being burnt alive, thrown onto bonfires, I saw bodies, I saw blood, I saw many things," he said. "The madness that very first day could have finished everybody." Whatever the wisdom of dividing India, a thoughtful analyst might at least think twice before recommending the imposing the same solution in Iraq. But cautionary tales like these aren't enough to stop plucky "scholars" like Michael O'Hanlon from offering their proposals to a friendly audience of the powerful.

Partition Ext—Causes Conflict

Ethnic partition fails- no political leadership and Kurds would invite conflict

Riggins 7 (David, Lieutenant Colonel in the US army, 4/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493639&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

Politically, only the Kurds seem truly prepared to establish and sustain an effective postpartition government. Kurdistan already holds regional elections, has an armed defense/police force known as the Peshmerga (with a history of guerilla actions against Iraq, Turkey, and Iran), and has established basic local government-type functions similar to those executed by US states and localities. Yet the Kurds are quick to point out that their efforts are not focused on creation of a new country, separate from the rest of Iraq. They do so out of necessity, because their economy and defense capabilities are not presently sufficient to stand alone. This is particularly true since, as discussed earlier, a separate Kurdistan would likely be fiercely opposed by Turkey and Iran due to the potential impact on Kurds in both countries. A separate Kurdistan could also inspire violence along its southern border by acting as a catalyst to unite Arabs of all sects against Kurds. The result is a Kurdish desire to implement a state-based system similar to the US under an Iraqi Constitution that will “recognize the particular interests of states” [62]. Unlike the Kurds, neither the Shia nor the Sunnis appear prepared to function politically or militarily in a post-partitioned Iraq. There is no emergent leader or predominant organization in either of these groups with enough popular support to centralize political power across the whole of the sect. Instead, there are several fractional groups among both Sunnis and Shia that are often responsible for intrasectarian strife. These intragroup divides are most apparent in the form of militia organizations that frequently conduct armed engagements against other forces from the same sect. Given such divisive dynamics, it seems unrealistic to assume that the postpartition states could independently establish effective, lasting central governments in the near term. Doing so would require large investments of time, money, and security forces by external players who would have to be committed to the long-term success of the new state(s). With the possible exception of Iranian support to segments of Iraqi Shiites, no other countries are prepared to offer this kind of commitment. Presented with a Sunni Iraq devoid of natural resources and in need of substantial long-term support, it is easy to see why.

3 State partition leads to violence- empirically proven in India and Vietnam

Harris et al 7 (Ronald. A., Ph.D in health sciences, Bilal Haciogallari, associate in Public Policy at Southern Univ, Alaa Shams, analyst in energy and environmental studies at Southern Univ., and Sinan A. Abood, master’s candidate in civil and environmental engineering at Michigan Tech Univ., 6/15, <http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc07/papers/papers/pap_1729.pdf>) my

An alternative to unification is the partition of Iraq (Abood, 2006; Hacioullari, 2007). A three-state solution (Figure 6) was first proposed following the recent invasion of Iraq by U.S. led forces in 2003 (Gelb, 2003; Galbraith, 2006). We propose a tri-partite return to the ancient governates "pashas" of Mosul (Kurdistan), Baghdad (Sunni-Arab), and Basra (Shia-Arab). Iraqi oil resources are mostly located in two parts of the country, north and south, while hydrology resource converge in the centralized region that first created the country. To the north, Turkey can control the flow of rivers. The dominant religious and ethnic groups, Kurds in the north, Sunni Arabs in the central region, and Shia Arabs in the south, vie with one another for control over the landscape. Kurdish nationalism will not permit a two-state solution in combination with Sunni Arabs, while Sunni Arabs cannot reconcile with Shia Arabs. The three-state solution is: (1) Kurdistan (Sunni Kurd), (2) State of Baghdad (Sunni Arab), and (3) State of Basra (Shia Arab). Partition entails a reorganization of political space that triggers complex identity problems within and across the borders of the states involved. The history of partition is steeped in controversy and violence. That history is comprised of both colonial partitions that occurred in Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus, as British imperial rule contracted in these locations (Hitchens, 2003) and cold war partitions in Germany, Vietnam and Korea. Recent examples of territorial division are Ireland (1920), Germany and Korea (1945), India (1947), and Indochina (1954), Yugoslavia (1991), Serbia and Montenegro (2006). The breakup of India into Muslim states of Pakistan and Bangladesh was conflictual, which continues in Kashmir. Reunification of Germany was relatively peaceful, while reunification of Vietnam was relatively violent. There is continued conflict in Palestine over Israel and in Korea with threats against the South by the North. Partition is accepted as a method for terminating disputes outstanding among nations without recourse to war.

Partition Ext—Causes Instability

3 state partition is universally opposed by all ethnic groups and causes instability- all ethnic groups would take up arms

Rosen 3 (Nir, journalist specializing in Iraq/Afghanistan, Asia Times, 11/27, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/EK27Ak05.html) my

It is wrong to speak of an artificial "Sunni triangle". Iraqis do not divide their country into religious regions like this. It is also wrong to say that Sunnis dominated Iraq under Saddam. More accurate would be to say that members of Saddam's extended tribe, or of his hometown, dominated Iraq, to the exclusion of everyone else. Many Sunnis in the so called Sunni triangle resent the undue importance Saddam gave to Tikritis, for example. Iraq's Sunnis and Shi'ites are related by common history and often common tribal relations, since Iraq only became a majority Shi'ite state after Sunni tribes converted to Shi'itism in the 18th century. Even the most extreme Iraqi Shi'ites are Iraqi nationalists and view Iran with suspicion. Iraqi Shi'ites believe their country is the rightful leader of the Shi'ite world, since Shi'itism began in Iraq, most sacred Shi'ite sites are in Iraq and the Hawza, or the Shi'ite clerical academy of Najaf, thought dominated by Shi'ites until recently. Iran is a rival for them. Iraqi nationalism and unity were proven when all members of the IGC unanimously rejected the American proposal to introduce Turkish peacekeepers into the country. An Iraqi population already skeptical of American motives would view any suggestion of further division as proof of a nefarious scheme to divide and plunder their country. Sunnis and Shi'ites would all take up arms and the resistance would be universal. There is no Sunni or Shi'ite Iraqi who wants to divide his country. The Kurds of Iraq are of course a separate ethnic group. However, they have participated in united opposition movements before the war, the reconstruction efforts after the war and are represented in the IGC by both major Kurdish parties. Even the Iraqi foreign minister is Kurdish. During Saddam's reign and before, many Kurds actually cooperated with the regime, serving as ministers and officers and even fighting the rebel brethren. Kurdish leaders from all political parties have called for inclusion in the new Iraq, and while many may dream of an eventual Kurdish state, all recognize that it is quixotic at this juncture. There is only a light American presence in Kurdistan anyway, and it is not the reason troops are meeting resistance elsewhere. A Kurdistan without US troops is the greatest fear of most Kurds today who live under the ominous shadow of their Turkish, Iranian, and even Syrian neighbors. There is no clear border for Kurdistan. Kurds covet Mosul and Kirkuk, where many Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen would violently oppose secession. Gelb's proposal is the singularly least democratic suggestion offered to solve the Iraq crisis to date. Moreover, no neighboring country would accept the idea of dividing Iraq. How many small, artificial and unviable countries (like Jordan and the Gulf countries) does the West wish to create in repetition of its post-Ottoman errors? Unlike Yugoslavia, Iraq's different groups have no history of separate existence and they have no history of mutual slaughter. It is true that Iraq was to a certain extent an invention. But all states begin as an imagined idea. A state succeeds if its people believe in it. Iraqis believe in Iraq. If anything, the American occupation is only uniting Iraqis in resentment of the foreigners and non-Muslims who rule them, and increasing their desire to be "free, independent and democratic" as the graffiti says on walls throughout the country. These are the "ambitions" of the Sunnis that Gelb demonizes, just as they are the ambitions of the Shi'ites and Kurds. Iraqis believe in Baghdad, an extremely diverse capital city, where Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds live together and even intermarry.

Partition Ext—A2: Causes Kurdistan Conflict

Violence won’t spill over to Kurdistan- stable government and refrained demands on independence

VOA 6 (Voice of America, July, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=95&lngnr=12&anr=12517&smap=) my

The Kurdistan region is part of Iraq, but since 1992 has had its own elected parliament and run its affairs. The Kurdistan Region encompasses the three northern provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaimaniyah. Unlike other areas of Iraq, the region has few security problems. As violence continues to ravage Baghdad and other parts of the country, Prime Minister Barzani says he does not believe Iraq has descended into a civil war. "The fight is over Baghdad," he says, "This is the problem that is happening. Yes, we are facing serious problems in Baghdad, especially between the Shiites and the Sunnis, but I cannot call it a civil war." Barzani says he does not believe the violence will spill over into the Kurdistan Region because there are no sectarian problems here. At a time when Iraq looks ready to split apart, Mr. Barzani says although the Kurdish people would like their own state, the Kurdistan Region is not seeking statehood. "Sometimes it is important for people to differentiate between dreams and what is the reality on the ground," he says. "But he would not rule out seeking an independent state in the future, saying only that at this stage, it is not in the interest of the Kurdish people." What he does believe is in their interest, is a democratic, federal Iraq that respects its own people.

Partition Ext—A2: Kaufmann Analysis

Kaufmann’s partition theory is flawed- too absolute and underrepresented power of negotiation

Riggins 7 (David, Lieutenant Colonel in the US army, 4/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493639&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

It is undeniable that Kaufmann’s predictions on the effects of ethnic civil wars— hardened ethnic identities and an intense security dilemma—have materialized in Iraq. But after investigation of the complexities associated with US, regional, and internal Iraqi interests and issues, it is difficult to accept Kaufmann’s theory as the only remedy for two reasons. First, the absolute nature of the theory leaves no room for solutions other than complete one-sided military victory, third party occupation and suppression, or physical separation of groups, even though the literature points out historical examples of other outcomes. Second, Kaufmann’s analysis unconvincingly negates the effectiveness of negotiated settlements as a solution, even though his research dataset contains numerous successful instances of this approach. One possible defense of Kaufmann’s theory in light of this inconsistency involves his requirement for ethnic separation into “defensible enclaves”—a term he fails to define in detail. In spite of a significant US and coalition military presence in Iraq, the large geographic area combined with the nature of insurgent operations make the concept of secure, defensible enclaves there nearly impossible. Combine this with a strong potential for hostilities from regional neighbors and splintering within Sunni and Shia sects, and it is easy to understand why Fearon warns that partition “may simply replace civil conflict with interstate conflict” [63]

Federalism Bad—Kurds

18 province federalism model fails- upsets Kurdistan and risks involvement of Iran and Turkey

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

Overall, though, the logic of constructing a federation on the basis of the eighteen-province model is plausible (at least superficially), which is probably why it continues to be the option of choice for most analysts. Unfortunately, however, regardless of how convincing the logic, this model is not feasible in practice. There are several possible flaws with this design— not the least of which is that promoting intra-ethnic conflict in the one region of Iraq (Kurdistan) that has remained stable and secure since 2003 is a highly dangerous strategy and one that risks increasing the involvement of external powers (Iran and Turkey) in the internal affairs of Iraq. More importantly, like the previous option, the eighteen-province model is unacceptable to the Kurds.35 The two Kurdish leaders (Jalal Talabani of the PUK and Masoud Barzani of the KDP) have presented a united front during negotiations over Iraq’s political future and have made it clear that the nonnegotiable price for their reintegration into the state of Iraq is constitutional recognition of a distinct Kurdish region. The implication of the Kurdish position is that if Iraq is to survive as a unified territorial entity, then some form of plurinational federalism is inevitable.

18 province model exacerbates intercommunal violence- Kirkuk and Ninevah prove

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

The second objection, that the five-region model would precipitate the fragmentation of Iraq, either through civil war or secession, is valid to the extent that a viable alternative exists that offers better prospects of holding Iraq together democratically. The eighteen-province model—the main alternative—is unacceptable to the Kurds and its adoption would make Kurdish withdrawal from Iraq a virtual certainty. Moreover, the eighteenprovincemodel, while not the cause of intercommunal violence, appears to have done little to assuage it. An Iraq governed under this model has witnessed a steady increase in intercommunal violence since 2003, notably in those provinces and cities with the most diverse populations.54 Part of the theoretical rationale for maintaining the eighteen provinces is to retain diverse subunits in which communities are ‘‘forced’’ to cooperate in order to govern. The two most appropriate testing grounds for this theory are the provinces of Kirkuk and Ninevah, both of which are characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity, and both of which have suffered some of the worst interethnic violence in Iraq. In Mosul and Kirkuk cities, initial efforts to generate interethnic cooperation through the use of power-sharing mechanisms swiftly disintegrated, and the recent election has gifted control over both to the Kurds. Kurdish political dominance over the staunchly Sunni Arab city of Mosul and the deeply divided, oil-rich city of Kirkuk can only exacerbate interethnic tensions.55 While it is unreasonable to attribute increasing levels of interethnic and intersectarian violence to the design of political institutions, the logic on which the eighteen-province model relies is seriously undermined by the absence of intercommunal cooperation in those regions where it should be most evident, and where it is most required. The five-region model separates communities territorially, but it separates communities that are already on the cusp of civil war.

Federalism Bad—Conflict

18 state federalism increases conflict- inequality of resources

Riggins 7 (David, Lieutenant Colonel in the US army, 4/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493639&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

To some extent, ad hoc partition among Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs already exists in Iraq. As shown in Figure 1, Kurdish Iraqis are largely concentrated in the northern portion of the country, while Shia Arabs primarily occupy eastern regions in central and southern Iraq, along the Iranian border. Sunnis generally reside in the central and western regions of Iraq. The southern deserts along the border with Saudi Arabia are sparsely populated with a mix of Shia and Sunni Arabs. Although the populations are somewhat divided, Figure 1 points out that there are significant areas where groups are mixed. Figure 2 illustrates another complication in the determination of how to partition the country. Iraq is administratively divided into 18 governorates, only nine of which are predominantly homogeneous. The most obvious way to partition the country would be to do so along these existing boundaries. In fact, the new Iraqi constitution contains provisions for the creation of largely autonomous federated regions based on these existing governorates, if approved by majority. However, partition based on the existing administrative divisions seems more likely to increase conflict rather than decrease it, due to potential gain or loss of land and related resources. Even if the lines of division are redrawn to more accurately reflect the current ad hoc partition, several areas with mixed populations will likely require forced relocation of tens of thousands to fully effect partition and minimize sectarian cleansing.

Federalism Bad—A2: Ethnic Conflict

Communal divisions are an entrenched part of Iraqi politics- election votes split by ethnic groups

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

The two most obvious objections to the five-region model are, first, that the division of Iraq into five separate communal ‘‘enclaves’’ will entrench rather than ameliorate intercommunal tensions and, second, that this model is a recipe for the future fragmentation of the state. The first of these objections speaks to the broader theoretical debate regarding the most effective institutional means of dealing with divided societies. Political institutions can be crafted either to reflect or to deny the significance of Iraq’s communal divisions. While the significance of communal divisions cannot be quantified in any meaningful way, certain historical trends are undeniable. Since Iraq’s creation in the 1920s until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Sunni Arabs governed and Shi’a Arabs and Kurds were systematically excluded from political power. Since 2003, Iraq has been governed by the Iraqi Governing Council,51 with seats allocated on a communal basis, and an interim government,52 with a secular Shi’a prime minister, a Sunni Arab president, and a religious Shi’a and a Kurd as the two vice presidents. Iraq’s first democratically elected government perpetuates this tradition, with ministerial portfolios allocated on a communal basis, and a Presidential Council comprising a Kurd (President Jalal Talabani), a Sunni Arab (Vice President Ghazi al-Yawer), and a religious Shi’a Arab (Vice President Abdul al-Mahdi). Both the election and the ongoing insurgency provide strong evidence that communal identity is now a key factor in Iraqi politics. Sunni Arabs largely boycotted the election, Shi’a Arabs voted in massive numbers for the main Shi’a ticket, and Kurds voted almost exclusively for the Kurdish list.53 The insurgency is dominated by Sunni Arabs, while Kurds and Shi’a staff the nascent Iraqi defense forces. Communal divisions have always existed (and been exploited) in Iraqi politics, and they have only hardened since the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Power sharing on the basis of community identity is already an established fact of political life in Iraq’s new democracy because governing on any other basis seems not to be possible at present.

Federalism Bad—Fails

Iraqi federalism fails—better in theory than in practice

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

The debate over the design of Iraq’s federal system also yields valuable insights regarding the limitations of theory when juxtaposed against political realties on the ground. The ideal solution theoretically—a system that promotes intercommunal cooperation or intracommunal competition – turns out to be unfeasible in practice. The reality of contemporary Iraq is that the Kurds have both the determination and the capacity to secede (or at least withdraw) from Iraq if their demands are not satisfied. Hence, regardless of theoretical plausibility, any argument that posits a federal system that does not recognize the existence of a Kurdish region as its starting point runs the risk of precipitating precisely the outcome it is designed to avoid.

Federalism Bad—Stability

Federalism destabilizes Iraq- perceived to weaken the state, fears of inequality, and division along sectarian lines

Sommer-Houdeville 9 (Thomas, research associate of Focus on the Global South, Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, 3/16, http://api.ning.com/files/I98qfrw39Z2kmjlk9TbGIpMLwe1lcGXoVRavyZBd7dheKaS54aQLq2oVcAihy4mof7wH3E-u0fSgoiKiaD7x4zgRQkpilVV4/Report.Sixyearsafter:%20ThepoliticallandscapeinIraq.pdf) my

The question of federalism is still undermining the stability of Iraq. The problem is not federalism in itself, but the context in which it is implemented. First, it is still seen by a majority of Iraqis as an imported and unwanted political solution82. Second, it is seen by lot of political actors, but also a vast part of the Iraqi population as a tool to weaken the state and maybe to provide a legal way to split the country83, at the very same time when the rebuilding of the Iraqi state is still not accomplished. Above all, the question of division of resources between the federal state and the regions or governorates has fuelled the fear of unequal development between the areas which have oil and those which don’t. Also, interpretation of the law relating to decision making between all the different levels of the federal government, the governorates, and the provincial councils is still a source of confusion and heated debate. There is a real need for clarifying the different missions, fields and areas of competence of each level of the federal institutions. Finally, the possibility engendered by the current Iraqi federalist system to create super-regions may reinforce the sectarian trend and the instability of Iraq. In this context, the main problem is not the existence of the Kurdistan region which has been an entity de facto since the 1991 war. Due to the historical and national struggle of the Kurdish people, it is mainly accepted by the Iraqi political actors. But the projects84 led by the ISCI and other Shiia political actors for the creation of a super region including nine governorates (or maybe eleven, including Baghdad85) is a direct projection of a sectarian vision of Iraq. With a mostly Shiite Southern region86, a Kurdish region (containing three governorates, but still trying to incorporate surrounding territories87) in the North, the only solution for the remaining governorates will be to gather in a third super region which will be seen as mainly Sunni. Consequently, many think that this will inevitably lead to the partition of Iraq on sectarian lines.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Kills Credibility

Credibility Ext—Withdrawal Kills

Withdrawal would “cripple American credibility”

Time 4 (Apr 19, [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,993849-6,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C993849-6%2C00.html)) LL

The TIME/CNN poll last week showed only 24% of Americans now view the military campaign in Iraq to be "unsuccessful"; on the other hand, more than half say the U.S. should maintain or increase the number of troops in Iraq. The relative public equanimity gives the Bush Administration precious time to try to get things right. Foreign policy luminaries from both parties say a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would cripple American credibility, doom reform in the Arab world and turn Iraq into a playground for terrorists and the armies of neighboring states like Iran and Syria. "We can't afford to have a failed state there," says Nancy Stetson, a foreign policy adviser to Kerry. "If we walk away, the place could implode."

**Withdrawal damages US reputation**

Science Direct 8 (Aug 27, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-4T9JWKM-2&_user=1651279&_coverDate=12/31/2008&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1392382145&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000054090&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1651279&md5=fa6c5fec1e4c80f3bda78aa4904735d2>) LL

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Causes Afghan Troop Shift

Troop Shift Module

Withdrawal from Iraq shifts all the troops to Afghanistan- higher priority for Obama

Dreazen 9 (Yochi J., staff writer, Wall Street Journal, 1/24, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275907840012057.html) my

The U.S. Marine Corps is proposing to completely withdraw from Iraq later this year and shift 20,000 Marines to Afghanistan, boosting the Obama administration's plan to devote significant new resources to the Afghan war. Gen. James Conway, the top Marine commander, said Friday that the combat portion of the Iraq war was effectively over. "The time is right for Marines in general terms to leave Iraq," he told reporters. "A building fight taking place in another locale -- that's really where Marines need to be." On Friday, U.S.-fired missiles killed 18 people on the Pakistan side of the Afghan border, in the first attacks on the militant stronghold since President Barack Obama took office. The strikes from unmanned CIA planes confirm that Mr. Obama, as expected, is continuing the Bush Administration's attacks in the ungoverned tribal regions. The Bush administration had devoted the vast bulk of the nation's military resources to the war in Iraq. Mr. Obama has made clear that he sees Afghanistan as a higher priority, and has promised to withdraw all U.S. combat forces from Iraq within 16 months of taking office. Pentagon officials are drawing up plans to shift up to 30,000 new troops in Afghanistan in coming months. White House aides say that Mr. Obama, who as a candidate called for a shift of roughly similar scale, is likely to approve the request. "The president has been quite clear that the mission is to responsibly draw down and end our active combat role [in Iraq]," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday. "He wants to put more emphasis on Afghanistan and deal with the problems ... and the challenges that we face in Afghanistan." The new president will have to make some difficult trade-offs. The military is facing significant manpower strains because of the demands of the two long wars. "Anything that you put into Afghanistan must necessarily come from a reduction of the number of Marines in Iraq," Gen. Conway said. There are currently 22,000 Marines there.

US presence only aggravates anti-Western jihadists- this is a linear impact

Bacevich 9 (Andrew J., professor of history and international relations, AJC, 12/7, http://www.ajc.com/opinion/pro-s-troop-surge-230980.html) my

In the wake of Sept. 11, American statecraft emphasized the first approach: President George W. Bush embarked on a “global war” to eliminate violent jihadism. President Barack Obama now seems intent on pursuing the second approach: Through military escalation in Afghanistan, he seeks to “finish the job” that Bush began there. Through war, Bush set out to transform the greater Middle East. Obama’s election was to mark a new beginning, an opportunity to “reset” America’s approach to the world. The president’s chosen course of action for Afghanistan suggests he may well squander that opportunity. In Afghanistan, he will expend yet more blood and more treasure hoping to attenuate or at least paper over the wreckage left by the Bush era. Achieving even a semblance of success, however modestly defined, will require an Afghan government that gets its act together, larger and more competent Afghan security forces, thousands of additional reinforcements from allies already heading toward the exits, patience from economically distressed Americans as the administration shovels hundreds of billions of dollars toward Central Asia, and even greater patience from U.S. troops shouldering the burdens of seemingly perpetual war. Above all, success will require convincing Afghans that the tens of thousands of heavily armed strangers in their midst represent Western beneficence rather than foreign occupation. What Afghanistan tells us is that rather than changing Washington, Obama has become its captive. The president has succumbed to the twin illusions that have taken the political class by storm in recent months. The first illusion is that events in Afghanistan are crucial to the safety and well-being of the American people. The second illusion is that the United States possesses the wisdom and wherewithal to guide Afghanistan out of darkness and into the light. According to the first illusion, Sept. 11 occurred because Americans ignored Afghanistan. By implication, fixing the place is essential to preventing the recurrence of terrorist attacks on the United States. In Washington, the appeal of this explanation distracts attention from the manifest incompetence of the government agencies that failed on Sept. 11, while also making it unnecessary to consider how U.S. policy toward the Middle East during the several preceding decades contributed to the emergence of violent anti-Western jihadism. According to the second illusion, the war in Iraq is ending in a great American victory. Forget the fact that the arguments advanced to justify the invasion of March 2003 have all turned out to be bogus: no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found; no substantive links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida established; no tide of democratic change triggered across the Islamic world. The “surge” in Iraq enables proponents of that war to change the subject and to argue that the counterinsurgency techniques employed in Iraq can produce similar results in Afghanistan — disregarding the fact that the two places bear about as much resemblance to each other as North Dakota does to Southern California. So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel, with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush’s thoroughly discredited “global war on terror”: Sending U.S. troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism. Under the guise of cleaning up Bush’s mess, Obama has chosen to continue Bush’s policies. No doubt pulling the plug on an ill-advised enterprise involves risk and uncertainty. It also entails acknowledging mistakes. It requires courage. Yet without these things, talk of change will remain so much hot air

Afghan Troop Shift Ext—Links

Iraq withdrawal opens the door for troop shifts- Obama is committed

Salant 8 (Jonathan, reporter, Bloomberg, 6/20, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aytVdzUL4u.s&refer=us)

Barack Obama, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, said today that U.S. combat troops should be shifted to Afghanistan from Iraq. ``This has to be our central focus, the central front of our battle against terrorism,'' Obama said on CBS's ``Face the Nation'' program. ``One of the biggest mistakes we've made strategically after 9/11 was to fail to finish the job here, focus our attention here.'' Obama, who opposed the war with Iraq, said that conflict distracted the U.S. from the task of capturing al-Qaeda leaders and rebuilding Afghanistan after the militant Islamic Taliban regime was ousted. ``We made a strategic error, and it's one that we're going to pay for, and unfortunately the people of Afghanistan have paid for as well,'' the Illinois senator said. ``But we now have an opportunity to correct that problem.'' Obama, 46, was interviewed in Afghanistan, where he arrived yesterday. He is on a six-day tour that also will include stops in Iraq, Israel and Western Europe. He spent last night at Bagram Air Force Base outside Kabul.

Afghan Troop Shift Ext—Links

Troops would be shifted to Afghanistan- new priorities for Obama

Miller and Redha 9 (Greg and Usama, staff writers, LA Times, 3/9, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/09/world/fg-iraq-troops-violence9) my

WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD — The U.S. will reduce its military presence in Iraq by 12,000 troops over the next six months as part of the first major drawdown since President Obama announced his plan to end combat operations in the country next year, U.S. military officials in Baghdad said Sunday. The announcement came just hours after a suicide bomber on a motorcycle struck a crowd of police recruits outside an Interior Ministry compound in Baghdad, killing at least 33 people and wounding 61. Despite that grim reminder of the lingering danger, U.S. officials said the drawdown reflects growing confidence in the security gains in Iraq over the last two years. It also reflects a major shift in priorities for the U.S. military, which is increasingly focused on efforts to arrest the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. The plan would reduce U.S. troop strength by nearly 10% just as Iraq is preparing for nationwide elections in the fall -- a step that would have been unthinkable at the height of the insurgency but was endorsed in this case by top U.S. military officials. "The time and conditions are right for coalition forces to reduce the number of troops in Iraq," U.S. Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, said in a statement. Successful provincial elections in January "demonstrated the increased capability of the Iraqi army and police to provide security," he said. In the coming months, Odierno said, "Iraqis will see the number of U.S. forces go down in the cities while more and more Iraqi flags go up at formerly shared security stations." The plan calls for the number of U.S. brigade combat teams to drop from 14 to 12. Two brigade teams that had been scheduled to redeploy in the next six months will not be replaced. A British brigade will also leave Iraq without being replaced, taking the final British combat troops out of Iraq. When the American move is completed, it would reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq to about 128,000 troops, dipping for the first time below the number of troops in the country before then-President Bush ordered the buildup he referred to as the "surge" in 2007. The schedule for the withdrawal represents a compromise between the 16-month timetable President Obama had advocated during his election campaign and a 23-month plan that had been pushed by the military. Under the compromise, all combat forces would be pulled out of Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010, but a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops would remain for training and support missions. The Iraq withdrawals are crucial to the administration's plans to devote more military resources to Afghanistan, as well as to limit spending at a time when the government is facing record deficits. Senior U.S. national security officials are nearing completion of a strategic review of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, a step that Obama has described as an effort "to stabilize a deteriorating situation," one he has implied was neglected by Bush. Seven years after the U.S. invasion, Afghanistan's stability is threatened by a renewed Taliban insurgency, as well as increasing frustration within the country with a central government regarded as corrupt and ineffective. Last month, Obama announced plans to send 17,000 additional U.S. soldiers and Marines to Afghanistan -- deployments that would more than offset the troop reductions in Iraq.

Obama would shift troops- situation is more urgent

Reuters 8 (Carl Bohan, 7/22, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0236543520080722) my

The question of when to withdraw some 147,000 U.S. troops in Iraq overshadowed the first term senator's trip. Obama has made his opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 a centerpiece of his election campaign. "What I have proposed is a steady, deliberate draw down over the course of 16 months," he told a news conference in Amman. Obama has said the draw down would enable more troops to be deployed in Afghanistan, where insurgent attacks in the past two months have killed more U.S. soldiers than in Iraq. He described the situation in Afghanistan as "perilous and urgent" and said al Qaeda and the Taliban were planning more attacks in the United States. "In Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban are mounting a growing offensive against the security of the Afghan people and increasingly the Pakistani people, while plotting new attacks against the United States," he said. Progress in boosting stability and security in Iraq would come from reconciling Iraq's feuding political groups, he said.

Afghan Troop Shift Ext—Links

Troops would be redeployed to Afghanistan in withdrawal- Marines already deployed

Stack 8 (Liam, freelance journalist, Christian Science Monitor, 8/28, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2008/0828/p99s01-duts.html)

American and Iraqi officials announced on Wednesday that United States forces would hand over control of the Anbar Province, the scene of some of the war's most gruesome violence, to the Iraqi military as soon as next Monday. Most of the departing US soldiers are marines, many of whom will be sent to Afghanistan, where conflict has renewed between NATO forces and a resurgent Taliban. The move out of Anbar and into Afghanistan appears to be as much a vote of confidence in Iraqi forces as it is an indication of US concerns about the war in Afghanistan. Speaking to Agence France-Presse at the Pentagon, US Marine Corps commandant Gen. James Conway outlined the case for a speedy withdrawal from Anbar and described Afghanistan as "a stiffer fight." "Anbar remains a dangerous place, but the ever growing ability of the Iraqi security forces continues to move us closer to seeing Iraqi control of the province," the general said. He expressed the hope that the handover of the Anbar province to Iraqi control will allow the Pentagon to redeploy troops elsewhere. "More US forces are needed in Afghanistan," he said. "However, in order to do more in Afghanistan, our marines have got to see relief elsewhere."... "It's our view that if there is a stiffer fight going someplace else, in a much more expeditionary environment where the Marine air-ground task force really seems to have a true and enduring value, then that's where we need to be," he said about Afghanistan.

The only way to send troops to Afghanistan is by pulling them from Iraq- this is a forced choice

Biddle 9 (Stephen, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 3/2, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18670/iraq\_and\_afghanistan.html) my

But to get reinforcement in Afghanistan, don't you have to pull them out of Iraq? Yes, if you want troops for Afghanistan, you can only get them from Iraq. In that trade-off you have to make some kind of balance. You also have a series of constraints you are working under, like the SOF agreement's 2011 deadline, and the president's campaign pledge to have the major combat formations out in sixteen months. The nineteen-month withdrawal for combat brigades with the 35,000-to-50,000 residual through 2011 is a way of trying to cast a reasonable balance among these various competing demands. At the same time, it is important in assessing that balance to be very careful about what we think we need troops for in Iraq. It is important to understand this ongoing military need for peacekeeping in the context of the early stages of a negotiated settlement to a sectarian civil war. The primary military purpose of the United States presence in Iraq right now is not training and advising. And it is not primarily counterterrorism. It is primarily peacekeeping to stabilize the system of negotiated peace that the United States played a major role in achieving. Generally speaking, peacekeeping is labor intensive, but it's not as if there is a set number required. Generally speaking, more is better, less is worse. The smaller the peacekeeping troop count, the lower the probability of success. But it never goes to zero. And again you have the competing requirement for troops in Afghanistan. The president is trying to draw a balance in which you accept some reduction of the probability of success in the peacekeeping effort in Iraq in exchange for increasing the probability of success in Afghanistan if there were no additional troops there.

Afghan Troop Shift—Troops Trade Off

Additional US troops create a backlash and undermine support for Afghan forces

Karon 9 (Tony, Senior editor at Time Magazine, 12/6, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1945869,00.html) my

President Obama knows that the Afghan war is going badly, but he insists that the specter of an al-Qaeda comeback makes Afghanistan a "war of necessity." So he has ordered some 30,000 new troops to the front, hoping to hold the line enough that Afghan forces can be built up to eventually take over the mission from the U.S. It may sound like a limited goal, after the sweeping visions of democracy promised during the Bush years. But even that relatively modest strategy is based on some very questionable assumptions. (See a slide show of the war in Afghanistan up close.)  Here are five of them: The Al-Qaeda Threat Requires a Ground War  Obama made the threat of al-Qaeda's returning on the back of a Taliban victory the primary rationale for escalating the war in Afghanistan. But as many have pointed out, al-Qaeda doesn't need sanctuaries in order to plot terrorist attacks, and its leadership core is based in the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan — which means that 100,000 U.S. troops are now being committed to a mission whose goal is to prevent a few hundred men from re-establishing a base of operations. And then there's the problem that having masses of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, for whatever reason, inevitably creates a nationalist backlash that fuels the insurgency — a problem that Defense Secretary Robert Gates had noted early in the debate. The fact that the Taliban is now effectively in control of as much as half of the country eight years after being routed by the U.S.-led invasion is a sign that the local population is at least more tolerant of an insurgency against foreign forces. Expanding the ground war may not solve this problem. As University of Michigan historian Juan Cole wrote last week, "The U.S. counter-insurgency plan assumes that Pashtun villagers dislike and fear the Taliban, and just need to be protected from them so as to stop the politics of intimidation. But what if the villagers are cousins of the Taliban and would rather support their clansmen than white Christian foreigners?" (See pictures of the battle against the Taliban.) Afghan Security Forces Can Be Trained to Take Over the Mission The centerpiece of Obama's exit strategy is the training of Afghan security forces to take responsibility for fighting the Taliban, just as Iraqi forces have taken charge of security in Iraq. But Afghanistan is nothing like Iraq, and training may not be the decisive issue: although the U.S. has officially trained 94,000 Afghan soldiers, there's no sign of an effective Afghan security force capable of fighting the Taliban. Desertion rates are high — 1 in 4 soldiers trained last year, by some accounts. So are rates of drug addiction. Most important, the most effective elements of the military are dominated by ethnic Tajiks, which does little to help win support of the Pashtuns, the country's largest ethnic group and the one among which the insurgency is based. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan had no powerful army or strong state before the U.S. went in — nor does it have the oil wealth that allows Iraq to pay for its own armed forces. There's also the question of whether they'll be willing to fight the Taliban on behalf of a foreign-backed government.

Increased US troops tradeoff with support of Afghan forces

Tristam 9 (Pierre, journalist, http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/a/eikenberry-memo-afghanistan.htm) my

We overestimate the ability of Afghan security forces to take over," Eikenberry writes. The goal is for Afghan forces to control their country by 2013. Eikenberry's conclusion: the goal is far-fetched. Karzai isn't doing anything to build up the forces. And "simply keeping the force at current levels requires tens of thousands of new recruits every year to replace attrition losses and battlefield casualties." Increasing foreign troops would steepen the problems with the Afghan army, not alleviate them, as the Afghan government would feel less urgency to maintain its own troop levels and the troops themselves would senses that, with a surge, foreign troops can do the dirty work and take the casualties instead. Challenges facing the national police are even stiffer because policemen are paid less and face higher risks as they reach into villages and districts where even the Afghan army won't go. Rather than increasing foreign troop levels, Eikenberry recommends paying police and army recruits more.

Afghan Troop Shift—Troops Trade Off

No risk of a turn, only a link- more troops hurt Afghan security training efforts

Peter 9 (Tom A., journalist specializing in Middle East, CSMonitor, 11/4, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1104/p08s04-wosc.html0) my

If there is a surge, US Army Capt. Micah Chapman says there will likely be more months like this ahead. "The more troops you have on the ground, the more chances there are for casualties," says the Fort Drum, N.Y., resident. "But I think you'll see a marked decrease in violence across the board once you get past the initial flood stage." But for many of the soldiers at Combat Outpost Penich, top commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's stark warning – to send more troops or risk failure – sounds too dire. At least in the eastern Kunar River Valley, where their company-sized force (about 100 soldiers) is posted, they say the challenges aren't quite so insurmountable. Yes, they say, major results may take time, and soldiers here face difficult living and working conditions, but they say they can get the job done. Combat Outpost Penich (manned by Attack Company, of the US Army's 1-32 Infantry Battalion, 10th Mountain Division) is experiencing something of a minisurge itself. Through a shuffling of forces, nine months ago, Attack Company became the first permanent US troop presence east of the Kunar River, helping to control an area of Kunar Province long out of reach for United States forces. "If you bring more troops it will speed up results, but it can be done with what we have," says US Army Lt. Gabe Lamois of Alexandria, Va., echoing the common sentiment here in the river valley. A surge in US troops could even hinder another goal here, of putting an Afghan face on security efforts, some soldiers point out.

Only a risk surge will hurt Afghan forces- hurts legitimacy

Peter 9 (Tom A., journalist specializing in Middle East, CSMonitor, 11/4, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1104/p08s04-wosc.html0) my

One of the most important questions about a potential NATO surge is how local Afghan forces will factor into the equation. International forces have been working to put Afghans in the lead for most missions. While some Afghan units are highly competent, many others struggle to maintain even the most basic standards of a professional army. An American troop surge could risk putting "a huge US face on everything," which would do little to bolster the reputation of Afghan security forces in the eyes of locals, says Lamois. But US Marine Lt. Richard Allis of Princeton, N.J., who is part of an embedded training team working with a local Afghan Army unit, says increasing the size of each embedded team would help. Now, with only two other men on his team, for security reasons none of the marines are allowed to accompany the Afghan Army on missions unless they're part of a larger joint patrol with the US Army. "It would be nice to be a little more independent," he says. The attitudes of Afghan security forces mirror those of their US counterparts, with most saying the current NATO troop level works. Though more would help, they say, success here does not depend on a surge.

Afghan Troop Shift—Afghan Troops Key to War

Afghan troops key to war- US troops don’t solve this

Associated Press 9 (11/29, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34193188/ns/politics-capitol\_hill/) my

WASHINGTON — The leading Senate Democrat on military matters said Sunday that President Barack Obama's anticipated plan for significantly expanding U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan must show how those reinforcements will help increase the size of the Afghan security forces. Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that more Afghan army and police are central to succeeding in the 8-year-old war and more U.S. trainers and equipment can help meet that goal. But it's unclear, Levin said, what role tens of thousands additional combat troops will play and Obama has to make a compelling case during a national address he's scheduled to give Tuesday night from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. "The key here is an Afghan surge, not an American surge," said Levin, D-Mich. "We cannot, by ourselves, win (the) war." Levin's remarks are a preview of the possible roadblocks Obama faces from his own party as he prepares to sell a broader, more expensive battle plan for Afghanistan to an American public weary of the conflict that began just weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks

Afghan forces key- US troops would fuel the Taliban

Jakes 9 (Lara, Pentagon Reporter for Associated Press, SF Gate, 9/12, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-12/news/17204088\_1\_afghan-security-forces-troop-buildup-vote-fraud-probe) my

Washington - — The Senate Armed Services chairman Friday added to mounting pressure on the White House to avoid escalating the war in Afghanistan by calling for faster training of Afghan security forces instead of sending more U.S. troops into combat. The Senate panel's chairman, Michigan Democrat Carl Levin, had earlier raised concerns about a possible new troop buildup. But his proposal Friday to focus the U.S. mission in Afghanistan more on training than fighting was a blunt warning to the Obama administration - and it came after other Democratic congressional leaders raised similar concerns this week. Levin said the trainers would help build a "surge" of 400,000 Afghan army and police officers a year earlier than initially planned. The term "surge" is most recently associated with the 2007 U.S. troop buildup in Iraq that is credited with helping bring the nation back from the brink of civil war. "Our support of this surge of the Afghan security forces will show our commitment to the success of a mission that is clearly in our national security interests," Levin said at a Capitol Hill news conference. "But we would do so without creating a bigger U.S. military footprint, which provides propaganda fodder for the Taliban." He added: "And we should implement these steps on an urgent basis, before we consider an increase in U.S. ground combat forces beyond what is already planned by the end of this year."

Afghan Troop Shift—More Troops Kill Afghan War

Additional troops fail to control the war- alienates the population

Feingold 8 (Russ, senator, 10/24, CSMonitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1024/p09s01-coop.html) my

For far too long, we have been fighting in Afghanistan with too few troops. It has been an "economy of force" campaign, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it. But we can't just assume that additional troops will undo the damage caused by years of neglect. Sending more US troops made sense in, say, 2006, and it may still make sense today. The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated badly over the past year, however, despite a larger US and coalition military presence. We need to ask: After seven years of war, will more troops help us achieve our strategic goals in Afghanistan? How many troops would be needed and for how long? Is there a danger that a heavier military footprint will further alienate the population, and, if so, what are the alternatives? And – with the lessons of Iraq in mind – will this approach advance our top national security priority, namely defeating Al Qaeda? We must target Al Qaeda aggressively, and we cannot allow Afghanistan to be used again as a launching pad for attacks on America. It is far from clear, however, that a larger military presence there would advance these goals. To the contrary, it might only perpetuate a counterproductive game of cat and mouse that has led to a steep erosion in Afghans' support for foreign forces in southwestern Afghanistan, the main Taliban stronghold. One of the most recent polls found that, while most Afghans support the US presence, only a minority rate it positively. Regardless of whether we send more troops, we need to understand that, as in Iraq, there is ultimately no military solution to Afghanistan's problems. Unless we push for diplomacy and a regional approach, work to root out corruption, stamp out the country's narcotics trade, and step up development and reconstruction efforts, Afghanistan will probably continue its downward trajectory.

Increased US presence destabilizes Afghanistan and increases violence

China View 9 (12/10, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/10/content\_12620353.htm) my

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9 (Xinhua) -- Violence will likely increase in Afghanistan as the United States starts to send 30,000 more troops there, a senior U.S. military leader warned Wednesday. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, David Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command who oversees both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, predicted increased violence in Afghanistan next spring and incoming turmoil within the Afghan government. In addition to increased violence in the spring, the troop surge will also be met with a rise in "security incidents" next summer, he said. Thus, any complete evaluations of the surge's progress should be held off until December 2010, said the general. Nevertheless, he said U.S. success in Afghanistan is within reach but will be difficult to attain. Petraeus' testimony was the latest by top U.S. officials on Capitol Hill after U.S. President Barack Obama announced on Dec. 1to deploy 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan and to start pulling U.S. forces out of there in July 2011.

Afghan Troop Shift—More Troops Kill Afghan War

Additional troops entrench American presence in Afghanistan and ensure long-term conflict

Kolodkin 9 (Barry, expert on US relations in Eastern Europe, 9/30, http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/b/2009/11/30/prospects-for-the-troop-surge-in-afghanistan.htm) my

Certainly, there will eventually be less Taliban aggression in areas where US troops are placed. The revised strategy is expected to focus on attacking Taliban strongholds in and around Kandahar and protecting the local population. However, additional US troops will not provide greater security for Afghan citizens in other areas of the country. Taliban fighters will likely move to areas away from US troop strength and engage in battles on their own terms. A surge of 21,000 troops in March 2009 has not proven effective. The US military considers the troop surge in Iraq a success. Senator John McCain lauded the surge during the 2008 Presidential campaign. Yet two years after the surge, General Ray Odierno, the US commander in Iraq opined that the US may not be able to declare victory in Iraq for 5-10 years, maybe ever. In Afghanistan, the US faces a more radicalized, battle-hardened enemy, which previously repelled the Soviets, in terrain less favorable than Iraq to American armored and mechanized capabilities. NATO soldiers in Afghanistan already outnumber Taliban fighters by a margin of 12-1. The odds of the US being able to declare victory in Afghanistan or leaving a relatively stable, peaceful Afghanistan in the coming years seem remote. Outlook It is difficult to foresee a benefit to the US buildup. General David Petraeus has stated we cannot "kill our way to victory" in Afghanistan. Assuming the US strategy continues to be focused on protecting Afghan population centers, then 34,000 or 40,000 troops are not nearly enough. The best hope for the US buildup is that it will increase NATO's capability to strike at Taliban bases in Pakistan and, if necessary because of a worst case scenario, destroy Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability.

No Invasion Now—Over-Extension

No American Interventionalism- Iraq and Afghanistan

Dayen 10(David, Writer for the FDL, June 27, <http://news.firedoglake.com/tag/counter-insurgency/>)

The BBC reports that Western embassies in Yemen were shut down after the government “lost track” of an arms shipment. It’s a useful reminder of how little control we have over events in countries like Yemen, which meander between ally and failed state, with internal crises that have an impact over the perceived global security threat: It spells more bad news for the Arabian nation of 23 million, already suffering from dwindling water and oil supplies, an insurgency in the north and a southern secessionist movement. Add to this the fact that it is already the poorest country on the Arabian Peninsula with an unemployment rate of 40 per cent – and Yemen’s population is expected to double by 2035. But not since the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole that killed 19 American sailors has Yemen received such foreign scrutiny as it has these past weeks. And that, warns Barbara Bodine, the former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, could be dangerous. “I think it would be a major mistake to turn this into a third front, if Iraq and Afghanistan are somehow front number one and number two,” said Bodine in an interview with the Star. “If we try to deal with this as an American security problem and dealt with by American military, we risk exacerbating the problem.”

No United States Adventurism- Building Security Forces

Dreazen 10 ( Writer for the Wall Street Journal, January 7 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126279143158217957.html>)

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared to rule out direct U.S. military action in Yemen, the home of the al Qaeda affiliate that has claimed responsibility for the alleged attempt to blow up a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.Speaking to students at George Washington University, Adm. Mullen, the nation's top military officer, was asked whether the U.S. was considering carrying out airstrikes on targets inside Yemen or deploying American ground forces there. He replied that the U.S. effort would be limited to helping fund and train the Yemeni security forces, some of whom are already mentored by small teams of elite American Special Operations forces. "We've worked ... to support a growing Yemeni armed forces capability," Adm. Mullen said. "We are going to continue to support the Yemeni government in the execution of their strategy to eliminate these terrorists."Karim Ben Khelifa for The Wall Street Journal Photo Journal: Fighting Against al Qaeda in Yemen Yemeni forces have launched a manhunt for the leader of the al Qaeda cell there, which U.S. officials said was behind a threat that forced the temporary closure of the U.S. and British embassies in San'a. The Yemeni troops this week killed at least two suspected al Qaeda members and arrested seven others, the government said. The U.S. and British embassies reopened Tuesday, saying the effort by Yemeni forces had largely resolved the threat. Since the failed Christmas attack, U.S. military officials have said privately that the Pentagon planned to ramp up its training efforts in Yemen, and U.S. and British officials have since announced a plan to jointly fund a new Yemeni counterterrorism force. Adm. Mullen's comments were notable because he is the first senior U.S. commander to formally indicate that the U.S. had no current plans to carry out new attacks inside Yemen in response to the terror incident. Yemen's foreign minister said this week his country opposes any direct intervention by U.S. or other foreign troops in the fight against al Qaeda. Anti-American sentiment is widespread in Yemen, and the appearance of too close an alliance with Washington could backfire on the government in San'a.

No Adventurism – Obama Peace Talks

Brooks 10 ( Webster, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at CNPP, Janurary 16 http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2010/01/16/al-quedas-new-strategy-in-yemen-threatens-u-s-saudi-arabia-axis/)

In response to the AQAP’s offensive, President Obama pledged $70 million to Yemen’s government, increased Special Forces deployments to “train” Yemeni counter-terrorist units and launched cruise missile strikes against Al Queda bases in mid-December. Notwithstanding President Obama’s countermeasures, it’s clear his administration does not have a thoughtful strategy to neutralize Al Queda in Yemen. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community’s failure to recognize the seriousness of AQAP’s buildup and new capabilities until Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas bombing attempt has left the Obama administration desperately playing catch-up. The Obama administration needs a practical strategy to neutralize Al Queda in Yemen. Such a strategy must begin with preventing the collapse of President Saleh’s regime which cannot survive fighting three insurgencies simultaneously. The Southern Movement and the Al Houthi insurgents are not calling for the overthrow of President Saleh’s government; both seek to break away from the Yemen’s corrupt and criminal regime. Therefore, the Obama administration must convince President Saleh that significant concessions must be made to the Al Houthi and the Southern Movement to stabilize his regime, preserve Yemen’s sovereignty and isolate AQAP. In short, both groups will have to be offered some form of regional autonomy and Yemen must be transformed into a federated state with the central government possessing limited powers.

No Invasion Now—Yemen

U.S. Can’t invade Yemen because of the Iraq war

Nebel 10(Jake, Writer for AFP, February 15, Stay the Course: U.S. Should Maintain Its Strategy for Yemen, http://afpprinceton.com/2010/02/stay-the-course-u-s-should-maintain-its-strategy-for-yemen/, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

US Forces can’t Intervene with Yemen – Overstretch

Brooks 10 ( Webster, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at CNPP, Janurary 16 http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2010/01/16/al-quedas-new-strategy-in-yemen-threatens-u-s-saudi-arabia-axis/)

Al Queda’s shift in global strategy to transform Yemen into a platform to destabilize Saudi Arabia represents the most serious national security crisis the Obama administration has confronted. Saudi Arabia is the strategic lynchpin of energy security powering the U.S. dominated global order. Any chaos, instability or leadership change in Riyadh that disrupts Saudi oil production could trigger price shocks, a global economic downturn and enhance Iran’s status as the dominant regional hegemon in the Middle East. Osama bin Ladin’s escalation of attacks against the House of Saud comes at a time when U.S. military forces are overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq and American public opinion is staunchly opposed to another military intervention. Given the constraints on his administration’s capacity to commit ground forces to the region, Obama must now rely on President Ali Saleh’s faltering regime to eliminate Al Queda’s growing presence in Yemen’s vast ungoverned spaces. AQAP’s sudden emergence as a serious threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia is not accidental; it is product of Osama bin Ladin’s long-term strategic planning.  Over the past year Osama Bin Ladin has merged his Saudi Arabia and Yemen operations into Al Queda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Led by Nasser Wahayshi and his Saudi deputy, Saeed al-Shihri, AQAP includes veterans from its defeated insurgency in Saudi Arabia two years ago, along with recruits from Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. The new franchise has established command structures, communications lines, base areas and bomb making factories that fabricated new stealth PETN explosives recently tested in Saudi Arabia and the United States. By claiming responsibility for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day attempt to blow up the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit and the August 2009 suicide bomber attack on Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohemmend bin Nayef, AQAP has signaled that its presence in Yemen will be permanent, lethal and have global reach.

Causes Invasion—Yemen

Freeing troops causes invasion of Yemen

Azikiwe 10(Abayomi, Editor of the Pan-African News Wire, January 6, “U.S. targets Yemen, harasses Nigeria”, http://www.workers.org/2010/world/yemen\_0114/, accessed 7/7/10)jn

It appears from statements by Obama administration officials and U.S. intelligence sources that further military attacks are being planned against Yemen. This impoverished country on the Arabian Peninsula has been bombed several times in recent weeks. Reports indicate that the U.S. is behind these actions, in which dozens of people are reported to have been killed. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. military commander for Iraq and Afghanistan, visited Yemen on Jan. 2 and met with President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Around the same time, embassies of three leading imperialist states — the U.S., Britain and France — were closed, purportedly in response to threats from al-Qaida. Yemen is now being described as dangerous in the same way that Afghanistan was labeled in 2001. The notion of a “failed state,” used against Afghanistan to justify the ongoing U.S. invasion and occupation there, is now being applied to Yemen. Commentary by a constant flow of U.S. intelligence operatives and militarists is being put forward in the corporate media to condition the people for more aggressive military action against Yemen.

Invasion Bad—War on Terror

Invasion increases terrorism

AFP 10(January 7, “Yemen warns US military intervention could strengthen Qaeda”, http://wire.antiwar.com/2010/01/07/yemen-warns-us-military-intervention-could-strengthen-qaeda/, accessed 7/7/10)jn

US military intervention in Yemen to help fight Al-Qaeda militants could backfire and strengthen the jihadists believed behind the botched attack on a US airliner, a top Yemeni official said on Thursday. "Any intervention or direct (military) action by the United States could strengthen the Al-Qaeda network and not weaken it," deputy prime minister for defence and security affairs Rashed Al-Aleemi told a press conference. "Our position is clear: we will fight and chase the Al-Qaeda group depending on Yemeni forces and security agencies (alone)," he said. However, Aleemi also said Yemen needs US help to train Yemeni counter-terrorism units. "Since Al-Qaeda is a global organisation that threatens international stability, all countries in the world, headed by the United States, must cooperate to confront them," he said. "All we need from the United States is training and providing weapons and equipment to counter-terrorism units and they are capable of liquidating Al-Qaeda and all terror elements."

Invasion Bad—Stability

Invasion destabilizes Yemen

Colachal 10(Dr. Abdul, Independent Columnist in International Affairs, January 3, “US Terror War in Yemen”, http://www.markthetruth.com/pakistan-a-the-world/270-us-terror-war-in-yemen.html, accessed 7/7/10)jn

Western rogue states have no sympathy for poor nations and continue to convert them as their arms client states. Yemen is the poorest of the Arab countries, has exhausted its very limited oil export capacity, and now faces severe water shortages; some 35 percent of the adult population of the country is unemployed. USA selects targets in Islamic/Arab world well in advance for the so-called “retaliatory strikes” in due course when the intended “strike” is achieved by provocative actions. Once again, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq , American imperialism is preparing a military bloodbath in an impoverished country, using a terrorist attack—in this case a failed attempt—as the pretext. The CIA and other US agencies ignored warnings about the impending attack and let the “mishap” taken place so that “retaliatory” strike could be morally possible. The truth is Yemen is seeking stepped up US military aid, presumably as part of a package deal—in effect, a bribe for allowing the country’s territory to be turned into a battlefield for US commandos. The hawkish US media portray Yemen as a lawless hotbed of terrorism and a major threat to the USA, in order to justify in advance an American attack, or even a full-scale invasion. The terrorist comments by “terrorism experts” prepare enough ground for a possible US terror attack on any country. They argue there’s a pool of potential terrorists out there that have Western passports that can board planes without visas. Today the all powerful USA can invade any Muslim country by provoking the opposition there to play the American role there and destabilize the nation.

\*\*\*Random Answers

Withdrawal Bad—A2: Withdraw Inevitable

Obama’s plans irrelevant—some troops will still be deployed and serve the same function

Arango 7/2(Tim, Staff Writer@the NYT, “War in Iraq Defies U.S. Timetable for End of Combat”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html, accessed 7/3)jn

The August deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq, but here it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here. The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics. What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the United States military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions. “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties. So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to icasualties.org.

Withdrawal Bad—A2: Iraq SDF Solves

Iraqs forces are underfunded—can’t prevent instability

Navarro 10 (Lourdes Garcia- June 21, NPR correspondent B.S. in International Relations from Georgetown University http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127986221 accessed 7/3) CM

By Sept. 1, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq will be pared to about 50,000 troops, part of a massive drawdown to continue in 2011 under an agreement negotiated with Baghdad. But many Iraqi soldiers, especially at installations recently placed in their control by the U.S. military, have come to rely on American largesse to keep the facilities running. And as U.S. troops withdraw, many Iraqis feel a growing mistrust of the Iraq security forces that are supposed to protect them. Some of the Iraqi forces behave with impunity, and as a result, Iraqis say, they are now more afraid of them than the insurgency. That has some Iraqi security officials wondering whether they can trust their government to fund the army and police as the Americans have. And the situation has some Iraqis wondering if they can rely on their own Iraqi forces. Maj. Gen. Bahaa Noori Yaseen is the head of the Basra Brigade, which is under the direct supervision of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In theory, he should be able to get whatever he wants for his men. But it is not the case, he says. We are complaining in the shortage in the money. We have no budget at all in our division and even in federal police. - Iraqi Maj. Gen. Bahaa Noori Yaseen "We are complaining in the shortage in the money. We have no budget at all in our division and even in federal police," Yaseen says. Iraq earns billions of dollars in oil revenue a month. But still, the security services and other Iraqi agencies depend on the U.S for help. Some $600,000 in improvements at the large facility transferred to Yaseen's control from the Americans about a year ago came not from Iraq's Ministry of Interior, but from the U.S military. "I should be honest with you. You should know the facts. I get everything from the Americans. What I need, I just ask the Americans. It's easy to get everything from the Americans," Yaseen says. The generator at his largely unoccupied facility was donated by the Iraqi government, but doesn't work, and in any case there is no money for fuel. And there is only about one hour of electricity out of seven from the city's power grid.

Withdrawal Bad—Jordan Refugees

Withdraw from Iraq creates Jordani instability which is a key buffer between Israel and the East

Wehrey et al 10, ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

The second major fallout of the Iraq War from Israel’s perspective is the growing potential for instability in Jordan emanating from this con- flict. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Iraq War sent over half a mil- lion refugees to Jordan, straining already limited domestic resources in education and health care and creating new political uncertainties about the future role of this community in Jordanian society. Jordan’s loss of subsidized oil from Iraq after the war contributed to rising prices for food, heating oil, and other basic goods, creating a serious eco- nomic crisis and widespread discontent with the regime, even among the monarchy’s traditional bases of support. In addition to economic pressures, Jordanians also face the pros- pect of extremist violence spilling over from Iraq. The hotel bomb- ings in Amman in 2005—the worst terrorist incident on Jordanian soil to date—were carried out by Iraqis, although the Jordanian security services have proven effective in preventing similar types of incidents. Still, with violence and political uncertainty surrounding Jordan, Israe- lis worry about the future stability of the friendly Hashemite-led Jorda- nian state. As one Israeli analyst suggested, Jordan is the “weakest link in the aftermath of the war” and could be “in serious trouble” if waves of refugees attempt to enter Jordan in the future because Jordan risks being “squashed” between the absence of a solution on the Palestinian front to the west and the deterioration of Iraq to the east.69 Before the Iraq War, Israel took Jordan’s ability to serve as a buffer between Israel and Iraq as a given; now, Israelis worry about the loss of such a buffer shielding them from aggression from the east.70

Withdrawal Bad—Re-Invasion

Withdrawal will lead to a re-invasion after Iraq is destabilized

Messerli 7(Joe, Editorialist@Balanced Politics, August 21, “Should the U.S. Withdraw its Troops from Iraq?”, http://www.balancedpolitics.org/iraq\_withdrawal.htm, accessed 7/6/10)jn

We may have to re-invade if we don't stabilize the country since it could become a terrorist haven or could bring to power another Saddam. Iraq's democracy is definitely fragile. History shows that weak governments can easily be overtaken by brutal, power-hungry thugs...Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, Castro, Hussein...the list goes on and on. The whole terror war started because the ruthless Taliban took control of Afghanistan and gave shelter to Osama bin Laden as he planned the 9/11 attacks. If we leave too soon, Iraq may become the new haven for terrorists. It could also be taken over by another Saddam-type leader or by fundamentalist clerics such as in Iran. In any of these cases, it would only create a situation where we have to re-invade and start the process all over again. And next time, we likely won't have the military bases or any world support to launch an attack.

Withdrawal Bad—Kills Heg

Withdrawal from Iraq kills heg

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

For that reason, a US boots-on-the-ground presence will be needed way beyond 2008, to keep the pile of dinner plates from crashing to the ground. It is conceivable that some other military force would do the job. The Saudis might pay for Egyptian troops to provide the balance in Iraq, for example. Or NATO might be of some help. But those are probably wishful thoughts. The US military is the only serious and trustworthy intervention force in the world. Blue helmets don't fight. Oddly enough, in the long term America's getting entangled in Iraq may turn out to be a force for good. Yes, it's a pain in so many ways - taking casualties, a drain on our resources and treasure, seeing the nightly horrors on TV. But Iraq provides the United States with a strategic position in the Gulf, the major source of oil that keeps the world alive. Afghanistan and Iraq both border Iran, and Saudi Arabia is fifty miles across the Gulf. As the Iranian "second revolution" invigorates the imperialist tendencies of the Khomeini cult, a geo-strategic case can be made that this is where we should be. If the US does not want the responsibilities of a superpower, it can walk away. But we cannot be the guarantor of world peace, free trade, a steady oil supply, and a slow movement toward greater sanity without paying a price. I have previously argued that the United States won the Cold War because it was willing to show immense patience and persistence in Vietnam; we lost the battle but won the strategic war, exhausted the Soviets and saw the crumbling of the Evil Empire. Nobody wanted all the sacrifice the United States had to endure, but in the end we did it. Iraq is similar. It looks like we miscalculated in overthrowing Saddam ---- not unreasonably, but without understanding that Al Qaeda and Iran would kill thousands of innocent civilians to bring Iraq back to an even more brutal past. Iraq has now become a proxy war for two world conflicts: The modern world against the primitives of throwback Islam; and the Shiite and Sunni divisions within Islam. The long term strategy therefore becomes power-balance: Keeping the Shiite and Sunni sides from fully winning the battle. Today, that means facing down the threat from Iran. Strategically, it puts US forces and allies on all of Iran's borders. This is a new version of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy to divide China and the USSR, which worked very successfully. The cost: A long-term US presence in Iraq, just like the US presence in Germany to keep the Soviets from invading. Seventy years after WWII, we still have tripwire garrisons in Korea, Japan and Europe. They all serve to keep the peace. Iraq seems destined to become another one. It is a high cost, but the alternative is much, much worse.

Withdrawal Bad—U.A.E. Relations

Withdrawal hurts U.A.E. Relations

Korb and Wadhams 10(Lawrence, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and Caroline, Director of South Asian Security Studies at the Center for American Progress, May 19, “Perceptions of Security in the Arab Gulf Region”, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/arab\_gulf\_trip.html, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Emiratis consistently lament the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and are now concerned about a U.S. withdrawal scheduled by the end of August. Many want us to remain even if it means violating the strategic framework agreement we signed with the Iraqis in December 2008. These concerns reflect their fears about Iran. They opposed our overthrow of Saddam Hussein because their leaders saw him as a counterweight to Iran and feared the results of a vacuum. They worry that the Iranians will continue to dominate the country if we leave, and the most recent Iraqi elections did little to assuage those fears.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Good\*\*\*

\*\*\*Withdrawal Solves Terrorism

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

US presence in Iraq creates resentment and breeds terrorism

Bandow 7 (Doug, sr fellow @ the Cato Institute: foreign policy and civil liberties, Apr 28, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/04/27/fight-terrorism-get-out-of-iraq/>) LL

As the conflict in Iraq has worsened, a majority of Americans has come to believe that the war was a mistake. There were no WMDs to seize. There was no operational relationship with al-Qaeda to disrupt. There was no cohesive, democratic Iraqi nation to reclaim. It is bad enough that a war now justified as fighting terrorism does not fight terrorism. But it is worse: Iraq is creating terrorism. The conflict is creating another grievance that makes more people hate America and encourages more people to take up arms against the U.S. Iraq also is providing a convenient terrorist battleground, putting tens of thousands of Americans in reach of jihadist thugs who otherwise would remain an ocean away from the U.S. The American people apparently understand. A new Washington Post-NBC poll finds that 57 percent of Americans believe that “the war on terrorism can be a success without the United States winning the war in Iraq.” Indeed, to better fight terrorism we must leave Iraq.

US efforts misguided – al Qaeda benefits from US presence

Byman and Pollack 8 (Daniel and Kenneth, American Academy of Political and Social Science, <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/618/1/55.pdf>) LL

The U.S. war in and occupation of Iraq has benefited the wider al Qaeda movement in many ways, including providing a recruiting tool. As Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, sarcastically noted, “If Osama was a Christian—it’s the Christmas present he never would have expected” (CBS News 2004). In the heart of the Muslim world, with more than one hundred thousand U.S. troops occupying the country for a long period of time, Iraq has become the focus of the media throughout the world and especially the Middle East. Arab and Muslim communities are united in their belief that the U.S. intervention is an attack on Islam and represents an attempt to subjugate a powerful Arab state. A study by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank found that “the Iraq War has generated a stunning sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to literally hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and thousands of civilian lives lost”—and that figure includes not only a surge in attacks in Iraq itself, but also an increase in the rest of the world (Bergen and Cruickshank 2007, 1-6). Not surprisingly, Iraq has been at the center of al Qaeda’s fund-raising and recruitment efforts. Fighting the United States is tremendously popular among radical and even mainstream Islamist circles and proof of bin Laden’s “far enemy” theory: that for Muslims, the misdemeanors or even high crimes of their own governments (the “near enemy”) are overshadowed by those of faraway Washington.2 Within the broader Salafi community, Iraq proved an enormous public relations boon to al Qaeda. Many Salafists have condemned al Qaeda for being excessively violent and political, and in particular for its willingness to declare “jihad” at the drop of the hat. Even shaykhs critical of al Qaeda, however, see the struggle in Iraq as a legitimate defensive jihad, even in countries that are close allies of the United States. For example, in November 2004, twenty-six leading Saudi clerics wrote an “open letter to the Iraqi people” calling for a defensive jihad against the United States in Iraq (Jones 2005). Iraq has fostered a new brand of jihad, providing a place where budding Salafi insurgents gain combat experience and forge lasting bonds that will enable them to work together in the years to come, even if they leave Iraq. Former French defense official Alexis Debat (2004, 22) contended that al Qaeda seeks “to turn Iraq into what Afghanistan was before autumn 2001: a public relations windfall for their ideologues, a training ground for their ‘rookies,’ and even a safe-haven for their leadership.” Indeed, it is no small irony that some of those who launched attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan appear to have trained in Iraq. Although it is unclear how many of those trained and “blooded” in Iraq have been killed in the fighting in Afghanistan, especially when the tide turned against them in 2007, some percentage had already departed Iraq and others may flee elsewhere even if U.S. counterinsurgency operations continue to scour Iraq of the Salafi militant presence.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

US occupation of Iraq leads to more recruiting, radicalization, and training of terrorists

Bandow 7 (Doug, sr fellow @ the Cato Institute: foreign policy and civil liberties, Apr 28, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/04/27/fight-terrorism-get-out-of-iraq/>) LL

Unfortunately, the invasion and occupation of Iraq have made the problem worse, much worse. Daniel Benjamin of the Brookings Institution testified before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year that “the invasion of Iraq, gave the jihadists an unmistakable boost. Terrorism is about advancing a narrative and persuading a targeted audience to believe it. Although leading figures in the American administration have often spoken of the terrorists’ ideology of hatred, U.S. actions have too often lent inadvertent confirmation to the terrorists’ narrative.” In particular, “in the context of the culture of grievance that exists in much of the Muslim world, the extremists’ narrative has had a profound resonance. Through their violence, the jihadists have also created a drama of the faith that disaffected Muslims around the world can watch on television and the Internet.” London’s Royal Institute for International Affairs, or Chatham House, reached a similar conclusion: “There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and for the wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the al-Qaeda network’s propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an ideal targeting and training area for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists.” Islamists make similar points. Lebanese Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah charged that “the method the American administration has used in the war against terror may have complicated the situation even more.” He accused Washington of attempting to assassinate him in 1985 (he escaped, but some 80 people died in the bombing), and pointed to prior support for undemocratic Arab regimes, adding: “the occupation of Iraq has increased acts of terrorism against the U.S. and everyone going along with it, including the Iraqis themselves.” Indeed, though al-Qaeda has been damaged, the organization is recovering. Indeed, reports the Financial Times: “Al-Qaeda is reaching out from its base in Pakistan to turn militant Islamist groups in the Middle East and Africa into franchises charged with intensifying attacks on western targets, according to European officials and terrorism specialists. The development could see radical groups use al-Qaeda expertise to switch their attention from local targets to western interests in their countries and abroad.” Al-Qaeda is drawing particular strength from new, local groups that have sprung up in the aftermath of the Iraq war. For instance, Ayman al-Zawahiri last year talked of a merger between al-Qaeda and an Algerian Salafist Group known as Call and Combat – apparently responsible for two recent bombings in that nation. A similar alliance might be in the offing with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, heretofore most known for seeking to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi. But our problem runs far beyond al-Qaeda. Daniel Benjamin argues that the Iraq war has spawned three new terrorist clusters. “The first group is comprised of self-starters, also often called ‘home-grown terrorists’.” These are the local killers in Madrid and London, Bali and Jakarta. Benjamin adds, “These are individuals who may have very little connection to al-Qaeda or other preexisting groups, but they have been won over by the ideas of Osama bin Laden and his followers.” Iraq appears to have been one of the factors motivating these terrorists. Even a few individuals carrying out a few successful attacks have done great harm. Moreover, writes Benjamin: “We should also not make the mistake of believing that terrorists who begin as self-starters will not find the connections, training and resources they seek. It is now widely accepted that the July 7, 2005 Tube bombings in London were carried out with guidance and support from jihadists in Pakistan, including possibly al-Qaeda members, who the operatives may have met during visits.” The second category Benjamin points to are foreign fighters, most of whom were radicalized by the Iraq conflict. Separate studies by Saudi Nawaf Obeid and Israeli Reuven Paz reached the same conclusion: most of these imported terrorists were not previously active in jihadist circles. They are new recruits, drawn by the war. But they might not stop with Iraq. These terrorists, worries Benjamin, “could become the vanguard of a new generation of jihadists, much as the veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s were the founding generation of al-Qaeda.” Perhaps most fearsome is the emergence of Benjamin’s third group, Iraqi jihadists. Iraqis have largely taken over al-Qaeda in Iraq. Worries Benjamin: “According to some reputable sources, there could be more than 15,000 in their ranks. The chaos in Iraq has allowed for extensive training and development in various terrorist tactics and urban warfare, including increasingly proficient use of improvised explosive devices.” The Iraqi jihadists assert as much. Said Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, head of an Iraqi-based, al-Qaeda-linked organization, earlier this month, “From the military point of view, one of the [enemy] devils was right in saying that if Afghanistan was a school of terror, then Iraq is a university of terrorism.”

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

US presence in Iraq is the key barrier to terrorism growth

Byman and Pollack 8 (Daniel and Kenneth, American Academy of Political and Social Science, <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/618/1/55.pdf>) LL

The potential blow to U.S. credibility and civil war in Iraq (which may be inevitable whether or not the United States remains in Iraq) are only part of the price of withdrawal. Most worrisome, Iraq has become a new “field of jihad,” a place where radicals come to meet, train, fight, and forge bonds that last when they leave Iraq for the West or for other countries in the region. If the situation returns to its 2006 nadir, Iraq could become a new terrorist haven comparable to or perhaps exceeding Afghanistan under the Taliban (Bergen and Reynolds 2005). Right now, the U.S. military presence shapes the scale of the jihadist effort: there is no equivalent to the massive training camps or aboveground existence that the radicals enjoyed in Afghanistan. Should U.S. withdrawal allow the formation of such a base, jihadists could organize and train to strike at U.S. or allied facilities around the world, including in the U.S. homeland. Moreover, ensuring that area tribes remain vigilant against al Qaeda appears to depend on the presence of U.S. forces and the material support they provide. The jihadists who would rise from Iraq’s ashes would be far more capable fighters than they were when they first arrived in the land of the two rivers. Many Muslims came to Iraq to expel the United States from Muslim lands; many Iraqis took up arms for the same reason. In the course of the conflict, however, their agendas grew broader. Exposed to hardened terrorists like Zarqawi, their ambitions and grievances went beyond Iraq, expanding their agenda to embrace one closer to the al Qaeda core.

US occupation of Iraq “reinvigorated” al Qaeda recruitment

The Toronto Star 3 (May 20, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0520-02.htm>) LL

LONDON - The U.S.-led war on Iraq gave Al Qaeda the opportunity to reinvigorate its weakened terrorist network with new recruits and more funding, say experts on terrorism. The Iraq war "clearly increased the terrorist impulse," said Jonathan Stevenson, senior fellow for counter-terrorism at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. The U.S.-led invasion, at least in the short term, drew more people toward Osama bin Laden's vision of a global clash between Islam and the West, Stevenson said yesterday. It partly explains the series of co-ordinated, multiple attacks last Tuesday in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where 34 people died, and on Friday in Casablanca, Morocco, where 41 people, including 13 attackers, were killed by five bomb blasts. Stevenson believes U.S. President George W. Bush's administration knew full well the war would initially increase support for Al Qaeda. But U.S. officials estimated the long-term impact of setting up a democratic government in Iraq would outweigh the short-term pain of more terror attacks, he said. Other experts, however, believe that the U.S., and those European countries that supported the war, badly miscalculated. "The political masters in the U.S. and Europe underestimated the extent to which bin Laden would use the war in Iraq as a propaganda weapon to rejuvenate the movement and attract more funds," said Paul Wilkinson, head of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrew's University in Scotland. "As far as the war against Al Qaeda goes, it possibly has been counterproductive. We face turbulent times ahead," Wilkinson told Sky TV. U.S. officials partly tried to justify the Iraq war by insisting there were links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's ousted regime an assertion most experts continue to believe is unsubstantiated. By linking the Iraq war with the war on terror, Bush has left himself vulnerable to Americans concluding the invasion was a failure if terrorist attacks continue, said Andrew Garfield, director of the International Center for Security Analysis at King's College in London. Garfield believes Al Qaeda continues to plan "something big" in the way of an attack in Europe or North America. But police crackdowns and increased security co-operation across borders have foiled attempts to carry out such plans since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, told reporters in Riyadh yesterday: "There is chatter, a high level of chatter regionally and in other international spots" that something could happen in Saudi Arabia or the United States. Al Qaeda was always a loose collection of local terrorist groups. But the loss of its training camps and bases in Afghanistan after the U.S.-led war there, as well as the arrests of several top lieutenants, have forced the terrorist network to become even more decentralized, Stevenson said in an interview. "So while the Al Qaeda leadership has been weakened, the network as a whole has become more elusive than before," he said, adding that responsibility for planning and carrying out attacks rests more than ever with local groups.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Withdrawal from Iraq and redeployment best solves terrorism

Center for American Progress 7 (June 25, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/strategic_reset.html>) LL

The United States should immediately begin redeploying its troops from Iraq and declare it does not intend to maintain military bases permanently in Iraq. A swift strategic redeployment from Iraq, coordinated with Iraq’s government, gives the United States the best chance to revitalize its ground forces now stretched too thin to address growing threats on other fronts in the fight against global terrorist groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Getting U.S. troops out of Iraq’s multiple conflicts and positioning troops in neighboring countries puts the United States in a better position to prevent Iraq’s multiple sectarian conflicts from spreading beyond its borders and gives Iraq and its neighbors the right incentive to help resolve Iraq’s internal conflicts. It also would increase U.S. capacity to confront threats from global terrorist groups more effectively than our massive troop presence in Iraq currently does. U.S. armed forces need to regroup to fight the enemies we have, not referee Iraqi combatants with other scores to settle.

US occupation of Iraq has caused massive increases in incidences of terrorism

Gundzik 5 (Jephraim, Asia Times, Nov 3, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK03Ak03.html>) LL

Rather than vanquishing terrorism, the war in Iraq has become a breeding ground for terrorists. Iraq's most prominent terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was of slight consequence before the war, while al-Qaeda in Iraq did not even exist. Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq, which is composed largely of foreign jihadis, are behind many of the bombings, kidnappings and assassinations that have occurred in Iraq since the 2002 invasion. According to reports issued by the US National Intelligence Council and the Central Intelligence Agency in January and June, respectively, Iraq's foreign jihadis pose an enormous future security threat to the US and its allies. Both reports highlighted the extensive urban guerilla warfare training that these jihadis are benefiting from in Iraq. These reports also pointed out that the number of jihadis that have been attracted to Iraq since the US-led invasion was significantly higher than the number of jihadis that fought in Afghanistan against Russia. The war in Afghanistan is known to have trained thousands of foreign jihadis, including Osama bin Laden and Zarqawi. Jihadis' training in Afghanistan was limited to rural combat. By comparison, the urban-combat training that jihadis are receiving in Iraq is much more easily applied to terrorist action in other countries. In addition to Zarqawi and his organization, the war in Iraq has also created an army of domestic insurgents or terrorists. Attacks on US-led forces by domestic insurgents were led by Saddam loyalists or Ba'athists in the initial months of the US occupation. In the past 12 months, Sunni insurgents, who seemed to have joined forces with the Ba'athists, have also been responsible for many bombings as well as attacks on US-led military forces. More recently, Sunni insurgents have stepped up attacks on Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds, fueling a civil war. Estimates of the size of insurgent forces in Iraq, including foreign jihadis aligned with Zarqawi, range from 30,000 by US intelligence sources to 200,000 by Iraqi intelligence sources. Undoubtedly, the majority of these forces are composed of Sunni and Ba'athist insurgents. Unlike the foreign jihadis, these insurgents are bent on retaking control of Iraq's government. It is in their interest to intensify the country's civil war in order to further destabilize the US-supported regime. The progression of the insurgency in Iraq toward civil war has already allowed foreign jihadis to leave Iraq in order to undertake terrorist actions in other countries. The deeper Iraq slides into civil war the greater the exodus of foreign jihadis will be. As these jihadis continue to spread around the region and around the world terrorist attacks will become more frequent and deadly. According to the US State Department's most recent report on global terrorism, issued in April, the number of terrorist attacks tripled in 2004 from 2003. The number of terrorist attacks in Iraq increased nine-fold in the same period. While new guidelines now prevent the State Department from publishing its tally on terrorism, these statistics were widely disseminated in the US Congress. In the future such statistics are not expected to be revealed to either the public or the Congress.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Presence creates Iraq as a breeding ground for terrorism

Byman 7(Daniel, July, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy@the Brookings Institution, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/07iraqterrorism.aspx, accessed 7/6/10)jn

The U.S. war and occupation of Iraq has benefited Al Qa’ida in many ways. As long as the United States is in Iraq, Al Qa’ida has the best recruiting tool it could wish for. As Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s bin Ladin unit, sarcastically notes, "If Osama was a Christian – it’s the Christmas present he never would have expected."[[10]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn10) In the heart of the Muslim world, with over 100,000 U.S. troops occupying the country for a long period of time, Iraq has become the focus of the media throughout the world and especially the Middle East. Arab and Muslim communities are united in their belief that the U.S. intervention is an attack on Islam, and attempt to subjugate a powerful Arab state. A study by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank found that "the Iraq War has generated a stunning sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to literally hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and thousands of civilian lives lost" – and that figure includes not only a surge in attacks in Iraq itself, but also an increase in the rest of the world.[[11]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn11) Not surprisingly, Iraq is at the center of the jihadists’ fundraising and recruitment efforts. Fighting the United States is tremendously popular among radical and even mainstream Islamist circles. Equally important for Al Qa’ida,it is proof of the "far enemy" theory it promulgates: for many Muslims, the conflict overshadows the misdemeanors or even high crimes of their own governments and convinces them that the proper focus for opposition should be faraway Washington.[[12]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn12) Within the broader salafist community—the group of Muslims who endorse a puritanical interpretation of Islam, many of whom reject both violence and politics—Iraq has become an enormous public relations boon to Al Qa’ida. Many salafists condemn Al Qa’ida for being excessively violent and political, and in particular condemn its willingness to declare jihad at the drop of the hat. Even sheikhs critical of Al Qa’ida, however, see the struggle in Iraq as a legitimate defensive jihad. This is true even in countries that are close allies of the United States. In November 2004, 26 leading Saudi clerics wrote an "open letter to the Iraqi people" calling for a defensive jihad against the UnitedStates in Iraq.[[13]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn13) Iraq has fostered a new brand of jihad. It has been transformed into a country where budding insurgents gain combat experience, and forge lasting bonds that will enable them to work together in the years to come, even if they leave Iraq. Former French defense official Alexis Debat contends that jihadists seek "to turn Iraq into what Afghanistan was before autumn 2001: a public relations windfall for their ideologues, a training ground for their ‘rookies’, and even a safe-haven for their leadership."[[14]](http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/ciao10022/index.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn14) And Iraq is becoming just such a haven. Indeed, it is no small irony that some of those who launched attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan appeared to have trained in Iraq.

Withdrawal key to limit terrorism

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

 Much of the Muslim world resents the presence of American troops, and it is an easy source of terrorist recruitment and anti-American propaganda. The lifeblood of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is propaganda. To ensure successful continuance of their war, they must replenish their losses with a steady stream of new recruits. They also must be able to manipulate the press and weak politicians. In short, they must make themselves look like "freedom fighters". As long as American troops are in Iraq, all they have to do is put together videos showing soldiers in Muslim lands, as well as videos of Iraqi civilians suffering in hospitals. It won't matter to Al Jazeera & other biased media "reporters" that almost all civilian deaths in Iraq are a result of the terrorist insurgent actions, the Americans will still get blamed. And a new generation of terrorists and America haters will continue to grow.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Iraqi presence creates resentment – resentment creates new terrorist recruits, globally

The New York Times 3 (Mar 16, <http://www.anotheramerica.org/terrorist_recruitment.htm>) LL

On three continents, Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have intensified their efforts to recruit young Muslim men, tapping into rising anger about the American campaign for war in Iraq, according to intelligence and law enforcement officials. In recent weeks, officials in the United States, Europe and Africa say they had seen evidence that militants within Muslim communities are seeking to identify and groom a new generation of terrorist operatives. An invasion of Iraq, the officials worry, is almost certain to produce a groundswell of recruitment for groups committed to attacks in the United States, Europe and Israel. "An American invasion of Iraq is already being used as a recruitment tool by Al Qaeda and other groups," a senior American counterintelligence official said. "And it is a very effective tool." Another American official, based in Europe, said Iraq had become "a battle cry, in a way," for Qaeda recruiters. Some of the information about Qaeda recruiting comes from interrogations of captured operatives and from materials found at the house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, where Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the third-ranking Qaeda leader, was arrested this month, officials say. The surge in Qaeda recruitment efforts has been most visible in Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, the officials said. Investigators have significantly increased their use of informants and, in some cases, bugging devices, to monitor mosques and other gathering places, where they have observed a sharp spike in anti-American rhetoric. For example, German domestic intelligence agents have eavesdropped on increasingly shrill sermons in mosques about the possibility of war with Iraq, a message that officials there say has clearly resonated with young people. The officials expressed deep concern that the angry climate would lead to a torrent of new recruits. "I can't use numbers, but we know the activity is increasing and the willingness to participate and to listen to radical messages is on the rise," says Carl Heinrich von Bauer, ministerial counsel at the Interior Ministry of North Rhine-Westphalia. He is the chief of the German state department that is responsible for monitoring terrorism. "There are more people coming to hear radical talks," he said. "Also we are seeing people go suddenly from jeans to traditional dress and long beards." That target audience, officials say, is a somewhat changed one — younger people, many of them converts to Islam, easily susceptible to the appeal of violence. In addition, more women are being attracted to Al Qaeda, albeit in secondary roles, officials say. "We have noticed an increasing number of people who seem to be willing to use violence for Islamic causes since Sept. 11 and especially in recent months because of Iraq and Palestine," said Jean-Louis Bruguière, France's top investigative judge on terrorism cases. In particular, Mr. Bruguière said he had detected a "much more menacing attitude" that could make it much easier for Al Qaeda to sign up new recruits. "More people seem to be willing to commit violence," he said.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

US occupation of Iraq leads to more recruiting and training of terrorists

Bandow 7 (Doug, sr fellow @ the Cato Institute: foreign policy and civil liberties, Apr 28, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/04/27/fight-terrorism-get-out-of-iraq/>) LL

Unfortunately, the invasion and occupation of Iraq have made the problem worse, much worse. Daniel Benjamin of the Brookings Institution testified before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year that “the invasion of Iraq, gave the jihadists an unmistakable boost. Terrorism is about advancing a narrative and persuading a targeted audience to believe it. Although leading figures in the American administration have often spoken of the terrorists’ ideology of hatred, U.S. actions have too often lent inadvertent confirmation to the terrorists’ narrative.” In particular, “in the context of the culture of grievance that exists in much of the Muslim world, the extremists’ narrative has had a profound resonance. Through their violence, the jihadists have also created a drama of the faith that disaffected Muslims around the world can watch on television and the Internet.” London’s Royal Institute for International Affairs, or Chatham House, reached a similar conclusion: “There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and for the wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the al-Qaeda network’s propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an ideal targeting and training area for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists.” Islamists make similar points. Lebanese Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah charged that “the method the American administration has used in the war against terror may have complicated the situation even more.” He accused Washington of attempting to assassinate him in 1985 (he escaped, but some 80 people died in the bombing), and pointed to prior support for undemocratic Arab regimes, adding: “the occupation of Iraq has increased acts of terrorism against the U.S. and everyone going along with it, including the Iraqis themselves.” Indeed, though al-Qaeda has been damaged, the organization is recovering. Indeed, reports the Financial Times: “Al-Qaeda is reaching out from its base in Pakistan to turn militant Islamist groups in the Middle East and Africa into franchises charged with intensifying attacks on western targets, according to European officials and terrorism specialists. The development could see radical groups use al-Qaeda expertise to switch their attention from local targets to western interests in their countries and abroad.” Al-Qaeda is drawing particular strength from new, local groups that have sprung up in the aftermath of the Iraq war. For instance, Ayman al-Zawahiri last year talked of a merger between al-Qaeda and an Algerian Salafist Group known as Call and Combat – apparently responsible for two recent bombings in that nation. A similar alliance might be in the offing with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, heretofore most known for seeking to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi. But our problem runs far beyond al-Qaeda. Daniel Benjamin argues that the Iraq war has spawned three new terrorist clusters. “The first group is comprised of self-starters, also often called ‘home-grown terrorists’.” These are the local killers in Madrid and London, Bali and Jakarta. Benjamin adds, “These are individuals who may have very little connection to al-Qaeda or other preexisting groups, but they have been won over by the ideas of Osama bin Laden and his followers.” Iraq appears to have been one of the factors motivating these terrorists. Even a few individuals carrying out a few successful attacks have done great harm. Moreover, writes Benjamin: “We should also not make the mistake of believing that terrorists who begin as self-starters will not find the connections, training and resources they seek. It is now widely accepted that the July 7, 2005 Tube bombings in London were carried out with guidance and support from jihadists in Pakistan, including possibly al-Qaeda members, who the operatives may have met during visits.” The second category Benjamin points to are foreign fighters, most of whom were radicalized by the Iraq conflict. Separate studies by Saudi Nawaf Obeid and Israeli Reuven Paz reached the same conclusion: most of these imported terrorists were not previously active in jihadist circles. They are new recruits, drawn by the war. But they might not stop with Iraq. These terrorists, worries Benjamin, “could become the vanguard of a new generation of jihadists, much as the veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s were the founding generation of al-Qaeda.” Perhaps most fearsome is the emergence of Benjamin’s third group, Iraqi jihadists. Iraqis have largely taken over al-Qaeda in Iraq. Worries Benjamin: “According to some reputable sources, there could be more than 15,000 in their ranks. The chaos in Iraq has allowed for extensive training and development in various terrorist tactics and urban warfare, including increasingly proficient use of improvised explosive devices.” The Iraqi jihadists assert as much. Said Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, head of an Iraqi-based, al-Qaeda-linked organization, earlier this month, “From the military point of view, one of the [enemy] devils was right in saying that if Afghanistan was a school of terror, then Iraq is a university of terrorism.”

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism

Iraq is a locus for terrorist activities – training and dispersion are rooted in Iraq

Priest 5 (Dana, The Washington Post, Jan 14, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7460-2005Jan13.html>) LL

Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for the next generation of "professionalized" terrorists, according to a report released yesterday by the National Intelligence Council, the CIA director's think tank. Iraq provides terrorists with "a training ground, a recruitment ground, the opportunity for enhancing technical skills," said David B. Low, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats. "There is even, under the best scenario, over time, the likelihood that some of the jihadists who are not killed there will, in a sense, go home, wherever home is, and will therefore disperse to various other countries." Low's comments came during a rare briefing by the council on its new report on long-term global trends. It took a year to produce and includes the analysis of 1,000 U.S. and foreign experts. Within the 119-page report is an evaluation of Iraq's new role as a breeding ground for Islamic terrorists. President Bush has frequently described the Iraq war as an integral part of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. But the council's report suggests the conflict has also helped terrorists by creating a haven for them in the chaos of war. "At the moment," NIC Chairman Robert L. Hutchings said, Iraq "is a magnet for international terrorist activity." Before the U.S. invasion, the CIA said Saddam Hussein had only circumstantial ties with several al Qaeda members. Osama bin Laden rejected the idea of forming an alliance with Hussein and viewed him as an enemy of the jihadist movement because the Iraqi leader rejected radical Islamic ideals and ran a secular government. Bush described the war in Iraq as a means to promote democracy in the Middle East. "A free Iraq can be a source of hope for all the Middle East," he said one month before the invasion. "Instead of threatening its neighbors and harboring terrorists, Iraq can be an example of progress and prosperity in a region that needs both." But as instability in Iraq grew after the toppling of Hussein, and resentment toward the United States intensified in the Muslim world, hundreds of foreign terrorists flooded into Iraq across its unguarded borders. They found tons of unprotected weapons caches that, military officials say, they are now using against U.S. troops. Foreign terrorists are believed to make up a large portion of today's suicide bombers, and U.S. intelligence officials say these foreigners are forming tactical, ever-changing alliances with former Baathist fighters and other insurgents. "The al-Qa'ida membership that was distinguished by having trained in Afghanistan will gradually dissipate, to be replaced in part by the dispersion of the experienced survivors of the conflict in Iraq," the report says. According to the NIC report, Iraq has joined the list of conflicts -- including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, and independence movements in Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao in the Philippines, and southern Thailand -- that have deepened solidarity among Muslims and helped spread radical Islamic ideology.

The Iraq war serves as the “primary recruitment vehicle”

DeYoung 6 (Karen, The Washington Post, Sept 24, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20060924/ai_n16748244/>) LL

WASHINGTON -- The war in Iraq has become the primary recruitment vehicle for violent Islamic extremists, motivating a new generation of potential terrorists around the world whose numbers are increasing faster than the United States and its allies are eliminating the threat, U.S. intelligence analysts have concluded. A 30-page National Intelligence Estimate completed in April cites the "centrality" of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the insurgency that has followed, as the leading inspiration for new Islamic extremist networks and cells that are united by little more than an anti-Western agenda. Rather than contributing to eventual victory in the global counterterrorism struggle, it concludes that the situation in Iraq has worsened the U.S. position, according to officials familiar with the classified document. "It's a very candid assessment," one intelligence official said Saturday of the estimate, the first formal examination of global terrorist trends written by the National Intelligence Council since the March 2003 invasion. "It's stating the obvious."

A2: Withdrawal Causes Terrorism—Iraq Not Key

US presence in Iraq doesn’t solve for underlying Syrian and Iranian threats

Labot 6 (Eise, CNN Washington Bureau, Apr 28, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/28/terror.report/index.html>) LL

Militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq group and others "view Iraq as a potential safe haven and are attempting to make it a reality," said the annual report on worldwide terrorism. The study said Syria and Iran, whom the United States consider to be state sponsors of terror, are supporting terrorists in Iraq. Syria "was used as a facilitation hub for terrorist groups operating in Iraq" and Iran "has provided political and ideological support for several terrorist and militant groups active in Iraq," the report found. It also noted the "proliferation of smaller looser networks that are less capable but also less predictable." These terrorist groups loosely associated with al Qaeda "represent the most prominent current terrorist threat to the United States" and allies because they are "smaller, harder to detect and more difficult to counter," the report found. "These micro-actors are launching more attacks, and they are more local and more lethal," said a senior State Department official involved in the preparation of the report. The study found al Qaeda's senior leadership is mostly scattered and on the run and said it "often inspired terrorist activity but could not direct it as fully in the past." The senior official described al Qaeda as "crippled and constrained without the strategic network" it once had but said there are indications the terrorist group is planning a spectacular attack on U.S. soil. "We have not been able to deliver the knockout punch to al Qaeda, and there is no doubt they are in the planning stages for something big," the official said, adding that Osama bin Laden and deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri might settle for something less due to their diminished capacity. The report suggested bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are in a power struggle with al-Zarqawi, the al Qaeda in Iraq leader.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Solves Democracy

A2: Withdrawal Kills Democracy

**Withdrawal is key to preventing political frictions that would ruin stability and US-Iraq relations**

Laipson 8( Ellen, 6/8, former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council (1993-95), National Intelligence Officer for Near and South Asia, The Century Foundation, <http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=644> page 15 accessed 7/4) CM

 It is time to plan for a transition to a more modest and realistic relationship with Iraq. The United States has important stakes in Iraq, but needs to shift its focus from trying to be the impresario of Iraq’s reinvention to being a supportive friend of a country in a critical and extended transition. We understand from other regions that the normal cycle from a great rupture or collapse of one political order to a stable new order takes a decade or more. Unlike wards of the international community, such as East Timor or Kosovo, Iraq has the capacity and intention to be master of its own destiny, and a prolonged U.S. occupation creates new frictions and accrues new costs to both parties. The best course for all parties would be for the United States to establish a realistic set of goals and a path toward a more normal relationship with Iraq, based on a fresh articula­tion of U.S. interests in the region and U.S. approaches to the region’s ongoing tensions. Some have suggested that the U.S. relationship with South Korea might serve as an alternative model for U.S. relations with Iraq.12 But that is a formal alliance relationship premised on a real and shared threat perception relating to North Korea and its support from a communist giant, the People’s Republic of China, as part of a global ideological challenge. While Iraq and the United States may consider al-Qaeda a real and shared threat, one can easily see that a formal military alliance with an open-ended commitment of U.S. combat-ready troops is not the most useful or appropriate way to mitigate that threat, and such an alliance does not appear to be politically feasible at this time. Another analogy for relations with Iraq might be the concept of “pivotal states” that shaped the Clinton administration’s approach to a set of emerg­ing middle powers in democratic transitions. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s list of states that merited special attention and support included countries that had important roles in their regions, and were potential middle powers on the global scene—Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Ukraine. One can see Iraq, should it achieve internal stability and manage its relations with Iran, as a country of particular importance to a regional and global strategy that recognizes achievements in reform and in regional leadership.

**US withdraw is key to relations with neighboring countries and democracy promotion**

Laipson 8( Ellen, 6/8, former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council (1993-95), National Intelligence Officer for Near and South Asia, The Century Foundation, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=644 page 16 accessed 7/4) CM

A new policy planning exercise begins with an articulation of U.S. inter­ests and goals. The new administration should make this exercise a priority, and should begin soliciting ideas and exchanging views with diverse experts during the transition period. This report expresses the new goal as “a more normal relationship,” arguing that the United States should scale back its presence and engagement to something more in balance with its relations with other key regional players, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and to do so independently of Iraqi progress or lack thereof on political and security conditions. The policy seeks to reduce the costs of our engagement in Iraq, and to accept more modest outcomes for the U.S. investment there. It focuses on the importance of Iraqis owning the next phase of their transition to stability and political openness, and asserts that a big brother role for the United States is now counterproductive: it is delaying rather than facilitating further reforms in the Iraqi political system. It is also an important principle for U.S. democracy-promotion in general that the United States support institutions and processes more than individuals.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Democracy

American presence weakens the credibility of the Iraqi government and invites insurgencies

Jenkins 6 (Simon, journalist, Sunday Times, 5/21, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\_contributors/article722812.ece) my

A crucial illusion of American and British policy is that the occupation is somehow maintaining the integrity of the state and its government. It is not. It is undermining both. In truth there is no state and coalition troops are merely squatting in camps dotted across the landscape, emerging occasionally to kill or get killed. There are two consequences of each refusal to leave. First, the troops offer an ever more inviting target for insurgency and a magnet for anti-western guerrillas from across the region. This in turn boosts the militias as alternative power networks and encourages politicians to back them rather than the army. Second, each postponement of withdrawal undermines the independence and self-reliance of the current Iraqi leader. The American failure to entrench Ayad Allawi as a new Baghdad strongman last year and leave him to fend for himself was not democracy but stupidity. Miliki’s position even within the Shi’ite majority depends on his appeasing the Mahdist gangs and the Iran-backed Badr Brigades linked to Ayatollah al-Sistani. The one certainty is that the presence of American power at his elbow will weaken, not strengthen, his credibility as a nationalist leader.

Fill in solves stability and democracy

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

We can help the new Iraqi government without providing troops; for example, we can provide arms, money, and training. Just because we'd be withdrawing troops doesn't mean we're completely abandoning the Iraqis. We can still provide weapons, money, and whatever help is needed short of troop deployment. We can still train Iraqi police and soldiers, just at locations outside the country. Several other countries would probably be more willing to help since the U.S. is no longer an "occupying force", as it's in almost everyone's best interests to secure stability in the region.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Solves Leadership

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

Withdrawal can only strengthen, but not weaken, the US image

Sinha 8 (Anurag, Global India Foundation, 2008, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:nzKvcgG42EsJ:www.globalindiafoundation.org/E-article_AS.doc+US+pullout+from+Iraq+credibility&cd=16&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>) LL

Further counters to a time-bound withdrawal of troops are the arguments that an American exit from Iraq at this moment shall increase the growing influence of terrorists in the country, while severely undermining the stature and credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world. However, this is far from the truth. Firstly, the point about terrorists is a double-edged sword and is a risk that must be run. While a withdrawal may indeed augment the power of terrorists in Iraq, it is equally salient to note that the American presence has provided the al Qaeda (and its many spin-offs or imitators) with a free hand to attack US nationals. Indeed, it is the very occupation which the opponents of a withdrawal seek to prolong that endangers the lives of Americans and Iraqis alike by proving to be a rallying point for terrorists. In fact, pulling out of Iraq may encourage the Sunnis to take the offensive to the al Qaeda and its sympathizers (Odom, 2006; Posen, 2006). Secondly, it is foolish to expect that an American withdrawal can change (for the worse), to any considerable degree, the existing image of the United States in the eyes of the world. As Richard Haass argues, this image of the credibility of the US was already in question once it launched an unwarranted preventive war, and got further tainted when it delayed the involvement of the United Nations and other (willing) countries to aid the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq (2006, 182-194). In addition, recent studies argue that the moral fibre of the US, which fuels the pursuits of democracy promotion and liberation of other peoples as ethical responsibilities, is in itself illiberal (Desch, 2007). Thus, instead of further undermining the US’ credibility, withdrawal from Iraq may, in fact, strengthen the American image somewhat.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

Withdrawal key to international image

Carpenter 7 (Ted, VP, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, CATO, Jan 11, <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html>) LL

Leaving Iraq is clearly not cost-free, but the costs (both tangible and intangible) of a prompt exit must be measured against the costs of staying the course. Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the costs of a prolonged mission, there is no certainty that anything resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed, most of the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying defeat. Even the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point and inspiration for Muslim extremists. Equally worrisome, it had also served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military and terrorist skills. An Al Qaeda letter intercepted by the U.S. military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon to its cause. A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year. Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of attitudes toward the United States. Even among long-standing friends and allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those problems will become.

Military presence in Iraq has created resentment amongst US allies

Gard and Johns 5 (Robert and John, Lt. Gen and Brig. Gen, US Army, Nov 2005, <http://www.wand.org/issuesact/051129/generalsoniraq.pdf>) LL

Accusations that arguments for policy change constitute a “cut and run” surrender is an emotional ploy that obfuscates the issue. It is precisely the U.S. intervention in Iraq that has squandered the positive image of, and world sympathy that was felt for, the U.S. immediately after 9/11. According to authoritative polling, after two years of an aggressive U.S. campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East, the Iraq war has made millions suspicious of U.S. intentions; and the polls reveal that most now believe the war has made the world more, not less, dangerous. Not only do most Europeans view us in a negative light, but our image in the Muslim world is even worse: only about one fifth of Turks, Pakistanis or Jordanians -- to name three U.S. allies -- view us positively. It is true that American military power is respected and prestigious because it is the strongest in the world; but being regarded as a stubborn bully focused exclusively on our own interests as seen by the Administration does not give our nation the kind of image or credibility we desire and need. It is significant that polls show 80% of Iraqis want the American military to depart. At a recent conference, Iraqi leaders called for the departure of American troops and even suggested that insurgents are justified in killing coalition troops. The war against extremists cannot be won primarily through the use of force—it is foremost a war of ideas. We are losing that war and our Iraqi policy is one of the contributors to that condition. The U.S. cannot rebuild its credibility by extending the occupation, but rather by reforming the botched reconstruction program to restore a consistent supply of water, electricity and gasoline to Iraq’s civilian population, and by talking with all parties in the country and region to help rebuild its political structure.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

Allies are suspicious of US intervention in Iraq

Gard and Johns 5 (Robert and John, Lt. Gen and Brig. Gen, US Army, Nov 2005, <http://www.wand.org/issuesact/051129/generalsoniraq.pdf>) LL

The number of countries assisting the U.S. in Iraq, most of which provide few troops, has already fallen by a quarter, from 34 last year to 25 today; and five more are due to leave by year's end. Recently South Korea announced the reduction of its commitment. Furthermore, the international cooperation necessary to confront terrorism may deteriorate further by the continued suspicion of, and hostility toward, the United States in most other countries. A recent Pew Center international poll shows that the United States is held in low esteem across the globe, particularly in the Muslim world, largely as a result of the U.S. Administration’s foreign policies; and the war in Iraq continues to be deeply unpopular internationally, including with the populaces of our allies. Most countries believe that the invasion and occupation of Iraq has made the world a less safe place. Many are also suspicious that the United States intends to establish permanent bases in Iraq to secure the flow of oil from the region, a charge the Administration has not denied.

US credibility will be hurt by “adhering to a losing strategy” in Iraq

Rubin 7 (Barry, director of the Global Research in International Affairs, June 22, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/23137-iraq>) LL

If overwhelming force would be infeasible and picking a winner or partition would likely lead to outcomes detrimental to U.S. and Iraqi interests, the United States may be best served by withdrawing its troops. The strongest argument against withdrawal is that U.S. and other Coalition forces are preventing a bad situation from becoming worse. Those who argue that U.S. forces must remain in Iraq predict that their departure would cause even greater violence, followed by the creation of terrorist safe havens and an arena in which Iraq’s neighbors would vie for influence.8 Some argue that withdrawal would have high costs in terms of a loss in U.S. credibility.9 They say that withdrawal might encourage insurgents elsewhere to battle forces, U.S. or not, engaged in peace enforcement operations rather than to seek accommodation with domestic foes. They also believe that withdrawal would reduce U.S. credibility with current or potential partners or allies around the globe, as the United States would be perceived as not adhering to its commitments.10 The credibility of promises by the United States to defend Arab states, especially those situated around the Persian Gulf, is of particular concern. Opponents of withdrawal also cite the dangers posed to other U.S. policy interests. Withdrawal from Iraq could be viewed as reinforcing perceptions that Iran has bested the United States in Iraq and is in a position of rising regional power.11 Some argue that withdrawal would set back the attainment of U.S. goals of a peaceful Middle East and the spread of democracy in the region.12 Each of these arguments has weaknesses. Credibility is not enhanced by adhering to a losing strategy; nor are other U.S. goals in the Middle East. Iraq has already become a training ground for terrorists and a cause célèbre for radical Islamists. U.S. withdrawal would eliminate a primary draw for foreign fighters—the opportunity to fight against and kill Americans. If U.S. forces were to leave, Iran would see the U.S. departure as vindication. As conflict continues, the Iranian government would likely find itself increasingly involved in Iraq. It might even attempt to pacify the country, encountering some, if not all, of the same problems as the United States. It would certainly have to deal with an influx of refugees and could possibly suffer from the spread of the conflict to Kurdish or Arab enclaves in Iran itself. Under this scenario, Tehran might well come to regret the U.S. departure.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

Withdrawal creates international goodwill

Serwer and Parker 8 (Daniel and Sam, United States Institute for Peace, Apr 2008, <http://www.usip.org/resources/iraq-after-surge-options-and-questions>) LL

This policy risks a complete failure of the Iraqi state, massive chaos and even genocide. Should genocide occur, advocates of this policy believe the U.S. would have to intervene to stop it. The credibility the U.S. will generate with the international community by withdrawing from Iraq may increase the likelihood that others would assist in this effort. This policy also requires that the neighboring states accept an increased U.S. military presence and not interfere in the U.S. withdrawal.

US withdrawal would restore America’s reputation

Kirstein 6 (Peter, prof of history @ St. Xavier, Apr 3, <http://hnn.us/articles/23421.html>) LL

The architects of illusion claim withdrawal will damage America’s credibility to defeat so-called “global terrorism.” Withdrawal might restore America’s reputation as a constructive force within the international community and improve our relations with the Muslim world that believes America is a racist, anti-Islamic colonizer. Furthermore, Europe might construe disengagement from Iraq as an American acknowledgement that empire has its limits. The architects of preemptive war insist withdrawal must be deferred until the insurgency has been defeated by Iraqi military and police forces. This fantasy presupposes nation building can be effective. In Vietnam, a U.S. trained and equipped million-person Army of the Republic of Vietnam could not defeat the Vietcong or North Vietnamese. America cannot create an Iraqi army, that would predominately recruit Shi’a and Kurds, to prevail in a remorseless sectarian-communal war. Like the Diem, Ky and Thieu governments in South Vietnam, no Iraqi government has legitimacy to govern, much less defeat an insurgency, while under foreign occupation. Iraq must resolve its own affairs. Yes we should provide assistance for infrastructure repair, education, health care and third-country debt forgiveness but remove its soldiers, avoid permanent military bases and terminate counterinsurgency warfare.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

US presence in Iraq would cause credibility to plummet

Rubin 7 (Barry, director of the Global Research in International Affairs, June 22, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/23137-iraq>) LL

The Iraq war is one of modern history's most difficult, controversial issues. There is no ideal solution but, as is so typical of our current era, the passions aroused make it difficult to discuss the problem rationally. In the West, there are two main viewpoints on the war. Defenders of continuing the leading U.S. role argue that the battle is going better than the media reports and that an American withdrawal would have dire consequences. U.S. credibility would plummet; radical Islamists and terrorists would claim it as a victory. They warn that a U.S. withdrawal might precipitate a bloodbath, an Iranian takeover of Iraq, or an al-Qaida victory there.

US credibility will be hurt if US remains in Iraq

Rubin 5 (Barry, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, <http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_rubin.pdf>) LL

One of the most forceful arguments against a planned and phased U.S. withdrawal is based on the administration’s desire to preserve its own reputation and U.S. credibility. Refusing to leave Iraq, U.S. policymakers believe, is the only way to ensure that the United States retains a high level of credibility with its adversaries in the region. For the United States, to pull out as it did from Vietnam or to allow for the defeat of its allies as it did in the shah’s Iran, they argue, would signal to radical forces that they could attack U.S. interests with impunity and disregard its threats. Although this may sound like a persuasive argument, it does not accurately reflect the current situation. The United States achieved the most credibility possible through its willingness and ability to overthrow Saddam. Being bogged down in an endless war in Iraq, however, can only erode U.S. standing in the region. The United States is currently so overextended in Iraq that it is incapable of taking tough action on any other issue in the region or elsewhere in the world—and its enemies know it. The U.S. military presence has been used to criticize and mobilize forces against the United States. The lack of a U.S. victory has been portrayed as proof of its weakness, and U.S. misdeeds have been invented or magnified to demonstrate that the United States has evil intentions toward Arabs and Muslims. Furthermore, Iraq has become a focal point for an anti-U.S. jihad and a not-so-covert war waged against the United States by Iran and Syria. The United States has been too preoccupied to take any serious action against either of these countries, both of whom have been aided by money and volunteers from Saudi Arabia and others driven by anti-U.S. sentiment. Once U.S. forces are no longer tied down in Iraq, the focus will shift back to Washington’s enormous deterrent power and its willingness to use it against enemies when severely provoked.

A2: Withdrawal Kills Leadership

Withdrawal can only strengthen, but not weaken, the US image

Sinha 8 (Anurag, Global India Foundation, 2008, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:nzKvcgG42EsJ:www.globalindiafoundation.org/E-article_AS.doc+US+pullout+from+Iraq+credibility&cd=16&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>) LL

Further counters to a time-bound withdrawal of troops are the arguments that an American exit from Iraq at this moment shall increase the growing influence of terrorists in the country, while severely undermining the stature and credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world. However, this is far from the truth. Firstly, the point about terrorists is a double-edged sword and is a risk that must be run. While a withdrawal may indeed augment the power of terrorists in Iraq, it is equally salient to note that the American presence has provided the al Qaeda (and its many spin-offs or imitators) with a free hand to attack US nationals. Indeed, it is the very occupation which the opponents of a withdrawal seek to prolong that endangers the lives of Americans and Iraqis alike by proving to be a rallying point for terrorists. In fact, pulling out of Iraq may encourage the Sunnis to take the offensive to the al Qaeda and its sympathizers (Odom, 2006; Posen, 2006). Secondly, it is foolish to expect that an American withdrawal can change (for the worse), to any considerable degree, the existing image of the United States in the eyes of the world. As Richard Haass argues, this image of the credibility of the US was already in question once it launched an unwarranted preventive war, and got further tainted when it delayed the involvement of the United Nations and other (willing) countries to aid the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq (2006, 182-194). In addition, recent studies argue that the moral fibre of the US, which fuels the pursuits of democracy promotion and liberation of other peoples as ethical responsibilities, is in itself illiberal (Desch, 2007). Thus, instead of further undermining the US’ credibility, withdrawal from Iraq may, in fact, strengthen the American image somewhat.

Withdrawal key to save public opinion

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

 World opinion of the United States will continue to get worse until we withdraw. Poll after poll shows that world opinion of the United States has degraded. Although we cannot take back our decision to launch what many thought of as an illegal preemptive war, we can at least try to make the best of things from this point on. The United States is starting to be seen as an occupying power in the same way that Israel is seen as an occupying power of Palestine. It's time to reverse the plummeting tide of world opinion.

Soft Power Good

Soft power key

Nye 4 (Joseph, Dean of John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Aug 2, <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>) LL

Soft power has always been a key element of leadership. The power to attract—to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda—has its roots in thousands of years of human experience. Skillful leaders have always understood that attractiveness stems from credibility and legitimacy. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction as well as fear. When the United States paid insufficient attention to issues of legitimacy and credibility in the way it went about its policy on Iraq, polls showed a dramatic drop in American soft power. That did not prevent the United States from entering Iraq, but it meant that it had to pay higher costs in the blood and treasure than would otherwise have been the case. Similarly, if Yasser Arafat had chosen the soft power model of Gandhi or Martin Luther King rather than the hard power of terrorism, he could have attracted moderate Israelis and would have a Palestinian state by now. I said at the start that leadership is inextricably intertwined with power. Leaders have to make crucial choices about the types of power that they use. Woe be to followers of those leaders who ignore or devalue the significance of soft power.

Soft power is key to international agenda

Nye 3 (Joseph, Dean of John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, The paradox of American power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone, pg 8, Questia) LL

In my view, if the United States wants to remain strong, Americans need also to pay attention to our soft power. What precisely do I mean by soft power? Military power and economic power are both examples of hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But there is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics

Soft Power Good

America is reliant on soft power

Nye 3 (Joseph, Dean of John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2003, <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_usiraq_foraffairs_070103.htm>) LL

The willingness of other countries to cooperate in dealing with transnational issues such as terrorism depends in part on their own self-interest, but also on the attractiveness of American positions. Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It means that others want what the United States wants, and there is less need to use carrots and sticks. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When U.S. policies appear legitimate in the eyes of others, American soft power is enhanced. Hard power will always remain crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, but soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution. One of Rumsfeld's "rules" is that "weakness is provocative." In this, he is correct. As Osama bin Laden observed, it is best to bet on the strong horse. The effective demonstration of military power in the second Gulf War, as in the first, might have a deterrent as well as a transformative effect in the Middle East. But the first Gulf War, which led to the Oslo peace process, was widely regarded as legitimate, whereas the legitimacy of the more recent war was contested. Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise its price. When Turkish parliamentarians regarded U.S. policy as illegitimate, they refused Pentagon requests to allow the Fourth Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north. Inadequate attention to soft power was detrimental to the hard power the United States could bring to bear in the early days of the war. Hard and soft power may sometimes conflict, but they can also reinforce each other. And when the Jacksonians mistake soft power for weakness, they do so at their own risk. One instructive usage of soft power that the Pentagon got right in the second Gulf War has been called the "weaponization of reporters." Embedding reporters with forward military units undercut Saddam's strategy of creating international outrage by claiming that U.S. troops were deliberately killing civilians. Whereas CNN framed the issues in the first Gulf War, the diffusion of information technology and the rise of new outlets such as al Jazeera in the intervening decade required a new strategy for maintaining soft power during the second. Whatever other issues it raises, embedding reporters in frontline units was a wise response to changing times. ALLIANCE A LA CARTE Proponents of the neoconservative strand in the new unilateralism are more attentive to some aspects of soft power. Their Wilsonian emphasis on democracy and human rights can help make U.S policies attractive to others when these values appear genuine and are pursued in a fair-minded way. The human rights abuses of Saddam's regime have thus become a major post hoc legitimization of the war. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the Bush administration has made wise investments in American soft power by increasing development aid and offering assistance in the campaign against HIV/AIDS. But although they share Woodrow Wilson's desire to spread democracy, the neo-Wilsonians ignore his emphasis on institutions. In the absence of international institutions through which others can feel consulted and involved, the imperial imposition of values may neither attract others nor produce soft power. Both the neo-Wilsonian and the Jacksonian strands of the new unilateralism tend to prefer alliance a la carte and to treat international institutions as toolboxes into which U.S. policymakers can reach when convenient. But this approach neglects the ways in which institutions legitimize disproportionate American power. When others feel that they have been consulted, they are more likely to be helpful. For example, NATO members are doing much of the work of keeping the peace in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Nato works through many committees to achieve the standardization and interoperability that allow coalitions of the willing to be more than ad hoc groupings. Without regular institutional consultation, the United States may find others increasingly reluctant to put tools into the toolbox. One day the box might even be bare. American-led coalitions will become less willing and shrink in size -- witness the two gulf wars. The UN is a particularly difficult institution. The power of the veto in the Security Council has prevented it from authorizing the use of force for collective-security operations in all but three cases in the past half-century. But the council was specifically designed to be a concert of large powers that would not work when they disagreed. The veto is like a fuse box in the electrical system of a house. Better that a fuse blows and the lights go out than that the house burns down. Moreover, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out after the Kosovo war proceeded in 1999 without a UN resolution -- but with French and German participation -- the UN is torn between the strict Westphalian interpretation of state sovereignty and the rise of international humanitarian and human rights law that sets limits on what leaders can do to their citizens. To complicate matters further, politics has made the UN Charter virtually impossible to amend. Still, for all its flaws, the UN has proved useful in its humanitarian and peacekeeping roles on which states agree, and it remains an important source of legitimacy in world politics. The latter point is particularly galling to the new unilateralists, who (correctly) point to the undemocratic nature of many of the regimes that cast votes in the UN and chair its committees -- one rankling example being Libya's chairmanship of the Human Rights Commission. But their proposed solution of replacing the UN with a new organization of democracies ignores the fact that the major divisions over Iraq were among the democracies. Rather than engage in futile efforts to ignore the UN or change its architecture, Washington should improve its underlying bilateral diplomacy with the other veto-wielding powers and use the UN in practical ways to further the new strategy. In addition to overseeing the UN's development and humanitarian agenda, the Security Council may wind up playing a background role in diffusing the crisis in North Korea; the Committee on Terrorism can help prod states to improve their procedures; and UN peacekeepers can save the United States from having to be the world's lone sheriff. If Washington uses it wisely, the UN can serve U.S. interests in a variety of practical ways. But the reverse is also true: the new unilateralists' attacks on the UN may backfire in ways that undercut American soft power. There is considerable evidence that the new unilateralists' policies tend to squander U.S. soft power. Before the war, a Pew Charitable Trust poll found that U.S. policies (not American culture) led to less favorable attitudes toward the United States over the past two years in 19 of 27 countries, including the Islamic countries so crucial to the prosecution of the war on terrorism. Other polls showed an average drop of 30 points in the popularity of the United States in major European countries. No large country can<CONTINUED>

Soft Power Good

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 afford to be purely multilateralist, and sometimes the United States must take the lead by itself, as it did in Afghanistan. And the credible threat to exercise the unilateral option was probably essential to getting the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1441, which brought the weapons inspectors back into Iraq. But the United States should incline toward multilateralism whenever possible as a way to legitimize its power and to gain broad acceptance of its new strategy. Preemption that is legitimized by multilateral sanction is far less costly and sets a far less dangerous precedent than the United States asserting that it alone can act as judge, jury, and executioner. Granted, multilateralism can be used by smaller states to restrict American freedom of action, but this downside does not detract from its overall usefulness. Whether Washington learns to listen to others and to define U.S. national interests more broadly to include global interests will be crucial to the success of the new strategy and to whether others see the American preponderance the strategy proclaims as benign or not. To implement the new strategy successfully, therefore, the United States will need to pay more attention to soft power and multilateral cooperation than the new unilateralists would like.

Soft Power Good

Soft power is key to hard power

Nye 4 (Joseph, Dean of John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Aug 2, <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>) LL

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pickup coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow them to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. For example, initially the U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in was not very popular in Japan, but over the decades, polls show that it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction, so that other countries are not obliged continually to reexamine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the U.S. by the Japanese public “contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony” and “served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.”17 Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation’s John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue, power in the global information age will come not just from strong defenses, but from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in the information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.18 As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

\*\*\*A2: Partition DA

Federalism Good—Kurds

5 region federalism promotes regional balance, Kurd autonomy, and is acceptable to major political forces

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

The five-region model championed by, among others, Iraq’s national security advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie envisages the creation of the following regions: Basra province (to include Basra, Nasariyyah, and Amara), Kufa province (to include Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, and Hilla), Greater Baghdad (to include Ba’quba), and Mosul province (to include Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah, and Ramadi). Combined with the established Kurdish region in the north, these five regions would form the basis of Iraq’s new federal system.43 Figure 3 illustrates one possibility for where the boundary might fall in such a system. To avoid preferential treatment for any group, the five regions should enjoy constitutional symmetry. The powers granted to one should be granted to all. The Spanish model, whereby all regions have the option of negotiating directly with the federal government to extend autonomy beyond that granted in the constitution, should also be seriously considered for Iraq.44 Benefits of a Five-Region Model In addition to constitutional equality, these five regions would have rough equality in terms of population. Under any system that preserves the eighteen provinces (or fifteen plus a Kurdish region), Baghdad, with approximately 7 million inhabitants, dwarfs all others in term of population. One of the purposes of adopting a federal system for Iraq is to devolve power from the center to the periphery (a point of consensus among scholars), but this is difficult to achieve when the center is simultaneously the capital city, a province, the cultural, economic, and communications hub of the country, and home to over one-fourth of the country’s population. The five-region model creates regions with a more symmetrical population distribution. Greater Baghdad would still be the most populous, but it would coexist with four other regions, each with 4–5 million inhabitants. That five regions will have more power (all else being equal) relative to eighteen provinces is largely self-evident. There are fewer of them and each represents a larger proportion of territory, resources, and population, thus enhancing their political influence in relation to the central government. The importance of this extends beyond the devolution of power. Historically, the extreme level of centralization that defined the Iraqi political system has made the country vulnerable to military coups. On several occasions, relatively minor forces have been able to effect regime change by establishing control over the capital city. The establishment of five power centers in Iraq will make this more difficult. By far the major benefit of this model, however, is that it is potentially more broadly acceptable to major political forces than any alternative. From the Kurdish perspective the major advantage of the regional model over all other alternatives is that it is a compromise position that allows the Kurds to keep the autonomy they already enjoy but that is also likely to prove acceptable to other Iraqi groups, particularly the Shi’a. According to an aide of Ayatollah Sistani, ‘‘the creation of two main provinces for Shiites, one with oil and another one with the clerical schools and shrines is exactly what Sistani would like to see now.’’45 If the Kurds push for a regional model, therefore, they will find themselves allied with Iraq’s most influential political figure, rather than opposed to him as they are now. Likewise, Ahmed Chalabi, the secular leader of the Iraqi National Congress (a faction within the UIA), has argued for the establishment of a southern region in any future federal system, claiming, ‘‘The people of the south want a southern region as part of the federal union of Iraq.’’46 Elsewhere, a top official of SCIRI has called for the establishment of a Holy Region centered on Karbala, and the Sunni Arab governor of Anbar province has proposed a large Sunni region, comprising Saladin, Ninevah, and Anbar provinces.47 The five-region model is, therefore, a compromise position that allows the Kurds to keep their autonomy but that does not involve ‘‘preferential treatment for any group’’ and is potentially acceptable to many of Iraq’s major political forces.48

Federalism Good—Ethnic Conflict

Sunni controlled region solves Sunni conflict- protects from Shi’a retribution

Anderson and Stansfield 5 (Liam, prof of political science at Wright State, and Gareth, prof of Middle East politics at Univ. of Exeter, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/publiuspdf.pdf) my

It is unclear how Iraq’s broader Sunni Arab population would react to a five-region proposal. However, absent the restoration of Sunni control over a powerful central government, the regional model is likely to be at least as acceptable as any alternative. It will allow Sunnis to govern and police themselves in the Mosul province, as well as to maintain a position of (possibly decisive) influence in Greater Baghdad. If nothing else, it will protect Sunnis against Shi’a dominance and the possibility that the Shi’a will exploit their newly acquired position of power to exact retribution for decades of oppression. Reintegrating the Sunni into the political process and ending the insurgency is impossible at present because there is no coherent Sunni leadership with which to negotiate. The forces currently uniting Sunni Arabs are hostility toward the occupation and resentment at the new political order—beyond this, they are hopelessly fragmented as a political force. The widespread nonparticipation of Sunni Arab voters in the election guaranteed the virtual exclusion of their representatives from the National Assembly. It also gifted control of key provincial councils to the Kurds. In particular, Kurdish control of Ninevah, and, thereby, the city of Mosul, is likely to exacerbate already deep Kurd/Arab divisions in the city. There are no easy solutions to the problem of Sunni marginalization. However, a single, unified, Sunni-dominated region (to include Mosul) allows for the possible emergence of a broad, catchall political force that represents, and can negotiate on behalf of, Sunni Arab interests. This is preferable to the prevailing situation in which Sunni interests are fragmented among numerous provinces, several of which are now controlled by Kurds.

Federalism Good—Conflict

Ethnic federalism is stable and reduces conflict- separates warring factions

Merritt 7 (Douglas W., grad student, Master’s Thesis, 12/14, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475503&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

Federalism based on ethnic partition is a viable solution in Iraq. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish objectives are attainable, the ethnic distrust which has survived throughout history will remain well beyond the conclusion of OIF. Based on the study of primordial nationalism and the ethnic relationships in Iraq and Bosnia, the best the U.S. Government can hope for is to achieve peace through equal power sharing in the region. This end-state would serve to reduce the level of ethnic insecurity and return the area back to a condition relative peace. It would give each group a sense of control and autonomy in the region, while the decentralized government provides international diplomacy, economic reform, and guarantees fair representation through sharing of the countries resources. The center of gravity in Iraq is the removal of ethnic insecurities though security, governance, and economic reform. Sectarian Conflict Resolution The resolution of the conflict between Shia, Sunni, and Kurd will not occur during OIF and possibly will remain indefinitely. Based on the analysis in chapter 4 of the different ethnic groups’ objectives and inter-relations it is overly-optimistic to believe the United States can mend the “bad blood” between the groups to achieve total peace in the region. It is more realistic to achieve tolerance based on equal power sharing and equal recognition within the region. The ethnic groups require a different set of conditions to achieve their objectives, however, every group requires security and governmental controls to reduce the level insecurity in their province. To reduce the level of insecurity within Iraq, the ethnic groups attain an increased level of authority by establishing their own government, running their own elections and developing provincial laws. At the local and provincial level, the people of Iraq could not blame their situation on the other ethnic groups if they are being governed by leaders that they elected from the same ethnic group. With the establishment of ethnic provinces, the United States could anticipate the enormous task of implementing the provincial borders and securing the potential mass movement of people to their perspective provinces. This thesis assumed that the provinces would not be ethnically pure similar to Bosnia. People would have the opportunity to move or be governed by a different ethnic group. Acceptance of the provincial leadership would reduce the insecurity level and the sectarian violence would reduce. Based on the study of Bosnia and the current trends in Iraq, soft partition seems to be occurring already. The establishment of ethnic provinces establishes safe borders for each ethnic group reducing the level of conflict through geographic separation. Requirements for each ethnic group come with the geographic separation. To provide the separation required to reduce sectarian violence the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds would have to secure their borders and provide adequate governance to their people.

Partition Good—Civil War

Civil war is coming unless we partition- Sunni upset

Howe 6 (Russell Warren, Washington-based free-lance journalist , Iraq Updates, 7/16, http://admin.iraqupdates.net/p\_articles.php/article/9375) my

Bush administration spokesmen continually stress the need to preserve the unity of Iraq. Why? The country is geographically and ethno-religiously divided into three: Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’i Arabs, with Turkoman and Christian minorities. The present endemic violence has a strong chance of boiling over into civil warfare if a federation or confederation is imposed on terms not acceptable to all three major groups. The Sunni Kurds in the north, in particular, have stressed that they want to preserve the autonomy which the U.S. Air Force overflights virtually created in Saddam Hussain’s time. Both main Kurdish leaders talk openly of an independent Kurdistan. Would the Sunni Arabs in the west accept anything less—anything that stresses that they are a minority in the 21st century version of a colonial concept in which the Shi’i are a majority, enjoying close relations with the exuberantly Shi’i nation next door, Iran?

Partition is the only available route for Iraq- alternatives are escalating civil war

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

The time may be approaching when the only hope for a more stable Iraq is a soft partition of the country. Soft partition would involve the Iraqis, with the assistance of the international community, dividing their country into three main regions. Each would assume primary responsibility for its own security and governance, as Iraqi Kurdistan already does. Creating such a structure could prove difficult and risky. However, when measured against the alternatives— continuing to police an ethno-sectarian war, or withdrawing and allowing the conflict to escalate— the risks of soft partition appear more acceptable. Indeed, soft partition in many ways simply responds to current realities on the ground, particularly since the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, a major Shi’i shrine, dramatically escalated intersectarian violence. If the U.S. troop surge, and the related effort to broker political accommodation through the existing coalition government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki fail, soft partition may be the only means of avoiding an intensification of the civil war and growing threat of a regional conflagration. While most would regret the loss of a multi-ethnic, diverse Iraq, the country has become so violent and so divided along ethno-sectarian lines that such a goal may no longer be achievable. Soft partition would represent a substantial departure from the current approach of the Bush Administration and that proposed by the Iraq Study Group, both of which envision a unitary Iraq ruled largely from Baghdad. It would require new negotiations, the formation of a revised legal framework for the country, the creation of new institutions at the regional level, and the organized but voluntary movement of populations. For these reasons, we refer to it as a “Plan B” for Iraq. It would require acquiescence from most major Iraqi political factors (though not necessarily all, which is an unrealistic standard in any event). It might best be negotiated outside the current Iraqi political process, perhaps under the auspices of a special representative of the United Nations as suggested by Carlos Pascual of the Brookings Institution. International mediation could succeed where the current, U.S.-led effort to pry concessions out of al- Maliki’s government has failed. Indeed, Kurds and Shi’i Arabs would have far more incentive to cede on the fundamental issue of oil production and revenuesharing if they knew that their core strategic objectives would be realized through secure, empowered regions. Although it would surely play a facilitating role along with the United Nations, the United States need not bear the burden, nor the stigma, of leading Iraqis towards soft partition. At the outset, it would suffice for the United States simply to cease its insistence on the alternative of an Iraq ruled from Baghdad that at once fails to serve Sunni Arabs while serving as a symbolic threat to Shi’i Arabs—an Iraq that has encouraged the Shi’i Arabs to cement their dominance of the country’s power center against any potential Sunni Arab revival.

Partition Good—Civil War

The facade of a centralized government is causing the current civil war- careful partition solves

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

As for the wider ramifications, a carelessly conceived and implemented partition could potentially cause regional destabilization and conflict. Indeed, this is a crucial difference between Iraq and Bosnia. In the latter’s case, its neighbors, Serbia and Croatia, were unified in their ambition to divide Bosnia and achieved a common approach. By contrast in Iraq it is precisely the ongoing civil war that presents the worst risk for regional stability. Rather than mitigating this internal conflict, the current insistence on maintaining the façade of a centralized government in Iraq is fuelling the conflict and perpetuating the security dilemma that each community feels. Given the depth of mistrust between ethno-sectarian groups and the nearly complete polarization of the security forces, exhortations to the government to “reform” and “reconcile” are likely to fail—even if they are worth a final try.

US military destroyed the only possibility for unified Iraq- ensures civil war

Asia Times 4 (Sadi Baig, 5/12, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/FE12Ak04.html) my

The war has changed Iraq in many ways for some time to come, if not forever. While conveying to their masses how they were destroying a totalitarian and repressive regime, the United States and the United Kingdom actually destroyed the strongly federated state of Iraq. The systematic looting and destruction of the state structure including the ministries of health, education, agriculture, the museums depicting Iraq's unparalleled cultural and historical heritage, all under the silent watch of the US military, meant that the future occupiers had no interest in a unified Iraq - in line with the history of British and French colonialism to leave more states behind than before colonization. Related with the previous argument is the incessant talk of a civil war in Iraq. Iraq has had no history of such strife, but US and British military and political leadership started talking about it from the very early stages of the conflict. It was repeated so thoroughly, that besides the compliant mainstream media, even respected US publications such as Salon.com and the British Independent bought the theme, hook, line and sinker. As Aldous Huxley would have noted, it is a case of the "irrational" propaganda crossing over into "rational" propaganda through creative use of repetition. Some conservative leaders are already talking about a three-state solution. The US and subsequently the United Nations plan is designed to engineer a divide by having a president and two vice presidents, each representing the three divisions of Kurd, Shi'ite and Sunni. A US equivalent of it will be to have a white president with two vice presidents, one African-American, and the other a Latino. The UN-sponsored solution will not be very different than the weakly federated states of the Balkans that are held together by UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.

Partition Good—Terrorism

Independent Shia state good- can cooperate with the US to stop terrorism

Galbraith 6 (Peter, former US ambassador with emphasis on Iraq, The Sunday Times, 7/16, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article688198.ece) my

 If the Shi’ite south forms a region, it can set up a theocratic government and establish a regional guard. Iran will be the dominant power and the Bush administration has no ability, and no intention, of countering Iran’s position there. These are not welcome developments but they need not be catastrophic. For the United States and the world’s Shi’ites (including the Iranians) have a common interest in defeating Al-Qaeda and its kindred Sunni fundamentalist movements. Certainly Iraq’s Shi’ites would line up against the United States in the event of an American confrontation with Iran. But America could have good relations with a southern Iraqi Shi’ite theocracy that did not share the tortured US relationship with Iran but came to power through a democratic process that coalition troops made possible. And an elected regional government — with a regional guard responsible to it — would certainly be preferable to the current ad hoc system of informal Islamic rule enforced by sometimes competing militias. Even a theocratic government can provide the political and economic stability needed to permit new investment in the south’s vast oil reserves. By providing technical assistance to a southern government, America and its coalition partners may have some influence on internal developments.

Partition Good—Prevents Genocide

3 State partition is the only solution- attempting to unify Iraq is impossible and results in violence and genocide

Galbraith 6 (Peter, former US ambassador with emphasis on Iraq, The Sunday Times, 7/16, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article688198.ece) my

There is no good solution to the mess in Iraq. The country has broken up. The United States cannot put it back together again and cannot stop the civil war. The conventional wisdom holds that Iraq’s break-up would be destabilising and should be avoided at all costs. Looking at Iraq’s dismal history since Britain cobbled it together from three Ottoman provinces at the end of the first world war, it should be apparent that it is the effort to hold Iraq together that has been destabilising. Pursuit of a coerced unity under Sunni-Arab domination — from the first British-installed king to the end of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in 2003 — has led to endless violence, repression and genocide. I do not believe it is possible in the long run to force people living in a geographically defined area to remain part of a state against their will. Certainly Iraq’s Kurds will never reconcile themselves to being part of Iraq. Under these circumstances I believe that a managed amicable divorce is in the best interests of the peoples of Iraq and will hasten American and British withdrawal. At the beginning of this year the Bush administration invested heavily in diplomatic efforts aimed at forming a national unity government that included the Shi’ites, Kurds, Sunni Arabs and secularists. It took until late April to agree on a prime minister, president, two vice-presidents and the speaker of the parliament. Because of its internal tensions, the government is not likely to function very well. Even if it does, what will it govern? Not Kurdistan: the regional government insists on its constitutional authority to run its region. Baghdad ministries are not allowed to open offices there. Not the Shi’ite south: it is run by a patchwork of municipal and governorate officials who front for the clerics, religious parties and militias that are the real power in the region. Not the Sunni-Arab heartland: it is a battleground. The American military, assisted by Shi’ite troops, are at war with insurgents and foreign terrorists. Many Sunni Arabs despise both sides of this battle, but it does not mean that they will accept the authority of a Shi’ite-led national government which they see as installed by the Americans and aligned with Iran. Not Baghdad, at least outside the green zone: Iraq’s capital is a city of armed camps. Wealthy Iraqis maintain private armies for security. Although most of Iraq’s ministries are outside the green zone, many ministers live inside it. Most rarely go to their offices and spend their days visiting colleagues in the zone. There is much talk at the highest levels of Iraq’s government — but little government. The situation should be blindingly obvious to the top US officials who visit. After three years of occupation they cannot leave the green zone or even move within the zone without a security detail the size of a small army. Even when America and Britain had full legal authority in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, they did nothing to arrest the break-up of the country. In the south they allowed the Shi’ite clergy and religious parties to take power and to build their Islamic states. While saying that Kurdistan should rejoin Iraq, America did nothing to reduce any part of Kurdistan’s autonomy. While outlawing armed forces that were not part of the Iraqi army, the coalition allowed militias to proliferate. If the coalition could not prevent Iraq’s unravelling when it was fully in charge of the country, it is illogical now to put all the emphasis on building strong national institutions, such as a single Iraqi army and powerful central government, when American influence is much diminished.

Partition Good—A2: Violence

3-state partition feasible and good- capitalizes on ethnic realities and empirically proven

Gelb 3 (Leslie, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York Times, 11/25, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/25/opinion/the-three-state-solution.html?pagewanted=1>) my

The only viable strategy, then, may be to correct the historical defect and move in stages toward a three-state solution: Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shiites in the south. Almost immediately, this would allow America to put most of its money and troops where they would do the most good quickly -- with the Kurds and Shiites. The United States could extricate most of its forces from the so-called Sunni Triangle, north and west of Baghdad, largely freeing American forces from fighting a costly war they might not win. American officials could then wait for the troublesome and domineering Sunnis, without oil or oil revenues, to moderate their ambitions or suffer the consequences. This three-state solution has been unthinkable in Washington for decades. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, a united Iraq was thought necessary to counter an anti-American Iran. Since the gulf war in 1991, a whole Iraq was deemed essential to preventing neighbors like Turkey, Syria and Iran from picking at the pieces and igniting wider wars. But times have changed. The Kurds have largely been autonomous for years, and Ankara has lived with that. So long as the Kurds don't move precipitously toward statehood or incite insurgencies in Turkey or Iran, these neighbors will accept their autonomy. It is true that a Shiite self-governing region could become a theocratic state or fall into an Iranian embrace. But for now, neither possibility seems likely. There is a hopeful precedent for a three-state strategy: Yugoslavia after World War II. In 1946, Marshal Tito pulled together highly disparate ethnic groups into a united Yugoslavia. A Croat himself, he ruled the country from Belgrade among the majority and historically dominant Serbs. Through clever politics and personality, Tito kept the peace peacefully. When Tito died in 1980, several parts of Yugoslavia quickly declared their independence. The Serbs, with superior armed forces and the arrogance of traditional rulers, struck brutally against Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Europeans and Americans protested but -- stunningly and unforgivably -- did little at first to prevent the violence. Eventually they gave the Bosnian Muslims and Croats the means to fight back, and the Serbs accepted separation. Later, when Albanians in the Serb province of Kosovo rebelled against their cruel masters, the United States and Europe had to intervene again. The result there will be either autonomy or statehood for Kosovo. The lesson is obvious: overwhelming force was the best chance for keeping Yugoslavia whole, and even that failed in the end. Meantime, the costs of preventing the natural states from emerging had been terrible. The ancestors of today's Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds have been in Mesopotamia since before modern history. The Shiites there, unlike Shiites elsewhere in the Arab world, are a majority. The Sunnis of the region gravitate toward pan-Arabism. The non-Arab Kurds speak their own language and have always fed their own nationalism. The Ottomans ruled all the peoples of this land as they were: separately. In 1921, Winston Churchill cobbled the three parts together for oil's sake under a monarch backed by British armed forces. The Baathist Party took over in the 1960's, with Saddam Hussein consolidating its control in 1979, maintaining unity through terror and with occasional American help. Today, the Sunnis have a far greater stake in a united Iraq than either the Kurds or the Shiites. Central Iraq is largely without oil, and without oil revenues, the Sunnis would soon become poor cousins. The Shiites might like a united Iraq if they controlled it -- which they could if those elections Mr. Bush keeps promising ever occur. But the Kurds and Sunnis are unlikely to accept Shiite control, no matter how democratically achieved. The Kurds have the least interest in any strong central authority, which has never been good for them. A strategy of breaking up Iraq and moving toward a three-state solution would build on these realities. The general idea is to strengthen the Kurds and Shiites and weaken the Sunnis, then wait and see whether to stop at autonomy or encourage statehood.

Partition Good—A2: Conflict/Econ

Partition is feasible and successful- won’t splinter, economically successful, and minimizes ethnic conflict

Riggins 7 (David, Lieutenant Colonel in the US army, 4/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493639&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) my

Kaufmann concludes his arguments by rebutting objections to ethnic partition. To those who believe that partition encourages splintering of states, he argues that government suppression of secession attempts makes them extremely costly and unlikely unless the state was destined to break up anyway. Others may argue that population transfers cause suffering. Kaufmann replies that spontaneous refugee movement causes the greatest suffering, while planned relocations supported by the international community would be much safer. Some may believe that separation merely substitutes international conflict for civil unrest. While postpartition wars are possible, Kaufmann argues that they are unlikely and the cost of intercommunal slaughter justifies separation [26]. Another potential weakness of partition is that the resulting states may not be robust enough to survive. Kaufmann points out that there are no historical examples of partitioned states that failed economically. Further, international influence and support of the resulting states goes a long way toward ensuring the economic viability of the resulting states. Finally, Kaufmann argues that while partition does not resolve ethnic hatred, there is little that anyone could do to solve this issue. Instead, partition provides a means of reducing interethnic antagonisms and perceived security threats. In his 2004 paper for the journal Security Studies, scholar Alexander Downes endorses the argument for partition when he states: “Partition has potential because it minimizes the degree to which groups must cooperate with and trust one another; does not require them to disarm or merge their militaries; limits the level of external military intervention required and allows it to be used to better effect; and, by satisfying nationalism and the need for physical security, allows passions to cool between formerly hostile groups” [27]. While it may not result in a perfect peace, Kaufmann argues that partition will provide the means for safer and longer lasting peace following ethnic conflicts.

Partition Good—A2: Iraqi Opposition

Civilians are already fleeing to areas of ethnic homogenity

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

The IOM monitors the movements of the displaced in fifteen of Iraq’s eighteen governorates (provinces) and confirms that in general, IDPs are moving to homogenous communities, sometimes within the same city (such as Baghdad), sometimes to different regions. 9 According to the IOM: “Shias tended to move from the center to the south. Sunnis tended to move from the south to the upper center, especially al-Anbar. Both ethnicities moved from mixed communities to homogenous ones in the same city, especially volatile Baghdad and Baquba. Christians primarily fled to Ninewa and Kurds were usually displaced to Diyala or Tameem/Kirkuk.”10 Echoing this view, Refugees International explained the consequences of ethnosectarian flight in this manner: “as Iraqis race to escape sectarian violence and de facto ethnic cleansing in southern and central areas[,] Iraq is becoming Balkanized as formerly mixed neighborhoods disintegrate into Sunni and Shia redoubts, all afraid of one another.”11 The data from refugee experts confirm that the impetus for ethno-sectarian flight comes from the ethno- sectarian nature of the killing, rather than armed conflict per se.12 Put otherwise, those with the best onthe- ground intelligence and the most at stake, Iraqi civilians, are not simply fleeing the violence. Rather they are seeking security and they define security in large part through ethno-sectarian demographics. If they lack the means to escape Iraq or to move to relatively quiet areas such as Kurdistan, Basra or Karbala, then instead they move to nearby locations where they are part of the ethno-sectarian majority, and where militias of their own group tend to be in control. To illustrate, a Shi’i Arab family profiled by The Washington Post fled the predominantly Sunni Arab neighborhood of Ghazaliya in western Baghdad after receiving threatening leaflets. They chose to move to the mostly Shi’i Arab Kadhimiyah neighborhood. Although still in Baghdad, vulnerable to violence and facing material hardships, the family now feels a sense of security as explained by one of the daughters: “we were living in constant anxiety [in the old neighborhood.] Here we at least feel comfortable. We are living as one [with our new Shi’i Arab neighbors.]”13 A Sunni Arab family interviewed by Time had a similar experience. Fleeing from Baghdad’s mostly Shi’i Arab Shualla neighborhood to Sunni Arab Adhamiya, Ayesha Ubaid stated that, after the move, “she feels as safe as it is possible to be in Baghdad.”14 She added that despite the promise to protect their house, their erstwhile Shi’i Arab neighbors did nothing as a Shi’i Arab family quickly moved in to take the place of the displaced Sunni Ubaid family.

Partition Good—A2: Iraqi Opposition

Iraqi public moving toward partition- elections prove and violence erodes unity

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

Many commentators oppose the soft partition of Iraq because there is no longstanding enmity between Sunni and Shi’i Arabs.33 Democracy advocates cite polls taken in Iraq showing that despite the violence and separation, Sunni and Shi’i Arab populations continue to have a strong “Iraqi national identity” and oppose partition.34 Despite this, there is strong evidence that violence is steadily eroding national unity.35 In addition, there are demonstrable roots to Sunni-Shi’i tension, such as the longstanding Sunni Arab dominance of the oppressive Ba‘th Party, common scorn among Sunnis for Shi’ah whom they view as “Persian” and lower in class standing, and Saddam’s pogroms against the Shi’i Arabs in the early 1990s.36 According to Vali Nasr of the Naval Postgraduate School: “When [Saddam] killed a Sunni, it was personal—because of something that person had done; when it came to killing Shi’ites, he was indiscriminate. He didn’t need a specific reason. Their being Shi’ite was enough.”37 Although Shi’i Arabs profess support for an Iraqi national identity, they also have a shared memory of oppression and a widespread feeling of an entitlement to rule. This has left Iraq in the grips of an insidious form of “identity politics.”38 The most recent ABC News survey provides important evidence for the growing acceptance of regionalism. Although all polling in Iraq must be read with caution, the figures are striking. The poll shows that a solid majority of Shi’ah (59 percent) believe that Iraq should either be reconstituted into regions or divided outright into separate states. An even larger majority (73 percent) believes that Iraq will be divided in one of these two manners at some point in the future—the personal preference of the respondents notwithstanding. The number of Iraqis now saying that the country should remain unified has dropped from 79 percent in February 2004 to 58 percent in March 2007. Almost the exact same number (57 percent) also says that regardless of their personal preferences Iraq will be divided either into regions or separate states.39 In any event, whatever Iraqis say in surveys about rejecting division of the country, what they do at elections suggests they are embracing it and hastening its arrival. Secular and religious Shi’ah alike heeded Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa and streamed to the polls in December 2005 propelling heavily sectarian, religiousoriented parties into power. The parade of Shi’i Arabs wagging their purple fingers at the polls elicited deepset Sunni Arab anxieties. For the Sunni Arabs, “the officially sanctioned emergence of the Shiites as the ruling element in Iraq was a massive psychological blow [confirming their] worst fears about [the Shi’ah.]”40 When Sunni Arabs decided to participate in the second parliamentary election of the year they emulated their Shi’i Arab counterparts and voted overwhelmingly for sectarian parties. At the December 2005 poll, voters from all sides rejected the option of national unity by an even greater margin than they had twelve months previously.41 To summarize, as in the former Yugoslavia, elections in Iraq have been less a transition point to democracy than an exercise in ethno-sectarian politics and the pursuit of group self-interest. As Shi’i Arab voters in particular have asserted their dominance by voting en bloc, they have provoked further sectarian responses from the Sunni Arabs. As each side has responded (by dividing the government along sectarian lines, by forming militias, by launching reprisal attacks), ethnosectarian identities, which have deep roots in each group’s historical experience, have hardened.

Partition Good—Best Alternative

Partition is the lesser of 2 evils- and the Iraqi people support it

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

These strong reservations present a high hurdle for the advocates of partition. We share some of these concerns and, as a matter of principle and theory, we dislike partition as a solution to ethno-sectarian conflict. However, at some point it can become the lesser of a range of possible evils. Iraqi realities are beginning to trump theory. Ethnic killing and cleansing are the most important evidence of this trend. The proof goes further than acts of violence alone. The views and actions of an even larger percentage of the population than the violent minority (or “extremists” as Iraqi officials label them) indicate a drift towards separation. Disproving the notion that Iraqis “want to live together,” citizens through their political choices and their movements are actually “voting” for separation. For example, voters twice rejected credible, non-sectarian alternatives to the current governing coalition by an increasing margin in the January and December 2005 legislative elections. Furthermore, in their flight from danger, Iraqis have demonstrated that they seek security not just by gaining distance from the violence—but more importantly by sheltering with members of the same ethno-sectarian group. By doing so they render the remaining minorities within Iraq’s emerging regions even more vulnerable, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will eventually have to leave (a phenomenon known as the “security dilemma”).2

Partition Good—Inevitable

Partition inevitable- dysfunctional government already starting to divide territory

Cockburn 6 (Patrick, foreign correspondent at The Independent, 6/24, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/sectarian-breakup-of-iraq-is-now-inevitable-admit-officials-409088.html)

The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, meets Tony Blair in London today as violence in Iraq reaches a new crescendo and senior Iraqi officials say the break up of the country is inevitable. A car bomb in a market in the Shia stronghold of Sadr City in Baghdad yesterday killed 34 people and wounded a further 60 and was followed by a second bomb in the same area two hours later that left a further eight dead. Another car bomb outside a court house in Kirkuk killed a further 20 and injured 70 people. "Iraq as a political project is finished," a senior government official was quoted as saying, adding: "The parties have moved to plan B." He said that the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish parties were now looking at ways to divide Iraq between them and to decide the future of Baghdad, where there is a mixed population. "There is serious talk of Baghdad being divided into [Shia] east and [Sunni] west," he said. Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, told The Independent in an interview, before joining Mr Maliki to fly to London and then Washington, that in theory the government should be able to solve the crisis because Shia, Kurd and Sunni were elected members of it. But he painted a picture of a deeply divided administration in which senior Sunni members praised anti-government insurgents as "the heroic resistance".

Partition Good—Iraq Divided – Government

Iraq is split—proves partition is likely

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

To summarize, the manner in which Sunni and Shi’i Arabs seek security is part and parcel of the increasing, accelerating emergence of largely homogenous ethnosectarian regions in Iraq. The internal displacement in Iraq has become an accelerant of the conflict, creating a self-sustaining momentum. The flight of refugees across international borders has also robbed the country of a core, moderate middle class needed for reconciliation. Not only are extremists on both sides making the civil conflict “self-sustaining,” in the words of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the movement of victims is further widening the sectarian divide.20 It will be very difficult to reverse this, if indeed it is even possible.

The Iraqi government is split along strictly sectarian lines

Joseph and O’Hanlon 7 (Edward P., scholar at Johns Hopkins, and Michael E., senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Brookings, June, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq\_joseph/06iraq\_joseph.pdf) my

Both the Iraq Study Group and the Bush Administration expressly oppose devolving power to semi-autonomous regions. Instead, both advocate maximal support for, as the Iraq Study Group puts it, “central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad.”21 To stem sectarian violence they logically advocate goading Iraq’s dominant Shi’i Arabs and Kurds to meet a number of “milestones” that will foster “reconciliation.”22 Resistance to this approach so far has not been surprising, however, given the strong sectarian sympathies and motivations of most in al-Maliki’s government.23 The abject bias of Prime Minister al-Maliki, a Shi’i Arab from the Da’wa party, and his government is well documented. This bias was detailed in a leaked memo written by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley which described “an aggressive push [in government] to consolidate Shia power and influence.” Hadley’s memo suggested that al-Maliki himself is either ignorant or duplicitous or weak.24 However, al-Maliki is only the tip of the iceberg. The Iraqi government is split almost wholly along ethno-sectarian lines. Based on the parliamentary seat allocation from the December 2005 election, less than 10 percent of Iraqi parties in the Council of Representatives (the unicameral parliament) are simply “Iraqi”—in the sense that they represent more than one ethno-sectarian group. The Iraqi National List of Iyad Allawi, the main non-sectarian party that ran in the most recent parliamentary elections, holds 13 percent of ministry or leadership positions.25 All the other ministries have been allocated along ethno-sectarian lines. The most sensitive function of government, providing security, is also contaminated by ethno-sectarian mistrust at the highest levels. Shi’i Arabs openly admit that Deputy Prime Minister Salam az-Zubayi, a Sunni Arab whose portfolio includes oversight of security affairs, is deliberately kept in the dark. They say that they “cannot share details about security operations with Sunni leaders [like az-Zubayi] because of fears that the Sunnis will disclose the plans to insurgent groups.”26 For their part, Sunni Arab leaders suspect that the government makes only half-hearted efforts to rein in Shi’i Arab militias, while deploying forces vigorously against the Sunni Arab insurgency. U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus and other American officials are currently quite focused on this problem, but it is not yet clear how much improvement will be possible.

Partition Good—A2: Turkish Opposition

Turkey welcomes independent Kurdistan- provides a buffer to the south

Galbraith 6 (Peter, former US ambassador with emphasis on Iraq, The Sunday Times, 7/16, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article688198.ece) my

How could a divorce be carried through? Arab Iraqi leaders have told me privately that they accept Kurdistan’s right to self-determination. Some seem to prefer that Kurdistan should leave, having grown weary of its refusal to make any concessions to a shared state. With settled borders, the split between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq could be more like Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce than Yugoslavia’s wars. Turkey — with many Kurds living within its borders — has long been considered the chief obstacle to Kurdish dreams for an independent state. Turkish attitudes have evolved significantly, however. Some Turkish strategic thinkers, including those within the so-called “deep state” comprising the military and intelligence establishments, see a secular, pro-western and non-Arab Kurdistan as a buffer to an Islamic Arab state to the south.

\*\*\*Random Answers

Withdrawal Good—Civil War

Withdrawal prevents civil war

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

 It will push Iraqi lawmakers to come to more agreements in running the new democracy. Much of Iraqi is still bitterly divided. Sunnis used to rule the country under Saddam. Now the Shiite majority has taken the bulk of power in the new democratic government. However, until government officials can learn to share certain powers and come to more agreements, a de facto civil war will continue. If American troops leave, it will push lawmakers to the negotiating table since the soldiers won't be around to suppress insurgencies. In other words, Iraqi officials will be forced to use more of a carrot approach than a stick approach.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Oil

Russian Oil dominance falls victim to Dutch disease increasing the risk of conflict and leads the Russians towards economic collapse

Shlapentokh 6 (Vladimir, Nov 6professor of sociology @ MSU, <http://forum.pravda.com.ua/read.php?9,1606588> Oil & Gas Journal, accessed 7/6) CM

A content analysis of 50 national newspapers produced remarkable results: Between February and July, 2005, the press mentioned “oil” in 7,285 articles and mentioned “gas” in 8,313 articles, while other important subjects were mentioned less often, including “inflation” (3,565 articles), “corruption” (3,354 articles), and “crime” (1,569 articles). With the idea that oil has provided them with an advantage over their enemies, Russian nationalists are inebriated with thoughts of revenge. In their dreams, they see the US crawling before the Russian oil giant, begging for a few drops of oil. With almost sadistic pleasure, some Russian journalists, such as Evgenii Anisimov from Komsomol’skaia Pravda, suggested that because of Russia’s new role as a supplier of energy, “Europe is scared,” and “her resources of energy are close to exhaustion.” It is not surprising that, under the impact of the Kremlin’s “oil propaganda,” the Russians were glad to see Moscow force Ukraine to accept, at the end of 2005, a four-fold increase in the price of gas. The absolute majority of the Russian public-80% in the country as a whole and 94% in Moscow and St. Petersburg-unequivocally supported the Kremlin’s position in the December 2005 gas conflict. Dutch disease As suggested by many economists, Dutch disease-a country’s excessive dependence on the export of raw materials-can have serious economic consequences as a country becomes increasingly dependent on that raw materials sector. Other branches of the economy, such as manufacturing, often decline because of the concentration of such resources as oil or gold, as happened in 16th century Spain. A sudden fall in the price of the raw materials could bring an economic collapse. Seemingly, the Russian leaders, like their colleagues in Venezuela and Iran, see the world through the prism of oil revenues. It goes without saying that one of the first victims of the political Dutch disease is democracy. However, an even more dangerous consequence of the political Dutch disease is the leader’s loss of a sober assessment of reality. Under the impact of their technological achievements, both Stalin and Khrushchev, with their skewed visions of reality, moved the country closer to a major war. Putin’s euphoria over oil prices may not be as great as his predecessors’ enthusiasm, but his aggressiveness in foreign policy in general, and toward the US and Russia’s neighbors in particular, has clearly increased since 2005. The shift occurred in late 2005 when Moscow brandished its gas weapon against Ukraine and indirectly against Europe. Russia’s foreign policy has hardened (despite some cooperative gestures toward the West) and influenced several international conflicts, including issues surrounding North Korea, Iran, and the Middle East. The conspicuous demonstrations in July of friendship with Venezuela’s Chavez, another political leader inebriated by oil revenues, and the readiness to sell him weapons despite American protests were clear signals of unfriendliness toward the US. Russian media treated Moscow’s attitudes toward Chavez as an obvious demonstration of disregard toward American concerns. Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal to make the ruble fully convertible in an attempt to renew the currency’s international status was another result of the country’s oil fever. Medvedev talked contemptuously about “the financial irresponsibility of the United States,” citing the country’s growing national deficit. He also denounced the International Monetary Fund’s attempt to promote market reforms, forgetting that only a few years ago Russia had scrounged for credits from this bank. Oil fever has not infected all Russians. The level of enthusiasm among the general public and particularly among experts does not match the levels observed after Sputnik and cosmonaut Gagarin were launched into space, to say nothing of the excitement after the 1945 war victory. Among the most persistent critics of the oil frenzy is Egor Gaidar who suggested that the leadership’s oil delirium and its disregard for the instability of oil prices were dangerous to the country. Several independent politicians and journalists have seconded Gaidar’s critique of the Kremlin’s “hydrocarbon doctrine,” demonstrating concern for the “time bomb in our political system.” Concerned about the Kremlin’s “muddled vision of the world,” some independent minds in Russia, such as Dmitry Muratov, the editor of Novaya Gazeta, insisted: “The intellect of the government changes inversely with the price of oil.”6 Leonid Radzikhovsky, a famous liberal journalist, wrote about the inverse correlation between the level of democracy and the price of oil. What is more, even Vladislav Surkov, until now the Kremlin’s leading ideologue challenging Medvedev, in a struggle for influence over Putin, suggested that, with gas as its only basis, the Russian economy would inevitably reveal its fake prosperity in the “post-hydrocarbon era.” Russia is not the only country in the world that is obsessed with oil. Every country, in one way or another, is preoccupied with oil. While the US, Europe, China, and India are concerned about fuel supply and the adverse influence of high oil prices on the economy and standard of living, several countries, including Russia, have turned their oil resources into weapons for achieving their domestic and foreign goals. As the experiences of Stalin and Khrushchev showed, Russian leaders sometimes overstretch the potential of their advantages and lose a sober perspective of reality. Mesmerized by his clout, Putin may accept “the invitation” of the Russians to stay in power after 2008. Today, 51% of the Russians would vote for him if he decided to try for a third term, which he promised not to do. In the foreign arena, Putin has already shown less willingness to cooperate with the West and the US in particular. His foreign policy may harden even more. However, it is unlikely that Moscow will demonstrate direct hostility toward the West in the near future. The post-Soviet space is another story, however. The idea that oil will allow Russia to take control over Ukraine, Georgia, and Belorussia is deeply engrained in the minds of Kremlin politicians. We can expect an exacerbation of the political developments in the post-Soviet space, which will undoubtedly complicate relations with the West. Aside from the damage to Russia’s international relations, the oil delirium is more problematic to the country’s long-term national interests. The

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Withdrawal Good—A2: Oil

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overconfidence in oil revenues may lead to a decline in the spirit of entrepreneurship, to a refusal to modernize industry, or even to an acceptance of deindustrialization. The obsession with high oil prices explains why the Kremlin sees few obstacles to the country’s continued move toward an authoritative regime. It also explains the Kremlin’s conspicuous disregard for the growing problem of corruption in society. With the vision of the Russian leadership blurred, it may become increasingly insensitive to various destructive tendencies in the country. The impact of the price of oil on political decision-making in Russia is crucially important to the world and should be closely monitored.

High Oil Prices hurt Russia’s economy

China Daily 10 (no author, May 25, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-05/29/content\_9907238.htm accessed 7/6) CM

High oil prices were the obstacle for modernization of Russia, President Dmitry Medvedev said during his meeting with the ruling United Russia party on Friday. "To put it bluntly, $140 per barrel is a disaster for Russia as it would mean the elimination of any stimulus for development," Medvedev said. Currently, June oil futures have been trading around $70 mark. Oil prices reached historical maximum of $140 per barrel in summer 2008. Russia built a lion share of its budget surplus from oil export. However, Russian economy was not immune to the so-called "Dutch disease," an economic phenomenon typical for countries reliant on commodities export as their main source of budget intake. High price for the raw materials on the international markets swept the export-oriented nations away of the incentives they may bear to develop other sectors of the economy. Russian experts estimated that the "golden mean" oil price for national economy is 75 dollars per barrel.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Ethnic Violence

Ethnic violence is already increasing with troops

Wick 9 (Laura Sept 21, U.S. Foreign Policy Intern at EastWest Institutehttp://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open\_Think\_Tank\_Article/Deadly\_Divide%3A\_Sunni-Shia\_Conflict\_Determines\_Iraq%27s\_Future\_\_

Without American troops as a watchdog, chaos and sectarian violence may easily re-ignite in Iraq.  There is the possibility of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia regaining strength, and of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army resurfacing.  It is questionable whether the Sons of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces will be able to hold off insurgents, militias, and al Qaeda without the help of the US.  The suicide bombings in Iraq's northern Nineveh Providence in early July 2009 portray an increase in Kurdish-Arab violence in addition to an increase in Sunni-Shia aggression within Baghdad's Sadr City. More troublesome are the attacks of August 19, 2009 in Baghdad which resulted in approximately 95 casualties and 300 injuries.  Sunni extremist groups, possibly including al Qaeda, are thought to be responsible for the attacks which targeted the Iraqi foreign ministry and other government buildings.  Again Sunnis are violently reacting to the Shia dominated Iraqi government and may represent a dismal future for the stability and safety of Iraq especially as elections draw near.  As a reaction to the recent fighting, Prime Minister al-Maliki extended the date of complete US withdrawal beyond the December 31, 2011 deadline if so required.  The possibility of US troops withdrawing by 2011 is becoming further from reality given the intense ethnic violence that is resonating throughout the nation. Intrastate ethnic violence in Iraq could easily spread outward transforming the conflict into an interstate struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.  Despite the centuries of hostility between Arabs and Persians, many fear the capabilities of an emboldened Iran backed by the Shia majority of Iraq.  Fear of Sunni suppression in Iraq, especially after Bremer's notorious de-Ba'athification, is a significant concern for neighboring Sunni countries particularly Saudi Arabia.  Recently the Shia dominated Iraqi forces seized a camp of Iranian opposition and MEK exiles in Iraq.  Such action helps align Iraq with Tehran, causing greater fear among Sunnis, particularly the Saudis, of Shia dominance spreading throughout the region. With hardliner Ahmadinejad seeking nuclear capabilities, the Saudi Sunnis will likely seek to balance Persian power and curb the power of their own Shia communities.  The Kingdom is arguably the only Sunni state in the Middle East large, wealthy, and powerful enough to check Iran.  However, a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East is a treacherous way for such states to balance power.  Acknowledging the ethnic divides within Iraq is of utmost importance because of its implications on the future of Middle Eastern security.  Both the Saudis and Iranians may use Iraq as a proxy with each state exerting influence by supporting Sunni or Shia communities respectively.  The economic and political motivations of powerful regional states like Saudi Arabia and Iran will be masked by the religious divide.  In attempts to obtain political, economic, and social power within the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to invoke ethno-rel igious hatreds and fears to obtain their goals.  Increased propaganda will likely reinforce Sunni-Shia divisions where otherwise they may have gone unnoticed by common Middle Eastern communities. Policy prescriptions for the centuries-old conflict remain uncertain though not unattainable.  If the US and its European allies begin looking at the conflict from a state centric perspective rather than an ethno-religious viewpoint they may begin making headway in alleviating the civil strife between Sunni and Shia Muslims, especially in Iraq.  Re-directing US and European attention toward the powerful states of Iran and Saudi Arabia may be the most successful way to bring about stable relations between Sunnis and Shias.  Especially after the substantial withdrawal of Coalition troops from Iraq and the subsequent violence, it is apparent the problem cannot be solved without getting to the heart of the conflict which is being fueled by states like Iran and Saudi Arabia and political entrepreneurs within.  Only by addressing the political ambitions, power struggles, and use of ethno-religious divisions to mask personal and state interests of powerful Middle Eastern states will the Sunni-Shia divide finally fade.

U.S. presence can’t solve religious conflict—it is inevitable

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

 7) On Shiite-Sunni conflict. The US presence is not preventing Shiite-Sunni conflict; it merely delays it. Iran is preventing it today, and it will probably encourage it once the Shiites dominate the new government, an outcome US policy virtually ensures.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Civil War

Civil war is inevitable—troops can’t prevent it

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

1) On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis. Insurgents have killed far more Iraqis than Americans. That’s civil war. We created the civil war when we invaded; we can’t prevent a civil war by staying.    For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, re-establishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to knit together a large coalition including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China, and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until the United States withdraws from Iraq and admits its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Credibility

Withdrawal won’t hurt credibility—only a continuing the failed war could

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

2) On credibility. If we were Russia or some other insecure nation, we might have to worry about credibility. A hyperpower need not worry about credibility. That’s one of the great advantages of being a hyperpower: When we have made a big strategic mistake, we can reverse it. And it may even enhance our credibility. Staying there damages our credibility more than leaving.   Ask the president if he really worries about US credibility. Or, what will happen to our credibility if the course he is pursuing proves to be a major strategic disaster? Would it not be better for our long-term credibility to withdraw earlier than later in this event?

Not withdrawing would hurt US credibility

Jarrar 10 (Raed, The Progressive, May 25, <http://www.progressive.org/mpjarrar052510.html>) LL

President Obama should not bow to the Beltway voices urging him to keep U.S. troops longer in Iraq. At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, Obama said: “We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer.” His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be “flexible” and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Democracy

Democracy can’t be created in Iraq—multiple reasons

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

 3) On the insurgency and democracy. There is no question the insurgents and other anti-American parties will take over the government once we leave. But that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any government capable of holding power in Iraq will be anti-American, because the Iraqi people are increasingly becoming anti-American.   Also, the U.S. will not leave behind a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq no matter how long it stays. Holding elections is easy. It is impossible to make it a constitutional democracy in a hurry.   President Bush’s statements about progress in Iraq are increasingly resembling LBJ's statements during the Vietnam War. For instance, Johnson’s comments about the 1968 election are very similar to what Bush said in February 2005 after the election of a provisional parliament.   Ask the president: Why should we expect a different outcome in Iraq than in Vietnam?   Ask the president if he intends to leave a pro-American liberal regime in place. Because that’s just impossible.  Postwar Germany and Japan are not models for Iraq.  Each had mature (at least a full generation old) constitutional orders by the end of the 19th century.  They both endured as constitutional orders until the 1930s.  Thus General Clay and General MacArthur were merely reversing a decade and a half totalitarianism -- returning to nearly a century of liberal political change in Japan and a much longer period in Germany.   Imposing a liberal constitutional order in Iraq would be to accomplish something that has never been done before.  Of all the world's political cultures, an Arab-Muslim one may be the most resistant to such a change of any in the world. Even the Muslim society in Turkey (an anti-Arab society) stands out for being the only example of a constitutional order in an Islamic society, and even it backslides occasionally.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Terrorism

Only leaving Iraq will be able to limit terrorist recruiting in Iraq

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

4) On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground for terrorists. In fact, the CIA has pointed out to the administration and congress that Iraq is spawning so many terrorists that they are returning home to many other countries to further practice their skills there. The quicker a new dictator wins the political power in Iraq and imposes order, the sooner the country will stop producing well-experienced terrorists.   Why not ask: "Mr. President, since you and the vice president insisted that Saddam's Iraq supported al Qaeda -- which we now know it did not -- isn't your policy in Iraq today strengthening al Qaeda's position in that country?"

Withdrawal Good—A2: Iran

Iran influence inevitable—U.S. presence upholds it

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

5) On Iranian influence. Iranian leaders see US policy in Iraq as being so much in Teheran's interests that they have been advising Iraqi Shiite leaders to do exactly what the Americans ask them to do. Elections will allow the Shiites to take power legally. Once in charge, they can settle scores with the Baathists and Sunnis. If US policy in Iraq begins to undercut Iran's interests, then Teheran can use its growing influence among Iraqi Shiites to stir up trouble, possibly committing Shiite militias to an insurgency against US forces there. The US invasion has vastly increased Iran's influence in Iraq, not sealed it out.   Questions for the administration: "Why do the Iranians support our presence in Iraq today? Why do they tell the Shiite leaders to avoid a sectarian clash between Sunnis and Shiites? Given all the money and weapons they provide Shiite groups, why are they not stirring up more trouble for the US?  Will Iranian policy change once a Shiite majority has the reins of government? Would it not be better to pull out now rather than to continue our present course of weakening the Sunnis and Baathists, opening the way for a Shiite dictatorship?"

Withdrawal Good—A2: Middle East Stability

The Middle East is already unstable, and Iraq will inevitably draw in without withdrawal

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

6) On Iraq’s neighbors. The civil war we leave behind may well draw in Syria, Turkey and Iran.  But already today each of those states is deeply involved in support for or opposition to factions in the ongoing Iraqi civil war. The very act of invading Iraq almost insured that violence would involve the larger region. And so it has and will continue, with, or without, US forces in Iraq.

Withdrawal Good—A2: Iraq Defense Fails

Iraq defense force is capable—political instability is an alt cause

Odom 5(William, Retired Lieutenant General, August 3, “What’s Wrong with Cutting and Running?”, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=129, accessed 7/6/10)jn

 8) On training the Iraq military and police. The insurgents are fighting very effectively without US or European military advisors to train them. Why don't the soldiers and police in the present Iraqi regime's service do their duty as well?  Because they are uncertain about committing their lives to this regime. They are being asked to take a political stand, just as the insurgents are. Political consolidation, not military-technical consolidation, is the issue.   The issue is not military training; it is institutional loyalty. We trained the Vietnamese military effectively. Its generals took power and proved to be lousy politicians and poor fighters in the final showdown.  In many battles over a decade or more, South Vietnamese military units fought very well, defeating VC and NVA units. But South Vietnam's political leaders lost the war.   Even if we were able to successfully train an Iraqi military and police force, the likely result, after all that, would be another military dictatorship. Experience around the world teaches us that military dictatorships arise when the military’s institutional modernization gets ahead of political consolidation.

Withdrawal Good—Saudi Relations

Withdrawal helps U.S. Saudi relations

Korb and Wadhams 10(Lawrence, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and Caroline, Director of South Asian Security Studies at the Center for American Progress, May 19, “Perceptions of Security in the Arab Gulf Region”, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/arab\_gulf\_trip.html, accessed 7/6/10)jn

Saudi officials overall do not advocate for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq. They believe that the United States should live up to the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq and withdraw on schedule. They lament our invasion of Iraq, believe we handed Iraq to the Iranians on a platter, and worry about growing Iranian influence in Iraq following our withdrawal. And they argue that the world community needs to step in to help maintain unity in Iraq after the United States withdraws.

\*\*\*A2: Afghanistan Troop Shift

A2:Troop Shift—Alt Cause

Afghan war efforts inevitably fail absent efforts at regional diplomacy and government and infrastructure buildings

Feingold 8 (Russ, senator, 10/24, CSMonitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1024/p09s01-coop.html) my

Many of the biggest threats we face in Afghanistan emanate from across its long border with Pakistan. The US intelligence community concluded last year that Al Qaeda has "a safe haven in the Pakistani Federal Administered Tribal Areas. The Taliban also enjoys a haven in Pakistan from which it launches cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. No policy in Afghanistan will succeed without a change in our policy toward Pakistan, to one that encourages a sustained pursuit of Al Qaeda leadership as well as broad engagement with Pakistan's civilian institutions, its population, and civil society. We must also work with other key nations, such as Saudi Arabia and China. In late 2001, the Bush administration was able to bring all the regional players together to develop an internationally recognized, post-Taliban framework for Afghanistan. We should consider a similar high-level diplomatic initiative. The way forward requires a renewed strategy that has the support of Afghanistan's neighbors and stakeholders. In addition, we need to help build a more stable, more representative, less corrupt Afghan government. We cannot rely on a single leader while turning a blind eye to corruption and repression, as we did in Pakistan. The establishment of the rule of law and strong civil institutions is critical. Otherwise, Afghanistan may end up being devoured by parasitic warlords who hold sway over key ministries and impede critical reform. Afghanistan's massive opium production, and the involvement of prominent government officials in the narcotics business, are serious problems. So far, we have relied too much on poppy eradication, even though similar efforts have not been effective in other parts of the world. The US government should provide support for robust rural development programs, which provide alternative opportunities for farmers, thereby undermining the incentive to grow poppies. Finally, the US has yet to deliver on much of the development assistance it had planned for Afghanistan. Its infrastructure needs are immense, from decent hospitals to functioning schools and passable roads. Every day that those needs go unmet, more Afghan people may turn away from their own government and allow the Taliban to move in. In the long run, regional diplomacy, government reforms, and infrastructure development may be more important to Afghanistan's success – and to our own national security – than committing additional troops.

A2:Troop Shift—Alt Cause

Troop presence in Afghanistan will inevitably fail- Karzai, Afghan forces, civilian development and Pakistani sanctuaries preclude success

Tristam 9 (Pierre, journalist, http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/a/eikenberry-memo-afghanistan.htm) my

As President Obama spent the fall of 2009 debating whether to send additional troops to Afghanistan, the American ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, had one message for the president: don't. Sending more troops "on a large, all-or-nothing" mission might be useful in the short run to better control the country and reduce Taliban influence. But the gains would be temporary, and would aggravate greater problems than they'd solve--namely, the dependence on U.S. troops by the corrupt and unreliable government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. And recent history suggests there may not even be such short-term gains. "The last time we sent substantial additional forces--a deployment totaling 33,000 in 2008-2009--overall violence and instability in Afghanistan intensified," Eikenberry warned. Eikenberry was the commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for 18 months from 2006 to 2007. He's seen the country from the military and civilian angle. His two secret memos to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, written on Nov. 6 and Nov. 9, 2009, were published in full by The New York Times on Jan. 26, 2010. By then, Eikenberry claims he was in agreement with Obama's troop increase. But Eikenberry did not explain how the concerned he raised in November were resolved. Here are the main points of Eikenberry's two memos: Problems With Hamid Karzai Eikenberry is unequivocal about Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner." Karzai, in Eikenberry's analysis, wants to use American power to prop up his own. He's not interested in building a civil Afghan society. He's not interested in assuming the burdens of national security. He's not even interested in tackling his government's endemic corruption. He wants power and protection. "Sending more combat forces will only strengthen his misconceptions about why we are here," Eikenberry writes, leaving no room for hope that Karzai can change "this late in his life and in our relationship." The ambassador says Afghanistan itself is equally unprepared to develop into a functional nation when Afghans have no interest in national unity, when the country has few sources of revenue to build any institutions, and few means to deliver services to citizens. Increasing either military or civilian assistance will increase dependence, not develop the country, Eikenberry argues. Afghan Security Forces Are Overrated "We overestimate the ability of Afghan security forces to take over," Eikenberry writes. The goal is for Afghan forces to control their country by 2013. Eikenberry's conclusion: the goal is far-fetched. Karzai isn't doing anything to build up the forces. And "simply keeping the force at current levels requires tens of thousands of new recruits every year to replace attrition losses and battlefield casualties." Increasing foreign troops would steepen the problems with the Afghan army, not alleviate them, as the Afghan government would feel less urgency to maintain its own troop levels and the troops themselves would senses that, with a surge, foreign troops can do the dirty work and take the casualties instead. Challenges facing the national police are even stiffer because policemen are paid less and face higher risks as they reach into villages and districts where even the Afghan army won't go. Rather than increasing foreign troop levels, Eikenberry recommends paying police and army recruits more. Civilian Infrastructure Is Nonexistent Eikenberry is almost contemptuous of the attention given the military approach for being at the expense of more attention to civilian development. Even if the military approach scores some successes, civilian governance is the heart of the problem. Any progress on that score is bound to be slow and uneven--or worse, if it's left unattended. The military surge is doing just that--leaving the civilian sector unattended. When the American embassy in Kabul requested $2.5 billion for development and governance assistance last summer, the Obama administration rejected it--even as it prepared to increase military spending by $60 billion a year. "Progress on governance, anti-corruption, rule of law, and reconstruction will ultimately determine our success," Eikenberry writes, "but our coalition efforts will remain less than optimum unless a stronger civilian structure is created." The problem: There is no clear line of leadership on civilian development in Afghanistan, as there is on military leadership. The United States should assume leadership on both counts, Eikenberry recommends--a contradiction with his analysis that the more the United States takes on, the more dependent Afghans will be on the United States. Eikenberry leaves the contradiction unresolved. The Pakistan Problem For all the outlays of American military power in Afghanistan, "more troops won't end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain," Eikenberry writes. Those sanctuaries in Waziristan and in Balochistan are the source of Afghanistan's greatest instability. The Pakistani military's Waziristan assault has already withered. Pakistan never took on the sanctuaries in Balochistan. "As we contemplate greatly expanding our presence in Afghanistan, the better answer to our difficulties could well be to further ratchet up our engagement with Pakistan," Eikenberry writes, without explaining what he means.

A2:Troop Shift—Surge Good

War in Afghanistan fails unless we commit a substantial amount of forces- labor-intensive tasks welcome any new forces

Graham et al 9 (Lindsey, Joe Lieberman, independent senator, John McCain, 2008 Republican Presidential Candidate, 9/13, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203440104574404753110979442.html) my

However, we need more than the right team and the right strategy. This team must also have the resources it needs to succeed—including a significant increase in U.S. forces. More troops will not guarantee success in Afghanistan, but a failure to send them is a guarantee of failure. As we saw in Iraq, numbers matter in counterinsurgency. Protecting the population and developing capable indigenous security forces are inherently manpower-intensive endeavors. Moreover, in the absence of basic security, the other crucial components of successful counterinsurgency—fostering the emergence of effective, legitimate government and economic development—simply cannot get off the ground. We recognize that a decision to increase the number of American troops in Afghanistan will be politically difficult here at home. Some will say we can't afford it. Others will warn the president of "quagmire" and urge him to send either no new forces, or fewer than Gen. McChrystal recommends—perhaps with the promise of "re-evaluating" further deployments later on. It is precisely this middle path—which the previous administration pursued for too long in Iraq—that is a recipe for quagmire and collapse of political support for the war at home. Mr. Obama was right when he said last year that "You don't muddle through the central front on terror . . . You don't muddle through stamping out the Taliban." We have reached a seminal moment in our struggle against violent Islamist extremism, and we must commit the "decisive force" that Gen. McChrystal tells us carries the least risk of failure. We believe that the short-term political reaction from Congress to any increase in troop numbers, no matter how small or large, will be essentially the same. The key question is whether the increase is substantial enough to have a decisive effect on the course of the war within the next 12 to 18 months. If we are to send more of our brave men and women in uniform into harm's way, we should do so in a way that carries the greatest probability of success. In the interim, the president and his allies—and we count ourselves among them on this issue—must invest significantly greater effort to explain why, as the president recently put it, Afghanistan is a "war of necessity." Additional U.S. resources must be accompanied by significant and meaningful benchmarks that hold the government of Afghanistan and our own government accountable. We must ensure that Afghan leaders are doing their part to combat the corruption and insecurity that undermine the counterinsurgency effort.

A2:Troop Shift—Surge Good

Surge solves multiple alt causes- trains Afghan troops, provides civilian infrastructure, and supports Pakistan

Kaufman 9 (Stephen, staff writer, American.gov, 12/1, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/December/20091201205642esnamfuak0.7319147.html) my

The 30,000 additional U.S. troops will deploy in the first part of 2010 to reverse the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan and increase U.S. capacity to train Afghan security forces. “They will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans,” Obama said. The president gave the order for the deployment of the additional troops at a November 29 White House meeting with senior U.S. military officials. In July 2011, “our troops will begin to come home,” he said. Just as in Iraq, where U.S. combat brigades will depart at the end of summer 2010 and all troops will leave by the end of 2011, the security transition in Afghanistan will be executed responsibly, “taking into account conditions on the ground,” the president said. The United States will continue to provide advice and assistance to Afghanistan, but it will be clear to both the Afghan people and their government that “they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.” The second part of the U.S. effort will also include a “more effective civilian strategy” that will allow Afghan authorities to take advantage of security improvements. “This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over,” Obama said. The United States will support Afghan leaders at the national, provincial and local levels who “combat corruption and deliver for the people,” but “we expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable,” he said. U.S. civilian assistance will focus on areas such as agricultural development that can quickly affect the lives of the Afghan people, he said. The third element involves recognizing that success in Afghanistan is “inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.” In recent years, “it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism,” through attacks by militants living within their borders. “The United States and Pakistan share a common enemy,” Obama said, and the United States is committed not only to strengthening the country’s capacity to target extremist groups, but also to provide “substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development.” During her visit to Pakistan in October, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton outlined millions of dollars in U.S. assistance for Pakistan ranging from humanitarian, education and security assistance to microloans and a cellular-phone network. Obama assured the Pakistani people that “America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.”

\*\*\*SOFA Timeline Good

SOFA Good—Iraqi Leadership

Swift passage of the SOFA proves Iraqi leadership is stable and ready for US departure

Swopa 8 (11/28, Firedoglake, http://firedoglake.com/2008/11/28/what-does-passing-the-sofa-mean-for-iraq/) my

Yesterday, Attackerman wrote about the Iraqi legislature’s approval of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S., noting that the newly-promised public referendum in mid-2009 isn’t much of a concession by the Maliki government. Even if the referendum rejected the SOFA, the resulting "forced" one-year withdrawal would actually match the 16-month timeline proposed by Barack Obama (and endorsed by Maliki back in July). Could it be that the Iraqi regime — long thought to be a puppet entity that wouldn’t last more than a few seconds without American support — is really serious about this kicking-us-out stuff? I think they are. I wrote in July that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shiite religious parties he shepherded into power have intended since 2003 to "use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete." The relative ease with which the SOFA was passed, ignoring the Sadrists’ objections and buying the support of Sunni and secular parties with only token concessions, suggests that Maliki & Co. truly do have a plausible grasp on the political reins. (As Reidar Visser writes, "today’s package of legislation is sadly reminiscent of many of the deals that have been cut with the Maliki government since 2006: it bestows ample privileges on the Iraqi government in return for promises of reform that are both vague and without a clearly defined timeline.") Despite the dissatisfaction of nearly every other party with Maliki’s increasingly apparent authoritarian ambitions, he’s been able to keep them all sufficiently off balance, and suspicious of each others’ motives, that they can’t find a way to unite against him. Whether Maliki can protect himself militarily without U.S. troops is a much taller order, one that many observers see as overly ambitious. But that’s why it’s valuable to him to have the 16-month (or whatever) transition period in which American soldiers continue to help him entrench his power. And it’s just as important (if under-discussed) that the SOFA aids this process by placing the U.S. military in a subordinate role during the transition. Whereas earlier this year the Bushites could try to restrain Maliki by arresting members of his party/government for crimes, or establishing external sources of power such as the "Sons of Iraq" militias, the text of the SOFA eliminates that authority. It’s no coincidence that as the SOFA neared approval, Maliki has celebrated by firing American-installed oversight officials in government ministries

Following the SOFA sends a signal that Iraq’s government is ready to be independent

al-Oraibi 9 (Mina, journalist, RUSI, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4A4B2620A2286/) my

On their part, American officials have been stressing Iraq’s ability to take care of its own affairs. The Strategic Framework Agreement, the second agreement signed by the two countries along with the SOFA, is held up by American officials as the fundamental basis of relations between the two: one of mutual respect and interests, rather than military dominance. While Iraqi politicians in positions of power in Baghdad owe much to American support, both sides are keen to highlight the increased independence of Iraq’s rulers. Iraq standing on its own feet is vital for the new American administration under the leadership of President Barak Obama. It is clear that the Obama administration sees Afghanistan as the bigger challenge, the more smoothly the transition over the next months in Iraq, the more the focus on Afghanistan will be. By September 2010, American combat troops will leave Iraq, with an end-goal of all troops out of Iraq by December 2011, as dictated by the SOFA. However, Washington must not repeat the mistakes of the past, when a relatively stable Afghanistan in 2002-2003 was abandoned to deal with Iraq, the reverse must not be repeated. A relatively less volatile Iraq is not in itself a mark of success for the United States. The balance between military withdrawal and political investment for stability will be one of the main tests for both Baghdad and Washington.

SOFA Good—Iraqi Leadership

Iraqi leadership supports withdrawal

Lynch 10 (Marc, professor of political science and international relations, Foreign Policy, 2/23, http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/23/iraq\_contingencies) my

There's been a mini-boom of late in commentary urging Obama to delay his timeline for drawing down U.S. forces, or at least to "do more" -- the Kagans are shocked, shocked to discover that Iranians are influential in Iraq, Jackson Diehl just wants Obama to care more about Iraq (without any hint of what policies might follow). They should be ignored. The administration is handling Iraq calmly, maturely, and patiently, has demonstrated in word and deed its commitment to its drawdown policy, and has tried hard to thread a devilish needle of trying to shape events without triggering an extremely potent Iraqi backlash. It is possible, if not likely, that there could be slippage on the August deadline of getting to 50,000 troops, mainly because the elections slipped all the way to March. That's one of the reasons I always was skeptical of pegging the drawdown to the elections, but that ship has long since sailed. But the SOFA target of December 2011 for a full U.S. withdrawal is a legal deadline, not a political one. It could only be changed at the request of the Iraqi government, and not by American fiat. While Iraqi politicians may say in private that they may be open to a longer U.S. presence, very few will say so in public -- because it would be political suicide in a nationalist, highly charged electoral environment. The drawdown will probably matter considerably less than people expect. With the new SOFA-defined rules of engagement, U.S. forces have already stopped doing many of the things associated with the "surge." The Iraqi response to American efforts on the de-Baathification circus demonstrate painfully clearly that the nearly 100,000 troops still in Iraq gave very little leverage on an issue which the U.S. at least publicly deemed vital -- a point made very effectively by Ambassador Hill at the Council on Foreign Relations last week. The sharp backlash against even the measured criticisms by U.S. officials offers an important lesson: Doing the sorts of assertive things which may please Obama's critics are highly likely to spark a negative reaction among Iraqis, generating more hostility to the U.S. role without actually accomplishing anything. The U.S. is wise to avoid them. That doesn't mean that things are rosy. The de-Baathification circus has demonstrated the fragility of Iraqi institutions, and helped to reignite sectarian resentments and fears (many Sunnis feel targeted, while many Shia are being treated to an endless barrage of anti-Ba'athist electoral propaganda). There's very much a risk of long, drawn-out coalition talks after the election. It isn't certain how a transition from power will go, should Maliki's list lose, given the prime minister's efforts to centralize power in his office over the last few years. There may well be a spike in violence by frustrated losers in the elections. If there's massive fraud on election day, things could get ugly. The elections, already marred by the de-Baathification fiasco, may well end up producing a new Parliament and government which doesn't really change much. There are big, long-deferred issues to confront after the elections, such as the Article 140 referendum over Kirkuk. But none of those issues would be resolved by an American effort to delay its military drawdown. They generally fall into the "sub-optimal" rather than the "catastrophic" category. An American decision to delay the drawdown would not likely be welcomed by Iraqis in the current political environment. Nor would it generate more leverage for the U.S. over internal Iraqi affairs. Iraq's future is not really about us, if it ever was -- not a function of American military levels, commitment, or caring, but rather of internal Iraqi power struggles and dynamics.

Continued US presence undermines the Iraqi government

Jarrar and Leaver 10 (Raed, fellow at Middle East at Peace Action, and Erik, fellow at Institute for Policy Studies, 3/2, http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding\_backwards\_on\_iraq) my

Flying in the face of these consistent messages of assurance by the White House and Congress, Odierno's statement has harmed the president's credibility in Iraq and caused the first major storm of criticism inside the country since Obama's election in 2008. The Iraqi media has been overwhelmed with political statements, analysis, and press releases condemning the possible prolongation of the U.S. occupation. In one statement, MP Omar Al-Jubouri, a Sunni from the National Iraqi Coalition, rejected the attempts to change the withdrawal plans, telling the Nina News Agency that while he "acknowledges the troubled administrative and security situation," he still "holds the U.S. forces responsible" for the deterioration. In another statement, covered by Al-Sabaah newspaper, MP Jamal Jaafar, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, argued that prolonging the U.S. presence "will cause more tension" among Iraqis. Jaafar also stated that the United States must "get an approval from the Iraqi government" if it was planning to leave even "one single soldier in Iraq beyond the withdrawal deadline included in the bilateral security agreement." MP Abdul-Karim As-Sameraie, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, criticized the attempt to change the withdrawal plans and asked again for a public referendum on the bilateral security agreement. Such a measure could result in the cancellation of the agreement, potentially leading to an earlier U.S. withdrawal or having troops operate in Iraq without international legal safeguards.

SOFA Good—Iraqi Leadership K2 Solve

Stable Iraqi government includes all factions- prevents future insurgencies

VOA 6/4 (Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Odierno-Iraq-Moves-Toward-Stability-US-Drawdown-on-Track-95646044.html) my

General Odierno says in addition to security, the other key to long-term stability in Iraq is politics. He called the certification of the election results a very important step, and also said he is pleased with talk of forming a government that includes all political factions. "Most of the security issues will come from what spawns out of the political realm," said Odierno. "That's why it's important to have a unity government. We don't want to see any group that feels it's been disenfranchised and even contemplates moving back to an insurgency." General Odierno also says Iran appears to have changed its strategy in Iraq in a way that contributes to the reduction in violence, but still seeks to gain influence. "They clearly moved away from a heavy lethal strategy to one that involves some lethal, and then some non-lethal, trying to almost gain monopolies in some economic areas as well as through heavy diplomatic and security collection influence inside of Iraq," he said. "So they're still doing it, but at a lower level."

Infighting over the government undermines support for democracy and ignites ethnic violence

Henne 10 (Peter, Security Fellow, Truman National Security Project, Huffington Post, 4/26, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-henne/supporting-allawi-and-sta\_b\_548222.html) my

While Americans want out of Iraq, the stability of the country is far from assured, and reignited ethnic violence in that country can harm both US interests and the American conscience. The best course for the United States to take may be to fully support the outcome of the parliamentary elections, including its winner, Iyad Allawi. As I argued recently, the recent parliamentary elections represented a significant milestone in Iraq's democratic development. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's secular coalition -- which many Sunnis supported -- won a plurality of votes, claiming victory. He beat out incumbent Nouri al-Maliki's coalition of Shia groups, and the more radical Shia bloc of Moqtada al-Sadr. Because no side gained a clear majority, difficult negotiations among the factions are needed before a new government is formed. Yet, al-Maliki has hesitated in accepting Allawi's victory. Al-Maliki ominously pointed out that he remains the commander of Iraq's military, and accused Allawi of fraud. Also, he convinced Iraq's Supreme Court to allow him -- instead of Allawi -- to set up the next government. And there have been continuing moves to disqualify some candidates in Allawi's bloc for reputed Baathist ties, which could erase his lead. In addition to this, al-Maliki has been negotiating with al-Sadr to merge their blocs, which would yield a majority. If al-Maliki succeeds in holding on to power, the results could be disastrous. If he does so through extra-democratic means -- such as a coup (even a soft one) or disqualifying members of Allawi's coalition -- it could undermine the viability of Iraqi democracy and set the stage for a return to dictatorship. Even if he wins through an alliance with al-Sadr, ignoring the outcome of an election could degrade voters' confidence in the system. More troublesome, though, would be the possibility of ethnic strife. Allawi's Sunni supporters hoped to balance the perceived Shia favoritism of al-Maliki through their votes. If Allawi were to be passed over for Prime Minister in favor of al-Maliki, this would -- at best -- lead to greater cynicism among Sunnis concerning the electoral process, with decreased participation. At worst it could lead to renewed Sunni-Shia violence.

SOFA Good—Laundry List

Strong Iraqi government key to restarting economy, civil services, corruption reform, and stable international relations

Sumaida'ie 9 (Samir, ambassador of Iraq to the US, Seattle Times, 12/6, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2010428201\_guest07sumaidaie.html) my

The next challenge after that will be forming the new government. Again, at the end it will be formed. Iraqis have demonstrated their ability to find working compromises sometimes past the 11th hour in situations that looked very bleak, politically. The new government will face a daunting list of urgent tasks. Political stability and security have to be enhanced and consolidated. The economy has to be activated by a wide combination of measures designed to improve the business and investment environment. The government will need to urgently improve services to its citizens, combat corruption and tame its burgeoning bureaucracy. Easier said than done. The legacy from decades of war, mismanagement and organized looting has driven many of the qualified leaders in management and other professions out of the country. This has left the rest of the population traumatized, brutalized and prone to corruption and many other social and political diseases. In the regional and international arenas, Iraq needs to get out from under the United Nations sanctions imposed in 1991 by the U.N. Security Council against Saddam Hussein's regime, and which are now unjustifiable anachronisms. Iraq will need to continue its current foreign policy of establishing a working relationship with all its neighbors while insisting on noninterference in its internal affairs as well as playing a positive and active role as a responsible member of the family of nations. One might say that all this is one tall order. But it has to be done. The Iraqi government will have to rely on steady incremental and accelerating improvements in its oil-production levels, its economy, its rate of return of refugees, particularly qualified people who had fled the violence, and above all, a more conducive political climate based on a national consensus born of reconciliation. If things go well, it will be good for the Iraqi people and good for the United States. American troops will be able to return home with honor and on schedule and the relationship between our countries will continue to move away from security and toward economic, diplomatic, cultural and educational cooperation, as envisioned by the Strategic Framework Agreement signed in November 2008.

Iraqi instability spreads through the Middle East and escalates to nuclear war

Center for Global Affairs 7 (Spring, http://www.scps.nyu.edu/export/sites/scps/pdf/global-affairs/iraq-2010-scenarios.pdf) my

Iraq has descended into outright civil war. Instability spreads throughout the Middle East. The regional players, competing and insecure, fail to cooperate on matters of defense and counter-terrorism and prove unable to contain the fighting within Iraq. While U.S. pressure and the limited military capacity of local actors have succeeded in preventing all-out regional conflict between Sunni and Shia-led states, the proxy war fought on Iraqi territory (Scenario Two) spreads to adjoining states through refugee flows, growing radicalization of Arab populations, escalating non-state terrorism, and the deliberate efforts of regional rivals to destabilize each others’ governments. Existing regimes in the region cling to power, but with insufficient domestic political support or acquiescence to create coalitions and pursue effective balance of power strategies necessary to contain the Iraq civil war. Because their appetite for direct state-to-state conflict is limited, many regimes use substate actors to strike at their enemies. Regional rivalries flare up as various players vie for influence and control. Radicalization of Arab populations increases as sectarian strife radiates from Iraq. In these circumstances, unforeseen events—such as an Iranian-style revolution in a major Arab country—could radically alter the political landscape and reorder foreign policy priorities in the region. Events could easily globalize this regional conflagration. A serious disruption to the oil supply, as the result of an attack on an important oil installation in the Gulf, is a likelihood in this scenario. Such an attack could come in various guises. Terrorists might target the energy infrastructure, with the U.S. retaliating against Iran as a target. The U.S. or Israel could also react to any number of Iranian provocations, including its imminent (by 2010) development of nuclear weapons, leading toward a major war.

SOFA Good—Public Opinion

Public opinion is calling for US withdrawal

Guardian 8 (10/15, Buzzle.com, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/230014.html) my

"The withdrawal is to be achieved in three years," Dabbagh said. "In 2011 the government at that time will determine whether it needs a new pact or not. What type of pact will depend on the challenges it faces." Dabbagh indicated US troops and Pentagon contractors would be subject to US law while on base or while conducting off-base "military missions" - a potentially catch-all definition since US forces rarely venture off base. But he added that "Iraqi judicial law will be implemented in case these forces commit a serious and deliberate felony outside their military bases and when off-duty". In such instances, American offenders would be held in US custody but could be surrendered to the Iraqi authorities for questioning and possible trial. A series of incidents allegedly involving US forces and Pentagon employees which led to the death of Iraqi civilians and, in one case, the alleged rape of a 14-year-old girl, has outraged public opinion and added to pressure for tougher rules. Officials in Washington confirmed yesterday that a compromise on prosecutions and a withdrawal date had been reached but urged caution. "There is a text that people are looking at," a state department spokesman said. "Nothing is done until everything is done. Everything isn't done." The draft agreement, if implemented, would also prevent the US military from continuing to hold Iraqi suspects without charging them with crimes under Iraqi law. At present the majority of the 18,000 people held by coalition forces have not been charged with any offense. British soldiers serving in Iraq are likely to be subject to the new rules from next year. Asked this week about the future status of British forces, the Ministry of defense said: "Our requirements are very similar to those of the US. We intend to use the Iraqi/US text as the basis of our agreement." The mooted deal comes against a backdrop of growing pressure from Iraqi public opinion and from Iraq's powerful majority Shia neighbor, Iran, for the departure of US and other foreign forces. Iraq's nationalist prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has moved successfully in recent months to assert army and police control over areas such as Basra, although levels of violence have been rising again in recent weeks

Public support is against US presence

Hussein 9 (Safa A., member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council, Common Ground News Service, 7/15, http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=25882&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0) my

The Kurdistan Region's constitution that was passed recently by the Kurdish parliament may add to these tensions. US forces had been playing a role in easing them by encouraging dialogue to try and bridge differences. This role should now be transferred to the US embassy with the resources necessary to accomplish it. Implementation of the security agreement and the withdrawal of American troops also present new opportunities to the Iraqi government. Iraqi public opinion generally sees the United States as an occupying power and wants it and other coalition forces to leave as soon as possible. Various militant groups have exploited the slogan, "resisting the occupiers" in their struggle for power.

SOFA Good—Public Opinion

Iraqi public hates further US involvement- huge demonstration

USA Today 8 (10/18, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-10-18-iraq-protests\_N.htm) my

Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Saturday called on Iraq's parliament to reject a U.S.-Iraqi security pact as tens of thousands of his followers rallied in Baghdad against the deal. The mass public show of opposition came as U.S. and Iraqi leaders face a Dec. 31 deadline to agree on the deal to replace an expiring U.N. mandate authorizing the U.S.-led forces in Iraq. Al-Sadr's message was addressed to the crowd as well Iraqi lawmakers and read by his aide Sheik Abdul-Hadi al-Mohammadawi in Baghdad before a huge crowd of mostly young men waving Iraqi and green Shiite flags and chanting slogans including "no, no to the agreement" and "yes to Iraq." "The Iraqi government has abandoned its duty before God and its people and referred the agreement to you knowing that ratifying it will stigmatize Iraq and its government for years to come," he said. "I am with every Sunni, Shiite or Christian who is opposed to the agreement ... and I reject, condemn and renounce the presence of occupying forces and basis on our beloved land," the message added. Al-Sadr, who is living in Iran, also cast doubt on the Iraqi government's argument that the security pact is a step toward ending the U.S. presence in Iraq. The deal would require U.S. forces to leave by Dec. 31, 2011 unless Iraq asked some of them to stay. "If they tell you that the agreement ends the presence of the occupation, let me tell you that the occupier will retain its bases. And whoever tells you that it gives us sovereignty is a liar," al-Sadr's message said. "I am confident that you brothers in parliament will champion the will of the people over that of the occupier ... Do not betray the people." The demonstrators marched from the main Shiite district of Sadr City to the more central Mustansiriyah Square in eastern Baghdad. "No, No to America," shouted one man, wearing a white Islamic robe as he sat in a wheelchair and clutched a poster of the Iraqi flag. "We prefer death to giving concessions." One banner in English said "We refuse the existence of the U.S. in Iraq." Organizers insisted the turnout for the demonstrations exceeded 1 million, but Associated Press reporters and photographers at the scene said the crowd was in the tens of thousands. Police had no estimates of their own. "This demonstration is our response to the agreement," said Nasser al-Saadi, one of 30 Sadrist lawmakers. "It is also meant to demand a popular referendum on the agreement."

70% of Iraqi public wants the US out

Stoner 9 (Eric, professor and freelance journalist, 1/6, Commondreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/01/06-6) my

A March 2008 poll by Opinion Business Research found that 70% of Iraqis wanted foreign troops to leave. Of that group, 65% said they wanted the troops to leave "immediately or as soon as possible," and another 13% responded "within six months." Such sentiment has remained fairly consistent since shortly after the U.S. invasion. In April 2004, for example, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll found that 57% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. and British forces to "leave immediately." Obama has repeatedly pledged to "responsibly end the war in Iraq," convincing many of his supporters who didn't dig beneath the campaign rhetoric that he was the "peace candidate." Obama's plan from the beginning, however, has consisted of withdrawing only the "combat brigades" over a 16-month period and leaving behind a "residual force in Iraq [that] would perform limited missions: going after any remnants of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, protecting American service members and, so long as the Iraqis make political progress, training Iraqi security forces."

Prolonged presence signals broken promises and ensures future entrenchment

Jarrar 10 (Raed, fellow at Middle East at Peace Action, 5/25, The Progressive, http://www.progressive.org/mpjarrar052510.html) my

While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation.

SOFA Good—Public Opinion K2 Solve

Public opinion key to success in Iraq- negative public hinders the government and impedes counterinsurgency efforts

Kull 8 (Steven, Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), 6/23, World Public Opinion.org, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/517.php) my

Thank you for inviting me to speak. Today I will be addressing the question of how the Iraqi people view the presence of US troops in Iraq and, more importantly, what they want to see happen in the future. As I will demonstrate, the Iraqi people are showing signs of impatience with the pace of US withdrawal. Now one may ask why this matters. Obviously the Iraqi people will not be negotiating the agreements about US forces in Iraq. As long as the government wants US troops there, one may believe that it does not matter what the Iraqi public thinks. However, it does appear that the Iraqi government is paying attention to the Iraqi public. As you probably know, 144 of the 275 members of Parliament signed a letter calling for a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops, citing as a key reason the attitudes of the Iraqi people. This call for a timetable was then reiterated in the June 3rd letter presented to the US Congress from representatives of the Iraqi Parliament. Just in the last few days Prime Minister Maliki has been increasingly aligning himself with this public pressure. This may well be influenced by the prospect of upcoming elections. Thus, if the US government wishes to play a constructive role in the future of Iraq it behooves us to understand better the dynamics of public opinion and thus the forces of the political universe within which Iraqi leaders are operating. Furthermore, Iraqis' attitudes about US forces are likely to affect their readiness to cooperate with coalition efforts to fight the insurgency, or even their readiness to support the insurgency. There is evidence that many Iraqis do support attacks on US troops and that this attitude is related to perceptions of US long-term intentions in Iraq. Thus dealing with these perceptions is critical to the success of the mission.

Withdrawal undermines public support for violent attacks and puts Iraq on the path to stability

Young 8 (Kevin, doctoral student in Latin American history, Z Magazine, March, http://www.zcommunications.org/the-effect-of-the-u-s-occupation-of-iraq-by-kevin-young) my

For those of us who are U.S. citizens and who therefore bear at least partial responsibility for our government's actions overseas, two points should stand out regarding the current situation in Iraq: (1) the U.S. presence causes more violence and conflict than it prevents, even taking into account the Fall 2007 decrease in violence, and (2) the Iraqi people want a near-term withdrawal of U.S. forces and bases from their country. All policies, political platforms, and activist actions which are motivated by genuine concern for the future of the Iraqi people must take these two realities as their starting points. The other major consideration that U.S. citizens understandably take into account—the well-being of U.S. soldiers—presents no contradiction with these arguments, since U.S. soldiers share the Iraqis' interest in a near-term U.S. withdrawal; soldiers in Iraq have expressed as much in polls. An immediate or near-term withdrawal of U.S. forces, which is the only moral and logical action for the U.S. at this point, is certainly not going to bring a magical end to all of Iraq's problems. No knowledgeable observer would suggest that violent conflict will simply disappear once the U.S. leaves. Still, a U.S. departure will eliminate the primary justification for the violence among Iraqis, significantly eroding popular support for violent attacks and providing Iraq with, at the very least, a chance to heal its internal wounds and rebuild a stable society. Support for a full military withdrawal is therefore the best option available. Other U.S. actions would have to follow, such as working in good faith with Iraq's neighbors in the Middle East to help reduce violence, providing massive humanitarian and economic reparations for the devastation that the invasion and subsequent violence have caused, and opening the political system to meaningful grassroots participation so that Iraqis can decide the future of their country. U.S. withdrawal is no panacea, but it is a necessary first step in what is sure to be a long, painful recovery for the Iraqi people.

SOFA Good—**Public Opinion K2 Solve**

Recent elections prove citizens have some political power- means they check the politicians

ICOS 8 (International Council on Security and Development, international policy think tank, http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/iraq\_angry\_hearts/realities) my

Giving voice to the Iraqi people: Policies to reflect public aspirations In the context of Iraq’s multifaceted challenges and rising public disillusionment, it is vital that national and international policies curb the spread of extremists’ influence and at last make a real contribution to winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Formulating policies consonant with the needs and ambitions of the Iraqi people would contribute significantly to the country’s unity, stability and prosperity. In turn, this will foster confidence and a closer partnership with members of the international community. With the support of the international community, Iraqis should take the lead in their country’s decision and peace-making processes. Giving voice to the Iraqi people and allowing them to have greater stake in decisions and actions directly affecting their lives and their country’s future is an integral component of a functioning and stable democratic state. Formerly a highly centralised state with limited representation or accountability at the local level, the Iraqi government is now faced with an immense challenge: to develop a bottomup approach, empower provincial bodies and be responsive to their needs and aspirations. Holding free, countrywide elections is central to building grassroots democracy and providing the foundations for national unity and stability. Iraqi provincial elections will be held on 1 October 2008, while national parliamentary elections are expected to be held in late 2009 or early 2010. In preparation for the parliamentary elections, in May 2008, the Iraqi cabinet issued instructions to the planning ministry to make the census account for the Iraqi people before September 2009, in time for the parliamentary elections. The last census held in Iraq was in 1997, but it did not include the Kurdistan region or Iraqis living abroad. The empowerment of Iraq’s civil society is central to building local capacities and developing a representative, functioning state. Civil society organisations are a well-suited means of promoting grassroots participation and represent a platform for Iraqis to express their concerns and influence decisions and activities. Notably, Iraq has a growing civil society with more than 2,500 registered NGOs. In addition, over 250 newspapers and magazines have been launched since 2003. Certainly, these efforts need to be further supported by the political leadership of Iraq as well as the international community. A strong civil society, social and gender quality, and a free and vibrant press are all vital instruments in promoting security and stability in Iraq.

SOFA Good—US Credibility

Following the SOFA gives Obama a graceful exit out of Iraq and improves credibility

Milne 8 (Seumas, staff writer, The Guardian, 10/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/11/iraq-withdrawal-comment-debate) my

In the case of Britain, which marched into a sovereign state at the bidding of an extreme and reckless US administration, the war has been a national disgrace which has damaged the country's international standing. Britain's armed forces will withdraw from Iraq with dishonour. Not only were they driven from Basra city last summer under cover of darkness by determined resistance, just as British colonial troops were forced out of Aden 40 years ago - and Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places, before that. But they leave behind them an accumulation of evidence of prisoner beatings, torture and killings, for which only one low-ranking soldier, Corporal Payne, has so far been singled out for punishment. It's necessary to spell out this brutal reality as a corrective to the official tendency to minimise or normalise the horror of what has evidently been a criminal enterprise - enthusiastically supported by David Cameron and William Hague, it should be remembered, as well as Tony Blair and his government - and a reminder of the dangers of escalating the war that can't be won in Afghanistan. It was probably just as well that the timetable for British withdrawal from Iraq was given in a background military briefing, after Gordon Brown's earlier schedule for troop reductions was vetoed by George Bush. But in any case, in the wake of Barack Obama's election on a partial withdrawal ticket, the latest plans look a good deal more credible. They are also welcome, of course, even if several hundred troops are to stay behind to train Iraqis. It would be far better both for Britain and Iraq if there were a clean break and a full withdrawal of all British forces in preparation for a comprehensive public inquiry into the Iraq catastrophe. Instead, and in a pointer to the shape of things to come, British troops at Basra airport are being replaced by US forces. Meanwhile, the real meaning of last month's security agreement between the US and Iraqi governments is becoming clearer, as Obama's administration-in-waiting briefs the press and officials highlight the small print. This "status of forces agreement", which replaces the UN's shotgun mandate for the occupation forces at the end of this month, had been hailed by some as an unequivocal deal to end the occupation within three years.

Reneging on withdrawal destroys Obama’s credibility and hurts the US’s image

Jarrar and Leaver 10 (Raed, fellow at Middle East at Peace Action, and Erik, fellow at Institute for Policy Studies, 3/2, http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding\_backwards\_on\_iraq) my

An Obama flip-flop on the timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops would have serious consequences in the United States and Iraq. The U.S. global image will be tarnished, Obama's credibility will be called into question, and the administration will likely lose what little global political capital it gained in the last year. But reneging on withdrawal would have the gravest consequences in Iraq. The Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan. The mantra was "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But such plans for "condition-based" withdrawal create the very deteriorating conditions that lead to an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, there is considerable support both inside and outside Iraq for the continuation of U.S. occupation. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that takes an enormous toll on human lives, money, and global reputation. And Iran and other regional players fear the reemergence of a strong, independent, and united Iraq.

SOFA Good—US Credibility

Delayed withdrawal is the death blow to US credibility and emboldens insurgency efforts

Jarrar 10 (Raed, fellow at Middle East at Peace Action, 5/25, The Progressive, http://www.progressive.org/mpjarrar052510.html) my

Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one.

SOFA Good—Credibility Prevents Chinese Influence

Waning US credibility in Iraq encourage China to strengthen its Middle Eastern ties over oil competition

Wehrey 10 (Frederic, policy analyst at RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf) my

Despite the fact that the United States retains its status as the balancer of choice in the Middle East, the erosion of U.S. credibility and influence has created an opportunity for growing extraregional activism, even if such activism has to date largely complemented rather than supplanted the U.S. regional role. The following sections further assess the extent and nature of extraregional involvement in the Middle East in the years following the Iraq War. China Chinese Prospects in the Gulf. China’s recent engagement in the Gulf has largely been driven by its status as a “stakeholder state” favoring regime stability.10 That is to say, given the importance of China’s economic growth as the source of its emerging power, China is heavily invested in promoting the stability conducive to the flow of Chinese exports to the region, as well as to the import of Middle Eastern oil and gas to China. However, the precariousness of regional security in light of the repercussions of the war in Iraq creates both challenges the region. Specifically, the disruption of Iraqi oil supplies is leading China to strengthen its relationships with other producers, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, the U.S. entanglement in Iraq and the move of some Gulf States to hedge against an erosion of American power by diversifying their security alliances creates opportunities for China to expand its influence in the Gulf. However, while China has sought to expand its footprint in the region and become more proactive in ensuring its access to Middle East markets and share of the region’s oil and gas, this expansion of China’s role in regional affairs is likely to proceed gradually and remain focused on the economic dimension. The Chinese-Saudi Dimension. Violence in Iraq has thwarted Chinese ambitions to maximize oil potential there, and while it is pushing for major oil deals with the new Iraqi government, its biggest focus on the Arab side of the Gulf is Saudi Arabia. From China’s vantage point, the calculus is simple: As the world’s largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia is a natural provider of China’s energy needs. The benefit is equally clear for Saudi Arabia: The Iraq War underscores the risk of reliance on a single power for maintaining regional security. Saudi Arabia is therefore keen to strengthen its relationships with other powers that can be employed to reinforce the kingdom’s security in a dangerous neighborhood. Ambassador Chas Freeman describes the underlying logic this way: What do the Arabs and Chinese see in each other? Quite a bit. The Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology, abandon their way of life, or make other choices they’d rather avoid. They see a country that is far away and has no imperial agenda in their region, but which is internationally influential and likely in time to be militarily powerful. (Freeman, 2006) In short, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states view China as a stable market for their oil and gas resources and a potential check on the use of force in the region but not an alternative to the U.S.-led regional security order. Alterman and Garver, 2008, p. 57, have observed that China cannot supplant the United States in the Middle East as a military power, lacking anything close to the requisite military might. Yet, Middle Eastern countries can use a relationship to China to supplement the bilateral relations with the United States and perhaps give those countries the freedom of greater distance from Washington. Put another way, China provides the Gulf states with an opportunity to reduce their dependence on the United States as the sole heavyweight in the region. By any measure, China’s ties in the Middle East are growing. In 2006, King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Hu Jintao of China exchanged visits. ‘Abdullah’s visit was the first by a Saudi head of state since China and Saudi Arabia established formal diplomatic relations in 1990. This historic step culminated in an offer from Saudi Arabia to build and operate a strategic oil reserve in China that would hold 100 million barrels of oil, roughly 10 days’ worth of Saudi oil output (Georgi, 2006). While there is nothing suspicious about China’s pursuit of Saudi oil, there is concern that China’s demand for Gulf oil may lead to an intensification of American-Chinese energy competition.

SOFA Good—Stable

Elections stable- US can withdraw on the SOFA timeline

Lynch 10 (Marc, professor of political science and international relations, Foreign Policy, 3/25, http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/25/iraqs\_moment\_of\_truth?obref=obnetwork) my

For the United States, which still has over 90,000 troops in the country, the elections have been set up as a crucial turning point before the large scale withdrawal of forces can begin. But the electoral experience has only highlighted the essential irrelevance of the United States to unfolding events. The American military presence provided Washington little influence over Iraq’s turbulent politics. The dozens of lists and parties competing for seats in the Iraqi parliament spent much of the campaign competing with one another to be the loudest advocates of Iraqi nationalism and sovereignty. When American officials tentatively intervened in the de-Baathification fiasco, Iraqi politicians turned America’s carefully modulated complaints into political dynamite, rushing to loudly denounce foreign interference in Iraqi affairs. It was not an edifying sight to see leading Iraqi politicians declaring General David Petraeus a “Baathist” and General Raymond Odierno, the commander of US forces, openly accusing them in turn of being Iranian pawns. The United States structured its drawdown in order to keep the maximum number of troops in Iraq until after the elections – a schedule touted as a necessity to provide security. But American troops largely stayed out of the way as Iraqis went to the polls: Iraqi security forces and election officials took the lead. The US army’s main role was, and remains, as a security blanket – available to restore the peace as a last resort, or perhaps to stand guard against a possible coup or enforce a peaceful transfer of power if al Maliki refuses to leave office. American analysts, who have a difficult time imagining an Iraq without a large-scale US military presence, are anxiously scanning the political landscape in search of a reason why the United States cannot possibly withdraw its troops. But they miss the wider picture of an Iraqi public which no longer wants or needs their supposedly stabilising role. Whatever the private feelings of Iraqi leaders – many of whom may well fear for their political obsolescence, if not their physical safety, after American troops depart – the electoral campaign has made clear the strong nationalist current in Iraqi politics. No request for an extension of the US presence or a renegotiation of the agreement dictating troops depart by the end of 2012 is likely to be forthcoming.

\*\*\*SOFA Timeline Bad

SOFA Timeline Bad – Civil War

Obama’s planned withdrawal could result in violence, civil war, economic downturn, and regional instability

Ricks 10 (Thomas, member of Center for a New American Security: defense policy think tank and member of Harvard’s Sr Advisory Council on US Civil-Military Relations, Feb 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>) LL

Iraq’s March 7 national election, and the formation of a new government that will follow, carry huge implications for both Iraqis and American policy. It appears now that the results are unlikely to resolve key political struggles that could return the country to sectarianism and violence. If so, President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue. Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, 2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, this is likely the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq. The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well, having spent years working there. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions. The Bush administration’s grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded. By June, American troops may be leaving areas that are far from quiet, and where new tensions may be brewing as a result of the elections. Once again, the United States would be rushing toward failure in Iraq, as it did so often under the Bush administration, trying to pass responsibility to Iraqi officials and institutions before they are ready for the task. By late summer, the Obama administration could find itself in the uncomfortable position of reconsidering its vows to get out of combat in Iraq by August and to remove all troops by the end of next year. This will be politically difficult for the president, but he has shown admirable flexibility in his handling of Iraq. My impression is that the American people now wish they had never heard of Iraq, but understand just what a mess it is and are willing to give the president a surprising amount of leeway. Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it

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SOFA Timeline Bad – Civil War

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 might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild. In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them.

SOFA provisions for withdrawal could allow civil war to erupt

Younes 10 (Ali, Middle East Views, Mar 5, <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/03/05/102239.html>) LL

Another factor in Anderson’s prediction is that the Iraqi Army is the most trusted institution in Iraq now, and most Iraqis he talked to, think that the return of one man rule or a dictatorship is inevitable. This belief resonates within the halls of the White House, which will face its reality-check in the aftermath of the elections as the drawdown of troops near as agreed upon in the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA agreement stipulates that by 1 September of 2010 nearly 50,000 troops should leave Iraq, and by the end of 2011, all of the U.S. troops should be out of Iraq completely. In order to prevent an apocalyptic scenario in Iraq, Col. Anderson suggests that the U.S. should keep a permanent combat troop presence in the country in order to prevent a civil war between the different Shia factions, or Sunni vs. Shia or Arabs vs. Kurds. Col. Anderson dire predictions were echoed by General Raymond Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, who, while in Washington most recently, had asked the White House for brigade level troops to keep the peace in the city of Kirkuk which is potential hot spot between Arab and Kurds. General Odierno main concern is stability of Iraq after the election and the role Iran plays in Iraq. Gen. Odierno believes that Iran is playing a subversive role in Iraq which undermines the country’s long term stability. During a talk at the Army and Navy club in Washington last month, Gen. Odierno said “Iran clearly has a strategy that goes across lethal aims, diplomatic aims and then soft-power aims — i.e., influencing people through investment in the economy” Gen. Odierno added that “We still uncover Iranian rockets and other goods that are made, and individuals that are trained, in Iran to conduct attacks against both U.S. and Iraqi security forces.” Gen. Odierno expressed the fear, while in Washington, that if the U.S. troops withdraws from Iraq on schedule, Iraq will either become a “Somalia with Oil, or a Persian Iraq.” The key question should be if president Obama would have to break his campaign promise and keep troops in Iraq after the promised deadline. Thomas E. Ricks believes that the Obama administration will find itself in a position that it needs to revisit the status of Force Agreement and re-negotiate that with the future Iraqi government. Ricks who wrote a policy brief for a security think tank in Washington and who fundamentally opposed the invasion of Iraq, adds that “Leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000-50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq for many years to come.”

Renegotiation of SOFA ensures US-Iraq cooperation and prevents sectarian warfare

Lake 9 (Eli, The Washington Times, Feb 11, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/11/iraq-buys-us-gear-beyond-troop-deadline/>) LL

To build a sustained U.S.-Iraq military relationship, Iraq and the United States would need to modify the SOFA. U.S. and some Iraqi officials say that these arrangements usually are renegotiated over time and that some of the sections of the agreement leave open the option of a longer-term training relationship. Gen. Helmick pointed out that Article 4 of the current pact allows for training. "It says we shall continue in our efforts to strengthen Iraq's security capabilities, and that the training is mutually agreed upon. Equipping, supporting and supplying Iraq are all mutual agreed upon tasks," he said Another factor is that both Kurds and Sunni Arabs, who are minorities in Iraq, may push for a continued U.S. presence as insurance against a resumption of the sectarian warfare that ravaged the country between 2005 and 2007.

**SOFA Timeline Bad – Inefficient**

SOFA agreements completely handicap all US military operations in Iraq

Bruhns 8 (John, The Huffington Post, Dec 14, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sgt-john-bruhns/iraq-is-the-sofa-viable_b_150893.html>) LL

The Status of Forces Agreement between the governments of Iraq and the United States comes with outrageous stipulations that render our troops helpless, subject them to Iraqi military tribunals, halt U.S. military operations, and turn vengeful detainees over to the Iraqis. So what is the point of leaving our troops there as potted plants for the next three years? Anyone who thinks this SOFA is similar to that of the pacts we have with Germany or Japan is delusional. There will be no safe tours of the Iraqi countryside for our troops on R&R. The Bush Administration, in one of their last attempts to salvage some grain of positive legacy, pushed this "rush job" through so they can say: "look at how far the Iraqis have come, see, we really did liberate them." At the same time a bipartisan majority of Congress sat on their hands with the deer in the headlights look. Knowing it's going to blow up in the Obama Administration's face. You gotta love how politics works. Mr. Obama has promised to initiate a firm time line for troop withdrawal which coincides with the SOFA. However, it won't be overnight -- it will take years. And if upon our exit from Iraq violence spikes, it is likely that the withdrawal plan will be replaced by a contingency plan that keeps our troops in harms way indefinitely. According to the SOFA a system has to be established for Iraqi approval of all U.S. missions. Therefore, our military strategy over the next six months is to leave Iraqi cities and confine ourselves behind walls while waiting to be assigned approved missions by the Iraqi government. Every time U.S. troops leave their bases it will have to be cleared by the Iraqis -- even if they want to conduct a convoy to Kuwait for resupply purposes. Not to mention an actual combat mission to quell violence and find bad guys.

SOFA Timeline Bad – Political Instability

Election complications means that the terms negotiated under the SOFA may not be strategic

Baker and Norland 10 (Peter and Rod, The New York Times, Apr 27, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html>) LL

But the resistance to revisiting the deadline has drawn concern from former American officials, including some who participated in formulating the Obama policy last year. The original plan anticipated Iraqi elections in December and the formation of a new government at least 60 days afterward. Instead, the elections did not take place until March and produced a near tie between the parties of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. And now the two are fighting through the courts and recounts. Ryan C. Crocker, the former American ambassador to Iraq who was appointed by President George W. Bush and later made recommendations to Mr. Obama regarding the drawdown, said the administration should consider extending the August deadline. “I am a little bit nervous,” Mr. Crocker, now dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, said in a recent interview. “The elections were later than expected and there were very close results between Maliki and Allawi, which suggest it’s going to be a very long process. We may not even have a new government until we’re at the August deadline. I’d like the U.S. to retain the original flexibility.” Meghan L. O’Sullivan, a former deputy national security adviser to Mr. Bush who oversaw Iraq policy, also said August might be too soon. “I’m for a shift away from the current rigid deadline to something more flexible, more reflective of the fluid and tense situation in Iraq, where the last thing the Iraqis really need is for the United States to be focused more on exit than anything else at a moment of high political uncertainty,” she said.

SOFA seems unlikely to succeed given political instability and risks of terrorism

Alaaldin 10 (Rani, The Guardian, UK, May 1, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/01/iraq-elections-allawi-maliki>) LL

Iraq continues to be embroiled in its messy post-election coalition-building process. It has become so messy that the US may well be rethinking its withdrawal plans, and particularly its withdrawal of all combat troops at the end of August. In the past few weeks, amid a number of terror attacks, two key developments have taken place: an order by an electoral panel to have all the votes cast in Baghdad manually recounted; and a ruling that paves the way for banning some elected candidates because of their sympathies for the outlawed Ba'ath party. Reports suggest at least two of these candidates won seats in the 325-member Iraqi parliament; both belong to the winning bloc of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), led by Ayad Allawi who won 91 seats, ahead of Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law coalition's 89 seats. The banning of other INM elected members is also possible within the next couple of weeks. Together, the recount and the ban, may give Maliki little more than three or four additional seats, making him the overall electoral winner. But many will question what difference it will make, since Iraq's supreme court has already ruled that it is the largest post-election parliamentary alliance, rather than the largest vote winner, that can form the next government. Any changes in Maliki's favour strengthen his hand in his push to retain the premiership and have his State of Law coalition lead the next government. State of Law (and indeed, Maliki) will redeem the prestige lost when INM was declared the largest single bloc after the elections. In such a position, Maliki could also be more willing to negotiate with INM since he would rather Allawi and INM played second-fiddle to him (as runners-up) than the other way around. Maliki has also reportedly encountered internal problems within his Islamic Dawa party, with some factions in the group opposing another tenure for him. Any changes in his favour would constitute a political boost and help to silence his critics. The decisions on the recount and the bans may be perceived on the Iraqi street as yet another set of attempts to sideline the Sunni voice in post-2003 Iraqi politics. But it is too easy to assume that they mark the beginning of the return to Iraq's violent past. Although there is cause for concern, as argued this week by Simon Tisdall, the recount itself was expected since both Allawi and Maliki complained of irregularities in the voting process and count. Also, he decision to ban the candidates was made on election day itself, meaning all the political entities had ample warning of what was to come; significant in this context is that the ban will not dramatically alter the allocation of seats. The extent to which both rulings will adversely impact on Iraq's political process and, indeed, US withdrawal plans will, of course, depend on Allawi and the INM's own reactions to them – whether, that is, their reactions will go beyond rhetoric. Allawi's coalition, it should be noted, contains fierce ultra-nationalists all too capable of igniting damaging and destructive violence, but there is a feeling that Iraq's political actors, some of them former insurgency members, have matured and given up their futile and costly ways of violence. INM would certainly be concerned about the possibility of the recount justifying State of Law's calls for a manual recount in other provinces, particularly if it provides for any significant changes. As a result of all this, a government is unlikely to be formed until August or perhaps even September, creating a vacuum that terrorists are all too happy to try to fill, and leaving the US with sufficient justification to alter its withdrawal plans.

**SOFA Timeline Bad – Iraq Unprepared**

Premature withdrawal could lead to escalating tensions, as the Iraqi forces will not yet be prepared to deal with security threats

Thompson 8 (Mark, The New York Times, Nov 18, [http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859955,00.html#ixzz0svyOTmMn](http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0%2C8599%2C1859955%2C00.html#ixzz0svyOTmMn)) LL

The Pentagon, after pushing for nearly a year for new rules governing the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, is already back-pedaling. On the one hand, the agreement between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi cabinet — which still requires a potentially contentious vote of approval by the Iraqi parliament — simply codifies a U.S. redeployment already in the making. But the agreement's hard deadline for the removal of all U.S. troops by the end of 2011 represent a significant retreat for a Bush Administration that has long opposed setting a timetable for withdrawal. And it also poses a challenge for the U.S. military. Despite the agreement on a timetable for withdrawal, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, on Monday stressed he still wants U.S. troops withdrawn only when security conditions warrant it. Under the status of forces agreement (SOFA) approved by Washington and the Iraqi cabinet, U.S. troop withdrawals will accelerate in the months ahead until all of the 150,000 U.S. troops now in Iraq will will be gone by New Year's Day 2012, leaving behind only a Marine guard unit of the type that protects U.S. embassies all over the world. Like kids getting set to take a roller coaster ride, the U.S. military is about to forfeit a lot of control over their fate in Iraq in the next three years. (See pictures of five years of U.S. troops in Iraq) Speaking from Baghdad on Monday, Army Colonel John Hort of the 4th Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team, said that the SOFA simply recognizes what is already happening inside Iraq. "We're kind of already moving in that direction — even prior to the SOFA — with the Iraqi army taking more and more responsibility, more and more of the lead, particularly the targeting of the bad people," Hort told Pentagon reporters in a video press conference. "So I don't see a significant change." Admiral Mullen said Monday that he believes sufficient Iraqi forces will be trained by 2012 to assume responsibility for all of Iraq's security. While most of Iraq is now under the control of the Iraqi military, Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul remain under U.S. control. Turning the capital over to Iraqi security forces "will be a big challenge," Mullen said, and "we continue to be in a pretty tough fight up in Mosul." The SOFA deal, which creates a legal basis for foreign forces to remain in Iraq beyond the December 31 deadline when the current U.N. mandate expires, not only sets a three-year deadline for U.S. troops to leave Iraq; it also requires that they leave Iraq's cities by June 30 of next year. The troops would redeploy to bases in the countryside, from which they could be called into action to support Iraqi security forces, as they currently do across much of Iraq. The SOFA also gives Iraq expanded legal jurisdiction when serious crimes are committed by U.S. troops who are off-base and off-duty — a rare circumstance for American troops in Iraq. The U.S. has also agreed not to attack Iraq's neighbors from inside Iraq — a key provision in persuading the many allies of Iran in the Iraqi government to support the agreement — and to refrain from searching Iraqi homes or detaining Iraqis without their government's approval. Hort said some of his forces in Baghdad would "probably have to push more out towards the perimeter of the city, but I think that we can work through all of that." Still, Pentagon officials continue to express concern about the ability of the Iraqi military to keep the peace as the Americans pull out. Deep historical animosities among Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurdish groups remain, and local troops loyal to a specific sect won't be as capable of defusing tensions, U.S. officials fear. But Hort said that the Iraqi military "has got a tremendous amount of confidence in themselves, and is doing more and more each and every day that we work with them."

Iraq will not be prepared by 2011 for US withdrawal

Ricks 10 (Thomas, member of Center for a New American Security: defense policy think tank and member of Harvard’s Sr Advisory Council on US Civil-Military Relations, Mar 10, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-11-17-voa66-66734617.html>) LL

Regardless of who wins the election, Baghdad will not have a military capable of defending it against external threats by the time the SOFA expires [at the end of 2011, when all U.S. military forces are supposed to be out of Iraq]. It will have no real control over its air space . . . . Think of that. On Jan. 1, 2012, when, some say, there will be no more Status of Forces Agreement, there really will be very little to prevent Israeli aircraft from zipping right through Iraqi air space and onto targets in Iran. And if American forces are out, no one can blame the Americans for allowing it to happen . . . . But if Iraq re-opens the SOFA and negotiates a substantial continued U.S. presence, the door for potential Israeli air strikes stays closed.

SOFA Timeline Bad - Arbitrary

Withdrawal plans are too politically oriented; plans should be more flexible

Feaver 10 (Peter, Foreign Policy, Apr 28, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/28/whats_dictating_the_iraq_withdrawal_timeline>) LL

The gist of the Baker/Nordland article is that Obama is doubling down on the rigid Iraqi withdrawal timeline even though the assumptions on which the timeline was based have proven overly optimistic. Respected Iraq hands -- some on the record and, more ominously for Obama, some insiders on a not-for-attribution basis -- told the reporters that the political delays in Baghdad should be accompanied with a commensurate delay in the withdrawal schedule. The original timeline was supposedly dictated by the Iraqi election clock: whatever newly elected Iraqi government took power would need the reassurance of a sizable U.S. combat troop presence for some period of time (months, not weeks) to ensure a smooth transition. On the original political calendar, an August deadline for completing the withdrawal seemed ambitious but doable. The Iraqis are now well off the original political calendar, however, and it now seems likely that by the time of the August deadline there will be no new government seated, or at best one only seated for a few weeks. The article dangles tantalizingly the possibility that it is the American political calendar that is dictating the timeline now: "... with his liberal base angry at the Afghan troop buildup, any delay of the Iraq drawdown could provoke more consternation on the left." It is hard to predict where August will fall in the Iraqi political trajectory, but it is a rock-solid certainty that August comes comfortably before the U.S. midterm election. The reporters are right that letting the August deadline slide could pose an enormous political headache for an administration already struggling to mobilize its base when the national mood favors the Republicans. But a failure to heed the situation on the ground in Iraq would, I suspect, pose much greater headaches down the road for the administration so I fervently hope that the U.S. midterm elections are not dictating the timeline. Even without domestic politics confounding the calculation, the strategic challenge would be vexing. One of the hardest things to do in war is to ascertain when developments on the ground require a change in plans and when the plan is still viable despite some setbacks. The Bush administration did not always get this right. It came under withering and justifiable criticism for being slow to adjust to Iraqi realities in the months after the invasion. Even though the unfolding events revealed that several of the assumptions of the original Phase IV plan had been overly optimistic, critics charged that Secretary Rumsfeld stuck with the original military plan.

SOFA Timeline Bad – No Enforcement

SOFA fails – lack of enforcement

Leavers 9 (Erik, Policy Outreach Director for Foreign Policy In Focus and is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, June 25, <http://ampedstatus.com/dont-believe-the-hype-us-forces-will-stay-in-iraq>) LL

On November 17, 2008, when Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari and U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker signed an agreement for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, citizens from both countries applauded. While many were disappointed about the lengthy timeline for the withdrawal of the troops, it appeared that a roadmap was set to end the war and occupation. However, the first step — withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009 — is full of loopholes, and tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers will remain in the cities after the “deadline” passes. The failure to fully comply with the withdrawal agreement indicates the United States is looking to withdraw from Iraq in name only, as it appears that up to 50,000 military personnel will remain after the deadline. The United States claims it’s adhering to the agreement, known as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), even with so many troops being left in the cities. But the United States is changing semantics instead of policy. For example, there are no plans to transfer the 3,000 American troops stationed within Baghdad at Forward Operating Base Falcon, because commanders have determined that despite its location, it’s not within the city. The original intent of moving troops out of the cities was to reduce the U.S. military role and send the message to Iraqis that the United States would be leaving the country soon. But troops that are no longer sleeping in the cities will still take part in operations within Iraqi cities; they will serve in “support” and “advisory” roles, rather than combat functions. Such “reclassification” of troops as military trainers is another example of how the United States is circumventing the terms of the SOFA agreement. The larger loophole in the agreement is the treatment of military contractors. There has been little mention of the 132,610 military contractors in Iraq. Of these, 36,061 are American citizens, according to a recent Department of Defense report. Since September 2008, only 30,000 troops have left Iraq. The 134,000 soldiers that remain are just slightly below the number of troops that were in Iraq in 2003. These numbers are likely to remain well above 100,000 until 2010. Instead of sending soldiers stationed in cities home, the military has been expanding and building new bases in rural areas to accommodate soldiers affected by the June 30 deadline. And Congress just passed a war-spending bill that includes more funding for military construction inside Iraq.

No real withdrawal – just re-labeling

Bennis 9 (Phyllis, Institute for Policy Studeies, Feb 26, <http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117>) LL

President Barack Obama said directly that he would be announcing “a way forward in Iraq that leaves Iraq to its people and responsibly ends this war.” As far as it goes, that sounds good. This is an indication that President Obama is largely keeping to his campaign promises, and that's a hopeful sign, reflecting the power of the anti-war consensus in this country. If this plan were actually a first step towards the unequivocal goal of a complete end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq, it would be better than good, it would be fabulous. But that would mean this withdrawal would be the first step towards a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops, pulling out of all the 150,000+ U.S.-paid foreign mercenaries and contractors, closing all the U.S. military bases, and ending all U.S. efforts to control Iraqi oil. So far that is not on Obama's agenda. The troop withdrawal as planned would leave behind as many as 50,000 U.S. troops. That's an awful lot. Even Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi thinks that may be too much. She told Rachel Maddow, "I don't know what the justification is for 50,000, at the present …I would think a third of that, maybe 20,000, a little more than a third, 15,000 or 20,000." Those troops won't include officially designated "combat" troops. But those tens of thousands of troops will still be occupying Iraq. Doing what? Very likely, just what combat troops do — they would walk and talk and bomb and shoot like combat troops, but they’d be called something else. The New York Times spelled it out last December: describing how military planners believe Obama's goal of pulling out combat troops “could be accomplished at least in part by re-labeling some units, so that those currently counted as combat troops could be 're-missioned,' their efforts redefined as training and support for the Iraqis.” That would mean a retreat to the lies and deception that characterized this war during Bush years — something President Obama promised to leave behind. It would also mean military resistance in Iraq would continue, leading to more Iraqi and U.S. casualties

SOFA Timeline Bad – No Enforcement

SOFA process take too long and is not thorough

Bennis 9 (Phyllis, Institute for Policy Studeies, Feb 26, <http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117>) LL

Mercenaries and Contractors Ending the U.S. occupation means ending all U.S. funding for the giant contractors — Dyncorp, Bechtel, Blackwater — that serve as out-sourced private unaccountable components of the U.S. military. The contractor companies — and the mercenaries they hire — were part of what led to Abu Ghraib. (Blackwater's recent name change to "Xe" should not allow its role in killing Iraqi civilians to be forgotten.) Even as some troops may be withdrawn, we will need to mobilize for congressional hearings, independent investigations, and more on the human rights violations and misuse of taxpayer funds by the war profiteers who run these companies. President Obama's decision to close the Guantanamo prison shows his awareness of severity of the crimes committed there. Ending the funding of the contractors who carried out so many of those crimes should be a logical next step. U.S. Military Bases We've heard how long it will likely take to evacuate each of the 50+ U.S. military bases in Iraq (6 weeks for the small ones, 18 months for the biggest) but we haven't heard any indication, let alone a promise, that they will actually be turned over to the Iraqis. The issue of bases places Iraq at the centerpiece of the broad global movement challenging the network of U.S. military bases all over the world. Opposition to the impact of those bases — environmental, social and women's rights, economic and more — is rising in countries as diverse as Korea, Italy, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan and more. In fact in some countries governments are joining with civil society to reject Washington's global crusade. Kyrgyzstan decided to close the U.S. air base there, indicating they prefer Russian bribes to U.S. warplanes. (That decision may present the Obama administration with the unsavory prospect of renewing the U.S. alliance with Uzbekistan, whose government is characterized by some of the most egregious human rights violations in the world.) Ecuador has recently passed a new constitution prohibiting the presence of foreign military bases on their soil, and is in the process of ending its hosting of the U.S. airbase at Manta.

SOFA is ineffective – no real change will occur

Arango 10 (Tim, The New York Times, July 2, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html>) LL

NEAR TULUL AL-BAQ, Iraq — President Obama has set an August deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq. Here at this makeshift desert camp in the insurgent badlands of northern Iraq, a mission is under way that is not going to stop then: American soldiers hunting terrorists and covertly watching an Iraqi checkpoint staffed by police officers whom the soldiers say they do not trust. “They’re not checking anybody, and they’re wondering why I.E.D.’s are getting in to town,” said Staff Sgt. Kelly E. Young, 39, from Albertville, Ala., as he watched the major roadway that connects Baghdad with Mosul, regarded as the country’s most dangerous city. He referred to improvised explosive devices, the military term for homemade bombs. The August deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq, but here it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here. The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics. What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the United States military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions. “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties. So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to icasualties.org.

SOFA Timeline Bad – No Enforcement

US will find a way to avoid SOFA provisions

Reazen 8 (Yochi, The Wall Street Journal, Dec 14, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122917052669504345.html>) LL

Gen. Raymond Odierno told reporters here that the U.S. troops assigned to "joint security stations" inside Iraqi cities like Baghdad would remain in the outposts indefinitely. The bases, which are a key part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, house thousands of American personnel across the country. There are well over a dozen such outposts in Baghdad alone. Gen. Odierno, who assumed command in September, explained that the withdrawal provision in the security pact applied only to combat personnel. The U.S. forces assigned to the joint security stations mentor and fight alongside Iraqi troops, so American commanders classify them as training personnel and don't consider them to be covered by the withdrawal language, he said. "We believe that's part of our transition teams," he said. "We believe we should still be inside of those [small bases] after the summer." The comments were significant because they represent the first official U.S. acknowledgment that the security pact's withdrawal language may not be as definitive as many Iraqi and American officials had first indicated. The "status of forces" agreement between Washington and Baghdad was approved by Iraq's parliament in late November after months of arduous and often contentious negotiations. The agreement calls for U.S. troops to leave Iraqi cities by June 2009 and to fully withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. Gen. Odierno, who assumed command in September, said that he was operating under the assumption that all American forces would leave Iraq by December 2011. There are currently approximately 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. "I expect us, frankly, to be out by 2011," he said. Still, Gen. Odierno outlined a series of possible exceptions to the two withdrawal deadlines. He said that U.S. commanders were talking to their Iraqi counterparts about the possibility of leaving combat personnel in the turbulent northern city of Mosul beyond the summer, though he stressed the final decision would be left to the Iraqi government. Gen. Odierno also said that future American and Iraqi governments could "renegotiate" the overall security pact before 2011 to allow some U.S. forces to remain in the country past the deadline. Many American commanders privately argue that the U.S. will likely need to keep tens of thousands of training, logistics, Special Forces and Air Force personnel in Iraq to continue training the Iraqi security forces and fighting the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups.

SOFA Timeline Bad – No US Consensus

Political considerations and election complications prevent effective withdrawal plans

O’Brien 10 (Michael, The Hill, May 31, <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/100719-americans-split-on-iraq-withdrawal-if-conditions-arent-right>) LL

Americans are virtually split over whether or not President Barack Obama should withdraw troops from Iraq in August as planned if that nation still suffers from violence and political instability. 51 percent of voters said they would favor the president pushing ahead with his plan to withdraw most troops from Iraq even if there is widespread violence and a lack of a stable government at that time, a CNN/Opinion Research poll released Monday found. 48 percent would oppose removing U.S. troops, well within the 4.5 percent margin of error for that question in the poll. Obama announced in February of 2009 a staged drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq set for August of this year, though his administration has left wiggle room in that timetable based on conditions on the ground. The current plan would withdraw all but 35,000 to 50,000 troops from Iraq in August, the remainder of which would steadily leave Iraq through the end of 2011. Republicans had criticized such a timetable when it was first announced, arguing it would put terror and political groups in Iraq that oppose the United States on notice about the military's intentions. Also making the withdrawal more difficult were the controversial March elections, which were marked by violence and allegations of fraud.

SOFA Timeline Bad – Terrorism

Obama’s planned withdrawal would remove counter-terrorism measures

Ricks 10 (Thomas, member of Center for a New American Security: defense policy think tank and member of Harvard’s Sr Advisory Council on US Civil-Military Relations, Feb 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>) LL

If so, President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue. Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, 2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, this is likely the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq. The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well, having spent years working there. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions. The Bush administration’s grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded. By late summer, the Obama administration could find itself in the uncomfortable position of reconsidering its vows to get out of combat in Iraq by August and to remove all troops by the end of next year. This will be politically difficult for the president, but he has shown admirable flexibility in his handling of Iraq. My impression is that the American people now wish they had never heard of Iraq, but understand just what a mess it is and are willing to give the president a surprising amount of leeway. Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.)

SOFA Timeline Bad – Terrorism

Removal of US forces would leave a power vacuum and a terrorist-susceptible Iraq

Alaaldin 10 (Rani, The Guardian, UK, May 1, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/01/iraq-elections-allawi-maliki>) LL

Iraq continues to be embroiled in its messy post-election coalition-building process. It has become so messy that the US may well be rethinking its withdrawal plans, and particularly its withdrawal of all combat troops at the end of August. In the past few weeks, amid a number of terror attacks, two key developments have taken place: an order by an electoral panel to have all the votes cast in Baghdad manually recounted; and a ruling that paves the way for banning some elected candidates because of their sympathies for the outlawed Ba'ath party. Reports suggest at least two of these candidates won seats in the 325-member Iraqi parliament; both belong to the winning bloc of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), led by Ayad Allawi who won 91 seats, ahead of Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law coalition's 89 seats. The banning of other INM elected members is also possible within the next couple of weeks. Together, the recount and the ban, may give Maliki little more than three or four additional seats, making him the overall electoral winner. But many will question what difference it will make, since Iraq's supreme court has already ruled that it is the largest post-election parliamentary alliance, rather than the largest vote winner, that can form the next government. Any changes in Maliki's favour strengthen his hand in his push to retain the premiership and have his State of Law coalition lead the next government. State of Law (and indeed, Maliki) will redeem the prestige lost when INM was declared the largest single bloc after the elections. In such a position, Maliki could also be more willing to negotiate with INM since he would rather Allawi and INM played second-fiddle to him (as runners-up) than the other way around. Maliki has also reportedly encountered internal problems within his Islamic Dawa party, with some factions in the group opposing another tenure for him. Any changes in his favour would constitute a political boost and help to silence his critics. The decisions on the recount and the bans may be perceived on the Iraqi street as yet another set of attempts to sideline the Sunni voice in post-2003 Iraqi politics. But it is too easy to assume that they mark the beginning of the return to Iraq's violent past. Although there is cause for concern, as argued this week by Simon Tisdall, the recount itself was expected since both Allawi and Maliki complained of irregularities in the voting process and count. Also, he decision to ban the candidates was made on election day itself, meaning all the political entities had ample warning of what was to come; significant in this context is that the ban will not dramatically alter the allocation of seats. The extent to which both rulings will adversely impact on Iraq's political process and, indeed, US withdrawal plans will, of course, depend on Allawi and the INM's own reactions to them – whether, that is, their reactions will go beyond rhetoric. Allawi's coalition, it should be noted, contains fierce ultra-nationalists all too capable of igniting damaging and destructive violence, but there is a feeling that Iraq's political actors, some of them former insurgency members, have matured and given up their futile and costly ways of violence. INM would certainly be concerned about the possibility of the recount justifying State of Law's calls for a manual recount in other provinces, particularly if it provides for any significant changes. As a result of all this, a government is unlikely to be formed until August or perhaps even September, creating a vacuum that terrorists are all too happy to try to fill, and leaving the US with sufficient justification to alter its withdrawal plans.

SOFA Bad – Renegotiation Good

Absence of election year pressures means Iraqis will be more likely to renegotiate—Solves downsides

Biddle 9 (Stephen, Center on Foreign Relations, May 2009, [http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:0X42emQTACkJ:www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CPA\_contingencymemo\_2.pdf+SOFA+Iraq+withdr\*+bad&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESij4oIynfJLadBGWxsiOxGKbD-uX5Nln5J-1VOtVK-7](http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:0X42emQTACkJ:www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CPA_contingencymemo_2.pdf+SOFA+Iraq+withdr*+bad&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESij4oIynfJLadBGWxsiOxGKbD-uX5Nln5J-1VOtVK-7)) LL

To slow the U.S. withdrawal timetable will be difficult—and it could be impossible if the Iraqis oppose this. Iraq is a sovereign nation with whom the United States has negotiated a SOFA that obliges the United States to leave by 2011. If the Iraqis choose to enforce these terms, the United States has no choice but to comply, and should do so. But any international agreement can be renegotiated if the parties wish, and there may be reason to suspect that Iraqis could be open to renegotiating this one some time between now and 2011. The current SOFA was written under the pressure of a looming provincial election in which Iraqi officials faced powerful domestic partisan political incentives to demonstrate their credentials as opponents of an unpopular U.S. occupation. The result was a competition among Iraqis to be seen as driving a harder bargain than their rivals and to insist on greater restrictions and earlier withdrawals. With these election-year incentives behind them, Iraqi officials’ attitudes may change. Conditions on the ground may also change. Indeed, the Iraqi government itself may change: there are national elections scheduled for 2010 in Iraq. It is thus impossible to know for now what Iraqi attitudes toward the SOFA will be in 2011. Again, if Iraqis want the United States to leave quickly then it must. But the United States should remain open to the prospect of renegotiating a slower withdrawal, and this prospect warrants quiet exploration behind the scenes well in advance of the 2011 deadline.

SOFA Bad – Renegotiation Good

Renegotiation is always an option – allows for the best policies

VOA News 8 (Nov 17, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-11-17-voa66-66734617.html>) LL

U.S. officials say the agreement to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq in three years, signed in Baghdad Monday, is a firm commitment. But they say it could be renegotiated in the future, depending on security conditions. VOA's Al Pessin reports from the Pentagon. At a news conference Monday, the top U.S. military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, responded "yes" when asked whether the agreement signed in Baghdad earlier in the day requires all U.S. troops to leave Iraq by the end of 2011, regardless of the security conditions. But he also called the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, "adequate for what we need now." "Three years is a long time," said Admiral Mullen. "Conditions could change in that period of time. And, if we get to a point where this SOFA is agreed to, and have a relationship with the government of Iraq tied to it, that we will continue to have discussions with them over time, as conditions continue to evolve." At the White House, Press Secretary Dana Perino also hedged on the withdrawal date, sticking to the label "aspirational" that she and other officials have used in the past. "When you work with a partner on a negotiation, you have to concede some points," said Dana Perino. "One of the points that we conceded was that we would establish these aspirational dates."

SOFA is open to renegotiation based on future needs

Ackerman 9 (Spencer, The Washington Independent, July 23, <http://washingtonindependent.com/52402/iraqi-prime-minister-open-to-renegotiating-withdrawal-timeline>) LL

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opened the door for the first time Thursday to the prospect of a U.S. military presence in Iraq after the December 2011 deadline for troop withdrawal set by last year’s bilateral accord — something President Obama appeared to rule out during a joint appearance on Tuesday. Speaking to an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, Maliki said the accord, known as the Status of Forces Agreement, would “end” the American military presence in his country in 2011, but “nevertheless, if Iraqi forces required further training and further support, we shall examine this at that time based on the needs of Iraq,” he said through translation in response to a question from The Washington Independent. “I am sure that the will, the prospects and the desire for such cooperation is found among both parties.” Maliki continued, “The nature of that relationship — the functions and the amount of [U.S.] forces — will then be discussed and reexamined based on the needs” of Iraq. The Iraqi prime minister’s allowance for a post-2011 U.S. troop presence comes despite his increasingly nationalist tone to a domestic audience in advance of parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for January. He resisted the advice of Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, to keep a U.S. combat presence in volatile areas like Mosul after June 30, the date set by the Status of Forces Agreement for their evacuation from Iraqi cities and towns. Instead, when they departed, Maliki declared a national holiday. He called the withdrawal a “great victory” for Iraq, language reminiscent of his oft-stated declarations of victory over Iraq’s various insurgent groups. In his remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Maliki moderated that remark, saying the U.S. “withdrawal from the cities is a victory, not a failure for either the Iraqis or the Americans.”

SOFA Bad – **AT Public Support**

Public sentiment not key

Kull 8 (Steven, Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes, July 30, Director, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home\_page/517.php) LL

R. KULL: Thank you for inviting me to speak. Today I will be addressing the question of how the Iraqi people view the presence of US troops in Iraq and, more importantly, what they want to see happen in the future. As I will demonstrate, the Iraqi people are showing signs of impatience with the pace of US withdrawal. Now one may ask why this matters. Obviously the Iraqi people will not be negotiating the agreements about US forces in Iraq. As long as the government wants US troops there, one may believe that it does not matter what the Iraqi public thinks.

Iraqis appreciate US support

**Thompson 9** (Emily, UN Intermediate Peace Building Commission, Dec 5,

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gCkF4zpwRasJ:coloradomun.org/BG\_PeacebuildingIraq.doc+despite+the+assuredness+of+Mr.+Obama’s+words,+the+government+of+Iraq+still+lacks+stability,+and+it+is+possible&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) LL

Recently, Iraq has witnessed the initial removal of US troops beginning on June 30th, 2009. President Obama plainly stated earlier this year, “By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end,” although around 50,000 “advisors” will remain indefinitely. However, despite the assuredness of Mr. Obama’s words, the government of Iraq still lacks stability, and it is possible that US military forces may need to be implemented again in the future. While the pledge to withdrawal of troops pleased many Iraqis, many have also become increasingly worried about the strength of their government, and its ability to stand alone without US forces. Scheduled for January 16th, 2010, Iraqis will elect new political leaders. However, debate surrounding the date of the election has emerged, notably from Kurds who feel that their political opinions have not been addressed since they were expelled by Saddam Hussein.

Iraqi civilians recognize the weakness of their own government and welcome US support

**Arraf 10** (Jane, Christian Science Monitor, May 11, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/11/93955/latest-iraq-attacks-expose-security.html) LL

BAGHDAD, Iraq — Iraqi security forces and citizens were on edge Tuesday after a string of attacks that has raised fears of heightened instability, perhaps culminating in governmental collapse, and sparked accusations that the government has become too consumed with forming a coalition to be able to protect its citizens. Iraqi officials immediately blamed Al Qaida in Iraq for the violence Tuesday, which killed more than 100 people in the deadliest day in Iraq this year. The U.S. State Department said the attacks would "undermine the confidence the Iraqi people have demonstrated in their government and their security forces." The attacks appear to have not only undermined Iraqi confidence in their security forces but the security forces' confidence in their government. Many Iraqis, including policeman and soldiers, say they believe their own politicians are behind the attacks. "I can't speak badly about security because I don't want to spoil the image of the security services, but to tell you the truth, it is not good," said a policeman near the site of one of the checkpoint attacks. "This is a struggle for power - none of the citizens are blindfolded - we can all see and understand the situation. I blame the government for this."

SOFA Bad – **AT Public Support**

US forces in Iraq improve civil capacity

America Forces Press Service 9 (Mar 16, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/17/18328-us-training-efforts-build-self-sufficiency-in-iraq/>)LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 - U.S. forces in Iraq are equipping Iraqis with the skills they need to assume a greater role in their nation's security. An integral part of that process is training, and U.S. forces are arming themselves with knowledge so they, in turn, can help outfit Iraqis with the tools required to move toward self-sufficiency. Earlier this month, U.S. Soldiers of the 172nd Infantry Brigade focused on training during the unit's first Blackhawk Warrior Leader Course for junior noncommissioned officers at Forward Operating Base Kalsu. The course, held March 2 to 6, comprised more than 20 topics, including civil capacity, force protection and Iraqi security professionalization. "We are training team leaders to be subject-matter experts at the squad level," said Army Sgt. Maj. Steven Spillman, course commandant and operations sergeant major for 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment. "We want to reinforce their understanding of basic warrior tasks and skills, such as casualty-evacuation procedures, lifesaving, load plans, vehicle-recovery drills, asset integration, and improvised explosive device tactics, techniques and procedures." Students also learned Iraqi rank structure and Iraqi military and police culture to further their understanding of how Iraqi security forces operate. "We wanted the students to learn more about the Iraqi way of doing things so they could better train them," Army Command Sgt. Maj. Steven W. McClaflin of the 172nd Brigade said. "Iraqi warrants and detainee operations classes were taught as well, so that our Soldiers would be knowledgeable of the system we now work under."

**US troops offer essential amenities to Iraqis**

Garamone 9 (Jim, American Forces Press Service, Mar 16, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53501>) LL

WASHINGTON, March 16, 2009 – As security continues to improve in Iraq, civil affairs units and provincial reconstruction teams become more effective, the commander of the Army reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade said today. Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman, commander of the Army Reserve’s 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, listens to an Iraqi officer lecture on his division’s military operations capabilities at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, March 12, 2009. The brigade assisted the Iraqi army in hosting the event, which allowed civil military operations representatives from all over Iraq to brief Iraqi and coalition forces on their projects and current state of affairs. In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Army Col. Daniel R. Ammerman said the improved security situation allows civil affairs personnel to do more to improve governance and economic life in the country. And as U.S. combat units redeploy from Iraq, he said, the work civil affairs personnel do will be critical in ensuring progress continues. The 304th, from Philadelphia, is composed of about 100 soldiers and sailors from throughout the northeastern United States. The unit is an enabler for improving governance and the economy in the country. “We focus mostly on building government of Iraq civil capacity – enabling the government to meet those essential service needs of the people as well as economic growth to provide jobs,” Ammerman said. Building governance is an amorphous concept. Ammerman takes it to its foundation. “It’s what people expect from their government to meet their needs,” he said. “It’s putting in place essential services, it’s putting in place an economic environment so people can work, and it’s putting in place the infrastructure needed for businesses to flourish.” From a practical standpoint, it is developing the infrastructure so the government can clean streets, maintain the sewers, and build water purification plants and the piping to get the water to homes. It’s building the generating plants and the distribution network to get electricity to homes and businesses. Ammerman said it is about more than just building these facilities for the Iraqis. It also is about helping the Iraqis set up the process by which a government – local, provincial or national – can build and maintain these services. “The provincial reconstruction teams have the lead in working with city councils and provincial councils to put these in place,” Ammerman said. This entails working on budgeting, raising money, preventing corruption and ensuring the rule of law is followed, he said. The unit works with interagency partners and with Iraqi entities. The civil affairs teams are partners at the PRTs, Ammerman said. “They basically come up with a joint plan on how they are going to address the civil capacity in the province,” he said.

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Text: The United States federal government should offer <the plan> if and only if US military forces certify Iraqi forces can adequately and safely replace US forces

Conditions based withdrawal comparatively best; US should assess Iraqi forces prior to withdrawal

Cordesmann and Mausner 9 (Anthony and Adam, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Aug 12, http://csis.org/publication/withdrawal-iraq-0) LL

Iraq and the United States face a critical transition through 2011 and beyond. The awkward reality is that an Iraqi-U.S. failure to properly manage the U.S. withdrawal and the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is as serious a threat to Iraq's future stability and security as any internal or external threat. Realism is a key to future success. The improvement in ISF capabilities is very real, and Iraqi forces are experiencing growing success in combat. But they are still very much a work in progress, and many Iraqi and U.S. politicians still seem unaware of how much remains to be done. U.S. forces play a critical role in developing the effectiveness of the ISF, providing stability in areas with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions and helping Iraq achieve political accommodation and more effective governance. Through detailed analyses of Iraqi force capabilities, augmented by on-site interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military officials, the authors conclude that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq needs to be conditions-based, not tied to political timelines. Both Iraqi and U.S. leaders need to be careful about exaggerating Iraqi capabilities and the speed with which the United States can safely withdraw its forces and advisory teams. Conditions for success include realistic and fully resourced plans for the ISF's development; candid and accurate measures of ISF capabilities; and careful assessments of the overall level of security, stability, and political accommodation in Iraq. After years of destructive conflict, Iraq now has the chance, however tenuous, to become a stable and prosperous country. The United States, say the authors, will be judged far more by the way it leaves and what it leaves behind than by the way it entered and how it fought the counterinsurgency campaign.

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Premature withdrawal could result in violence, civil war, economic downturn, and regional instability

Ricks 10 (Thomas, member of Center for a New American Security: defense policy think tank and member of Harvard’s Sr Advisory Council on US Civil-Military Relations, Feb 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>) LL

Iraq’s March 7 national election, and the formation of a new government that will follow, carry huge implications for both Iraqis and American policy. It appears now that the results are unlikely to resolve key political struggles that could return the country to sectarianism and violence. If so, President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue. Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, 2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, this is likely the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq. The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well, having spent years working there. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions. The Bush administration’s grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded. By June, American troops may be leaving areas that are far from quiet, and where new tensions may be brewing as a result of the elections. Once again, the United States would be rushing toward failure in Iraq, as it did so often under the Bush administration, trying to pass responsibility to Iraqi officials and institutions before they are ready for the task. By late summer, the Obama administration could find itself in the uncomfortable position of reconsidering its vows to get out of combat in Iraq by August and to remove all troops by the end of next year. This will be politically difficult for the president, but he has shown admirable flexibility in his handling of Iraq. My impression is that the American people now wish they had never heard of Iraq, but understand just what a mess it is and are willing to give the president a surprising amount of leeway. Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it

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might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild. In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them. Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear

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Middle East instability escalates globally

Steinbach 2 (John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, Mar 2002, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm) LL

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Military Certification CP—Solvency

A sound exit strategy includes US-Iraqi military certification that the Iraq forces can be sustained

Danvers and O’Hanlon 5 (Bill and Michael, Clinton administration's National Security Council. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Nov 22, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1122/p09s01-coop.html>) LL

Iraq presents a policy quandary of the first order. The US presence in that country is both part of the problem and a necessary part of any solution. US troops must be there to provide security until Iraqis can do so for themselves. Yet their large presence also galvanizes the resistance and motivates the jihadists. The US needs a viable exit strategy - not only to save American dollars and lives, but to prevail in the mission to leave behind a stable, functioning Iraq. A complete US withdrawal from Iraq, however, could lead unintentionally to defeat. Iraqi security forces as well as the Iraqi government are nowhere near being able to keep a cohesive nation together on their own. A time certain for withdrawal, not tied to the situation on the ground, could embolden the resistance and weaken the resolve of Iraq's patriots who are trying - with limited but still real success - to build a new nation. But if calls for a firm withdrawal date go too far in one direction, the administration goes too far in the other. Its steadfast commitment to purpose fails to acknowledge how unpopular our presence is within Iraq and how much it acts as a gravitational force for the global Al Qaeda movement. American polling agencies in Iraq basically stopped asking Iraqis what they thought of the US and its troops when our unpopularity approached 90 percent in Iraq in the spring of 2004. There is little reason to think the situation has improved. And clearly, for jihadists, the presence of American troops in Iraq makes it the epicenter of their worldwide struggle today. That is of course one reason the US must not fail. But it is also a reason why it must minimize its presence at the earliest opportunity. To try to avoid the pitfalls of either staying the course or withdrawing completely - and to take the best ideas of each - we propose the following exit strategy: • A clear statement from Washington that it intends to downsize troop presence dramatically once Iraqis are in a position to protect themselves. Specifically, at least three-quarters of US troops should come home from Iraq as soon as a number of conditions are met, probably over the next 18 months. • A pledge to reduce the foreign military presence by one soldier for every two Iraqi soldiers within units that become certified as meeting the first- or second-highest level of combat readiness, as defined by joint US-Iraqi military assessments. • A further stipulation that the foreign drawdown could accelerate if Iraq makes faster progress in rehabilitating its infrastructure and building its government ministries. • More detailed monthly reports from the administration, in both unclassified and classified form, on progress in security and economic areas. • An effort to elicit much greater European and UN help in the effort to improve Iraq's government ministries in particular. • Establishment of an international contact group, such as the one in the Balkans, to help oversee the rebuilding of Iraq. This would help make the effort to rebuild Iraq more international, which would help reverse the flagging support of the American people for the Iraq mission. • A firm reaffirmation that the US will leave Iraq entirely at any point the Iraqi government requests it. • An additional declaration that the US has no plans for longer-term military bases in Iraq and any discussion of that subject would have to await the next American administration, would have to be initiated by Iraq, and would have to be discussed at the UN Security Council. After the drawdown period, outside forces may need to maintain 30,000 to 40,000 troops in Iraq, ideally under NATO leadership - roughly the number needed to continue training Iraqi forces, to help protect the Green Zone, and to maintain several mobile combat brigades in a number of regions to back up Iraqi Security Forces. And it might be necessary to keep that number for a period of time. But such numbers would become a ceiling, not a floor, in future policy discussions. This plan would be a strategically sound exit strategy. It would in effect honor and respect the better parts of the arguments made by both the administration and its critics. It also has the added benefit of more clearly empowering the Iraqis to determine when and under what circumstances foreign troops will withdraw. When the conditions are met, the troops will go. Bringing the Iraqi government into the process of deciding their own fate is essential to the success of any plan.

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**US withdrawal should be based on the ability of Iraqis to effectively substitute US forces**

Reuters 8 (Jul 8, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL0856283520080708>) LL

(Reuters) - Iraq will not accept any security agreement with the United States unless it includes dates for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the government's national security adviser said on Tuesday. But the government's spokesman said any timetable would depend on security conditions on the ground. Their differences underscore the debate in Baghdad over a deal with Washington that will provide a legal basis for U.S. troops to remain when a U.N. mandate expires at the end of the year. But Washington played down calls from Baghdad for a firm withdrawal deadline, saying both sought greater Iraqi security. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Tuesday he expected to pull more U.S. troops from Iraq and stressed any decision to withdraw would be based on the ability of Iraqi troops to take responsibility for security and combat. On Monday, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki suggested for the first time that a timetable be set for the departure of U.S. forces under the deal being negotiated, which he called a memorandum of understanding. National Security Adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubaie appeared to go further on Tuesday. "We can't have a memorandum of understanding with foreign forces unless it has dates and clear horizons determining the departure of foreign forces. We're unambiguously talking about their departure," he told reporters in Najaf after meeting Iraq's top Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. He said he had spoken to Sistani about the U.S. talks, but did not say if the cleric had an opinion on the negotiations. The revered cleric is routinely briefed on key national issues. "I informed the (clerical leaders) about some of the advances in the talks ... There is a big difference in outlook between us and the Americans," Rubaie said, adding Iraq's 500,000-strong security forces had greatly improved. Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, speaking on al-Hurra television, said it was an Iraqi demand to know when foreign forces would leave. "Will this be through a timetable, a timeframe or time horizon? It depends on the situation on the ground. I think this will determine the dates or will affect whether it is possible to put (the departure) under a timetable." A senior Shi'ite official added: "It is very soon to talk about details. The talks are in the early stages."

Stability is a prerequisite; Iraq needs the US

**Thompson 9** (Emily, UN Intermediate Peace Building Commission, Dec 5,

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gCkF4zpwRasJ:coloradomun.org/BG\_PeacebuildingIraq.doc+despite+the+assuredness+of+Mr.+Obama’s+words,+the+government+of+Iraq+still+lacks+stability,+and+it+is+possible&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) LL

Recently, Iraq has witnessed the initial removal of US troops beginning on June 30th, 2009. President Obama plainly stated earlier this year, “By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end,” although around 50,000 “advisors” will remain indefinitely. However, despite the assuredness of Mr. Obama’s words, the government of Iraq still lacks stability, and it is possible that US military forces may need to be implemented again in the future. While the pledge to withdrawal of troops pleased many Iraqis, many have also become increasingly worried about the strength of their government, and its ability to stand alone without US forces. Scheduled for January 16th, 2010, Iraqis will elect new political leaders. However, debate surrounding the date of the election has emerged, notably from Kurds who feel that their political opinions have not been addressed since they were expelled by Saddam Hussein.

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Conditions approach best; withdrawal should occur based on ground conditions; empirically, such processes have gone on without backlash

Reeson 9 (Greg, Associated Content, Mar 9,

<http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1547145/the_media_and_withdrawal_from_iraq.html?cat=9>) LL

An increasing number of reports coming out of Iraq indicate that the United States and the Maliki government are close to completing an agreement for the continued presence of U.S. forces. Reuters even reported August 25 that Prime Minister Maliki, in a speech to tribal sheiks in the Green Zone, has said a final agreement has been reached. Whether an agreement has been finalized or not, the outlines of the proposed pact, together with the caveat statements made by Iraqi officials, that have emerged thus far appear to be an acceptance of President Bush's demand for a conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces.  According to leaked details, the draft security agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and villages by June 30 of next year. It further calls for a departure of all U.S. forces from [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) by the end of 2011. Sticking points that are in the fine tuning stages of negotiation include legal immunity for U.S. troops in [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) and a few other lesser details. But putting talk of specific dates aside, the realities on the ground in [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) will dictate that the final agreement be conditions-based, and not beholden to a rigid timetable. Here's why.  First, to state the blatantly obvious, a conditions-based approach provides military commanders the flexibility to respond to long-term trends in the patterns of violence. Knowing they have the ability to reinforce, or reduce, troop levels as needed, military commanders can plan long-term strategies designed to ensure the security necessary for political progress. In short, it just makes good military sense.  Second, while Iraqi security forces continue to grow in both size and capability, they have a long way to go. Sectarian rivalries still exist within the ranks, and both equipment and competency shortfalls still need to be addressed. Even more importantly, Iraqi security forces lack strong officers and noncommissioned officers. Leaders take time to develop, and in the case of Iraq, where leadership positions under Saddam Hussein were awarded based on personal acquaintance and loyalty to Saddam, the United States literally started from scratch. And the Iraqi police, considered vital to the type of local, among-the-people interaction needed to combat an insurgency, are in even more need of assistance than the Iraqi Army. The training effort is ongoing, and progress is being made. To abandon the army and police forces before they are ready to provide security for the country is to doom Iraq to failed state status. Third, elections scheduled for later this year, or more likely for early next year, will put recent political accommodations to the test. U.S. and Iraqi forces have prepared for elections in the past by increasing the number of available troops to help head off increased levels of violence that often accompany struggles for power in developing states. Both U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to have the means at their disposal, in other words the ability to deploy security forces, to meet the challenges that will surely arise as a result of the elections. A fixed withdrawal timeline makes this impossible. Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life. Finally, Muqtada al-Sadr's intentions remain unclear. Sadr recently reorganized his Mahdi Army into a cultural wing to foster ties with the Iraqi people and an armed wing to continue the fight against U.S.-led forces. Sadr has been losing ground in Iraq in the wake of continuing offensives by U.S. and Iraqi forces, and he appears to be attempting to figure out a way to stay relevant. He is very popular among Iraq's Shi'a, largely due to a social services network modeled after Hezbollah's in Lebanon. But his continued absence from Iraq, ostensibly for religious studies in Iran, weakens his position and threatens his movement. The continued presence of U.S. forces, based on regular assessments of the security situation, allows the government of Iraq to continue to increase its capacity to deal with threats like al Sadr. As that capacity grows, the need for U.S. forces will diminish. None of this is new, even for the most casual of Iraq observers. But the fact remains that there are valid reasons for determining U.S. troop levels based on conditions, and not on time. Iraqi leaders know this, and their caveats when talking about timetables demonstrate their understanding of the realities on the ground. On August 22, The New York Times quoted Mohammad Hamoud, Iraq's chief negotiator, as saying the draft security pact contained provisions that allowed the "timetable" to be adjusted based on the security situation. The Times also quoted another senior Iraqi official as saying the dates in the pact were "prospective," and dependent on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. In another article last week, The Los Angeles Times quoted Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, as saying the dates in the proposed security agreement were "hypothetical," and that ultimately Iraqi national security interests would dictate the pace of any U.S. withdrawal. What's happening right now is that Iraqi leaders are tailoring their public statements in response to domestic political pressures while privately expressing

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Military Certification CP—Solvency

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a realistic understanding of the challenges they still face. Even Prime Minister Maliki, who has of late been stepping up his timetable rhetoric, has generally included caveats in his statements that include phrases like "conditions permitting," and "if conditions hold." There's nothing wrong with articulating goals, or "time horizons," or "aspirations." The Iraqi people don't want to be dependent on U.S. troops, and the United States needs to relieve some of the stress on its ground forces and free up assets for other global crises that will undoubtedly arise. But officials in both Iraq and the United States recognize what is at stake. And that's why a conditions-based approach to U.S. troop withdrawals will ultimately prevail, even if it contains adjustable dates.

Military Certification CP—Solvency

**Senior officials recommend US withdrawal from Iraq to be conditions based; Obama has pledged to consult with military officials**

Dreazen 8 (Yochi, The Wall Street Journal, Nov 18, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122696942306335651.html>) LL

WASHINGTON -- President-elect Barack Obama is facing an early confrontation with the Pentagon over the hot-button issue of how fast to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, with some senior officers arguing for a slower drawdown. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that the withdrawal should be driven solely by conditions on the ground in Iraq. The statement ran counter to Mr. Obama's frequent calls for a fixed timetable for a drawdown. "I do think it's important that it be conditions-based," Adm. Mullen said. "I certainly understand there are other options, and it's something that we look at all the time. But...from the military's perspective, I think it's best to be conditions-based." Adm. Mullen, the nation's top uniformed military officer, was quick to stress that he would carry out whatever orders he received from the new president next year. Still, the comments suggested that Mr. Obama may face a military establishment that deeply disagrees with one of his core policies. Brooke Anderson, a spokeswoman for the Obama transition team, said the president-elect remains committed to withdrawing all U.S. combat forces within 16 months of taking office. The comments from Adm. Mullen came a day after the Iraqi cabinet approved a long-debated security pact that would require U.S. forces to leave all of Iraq's cities by next summer in preparation for a full military withdrawal by the end of 2011. The "Status of Forces Agreement" between Washington and Baghdad is set to come to a vote in Iraq's fractious parliament next week. Senior U.S. officials expect the deal to pass overwhelmingly. If approved, the pact would begin winding down the U.S.-led war in Iraq -- a development that would be in keeping with Mr. Obama's repeated calls for American forces to leave Iraq by mid-2010. "As soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops," Mr. Obama said in an interview Sunday on CBS's "60 Minutes" television program. Many senior military officials agree with Mr. Obama's call to withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Iraq next year. They believe that the large U.S. military presence in Iraq is causing significant manpower strains on the armed forces and preventing needed reinforcements from being sent to Afghanistan, where conditions have worsened in recent months. Still, there is a fair amount of skepticism within the Pentagon about Mr. Obama's call to have all U.S. forces out of Iraq by 2010. In recent interviews, two high-ranking officers stated flatly that it would be logistically impossible to dismantle dozens of large U.S. bases there and withdraw the 150,000 troops now in Iraq so quickly. The officers said it would take close to three years for a full withdrawal and could take longer if the fighting resumed as American forces left the country. Adm. Mullen said he would advise Mr. Obama on the importance of allowing conditions on the ground in Iraq to dictate the pace and scale of the withdrawal. "What President-elect Obama has also said is that he would seek the counsel of myself and the Joint Chiefs before he made any decisions," he said. "I look forward to that discussion."

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Conditions based withdrawal is most strategic

Reuters 8 (Jul 26, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN26392694>) LL

July 26 (Reuters) - U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama said in an interview published on Saturday the size of a residual U.S. force left in Iraq after the withdrawal of combat troops would be "entirely conditions-based." In comments seized upon by the campaign of Republican rival John McCain, Obama told Newsweek Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recognized Iraq was "going to need our help for some time to come." "We're going to have to provide them with logistical support, intelligence support. We're going to have to have a very capable counterterrorism strike force," Obama told the magazine while approaching Paris during a high-profile foreign tour, which included stops in Iraq and Afghanistan. "We're going to have to continue to train their army and police to make them more effective," the Illinois senator added, calling such support consistent with his proposal for a 16-month timetable for withdrawing U.S. combat troops. Asked if he had a clearer idea after talks with diplomatic and military officials how big a force would need to be left behind for those tasks, Obama replied: "I do think that's entirely conditions-based. "It's hard to anticipate where we may be six months from now, or a year from now, or a year and a half from now." The McCain campaign said the comments were the latest shift in Obama's position on Iraq toward his opponent's view that troop withdrawals must be based on security conditions. "Barack Obama is ultimately articulating a position of sustained troop levels in Iraq based on the conditions on the ground and the security of the country. That is the very same position that John McCain has long held," said McCain spokesman Tucker Bounds.

Military Certification CP—**Net Benefit: Laundry List**

Premature withdrawal bad – Iraqi civil war, oil vulnerability, drop in US credibility, increases in terrorism, and humanitarian crisis result

Duclos 7 (Susan, Wake Up America, Jan 15, <http://wwwwakeupamericans-spree.blogspot.com/2007/01/if-we-withdrew-today.html>) LL

From the Heritage Foundation we have five likely outcomes of an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq: Consequence #1: An Army Up for Grabs. A sudden U.S. withdrawal would raise the risks of full-fledged civil war and disintegration of the army into hostile factions. The defection of soldiers to various militias, taking with them their heavy equipment, would bolster the militias’ firepower and capacity to seize and hold terrain. The result would be a bloody and protracted civil war such as the conflict in Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Consequence #2: Energy Uncertainty. Growing anarchy in Iraq and the possible breakup of the country into autonomous regions would severely affect Iraq’s oil exports. In 2005, Iraq produced about 1.9 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil and exported about 1.4 MBD. By June 2006, Iraqi oil production had risen to 2.5 MBD, and the govern ment hopes to increase production to 2.7 MBD by the end of the year. A U.S. withdrawal would undermine the security of oil pipelines and other facilities and increase the vulnerability of Iraqi oil production to sabotage. The resulting drop in Iraqi oil exports would increase the upward pressure on world oil prices in an already tight oil market. Energy uncertainty would be increased further if Iraq splintered and Iran gained domination over a Shia-dominated rump state in the oil-rich south. Consequence #3: Allies in Jeopardy. The chief beneficiary of a rapid U.S. pullout would be Iran, which has considerable influence over the dominant Shiite political parties, which represent most Iraqi Shiites: about 60–65 percent of the population. If Iraq imploded, Iran quickly could gain dominance over an emerging “Shiastan” rump state endowed with the bulk of Iraq’s oil reserves. This would give Iran additional resources and a staging area to escalate subversive efforts targeted at the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Shiite minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other countries look to the United States to serve as a guarantor against an aggressive Iran. If the United States fails to follow through on its commitment to establish a stable government in Iraq, it will severely undermine its credibility. Abandoning Iraqi allies would erode the confidence of other allies in U.S. leadership and further fuel conspiracy theories about American plots to carve up Iraq to keep Arabs weak and divided. Consequence #4: Al-Qaeda Triumphant. Osama bin Laden would trumpet an abrupt U.S. withdrawal as a victory for al-Qaeda and proof that America is a “paper tiger,” just as he claimed after the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. An unstable, failed state in Iraq would also provide al-Qaeda and other radical groups with a sanctuary for recruiting a new generation of suicide bombers and a strategically located staging area for deploying terrorists for attacks on Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere around the world. The recently declassi fied “key judgments” of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” pointed out that a perceived victory for jihadists in Iraq would boost their strength and ability to threaten Americans. Consequence #5: A Humanitarian Catastrophe. Iraq is a mosaic of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal sub groups. Baghdad and other major cities include sig­nificant intermingling of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other Christians. Instability and civil war would put many of these people to flight, creating a vast humanitarian crisis that would dwarf those seen in Bosnia and Kosovo and rival the scenes of horror and pri vation witnessed in Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, and Sudan. Not only would Iraqis be put at risk of disease, starvation, and violence, but with the gov ernment unable to meet their basic needs, the Iraqi refugees would fall under the control of the sectar ian militias, turning Iraq into Lebanon on steroids.

Military Certification CP—**Net Benefit: Laundry List**

Premature withdrawal could lead to escalating tensions, as the Iraqi forces will not yet be prepared to deal with security threats

Thompson 8 (Mark, The New York Times, Nov 18, [http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859955,00.html#ixzz0svyOTmMn](http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0%2C8599%2C1859955%2C00.html#ixzz0svyOTmMn)) LL

The Pentagon, after pushing for nearly a year for new rules governing the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, is already back-pedaling. On the one hand, the agreement between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi cabinet — which still requires a potentially contentious vote of approval by the Iraqi parliament — simply codifies a U.S. redeployment already in the making. But the agreement's hard deadline for the removal of all U.S. troops by the end of 2011 represent a significant retreat for a Bush Administration that has long opposed setting a timetable for withdrawal. And it also poses a challenge for the U.S. military. Despite the agreement on a timetable for withdrawal, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, on Monday stressed he still wants U.S. troops withdrawn only when security conditions warrant it. Under the status of forces agreement (SOFA) approved by Washington and the Iraqi cabinet, U.S. troop withdrawals will accelerate in the months ahead until all of the 150,000 U.S. troops now in Iraq will will be gone by New Year's Day 2012, leaving behind only a Marine guard unit of the type that protects U.S. embassies all over the world. Like kids getting set to take a roller coaster ride, the U.S. military is about to forfeit a lot of control over their fate in Iraq in the next three years. (See pictures of five years of U.S. troops in Iraq) Speaking from Baghdad on Monday, Army Colonel John Hort of the 4th Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team, said that the SOFA simply recognizes what is already happening inside Iraq. "We're kind of already moving in that direction — even prior to the SOFA — with the Iraqi army taking more and more responsibility, more and more of the lead, particularly the targeting of the bad people," Hort told Pentagon reporters in a video press conference. "So I don't see a significant change." Admiral Mullen said Monday that he believes sufficient Iraqi forces will be trained by 2012 to assume responsibility for all of Iraq's security. While most of Iraq is now under the control of the Iraqi military, Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul remain under U.S. control. Turning the capital over to Iraqi security forces "will be a big challenge," Mullen said, and "we continue to be in a pretty tough fight up in Mosul." The SOFA deal, which creates a legal basis for foreign forces to remain in Iraq beyond the December 31 deadline when the current U.N. mandate expires, not only sets a three-year deadline for U.S. troops to leave Iraq; it also requires that they leave Iraq's cities by June 30 of next year. The troops would redeploy to bases in the countryside, from which they could be called into action to support Iraqi security forces, as they currently do across much of Iraq. The SOFA also gives Iraq expanded legal jurisdiction when serious crimes are committed by U.S. troops who are off-base and off-duty — a rare circumstance for American troops in Iraq. The U.S. has also agreed not to attack Iraq's neighbors from inside Iraq — a key provision in persuading the many allies of Iran in the Iraqi government to support the agreement — and to refrain from searching Iraqi homes or detaining Iraqis without their government's approval. Hort said some of his forces in Baghdad would "probably have to push more out towards the perimeter of the city, but I think that we can work through all of that." Still, Pentagon officials continue to express concern about the ability of the Iraqi military to keep the peace as the Americans pull out. Deep historical animosities among Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurdish groups remain, and local troops loyal to a specific sect won't be as capable of defusing tensions, U.S. officials fear. But Hort said that the Iraqi military "has got a tremendous amount of confidence in themselves, and is doing more and more each and every day that we work with them."

Military Certification CP—**Net Benefit: Stability**

Instability leads to collapse

**Arraf 10** (Jane, Christian Science Monitor, May 11, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/11/93955/latest-iraq-attacks-expose-security.html) LL

BAGHDAD, Iraq — Iraqi security forces and citizens were on edge Tuesday after a string of attacks that has raised fears of heightened instability, perhaps culminating in governmental collapse, and sparked accusations that the government has become too consumed with forming a coalition to be able to protect its citizens. Iraqi officials immediately blamed Al Qaida in Iraq for the violence Tuesday, which killed more than 100 people in the deadliest day in Iraq this year. The U.S. State Department said the attacks would "undermine the confidence the Iraqi people have demonstrated in their government and their security forces." The attacks appear to have not only undermined Iraqi confidence in their security forces but the security forces' confidence in their government. Many Iraqis, including policeman and soldiers, say they believe their own politicians are behind the attacks. "I can't speak badly about security because I don't want to spoil the image of the security services, but to tell you the truth, it is not good," said a policeman near the site of one of the checkpoint attacks. "This is a struggle for power - none of the citizens are blindfolded - we can all see and understand the situation. I blame the government for this."

Military Certification CP—Net Benefit: Terrorism

US withdrawal opens the possibility for al Qaeda resurgence

Reeson 9 (Greg, Associated Content, Nov 22, <http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2419054/iraq_al_qaeda_gaining_strength.html?cat=9>) LL

The Washington Post reported November 22 that al Qaeda in Iraq has regained some of its strength and is now trying to inflict damage to the Iraqi government as U.S. military forces prepared to withdraw from the country. The Post says, "The group asserted responsibility for four powerful bombings that targeted five government buildings in Baghdad in August and October -- the deadliest attacks directed at the government in more than six years of war. Authorities say al-Qaeda in Iraq intends to carry out additional high-profile attacks in the months ahead and is attempting to regain its foothold in former strongholds just outside the capital. "The strategy represents a shift in tactics from the group's efforts to kindle the kind of sectarian violence that brought Iraq to the brink of anarchy in 2007. The group suffered major setbacks after the 'surge' in U.S. troops to Iraq that year, but American and Iraqi officials say that al-Qaeda in Iraq has found more recent success by enlisting other groups in an effort aimed at undermining elections scheduled for January and the formation of a new government." I suspect we'll see some power plays from other groups as well. If competing factions expect U.S. military forces to withdraw, they will inevitably jockey for position in a post-U.S. occupied Iraq. The Maliki government may or may not survive. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army will probably make a move at some point, with or without his return from Iran. Going back to al Qaeda in Iraq, The Post says, "Although the group has lost many top leaders, funding sources and popular support, it stands to gain from a deeply split political establishment, growing Sunni resentment toward the Shiite-led government, disjointed Iraqi security agencies and the diminishing ability of U.S. forces to engage in combat operations in Iraq. 'They're still capable of conducting singular high-profile attacks,' Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said. What was once a foreign-led terrorist organization is now a mostly Iraqi network of small, roving cells that continue to rely on the flow of fighters and weapons smuggled through the Syrian border, albeit at a slower rate, U.S. and Iraqi officials say." One personal note here: the Syrian border has been a problem since day one of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The Assad government has taken minimal steps, and even then only when pressed by the U.S. government, to stop the flow of foreign fighters across its border with Iraq. Of course, Syria denies that there is a problem. The Post continues, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq came to control large parts of the country between 2005 and 2008. The group is the largest within the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella organization that seeks to turn Iraq into an Islamic republic run by Sunnis. The U.S. troop surge in 2007 and the creation of American-funded Sunni paramilitary groups left al-Qaeda in Iraq reeling, as scores of its leaders were killed or detained. But after the provincial election in Iraq this year, al-Qaeda offered an olive branch to other Sunni extremist groups, issuing a message that even went as far as extending 'a hand of forgiveness' to those who worked with the Americans."

Military Certification CP—AT: Perm

Mutually exclusive – 1ac shouldn’t be able to sever from the conditional nature of the plan (severance bad theory)

Competes through the net benefits – perm still links

Perm links to the terrorism net benefit

Reeson 9 (Greg, Associated Content, Nov 22, <http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2419054/iraq_al_qaeda_gaining_strength.html?cat=9>) LL

Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life.

Ground conditions outweigh political agendas – Iraq failure is comparatively devastating

Cordesmann and Mausner 9 (Anthony and Adam, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Aug 12, http://csis.org/publication/withdrawal-iraq-0) LL

Iraq and the United States face a critical transition through 2011 and beyond. The awkward reality is that an Iraqi-U.S. failure to properly manage the U.S. withdrawal and the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is as serious a threat to Iraq's future stability and security as any internal or external threat. Realism is a key to future success. The improvement in ISF capabilities is very real, and Iraqi forces are experiencing growing success in combat. But they are still very much a work in progress, and many Iraqi and U.S. politicians still seem unaware of how much remains to be done. U.S. forces play a critical role in developing the effectiveness of the ISF, providing stability in areas with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions and helping Iraq achieve political accommodation and more effective governance. Through detailed analyses of Iraqi force capabilities, augmented by on-site interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military officials, the authors conclude that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq needs to be conditions-based, not tied to political timelines. Both Iraqi and U.S. leaders need to be careful about exaggerating Iraqi capabilities and the speed with which the United States can safely withdraw its forces and advisory teams. Conditions for success include realistic and fully resourced plans for the ISF's development; candid and accurate measures of ISF capabilities; and careful assessments of the overall level of security, stability, and political accommodation in Iraq. After years of destructive conflict, Iraq now has the chance, however tenuous, to become a stable and prosperous country. The United States, say the authors, will be judged far more by the way it leaves and what it leaves behind than by the way it entered and how it fought the counterinsurgency campaign.

Military Certification CP—AT: Perm

Conditions approach best; withdrawal should occur based on ground conditions; empirically, such processes have gone on without backlash

Reeson 9 (Greg, Associated Content, Mar 9,

<http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1547145/the_media_and_withdrawal_from_iraq.html?cat=9>) LL

An increasing number of reports coming out of Iraq indicate that the United States and the Maliki government are close to completing an agreement for the continued presence of U.S. forces. Reuters even reported August 25 that Prime Minister Maliki, in a speech to tribal sheiks in the Green Zone, has said a final agreement has been reached. Whether an agreement has been finalized or not, the outlines of the proposed pact, together with the caveat statements made by Iraqi officials, that have emerged thus far appear to be an acceptance of President Bush's demand for a conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces. According to leaked details, the draft security agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and villages by June 30 of next year. It further calls for a departure of all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. Sticking points that are in the fine tuning stages of negotiation include legal immunity for U.S. troops in Iraq and a few other lesser details. But putting talk of specific dates aside, the realities on the ground in Iraq will dictate that the final agreement be conditions-based, and not beholden to a rigid timetable. Here's why. First, to state the blatantly obvious, a conditions-based approach provides military commanders the flexibility to respond to long-term trends in the patterns of violence. Knowing they have the ability to reinforce, or reduce, troop levels as needed, military commanders can plan long-term strategies designed to ensure the security necessary for political progress. In short, it just makes good military sense. Second, while Iraqi security forces continue to grow in both size and capability, they have a long way to go. Sectarian rivalries still exist within the ranks, and both equipment and competency shortfalls still need to be addressed. Even more importantly, Iraqi security forces lack strong officers and noncommissioned officers. Leaders take time to develop, and in the case of Iraq, where leadership positions under Saddam Hussein were awarded based on personal acquaintance and loyalty to Saddam, the United States literally started from scratch. And the Iraqi police, considered vital to the type of local, among-the-people interaction needed to combat an insurgency, are in even more need of assistance than the Iraqi Army. The training effort is ongoing, and progress is being made. To abandon the army and police forces before they are ready to provide security for the country is to doom Iraq to failed state status. Third, elections scheduled for later this year, or more likely for early next year, will put recent political accommodations to the test. U.S. and Iraqi forces have prepared for elections in the past by increasing the number of available troops to help head off increased levels of violence that often accompany struggles for power in developing states. Both U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to have the means at their disposal, in other words the ability to deploy security forces, to meet the challenges that will surely arise as a result of the elections. A fixed withdrawal timeline makes this impossible. Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life. Finally, Muqtada al-Sadr's intentions remain unclear. Sadr recently reorganized his Mahdi Army into a cultural wing to foster ties with the Iraqi people and an armed wing to continue the fight against U.S.-led forces. Sadr has been losing ground in Iraq in the wake of continuing offensives by U.S. and Iraqi forces, and he appears to be attempting to figure out a way to stay relevant. He is very popular among Iraq's Shi'a, largely due to a social services network modeled after Hezbollah's in Lebanon. But his continued absence from Iraq, ostensibly for religious studies in Iran, weakens his position and threatens his movement. The continued presence of U.S. forces, based on regular assessments of the security situation, allows the government of Iraq to continue to increase its capacity to deal with threats like al Sadr. As that capacity grows, the need for U.S. forces will diminish. None of this is new, even for the most casual of Iraq observers. But the fact remains that there are valid reasons for determining U.S. troop levels based on conditions, and not on time. Iraqi leaders know this, and their caveats when talking about timetables demonstrate their understanding of the realities on the ground. On August 22, The New York Times quoted Mohammad Hamoud, Iraq's chief negotiator, as saying the draft security pact contained provisions that allowed the "timetable" to be adjusted based on the security situation. The Times also quoted another senior Iraqi official as saying the dates in the pact were "prospective," and dependent on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. In another article last week, The Los Angeles Times quoted Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, as saying the dates in the proposed security agreement were "hypothetical," and that ultimately Iraqi national security interests would dictate the pace of any U.S. withdrawal. What's happening right now is that Iraqi leaders are tailoring their public statements in response to domestic political pressures while privately expressing a realistic understanding of the challenges they still face. Even Prime Minister Maliki, who has of late been stepping up his timetable rhetoric, has generally included caveats in his statements that include phrases like "conditions permitting," and "if conditions hold." There's nothing wrong with articulating goals, or "time horizons," or "aspirations." The Iraqi people don't want to be dependent on U.S. troops, and the United States needs to relieve some of the stress on its ground forces and free up assets for other global crises that will undoubtedly arise. But officials in both Iraq and the United States recognize what is at stake. And that's why a conditions-based approach to U.S. troop withdrawals will ultimately prevail, even if it contains adjustable dates.

Military Certification CP—Unconditional Withdrawal Bad

Unconditional withdrawal fails – empirically proven

**UNSC 9** (United Nations Security Council, July 30, www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG\_Report\_S\_2009\_393\_EN.pdf) LL

In continuation of the implementation phase of the bilateral security agreement, the United States military redeployed from urban areas on 30 June 2009, a day marked as a national holiday, Iraqi Sovereignty Day, leaving the Iraqi security forces with overall domestic security responsibilities. Al-Qaeda and other extremist elements conducted a series of high-profile mass casualty attacks across the country during the transition period. There was a series of car bomb attacks across Baghdad, including an attack on 24 June that killed 62 civilians and injured 150 others in Sadr City and several similar attacks around Kirkuk and Mosul. Those attacks are indicative of continued efforts by the extremist elements not only to test the capability of the Iraqi security forces but to undermine public confidence in the Government to enact its sovereign role in protecting its citizens.

Unconditional withdrawal leads to conflict escalation

**AP 10** (May 12, http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/05/12/us-reconsidering-pace-of-iraq-troop-withdrawal-over-worries-of-political-instability-34764/) LL

BAGHDAD — Worries over violence fueled by Iraq’s political instability have forced U.S. commanders to reconsider the pace of a major pullout this summer without overstepping a deadline to cut the military’s presence by nearly half by the end of August. Under a plan by the top U.S. commander in Iraq, the military was to begin significant pullouts in May to meet President Barack Obama’s goal of 50,000 troops in country by August 31. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior military official at the Pentagon with knowledge of the military’s plans tell The Associated Press that the major drawdown is not expected to begin until June at the earliest. They spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. If the US removes its troops too early the Iraqi government won’t be stable enough to control conflicts, which will rapidly escalate.

\*\*\*A2: Military Certification CP

A2: Military Certification CP—Stability Now

Iraq is stable now – ready for US withdraw

**VOA News 10** (Apr 9, http://www1.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-Condemns-Iraq-Bombings-90593389.html) LL

Bombs tore through apartment buildings and a market in mostly Shiite areas of Baghdad on April 5th, killing 50. The attacks appeared to be an attempt by al-Qaida in Iraq or other extremists to exploit a power vacuum during the lengthy negotiations to form a new government. About 120 people have been killed in and around the capital over the past several weeks. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Forces in Iraq strongly condemn these latest terrorist attacks against innocent civilians. The U.S. especially deplores the targeting of foreign diplomatic missions in Baghdad, and expresses its solidarity with its diplomatic colleagues who are in Iraq to help the Iraqi people. "Despite the ruthless killings of innocent Iraqis," said U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill and General Ray Odierno in a joint statement, "we feel confident that the forward progress of Iraq will continue. Notwithstanding these attempts at intimidation, we believe Iraqis will not be deterred from working towards a stable, sovereign and self-reliant Iraq. And Iraq's friends will help them." The government of Iraq and Iraq security forces have the lead in investigating these incidents and are working hard to prevent future attacks. The U.S. stands ready to provide support to the government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces as requested. Iraq has just completed a very credible election process. It is now critical that the various parties complete the challenging task of building a coalition government -- one that can respond to the needs and aspirations of the Iraqi people. The overwhelming majority of the Iraqis rejects sectarian violence and wants a democratic government that can provide peace and security. The U.S. and the Iraqi Security Forces have worked tirelessly to combat terrorism and restore stability and relative peace in Iraq. Those responsible for these attacks seek to create chaos and uncertainty to prevent Iraqis from building a peaceful and prosperous society. They must not be allowed to succeed.

A2: Military Certification CP—Rapid Withdrawal Key

Rapid withdrawal is key to long term success

**Nuttle 10** (David, Helium, June 16, http://www.www.helium.com/items/1131677-how-to-plan-the-us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq) LL

In order for the Iraqi government to gain support from their divided population, they must call for a time-table for the U.S. to withdraw troops. No Iraqi I know of wants U.S. troops in Iraq any longer than needed to give Iraqi forces the training and means necessary to provide their nation with a reasonable degree of security. A failure to now schedule U.S. troop withdrawal would harm the political viability of the Iraq government. As Americans we should not view Iraqi actions as ingratitude. We need to keep in mind that U.S. forces have made hundreds of significant mistakes, in Iraq. For the most, part we have not made ourselves popular with the Iraqi populations. Our forces entered Iraq trained, equipped, and prepared to fight a conventional war. With the exception of a few of our special operations units, our forces were not trained, equipped, or prepared to undertake sustained counterterror, counterinsurgency, civic action, and/or homeland security efforts. All too often we countered attacks with excessive conventional military force causing damage to our rapport building efforts with local populations.

A2: Military Certification CP—Unconditional Withdrawal Good

Unconditional withdrawal is key to long term stability and solvency

**National Security Network 10** (Apr 20, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1577) LL

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces - which remains on track - is the best vehicle for building a long-term, strategic relationship with Iraq and its people. General Odierno explained yesterday that the U.S. is on target for withdrawal, saying "I feel very comfortable with us going down to 50,000 as the Iraqi security forces significantly continue to increase their capacities and capabilities." In an interview with Fox News this weekend, Odierno went into greater detail: "...we are on target to be at 50,000 by August. We will still have formations here that are able to train combat formations. We'll still be able to conduct counterterrorism operations. We'll still be able to support provincial reconstruction teams. We're at about 95,000 today, Chris, so I - our plans are intact. I feel very comfortable with our plan. And unless something unforeseen and disastrous happens, I fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the 1st of September." The Center for American Progress's Brian Katulis explains why the withdrawal must take place, pointing out that "Iraq's leaders demanded a clear timeline for troop withdrawals in its negotiations with the Bush administration, and there are strong political actors in Iraq who are demanding an end to what they view as an ‘occupation.'" Katulis adds that, "Not moving forward with the planned troop drawdown because of protracted political negotiations in Baghdad makes little strategic sense for broader U.S. national security." Withdrawal is also the best means of solidifying a strategic relationship with the Iraqi people. As Marc Lynch wrote recently, withdrawal "doesn't mean ignoring Iraq." What it does mean, according to Lynch, is "moving to develop a normal, constructive strategic relationship with the new Iraqi government, with the main point of contact the Embassy and the private sector rather than the military, and adhering in every way possible to the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and to the drawdown timeline."

\*\*\*Regional Framework CP

Regional Framework CP—1NC Shell

Text: The United States federal government should offer <the plan> if and only if Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia agree to create a regional security framework for resolving the conflict in Iraq, through the United Nations.

Regional negotiations solve- neighbors willing to negotiate for a stable Iraq

US Institute of Peace 3 (Think tank, 6/30, http://www.usip.org/newsroom/news/iraqs-neighbors-help-or-hindrance) my

WASHINGTON—American-led reconstruction efforts in Iraq have intensified, but the current focus on internal issues neglects the important role Iraq's neighbors will play in determining the ultimate success and stability of postwar Iraq. Neighboring governments in Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have complex interests at stake in Iraq and varied concerns about the U.S. military presence. The United States faces a two-pronged political challenge in Iraq: not only creating a new democratic government, but overturning a longstanding domestic balance of power between various ethnic and sectarian groups. In order to succeed at the latter challenge, America must attend to the views of Iraq's neighbors, who might use this interim period to press their advantages or protect their interests by fomenting discord among Iraq's diverse groups or by lending support to one or another faction. Over the past several months, the U.S. Institute of Peace has held a series of informal meetings with expert analysts and diplomats from the countries bordering Iraq. The aim of these meetings was to understand regional issues and interests in Iraq, and how Iraq's neighbors regard the U.S. presence in Iraq and U.S.-led reconstruction efforts there. The views summarized below reflect the findings drawn from these meetings. The views summarized below reflect the discussion at the meeting; they do not represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies. Neighbors to U.S.: Don't Stay Too Long—But Don't Leave Too Soon While each of Iraq's neighbors has its own interests in Iraq (summarized below), all are concerned about the U.S. military presence in Iraq and would prefer that it not be prolonged. This view is even stronger among general publics than among elites and governments. At the same time, there is general recognition that a peremptory American withdrawal before a stable interim Iraqi authority is in place would be disastrous, not only for Iraq, but for the region as a whole. Moreover, given Iraq's history of tensions with its neighbors, and the parochial agendas each of the neighbors has pursued in the country, there is little question that an American-British occupation is more acceptable and less humiliating to Iraqis today than would be an administration run by Arabs or other Muslims. Identify the Neighbors' Role in Reconstruction The neighboring states would be more comfortable engaging with an interim Iraqi administration than with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), but each is busily identifying economic opportunities in postwar Iraq and seeking multilateral cover for engagement with a still-occupied Iraq. Concerns over potential meddling by the neighbors has made the United States hesitant to plan how these states could put their varied interests in Iraq to good use in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. But the CPA should exploit opportunities for constructive engagement. All the neighbors, for example, have strong interests in Iraq's territorial integrity, and their efforts can be harnessed to promote the success of intra-Iraqi negotiations on this delicate but crucial issue

Regional Framework CP—1NC Shell

A regional solution provides a forum for Iran and keeps it in line

Pascual and O’Hanlon 7 (Carlos and Michael, director and senior fellow at Brookings, 1/21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0121iraq\_pascual.aspx)

All that said, a very sober and clear-eyed case remains for regional diplomacy, involving not only Iran, Iraq, Syria and the United States but Turkey, the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and the European Union and U.N. This would not be diplomacy in the sense of trading favors with friendly states, all of which basically share common interests. Rather, it would be a savvier, realpolitik type of negotiation designed as much to pressure Iran as to ask for its help, as much to convey our resolve to remain a Persian Gulf power as to plead for assistance in dealing with the mess in Iraq. To be specific, there are three main hard-headed reasons to convene an ongoing regional diplomatic process over Iraq, even if we should not expect breakthroughs as a result. First, such a process will allow the United States and its allies to disabuse Iran of any belief it can drive us out of the region through a defeat in Iraq. Second, it will at least marginally elicit greater help from some countries -- if not in terms of deploying troops to Iraq, then at least in terms of accepting refugees, providing economic aid, and so forth. Third, and more subtlely, it will create a mechanism that might be useful in the future, when the environment is riper for a peace deal within Iraq -- or, heaven forbid, when the danger of Iraq's civil war mutating into a regional conflagration has grown. As to conveying resolve, Tehran may believe that with its large population, the recent successes of its partners in places like Lebanon, its burgeoning nuclear capabilities and developments in Iraq, it is positioned to become the region's great power through combined charismatic appeal, economic weight and military might. To some extent it would become the champion of Muslims throughout the broader region; to some extent it would usher in what Vali Nasr calls the Shia Revival, at the expense of other states. But most other Middle East countries are nervous about Iran. While hardly spoiling for a fight, they want to show resolve in the face of Iran's rise. Regional diplomacy would allow numerous countries to send Iran the message that, whatever may happen in Iraq, their partnerships with the United States will endure. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has just worked with some of America's key regional partners to send such a message. But a one-time effort is not enough, and the message might transmit better with Iran also in the same room. If Iran comes to realize the United States is in the region for the long haul, its thinking about Iraq may shift at least slightly, and its interest in fomenting mayhem there may decline somewhat.

**Bargaining with Iran can solve prolif**

Leverett 6 (Flynt, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, American Century Foundation Report, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett\_diplomatic.pdf)

The United States needs a comprehensive and strategically coherent diplomatic approach to dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The threats that Iran poses to U.S. interests—including the proliferation risks associated with its nuclear activities—have grown more acute in the post–September 11 period, and Tehran’s ability to impede America’s pursuit of important policy objectives in the Middle East and in the war on terror is steadily increasing. American options for leveraging changes in Iranian behavior through multilateral sanctions, slowing the development of Iran’s nuclear capabilities by attacking its nuclear infrastructure, or resolving Iranian threats to U.S. interests by promoting regime change in Tehran are strategically weak and potentially dysfunctional for other important policy goals. This paper lays out a comprehensive strategy for diplomatic engagement with Iran. The paper’s core argument is that successful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue requires a “grand bargain” between the United States and Iran—that is, an overarching framework in which outstanding bilateral differences are resolved as a package. Any incremental, issue-by-issue or step-bystep approach to engagement with Iran will fail. Moreover, while some would wish otherwise, at the heart of a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain there will need to be an American security guarantee to the Islamic Republic. However, under the rubric of a grand bargain, the United States would gain—among other benefits— strategically meaningful limits on Iran’s nuclear activities, termination of its support for terrorism, and Iranian cooperation in stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq. U.S.-Iranian rapprochement also could provide the foundation for establishing a regional security framework in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East more broadly.

Regional Framework CP—1NC Shell

Iranian prolif ushers in a new era of Middle Eastern proliferation and nuclear war

Allison ‘06 [Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Boston Globe, March 12, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1525/nightmare\_this\_time.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F20213%2Fway\_forward\_on\_missile\_defense)

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change warned in December 2004 that current developments in Iran and North Korea threatened to erode the entire nonproliferation regime to a point of 'irreversibility" that could trigger a 'cascade of proliferation." If Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could produce the first multiparty nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition between the US and USSR. Given Egypt's historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The International Atomic Energy Agency's reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased secretly in the 1980s, few in the American intelligence community would be surprised. Given its role as the major financier of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. In 1962, bilateral competition between the US and the Soviet Union led to the Cuban missile crisis, which historians now call 'the most dangerous moment in human history." After the crisis, President Kennedy estimated the likelihood of nuclear war as 'between 1 in 3 and even." A multiparty nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette with five bullets in a six-chamber revolver-dramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war

Regional Framework CP—Solvency

Regional diplomacy solves- neighbors want to establish a unified stable Iraq

Blanchard 9 (Christopher, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 10/6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33793.pdf) my

While continuing to suggest that U.S. decisions about the timing and scope of troop withdrawals remain conditions based, the Obama Administration has built its policy toward Iraq on the assumption that sequential reductions in U.S. forces over time and the continued building and training of Iraq’s security forces are likely to produce a central government able to defend itself. Some critics contend that, security improvements notwithstanding, the United States has not, to date, accomplished its primary goal—to translate improved security conditions into the achievement of political reconciliation among Iraq’s key communities—and that any security gains therefore remain tenuous. Some of Iraq’s neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, appear to share this perspective and continue to support an active role for U.S. forces in Iraq, while others, like Iran and Syria, remain concerned about the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq as a potential threat. Section 1 of the Iraqi-U.S. Strategic Framework Agreement and Article 27 of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) state that “The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.”6 In considering longer-term possibilities for Iraq’s stability and unity, the United States and Iraq’s neighbors are seeking to determine and influence “which Iraq” will emerge from the current period of transition. Faced with the prospect of destabilizing violence in Iraq or terrorist threats from Iraq-based entities, such as the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Iraq’s neighbors may welcome and seek to promote the establishment of a strong central government in Iraq and oppose federal arrangements that could leave local security responsibilities in the hands of weaker or potentially less responsive regional actors. On the other hand, some analysts have argued that the “demonstration effect” of a united, democratic Iraq in which Islamist political parties, Shiites, and ethnic minority groups are represented in government and are allowed to participate freely would create political pressure on neighboring countries, where similar parties and groups do not enjoy comparable rights or privileges. A stable Iraq, its neighbors, and the United States also will need to reconcile several outstanding differences in order to define the new Iraqi government’s role in the region’s economic and strategic environment. Long-term questions about key issues remain unresolved and could prove to be divisive, such as: • Iraq’s participation in OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council;7 • Iraq’s future ability to project military force beyond its borders; • the presence in Iraq after 2011 of U.S. or other military bases or personnel; and • Iraq’s sovereign economic, political, and military relations with regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and with global powers such as China and Russia.

Regional Framework CP—Solvency

Long history of regional negotiation ensures familiarity and solvency

Blanchard 9 (Christopher, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 10/6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33793.pdf) my

From early 2003 through early 2007, the United States engaged regularly with Iraq’s neighbors, with the exception of Syria and Iran, on Iraq-related issues of common concern.93 U.S.-supported diplomatic efforts include the international conference on Iraq that was held in November 2004, in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, which included high-level representatives from Iraq, its key neighbors (including Iran and Syria), the G-8, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.94 Select multilateral fora, such as the meetings of the U.N.-sponsored International Compact for Iraq, also provided opportunities for U.S. officials to hear from and potentially interact with Iraq’s neighbors, including their Iranian and Syrian counterparts. During the Bush Administration, engagement efforts also focused on a series of ministerial conferences of Iraq’s neighbors: the last was held in April 2008 in Kuwait. Iraq is now a member of what the U.S. government refers to as the “GCC plus three” group, which includes the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council plus Jordan and Egypt. The group met in New York in September 2009. U.S. engagement with Syria and Iran on matters pertaining to Iraq has grown since early 2007. U.S. dialogue with Syria began when then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam in May 2007 at the International Compact for Iraq meeting in Sharm el Shaykh; the Obama Administration has continued and expanded this dialogue since March 2009. As described above, the Bush Administration also opened discussions with Iranian government representatives regarding Iraq, and a working group chaired by the U.S. and Iranian ambassadors to Iraq met periodically in Baghdad. The key questions with regard to diplomatic outreach proposals remain: how much political and material support will Iraq’s neighbors be willing to provide to sustain the implementation of Iraqi reconciliation arrangements; and, which Iraqis will be willing to cooperate with regionally supported initiatives? Statements agreed to and commitments made by Iraqis and their neighbors in regional conferences held since 2003 generally have not been implemented, although as security conditions have improved, some neighboring states have expanded their engagement with Iraq.

Regional Framework CP—Solvency - Iran

Iran would negotiate and say yes to withdrawal by timetable- wants unified Iraq and hiding nuclear program

Friedman and Bhalla 7 (George, political scientist, and Reva, director of Stratfor, 5/16, http://www.stratfor.com/united\_states\_iran\_and\_iraq\_negotiation\_process) my

Iran does not want an abrupt withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq for fear this would lead to reshuffling the cards and redistributing power. Instead, there should be a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from Iraqi cities and relocation at bases and camps inside Iraq, provided the Iraqi forces have reached the point at which they can provide security. The Iranians also stated that they would extend all possible assistance so that foreign forces could exit “honorably” from Iraq. The U.S. decision to surge more troops into Iraq forced Iran to think twice about placing its bets on a complete U.S. withdrawal. An abrupt withdrawal without a negotiated settlement leaves more problems than Tehran can manage in terms of containing Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions, and Iran does not want to be left to pick up the pieces in a country that is already on the verge of shattering along sectarian lines. It is important to note that Iran is not calling for a complete withdrawal from Iraq, and actually acknowledges that U.S. forces will be relocated at bases and camps inside the country. Though this acts as a blocker to Iranian ambitions, the presence of U.S. bases also provides Iran with a stabilizing force placating the Sunnis and Kurds. Moreover, the Iranians are sending assurances to the United States that they are willing to cooperate so the Iraq withdrawal does not look like another Vietnam scenario for the U.S. administration to deal with at home. 2. Iran is “strongly opposed to all attempts to partition Iraq or impose a federal system that allows for regional autonomy.” No region should be allowed to monopolize the resources in its territory and deprive other regions of the revenues from these resources. Iran is essentially saying that Tehran and Washington have a common desire to see a unified Iraq. The U.S. insistence on a unified Iraq takes into account Sunni concerns of being left with the largely oil-barren central region of the country. Iran is signaling that it is not interested in seeing Iraq get split up, even if such a scenario leaves Tehran with the second-best option of securing influence in a Shiite-dominated, oil-rich southern autonomous zone. 3. Iran wants a plan, involving the Kurds and Sunnis, drawn up to root out the transnational jihadist forces allied with al Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni tribes should also assume the responsibility of confronting jihadists, whether they are Iraqi citizens or are from other Arab and Muslim countries. In this demand, Iran and the United States share a common goal. The jihadists will use every attempt to sow sectarian strife in Iraq to prevent a political resolution from developing. The United States does not want to provide al Qaeda with a fertile base of operations, and Iran does not want its ideological nemesis gaining ground next door and working against Shiite interests. 4. Iran clearly states that the negotiations over Iraq cannot be separated from other regional issues and Tehran’s nuclear file. STRATFOR has extensively discussed the nexus between Iran’s nuclear agenda and its blueprint for Iraq. Iran is trying to link the nuclear issue to its dealings with the United States on Iraq as a sort of insurance policy. Iran does not want to reach an agreement on Iraq and then leave the nuclear issue to be dealt with down the road, when the United States is in a stronger position to take action against Tehran. Iran basically is looking for a deal allowing it voluntarily to agree to freeze uranium enrichment in exchange for political concessions over Iraq, but without it having to dismantle its program. That would leave enough room to skirt sanctions and preserve the nuclear program for its long-term interests. Washington is not exactly amenable to this idea, which is what makes this a major sticking point. The United States already has made it clear that it is leaving the nuclear issue out of the Iraq discussions

Regional Framework CP—Solvency- Turkey

Turkey wants to create a stable and unified Iraq post withdrawal and would engage in negotiations

Blanchard 9 (Christopher, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 10/6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33793.pdf) my

the aftermath of the war, Turkey has sought a stable, democratic, and unified Iraq. Foremost, Turkish officials desire an Iraq that retains its territorial integrity, without being dismembered or dominated by any ethnic or sectarian group, an outcome they view as key to regional stability. They have some concern, mainly voiced in private, that Iran could gain control over a Shiite dominated Iraq. They also are apprehensive that a U.S. military withdrawal will lead to chaos in Iraq and the region. In order to avoid that outcome, Turkey has established a dialogue with and encouraged all Iraqi parties to resolve problems through reconciliation and negotiation and to participate in the Baghdad government. It wants the federal structure of Iraq to function and the Kurds to play a constructive role in it. As a related issue, Turks care especially about the Iraqi Turkomen (or Turkmen), their ethnic kin, although they claim that it is the same as their concern for all Iraqis. They also seek to strengthen bilateral economic ties. In August 2009, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Iraq was a strategic partner and friendly country for Turkey, adding that every development in Iraq would affect Turkey, too.18 Turkey’s interest in regional stability has extended to assisting Iraq and Syria to reduce bilateral tensions that arose after the former accused the latter of harboring Iraqi Ba’thist terrorists responsible for deadly bombings in Iraq on August 19, 2009, which Syria denies. Policy Priorities The high priority that Turkey puts on Iraq’s territorial integrity stems from its desire to thwart the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state that could serve as a model for separatist Turkish Kurds and a staging site for anti-Turkish terror. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey fought a war costing more than 30,000 lives against the separatist PKK, mainly in southeast Turkey. The U.S. State Department lists the Kongra-Gel(KGK)/PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Of an estimated 4,000-5,000 PKK members, about 3,000-3,500 are believed to be in the Qandil (or Kandil) Mountains of northern Iraq.19 The Turkish government has deployed military forces into northern Iraq to combat the threat, and increasingly also has engaged in diplomacy with Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish officials for that and broader reasons. Ankara maintains that if Iraq is unable to stop terrorists from using its territory against Turkey, then it is Turkey’s right under international law to defend itself. While Ankara addressed Baghdad on this issue, it also challenged Washington because most Turks viewed the United States as the authority in Iraq.

Regional Framework CP—Iran Ext- Link

**Cooperation over Iraq sets a framework for pressuring Iran**

Blanchard 9 (Christopher, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 10/6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33793.pdf) my

The security and stability of the Persian Gulf region and its energy resources are of critical strategic and economic importance to the United States, Iraq’s neighbors, and the wider international community. Insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq created unique political challenges and security threats for Iraq’s neighbors, contributing to regional uncertainty and insecurity. As those threats have subsided, the reintegration of Iraq in the region’s security balance has emerged as a pressing issue. The U.S. military presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East remains politically unpopular in the region in spite of a measure of support from Sunni Arab-led governments and Sunni citizens’ fears of terrorist threats and possible Iranian ambitions. As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, popular perceptions of the United States in the region may shift, and changes are likely to occur in the use and posture of U.S. military facilities in neighboring countries. Disputes between Iran and the United States over Iraq, Iran’s nuclear program, and Iranian support for terrorist groups opposed to peace with Israel are likely to continue to create regional tension. Insurgent and terrorist threats to energy infrastructure in the region constitute the other main security risk. Greater coordination between the United States and its regional allies may improve U.S. chances of meeting and overcoming these challenges. However, regional political rivalry and local political developments may limit the ability of governments to respond effectively to these threats or to coordinate among themselves and with the United States. 92 “

Regional Framework CP—Iran Ext- Prolif Impact

Absent Iranian disarmament, Israel will strike Iran--results in a nuclear holocaust

IHT 8 (Benny Morris. a professor of Middle Eastern history at Ben-Gurion University, International Herald Tribune. July 18, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/18/opinion/18morris.html?pagewanted=print)

Which leaves only Israel — the country threatened almost daily with destruction by Iran’s leaders. Thus the recent reports about Israeli plans and preparations to attack Iran (the period from Nov. 5 to Jan. 19 seems the best bet, as it gives the West half a year to try the diplomatic route but ensures that Israel will have support from a lame-duck White House). The problem is that Israel’s military capacities are far smaller than America’s and, given the distances involved, the fact that the Iranian sites are widely dispersed and underground, and Israel’s inadequate intelligence, it is unlikely that the Israeli conventional forces, even if allowed the use of Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (and perhaps, pending American approval, even Iraqi air strips) can destroy or perhaps significantly delay the Iranian nuclear project. Nonetheless, Israel, believing that its very existence is at stake — and this is a feeling shared by most Israelis across the political spectrum — will certainly make the effort. Israel’s leaders, from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert down, have all explicitly stated that an Iranian bomb means Israel’s destruction; Iran will not be allowed to get the bomb. The best outcome will be that an Israeli conventional strike, whether failed or not — and, given the Tehran regime’s totalitarian grip, it may not be immediately clear how much damage the Israeli assault has caused — would persuade the Iranians to halt their nuclear program, or at least persuade the Western powers to significantly increase the diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. But the more likely result is that the international community will continue to do nothing effective and that Iran will speed up its efforts to produce the bomb that can destroy Israel. The Iranians will also likely retaliate by attacking Israel’s cities with ballistic missiles (possibly topped with chemical or biological warheads); by prodding its local clients, Hezbollah and Hamas, to unleash their own armories against Israel; and by activating international Muslim terrorist networks against Israeli and Jewish — and possibly American — targets worldwide (though the Iranians may at the last moment be wary of provoking American military involvement). Such a situation would confront Israeli leaders with two agonizing, dismal choices. One is to allow the Iranians to acquire the bomb and hope for the best — meaning a nuclear standoff, with the prospect of mutual assured destruction preventing the Iranians from actually using the weapon. The other would be to use the Iranian counterstrikes as an excuse to escalate and use the only means available that will actually destroy the Iranian nuclear project: Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. Given the fundamentalist, self-sacrificial mindset of the mullahs who run Iran, Israel knows that deterrence may not work as well as it did with the comparatively rational men who ran the Kremlin and White House during the cold war. They are likely to use any bomb they build, both because of ideology and because of fear of Israeli nuclear pre-emption. Thus an Israeli nuclear strike to prevent the Iranians from taking the final steps toward getting the bomb is probable. The alternative is letting Tehran have its bomb. In either case, a Middle Eastern nuclear holocaust would be in the cards.

That draws in every major power

Ivashov 7 (General Leonid Ivashov, vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. Global Research April 9, 2007. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309>)

What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.

Regional Framework CP—A2 Perm

Distrust of US diplomacy means the CP must be genuine- or framework will collapse

Yakis et al 7 (Yaşar Yakiş, former Turkish foreign minister, Ghassan al-Atiyyah, Iraqi political analyst, Khalid al-Dakhil, Saudi academic, Scott Lasensky, researcher, U.S. Institute of Peace, 5/1, Washington Post, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2007/05/make\_sharm\_elsheikh\_the\_turnin.html) my

Istanbul, Riyadh and Washington - No one fears instability and violence in Iraq more than Iraqis and their neighbors. But mutual suspicions and rivalries, and a lack of U.S. commitment to regional diplomacy, have prevented Iraq and its neighbors from turning common anxieties into a common agenda. However, an emerging regional diplomatic initiative—the focus of this week's foreign minister's conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt—could be a turning point that leads all sides toward concerted action. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should use the Sharm el-Sheikh gathering to demonstrate Washington's new commitment to sustained, high-level engagement and effective regional diplomacy. If this new initiative is to succeed, the United States should also make clear that the American military presence in Iraq is also part of the agenda. As regional anxieties surge, reliance by the neighbors on unilateralism is giving way to renewed interest in multilateral diplomacy. “Iraq's neighbors acknowledge their shared responsibility to support Iraqi reconciliation,” said a group of leading foreign policy figures in the Marmara Declaration, the recent product of non-official dialogue between Iraqis and their neighbors. Stabilizing Iraq, the group declared, “is inextricably linked to protecting [the neighbors'] own national security interests.” The first order of business is to build an on-going, results-oriented process that includes all the pivotal players. Iraq and its neighbors have been holding regular ministerial meetings since 2003 as part of a Turkish initiative, but without the United States. The key international and regional players convened in late 2004 at Sharm el-Sheikh, but with little follow-up. Summit meetings should punctuate rather than define the process.

Only genuine negotiation and oversight of the UN will enforce agreements

Pascual 8 (Carlos, director of Brookings, 4/3, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0403\_iraq\_pascual.aspx) my

A new approach is needed. It should be led by the UN. But in order for the UN to even consider such a role, the United States must make clear that it welcomes UN involvement and that it will coordinate military action to support the diplomatic process. All Iraqi parties that are not associated with Al Qaeda in Iraq should be given a voice in the process. To succeed, regional actors would have to endorse a political settlement, or agree at a minimum not to undermine it. If an agreement is reached, it will require international troops and oversight to implement it.[2] Political agreements to end civil wars require massive preparation and negotiation. They do not spontaneously generate. To be effective, the UN must also be mindful of its shortcomings, and member states must take seriously that they constitute the UN. Members of the Security Council must place international imperative over political bickering. Given widespread anti-American sentiments, some countries will be content to see the United States continually bogged down in a protracted and humiliating quagmire. China and Russia could play a constructive role in advocating for the UN to seek a viable place in Iraq, if they act on their interests in a stable Middle East and international energy markets. All member states have to put behind them the controversies of the Oil for Food program, drawing lessons on corruption and transparency from past management mistakes.

Regional Framework CP—A2 Perm

CP must be genuine- otherwise the US is perceived as without a plan- empirically proven

Katulis 7 (Brian, senior fellow, Center for American Progress, 11/2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/iraq\_summit.html) my

Second, the failure to address the simmering PKK issue through earlier regional conferences is emblematic of a broader inability to produce substantive achievements out of important diplomatic meetings. As is the case across the Middle East these days, crisis management rather than concrete steps to building enduring collective regional security cooperation will likely dominate the Istanbul summit. To escape this crisis-management trap, the United States needs to be more proactive in addressing potential regional problems arising in and around Iraq rather than simply waiting for them to boil over. For the past five years, the United States has rushed from crisis to crisis in the Middle East, allowing events to shape its actions rather than developing a realistic strategy that shapes events. We need to do our part to set the agenda and air uncomfortable issues across the Middle East, rather than letting events set the agenda for us. A big part of the problem is an incoherent U.S. approach to the entire region—one that fails to balance competing interests and priorities. As retired Gen. John Sheehan noted earlier this year when he turned down the Bush administration’s offer to serve as the White House “czar” for Iraq and Afghanistan, “What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region ... the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically.” This strategic incoherence is a key factor impeding progress on several key fronts in the Middle East—Iraq, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these issues to a large extent are interconnected, but the United States has not developed a strategy that properly balances the competing interests on these different tracks. As a result, conferences like this weekend’s Istanbul summit and the Annapolis conference later this month on the Arab-Israeli conflict are unlikely to be little more than gab fests that have only a little potential for producing even small gains.

False negotiations collapse the framework- perceived as inaction

Katulis 7 (Brian, senior fellow, Center for American Progress, 11/2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/iraq\_summit.html) my

Retired Gen. Joseph Ralston, the former NATO commander, recently stepped down as a special envoy on the PKK issue in frustration over perceived American and Iraqi inaction. Ralston also said that Washington inaction and its failure to deliver on promises were “driving strategically the Turks and Iranians together.” American attention needs to be focused on using these regional conferences to defuse border crises before they explode—and the United States should appoint a full-time high-level envoy to deal with this crisis and work with the lower-level officials dealing with cross-border issues. The Bush administration should empower the envoy to take concrete steps toward resolving the tensions and not simply send this envoy on symbolic shuttle diplomacy. Third, the international community needs to help enforce accountability mechanisms for agreements made at these summits. The most prominent accord produced out of the discussion in the first ministerial meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh this past spring—a pledge to halt the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq—has not been honored, according to the United States. Without some guarantee that agreed-upon action will be taken, regional summits amount to nothing more than talking shops.

Regional Framework CP—A2 S Def

Regional negotiation sets up a political framework for future negotiations and can prevent escalation, even if they win we don’t solve

Pascual and O’Hanlon 7 (Carlos and Michael, director and senior fellow at Brookings, 1/21, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0121iraq\_pascual.aspx)

Third, states in the region and internationally need to create pressure for all parties to stay out of the conflict in Iraq. That will be difficult. Much is made of Iranian and Syrian meddling. In fact, virtually every state in the region is engaged in some way, hedging against further ascendancy of its perceived worst enemy. The worst-case scenario is declaration of a Kurdish state that draws Turkey and Iran directly into the war, with Sunni Arabs reacting to Iran by funding and supplying Sunni extremists. No side can win in such a conflagration. The red lines against it should be drawn now. Of course, no one should expect a regional negotiation to settle the war in Iraq. For now, the Shi'ites think they can win and probably will try to do so. Iran has little incentive to restrain its Shi'ite brethren. But the United States needs to be smart about the realities of civil war. At some point, there must be a political deal to stop the fighting or insurgents and terrorists will continue to kill, maim and disrupt because they think time is on their side. That type of accord may not be possible now. But there is still reason to create the foundations for a political process that can be used to press for a settlement as the surrounding states lose patience with the chaos. Regional dialogue is not an alternative to President Bush's surge concept. It is a necessary complement -- and if the surge goes badly, it will become a critical element of an alternative strategy. If the surge brings stability, having a regional framework to build on such progress could help. If the surge fails, it will still be important to have a mechanism to restrain the worst. Eventually parties will get tired of the killing. It is better to create a way for them to come together now, rather than later make the very act of creating a process yet another political concession that delays a rational outcome.

Regional Framework CP—A2 Iran Takes Advantage

**Iran would uphold its bargain- already working with Sunni leaders**

Friedman and Bhalla 7 (George, political scientist, and Reva, director of Stratfor, 5/16, http://www.stratfor.com/united\_states\_iran\_and\_iraq\_negotiation\_process) my

Back in Washington, the Bush administration is looking at the Iranian withdrawal plan skeptically. Right now, the United States wants assurances that a withdrawal plan worked out with the Iranians does not simply leave a longer-term opportunity for Iran to gradually take control of Iraq once the major roadblocks are out of the way. In other words, the United States needs guarantees that, as it draws down its troop presence, the Iranians will not simply walk in. The Iranian proposal to expand Sunni representation is a direct response to these concerns, provided the relevant parties can actually deliver on their promises. This is still highly questionable, though significant developments are already taking place that reveal the United States, Iran and various Iraqi players are making concrete moves to uphold their sides of the bargain. With Iran’s blessing, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) has announced it will undergo a process of “Iraqization” — a largely symbolic demonstration that SCIRI will not operate simply as an Iranian proxy. Meanwhile, the Sunni tribes and clans in Anbar province are increasingly broadcasting their commitment and progress in combating transnational jihadists. And finally, numerous reports in the Arab media suggest the United States would be willing to heed the Iranian demand that the Iraqi military not have offensive capabilities allowing it to threaten its Persian neighbor. The negotiations are moving, and it is becoming more and more apparent that a consensus is emerging between Tehran and Washington over how the Iraq project should turn out. With enough serious arrestors in play for this deal to fall through, it is now up to all players — whether those players call Washington, Tehran, Riyadh or Baghdad home — finally to put their money where their mouths are.

\*\*\*A2: Regional Framework CP

**Aff Regional Framework CP—NB Non-Unique**

Current regional diplomacy solves- American diplomacy isn’t respected

Hamzawy 8 (Amr, 6/19, political scientitst, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20242) my

Firstly, the Bush administration marginalised a key instrument that the US had always depended on in the exercise of its role and implementation of its policy in the Middle East: diplomacy, with both its incentive and punitive dimensions. Instead, this administration threw all its weight behind confrontationist and containment strategies, and their combative instruments, notably the military machine, arms pacts and security/intelligence activities. By the time the Bush administration, yielding to the pressures of Washington's Arab allies following the war against Lebanon in 2006, rediscovered diplomacy and invested some real effort into reviving the Palestinian- Israeli negotiating strategy, it was too late. Too little time was left for it to achieve sufficient inroads to generate qualitative shifts, and the regional parties had, in all events, lost faith in the ability of the American diplomacy to deliver. Secondly, the occupation of Iraq, as recent congressional reports have stressed, brought such an unprecedented increase in the financial and human costs of US Middle East policy as to hamper the manoeuvrability of this superpower on the ground in regional conflicts and crises, hence, undermining its efficacy. The deployment of US naval units to the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean and veiled threats by US officials of possible military strikes against their adversaries in Iran, Syria, Hizbullah or Hamas no longer elicit the fear and panic they once did due to the sapping of US military energies in Iraq and the repeated warnings of US military brass against the folly of another military engagement. Finally, Washington's failures and growing incompetence have heightened its allies' scepticism towards its policy, and spurred them into exploring alternative strategies that are not solely dependant on superpower might. This trend, naturally, contributed to exacerbating Washington's crisis in the Middle East. Perhaps the most important development in this regard is that America's allies have become increasingly wary of, if not outspoken against, the Bush administration's incessant rashness and insatiable lust for propelling tensions in the region to critical mass. Washington's allies in the Gulf now refuse to treat Iran solely as a source of threat and instability that needs to be contained, testimony to which can be found in Riyadh's cautious overtures to Tehran, regional coordination with it over the Lebanese crisis, and other regional efforts to explore opportunities for negotiation and cooperation in order to dispel the spectre of war from the Gulf and the Middle East and, simultaneously, in the hope of controlling Iran's regional influence. In addition, Egypt has stepped up diplomatic activity aimed at calming the security situation in Gaza, promoting a truce between Israel and the Palestinian factions, and paving the way for a national dialogue between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Egypt's unwillingness to exclude Hamas contrasts starkly with the White House strategy as reiterated by Bush during the Global Economic Forum in Sharm El-Sheikh when he referred to Hamas as a terrorist organisation that had to be fought like the Nazis. Indeed, even Israel, which ardently supports military confrontation against Iran and just as ardently refuses to speak with Hamas, has made overtures to Syria via an indirect negotiating track mediated by Turkey. Neither Ankara nor Tel Aviv, the US's most important allies in the region, paid great heed to Washington's disgruntlement at having been left out of the loop. Clearly, then, the current diplomatic activity in the Middle East is, in many areas, superseding US policies and strategies at a time when the American role has become palpably ineffective. In retrospect, we might point to the war on Lebanon in 2006 as the major turning point in the realisation by regional parties of the dangers of the vacuum created by American policy failures and of the absolute need for a cool and rational exploration of pragmatic agreements and undertakings in order to put if only a partial and interim end to the disruptions that followed the occupation of Iraq. Yes, countries in the Gulf are apprehensive of Iran's growing influence and have an effective interest in containing it. Nevertheless, the capitals of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries -- Riyadh above all -- know full well that it will be impossible to realise stability in Iraq, safeguard the security of the Gulf and help Lebanon overcome its current crisis without coordinating with Tehran and, hence, without offering Iran certain incentives in exchange for excepting certain restrictions on its actions in the region.

**Aff Regional Framework CP**—Perm Evidence

US should withdraw regardless if a settlement is reached- solves the net benefit by including other countries

Pascual 8 (Carlos, director of Brookings, 4/3, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0403\_iraq\_pascual.aspx) my

For Republicans, the hardest point to accept in this strategy is this: if Iraqis are given the chance to broker a political settlement and reject it, then this eclipses the rationale to keep American troops in Iraq. U.S. forces cannot fix Iraq for them. We would need to tell Iraqis clearly that if they do not take this opportunity, we will withdraw and reposition U.S. forces to control the spillover from Iraq. For Democrats the point of discomfort comes with success. If a settlement can be reached, then Iraqis will need sustained international support in order to implement it. A UN-brokered settlement increases the prospects to diversify the international military presence, but the core military effort would still have to be borne by the United States. If attempts at a settlement fail, this diplomatic initiative is still worth the effort. As argued earlier, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and India all have a stake in stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. They should have an incentive to invest in regional stability. A focused diplomatic effort, led by the UN, could begin the process of re-engaging these countries and seeking their support to control the spillover of war into the region, as well as to address the plight of refugees. Without such an initiative that can change the diplomatic dynamics around Iraq, the military costs of containment will fall on the United States, as well as the people in the surrounding countries who would feel the direct impacts of a return to an intensified Iraqi conflict.

\*\*\*Consult Iraq CP

Consult Iraq—1NC

Text: The United States federal government should engage in prior binding consultation with the Republic of Iraq about <<<insert the mandates of the plan>>> and implement the outcome.

Iraq is open to consultation and will say yes

Ackerman 9 (Spencer, staff writer, 7/23, Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/52402/iraqi-prime-minister-open-to-renegotiating-withdrawal-timeline) my

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opened the door for the first time Thursday to the prospect of a U.S. military presence in Iraq after the December 2011 deadline for troop withdrawal set by last year’s bilateral accord — something President Obama appeared to rule out during a joint appearance on Tuesday. Speaking to an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, Maliki said the accord, known as the Status of Forces Agreement, would “end” the American military presence in his country in 2011, but “nevertheless, if Iraqi forces required further training and further support, we shall examine this at that time based on the needs of Iraq,” he said through translation in response to a question from The Washington Independent. “I am sure that the will, the prospects and the desire for such cooperation is found among both parties.” Maliki continued, “The nature of that relationship — the functions and the amount of [U.S.] forces — will then be discussed and reexamined based on the needs” of Iraq. The Iraqi prime minister’s allowance for a post-2011 U.S. troop presence comes despite his increasingly nationalist tone to a domestic audience in advance of parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for January. He resisted the advice of Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, to keep a U.S. combat presence in volatile areas like Mosul after June 30, the date set by the Status of Forces Agreement for their evacuation from Iraqi cities and towns. Instead, when they departed, Maliki declared a national holiday. He called the withdrawal a “great victory” for Iraq, language reminiscent of his oft-stated declarations of victory over Iraq’s various insurgent groups. In his remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Maliki moderated that remark, saying the U.S. “withdrawal from the cities is a victory, not a failure for either the Iraqis or the Americans.”

Counterplan solves the case—consultation is critical to prevent Iraqi instability

Dobbins 7(James, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center@RAND Corporation, July, “U.S. Policy Options in the Iraq Crisis”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND\_CT288.pdf, Accessed 7/7/10)jn

The debate in Congress has largely been about American troop levels. The obvious question, therefore, is what sort of American troop levels might emerge from such a process of regional diplomacy, and might be required thereafter to sustain it. The answer, I think is some smaller, but not insignificant number of troops, for some extended, but not indefinite period. In other words, in my judgment, consultations with Iraq and its neighbors would likely lead to a result not dissimilar to that recommended by the Iraq Study Group a year ago. I would prefer that decisions regarding American troop levels flow from such a diplomatic process, rather than precede it. Faced with a real prospect of American withdrawal, I believe most Iraqi leaders, and all regional governments will urge us to stay, not indefinitely and not necessarily in our current numbers, but in some strength, and for some further period. Open ended consultations about America’s future role can thus help us forge a regional consensus about that role, and about the shape of a future Iraq that we currently lack. Knowledge that the United States will not remain indefinitely in Iraq in current numbers, or permanently in at any level can provide American diplomats some leverage in moving governments of the region to recognize their own interests in, and responsibilities for, stabilizing Iraq. I would therefore urge Congressional action that presses the President to move in this direction, without so circumscribing his discretion as to render such diplomacy ineffective.

Consult Iraq—1NC

Instability in Iraq would destabilize the Middle East

Oppenheimer et al 7 (Michael, August clinical associate prof. @ the Center for Global Affairs @NYU, Center for Global Affairs, http://www.scps.nyu.edu/areas-of-study/global-affairs/cga-scenarios/ accesed 7/2) CM

 Iraq has descended into outright civil war. Instability spreads throughout the Middle East. The regional players, competing and insecure, fail to cooperate on matters of defense and counter-terrorism and prove unable to contain the fighting within Iraq. While US pressure and the limited military capacity of local actors have succeeded in preventing all-out regional conflict between Sunni and Shi'a-led states, the proxy war fought on Iraqi territory (Scenario 2) spreads to adjoining states through refugee flows, growing radicalization of Arab populations, escalating non-state terrorism, and the deliberate efforts of regional rivals to destabilize each others’ governments.   Existing regimes in the region cling to power, but with insufficient domestic political support or acquiescence to create coalitions and pursue effective balance of power strategies necessary to contain the Iraq civil war. Because their appetite for direct state-to-state conflict is limited, many regimes use sub-state actors to strike at their enemies. Regional rivalries flare up as various players vie for influence and control. Radicalization of Arab populations increases as sectarian strife radiates from Iraq. In these circumstances, unforeseen events—such as an Iranian-style revolution in a major Arab country—could radically alter the political landscape and reorder foreign policy priorities in the region.   Events could easily globalize this regional conflagration. A serious disruption to the oil supply, as the result of an attack on an important oil installation in the Gulf, is a likelihood in this scenario. Such an attack could come in various guises. Terrorists might target the energy infrastructure, with the US retaliating against Iran as a target. The US or Israel could also react to any number of Iranian provocations, including its imminent (by 2010) development of nuclear weapons, leading toward a major war.

Middle Eastern Instability leads to nuclear war

Steinbach, 2 (John, March 3, nuclear specialist at the Center for Research on Globalization, Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html accessed 7/2) CM

Meanwhile**, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.** Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Consult Iraq—A2: Lie Perm

Genuine consultation is key—better results, regional support

Dobbins 7(James, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center@RAND Corporation, July, “U.S. Policy Options in the Iraq Crisis”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND\_CT288.pdf, Accessed 7/7/10)jn

The American habit is to decide and then consult. In this case, I would recommend the opposite. Uncertainty about our ultimate intentions can, in this instance, provide us leverage with the Iraqis and their neighbors. Obviously, in the end, we will make our own decisions. Those decisions will be wiser and more sustainable, however, if they are informed by genuine consultation and buttressed by local and regional support.

Consult Iraq—Say Yes

Iraq wants the US out on a timetable- would immediately say yes

Londono and Eggen 8 (Ernesto and Dan, Washington Post, 7/9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070801311.html) my

BAGHDAD, July 8 -- Iraq's national security adviser said Tuesday that his government would not sign an agreement governing the future role of U.S. troops in Iraq unless it includes a timetable for their withdrawal. The statement was the strongest demand yet by a senior Iraqi official for the two governments to set specific dates for the departure of U.S. forces. Speaking to reporters in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie said his government was "impatiently waiting" for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. "There should not be any permanent bases in Iraq unless these bases are under Iraqi control," Rubaie said, referring to negotiations over a bilateral agreement governing the future U.S. military role in Iraq. The agreement, if approved, would go into effect when a U.N. mandate expires in December. "We would not accept any memorandum of understanding with [the U.S.] side that has no obvious and specific dates for the foreign troops' withdrawal from Iraq," Rubaie said. U.S. officials said the remarks, along with a similar statement Monday from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, were aimed at local and regional audiences and do not reflect fundamental disagreements with the Bush administration. White House spokesman Tony Fratto said specific withdrawal dates are not part of the talks. He added: "We have great confidence that the political leadership in Iraq would not take an action that would destabilize the country."

Iraq favors a timetable- not afraid to stand up to the US

Hider 8 (James, staff writer, The Sunday Times, 7/8, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article4288108.ece) my

Iraq said for the first time yesterday that it wanted to set a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from its territory. President Bush has long resisted a schedule for pulling his 145,000 soldiers out, arguing that it would play into the hands of insurgents. Nouri al-Maliki, the Shia Prime Minister, who boasted last week that he had crushed terrorism in the country, suggested that it was time to start setting time-lines. “The current trend is to reach an agreement on a memorandum of understanding either for the departure of the forces or to put a timetable on their withdrawal,” Mr al-Maliki said during a visit to the United Arab Emirates. He rejected efforts by Mr Bush to hurry through an agreement on vital issues such as the immunity of US troops in Iraq and use of the country’s airspace. Mr Bush had hoped to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) by the end of July to establish the basis for a long-term presence of US troops in the country. The Iraqi parliament has bridled at pushing through such a binding deal with the outgoing and unpopular Bush Administration, saying that the negotiations have been secretive and could undermine Iraq’s sovereignty. “I don’t know anything about this agreement and neither does parliament,” said Ezzedine Dawla, a Sunni MP. “We’re going to pass something we don’t know anything about.” Mr al-Maliki’s announcement showed a growing self-confidence that Iraqi leaders can stand up to their powerful ally. His oil minister said last week that leading Western oil companies would not be allowed to set conditions for future deals over Iraq’s main natural resource. The tough stance also comes before Iraqi provincial elections later this year, and may mark the start of the Prime Minister’s campaign to be reelected. His popularity was bolstered by military operations to take back the southern oil city of Basra and the town of al-Amarah from Iranian-backed Shia militias. His comments may also hint at future cooperation with Barak Obama, the Democratic candidate, who has promised to pull US troops out of Iraq within 16 months, although Mr Obama has since appeared to waver on the commitment. “The negotiations are continuing with the American side,” Mr al-Maliki said, reflecting the desire of many MPs to wait until a new administration is in the White House, and Iraq’s provincial elections are over, before making any deal. The agreement would govern such issues as immunity for US troops from prosecution, the use of Iraqi airspace, and which side takes operational control for military missions against insurgents

Consult Iraq—Key to Stability

US should Consult Iraq on the Strategic Relations and its key to relations and the stability of Iraq

Laipson 8( Ellen, 6/8, former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council (1993-95), National Intelligence Officer for Near and South Asia, The Century Foundation, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=644 page 20-21 accessed 7/4) CM

A transition to this new policy will require careful negotiations with the incumbent Iraqi government, and good communication with other Iraqi actors and constituencies. Iraqis can and probably will misunderstand or interpret any change in U.S. policy according to their own political preferences, but the United States can work in its public pronouncements and its more operational interactions to convey the new policy and its component parts. The Strategic Framework Agreement currently in negotiation may become a useful platform for annual consultations that help set priorities for the bilateral relationship, and provide both sides a chance to exchange views on the regional and global con­texts. It may in fact be useful that as of mid-2008, both parties seem to prefer a general statement of principles to a formal treaty; this may offer a more flexible way to keep the bilateral conversation open and responsive to changes in either party’s political environment. Within a year of a new U.S. policy, Iraq too could have new leaders as a result of their 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. It is possible that new Iraqi leaders would want to accelerate the disentanglement of the two countries’ politics and policies, particularly if Iraqi voters make the U.S. occu­pation a major issue in the campaign. Some Iraqi political parties are intensely ideological and espouse anti-American views. But it is more likely that Iraqi leaders across the political spectrum will look for ways to work constructively with the United States. For better or worse, the Iraqis are likely to be pragmatic in their dealings with the outside world, so long as their needs for technical and political support are compelling. The key states in the region also need to be consulted in a way that mini­mizes their ability to undermine a transition, and attempts to persuade them to participate more actively in treating Iraq as a normal country. Our goal should be to eliminate the negative; accentuating the positive in Iraq’s relations with its Arab neighbors in particular may be difficult for some time to come. The Arab neighbors simply are not ready to trust the new Iraq and its leaders; the shift to a messy, Shia-dominant government after years of predictable Sunni authori­tarianism is still hard to accept. The neighbors will be anxious about what a contraction of the U.S. presence will mean for them, including possible expecta­tions that the United States will ask them for more military access. Serious talk of a new regional strategy that engages all the neighbors and integrates Iraq will be the best way to avoid the pitfalls and the disappointments of recent years.

Consult Iraq—Key to Stability, Solves

Empirically, conditioned withdrawals have been effective

Reeson 9 (Greg, Associated Content, Mar 9,

<http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1547145/the_media_and_withdrawal_from_iraq.html?cat=9>) LL

An increasing number of reports coming out of Iraq indicate that the United States and the Maliki government are close to completing an agreement for the continued presence of U.S. forces. Reuters even reported August 25 that Prime Minister Maliki, in a speech to tribal sheiks in the Green Zone, has said a final agreement has been reached. Whether an agreement has been finalized or not, the outlines of the proposed pact, together with the caveat statements made by Iraqi officials, that have emerged thus far appear to be an acceptance of President Bush's demand for a conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces.  According to leaked details, the draft security agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and villages by June 30 of next year. It further calls for a departure of all U.S. forces from [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) by the end of 2011. Sticking points that are in the fine tuning stages of negotiation include legal immunity for U.S. troops in [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) and a few other lesser details. But putting talk of specific dates aside, the realities on the ground in [Iraq](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/518/iraq.html) will dictate that the final agreement be conditions-based, and not beholden to a rigid timetable. Here's why.  First, to state the blatantly obvious, a conditions-based approach provides military commanders the flexibility to respond to long-term trends in the patterns of violence. Knowing they have the ability to reinforce, or reduce, troop levels as needed, military commanders can plan long-term strategies designed to ensure the security necessary for political progress. In short, it just makes good military sense.  Second, while Iraqi security forces continue to grow in both size and capability, they have a long way to go. Sectarian rivalries still exist within the ranks, and both equipment and competency shortfalls still need to be addressed. Even more importantly, Iraqi security forces lack strong officers and noncommissioned officers. Leaders take time to develop, and in the case of Iraq, where leadership positions under Saddam Hussein were awarded based on personal acquaintance and loyalty to Saddam, the United States literally started from scratch. And the Iraqi police, considered vital to the type of local, among-the-people interaction needed to combat an insurgency, are in even more need of assistance than the Iraqi Army. The training effort is ongoing, and progress is being made. To abandon the army and police forces before they are ready to provide security for the country is to doom Iraq to failed state status. Third, elections scheduled for later this year, or more likely for early next year, will put recent political accommodations to the test. U.S. and Iraqi forces have prepared for elections in the past by increasing the number of available troops to help head off increased levels of violence that often accompany struggles for power in developing states. Both U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to have the means at their disposal, in other words the ability to deploy security forces, to meet the challenges that will surely arise as a result of the elections. A fixed withdrawal timeline makes this impossible. Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life. Finally, Muqtada al-Sadr's intentions remain unclear. Sadr recently reorganized his Mahdi Army into a cultural wing to foster ties with the Iraqi people and an armed wing to continue the fight against U.S.-led forces. Sadr has been losing ground in Iraq in the wake of continuing offensives by U.S. and Iraqi forces, and he appears to be attempting to figure out a way to stay relevant. He is very popular among Iraq's Shi'a, largely due to a social services network modeled after Hezbollah's in Lebanon. But his continued absence from Iraq, ostensibly for religious studies in Iran, weakens his position and threatens his movement. The continued presence of U.S. forces, based on regular assessments of the security situation, allows the government of Iraq to continue to increase its capacity to deal with threats like al Sadr. As that capacity grows, the need for U.S. forces will diminish. None of this is new, even for the most casual of Iraq observers. But the fact remains that there are valid reasons for determining U.S. troop levels based on conditions, and not on time. Iraqi leaders know this, and their caveats when talking about timetables demonstrate their understanding of the realities on the ground. On August 22, The New York Times quoted Mohammad Hamoud, Iraq's chief negotiator, as saying the draft security pact contained provisions that allowed the "timetable" to be adjusted based on the security situation. The Times also quoted another senior Iraqi official as saying the dates in the pact were "prospective," and dependent on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. In another article last week, The Los Angeles Times quoted Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, as saying the dates in the proposed security agreement were "hypothetical," and that ultimately Iraqi national security interests would dictate the pace of any U.S. withdrawal. What's happening right now is that Iraqi leaders are tailoring their public statements in response to domestic political pressures while privately expressing a realistic understanding of the challenges they still face. Even Prime Minister Maliki, who has of late been stepping up his timetable rhetoric, has generally included caveats in his statements that include phrases like "conditions permitting," and "if conditions hold." There's nothing wrong with articulating goals, or "time horizons," or "aspirations." The Iraqi people don't want to be dependent on U.S. troops, and the United States needs to relieve some of the stress on its ground forces and free up assets for other global crises that will undoubtedly arise. But officials in both Iraq and the United States recognize what is at stake. And that's why a conditions-based approach to U.S. troop withdrawals will ultimately prevail, even if it contains adjustable dates.

\*\*\*A2: Consult Iraq

A2: Consult Iraq—Withdrawal Solves Stability

Withdrawal solves stability—delaying doesn’t solve

NSN 10(National Security Network, 4/20, “U.S. and Iraqi Forces Deal Major Blow to al Qaeda in Iraq”, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1577)

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces - which remains on track - is the best vehicle for building a long-term, strategic relationship with Iraq and its people.  General Odierno explained yesterday that the U.S. is on target for withdrawal, saying "I feel very comfortable with us going down to 50,000 as the Iraqi security forces significantly continue to increase their capacities and capabilities."  In an interview with Fox News this weekend, Odierno went into greater detail: "...we are on target to be at 50,000 by August. We will still - we will have formations here that are able to train combat formations. We'll still be able to conduct counterterrorism operations. We'll still be able to support provincial reconstruction teams.  We're at about 95,000 today, Chris, so I - our plans are intact. I feel very comfortable with our plan. And unless something unforeseen and disastrous happens, I fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the 1st of September." The Center for American Progress's Brian Katulis explains why the withdrawal must take place, pointing out that "Iraq's leaders demanded a clear timeline for troop withdrawals in its negotiations with the Bush administration, and there are strong political actors in Iraq who are demanding an end to what they view as an ‘occupation.'"  Katulis adds that, "Not moving forward with the planned troop drawdown because of protracted political negotiations in Baghdad makes little strategic sense for broader U.S. national security."  Withdrawal is also the best means of solidifying a strategic relationship with the Iraqi people.  As Marc Lynch wrote recently, withdrawal "doesn't mean ignoring Iraq."  What it does mean, according to Lynch, is "moving to develop a normal, constructive strategic relationship with the new Iraqi government, with the main point of contact the Embassy and the private sector rather than the military, and adhering in every way possible to the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and to the drawdown timeline."

A2: Consult Iraq—Say No

Iraq says no—safety

Ackerman 8(Spencer, Analyst for the Washington Independent, March 26, “Ensuring Permanence”, http://washingtonindependent.com/1878/ensuring-permanence, accessed 7/7/10)jn

But from the Iraqi perspective, the idea of tens of thousands of U.S. troops standing idle while Iraq is under attack is unacceptable. Last month, Samir Sumaida’ie, the Iraqi ambassador to the U.S., [said](http://washingtonindependent.com/view/us-has-moral) that as long as Iraq’s security forces remain weak, “We also don’t want to be the victim of attacks from our neighbors. During this time we believe the United States has a moral obligation to protect us.”

\*\*\*T Stuff

T—Can’t Meet SOFA

A. Interpretation—Reduce means to make something smaller in size

Dictionary.com (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reduce>, date accessed: 6/25/2010, AJK)

1.to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number, etc.: to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds.

2.to lower in degree, intensity, etc.: to reduce the speed of a car.

B. Violation—The aff meets the SOFA rather than reducing.

C. Standards:

 1. Education—The aff kills clash by taking away in depth comparisons of meeting the SOFA, the status quo, and speeding up the timeframe.

 2. Ground—The aff functionally takes the status quo away from the negative, killing the negatives ability to generate offense.

D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it forces debate about what the topic should look like, while reasonability is arbitrary.

Iraq—Substantial Definitions

A substantial troop reduction in Iraq would be 25,000 troops

VandeHei and Goldfarb 6 ([http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/inline=y&smi=LOGOS&key=12311&componentseq=1&type=logo](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/inline%3Dy%26smi%3DLOGOS%26key%3D12311%26componentseq%3D1%26type%3Dlogo)Jim and Zachary, August 27, Washington Post, “Democrats Split Over Timetable For Troops; In Close Races, Most Reject Rapid Pullout”, http://web.lexis nexis.com/scholastic/document?\_m=231a651a63eb1c046c24b3c1a9e57c1a&\_docnum=2&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkVk&\_md5=6ad3f95b084810bacbc45b6193cd3057, date accessed: 6/27/2010, AJK)

Of the 59 Democrats in hotly contested House and Senate races, a majority agree with the Bush administration that it would be unwise to set a specific schedule for troop withdrawal, and only a few are calling for substantial troop reductions to begin this year, according to a Washington Post survey of the campaigns. The large number of Democrats opposed to a strict timeline for ending the military operations runs contrary to the assertion by President Bush and top Republicans that Democrats want to "cut and run" amid mounting casualties and signs of civil war. At the same time, the decision by many Democrats to refrain from advocating a specific plan for withdrawal complicates their leaders' efforts to convince voters that they offer a clear new direction for the increasingly unpopular war.  "It is like dropping a raw egg and asking me what my plans are for putting it back together," said Chris Murphy, the Democrat challenging Rep. Nancy L. Johnson (R-Conn.). Murphy favors bringing home National Guard and reserve units, or about 25,000 of the 138,000 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq, beginning next year, and leaving it to Bush's military commanders to determine the rest of the exit strategy.

There are 92,000 troops in Iraq

Strategy Page 2010 (May 27, “Iraq Fades But Does Not Disappear”, <http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20100527.aspx>, date accessed: 6/27/2010, AJK)

For the first time since 2003, there are more American troops in Afghanistan than in Iraq (or Kuwait). As of May 24, there were 94,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and 92,000 in Iraq. In the last two years, American troop strength in Afghanistan has gone from 30,000 to nearly 100,000 (a number that will be reached by the end of the year). In that same time, troop strength in Iraq has gone from 150,000 to, in a few months, 50,000.