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Observation 1: Inherency

There are no plans for the US to withdraw from Japan

Epatko 10 (Larisa, World Editor, PBS NewsHour, “Japan's Premier: U.S. Base to Stay at Okinawa Due Partly to Korean Tensions”, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/05/us-base-to-stay-at-okinawa.html>) MAT

Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said Monday he has given up on efforts to find an alternative location for a controversial U.S. airbase on the island of Okinawa, and that tensions on the Korean peninsula helped him reach his decision. After searching for a new site in Japan for six months, Hatoyama said he would honor a 2006 agreement with the United States to keep the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, but move it from its current location in a crowded city to a more remote part of the island, despite strong local opposition. "I decided that it is of utmost importance that we place the Japan-U.S. relationship on a solid footing of mutual trust, considering the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Asia," he said, [reported The Guardian](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/24/japan-uturn-us-base-okinawa). "I apologize from the bottom of my heart for the confusion I have caused the people of Okinawa." Last week, [South Korea released the results](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june10/southkorea_05-20.html) from a multinational investigation into the March sinking of one of its naval vessels that concluded it was caused by a North Korean torpedo, ratcheting up tensions in the region. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during a visit to Beijing on Monday, [praised Hatoyama for making "the difficult but never-the-less correct decision."](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N19320100524?type=politicsNews) According to a [Wall Street Journal article](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704113504575264181543682168.html), the negative response to Hatoyama's decision could further erode public opinion of his eight-month-old government ahead of national elections in July. More than half the 47,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan are in Okinawa.

Plan: The United States federal government should adopt a strategy of offshore balancing toward the government of Japan

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Advantage 1: Alliance Burden Sharing

Military presence is angering the Japanese public.

ZeeNews 6/22 (2010, Indian Current Events Newspaper http://www.zeenews.com/news635724.html) JL

But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there — more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details are undecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it.

Reforms fail. Military presence guarantees events that threaten to shake the foundation of the alliance

The Guardian 8 (Justin McCurry 2/28, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/28/japan.usa) JL

Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, apologised yesterday for a string of crimes involving American troops based in Japan, amid warnings that failure to improve discipline risked damaging relations between Washington and one of its closest allies. Resentment towards the US military presence erupted this month following the arrest of a marine for the alleged rape of a 14-year-old girl on the island of Okinawa, home to more than half of the 50,000 US troops in Japan. Since then, US soldiers on the island have been arrested for trespassing and drink driving, and another is being questioned about the alleged rape of a Filipino woman in a hotel room. The rape allegation has echoes of the 1995 gang rape of a 12-year-old girl by three US servicemen, which brought 85,000 people on to the streets in protest and international attention to the US base. Rice, who was in Tokyo yesterday on an official visit, said: "We just regret deeply that this happened. [It] is very hard to see something like this happen and it's especially hard because it involves a young girl. We certainly hope that there will not be lasting effects. It's a long-standing and strong alliance." The Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, called the alleged rape "unforgivable" and Shigeru Ishiba, the defence minister, warned that it could "shake the foundations" of the Japan-US alliance just as the two countries were cooperating to try to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. In an attempt to limit the diplomatic fallout, US military authorities imposed a 24-hour, indefinite curfew on 45,000 military personnel and their families, including the 10,000 who live off-base. They also agreed to review anti-sexual assault guidelines and improve education programmes for newly arrived service personnel. The new commander of US forces in Japan, Lieutenant General Edward Rice, promised "zero tolerance" of crimes committed by his troops. But critics said previous attempts to improve conduct had failed. "This has been going on since the US began occupying our island decades ago," said Chie Miyagi, a schoolteacher and activist against the base. "The US military apologises and promises us that it won't happen again, but it always does. The government and the rest of Japan don't really care about how we feel. If it was their daughters who were being raped, I'm sure they would react differently." Campaigners believe the marines on Okinawa will soon revert to their old ways once the curfew is lifted. "When they arrive here they have no idea what this place is like, about its tragic history," said Suzuyo Takazato, head of a women's group that monitors crimes by US soldiers in Okinawa. "We live in fear of what they will do next. When they are caught they get off with light sentences. The message seems to be: if you want to rape a girl, do it in Japan."

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Strong US Japan relations are key to ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and global peace

Balbina Y. Hwang, Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. "The Evolution of the U.S.–Japan Alliance and Future Prospects" December 21, 2004.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl861.cfm

The United States, as part of its Global Defense Posture Review, has begun the difficult task of working with partners to encourage new thinking about the purpose and value of alliances. In Asia, Washington has encouraged allies to contribute more to their own defense by identifying key areas in which the interests of both partners are better served by assigning leadership to the alliance partner. Moreover, the United States is asking that alliance partners reduce structural factors that impede full cooperation—for example, land and basing access for military maneuvers, and constitutional limitations. As simple as this principle sounds, it is a new idea to the Japanese, one that will require bold changes in attitude and practice. Yet all indications are that the Japanese leadership have embraced this new initiative and are rising to the challenge. This is evident in the Arakai Report. Although not an official report, it provides an important gauge of sentiments in Tokyo. As we embark on the next four years of the Bush Administration, the United States and Japan will face one of the most critical foreign policy challenges of this decade together—the North Korean nuclear issue. How the two partners can resolve this issue in a way that promotes the interests of both countries will be the true test of how far the U.S.–Japan alliance has evolved over the last half-century. If resolved successfully, the implications may be far greater than achieving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. It may just provide the model for a new and great alliance that will be a pillar for stability not just in Northeast Asia, but globally.

North Korea conflict goes nuclear

**Chol ‘99**, Executive Director of Center for Korean-American Peace, Kim Myong, “US-DPRK Will End Up in Shotgun Marriage,” Policy Forum Online, October 22, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/9907G_Kim.html>.

Kim Jong Il, often called North Korea's David, did not flinch from standing up to the military muscle of the world's super-Goliath, the United States. Kim Jong Il had already built up a lethal war machine capable of wreaking unprecedented havoc on the American mainland at a minute's notice. Kim Jong Il is sure of the huge capability of his military. It would take the Korean People's Army as few as several minutes to wipe out off the world map the whole of South Korea and the entire Japanese archipelago. Significantly absent from the Perry report is a mention of the real threat of any new war in Korea instantly expanding into nuclear war, with 12 operating nuclear reactors in the ROK, 51 reactors in Japan and 102 in the United States singled out as prime targets. However, the Perry report noted that a new war would be fought on the world's most densely populated and industrialized areas, unlike the Gulf War and the Yugoslavia war. Resumption of hostilities in Korea would spell an abrupt end to the present unprecedented economic prosperity the Americans are enjoying. It would leave South Korea and Japan smoking in Stone-Age ruins. Forward military bases, AEGIS ships, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines and cruise missiles would be of little operational value in safeguarding the American mainland from nuclear holocaust. Moreover, dozens, hundreds of Chernobyls will inevitably break out in South Korea, Japan and the United States.

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Troop withdrawal provides a new foundation for relations with Japan. Permanent presence is unnecessary for power projection and new basing agreements can guarantee access in a time of crisis.

Preble 6 (Christopher, dir. of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6335) CBC

 Although **Japan is economically capable and now seems politically motivated to assume full responsibility for defending itself from threats,** it is legally constrained from doing so under the terms of the Japanese constitution, particularly Article 9. The path to defensive self-sufficiency is also impeded by Japan’s continuing dependence on the United States embodied in the U.S.-Japan security alliance. **With the United States struggling to meet military commitments abroad, and with Japan increasingly asserting military autonomy, American policymakers must shape a new policy that will more equitably distribute security burdens between the two countries.** Three recent instances in which the **United States and Japan have worked together** on matters of mutual interest—Iraq, Taiwan, **and** North Korea—**offer useful clues as to how a cooperative strategic relationship might operate in the future. A new U.S.-Japan strategic relationship will be crafted over a period of several years, but the process should begin immediately**. As a first step, the United States should refrain from interfering in the decisions that the Japanese people may make with respect to their own defense. Washington should remain agnostic on the question of revisions to the Japanese constitution, including the crucial Article 9. Further, while U.S. policymakers might advise the Japanese of the uncertain benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons relative to the high costs, the United States should not expect to be able to prevent the Japanese from developing such weapons—nor should it try. Finally, **the new strategic partnership should culminate with the removal of U.S forces from Japanese soil.** **The two countries could negotiate basing agreements for U.S. naval vessels and aircraft**, and possibly also some prepositioning of heavy equipment in depots for rapid deployment in the region**, but such agreements need not depend on the continuation of a largescale, and effectively permanent, U.S. troop presence.** **The new alliance between two normal countries**— as opposed to one between a patron and a de facto client—**will provide a more durable foundation for addressing the most pressing security challenges in East Asia and beyond.**

Modification of the alliance is inevitable-a more assertive and independent Japan ensures that even without presence the security alliance won’t collapse.

Tisdall in 10 (Simon, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist. He was previously a foreign leader writer for the paper and has also served as its foreign editor and its US editor, based in Washington DC. He was the Observer's foreign editor from 1996-98, The Guardian, China threat can heal US-Japan rift, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/08/china-us-alliance-under-pressure)

The Okinawa dispute reflects broader differences. Hatoyama's view that Japan needs a more "balanced" relationship with Washington after 65 years of polite subservience in the security sphere, and his related interest in developing an EEC-style east Asian economic community including China, have produced sharply critical reactions in Washington. "The relationship between the US and Japan is in its worst state ever," said Hisahiko Okazaki, a former ambassador, in the daily newspaper Sankei Shimbun. "The Japan-US alliance is too valuable an asset to lose," he wrote. Despite such dramatic huffing and puffing, the bottom-line reality, say senior foreign ministry officials, former and serving ministers, and leading commentators, is there is not the remotest chance that the security alliance will be "lost". It may be adapted or modified. It may evolve. And for its part, says former deputy foreign minister Hitoshi Tanaka, Japan "needs to think seriously about how it can better contribute to international security" and "to consider if it is still right to stick to the existing interpretation of the constitutional prohibition on the use of force". But the official consensus is firm that the US relationship will continue to form the "cornerstone" of Japan's defences, as foreign minister Katsuya Okada put it – a position shared by Hatoyama.The main reason behind this confidence that, despite all the stresses and strains, the alliance will endure is not hard to discern: growing mutual fear of China.

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Japanese defense build up is comparatively better-it preserves US hegemony while assuring neighbors that build up will be constrained, preventing an arms race in the region.

Perry in 2k4 (Charles, publication the institute for foreign policy analysis, Alliance Diversification and the Future of the US-Korean Security Relationship, p82-83)

Consider a situation in which America's allies accept an arrangement (explicitly or implicitly) that has the United States providing certain power projection functions while the allies focus largely on coastal and border defense and logistical support operations. The United States would offer its expertise in long-range reconnaissance and strike capability, distant sea lane protection, and access to certain military technologies, possibly keeping the allies under its nuclear umbrella. In return, the ROK and Japan would provide for their own defense, achieve sufficient interoperability to support allied sea and air missions in the region, and contribute to the intelligence-gathering process. The combination would be extremely powerful and provide a strong deterrent to potential enemies, but it could also be reassuring to neighbors because of the high political threshold necessary to exercise that power (two democracies must support a military move in order for it to be triggered). Korean and Japanese power projection, therefore, is largely outsourced to the United States and "bolted on" to domestic capabilities under certain circumstances. In addition to being an efficient use of resources (less redundant investment in carriers, airlift, submarines, and so on), this arrangement has the added benefit of allowing the ROK and Japan to provide for their own defense in a manner that does not threaten others or stimulate an arms race. In this situation it might also be possible to encourage a higher level of specialization with effective trilateral coordination, for example if Japan were to develop relatively more robust rear-area logistical support capabilities while Korea could be more flexible to support, or even participate in, certain off-peninsula combat operations.

Japanese self defense can hold the peace in East Asia

Bandow in 9 (Doug, Sr. fellow at Cato Institute, Cato Institute , Time for Japan to Do More, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/06/23/time-for-japan-to-do-more/) pl

It seems that the Japanese government no longer seems entirely comfortable relying on America for its defense. Reports Reuters: A draft of Japan’s new mid-term defense policy guidelines is calling for the reinforcement of military personnel and equipment in the face of growing regional tensions, Kyodo news agency said. The draft, obtained by Kyodo, says Japan needs to reverse its policy of reducing its defense budgets in light of North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear tests, as well as China’s rise to a major military power, the news agency said. The document urges the government to raise the number of Ground Self-Defense Forces troops by 5,000 to 160,000, Kyodo said. The new National Defense Program Guidelines, covering five years to March 2015, are scheduled to be adopted by the government by the end of the year. The draft also says there is a need to “secure options responsive to changing situations” of international security, indicating Tokyo’s intention of considering if it should be capable of striking enemy bases, Kyodo said. This is good news. Historical concerns remain, of course, but World War II ended more than six decades ago. The Japan of today is very different than the Imperial Japan of yore — the mere fact that Japanese have been so reluctant to become a normal country again illustrates the change. There’s still a substantial distance for Japan to go. But the Japanese government is moving in the right direction. Obviously, peace in East Asia benefits all concerned. That peace will be more sure if Tokyo is prepared to defend itself and help meet regional contingencies. It is time for prosperous and populous allies to stop assuming that Washington’s job is to defend them so they can invest in high-tech industries, fund generous welfare states, and otherwise enjoy life at America’s expense.

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Withdrawal won’t end all US power projection capabilities-in times of extreme crisis Japan will allow the US base access

Global Security 10 (GlobalSecurity.org, *Military*, “Okinawa, Japan”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm) MAT

By 2003 the US was considering moving most of the 20,000 Marines on Okinawa to new bases that would be established in Australia; increasing the presence of US troops in Singapore and Malaysia; and seeking agreements to base Navy ships in Vietnamese waters and ground troops in the Philippines. For the Marines based on Okinawa, most for months without their families, the US is considering a major shift. Under plans on the table, all but about 5,000 of the Marines would move, possibly to Australia. During 2004 Japan and the United States continued discussions on plans to scale back the US military presence in the country. Tokyo will ask Washington to move some Marines now on the southern island of Okinawa outside the country. There is no doubt some changes will be made to the Okinawa forces. The US Marines are a tremendous burden in Okinawa, particularly the infantry and the training needs of the infantry in Okinawa can't really be met on the island, given the sensitivities there. Okinawa accounts for less than one percent of Japan's land, but hosts about two-thirds of the 40,000 American forces in the country. In recent years, Okinawans have grown increasingly angry about the military presence, because of land disputes and highly publicized violent crimes committed by a few U.S. troops. In return for moving troops outside the country, Japan would provide pre-positioning facilities for weapons, fuel and other equipment for the US military. Okinawa's proximity to potential regional trouble spots promotes the early arrival of US military forces due to shorter transit times and reduces potential problems that could arise due to late arrival. The cost of this presence is shared by the government of Japan, which provides bases and other infrastructure on Okinawa rent-free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces.

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Loss of US preponderance is inevitable-we must act now to allow allies to build up their own defenses. This diffuses regional conflicts and allows the US to focus on national interests.

Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne in 2k2 (literary and national editor of The Atlantic, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, The Atlantic Monthly, A New Grand Strategy, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2002/01/schwarzlayne.htm)

The rise of new great powers is inevitable, and America's very primacy accelerates this process. If Washington continues to follow an adult-supervision strategy, which treats its "allies" as irresponsible adolescents and China and Russia as future enemies to be suppressed, its relations with these emerging great powers will be increasingly dangerous, as they coalesce against what they perceive as an American threat. But that is not even the worst conceivable outcome. What if a sullen and resentful China were to align itself with Islamic fundamentalist groups? Such a situation is hardly beyond the realm of possibility; partners form alliances not because they are friends, or because they have common values, but because they fear someone else more than they fear each other. A strategy of preponderance is burdensome, Sisyphean, and profoundly risky. It is therefore time for U.S. policymakers to adopt a very different grand strategy: one that might be called offshore balancing. Rather than fear multipolarity, this strategy embraces it. It recognizes that instability—caused by the rise and fall of great powers, great-power rivalries, and messy regional conflicts—is a geopolitical fact of life. Offshore balancing accepts that the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers, either within the present American sphere (the European Union, Germany, Japan) or outside it (China, a resurgent Russia). Instead of exhausting its resources and drawing criticism or worse by keeping these entities weak, the United States would allow them to develop their militaries to provide for their own national and regional security. Among themselves, then, these states would maintain power balances, check the rise of overly ambitious global and regional powers, and stabilize Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. It would naturally be in their interests to do so. It's always safest and cheapest to get others to stabilize the turbulent regions of the globe. Historically, however, this has seldom been an option, because if one lives in a dangerous neighborhood, one must be prepared to protect oneself from troublemakers rather than relying on someone else to do so. In fact, the only two great powers in modern history that successfully devolved onto others the responsibility for maintaining regional stability are Britain during its great-power heyday (1700-1914) and the United States (until 1945). They were able to do so because they had moats—a narrow one for England, and two very big ones for the United States—that kept predatory Eurasian great powers at bay. As offshore balancers, Britain and the United States reaped enormous strategic dividends. While they were shielded from threatening states by geography, London and Washington could afford to maintain militaries smaller than those of Continental powers, and concentrate instead on getting rich. Often they could stay out of Europe's turmoil entirely, gaining in strength as other great powers fought debilitating wars. And even in wartime offshore balancers have enjoyed advantages that Continental powers have not. Instead of sending big armies to fight costly Continental wars, Britain, for instance, relied on its navy to blockade those states bidding for mastery of Europe and on its financial power to underwrite coalitions against them, and stuck its allies with the greater part of the blood price of defeating those powers that aspired to dominate the Continent. The United States, of course, followed a similar strategy during World War II. From 1940 to 1944 it confined its role in the European war to providing economic assistance and munitions to the Soviet Union and Britain and—after entering the war, in December of 1941—to relatively low-cost strategic air bombardment of Germany, and peripheral land campaigns in North Africa and Italy. The United States was more than happy to delay the invasion of Europe until June of 1944. By then the Red Army—which inflicted about 88 percent of the Wehrmacht's casualties throughout the war—had mortally weakened Germany, but at a staggering cost. Taken together, the experiences of Britain and America highlight the central feature of the offshore balancing strategy: it allows for burden shifting, rather than burden sharing. Offshore balancers can afford to be bystanders in the opening stages of conflict. Because the security of others is most immediately at risk, an offshore balancer can be confident that those others will attempt to defend themselves. Often they will do so expeditiously, obviating the offshore balancer's intervention. If, on the other hand, a predominant power seems to be winning, an offshore balancer can intervene decisively to forestall its victory (as Britain did against Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon). And if the offshore balancer must intervene, the state aspiring to dominance will already have been at least somewhat bloodied, and thus not as formidable as it was for those who had the geopolitical misfortune to constitute the first line of defense. The same dynamics apply—or would, if the United States gave them a chance—in regional conflicts, although not quite as dramatically. Great powers that border restive neighbors, or that are economically dependent on unstable regions, have a much larger interest than does the United States in policing those areas. Most regional power balances (the relative positions of, say, Hungary and Romania, or of one sub-Saharan state and another) need not concern the United States. America must intervene only to prevent a single power from dominating a strategically crucial area—and then only if the efforts of great powers with a larger stake in that region have failed to redress the imbalance. So for an offshore balancing strategy to work, the world must be multipolar—that is, there must be several other great powers, and major regional powers as well, onto which the United States can shift the burden of maintaining stability in various parts of the world. For America the most important grand-strategic issue is what relations it will have with these new great powers. In fostering a multipolar world—in which the foreign and national-security policies of the emerging great powers will be largely devoted to their rivalries with one another and to quelling and containing regional instability—an offshore balancing strategy is, of course, opportunistic and self-serving. But it also exercises restraint and shows geopolitical respect. By abandoning the "preponderance" strategy's extravagant objectives, the United States can minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers. Although jockeying for advantage is a fact of life for great powers, coexistence, and even cooperation between and among them, is not unusual. Offshore balancing seeks to promote America's relative power and security, but it also aims to maximize the opportunity for the United States to be on decent terms with the other great powers. In this sense the strategy has much in common with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's vision of détente. That policy was a significant departure from previous Cold War approaches, in that the United States explicitly recognized the Soviet Union as a collaborator in, rather than a challenger to, the effort to maintain the stability of the international system. To understand this dramatic shift, contrast the inaugural address of John F. Kennedy, in which that paragon of Cold War liberalism advanced the stirring but rather dangerous notion that in the struggle with communism the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden," with Nixon's first inaugural address, which promulgated the realistic but conciliatory message that "we cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy." This was détente's animating sentiment. Détente was based on the assumption (hardly contested at the time) that the USSR wouldn't go away. Because the superpower rivalry could not be resolved without destroying humanity, there was, as Kissinger declared, "no alternative to coexistence." Détente, then, was a strategy for managing a permanent relationship. In what Nixon and Kissinger hoped would evolve into a mature relationship, Moscow and Washington would acknowledge each other's legitimate interests and try not to allow disagreements to poison accommodations. Détente was a shift in style with substance—or, rather, a shift in style with substantive consequences. The Soviets and the Chinese were to be approached not as alien ideologues but as intelligent adults with whom the United States should find a substantial area of common interest. Similarly, an offshore balancing strategy would dictate that in order to coexist with the emerging great powers, or even to enjoy cooperative ties with them (in efforts to combat Islamic terrorism, for instance), the United States must start treating such powers like fellow adults. This would mean both accepting them as peers and acknowledging the legitimacy of their national interests. In concrete terms, here is how an offshore balancing strategy would apply to particular cases.

Preponderance causes US involvement in global wars that go nuclear-offshore balancing is comparatively better for security

Christopher Layne in 97 International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997), pp. 86-124

An offshore balancing strategy would have two crucial objectives: minimizing the risk of US. involvement in a future great power (possibly nuclear) war, and enhancing America's relative power in the international system. Capitalizing on its geopolitically insular position, the United States would disengage from its current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe. By sharply circumscribing its overseas engagement, the United States would be more secure and more powerful as an offshore balancer in the early twenty-first century than it would be if it continues to follow the strategy of preponderance. In advocating this strategy, I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (e.g., increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States abandons its strategy of preponderance. Indeed, they may; however, that is only half of the argument. The other half, seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance, is that bad things—perhaps far worse things—could happen if the United States stays on its present grand strategic course. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide; whether, given international systemic constraints, they are sustainable; their cost; the degree of risk they entail; and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Any serious debate about U5. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. I hope to foster an awareness that fairly soon the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests.

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Advantage: China

US permanent presence in Japan encourages rapid Chinese military modernization.

Smith 10 (Sheila A., 6/5, Sr. Fellow Japan Studies at Council of Foreign Relations

http://two--plus--two.blogspot.com/2010/06/point-of-view-sheila-smith-more-mature.html) JL

The current tension between the United States and Japan comes as China’s expanding economy and military growth raise new questions about how Beijing intends to exert its rising influence. But some regional experts say that any American concerns are overdrawn. “China is not the threat the U.S. had made it out to be,” said Chalmers Johnson, president and co-founder of the Japan Policy Research Institute at the University of San Francisco. “It has too many internal problems to make going to war with other countries a good idea.” Instead, Johnson said, China’s rapid military growth is a reaction to the permanent American presence in Asia. If the U.S. military backed out of the region, Johnson said, China would slow its own military ambitions. Satoshi Morimoto, a professor at Takushoku University in Tokyo and a national security and international relations expert, said many Japanese also discount any potential Chinese threat. And that in turn has caused many to question the need for the U.S.-Japan military alliance in its current form. “[A] decrease in the public’s sense that China is a threat means there’s less of a belief in the need of the U.S. military presence in Japan,” he said.

**China models military modernization off of US military policy in the Asian region**

Mulvenon et al. 06 (“Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense “ National Defense Research Institute Pg. 25 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\_MG340.pdf) JL

China has at least four identifiable military modernization options to counter U.S. military transformation. The first is “business as usual,” focusing on conventional military modernization to achieve local deterrence, area access denial for U.S. forces, and power projection to defeat or intimidate Taiwan. Given the performance of U.S. forces in Iraq and the pace of transformation, this option, taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence. The second strategy is to develop robust information warfare (IW) capabilities to threaten broadly the vulnerabilities of U.S. NCW, including the use of computer network attack (CNA) tools to cripple rear-area logistics and communications systems necessary for U.S. deployment to a Taiwan contingency. A third strategy would be a missile-centric one that seeks to (1) present an overwhelming shortrange threat to Taiwan and (2) improve China’s strategic offensive threat to the United States, reasoning that U.S. apprehension about escalation may deter U.S. military intervention in defense of Taiwan or at least U.S. attacks on China itself in such a crisis. A fourth possible strategy is to ape the United States and attempt to develop NCW, at least selectively. This would require significant organizational, technological, and cultural change within the PLA. This study assesses the cost-benefit feasibility calculations, as viewed by the Chinese, for pursuing such alternative strategies (or combinations).

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Chinese modernization threatens to escalate into a full blown arms race, causing intentional and miscalculated conflict.

Twomey 09 (Christopher, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Association, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey)

**China and the United States** are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their **modernization** and sizing decisions **increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core** of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, **China is the only permanent member of the** UN **Security Council expanding its arsenal**; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

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US-China conflict could escalate to nuclear war

Eland 3 (Ivan, Dir of Defense Policy, CATO Institute, “The China-Taiwan Military Balance: Implications for the United States”, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb74.pdf>) MAT

Even an ambiguous U.S. security guarantee for Taiwan is dubious. The security of Taiwan has never been strategically essential to the United States, and dueling with a nuclear-armed power in any crisis over the island would be ill-advised. In any conflict between the China and the United States over the island, escalation to nuclear war is an ever-present danger. Although the United States possesses thousands of nuclear warheads that could hit China, and the Chinese have only about 20 warheads that can reach the United States, China cares much more about Taiwan than does the United States and could even be irrational about the issue. Although coming to the defense of a fellow democracy against an authoritarian Chinese regime has emotional appeal, U.S. policymakers have to ask themselves whether they are willing to trade Los Angeles to save Taipei. The answer should be a resounding no. The United States should sell Taiwan the arms it needs for self-defense but should not guarantee its security. Besides, despite what some analysts suggest, Taiwan is more than capable of deterring a Chinese attack and defending against Chinese aggression if deterrence fails.

Chinese modernization creates an overly aggressive PLA which collapses loyalty to the CCP and triggers regime collapse

Krawitz 3 (Howard, research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Dec, “Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?”, Strategic Forum, No. 204, Acc. Jul 29, 2009)

To understand the dilemma faced by the CCP and PLA, it is necessary to understand how military reform potentially undermines the very foundation upon which the PLA rests. Building a modern, world-class military means attracting and retaining relatively well-educated, comparatively sophisticated personnel capable of accepting responsibility and thinking for themselves. But this is not where PLA military tradition lies. Perhaps uniquely, when compared to any other modern major state, the PLA is not a central state military organization. It is the military organ of the CCP, dedicated to preserving and defending the party, not the state. The Party Central Military Commission (CMC), not the state Central CMC or the Ministry of Defense, exercises the equivalent of national command authority over most aspects of PLA operational, logistical, and support activities for warfighting and internal security operations. (China’s Ministry of Defense has authority only over non-operational training, some higher education, research and development, and certain infrastructure/construction activities in support of China’s national defense agenda.) This distinction may be blurred, or even inconsequential, in the PLA performance of its everyday duties and operations because commanders filling state and party military leadership positions have been one and the same in the PRC history to date. But it is a distinction that exists, is well understood by PLA cadre, and becomes meaningful in times of crisis, especially in cases of internal crisis. The primary PLA allegiance is to the party. It has always filled its ranks with politically dependable members drawn from those in Chinese society most willing to accept the party’s authority and most susceptible to manipulation through propaganda. Party-directed political education and indoctrination along with party discipline have been key elements in keeping Communist China’s armed forces from playing roles as “kingmakers” and power brokers. These elements remain essential aspects of PLA life and identity, even today. But politics and professionalism may not necessarily mix well. Taken to extremes, the side effects of the modernization process could foster an environment that weakens party loyalty and perhaps even creates an armed entity with loyalty to none save itself. Obviously, any move in this direction poses a serious conflict of interest for, if not an outright threat to, the CCP, which certainly wants China to have a strong, competent, respected military, but not at its own expense. For China’s leaders, the Indonesian military experience serves as a constant reminder of the possibilities for this sort of worst-case scenario.

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Collapse of the CCP control triggers a nuclear civil war and regional conflicts

Yee and Storey 2002

(Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002 (The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, RoutledgeCurzon, pg 5 bham))

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the **fear of political** and economic **collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees** pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, **any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems**, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. **These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords**.'2 From this perspective, **a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world**.

Current U.S. presence in East Asia is harming relations with China - reversal of our military buildup solves.

Eland in 3 (Ivan, Former dir. Of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, Is Chinese Modernization a Threat to the United States?, No. 265, p. 12-13) pl

Although many alarmist articles in the press have trumpeted improvements in the Chinese military, those enhancements are pockets of modernization in a largely antiquated force. China’s military modernization is more rapid than before but is not a massive Soviet-style military buildup. As the Chinese economy grows and China becomes a great power, the United States should accept that it, like other great powers, will want more influence over its region. If kept within bounds, that increased sphere of influence should not threaten vital U.S. interests. But the United States', especially under the Bush administration’s new expansive national security strategy of primacy and preemption, sees any change in the status quo in East Asia as a threat to its expansive list of vital interests. If the United States unnecessarily maintains, or even continues to expand, its defense perimeter to surround and contain China, the rising power and the status quo power—both armed with nuclear weapons—may come into needless conflict. The United States must take a less grandiose view of its vital interests, redraw its defense perimeter, abrogate its Cold War–era alliances (including the informal alliance with nonstrategic Taiwan), and reverse its military buildup. Currently, the United States is unnecessarily modernizing its armed forces faster than is China, which is starting from an extremely low level of military modernity. China, whose highest priority is economic development, is now reacting to the expansion of the U.S. defense perimeter and the U.S. military buildup by increasing its own defense budget more rapidly. Thus, U.S. policy may be engendering the threat it most fears.

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Deterioration of relations risks war over Taiwan that would escalate

The China Post 10 (Global News Wire, The Financial Times Limited, “Warnings of war diminished but still relevant 3 years on”, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9665816103&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9665814308&cisb=22_T9665814307&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=7>) MAT

When introducing the book, Bush had said they reached an optimistic conclusion with a pessimistic sub-conclusion. In most areas, he said, the relationship between the United States and China X which the book characterized as close cooperation and friendly rivalryX was pretty good. The one place where the U.S. and China might come into conflict, they had predicted, was over the issue of Taiwan. If war did erupt across the Taiwan Strait, Bush and O'Hanlan thought armed invasion of Taiwan would be too costly in terms of losses to the People's Liberation Army. Rather, they envisaged a military-backed blockade coupled with missile and cyber attacks. These, they said, would be far harder for Taipei and Washington to deal with than a conventional attack. Moreover, Taiwan's increased economic dependence on China would make a blockade that much easier to enforce. Whether the United States came to Taiwan's aid would depend on various factors, they said, but hinged on interpretation of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, and which side was deemed to have provoked the conflict. In their absolute worst-of-the-worst scenario, the authors imagined China might attack U.S. Navy ships to inflict a few thousand casualties in the hope of deterring further U.S. participation. Bush and O'Hanlan imagined this having a contrary effect, however, with Washington launching military strikes against Chinese territories, including pre-emptive attacks on nuclear installations. This might then be followed by Beijing using its nuclear weapons before they were wiped out. Fortunately this unlikely but extremely costly war has not erupted. Indeed, three years on, and China's patient cold-shouldering of Chen Shui-bian through the two terms of his Democratic Progressive Party administration has finally paid off. Even before Ma's election, the Chinese Communist Party was entertaining members of his Kuomintang, its erstwhile enemy, at functions in China in preparation for regime change in Taiwan. In fact, it is U.S.-Chinese relations which have deteriorated during this period. Rather than “close cooperation,” they are now more frequently characterized by rivalry, and rivalry of a decreasingly “friendly” nature. This is hardly unexpected, of course, and the Brookings authors' were long ago criticized by some as being too optimistic, if not naive, in imagining that relations between China, as it metamorphoses into a major power on the world stage, and the United States, as it struggles to maintain its position as the only remaining superpower, could ever be anything other than fractious. China's scramble for resources to feed the appetite of its developing manufacturing sector (and its concomitant neo-colonial economic and diplomatic endeavors) set it on collision course with similar needs in the already developed nations. Though these conflicts have been temporarily eased due to the global economic downturn, the downturn has also brought into focus other areas of contention, such as the sizable amount of U.S. national debt held by China and China's intransigence with regard to revaluing the yuan.

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Conflict over Taiwan goes nuclear-risks global conflict

Lind 5 (William, Dir of Center for Cultural Conservatism, Free Congress Foundation, “War With China?”, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind65.html>) MAT

Regrettably, there are influential voices in Washington that want a war with China, the sooner the better. The most likely cause is Taiwan. Few in Washington understand why China is so adamant about Taiwan remaining officially part of China. The reason is China’s history, throughout which her greatest threat has not been foreign invasion but internal division. China has often fractured, sometimes into many parts. Today, Beijing fears that if one province, Taiwan, achieves independence, others will follow. China will go to war, including with the United States, to prevent that from happening. Correctly, Kaplan observes that China is not able to successfully fight a sea and air war with America: China has committed itself to significant military spending, but its navy and air force will not be able to match ours for some decades. The Chinese are therefore not going to do us the favor of engaging in conventional air and naval battles, like those fought in the Pacific during World War II. So how would China fight us? If we send some carrier battle groups to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan, I think China will do something Kaplan does not mention. She will go nuclear at sea from the outset. The Chinese way of war is indirect. In most cases, that means China will engage us with "soft power," as she is already doing on multiple fronts. But in the case of American intervention in a Taiwan crisis, what if a Chinese ballistic missile popped a nuke say, 100 miles from an advancing American carrier battle group? No one gets hurt, but the message would be loud and clear: keep coming and you’re toast. If we kept coming anyway and the Chinese did nuke a carrier, we would immediately face an asymmetrical situation. How would we respond? By nuking a Chinese carrier? China doesn’t have any. If we drop a nuke on Chinese territory, we have initiated a strategic nuclear exchange. Is Taiwan worth Seattle or L.A.?

\*\*\*Inherency\*\*\*

No Plans To Remove Troops

Any relocation out of Japan is not going to occur in the near future.

**Press TV in 10** (Press TV, US insists on keeping military base in Japan, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=118895&sectionid=3510203) PL

A top US diplomat says that Washington wants Tokyo to keep the US military airfield in the Japanese southern island of Okinawa.  "Our preference is for the current plan to go forward, but we are prepared to face a variety of different possibilities going forward," US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said.  In 2006, Washington and Tokyo agreed to relocate US troops stationed at Futenma Marine airfield in Okinawa to a smaller town of Nago.  The new government in Japan has launched a review of the agreement, saying it may have to move the US base off Okinawa or even outside of Japan.  Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama later announced that it would decide on the deal by May.  "I am not going to get into the specifics, but we also have studied many different potential solutions very closely, not over a period of months, but years," Campbell said in an interview with the Japanese daily *The Sankei Shimbun*.  Accidents and crimes committed by American service personnel near residential areas have turned the local population of Okinawa against the presence of the US forces there.  Earlier this week, US Senator Jim Webb, a Virginia Democrat and a former secretary of the US Navy, claimed that the nearly 50,000 US armed forces in Japan remain essential to maintaining stability in the East Asian region.

US Presence in Japan

The US has 36,000 military personnel onshore and 11,000 offshore costing approximately $1.4 billion as wages

U.S. Forces Japan 10 (US Military, “About U.S. Forces Japan”, “Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan”, <http://www.usfj.mil/>) MAT

Originally established at Fuchu Air Station on July 1, 1957, USFJ, with its U.S. Army, U.S Marine Corps, U.S Navy, and U.S Air Force elements, consists of approximately 36,000 military personnel, 43,000 dependents, 5,000 DoD civilian employees, and 25,000 Japanese workers. U.S. forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. Besides reduction in facilities, there was a decrease in the number of Japanese nationals employed by USFJ. On July 1, 1957, USFJ was one of the largest employers in Japan with a main island workforce of 152,000. Overall labor costs were low -- with an average annual payroll cost of $1,181 per employee. Today, the Japanese national workforce is about 25,000; with an average annual payroll of over $56,000 per appropriated employee. U.S. military strength in Japan is about 36,000 ashore and 11,000 afloat, and U.S. forces are dispersed among 85 facilities located on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa. Total acreage of U.S. bases is approximately 77,000 acres. USFJ bases and facilities range in size from a several thousand acre training area to a single antenna site.

Japan provides financial support for the roughly 50,000 American troops stationed there, who are there to preserve and promote democratic affairs in Asia

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 10 (US Department of State, “Background Note: Japan”, “U.S.-Japan Relations”, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm>) MAT

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity. Despite the changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be based on shared vital interests and values. These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole. Japan provides bases and financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region. Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the Army's I Corps. The United States currently maintains approximately 50,000 troops in Japan, about half of whom are stationed in Okinawa.

\*\*\* Relations Advantage\*\*\*

Presence 🡪 Tensions With Alliance

Japanese leaders want all 47,000 US troops out of their country now

Stars and Stripes 9 (United States Department of Defense, “Japanese Politician: Too Many U.S. Troops In Japan”, <http://www.stripes.com/news/japanese-politician-too-many-u-s-troops-in-japan-1.88692>) MAT

The rising star of Japanese politics, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan leader Ichiro Ozawa, says he sees no need for most of the U.S. troops in the country. Ozawa, talking with reporters last week, said Japan could get along with just the U.S. 7th Fleet. The rest of the 47,000 U.S. military personnel could go home, he said, according to Japanese press accounts. "If Japan is prepared to take care on its own issues that are relevant to itself, then there is no need for the United States to forward deploy to such an extent in Japan," Ozawa is quoted on his party’s Web site. "The Americans’ role should become smaller if Japan has a decent strategy for dealing with global issues and shares greater burdens at least on matters associated with our country." Ozawa has called for Japan to be more independent of the United States in regional security issues. In 2006, the two sides agreed to realign U.S. troops in the country. According to the agreement, the biggest change would be on Okinawa, which now hosts a bit less than half the troops and 75 percent of the bases solely used for the U.S. military in Japan. Under the agreement, Marine bases south of Camp Foster would be closed, Marine air operations would be moved to the island’s rural northeast on Camp Schwab, and some 8,000 Marines would move to Guam.

Tension is rising over the presence of military bases in Japan

Market Watch 10 (Myra P. Saefong, 5/31, Extension of the Wall Street Journal http://www.marketwatch.com/story/political-tension-complicates-japans-outlook-2010-05-31) JL

A stronger yen has put pressure on Japan's exporters' profits as uncertainty over the euro's value and concerns over the spread of European debt troubles have already clouded the progress of the nation's economic recovery. Hatoyama went back on his campaign promise to move the U.S. Marine base off the island of Okinawa and instead opted to relocate the base to a more remote part of the island. Following the move, the Social Democratic Party in Japan resigned over the weekend from its governing coalition. China, Japan prime ministers face tough issues The prime ministers of China and Japan met in Tokyo as the world's No. 2 and 3 economies eyed a slate of tough issues ranging from labor disputes to North Korea. "The disputes in Japan regarding the U.S. Okinawa military base [are] terrible timing," said Richard Hastings, a consumer strategist at Global Hunter Securities. The situation between North and South Korea related to the sinking of a South Korean warship is "very unsettled" and anger is on the rise in Japan and in Okinawa "regarding the base and some aspects of the Japan-U.S. relationship," he said. "The timing is simply awful." Popular support for Hatoyama's party hit a new low of 19.1%, compared to over 70% in September when the prime minister took office, according to a recent poll by Kyodo News. "The disapproval numbers for Hatoyama are just humongous, and talk about timing -- we would not want to see further sovereign unrest anything like what recently occurred in Greece," said Hastings. However, "the Okinawa situation is not going away, and the pressure on the Japanese government to reform certain aspects of its relationship with the U.S. is an issue for financial markets," he said.

Presence 🡪 Tensions With Alliance

Public discontent over military bases threatens to collapse alliance

Asia Pacific 1 (September, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 54) JL

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Japanese policymakers have successfully reaffirmed the U.S.–Japan security alliance. Yet, even as they have done so, a series of events has revealed a deeper ambivalence in Japan about the terms of the alliance. These events began with the 1995 rape of a school girl in Okinawa by U.S. servicemen, focusing attention on the social costs to residents of hosting U.S. forces. In 1999 came North Korea’s launch of a missile over Japan, raising doubts among many Japanese about their alliance partner’s ability to protect them. Most recently, the outcome of the 2001 sinking of the Ehime Maru training ship by a U.S. nuclear sub seemed to many to sacrifice Japanese citizens’ interests to those of the U.S. military. Taken independently, these developments may seem temporary setbacks to policymakers, but together they suggest that there is increasing impatience among Japan’s citizens with the way the alliance is managed. This disconnect between the public and policymakers could, if untended, have serious implications for the U.S.–Japan alliance.

Presence damages alliance

Tokyo Shimbun 10 (“The Curse of Deterrence Theory” May 16, http://watchingamerica.com/News/56794/the-curse-of-deterrence-theory/) JL

The U.S. military bases, the burden of expenses and the inequality that marks the Japan Status of Forces Agreement are remnants of the U.S. occupation. The Prime Minister claims a “close and equal U.S. alliance,” but he needs to clarify the political problems caused by current plans to relocate the base within the prefecture. He should regroup and begin candid discussions with the U.S about the appropriate relocation of the military station. The Prime Minister keeps flip-flopping on his position and the Japan-U.S. alliance is in a state of crisis. These problems are not necessarily all bad for Japanese citizens. Regardless of intent, the issues of American deterrence and the feelings of the Okinawa constituents have brought the entirety of Japan together. In Okinawa, people openly refer to the heavy burden of hosting the Marines as discrimination at the hands of the Japanese mainland. Originally, the Marines in Okinawa were based in the Gifu and Yamanashi prefectures. In 1956, due to the Sunagawa incident and other anti-base movements on the Japanese mainland, U.S. bases on the mainland moved to Okinawa, which at the time was still under U.S. military governance.

Presence 🡪 Tensions With Alliance

US military presence causes conflict in alliance

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

There are indeed an ample number of storm signals in both countries. The reliably pro-U.S sentiments of the "Yoshida faction," which still dominates Japan's foreign policy bureaucracy, are not necessarily reflected in the attitudes of the Japanese people or even the younger generation of political leaders. The emergence of Ryutaro Hashimoto, minister for international trade and industry and a prominent advocate of hard-line positions toward the United States (especially on economic issues), as the leader of the LDP and a serious candidate to become the next prime minister is only the latest indication of shifting sentiment. Public annoyance at the United States is rising and is manifested in a variety of ways.(43) Anger about escalating U.S. demands on the trade front is the most obvious, but there are others. There is, for example, a growing awareness of the implicit anti-Japan motives underlying Washington's smothering strategy and the U.S. insistence on maintaining a large military presence in East Asia despite the end of the Cold War. That awareness and the resentment it produces are no longer confined to an ultranationalist political fringe in Japan.(44) Public sentiment in the United States toward Japan has likewise become more critical, if not negative, in recent years. Again the trade issue is at the forefront. A Journal of Commerce survey taken in September 1995 revealed impressive public support for President Clinton's "confrontational" strategy to open up Japan's markets. Moreover, those who expressed dissatisfaction with the administration's handling of U.S.-Japanese trade relations were likely to favor even more hard-line initiatives.(45)

Japan's economic issues and the United State's pressures threaten US-Japan relations. Bergsten, Ito, et al in 1 (C. Fred, Takatoshi, et al, Sr. fellow at Brookings Institute, National Fellow at Stanford, Institute for International Economics, No More Bashing, p. 235-237) PL

It does suggest, however, that the United States no longer needs to treat Japan separately as a special, unique target of a country-specific foreign economic policy. It is not clear, in fact, that it made sense to do so in the past. Japan's macroeconomic impact on the United States has always been rather modest. Moreover, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, the tangible results of the frequently intense US pressures on Japan during the past 30 years have been exceedingly modest, despite an enormous variety of approaches and huge expenditures of political capital. Some of the wide array of Japan-specific policies pursued by the United States during this extended period – such as the campaign to achieve abolition of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law – were met largely by accommodation, whereas some others did not produce any tangible results, at least from the viewpoint of the "results-oriented" camp. Changes and reforms have tended to happen in Japan when US demands have made economic sense and have won allies within Japan itself, but results have not been delivered when US demands have lacked a coherent rationale and domestic supporters. The final element in the equation is the reduction in the US ability to prompt changes in economic policy in Japan, as revealed so clearly by the failure of the last major US trade initiatives in the middle 1990s and the equally aggressive US efforts to change Japanese macroeconomic and financial policies in the late 1990s. This is partly the natural result of the maturation of Japan to a point where it no longer feels such an acute need for US patronage and approval. It is partly due to the idiosyncratic twists and turns in the policy of the United States itself, which left Japan successively feeling betrayed (as in the Asian financial crisis) and beleaguered (as in so many of the trade disputes). It is partly due to the end of the Cold War, with the consequent sharp reduction in Japan's need for protection by an external superpower. It is partly due to Japan's persisting economic weakness and the new found strength of the United States which suggests to many Japanese both that the United States no longer needs their help and that they can no longer afford to give it. And it is particularly due to the creation of the World Trade Organization with its dispute-settlement mechanism that protects Japan against US unilateralism. There is considerable evidence that Japanese resistance to foreign pressure has risen substantially and that future efforts to deploy it will be more likely to jeopardize the overall relationship than to win Japanese acceptance of US objectives. As was discussed in chapter 6, this effect could be compounded by the inevitable fiscal pressures of Japan's huge budget deficit and national debt, and the subsequent rapid aging of the population. These pressures have already led to modest cuts in Japan's aid budget and calls to reduce "supporting costs" for the US military, and they could pose an increasing threat to the security relationship, especially if the overall ties between the countries were to sour. One traditional element in the security debate, emanating from the foreign policy and national security community, as always been that the economic tensions should be ignored or at least downplayed to avoid jeopardizing the broader relationship. As the relative importance of security issues has again risen in the US calculus, with the ascent of China replacing the decline and demise of the Soviet Union, that concept clearly takes on added weight.

Presence 🡪 Tensions With Alliance

Military Misconduct will eventually force Japan to break relations with the U.S.

Miller 8 (Andrew, senior writer, *theTrumpet.com, http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=4854.3126.0.0*) AK

With Japan having built up its own military defense force and forging strong ties with the Asian nations against which America was previously committed to defending it, the Japanese have less and less of a need for American defense forces to be stationed on Japanese territory. As a matter of fact, as Sino-American relations deteriorate, Japan will increasingly find that it cannot work closely with both China and the U.S. at the same time. Eventually, Japan will have to choose its friends. Incidents like the alleged Okinawa rape case only serve to hasten the day when Japan will ditch its alliance with the U.S. in favor of alignment with Asia.

U.S military misconduct has occurred “over and over again” hurting the Alliance.

Miller 8 (Andrew, senior writer, theTrumpet.com, http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=4854.3126.0.0) AK

Outrage has been unleashed across Japan over the suspected rape of a 14-year-old girl by a U.S. marine stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa. On February 11, the marine was arrested on suspicion of committing the offense. Although he denied the charge, local Okinawans and Japanese officials are outraged at the alleged incident. “It is unforgivable,” said Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. “It has happened over and over again in the past and I take it as a grave case.” When Fukuda said that instances like this have occurred “over and over again” he was most likely referring to a 1995 case where a 12-year-old Japanese schoolgirl was gang raped by three U.S. servicemen. This incident prompted huge Japanese protests calling for the U.S. military to leave Okinawa, and set in motion a process of U.S. troop reduction on the island. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer flew to Okinawa last week to offer personal apologies for the alleged rape and promises of tighter military discipline in the future. After Schieffer’s apology, a U.S. marine was arrested for drunk driving and another marine broke into an Okinawan household and was found drunk on the sofa at 4:25 a.m. Following these incidents, Japanese government spokesman Nobutaka Machimura said the Japanese would take the issue up with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when she visits Japan next week. Instances of misconduct by a few irresponsible U.S. marines are casting a bad image on the more than 40,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan. “This will have a big impact on future U.S-Japan relations,” said Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

**U.S. Military Misconduct such as rape greatly strains our relations with Japan.**

The Economist 10 (English Language Weekly News, The Economist)AK

ON THE wall of the Sakima Art Museum in this bustling city is a work called the Battle of Okinawa. It depicts the suffering of local civilians during the American invasion of Okinawa in 1945, partly at the hands of murderous-looking Japanese troops. On the roof of the museum, there is a more mischievous—but equally effective—work of anti-war polemic, this time directed against the Americans. A platform looks out over the fenced-off Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, which stretches out to the sea over an area larger than Central Park in New York. In just a few minutes, your correspondent witnessed a transport plane taking off, three fighter jets roaring overhead and a military helicopter rumbling to life. An aircraft-carrier might be less noisy. The base was seized by the American army in 1945, but since then Ginowan has grown to surround it with offices, homes and government buildings. Ginowan is only a small city, of 92,000 people; even so, imagine how New Yorkers living around Central Park would feel, were it an air base bristling with marines belonging to a country that once colonised them. That gives a sense of why Futenma, however much it has helped keep the peace in East Asia, has long needed to move. That much America and Japan agree upon. Negotiations to find a replacement have dragged on since 1996, the year after three American marines gang-raped a 12-year-old Okinawan girl. But since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power last September, the issue has opened an unusually deep wound in relations between the two countries. It still festers. On January 12th Katsuya Okada, Japan's foreign minister, and Hillary Clinton, America's secretary of state, agreed not to let the dispute stop them discussing other ways to bolster their military alliance. But Mrs Clinton continued to press for Futenma to be relocated in Okinawa.

Presence 🡪 Tensions With Alliance

Military dependence threatens the alliance

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

A third possibility for an unexpected termination of the relationship would be a shift in domestic Japanese political sentiment. That could take several forms: public anger at Japan's military dependence and vulnerability, growing recognition that the U.S. security commitment is at least partly motivated by American distrust of Japan, or a decision by Japan's political elite that the U.S. security shield no longer provides benefits that outweigh the obstacles it creates to Tokyo's pursuit of great-power status. In any of those cases, the initiative for terminating the alliance would come from the Japanese side, and bewildered U.S. leaders could do little more than complain about Japan's ingratitude and wonder what went wrong.

Relations brink- Next year key

Basing dispute threatens the alliance-the next year is key

Eric Talmadge - The Associated Press in 10 Japan balks at $2 billion to host U.S. troops, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/ap\_military\_japan\_020710/

The scrutiny in Japan, Washington's deep-pocketed ally and most important strategic partner in Asia, comes at a bad time for the U.S., whose defense budget is already spread thin in Iraq and Afghanistan. Japanese call their share a "kindness budget," implying the U.S. is getting a free ride, and its opponents say it is rife with waste. The opposition also reflects a long-standing feeling, particularly on the left, that the U.S. is taking its security alliance with Japan too much for granted. The alliance has come under intense pressure since Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama took office last September. He says the alliance remains a "keystone" of Japanese policy, but he wants to reevaluate it. "This will be a very important year for our relationship," he said last month. The flash point of the debate is the southern island of Okinawa, where most of the nearly 100 U.S. facilities in Japan are located. Futenma Airfield, where several thousand Marines are stationed, was to have been moved from the town of Ginowan to Nago, in a less crowded part of the island. But that plan came into doubt last month after Nago elected a mayor who opposes having the base.

Withdraw 🡪 Improved Japan Alliance

U.S. withdraw secures alliance – presence unnecessary

Carpenter 95 (Ted, Dir. Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Inst., “Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.- Japanese Security Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1103) CBC

**The U.S. military alliance with Japan no longer serves the best interests of either country.** **Washington subsidizes Japan's defense at the expense of American taxpayers.** **That subsidy,** which has amounted to approximately $900 billion (in 1995 dollars) since the early 1950s, **is a powerful incentive for the Japanese to continue free riding on the U.S. security guarantee.** And Japan's much-touted host-nation support of $5 billion a year actually pays only a small fraction of the total cost of the U.S. security commitment. Even worse, Washington's policy encourages a dependent mentality on the part of the Japanese and enables Tokyo to evade political and military responsibilities in East Asia even when Japan has important interests at stake. Japanese officials confirm that, in the event of war, Japanese military units would not join U.S. forces in combat operations unless Japan itself were attacked. U.S. leaders foolishly perpetuate Japan's security dependence. Washington's East Asian policy is held hostage to the exaggerated fears of Japan's neighbors, who oppose a more active military role for Tokyo. A lingering undercurrent of distrust toward Japan in U.S. policy circles has also been a major motive for Washington's "smothering" strategy. **A new policy is badly needed**. **It would seek a mature relationship between equals and recognize that Japan**, as the principal great power in East Asia, **must take a more significant role in the region's security affairs. The United States should withdraw its forces from East Asia over the next five years and keep smaller forces based in Guam and other U.S. territories**. **The U.S.-Japanese alliance ought to be replaced by a more limited, informal security relationship**. **America should be the balance**r of last resort, not the intervenor of first resort, **in East Asia's security equation.**

Withdraw 🡪 Improved Japan Alliance

A phase out of U.S. troops solves relations with Japan

Kito 94 (Makoto, Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent for the CATO Institute, CATO Institute, “Pullout of U.S. troops urged; U.S. think tank says Japan, South Korea, can fill power vacuum”, LN) CBC

**A U.S. think tank has recommended that the U.S. administration****withdraw its armed forces** **from Japan over the next few years as the capability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces strengthens**. The proposal was recently made by William Niskanen, chairman of the Republican-affiliated think tank CATO Institute. A report on the proposal is to be compiled by the institute in the near future. Ted Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at the institute, said **the proposal was aimed at reshaping****U.S.-Japan relations in all spheres--politics, economics and security--into an equal partnership.** With the Republican Party in control of both the Senate and House of Representatives, the institute's influence is regarded as more powerful, due to its close ties with the Republican Party and its advocacy of small government.The proposal contains many noteworthy points that are expected to appeal to the U.S. public, despite its general indifference to foreign affairs. Niskanen's proposal could set off a heated debate inside and outside the Republican Part and might lead to calls for revisions in the Japan-U.S. security treaty. The institute called on Japan to assume greater political and military roles in the northeast region of Asia and in the United Nations over the next few years**. As Japan's roles increase, the United States should correspondingly** **withdraw its troops in stages from Japan** and South Korea. **Both Tokyo and Seoul would fill the power vacuum to balance the influence of China and Russia. The United States would maintain its current level of involvement in the Asian-Pacific region by redeploying its naval and marine forces on a smaller scale to bases in Hawaii and along the U.S. West Coast.** Since the security treaty reflects conditions that existed during the Cold War, the proposal called for its revision to make it more flexible, allowing for more frequent Japan-U.S. military exercises.Niskanen's proposal was released at a time when the public's interest in Asian affairs has ebbed.Niskanen said Japan and South Korea should expand their roles in northeast Asian affairs since they are already heavily involved in the area.He also predicted that **if U.S. economic influence waned for an extended period, there would be louder calls in Japan** and South Korea **for the withdrawal of U.S. troops when tensions flared** on the Korean Peninsula **and when Japan-U.S. economic relations deteriorated**.On the issue of nuclear arms, Niskanen predicted Japan would opt for possession of highly advanced conventional weapons.

Withdrawal strengthens the US-Japan alliance

Preble 6 (Christopher, Dir. of foreign policy studies at Cato Institute, Cato Institute, Two Normal Countries:

Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship, p. 1, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10645) PL

The U.S.-Japan strategic relationship, formalized during the depths of the Cold War and refined during the 1980s and 1990s, continues to undergo dramatic changes. Although Japan is economically capable and now seems politically motivated to assume full responsibility for defending itself from threats, it is legally constrained from doing so under the terms of the Japanese constitution, particularly Article 9. The path to defensive self-sufficiency is also impeded by Japan’s continuing dependence on the United States embodied in the U.S.-Japan security alliance. With the United States struggling to meet military commitments abroad, and with Japan increasingly asserting military autonomy, American policymakers must shape a new policy that will more equitably distribute security burdens between the two countries. Three recent instances in which the United States and Japan have worked together on matters of mutual interest—Iraq, Taiwan, and North Korea—offer useful clues as to how a cooperative strategic relationship might operate in the future. A new U.S.-Japan strategic relationship will be crafted over a period of several years, but the process should begin immediately. As a first step, the United States should refrain from interfering in the decisions that the Japanese people may make with respect to their own defense. Washington should remain agnostic on the question of revisions to the Japanese constitution, including the crucial Article 9. Further, while U.S. policymakers might advise the Japanese of the uncertain benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons relative to the high costs, the United States should not expect to be able to prevent the Japanese from developing such weapons—nor should it try. Finally, the new strategic partnership should culminate with the removal of U.S forces from Japanese soil. The two countries could negotiate basing agreements for U.S. naval vessels and aircraft, and possibly also some prepositioning of heavy equipment in depots for rapid deployment in the region, but such agreements need not depend on the continuation of a largescale, and effectively permanent, U.S. troop presence. The new alliance between two normal countries— as opposed to one between a patron and a de facto client—will provide a more durable foundation for addressing the most pressing security challenges in East Asia and beyond.

Withdraw 🡪 Improved Japan Alliance

US Japan relations are in trouble-withdrawal solves

**Bandow 98** (Doug, Sen. fellow at the Cato Institute, Cato Institute**, “**No One Benefits From U.S. Presence In Japan”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5951**)** CBC

Supposedly, the United States and Japan long ago resolved the most contentious security issue dividing the two countries: American bases on Okinawa. Washington was to consolidate its forces and replace Futenma Air Station with an offshore heliport. But voters in the Okinawa town of Nago recently rejected the plan. With Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto promising to respect his citizens' wishes, American deployments are again in doubt. The Nago vote is just the latest evidence that **Japan's outdated security dependence on the US no longer serves the interests of either nation**. **It is time for a civil divorce**. **Washington and Tokyo updated their military cooperation agreement last fall.** But, given the fine print, Japan's professed willingness to cooperate beyond the defense of its own archipelago means little. **Tokyo's military will not fight or even enter a combat zone, and Japan's logistics support excludes weapons and ammunition**. Moreover, **the Japanese government is cutting defense outlays, as well as host-nation support for the US. The purpose of the existing security relationship has disappeared**. In 1945, Washington was concerned about containing communism after the collapse of wartime Japan. Five decades later, communism has collapsed, while Japan has become an economic powerhouse. Yet**, the US continues to bear a disproportionate defense burden, devoting roughly 4 percent of gross domestic product to its military**, quadruple Japan's level. Equally important, **Americans remain at risk in order to guard Japan's national interests with little or no assistance from Tokyo**. This was illustrated by Japan's tepid support for Washington's policies toward North Korea and China. Tokyo also has unambiguously stated its opinion of potential conflicts elsewhere in the region - they are America's problems. **This relationship is hardly a serious partnership, let alone a military alliance worth the $20 billion** or so **it costs the US.** Although Japan benefits from this subsidy, it also suffers. **The presence of thousands of primarily young males and the activities that inevitably accompany military bases fall heavily on local residents.** Despite promises by Tokyo and Washington, **little has been done to reduce the unfair burden on Okinawa**. The proposed heliport offers only a minimal improvement, and no other region in Japan seems likely to accept the "adequate replacement facilities" that Washington has demanded as the price of moving its forces. Unfortunately, America's role in Okinawa has long been discreditable. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the US asserted de facto sovereignty over the island (which was returned to Japan only in 1972) and seized land from local landowners. Washington's military protectorate imposes other costs on Japan. Especially offensive is the lack of international confidence. Many US officials privately agree with Maj. Gen. Henry Stackpole, who stated that America is "the cap in the bottle" preventing "a rearmed, resurgent Japan." In time, the Japanese people likely will tire of paying for their foreign watchdog, especially when US policies could embroil their nation in war. For instance, should the US use its bases to strike at China in a conflict over Taiwan, Beijing would not likely draw fine distinctions between Japanese and American installations when retaliating. It is for this reason that Liberal Democratic Party leaders have squabbled over whether the US-Japan alliance should cover Taiwan. These sorts of differences are likely to widen as the cold war further recedes. Although Washington has promised to maintain 100,000 troops in East Asia forever, or nearly so, the rationale for that presence has disappeared. **Japan faces no serious threats and has no incentive to launch another aggressive war;** South Korea can protect itself; China's defense buildup remains years away from endangering Japan; and Russia's Pacific military forces are in shambles. **"We cannot be a superpower, we cannot have global reach without allies**," Defense Secretary William Cohen said last year in Japan. But military alliances should have a purpose. **The alliance with Tokyo costs the US far more than it provides in benefits. America should scale back its disproportionate presence** in Okinawa, **followed by a** general **withdrawal of US forces from Japan**, and cancellation of the so-called mutual defense treaty. **Washington could then turn its position of unhealthy dominance into a truly equal partnership, benefiting both nations.**

Withdraw 🡪 Improved Japan Alliance

US presence hurts the alliance – withdrawal solves

Bandow in 10 (Doug, Sr. fellow at Cato Institute, Cato Institute, Get Out of Japan, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11928) PL

Candidate Barack Obama may have charmed foreign peoples, but President Barack Obama unashamedly cold shoulders foreign leaders he doesn't like. One of them was Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who sought to reduce the number of U.S. bases on the island of Okinawa. The Obama administration worked diligently to frustrate Hatoyama's efforts, which helped force his resignation barely eight months into his term. It was an impressive performance in raw political power. But it likely was a Pyrrhic victory. When World War II ended, the U.S. occupied Japan and effectively colonized the island of Okinawa, seized in a bitter battle shortly before Tokyo surrendered. The U.S. loaded Okinawa with bases and only returned it to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Four decades later nearly 20 percent of the island remains occupied by American military facilities. The U.S. military likes Okinawa because it is centrally located. Most Japanese like Okinawa because it is the most distant prefecture. Concentrating military facilities on the island — half of U.S. personnel and three-quarters of U.S. bases (by area) in Japan are located in a territory making up just .6 percent of the country — is convenient for everyone except the people who live there. Okinawans have been protesting against the bases for years. In 1995 the rape of a teenage girl set off vigorous demonstrations and led to various proposals to lighten the island's burden. In 2006 the Japanese government agreed to help pay for some Marines to move to Guam while relocating the Futenma facility to the less populated Okinawan community of Henoko. But residents wanted the base moved off of the island and the government delayed implementation of the agreement. During last year's parliamentary election the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) promised to move the installation elsewhere. Prime Minister Hatoyama later said: "It must never happen that we accept the existing plan." However, the Obama administration refused to reconsider and threatened the U.S.-Japanese relationship. That unsettled a public which had voted the DPJ into power primarily for economic reasons. Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to turn the unbalanced alliance into a more equal partnership but the Japanese people weren't ready. Said Hatoyama as he left office: "Someday, the time will come when Japan's peace will have to be ensured by the Japanese people themselves." Washington's victory appeared to be complete. The Japanese government succumbed to U.S. demands. A new, more pliant prime minister took over. The Japanese nation again acknowledged its humiliating dependency on America. Yet the win may prove hollow. Although Hatoyama's replacement, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, gives lip service to the plan to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma within Okinawa, the move may never occur. There's a reason Tokyo has essentially kicked the can down the road since 1996. Some 90,000 people, roughly one-tenth of Okinawa's population, turned out for a protest rally in April. With no way to satisfy both Okinawans and Americans, the Kan government may decide to follow its predecessors and kick the can for a few more years. Moreover, there is talk of activists mounting a campaign of civil disobedience. Public frustration is high: in mid-May, a human chain of 17,000 surrounded Futenma. Local government officials oppose the relocation plan and would hesitate to use force against protestors. Naoto Kan could find himself following his predecessor into retirement if he forcibly intervened. Even a small number of demonstrators would embarrass U.S. and Japanese officials alike. Moreover, Washington's high-handedness may eventually convince the Japanese people that their nation must stop being an American protectorate. It may be convenient to be defended by the world's superpower, but self-respect matters too. Tokyo has essentially given up control over its own territory to satisfy dictates from Washington. That is a high price to pay for U.S. protection. Kenneth B. Pyle, a professor at the University of Washington, writes: "the degree of U.S. domination in the relationship has been so extreme that a recalibration of the alliance was bound to happen, but also because autonomy and self-mastery have always been fundamental goals of modern Japan." Yet what is most curious about the issue is the dogged insistence of American officials in maintaining the Japanese protectorate. The world in which the security treaty was signed has disappeared. Admits Kent E. Calder of SAIS, "the international political-economic context of the alliance and the domestic context in both nations have changed profoundly." There is no reason to assume that a relationship created for one purpose in one context makes sense for another purpose in another context. The one-sided alliance — the United States agrees to defend Japan, Japan agrees to be defended — made sense in the aftermath of World War II. But sixty-five years later Japan possesses the second-largest economy on earth and has the potential to defend itself and help safeguard its region. "All of my Marines on Okinawa are willing to die if it is necessary for the security of Japan," Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, the Pacific commander of the Marine Corps, observed in February. Yet "Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States."

Withdraw 🡪 Improved Japan Alliance

Withdrawal is key to preserving the alliance

Feffer 10 (John, co-dir. At Institute for Policy Studes, Foreign Policy in Focus, Can Japan Say No to Washington?, http://www.fpif.org/articles/can\_japan\_say\_no\_to\_washington) PL

For a country with a pacifist constitution, Japan is bristling with weaponry. Indeed, that Asian land has long functioned as a huge aircraft carrier and naval base for U.S. military power. We couldn’t have fought the Korean and Vietnam Wars without the nearly 90 military bases scattered around the islands of our major Pacific ally. Even today, Japan remains the anchor of what’s left of America’s Cold War containment policy when it comes to China and North Korea. From the Yokota and Kadena air bases, the United States can dispatch troops and bombers across Asia, while the Yokosuka base near Tokyo is the largest American naval installation outside the United States. You’d think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn’t make a big fuss about closing one of them. Think again. The current battle over the Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa -- an island prefecture almost 1,000 miles south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen U.S. bases and 75% of American forces in Japan -- is just revving up. In fact, Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base alone, which reveals much about U.S. anxieties in the age of Obama. What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is an obsolete base. Under an agreement the Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the U.S. was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere “Pacific squall,” as Newsweek dismissively described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything the United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D. Eisenhower once called an “indestructible alliance” is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon’s perspective, Japan’s resistance might prove infectious -- one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value. During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless Communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe, NATO countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon’s new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the U.S. out of its air base in Manta. All of these are undoubtedly symptoms of the decline in respect for American power that the U.S. military is experiencing globally. But the current pushback in Japan is the surest sign yet that the American empire of overseas military bases has reached its high-water mark and will soon recede. Until recently, Japan was virtually a one-party state, and that suited Washington just fine. The long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had the coziest of bipartisan relations with that city’s policymakers and its “chrysanthemum club” of Japan-friendly pundits.

Public K2 Alliance

Public support key to maintain US-Japan alliance

Steinberg 10(James, Deputy Secretary of State, “The Future of The US Japan Alliance” Jan 15 http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/135270.htm) JL

Indeed, Japan today is playing an increasingly active role on the world stage, aiding in reconstruction efforts in Iraq and anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. In Afghanistan, its $5 billion in assistance will help train police officers, rehabilitate demobilized fighters, and build schools and roads – major contributions towards our shared interest in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan as well as our partnership to support progress and hope in Pakistan. While Japanese refueling support has just ended, we share the hope on the part of the international community that there will be other Japanese non-monetary contributions to stability in this crucial region. Japan has also been a strong supporter of the global nonproliferation regime, reflected recently in the installation of a respected Japanese public servant as the new director of the IAEA. And last month in Copenhagen, Japanese leadership played a vital role in helping the international community take a meaningful step towards addressing the global challenge of climate change. Thus you can see that on a range of the global issues facing our time, Japan today plays a central leadership role. Now under the banner of change, both the United States and Japan last year elected new leadership, an expression in both societies of the desire for fresh, forward-looking approaches to the challenges of the twenty-first century. I don’t need to tell this audience that the impact of that change has been particularly profound for Japan, bringing with it a new generation of leaders who have challenged their government and their people to think afresh about Japan’s approach to its own governance and to its relations with the broader international community. We in the United States welcome this expression of Japan’s vibrant democracy. But more importantly, we welcome the opportunity to conduct an open dialogue on shaping the future of the alliance. As President Obama said in his Tokyo speech, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but an abiding commitment to each other that is fundamental to our shared security. That means it’s essential that we work together to make sure that the alliance retains the support and understanding of both the Japanese and the American people, support that is crucial for the alliance to thrive. So this is a particularly important time for us to reflect on the need both for continuity and for change in our relationship, to reflect again on why the relationship remains the cornerstone of our engagement despite the remarkable changes that have taken place in the region.

Alliance K2 Stability

US-Japan alliance key to East Asian stability

Auslin 10 (Michael, Dir of Japan Studies, American Enterprise Institute, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Relic of a Bygone Era?”, <http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929>) MAT

The alliance has served as the cornerstone of Japanese defense and East Asian stability for fifty years. It has done so because of the willingness of both Japan and the United States to bear heavy burdens. Without Japanese support and bases, there would be no credible U.S. military presence in Asia. Without the alliance, there is no assurance that the peace among the major powers in the past fifty years would have continued, nor that they would have been able to develop their economies to the degree they have. For this reason, the alliance should continue and maintain its core focus on defending Japan and maintaining stability in East Asia. That said, the alliance has always required delicate political management by Tokyo and Washington. The two countries have often disagreed on issues of host nation support, SOFA, base location, and joint training. That is natural, and the efforts of thousands of bureaucrats over the past five decades have maintained a positive working relationship. Perhaps the most worrisome trend today is the slow erosion of trust between alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific and a growing sense of frustration with each other. Today, as East Asia changes dramatically--with the rise of China, the continuation of economic integration, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction--the Obama and Hatoyama administrations must decide if they view the alliance as a key element in their security strategies or as an outdated relic of a bygone era. There are great benefits to be had throughout Asia from closer economic integration, but greater dangers if old territorial or historical disputes are not resolved peacefully. If Asia is to continue to be the engine of global economic growth, then Japan's role is indispensable as the leading liberal democratic nation with a civil society based on individual freedom and the rule of law. In playing both a regional and global role, it is natural for Japan to work with the United States to promote the values and policies that have most benefited both countries. The same holds true for the United States, which will continue to be the underwriter of global and regional security for the foreseeable future. The costs and difficulties of maintaining the alliance are far outweighed by the benefits the alliance continues to bring to Japan, the United States, and Asia as a whole.

Alliance K2 Stability & Economy

US-Japan alliance is critical to maintaining security both economically and against threats

FPRI 05 (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Avery Goldstein “China’s Grand Strategy and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 9/27 http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050927.asia.goldstein.chinagrandstrategy.html) JL

There are, of course, no guarantees about how China will respond to a sensible U.S. approach of contingent cooperation. Others might well argue, then, that prudence requires us instead to “to prepare for the worst,” that it is “better to be safe than sorry,” and that wisdom suggests it is wiser to take a hard line against China while it is still weak. For three reasons, I think that position is misguided. First, it would undermine currently important U.S. interests; China would reciprocate our hostility and that would make it much more difficult for us to address the many international economic, environmental, and security problems on which Chinese cooperation is important. Second, a policy designed to contain China and prevent its rise would be exceedingly difficult to implement. Unlike the U.S. effort to contain the former Soviet Union, an attempt to contain China would find little support from the countries whose support is essential for such a strategy to succeed. On the contrary, with a few exceptions, such an approach would most likely aggravate relations with many American allies and partners around the world. Third, and most importantly, urgent calls to deal now with the possible dangers China’s rise might one day pose overstate the risks for the U.S. of waiting and watching, responding as China acts, and adjusting our approach towards a rising China as events warrant. The U.S. holds huge advantages over China, both in hard and soft power. There is no need to be stampeded into prematurely dealing with China as an adversary. China cannot become a great power overnight; it will be a rising power for several decades and will only emerge as a great power if it succeeds in overcoming some very daunting domestic obstacles to modernization. China has adopted the grand strategy I described because it recognizes just how weak it is relative to the U.S. and its allies. As such, China’s strategy reflects its attempt to play a weak hand well. The U.S., by contrast, holds most of the high cards; we need only be sure that we don’t play our strong hand poorly. A rush to judgment about the nature of the China we are likely to face several decades from now is not only unwise, it is also unnecessary.

Alliance K2 Stability & Economy

Alliance is key East-Asia economic and regional security

Auslin 10 (Michael, resident scholar at AEI“The US-Japan Alliance” Jan, http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929) JL

Taking such an approach will also help the alliance work together to engage China. Japan and the United States have common economic and political interests with China, and coordinating outreach to China can help set clear benchmarks for progress on many issues, including climate change, confidence building, and trade promotion. It does not make sense for Tokyo and Washington always to deal with Beijing independently given these common interests, although each country will follow its own policies and national goals when talking with China. Given the concerns both the United States and Japan have about China's military buildup or the effects of Chinese industry on pollution, joint efforts to begin dialogues with China or presenting a shared position may be extremely useful. The alliance has served as the cornerstone of Japanese defense and East Asian stability for fifty years. It has done so because of the willingness of both Japan and the United States to bear heavy burdens. Without Japanese support and bases, there would be no credible U.S. military presence in Asia. Without the alliance, there is no assurance that the peace among the major powers in the past fifty years would have continued, nor that they would have been able to develop their economies to the degree they have. For this reason, the alliance should continue and maintain its core focus on defending Japan and maintaining stability in East Asia. That said, the alliance has always required delicate political management by Tokyo and Washington. The two countries have often disagreed on issues of host nation support, SOFA, base location, and joint training. That is natural, and the efforts of thousands of bureaucrats over the past five decades have maintained a positive working relationship. Perhaps the most worrisome trend today is the slow erosion of trust between alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific and a growing sense of frustration with each other. Today, as East Asia changes dramatically--with the rise of China, the continuation of economic integration, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction--the Obama and Hatoyama administrations must decide if they view the alliance as a key element in their security strategies or as an outdated relic of a bygone era. There are great benefits to be had throughout Asia from closer economic integration, but greater dangers if old territorial or historical disputes are not resolved peacefully. If Asia is to continue to be the engine of global economic growth, then Japan's role is indispensable as the leading liberal democratic nation with a civil society based on individual freedom and the rule of law. In playing both a regional and global role, it is natural for Japan to work with the United States to promote the values and policies that have most benefited both countries. The same holds true for the United States, which will continue to be the underwriter of global and regional security for the foreseeable future. The costs and difficulties of maintaining the alliance are far outweighed by the benefits the alliance continues to bring to Japan, the United States, and Asia as a whole.

Alliance K2 Economy

US-Japan alliance is a great boon to Japanese economy

Armitage and Nye 7 (Richard L., Former Deputy Secretary of State, Joseph S., Ph.D in Political Science, CSIS, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Right Through 2020” p. 23)

For these reasons, the United States and Japan should declare intentions to commence negotiations on a comprehensive free-trade agreement as soon as possible. While the near-term expiration of trade-promotion authority makes this unlikely before the 2008 election, U.S. and Japanese leaders should nonetheless keep this goal in sight. This agreement would not only harmonize tariffs and customs procedures, it would reach far deeper, aiming toward convergence of the regulatory and investment environment, with the goal of significantly increasing productivity on both sides of the Pacific. An FTA, consistent with Doha obligations, could meaningfully level the playing field and enhance transparency across the board, significantly boosting opportunities for foreigners and newcomers in the Japanese market. Also, an FTA done right would undoubtedly open the door much wider for U.S. investment in Japan, in turn helping Japan meet the challenge of structural adjustment even in the face of an aging society. Over the next 20 years a U.S.-Japan FTA should aim to bring Japan’s level of inward direct investment up from 2.1 percent of GDP to the U.S. level of 14 percent of GDP (even so, this would be below the G-7 average of 20 percent of GDP). Finally, and critically, a WTO-compatible bilateral free-trade agreement could serve as the hub for a network of market economies in the region. In particular, a U.S.-Japan FTA could be part of a web of FTAs that the United States has or is negotiating with Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. This would provide a powerful incentive for China to meet its WTO obligations and, importantly, also become part of this web of high-quality FTAs. In sum, the direct economic benefits of a comprehensive U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement would likely be considerable. However, the political and strategic benefits for all of the members of the Asia-Pacific community would be even greater. For the United States and Japan to sign an economic alliance agreement—based on common core principles every bit as strong as those that underlay the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—would send a remarkably powerful signal to the region and the world. It would show that, economically and politically, our two nations share the same dreams and aspirations for our people’s future and for the stability and prosperity of the world.

Alliance K2 Economy

The alliance between the US and Japan guarantees that the two will be the strongest economies in the world until 2020

Armitage and Nye 7 (Richard L., Former Deputy Secretary of State, Joseph S., Ph.D in Political Science, CSIS, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Right Through 2020” p. 15)

With the goal of “getting Asia right,” there is the question of where the U.S.- Japan alliance fits within this strategy. Some argue that if we rely too much on the U.S.-Japan alliance, we and Japan will be isolated in Asia. They point to the immediate tensions between Japan and China and between Japan and Korea over historical issues and advocate a shift in our long-term strategy to China. We believe this construct would needlessly weaken our greatest strategic asset in the region—the close U.S.-Japan alliance. The alliance can and should remain at the core of the United States’ Asia strategy. The key to the success of this strategy is for the alliance itself to continue to evolve from an exclusive alliance based on a common threat toward a more open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values. One thing is certain about 2020: the United States and Japan will still be the world’s two largest economies with democratic systems and shared values. That is why the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to shape Asia’s future as it has its past—and be a critical factor in the global equation. Consider Japan’s role today. Japan upholds international institutions as the second-largest donor to the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank. Polls in 2006 of countries around the world demonstrate that, with the exception of China and Korea, Japan is the world’s most respected contributor of public goods. Japan upholds the balance of power in Asia through its own measured self-defense capabilities and support for U.S. presence. Japan provides relief in cases like the 2004 tsunami, with over $500 million in grants and the dispatch of its Self- Defense Forces. Japan has become a positive model for economic development, democratic principles, and global cooperation. The ability of the Japanese economy to sustain such high levels of financial support for the international system will likely decrease in relative terms by 2020, but after 50 years of passivity, Japan’s new leaders are arguing for a more proactive security and diplomatic role that will keep Japan’s weight in the international system high. The United States needs a Japan that is confident and engaged in that way. Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a “middle power” at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan’s full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment, Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means.

Alliance K2 Deterrence- China

Japan-U.S. relations are key to deterring China.

Press Trust of India in 10 (PTI, China asks Japan to be prudent over US alliance, http://news.rediff.com/interview/2010/feb/26/china-asks-japan-to-be-prudent-over-us-alliance.htm) pl

China has warned Japan that efforts to link growing US-Japanese defence alliance with the rise of Chinese military power could prove counterproductive to ties between Beijing and Tokyo. China's defence ministry said recent comments by Japanese politicians underlining that the US-Japanese defence alliance has become more important to counteract growing Chinese military power could result in deterioration in Beijing's trust in Tokyo. Some Japanese politicians said recently that Japan's alliance with the United States would become even more important given China's rise as a military power and decided to hold discussions on the issue when amending its new defence guidelines, according to report in China Daily on Friday. As Sino-Japanese defence ties have been developing positively, such remarks would definitely have a big impact on the countries mutual trust, the daily quoted senior Colonel Huang Xueping, the defense ministry's spokesman, as saying. "I need to point out that the Japan-US alliance is a bilateral arrangement against a specific historical background, which should be limited strictly to the bilateral sphere and not target a third party," Huang said. According to Zhou Yongsheng, a Japan studies professor with the China Foreign Affairs University, the new defence guidelines reflect the fact that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's pro-China attitude cannot outweigh a growing negative trend against Beijing in the country. "The new guideline sees China as a future threat, and that means Japan has basically returned to its old strategies," Zhou was quoted as saying in the report titled 'Japan told to be prudent over US alliance'. In recent past, some of Japanese politicians have expressed apprehension over the increasing expansion of the Chinese military. Ichiro Ozawa, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Japan, in his recent visit to Beijing met Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie in Beijing and expressed concern over China's military build-up. "There is sentiment in Japan that sees China's military modernisation as a threat," Ozawa said he told Liang during their meeting. "If Japan were to strengthen armaments, it would not bring good results for the future of Japan and China," Ozawa said. The influential Japanese lawmaker quoted Liang as telling him that China's military "serves to protect a large territory and border, definitely not to seek hegemony." Last year's victory of DPJ, regarded as pro-China compared to the Conservative Party, has raised hopes of more balanced relations between the two Asian neighbours. However, Tokyo's concern over Chinese military and firming up alliance with Japan-US defence ties remained dominant. Two months ago, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa had said Japan's alliance with the United States would become more important with China's rise as a military power. "It is true that China is building up its navy and air force. But their intentions are not clear to us," Kitazawa said. "As China increases its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, there may be countries that feel threatened. In that sense, the value of the Japan-US alliance will actually increase," he said.

Japan key to Chinese containment

Asia-Pacific Review 5 (November 1”Why Japan Still Matters” Pg 111 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=11&sid=3dddf44e-d956-4a96-aba1-c072d6816bed%40sessionmgr13) JL

When outsiders look at Northeast Asia, Japan stands out as a beacon of democracy, peace and stability. This benign image tends to factor Japan out of concerns about the future balance of power in East Asia and the broader Asia Pacific. This would be a mistake. Given its political, economic and military weight, Japan is the only potential regional balancer to China.58 Japan is not about to accept subordinate status in a future Chinese-dominated hegemonic order in East Asia. It will resist Chinese attempts to weaken its influence as a substantial power in the region. In some respects, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will play a key role in America’s grand strategy of balancing against China. Because of the incipient great power rivalry between China and Japan, Japan will choose balancing against China rather than bandwagoning with it, which makes Japan a suitable partner for America’s Asia–Pacific strategy. Japan and the US–Japan alliance are the principal obstacles standing between China and its desire for hegemony in the region.59 How to deal with a rising China is a strongly shared strategic concern of the United States and Japan, as is a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem.60 Japan has also become more important to the United States because South Korea is increasingly seen as a less reliable partner. Japan is now central to US global as well as regional strategic planning, and the alliance is going through a third stage of reaffirmation, redefinition and revitalization.61 For other states concerned that China might gain hegemony over Asia, Japan is central to preventing China’s sphere of influence spreading across the Asian continent.62 For this reason, resistance from regional states in the Asia–Pacific to Japan’s rise will be moderated. They will be less concerned about the growth of Japanese military power than they might be. Japan will become more important as a balancer of China to Southeast Asian countries and to Australia – in other words, to all those countries seeking regional counterweights to Chinese influence. 63 Southeast Asian states, in particular, are concerned to see a diplomatic balance maintained in the region between China and Japan. Too far a tilt in China’s direction leaves them exposed to unilateral Chinese influence.

Alliance K2 Deterrence- China

**Alliance key to contain the growing threat of China**

Council on Foreign Relations 9 (“Countering China's Military Modernization” Feb 4 http://www.cfr.org/publication/9052/countering\_chinas\_military\_modernization.html) JL

Japan and China compete over a host of issues, from regional security to international trade to access to energy. The two countries have a centuries-old history of conflict, including two Sino-Japanese wars that began in 1894 and 1931, and a bloody Japanese occupation of China during World War II. As this Backgrounder points out these animosities surface in recurring cycles, often involving Chinese anger over Japan's perceived lack of contrition for wartime crimes. But concrete territorial and economic issues also aggravate the relationship, including Japan's close alliance with the United States, trade frictions, and ongoing disputes over ownership of various islands in the East China Sea. In 2007, China and Japan ranked third and fifth respectively in national defense expenditures (PBS), both spending only a small fraction of the U.S. budget even after adjusting for gross underreporting by Beijing. China's military modernization fuels Japanese fears that China will use its growing economic leverage and military prowess to throw its weight around and dominate the region. Tanaka Akihiko of the University of Tokyo, speaking at a December 2008 CFR symposium on U.S.-Japan relations said China's growing military forces might change the balance of power in East Asia, which "would necessitate for Japan and the United States to readjust its force structure and other military management." Japan has significantly upgraded capabilities over the past 15 years, deploying the Aegis radar and accompanying missile systems for its navy and warplanes armed with advanced air-to-air missiles for its air force. Since 1998, when a North Korean missile test violated Japanese airspace, Toyko has been working in partnership with the United States to develop theater missile defenses which have obvious application in the event of any conflict with China. Over the past decade the U.S.-Japanese security alliance has been strengthened through revised defense guidelines, which expand Japan's noncombatant role in a regional contingency, allows for the deployment of an X-Band radar system in Japan as part of a missile defense system, expands bilateral cooperation in training and intelligence sharing, and allows a nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier in the Yokosuka Naval Base. In September 2007 Japan joined a multinational naval exercise with the United States, Australia, Singapore, and India in the area west of the Malacca Straits. The exercise reinforced the U.S.-led campaign of strengthening security ties among its democratic allies and "the strategic countering (PDF) of Chinese military power," argues a December 2008 U.S. Congressional Research Service report. In 2005, a joint statement by U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 2005 for the first time included Taiwan as a common strategic objective where the parties would "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues" through dialogue. Though Japan's foreign affairs ministry said this did not change the country's position on Taiwan, many experts believe the shift indicates that Japan is increasingly concerned with China's growing military capabilities.

Alliance K2 Deterrence- China

U.S.-Japan alliance key to deter China-prevents conflicts and solves for security

The Daily Yomiuri 05 (Tokyo, staff writer, The Daily Yomiuri, “No Title”, LN)

China is rapidly emerging as a military superpower. **It** already **deploys many ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads--the whole of the Japanese archipelago is within their range**. Against such a background**, China claims its sovereignty over the** Senkaku **Islands--which are indisputably and inherently part of Japan**--while its submarines have repeatedly intruded into Japan's territorial waters and **the Chinese continue to explore natural resources in Japan's exclusive economic zone, infringing upon** our **sovereignty**. We have to be aware that such moves by China are designed to test the determination of Japan and the United States and the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. alliance, while trying to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington. How can Japan cope with this situation? Armitage told the Tokyo forum that an increased collective self-defense capability would paradoxically make it less likely to be used. "Will China be a threat? They will less likely be a threat if we stay together," he said. Armitage thus showed that Japan's only realistic choice--making the Japan-U.S. alliance unshakable--is the only solution to deal reasonably and coexist stably with China, which is not only Japan's largest trading partner but also the biggest military threat to this country. Only when both Japan and the United States demonstrate their common determination to make any sacrifice for their alliance and show full preparedness for that purpose, will peace and stability in East Asia be ensured. That is what ASEAN countries expect of Japan and the United States. To that end, Tokyo and Washington will have to send a crystal-clear message to China to let Beijing know their alliance is unbreakable. For its part, Japan should say it makes no sense at all to discuss the idea of an East Asian Community as long as Japan's sovereignty continues to be infringed on by China. Long-lasting, stable and amicable international relations are viable only if the countries concerned respect each other. If Japan is enticed by China's massive market to follow and flatter Beijing, China will take advantage of it, and the mutual trust between Japan and the United States will be impaired. Bear in mind that only a reasonable and resolute attitude can ensure mutual trust and respect, which serves the national interest in the long term.

Alliance K2 Deterrence- China

Cooperation between Japan and US prevents China from becoming a threat.

Nye in 8 (Joseph S., Dean of Kennedy School of Govt. at Harvard Uni., Carnegie Council, Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, http://news.rediff.com/interview/2010/feb/26/china-asks-japan-to-be-prudent-over-us-alliance.htm) pl

Many analysts currently detect malaise in Japan about its alliance with the United States. Some of this relates to North Korea's nuclear weapons and a concern that the United States will not adequately represent Japan's interests (such as accounting for Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea years ago.) Other issues concern the basing of U.S. marines in Okinawa and sharing the costs of moving some to Guam. The list is long, but they might best be thought of as "housekeeping" issues: many a couple can quarrel over them without contemplating divorce. There is a deeper level of concern, however, which relates to Japan's fear of being marginalized as the United States turns toward a rising China. For example, some Japanese complain that China receives far more attention than Japan in the American election campaign. Such anxiety is not surprising: U.S. and Japanese defense capabilities are not symmetrical, and that is bound to agitate the more dependent party. Over the years, various suggestions have been made with a view to making the alliance more symmetrical, including that Japan become a "normal" country with a full panoply of military capabilities, even nuclear weapons. But such measures would raise more problems than they would solve. Even if Japan implemented them, they would still not equal the capacity of the United States or eliminate the asymmetry. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, America's European allies had similar anxieties about dependency and abandonment, despite their own military capabilities. The real guarantee of American resolve to defend Japan is the presence of U.S. troops and bases, and cooperation on issues—such as ballistic missile defense—aimed at protecting both Americans and Japanese. Moreover, there are two good answers to the question of whether the United States would abandon Japan in favor of China: values and threat. Japan and the United States, unlike China, are both democracies, and they share many values. In addition, both Japan and the United States face a common challenge from China's rise and have a strong interest in ensuring that it does not become a threat. The United States regards a triangular Japan-China-U.S. relationship as the basis of stability in East Asia, and wants good relations between all three of its legs. But the triangle is not equilateral, because the United States is allied with Japan, and China need not become a threat to either country if they maintain that alliance. On the other hand, China's power should not be exaggerated. A recent poll indicates that one-third of Americans believe that China will "soon dominate the world," while 54 percent see its emergence as a "threat to world peace." To be sure, measured by official exchange rates, China is the world's fourth largest economy, and it is growing at 10 percent annually. But China's income per capita is only 4 percent that of the United States. If both countries' economies continue to grow at their current rates, China's could be larger than America's in 30 years, but U.S. per capita income will still be four times greater. Furthermore, China lags far behind in military power, and lacks America's "soft power" resources, such as Hollywood and world-class universities. China's internal evolution also remains uncertain. It has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million live on less that $2 per day. Along with enormous inequality, China has a migrant labor force of 140 million, severe pollution, and rampant corruption. Nor has its political evolution matched its economic progress. While more Chinese are free today than ever before in Chinese history, China is far from free. The danger is that Party leaders, trying to counter the erosion of communism, will turn to nationalism to provide ideological glue, which could lead to an unstable foreign policy—including, for example, conflict over Taiwan. Faced with such uncertainty, a wise policy combines realism with liberalism. By reinforcing their alliance, the United States and Japan can hedge against uncertainty while at the same time offering China integration into global institutions as a "responsible stakeholder." The greatest danger is that an escalating fear of enmity in the three countries becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In that sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance rests on deeply rooted joint interests. There is a new dimension to the alliance, however, and to the relationship with China. This year, China surpassed the United States as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. China argues, correctly, that it is still behind the United States and Japan in per capita emissions, but this does not reduce the costs imposed on the world (including Japan and the United States). A cooperative program that helps China to burn its coal more cleanly is in the interests of all three countries. In general, transnational threats such as climate change or pandemics can cause damage on a scale equivalent to military conflict. (In 1918, avian flu killed more people than died in World War I). Responding to such threats requires cooperation, soft power, and nonmilitary instruments, and this is an area in which Japan is a much more equal and important ally. If anything, the new and growing dimension of transnational threats, when added to traditional security concerns, makes the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance look more promising than ever.

Alliance K2 North Korea

Japan's policy toward N. Korea is strengthened by strong U.S.-Japan relations.

Hughes in 9 (Christopher, Prof. of Intnl. Politics at University of Warwick, Asian Survey, "SUPER-SIZING" THE DPRK THREAT: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea, 49(2), p. 299-302) pl

But even as Japanese policy makers have searched for non-military means to moderate the origins of Pyongyang’s confrontational behavior, they remain conscious that the North presents a range of direct existential military threats. Japan’s conventional military concerns with regard to North Korea revolve around the threat of guerrilla incursions and attacks on sensitive facilities such as nuclear power stations on the Sea of Japan coast. The abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s have been taken as demonstrations of the North’s ability to infiltrate Japanese territory at will. In March 1999 and December 2001, the JSDF and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) intercepted and fired upon North Korean vessels (referred to as fushinsen, suspicious ships) believed to be spying. Japan’s second anxiety focuses on the direct threat from North Korea’s ballistic missile programs. Japanese policy makers have long been aware, especially since the May 1993 test launch of a Nodong-1 in the Sea of Japan, that a significant part of Japanese territory is exposed to attack from the North’s stock of 100 to 200 of these 1,000–1,300-kilometer medium range ballistic missiles. However, Japan’s vulnerability was fully revealed to policy makers and the public alike by the test launch of a Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998 over Japanese “airspace.” The North Korean missile threat was confirmed by the July 2006 test of seven missiles, including the Taepodong-2 with a potential range of up to 6,000 kilometers. 15 Japan is concerned that North Korea might deploy these missiles with conventional high-explosive warheads, or mount chemical or biological weapons; despite their relative inaccuracy, the missiles would pose a significant threat to Japan’s civilian urban population. Last but certainly not least, Japanese policy makers fear that North Korea will eventually look to combine its missile capabilities with its newly acquired nuclear weapons technology. Japan has looked on askance as the North has pushed forward its nuclear program since the mid-1990s; Tokyo reacted strongly to the nuclear test of October 2006. The ultimate Japanese The combination of existential military threats that North Korea presents has been magnified unduly and pushed up the Japanese security agenda because it complicates the alliance basis of Japan’s security policy and revives dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment. Again, entrapment has been a generally lesser concern for Japanese policy makers, although, as explained shortly, alarm bells were rung by the 1994 nuclear crisis and U.S. requests to activate the security treaty to enable Japan to provide support in the event of a Korean Peninsula contingency, thus raising the risk of Japanese embroilment in a second Korean War. Similarly, the George W. Bush administration’s initial identification of North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002 and the associated talk of regime change sparked Japanese fears that the U.S. might attempt to precipitate a preemptive war to halt the North’s nuclear program, which might have threatened to suck Japan into an unwanted Korean conflagration.17 Hence, in large part Prime Minister Koizumi’s summitry in North Korea in September 2002 was designed to demonstrate to the U.S. the importance of exhausting diplomacy before turning to military options. By and large, though, Japan’s alliance security concerns have concentrated on North Korea’s capability to threaten to drive a wedge between Japanese and U.S. interests, raising fears of abandonment for Japan. North Korea first demonstrated this capability during the nuclear crisis of the mid- 1990s. The U.S. was focused on preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula and halting nuclear proliferation; its concerns were therefore regional and global. By contrast, Japan’s security priorities at the time were predominantly domestic. The divergence of security priorities was revealed after Washington’s mid-1994 request to activate the security treaty and procure Japanese logistical support. Japan was focused only on self-defense under both Article 5 of the security treaty and Defense Guidelines. This meant that Tokyo was unable to respond positively to Washington’s Article 6-based requests, with their regional scope. The consequence was that the bilateral alliance was exposed by North Korea as a largely empty construct for responding to regional crises. Japan’s failure to be seen to back its American ally in the North Korean nuclear crisis, coupled with the eruption of domestic opposition to U.S. bases on Okinawa in 1995, triggered a crisis of political confidence in the alliance, and genuine Japanese fears that it might be abandoned as an untrustworthy ally.18 Although North Korea’s capacity to shake the political foundations of the alliance was tempered somewhat by subsequent alliance restructuring, as outlined in later sections, the North has continued to highlight the weakness of a shared U.S.-Japan alliance vision. North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong-1 test again demonstrated the potential divisions of interests. Japan reacted to the test as a direct challenge to its national security, imposing limited sanctions and intimating that it would hold back on financial support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), thus threatening to undermine the U.S.’s approach based on the 1994 Agreed Framework to contain North Korean nuclear proliferation. Against this, U.S. policy makers, although concerned about how the Taepodong-1 test was edging North Korea closer to being able to strike the continental United States, were focused on trying to prevent the Agreed Framework from being derailed by the North’s provocations. Hence, Japan found itself isolated and was cajoled back into supporting KEDO, even though its fundamental security concerns about the North’s missiles were never addressed. The unfolding of the second nuclear crisis, culminating in North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests of 2006 and their aftermath, told a similar story of potential divergence between Japanese national and U.S. regional and global security interests. This has been in spite of constant efforts to strengthen the alliance. Japanese policy makers since September 11, 2001, have remained anxious that the U.S.’s focus on the “war on terror” and global interests beyond the East Asia region might lead to a general denudation of their ally’s resolve to arrest North Korea’s inexorable move toward nuclear weapons acquisition—and to defend Japan. Moreover, even after the U.S. returned to focus on the Korean Peninsula, especially since the start of the Bush administration’s second term, from Japan’s perspective the U.S. has not always shown sufficient cognition of its ally’s interests. 19 For sure, Japan and the U.S. demonstrated considerable alliance solidarity in their U.N. diplomacy in 2006 to pass resolutions 1695 and 1718 condemning the missile and nuclear tests and imposing limited sanctions. Nonetheless, Japan’s increasingly assertive attitude toward containing the North Korean threat, compounded by domestic anti-North Korean feeling over the abductions issue, has been matched by a similar U.S. resolve and hard-line approach. In the wake of the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, for instance, Japanese policy makers considered the option of backing a potential U.S. economic blockade of the North, in keeping with Japan’s Defense Guidelines. But the U.S. soon made it clear that it needed to pursue diplomacy and was not prepared as yet to exert military pressure on the North.20 In turn, the U.S.’s desire for a diplomatic solution has meant that since February 2007 it has pushed ahead with implementing the SPT’s agenda for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, over the head of Japanese concerns that the North has been rewarded for its “bad behavior” in conducting the missile and nuclear tests. Indeed, Japan’s major fear is that as part of the SPT process, it could be bounced into normalization with the North without satisfactory progress on the abductions, and that the U.S. might even extend a negative security guarantee to North Korea. Washington might even be prepared to tolerate North Korean maintenance of nuclear weapons as long as there was no proliferation beyond the Korean Peninsula. Certainly for Tokyo, any U.S. security arrangement with the North would be anathema, raising questions about how far the U.S. is willing to defend Japan from nuclear attack.21 In this instance, the U.S.’s concern with achieving overall regional stability, and its global goals of non-proliferation, might conflict with Japan’s more immediate goals of removing North Korea as a nuclear threat, raising worries that Japan’s security might be de-coupled from that of the U.S.22 Japanese policy makers have expressed quiet concerns recently that the U.S. might sacrifice a resolution of the abductions issue in the course of pushing forward the SPT. The administration of Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo did look set to acquiesce in subverting this issue in the interests of resuming bilateral normalization talks with North Korea and rehabilitating Japan as an active player in Korean Peninsula diplomacy. However, the new administration of Prime Minister Asō Tarō has again taken a harder line approach on the abductions and sought U.S. pledges not to abandon Japan on the issue.

Alliance K2 North Korea

U.S-Japan relations deter and counter N. Korean threats.

Hughes in 9 (Christopher, Prof. of Intnl. Politics at University of Warwick, Asian Survey, "SUPER-SIZING" THE DPRK THREAT: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea, 49(2), p. 304-310) pl

Between the drafting of the revised guidelines (1996 –97) and the passage of legislation in 1999 enabling logistical support for the U.S. in regional contingencies, Japan’s policy makers continued to maintain the fiction that these measures were not aimed at China. The Japanese government persisted with its argument that the scope of the revised Defense Guidelines was “situational” rather than geographically specific, so as to leave ambiguous the position of Taiwan within the coverage of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, Japanese policy makers, despite their verbal contortions, eventually gave the game away. Katō Kōichi, having recently served as chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Committee, was reported to have told Chinese leaders on a visit to Beijing in July 1997 that the real concern of the revised Defense Guidelines was the Korean Peninsula and not China. But Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku countered this assertion a month later by stating that the guidelines did include Taiwan.30 The Japanese government’s preparedness to manipulate the catch-all North Korean threat was also shown in the run-up to the passing of the guidelines legislation in 1999. Although it is unlikely ever to be proved— but as figures such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu have argued—it was perhaps more than serendipity that Japan’s defense forces intercepted a North Korean fushinsen exactly when the Defense Guidelinesrelated legislation was being debated in the Diet.31 North Korea’s role as a convenient threat to be manipulated to disguise the dual nature of changes in Japan’s defense posture is also witnessed in justifications for BMD. Japan’s “clear and present danger” in terms of ballistic missiles is undoubtedly North Korea, and the BMD program is currently driven primarily by this imperative. Nevertheless, Japanese policy makers have often been disingenuous in neglecting to indicate that China is also a potential long-term object of the development and deployment of BMD. Japan’s government certainly intends to deploy BMD assets to defend JSDF and U.S. bases in the event of Korean Peninsula or Taiwan Strait contingencies. Officials are aware that in the event of the former, it may face U.S. demands to deploy the system around Taiwan. As noted earlier, since the fi rst North Korean nuclear crisis Japan has seen two iterations (in 1995 and 2004) of the revision of the Defense Guidelines. In terms of conventional military capabilities, since the mid-1990s Japan has scaled down the JSDF’s force structure, largely aimed at defeating a Soviet land invasion. Japan has begun to acquire capabilities more suited to responding to the post-Cold War threats from both North Korea and China, although legitimized primarily via the threat from the North. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in the 2004 Defense Guidelines moved to further reduce the number of its main battle tanks and to instead emphasize rapid-reaction style forces through the establishment of a Central Readiness Group, able to respond to North Korea-type guerrilla incursions and to train for overseas international dispatch. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is to reduce the number of its destroyers and concentrate on its qualitative investmented in six destroyers equipped with the Aegis sea-mobile BMD system, suited to intercepting North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles. The MSDF began upgrading its ships for BMD in 2007 and should complete its deployments by 2011, on a timetable accelerated by the North’s missile tests of 2006. Japan, with U.S. cooperation, conducted its fi rst successful interceptor test of the Aegis BMD system off Hawaii in December 2007, and a second, less successful test in November 2008. The MSDF has also introduced 200-tonne [i.e., 196 long ton] high-speed missile patrol boats to respond to future fushinsen. It is known to have considered procuring Tomahawk cruise missiles to provide Japan with a means to strike back at North Korean ballistic missile launches.32 The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), partly in reaction to the North Korean threat, has acquired in-fl ight refueling capabilities and since 2008 has started to procure precision-guided munitions that could strike against North Korean missile bases. The ASDF completed the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC) BMD systems between 2006 and 2008 around Tokyo, and practiced their deployment in central Tokyo in September 2007 and January 2008.33 Similarly, the JCG, a near-second navy in terms of its tonnage and patrol vessel capabilities, has installed powerful 30 mm long-range machine guns on its ships to counter North Korean intruders.34 Japan has beefed up its overall intelligence capabilities to respond to North Korean missile tests, launching four intelligence-gathering satellites (two using synthetic aperture radar and two with optical capabilities) between March 2003 and February 2007. Although Japan classifies these as “multi-purpose intelligence-gathering satellites,” the decisive impetus for its own spy satellite program came from the Taepodong-1 test; the satellites’ prime military use thus far has been to monitor preparations for North Korean missile launches. Japan’s reaction to North Korea has also precipitated change in the fundamental prohibitions governing its use of military force. Japanese procurement of in-flight refueling capabilities and interest in precision-guided munitions and Tomahawk missiles have raised the question of whether this is leading to a possible breach of the Constitution’s anti-militaristic principle barring possession of offensive weaponry. There has been discussion of whether Japan is looking to lift its ban on the use of preemptive force to respond to North Korean missile attacks. Thus far, the Japanese government has adhered to its consistent position since 1956 that strikes may be launched only when an aggressor has embarked on definite steps to attack, and not simply when it is feared to be about to attack. For Japan, the latter is the definition of preemption.36 Japan’s temptation to transgress its anti-militaristic principles in order to respond to North Korea has also been shown by its intelligence satellite program, which de facto has led to the use of space for military purposes. The Japanese government has increasingly shifted its interpretation of this anti-militaristic principle from one defi ned in 1969 as peaceful (heiwa no mokuteki) and non-military (higunji) to one of the defensive military use of space. In May 2008, the LDP, with support from the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), passed through the Diet a new Basic Law for Space Activities. Article 2 states that Japan will conduct activities in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, thereby now permitting the use of space for defensive purposes and fi nally breaching the anti-militaristic principle.37 Japan’s embarkation on BMD is placing severe pressure on other antimilitaristic principles and constitutional prohibitions. In order to operate a BMD system that seeks to respond in real time to missiles that may reach their target in Japan within a matter of minutes, it is necessary to delegate greater authority to launch interceptors to field commanders, in line with pre-planned rules of engagement. Japan has traditionally retained decisions on the use of military force in the hands of the prime minister, in line with the post-war principles of civilian control. However, in February 2005, the government revised its legal measures to dilute civilian control while enhancing the authority of the minister of defense and JSDF commanders —for the [notextdeleted]purposes of BMD.38 Likewise, BMD is placing extreme pressure on Japan’s ban on collective self-defense. Japan, to effectively operate the BMD system, will need to boost information-sharing and also integration of its command-and-control systems with those of the U.S., to draw on the latter’s superior infrared sensor systems for detecting and tracking missile launches. Japan and the U.S. have already agreed since May 2006 to collocate their air defense systems for missile defense at Yokota Air Base near Tokyo. Japan’s closer cooperation with the U.S. and possession of an Aegis BMD system, largely interoperable with that of the U.S., which has also deployed its fi rst BMD-capable Aegis cruiser assets in Japan since the North’s 2006 missile tests, should increases expectations for Japan to assist the U.S. in regional contingencies involving North Korea and Taiwan. U.S. policy makers, including Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacifi c Affairs Richard Lawless, have also made it progressively clearer since 2006 that the U.S. expects Japan to use its BMD assets to help intercept missiles targeted for the U.S. If the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense interferes with this, their view is that it should be breached. As noted in earlier sections, North Korea’s perceived threat to Japan has been multiplied by the fact that it has attacked the political basis of the alliance, potentially prizing apart U.S. and Japanese interests. Japan has reacted by seeking to strengthen political and military confidence in the U.S.-Japan alliance to demonstrates its indispensability for Japanese and U.S. interests regionally and globally. In the wake of the fi rst North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan therefore sought to rehabilitate the alliance by revising the NDPO and Defense Guidelines to accommodate Article 6-type regional contingencies, which have become the U.S.’s prime interest in the post-Cold War era. Similarly, in the wake of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan and the U.S. have again moved, through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) of 2004 – 06, to consolidate the alliance’s regional contingency functions to respond to North Korea. Moreover, BMD in large part, despite inevitable tensions over constitutional restrictions, has served to boost alliance cooperation through enhanced informationsharing, and also sensor and interceptor deployments. North Korea’s magnified threat can also be said to has magnified Japan’s military role and U.S.-Japan alliance ties by encouraging Japan to expand its security horizons to the global level. Japan’s dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq between 2004 and 2006 was justifi ed by then-Prime Minister Koizumi on two rationales. The fi rst was that it would contribute to Iraqi reconstruction and the “war on terror” on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Second, and arguably most prominent for Japanese policy makers and generally implicitly accepted by the public, was that the troop dispatch was the unspoken quid pro quo for securing U.S. alliance support to defend Japan as an indispensable and loyal ally against the re-emerging North Korean nuclear threat. Japan’s possible exercise of its so-called “nuclear option”—moving to acquire an autonomous force de frappe nuclear deterrent to ward off a nuclear armed North Korea—is the other area of change in its security policy often speculated about in the wake of the North’s 2006 nuclear test. For sure, certain Japanese policy makers, including then-Foreign Minister Asō Tarō and then-chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Nakagawa Shōichi, immediately following the test did attempt to initiate a debate on the value of Japan possessing nuclear weapons. However, few influential policy makers actually advocated breaching the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and it appears that currently the drivers for Japan as a potential nuclear proliferator are too weak.41 First, Japan retains sufficient confidence in the extended U.S. deterrent to believe that it sees no overwhelming national security threat from the North. Indeed, any move by Japan to go nuclear might only serve to alienate the U.S. and worsen Japan’s security situation. In addition, Japan’s acquisition of BMD and possible acquisition of conventional deterrence capabilities, such as the ability to strike North Korean missile bases, should mean that it can counter North Korea conventionally. Second, the fact that Japan has drawn international kudos by adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, coupled with very strong domestic anti-nuclear sentiment, means that there is no incentive to go nuclear in terms of international prestige and becoming respected as a great power.42 Third, Japan’s dependence on civilian nuclear and fossil fuels from overseas means that acquiring nuclear weapons could lead to economic isolation and extreme energy vulnerability. Fourth, Japan may have the technological capacity over the medium to long term to acquire nuclear weapons, but the effort of acquiring delivery systems, submarines, and command-and-control systems would be very costly fi nancially. In the interim, Japan might risk losing its U.S. nuclear umbrella, and any force de frappe developed would likely be a poor substitute for the full panoply of U.S. nuclear capabilities.43 Hence, at present the relatively weak North Korean nuclear threat is only sufficient to force Japan to saber-rattle and question its anti-nuclear taboos. Still, in the future, any potential for a growing North Korean nuclear capacity and a perceived decline in the U.S. commitment might cause a more serious reconsideration of Japan’s stance.

Alliance K2 North Korea

Strong U.S.-Japan relations are key to avoiding a crisis with N. Korea.

Yasuaki 05 (Chijiwa, Fellow at National Institute for Defense Studies, Asian Survey, Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations on the Eve of the Iraq War: Dilemmas over "Showing the Flag", 45(6), p. 856-857) pl

Why did the Japanese government expand its win-set by trying to restrain the U.S. from military action through declaring support without a new resolution? This can be explained from the standpoint that the relative cost of no agreement between Japan and the U.S. was too high for Japan. Since the inception of the bilateral security treaty in 1951, Japan has been a staunch ally of the U.S. and for more than half a century Japan's security policy had been developed around the assumption that the Japan-U.S. alliance functions in part to protect Japan. During the leadup to the Iraq War, political and military tensions were also building in Northeast Asia over North Korea's nuclear weapons development, and so it was vital for Japan to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. (Japan's only ally) in case of a crisis in which Japan was threatened by a nuclear-armed North Korea.66 If an agreement could not be reached because of the Japanese government's demand that the U.S. refrain from military action in Iraq, the U.S. would likely engage in unilateral military action without Japan's political or logistical support. Moreover, unlike France or Germany, Japan is constitutionally barred from engaging in military action: if these states suddenly reversed their opposition to the war and altered their policy toward the U.S., Japan would find itself isolated. In any case, Armitage, Baker, and others appeared to have tried to expand Japan's win-set by appealing to public opinion or government parties and MOFA, which were sensitive to the cost of no agreement.

US Japan alliance key to ensure stability on Korean peninsula

Michael W. Michalak, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Embassy of the United States in Japan, 2005, online: http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20050218-77.html

China is a key partner in our continuing efforts to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through the six-party talks. We believe that these talks are still the best way forward to try to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Japan and the United States will continue to be united in our commitment to resolve these difficult issues by diplomatic means. And, at the same time, the United States will continue to support the government of Japan in its ongoing quest to seek a full accounting from the North Koreans of the Japanese citizens who have been abducted.

US Japan alliance key to North Korean deterrence

Hsi-hsun Tsai, full time Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute of Japanese studies at Tamkang University, 2005, online: http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/9-1/913.pdf

Japan is a main supporter for American foreign policies. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a backbone for two countries’ stable relations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, “If you think about North Korea, we have to say the Japan-U.S. security alliance has been a great deterrence.” “I will handle international affairs while at the same time looking closely at our alliance with the U.S. and thinking about the need for international cooperation.”7 Thus, Japanese perspective is that supporting American foreign policies is in Japan’s best interests. From the approach of American global strategic interests, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the defense of Japan, and the Japanese bases are critically important.

US K2 Prevent North Korea War

Lack of US involvement in Korean affairs will lead to nuclear war with an unpredictable North Korea

Jin-Hyung 9 (Kim, Staff Writer, The Huffington Post, “North Korea Warns of Nuclear War”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/14/north-korea-warns-of-nucl\_n\_215324.html) MAT

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea's president said Monday that the country's alliance with the United States is key to resolving North Korea's nuclear and missile threats as he flew to Washington for a summit with President Barack Obama. The summit scheduled for Tuesday comes in the wake of North Korea's declaration over the weekend that it would step up its bomb-making atomic program. It also threatened war with any country that tries to stop its ships on the high seas under new sanctions approved by the U.N. Security Council in response to its May 25 nuclear test. "We cannot stress enough the importance of diplomacy at a time when a security crisis is intensifying due to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats," Lee told a regular radio speech before his departure. "In particular, the South Korea-U.S. diplomacy is key to that diplomacy," he said. "I will use this summit to reconfirm the strong Korea-U.S. alliance." The strong ties between South Korea and the United States are a thorn in the side of North Korea, which accuses the two countries of plotting to attack it and topple its communist regime. The U.S., which denies any such ambitions, has 28,000 troops stationed in South Korea to protect it from North Korea. Pyongyang says it is committed to building atomic bombs and has been developing missiles capable of striking Japan and the United States. It says the two programs are a deterrent against the United States. Tension on the Korean peninsula spiked after North Korea said Saturday that it would "weaponize" all its plutonium and acknowledged the existence of a long-suspected uranium enrichment program for the first time. Both plutonium and uranium are key ingredients of atomic bombs. North Korea is already believed to have enough plutonium for at least half a dozen atomic bombs. The United States says it is worried that the impoverished North Korea will sell its nuclear technology to rogue nations, spreading the nuclear threat in the world. The new U.N. sanctions are aimed at depriving the North of the financing used to build its nuclear program. They also authorize searches of North Korean ships suspected of transporting illicit ballistic missile and nuclear materials. In Washington, Vice President Joe Biden expressed the U.S. commitment to enforcing the sanctions while acknowledging that "God only knows" what ruler Kim Jong Il wants from the latest showdown. Biden told NBC's "Meet the Press" Sunday that it's crucial for the U.S. and other nations to "make sure those sanctions stick." Kim reportedly had a stroke 10 months ago, and analysts believe there may be a plan in place to name his inexperienced 26-year-old son, Kim Jong Un, as the future leader. "There's all kinds of discussions," said Biden. "Whether this is about succession, wanting his son to succeed him. Whether or not he's looking for respect. Whether or not he really wants a nuclear capability to threaten the region. ... We can't guess his motives.

US-North Korea War Likely

North Korea is willing to escalate conflict to the nuclear option.

Vieru 9 (Tudor, Science Editor, SoftPedia, “Nuclear War Looming: North Korea Threatens to Attack the South: If its ships are stopped and searched”, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Nuclear-War-Looming-North-Korea-Threatens-to-Attack-the-South-112694.shtml) MAT

North Korean authorities apparently mean business, western officials have said. The Communist nation has announced just recently that it will openly engage in military confrontations with South Korea, if any of its ships, military or civilian, are stopped and searched by a US-led coalition. The Democratic half of Korea said a few days ago that it would join the initiative, whose objective was to search suspicious vessels for signs of weapons of mass destruction that could potentially be used to attack America or Canada. The statement by the Communists does nothing to alleviate tensions in the area, which are also increased by the fact that the developed world is applying increased sanctions on the rogue nation. South Korean media outlets said today that the North had restarted one of its older nuclear reactors, which could be used to make plutonium. The chemical is an absolute requirement for manufacturing nuclear bombs, which the North has already proven to be capable of. Following Monday's nuclear explosion, which was recorded by seismographs as far as Japan, the Communist state made it abundantly clear that it was capable of defending itself against invading forces. According to official news agencies, the Russian Federation has currently begun preparations of limiting damages it may receive following a nuclear war. Undoubtedly, some in Russia think, if North Korea is attacked, or if it attacks, nuclear weapons will become involved at one point or another. The eastern part of Russia will be especially vulnerable to either direct damage, or nuclear fallout, and several state agencies have been placed on alert to limit the potential effects of atomic explosions. “Any hostile act against our peaceful vessels including search and seizure will be considered an unpardonable infringement on our sovereignty and we will immediately respond with a powerful military strike,” the official North Korean news agency KCNA quotes a top Army official as saying. He also added that the North no longer considered itself as part of the armistice the country had signed with the South after the war in 1950-1953, on account of the fact that the US, who was part of the document, ignored its provisions by leading the South in the initiative. “The [Monday] nuclear test was a grand undertaking to protect the supreme interests of the DPRK (North Korea) and defend the dignity and sovereignty of the country and nation,” the KCNA quotes a superior Communist official as saying during a meeting, in which top military cadres celebrated the successful nuclear test. [Reuters](http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSSEO14165620090527?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews) reports that the western world believes Pyongyang only has sufficient fissile material for five to seven nuclear bombs, but that its newly reopened reactor could provide fuel for one more by the end of this year.

North Korea ready to go to war and take it nuclear

Moore 9 (Malcolm, Staff Writer, Telegraph.co.uk, “North Korea claims US could provoke nuclear war”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5532319/North-Korea-claims-US-could-provoke-nuclear-war.html) MAT

A commentary in the North's state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper claimed the US had 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea ready to strike. Meanwhile, the Tongbil Sinbo newspaper said that North Korea is "completely within the range of US nuclear attack and the Korean peninsula is becoming an area where the chances of nuclear war are the highest in the world." Over the weekend, North Korea angrily responded to fresh United Nations sanctions by threatening to build as many nuclear weapons as possible. Until now, it said, it had only reprocessed one-third of its spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Analysts believe the rogue state could end up with enough plutonium to make eight to nine bombs. The rogue state also claimed to have a uranium-enrichment programme, the first time it has admitted to one. The claim is alarming, said Professor Yang Moo-Jin, of Seoul's University of North Korean Studies. "The North has abundant natural uranium of good quality, which, if combined with technology and facilities, would result in a great nuclear arsenal," he said. The new UN sanctions include the mandatory inspection of any ship suspected of carrying drugs, weapons or counterfeit money, the main sources of income for the impoverished country. However, North Korea responded with threats that any attempt to search one of its ships would be considered "an act of war" and would be "met with a decisive military response".

North Korea War 🡪 Nukes

WAR ON THE PENNINSULA WILL END LIFE ON EARTH

 AFRICA NEWS, December 25, 1999, Lexis Nexis

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.

North Korea would retaliate – it would be an all-out conflict

**Fagge 10 [Nick, Staff Writer, March 27, The Express News, Lexis]**

**FEARS of an all-out conflict between North and South Korea grew last night after a ship was sunk in a suspected torpedo attack**. Early reports suggested that only 58 of the South Korean naval vessel's 104-strong crew had been saved. After the ship went down, the South Korean navy fired on an unidentified ship in the Yellow Sea, close to North Korea. The incident took place on a disputed sea boundary that has been the scene of numerous incidents, most recently in January and February. Clashes took place in 2002 but these were not as serious as a border dispute in 1999 that left up to 80 North Korean sailors dead after an exchange of gunfire. There are now fears that the latest incident in worsening relations between the two countries could plunge them into war. An emergency meeting of security officials was called by South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak in the capital Seoul. However South Korea was careful not to confirm reports that the attack was by forces controlled by North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il. A spokesman said: "It is not clear whether North Korea was involved." **The dramatic escalation of the conflict comes after North Korea warned it was bolstering its defences in response to joint military operations held by South Korea and America**. **North Korea had already threatened nuclear strikes against the US and South Korea over claims they were trying to topple Kim Jong-il's communist regime.**

\*\*\*Burden Sharing\*\*\*

US Military Overstretched

U.S. forces are overstretched-large occupations and recruiting are weakening the military

Gharib 8 (Ali, foreign policy journalist, IPSNews, “Overstretched Forces Concern Officers”, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41260) CBC

**The U.S. military is "severely strained" by** two **large-scale occupations** **in the Middle East, other troop deployments, and problems recruiting**, according to a new survey of military officers published by Foreign Policy magazine and the centrist think-tank Centre for a New America Strategy. "They see **a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight,"** said the report, ‘The U.S. Military Index,’ which polled 3,400 current and former high-level military officers. **Sixty percent** **of** the **officers surveyed said that the military is weak**er now than it was five years ago, **often citing the number of troops deployed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.** "**We ought to pay more attention to quality**," said retired Lt. General Gregory Newbold, who retired from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in part over objections to the invasion of Iraq, at a panel during a conference to release the data. From Republican presidential hopeful Sen. John McCain to President George W. Bush, politicians regularly speak on the military from a position of authority. They know, they contend, that despite the two ongoing wars, the U.S is ready to deal with new threats militarily if need be. "I'm sorry to tell you, there's going to be other wars," said McCain at a campaign stop last month. "We will never surrender but there will be other wars." But the officers surveyed implied that military options against future threats may not be - **as politicians from across** the spectrum have intimated - "on the table." "**Asked whether it was reasonable or unreasonable to expect the U.S. military to successfully wage another war at this time,**" said the report, "**80 percent of the officers say that it is unreasonable**." When asked to grade the preparedness of the military to deal with the threat of Iran - on which McCain’s rhetoric has been especially hawkish - respondents gave an average score of 4.5 on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing fully prepared. The difference in which civilian and military leadership are viewed also made its way into the survey results. The level of confidence in the presidency among officers averaged just 5.5 out of 10, with 16 percent having "no confidence at all in the president." The U.S. Congress scored lowest of the institutions that the survey referred with an average score of just 2.7. The low regard for politicians could arise from the officers’ notion that elected officials know little about the workings of military - 66 percent of officers responded that elected leaders are "either somewhat or very uninformed about the U.S. military." Those views are likely informed by survey respondents’ opinions about the way the civilian leadership handled the war in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein. Nearly three quarters of the officers said that the goals of the civilian leadership for the military were "unreasonable". Furthermore, it appears that **many officers find that the efforts of U.S. forces have sometimes been counterproductive. Asked what country had gained the "greatest strategic advantage" from the war in Iraq, 37 percent said Iran while 22 percent answered China. Just one in five of the officers answered that the U.S. had gained the most.** Though many of the results of the survey were negative, the officers were not pessimistic about the forces themselves. 64 percent of the officers said that they believe morale is high in the military, and nearly 9 in 10 believe that the ‘surge’ escalation was having a positive effect on the war effort.

50 years.

U.S. forces are overstretched-this leads to soldiers not wanted to fight

Lazare 12-26-10 (Sarah, Project Director of [Courage to Resist](http://www.alternet.org/authors/9794/www.couragetoresist.org), Rawa News, “The US army is overstretched and exhausted, says peace compaigner”, http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/12/26/the-us-army-is-overstretched-and-exhausted-says-peace-campaigner-sarah-lazare.html) CBC

**The call for over 30,000 more troops to be sent to Afghanistan** is a travesty for the people of that country who have already suffered eight brutal years of occupation. It **is** also **a harsh blow to the US soldiers facing imminent deployment.** **As** Barack **Obama**, the US president, **gears up for a further escalation that will bring the total number of troops** in Afghanistan **to over 100,000**, **he faces a military force that has been exhausted and overextended by fighting two wars**. **Many** from **within the ranks are openly declaring that they have had enough**, allying with anti-war veterans and activists in calling for an end to the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, **with some active duty soldiers publicly refusing to deploy**. **This growing movement of military refusers is a voice of sanity in a country slipping deeper into** unending **war.**

US Military Overstretched

The U.S. does not have enough troops and resources-Iraq and Afghanistan prove

Nelson 6 (Michael, Master of Arts In Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, “Overstretched and Underfunded The Status of the US Military in the GWoT”, http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-02072006-200108/unrestricted/Thesis.pdf) CBC

**The invasion of Iraq**, entitled Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), **increased the deployment of forces further.** **Additional bases were built in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.** Although attempts to use Turkey during OIF failed, the effort to establish bases for military **operations demanded increased money, personnel, and equipment.** **Additional forces were deployed in order to execute the operations in Afghanistan as well as the operations in Iraq.** **The Air Force established planned cycles for deployments in the mid-1990s to compensate the increased deployment schedules resulting from reduced forces and increased overseas obligations.** **In order to support OIF, the Air Force temporarily abandoned these planned deployment cycles as it was finding the program overwhelmed by the required resources needed to fill the two combat operations at once**. The navy deployed additional carrier groups and flying squadrons outside of the pressed deployment cycles created by OEF while the US Army recalled thousands of Army National Guardsmen to fulfill posts normally reserved for active duty service members. **The government recalled 410,000 of the 1.15 million in the Reserve since 2001. These reservists were intended to serve when the nation was at maximum war-fighting capacity.** Despite President Bushís proclaimed cessation of major combat operations in Iraq on the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, the high level of commitments of forces overseas remained. **There are currently 140,000 US troops in Iraq with over 120 additional outposts, bases and forward operating locations. Each of these locations requires maintenance, housing, food, and operating facilities. This does not include the required infrastructure in order to ensure communication between all of the facilities both through roadways, airfields, and telephone/internet connectivity**. The costs of these outposts will be discussed later; it is **the extensive deployment of US troops** overseas which **remains significant here**.

U.S. forces overstretched now

Parker 6 (Randall, Prof. of Econ. East Carolina Univ., Mercury News, “Two Reports See US Military As Overstretched”, http://www.parapundit.com/archives/003241.html) CBC

**A pair of reports by outside experts in the last two days warn that the Army has been stretched thin by repeated combat tours** in Iraq and Afghanistan **and could soon reach the breaking point. The first**, a report on the Iraq war that was commissioned by the Pentagon and made public Tuesday, **said defense officials risk "breaking the force" if current troop levels are maintained in both countries** without increasing the size of the Army or slowing the pace of deployments. **The second**, issued Wednesday by Democrats on Capitol Hill, warned that **unless the strain on the Army and Marine Corps is relieved soon, "it will have highly corrosive and potentially long-term effects on the force.**" **Over time**, it argued, **the services would be weakened and the country would be more vulnerable to potential enemies.** [One report was done for the Pentagon.](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/01/26/warmy26.xml&sSheet=/news/2006/01/26/ixworld.html)The report's author, retired Lt Col Andrew Krepinevich, a Vietnam veteran and former adviser to three defence secretaries, says the decision to reduce troop numbers in Iraq was an admission that the military was overstretched. **If the 500,000 strong force does not win its "race against time", leaders "risk breaking the force in the form of a catastrophic decline" in recruitment and re-enlistment.** [**The recruiting slump could turn down even more drastically.**](http://pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/trib/newssummary/s_416921.html)

**As evidence,** Krepinevich **points to the Army's 2005 recruiting slump** -- missing its recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 -- and its decision to offer much bigger enlistment bonuses and other incentives. "**You** **really begin to wonder just how much stress and strain there is on the Army, how much longer it can continue,"** he said in an interview.

US Military Overstretched

The U.S. military is overstretched

Noonan 10-25-10 (Peggy, Editor: Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal, “McChrystal Forces Us to Focus”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704911704575327204110143126.html) CBC

Republican **leaders** such as John McCain are stalwart: This war can be won. But there's a sense when you watch Mr. McCain that he's very much s peaking for Mr. McCain, and McCainism. Republicans **respect this attitude: "Never give in**." But people can respect what they choose not to follow. The other day Sen. Lindsey Graham, in ostensibly supportive remarks, said that Gen. David Petraeus, Gen**. McChrystal's replacement, "is our only hope." If he can't pull it out, "nobody can." That's not all that optimistic a statement. The U.S. military is overstretched in every way, including emotionally and psychologically. The biggest takeaway from a week at U.S. Army War College in 2008 was the exhaustion of the officers. They are tired from repeat deployments, and their families are stretched to the limit, with children reaching 12 and 13 without a father at home.** The president himself is in a parlous position with regard to support, which means with regard to his ability to persuade, to be believed, to be followed. The latest Wall Street Journal/NBC poll shows more people disapprove of Mr. Obama's job performance than approve.

U.S. forces exhausted-no help coming

Bremmer 8 (Ian, Pres. Of Eurasia Group, The National Interest, “Invasive Procedures”, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/5026703105?title=Invasive%20Procedures) CBC

**The greatest threat to Afghanistan's future--and to** Washington's **hopes of defeating terrorists there--comes from a military stalemate that prevents the country's elected government, with the help of NATO troops, from extending its political control beyond Kabul**. **Without a substantial increase in the number of troops in the country, the situation will almost certainly get worse.** **The U.S. military** **is** already **overstretched**. **European leaders, wary of committing soldiers to what may well prove a losing battle, are reluctant to offer much additional help.**

**There are now about 41,700 NATO troops in Afghanistan, including some 26,000 Americans. The Pentagon is currently studying a plan that might send 3,000 additional marines into the country**. Yet, **more U.S. and NATO soldiers were killed across the country in 2007 than at any time since the 2001 invasion.** The United Nations estimates that **Taliban attacks increased by 20 percent last year.** In the south, particularly in areas along the border with Pakistan, violence has escalated dramatically… (CONTINUES)…**THE DIVERSITY of challenges facing the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan underline** just how complex the effort to counter Islamic militancy truly is--and **how creative and comprehensive any long-term solutions to these problems must be**. A broad range of tough questions awaits the next administration. **Has Washington wisely employed its resources in these countries?** To bolster near-term stability, should the new president slow the Bush administration's drive for democracy in Iraq in favor of support for a more autocratic central government? Is it too late to shift America's military focus from Iraq back to Afghanistan? Or **should Washington simply accept that its ability to help stabilize these countries will always be limited and instead leave local leaders to solve their own problems? The next president won't have much time to answer these questions before the challenges they represent grow far beyond Washington's ability to manage.** More daunting still, **the failures to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, to face down nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the seemingly ever-rising tide of an Americanism in much of the world have generated deep skepticism among many Americans that the country can (or should) sustain its leadership role in international politics**. The next president will have to persuade both voters and their elected representatives in Congress that leadership is worth the costs. A failure to make this case would cede a lot of ground to Islamic radicals, who remain determined to strike a blow against American power and the current international system.

US Military Overstretched

U.S. forces are overstretched-troops are tired and weak

Mulrine 7 (Anna, Sn. Editor U.S. News & World Report, U.S. News & World Report, “Military Experts: Iraq War Is Damaging Forces”, http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/6105-news-with-ground-forces-overstretched-us-military-faces-readiness-crisis-korb-tells-senate.html) CBC

**Following Sept. 11, the Bush administration had a** treme**n**dous **opportunity to increase the size of the ground forces. Unfortunately**, the president and Secretary of Defense **Rumsfeld pursued a misguided and naïve policy. Instead of increasing the size of the ground forces they actually sought to cut them. This error was compounded when the Bush administration diverted its efforts from Afghanistan and proceeded to undertake an ill-advised invasion of Iraq**. **This strategic mistake has allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in Afghanistan, weakened the standing of the United States in the world, and has undermined the nation’s efforts in the fight against the radical extremists responsible for the attacks on 9/11. Today there is little doubt that the ground forces are overstretched.** In early March, we at the Center for American Progress released a study chronicling the effects that sustained deployments in Iraq are having on the Army. [Note 1: Lawrence Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, “Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the Overuse of the Army in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, March 2006.] **By analyzing every Army brigade we were able to convey the strain and fatigue placed on the force and illustrate its implications for our nation’s national security**. The facts that we compiled are troubling: **Of the Army’s 44 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in South Korea, have served at least one tour**. Of the remaining 43:-- 12 Brigades have had one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan -- 20 Brigades have had two tours in Iraq or Afghanistan -- 9 Brigades have had three tours in Iraq or Afghanistan -- 2 Brigades have had four tours in Iraq or Afghanistan **Additionally, the task of sustaining or increasing troop levels in Iraq has forced the Army to frequently violate its own deployment policy. Army policy holds that after 12 months of deployment in a combat zone, troops should receive 24 months at home for recuperation and retraining before returning to combat**. Even before the surge, the Army had reduced dwell time to one year. **Increasing troop levels** in Iraq **will only force the Army to place more strain on those serving**. In fact, on April 2 the Pentagon announced that **two units will be sent back to Iraq without even a year at home. Extending deployments and shortening dwell time cause havoc on the lives of those serving in uniform**.It is also wrong, both militarily and morally, to send troops into a war zone who are not fully combat ready.

Overstrech Collapses Power

US force overstretch threatens collapse of power

Richter in 2k9 (Thomas, E-IR, Is US Power in Decline?, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=984)

Many neo-conservatives of the Bush administration insisted that the United States could not be challenged militarily and that it would stay the course in Iraq until victory was achieved. Now with a new US administration announcing that it would withdraw US forces from Iraq by August 2010 while at the same time deploying more troops to Afghanistan the limitations of US power become clear. While the withdrawal of US forces was an Obama campaign promise it is also a necessity born out off the need for more troops in Afghanistan as the United States is according to US Gen. David D. McKiernan “not winning the war against the resurgent Taliban”.[7] There is even talk of military overstretch and the need for the United States to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan because it cannot support even more troops being deployed in active war areas. This clearly marks a decline in US power as both wars are taking more resources and time than anticipated. General (retd.) Barry McCaffrey even argues that “the [US] military is grossly under-resourced….It’s coming apart.”[8] The potential overstretch of the US military clearly represents a challenge to US power but it is only one of many indicators that US power in general is in decline, yet one should still recognise that the United States retains a large lead on other nations in terms of military capabilities.

Troop overstretch will collapse US power. They must reduce deployments.

Niall Ferguson in 10 (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School, Foreign Affairs - March/April 2010 Edition, Empires on the Edge of Chaos, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article24874.htm)

Although hardly anyone reads Spengler or Toynbee today, similar strains of thought are visible in contemporary bestsellers. Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is another work of cyclical history -- despite its profusion of statistical tables, which at first sight make it seem the very antithesis of Spenglerian grand theory. In Kennedy's model, great powers rise and fall according to the growth rates of their industrial bases and the costs of their imperial commitments relative to their GDPs. Just as in Cole's The Course of Empire, imperial expansion carries the seeds of future decline. As Kennedy writes, "If a state overextends itself strategically . . . it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all." This phenomenon of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy argues, is common to all great powers. In 1987, when Kennedy's book was published, the United States worried that it might be succumbing to this disease. Just because the Soviet Union fell first did not necessarily invalidate the hypothesis.

Japan Dependency Bad - Outdated

Japanese defense build-up is beneficial

Carpenter 02. (Ted Galen, January 8 Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security, Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author or editor of 13 books on international affairs.)G.L

The Japanese Diet has taken a much-publicized step to allow Japan to play a meaningful security role in the 21st century. Over the opposition of pacifist legislators, the Diet recently passed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's anti-terrorism bill, which allows Japan's Self Defense Forces to support the U.S.-led war against Osama bin Laden. Three Japanese naval vessels are now on their way to take up positions in the Indian Ocean. It is time for Japan to fully rejoin the ranks of the great powers. And the United States needs to help with that transition. U.S. officials have not only allowed Japan to get away with free riding on the U.S. security guarantee, they have openly discouraged Japan from venturing beyond the status of being Washington's logistical helpmate. That attitude must be discarded.

Now is time for Japan get self defense

Carpenter 02. (Ted Galen, January 8 Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security, Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author or editor of 13 books on international affairs.)G.L

That limitation needs to end. Article 9, the "pacifist clause" in Japan's constitution, has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had when it was adopted at the insistence of the United States after World War II. Japan is the only major power that refuses to play a security role commensurate with its political and economic status. Even Germany, the other principal defeated power in World War II, has recently sent peacekeeping troops to the Balkans and has now agreed to send 3,000 combat personnel to participate in the war against bin Laden. Tokyo cannot forever confine its security role to one of cheerleading, financial subsidies and logistical support.

Withdrawal 🡪 Japan Defense

Japan will build up their military with US withdrawal

BBC News 6 (“Agreement on US-Japan troop deal” May 2, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4963630.stm) JL

Some 8,000 US troops will be moved from the Japanese island of Okinawa, with other bases earmarked for closure. Japan's military will take a greater role in maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region and will receive US anti-ballistic missile technology. The deal was agreed in October last year, but was held up amid discussions over how to pay for the changes. It was finalised at a meeting in Washington between US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Aso and the head of Japan's defence agency Fukushiro Nukaga. They called the US-Japan relationship "the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region". The full cost of the restructuring has not been finalised but is believed to be tens of billions of dollars.

Withdrawal 🡪 Japan Defense

Only an end to US patronage would force Japan to develop military capabilities

Carpenter 95 (Ted Galen, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Paternalism And Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html>

Japan's reluctance to build up its military and play a more active security role is not merely a product of domestic considerations, however. That reluctance must be viewed in the context of the military relationship with the United States. The U.S. policy of providing for the bulk of Japan's security needs--combined with the policy of discouraging independent Japanese initiatives--has greatly skewed the incentives. During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, Washington's willingness to assume the costs and risks of defending Tokyo's interests spared the Japanese people and government difficult decisions about how to protect those interests.(24) Instead of sending military forces to protect the Persian Gulf oil supply, which Japanese officials insisted was a vital national interest, Japan hid behind the Peace Constitution and resorted to another form of checkbook diplomacy. Tokyo did provide more than $13 billion to help pay for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, but it assiduously avoided sharing the military risks. That approach worked--at least in the sense that no breach occurred in the U.S.-Japanese relationship, despite some public anger in the United States. But one ought to wonder if the reaction of the American public to Japan's checkbook strategy would have been as restrained if the Persian Gulf War had produced the thousands of American casualties most military experts predicted instead of fewer than 200 deaths. That is an especially pertinent question since Japan would apparently adopt the same strategy of confining its role to financial and (possibly) logistical assistance in the event of a war in East Asia. It is highly unlikely that Japan would continue to spend such a meager percentage of its GDP on the military or to remain so diffident on matters that affect its own well- being, were it not for the smothering strategy of the United States. Tokyo's long-standing policy was aptly described by Kenneth Hunt, vice president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Defence spending has tended to be set simply at levels which kept both Washington and domestic opinion not too restive."(25) The incentive to continue free riding, the arrogant and exploitive mentality of some Japanese leaders, and the changes in both policy and attitude that would probably occur if the United States withdrew the defense subsidy and security shield were all illustrated during a September 1995 television debate between Ryutaro Hashimoto and Junichiro Koizumi, the candidates for president of the LDP. When asked whether the current U.S.-Japanese security treaty should be maintained, Koizumi replied, Not necessarily, because lately the United States has been asking Japan to bear more of the cost of maintaining the U.S. Forces in Japan [USFJ]. Japan has been paying as much as it can. If the United States cannot bear the USFJ's stationing costs, we will have to ask them to reduce military personnel and bases in Japan to a size [the United States] can afford to maintain.(26) He added, however, that Japan would commit itself to its own defense buildup if a scaled-down USFJ could not provide adequate protection. Koizumi's comments illustrate that keeping Japan a U.S. military dependent has become increasingly unhealthy for both countries. That policy perpetuates an expensive set of security obligations for the United States, and it encourag- es the Japanese to act as though they can forever evade political and military issues. Yet, despite occasional rhetorical gestures to the contrary, Washington appears determined to maintain a policy of paternalism.

Withdrawal 🡪 Japan Defense

A shift away from the patron-client model will cause Japan to further augment the SDF and become a regional power

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

As the total number of U.S. military personnel in Japan has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defensive capabilities have expanded. Japan is already an active player in East Asia, and it possesses the resources necessary for it to contribute to global security using a wide range of political, economic, and military means. Indeed, Japan’s total economic output ranks second only to that of the United States. Japan has used a small portion of its great economic strength to upgrade its military capabilities, focusing particularly on qualitative improvements, as opposed to the number of troops, ships, or planes.28 So even as Tokyo continued to brandish its pacifist constitutional principles, and while total military spending as a share of GDP has remained at or just below 1 percent, the SDF has become a formidable, technologically advanced, and tactically diverse force whose ground, maritime, and air components boast nearly 240,000 active-duty personnel. The Maritime SDF includes 44 destroyers, 9 frigates, and 16 submarines, and the combined air power of the SDF includes 380 combat-capable aircraft plus other fixed-wing and helicopter assets.29 Japan’s defense expenditures are much smaller than those of the United States but are comparable to those of all other advanced industrial economies in real terms. In the mid- 1980s, Japan had the world’s sixth-largest defense budget behind the Soviet Union, the United States, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom; by the end of the decade, Japan trailed only the Soviet Union and the United States. Military spending continued to rise throughout the 1990s, and expenditures have remained stable since then. According to official statistics compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan’s defense expenditures in 2004 were exceeded only by those of the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems likely, however, that Japan’s defense budget was also less than that of China (Table 1).30 Chinese defense figures are widely disputed, and are likely 40 to 70 percent higher than the Chinese government’s official statistics. Leaving those three countries aside, however, Japan almost certainly spends more than the other two permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Russia) but also more than Germany and almost three times as much as India, two other countries that aspire to permanent membership on the Security Council. Japanese per capita defense spending is roughly equivalent to that of Germany and South Korea. This hardly constitutes a crushing burden on Japanese taxpayers, and it could easily be expanded if changing strategic circumstances so dictated. Citizens in the United Kingdom pay more than twice as much per person to maintain their highly effective military, and the French spend almost twice as much per capita as do the Japanese. Although Japan’s defense spending is comparable to that of other advanced industrial democracies, it might still be insufficient relative to the threats Japan faces. Tokyo’s allocation of approximately 1 percent of its GDP to defense in 2004 contrasts with the 2.4 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the more than 4 percent spent by the United States during the same period, and yet Japan is operating within the same strategic environment and is concerned about similar threats. It is logical to conclude, therefore, that the U.S. security guarantee has enabled the Japanese to refrain from spending more on their defense.31 On the other hand, military spending is hardly the only measure of a country’s international engagement. Japan remains a leading provider of foreign aid, contributing more than $6.7 billion in Official Development Assistance in 2003, more than any other country with the exception of the United States.32 These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security—and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future. The best way to break this cycle of dependence is to phase out the American security guarantee and replace it with a more equitable mutual defense pact. It is unlikely that Japan can assume its place among the community of great nations—despite its considerable wealth and foreign policy activism through financial aid—without a fundamental reorientation of the current patron-client security relationship with the United States.

Japan Defense K2 Good US Relations

Japan’s increased military role is critical to the US-Japan alliance

Szechenyi 6 (Nicholas, Deputy Dir. At Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly , A Turning Point for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, p. 139-141) pl

Article IX of Japan’s postwar constitution, ratified by Japan’s Diet nearly 60 years ago, renounces war as a sovereign right and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In contrast, Article 51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter clearly states that Japan, as a member, has the right to individual or collective self-defense. Japan has struggled over the last 50 years to reconcile this contradiction between its constitution’s pacifist principles and a desire to play a role in maintaining international peace and security. This also applies to the U.S.-Japanese alliance, in which Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) play a limited role in Japan’s own defense but are prohibited from taking action to defend the United States. To address this imbalance, the two countries have taken incremental steps over the years to expand Japan’s security role in response to changes in the international security environment. Recent U.S.-Japanese joint statements envision the SDF playing a more visible role regionally and globally through participation in missile defense, maritime security operations, humanitarian relief operations, and other initiatives that would undoubtedly buttress Japan’s security and burnish its reputation as a responsible member of the international community. Moreover, as the United States transforms its global military posture to face the challenges of the post–September 11 era, Japan is exploring ways to assume a greater defense burden and to accept new roles and missions as a U.S. alliance partner. These developments appear to indicate a strategic interest in elevating Japan’s profile internationally by putting the SDF forward to confront new security challenges. Doing so would not only serve the U.S.- Japanese alliance in preserving peace and stability in Asia but also respond to international pressure for Japan to become a more “normal nation.” The two governments have agreed on a plan to restructure the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and have pledged to integrate their countries’ military operations further. These changes in Japan’s security policy in response to a shifting international security environment are nothing new. In 1960, in the midst of the Cold War, the threat from the Soviet Union prompted Washington and Tokyo to update their 1952 bilateral security treaty. According to the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan assumed some responsibility for defending its territory while the United States was granted permission to maintain bases in Japan for defense of the Far East. Furthering the strategy of containment, the two countries concluded bilateral defense guidelines in 1978 that paved the way for Japan to play a greater role in defense of the sea lanes. In 1991 the Diet dispatched SDF forces overseas for the first time to conduct minesweeping activities after the Persian Gulf War. The SDF then participated in its first UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992. Concerns about instability on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the need to recalibrate after the Cold War, led the United States and Japan to announce a joint declaration on security in 1996 and, a year later, to revise the 1978 defense guidelines to broaden the SDF’s role in regional security. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Diet has passed two special measures laws authorizing the dispatch of SDF forces, the first to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the second to Iraq for reconstruction efforts in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Japan’s security policy will continue to evolve; the question is whether future changes will be in response to pressure from the United States and other alliance partners or stem from a domestic consensus on the need to expand the global presence of the SDF. Today, Japan’s leaders have begun to reason that “the national interest may sometimes lie far from home and that the constitutional taboo on sending Japanese troops abroad can in fact be broken.”1 To break this taboo, they must convince skeptics of the strategic necessity of an expansive mandate for the SDF for Japan’s unilateral security, the credibility of its alliance with the United States, and its diplomatic agenda. Tokyo must also adapt its capabilities to assist in the war on terrorism if U.S. military transformation in Asia is to succeed and if the bilateral alliance is to remain the “indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”2 By expanding the geographic parameters of SDF operations, Japan can help prevent regional crises and affect the evolution of the international security environment, thereby gaining more respect from a broader community of nations. How might this expansion be realized, and what are the challenges involved? To help answer this question, the Office of the Japan Chair at CSIS convened a study group in the spring of 2006 to analyze key issues for future U.S.-Japanese alliance cooperation and produced a set of policy recommendations for public debate. The group’s discussions generated and improved ideas, for which this author is indebted, for potential areas of concentration for the SDF that could enhance Japan’s global security role. Tokyo has reacted to changes in the security environment for long enough. It is time instead to shape that environment and to tackle regional and global challenges in a proactive manner.

Japan Defense K2 Stability

Japan self defense good-key to security in East Asia

Preble 6 (Christopher, Dir. Of foreign policy studies at the Cato Inst., Cato Inst., “A Plea for Normalcy”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8791) CBC

The United States and Japan have cooperated to address East Asian security issues for many years, and the relationship continues to evolve. **Policymakers in Tokyo have grown more confident and assertive. By refining the concept of "self-defense", they have redefined the uses of military force that are considered legitimate under Japan's officially pacifist constitution**. These are useful changes, but they have not fundamentally altered the character of the relationship as one between a dominant security patron, the United States, and a vulnerable client, Japan. **Washington and Tokyo must work harder to establish Japan as a nation responsible for its own security and capable of assuming a wider strategic role in East Asia**. Outgoing Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has set the stage for this transition, strengthening the ties between the United States and Japan, while also carving out a unique role for Japan that could expand in the near future. The prime minister has been one of the Bush Administration's most enthusiastic supporters. In the wake of 9/11, he dispatched Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) ships to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In late 2003, Japan sent over 500 members of the ground JSDF to Iraq — the first such deployment of Japanese personnel to a conflict zone since the end of World War II. **These two signature foreign policy initiatives enjoyed only lukewarm support among the Japanese public**, **but** Koizumi's popularity provided him with the necessary latitude to **largely define Japan's new security role.** His successor will almost certainly lack Koizumi's charisma, and will therefore suffer by comparison; but notwithstanding this handicap**, the** next **prime minister is** likely **to continue to move Japanese politics, and especially Japan's foreign policy, along the trajectory established by** the flamboyant **Koizumi**. *.*This prospect worries many in East Asia, where people, especially in China and Korea, fear that Japanese assertiveness is a manifestation of, or a precursor to, Japanese nationalism, or even revanchism. Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine seem to fit a pattern whereby Japan plays down the gravity of the Imperial Army's abuses during World War II. In another well-publicized instance, a controversy over several Japanese textbooks that overlook Japan's past conduct has contributed to a sense in Asia, particularly in Korea and China, that some Japanese have not fully accepted guilt for the war. But **Japan's emergence as a regional power is welcomed in Washington, where the focus is on burden sharing. So Koizumi's successor will have to strike a delicate balance — satisfying American requests for Japan to become a more active player in regional security while assuaging concerns in key East Asian countries that a greater strategic role for Japan does not pose a threat to their national security.**

Japan Defense K2 Stability

Rearmament secures the region

Preble 6 (Christopher, Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “A Plea for Normalcy” 9/6, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=2&hid=11&sid=f9071bb8-b104-4017-a18f-e11efcb81973%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=22491225) JL

Short of pre-emptive strikes, a Japanese military, operating independently of the United States, could deter North Korea from attacking Japan. An independent and empowered Japan might also succeed in convincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The potential gains are speculative and Japan's actions will still be constrained by the anti-militarist impulses of the Japanese public, but the prospects for a more credible deterrent or threat coming from a "normal" Japan should be considered relative to U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure, which has been completely ineffective in halting North Korea's bellicosity. Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future, more serious challenges to the regional security order. Japan's lingering hostility toward and suspicion of North Korea in the near term pales in comparison with its medium-to long-term concerns of a rising China. The trajectory of China's rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition for influence in East Asia will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific. Common economic interests within Asia may lead to China's peaceful integration into the region. Or China could turn away from its current course of political and economic liberalization and revert to economic autarchy imposed by military force. It is even possible that China could become a revisionist power, no longer content to accept regional security configurations in their present form. That could occur even if the PRC holds to a course of economic reform. Against those unlikely but dangerous possibilities, Japan's neighbors should welcome a potential counterweight to a rising China. Many already do. Attitudes toward Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Filipinos and Malays much more favorably disposed than are Koreans to the notion of a wider security role for Japan. These attitudes could evolve further if China's behavior grows more threatening. The decades-long U.S.-Japan strategic partnership is changing. Americans are becoming increasingly anxious about the costs and risks of our permanent global military presence. We welcome changes that will allow the U.S. military to step back from its role as the world's policeman, and are looking for ways to devolve security responsibilities and reduce our risk exposure. The Japanese--while retaining a strong anti-militarist disposition--are willing to play a more assertive role. They are anxious for their country to behave, and to be treated as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are already highly capable, and Japanese military capabilities could quickly expand if the security environment grows more threatening.

Japan self defense integral to regional stability

Teslik 06 (Lee Hudson Teslik, April 13, 2006 http://www.cfr.org/publication/10439/japan\_and\_its\_military.html)

Japan's SDF currently has more than 240,000 personnel—all technically civilians, in accordance with the 1954 law establishing the SDF. Its annual budget is nearly $50 billion, divided among land, sea, and air forces. Japan's navy is considered the most formidable of these three branches, and among the most sophisticated in the world. The air force, historically less powerful than the navy, is currently working with the United States to develop a Theatre Missile Defense system (TMD), and is also considering expanding its long-range precision missile technologies, should the LDP secure either legal approval or amend the constitution. But given their mandates, the SDF's naval and air forces have faced some significant constraints. For instance, the navy is not allowed to have nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers, which are considered "offensive weaponry." Some experts have also criticized the overall efficiency of the SDF, given a historical lack of coordination among its branches. "Ten or fifteen years ago, [the branches] couldn't even communicate with each other," says Masaru Tamamoto, an editor at The Japan Insititute of International Affairs. "An army without air cover is useless." A March 2006 bill has enabled the consolidation of oversight of these operations, marking the first organizational change to the SDF since it was founded. Experts say the bill is likely to increase the SDF's efficiency, and could also foreshadow a shifting of funds from ground forces to improved air and naval forces. The United States has long pressured Japan to take a more robust military posture. Though U.S. military bases in Japan serve a critical function for the United States—allowing it to project an image of strength in a potentially volatile region—American military resources are already spread thin worldwide, and U.S. officials have encouraged Japan pick up some of the slack, at least regionally. Developing this relationship could be essential to maintaining regional stability. As Chris Hughesput it in his recent book, Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power, "the framework of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance will be crucial for the U.S. in terms of its ability to mobilize regional allies."

Japan Defense K2 Security

Regional threats promote Japan rearmament to dispell security threats

Cambridge Review of International Affairs 7 “Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan’s security, the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia”, June, Pg 329 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=11&sid=f4fcc4bf-791d-40d1-bf93-855b1f7dbce9%40sessionmgr10) JL

Japanese comprehensive security has undergone significant alterations and faced significant challenges in the wake of the Cold War and September 11. Japan faced its first major global security crisis during the GulfWar of 1990–1991, when it was presented with and failed to respond to demands from its US ally and the international community to provide a ‘human contribution’ to the war effort in the form of a JSDF dispatch. Japan has also confronted heightened regional threats, most immediately from North Korea. Japanese anxieties focus upon North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and proliferation of WMD—most graphically demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of a nuclear test on 10 October 2006. These fears are compounded by North Korea’s ballistic missile programme. Japan’s vulnerability to missile attack was highlighted by the test launch over its airspace of a Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, and a series of North Korean missile tests in the Sea of Japan in July 2006. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–1994, Japanese policy-makers have also feared incursions into Japanese territory by North Korean spy ships ( fushinsen) and North Korean guerrilla attacks. North Korea represents the most ‘immediate and present’ danger for Japan, especially in the public consciousness, but China embodies the greatest challenge for Japan’s security over the medium to longer terms. Japan’s greatest concerns revolve around China’s increasing propensity to exercise military power outside its immediate borders. Japanese policy-makers fear a Chinese blue-water naval capacity that might interfere with Japan’s sea lines of communication through the South China Sea, and Sino-Japanese tensions have been heightened by territorial disputes in the East China Sea over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) gas fields. In addition, Japan-China security relations have been further complicated by the Taiwan issue and Sino-US strategic competition. Japan watched the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 with anxiety, and fears that China may eventually challenge the US militarily in the region. Japan’s security planners envisage the following in the event of a new Taiwan independence crisis reaching the point of conflict: US bases in Japan are likely to be the target of Chinese ballistic-missile attack, China might attempt to use amphibious forces to seize offshore islands to disrupt US–Japan alliance cooperation, and Japan risks being drawn into war with its neighbour through US alliance pressure. Japan’s preferred responses to these global and regional crises have clearly been nonmilitary in nature. Japan has continued to rely on diplomatic approaches to the North Korean nuclear crisis, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Koizumi initiating summits with North Korea in 2002 and 2004 to clear away the obstacles to bilateral diplomatic normalization and to demonstrate to the US the importance of persisting with negotiations in order to avoid conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Japanese policy-makers have further persisted with their efforts to engage North Korea economically, even as high-level diplomatic relations stagnated during Koizumi’s premiership (Tanaka and Tahara 2005, 27–29). Moreover, Japan has continued to place great emphasis on economic security and other nontraditional security concerns as important within their own right within comprehensive security. Japan has played an important role in articulating conceptions of ‘human security’, as can be seen in its reaction to the economic and social fallout from the East Asia financial crisis of 1997–1998 and its humanitarian relief activities in the Asian tsunami of 2004. Nonetheless, Japanese policy-makers have shown signs of declining confidence in their ability to use economic and diplomatic means to respond to security issues, such as North Korea and China. These concerns have been prompted by Japan’s relative economic decline vis-a`-vis China, and the need to reduce the overall ODA budget (although since 2006 Japan has indicated its desire to once again increase its overseas aid). Since the mid-1990s, Japanese policy-makers have thus sought to rebalance comprehensive security by strengthening Japan’s military components. In the face of the global crisis of the GulfWar, Japan eventually found a form of military response through the passing in June 1992 of the International Peace Cooperation Law that allows JSDF on UN-mandated noncombat peacekeeping operations.

Japan Defense K2 Deterrence – North Korea

Japan is pursuing increased defense options to contain the Korean threat.

Hughes in 9 (Christopher, Prof. of Intnl. Politics at University of Warwick, Asian Survey, "SUPER-SIZING" THE DPRK THREAT: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea, 49(2), p. 293-296) pl

Just as important, this paper seeks to explain why the perceived North Korean threat has had such an impact on Japanese security policy, despite the fact that its impact is arguably disproportionate to the magnitude of the actual military threat. The paper stresses that for Japan, the North Korean threat is multiplied, or “super-sized,” by its multilayered nature. First, Japan faces growing existential military threats and has legitimate security concerns from the North’s missile and nuclear capabilities. But second, for Japan this threat is unduly accentuated by the fact that the North has repeatedly exerted an alliance political-military threat to the solidarity of the U.S.-Japan pact, thus threatening to undermine the very foundation of Japan’s post-war security policy. As explained in later sections, North Korea has shown itself adept at creating for Japan alliance dilemmas of entrapment and, particularly, abandonment by generating and exploiting differences of threat perception between the bilateral allies.4 In instances of feared entrapment, such as U.S. demands for a Japanese military contribution in a second Korean Peninsula conflict, Japan has moved to strengthen its autonomous defense options. Japan’s principal concerns about abandonment, however, have forced it to shore up political confidence in U.S.-Japan security ties by indicating that it is prepared to undertake additional alliance commitments. In certain cases, these alliance commitments are designed to directly counter the threat from North Korea. But in others they are designed to demonstrate a willingness to support the U.S. in dealing with regional and global contingencies that are more important to Washington than to Tokyo, in the hope that this will ensure U.S. reciprocation to support Japan against North Korea. As will be argued below, Japan’s motivations to support the U.S.-led “war on terror” through the dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq between 2004 – 06, and to thus take on a greater global security role, can in large part be interpreted in the light of the need to strengthen alliance solidarity to respond to North Korea.5 Third, changes in Japan’s military posture in reaction to North Korea have been exacerbated by the North’s increasing assumption of the guise of a domestic security threat. The North’s suspected and later revealed involvement in the abductions of Japanese citizens has increasingly earned it the label of “terrorist” state in domestic political discourse.6 This has engendered a growing hard-line approach toward North Korea among Japan’s policy makers and citizenry. Although both groups have some legitimate grounds to fear the North’s penetration of Japanese internal security, such anti-North Korean sentiment, stoked by conservative politicians such as former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and the mass media, has at times been irrational, bordering on hysteria. Consequently, Japanese policy makers have enhanced diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the North, even when other states are looking to turn toward engagement. Hence, even though Prime Ministers Koizumi Junichirō and Fukuda Yasuo have sought to engage the North so that Japan would not fall behind its partners in the Six Party Talks (SPT) process, Japan in recent years has found it increasingly difficult to promote bilateral diplomatic normalization talks.7 Fourth, North Korea’s poor standing in Japan and internationally has meant that the North has often been used by policy makers as a convenient proxy threat to legitimize pushing through changes in Japanese security policy. The changes are as much or more directed toward dealing with other forms of potential and existing threats that are politically and diplomatically unacceptable to identify explicitly. In particular, Japanese policy makers have manipulated the North Korean threat to camouflage the fact that many of Tokyo’s military procurement activities and moves to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance are actually designed to deal with the increasing and longer-term threat from China. Hence, this paper argues that even if the military threat from North Korea is not sufficient prima facie to Japan’s making it preeminent, the threat has nevertheless succeeded out of all proportion in serving as the key driver for Japan’s normalization agenda. Japan’s security policy throughout the post-Cold War period has involved the pursuit of “Comprehensive Security,” an attempt to balance diplomatic, economic, and military components. In terms of military security, Japan’s post-war policy makers—principally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Defense (MOD, formerly the Japan Defense Agency, until January 2007), and the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—have been obliged to pursue a traditionally low-posture role, as mandated by restrictions on the use of force in Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution of 1947 and the depth of anti-militaristic norms among Japan’s citizenry.8 Japan’s government has interpreted the Constitution as permitting the maintenance of military forces to defend its national territory; during the Cold War, Tokyo built up a substantial military to counter the threat from the Soviet Union. However, the JSDF has remained highly restricted in its activities and capabilities by a range of anti-militaristic prohibitions derived from interpretations of Article 9. Japan has elaborated a doctrine of “exclusively defense-oriented defense,” eschewing the acquisition of weaponry that might be used for offensive purposes and power projection, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missiles, longrange strategic bombers, in-fl ight refueling aircraft, or aircraft carriers. In turn, Japan has argued that even though it possesses the right of collective self-defense under the U.N. Charter, it is prohibited from exercising this right because this would exceed constitutional interpretations that limit Japan’s use of military force to the minimum necessary for self-defense. In practice, this has meant that Japan has been reluctant to dispatch the JSDF overseas on anything other than non-combat logistical missions. Finally, Japan’s military capacity has been restricted by a range of anti-military principles derived from the Constitution, including the 1967 and 1976 bans on the export of arms and military technology; a 1969 House of Councilors resolution on the exclusively peaceful use of outer space; the three non-nuclear principles of 1967 promising not to “produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons”; and the limiting of defense expenditure to 1% of gross national product (GNP).9 In turn, Japan’s limited national military capabilities have meant that it has in large part entrusted its defense to the mechanism of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Japan and the U.S. have traditionally predicated their security treaty upon a grand strategic bargain: Japan gets U.S. military protection in return for providing bases to facilitate the projection of U.S. military power in East Asia. However, Japan has attempted to temper its reliance on the U.S. security guarantee by building up its own national defense capabilities and indigenous defense production, and by careful hedging against the dual alliance dilemmas of “entrapment” and “abandonment” in U.S. regional and global military strategy. Regarding entrapment, Japan has long feared that it could become a proxy target in a nuclear exchange between first the Russia or China and the U.S

Burden Sharing K2 Stability

Burden sharing key to stability in the region

Washington Quarterly 6 (Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability”, January 1 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=11&sid=f6d1397c-5334-4c2a-b996-a631643e8eb7%40sessionmgr13) JL

The U.S.-Japanese alliance is the most important and long-standing element of U.S. security strategy in Asia and is central to its efforts to hedge against the possible emergence of a revisionist China. The Bush administration has consistently taken steps to increase Japan’s military role and diplomatic involvement in global and regional security affairs. U.S. strategists support such actions in arguing they are commensurate with Japan’s position as an economic power, as a means to burden-share with Japan in addressing regional security challenges, and as consistent with U.S. efforts to shape China’s ascendance and dissuade it from potentially destabilizing actions in the future.12 The United States seeks a “global partnership” with Japan and is pursuing this by encouraging it to contribute to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, coordinating extensively with Tokyo on regional aid and relief issues, and augmenting bilateral defense trade. The United States also supports constitutional reform that could allow Japan’s military potentially to expand and be more active in the region. Such an expanded role was demonstrated by the participation of Japanese forces in the U.S.-Thai- Singaporean “Cobra Gold” military exercise with Southeast Asian nations for the first time this year. U.S.-Japanese military technical cooperation is also growing, especially on missile defenses. In February 2005, the United States and Japan issued for the first time a highly consequential joint statement that explicitly tied the bilateral alliance to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the current U.S. Global Defense Posture Review envisions changes in deployments and command structures that would increase interoperability and further facilitate Japan’s military assuming a greater role in U.S.-led military operations in Asia and beyond.

Burden Sharing K2 Alliance

The US-Japan alliance is hurting and a lack of burden-sharing is the reason for it

Gordon 10 (Bernard K., Prof Emeritus at U of New Hamshire, YaleGlobal, “Globalization in Trouble – Part I”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/globalization-trouble%E2%80%93part-i) MAT

Burden-sharing differences are also at the heart of alliance troubles with Japan, where the issues are US forces and military bases on Okinawa. They have long faced much local opposition to their noise and related problems, and in 2006 Japan and the US hammered out an agreement to move some forces to less crowded areas on Okinawa and others to Guam. But implementation was interrupted when Yukio Hatoyama‘s Democratic Party of Japan won a victory last August. That ended the 50-year dominance of Japan’s Liberal-Democratic Party, under whose auspices the Okinawa agreement was negotiated. Although Hatoyama’s election reflected essentially domestic issues and much dissatisfaction with the LDP and Japan’s bureaucrats, Hatoyama had long argued for a “more equal” relationship with the United States, and his coalition included many who resisted the alliance and opposed the Okinawa bases. Clear evidence the alliance was in trouble peaked in October when Defense Secretary Gates stressed in Japan that the 2006 agreement should be implemented without delay. Japan’s response has been that no decision would come until at least May, although Prime Minister Hatoyama personally asked President Obama to “trust me,” and his Foreign Minister gave similar assurances to Secretary of State Clinton. Among the issues’ many complications are that Okinawans have long been regarded by many main-island Japanese as “second class” citizens whom Tokyo would not wish to further offend by implementing the 2006 Agreement. Another is that some American officials reportedly believe the bases are less critical to US defense needs than is publicly argued.

Burden Sharing K2 Stability

Burden sharing key to stability in the region

Washington Quarterly 6 (Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability”, January 1 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=11&sid=f6d1397c-5334-4c2a-b996-a631643e8eb7%40sessionmgr13) JL

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Offshore Balancing Good- US Power

Offshore balancing is key to maintaining US power- allows other powers to focus on regional security and preserves US deployment for preventing escalation

Stephen M. Walt in 2k5 (Professor of international affairs at Harvard University, In the National Interest

A grand new strategy for American foreign policy, Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php)

A key element in the strategy of offshore balancing is reducing the overall “footprint” of U.S. military power and beginning to play hard-to-get when dealing with various regional powers. Instead of insisting that the United States be responsible for solving all global-security problems, and instead of accepting (or seeking) the job of running large areas of the world, offshore balancing seeks to take advantage of America’s hegemonic position in the Western hemisphere and its distance from the other key centers of world power. As discussed above, the United States would stand ready to deploy its power against specific threats to America’s vital interests but would otherwise refrain from large-scale, quasi-permanent military engagements overseas. What would this strategy mean in practice? First, the United States would remain a member of NATO but would drastically reduce its military presence in Europe. Most of Europe is now reliably democratic and faces no significant external military threats. Although far from united on matters of foreign policy, the EU countries have the political and economic wherewithal to deal with the modest security challenges that they are likely to face in the foreseeable future. Small American contingents would remain in Europe for training purposes and as a symbol of America’s transatlantic commitments, but the United States would no longer play the leading security role there. Second, the United States would maintain a significant military presence in Asia (primarily air and naval forces) and continue to build cooperative security partnerships with its current Asian allies. In addition to helping support counterterrorist operations against al Qaeda affiliates in several Asian countries, maintaining the military presence in Asia also lays the foundation for an effort to contain China in the event that China’s rising power eventually leads to a more ambitious attempt to establish a hegemonic position in East Asia.

Offshore balancing preserves US power-prevents other countries from building up in order to counter US

Christopher Layne in 97 International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997), pp. 86-124

Offshore balancing is a balance-of-power strategy, not a hegemonic one. It assumes that the United States would be more secure in a multipolar system than it would be by attempting to perpetuate its current preeminence. It is, up to a point, an offensive realist strategy. Unlike the offensive realist variant of the strategy of preponderance, however, this strategy would be predicated on the assumption that attempting to maintain U.S. hegemony is self-defeating because it will provoke other states to balance against the United States, and result in the depletion of America's relative power—thereby leaving it worse off than it would have been by accommodating multipolarity. An offshore balancing strategy also would reject the balance-of-threat argument advanced by preponderance's defensive realist proponents: it is the very fact of the hegemon's unbalanced power that threatens others (and spurs the emergence of new great powers). An offshore balancing strategy would accept that the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within or outside its sphere of influence.73

Offshore Balancing Good- US Power

Decreasing US commitments frees up resources needed to deal with foreign policy goals-overall better for US hegemony

Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne in 2k2 (literary and national editor of The Atlantic, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, The Atlantic Monthly, A New Grand Strategy, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2002/01/schwarzlayne.htm)

For more than fifty years American foreign policy has sought to prevent the emergence of other great powers—a strategy that has proved burdensome, futile, and increasingly risky. The United States will be more secure, and the world more stable, if America now chooses to pass the buck and allow other countries to take care of themselves Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. grand strategy has revolved around maintaining this country's overwhelming military, economic, and political preponderance. Until now most Americans have acquiesced in that strategy, because the costs seemed to be tolerably low. But the September 11 attacks have proved otherwise. Those assaults were neither random nor irrational. Those who undertook them acted with cool calculation to force the United States to alter specific policies—policies that largely flow from the global role America has chosen. The attacks were also a violent reaction to the very fact of America's pre-eminence. Several tasks confront us. The most immediate is the one that rightly preoccupies the nation now: tracking down the al Qaeda terrorists and destroying their networks and their infrastructure, and waging war on the Taliban movement that harbors them. The larger task will take time, because it amounts to inventing a new American stance toward the world for the century ahead. We need to come to grips with an ironic possibility: that the very preponderance of American power may now make us not more secure but less secure. By the same token, it may actually be possible to achieve more of our ultimate foreign-policy goals by means of a diminished global presence.

Offshore Balancing Good- Escalation

Offshore balancing keeps wars from escalating while maintaining US power projection globally

Christopher Layne, teaches international politics at UCLA. 1993, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise , International Security, Vol. 17, No.4. (Spring,), pp. 5-51. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=01622889%28199321%2917%3A4%3C5%3A TUIWNG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 , PS

The United States must adjust to the inevitable emergence of new great powers. The primary role of forward-deployed American forces now is to dissuade Japan and Germany from becoming great powers. There are three reasons why American forward deployments in Europe and Northeast Asia should be phased out soon. First, a policy of forward deployment could unnecessarily entangle the United States in overseas conflicts where the stakes are more important to others than to itself. Second, because the United States faces severe fiscal and economic constraints, the opportunity costs of such a strategy are high. Third, such a policy cannot work. Indeed, the strategy of preponderance is probably the worst option available to the United States because it is not coercive enough to prevent Japan and Germany from becoming great powers, but it is coercive enough to antagonize them and cause them to balance against the United States. If the analysis presented in this article is correct, a policy of attempting to smother Germany's and Japan's great power emergence would be unavailing because structural pressures will impel them to become great powers regardless of what the United States does or does not do. Simply stated, the declining hegemon's dilemma is acute: neither benign nor preventive strategies will prevent the emergence of challengers and the consequent end of the hegemon's predominance in the international system. American grand strategy must be redesigned for a multipolar world. In a multipolar system, the United States should follow a policy of strategic independence by assuming the posture of an offshore balancer.v" Traditionally, America's overriding strategic objective has been to ensure that a hegemon does not dominate Eurasia. 163 That objective would not change under strategic independence, but the means of attaining it would. Rather than assuming primary responsibility for containing the rise of a potential hegemon, the United States would rely on global and regional power balances to attain that goal. Strategic independence is not an isolationist policy that rules out the use of American power abroad. Strategic independence also differs from the selective-commitment variant of offshore balancing articulated by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, whereby the United States would be relatively indifferent to Third World events but would remain militarily engaged in Europe and Northeast Asia in order to preserve "stability. ''" Strategic independence is a hedging strategy that would commit the United States militarily if, but only if, other states failed to balance effectively against a rising Eurasian hegemon. The United States would need to remain alert to the events that would require a more engaged policy: (1) the appearance of a "careful" challenger able to cloak its ambitions and ward off external balancing against it; (2) a dramatic narrowing of America's relative power margin over Japan; or (3) the inability of other states to act as effective counterweights due to internal difficulties. Strategic independence aims to capitalize on America's inherent geopolitical advantages. 167 First, in a relative sense, the United States is probably the most secure great power in history because of the interlocking effects of geography, nuclear weapons, and capabilities which, although diminished relatively, are still formidable in absolute terms. Such "strategic security enables the balancer to stay outside the central balance until the moment when its intervention can be decisive."168 America's insularity means that it can benefit strategically from geography in another way, as well. Because America is distant from the likely theaters of great power conflict, in a multipolar world others are unlikely to view it as a threat to their security. Indeed distance would enhance America's attractiveness as an ally. (In a unipolar world the United States loses this advantage because hegemons repel others rather than attracting them). Finally, because of its still considerable great power capabilities, in a multipolar world America's intervention would decisively tip the scales against an aspiring hegemon.

Offshore Balancing Good- War

Offshore balancing prevents US involvement in wars that escalate

Layne in 2k6 (Christopher, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University, International Security 31.2 (2006) 7-41, The Unipolar Illussion Revisited

The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment)

If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy

Offshore Balancing Good- Terrorism/Stability

Offshore balancing preserves US interests while maintaining regional stability. This decreases backlash against the US and solves terrorism

Stephen M. Walt in 2k5 (Professor of international affairs at Harvard University, In the National Interest

A grand new strategy for American foreign policy, Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php)

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability,” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests.

Influence !- Prolif/stability

US global influence needed to prevent WMD proliferation, promote democracy, and maintain stability

Stephen M. Walt in 2k5 (Professor of international affairs at Harvard University, In the National Interest

A grand new strategy for American foreign policy, Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php)

America’s economic, military, and ideological power is the taproot of its international influence and the ultimate guarantor of its security. Anyone who thinks the United States should try to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or defend a particular ally must start by acknowledging that America’s ability to do any of these things depends first and foremost upon its power. Yet America’s position of primacy also fosters fear and resistance when its power is misused. Because the United States is so strong and its impact on others so pervasive, it inevitably attracts suspicion from other states and finds it difficult to elicit their full and enthusiastic cooperation. Moreover, because the United States is wrestling with so many issues in so many places, it is prone to being manipulated or hoodwinked by states who wish to use American power to advance their own interests. Given these constraints, how can the United States maximize the benefits that primacy brings and minimize the resistance that its power sometimes provokes? Trying to increase the American lead might not be worth the effort (if only because the United States is already far ahead), but allowing other states to catch up would mean relinquishing the advantages that primacy now provides. For this reason alone, the central aim of American grand strategy in foreign policy should be to preserve its current position for as long as possible. Several obvious implications follow. First, American leaders should take care not to squander the nation’s power unnecessarily (by fighting unnecessary wars, for example) or mismanage its economy in ways that undermine its long-term vitality. Second, the United States should avoid giving other states additional incentives to build up their own power—either by acquiring new capabilities of their own or by joining forces with others—and should encourage them to rely on America’s help when security problems arise in their own regions. In other words, we want to discourage balancing against the United States, and encourage regional balancing with us.

AT: China Fears Japan

China welcomes stabilizing counterbalances. This includes a more powerful Japan

Yang 1(Jian, Centre for Strategic Studies, “STRATEGY TOWARDS JAPAN:

Perceptions, Policies and Prospects,” http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/working\_papers/WP17.pdf) MJ

**China’s perceptions of and policies towards Japan experienced a dramatic evolution during the Cold War**. Immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Chinese propaganda consistently attacked Japanese militarism and monopoly capitalism. **China’s concern about an attack by Japan was explicitly expressed in the Sino-Soviet security treaty of 1950**.1 **The major cause of the concern**, however**, was China’s fear of the United States** rather than the defeated, weak Japan.2 In the 1960s, with the split of the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Soviet Union became China’s biggest potential threat. Understandably, China was eager to co-exist peacefully with Japan. In fact, **although the two nations had become more evenly matched by the late 1960s, neither China nor Japan defined each other as a direct security threat**.3 In the 1970s, with the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, China and Japan entered a period of ‘good feelings’. The Sino-Japanese Communiqué of September 1972 formally put an end to the state of war between the two countries. The relationship was further strengthened by the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. The treaty was followed by China’s military clash with Soviet ally Vietnam in early 1979 and the formal termination by China of its 30-year alliance with the Soviet Union in 1980**. A friendly and stronger Japan then could help China in balancing against the Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership therefore encouraged the growth of Japanese military strength even as China’s own military power went through a period of retrenchment** in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.4

AT: SE Asia Fears Japan

Fears of Japan expansion are decreasing

Singh 2(Bhubindar, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, “ASEAN’s PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN,” http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/pdf/10.1525/as.2002.42.2.276) MJ

**The reactions of ASEAN members toward Japan’s enhanced political presence in Southeast Asian affairs can hardly be described as unified**. The variance can be partially attributed to the diverse experiences of each country under Japanese occupation. According to Ivan Hall, one example can be seen by contrasting the preferential treatment ethnic Malays received during the occupation to the harsh measures meted out to the Chinese.91 Broadly put, countries with dominant ethnic Chinese populations have been more vocal against an increased Japanese political role in Southeast Asian affairs. However, as this paper has shown, **voices that are critical of Japanese participation in the political/security sphere in Southeast Asia are becoming softer**, especially in the post-Cold War period. This suggests that history will diminish as a determining factor in defining Japan-ASEAN relations in the future. This exercise of identifying the two trends in ASEAN’s perceptions of Japan is valuable as it gives us a comprehensive insight into the way Japan- ASEAN relations are likely to develop in the future. First, **relations will continue to strengthen through greater integration of Japan into ASEAN’s economic affairs. Although China’s economic presence in Southeast Asia is expected to grow, especially in the wake of Beijing’s entry into the WTO, China is unlikely to topple Japan from its leadership position in the near future**. **Second, the level of suspicion and fear of Japan will continue to decrease among ASEAN countries**. As a result**, we will witness greater Japanese involvement in Southeast Asian security or political affairs through both bilateral and multilateral security dialogues and defense exchanges**. The likelihood of a more active political/security role for Japan is accentuated by the accession of the Bush administration in the United States. President George W. Bush sees Japan as America’s most important strategic ally in Asia.92 There have already been suggestions that the U.S.-Japan alliance will be strengthened, and Japan will assume greater responsibility in this arrangement, as illustrated by its recent participation in the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. As such, the presence of Japan in the political/security affairs of the ASEAN region is also expected to expand.

\*\*\*China Advantage\*\*\*

\*\* Relations\*\*

Presence 🡪 Bad Relations

China feels threatened by US military presence

Monthly Review 02 (March, “U.S. Military Bases and Empire” Vol. 53 Iss. 10 http://monthlyreview.org/0302editr.htm) JL

Military doctrine insists that the strategic significance of a foreign military base goes beyond the war in which it was acquired, and that planning for other potential missions using these new assets must begin almost immediately. For this reason the build-up of bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and three of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is inevitably seen by Russia and China as constituting additional threats to their security. Russia has already indicated its displeasure at the prospect of permanent U.S. military bases in Central Asia. As for China, as the Guardian (London) noted on January 10, 2002, the base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, where U.S. planes are landing daily, “is 250 miles from the western Chinese border. With U.S. bases to the east in Japan, to the south in South Korea, and Washington’s military support for Taiwan, China may feel encircled.”

Presence 🡪 Bad Relations

Relations will remain bad between the United States and China assuming military presence is kept up in Japan

Junbo 9 (Dr Jian, Prof of International Studies at Fudan Univ, Asian Times, “Doubts over US-China-Japan talks”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KF16Ad01.html>) MAT

Whether the three-way talks mark the beginning of an end to the Cold War-like tensions in East and Northeast Asia depends on two factors - the future of US-Japan and US-South Korea ties and the North Korea nuclear issue. If, on the one hand, the China-US-Japan dialogue continues annually but the US continues to strengthen its presence through these allies in the region, then the trilateral dialogue will just become a talk shop. More specifically, if the dialogue is not aimed at ending the US-led military alliance in the region, it cannot lead to the end of tensions.

China is concerned of US military presence in Japan

Xiang 10 (Zhang, Prof at UC-Berkeley, Xinhua, “China concerns with Japanese PM's "deterrent" remarks: FM”, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/24/c_13367568.htm>) MAT

China voiced concern Thursday over Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan's reported remarks that the military presence of the United States in Japan is an important deterrent to China. Kan made the remarks during a debate session with leaders of other parties Tuesday, when responding to questions on the Japan-U.S. alliance. He also said he was "paying great attention to China's burgeoning military power and thinking that we must watch out for it." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular news briefing that the Tokyo-Washington alliance, as a bilateral arrangement, should not exceed its bilateral scope and should not target any third country. "China is a country that sticks to the path of peaceful development. It does not pose a threat to any other nation, and accepts no 'deterrent' from other countries," Qin said.

China is already angry at US presence in Japan

Times Wire Services 5 (Los Angeles Times, “U.S.-Japan Statement Angers China”, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/21/world/fg-taiwan21>) MAT

China issued a stiff protest Sunday about military cooperation between the United States and Japan, attacking a recent joint statement on Taiwan as an unwelcome intrusion into Beijing's affairs. The complaint, issued by the Foreign Ministry, reflected deep concern over Japan's increasing security cooperation with the U.S. in East Asia. The revised U.S.-Japanese strategic understanding, issued Saturday after a meeting of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld with their Japanese counterparts, for the first time included security in the area around Taiwan as a "common strategic objective." This was described by U.S. officials as a new element in a close military association that dates from the aftermath of World War II. In addition, the U.S.-Japanese statement drew attention to China's rapid military modernization program, calling it a matter of concern, and urged Beijing to be more transparent in its military planning and weapons procurement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said Sunday that "the statement included the Taiwan issue, which relates to China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. The Chinese government and people strongly oppose this statement."

Presence 🡪 Bad Relations

**China’s rise prompts bad relations with the US**

Chellaney 10 (Brahma, Prof of Strategic Studies at Centre for Policy Research, Japan Times, “America's China policy flop”, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100623bc.html>) MAT

Success breeds confidence, and rapid success spawns arrogance. That, in a nutshell, is the China problem facing Asian states and the West. But no country faces a bigger dilemma on China than the United States because the present American policy simply isn't advancing its objectives. Rising economic and military power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy, as exemplified by several developments — from China's inclusion of the South China Sea in its "core" national interests, an action that makes its claims to the disputed islands non-negotiable, to its vile protests against the Indian prime minister visiting a state of the Indian Union, Arunachal Pradesh, on which Beijing has resurrected its long-dormant claim. A new chill in relations between American and Chinese militaries, underlined by a Chinese admiral's carping lecture on American "hegemony," has torpedoed the Obama administration's hopes to make China a responsible partner in global affairs by giving Beijing a larger stake in solving international problems. The shift in Beijing's South China Sea position has resulted in its conveying to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian claimants the message that any discussions between and among them other over their claims would amount to interference in China's internal affairs. But no less significant is that China's expanding naval role and maritime claims are beginning to collide with U.S. interests, including the traditional emphasis on freedom of navigation. The present U.S. policy on China is a study in contrast to the way Washington unabashedly exercised its leverage when another Asian country — Japan — emerged as a global economic powerhouse in the 1980s. As it rose dramatically to become a potential economic peer to the U.S., Japan kept the yen undervalued and erected hidden barriers to the entry of foreign manufacturers into its market. That resulted in the U.S. piling up pressure on Japan and periodically arm-twisting it to make trade concessions. Today, the U.S. cannot adopt the same approach against Beijing, largely because China is also a military and political power and Washington depends on Chinese support on a host of international issues — from North Korea and Burma to Iran and Pakistan. By contrast, Japan has remained just an economic power.

China rejects US-Japan relations and is gaining power to challenge their alliance

Blumenthal 6 (Jake, Commissioner of US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American Enterprise Institute, “America and Japan Approach a Rising China”, <http://www.aei.org/docLib/20061208_200612AOg.pdf>) MAT

America’s post-Cold War China policy was premised on the hope that multidimensional engagement with Beijing would result in a strong, rich, peaceful, and democratic China. Almost two decades later, America’s attitude toward China reflects the fear that engagement has led instead to a China that is indeed stronger and richer, but still authoritarian. It appears increasingly likely that China will use its growing power to challenge American leadership in Asia. The United States and Japan can meet this challenge through greater military cooperation and by strengthening and supporting democratic ideals. Japan is the key to this hedging strategy. Although Washington has been prodding Japan for over a decade to contribute more to international security, regional military dangers and bold new Japanese leadership have made such prodding less necessary. Tokyo has watched as Beijing has expanded its military power and deployed into contested waters. Kim Jong Il’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons--coupled with his missile tests--has made Japan take its own defense seriously. The changes underway in the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship would have been hard to imagine a decade ago. Within the next few years, the United States and Japan will have an interoperable missile defense system and a collocated air command system. As Richard Lawless, the senior defense official in charge of Asia, has said: the United States and Japan will “operate together, train together, and work together, and share--to a much greater degree--missions, roles and responsibilities.”[3] Tokyo is as determined as Washington to develop greater military capabilities to check Beijing’s military expansion and to protect itself against the vagaries of a mad North Korea. Recently elected Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe once joked that Japan, living in a dangerous neighborhood, has been “mugged by reality.”[4] It is no coincidence that this declaration mentions universal values that China rejects. Nor has it gone unnoticed in Japan that in its geopolitical competition with China, Tokyo’s commitment to those universal values provides it with a key diplomatic advantage. Indeed, most of Japan’s major foreign policy initiatives now highlight support for democracy promotion.

Relations !- Global War

Full collapse of relations ushers in global competition that ensures war

Ferguson 9 (Neil, Staff Writer, NewsWeek, “'Chimerica' is Headed for Divorce”, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9665820048&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=76&resultsUrlKey=29_T9665814308&cisb=22_T9665822618&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=5774&docNo=78>) MAT

When does a rising power become a threat? There is seldom a single moment. A century ago, AngloGerman antagonism was still a relatively new phenomenon; an alliance between the two empires seemed plausible as late as 1899. Likewise, the United States took time to identify Japan as a serious rival in the Pacific region; it was not until the 1930s that relations really soured. In both cases, the perception of a strategic threat was slow to grow. But grow it did--and ultimately it led to war. Could the same be happening to the United States and China today? Are we imperceptibly but inexorably slipping from cooperation to competition? Back in early 2007, it seemed as if China and America were so intertwined they'd become one economy: I called it "Chimerica." The Chinese did the saving, the Americans the spending. The Chinese did the exporting, the Americans the importing. The Chinese did the lending, the Americans the borrowing. As the Chinese strategy was based on export-led growth, they had no desire to see their currency appreciate against the dollar. So they intervened consistently in currency markets, and as a result, they now have international reserves totaling $2.1 trillion. About 70 percent of these are in dollar-denominated securities, and a large proportion of these are in U.S. government bonds. The unintended effect of this was to help finance the U.S. current-account deficit at very low interest rates. Without those low long-term rates, it's hard to believe that the U.S. -real-estate market would have bubbled the way it did between 2002 and 2007. For a time Chimerica seemed like a marriage made in heaven: both economies grew so fast that they accounted for about 40 percent of global growth between 1998 and 2007. The big question now is whether or not this marriage is on the rocks. America's highly indebted consumers just can't borrow anymore. The U.S. savings rate is soaring upward, and U.S. imports from China have slumped, down 18 percent between May 2008 and May 2009. Of course, that doesn't mean the Chinese are going to stop buying dollars. They dare not allow their currency to appreciate when so many jobs in the export sector are under threat. But it does mean that they are questioning the Chimerica strategy. It's a bit like one of those marriages between a compulsive saver and a chronic spender. Such partnerships can work for a certain period of time, but eventually the penny-pincher gets disillusioned with the spendthrift. Every time Chinese officials express concern about U.S. fiscal or monetary policy, it reminds me of one of those domestic tiffs in which the saver says to the spender: "You maxed out on the credit cards once too often, honey." What is China's alternative if it seeks a divorce from America? Call it the empire option. Instead of continuing in this unhappy marriage, the Chinese can go it alone, counting on their growing economic might (according to Goldman Sachs, China's gross domestic product could equal that of the United States by 2027) to buy them global power in their own right. In some ways they've already begun doing this. Their naval strategy clearly implies a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Their investments in African minerals and infrastructure look distinctly imperial too. And now the official line from Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is to "hasten the implementation of our 'going out' strategy and combine the utilization of foreign exchange reserves with the 'going out' of our enterprises." That sounds like a Chinese campaign to buy up foreign assets--exchanging dodgy dollars for copper mines. The global implications of this divorce are huge. Imagine a new Cold War, but one in which the two superpowers are economically the same size. Or, if you prefer an older analogy, imagine a rerun of the Anglo-German antagonism of the early 1900s, with America in the role of Britain, and China in the role of imperial Germany. This is a better analogy because it captures the fact that a high level of economic integration does not necessarily prevent the growth of strategic rivalry and, ultimately, conflict.

Relations !- Taiwan

Strong China-U.S relations are key to prevent conflict over Taiwan.

Kerr in 99 (Paul, research analyst at the Arms Control Association, International Security, “Taiwan: Maintain the Current Ambiguity.” 1(1))pl

Stable U.S.-China relations can also help prevent Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. The bottom line is whether or not Beijing can be persuaded to accept the status quo between the two countries. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan inextricably links relations between Taipei and Beijing to the relationship between Beijing and Washington. If the PRC perceives other areas of its relationship with the United States to be strong, such as U.S. – China trade and negotiations over China's membership in the WTO, it has less incentive to disrupt the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Provocative U.S. actions may lead Beijing to believe that it has little to gain by maintaining peaceful relations with the United States.

Taiwan !

War over Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear

Johnson in 2k2 Japan Policy of Reasearch Institute (Johnson Chalmers, January, “Okinawa Between the United States and Japan” http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op24.html) JL

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious American militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a defensive deterrent against the overwhelming American power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese nuclear warheads versus over 7,000 American nuclear warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo in 1914 led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the U.S. and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory. In any case, forward-deployed American forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect on China's decision-making concerning Taiwan, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to formally declare its independence.2

Relations !- Stability

China-U.S. relations are needed for Asian stability.

Shambaugh in 5 (David, Director of the China Policy Program @ George Washington University, Brookings Institute, China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/winter\_china\_shambaugh.aspx) pl

On balance, this complex relationship is characterized by substantial cooperation on bilateral, regional, and global issues. While not a full condominium of two-power domination, and occasionally displaying traditional balance of power features, Sino-American cooperation is a signicant feature of the current Asian order. Even the absence of Sino-American antagonism is an important factor. While some Asian countries may hedge against either U.S. or Chinese domination, and adroitly acquire whatever resources and beneªts they can from both China and the United States, every country (except perhaps North Korea) seeks a stable, cooperative Sino-American relationship. Should Beijing andWashington one day confront each other, all of these regional states would be put in the awkward position of having to choose sides—and they seek to avoid this at all costs.

Relations !- Modernization

U.S.-China relations prevent China's modernization from causing regional conflict.

Wortzel, Swain et al 7 (Larry, Michael, V.P of foreign policy at Heritage Foundation, Research dir. Of Asia-Pacific policy at RAND center, Carnegie Endowment, The Implications of China's Military Modernization, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=943)pl

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is on course to become the most significant military force in East Asia after the United States within the next decade, by modernizing to create a military capable of defeating regional forces and credible enough to deter intervention by outside forces. As China expands its area of operations, U.S. and PLA forces will come into contact with increasing frequency, which makes continued U.S.-China strategic consultation critical to avoid accidental confrontations. Larry Wortzel of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and David Finkelstien, Director of the Chinese Studies Center at the CNA Corporation, offered their assessments of China’s military modernization and the threat it poses to the United States and Asia in the third of Carnegie’s China policy debates. Carnegie senior associate Michael Swaine moderated the event. Contingencies and capabilities The first Gulf War “shocked the PLA into confronting the stark reality that it was incapable of fighting twentieth-century warfare,” according to Finkelstein. In 1993 the PLA embarked on a holistic modernization program designed to develop the capabilities necessary for the small, high-technology conflicts typical of the latest generation of warfare. The PLA also designed its modernization program to prepare for several contingencies. Open-source data indicate that China is preparing for possible conflict with the United States, potentially over Taiwan, and is also focused on being able to defeat Taiwan. Wortzel argued that China is close to achieving that goal and is capable of dominating the militaries of other Asian powers (excepting Japan). The fact that the United States treats China as an enemy in its strategic planning is a driver of Chinese military planning, according to Wortzel. Implications for the United States The potential for miscalculation and misreading of intent are the biggest threats to the PLA and the U.S. armed forces, and as the PLA expands its area of control into parts of the Pacific to which the U.S. has traditionally had unfettered access the potential will increase. Confidence-building measures and regular defense consultations are the best way to reduce the threat posed by the PLA. However, Wortzel and Finkelstein agreed that as long as China’s decision-making process remains opaque the United States must maintain a sufficient deterrent. The U.S. should also ensure that allies are not selling sensitive military technology to the PLA. Both participants stressed that while the PLA is preparing for scenarios in which they could engage with the U.S. military, conflict is far from inevitable, given the deep economic and strengthening political ties between the two countries. Continued military-to-military exchange is crucial to preventing an arms race and to reduce the likelihood of unintentionally igniting a security crisis. Each side should make clear what actions will lead to conflict.

Relations !- Pakistan Collapse

Strong U.S and China relations allows them to easily work together and add stability to Pakistan, preventing the government to be overthrown and taken over by terrorist organizations.

Riedel, Singh (Bruce, Pavneet, Senior fellow at Saban Center for ME policy, Assistant Director for John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution, U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0112\_us\_china\_relations\_riedel/0112\_US \_China\_Relations\_Riedel.pdf) AK

In light of those factors, the time is ripe for the United States and the PRC to add the stability of Pakistan to the top of their bilateral agenda. As it stands, the agenda is already replete with important challenges. These include cooperating to realize balanced global economic growth, working towards an enduring peace in the Taiwan Straits, achieving denuclearization in North Korea and Iran, and mitigating or reversing the negative affects of climate change. And while officials in the U.S. and China have taken care to prevent the spillover of challenges in one issue area from impeding progress in another, a government takeover by al Qaeda and the Taliban would serve as an endogenous shock to many—if not all—of the other issues on the table. The United States and China can preempt this shock by beginning a serious dialogue with each other and with the Pakistanis about how to stabilize the beleaguered country. In order to do so, policy makers will first have to understand the matrix of independent and shared links each country has with Pakistan.

Pakistan Collapse !

Pakistan possesses numerous nuclear weapons all of which would be available to the terrorists if Al Qaeda and the Taliban topple the government

Center for Defense Information in 2k1, What if the terrorists go nuclear?, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.cfm) AK

Another potential source of diversion is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, estimated to number around 30-50 atomic bombs with explosive yields ranging from 1 to 15 kilotons. The weapons are probably assembled at Wah (50 miles from Afghanistan), and are stored primarily at Sargodha near a missile complex close to the border with India and only about 250 miles from Afghanistan. Pakistan's military government is walking a tightrope between pressure from the Bush administration on one side and anti-American Islamic militants on the other. Growing street opposition from the latter could certainly de-stabilize or even topple the regime, and in the midst of such dissolution, the weakening of nuclear security would inevitably occur. The ranks of government and military personnel are also fairly riddled with sympathizers of the radical Islamic faction, posing a distinct risk of insiders colluding to spirit away a bomb or two for bin Laden or other terrorists. In any case, control over Pakistan's arsenal could all too readily buckle in a serious crisis inside the country. Pakistani weapons are believed to lack sophisticated locks and other safeguards to prevent their unauthorized use. Loose nukes in the region would have unpredictable consequences, almost all of which would militate against the U.S. cause, not to mention the safety of U.S. forces dispatched there

Pakistani coup causes nuclear war with India that kills 17 million

Davidson in 2k2(Keay, The San Francisco Chronicle, nuclear threat has world on edge, june 7, LN)

Pakistan already is "what people mean by a failing state," Cirincione says. "If there is no Pakistani government, then there's nobody to crack down on and there'll be an increase in terrorist attacks" against India. Thereafter, for India, "it starts to look a lot like Vietnam." And that raises the specter of nuclear war: If Pakistan thinks its survival is threatened, its surviving leaders, whether civilian or military, might deploy nuclear weapons as desperate last-minute defenses. In recent years, Western analysts have conducted many computer-assisted scenarios about hypothetical India-Pakistan nuclear wars. These "war games" simulate conventional and nuclear conflicts.   
One such scenario was described in a report co-written in the late 1990s by David Shlapak, an international policy analyst at the Rand think tank whose experience with war gaming goes back to the Cold War. The report depicts a hypothetical India-Pakistan war that breaks out in 2005. Participants in the scenario "gamed" what happened next. They based their actions on their knowledge of the region and its leadership. Here's what they anticipated: "In the spring of 2006, India dramatically increases its counterinsurgency operations in both Kashmir and Punjab, and the rebels are pushed into precipitate retreat," the Rand report says. "Pakistan responds by infiltrating a number of special forces teams, which attack military installations supporting the Indian operations. "India mobilizes for war," the report continues, "and launches major attacks all along the international border, accompanied by an intense air campaign. . . . As Indian forces continue to press forward, Pakistan detonates a small fission (nuclear) bomb on an Indian armored formation in an unpopulated area of the desert border region; it is unclear whether the weapon was intended to go off over Pakistani or Indian territory. "India responds by destroying a Pakistani air base with a two-weapon nuclear attack. Condemning the 'escalation' to homeland attacks, Pakistan attacks the Indian city of Jodhpur with a 20-kiloton weapon and demands cessation of hostilities." Then "India strikes Hyderabad with a weapon estimated to be 200 kilotons and threatens 10 times more destruction if any more nuclear weapons are used. Pakistan offers a cease-fire in place." The war game ends shortly after the cease-fire. The report doesn't estimate the likely number of deaths in such a war. Some other scenarios have estimated the number of dead in an India-Pakistan war at up to 17 million.

Relations !- Proliferation 1/2

US-China cooperation vital to create a workable global nonproliferation regime

Twomey in 2k9 (Christopher, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Association, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey)

**A global approach to nonproliferation will fail without China's** active **support**. Bush administration policies have eroded the current system, already under stress due to globalization and the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-Indian deal on nuclear energy was highly salient for China because of its rivalry with India and friendship with Pakistan. In the North Korean case, inspections may well move forward on a bilateral basis rather than through existing global fora. **The United States can take steps to begin to repair this damage, regaining the initiative on the global nonproliferation regime.** Quick ratification of the CTBT will send a positive signal. Reinvigorated diplomacy on a treaty cutting off the production of fissile material for weapons might do so as well. On that issue, however, China's objections need to be taken seriously. China's stockpile of fissile material is a miniscule fraction of that of the United States. Freezing that ratio in place in perpetuity is something China would only concede in response to other inducements. These should be discussed frankly. **Beyond** these **small-scale steps** and more fundamentally, **a new nonproliferation architecture is needed. China must be integrally involved in its design**. In the wake of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal and with failures to stop proliferation in North Korea, it is unclear if the current hodgepodge of overlapping institutions (nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], etc.) will continue to form the basis of the global approach to containing proliferation. **As new global approaches are developed, it should be recognized that China's participation** in the World Trade Organization and in the recent G-20 meetings on the financial crisis **has generally been responsible, if not entirely to U.S. liking**. In the current global context**, the United States cannot dictate the design of that architecture; Beijing, as well as others, must play a constitutive role. It should be noted that Beijing's behavior in several specific cases has improved in this regard**. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has hailed Chinese leadership of the six-party talks. Chinese policy on Iran hardened notably in 2006, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1696. In both cases, U.S. preferences would have been for still-firmer action, but the **progress in Chinese policy is clearly discernable**. On the other hand, China's recent apparent regression in deciding to sell additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan seemed to flout common sense and its previous commitments to the NSG. Again, however, the U.S. role in undermining the framework within which the NSG exists by pursuing the India deal is notable.

Proliferations causes extinction – nuclear arms races and miscalculated nuclear war.

Utgoff in 2

(Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer)

First, the dynamics of getting to **a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain** nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, **some theorists** on nuclear deterrence appear to **think that** in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, **the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero** .3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. **History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong**. History includes instances in which **states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict.** China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would

Relations !- Proliferation 2/2

avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. **Egypt attacked Israel** in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat 4 And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?'5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.' Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. (con’t)Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But **the threat** of nuclear war **is not just a matter of a few weapons being used**. It could get much worse. **Once** a conflict reaches the point where **nuclear weapons are employed, the** stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be: seen as, justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, **we are headed toward a world** that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. **With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips**, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Relations !- Econ

**U.S.-China-Japan alliance strengthens the global economy**

Wang and Welch 3 (Jianwei and David, Prof. of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin and Ass. Prof. of Polt. Science Univ. of Toronto, Asian Perspective Vol. 27 No. 3, “A New Look At The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle: Toward Building a Stable Framework”, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v27n3-f.pdf) CBC

Thus, the greatest sources of potential conflict in the U.S.- China -Japan mangle are either ideation, conflicts, or material conflicts with important ideational components. This suggests that building a stable framework for managing relations the mangle will reouve leaders in all three countries to pay particular attention to each other's sensitivities. Managing relations within the mangle, in other words, requires a degree of empathy and psychological savvy, not merely a capacity for hard-headed realism. Over the long run the best outcome will be a transformation in attitudes by which all three countries will come to regard the other two as allies. and partners, in maintaining a stable international order" This is not on the horizon at present But neither . It out of the question—over the very long run What is the horizon is a period of uncertain duration during ach the common interests all three countries to strengthen the world economy, the institutions that govern that economy, and the fight against terrorism, encourages the avoidance of disruptive conflicts. With luck, this period will be long enough to permit a degree of positive changes in identities and attitudes. But, the U.S.-China-Japan triangle contains, within it, the seeds of its own disruption. Building a stable framework, the, is a task that will require enlightened leadership in all three countries, it is not something that will simply happen of its own accord.

Relations !- Air Pollution

Trilateral relations key to solve air pollution in China

Curtis 9 (Gerald, Prof. of Polt. Science at Columbia Univ., Center for a New American Security, “Getting the Triangle Straight: China, Japan, and

the United States in an Era of Change”, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/1\_curtis.pdf) CBC

**There is an important role**, nonetheless, **for a trilateral dialogue among China, Japan, and the United States. These are,** after all, **the three most powerful countries in East Asia, with many common interests that could be furthered by coordinating their policies. Japan’s pollution control technology, for example, is among the world’s best. A joint China-Japan-US program to combat water and air pollution in China**, for example, **could make an important contribution to dealing with an issue that not only affects the health of the Chinese population but also has an adverse impact on nearby countries as well.**

Relations !- WOT

U.S. China relations helps fight the war on terror

Lampton and Ewing 2 (David and Richard, Dir. and Ass.Dir. of Chinese Studies at the Nixon Center, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World”, <http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monograph%20complete%202%20(PDF).pdf>) CBC

**The September 2001 terrorist attacks** on New York and Washington **demonstrated for all to see the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism and altered its national priorities** (as reflected in its national budget, for example) **and its foreign policy**. **Almost immediately, the U.S. military around the world went to Def-Con 3 for the first time in nearly 30 years, the highest state of offensive readiness since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War**. As further indication of the national and government frame of mind, the Bush Administration formed a “shadow government” for activation were a massive attack to impair the normal national governing structure. After these immediate responses, the Administration endeavored to construct a coordinated response to the challenge of al Qaeda and global terrorism. The Administration sought to work with a broad range of nations to target terrorist groups, to stop the flow of resources to them, to win United Nations support for responses, and to set in motion an attack on Afghanistan. Washington did not, however, build a one-size-fits-all coalition, opting instead to cooperate with different sets of countries and organizations depending on the problem at hand. In dealing with Beijing, U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11 World President Bush initially pursued a less cluttered agenda, with sharper priorities filtered through the lens of national security. As for **Beijing**, it **recognized and**, to some extent, **seized the opportunity to** try to **improve relations with Washington. In the months following the terrorist attacks, limited security cooperation took shape in the form of Chinese support for United Nations resolutions, encouragement of Pakistan to cooperate with Washington, sharing of counterterrorism information, and acquiescence to increasing U.S. military** **presence in several areas** of Central Asia beyond Afghanistan. Later, **Beijing agreed to provide meaningful aid to the rebuilding effort in Afghanistan.**

Terrorism !

If terrorist organizations get a hold of nuclear weapons, they will use them against the Western World, particularly the United States.

Roul ‘10 (Animesh, executive director of research at the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, MacArthur Foundation, Nuclear Terrorism: How Serious is the Threat?, http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/blog/entry/409/) AK

The ongoing efforts by jihadist terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and radiological weapons, continue to be among the key challenges. Much evidence has been accumulated about al Qaeda’s inclinations to adopt a nuclear strategy. In a recent discussion on a Jihadi forum terrorists have reportedly discussed the future strategy of possible nuclear deployment against the western world, the primary target the US. The title of the topic says it all: “[Al-Qaeda’s nuclear bombings](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35501&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381&cHash=ab86e88c36) - Where would the battle start?” In many such forums, it is speculated that al Qaeda should attack the US with nuclear weapons which would end its tyrannical rule over the world. And they believe that such an attack is only a matter of time and propose a large scale evacuation of Muslims from the western world to avoid mass Muslim fatalities during a nuclear event.

United States will retaliate if attacked resulting in Nuclear War

Fox News ’10 (Fox News, Obama to Limit Potential Uses of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/05/obama-limit-potential-uses-nuclear-weapons/) AK

But for countries that don't have nuclear capabilities that are following the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Gates said they need not fear the United States' still-vast nuclear stockpile. "The United States pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against (those countries)," Gates said -- even in the case of a biological or [chemical attack.](http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/05/obama-limit-potential-uses-nuclear-weapons/)However, Gates said any country so bold as to launch such an attack on the United States "would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response." And he said nuclear treaty violators like Iran and North Korea would be exempt from that policy. "All options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category," he said.

Terrorism !

Nuclear terrorism is the biggest threat-would collapse the economy, security, and kill thousands

Stephen M. Walt in 2k5 (Professor of international affairs at Harvard University, In the National Interest

A grand new strategy for American foreign policy, Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php)

The issues just discussed are serious ones, but they pale in comparison to the potential danger of nuclear terrorism. Conventional terrorism—including the 9/11 attacks—can be horrifying and tragic, but even an event as awful as 9/11 does not threaten America’s existence or way of life. Although the United States should take every reasonable step to prevent another terrorist attack, we could absorb a replay of September 11 once every ten years and continue to thrive as a society. A terrorist attack involving WMDs—especially one involving a nuclear weapon—would be another matter entirely. If a nuclear bomb were to go off in any major American city, hundreds of thousands of lives could be lost in an instant. The economic damage would be enormous and far-reaching. We could not know if additional attacks were coming, and we might have little idea how and where to retaliate. Such an event would probably have incalculable implications for America’s security, prosperity, civil liberties, and foreign policy. Indeed, it could be the most significant single event in American history.

Terrorists organizations have been looking for nuclear weapons to use.

Roul ‘10 (Animesh, executive director of research at the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, MacArthur Foundation, Nuclear Terrorism: How Serious is the Threat?, http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/blog/entry/409/)AK

The news of terrorists groups like Al Qaeda and recently decimated [Tamil Tigers](http://www.nowpublic.com/world/sri-lanka-ltte-tried-buy-nuclear-weapons-kp) (LTTE) and other non state actors looking for nuclear materials and ready to use nuclear radiological device (RDD) in post Soviet states and elsewhere has brought nuclear and radiological terrorism concern to the forefront of the international security discourse. Analysts have broadly categorized non state actors (read terrorists) who can resort to a nuclear strike against a Nation state:  Apocalyptic groups (e.g Aum Shinrikyo), Politico-Religious Terrorist groups (e.g, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba) Nationalist and Separatists groups (e.g. LTTE), and Single issue Terrorist (e.g eco-terrorist).[Charles Ferguson and W C Potter].

\*\*Modernization\*\*

US Presence 🡪 China Modernization

**US presence prompted China’s rapid military expansion**

Times Wire Services 5 (<http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/21/world/fg-taiwan21>) MAT

China issued a stiff protest Sunday about military cooperation between the United States and Japan, attacking a recent joint statement on Taiwan as an unwelcome intrusion into Beijing's affairs. The complaint, issued by the Foreign Ministry, reflected deep concern over Japan's increasing security cooperation with the U.S. in East Asia. The revised U.S.-Japanese strategic understanding, issued Saturday after a meeting of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld with their Japanese counterparts, for the first time included security in the area around Taiwan as a "common strategic objective." This was described by U.S. officials as a new element in a close military association that dates from the aftermath of World War II. In addition, the U.S.-Japanese statement drew attention to China's rapid military modernization program, calling it a matter of concern, and urged Beijing to be more transparent in its military planning and weapons procurement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said Sunday that "the statement included the Taiwan issue, which relates to China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. The Chinese government and people strongly oppose this statement."

China’s military growth is prompted by US developments

Mulvenon et al. 06 (“Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense “ National Defense Research Institute Pg. 23 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\_MG340.pdf) JL

This report examines four notional Chinese response options to U.S. military transformation. Each is used as a heuristic to illustrate potentially threatening developments. Although these options are discussed in isolation, developments in China suggest that all or portions of each strategy are being pursued in earnest, and some combination of the options will likely characterize the final configuration. Option One: Conventional Modernization “Plus” The first potential strategy is characterized by the use of conventional weapons, including space weapons, submarines, and antiship cruise missiles, to conduct anti-access operations and to strike at perceived U.S. vulnerabilities or high-value targets whose degradation, denial, or destruction could decisively influence the campaign. Of the analyzed options, this strategy is the most feasible because it relies on proven technologies that can be developed or purchased; however, it is vulnerable to U.S. network-centric warfare (NCW) efforts. Signposts of Chinese efforts in this direction include increased and coordinated blue-water training by the Navy, over-water training by air units, development of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, and development or purchase of counter-space technologies. The PLA’s concentration on the use of conventional weapons against U.S. vulnerabilities indicates that the U.S. military must prepare for the PLA to seize the initiative, requiring increased attention to defensive training and technologies such as antisubmarine warfare and passive and active air base defenses. Chinese strategists have avidly consumed U.S. defense writings over the past 10 years and have keenly observed the changing nature of U.S. military strategy and force transformation. They have followed the emergence of networking concepts and corresponding investments. Commentary by Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) experts on Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests that Beijing believes the Pentagon’s efforts to transform toward network-centric warfare (NCW) are not just succeeding, but accelerating. Yet the concomitant acceleration of Chinese military modernization also suggests that the Chinese are not discouraged by U.S. transformation and military victories. Although military capabilities are not China’s highest priority, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must assume that the Chinese will work, within their limitations, to deny the United States even greater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys. The question is: How?

**US Presence 🡪 China Modernization**

U.S. presence in East Asia causes China, among others, to modernize and militarize

Eland 3 (Ivan, Dir of Defense Policy, CATO Institute, “Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1324) MAT

The ongoing modernization of the Chinese military poses less of a threat to the United States than recent studies by the Pentagon and a congressionally mandated commission have posited. Both studies exaggerate the strength of China's military by focusing on the modest improvements of specific sectors rather than the still-antiquated overall state of Chinese forces. The state of the Chinese military and its modernization must also be put in the context of U.S. interests in East Asia and compared with the state and modernization of the U.S. military and other militaries in East Asia, especially the Taiwanese military. Viewed in that context, China's military modernization does not look especially threatening. Although not officially calling its policy in East Asia "containment," the United States has ringed China with formal and informal alliances and a forward military presence. With such an extended defense perimeter, the United States considers as a threat to its interests any natural attempt by China--a rising power with a growing economy--to gain more control of its external environment by increasing defense spending. If U.S. policymakers would take a more restrained view of America's vital interests in the region, the measured Chinese military buildup would not appear so threatening. Conversely, U.S. policy may appear threatening to China. Even the Pentagon admits that China accelerated hikes in defense spending after the United States attacked Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue in 1999.

US dealings in Southeast Asia incentivize China to modernize its military

Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Staff Writer and Master’s Degree in Int’l Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Countering China’s Military Modernization”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9052/countering\_chinas\_military\_modernization.html#p2) MAT

Southeast Asia: Experts say Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are currently calculating whether the political and economic benefits of closer ties with a strong China outweigh the military risks. Bilateral trade between China and all ten countries within the [Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)](http://www.aseansec.org/) is expected to exceed $200 billion in 2008 up from $ 190 billion in 2007. The region is now China's fourth-largest trading partner. Despite the economic windfall, ASEAN countries want the United States to pay more attention to the new security trends in the region, experts say. While these countries are not very vocal about their fears, experts say they are nervously looking over their shoulders at China's military buildup and wondering where it's headed. Border disputes with some countries also complicate China's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Vietnam and China each assert claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, archipelagos in a potentially oil-rich area of the South China Sea. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan also claim all or part of the South China Sea. China's assertion of "[indisputable sovereignty](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm#relations)" over the Spratly Islands and the entire South China Sea has elicited concern from Vietnam and its Southeast Asia neighbors, according to the U.S. State Department. Vietnam has been pursuing closer military relations with the United States through joint military exercises, and sharing intelligence on terrorism, drugs, and other transnational threats. Vietnam has also hosted U.S. warships at its ports.

**China is prepared for war with the US**

Capaccio 9 (Tony, Staff Writer, Bloomberg, “China’s New Weapons May Threaten U.S. Bases, Ships, Gates Says”, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=am6ExRzB1cjo>) MAT

China is developing new weapons that could threaten the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, Defense Secretary [Robert Gates](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Robert+Gates&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1) said today. “We should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. -- fighter-to-fighter or ship-to-ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options,” Gates told an audience of airpower advocates during a speech in suburban Maryland. His comments reflect a growing concern within the U.S. intelligence and military community over the range and sophistication of China’s weaponry. Director of National Intelligence [Dennis Blair](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Dennis+Blair&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1) told the Senate Intelligence Committee in April that China has “dramatically expanded” its ability to hack into U.S. government computers. “Information warfare has become the pillar of China’s military modernization program and war planning,” Blair said

US Presence 🡪 China Modernization

China has rapidly modernized in order to compete with the US in the Pacific region

Zhang 4 (Baohui, Ph.D and Prof of Political Science at Univ of Texas, Asian Perspective, “American Hegemony and China’s U.S. Policy”, 28 (3), p. 86-89) MAT

China’s rapid modernization has increased its global influence at an impressive pace. However, this rising China faces the question of how to manage its relations with the world’s greatest power, the United States. China’s national interests will be profoundly affected by that relationship. In recent years, the bilateral relationship has seen much uncertainty and in fact, in both countries there have been hot debates over policy choices toward each other. In the United States, the debate centers on whether a rising China will be a revisionist state that seeks to change the world order, or a status-quo state that will respect and play by international rules. Some observers argue that China is a revisionist state and thus the United States must contain China to suppress its power. Most, however, believe that through engagement the United States can influence China to play by the accepted rules of the world community.1 Chinese policymakers are concerned with a similar question, which is how China should best pursuer its interests in a world dominated by American hegemony. Chinese policy choices, they believe, should be based on both an interpretation of American intentions toward China and a projected balance of power between the two countries in the future. In theory, benign or hostile U.S. intentions, and a favorable balance of power, would result in rational choices of different policies toward the United States. Unfortunately, it is widely known that discerning one country’s intention toward another is difficult at best. It is hampered by prejudice, lack of intention, and insufficient communication. Chinese policymakers and experts are inevitably divided with regard to their interpretation of American intentions toward China.2 National capabilities or power, on the other hand, are substantially easier to measure. This article argues that China’s policy toward the United States must incorporate the power factor. In fact, this is the classic perspective of the realist tradition in world politics. It emphasizes the central role of power in the choices of foreign policies. The articles raises the question, given the projected balance of power between China and the United States, what is China’s most realistic policy to maximize its national interests and global influence? One policy pursues rivalry and competition with the United States. The other policy recognizes American global dominance and promotes China’s interests through cooperation with the United States. This article argues that the only realistic policy choice for China is the cooperation strategy. This view is based on the projected balance of power between the two countries. In essence, it recognizes that China will be unlikely to match the power of the United States. The following sections will examine the Chinese view of the future balance of power versus the United States and the appropriate responses from China.

**US Presence 🡪 China Modernization**

US deployment to Japan collapses relations with China causing instability.

Saunders and Yaun in 2K (Phillip and Jing-Dong, Sr. research fellow at Institute for National Strategic Studies and Dir. Of East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group, China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications, p. 5-7)pl

The first scenario (credible minimum deterrence) would have a fairly limited international impact. It would involve a relatively modest increase in deployed Chinese weapons (assuming older systems are retired). However, development of a small but modern strategic missile force would position China to significantly expand the size of its force in the future. Given China’s lack of transparency on strategic issues, this potential would fuel suspicion about China’s intentions among its neighbors and in the United States, complicating regional security and arms control efforts. If U.S. deployment drives Chinese force modernization (the second scenario), China’s commitment to the current arms control and nonproliferation regimes might weaken. China would attempt to use international arms control negotiations to restrain the expansion of U.S. NMD systems (for example, by linking restrictions on outer-space weapons to other arms control treaties). China would refuse to negotiate a fissile-material cutoff treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit future production and possibly require reductions in existing stockpiles. The heightened importance of developing a MRV/MIRV capability might prompt China to withdraw from the CTBT if additional tests of miniaturized nuclear warheads were necessary. Beijing might also re-evaluate its nuclear and missile nonproliferation commitments in order to increase pressure on the United States to limit missile defense deployments. U.S. TMD deployments to Japan or especially Taiwan would probably eliminate China’s willingness to expand its international nonproliferation commitments or to adhere to bilateral commitments. Because this scenario involves a significant expansion of China’s strategic nuclear force, it would have a broad negative impact on international arms control and nonproliferation regimes. In the worst case, the United States might interpret China’s buildup in response to a U.S. NMD deployment as evidence of hostile Chinese intentions, stimulating an arms race and an end to cooperation on regional security, nonproliferation, and arms control issues. A doctrinal shift from minimal deterrence to limited deterrence would call China’s NFU pledge into question. The associated build-up of Chinese nuclear missile forces, coupled with a U.S.-Russian START III build-down, would move China closer to numerical parity. This could have two contradictory consequences. China’s two-decade free ride on superpower nuclear weapons reductions might end, as international pressure mounted for China to participate in the global nuclear disarmament process. However the United States and Russia might reconsider further reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, especially if China refused to make reductions in its arsenal. A shift in Chinese nuclear doctrine would probably be interpreted by the United States as evidence of Chinese hostility, worsening relations and undermining regional stability. Any significant expansion of China’s nuclear force would have important implications for regional security dynamics. Some Japanese analysts would interpret China’s strategic modernization as a threat, especially if it includes a shift to limited deterrence and an expansion in the number of MRBMs. The closing of the gap between Chinese nuclear missile forces and U.S. military capabilities and the potential for nuclear exchanges in the western Pacific could cause Tokyo to question the credibility of extended deterrence and the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This might lead Japan to make a greater commitment to theater missile defense and to reconsider its nuclear and ballistic missile options. This reassessment might also be triggered by an easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula, which might undercut the rationale for a forward-based U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. India would also be directly affected by China’s nuclear modernization programs. India would point to Chinese modernization as justification for its own strategic buildup, impeding international efforts to pressure India to cap its nuclear and missile programs. However, China would continue efforts to use the international arms control regime to pressure India, fueling bilateral tensions. As China’s strategic forces become more capable and move toward a higher-alert status, India might feel the need to enhance the credibility of its own nuclear and missile forces. The resulting arms competition would further erode the nuclear nonproliferation regime and damage the fragile consensus among the nuclear weapons states. Although some degree of Chinese strategic modernization is inevitable, outsiders have some ability to influence the pace and scope of China’s buildup. U.S. decisions about NMD will directly shape Chinese decisions about force structure. If the United States decides to deploy NMD, it should initiate a strategic dialogue with China to clarify the technical parameters of the NMD architecture and to discuss China’s responses. Strategic dialogue is important because differing assessments of NMD’s effectiveness mean that many Americans will view China’s response as excessive, even if China feels it is being restrained. The goal should be to minimize damage to bilateral relations through mutual strategic reassurance. The United States might offer assurances about the ultimate scope of its NMD system; China might offer greater transparency about its modernization plans (possibly including force structure levels keyed to specific missile defense architectures). Open-ended U.S. plans for expansion or an explicit effort to nullify China’s nuclear deterrent would have a devastating impact on relations that would foreclose prospects for future security and arms control cooperation. In emulating U.S. and Russian modernization patterns, China is moving away from its previous secure force structure and increasing the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches. Bilateral or trilateral dialogue about nuclear command and control, nuclear weapons safety, and operational security might help find solutions that maintain survivability at lower alert levels that minimize chances of accidental or unauthorized launches. Greater Chinese transparency and technical exchanges about nuclear command and control and permissive action links (PALs) may be useful in addressing these concerns. China might also be invited to participate in a joint missile early warning center as a confidence-building measure. External factors such as the overall state of the nonproliferation and arms control regimes will influence Chinese modernization plans (especially on the question of doctrinal change). Robust regimes will increase pressure on China to restrain its strategic buildup; regime breakdown will reduce the costs of unilateral modernization. China has historically responded to international pressure, especially when it is isolated. (E.g., pressure to stop nuclear testing played a major role in persuading China to sign the CTBT.) Technology exports to China have become a contentious American political issue.

Modernization 🡪 CCP Collapse

Military modernization creates irresolvable tensions in China, which collapses the CCP and destabilizes all of Asia

Krawitz 3 (Howard, research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Dec, “Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?”, Strategic Forum, No. 204, Acc. Jul 29, 2009)cn

China is committed to modernizing almost every aspect of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But military modernization may be more of a high-stakes gamble than Beijing realizes. Politics and professionalism may not mix well. No matter how carefully crafted, modernization inevitably will alter the PLA sense of identity and change its relationship over time with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Modernization may foment friction between military and civilian authorities competing for political primacy and limited resources or create within the PLA divisive social issues similar to those dogging Chinese civil society generally. The CCP struggle to define its future in a changing society makes the problem more complex. The PLA could become a truly national army, unwilling to be a tool for enforcing party dicta or policing internal security. Or PLA factions could end up vying for power. The resulting instability, if not outright anarchy, could threaten all of Asia.

Modernization 🡪 CCP Collapse

Modernization fuels wealth disparities in China and threaten to collapse the CCP

Krawitz 3 (Howard, research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Dec, “Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?”, Strategic Forum, No. 204, Acc. Jul 29, 2009)

China’s accelerated push to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) raises two important questions: What impact will such change have upon the PLA image, status, and role in Chinese society? And how will Chinese military modernization affect the strategic interests and security concerns of the United States and China’s neighbors in the region? Making the PLA into a more professional, technologically proficient force would certainly strengthen its capability to perform national defense, regional security, and other externally oriented missions more effectively. But modernization could also significantly change internal PLA demographics, resulting in a drastic alteration of the social contract that has traditionally existed between China’s military and civilian society. The aftereffects of major changes in the historic social contract remain a large and potentially dangerous unknown. Conceivably, substantive change could create conditions leading to political competition between civilian and military authorities or wrangling over limited resources. It might promote within the PLA itself a rise in divisive issues similar to those now plaguing Chinese society in general as a result of two decades of uneven economic reform: intensified urban-rural distinctions, rifts between haves and have-nots, and increasing divisions between the educated and uneducated, the privileged and unprivileged. For the PLA parent entity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), modernization represents a double-edged sword. It promises the party a more effective mechanism for maintaining domestic primacy and enhancing international prestige. Conversely, the modernization process could equally well create a military increasingly unwilling to be seen as a tool for enforcing party dicta or policing internal security—in effect, working against party interests. The PLA could evolve into a national military with loyalties to the state as a whole rather than to one specific political element within the state (the CCP), as is the case today. Or the PLA itself could even develop into a distinct political element, brokering power and seeking organizational advantage at other political entities’ expense.

Modernization 🡪 US-China War

Continued Chinese nuclear modernization makes war with the U.S. inevitable

Gaffney 5(Frank, columnist for The Washington Times and author, Nov 15, “Get Real About China,” <http://www.en8848.com.cn/yingyu/90/6290-60956.html>, Acc. Jul 29, 2009)

In that happens, history may record this as a moment when the failure to speak truth to the Chinese communists condemned the two nations to conflict later. That grim prospect might just be avoided if Mr. Bush reads in the course of his Far Eastern visit the report issued last week by the congressionally mandated, blue-ribbon U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Its bipartisan conclusion is that "over the past year, on balance, the trends in the U.S.-China relationship have negative implications for our long-term economic and security interests." The commission backs this up with nearly 170 pages of analysis based on 14 hearings. It represents the only "second opinion" on China both informed by full access to classified information and available to the American people, as well as their elected representatives. This panel performs a real public service and its conclusions deserve careful scrutiny -- by President Bush, as well as the rest of us. Such a review is made all the more necessary insofar as the U.S.-China Commission notes the United States lacks a "coherent strategic framework... grounded in a clear-eyed understanding of how the Chinese military and political leadership leads the country, how decisions are made and how their economy works... . China is an authoritarian regime and a nonmarket command economy still controlled by the Communist Party. The central goal of its leadership is maintaining its own power, at all costs." It flows from this basic insight that we must be concerned about such developments as: The persistent assertion by the Chinese leadership to their political cadre and military officers that America is the "main enemy" and that war with the United States is "inevitable." Official Chinese efforts to secure energy resources from all over the world to meet its yawning needs (60notably for oil, coal and natural gas) in a way that seems meant to deny such resources to the U.S. and other global competitors. The PRC's predatory trade practices and intellectual property theft that continue in violation of past commitments and World Trade Organization obligations. In part, the result is a bilateral trade deficit that has increased "over 140 percent in only four years." The wealth thus garnered by China is used -- among other things -- to fuel the plundering of America's remaining high-technology industrial base and the utter liquidation of our manufacturing sector. Wealth transfers from the United States are underwriting Beijing's ominous build-up of its armed forces, as well. The commission says: "China is engaged in a major military modernization program, the motives of which are opaque and unexplained. It is building a modern navy and air force, upgrading its nuclear-armed ICBM force and beginning to operate in a power-projection mode. It has markedly expanded its information warfare operations to a level that is clearly designed to disrupt American systems."

US-China War Escalates

US-China war goes nuclear culminating in extinction

Straits Times 2k [Jun 25, LEXIS]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

US-China War Escalates

US-China war, even nuclear war, is just waiting to happen – the foundations are already set

West 9 (James, Columnist, GoldSeek, “World War 3: U.S. versus China”, <http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1236783600.php>) MAT

I recently had a conversation with a senior Chinese government official who assured me that the Chinese observed the regime change machinations of the Bush administration with interest. He suggested that the precedents set by the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, Panama, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, and myriad other coups overt and covert have thoroughly established the expectation among democratic citizens that forcible regime change of irresponsible governments is an acceptable tool in the democratic arsenal. That the United States deploys this tool indiscriminately does not pass un-noticed. To the Chinese strategic thinkers, it acts to condone future regime change strategies lurking within the long range plans of expansion-minded countries whose resources may be reaching critical shortages due to excessive population. Notice that virtually no criticism was leveled by China against Bush’s contrived Weapons of Mass Destruction fallacy, and no interference with the subsequent attack on Saddam Hussein’s fiefdom was seen. An interesting tidbit in the news over the last 24 hours demonstrates just how easily the pre-text for war can be manufactured. Five Chinese vessels maneuvered dangerously close to a U. S. Navy ship in the South China Sea on Sunday, closing within eight metres of the unarmed surveillance ship, the Pentagon said. "This was a reckless, dangerous maneuver that was unprofessional" and violated international law, said Defence Department spokesman Bryan Whitman. The United States protested to Chinese authorities in Beijing and to the defense attaché in Washington over the incident, which occurred in the South China Sea, about 120 kilometers south of Hainan Island. A Republican lawmaker called the standoff a critical "early test" for President Barack Obama just weeks before he meets Chinese President Hu Jintao in April. Far from a provocative act of war, the unwillingness of both China and the U.S. to admit any sort of wrong-doing over the incident demonstrates the battle of wills that lurks just under the surface of U.S. – China relations. The third world war, which is, in fact, underway, is being fought economically, as evidenced by Timothy Geithner’s first verbal blunder as Treasury Secretary, where he accused the Chinese of “currency manipulation”, referring to the suppression of the rise of the Yuan against the U.S. Dollar. Considering U.S. suppression of gold over three decades to create the illusion of a strong U.S. dollar, this is a clear case of the pot calling the kettle black. But that is an entirely different set of cats to skin. The bottom line is the Chinese, who are the largest foreign holders of United States Treasury Bills, have been underwriting U.S. economic growth for decades, and now hold billions in foreign reserves of a currency being diluted into fractions of its former worth. This monetary hyper-inflation has, in theory, the net effect of devaluing the U.S. dollar denominated foreign reserve holdings in tandem of China and every other holder of Treasurys. It's like two cowboys each holding a gun with trigger cocked at the other guy’s head, both of them yelling at the other guy to “drop the gun”. The likelihood of a civilized resolution to such a scenario is just about as unthinkable as a nuclear world war.

China War 🡪 US-Japan Alliance Collapse

East-Asian conflict collapses the alliance

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

Another scenario for a sudden fracture in the U.S.- Japanese alliance would be the outbreak of a conflict somewhere in East Asia that did not include an attack on Japan. Japanese officials have made it clear that their country would merely hold America's coat while U.S. forces intervened to restore peace. Johnson and Keehn accurately judge the probable consequences of such restraint in the case of a conflict in Korea. "The Pentagon should ponder the specter of Japanese warships standing idly by while the United States takes major risks to defend South Korea. Popular support in the United States for any defense of Japan would instantly vanish."(52) That scenario underscores the inherent fragility of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Its continued viability is contingent on the alliance's never being put to the test by a military conflict in East Asia. U.S. policymakers will of course argue that the principal purpose of the alliance is to deter such a conflict in the first place. That is undoubtedly true, and the strategic partnership probably does make the outbreak of combat in the region less likely. Nevertheless, it is dubious wisdom to invest all of one's hopes in the infallibility of deterrence. To be viable, an alliance must also be of unquestioned value to both parties if deterrence fails and a war has to be waged. An arrangement in which one party must assume most of the costs in blood and treasure while the other party merely reaps the benefits is unstable as well as unjust. Yet that is the reality of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and an East Asian military crisis would immediately expose that fact.

Modernization 🡪 India Rearm

Chinese modernization causes Japan and India to rearm causing global conflict

Saunders and Yuan 00 (Phillip and Jing-dong, Dir. + Sen. research associate of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies, “China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications”, <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/op4_sjd.pdf>) CBC

Any significant expansion of China’s nuclear force would have important implications for regional security dynamics. **Some Japanese analysts would interpret China’s strategic modernization as a threat, especially if it includes a shift to limited deterrence and an expansion in the number of MRBMs.** **The closing of the gap between Chinese nuclear missile forces and U.S. military capabilities and the potential for nuclear exchanges in the western Pacific could cause Tokyo to question the credibility of extended deterrence and the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This might lead Japan to make a** greater **commitment to theater missile defense and to reconsider its nuclear and ballistic missile options.** This reassessment might also be triggered by a easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula, which might undercut the rationale for a forward-based U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. **India would also be directly affected by China’s** nuclear **modernization** programs. **India would point to Chinese modernization as justification for its own strategic buildup, impeding international efforts to pressure India to cap its nuclear and missile programs.** However, China would continue efforts to use the international arms control regime to pressure India, fueling bilateral tensions. **As China’s strategic forces become more capable and move toward a higher-alert status, India might feel the need to enhance the credibility of its own nuclear and missile forces. The resulting arms competition would further erode the nuclear nonproliferation regime and damage the fragile consensus among the nuclear weapons states.**

Modernization 🡪 Miscalcuation

Chinese militarization leads to miscalculation in Asia

Krawitz 3 (Howard, research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, “Modernizing China’s military: a high stakes gamble?”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0QZY/is\_203-204/ai\_n13803180/) CBC

Would a strong, professional PLA be a plus or a minus for the region? A PLA that fails to revamp its outdated structure and capabili- ties will remain a flawed tool that denies China a strong voice in a region that is home to relatively strong actors (India, Japan, Korea, and even Russia) capable of banding together to check China. In some respects, this may be preferable, but it may also be a drawback. **A China too inefficient or too weak to project power in a timely and credible manner would also likely be a China incapable of playing a decisive role in preserving peace and stability in the region should it be called upon to do so.** Conversely, **a powerful military might encourage Beijing to challenge with confidence perceived competitors in the region, elevating China to the status of hegemon in Asia.** **While Beijing-as-superpower might lend its efforts to guaranteeing peace and stability in the region, it might opt to do so regardless of its neighbors’ wishes, enforcing a pax sinica of its own choosing.** **It also might overestimate its own capabilities, leading to adventurism and** possible **miscalculation in deciding how far it could safely go in testing limits or trying to further controversial foreign affairs policies.** Encouraging military-to-military exchanges and contacts between China and other nations, especially the United States, Japan, and European countries, may help guide and inject greater rationality into China’s revolution in military affairs—or it may not**. China’s march to military prowess could produce armed forces with superior soldiering skills and equipment, strong nationalistic tendencies, and few restraints against regional, or even global, adventurism.**

Chinese modernization combined with strategic flaws means catastophy and miscalculation

CNN 7 (“Military pumps up China's influence, Pentagon says” May 25 http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/25/china.military/index.html

It also says that China continues to modernize its Navy with better air-defense systems and new submarines, while its offensive air power has been improved with the acquisition of Su-30 strike aircraft and F-10 fighters. Military spending continues to grow more quickly than the expansion of the economy, with Beijing announcing an increase of nearly 18 percent in its defense budget in March. Looking at the situation with Taiwan, the report says the balance of forces continues to shift in the mainland's favor, with military exercises and deployments contributing to an atmosphere of intimidation. The report adds that tension could also increase as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election, planned for March 2008. Despite the pace of modernization, the report says, the People's Liberation Army remains untested in modern warfare and most of China's leaders lack military experience. That gives rise to a greater potential for miscalculations, according to the report, which "would be equally catastrophic whether based on advice from operationally inexperienced commanders or from 'scientific' combat models.

Modernization 🡪 Taiwan

Modernizaiton undermines stability and risks conflict over Taiwan

CNAS 09 (“China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship” SpetemberPg 7 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20China's%20Arrival\_Final%20Report.pdf) JL

Not content merely to deploy its economic influence abroad, China has also used its economic growth to support double-digit increases in its military budget since 1989. This has fed a comprehensive military modernization program that has transformed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a force focused on fighting protracted land wars of attrition on China’s territory into one capable of fighting short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China’s periphery against technologically superior opponents. For example, the PLA has emphasized developing rapid reaction forces capable of deploying beyond China’s borders, and the PLA Navy has been acquiring longer-range air defense and cruise missile systems, as well as more effective submarine forces. 22 Chinese strategists have also sought to develop an “assassin’s mace” collection of niche weapons that the PLA can use to exploit asymmetrical vulnerabilities in adversary military defenses, such as America’s growing dependence on complex information technology. For example, China’s continued exploitation of U.S. government computer networks poses significant risks to U.S. national security and could produce friction in the bilateral relationship. China’s military modernization has been geared presumably for a contingency in the Taiwan Strait, though regional powers such as India and Japan believe its interests are more expansive. Anxiety in the region is growing as China continues to invest billions to advance its force projection capabilities. According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military power, “One measure of increasing resourcing for the PLA is the official budget, which has more than doubled from $27.9 billion in 2000 to $60.1 billion in 2008 (in 2008 USD). The budget, however, does not capture the totality of military expenditure.” 25 This figure contains an average annual increase of 15 percent in China’s military spending during the past five years, one of the few sectors that outpaces the country’s economic growth. The lack of transparency regarding Chinese defense expenditures obscures the true amount, but most foreign analysts estimate that the PRC spent between $97 and $139 billion on military-related expenditures in 2007 (up to three times the official Chinese budget figures of $45 billion). 26 There are also growing indications that China is becoming more militarily assertive in the wake of the international financial crisis. The recent incident involving the USNS Impeccable — a surveillance ship that was provocatively harassed by Chinese Navy and merchant vessels near Hainan Island — was, according to Dr. Ian Storey of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, “…part of a pattern of increased [Chinese] assertiveness in the South China Sea...” 27 Dr. Tim Huxley, executive director at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, contends that the Impeccable incident reflects a more confident Chinese government that is taking advantage of the Obama administration’s “…need to keep China on board in cooperating in resolving the financial and economic crisis.”

US Presence 🡪 Retaliation

China and the US could easily go to war – war scenarios are already being practiced

Rogers 6 (Paul, Columnist, OpenDemocracy, “The United States vs China: the war for oil”, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/war_for_oil_3646.jsp>) MAT

In both countries China is prepared to take risks with its investments, not least because of the sheer speed at which its requirements for oil imports are [rising](http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=45556&nav02=43871&nav01=43092). This is well-known among analysts specialising in energy security, some of whom argue cogently that one of the real drivers of international relations in the Persian Gulf is the desire by the United States to remain the dominant military force in the region, while China seeks to develop much closer political and economic ties. The connection between these geopolitical issues and the United States's military thinking is highlighted by the extraordinary coincidence of timing between the Chinese premier's visit to the White House and a major US military wargame being conducted in Hawaii. The exercise, involving senior military planners from the Pentagon, is reported in the informed security journal Defense News (see Vago Muradian, "[U.S. Exercise Reflects Growing Tensions](http://www.defensenews.com/channel.php?C=thisweek&P=20060529)", 29 May 2006 [subscription only]). The wargame started with a crisis involving [Iran](http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/View.jsp?id=3463) which quickly escalated when the Tehran regime attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf; this in turn provoked a massive US naval response. As this conflict was developing, China attacked Taiwan, leading the US to split its forces in order to be able to respond to this additional challenge. Just to make things really complicated, Venezuela then got in on the act by sending submarines into the Gulf of Mexico, linking up with a Chinese submarine and then rocketing American and Mexican oil facilities. The United States could not cope with this and called on the British to help; London promptly sent some nuclear-attack submarines to sink the Venezuelan and Chinese forces. As the "game" played out, India joined in on the US side only when the war was going well for Washington, and Russia stayed firmly out of the conflict. The details of the US's regular wargames are frequently leaked to the specialist defence press, from where they are noted by defence experts in Congress. They can be seriously far-fetched – the prospect of the Chinese sending a submarine half way round the world and Venezuela declaring war on the United States still belongs (Hugo Chávez's [rhetoric](http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/View.jsp?id=3642) notwithstanding) more to the pages of a Tom Clancy novel than to reality; but the projections they act out also serve the purpose of building on pre-existing fears in ways that can have a practical, military and commercial, result. For example, the request for British intervention as part of the wargame raises the possibility of the US navy claiming that it urgently needs more anti-submarine forces in order to preserve its strategic independence.

US Presence 🡪 Retaliation

**China has plans to dismantle military bases in Japan**

Yoshihara 10(Toshi, “Chinese missile strategu and the US naval presence in Japan”, researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute Pg 50 http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Chinese-Missile-Strategy\_Yoshihara\_Toshi\_NWCR\_2010-Summer.pdf) JL

Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to complicate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home islands. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work on the PLA’s strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the conditions under which China might seek to conduct conventional missile operations against outside intervention.43 Notably, the document explores “fi repower harassment” as a potentially effective tactic to resist external interference. Given its explicit references to the U.S. use of military bases on foreign soil, a passage on harassment strikes is worth quoting in its entirety: When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military intervention; and when the powerful enemy’s allied military bases around our periphery are beyond our air arm’s firing range, and when the carrier battle groups are far away from our shores, thus making it difficult to carry out the overall operational advantages associated with firepower coordination among the armed services and service arms, conventional missiles can be used to implement harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy’s allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups.

China rejects US-Japan relations and is gaining power to challenge their alliance

Blumenthal 6 (Jake, Commissioner of US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://www.aei.org/docLib/20061208_200612AOg.pdf>) MAT

America’s post-Cold War China policy was premised on the hope that multidimensional engagement with Beijing would result in a strong, rich, peaceful, and democratic China. Almost two decades later, America’s attitude toward China reflects the fear that engagement has led instead to a China that is indeed stronger and richer, but still authoritarian. It appears increasingly likely that China will use its growing power to challenge American leadership in Asia. The United States and Japan can meet this challenge through greater military cooperation and by strengthening and supporting democratic ideals. Japan is the key to this hedging strategy. Although Washington has been prodding Japan for over a decade to contribute more to international security, regional military dangers and bold new Japanese leadership have made such prodding less necessary. Tokyo has watched as Beijing has expanded its military power and deployed into contested waters. Kim Jong Il’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons--coupled with his missile tests--has made Japan take its own defense seriously. The changes underway in the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship would have been hard to imagine a decade ago. Within the next few years, the United States and Japan will have an interoperable missile defense system and a collocated air command system. As Richard Lawless, the senior defense official in charge of Asia, has said: the United States and Japan will “operate together, train together, and work together, and share--to a much greater degree--missions, roles and responsibilities.”[3] Tokyo is as determined as Washington to develop greater military capabilities to check Beijing’s military expansion and to protect itself against the vagaries of a mad North Korea. Recently elected Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe once joked that Japan, living in a dangerous neighborhood, has been “mugged by reality.”[4] It is no coincidence that this declaration mentions universal values that China rejects. Nor has it gone unnoticed in Japan that in its geopolitical competition with China, Tokyo’s commitment to those universal values provides it with a key diplomatic advantage. Indeed, most of Japan’s major foreign policy initiatives now highlight support for democracy promotion.

US Presence 🡪 Conflict

Presence leads to conflict

Grossman 2 (Zoltan, member of the South-West Asia Information Group, “New US Military Bases: Side Effects Or Causes Of War?”, Feb 5 http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/grossmanbases.html) JL

Whether we look at the U.S. wars of the past decade in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, the Balkans, or Afghanistan, or at the possible new wars in Yemen, the Philippines, or Colombia/Venezuela, or even at Bushís new "axis of evil" of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, the same common themes arise. The U.S. military interventions cannot all be tied to the insatiable U.S. thirst for oil (or rather for oil profits), even though many of the recent wars do have their roots in oil politics. They can nearly all be tied to the U.S. desire to build or rebuild military bases. The new U.S. military bases, and increasing control over oil supplies, can in turn be tied to the historical shift taking place since the 1980s: the rise of European and East Asian blocs that have the potential to replace the United States and Soviet Union as the worldís economic superpowers. Much as the Roman Empire tried to use its military power to buttress its weakening economic and political hold over its colonies, the United States is aggressively inserting itself into new regions of the world to prevent its competitors from doing the same. The goal is not to end "terror" or encourage "democracy," and Bush will not accomplish either of these claimed goals. The short-term goal is to station U.S. military forces in regions where local nationalists had evicted them. The long-term goal is to increase U.S. corporate control over the oil needed by Europe and East Asia, whether the oil is in around the Caspian or the Caribbean seas. The ultimate goal is to establish new American spheres of influence, and eliminate any obstacles-- religious militants, secular nationalists, enemy governments, or even allies--who stand in the way. U.S. citizens may welcome the interventions to defend the "homeland" from attack, or even to build new bases or oil pipelines to preserve U.S. economic power. But as the dangers of this strategy become more apparent, Americans may begin to realize that they are being led down a risky path that will turn even more of the world against them, and lead inevitably to future September 11s.

US Presence 🡪 Conflict

Presence breeds hostility with China that makes war likely

Carpenter and Dorn 2k (Ted Galen, Vice Pres at CATO, James A., Scholar at CATO, CATO Institute, "China: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat?”, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4709>) MAT

The domestic tension created by opening China's economy to the outside world while preventing meaningful political change has to be released sooner or later. Gradualism appears to have worked reasonably well thus far, but the inefficiency of China's private sector is apparent and corruption is rampant. Wholesale privatization would help solve the problems of inefficiency and corruption but would undermine the last vestiges of party power. So the challenge for China's leadership is stark. Cutting off--or even limiting--trade with China in the hope of improving human rights would be self-defeating. Isolating China would strengthen the party and the state while harming the nascent market sector and reducing economic freedom. Moreover, if free trade is restricted, the probability of conflict between China and the United States will increase. That is why for peace and prosperity it is essential that the U.S. Congress vote in favor of PNTR with China and support its accession to the WTO. The best concise answer to the question of whether China will be a constructive partner or an emerging threat in the early 21st century was given to us by an independent scholar in Beijing; the answer, he said, will "depend, to a very great extent, on the fate of liberalism in China: a liberal China will be a constructive partner; a nationalistic and authoritarian China will be an emerging threat." America must prepare for both possibilities, but its policies should avoid needless snubs and provocations that would undermine the prospect for the emergence of a democratic, peaceful China.

Presence forces US and China into competition that risks conflict

Bandow 9 (Doug, Sr Fellow, CATO Institute, “Balancing Beijing”, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9997>) MAT

Even more important, Washington needs to back away from any kind of arms race with the PRC. The latest Pentagon Joint Operating Environment 2008 ominously declared that while Beijing doesn't "emphasize the future strictly in military terms," the Chinese do calculate "that eventually their growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific." The annual Pentagon assessment of PRC military spending appears to show Beijing's conscious effort to build a force capable of deterring American intervention against China in East Asia. As a result, Aaron Friedberg, until recently Vice President Cheney's chief foreign-policy adviser, worries that the balance of power "is beginning to shift in way that, under the wrong set of circumstances, could increase the risk of miscalculation and conflict." Yet the question is, what balance of power? Beijing poses no threat to America's homeland or even Pacific possessions and will not do so for decades, if ever. The United States possesses a far stronger military to start—eleven carrier groups to none, for instance—spends five or more times as much as the PRC on defense (excluding the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq) and is allied with most important industrial states in Asia and Europe. There is no Chinese threat or potential threat to America. At issue is relative influence in East Asia and the security of Washington's friends in that region. Yet the PRC so far has been assertive rather than aggressive and those nations, particularly Japan and South Korea, could do much more individually and collectively for regional security. Washington should not hesitate to sell arms to friendly states, including Taiwan, despite Chinese protests, but should leave them with responsibility for their own defense. Of course, a policy of continued restraint by Beijing will make it far easier for the United States to back away. In any case, there is little that Washington can do, at least at acceptable cost, to maintain U.S. dominance along China's borders, as the PRC—whose economy already ranks number two or three, depending on the measure, in the world—continues to grow. Washington would have to devote an ever larger amount of resources to the military, in the midst of economic crisis, to ensure its ability to overcome far more limited Chinese capabilities. Even then, Beijing is unlikely to forever accept U.S. hegemony. Confrontation if not conflict would be likely.

US Presence 🡪 Conflict

China is not a direct threat-Chinese build up is to counter excessive US power. War can be avoided

Bandow 10 (Doug, Sr Fellow, CATO Institute, “China: The Next "Necessary" Enemy?”, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11186>) MAT

What else is there? Russia is the enemy du jour for some, but Moscow today is a pale imitation of Moscow during the Cold War. The Soviet Union has been dismantled; its constituent states have seceded and shifted westward in orientation; the European Union alone has more than ten times Russia's GDP and spends more than Moscow on the military. Most important, though Vladimir Putin's Russia has taken a nasty authoritarian turn and exhibits near paranoid concern about the security of its border, world domination is no longer on Moscow's agenda. Even the most nationalistic Russian is not suicidal, and initiating war against America would be suicidal. Which leaves China. For some, the Yellow Peril is the latest excuse for ever more military outlays. A decade ago the Project for a New American Century, also busy promoting war with Iraq, declared: "Raising U.S. military strength in East Asia is the key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status." The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission routinely worries about the Chinese threat. The Rand Corporation has warned of U.S. military "vulnerability." The Center for Security Policy even charged that China hopes to be able "to defeat us militarily." Common are "China as enemy" books, including Jed Babbin's and Edward Timperlake's *Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States* and Richard Bernstein's and Ross Munro's *The Coming Conflict with China*. The conservative web service NewMax.com once advertised *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. The U.S. government affects a more measured tone, but worry still underlies U.S. policy towards China. Wallace C. Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, told Congress in early January: "There are other [military] capabilities China is developing that are destabilizing to regional military balances, that could restrict access to the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains, or that could enable China to exercise military aggression or coercion against its neighbors." It seems a lot of people in Washington are searching for the next "necessary" enemy. The real issue for Washington is dominance, not defense. For instance, Adm. Willard complained that China's military capabilities "appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China's influence over its neighbors — including our regional allies and partners." House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) opened the recent hearing: "the United States must demonstrate our own interests in the Asia-Pacific region including our ability to project power effectively there." In short, what worries U.S. officials is the difficulty of preserving Washington's ability to intervene every where at any time, even along China's border. Over the last two decades the U.S. has had the world's air and ocean space largely to itself. But, observed Assistant Secretary Gregson, "As China's international role expands, our two militaries will increasingly find themselves operating in the same space." What he meant, though was unwilling to say directly, was that Washington will no longer be able to threaten the PRC with war. That ability is fast disappearing. To deter the U.S., Beijing need not match American military power. Rather, China must modernize its nuclear force, to forestall atomic coercion, build missiles and submarines, to sink U.S. carriers, improve its air force, to end automatic American superiority, and develop asymmetric weapons, to take out U.S. satellites and attack America's information infrastructure. All of these the PRC is doing. Thus, the Chinese build-up looks threatening — but only to Washington's global ambitions. To no longer be able to intervene at will might unnerve U.S. policymakers, but that was the world which faced America for most of its existence. And it is the world in which every other country finds itself today.

US Presence 🡪 Instability

US forces create instability in the region

Japan Policy of Reasearch Institute 02 (Johnson Chalmers, January, “Okinawa Between the United States and Japan” http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op24.html) JL

It is impossible to predict how these complex issues will be resolved. But it is obvious what should happen. The United States should convert its treaties in East Asia into equitable state-to-state alliances without any permanent American military presence. This should be done for the following two reasons: (1) the forward-deployed American forces have themselves become militarily provocative and one of the main source of instability in the area; and (2) the moral consequences of the American military enclaves are destroying any basis of future trust and cooperation among the peoples involved. The Cold War is finally winding down in East Asia, just as it ended in Europe over a decade ago. The United States should dismantle its satellites in East Asia in an orderly manner before they rise up against the United States, as the former Soviet Union's satellites did in Eastern Europe.

US-Japan military alliance leads to insecurity and Chinese and Russian tensions

Kober 10 (Stanley, Research fellow in foreign policy studies at CATO Institute, “Alliance of Democracy?” June 15 http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11900

"Historically, we have seen many examples of seeking security through the formation of alliances and confrontation among different alliances, which often severely undermined the security of other countries and brought heavy burdens to the allies themselves," General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, told the Shangri-La Conference on June 5. "Exclusive military alliances are outdated. Furthermore, they are not helpful for building trust and are perilous." It is worth recalling George Washington's warning that military alliances should not be allowed to become permanent. "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world," he told the American people in his Farewell Address. "Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." The logic was simple. Alliances are a response to a threat. Once the threat — the extraordinary emergency — is dealt with, the alliance should be disbanded. Otherwise the U.S. risks creating the impression of a continuing confrontation which could increase rather than reduce the risk of conflict. It is unfortunate that the U.S. has not followed George Washington's advice; by doing this it risks dividing the world again. Russia and China, seeing the U.S. emphasize its alliances, have formed their own organizations: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). For Washington's foreign policy establishment, none of this seems to matter. The Japanese have been brought round, and things can continue as before. But it is not so. The resentment in Japan will grow. And how will U.S. claims of an alliance of democracies remain credible when it is opposing the will of the people? "There is zero chance" the new base will be built, says Susumu Inamine, the new mayor of Nago, a city in Okinawa that is supposed to host the new facility. "I cannot hide my rage." An alliance of democracies cannot long defy the will of the people. The U.S. should recognize that its strength is founded on its values, and should act accordingly. It might suffer some temporary reversals, but, as George Washington also argued, in the long run it will be better off.

Japan-US military agreement results in East-Asian tensions

Feffer 99 (John, Fellow of American Friends Service Committee, Foreign Policy in Focus, “U.S.-North Korea

Relations”, http://www.fpif.org/reports/us-north\_korea\_relations) MAT

In Northeast Asia more generally, the U.S. has already taken sterner measures. It continues to conduct war games in the vicinity of North Korea, and in 1998 changed its battlefield simulation to include invasion and defeat of the North. The administration plans to build a theater missile defense system that will theoretically protect allies in the region from perceived missile threats from North Korea and China. Despite billions of dollars of research, missile defense has yet to be proven technically feasible, and the proposed system has unnecessarily antagonized Russia and China. Moreover, in cooperation with conservative Japanese policymakers, the U.S. has redefined its alliance with Japan so that the latter will provide more support for U.S. operations in the region, shoulder more of the financial burden, and expand the military role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. For the first time in fifty years, Japan is considering the development of first-strike capabilities. These moves challenge Japan’s pacifist constitution, raise fears among the victims of Japan’s colonial past (chiefly China and the two Koreas), and sharpen conflict in an already volatile region.

US Presence 🡪 Instability – Taiwan

US involvement prevents peaceful reconcilliation of Taiwan and China

Chalmers 05 (Johnson, Japan Policy of Reasearch Institute, March, “No Longer the "Lone" Superpower: Coming to Terms with China” http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp105.html

If the United States and Japan left China and Taiwan to their own devices, it seems possible that they would work out a modus vivendi. Taiwan has already invested some $150 billion in the mainland, and the two economies are becoming more closely integrated every day. There also seems to be a growing recognition in Taiwan that it would be very difficult to live as an independent Chinese-speaking nation alongside a country with 1.3 billion people, 3.7 million square miles of territory, a rapidly growing $1.4 trillion economy, and aspirations to regional leadership in East Asia. Rather than declaring its independence, Taiwan may try to seek a status somewhat like that of French Canada -- a kind of looser version of a Chinese Quebec under nominal central government control but maintaining separate institutions, laws, and customs. [24] The mainland would be so relieved by this solution it would probably accept it, particularly if it could be achieved before the 2008 Beijing Olympics. China fears that Taiwanese radicals want to declare independence a month or two before those Olympics, betting that China would not attack then because of its huge investment in the forthcoming games. Most observers believe, however, China would have no choice but to go to war because failure to do so would invite a domestic revolution against the Chinese Communist Party for violating the national integrity of China.

Brink- Instability

East Asia is inherently unstable, and war is just waiting to break out

Bandow 10 (Doug, Senior Fellow at CATO Institute, Individual Liberty, Free Markets, and Peace, “An Unstable Rogue”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11661) MAT

South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China's preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North's nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-Il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRK's governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it's impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response. And the Yellow Sea incident highlights other dangers: it may have been an act of brinkmanship too violent by half or an act of military disobedience designed to sink any prospect of negotiations. Either of these could lead the worst of all outcomes on the peninsula — full-scale war. Then the PRC would face the worst case in virtually every dimension: the end of North Korea, a united ROK allied with Washington on China's border, mass refugee flows over the Yalu, and conflict, including possibly radiation, spilling over Chinese territory. None of these is necessarily likely. But all are possible and must be compared by Beijing to the price of confronting the Kim regime. Doing something starts to look like a much better option than standing behind the DPRK, hoping that everything works out. We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. But even if the former, the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox. It would only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war.

Brink- Instability

China is seeking to counter US dominance-this risks war

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 07 (Carter & Bulkeley “America’s Strategic Response to China’s Military Modernization” Vol. 9 Iss. 1 Pg 49 http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter07\_gov/carter.pdf) JL

The first step toward modernization is to deal with the Maoist legacy – downsizing the PLA and making China’s defense R&D system and militay industry more efficient. China’s reforms aim to increase the readiness of selected PLA units, train them intensively, and perform realistic exercises (including joint exercises with Russia and other nations). The second step is to bring China’s three military services into the age of joint operations. The Chinese further stress the need for “informationization.” What the United States calls “command, control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (C4ISR)”. To this end, the 2004 White Paper replicates the US emphasis on satellite and airborne sensors, unmanned aerial vahicles, and information warfare. Finally, China plans to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence and challenge American dominance wherever possible. Despite America’s overwhelming military superiority, China aims to exploit vulnerabilities in key US capabilities using counter-space, counter-carrier, counter-air, and information warfare to prevent the United States from dominating a military confrontation or achieving quick and easy victory. China’s recent anti-satellite missile test demonstrated its commitment to reducing America’s advantage in space.

High tensions run risk of creating conflict with China

Pace 9 (Nancy, Staff Writer, The Washington Times, “Be nice to China”, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9665814302&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9665814308&cisb=22_T9665814307&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8176&docNo=1>) MAT

Regarding the Op-Ed Obama 's China card" (Opinion, April 8), John C. Wohlstetter's sinful offer to China of a poisoned diplomatic apple would serve only to heighten geostrategic tensions. Why aggravate China, our banker and most influential ally in negotiating with North Korea, when it may be the country most likely to buy into President Obama's smart-power, win-win strategy of finding peaceful and mutually advantageous solutions to global problems? Immense U.S. profits already accrued from China's membership in the World Trade Organization will only grow further as China continues to rise - that is, if unresolved energy shortages, climate change, nuclear proliferation, war, terrorism, trade wars, worldwide crime and disease do not make future international trade moot. Increased enmity between the United States and China might even lead to war, which would be a catastrophe. Let's retire our lingering sentimental attachments to obsolescent strategies like sword-rattling and stick-shaking. Let's put an end to foreign policies based on threats and bullying.

Taiwan is a bomb waiting to explode and send the US and China to war

Carpenter and Logan 5 (Ted Galen, Vice Pres at CATO, Justin, Research Associate at CATO, CATO Institute, “The Trouble with Taiwan”, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3707>) MAT

Taiwan's lack of seriousness is unacceptable because it has the effect of pushing the United States to the forefront of the cross-Strait conflict. China's purchases of advanced KILO class submarines and Sukhoi fighter planes from Russia are eroding Taiwan's qualitative advantage. Taiwan's anti-submarine warfare capabilities are insufficient and dwindling, and its air supremacy is waning in the face of China's acquisitions. All of these trends are getting worse, and creating a sense in China that it may soon be able to take Taiwan by force or intimidate the Taiwanese into surrender. One apparent factor in Taiwan's irresponsibility is that it is banking on a U.S. security guarantee. However, Taiwanese legislators (and more than a few U.S. officials) would do well to take another look at the TRA, which some allege commits the United States to defend Taiwan's autonomy. The TRA merely asserts that "efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, would be a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Moreover, the TRA replaced an expiring mutual defense treaty (MDT) with Taiwan's government, and a debate ensued around the enactment of the TRA as to whether it should replicate the MDT's security guarantee. Proposals to incorporate such a guarantee were rejected. To be sure, it is possible that the United States could decide to involve itself in a conflict between Taiwan and China. That decision would be ill-advised in its own right, given the potential dangers, but it certainly should not be left to Taiwan's government to force such a momentous decision. However, given Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian's penchant for provocations, combined with Taiwan's dwindling defense capability, Taiwan is increasingly controlling the politics of the conflict without taking responsibility for the military consequences of its actions.

Drawdown solves China conflict

Power transitions will lead to conflict between China and the US

Qazi 09 (Shehzad, Associate Director, Council on Strategic and International Affairs, “United States’ attempt to balance the rise of China in Asia”, IPRI Journal IX, no.2 Pg 1 http://ipripak.org/journal/summer2009/Article3.pdf) JL

I n 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Charles Krauthammer wrote that the United States had been ushered into its unipolar moment. It has enjoyed this unipolar world order for almost a decade in which it has shaped the international order in its favour. However, as most scholars have argued, the United States’ unipolar moment is now over. Many political scientists, such as Robert Pape and John McCormick, explain that countries have started balancing U.S. pre-eminence by using their soft-power. In a report published in 2008 American intelligence officials have also forecast the descent of U.S. hegemony within the next two decades. Furthermore, the vibrancy of the European Union and the rise of China now point to the relative decline of American dominance. While the U.S. is still no doubt a hyperpower, often shy to declare itself an imperial power, the world is witnessing the beginning of a power transition, one in which the relative power of the U.S. is declining and that of China is increasing. Power-transitions are a messy business and have historically caused intense upheavals; thus, it should not be surprising if the current power transition also brings some turbulence in its wake. This could be avoided if the U.S. was to accept a diminished global status, but it seems unlikely given the imperial posture it has got used to. The current U.S. policy clearly indicates that like all hegemonic states of the past it has no intention of sitting back while its standing suffers a decline. As expected, the U.S. has actually adopted an aggressive policy against China. Informed by the “Realist” political framework and the European model of balance of power politics, the U.S. has embarked on a balancing strategy vis-a-vis China. In the past the U.S. had decided to counter the growing Chinese influence in Asia by helping Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia become bulwarks through strong economic aid. However, since the late 1990s and more remarkably since the formation of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the U.S. has forged a closer relationship with India. Seeing India’s economic potential and military strength, the U.S. has decided to balance China’s growing influence by propelling the growth of India. The “Bush Doctrine” advocates closer bilateral relations with India in the economic, military and energy spheres with the objective of raising it as a balancing power in Asia. Though the Obama administration’s policies toward India are so far unclear, it would be reasonable to expect U.S.-Indian ties strengthening given the Democrats’ historic alignment with India, as well as the latter’s rising global prestige.

\*\*\*Japan Spending Advantage\*\*\*

Japan Economy Up

After a slight downturn, the Japanese economy is showing remarkably good economic signs

Market News 10 (Tokyo@MarketNews, BOJ Report, “Most Japan Regions See Economy Improving”, <http://imarketnews.com/?q=node/16133>) MAT

The Bank of Japan on Thursday upgraded its overview of regional economies for July from three months ago, based on reports from its branch managers who met here for a one-day quarterly meeting. "Eight regions (out of the nine) judged that, compared with the assessment in April 2010, their economic conditions had improved further," the BOJ said in its latest regional economic report. "Many regions reported that amid the continued increase in production, business fixed investment had either stopped decreasing or had started picking up and the degree of severity in the employment and income situation had eased," it said. The BOJ said most regions reported that private consumption had either stopped decreasing or had started picking up. Today's report on the regional economic assessment is consistent with the BOJ's overall economic assessment that Japan's economy is showing further signs of a moderate recovery, induced by improvement in overseas economic conditions. The regional economic report said capital spending is picking up in four regions, although remaining at a low level, while capex has stopped declining in four other regions. Five regions reported that private consumption as a whole was picking up, showing signs of picking up or the decline had been coming to a halt, because of severity in the employment and income situation had eased somewhat and because policy effects had continued, said the BOJ. Production either increased or picked up in all regions, the latest report said. It also noted that "four regions reported that the pace of increase in production had accelerated mainly due to the improvement in overseas economic conditions." "The recovery in industrialized economies remains moderate while the growth among emerging and commodity-exporting countries remains strong," he said. "Both exports and production are on a steady recovery trend thanks to the robust exports to Asian and emerging countries," Hayakawa said, adding that both exports and output are likely to continue expanding. He added that the recovery in capital spending is stronger than he expected six months ago, and that corporate profits have risen, thanks to higher exports and production.

Japan on the way to extremely quick economic recovery

NTDTV 10 (New Tang Dynasty Television, “Japanese Economy Growing Stronger”, <http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/ns_bus/2010-07-06/529894389191.html>) MAT

Japan's trading partners may be experiencing a slowdown, but companies and the central bank in the world's No. 2 economy have become more optimistic. A Bank of Japan survey last week showed large manufacturers with their best business confidence in two years, while the BOJ is expected to revise up its own growth forecast soon. The central bank would hike GDP to a 2.5 percent growth forecast in the current year, up from an earlier 1.8 percent, based on strong exports to Asia that have boosted factory output. Worries remain such as the eurozone debt crisis, along with the strength of the U.S. and Chinese economies, but the government has already hiked its own expansion view to 2.6 percent from 1.4 percent. Japan's economy grew faster than Europe and the U.S. in the first quarter, but signs that export strength may be moderating have emerged. On Monday, a senior BOJ official said Europe has made little progress in dealing with its problems and it would take time for market confidence to return. Even with the forecast upgrade, some analysts say the central bank may keep its overall assessment unchanged, eyeing the rising yen and falling share markets. The yen is near a seven-month high against the dollar, sending shares of Japanese exporters to multi-month lows last week.

Japan Economy Up

Japan is experiencing strong predictions for further economic growth

Mochizuki 10 (Takashi, Analyst, Dow Jones Newswires, The Wall Street Journal, “UPDATE: Japan Lifts Economic View As Export-Driven Recovery Continues”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100618-702784.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines>) MAT

The Japanese government Friday upgraded its assessment of the economy, saying it "has been picking up" as a result of recovering capital investment and strong exports. The government also said in its monthly economic report for June that "the foundation for a self-sustaining recovery is being laid." It was the first time for the government to raise its economic view since March. Last month, it said the economy was picking up but lacks autonomous growth factors. "The gradual economic recovery trend is intact," Economy Minister Satoshi Arai said at a press conference after the release of the monthly economic report. "A self-sustaining recovery is coming into sight." Steady overseas demand for Japanese exports and rebounding corporate capital spending helped the economy grow at a 5.0% annualized pace in the first quarter. New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has called for policies to encourage strong economic growth and fiscal health in the world's second largest economy. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan, which Kan leads, aims for average real growth of over 2% in the decade ahead. The government will closely watch business investment trends because if these continue to recover, the overall economy would be able to achieve sustainable growth, said Keisuke Tsumura, a parliamentary secretary at the Cabinet Office. Capital spending makes up about 15% of Japan's gross domestic product. Increased capital investment often leads to more hiring and higher wages, prompting workers to spend more, in turn bringing more profits to firms. Analysts say a positive cycle could materialize later this year. Recent data have shown that industrial output rose 1.3% in April. Core machinery orders, a leading indicator of capital investment, increased 4.0% in the same month.

Japan Economy Up

Good investment prospects indicate a strong Japanese economy

Clancy 10 (Ray, Staff Writer, Investment International, “Investment managers are confident about the prospects for investing in Japan”, <http://www.investmentinternational.com/news/funds/investment-managers-are-confident-about-the-prospects-for-investing-in-japan-3700.html>) MAT

Investment managers are generally optimistic about the outlook in Japan due to the country’s thriving export industry, according to a survey by the Association of Investment Companies. Although Japan has had a mixed investment history they believe it is an interesting time to be looking at the country as the investment company Japan sector is currently up 8% over the last year, but down 19% over five years. It said that the Japanese Smaller Companies sector is also showing signs of recovery, up 12% over one year although still down a disappointing 43% over five years. When asked whether investors should have faith in investing in Japan, the managers were generally optimistic. Japan, like the rest of the world, has suffered as a result of the global recession however, the managers think that the thriving export industry in Japan is a cause for optimism and the outlook is positive. Andrew Rose, fund manager of Schroder Japan Growth Fund, is confident about the prospects for investing in Japan. ‘We believe the underlying positive case for recovery in Japan remains intact. Export data remains strong, and although the external side of the Japanese economy is outpacing the domestic, we expect to see clearer signs of improvement at home over the coming months,’ he said. ‘However, this has not been the case over the past 18 months despite the Japanese economy rebounding quicker than expected. Companies have also managed to produce record cash flow in recent periods thanks to the aggressiveness of the cost cutting undertaken during the downturn, but the market has still lagged. This relative underperformance, despite the improvement in fundamentals, provides investors with an exciting opportunity,’ he added. Shingo Sugiura, portfolio manager at Melchior Japan said he believes that Japan has recovered well after the global credit crisis. He pointed out that Japan is geographically well placed to benefit from the increasing presence of China in the global economy. ‘We expect Japanese corporate profits to continue to grow in the near term. We also expect the domestic economy to find a firmer footing and stage a recovery soon,’ said Sugiura. ‘A profits recovery is underway and should continue through into 2010, helped by rebounding exports and cost cutting at many firms. The Japanese market has taken the first steps towards catching up with global markets, which it has lagged over the medium term, but we believe there is further to run in this process,’ said Rose.

The Japanese economy is growing at a surprising rate

Kajimoto 10 (Tetsushi, Staff Writer, Reuters, “Japan Q1 GDP grows steadily on exports”, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64J06820100520>) MAT

The expansion in gross domestic product (GDP) translates into an annualized increase of 4.9 percent, smaller than a median market forecast of 5.4 percent but above the 3.2 percent growth in the United States. The upbeat data will be some relief to the Bank of Japan, which is considering drawing up a new loan scheme to encourage banks to lend more to industries with growth potential in what it describes as a long-term approach to beat deflation. "The figures clearly indicate that the Japanese economy is recovering on the back of the expansion in exports, mainly to Asia," said Azusa Kato, an economist at BNP Paribas. "As long as the Asian economy holds steady, some decline in exports to Europe won't hurt very much, though it would be a different story if those problems started causing turmoil in financial markets and a plunge in European and U.S. stocks." Private consumption, which makes up about 60 percent of the economy, grew 0.3 percent, Cabinet Office data showed on Thursday, partly due to a rush in demand for flat-screen televisions ahead of a change in April in a government incentive scheme for low-emission electronic goods. The economy also benefited from strong growth in Asia, with external demand contributing 0.7 percentage point to GDP. Solid exports to Asia have helped Japan's economy recover gradually after pulling out of recession in the second quarter of last year.

Japan Funds Bases

Japan paid 6 billion for the relocation of one military base

The Asia-Pacific Journal 10(Kensei Yoshida “Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. and Japanese ‘Global Defense Posture’” June 27, http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/3378) JL

Japan agreed to contribute $6.09 billion of “the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the Ⅲ MEF relocation to Guam” while the U.S. would fund the remaining $4.18 billion. Japan’s pledge to cover more than 60 per cent of the total cost was, according to the agreement, to meet “the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly.” The realignment was described as a deal to “maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens of local communities.” The agreement specified that the money allocated was designed for the Marine relocation, but Japan’s contribution is being spent not only to design and build Marine Corps facilities but to subsidize infrastructure improvement at Andersen Air Force base and at a Naval base.

Japan pays 6 billion for base relocation amid growing tensions

Tom Dispatch 10 (John Feffer “Japan pushes back on US bases”, 3/4, Military Current Events Website http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/03/japan-american-bases-military-presence ) JL

The immediate source of tension in the US-Japanese relationship has been Tokyo's desire to renegotiate that 2006 agreement to close Futenma, transfer those 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a new base in Nago, a less densely populated area of the island. It's a deal that threatens to make an already strapped government pay big. Back in 2006, Tokyo promised to shell out more than $6 billion just to help relocate the Marines to Guam.

Even through financial difficulties, Japan is pressured to pay to renovate US bases

Foreign Policy in Focus 10 (Akira Kawasaki, “Japan’s Military Spending at a Crossroads” May 10, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans\_military\_spending\_at\_a\_crossroads) JL

The second key characteristic of Japan’s military spending is the ratio of expenses allocated to U.S. forces in Japan. Although under the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement Japan’s financial responsibility for contributing to the construction and renovation of U.S. bases in Japan is not clear, the Japanese side has voluntarily supported these initiatives through omoiyari yosan or “sympathy budgetary allocations.” Through these allocations, Japan has provided a cumulative total of over $20 billion for the construction and renovation of U.S. bases under the “Facility Improvement Program” (FIP). A large proportion of this is housing-related, such as accommodation for families of U.S. military personnel, but it also includes entertainment facilities, hospitals, repair of ships and aircraft, and the construction of port facilities. These efforts add up to 12,000 construction or renovation projects on sixty-six U.S. bases throughout Japan. In light of Japan’s current financial difficulties, the government is leaning toward a reduction of construction and renovation as part of the FIP. However, within the recent realignment of the U.S. forces, many new expenses are cropping up such as training relocation costs. For example, in order to relocate training of U.S. marines based in Okinawa to SDF facilities in Japan, a cumulative total of $100 million was spent between 1997 and 2008 for the construction of specialized facilities within existing SDF facilities. In addition, expenditures are rising for newly created budget categories such as the relocation of the U.S. air base in Futenma and the construction of a new base at Henoko in Okinawa, the relocation of training facilities for U.S. Air Force fighter planes, and the relocation of the marines to Guam. The issue of costs related to the U.S. forces Japan and their realignment could potentially become a point of political dispute between the new U.S. and Japanese governments. President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama raised the issue of the relocation of the Futenma Air Base, for instance, at their November 2009 meeting. The new coalition government’s policy mentions “reduction of the burden of Okinawa,” and is suggesting a “re-examination” of the Futenma Air Base relocation issue, including a potential relocation to another prefecture in Japan or else overseas. On the other hand, the United States wants to speedily implement the previous agreement of relocating the base to Henoko, within Okinawa prefecture. Furthermore, in November 2009, the government included contributions to salaries for workers at U.S. bases as part of the “sympathy budgetary allocations” in the list of projects to be examined for budget reductions. It is not easy to predict how further negotiations on this issue will develop and what influence this will have on the financial burden of Japan in relation to the U.S. military.

Japan Funds Bases

The cost of upkeep of bases has been steadily increasing for Japan.

Yoda 6 (Tatsuro, Institute for Future Technology Sr. Researcher, *Asian Survey*, Japan's Host Nation Support Program for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Past and Prospects, 46(6), p. 940-942, JSTOR) PL

The first Special Measures Agreement was concluded in 1987 because it had become difficult for the Japanese government to increase the size of the Host Nation Support further using the nonlegal explanation of Kanemaru. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted that the spending covered by the SMA was “limited in scope (part of labor costs), provisional in period (five years), and exceptional to the SOFA.” This means the decision on spending for the HNS depends on concrete situations, unlike the provision of bases for U.S. forces. SMAs have been concluded five times (the first was revised) including the one in 2006, as Table 1 shows. The size of the HNS was increased by adding new support categories such as utility expenses (electricity, gas, and water) for the USFJ on a step-by-step basis. Japan’s share in local labor costs increased and reached 100% in the 1995 SMA. Each new SMA reflected different contexts at the time (rapid appreciation of the yen, growing U.S. trade deficit against Japan, and U.S. criticism of Japan’s free-riding in the late 1980s; the Gulf War in the early 1990s, etc.). Japan’s costsharing for facilities also increased from the late 1970s to the late 1990s under the FIP, which is based on the SOFA, not on the SMAs. Under these circumstances, the HNS made it possible for the U.S. to decrease the cost of maintaining bases in Japan, especially when the yen appreciated sharply against the dollar in the late 1970s. Since then the budget for the HNS has increased from 6.2 billion yen ($29.5 million) in 1978 to 244 billion yen ($2.26 billion) in 2004 (prices are not adjusted to inflation; see Figure 1). Adding indirect expenses such as land fees and compensation to the local community to the direct expenses and expressing them in dollar terms, the size of the HNS increased from $275 million in 1976 to about $4.4 billion in 2002. According to the U.S. Defense Department’s 2004 Statistical Compendium to Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense, Japan’s HNS ($4.41billion) was the largest among all U.S. allies and much larger than Germany’s ($1.56 billion) or South Korea’s ($842 million), the second and third largest, respectively (see Figure 2). Japan’s share of U.S. stationing costs (74.5% in 2002) was also high compared to that of other U.S allies, for example, Germany (32.6%) or South Korea (40%) (see Figure 2).

Japan pays billions for moving and supporting troops while experiencing economic issues.

Yamaguchi and Burns 10 (Mari and Robert, AP, Japan Balks at $2 billion bill to host U.S. troops, http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/japan-balks-at-2-billion-bill-to-host-us-troops) PL

In a country where land is a precious commodity, many U.S. bases in Japan boast golf courses, football fields and giant shopping malls whose food courts offer everything from Taco Bell to Subway and Starbucks. They are the most visible point of grievance in a sharpening debate about the cost to Japan of supporting the 47,000 American service members here—about $2 billion a year. That’s nearly a third of the total, and about three times what Germany pays to host U.S. forces on its soil. But facing economic woes and seeking a more equal relationship with the U.S., Japan’s new reformist government is questioning whether it should spend so much on U.S. troops—a topic that was taboo under the pro-Washington administrations that governed Japan for most of the post-World War II era. The scrutiny in Japan, Washington’s deep-pocketed ally and most important strategic partner in Asia, comes at a bad time for the U.S., whose defense budget is already spread thin in Iraq and Afghanistan. Japanese call their share a “kindness budget,” implying the U.S. is getting a free ride, and its opponents say it is rife with waste. The opposition also reflects a long-standing feeling, particularly on the left, that the U.S. is taking its security alliance with Japan too much for granted. The alliance has come under intense pressure since Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama took office last September. He says the alliance remains a “keystone” of Japanese policy, but he wants to reevaluate it. “This will be a very important year for our relationship,” he said last month. The flash point of the debate is the southern island of Okinawa, where most of the nearly 100 U.S. facilities in Japan are located. Futenma airfield, where several thousand Marines are stationed, was to have been moved from the town of Ginowan to Nago, in a less crowded part of the island. But that plan came into doubt last month after Nago elected a mayor who opposes having the base. At the same time, the U.S. is shifting about 8,000 troops from Okinawa to the U.S. territory of Guam and expects Japan to pay an estimated $6 billion of the moving costs. The frustrations run deep in cramped Ginowan. Local media regularly run images of the golf course at nearby Kadena Air Base and criticize the forces relentlessly whenever a service member is involved in a local crime. “When people who live in crowded areas in small houses drive by and see the situation on the bases, some feel angry,” said Hideki Toma, an official dealing with the bases on Okinawa. “This is a bigger issue than the golf courses and free highway passes,” Toma said. “It goes back to the fact that Okinawa was occupied after World War II and why the bases have to be here in the first place.” That sentiment is widely shared, and underscores a feeling that the bases should be spread out more evenly among Japan’s main islands and Okinawa. Okinawa was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II, and Okinawans feel that the continued U.S. presence places an uneven burden on them, though the argument that all U.S. forces should leave Japan is not popular. American officials say the deployment in Japan of troops, fighter jets and the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier based outside the U.S. has enabled Japan to hold down its own defense costs in line with its pacifist constitution.

Japan Funds Bases

Japan pays over 2 billion a year for US military support

Stars and Stripes 10 (David Allen, News on military affairs “Diet allocates $2.1B in funds for U.S. bases”March 28, http://www.stripes.com/news/diet-allocates-2-1b-in-funds-for-u-s-bases-1.100327) JL

GINOWAN, Okinawa — While the Futenma relocation controversy simmers, the Japanese Diet has passed a defense budget with little fanfare that allocates 186.9 billion yen — or $2.1 billion — for supporting U.S. bases. According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the so-called host nation support budget covers about 70 percent of the cost to maintain U.S. bases in Japan. The fiscal 2010 budget, passed by Japan’s Upper House on Wednesday, is a slight decrease from the 189.7 billion yen budgeted last year. It does not include the $1.4 billion in rents the Japanese government pays to 33,309 individuals and municipal governments that own property used by the U.S. military. The base support, sometimes called the "sympathy budget," began in 1978 to help the U.S. maintain the bases during a period of dramatic fiscal deficits in the United States. Since then, the cost-sharing has become the norm, rising steadily until the mid-1990s, with slight decreases since then. The entire defense budget for Japan is $53.2 billion. The amount for host nation support includes $1.58 billion in salaries and benefits for Japanese base employees, $266.7 million for utilities and $216.7 million for improving base facilities, according to the Ministry of Defense. Besides host nation support, Japan’s defense budget includes $532 million for the construction of facilities on Guam in preparation for the transfer of 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa and $881 million for other realignment projects, including the Futenma relocation project and moving carrier-based aircraft from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. The current host nation support agreement was signed in 2008 and expires next year. The agreement is renegotiated between the two countries every three years.

**Japan is covering the cost of moving US bases**

Japan Times 10 (Gregory Clark, March 11, “US base problem drags on” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100311gc.html) JL

Then there is the messy dispute over numbers and functions. Most also agree that there are too many U.S. troops based in Okinawa. In 2006, Japan and the U.S. prepared what they called a "Roadmap for Realignment," with Japan promising to pay $6.1 billion to cover much of the cost of moving 8,000 of the Okinawa-based marine troops to Guam by 2014. To satisfy the marine forces remaining in Okinawa it was proposed to build a new environment-destroying airport at Henoko in Nago Bay well to the north of Futenma. That construction is now on hold as Tokyo tries to deal with airport opponents. But the quota for the Okinawa-based marine force is only 18,000, and departures, mainly for service in Afghanistan, bring the total down heavily. So an expensive, locally opposed airport must be built just for those remaining after the 8,000 have moved to Guam? The Japanese Foreign Ministry says that it is mainly the marine command units that will be moved to Guam — that operational combat units will remain in Okinawa and will need the brand-new Henoko airport. But Japanese opponents of both the Henoko and Futenma airports say they have U.S. data that proves the Futenma-based operational units, including those noisy helicopters, were also supposed to move to Guam under the 2006 agreement. Yoichi Iha, mayor of long-suffering Ginowan, has visited military authorities in Guam and says he has confirmed the data. Now we also have a U.S. environmental impact report issued in November 2009 that lists three combat or training units as moving to Guam so that Guam can become the key U.S. military base in the western Pacific. So why the Tokyo bureaucratic insistence that the Futenma combat units have to remain in Guam until an alternative base is prepared, ideally at Henoko? The obfuscation continues. A Diet-based group of Okinawan and Social Democratic Party members has tried to follow up on Iha's claims. But Japanese defense and Foreign Ministry officials summoned to group discussions insist blandly that the midsize helicopters that the mayor has confirmed as moving to Guam will in fact come from the U.S. Iwakuni base in Yamaguchi Prefecture rather than Futenma. But the officials refuse to show the documents that the group demands as proof. As one member of the committee put it to me, the bureaucrats have yet to realize that a new government is in power. In theory, at least, Guam is where the Futenma marines should be based since their main task is training Southeast and South Asian defense forces, and Guam is better located for that. But both Tokyo and Washington now seem to insist that providing an alternative base — Henoko ideally — is a condition for closing that much-hated Futenma base. Maybe the need to supply troops and helicopters to Afghanistan has convinced them of Okinawa's advantages. For sticky fingers in the Japanese ministries involved, there is also the inviting prospect of being able to control the funds needed for a new base. For the U.S. military, a new base would be an attractive addition to its vast inventory of overseas bases since Okinawa offers a better lifestyle than isolated Guam. It also means access to the "sympathy budget" funds that Tokyo seems willing to keep on providing for U.S. bases in Japan. In effect Tokyo, which says it needs the bases for its security, is picking up the tab to train U.S. troops for service in Afghanistan.

Japan Funds Bases

Japan resentfully funds US military bases

Japan Times 6 (KirokuHanai,” No more tax money to U.S.” March 27, http://www.ipb.org/i/pdf-files/Japan\_Low\_Military\_Spending\_Underscores\_Dependence\_on\_US.pdf) JL

As for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, many Japanese are irked by reports that Washington is asking Tokyo to pay 75 percent of the estimated $ 10 billion cost to relocate 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam.It is hard to understand why Japan must help pay the cost of building a new base on territory where Japan has no sovereignty. The spending is unwarranted, even if it is interpreted as part of host-nation support for the U.S. military. Under Article 24 of the Japan-U.S. status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), Japan is required to defray only the cost of leasing facilities, related areas and rights of way. However, in 1978, then Defense Agency Director General Shin Kanemaru tentatively decided to make an exception for the Japanese government's contribution of 6.2 billion yen a year to help pay part of the salaries of Japanese workers on U.S. military bases. The decision was made in light of increasing U.S. difficulties in paying the cost of maintaining military bases in Japan due to Washington's growing budget deficits and the appreciation of the yen. In 1987 Japan and the United States signed a special agreement, subject to review every five years, on host-nation support, which has expanded to cover repair and maintenance costs for military housing, most salaries for Japanese workers, on-base utility bills, and the cost of moving U.S. troops on drills. Under the 2006 government budget, host-nation support amounts to 232.6 billion yen.

The Host Nation Support program that contributes to the US alliance is costing billions for Japan.

Yoda 6 (Tatsuro, Institute for Future Technology Sr. Researcher, Asian Survey, Japan's Host Nation Support Program for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Past and Prospects, 46(6), p. 937-939, JSTOR) PL

The Host Nation Support program (HNS) is Japan’s significant contribution to the U.S.-Japan security alliance. According to an annual study by the U.S. Defense Department (DOD), the budget for HNS in 2002 was about $4.4 billion. Although this is only about 1.3% of the U.S. defense budget ($345 billion in 2002), HNS has become a key factor in planning the operation of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). In 2002 74.5% of the operating costs of the USFJ—which does not include the personnel costs of U.S. servicemen and women—was borne by Japan. The HNS has a real value in continuing the USFJ’s operations and is recognized by the U.S. as a “key element of Japan’s strategic contribution.” In May 2006, the U.S. and Japan agreed on a realignment plan of the U.S. forces and bases in Japan, resolving the cost-sharing issue to relocate a part of the Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. territory of Guam by 2014. According to the plan, Roadmap for Realignment Implementation , “[O]f the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Forces] relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions. . . .” The bilateral Special Measures Agreement (SMA) covering April 2001 to March 2006 for the HNS expired in March 2006. The realignment and transformation of the USFJ made the negotiation process of a new SMA more complex than the previous SMAs. In January that year, both countries agreed to extend the SMA for another two years and Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick signed a new SMA. The agreement covers only two years because the financial measures for relocation had not been decided at the time. Other than that, the content of the HNS stipulated in the agreement is exactly the same as in the previous accord. This new agreement will expire in March 2008, so another round of negotiation on cost-sharing will be necessary in 2007 and 2008. These negotiations over the next SMA will be important for the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The program reflects an earlier aspect of the relationship, where Japan contributes mainly financially and in non-military areas and the U.S. contributes militarily. However, since 2001 Japan has sent military forces abroad to support the multinational military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the USFJ is now functioning more for regional security than solely to defend Japan, following the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997. How do those changes affect the perception of the HNS in Japan and the decision choices of the Japanese government? In spite of the centrality of the HNS for any analysis of the alliance, the literature analyzing the program is scanty. Most studies were written prior to 1990, when burden-sharing was a contentious policy issue between the U.S. and Japan. In this paper, I examine the HNS in the past (section 1), discuss key issues at present (section 2), analyze the issues (section 3), and assess prospects for the next SMA and beyond (section 4). The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 1960 forms the basic principle of bilateral cost-sharing about the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. SOFA is an administrative agreement under Article VI of the Security Treaty, which obliges Japan to grant the U.S. the right for “the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” Article XXIV of the SOFA stipulates the division of costs necessary for maintaining U.S. bases in Japan. Japan provides “all facilities and areas and rights of way” “without cost to the United States and make[s] compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof.” The U.S. side bears “without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan except those to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.” Simply put, Japan provides bases without cost to the U.S., and Washington pays the cost for operation of military forces on the bases.

Spending Hurts Japan Econ

The Japanese economy is on the brink and spending will push it further

Rafferty 10 (Kevin, author of "Inside Japan's Powerhouses," a study of Japan Inc. and internationalization, “Japan's economic fantasy” July 8 Japan Times http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100708a1.html) JL

To be fair, Kan has suggested a national debate over tax issues, but he needs to go further and launch a grand debate on the economy and society and how Japan can get out of the deep hole that its politicians and bureaucrats have dug. For years, dirty deals between bureaucrats and politicians, with the active compliance of construction companies, allowed massive spending on ugly but election-sweetening projects, like town halls, bridges, Shinkansen lines. Now the bill is coming due when Japan can least afford it. The outline facts are clear. Japan's government debts are the highest the world has ever seen, at 219 percent of gross domestic product, according to the International Monetary Fund. They have continued to rise as the economy has responded only sluggishly to government stimulus spending, and will rise more steeply as the rapidly aging population puts extra demands on health and welfare payments without a corresponding increase in income from taxes paid by a declining work force. Social security costs are rising by ¥1 trillion a year and account for ¥27.3 trillion or 30 percent of the budget.

The national debt is at critical point

Yuasa 10 (Shino,“Japan raises growth forecast to 2.6 percent” June 22, The Associated Press http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jmfkCQFvxtt6IXRmfAjmFGTya2yAD9GG9A700) JL

But the encouraging figures, including Tuesday's upward GDP revision, are tempered by persistent deflation and other negatives, including a lackluster labor market. Falling prices may boost individual purchasing power, but deflation is generally bad for an economy. It plagued Japan during its "Lost Decade" in the 1990s, hampering growth by depressing company profits, sparking wage cuts and causing consumers to postpone purchases. Japan is also one of the most indebted countries in the world. Its public debt reached 218.6 percent of GDP last year, according to the International Monetary Fund. Tackling the ballooning national debt is among most pressing tasks for Japan's new Prime Minster Naoto Kan.

Japan will go bankrupt if they continue spending - it empirically fails to increase growth decrease the national debt

Huat 10 (Quah Boon, research fellow at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research “Is Malaysia in danger of going bankrupt?” July 10 http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/7/10/business/6621939&sec=business) JL

While Japan hasn’t yet run into the kind of solvency problems faced by Greece, some commentators have already started predicting that it could end up being the world’s largest national bankruptcy. That’s because Japan’s public debt mountain is bigger than that of any other industrialised nation. Japan’s public debt is a legacy of massive half-baked economic stimulus packages during the “lost decade” of the 1990s, as well as during the recession that began in 2008. It is expected to hit 200% of GDP within 2010 as the government tries to spend its way out of the economic doldrums against a backdrop of plummeting tax revenues and soaring welfare costs. The Japanese government expects its fiscal deficit in 2010 to hit 9.3% of GDP, and public debt to rise to 17 times its annual tax revenues by the end of the year. Japan’s public debt situation seems irrecoverable, and its newly installed prime minister has warned that Japan could face a financial crisis of Greek proportions if it does not tackle its colossal debt

Base Spending Hurts Japan Econ

Costs of maintaining troops are increasing, this puts a strain on the Japanese economy

Akira Kawasaki in 2k9 (ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 129-146., JAPAN’S MILITARY SPENDING AT A CROSSROADS, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n4-f.pdf)

Through these allocations, Japan has provided a cumulative total of over $20 billion for the construction and renovation of U.S. bases under the “Facility Improvement Program” (FIP). A large proportion of this is housing-related, such as accommodation for families of U.S. military personnel, but it also includes entertainment facilities, hospitals, repair of ships and aircraft, and the construction of port facilities. These efforts add up to 12,000 construction or renovation projects on sixty-six U.S. bases throughout Japan.10 In light of Japan’s current financial difficulties, the government is leaning toward a reduction of construction and renovation as part of the FIP. However, within the recent realignment of the U.S. forces, many new expenses are cropping up such as training relocation costs. For example, in order to relocate training of U.S. marines based in Okinawa to SDF facilities in Japan, a cumulative total of $100 million was spent between 1997 and 2008 for the construction of specialized facilities within existing SDF facilities.11 In addition, expenditures are rising for newly created budget categories such as the relocation of the U.S. air base in Futenma and the construction of a new base at Henoko in Okinawa, the relocation of training facilities for U.S. Air Force fighter planes, and the relocation of the marines to Guam. The issue of costs related to the U.S. forces Japan and their realignment could potentially become a point of political dispute between the new U.S. and Japanese governments. President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama raised the issue of the relocation of the Futenma Air Base, for instance, at their November 2009 meeting.12 The new coalition government’s policy mentions “reduction of the burden of Okinawa,” and is suggesting a “reexamination” of the Futenma Air Base relocation issue, including a potential relocation to another prefecture in Japan or else overseas. On the other hand, the United States wants to speedily implement the previous agreement of relocating the base to Henoko, within Okinawa prefecture. Furthermore, in November 2009, the government included contributions to salaries for workers at U.S. bases as part of the “sympathy budgetary allocations” in the list of projects to be examined for budget reductions.13 It is not easy to predict how further negotiations on this issue will develop and what influence this will have on the financial burden of Japan in relation to the U.S. military.

**Japan Economy Down**

Japan's debt and U.S. dependency is crippling its economy.

The Economist in 10 (The Economist, Leaderless Japan, http://www.economist.com/node/16274071) PL

Since 2006 Japan has had no fewer than five prime ministers. Three of them lasted just a year. The feckless Yukio Hatoyama, who stepped down on June 2nd, managed a grand total of 259 days. Particularly dispiriting about Mr Hatoyama’s sudden departure is that his election last August looked as if it marked the start of something new in Japanese politics after decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). His government has turned out to be as incompetent, aimless and tainted by scandal as its predecessors. Much of the responsibility for the mess belongs with Mr Hatoyama. The man known as “the alien”, who says the sight of a little bird last weekend gave him the idea to resign, has shown breathtaking lack of leadership. Although support for his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has slumped in opinion polls and the government relied on minor parties, the most glaring liabilities have been over Mr Hatoyama’s own murky financial affairs and his dithering about where to put an American military base. The question for the next prime minister, to be picked in a DPJ vote on June 4th, is whether Mr Hatoyama’s failure means that Japan’s nine-month experiment with two-party democracy has been a misconceived disaster. The answer is of interest not just within Japan. Such is the recent merry-go-round of prime ministers that it is easy to assume that whoever runs the show makes no difference to the performance of the world’s second-largest economy. Now Japan’s prominence in Asia has so clearly been eclipsed by China, its flimsy politicians are all the easier to dismiss. But that dangerously underestimates Japan’s importance to the world and the troubles it faces. With the largest amount of debt relative to the size of its economy among the rich countries, and a stubborn deflation problem to boot, Japan has an economic time-bomb ticking beneath it. It may be able to service its debt comfortably for the time being, but the euro zone serves as a reminder that Japan needs strong leadership to stop the bomb from exploding. What’s more, stability around South and East Asia depends to a large extent on Japan’s 50-year-old security alliance with America, which acts as a counterbalance against Chinese military expansion. The nine-month stand-off between Japan and America over a marine base in Okinawa, a fight which Mr Hatoyama picked himself and has now done for him, is a glaring example of how poor leadership can muddy the waters. With Mr Hatoyama out of the way, it is tempting to hope that the DPJ will put its problems behind it and quickly rebuild its credibility with the electorate and Japan’s friends abroad. There are two reasons for misgivings, however. The first is the role of Ichiro Ozawa, the Svengali-like figure who stood mischievously behind Mr Hatoyama. The second is the calibre of the candidates to become Japan’s next prime minister. Mr Ozawa resigned as the DPJ’s secretary-general alongside Mr Hatoyama, but he, unlike his boss, has not promised to bow out of politics. Moreover, he has such influence over the party that he could continue to pull strings from behind the scenes, especially ahead of upper-house elections this summer. That would be inexcusable. Like Mr Hatoyama, Mr Ozawa has been caught up in campaign-funding scandals that have reeked as badly as they ever did under the LDP. He has meddled with good policies and failed to stop bad ones, such as the attempt to roll back the privatisation of the postal system. The “Shadow Shogun” represents the worst side of the old politics. If Mr Ozawa remains influential, he will only undermine any future party leader in the eyes of voters. Whoever that leader is will have plenty to prove as it is (see article). As The Economist went to press, the most likely replacement for Mr Hatoyama was Naoto Kan, the finance minister. He has shown more financial nous than Messrs Hatoyama and Ozawa in arguing for fiscal reform in Japan. But he has kept so quiet about the DPJ’s failing leadership that it is hard to imagine him putting Mr Ozawa in his place. Other potential candidates, who have stood up more firmly to Mr Ozawa, will be opposed by many in the party who are under the man’s sway. And sadly, none looks like he has enough of the right stuff to restore Japan’s standing in the world. For many voters, this all smacks of Japan’s earlier attempt to escape the LDP’s shadow, in 1993. The coalition government that replaced it—also under Mr Ozawa’s spell—lasted barely 11 months. But a lot has changed since then. Today the LDP has only slightly benefited from the DPJ’s woes, and is itself in danger of splintering. The legacy of two lost decades has left voters with little nostalgia for old habits. Having finally broken the mould of Japanese politics, it is almost inconceivable that they will vote the old lot back into office. However far-fetched it seems at this sorry juncture, Japan’s leadership crisis presents a chance to progress to a new sort of politics, based more around policies than personalities. Besides its fiscal problems, Japan has an ageing population that will be a draw on the public purse. Its stock of savings is diminishing, and though it is riddled with misgivings about the presence of American troops in Japan so long after the second world war, it can hardly pay for its own defence. Factional politics has failed utterly to deal with these problems. But divisions within the political duopoly have produced splinter parties, some of which have sensible ideas for putting Japan’s economy back on track. The new DPJ leadership, however badly it does in this summer’s upper-house elections, should capitalise on that by forming coalitions with its ideological peers, rather than with the mavericks it has relied on so far. Getting rid of Mr Ozawa would be a sign of real change. There is hope therefore that things are beginning to get so bad that reform really will appear relatively soon. But the main impression at the moment is of drift. The sad fact is that the world’s second biggest economy, home to companies that have changed industries around the world, is being kept out of dire trouble only by the loyalty of its own savers.

Japan Econ K2 Global Econ

A Japanese economy collapse is on the brink and would spell disaster for the world. Snyder 10 (Michael, analytic writer, Intelligence Daily, The Coming Economic Collapse Of Japan – And Why You Should Be Extremely Concerned About It, http://inteldaily.com/2010/05/japan-economic-collapse/) AK

(The Intelligence Daily) — Most Americans pay very little attention to what is going on in the economies of other nations. But they should. The reality is that in today’s global economy, what is happening on the other side of the world can have a dramatic impact on the U.S. economy. In particular, the ongoing implosion of Japan’s economy should greatly concern us all. Japan is the 3rd biggest economy in the world and is one of America’s most important trading partners. If Japan experiences a total economic collapse it will create a tsunami of financial panic around the globe. In fact, it is likely that a default by the government of Japan would plunge the world into such an economic nightmare that the American Dream would quickly vanish for millions of American families. So just how close is Japan to a financial collapse? Well, Fitch Ratings says that Japan’s gross public debt has reached 201 percent of GDP and is likely to continue to pile up into very dangerous territory for the foreseeable future. It is estimated that this gigantic mountain of debt amounts to 7.5 million yen for every person living in Japan. Needless to say this is extremely troubling. Japan has the highest level of public debt to GDP of any of the industrialized nations. Japan is literally drowing in red ink. Meanwhile, even with all of the massive government spending that has caused all of this debt, Japan’s economy still continues to implode at a frightening pace. Japan’s discouraging battle with deflation dragged into its 13th straight month in March as prices continued to decline and the unemployment rate rose sharply. In fact, the number of unemployed in Japan totalled 3.5 million in March. This represented a 4.5 percent rise from the same period a year ago.

Japan Econ K2 Global Econ

A Japanese economy collapse will affect supply chains and devastate the world’s economies – particularly China’s

Auslin 9 (Michael, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Wall Street Journal, Japan's Downturn Is Bad News for the World, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483257056995903.html) AK

If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far. The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region.

Collapsing China’s economy collapses the world economy

Lewis 8( Dan, Research Director for Economic Research Council, World Finance, The nightmare of a Chinese economic collapse, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html) AK

That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

Global Econ !- War

Continued economic decline will result in global war.

**Mead, 9** (Walter Russell Mead, [Henry A. Kissinger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Kissinger) senior fellow for [U.S. foreign policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._foreign_policy) at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 42009.  http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09) JM

Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, **financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth.** This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.**If financial crises have been a normal part of life** during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, **so has war**. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a** depression, what **rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born**? The United States may not, yet, decline, but**, if we can't get the world economy back on track,** **we may still have to fight**.

Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Lewis 98, (Chris H., environmental historian, University of Colorado-Boulder), THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 56 AD: 7-7-09 CS

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, Japan, and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.

**Economy K2 Alliance**

Economic insecurity collapses the alliance

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

That rupture could occur in any of three ways. The most likely danger is that the growing array of trade disputes between the United States and Japan will spill over into the security realm. Public discontent with alleged Japanese misconduct with regard to trade will sooner or later produce massive pressure to adopt the suggestion of Johnson, Keehn, and others to threaten the withdrawal of the U.S. military shield as bargaining "leverage." American advocates of a confrontational trade policy will not be content indefinitely to subsidize the defense of a nation that they believe engages in unfair trade practices.(49) Throughout the Cold War, there was a virtual consensus in both countries not to let economic quarrels undermine the security relationship, lest disunity play into the hands of the Soviet Union. Without the specter of the Soviet threat, however, that argument is far less compelling to many Americans.(50) Since Tokyo shows a rapidly decreasing inclination to capitulate to Washington's escalating demands for trade concessions, the potential for an unpleasant breach is obvious. Even Takakazu Kuriyama, Japan's ambassador to the United States, has stated that the greatest danger to the alliance is "spillover" from economic conflict.(51)

AT: Defense Spending bad

Self defense spending inevitable-only a risk aff saves money

Akira Kawasaki in 2k9 (ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 129-146., JAPAN’S MILITARY SPENDING AT A CROSSROADS, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n4-f.pdf)

To verify and reduce unnecessary spending within the administration, the new government established the Government Revitalization Unit under the cabinet. In drafting the 2010 budget, which totalled more than 95 trillion yen ($950 billion), the DPJ government has aimed to cut as much as 3 trillion yen ($30 billion) as part of its public reconsideration of each and every government program. It has specifically targeted inefficient public works projects and governmental corporations in collusive relationships with the bureaucracy. As they suffer through the economic crisis, people are watching with great interest the television programs featuring sensationalist denouncements of wasteful bureaucratic expenditure. But so far, despite all of these efforts to cut spending, the government continues to treat one sector as “untouchable.” Japan’s military expenditures remain beyond criticism and serious revision.

Defense spending has remained steady or decreased-only a risk aff saves money

Akira Kawasaki in 2k9 (ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 129-146., JAPAN’S MILITARY SPENDING AT A CROSSROADS, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n4-f.pdf)

In 2009, Japan’s military budget was 4.774 trillion yen.2 This represents 0.94 percent of Japan’s GDP and 9.2 percent of the central government budget. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Japan’s military spending in 2008 was $46.3 billion, making it the seventh-largest military spender after the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Germany.3 During the past decade, Japan’s military expenditures have largely remained at the same level or even decreased slightly. In 1999, for instance, the total was 4.932 trillion yen, and the budget has remained flat or declined at around one percent or less a year. The expenditure has been within 0.9 percent and 0.99 percent of the GDP, just short of the cap of one percent that has been the informal limit the Japanese government has adhered to since 1967.4 The ratio of military expenditures to general policy spending (the government budget) has also slightly declined,

from 10.5 percent in 1999 to the current 9.2 percent.

Spending on bases a small part of defense budget

Akira Kawasaki in 2k9 (ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 129-146., JAPAN’S MILITARY SPENDING AT A CROSSROADS, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n4-f.pdf)

In a breakdown of Japan’s 2009 military budget, Self-Defense Force (SDF) salaries comprised 44 percent; purchase of equipment including weapons, aircraft, and ships made up 17 percent; research and development 2.5 percent; base-related costs (including the burden of maintaining U.S. forces stationed in Japan) 9 percent; and other costs related to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, 1.5 percent.

AT: Defense Spending bad

Military spending boosts the economy in both supply and demand.

Academic encyclopedia 10 (Wang, journalist, “Military Kenysianism” Academic Encyclopedia, http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/591831) MKB

On the demand side**, increased military demand for goods and services is generated directly by government spending**. Secondly, **this direct spending induces a multiplier effect of general consumer spending**. These two effects are directly in line with general Keynesian economic doctrine.

On the supply side**, the maintenance of a standing army removes many workers, usually young males with less skills and education, from the civilian workforce. This demographic group ordinarily faces an especially high level of unemployment; some argue that drawing them into military service helps prevent crime or gang activity.** In the United States, enlistment is touted as offering direct opportunities for education or skill acquisition, possibly to target this demographic.

In this sense, **the military might act as an employer of last resort – it is an employment opportunity which tends to hire from the bottom** (least qualified) **part of the workforce,** provides a decent standard of living, serves a useful social purpose, and **offers jobs regardless of the state of the general economy.**

Also on the supply side, it is often argued **that military spending on research and development** (R&D) **increases the productivity of the civilian sector by generating new infrastructure and advanced technology. Frequently cited examples of technology developed partly or wholly through military funding but later applied in civilian settings include radar, nuclear power, and the internet.**

\*\*\*Relocation\*\*\*

Relocation Japan 🡪 Guam

Troops will be relocated to Guam after withdrawal from Japan.

Kan and Niksch 10 (Shirley, Larry, specialist in Asian security affairs, spec. in Asian affairs, Congressional Research Service, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, p.1)pl

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the U.S. territory of Guam to increase deterrence and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. Nonetheless, China has concerns about the defense buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. Guam’s role has increased with plans to withdraw some U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea. In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a “Roadmap” to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. The goals are to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of 8,000 marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide $6.09 billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about $1 billion for a road. However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan became Prime Minister. This political change raised a question about whether Japan would seek to renegotiate the agreement, even while the United States seeks its implementation. This dispute has implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (H.R. 2647, enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, without an impact on the implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation.

Withdrawn US troops will be redeployed to Guam.

Potter 10 (Matthew, contributor to Bnet, Bnet, U.S Military's Move From Japan To Guam Underway)pl

The United States has based troops on Okinawa and in Japan since the end of World War II. The 3rd U.S. Marine Division and large amounts of air assets are based on the island seized in a bloody battle in April through June of 1945. The U.S. and Japanese governments have been negotiating for years to close the air base at Futenma and moving most of the troops off of the island. A new airbase will be built on Okinawa in a less built up area. In 2006 it was decided that the U.S. Territory of Guam would be the site chosen. Japan has long desired the removal of U.S. troops and proper integration of the island back into it. This is one of the largest changes to the U.S. military’s facilities and basing as part of the last round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Guam is already providing heavy support to U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq by supporting fixed wing Air Force assets as well as transport flights. The plan is to expand the base to allow the 3rd Marines to be stationed their as well as increased support assets including a pier for aircraft carriers. Along with Marine and Navy assets an Army air defense organization will also be moved. All this will require new bases and facilities paid for by both the U.S. and Japanese governments. The building boom will be a big plus to the island’s economy although there are many in the Territory who are worried about the massive influx of new U.S. forces and their dependents. The new more liberal Government of Japan is also having second thoughts wanting further negotiations despite the U.S. holding firm on their commitment to the 2006 deal. They want perhaps a complete move of the air assets without building a new base. Many in Okinawa and Guam see massive environmental disruption and damage from the construction and moves no matter what the boon to the economy of the territory will be. The U.S. Navy announced this week despite the controversies that the first construction contracts using Japanese money were to be awarded. The $50 million contract with AHL Setiadi Gushiken Joint Venture LLC of Honolulu is for engineering support and architecture services that will begin the process of laying out and building the new facilities. Two actual projects were also executed with the Japanese funding to build a headquarters and fire station. The total amount expected to be contributed by Japan is over $6 billion with almost $3 billion in cash. There have been other arguments about the size of the population growth, lack of infrastructure and how the contracts will be divided up. Many of the companies will be from off island and utilize non-U.S. workers. There have also been disputes about the wages involved and whether they will be U.S. minimum, lower or union level. Obviously the higher the wages the greater the cost to the U.S. military but at the same time the workers must be treated fairly. This is one of the largest facility expansion in modern U.S. history. Only the construction of the permanent facilities in Iraq, Vietnam and Afghanistan in the last forty years come close. A total of almost 20,000 new residents will eventually be transferred to the island over several years. As Guam builds up Okinawa will wind down with a negative effect on that islands’ economy. This is a difficult process that politics only makes harder but to answer the wishes of Japan Guam will receive the good and bad of having a large U.S. military base built on it.

Relocation 🡪 US-Japan Relations

Relocation of troops to Guam strengthens US-Japan relations.

US Embassy in 6 (U.S. Department of State, United States, Japan Reaffirm Commitment on Security Cooperation, http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20060502-03.html)pl

Following up on an October 2005 SCC initiative, the ministers approved an implementation plan for realignment of U.S. military forces based in Japan. "The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security treaty, and at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance," according to the statement. Details of the implementation plan have been laid out in a report, "United States-Japan Road Map for Realignment Implementation," according to the officials. Speaking with reporters following the SCC meeting, Rumsfeld said the two sides had agreed to relocate two U.S. air bases from urban to rural areas, and are planning to develop a larger role for the island of Guam in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. The ministers also committed to continue joint efforts to achieve other SCC strategic objectives, including strengthening cooperation in ballistic missile defense, bilateral contingency planning, intelligence and information sharing and improved interoperability of U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force. "We have no better friend than Japan," Rice said after the meeting. "All in all, this is a very strong relationship. It is a relationship that has evolved from its early days and is now truly a pillar not just of regional, but of global stability." The texts of the report on realigning U.S. forces in Japan and the SCC joint statement, along with a transcript of the officials' remarks to the press, can be found on the State Department Web site.

Guam Presence K2 East-Asia Stability

Redeployment to Guam safeguards against potential threats.

Erickson and Mikolay in 5 (Andrew, Justin, assist. Prof. of Strategic Studies at U.S. Naval War college, Prof. at USNA, Comparative Strategy, Anchoring America’s Asian Assets: Why Washington Must Strengthen Guam, p. 168)pl

Several potential dangers could plausibly threaten American interests in East Asia; an effective response will require political and geographical diversification of the U.S. naval presence in the region, with a chain of overlapping bases and access rights. The linchpin can be a strengthened base in Guam. To maximize its ability to deter hostility, gather information, and overcome aggression, the U.S. Navy should continue to develop Guam as a forward logistics hub. A diversified and expanded American military presence on Guam will offer maximum flexibility in times of crisis and help ensure that future contingencies—such as the rise of a belligerent China, a change in Japanese foreign policy, or a reunification of the Koreas— does not create a “missing link” in the chain of U.S. capabilities. Moving assets westward across the Pacific and maintaining a flexible and growing constellation of facilities and access rights in East Asia would keep that chain strong—and even the most determined enemies would not be able to dislodge its anchor, Guam.

Guam Presence K2 Taiwan

Relocation to Guam provides strategic benefits.

Kan and Niksch in 10 (Shirley, Larry, specialist in Asian security affairs, spec. in Asian affairs, Congressional Research Service, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, p.2-4)pl

In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “roadmap” agreement to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provides for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000 marines will remain on Okinawa. The cost of the relocation is estimated at $10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute $6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.7 Visiting South Korea in June 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that U.S. troops there would remain at about 28,000, instead of carrying out the plan of 2004 to restructure U.S. forces by reducing troop strength from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. U.S. officials indicated that further withdrawals of Army forces would be possible, primarily to support the requirements of the Army and Marine Corps in the active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force planned to relocate expeditionary combat support units from South Korea and Japan to consolidate them on Guam. On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) told Reuters that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that the goals remain to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014. Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about $1 billion for a road. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the “Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another area of Okinawa. The FRF would be part of an interconnected package that includes relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa. In April 2009, the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State welcomed the Diet’s ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents. However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan became Prime Minister, and this political change raised questions about whether Japan would seek to renegotiate the agreement even before discussions about its implementation. Hatoyama had called for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on the local people and environment. Visiting Tokyo on September 18, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stressed that it is important to stay the course. But by the time of President Obama’s visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a “working group” to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement’s “implementation,” but Japan sought to “review” the agreement. The working group met without resolution on November 17 and December 4. Still, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on December 8 that Japan would still earmark about US$535 million in the 2010 budget for the transfer of U.S. marines to Guam. One rationale for the military build-up on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003 and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.8 In contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992, and countries like South Korea could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S. forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts about their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China. Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian theater. He stressed “flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we must have built-in flexibility” to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).9 In 2004, the Navy held “Summer Pulse 04,” its first exercise to increase readiness to “surge” operations in response to a crisis or emergency. In June 2006, PACOM held the “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam. A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and security for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca. Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to five hours.10 Moreover, Table 1 presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to Manila in East Asia, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.

Guam Presence K2 North Korea

Redeployment to Guam protects against N. Korea.

Erickson and Mikolay in 5 (Andrew, Justin, assist. Prof. of Strategic Studies at U.S. Naval War college, Prof. at USNA, Comparative Strategy, Anchoring America’s Asian Assets: Why Washington Must Strengthen Guam, p. 160-162)pl

U.S. military force planners now work in the framework of a broad new national security strategy calling for proactive responses to unpredictable threats. Dismantling WMD being among the highest priorities for national defense, the announcement of an ongoing nuclear weapons program in North Korea has drawn the concerted attention of American policy makers to Northeast Asia. Now that Saddam Hussein has been captured and his regime dismantled, decision makers would do well to ask, “Should North Korea be the next target of U.S. pressure?” and plan accordingly.32 Current U.S. priorities in the Middle East make it unwise to provoke North Korea now, but in the future building a more credible American threat that does not hinge on Japanese or South Korean participation may be essential in attempting to pressure Pyongyang. North Korean aggression remains a possibility (albeit remote) should détente with the South fail. Of course, a Korean Peninsula conflict would not be as lopsided as America’s Iraq campaign, for reasons that go beyond comparative military capabilities. The apparent military ease of Operation Iraqi Freedom should not be allowed to obscure key differences. First, in Iraq a slow diplomatic buildup allowed for massive troop prepositioning. This would not happen in the Koreas. The North, in a time of rising tensions, could preempt major troop deployments, threatening Seoul with artillery or Japan with missiles. Second, the coalition in Iraq had bases in neighboring Kuwait from which to launch an attack, with no restrictions on their use; public opinion in South Korea might not permit similar use of U.S. bases there. Third, North Korea has a far greater potential to inflict a “sea of fire”—unacceptable, even mass casualties among American troops and allied civilians—than Iraq ever did, greatly constraining U.S. options for applying pressure. Moreover, South Korean civilians would probably not embrace even a defensive American military buildup on the peninsula. Another place or base—such as Guam—is necessary to overcome this dilemma. With further investment, Guam could bring to life the current doctrinal focus on RSOI (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration). The concept of RSOI is to rapidly transport troops into a crisis theater or area of operations and unite them with their equipment. First, in-theater ships would deploy equipment at sea or in Japan, or stage the equipment in Guam. The process of arranging combat organizations in-theater depends on further transportation developments, mainly the transport of heavy (e.g., mechanized tanks) and light (such as mechanized infantry) equipment. It makes sense to preposition stocks in Guam and marry these stocks with troops using the RSOI process, rather than a costly yet less dependable prestaged maritime option. All U.S. military services already preposition equipment; it is simply preferable to consolidate and then fly troops in to meet the vessels carrying the equipment.33 A large conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a high-cost, low-probability prospect. For decades the need for America to respond to a full-scale invasion kept a permanent land force near the demilitarized zone. But the Pentagon is now backing away from this “tripwire” approach, since U.S. forces stationed within range of North Korean artillery undermine the American threat of preemptive strike. Moreover, the more likely contingency of heightened tensions—as opposed to immediate, full-scale war—suggests a rapid-response force. Here, as in much of East Asia, the bulk of U.S. influence lies not on land but at sea. For all these reasons, Washington needs to lay the groundwork for a flexible buildup designed not to support a bombing campaign or even an “Osirak-style” operation— modeled on Israel’s 1981 preemptive attack on Iraq’s developing nuclear facility—but rather proliferation containment. Targeted sanctions may be the key. Sanctions could involve a naval quarantine to prevent Pyongyang from exporting missiles (in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime), nuclear material (in violation of the NPT), or related military technologies. The U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative is a positive step toward stability in the region. Targeted sanctions have an encouraging track record. The U.S. Navy has used them for at least a decade in the Persian Gulf under the maritime-interdiction regime. In one variant, “leadership interdiction operations,” allied ships’ personnel question and sometimes search merchant vessels for terrorists. Since December 2003, thanks to more effective tactical authorization arrangements, leadership-interdiction forces have seized drug shipments and al-Qa‘ida members. Australia has particular expertise, one that could be capitalized on in the future, in intercepting North Korean drug-smuggling ships. Building up Guam as a homeport for maritime-interdiction ships could greatly strengthen these promising initiatives.34

\*\*\*AT Stuff\*\*\*

AT: Presence K2 Stability

**US military presence does little for maintaining security in the region**

Japan Policy of Reasearch Institute 02 (Johnson Chalmers, January, “Okinawa Between the United States and Japan” http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op24.html) JL

In lieu of concrete security threats in East Asia, some U.S. strategists have put forth the argument that if so much as a single American soldier is brought home, the result will be "instability." This was the contribution of a Harvard University professor, Joseph Nye, whom the Pentagon hired during the mid-1990s to think up some reasons why it should keep its bases in East Asia.4 Actually, there has been a good deal of instability in East Asia despite the American military presence, from the economic meltdown of 1997 to the most serious cases of nuclear proliferation in forty years in India and Pakistan and the destruction of East Timor by American-trained Indonesian forces while the U.S. looked on.5 The U.S. government often argues that it must remain in East Asia because there are no regional organizations comparable to the European Union that could deal with problems there. The fact is that the U.S. has a long record of undercutting efforts at regional organization; and its military presence interferes with the functioning of the most promising regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

AT: Japan Rearm - Realism

Constructivism has not shaped military expansion-Realism has

Lind 2004 (Jennifer, postdoctoral Research Fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, International Security, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v029/29.1lind.html#authbio) CBC

**How do predictions from the antimilitarist and buck-passing theories fare against the pattern of Japanese security policies since World War II? Was Japanese security policy driven by domestic antimilitarist norms or by the dictates of a buck-passing strategy? The antimilitarist argument explains Japanese security policy before the 1970s, but it cannot account for Japan's security policy thereafter. Most glaringly, it is inconsistent with the dramatic transformation of the Japanese military that began in the late 1970s. Contrary to the expectations of the antimilitarist explanation, Japan built one of the best air forces and navies in the world. Its sustained buildup in the post-Cold War era is also inconsistent with the expectation that norms will restrain major increases in Japanese power.** **The buck-passing theory** performs substantially better. It **explains Japan's weak military and restrained posture in the 1950s through the early 1970s, when the Soviet threat to Japan was low**. More critically, **the buck-passing theory explains the growth in Japanese military capabilities and roles in the 1970s and 1980s.** Japanese military **analysts** and leaders **are explicit about the reasoning behind the Japanese buildup: Japan needed additional military force to compensate for the growing Soviet threat and declining U.S. protection.**

Realism has not shaped Japan’s actions

Lind 2004 (Jennifer, postdoctoral Research Fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, International Security, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v029/29.1lind.html#authbio) CBC

**In the post-Cold War era, the buck-passing theory receives mixed results.** On the one hand, **the decline in conventional military threats to Japan predicts** **a reduction in Japanese military power and roles. This has not happened.** On the other hand, **the post-Cold War world has seen new dangers to Japan arise: the threat of regional wars has increased, and a war could trigger attacks on Japan with small numbers of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. The United States has offered to help Japan address the new ballistic missile threat but has demanded Japanese participation**.77 Not surprisingly, **much of the recent Japanese military buildup has involved weapon systems designed explicitly to counter ballistic missiles**.78

It is difficult to assess the nature of—and intentions behind—Japan's ongoing military buildup. In ten years**, Japan's behavior since 1990 may appear consistent with its Cold War buck-passing strategy. Japan's post-Cold War policies would be consistent with buck-passing if its new military acquisitions are merely aimed at the ballistic missile threat, and if Japan continues to rely on the United States to defend it as much as possible**. On the other hand, it is at least possible that Japan's current military buildup marks the early stages of a more assertive grand strategy that relies less on the United States.

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Instability

Japan rearmamant doesn’t pose a threat to the region

Carpenter 02. (Ted Galen, January 8 Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security, Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author or editor of 13 books on international affairs.)G.L

**The standard argument against Japan playing a more active military role is that it would upset its neighbors in East Asia.** The nations of that region, it is said, still remember the outrages committed by imperial Japan during the 1920s and 1930s and would react badly to any manifestations of "Japanese militarism." **But that argument oversimplifies reality.** True, a few countries (most notably South Korea) are still paranoid about Japan. China also opposes any military role for Japan. Indeed, if Beijing had its way, the Japanese SDF would not even exist. But **China's strident objections are self-serving;** **PRC officials realize that an** active, **assertive Japan would be a major obstacle to Beijing's own ambitions** to become the dominant power in the region. **Other East Asian countries are beginning to mute their objections to Japan playing a more active security role.** Successive Australian governments have said that the time has come to bury the fears about renewed Japanese militarism. Singapore earlier this year offered Tokyo the use of its naval facilities -- a strong signal that it accepts the reality that Japan no longer poses a threat. Similar accommodating statements have been emanating from the Philippines over the past year. **Those changes are gratifying. They show a recognition that the era of Japanese imperialism ended more than a half century ago, and that** 21st century **Japan bears no resemblance to the rapacious, expansionist Japan of that earlier era. Modern Japan is a conservative**, status quo **power that would be a stabilizing force against aggression, not a source of aggression. Japan needs to seize the opportunity afforded by the changing attitude of its neighbors. It is time for the SDF to play a realistic security role in East Asia** and beyond. **No rational person would object if Tokyo provided combat forces for the struggle against** Osama bin Laden and his **terrorists.** It is time for Japan to fully rejoin the ranks of the great powers. And **the United States needs to help with that transition. U.S. officials have** not only **allowed Japan to get away with free riding on the U.S. security guarantee**, they have openly discouraged Japan from venturing beyond the status of being Washington's logistical helpmate. **That attitude must be discarded. U.S. leaders ought to make it clear to Japan -**- and to that country's neighbors -- **that Washington no longer objects to Japan's playing a full-fledged security role. Indeed, the United States should state explicitly that it expects Japan to do so.**

Japan is not a threat, a Japanese military won’t be aggressive

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No imminent threat to the region and minimum rearmament

CATO Institute 4 (12/8 “East Asian Defense Commitments” Pg. 580 http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb\_109-58.pdf) JL

Washington should follow a similar strategy in Japan, which no longer faces a superpower threat. Whatever dangers to Japan remain or might arise in the future, from, say, an aggressive China or DPRK, could be met by a modest Japanese military buildup. Of course, many of Japan’s neighbors have long viewed Washington’s presence more as an occupation force to contain Tokyo than as a defense against other threats. But the Japanese do not possess a double dose of original sin; their nation, along with the rest of the world, has changed dramatically over the last half century. The Japanese people have neither the desire nor the incentive to start another conflict, having come to economic prominence in East Asia peacefully. Moreover, Tokyo is unlikely to accept a permanent foreign watchdog, and tensions will grow as the lack of other missions for the U.S. forces becomes increasingly obvious. Popular anger is already evident in Okinawa, where American military facilities occupy one-fifth of the island’s landmass. Washington should develop a four-year program for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan, starting with those in Okinawa. At the end of that period, Washington and Tokyo should replace their mutual defense treaty with a more limited agreement providing for emergency base and port access, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing.

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Several factors indicate Japan will not go nuclear

Alford 6 (Peter, Tokyo correspondent, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/why-japan-refuses-to-go-nuclear/story-e6frg6so-1111112431186) CBC

"**There is no change in Japan's policy of keeping its** three **non-nuclear principles**," he said. "There will be no debate within the Government on this."That was a rebuke to senior colleagues, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Liberal Democratic Party policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa, who argued that there needed be a debate, in light of theworsening threat from North Korea. The pretext may be fresh, but the question of Japan going nuclear is old. The Japan Defence Agency has secretly or unofficially examined the possibility at least twice, in 1970 and 1994, and the question has been raised in the political arena at least five times since the mid-1990s. Mr Abe, then a rising star on the LDP's nationalist wing, did so himself in April 2002 when he told students there was nothing in Japan's pacifist constitution to prevent it holding nuclear warheads "small enough to be strictly defensive". Mr Abe's grandfather Nobusuke Kishi was the first leader to openly point out to the Japanese, in April 1958, that their constitution did not forbid such weapons for a defensive purpose. But Mr Kishi then stated: "**Japan will not arm itself with nuclear weapons, nor will it allow the introduction of nuclear weapons** (to its territory)." He believed Japan had no strategic alternative but the US nuclear umbrella. Now occupying the same office as the grandfather he admired and emulated, Mr Abe has apparently reached the same conclusion and aligned himself with the strategic mainstream. Dr Dupont says that having studied the matter long and intently, **Japan's strategic establishment** believes having **nuclear weapons** would diminish rather than enhance security. "Because that **would then place them at direct risk of a nuclear exchange Japan could never win -- a nuclear conflict with China**," said Dr Dupont. "Secondly, **politically it would be extremely difficult for them to do so and remain within the US alliance -- the US would exert enormous pressure on them not to go nuclear because it's completely against US strategic interests, as well as everybody else's."** Veteran defence commentator Shunji Taoki, who has close links to the Japanese defence establishment, agrees with that calculus. Further, he doubts a Japanese nuclear deterrent would serve any useful purpose against the North Koreans. "The nuclear deterrent will not work against an irrational or desperate opponent," Mr Taoki said yesterday. "The concept of deterrence is based on the assumption that your opponents are rational and pursue self-preservation ... but if North Korea (launches a nuclear attack) it will be because they are already under attack from the US or in collapse."

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan is taking steps toward a world without nuclear weapons and will not allow nuclear weapons on its territory

Japan Today 10 (Tokyo, staff writer, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/okada-japans-security-assured-under-new-us-nuclear-strategy) CBC

**Japan on Wednesday welcomed a new US commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on other nuclear powers to take the same stance** as Washington. **"I would like to welcome the US announcement as a step towards a world without nuclear weapons," Prime Minister Yukio** Hatoyama **told reporters**, while Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada separately said that **Tokyo is assured that its security would not be endangered in light of the new nuclear strategy announced by the United States on Tuesday**. "A very good report has come out. The United States has squarely acknowledged that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states," Okada said. "**The United States has clearly said that this report would not lead its allies to danger."** "Other nuclear powers should take the same stance and (such commitments) should be guaranteed in such forms as Security Council resolutions or treaties, so that they would be reinforced," Okada said. In a major policy shift from his predecessors, US President Barack Obama said in the Nuclear Posture Review that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT member countries, even if it is attacked by them with conventional, biological or chemical weapons. But it made an exception for countries that have continued their quest for nuclear arms by violating or renouncing the international treaty, such as North Korea and Iran. Okada said North Korea is "obviously outside" the NPT and noted the United States made clear with the new report that countries have to dismantle their nuclear weapons and return to the NPT, if they fear becoming a target of a nuclear attack. North Korea announced its withdrawal in 2003. Under the NPT, the United States, Britain, China, France and Russia - which are designated by the treaty as nuclear-armed nations - are obliged to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in exchange for a promise that non-nuclear weapons states would not acquire nuclear weapons. **Okada said he expects the latest development to give positive momentum to the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament** in the run-up to the upcoming conference in May in New York to review the operation of the NPT. He also said the possibility of US nuclear-armed ships entering Japan in violation of Japan's non-nuclear principles has "become lower" as the United States says in the NPR that it will eliminate nuclear-equipped Tomahawk cruise missiles that can be deployed on nuclear submarines. The United States has made clear since 1991, after the end of the Cold War, that it will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its ships. **Japan, the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, has maintained three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory.**

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan will not go nuclear

The Japan Times 9 (Tokyo, staff writer, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090927a1.html) CBC

**The United Nations Security Counci**l on **Thursday unanimously adopted a resolution "to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons." This** strong and historic **resolution was adopted** **at the** first UNSC **summit on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament**, attended by the leaders of both the five permanent UNSC member states - the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, which are nuclear-weapons states - and the nonpermanent member states, which include Japan. The resolution is an important step toward making efforts to create a nuclear weapons-free world irreversible.It is significant that the resolution was sponsored by the U.S., since the U.S. and Russia combined possess some 90 percent of the world's nuclear warheads.Moreover, the summit was chaired by Mr. Barack Obama, who became the first U.S. president to chair a meeting of the 15-nation council.As Mr. Obama stated, the resolution "enshrines our shared commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons" and "brings Security Council agreement on a broad framework for action to reduce nuclear dangers as we work toward that goal." In his April speech in Prague, Mr. Obama underlined the right of people everywhere to live free from the fear of nuclear weapons in the 21st century and expressed America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. It is clear that this speech helped revive global efforts for nuclear disarmament. His recent decision to cancel a missile-defense program in Poland and the Czech Republic also provides a good chance for the U.S. and Russia to conclude a treaty to succeed START-1 (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-1) by yearend. In the UNSC meeting, Mr. Obama correctly described the dangers the world now faces. He said, "Although we averted a nuclear nightmare during the Cold War, we now face proliferation of a scope and complexity that demands new strategies and new approaches." The resolution calls on states that are not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to join it and urges NPT member states to cooperate so that the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 can "strengthen the treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in the treaty's three pillars: nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament." It also calls on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to negotiate a treaty to ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices as soon as possible. In an apparent reference to North Korea and Iran, the resolution "expresses particular concern at the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime" and demands that U.N. member states fully comply with past UNSC resolutions that imposed sanctions against the two countries. Importantly, the resolution calls on the five nuclear weapons states to fulfill their NPT obligations by undertaking "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control," and invites all other nations to join in this endeavor. If the five states - the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, and China - make sincere efforts to meet the call, they will acquire greater moral suasion in getting other states with nuclear weapons ambitions to give them up. It also calls on all states to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to bring the treaty into force at an early date. For the treaty to go into force, 44 more states have to ratify it. Of these countries, nine - the U.S., China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Israel, Egypt and Indonesia - have not yet either signed or ratified it. In an encouraging sign, the U.S. for the first time in 10 years attended a high-level New York conference on the CTBT on Thursday and Friday. The U.S.' ratification of the treaty could induce China to also ratify it. In addressing the UNSC summit, **Japanese Prime Minister** Yukio Hatoyama **renewed Japan's commitment to the three-point nonnuclear principle of not making, not possessing and not allowing the bringing in of nuclear weapons.** He also declared that **Japan, the only country that has suffered from atomic bombings, will not go nuclear.** **Although Japan has the potential to develop nuclear weapons,** Mr. Hatoyama said, **it wants to prevent the vicious cycle of a nuclear-arms race. This is a realistic and reasonable decision**.

Japan has pledged to remain nonnuclear

Kyodo 9 (Tokyo, staff writer, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Japan-vows-to-take-lead-in-achieving-nuclear-free-world/Article1-430415.aspx) CBC

**The Japanese government pledged** Thursday **to take a leading role in realizing a world without nuclear weapons after Group of Eight leaders agreed in Italy to strengthen efforts at nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.** "**We are ready to take a leadership role towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation,**" Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura said at a press conference. **Kawamura referred to the appointment of Japanese diplomat Yukiya Amano as the next International Atomic Energy Agency director general in expressing this willingness to tackle the issue.** "**We hope that all nuclear powers share this view and that there will be a significant move towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation**," he said. **The G-8 groups Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States.**

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

**Japan seeks nonproliferation while rearming**

Izumi and Furukawa 7 (Hajime and Katsuhisa, Senior Fellow for International Assessment and Strategy Center and Professor at the University of Shizuoka, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_06/CoverStory) CBC

**Since North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, there has been considerable foreign speculation that the explosion might prompt Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons arsenal.** **These views do not reflect the relatively restrained reaction in Japan itself**. Although the test helped break a public taboo on discussing the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capability, **there is little serious desire to replace the** U.S**. nuclear umbrella** **with a** homegrown **nuclear option.** Indeed, the discussions themselves may have been aimed in part at shoring up the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Rather than relying on nuclear weapons, **Japan’s security policy seems more geared toward** **strengthening cooperation with the United States while shoring up global nonproliferation efforts.** North Korea’s nuclear test certainly shocked the Japanese public. Just after the test, an Asahi Shimbun poll found that 82 percent of the respondents were “concerned.” Some 44 percent of those polled felt a “strong threat” from North Korea, and 38 percent felt “some level of threat.” It seems, however, that such concerns were neither deep nor sustained. The Japanese public in general did not demonstrate active interest in taking any specific measures, such as establishing underground shelters. Rather the Japanese media focused primarily on the radioactive contamination risks the test might pose to Japan. Having recognized that such risk was almost nonexistent, the public interest on this issue faded away promptly. After November 2006, the Japanese media’s coverage of North Korea focused more on Pyongyang’s decades-old abduction of Japanese citizens than concern over North Korea’s current nuclear weapon programs. There is a view among some experts that the Japanese public’s “sense of loathing” toward the Kim Jong Il regime may have overridden its perception of the threat emanating from North Korea’s missiles and nuclear-weapon programs. The Japanese government also has been restrained in several regards in its response to the tests. First, although it imposed sanctions on North Korea, Tokyo appears to place a higher priority on the abductions matter. Following his 2006 inauguration, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe quickly established within his cabinet an office to manage the abductions issue. Abe did not create an equivalent office to address Pyongyang’s nuclear or missile programs, despite his repeated statements that North Korea’s nuclear weapons presented the gravest threat to Japan, nor was any voice raised among the Japanese media in support of establishing such an office. Second, **Tokyo remains reluctant to negotiate with North Korea on ballistic missile development and deployment**, although Japan is the country that should be most concerned about Pyongyang’s medium-range ballistic missile programs. Third, **despite North Korea’s nuclear testing and missile firings, Japan has not seriously discussed or received strong domestic pressure to increase the defense budget.** **The reduction of the government’s** accumulated **deficit, almost 150 percent of Japan’s** gross domestic product (**GDP**), still **remains** one of **Tokyo’s top priorities, and the defense budget remains at less than 1 percent of GDP**. **Each military service branch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces**, for instance, **has** been forced **to cut back on personnel and procurement**. Fourth, soon after North Korea’s nuclear test, Japanese officials discussed the need to enact new legislation to enable interdiction and inspection of North Korean ships with suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related cargoes on the high seas, but such discussion has faded. Similarly, Japanese officials also weighed procuring and deploying an offensive weapon system to take out North Korea’s missile launching sites. This discussion has faded as well. To be sure, Tokyo has speeded up deployment of proposed anti-missile systems, and **a limited number of politicians** and experts **have argued in favor of** Japan pursuing **a nuclear option**. It is difficult, however, to find convincing evidence that the Japanese public feels so gravely threatened by North Korea’s nuclear program that they want to take concrete action as a response. Most Japanese regard foreign countries’ concerns about Japan’s nuclear future as exaggerated. In fact, **the Japanese** media **rarely conducts any extensive or serious discussion about Japan’s nuclear weapons capability or what might constitute Tokyo’s nuclear doctrine if it were to pursue such an option.**

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Public opinion prevents nuclear weapons in Japan

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

Finally, Japan's neighbors should realize that Japanese public opinion will help restrain any aggressive ambitions that might be harbored by a future political leader. A public that for five decades has resisted not only militarism but even modest expansions of Japan's military role is not likely to countenance a huge military buildup and an expansionist binge. Indeed, the opposite problem is a more legitimate concern: public opposition may continue to inhibit Japan from doing enough to protect its own security interests. The regional apprehension about Japan's "aggressive tendencies" parallels the attitudes in some European circles about Germany. But the Japanese are not congenital aggressors, any more than are the Germans. Imperial Japan's expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of conditions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable situation. Both East Asian and U.S. officials must move beyond the simplistic assumption that Japan's military role must inevitably be one of extremes--either the rampant imperialism of a half century ago or the self-effacing dependence of the post-World War II era. It is not only possible but probable that, left to its own devices, modern Japan would play a reasonably prudent role somewhere between those two extremes. In other words, Japan would act as a typical prosperous, conservative great power in the international system.

Japan will never possess nuclear weapons and will uphold its’ nuclear policy

Kyodo News Service 9 (Tokyo, staff writer, http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T9634724957&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=176&resultsUrlKey=29\_T9634724964&cisb=22\_T9634724963&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=195) CBC

**Japan's top government spokesman said Monday that Japan will never possess nuclear weapons, flatly dismissing a suggestion made by former Finance Minister** Shoichi **Nakagawa on Sunday that Japan should promote discussions on the possibility of going nuclear. "There is no doubt that we will continue firmly maintaining our policy of (upholding) the three nonnuclear principles" of not producing, possessing or allowing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil**, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura told a news conference. **"It is clear that Japan will never possess nuclear weapons,"** he said. On Sunday, Nakagawa**, referring to North Korea's announcement that it will resume its nuclear programme,** said in a speech in Hokkaido, "**It is common sense worldwide that in a purely military sense nuclear counters nuclear." But Nakagawa** also **said that discussing the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons and actually moving to possess them are "two different things," suggesting that the issue should be left as a discussion topic for the moment**.

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Studies show that a nuclear Japan is not possible due to it’s geographic location, budget deficit, and treaties with other countries

Izumi and Furukawa 7 (Hajime and Katsuhisa, Senior Fellow for International Assessment and Strategy Center and Professor at the University of Shizuoka, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_06/CoverStory) CBC

Technically, **experts have long contended that Japan possesses the basic capabilities to produce crude nuclear weapons.** Indeed, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso said last fall that “Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons.” But he added, “We are not saying we have plans to possess nuclear weapons.” Japan has nuclear fuel-cycle programs that produce reactor-grade plutonium, although in the form of mixed-oxide fuel, for civilian purposes. Japan also has the M-V and H2-A rockets, which have potential intercontinental capabilities. **Japan has not yet established the warhead control technology necessary for operational missiles**. In addition, Japan does not have the basic infrastructure that would be essential for nuclear weaponry, including a nuclear doctrine, a stringent legal framework to protect classified information, a unified command and control system, or a unified intelligence system. Moreover, **Japan’s use of any nuclear material has been strictly regulated by bilateral and international treaties.** **It is illegal for Japan to use its plutonium for weapons purposes without the consent of its treaty counterparts**, unless Japan dare follow the brinksmanship strategy of North Korea. **Even the proponents of Japan’s nuclear armament acknowledge that Japan would not be able to develop nuclear weapons without the approval and cooperation from other countries**, most importantly the United States, **because of Japan’s obligations under bilateral treaties to use imported nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, and technologies for peaceful purposes.** Furthermore, **Japan’s scientific and academic communities still remain within the pacifist tradition despite the general trend toward Japan becoming a more “normal country.”** **It would take enormous effort to establish a working relationship between these communities and the national security community**. **This would** invariably **make it difficult to mobilize resources essential for the construction of any sophisticated nuclear weapon.** Additionally**, under Japan’s democratic government, selecting the location of nuclear weapons facilities could prove a painstaking process.** Over the past decades, for instance, **the selection of a location for a radioactive-waste storage site has faced strong opposition from local communities nationwide.** The Japanese government has quietly re-examined its nuclear option several times, most poignantly in the 1960s when China conducted its first nuclear test. All such examinations have reached the same conclusion: **Japan’s possession of its own nuclear arsenal had little strategic merit**. These **studies have determined that a nuclear Japan could motivate a number of other countries to pursue nuclear development, and Japan could not secure a location to store nuclear weapons safely given its geographic limitations**. **Even the option to base nuclear weapons on submarines could not be completed before a decade and would require an enormous amount of investment, a challenge given Japan’s current budget deficit.**

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan won’t go nuclear – it would destroy East-Asia relations and the economy

Yokota 9 (Takashi, Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/06/12/the-n-word.html) CBC

**It sounds plausible. After all, Japan is one of the only great powers that doesn't already boast its own nuclear deterrent.** Though Tokyo has officially vowed never to possess, build or even allow nuclear weapons onto its territory--promises born from Hiroshima and the pacifist constitution imposed on Japan by its U.S. occupiers after the war--some big-name Tokyo politicians have questioned that stance in recent years. In April, Goji Sakamoto, a lawmaker from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said that Japan should at least "threaten" to go nuclear. Shinzo Abe, who was prime minister from 2006 to 2007, once reportedly told a room full of college students that possessing nukes wouldn't violate Japan's constitution as long as the arsenal was "small in scale." And after Pyongyang's first nuclear test in 2006, senior LDP member Shoichi Nakagawa and Prime Minister Taro Aso (then foreign minister) called for public debate on the question. **Yet this is all just rhetoric. For one thing, despite North Korea's threats and China's growing military and political power, the Japanese people remain dead set against building nuclear weapons**. **Polls** conducted **over the past three years show that less than 20 percent of the public currently says it favors possessing such a deterrent.** **For another, Japan--a crowded island nation--lacks the space to test a bomb. Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium for its nuclear-energy industry. But plutonium-type bombs require physical testing to verify their efficacy**. (Uranium bombs are considerably simpler and so may not need physical testing, but Japan doesn't have the weapons-grade uranium to make such a device.) **While some experts argue that Japan could test a plutonium weapon by detonating it underground, others--including former defense chief Shigeru Ishiba--insist that there is simply nowhere to do so in such a densely populated nation**. **Simulations would not be sufficient; those only work after at least one actual test**. **Japan,** moreover, now occupies the nuke-free high ground and **would risk losing its innocence if it went nuclear.** According to an internal 1995 study by Japan's defense establishment, **reversing the country's no-nukes policy would trigger the collapse of the Nuclear Non--Proliferation Treaty regime, as the withdrawal of the world's only nuclear victim could fatally undermine confidence in the system.** **Such a move would also severely damage relations with Washington--Tokyo's most important ally--and the alarm in Beijing and Seoul could set off a nuclear race across East Asia. Japan would get the blame**. **The consequences for Japan's energy supplies and economy could be equally catastrophic. If Japan broke out** of the NPT, **the countries that now supply it with nuclear fuel**, including Canada, Australia and the United States, **would** surely **hold back their shipments,** which are currently conditioned on the fuel's peaceful use. **That would be a nightmare for Japan, which relies on nuclear energy for nearly a third of its electricity.** There's one other roadblock to consider: Japan's top nuclear hawks have seen their power weaken considerably in recent years. Abe lost most of his clout after abruptly resigning as prime minister two years ago. In February, Nakagawa resigned as finance minister in disgrace after appearing drunk at a news conference. And Aso is practically a lame duck these days, with little room for bold moves. **Of course, the political environment may change if North Korea continues to act belligerently or if China proves to be a real threat, as Japanese hawks fear. But even then, most Japanese experts believe that their country would stop short of building a bomb of its own. At most, it might temporarily allow the United States to base nukes on Japanese territory**. **Another option would be to develop the means to stage a conventional strike** against North Korea's launchpads. **But even the strike plan won't become reality anytime soon**, as senior lawmakers **and** experts say **current proposals are "amateurish" and poorly thought out.**

AT: Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan’s moral obligation and fear of diplomatic damage prevent nuclear rearmament

The Japan Times 8 (http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T9634724957&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T9634724964&cisb=22\_T9634724963&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=169018&docNo=4) CBC

On the surface, Sato's statement appears to contradict Japan's nonnuclear policy. But it should not be used as an excuse to deviate from Japan's nonnuclear weapons policy. After China carried out its first test of a nuclear explosion in October 1964, Sato apparently sought a guarantee that the U.S. would protect Japan under its nuclear umbrella. A separate summary of Sato's meeting with Johnson shows that the American president replied positively to his request: "You have my assurance." But attention should be paid to another area of Sato's discussion with **Mr. McNamara**, in which he **stated that Japan had absolutely no interest in possessing nuclear weapons.** **He made it clear that although Japan had technical capabilities to make nuclear weapons, Japan would not follow the line of French President Charles de Gaulle, who pushed for the development of France's own nuclear arsenal.** In the Diet **in December 1967, Sato announced his Three Nonnuclear Principles**: nonproduction, nonpossession and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons, and in 1974 received the Nobel Peace Prize for establishing this nonnuclear policy. It is important to remember that **the government adopted the policy by taking into various factors including the diplomatic damage that "going nuclear" would cause. If Japan decided to become a nuclear power it would have to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a basic pillar of the global order.** **Going nuclear would also cause mistrust among neighboring countries and upset the regional balance of power. Finally, Japan - the only nation to suffer atomic bombings - would lose its moral authority to persuade other nations to give up nuclear weapons.**

Japan will not get nuclear weapons after a decrease in US presence in the country

Flitton 10 (Daniel, Diplomatic Editor for the Age, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/) CBC

**JAPAN has boosted calls to restrict the use of nuclear weapons in war** â€” **and ultimately eliminate the atomic threat** â€” **by finally easing its once-rigid demands to preserve a broad-based nuclear deterrent. The move follows a major international report** commissioned by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd **that urged countries to adopt a "sole purpose" nuclear posture** â€” **meaning they would only use atomic weapons in the face of a direct nuclear threat. Japan's Foreign Affairs Minister**, Katsuya Okada, **cited the Australian-sponsored report in a letter to US** Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, **cautiously backing a restricted role for America's nuclear arsenal as a step towards a world without nuclear arms.** But **Japan's prime minister** Yukio Hatoyama last week **went further, telling a parliamentary committee these were important concepts that he supported.** "**Since it would be unbearable if it was said Japan was reluctant on these, I would like to make the utmost efforts**," Mr Hatoyama said. Tokyo had long insisted the US nuclear umbrella should also protect countries from attacks by conventional forces, a veiled reference to the large armies of North Korea and China. This was despite Japan being the only country to have suffered atomic attack. The issue created heated debate last year in deliberations of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament â€” the panel of experts chaired by former foreign ministers of Australia and Japan, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi â€” before it settled on the "sole purpose" for nuclear weapons concept. A change of government in Japan last September after 50 years of mostly one-party rule opened the way for Toyko to change its nuclear posture. Mr **Okada told the Japanese Parliament last month that the idea of limiting the use of nuclear weapons was worthy of attention.** **"This government will deepen discussions with countries such as Australia and the United States on these** and other **issues**," he said. **Japan's change of heart could boost efforts to kick start nuclear disarmament talks ahead of a global nuclear security summit in April** called by US president Barack Obama.

AT: Japan Rearm Collapses Alliance

Japan’s increased military role is critical to the US-Japan alliance

Szechenyi 6 (Nicholas, Deputy Dir. At Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly , A Turning Point for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, p. 139-141) pl

Article IX of Japan’s postwar constitution, ratified by Japan’s Diet nearly 60 years ago, renounces war as a sovereign right and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In contrast, Article 51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter clearly states that Japan, as a member, has the right to individual or collective self-defense. Japan has struggled over the last 50 years to reconcile this contradiction between its constitution’s pacifist principles and a desire to play a role in maintaining international peace and security. This also applies to the U.S.-Japanese alliance, in which Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) play a limited role in Japan’s own defense but are prohibited from taking action to defend the United States. To address this imbalance, the two countries have taken incremental steps over the years to expand Japan’s security role in response to changes in the international security environment. Recent U.S.-Japanese joint statements envision the SDF playing a more visible role regionally and globally through participation in missile defense, maritime security operations, humanitarian relief operations, and other initiatives that would undoubtedly buttress Japan’s security and burnish its reputation as a responsible member of the international community. Moreover, as the United States transforms its global military posture to face the challenges of the post–September 11 era, Japan is exploring ways to assume a greater defense burden and to accept new roles and missions as a U.S. alliance partner. These developments appear to indicate a strategic interest in elevating Japan’s profile internationally by putting the SDF forward to confront new security challenges. Doing so would not only serve the U.S.- Japanese alliance in preserving peace and stability in Asia but also respond to international pressure for Japan to become a more “normal nation.” The two governments have agreed on a plan to restructure the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and have pledged to integrate their countries’ military operations further. These changes in Japan’s security policy in response to a shifting international security environment are nothing new. In 1960, in the midst of the Cold War, the threat from the Soviet Union prompted Washington and Tokyo to update their 1952 bilateral security treaty. According to the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan assumed some responsibility for defending its territory while the United States was granted permission to maintain bases in Japan for defense of the Far East. Furthering the strategy of containment, the two countries concluded bilateral defense guidelines in 1978 that paved the way for Japan to play a greater role in defense of the sea lanes. In 1991 the Diet dispatched SDF forces overseas for the first time to conduct minesweeping activities after the Persian Gulf War. The SDF then participated in its first UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992. Concerns about instability on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the need to recalibrate after the Cold War, led the United States and Japan to announce a joint declaration on security in 1996 and, a year later, to revise the 1978 defense guidelines to broaden the SDF’s role in regional security. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Diet has passed two special measures laws authorizing the dispatch of SDF forces, the first to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the second to Iraq for reconstruction efforts in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Japan’s security policy will continue to evolve; the question is whether future changes will be in response to pressure from the United States and other alliance partners or stem from a domestic consensus on the need to expand the global presence of the SDF. Today, Japan’s leaders have begun to reason that “the national interest may sometimes lie far from home and that the constitutional taboo on sending Japanese troops abroad can in fact be broken.”1 To break this taboo, they must convince skeptics of the strategic necessity of an expansive mandate for the SDF for Japan’s unilateral security, the credibility of its alliance with the United States, and its diplomatic agenda. Tokyo must also adapt its capabilities to assist in the war on terrorism if U.S. military transformation in Asia is to succeed and if the bilateral alliance is to remain the “indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”2 By expanding the geographic parameters of SDF operations, Japan can help prevent regional crises and affect the evolution of the international security environment, thereby gaining more respect from a broader community of nations. How might this expansion be realized, and what are the challenges involved? To help answer this question, the Office of the Japan Chair at CSIS convened a study group in the spring of 2006 to analyze key issues for future U.S.-Japanese alliance cooperation and produced a set of policy recommendations for public debate. The group’s discussions generated and improved ideas, for which this author is indebted, for potential areas of concentration for the SDF that could enhance Japan’s global security role. Tokyo has reacted to changes in the security environment for long enough. It is time instead to shape that environment and to tackle regional and global challenges in a proactive manner.

AT: Presence K2 North Korea

Presence not key to prevent North Korea attack

Meyer 3(Carlton, “The Mythical North Korean Threat”, May 7 http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm) JL

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

US presence prompts North Korean attack

Global Security.org 5 (“Weapons of Mass Destruction” 28/4) http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/doctrine.htm) JL

The perceived value of nuclear weapons for North Korea is reflected in the often cited statement attributed to former Indian Army Chief of Staff Sundarji: "one principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons." In the face of a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons, the United States and its coalition partners could be forced to change the way the US would conduct operations. North Korea may see the threat of use of nuclear weapons against US coalition partners or allies as a powerful tool in undermining US options for coalition warfare, or in seeking through coercion to undermine US basing or other support for operations. North Korea must also perceive enormous value threatening Japan in order to deny the United States access to key ports and airfields in the south. Nuclear weapons would also serve to coerce and deter the United States from responding to a North Korean attack on the South by launching a counter-offensive aimed at, for instance, seizing Pyongyang. Under Operations Plan 5027 (CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027), the United States plans to provide units to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the event of external armed attack. These units and their estimated arrival dates are listed in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), Appendix 6, to Annex A to CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027. The TPFDL is updated biennially through U.S./ROK agreements. CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027 is distributed with a SECRET-U.S./ROK classification. The Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL) exercise is the largest Command Post Exercise [CPX] among JCS Exercise category. It provides an opportunity for commanders and staffs to focus on strategic and operational issues associated with general military operations on the Korean peninsula. During this exercise each August, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United Nations Command (UNC) of Korea, as well as USFK practice the implement of OPLAN 5027 with the scenario of North Korean Peoples Army’s (NKPA) aggression. Combined political-military training emphasizes Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), ROK mobilization, US reinforcement, and synchronization of Deep, Close and Rear battles. OPLAN 5027 is the operations plan that is the "go to war in Korea" plan. Tasks performed during the early denial phase of OPLAN 5027 include Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) operations and theater Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration [RSOI]. This phase of OPLAN 5027 assumes the sustainability of the southern defense and consequently enough time for reinforcements. Tasks performed during the Destruction Phase of the OPLAN involves a strategy of maneuver warfare north of the Demilitarized Zone with a goal of terminating the North Korea regime, rather than simply terminating the war by returning North Korean forces to the Truce Line. In this phase operations would include the US invasion of north Korea, the destruction of the Korean People’s Army and the north Korean government in Pyongyang. US troops would occupy north Korea and "Washington and Seoul will then abolish north Korea as a state and ‘reorganize’ it under South Korean control. Given the parameters of OPLAN 5027, the narrow window for a decisive and relatively safe North Korean opportunity would be between a week and a month -- during the Denial Phase, before the rapid deployment of US light forces would be followed by the arrival of advance units of heavier divisions. North Korea would have significant incentive to achieve decisive results during this phase, at least through the use of chemical weapons against US forces in South Korea. North Korea might also seek to discourage Japanese support for reinforcments through threatening the use of nuclear weapons against US facilities in Japan, or threatening the use of chemical or biological weapons against the Japanese population, delivered either by missiles or clandestine means. The credibility of these threats against Japan might be enhanced through "demonstration" attacks that were not of sufficient magnitude to provoke American nuclear retaliation

AT: Presence K2 Solve East Asia Conflict

Military cooperation possible with withdrawal

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

Third, discussions should begin immediately about a new, more limited security relationship between the

United States and Japan. There are important American economic interests in East Asia, and clearly no one in the United States should want to see an expansionist power dominate the region, given the adverse security implications of such a development. America's overall policy goal should be a relatively stable balance of power in East Asia. Japanese and American security interests are likely to overlap in the coming decades, and it is reasonable to explore avenues of cooperation in those areas where there is a sufficient convergence of interests. That cooperation should not, however, take the form of a new alliance. An ongoing security dialogue and occasional joint military exercises would be more appropriate. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and can lock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill advised or even counterproductive when conditions change

Decreased military presence in the region can still solve conflict

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

But having some interests in the region and being willing to make a modest contribution to its stability are a far cry from volunteering to be point man in every crisis. America can still protect its core interests with a significantly reduced military presence based in Guam, Wake, Midway and other locations in the central and west-central Pacific.(56) There is no need to have large numbers of forward-deployed forces, much less units to serve as automatic tripwires if even a minor conflict erupts. The United States should be the balancer of last resort, not the intervenor of first resort, in East Asia's security equation. And the most crucial step in adopting that strategy is to devolve primary regional security responsibilities to Japan, the region's leading power.

AT: China Containment DA

The “China Threat” theory is based on an obsolete model of PRC politics. The new mode of leadership values cooperation and multilateralism as part of the “peaceful rise” strategy and will seek to avoid conflict.

Colonel Johnson 2009

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Chinese Pragmatism: Embracing the World Community. Beijing has committed itself to a “peaceful development” (or “peaceful rise”) that embraces economic globalization and the improvement of relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace—a peace that China assures its development will, in turn, reinforce. China is also firmly resolved to discredit the “China threat” theory and to convince the international community, the United States in particular, that its economic rise poses no threat. In 2005, the Chinese government issued a White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” which stated that: It is an inevitable choice based on its national conditions that China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development. During the 100-odd years following the Opium War in 1840, China suffered humiliation and insult from big powers. And thus, ever since the advent of modern times, it has become the goal of the Chinese people to eliminate war, maintain peace, and build a country of independence and prosperity, and a comfortable and happy life for the people. Although it has made enormous achievements in development, China, with a large population, a weak economic foundation and unbalanced development, is still the largest developing country in the world. To stick to the road of peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to attain national prosperity and strength, and its people’s happiness. What the Chinese people need and cherish most is a peaceful international environment. They are willing to do their best to make energetic contributions for the common development of all countries.52 China’s approach to multilateralism has changed markedly since China became an active participant upon entry into the UN in 1971. It has now joined all the major intergovernmental organizations within the UN system and takes an active and positive approach in Asian regional economic, security, and political organizations. In institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, China has been a model citizen. China continues to play a key role hosting and facilitating the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. It has expanded its participation in UN peacekeeping efforts. Since 1990 the PLA has sent 11,063 military personnel to participate in 18 UN peacekeeping operations. Eight lost their lives on duty. As of the end of November 2008, China had 1,949 military peacekeeping personnel serving in nine UN mission areas and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.53 Since 2000, China has sent 1,379 peacekeeping policemen to seven mission areas. As of November 2008, 208 Chinese peacekeeping policemen are serving in Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti, Sudan, and East Timor.54 Although deeply apprehensive of resolutions condoning sanctions or interventions, the PRC has not sought to stop UN missions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, or Iraq during the Gulf War and thereafter. Chinese leaders have broadly supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism that began after September 11, 2001, and have begun closer cooperation with U.S. and international counterterrorism agencies.

AT: China Containment DA

The status quo alliance is viewed by China as an attempt at containment that will provoke counterbalancing, the plan allows the alliance to work with China to prevent conflict

Wu 2006 (Wu Xinbo is a professor at the Center for American Studies and associate dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University in Shanghai, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2005-6, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/xinbo20060101.pdf>)

It is unrealistic, given its concerns, to assume that China will openly embrace the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as a durable institution for regional security. Yet, this is not to say that China cannot tolerate or learn to live with it. To a large extent, Beijing’s perception and attitude depends largely on the alliance’s mandate concerning China, as well as the state of trilateral relations among Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington. Although the U.S. political elite generally agree on the desirability of expanding U.S.-Japanese security ties, two different schools of thought exist in the United States regarding the function of the alliance vis-à-vis China. One suggests that the alliance should play an instrumental role in developing a security arrangement among the United States, Japan, and China. As former deputy assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell noted, “It is hard to imagine a continuing future of peace and stability in Asia unless these three powers can negotiate a kind of strategic modus operandi.”20 Some in this camp argue that the broader goal of the alliance “is to integrate China and Russia into a regional security order without sacrificing the security of Japan, South Korea, and the United States.”21 No matter what the ultimate formula of the security calculus looks like, this line of thinking seeks to use the alliance to engage and integrate China. The other school emphasizes constraining and containing China. Believing that a rising China is doomed to be the United States’ “strategic competitor” and the Taiwan Strait to be the place where the United States could become enmeshed in a major war in Asia, adherents of this school argue that a strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance, including an expanded Japanese role, will best serve the purpose of containing a stronger China and deterring China on the Taiwan issue.22 If the alliance opts for engagement and integration, Beijing will likely be willing to live with it and even work with it on certain issues of common interest. For example, the United States and Japan can seek to work with China to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and ensure the safety of the sea lines of communication in the western Pacific region. Even on the Taiwan issue, the U.S.-Japanese alliance can play a constructive role. In the fall of 2003, for example, when Taiwanese leader Chen Shuibian pushed for a plebiscite on cross-strait relations in the election campaign and sharply raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait, both Washington and Tokyo urged Chen not to push too far. In the end, the pressure from Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo helped keep Chen at bay. If the alliance chooses constraint, deterrence, and even containment, however, China will naturally view it as a major security threat and will endeavor to counterbalance it. Efforts to promote a more active Japanese military posture in order to balance a rising China and to accelerate U.S.-Japanese involvement in the Taiwan issue are all indicative of this approach. Current Chinese efforts to strengthen military cooperation with Russia, including the first joint military exercise between the two countries, held in August 2005, are a reflection of its growing concern over the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The state of U.S.-Chinese- Japanese trilateral relations also informs Beijing’s perceptions of and attitude toward the alliance. If China has normal relations with the United States as well as Japan and trilateral relations are largely stable, Beijing will be less suspicious of a Washington-Tokyo axis, as it will believe that both the United States and Japan value the importance of the trilateral framework to manage regional affairs and to promote their respective national interests. Under these conditions, the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the trilateral framework are more likely to be complementary than competitive. Yet, if trilateral relations are not stable and assume a posture of two (the United States and Japan) against one (China), Beijing will feel that the alliance mainly serves as a platform through which Washington and Tokyo will work against China rather than alongside it. Currently, despite various problems, Sino-U.S. relations are largely stable, while Sino-Japanese relations are at a historic low. Trilateral relations are consequently neither balanced nor sound, only increasing Beijing’s suspicion of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Japan’s desire to become a “normal” country, to walk out of the shadow of being an aggressor and a loser in World War II, is understandable. Japan’s normalcy, however, does not necessarily require building a more powerful military machine, assuming a more assertive military posture, or taking a rising China as its arch enemy. That Washington attaches great importance to the U.S.-Japanese alliance as its key security investment in the region since the Cold War years is also understandable. Yet, strong U.S.-Japanese security ties should not come at the expense of stable U.S.-Chinese-Japanese trilateral relations. Indeed, as China’s material power and influence grows, it will play an even more important role in regional affairs. In the end, sound trilateral relations among Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington will best serve regional peace and prosperity.

\*\*\*Politics\*\*\*

Dems Oppose

Some democrats are against relocation or withdrawal of US troops from Japan.

AP in 10 (AP, Japan Today, U.S. senator open to options on Japan base dispute, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-senator-open-to-options-on-japan-base-dispute)pl

A member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee said Monday he’s open to hearing options on how to resolve a dispute over the relocation of a contentious U.S. Marine base on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Starting a weeklong tour in Japan and Guam, Sen Jim Webb also called Toyota’s recent recall problems—the subject of two congressional hearings next week—a “business issue” that wouldn’t affect political ties between Japan and the United States. U.S.-Japan relations soured after the new Tokyo government put on hold a plan to move Futenma Marine airfield on the southern island of Okinawa—part of a broader 2006 agreement with Washington to reorganize the 47,000 U.S. troops in Japan—because of local opposition. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who swept into power last August, has said he plans to make a decision on Futenma by May. Webb, who has made numerous visits to Okinawa over the last 40 years, first as a Marine during the Vietnam War and later as a U.S. defense planner and government official, said the main purpose of his visit was to listen to the views of the Japanese government and people of Okinawa, where many resent the heavy U.S. military presence. “There could be a number of practical options,” Webb said about ways to resolve the Futenma issue. “I don’t want to outline those options today because I don’t want to cut short the discussions that we’re going to have.” Webb said a solution needed to be found quickly “on the Futenma issue for the well-being of the citizens in that area.” “I am open to listening to all suggestions from the Japanese government and also the people of Okinawa,” he told journalists at a press conference. The Obama administration has insisted the Hatoyama government proceed with the 2006 plan to move Futenma to Nago, a city in a less crowded part of Okinawa that recently elected an anti-base mayor. Webb said he did not recommend moving Futema’s facilities outside of Okinawa, as many local residents want, but he also suggested he didn’t necessarily support the Obama’s administration’s position. “We’re not a parliamentary system, so I am not obligated to support the administration in a specific way,” he said.

Dems Oppose

Influential Democrats oppose withdrawal of troops from Japan from Guam relocation

Brown in 10 (Peter J, Satellite journalist from Maine, Asia Times, Webb walks the line on redeployment, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LB20Dh01.html)pl>

United States Senator Jim Webb of Virginia has completed a week-long tour of the Asia-Pacific region to meet officials in Tokyo, Okinawa and Guam, among other places. Webb serves as chairman of the US Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations' East Asia and Pacific Affairs sub-committee as well as chairman of the personnel sub-committee on the Committee on Armed Services. He planned this trip for a number of reasons. Webb has a strong interest in personnel-related basing decisions in Japan. He is also keenly interested in the "big picture" when it comes to US relations with Asian countries in general. The primary purpose of Webb's trip was to evaluate the status of the US plan to relocate the US Marine Corps' Futenma air base from Ginowan to Nago on Okinawa. That is, if Japan ultimately decides to carry out this proposal, which was approved by a previous government in 2006. Webb now realizes that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government will fall apart instantly if the premier decides to go ahead and, in effect, break a promise that he made during his election campaign last year to uphold the wishes of the local electorate on Okinawa. A clear majority there do not want this relocation to happen. Webb was also interested in finding out what has to be done on Guam to prepare for the proper housing and accommodation of thousands of marines, their families and support personnel who will be transferred there as part of the relocation plan. When Webb visited Guam, he was not caught off guard by several senior elected officials telling him point blank that Guam is simply not prepared to meet the 2014 timetable for the relocation of the USMC personnel moving from Okinawa to Guam. These would be just some of the estimated 80,000 people, slightly less than half the island's present population, who will arrive over the next four years as part of a huge US military buildup on the island. US Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo, who represents the island and describes Webb as "a friend of Guam", seems increasingly annoyed that it will soon have to deal with a sudden population surge. "Nobody wants 80,000 additional people on Guam in 2014," she said. "We will do everything that we can, federally and locally, to stop that from happening. As I said before, we have our foot on the brakes. I will not support appropriations and authorizations that will result in a construction pace that brings 80,000 people to Guam in 2014." For Bordallo, Governor Felix Camacho, and other elected representatives, there was a growing sense of urgency as they tried to convince an influential member of the US Senate that the US military presence on Guam is entering an awkward phase, and that more coherent planning and better coordination was necessary. It is safe to say that Okinawa is not the only place where the local population is frustrated and increasingly uncomfortable with US military bases as neighbors. While Guam may be reluctant to admit, it appears to be slowly tilting in the same direction. This is no minor matter. US President Barack Obama will visit Guam next month as part of his upcoming trip to the region, which will include stops in Indonesia and Australia. The last thing that the Obama team wants to confront is a media circus spawned by upset residents complaining about the US government's seizure of more land on Guam, or about how acres of precious coral reefs may be destroyed in the military makeover. Webb's timing for this trip was ideal. He arrived on Guam just days after Bordallo had openly confronted US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and US Navy Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff during a defense budget hearing on Capitol Hill. She planted important buzzwords like "coral reefs" and "aircraft carriers" in the ears of the two top US military decision makers after complaining loudly that any outright seizure of additional land by the US military outside its existing "footprint" on Guam was unacceptable. It is doubtful, by the way, that Bordallo enjoyed making Gates and Mullen squirm in their seats. This was simply meant to send a strong message to the White House. Bordallo probably is aware that Webb is in the midst of another base-related showdown involving aircraft carriers. There is a proposal to shift an aircraft carrier battle group from Webb's state of Virginia - more specifically from Norfolk, the home base of the US Atlantic Fleet in Virginia - to a base further south in Florida. Webb's antenna went up immediately when this proposal first surfaced, and he adamantly opposes it. US politicians have battled over the future of US military bases both at home and abroad for years. Webb happens to be an astute Navy-centric politician who is keen on enhancing the US role in Asia at a time when the US government is drowning in red ink. Webb, a Democrat, is also in a very good position at a time when his political party is going through a very rough time. Like it or not, Obama needs good advice as he prepares for his second trip to Asia, and Webb who has already upped his profile as a mender of fences following his surprisingly successful foray into Myanmar last year may have important insights to share. Webb is not Gates. Webb went to Japan, Okinawa and Guam simply to listen, whereas Gates went to Japan in particular not just to listen, but to end the debate and instil in the Japanese a sense of purpose. When Webb informed Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima a few days ago that the planned airfield relocation on Okinawa from Ginowan to Nago should go forward for safety reasons, one gets the sense that Webb's statement may have been more polite and predictable than firm and distant. "There is no ideal solution to the transient berth proposal at Apra Harbor but I would urge a solution that requires the least damage to our coral and the least dredging." The sensitivity of this situation cannot be overlooked. Obama must step off Air Force One and be seen immediately by the public as a global climate-concerned, coral-hugging friend of Guam. So, as both the Mayor of Nago, Japan and Guam's lone representative in the US Congress find themselves fending off US military planners and each struggles to preserve the future wellbeing of their communities, a bond may be forming. This is what Webb's world looked like in mid-February as he trekked across the Pacific trying to emphasize the importance of partnerships at each stop. He walked a fine line and then went home to Virginia.

Public Supports

There is strong public and Democratic support for withdrawing troops from Japan.

Baldassare in 1 (Mark, Senior Fellow at Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, Global California: Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S\_901GMBS.pdf)pl

U.S. military troops have been stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. This military presence has been a controversial issue recently for both nations as they seek to redefine their relationship in the post-Cold War era. Californians are just as likely to support a U.S. military presence in Japan (45%) as to favor withdrawing the troops and letting Japan provide its own military defense (47%). Eight percent are not sure. In a Harris nationwide survey in March 1999, 63 percent of Americans said that the United States should maintain the bases as they are now, while 31 percent thought that the United States should reduce American forces in Japan. The question wording was different, making direct comparisons difficult. Still, Californians today seem remarkably ambivalent toward a military presence in Japan. State residents who say that U.S.-Japan relations are “very important” are divided on the issue of maintaining or withdrawing the troops (49% to 44%). A similar split is evident for those who have a favorable opinion of Japan (47% to 46%), who think that Japan and the United States have a lot in common (46% to 48%), who think that Japan has had a major influence on the United States (45% to 47%), and who think that current relations between Japan and the United States are excellent or good (48% to 46%). However, Californians' differing views on the most important issue in U.S.-Japan relations does influence how they feel about U.S. troops in Japan. Those who see economic issues as most important are divided on a continued U.S. military presence (45% to 48%), while those who see political and security issues as most significant are most in favor (54% to 41%) of keeping U.S. troops in Japan, and those who view global cooperation on issues such as the environment and population are most opposed (50% to 39%) to maintaining a U.S. military presence. Support for a military withdrawal is strong among 18 to 34 year olds (51%), while those 35 and older are evenly divided on the issue of maintaining or ending a military presence. Interestingly, there are no major socioeconomic differences on the question of U.S. military involvement in Japan. There are no differences across income levels. College graduates are slightly more in favor of troop withdrawal, but opinions are fairly evenly divided across education levels. There are also no major variations in attitudes across racial and ethnic groups. There are, however, some differences across partisan lines. A majority of Republicans (54%) are in favor of a continued U.S. military presence, while Democrats (50%) and other voters (50%) lean toward a troop withdrawal. San Francisco Bay area residents are more in favor of troop withdrawal than continuing to station troops in Japan (50% to 39%).

Public Opposes

Believing in a threat, the US public supports military intervention overseas.

Lee, Dury et al in 6 (Yitan and Cooper, Prof. of political science at U of Missouri, International Studies Association, "Pretty Prudent" or Swayed by Rhetoric?: The American Public's Support of Military Action, p.7)pl

In assessing these explanations for public attitudes toward military intervention, Jentleson (1992) disparages them all as non-purposive, arguing that they do not adequately capture the public’s reasoning for supporting or opposing the use of military force. He argues instead that the public is “‘pretty’ prudent,” consistently supporting military intervention to restrain aggression but opposing application of military force to induce internal political change. Restraining aggression generally involves intervening in an international rather than a domestic situation. Jentleson (1992: 53) argues that an international intervention involves “strategies that are primarily military” making the goal more concrete and easier for the public to grasp. Additionally, since domestic intervention involves sticky issues such as sovereignty, international norms typically accord less legitimacy to this type of military action, a point that is not lost on the American public. Finally, restraining aggression normally involves a “more clear and present” danger, and hence a clearer and more short-term policy commitment than does the “nation-building” character of much domestic intervention (Jentleson 1992: 54). According to Jentleson and his colleagues, these factors lead the American public to prefer policies that seek to stop international aggression. Does Rhetoric Matter? As suggested above, an important and potentially confounding issue is present in the “pretty prudent” argument. Military intervention to stop aggression is a rather simple policy to explain. When Saddam Hussein first invaded Kuwait, President Bush came on national television and said “This aggression will not stand.” It is hard to imagine a clearer, more succinct statement of a policy goal. While the details of how Iraqi troops would be removed from Kuwait were not explicated, the president clearly expressed the intention to end Iraq’s foreign aggression. In marked contrast, military intervention aimed at nation-building tends to be more difficult to explain. Somalia again provides a vivid example.

Public DN Care

The American public doesn’t care about foreign policy

Mueller 3 (John, professor of Political Science at Ohio University, “American Public Opinion and Military Ventures Abroard <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2003.PDF>) JL

In general, the American public pays very little attention to international affairs, a condition that does not seem to have been changed by the events of September 11, 2001. It seems to apply a fairly reasonable, commonsensical standard of benefit and cost when evaluating foreign affairs, and is about as accepting of involvement in foreign affairs as ever, but it does not have--and never has had--much stomach for losing American lives in ventures and arenas that are of little concern to it and does not value foreign lives highly. Although the President does not necessarily need public support in advance to pull off a military venture, there is little or no long term political gain from successful ones. When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American lives, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended or untenable position with little concern about saving face. However, if they are not being killed, American troops can remain in peace-keeping or nation-building ventures virtually indefinitely--for the most part, nobody will even remember that they are there.

T- Offshore balance = reduce military presence

Offshore balancing requires military disengagement from the host state

Christopher Layne in 97 International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997), pp. 86-124

Offshore balancing is a strategy for the multipolar world that already is emerging. Its underlying premise is that it will become increasingly more difficult dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control over, the international political system as called for by the strategy of preponderance. Offshore balancing would define U,S. interests narrowly in terms of defending the United States' territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore balancer, the United States would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy would be to insulate the United States from future great power wars and maximize its relative power position in the international system. Offshore balancing would reject the strategy of preponderance's commitment to economic interdependence because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore balancing also would eschew any ambition of perpetuating U.S. hegemony and would abandon the ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of preponderance. As an offshore balancer, the United States would not assertively export democracy, engage directly in peace enforcement operations, attempt to save "failed states" (like Somalia and Haiti), or use military power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. An offshore balancing strategy would be considerably less expensive than the strategy of preponderance. It would require defense budgets in the range of 2-2.5 percent of GNP. American military strategy for possible interventions would be based on the principle of limited liability. In contrast to the force structure currently underpinning the strategy of preponderance, offshore bal ancing would sharply reduce the size and role of US. ground forces. The strategy's backbone would be robust nuclear deterrence, air power, and—most important—overwhelming naval power. In the latter respect, an offshore balancing strategy would stress sea-based ballistic missile defense (crucial in the event the United States has to wagecoalitional warfare in the early twenty-first century) and sea-based precision, standoff weapons systems (enabling the United States to bring its military power to bear without committing ground forces to combat). The United States also could use naval power as a lever against others' economic interests to achieve its political objectives. As an offshore balancer, the United States would seek simultaneously to maximize its comparative military-technological advantages and its strategic flexibility.

Offshore balancing means a substantial decrease in military presence

Stephen Walt in 2k7 Brown Journal of World Affairs, Offshore Balancing or International Institutions? The Way Forward for U.S. Foreign Policy, http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/33119788/Offshore-Balancing-or-International-Institutions-The-Way-Forward-for-US-Foreign-Policy

A better, more realistic strategy would be one of offshore balancing. It recognizes the United States doesn't need to control other parts of the world or tell other societies how to govern their own internal processes. It just needs to maintain local balances of power to ensure that key areas of the world aren't dominated by hostile powers. For example, we have to make sure that Persian Gulf oil doesn't fall under the control of a single hostile power. Intervening with our own forces should only be a last resort, partly because other countries see U.S. power as potentially dangerous. Offshore balancing recognizes that U.S. power can do many good things, but the United States is not good at running other societies and we should stay out of that business. It calls for limiting our global military presence because that presence generates resentment, fuels more terrorism, and threatens our liberty at home. Finally, offshore balancing recognizes that there are limits to U.S. power.

T- Offshore balance = reduce military presence

Offshore balancing is a strategy for reducing military presence

MASASHI OKUYAMA in 2k5 (University of Reading, UNISCI Discussion Papers, GEOPOLITICS OF NORTH EAST ASIA: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE, http://revistas.ucm.es/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0505230009A.PDF)

‘Disengagement’ is the total opposite of ‘full engagement.’ This strategy generally aims to withdraw from the balance-of-power politics in the Eurasian continent. Thus, this means that the U.S.’s military presence should be reduced or completely eradicated from foreign soil. In general, there are two kinds of ‘disengagement’ strategies involved. The first is ‘isolationism’, and the other is ‘offshore balancing’.19 The former aims at the complete withdrawal from political-military involvement in the Eurasian land mass, and the latter aims in the same direction, except for occasional maintenance of the Eurasian balance of power. Both suggest bringing troops back home, yet ‘offshore balancing’ involves political (and of course, if necessary, military) interventions such as the United Kingdom exercised against the European continent for centuries.

Offshore balancing is a reduction in military presence

Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay in 2k5 (is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and vice president at the Council on Foreign Relation, Boston Review, 'For America, the age of geopolitics has ended and the age of global politics has begun.', http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/daalder.php)

Moreover, while Bush’s rhetoric often suggests otherwise, the actual conduct of foreign policy in the past four years mirrors the offshore balancing strategy Walt advocates. Bush has pushed for a reduction in the American military presence in Europe and Asia along the lines Walt supports. He has largely ignored areas around the world that are deemed of only peripheral interest to the United States—Africa and Latin America foremost among them. He has embraced rather than antagonized America’s most likely global competitors such as China, Russia, and India, and he has sought to divide Europe to exert power rather than to unite it in possible opposition to American interests. And for all his democratization rhetoric, Bush has done very little to undermine the authoritarian rule of America’s most important friends in the Middle East.

Offshore balancing policy ends permanent military presence

Dr Bromley in 2k8 Simon, Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University, American Power and the Prospects for International Order, Google Books

The obvious role for the United States, therefore, is as the external - though not. strictly speaking, offshore - balancer to the rivalries and balance of power among these states. While some analysts recommend a strategy of offshore balancing for the United Slates - that is. a policy that refrains from large-scale, quasi-permanent military engagements overseas' (currently in Europe. Japan and South Korea and perhaps in a future Iraq) - in which forces would only be deployed when a change in the regional balance posed 'specific threats to U.S. vital interest\*."4 this is to assume that the political and geopolitical influence that ihe United States derives from the forward commitment of military power to the European and Asian theatres is not a vital interest. Moreover, given what has already been said aboul the political importance of land forces, both assigns ofcommiimenl and as the sine qua non of an ability to turn military power into political outcome, the specific recommendations of advocates of offshore balancing - for example. Walt recommends that the United Stales drastically reduce its military presence in Europe, deploy its military forces in Asia primarily as air and naval forces and return to a balance of power policy in the Middle East aimed at denying dominance to others'5 - might easily be read assigns of strategic retreat as opposed to strategic restraint.