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Sales tax needs uniqueness.

Hegemony answers should be in the Heg Disad.

The impact debate for rearm is in the aff file.

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The China Relations stuff should help you with the counterplan. In the 2NC you can say rearm good, but you are on the wrong side of that debate. Don’t, don’t, don’t read the rearm disad with the counterplan. That’s a double-turn. You’ll lose. That’s never good. But you’re smart. So I know that you would never even think of doing anything stupid like that. If the aff reads rearm as a disad to the counterplan, you should say rearm links to them and go for case and rearm bad. And by case, I mean impact defense too and not just stuff in this small file.

If you’re aff, you should read the consult is normal means cards as reasons that the US would never ever let Japan kick American troops out. You should also read rearm as a disad to the counterplan. If they try to link it to you, win that your other advantages outweigh.

---Case---

AT: Dugong

Multiple alt causes.

Thai Society for the Conservation of Wild Animals, 10 (date last modified), http://www.tscwa.org/wildlife/rare\_or\_extinct\_15.html

Today the numbers of the dugong have fallen rapidly to a critical condition because they have been hunted for food, caught in fishing nets and die as a result. In addition to the long reproduction cycle, dugong eat only sea grasses which are getting scarcer because of pollution, contributing to fewer feeding areas and the possible contamination of existing feeding areas which might poison the dugong.

AT: Futenma Key to Relations

The Okinawa base issue is only a small part of Japan-US relations and may get lost in transition to the new government

Tze M. Loo, assistant professor of East Asian history at the University of Richmond, Virginia, June 10, 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-edloo.html?\_r=1

Was Hatoyama doomed to fail from the beginning? Maybe. The Futenma base issue is only the most visible tip of a much larger configuration of issues relating to the foundations of the postwar Japanese state and U.S.-Japan relations. It was naïve to think that Hatoyama could singlehandedly undo a situation that has been more than 60 years in the making.

But there are many ways to fail, and Hatoyama failed particularly badly. He reached an agreement with the United States on May 28 about Futenma’s relocation despite the strong, vocal and frequent expressions of opposition from Okinawans.

The anger at Hatoyama’s betrayal shut down channels of communication between Okinawa and the central government and aggravated local mistrust of the center. It has also exacerbated the sense among Okinawans that “mainland Japan” is perfectly willing to continue its discriminatory treatment of Okinawa by leaving the island to carry the burden of the U.S.-Japan security relationship from which all Japan benefits.

But this is not only about Okinawa. Any serious attempt to address the question of bases on Okinawa cannot avoid the inextricably linked question of the entire U.S.-Japan security arrangement.

In mishandling the Futenma issue, Hatoyama squandered the opportunity to start a frank discussion — and perhaps even a rethinking — of what Japan’s role in that relationship is, and what it wants from it.

This is crucial for Japan as a whole because a conversation about the country’s future direction (including its existing security relationships) within a rapidly changing East Asia is becoming increasingly necessary.

Hatoyama cast his resignation as taking responsibility for failure on the Futenma issue, but this too, looks likely to hurt the situation. Since his resignation, Japanese media and popular attention to the Futenma issue has collapsed, and Okinawa’s base issue faces the very real risk of getting lost in the transition to the new government.

Indeed, the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, has made the Japanese economy his primary focus. Regarding Futenma, he reaffirmed the government’s commitment to the May 28 agreement with the U.S. while promising (vaguely) to give attention to reducing Okinawa’s base burdens.

AT: Oppression

1. The Japanese Government has added to the oppression faced by Japanese civilians

Jorene Soto, “We're Here to Protect Democracy - We're Not Here to Practice It: The U.S. Military's Involvement in Trafficking in Persons and Suggestions for the Future”, [Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender, 2007[](http://heinonline.org/HOL/Contents?handle=hein.journals/cardw13&id=1&size=2&index=&collection=journals)http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cardw13&id=8&type=text&collection=journals]

Like the Philippines, women and children were trafficked to Japan from throughout Asia to fulfill the sexual desires of United States military personnel after the United States occupation at the end of World War II. The Japanese government lured hundreds of Japanese and Korean women and children to areas occupied by United States military personnel with false promises of lodging, clothing, and food.30 When the women and children arrived, they were forced to prostitute themselves to United States military personnel.3' The Japanese government spent nearly five million dollars to send approximately 70,000 women and children to areas surrounding United States military bases as an "emergency measure to protect our [pure] women and children from sex starved American soldiers."32 The Japanese Interior Ministry even recruited members of the Japanese army's women's corps to "bear the unbearable and be a shield for all Japanese women."33 Fine restaurants were turned into brothels with Japanese-government supplied prostitutes. United States military personnel paid eight cents for admission to the restaurant, a bottle of beer, and the services of a prostitute

2. The U.S. military and Japanese civilian are working together to reduce problems

Global Security.org ‘9

[www.globalsecurity.org/**military**/facility/**okinawa**.htm]

The bases and communities cooperate on issues affecting them both. Military aviation units have adjusted flying hours to reduce aircraft noise over civilian neighborhoods and schools. Okinawan real estate agents go out of their way to help service families find off-base housing near their work place and schools. And both communities -- military and civilian -- invite each other to participate in festivals and other social events.

AT: Global Instability

1. Impacts empirically denied—US troops have been in Japan since WWII without causing conflict.

2. U.S. withdrawal would leave Japan vulnerable—they lack the technology to counter China and North Korea—makes conflict more likely.

William C. Middlebrooks, Jr., policy program manager at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network for the Department of the Treasury, 2008; (Beyond Pacifism: Why Japan Must Become a “Normal” Nation, pg. xvii) http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=g-66eH6KCnIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Japan+military+rearm+&ots=Lh3wa4QdUc&sig=ZEcKE1J\_o1cHOc9l4zwHUNNhDSM#v=onepage&q=Japan%20military%20rearm&f=false

In North Korea, Japan has a calculating and determined foe willing and able to commit mass murder in its desperate struggle to prop up its cadaverous regime. North Korea’s launch of a Taepo Dong-I missile over the northern part of Japan in August 1998, and its test of at nuclear device eight years later, provided irrefutable proof not only that Japan is at risk as never before, but that the Japanese are ill equipped to counter North Korean aggressions. Because of Article 9 and decades of cautious interpretation, Japan is unprepared in almost every conceivable way to face the menace on the western shore of the Sea of Japan: Japan’s Air Self Defense Force does not have the capability to hit North Korean launch sites and return should Tokyo decide to strike preemptively, no branch of the SDF possesses land attack cruise missiles, and, even if such weapons were in its arsenal, Japan has not developed institutions and doctrines configured for a quick response to any North Korean threat. If that were not enough, the threat that a resurgent China poses (eager as it is to reacquire the dominant role in the region that it has not played in centuries) is potentially a more pronounced danger to Japan’s long-term interests. Japan’s ability to protect itself hinges on its willingness to break free of the inertia generated by 60 years of living under the premise that pacifism is a viable alternative to the immoral and ineffective reliance on crude violence as a means to defend one’s homeland. The premise is false, of course, because Japan has rested its defense, not on the good wishes of the world’s people, but entirely upon the promise of the greatest military power in the history of ~~man~~kind to go to war on Japan’s behalf should it be attacked. That promise is no longer sufficient to ensure Japan’s well-being.

**U.S.-Japan alliance key to stability in volatile, proliferated East Asia.**

Richard L. Armitage, et al, study group organized by National Defense University, 2000. (National Defense University) http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR\_JAPAN.HTM

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

AT: Global Instability

**Withdrawal weakens US-Japan Alliance – Japan may proliferate and become U.S. rival.**

(Daizo **Sakurada**, Associate Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Integrated Arts & Sciences of the University of Tokushima in Japan, July 19**97**, “For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective” http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working\_Papers/WP07.pdf”

The withdrawal of the US military forces from Japan would represent a fundamental disengagement of US military commitments in East Asia; it would signify the end of American trustworthiness. Fearing Japan’s remilitarization, no state in the Asia‐Pacific region, except perhaps North Korea, seeks the termination of the Treaty. Once the Treaty is abolished, Japan would be forced to consider options that Washington would currently regard as unpalatable. Japan may decide to take on a more independent strategic role in the region. The SDF could be developed to a greater potential, and could be used directly in support of its foreign policy goals. Strategic links with China and Russia could be reconsidered. Moreover, Japan might have to seriously consider a nuclear option. At the extreme both Japan and the US could grow to regard each other as hostile entities.44 The Treaty provides a mechanism to avoid this strategic rivalry and to deepen the cooperative strategic relationship between Japan and the United States.

**Japanese leadership supports U.S. alliance and presence.**

**CBS News**, 6-22-**10**. CBS News: US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, Faces New Strains. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/ap/asia/main6605396.shtml

(AP) TOKYO (AP) – Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a post-World War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyo’s new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact.

Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington.

“Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region,” Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. “Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States.”

The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan.

**U.S. presence in past big help to Japanese economy – limits Japan’s own defense budget.**

**CBS News**, 6-22-**10**. CBS News: US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, Faces New Strains. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/ap/asia/main6605396.shtml

The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere – a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world’s second-largest economy.

“Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong,” said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance.”

AT: Econ

Japanese economy is already recovering due to increased car and electronics exporting.

Hiroko Tabuchi, business, economics and technology reporter at The New York Times, May 19, 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/business/global/21yen.html

The Japanese economy grew at a healthy clip of 1.2 percent in the first quarter, the government said Thursday, hinting that the country’s recovery from a crippling recession was finally gathering momentum.

The expansion from the previous quarter marked the economy’s fourth quarterly gain in a row; it expanded by 1 percent in the last three months of 2009.

Economic recovery in Japan has been bolstered by a rebound in the nation’s mainstay exports of cars and electronics, which posted the fourth year-on-year rise in March. The rebound finally appears to be filtering through to domestic production and wages.

The Greek debt crisis, which has roiled global markets and caused the yen to surge against the euro, has raised some concerns that Japanese exports might suffer. A strong yen hurts Japanese exporters because it makes their products more expensive overseas, and their foreign-currency earnings are worth less when converted into yen.

Japan will “continue to experience an upward momentum for the time being,” Hirokata Kusaba, senior economist at the Mizuho Research Institute in Tokyo, said in a note Thursday after the economic growth figures were released.

**Japan’s economy is strong.**

Greg Sheridan, Foreign Editor, The Australian, 6/12/10

Official figures released this week indicate the Japanese economy was growing at an annual rate of 5 per cent in the first quarter of this year, its fourth consecutive quarter of growth.

The Japanese recovery has been export led though there are some signs of growing domestic demand now, too. It is reasonable to ask whether Europe's burgeoning debt crisis, and the need to cut demand through cutting expenditure in Europe and to some extent North America, will hurt Japanese recovery.

The early policy statements and actions of Kan, who was finance minister before becoming Prime Minister, all look pretty encouraging.

Solvency

Insiders agree—they can’t solve—logistics and politics.

Reuters, 10, “Japan PM Seeks to Quell Okanawan Anger over U.S. Base,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M0TS20100623 cp

Hatoyama had raised the hopes of Okinawa residents before the DPJ's landslide election win last year that Futenma could be moved off the island, but he failed to find a replacement site elsewhere in Japan or outside the country.

Washington and Tokyo have agreed to work out by the end of August a detailed plan, including a relocation site, but Japan's defense minister has already expressed doubts over how smoothly the deal can be implemented.

An election for the governor of Okinawa is due in November and the result could also affect the airbase deal, coming near the time when Obama is expected to visit Japan for an Asia-Pacific leaders' summit.

---China Relations---

Sino-Japanese Relations High

Relations high:

First, Japanese and Chinese reconciliation.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

While Japan may be seen as having initiated a chain of negative bilateral dynamics during Koizumi’s term in office, Tokyo’s foreign policy behaviour since 2006 has opened up the way for an improvement in Sino-Japanese political and security relations. From a Chinese perspective, a major contributing factor for this is the fact that none of Koizumi’s successors has visited Yasukuni. Abe’s first foreign trip as prime minster was to China, which was followed by the resumption of mutual diplomatic visits. Fukuda Yasuo (2007-2008), for his part, strongly promoted a deepening of ties with the PRC, and succeeded in steering Japan-China relations towards what was termed as “a new era of a mutually beneficial relationship”. During the term of Aso, the history issue re-emerged amid his decision to make an offering to Yasukuni. However, Beijing’s reaction was rather restrained in comparison with the Koizumi era. The Chinese government stressed its determination to push forward the “bilateral strategic mutual-beneficial ties”, while calling on Japan “to properly settle existing problems” with the PRC (Xinhua, 2009). Finally, Japan’s domestic political scene has dramatically changed in the wake of the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) electoral victory in the summer of 2009. The administration of Hatoyama Yukio (2009-present) has emphasised Japan’s Asia diplomacy, which contrasts with the US-centred foreign policy that had been pursued by the LDP.

Specifically—China is acknowledging Japanese apologies for WWII and trying to control anti-Japanese sentiment.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Beijing’s changing strategy towards Tokyo became clear when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his 2007 speech at the Japanese Diet11 acknowledged Japan’s remorse and apology for its aggression during World War II, and, what was seen as even more striking from a Japanese perspective, expressed an unequivocal appreciation for Japanese ODA to China (Daily Yomiuri, 2007b). Subsequent policies by the Hu administration, including the introduction of restrictions on media reports critical of Japan, have sought to contain Chinese people’s anti-Japan attitudes. The CCP government has also focused on promoting a positive image of Japan and de-emphasising the history problem, which has been possible due to Tokyo’s “non-provocative” behaviour on the history issue. Indeed, the dilemma that the PRC government faces is that while it may not be seen by its people as being soft on Japan due to the widespread anti-Japan attitudes (not least stimulated by official patriotism), it also realises that uncontrolled public sentiment could easily turn against the CCP regime (Moon and Suh, 2008). Domestic goals, therefore, seemed to underpin Beijing’s adjustment in its Tokyo strategy (Fujino, 2007). These included securing political stability and controlling the anti-Japan public sentiments, especially ahead of important events such as the 17th CCP convention in 2007, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. Mutual economic interests have also contributed to positive bilateral relations. In particular, Japan’s cooperation with China in the fields of environmental protection and energy conservation is seen by Beijing as crucial for China’s further economic development (ibid.).

Sino-Japanese Relations High

Second, military cooperation—but relations could deteriorate.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

As far as the security dimension of Sino-Japanese relations is concerned, there have been attempts for enhancing military transparency and confidence-building. These include regular highlevel defence meetings, an agreement for the establishment of an emergency communication hotline between the SDF and PLA, and the first since 1945 mutual visits by naval ships.12 Indeed, while a bilateral agreement for exchange visits by warships was reached in 2000, Beijing postponed the planned visits due to Koizumi’s tributes to Yasukuni. The Hatoyama administration has moved forward with strengthening defence ties with Beijing when in November 2009 the two sides agreed to hold in 2010 their first joint naval drill for search and rescue operations, as well as start discussions on cooperation in the areas of disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operations. These attempts in the post-Koizumi era for mutual reassurance have been paralleled by expressions of mutual strategic suspicion, however. Japanese White Papers on Defence have continued to urge Beijing to improve its military transparency, expressing concerns about its growing military spending. Abe, for example, stressed in 2007 that improved transparency was crucial if China were “to play a responsible role in the region” (Daily Yomiuri, 2007a). For its part, Hatoyama’s advisory group on security issues, which is preparing recommendations for the 2010 revision of the NDPG, has reportedly focused on the PRC’s military build-up in its discussions. Beijing has warned that playing the “China threat” card would damage mutual trust, while some Chinese observers have concluded that Tokyo would likely return to this approach in the new NDPG (Xinhua, 2010).

Third, public sentiment improving.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

With efforts made by both governments to maintain stable bilateral relations at the political level, public sentiments towards the other have changed as well. However, whereas in China there has been a sharp increase of a positive attitude towards Japan, there has been no such improvement, but indeed a worsening, of China’s image among the Japanese (Okada, 2008). While the CCP’s efforts at easing the anti-Japan sentiment may have succeeded domestically, many Japanese people have arguably continued to view China’s rise with suspicion and fear. The trend under Hatoyama suggests a slight increase in positive Japanese perceptions of China and the bilateral relations; the percentage remains lower than that observed among the Chinese (Daily Yomiuri, 2009).

Sino-Japanese Relations High

Fourth, security interests.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

The arrival of a DPJ-led administration in Tokyo may have further changed the strategic positioning of Japan and China within the triangle. The Hatoyama government has called for “an equal” US-Japan alliance, stressing the need for Japan to reduce its dependence on Washington in foreign policy. Instead, he has emphasised Japan’s ties with Asia, especially China and South Korea, and proposed the formation of “an East Asian community”. Strains in Japan-US security relations have emerged due to Hatoyama’s decision to review a bilateral agreement for the relocation of the US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Tokyo has also withdrawn Japanese supply ships from the Indian Ocean in support of the US-led war on terror, after the law authorising the refuelling mission (initially enacted by Koizumi in 2001) expired in January. Domestic considerations are arguably a leading factor for these decisions, given that the DPJ needs the support of its left-wing coalition partner (the Social Democratic Party) in the 2010 Diet elections. Critics warn that Hatoyama’s policies may lead to US distrust of Japan and have an adverse impact on the planned in 2010 revision of the alliance to mark the 50th anniversary of the bilateral Security Treaty.

Tensions Now – Taiwan

Specifically, the US, Japan, and China clash over Taiwan.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

It is the Taiwan question that has arguably led Beijing to see Tokyo’s adjustments in its security policy largely through the lens of cross-Strait relations; from a Japanese perspective, the perceived North Korean military threat is a legitimate reason to strengthen its defence posture and alliance with the US. China has been worried that the revised in 1997 US-Japan Defence Guidelines could be applied to a Taiwan contingency, as Tokyo and Washington have refused to explicitly rule Taiwan in or out, adopting a situational rather than geographical definition of the region, instead (Green, 2003). Likewise, Beijing has been concerned that a mobile, sea-based US-Japan BMD system could be used for the defence of Taiwan and, thereby, neutralise the mainland’s ability to coerce the island into re-unification. According to some Chinese analysts, the alleged inclusion of Taiwan in the US-Japan security cooperation “serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan” by creating perceptions that Washington and Tokyo would help Taipei “no matter which side provoked a war” in the Strait (Wu, 2005: 126). The 2004 Chinese White Paper on Defence stressed that the PRC would “never allow anyone to split Taiwan” and that if Taipei decided to seek independence China would “resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost” (Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2004).

Tensions over Taiwan.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

The Taiwan issue is also an illustration of the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, in which strategic divergences intersect with domestic politics. For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is a core national security interest on which the Chinese government cannot compromise. For Japan, Taiwan is particularly relevant from a geopolitical perspective, as the Taiwan Strait is located in an area where Japan’s vital for its economy SLOC stretch. This arguably feeds Beijing’s suspicion that Tokyo does not want reunification, hence its real motives behind the deepening of its security ties with Washington, as a unified China might be seen as a challenge to Japan’s strategic interests in the Western Pacific. Although Tokyo has officially adhered to a “one China policy” since the 1972 normalisation, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance has been perceived by Beijing as signalling a shift in Japan’s Taiwan policy (Xinhua, 2005a). Tokyo’s involvement in cross-Strait relations is viewed all the more negatively by the PRC, given Japan’s past colonisation of the island (Wu, 2000). LDP’s moves under Koizumi and Abe to revise Article 9 in order to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence in support of the US were interpreted as a major manifestation of Japan’s growing security ambitions and fuelled further Chinese suspicion regarding Tokyo’s future interference in the Taiwan issue. In Japan, meanwhile, Beijing’s hardened approach towards Taiwan and uncompromising attitude on the history issue only served to strengthen the public’s negative perceptions of the CCP’s authoritarian rule.

Sino-Japanese Tensions Now – Public Opinion

Tensions now—Japanese populations dislikes the Chinese.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

In Japan, meanwhile, negative popular perceptions and distrust of China have increased since the 1990s, not least due to the heightened anti-Japan sentiment within the Chinese society. The 1989 military crackdown on the democratic movement at the Tiananmen square was the first event that triggered a sharp decrease of the number of Japanese with friendly feelings towards the PRC (Mochizuki, 2007). Burdened by “apology fatigue” (Green, 2003), Japanese people increasingly came to believe that Beijing was taking advantage of the history issue in order to extract more economic assistance from Tokyo, as well as prevent Japan from maintaining, or expanding, its regional influence (Roy, 2006). There was also a perceived lack of appreciation for Japanese ODA to China and a strong feeling in Japan that the CCP stimulated anti-Japanese nationalism in order to legitimise its grip on power. These negative perceptions, together with the growing concerns regarding the PRC’s military modernisation and regional ambitions, arguably led to the Koizumi government’s decision in 2005 to terminate the yen loan programme of Japanese aid as of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Sino-Japanese Tensions Now – Energy

China and Japan compete for energy.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Finally, the structural vulnerabilities of Japan and China additionally complicate the security dimension of Sino-Japanese relations. Japan is a resource-poor country, which depends on energy imports for almost all of its oil and natural gas consumption; China’s demand for energy imports is increasing fast. Both countries’ dependence on secure access to energy supplies for ensuring economic growth fuels energy competition and generates mutual distrust. In this context, China’s expansion of its naval and air military capabilities has raised concerns in Tokyo, as this would allow Beijing to project power into the East and South China Seas where Japan’s vital for its economy sea lanes of communication (SLOC) stretch. The ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is representative of a mounting Sino-Japanese energy rivalry, as there are prospects for large oil and gas reserves in the surrounding waters. The dispute escalated in 2004 amid revelations of China’s development of a natural gas project very close to the Japan-drawn demarcation line of the contested exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boarder in the East China Sea. Beijing’s actions led to worries in Tokyo that the sources from the Japanese side could be drained.

Sino-Japanese Tensions Now – Military\*\*\*

High Sino-Japanese tensions now—military actions.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Sino-Japanese relations in the political and security areas have been influenced by a complex interaction of factors from both the international and domestic levels. The structural change in East Asia’s geopolitical environment, and the shift in the balance of power between Japan and China have led to strategic divergences and security dilemma dynamics. China’s military modernisation and active regional diplomacy have fuelled Japanese mistrust and sense of insecurity, while the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and Tokyo’s security activism have been perceived by Beijing as a threat to the resolution of the Taiwan issue. Domestically, the conservative trend in Japanese domestic politics under Koizumi provided a fertile ground for the CCP leadership to stimulate anti-Japanese nationalism and play the “history card” for internal political gains. In turn, this exacerbated mutual distrust and contributed to a sharp increase in the negative public perceptions of the other. The intersection between strategic divergences and domestic politics aggravated Sino-Japanese tensions by exposing the unresolved bilateral problems.

AT: Sino-Japanese Relations Stable

Tensions now—mistrust runs too deep.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

In the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that this cooling-off period will mark a transition towards long-term stability in Sino-Japanese relations. The present stability is fragile, for the differences between the two neighbours have not been resolved at the their root, i.e. at the level of strategic trust. Japan will remain wary of China’s regional strategic intentions and unwilling to accept a Pax-Sinica in East Asia, while Beijing’s concerns about the implications of the US-Japan alliance for the Taiwan issue and uncertainty regarding its relations with Washington will prevent it from treating Japan as a partner. While there may be political will at the moment for improved Sino- Japanese relations, Tokyo and Beijing are still far away from reaching a strategic understanding.

Ext – China-US-Japan Alliance Zero-Sum

US-China-Japan relations are all interconnected.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Sino-Japanese security relations have been largely conducted within a triangular framework of interactions with the US.13 Strategic divergences, unresolved historical issues, contrasting domestic political calculations and volatile public sentiments have been the major obstacles for the two neighbours to establish institutional mechanisms for the management of their relationship. This has increased the significance of the US factor in Sino-Japanese relations. America’s military presence in East Asia and role as a provider for regional stability has been a crucial determinant of Japanese and Chinese respective security policies. For Tokyo, its alliance with the US is the bedrock of Japan’s national security; for Beijing, the US (and its strengthened security partnership with Japan) poses the greatest potential threat to Beijing’s internal stability and leadership ambitions in East Asia. Despite the criticism of Japan’s alleged remilitarisation, most Chinese elites and observers do not seem to worry that, at least in the foreseeable future, Japan might become an independent (of the US) security actor in East Asia or turn into a national security threat to the PRC. China continues to recognise the US security umbrella as putting a cap on Japan’s rearmament. What mostly concerns Beijing is the perceived US hegemony in East Asia, of which Tokyo is seen as a main pillar, and its impact on the Taiwan issue (Roy, 2006). Especially during Koizumi’s term, Beijing regarded Japan’s normalisation being channelled through a strengthened US-Japan alliance and encouraged by Washington, hence came to view Tokyo as a major tool in America’s strategy of balancing the PRC’s rising power and maintaining the US regional security dominance (Wu, 2005).

Indeed, China’s US strategy of, what has been termed as, “hedged acquiescence”14 has been motivated in part by the unprecedented expansion of US-Japan security ties under the Koizumi- George W. Bush partnership, and its recognition of the strategic advantage enjoyed by the US as a balancer (notably with Japan) in Asia’s geopolitics (Pei, 2007). As mentioned earlier, Chinese hedging has included active regional diplomacy and military modernisation efforts. The US, too, has been hedging vis-à-vis China. While emphasising bilateral cooperation with Beijing, Washington has reinforced its security partnerships in Asia, with its alliance with Japan playing a central role in this strategy (Medeiros, 2005). Sino-US relations stabilised during the Bush administration, especially after 9/11, and this trend of focusing on common interests has continued under Obama.

AT: US-Japanese Relations Low

Even if relations are tense, they’re still strong.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

At the moment, therefore, it seems that China is better positioned in the triangle than Japan. While it enjoys good relations with both Obama and Hatoyama, there are tensions between Tokyo and Washington. Some sources note that Beijing’s support for Hatoyama’s “East Asian community” proposal is driven by a goal to weaken the alliance and hence America’s strategic influence in the region (Saeki, 2009). Beijing must also be pleased that Japan’s normalisation drive has slowed down in the post-Koizumi era. Indeed, Japan under Hatoyama seems unlikely to re-emerge as a pillar of the perceived US hegemony in a way that China feared was the case under Koizumi. To be sure, Washington and Tokyo agreed in February 2010 to strengthen their security cooperation and develop a common understanding regarding the security situation in East Asia in the framework of the deepening of the alliance. These developments, together with Hatoyama’s planned revision of the NDPG, led Beijing to remind Tokyo that the US-Japan military cooperation should not “target a third party” (Xinhua, 2010), alluding to a potential joint containment of China. Furthermore, Washington has sided with Tokyo in criticising the PRC’s steady military modernisation and lack of clarity in China’s strategic intentions,15 and the Obama administration, as Hatoyama, has expressed discontent with Beijing’s alleged censorship of the Internet in the wake of the recent Google scandal. Finally, US approval in January 2010 of a new arms package for Taiwan has raised tensions in Sino-US relations.

Chinese Multilateralism Solves Containment

Chinese multilateralism builds trust—key to check against containment.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

For Beijing, multilateralism has formed an important part of its “reassurance campaign” since the late 1990s aimed at minimising concerns in East Asia regarding China’s growing (military) power, especially in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (Saunders, 2008). Accompanied by political rhetoric and concepts such as “peaceful development”, the PRC’s involvement in regional multilateralism has sought to demonstrate to its neighbours that “China’s rise would be benign and mutually beneficial” (Foot, 2006: 85). Finally, Beijing’s regional diplomacy, together with its military modernisation, has become a crucial component of its hedging strategy towards the US (Medeiros, 2005; Pei, 2007). This strategy is designed to reduce the risk of containment by Washington and its East Asian allies, most notably Tokyo, as well as raise the stakes for the US (and Japan) of potential involvement in the Taiwan issue.

Sino-Japanese Relations Good – Energy

Strong relations are key to prevent war over East China Sea oil.

Janet Xuanli Liao, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3/2008, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration,” accessed via Springer Science cp

The period between the 1970s up to the early 1990s witnessed effective energy cooperation between China and Japan, both for economic and strategic reasons. However, the past decade has seen acceleration in energy competition between the two major players in East Asia. Following their rivalry over the Russian oil pipelines which commenced in 2003, these two nations have entered into a further dispute in the case over gas exploration in the East China Sea since mid 2004. Despite a series of diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan that lasted for more than three years, no solution settlement was reached. The commonly held opinion is that such competition is a prelude to an all out energy struggle between China and Japan in the international arena. Some even believe this could lead to armed conflict between these two regional powers [1, 12–14, 32]. Opinions for cooperation also exist [15, 24], but they seem less prevalent, largely due to political distrust between the two nations.

This article argues that while the concern of energy security was genuine given the increasing energy demands by China and Japan, the forces behind their intensified energy competition were political distrust and power politics. Taking the East China Sea dispute as an example, the direct causes for the dispute were the unsettled maritime boundary between China and Japan, which could either be solved through legal arbitrations or be shelved for later negotiations if better political trust existed between China and Japan. Nevertheless, due to the realist zero-sum perceptions held by both governments, no solution has been reached after 11 rounds of the bilateral negotiations in the past three years. This article aspires to illustrate the interplay between the energy security concerns and the mutual political distrust, in order to demonstrate that the power struggles had prevented the two countries from finding a solution to serve their interest in energy security.

Ext – Relations Key to Energy

Bad relations prevent compromise on energy dispute.

Janet Xuanli Liao, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3/2008, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration,” accessed via Springer Science cp

China and Japan started their diplomatic dialogues on 26 October 2004 in Beijing, aimed at finding a solution to the problem of making the East China Sea “a Sea for friendship”. The two delegations were led by Cui Tiankai, head of the Department of Asian Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Mitoji Yabunaka, head of Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, respectively. The focus of the discussions was on how to define the EEZ boundary between the two countries, and whether to jointly explore petroleum resources and how. However, neither side seemed to be prepared to concede but instead insisted on its own position over the EEZ boundary. Beijing repeated its invitation for joint-exploration but Tokyo rejected the offer by demanding China provide data of the gas fields first. Consequently, no progress was made at the first meeting (PD, 26 Oct 2004; FT, 26 Oct 2004).

In fact, fraught with the stressful political relationship between the two powers, the meeting was almost doomed to fail from the start. Despite the opotimistic estimates by the CNOOC, with over 150 billion cubic meters of gas reserves in the Xihu Trough (PD, 27 Apr 2000), a Japanese energy specialist held that the exploration of natural gas in the East China Sea had no economic viability due to the small scale of the gas fields and the high cost of offshore drilling. Many thus believed that the dispute was frought with highly political undertones in both countries prior to the dialogue (creaders.net, 22 Oct 2004). This concern was further proved by the METI Minister Shoichi Nakagawa’s statement that the dispute was a matter not only relevant to Japan’s energy sources, but also relating to its “national interests and sovereignty” (Yomiuri, 25 Oct 2004). Chinese analysts also argued that an overall energy competition with Japan would be “inevitable” given their “scarcity of energy” and the “surprising convergence of supply sources”. Some even went so far to claime that Japan was using energy as a means to constrain China from challenging Japan’s economic leadership in Asia (PD, 28 Oct 2004).

Improved relations are critical to resolve energy disputes—that’s key to East Asian stability.

Janet Xuanli Liao, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3/2008, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration,” accessed via Springer Science cp

However, as shown in the above analysis, the 11 rounds of talks between China and Japan have made limited progress so far, largely due to their lack of political trust. During Junichiro Koizumi’s premiership, such mistrust was highlighted by the history issue and severely undermined the progress of the negotiations. The post-Koizumi era has seen a warmer Sino-Japanese relationship but the political mistrust remains essentially intact, but more relevant to the changed balance of their power potentials. Compared with the history issue, the management of their co-existence as great powers in East Asia is a more practical and tougher task for the two governments. Unless the two nations, especially the top leaderships, are willing to change their perspectives towards each other and to reconcile in the negotiations, the stalemate may well continue for a while yet. It is encouraging to see some positive signs emerging towards an early solution for the dispute, but it is still too early to say if the possibility will be turned into reality in the foreseeable future. Energy security is important for China and Japan, but it should not become a football for power politics, and should never be achieved at the risk of regional peace and stability. East Asia can only stay peaceful and prosperous if China and Japan play a positive role in the region, based on better political trust and more liberal accord towards each other. It requires time for China and Japan to settle their dispute over the East China Sea gas exploration; but more importantly, it requires political willingness and wisdom from the two leaderships to ensure their energy security and regional stability in East Asia. To melt the ice completely, Japan and China must make further efforts.

Aff – East China Sea Dispute Good

Energy dispute prevents oil drilling.

Janet Xuanli Liao, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3/2008, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration,” accessed via Springer Science cp

As the bilateral dispute over the EEZ boundary persisted, Shell and Unocal announced, on 29 September 2004, that they would withdraw from the Xihu Project for “commercial reasons”, under the clause that the final decision on the project could be made “within 12 months pending a further assessment”. A Shell spokesman, Nick Wood, claimed that “Following that assessment, we made a commercial decision not to proceed”. A similar reason was given by Unocal’s spokesman Barry Lane who held that, “after the first year of analysis, we found the resources do not meet out commercial requirements” (IHT & PD, 30 Sept 2004). However, a report by Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun interpreted the oil majors’ withdrawal in a political light. The report alleged that the companies were told by Japan via Washington that, “their investment would be risky as the planned gas field was located in an area disputed” (Mainichi, 1 Oct 2004). Neither the US nor Japanese authorities offered confirmation of the report, but it was logical to assume that the ongoing territorial dispute between China and Japan formed at least part of the reason for their withdrawal.

That destroys ocean health.

USA Today, 7/14/2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2008-07-13-offshore-drilling\_N.htm cp

Environmentalists see two basic problems from offshore drilling: pollution from everyday operations and oil spills from platforms, pipelines and tankers.

On both fronts, they acknowledge, the industry has improved through the years.

"Today's technology is much better at routine drilling, at avoiding the kinds of seepages that were common a generation ago," says Tyson Slocum of Public Citizen.

Even so, there are still risks.

When oil is brought up from beneath the ocean floor, other things are, too. Chemicals and toxic substances such as mercury and lead can be discharged back into the ocean.

The water pumped up along with the oil may contain benzene, arsenic and other pollutants. Even the exploration that precedes drilling, which depends on seismic air guns, can harm sea mammals.

"Basically, oil and water don't mix," says Melanie Duchin of the environmental group Greenpeace, who lives in Alaska and still sees pollution from the 11 million-gallon Exxon Valdez spill of 1989, which supplanted Santa Barbara as the nation's worst. "Oil smothers wildlife."

**Extinction.**

Robin Kundis **Craig**, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, **2003**

34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155

The world's oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable. "Occupy[ing] more than [seventy percent] of the earth's surface and [ninety-five percent] of the biosphere," n17 oceans provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life, both aesthetic and economic, for millions of people worldwide. n18 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the ocean to humanity's well-being:"The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate." n19 Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. n20 In addition, many people assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world's seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact to future generations. n21

AT: Japan Multilateral Now/Strong Regional Ties Now

Not true—multilateral activates only supplement activates taken with the US and Japan is way behind China.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strat

egic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Japan, on the other hand, while emphasising its security alliance with the US, has also supported regional cooperation. The latter has been part of its “comprehensive approach” to security,5 reflected in Tokyo’s ODA diplomacy in Southeast Asia (as a main donor), promotion of alternative security concepts, such as “human security”, and support for regional multilateralism. For example, Japan has played a major role in establishing the ARF in 1994, has been active in the APT process and has participated in the SPT. By promoting regional cooperation, Tokyo has sought to increase its regional influence (notably vis-à-vis Beijing), as well as enmesh China in a web of interdependent relationships in order to encourage it to behave as a responsible power. However, Tokyo’s multilateral initiatives have only played a supplemental role to its bilateral security arrangements with Washington, or what has been called as a “bilateralism plus” security policy (Hughes and Fukushima, 2004). Japan is also seen as “catching up” with China rather than driving regional cooperation, for example, by joining the TAC in 2004 and launching FTA negotiations with ASEAN in 2005.

AT: Atanassove-Cornelis

She concludes that disagreements between China and Japan won’t destabilize relations.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

The recent dynamics in Sino-Japanese relations indicates efforts from both sides not to allow contentious issues destabilise the relations. Nevertheless, the underlying problems continue to reemerge.

AT: Yasukuni Shrine

Kan won’t visit the Yasukuni Shrine.

AP News, 7/5/2010

Japan's new Prime Minister Naoto Kan said Tuesday he would stay away from a controversial war shrine in Tokyo seen as a symbol of the country's past military aggression by its Asian neighbours.

"Class-A war criminals are enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine," Kan told the upper house. "It's problematic for the prime minister or a cabinet member to visit it. I don't intend to visit it while I'm in office."

The Yasukuni Shrine, which honours 2.5 million war dead, including 14 top war criminals, is reviled especially by China and the two Koreas which suffered under Japanese aggression before and during World War II.

Kan and his centre-left Democratic Party of Japan, which came to power in September, have long opposed Yasukuni visits by past conservative prime ministers and recommended building a new non-religious war memorial.

Kan's predecessor Yukio Hatoyama -- who abruptly stepped down this month for his inept handling of a row over a US airbase on Okinawa island -- refrained from visiting the shrine during its autumn festival in October.

Former conservative prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, who led the now opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), prayed once a year at the shrine during his 2001-2006 tenure.

His annual pilgrimages enraged China and South Korea, which refused to hold summits with him. Koizumi's three LDP successors avoided visiting the shrine but sometimes gave traditional offerings, which also prompted angry responses from Beijing and Seoul.

AT: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

No agreement—Chinese public opinion blocks a deal.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

In 2008, the Fukuda administration reached an agreement with Beijing for joint development of some of the gas fields in the disputed area around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, shelving the issue of the demarcation line of their EEZs. The agreement reflected an earlier proposal by Tokyo, as well as Beijing’s focus on pursuing a mutually beneficial strategic relationship with Japan. Nevertheless, as of early 2010 a bilateral treaty on the joint development has not been concluded. This may be attributed to the reluctance of the Chinese side to move forward with negotiations due to the domestic criticism to the deal; hence concerns by the Hu administration that the people may see the CCP making too many concessions to Japan. Prime Minister Hatoyma has urged an early launch of treaty negotiations in his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen, with Wen alluding to the public sentiments in China as a factor that needed consideration (Arima, Higashioka&Hakoda, 2009). Furthermore, in response to China’s reportedly started exploration works in an area, which Tokyo views as being left out of the agreement for further discussions, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya has warned that Japan “will have to take certain action” if China violates the deal (The Japan Times, 2010). The differences in the political values have also been exposed, when Hatoyama explicitly expressed hope that China would make progress with regard to democracy and human rights (The Japan Times, 2009).

---Counterplans---

Dugong

Base construction threatens dugong—US law can halt base construction.

Bob Egelko, staff writer, 8/5/2004, *San Francisco Chronicle*, “Imperiled Mamal Threatened by Plan for Okinawa Base,” http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/08/05/BAGDU82Q961.DTL cp

The shy, grass-eating dugong is in peril in the waters off the Japanese island of Okinawa, where a planned U.S. Marine base threatens its habitat. Its only hope may be a U.S. law designed to preserve historic properties.

On Wednesday, environmentalists argued in a San Francisco courtroom that the federal law be applied to the dugong, a distant relative of the Florida manatee, revered by Okinawans and classified as a "natural monument'' under Japanese law.

Their suit, filed last fall against the Defense Department, seeks a court order shelving plans -- at least until measures are taken to preserve the dugong -- for the relocation of the Futenma air base from central Okinawa to an offshore site alongside and atop a coral reef that plaintiffs say is the creature's chief remaining habitat.

The plaintiffs, environmental advocates from both the United States and Japan, say the U.S. courts are their only option because the Pentagon and the Japanese government have been unresponsive. The Justice Department challenges their unprecedented attempt to use the historic preservation law to protect a foreign species.

The 1966 National Historic Preservation Act requires the U.S. government to conduct an analysis, similar to an environmental impact report, before working on a project that would harm historically significant properties. The law defines those properties broadly to include subjects of cultural importance at home or abroad, the plaintiffs say.

The law "leaves it up to each nation to decide what's culturally significant,'' Marcello Mollo, a lawyer with Earthjustice in Oakland, told Chief U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel in a courtroom filled with supporters from Okinawa.

Other opponents of the project have occupied a beach encampment at the proposed airfield site for the past 100 days to protest preliminary undersea drilling in preparation of construction. The plaintiffs say noise from the drilling could harm the dugongs.

The Okinawan dugong, a distinct subspecies, has dwindled to about 50 in number -- a casualty, in part, of fierce battles near the end of World War II -- and could be extinguished by the impact of the Marine air base on an adjacent coral reef, environmentalists contend. The creatures, which in adulthood grow up to 111/2 feet long and weigh 800 pounds, spend their entire lives in sheltered, shallow waters.

Kick Out Counterplan 1/3

Text: The Government of Japan should refuse to host the United States federal government’s military presence in stationed in Japan.

Contention one is solvency.

Japan should quit providing bases to US troops.

Japan Times 6/1/2010

(Debito Arudo, coauthored the "Handbook for Newcomers, Migrants and Immigrants." “Just Be Cause” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100601ad.html)

In sum, it's less a matter of Japan wanting the U.S. bases to stay, more a matter of the U.S. bases not wanting to leave. Japan is a sovereign country, so the Japanese government has the final say. If that means U.S. forces relocating or even leaving completely, the U.S. should respectfully do so without complaint, not demand Japan find someplace else for them to go. That is not Japan's job.

Yet our politicians have worked hard for decades to represent the U.S. government's interests to the Japanese public. Why? Because they always have.

The time has come to stop being prisoners of history. World War II and the Cold War are long over.

That's why this columnist says: Never mind Futenma. All U.S. bases should be withdrawn from Japanese soil, period. Anachronisms, the bases have not only created conflicts of interest and interfered with Japan's sovereignty, they are now incapacitating our government. Japan should slip the collar of U.S. encampments and consider a future under a less dependent, more equal relationship with the U.S.

Contention two is the net benefit.

The counterplan terminates the US-Japan security agreement.

Japan Press Weekly, 11/1/2009, “A closer look at U.S. Futenma base’s ‘relocation’ issue,” http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2009/2644/USF4.html cp

The cause behind the DPJ turnabout is the party’s foreign and security policy of regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance as pivotal to Japan’s foreign relations and the party’s support of the argument that Japan needs the “deterrence of the U.S. forces in Japan including those in Okinawa” (P.M. Hatoyama), which is similar to the position of the LDP-Komei government.

On the other hand, DPJ Dietmembers elected from Okinawa and DPJ Okinawa assembly members stand with Okinawans against a new base in Okinawa. The DPJ thus finds itself in a double bind of being unable to straightly expressing support for the new base construction like the LDP-Komei government due to dissention within its ranks.

A number of countries in Europe and Asia succeeded in removing or reducing U.S. military bases while maintaining good relations with the United States. Unless the DPJ government shows resolute position on the base question, the United States will get the impression that the present government will easily give in to threats as their predecessors. It will close the possibility of creating a path to changing the Japanese foreign policy of submission to the United States.

China-US-Japan relations are zero sum. Ending the US-Japan alliance prompts stronger Sino-Japanese relations.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

Finally, for Japan, the close security relationship with America has been a major component of Japan’s own hedging approach towards China, which in the post-Cold War period has replaced the Cold War emphasis on accommodation (Mochizuki, 2007). At the same time, Tokyo has continued to deepen its economic and trade relations with the PRC. In the post-Koizumi era, the engagement component is seen to dominate Japan’s China policy, especially under Hatoyama. All in all, this mutual hedging has become an important characteristic of the interactions between China, and the US and Japan.

For Beijing, this triangularity means that it may not allow a simultaneous deterioration in its relations with both Washington and Tokyo. From this perspective, the Sino-Japanese tensions under Koizumi, which were paralleled by a strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, increased Chinese concerns about perceived US-Japanese containment, thereby stimulating China to embrace the US. As discussed earlier, the domestic politics in China was not favourable to a softer approach vis-à-vis Japan. For Tokyo, on the other hand, the improvement in US-China relations did not lead to “abandonment” fears, which is usually the case when Washington moves to engage Beijing and thereby raises Japanese memories of the “Nixon shock”. Indeed, the upgraded bilateral alliance and the strong interpersonal relationship between Bush and Koizumi reassured Tokyo, and provided the context domestically for the reinforcement of a more hard-line Japan’s China policy. The situation is different in the post-Koizumi era, however. Arguably to avoid marginalisation as US-China relations continued to move in a positive direction, the three successive LDP administrations continued to nurture a stable relationship with the PRC. This seemed all the more important, given the domestic political uncertainty in Japan stemming from the frequent changes in premiership. An additional factor for Tokyo was the lacking Koizumi-Bush-like strategic convergence between the two allies, which during Koizumi’s term provided Japan with greater leverage vis-à-vis China.

That’s key to East Asian stability.

Institute for Security and Development Policy, 10 (date last modified), “Sino-Japanese Relations,” http://www.isdp.eu/programs-a-initiatives/china-initiative/sino-japanese-relations.html cp

Throughout history, the relationship between China and Japan has more often than not been marked by mistrust and animosity, or even violent conflict. Despite three decades of normalized bilateral relations, several past and present issues serve to complicate the relation between the two states. Since a positive and functioning relationship between China and Japan, the two great powers in Northeast Asia, in many ways is a prerequisite for peace and stability in the region, a souring bilateral relationship is not only problematic for the states involved, but has implications for neighboring states and the international community at large. Against this background, it has become increasingly important to understand, identify and implement measures that can prevent and manage conflicts and disputes between these two states.

Nuclear war.

Toshimaru Ogura and Ingyu Oh, Professors of Economics and Political Economy at Waiikato University, MONTHLY REVIEW, April, 1997, p. 30

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi-or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region- nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among those countries would threaten to escalate into global conflagration.

AT: Can’t Kick Out Troops

Treaties force the US to deport its soldiers—this is from the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.

Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, 1/19/1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf cp

5. If the status of any person brought into Japan under paragraph of this Article is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States authorities shall notify the Japanese authorities and shall, if such person be required by the Japanese authorities to leave Japan, assure that transportation from Japan will be provided within a reasonable time at no cost to the Government of Japan.

6. If the Government of Japan has requested the removal from its territory of a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or has made an expulsion order against an ox-member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component or against a dependent of a member or ex-member, the authorities of the United States shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of him outside Jam. This paragraph shall apply only to persons who are not nationals of Japan and have entered Japan as members of the United States armed forces or civilian component or for the purpose of becoming such members, and to the dependents of such persons.

Japan should take actions—bases violate safety standards.

Japan Press Weekly, 11/1/2009, “A closer look at U.S. Futenma base’s ‘relocation’ issue,” http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2009/2644/USF4.html cp

Japan should demand that U.S. return Futenma base site without condition

Okinawans rejected the plan to construct a new U.S. base in a referendum held in December 1997 in Nago City.

In every opinion poll on this issue since then, 70-80 percent of the respondents have expressed opposition to the new U.S. base construction plan.

In July 2008, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly also expressed its opposition to the base in a resolution.

All this shows that the task now is for the Japanese government to begin discussing the issue with the United States on the premise that “rejection of the new base construction is non-negotiable.”

Even before that, the government must order the immediate closure of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station because it is in violation of U.S. safety standards.

AT: Can’t Kick Out Troops

Even if the US doesn’t leave, Japan will defund the bases.

Japan Press Weekly, 11/1/2009, “A closer look at U.S. Futenma base’s ‘relocation’ issue,” http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2009/2644/USF4.html cp

The Japanese government has so far used the so-called “sympathy budget” to fund the construction of everything that the U.S. forces need, including housing units for U.S. troops and hangars for fighter jets. It has promised to waste even more tax money to pay for all the costs for the construction of a new base in the Henoko district of Nago.

Why is the United States unwilling to give up on its military bases in Japan? It is because Japan is so generous as to pay the greater part of the costs for the U.S. military. It expends more than 10,000 dollars per U.S. troop every year.

Under the Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan has no obligation to pay for the U.S. military presence under the name of the “sympathy budget”. This being the fact, the Japanese government should abolish the “sympathy budget” immediately.

When Japan and the United States reached agreement in 1996 on the return of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station site to Japan and relocating it, many relocation plans were on the table, including one calling for integrating the functions of the Futenma base with the U.S. Kadena Air Force Base. All these plans were proven to be unfeasible or rejected by local residents.

The return of the Futenma base site without condition is the only viable alternative.

If the Hatoyama government wants to establish relations with the United States on equal footing, it should take the wishes of Okinawans to its negotiations with the United States and demand that the Futenma base be returned without condition.

---Rearm Disad---

Rearm 1/1

Ending the alliance freaks out Japan—they go nuclear by next Monday.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Will Japan go nuclear?Doubtful—but what if it does? It is possible to envision circumstances that would impel Tokyo and the Japanese populace to cast aside their long-standing dread of nuclear weapons and to construct an arsenal of their own for the sake of national survival. Menacing strategic surroundings or a collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty are two such circumstances. If some nightmare scenario did come to pass, the common wisdom has it, Japan could build a working bomb in short order. In 1991, Richard Halloran averred that “Japan isNminus six months,” although he saw no evidence that Japan entertained any ambition to tap its latent weapons capability.1 In 2007, Gary Sick, a well known commentator on Middle East affairs, reported having been privately told that Japan “could do it, sort of, over a long weekend.”2 Japan, that is, may now qualify as a “threshold state,” a term “commonly understood to mean possession of the indigenous ability to acquire nuclear weapons within a relatively short time frame, ranging from a few hours to several months.”3 Japan inhabits a tough neighborhood,while the U.S.military position in Asia looks increasingly wobbly. Nearby North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006 and paid no penalty for defying the “six party”framework. In January 2009, in fact, Pyongyang announced it has assumed an “all-out confrontational posture” toward rival South Korea and has “weaponized” enough plutonium for four or five implosion-type nuclear warheads.4 Japanese thinkers have studied the rise of China closely and what it portends for Japan, positioned just off the Asian seaboard. Beijing has mounted an aggressive naval buildup over the past decade, gaining confidence in its capacity to subdue Taiwanmilitarily if need be while holdingU.S.Navy aircraft-carrier task forces at bay.Taiwan adjoins Japan’s southern strategic frontier, meaning that Tokyo could not look with equanimity on a cross-strait war or a return of the island tomainland rule. Indeed, Japanese imperialist expansion more than a century ago was designed precisely to secure its southern strategic flank, the back door to its Ryukyu island chain, which stretches to the coast of Taiwan.5 Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan has been in “friendly hands” for over a century. Accordingly, Japanese policy makers do not take lightly a forcible Chinese acquisition of Taiwan. To complicate matters, as Chinese strategists look to the “day after Taiwan” they are considering how to exert influence on the sea lines of communication connecting Chinese ports with vital resources in the Middle East and Africa. China’s turn toward the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean may give Beijing not onlymore control over its ownmaritime security but alsomore control over the maritime communications on which the resource-dependent Japanese economy relies.

Extinction.

Ellen Ratner, White House correspondent and bureau chief for the Talk Radio News service, 1/173. http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?article\_id=30541.

This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

Link – Security Commitment

History proves—declining US security commitment pushes countries towards the nuclear option.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Indeed, historical precedents in ColdWar Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens,Washington withdrew a combat division fromthe Korean Peninsula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons,” despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park ChungHee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compoundmatters, President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an independent deterrent.

Similarly, China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction.” 37 This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communiqué,which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island.As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces fromTaiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves,” including nuclear weapons.38 Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade.39

In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States. While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.

Link – Withdrawal

U.S. withdrawal would lead to Japan rearmament because of security fears.

Llewelyn Hughes, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at MIT, 2007; http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v031/31.4hughes.html#top

Given the preponderance of U.S. conventional and nuclear military power, Japanese policymakers are unlikely to push for an independent nuclear deterrent as long as they remain confident that this deterrent power is conferred on Japan. North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006 suggests that external threats alone are not sufficient to cause change in the status quo. Rather, it is likely to be policies that undermine decisionmakers' confidence in Japan's existing insurance policies to manage nuclear threats that will reignite debate within Japan on whether to rebalance the scales toward nuclear autonomy rather than protection.

If this occurs, policymakers and scholars should not dismiss the propensity for future policy change, regardless of diplomatic rhetoric asserting that Japan has forever renounced the desire to develop a nuclear deterrent. The evidence presented here demonstrates that even though the policy equilibrium remains centered on continued reliance on the protection of the United States, Japan's political leaders have ensured that domestic legal constraints are surmountable.

Link – Nuclear Umbrella

U.S. nuclear umbrella currently prevents Japan rearmament- provides feeling of security.

Joe Hung, special contributor for The China Post, April 13, 2009; http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joe-hung/2009/04/13/204014/p2/Japan-may.htm

Well, that's the reason why the Japanese self-defense forces didn't fire missiles to destroy any debris. But along with the United States, Japan believes North Korea was testing long-range ballistic missile technology that can be used to carry a nuclear warhead far beyond its skies to Alaska.

The fear of a nuclear attack from North Korea, coupled with the current economic recession, is more than likely to prompt Japan to re-arm itself. North Korea, rather than Russia or the People's Republic of China, is Japan's only potential enemy. And the country is headed by Kim Jong-Il, the erratic despot son of Kim Il-Song, who launched an invasion to kick off the Korean War in 1950. Pyongyang has gone on the record by saying it has stopped trying to make nuclear bombs, but the Japanese military suspects that they may have been stockpiled.

Japan has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Uncle Sam provides a nuclear defense umbrella for Japan under the treaty signed at the beginning of the Cold War era for protection against attacks from the Soviet Union. Thanks to the mutual defense arrangements, Japan has been able to refrain from rearmament, which is frowned upon by the United States and the People's Republic of China, along with those Asian countries that were invaded or occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army before and during the Second World War.

Nuclear umbrella is critical to Japanese security—even a perception of weakness could trigger nuclearization.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

What would it take to empower adherents of Sagan’s security model, allowing their views to win out over domestic interests opposed to nuclear weapons and over norms of decades’ standing? A central feature of Japan’s security strategy is the nation’s utter dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. As Yukio Satoh succinctly explains, “The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan’s only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats.”32 That is, even barely perceptible signs of weakness in the U.S. nuclear posture (either perceived or real) could trigger alarm and overreactions in Japan.

Japanese concerns over the Obama administration’s recentmoves to advance nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such sensitivities. Specifically, Japanese policy makers fret that “extended deterrence could weaken if Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these [global disarmament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a latentNorth Korean nuclear capability in exchange for safeguards against proliferation.” 33 In 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test compelled the Japanese government to seek public reassurances from the United States that extended deterrence remained intact.34 Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter of Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could fundamentally reshape the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Research Service forcefully contends that “perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security.”35 The causes and processes by which U.S. extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo’s eyes are beyond the scope of this article.Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the nuclear umbrella would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese nuclear breakout.

Link – Realism

Realism proves the link—Japan will freak out without US protection.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Seen in realist terms, then, China’s maritime rise threatens to degrade Japan’s strategic position in the region. Tokyo may ultimately conclude that self-help represents the only way to shore up its position. Skyrocketing costs of developing and procuring weaponry are driving the force structure of the American military inexorably downward in numbers. Just one example: the Pentagon’s estimates of futureU.S.Navy fleet size now run as low as 150 ships, a fraction of the nearly six-hundred-ship navy of the 1980s.6 Even the 313-ship fleet espoused by the Navy leadership now appears fanciful, with 283 ships currently in active service and little prospect of accelerating shipbuilding rates enough to increase the inventory by thirty vessels.7 Allies like Japan monitor such trends closely. A precipitous decline in conventional U.S.military capacity in the theater could have major diplomatic ramifications, undercutting American staying power in the western Pacific, giving rise to Japanese fears of abandonment, and unsettling the entire Asian security architecture. More to the point, Accordingly, an effort to discern, as through a glass darkly, Tokyo’s nuclear options and their likely consequences is not only worthwhile but imperative for analysts and practitioners of Asian affairs. First, we briefly consider the motives that would induce Japan’s leadership to make such a radical break with the antinuclear sentiments of the postwar era. Second, we consider the prospect of Japanese “nuclear hedging,” an approach under which Tokyo would build up a capacity to develop nuclear weapons, keeping its strategic options open while remaining in formal compliance with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Third, we consider the technical feasibility of a swift Japanese nuclear breakout, paying particular attention to assumptions that Tokyo could stage a breakout within a year of deciding to do so.8 Fourth, we identify possible force structures and strategies available to Japan should the island nation’s leadership indeed decide it is in the national interest to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold. We close by identifying areas for future research, with the aim of generating a literature of immediate use to policy makers in Washington and Tokyo.

Prolif Causes Arms Race

Prolif leads to arms races—fear of insecurity.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Scott Sagan outlines three hypotheses to explain why nation-states seek nuclear weapons. First, according to Sagan’s “security”model, governments “build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats.” George Shultz memorably summed up the security approach: “Proliferation begets proliferation.”18 Two policies are possible when threats arise, says Sagan. Sounding a Thucydidean note, he maintains that “strong states dowhat they can . . . adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing their own nuclear weapons.”Weak states, by contrast, “do what they must: they can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence.”19 Doubts about the credibility of a nuclear ally’s security guarantee presumably bring pressure on even weak states—or on states that, like Japan, rely on alliances for other reasons—to seek nuclear capability. This is the logic of self-help.

Prolif Causes Arms Race

Tit for tat causes arms race.

ElenaAtanassova-Cornelis**,** Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium,10 , Paper for the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session “21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia,” “Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor” cp

The structural changes in East Asia, and the diverging strategic priorities between Tokyo and Beijing have created a basis for negative security dynamics. In this context, mutual concerns of strengthened military postures and suspicion regarding one another’s long-term strategic goals in East Asia have emerged as defining characteristics of Sino-Japanese relations. For Tokyo, a major concern has been Chinese military modernisation. Beijing has promoted a defensive image by stressing that China “will not pose a military threat to any other country” and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) main objective is “to win local wars under the conditions of informationalization” (Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2004, 2006). While Tokyo has concluded that China’s primary goal in the foreseeable future is to attain military superiority vis-àvis Taiwan, Japan has worried about the PRC’s modernisation of its nuclear and missile arsenal. China’s rapid development and deployment since the mid-1990s of short- and intermediate-range missiles has increased its ability of striking not only Taiwan, but also Japan and some of the main US military bases in East Asia. From this perspective, Japan has been concerned that the objective of Beijing’s military modernisation could be something more than the mere resolution of the Taiwan issue (Ministry of Defence, Japan, 2007).

A perceived lack of transparency on the PRC’s national defence, as well as the double-digit growth of its defence spending from the late 1990s on, has influenced the emergence of “the China threat” perception in Japan. For example, the 2004 National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) mentioned for the first time in Japanese national security doctrine two specific countries – North Korea and China – as Japan’s key security concerns (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2004). The 2009 Japanese White Paper on Defence expressed worries about the impact of China’s military strength on “the regional situation and Japanese security” (Ministry of Defence, Japan, 2009: 49) and underlined that “China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a major regional power” (ibid.: 50). This indicates Tokyo’s mistrust of Beijing’s strategic goals, as well as its apprehension of China’s future potential dominance in East Asia. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the US and during the term of Koizumi, Japan moved towards enhancing its security ties with the US and modernising its military capabilities. A strong supporter of Japan’s more robust foreign policy, Koizumi dispatched the Self- Defence Forces (SDF) on non-combat missions to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, respectively. In the wake of the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the Japanese government the same year decided to establish its own spy satellite programme and from 2003 on deployed four satellites. Japan in 1998 also announced its engagement with the US in a joint research on ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. In the wake of the second North Korean nuclear crisis of 2002-03, the Koizumi administration in late 2003 decided to accelerate the introduction of US-made both land- and sea-based MD systems.

China’s view of Japan’s changing security posture since the 1990s has mirrored Tokyo’s mistrust toward Beijing. China has repeatedly expressed worries regarding Japan’s alleged reemergence as a major military power, by emphasising Tokyo’s drive to acquire new military capabilities, notably BMD systems, and its expansion of the SDF’s missions. The developments in Japanese security policy have been described as one of the “complicating security factors” in the region (Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2004). Especially under Koizumi’s so-called security “normalisation” course, Japan was seen as “fabricating” threats, notably coming from the PRC’s military build-up, and abandoning “its post-war path of peaceful development to pursue political and military power” (Xinhua, 2005b). For example, in 2005, in response to then Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s remarks about China’s growing military budget, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang reportedly said that it was Japan’s expanded military profile that was a cause of serious concern and hence “Japan should interpret its military tendencies to the world” (Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2005). Indeed, Japan and China have no appreciation of one another’s respective security concerns (Yahuda, 2006), viewing each other’s steps in the security area with great suspicion.

Impact – Asian Stability

Japanese rearmament would anger China and South Korea and prevent effective military contribution

Nicholas Szechenyi, deputy director of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Autumn 2006, (The Washington Quarterly, pg. 146) http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/wash.2006.29.4.139

Proponents of expanded [Japanese] SDF roles and missions should be equally concerned about regional opposition to any effort by Japan to raise its defense profile. Suspicions concerning Japan's motives continue to complicate Japan's regional diplomacy more than 60 years after World War II. China and South Korea in particular have expressed outrage over Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan's war dead, including several Class A war criminals, are memorialized. Territorial disputes also complicate relations between Japan and those two nations. Any effort by Japan to increase defense spending would likely yield bombastic accusations of Japanese "remilitarization" and "aggression" from those opposed to a greater role for Japan in international affairs. Such rhetoric, although ostensibly false, could negate the numerous positive contributions of the SDF to international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief that have bolstered Japan's global leadership role. Japan's efforts to elevate its global diplomatic profile through SDF missions will likely succeed if complemented by sustained diplomacy close to home.

AT: Japan Needs International Help to Build Nukes

Specifically, Japan works with India to get bombs.

Khalid Iqbal, Retired Commodore of the Pakhistani Airforce, July 5, 2010, The Nation. http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/pages/Todays-Paper

Within the first two to four months of these bombings, the fallout effects killed 90,000 to 166,000 people in Hiroshima and 60,000 to 80,000 in Nagasaki, with roughly half of the deaths in each city occurring on the first day.   
These horrific effects prompted post-war Japan to adopt most stringent non-proliferation principles. Japan abdicated its right to acquire nuclear weapons, and has been an ardent opponent of nuclear proliferation in all its manifestations.   
However, couple of weeks from now, when memorial gatherings would be held for the victims of nuclear bombing, a sea change would have taken place. **India-Japan negotiations on nuclear cooperation in the follow up of Agreement 123 would be at an advanced stage.** Unfortunately, the most principled nation in the context of nuclear proliferation would be at the verge to bartering its time honoured principles with petty economic gains.   
Japan joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, on the understanding that India and other states would not be accepted in the future as nuclear weapon powers. In the past, Tokyo has been reluctant to pursue a nuclear programme with India. Some policy makers and nuclear disarmament advocates in Japan believe that full nuclear cooperation would amount to rewarding India for possessing nuclear weapons without accruing quid pro quo obligations towards non-proliferation and disarmament. **India has neither signed NPT and CTBT, nor has it agreed to end production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.**Japan is not alone in feeling that the exemptions India has gained through NSG and IAEA gave away too much in return for too little. Brazil, Germany, Norway, South Africa and Turkey however are a few of the major states that are disturbed by it.  
Only a small component of the Japanese government comprising the ministries of economy, trade and industry support nuclear trade with India. They argue that Japan should not be more righteous than other countries that are eager to do nuclear business with India. However, proponents of non-proliferation and disarmament argue that Japan should defend the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, even if the US and others wish to betray it.

**Japanese technology companies and some policy makers are of the view that nuclear cooperation could bring direct benefits and increase political goodwill, as this would open the way for broader business in India.**  
Over the recent months, India has been lobbying hard to coax the Japanese to supply civilian nuclear technology. The Bush administration and Congress had paved the way for these kinds of transactions in the 2005 US-India civil nuclear deal, which exempts India from nuclear trade restrictions on states that do not put all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards.   
Japan's leverage for kick-starting Agreement 123 is phenomenal. Though France has signed agreements to build several nuclear reactors in India, French supplier Areva needs components that are built by Japanese companies. Similarly, America's General Electric hopes to build reactors in India, but it depends on its partner Hitachi to supply nuclear equipment and know-how. Thus, Tokyo's decision on nuclear cooperation with India affects the scale of India's nuclear power ambitions, as well as the business prospects of these companies and their Japanese partners.  
**Japanese interests are complex and contradictory. It wants a closer relationship with India to strengthen the balance in the context of China and to promote mutually beneficial trade and investment. Tokyo is also under pressure from French and US nuclear partners to join the rat race. As a consequence, Japan's traditional non-proliferation stance is on stake.**  
To carry out its first nuclear explosion in 1974, India had clandestinely diverted Plutonium from a reactor provided to it by Canada; something the latter chose to conveniently forget when Indo-Canadian nuclear deal was signed in Toronto, on the eve of recently concluded G-20 meeting. It is interesting to recall that the NSG was created in 1975 to standardise nuclear trade rules as a reaction to India's testing of a nuclear explosive device in 1974.  
The objective of creating the NSG was to prevent access of nuclear material and know-how to the countries which are non-signatory to the NPT. It is an irony that NSG cartel has rushed to provide New Delhi all the cooperation it needs in the nuclear field, despite knowing well how the country had cheated by using its civil nuclear programme to produce bombs.

AT: Japan is Rational

Nuclearization debates aren’t rational—multiple other factors.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Second, Sagan’s “domestic politics”model “envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.” Three protagonists in nuclear policy making are typically the nuclear energy establishment, the armed forces, and politicians. The former two actors may have bureaucratic interests in going nuclear, as it would give them leverage in budgetary processes, allowing them to attract resources. “When such actors form coalitions that are strong enough to control the government’s decisionmaking process . . . nuclearweapons programs are likely to thrive.”Conversely, when a coalition opposes nuclear weapons or the various actors find themselves at loggerheads on this question,more ambiguous results are likely.20 A clash among domestic interests seldom yields neat, entirely rational policies.

Finally, under Sagan’s “norms” model, “nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity.” Government decisions are driven “not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national security interests or parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations.” A nuclear arsenal is a token of modernity, legitimacy, and great-power status. As Sagan points out, an interactive relationship exists between norms and the bureaucratic actors of his second model. As norms mature over time, they tend to be written into bureaucratic procedures and practices, influencing calculations vis-à-vis important matters like whether to seek nuclear capability.21 Beliefs and convictions color rational cost-benefit analyses.

Aff – AT: Nuclearization

Tech issues mean it takes at least three years for Japan to go nuclear.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

As noted above, analysts and Japanese politicians evince conviction that Japan could erect a nuclear deterrent in a relatively short period of time.We are unpersuaded by this apparent optimism and conventional wisdom. It is true that Japan possesses all the trappings of a nuclear power. Yet the path to a credible nuclear status is likely to be long andwinding.Above all, Japan needs the material capacity to develop a bomb.40With fifty-five nuclear-power plants in operation around the country and the nuclear sector’s large reserves of reactor-grade plutonium, Japan enjoys a readily available supply of fissile material. According to Sankei Shimbun, Japan possesses enough plutonium on its own soil and in reprocessing plants overseas to produce 740 bombs.41 How usable this reactor-grade material would be for weapons purposes, however, remains a matter of dispute among technical specialists. An internal government report unearthed by Sankei Shimbun reportedly concluded that Japan would need several hundred engineers, 200–300 billion yen (or $2–$3 billion), and three to five years to fabricate a serviceable nuclear warhead.42

IAEA ensures people would know about weaponization—international pressure ensures Japan never completes a bomb.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

The real question would be timing. It is doubtful in the extreme that Japan could circumvent its safeguards agreement with the IAEA undetected for long.43While the cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that it is possible to bypass the IAEA, Japan holds itself to much higher, more stringent standards, having assented to one of the most intrusive, regular inspection programs in the world.44 Furthermore, think of the diplomatic blowback: one can only imagine the uproar if such an effort on the part of Japan, a consistent, sincere opponent of nuclear weapons, were exposed to public and international scrutiny.

Thus, Japanese policy makers must consider the extent to which Tokyo could withstand mounting external pressure to cease and desist while its nuclear complex amassed enough bomb-making material for a viable arsenal. Tokyo cannot expect to deceive the international community long enough to present the world a fait accompli. It would probably have to make its intentions clear—and endure international opprobrium—well before reaching the breakout threshold, if not at the outset.

Aff – AT: Nuclearization

Even if Japan gets nukes, it’s too hard to use them.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct route would be to arm Japan’s existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force (SDF) inventory, however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the Asian mainland.

In light of this, ballistic or cruisemissiles would likely rank as Japan’s weapon of choice.45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on amissile delivery system, it would have to produce a workable,miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field, takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert some of its civilian space-launch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself—unless it could purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf fromtheUnited States, a doubtful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the political sensitivity of such a sale—compelled to start from scratch. Procuring and integrating satellite guidance, terrain-contour matching, and other specialized techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese weapon scientists.

Japan couldn’t make a bomb—it wouldn’t have anywhere to test.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted there safely—even leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given thememories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near some Japanese-held island in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again, the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)would be intense,while the Japanese populace would think back to the Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need only recall the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBT’s entry into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan. The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bomb-making efforts.

Aff – AT: Militarization

Japan is building up defense forces now.

Michael Auslin, director of Japan Studies at American Enterprise Institute and former research fellow at Yale, July 1, 2010; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575337661778908390.html (Wall Street Journal Online)

The foreign policy section of Kan's manifesto shows a more nuanced approach to overseas issues than previously expressed by the DPJ. The party promises to examine how Japan's Self Defense Forces can play a larger role in peacekeeping operations, and at the same time calls for establishing mutual trust with Japan's neighbors, as a step toward a broader East Asian Community. Alliance managers will also look for action on the promise to finish Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of this year, thus ending the limbo in security planning that began under Mr. Hatoyama.

Equally importantly, Mr. Kan plans to "maintain and stimulate the development of defense-related manufacturing technologies," and it is rumored that senior DPJ officials will soon propose the abandonment of the restriction on foreign defense industrial cooperation that has so hampered Japan's industrial base. These changes, if carried out, would signal a significant shift in how the DPJ views the country's role in the world and the future possibility of contributing to regional and global stability, while also helping to boost higher valued-added parts of the economy.

---Politics---

Plan Unpopular – Public

Polls prove the public opposes the plan.

Rassmussen, long-time trusted polling company, 15 Nov. 2009 *Rassmussen Reports*.   
     2009. Web. 1 July 2010. <http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public\_content/   
     politics/general\_politics/november\_2009/   
     26\_favor\_pulling\_all\_u\_s\_troops\_out\_of\_japan>.

Twenty-six percent (26%) of Americans say the United States should remove all its military troops from Japan, a central issue in President Obama’s trip to that country Friday and Saturday.

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 49% disagree and oppose the removal of all U.S. troops from Japan. Twenty-five percent (25%) are not sure.

---Japan Politics---

Japanese Docket FYI

FYI

Auslin, Michael. "Can Mr. Kan Save Japan? ." *The Wall Street Journal* 1 July   
     2010: n. pag. Web. 30 June 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/   
     SB10001424052748704103904575337661778908390.html>.

Has Japan entered its "Kan do" era? That's certainly the hope of the struggling Democratic Party of Japan at the ascension to power of Naoto Kan as prime minister after the disastrous run of Yukio Hatoyama. Mr. Kan has a rocky road ahead. He must repair strained relations with the United States, restore the public's trust in the DPJ, and craft policies to restore economic health to a country that is still suffering from deflation. Whether he succeeds or fails may well seal the fate not only of the DPJ to maintain its legitimacy, but also of Japan to pull out of its current malaise.

A visit to DPJ headquarters this week and discussions with top party officials makes it clear that those inside the party still believe in its mission and their ability to create a new Japan. Yet my conversations show equally that the party must do more to turn its vision into reality through concrete policies. The party's new manifesto, issued this month, moves beyond the vaguer pronouncements of the seminal electoral manifesto of last summer, but still lacks the specifics needed to turn aspirations into policy.

Above all else, the DPJ wants to purge the party of the influence of campaign cash and to end Japan's deflationary environment. It is telling, perhaps, that money, both as the root of all evil and as the reflection on the weak economy, is the major policy challenge. The DPJ swept into power last August promising to end the culture of corruption fostered by the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party and pull Japan out its two decade-long economic slump. So far, money politics has claimed the first DPJ premier and has continued to drag down the economy.

The DPJ's plans include reducing the corporate tax rate (particularly on small- and medium-sized enterprises), continuing regulatory reform and promoting comprehensive economic zones, though few specifics have been announced yet. In addition, the Kan administration will seek to conclude free-trade agreements, increase foreign direct investment in Japan, and focus on "infrastructure exports" such as high-speed railways and nuclear power plants.

Yet Japan faces difficulties reaching these goals, as any movement on free trade continues to be hamstrung by the powerful farmers' lobby. The country also faces tough competition abroad; countries ranging from China to France and South Korea are aggressively hawking their fast trains and nuclear plants around the globe.

Responding directly to the export challenges, Goshi Hosono, the DPJ's young deputy secretary general, explains that Japan's technological prowess can compete with any other nation's and that "we can be a full service provider of such technologies, owing to our capabilities and safety records." Yet the country will have to lobby aggressively for market share abroad, which is one reason Transportation Minister Seiji Maehara is currently in the U.S. making a pitch for Japan's bullet-train system.

Of equal interest, and challenge, is Mr. Kan's national-security agenda, or as he terms it, his plan for "realizing enlightened national interest through responsible foreign policies." Here, there are subtle changes to the Hatoyama manifesto. At the top of the list is deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance across the board, followed directly by acknowledging the 2006 agreement to move Marines out of the Futenma Air Station and into a new facility in the north of Okinawa.

Mr. Kan thus has made it clear that he will try to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. over the Futenma replacement plan. But he cannot ensure that local elections in Okinawa slated for September and November may not result in the emergence of officials opposed to the relocation agreement, or that the final plans for the new runway facility will be finished and approved by August, a concern expressed to me by senior DPJ officials.

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Equally importantly, Mr. Kan plans to "maintain and stimulate the development of defense-related manufacturing technologies," and it is rumored that senior DPJ officials will soon propose the abandonment of the restriction on foreign defense industrial cooperation that has so hampered Japan's industrial base. These changes, if carried out, would signal a significant shift in how the DPJ views the country's role in the world and the future possibility of contributing to regional and global stability, while also helping to boost higher valued-added parts of the economy.

Controlling the policy process is hard for any party, and the DPJ has been an example of the problems facing a political organization that fails to move quickly from campaigning to ruling. Yet the new "Kan do" attitude provides hope that the DPJ learned from its mistakes, and is serious about turning around Japan's fortunes. Unless he comes up with more specifics, however, Prime Minister Kan will leave Japan in a far more difficult, and perhaps unrecoverable, position than his predecessors, who provided strong examples of what not to do.

Financial Reform – Won’t Pass

**Financial reform doesn’t solve, and it won’t pass.**

Bill **Powell**, a senior writer for TIME magazine in Shanghai, June 4, 20**10**; http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1994227,00.html?xid=rss-world&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed:+time/world+(TIME:+Top+World+Stories

Now he's not unpopular, exactly, but the years have taken a political toll on Kan, 63. Some of his fresh, reformist, man-of-the-people image was stripped away when he admitted in 2004 that he hadn't paid all the social security taxes he should have. He has also been close to political power broker Ichiro Ozawa, who himself has tried to be an agent of change in Japan, but done so using old-style, shakedown methods of fund raising. That too has tainted Kan's image.

But even if he were as popular as he used to be — and able to use the office of Prime Minister as a bully pulpit the way few have before him — it s hard to imagine him shaking Japan up significantly now; not when, as Yukio Hatoyama's successor as the head of the ruling DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), he's going to have to spend all his time frantically bailing water out of a steadily sinking ship. Japan's public debt — inching close to 200% of GDP — makes Greece seem sober by comparison. Given that, Kan — who had served as finance minister under Hatoyama — said today that fiscal discipline would now be a central focus. "We can correct the current state in which [government] borrowing seems to keep growing indefinitely," he told a Tokyo news conference.

There are two potential problems with that goal. One is that Japan seems again in the grip of deflation. The country's core consumer prices fell in April for the 14th month in a row, declining by 1.5% in the year to the end of April. Kan, as finance minister, already indicated that he's for a weaker yen to help boost Japanese exports — something that would help offset the contractionary effects of higher taxes and less government spending. But he'll still need a lot of help from Tokyo's central bank if he truly wants to hit the fiscal brakes.

The other problem is that he can't do much of anything until an upper house election in Japan that is scheduled for July. Kan's DPJ is not a majority in the upper house of Japan's legislature, and given the party's current unpopularity, that's likely to remain the case after the elections, according to most political forecasters in Japan. As a result, says Robert Feldman, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, "policy stagnation is the most likely outcome." And at this point, in Japan as in many developed countries worldwide, "policy stagnation" is about the last thing it can afford. It seemed inevitable, when Naoto Kan burst onto the political scene in the mid-'90s, that he d be prime minister some day. Now he heads a party that the public, according to opinion polls, has soured on, at a moment that calls for the kind of decisiveness that once seemed a Kan trademark. In politics as in life, timing is everything. You could forgive Japan's new prime minister if he wished his might have been better.

Financial Reform – Not Pushing

Kan’s financial reform will create friction within the government by alienating the People’s New Party coalition members.

Osamu Kawakami, staff writer for Japanese newspaper The Daily Yomiuri, 6/9/2010; http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T100608003565.htm

Kan's appointments are apparently aimed at energizing debate on rectifying the nation's dire fiscal situation through measures including an increase in the consumption tax rate.

Yoshito Sengoku became the new chief cabinet secretary Tuesday, Yoshihiko Noda assumed the post of finance minister, and Koichiro Gemba was named chairman of the Democratic Party of Japan's Policy Research Committee.

However, Kan's fiscal reconstruction course could ruffle the feathers of the PNP--which champions increased public spending to boost the economy--and cause friction within the government. Before the DPJ's presidential election Friday, Kan indicated he is keen to put debate on raising the consumption tax rate back on the table. "I'll correct the current direction in which [government] borrowing appears as if it will continue to increase indefinitely," he said.

Sengoku, Noda and Gemba apparently share this sentiment.

In April, Sengoku, who was state minister in charge of national policy under former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, decried the initial fiscal 2010 budget in which the issuance of government bonds exceeded government tax revenue for the first time since the end of World War II. "This budget will cause concern [among the public] over whether this country can continue to exist," he said.

Noda, as senior vice finance minister, also has called on the government to rebuild public finances. Some DPJ members have whispered behind Noda's back, saying Finance Ministry bureaucrats have him in their pockets.

Meanwhile, Gemba assembled more than 100 DPJ members and launched on May 26 a group that discusses state finance. Gemba is a representative of the group. "It's important to design a system [for raising the consumption tax rate] before the next general election," Gemba said at a press conference Monday.

In April, Gemba said the consumption tax rate "must be raised within four years," and suggested that the rate "could be 10 percent in 2015."

Because the Policy Research Committee chairman coordinates policies proposed by the party, some midcareer DPJ members are wary about Gemba's intentions. "He might even spell out the timing and size of the consumption tax hike in the DPJ's manifesto for the upcoming House of Councillors election," one member complained.

The government hopes to spell out further steps toward fiscal reconstruction in a midterm fiscal framework that will be compiled this month and in its fiscal management strategy for the next 10 years. The framework will incorporate the government's projection of revenue and expenditure for the next three years.

However, the PNP could derail this plan.

PNP leader Shizuka Kamei, who also is state minister in charge of financial policy and postal reform, has attempted to forestall debate on fiscal reconstruction.

"I believe the government will implement economic stimulus measures and compile the [fiscal 2011] budget properly," Kamei said in Nagoya on Saturday.

The PNP has called for robust fiscal stimulus measures and plans to include "economic stimulus measures totalling 100 trillion yen over three years" in its campaign pledges for the upper house election. This could put Kamei on a collision course with Kan's fiscal reconstruction plans.

Sales Tax – Not Pushing

Kan distancing himself from increasing sales tax—it’s too unpopular.

Nasdaq, 7/1/2010.<http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/   
stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=201006270027dowjonesdjonline000002&title=japans-kan-distances-himself-from-tax-hikeonly-wants-talks>.

TORONTO -(Dow Jones)- Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan Saturday distanced himself further from a controversial idea to raise Japan's sales tax rate to help reduce the country's debt, saying he's only asking for cross-party debate on tax issues.

"My proposal only goes as far as inviting" other parties to discuss tax issues with the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, Kan told reporters after attending a meeting of the leaders of the Group of Eight industrialized countries.

Public support for lifting Japan's currently 5% consumption tax rate has wavered, with some polls suggesting that voters understand the need for a tax hike to fix the country's fiscal health, but other surveys indicating that when actual numbers for the tax raise are brought up, the idea becomes less popular.

Kan, who took office on June 8, has said he would use the opposition Liberal Democratic Party's proposal for a doubling of the tax rate to 10% "as a reference", without committing himself to lifting the tax to that level.

The prime minister repeated Saturday that he's only calling for cross-party discussions on overhauling Japan's tax policy soon after Upper House elections on July 11 wrap up.

Other political parties including the LDP have appeared reluctant to take part in Kan's proposed tax discussions, with some saying raising the regressive tax would hurt the poor.

Kan Bad – Sales Tax

Kan pushes tax hikes.

Yuka Hayashi, reporter for The Wall Street Journal, and Takashi Nakamichi, writer for Dow Jones Newswires 6/24/2010; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575323722651849494.html?KEYWORDS=Japan+fiscal+financial

Japan's new finance minister said he will push to increase taxes on high earners, not just to raise revenue but to narrow the country's income inequality.

"I believe we are at a stage where a little bit of egalitarian thinking… should guide our tax policy," Yoshihiko Noda said Wednesday in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. "In that sense, our tax reform will be designed with an eye toward restoring its income-redistribution function."

While Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his aides have talked openly about raising the consumption tax, Mr. Noda's added focus on income taxes suggests a more ambitious revenue-raising package is in the works. Earlier this year when he was finance minister, Mr. Kan endorsed a higher income tax. But Mr. Noda's comments were the first such public remarks from a top leader of the Kan administration.

"Japan used to derive its strength from its deep and broad middle class, but unfortunately, the income gap has grown and so many people have been left behind," said the 52-year-old minister, alluding to widely cited data showing some growing pay disparities between households. "Restoring the middle class is key to rebuilding Japan's strength."

Mr. Noda didn't discuss the specific timing or rate he was considering, but said the government's tax panel will accelerate discussions on a broad tax-reform plan after parliamentary elections scheduled for July 11.

The minister's comment comes as Mr. Kan's Democratic Party of Japan gears up for the elections with a pledge to reduce the government's massive debts to avoid falling into a Greek-style debt crisis. Surprising voters, Mr. Kan said last week the nation's broad sales tax will be doubled from the current 5%, though it may take " two, three year or maybe longer" until the increase is implemented.

That crashes the economy.

Chikafumi Hodo, Chief Correspondent for Reuters, Jun 28, 2010; http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65R1XF20100628

Japan's benchmark 10-year bond yield could sink below 1 percent if the country doubled its sales tax to around 10 percent, the head of Western Asset Management's Japan unit said on Monday.

New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has pitched such a hike as a necessary step to rein in Japan's massive public debt but this could significantly depress the economy, Naoya Orime told the Reuters Japan Investment Summit.

"The level of the 10-year JGB yield could quickly fall to around 0.75-0.8 percent if the sales tax was raised to 10 percent," Orime said.

While a sales tax hike could push up the consumer price index in the short run, the move could intensify deflation concerns and trigger heavy JGB purchases, he added.

The 10-year yield declined to a seven-year low of 1.125 percent last week on the view that Kan is more serious about fiscal reform than many of his predecessors. It was 1.150 percent on Monday.

Taxes Bad – Econ

Japanese “lost decades” empirically prove that tax hikes in Japan prolong recession

Paul J. Scalise, research fellow at Temple University Japan, guest columnist at Newsweek, June 12, 2010; http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/12/kan-s-megaproblem.html

Japan’s former finance minister, Naoto Kan, has become the nation’s fifth prime minister in just four years—and the predictable cycle of high expectations followed by mild cynicism has begun anew. How long he will remain in office is anyone’s guess, but one thing is certain: trying to solve government finances could be for this premier the same kind of career killer that the Futenma base-relocation issue was for the last one.

The inescapable math of an aging society that has been promised huge retirement and welfare benefits, which are not fully covered by taxes, could make Kan’s tenure a true test of government and party leadership. Japan’s gross debt-to-GDP ratio is second only to Zimbabwe, at almost 200 percent. Even if double counting the debt (what government agencies owe each other) were deducted, net debt is still 113 percent of GDP. That’s about the same ratio as Greece, which ignited a continent-wide financial meltdown earlier this year.

No one can predict if or when the Japanese bond market will collapse, of course, but rating agencies, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund have all publicly expressed concern. Aging populations exacerbate pension costs and pay fewer taxes. In Greece, the 65-and-over population is projected to increase from 18 percent of the total in 2005 to 25 percent in 2030. For Japan, the swell is worse, from 19.9 percent to 30 percent.

Until recently, Japan’s debt—the total of all annual budget deficits—was allowed to build thanks to the country’s unique market conditions. With 95 percent of the national debt held by Japanese, increased government borrowing from its own citizens was arguably nothing more than a domestic transfer—a shift of funds from the right hand (taxes to pay off the debt) to the left hand (interest income for bond holders). As long as interest rates remained artificially low and competing investment opportunities in the private sector limited, the government could manage the bond market without depending on the kindness of foreign lenders. It could tap into the country’s savings surplus until the economy recovered.

Except for one unforeseen glitch: the economy never recovered. Throughout two “lost decades,” Japan applied small Band-Aids to festering fiscal wounds that drained the country of its dynamism and prolonged the recession. In lieu of major tax cuts or aggressive spending that could have stimulated economic growth, the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opted for incremental tax hikes, increases on insurance premiums on social welfare, and minor cuts in benefits.

Today, the government has maneuvered itself into a cul-de-sac. The three largest expenditures—social security, debt servicing, and tax transfers to local governments—have grown from 30 percent of the national budget and 1 percent of GDP in 1960, to staggering heights: 70 percent of the national budget, and 13 percent of GDP. Any attempt now to cut welfare benefits drastically, raise taxes sharply, or reduce its legal obligations to financially strained local economies like Osaka and Akita would, at least in the short term, throw the economy deeper into recession. Ironically, that would make delivering these promised benefits all the more difficult.

---Misc---

**China Condones North Korean Sinking of South Korean Ship**

**Doo-hyong**, Hwang. "U.S. repeats calls on China to condemn N. Korea for ship   
     sinking: State Dept." *Yonhap News Agency* 30 June 20**10**: n. pag. Web. 30 June   
     2010. <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/07/01/52/   
     0301000000AEN20100701000400315F.HTML>.

The United States Wednesday repeated calls on China to join forces in condemning North Korea at the U.N. Security Council for the torpedoeing of a South Korean warship in March.

"The president framed this, we think, appropriately so," State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said. "We continue our discussions with China and other countries in New York, but we think at this point there's little ambiguity and, we believe the international community needs to send a direct and clear message to North Korea."

Crowley was responding to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which has said China's position on the sinking of the Cheonan is "fair and justified" and denounced President Obama for his remarks on China's "willful blindness" to North Korea on the Cheonan issue in Toronto Saturday while meeting with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on the margins of the G-20 economic summit.

"We respect the fact that China borders North Korea; it has a direct interest in North Korea's future," Crowley said. "But as the president made clear, we don't see any ambiguity here. And it's time for North Korea to take responsibility for its actions, to cease its provocative behavior and move in a more constructive direction."

The attack on the ship in the Yellow Sea killed 46 sailors.

China has not yet blamed North Korea for the incident, spawning suspicions that Beijing, Pyongyang's staunchest communist ally, will not endorse any Security Council presidential statement, let alone a resolution imposing fresh sanctions.

North Korea is already under an overall arms embargo and economic sanctions after its nuclear and missile tests last year.

An international probe concluded last month that a North Korean submarine torpedoed the Cheonan, but North Korea denies involvement and has threatened war if condemned by the Security Council.

  North Korea's ambassador to the U.N., Sin Son-ho, Tuesday conveyed a letter to Mexican Ambassador Claude Heller, this month's council rotating chairman, to call for a fresh probe into the sinking with participation by North Korea.

Crowley dismissed that, saying, "There has been a thorough investigation of the sinking of the Cheonan, and it was the evidence that was assembled during that investigation points clearly to North Korea and a North Korean torpedo.

  "So we don't think, at this point, that another investigation is warranted," he said. "We think the result is clear and compelling. We continue our discussions in New York about an appropriate and timely response to this provocative action."

A senior South Korean official, visiting here, meanwhile, told reporters that China has agreed to the need for the Security Council to issue a statement on the Cheonan incident.

The official, asking anonymity, said that the 15 members of Security Council have made progress on the wording of a statement to be issued, but added, "We still need to resolve the last big differences."

He said he does not expect the rebuke, whether a presidential statement or resolution, to be stronger than the one issued by the G-8 leaders in Canada Saturday.

"We think the G-8 statement is not bad, and we are discussing the wording with that as a basis," he said. "But it may be difficult for the council to produce a version to the level of the G-8 statement and I think the council version should be more delicate."

Russia, North Korea's traditional ally, has diluted the G-8 statement, opposing any clause directly linking North Korea to the ship sinking. Russia is a G-8 member, along with the U.S., Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Canada and Italy.

North Korea has another ally on the Security Council, China, which has joined with Russia in watering down any measures against North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests. China and Russia are two of five veto-wielding powers within the UNSC.

The G-8 communique did not directly link North Korea to the sinking of the Cheonan in the Yellow Sea in March, but noted an international probe concluded that North Korea is responsible.

"We condemn, in this context, the attack which led to the sinking of the Cheonan," it said. "We demand that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea refrain from committing any attacks or threatening hostilities against the Republic of Korea."

The anonymous official said that Washington is preparing for a set of unilateral financial measures against North Korea.

"I don't think Washington will single out any one foreign bank, like they did to the Banco Delta Asia," he said. "I understand they are coming up with general guidelines for financial sanctions on North Korea."

Washington froze more than US$25 million in North Korean accounts in Banco Delta Asia in 2005, designating the Macau bank as an entity suspected of helping North Korea launder money it earned by circulating counterfeit $100 bills called supernotes.

The U.S. lifted the freeze in early 2007 to entice the North to come back to the six-party talks on ending its nuclear weapons programs. Washington officials have said the freeze effectively cut off Pyongyang's access to the international financial system and dealt the nation a devastating blow.

**Japan Worries Over Deal Between Taiwan and China**

Tensions now.

Shimbun, Yomiuri. "China-Taiwan deal gives Japan firms pause." *Daily Yomiuri* 1 July 2010: n. pag. Web. 30 June 2010. <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/ business/T100630004001.htm>.

The historic trade pact signed by China and Taiwan on Tuesday will force many Japanese companies to rethink their strategies for this key market--one that could evolve into a powerful economic rival.

The economic cooperation framework agreement heavily favors Taiwan companies, cutting tariffs on 539 Taiwan export items to China as opposed to 237 items exported in the other direction.

Japan's electronics industry has crafted close links with consortiums of Chinese and Taiwan companies by commissioning them to manufacture their products. But Tuesday's signing has made some Japanese electronics makers wary of a possible rivalry with the so-called Chaiwan alliance.

"We could end up competing against them now," an executive of a major electronics maker said.

Intensified price competition might not be the only headache for Japanese makers. The strong partnership between China, which has a huge market, and Taiwan, which has advanced technology, would be a formidable competitor.

Japan's petrochemical industry has been competing with Taiwan companies for customers in China. But if tariffs between China and Taiwan are eliminated, Taiwan companies would be able to offer their products at more competitive prices than their Japanese counterparts.

The free trade agreement will slash tariffs on auto parts, fueling concern among Japanese automakers that are planning to ramp up production at their China plants.

But the trade agreement could benefit some Japanese industries.

Computers produced in Taiwan use many components made in Japan. If Taiwan products become more price-competitive in China--and therefore sell better--Japanese parts makers could reap the windfall.

However, a broader partnership between Chinese and Taiwan firms "will certainly be a threat" to Japanese companies on the global market, a source in the trade industry said.

The Japanese government will closely watch whether more items become subject to tariff cuts. It also will pull out all the stops to promote the joint study of a free trade agreement between Japan, China and South Korea, and to resume talks on an economic partnership agreement with South Korea, according to government officials.

Alliance Bad – China

A stronger US-Japan alliance propels Japanese rearmament, angers China.

Wu Xinbo, professor at the Center for American Studies and associate dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai; Winter 2005; http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/216067\_731508578\_918389659.pdf

Enhanced security ties between Washington and Tokyo since the mid·1990s, particularly during the past few years, have transformed the U.S.-Japanese alliance and reshaped the East Asian security environment. Although external threats to Japan today are at a historic low, the transformation has created room for Tokyo to pursue more active and aggressive security policy. From dispatching troops to Iraq to listing Taiwan as one of the "common strategic objectives" between the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has shown increased assertiveness and willingness to work militarily with the United States. Impressed by Japan’s enthusiasm and dynamism in promoting security cooperation, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, an enthusiastic proponent of strong U.S.-Japanese security ties, remarked satisfactorily on the achievements in the U.S.-Japanese alliance at the end of the first Bush administration: “If you look back to where we were in 2000 and where we are now, oh, so many things have changed. So many things.”’ Yet, as the United States and Japan have expanded their security ties to reflect changes in their respective threat perceptions and regional security strategies, strong concern has arisen in other countries.

This is particularly true in Beijing, which believes that enhanced security cooperation between Washington and Tokyo compromises China's security. For years, many Chinese analysts regarded the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a useful constraint on Japan’s remilitarization. Developments since the mid·l990s and especially during the past few years, however, have convinced them that the alliance has become an excuse for Japan to pursue more active security policy. Moreover, the "China factor" has played an even stronger role in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation under the Bush administration than in previous years. Concern with checking rising Chinese power and deterring a possible Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait has caused Washington to push for more assertive Japanese security policy, shaping both the form and substance of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Indeed, as Beijing continues to expand its material power and influence in Asia, Washington has sought to balance China's rise through its campaign to return Japan to a "normal nation.” Contrary to past policies, the United States is now driving rather than constraining Japan's rearmament. In the foreseeable future, short of a major adjustment of U.S. regional security strategy, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will act as a propellant of, rather than as a cap on, Japan's military development. At least as far as China is concerned, the bright side of the U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be gone.

Alliance Bad – Taiwan

Upgraded US-Japanese alliance creates regional instability in Taiwan.

Wu Xinbo, professor at the Center for American Studies and associate dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai; Winter 2005; http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/216067\_731508578\_918389659.pdf

Of Beijing’s various concerns about the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the most acute is the potential impact on Chinese handling of the Taiwan issue. Unfortunately, the strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance has led to Japan’s accelerated involvement in the Taiwan issue, as demonstrated by the February 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement, which in turn has further harmed Sino-Japanese relations. The widespread anti-Japanese protests in China in the spring of 2005 were aroused not only by historical and territorial disputes but also by Japan's unwarranted interference in what China perceives as its core national interests in the Taiwan issue.

To Washington and Tokyo, the alliance will serve first and foremost as a formidable deterrent against Beijing’s possible use of force against Taiwan. Should deterrence fail, their alliance would serve as a platform for a joint U.S.-Japanese response to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. In 1996 and 1997, when the United States and Japan worked to revise their defense cooperation guidelines, they included the Taiwan Strait in the parameters. Even though Tokyo insisted that the parameters are situational rather than geographical, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula have been listed by Tokyo and Washington as the two potential hot spots necessitating U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in East Asia. Since the defense cooperation guidelines were revised, both U.S.-Taiwanese and Japanese-Taiwanese security ties have been remarkably enhanced. Given the long-held U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, the expansion of U.S.-Taiwanese military relations may be expected. The growth Japanese-Taiwanese security ties, however; should be attributed to the expanded mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

In fact, interaction between Washington and Tokyo on the Taiwan issue has been increasing, with Tokyo more actively consulting and coordinating with Washington in its relations with Taipei. After listing Taiwan as a common strategic objective in February 2005, Japan and the United States are reported to be working on a joint war plan for the Taiwan Strait. As the U.S.-Japanese alliance assumes the function of security guarantor to Taiwan, it serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan, who believe that, no matter which side provoked a war in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Tokyo would be ready to come to their rescue. Based on this calculus, Taiwan has been pushing for the creation of a "U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security coalition” in recent years. For Beijing, the harsh reality is that, if the situation in Taiwan spins out of control and requires force, it has to be prepared to deal not only with the United States but also with a militarily more active and capable Japan.

Chinese analysts believe that it has been a key U.S. policy objective to maintain primacy in regional security since the Cold War years. To that end, Washington not only retains a strong forward deployment but also a vibrant “hub-and-spoke" alliance system, of which the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the core. In the post-Cold War era, Japan has become an even more valuable piece of the U.S. regional security strategy: it helps consolidate U.S. preponderance and balance China’s growing power. As Japan becomes more actively involved in the U.S. regional security strategy, enhanced U.S.-Japanese security ties will contribute to the primary U.S. strategic position in East Asia and the western Pacific region, amplifying U.S. clout on regional political, economic, und security affairs. As the alliance also intends to serve as the backbone of a regional security structure, the emphasis placed on it reflects an attempt to enhance the U.S.-Japanese condominium of regional security, a development that will both undermine China’s influence in the region and run the risk of returning the region to a bipolar structure characterized by strategic competition, antagonism, and even confrontation. A bipolar regional order would be a nightmare scenario, at least For China and presumably for the entire region, including the United States and Japan.

China is a Threat

China poses a serious threat to the U.S. from expanded conventional and nuclear forces

Lieutenant Colonel David P. Rodgers, writer for the U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 15, 2006; http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil482.pdf

The U.S. faces significant issues that require a diplomatic balancing act to ensure our relationship with China remains friendly and productive. Although China is a major trading partner, it also poses an emerging threat due to the development and size of its military. Beginning in 1989, China's annual defense spending as a percentage of total government expenditures grew by double digits through 2001. China has built a total active duty force of 2.3 million personnel, backed by a huge reserve force. Why does China need such a large force'? Is it to address internal unrest or to threaten others, especially Taiwan?

In 1996, China fired missiles toward Taiwan, prompting the U.S. to dispatch two aircraft carriers to the region. This action clarified some issues. It signaled clearly that China can expect American involvement if it makes an aggressive move toward Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA], any unprovoked attack or other coercive behavior toward the island (including blockades) would likely trigger an American military response. Public declaration of the U.S. commitment with regard to the TRA serves as a warning to China, indicating exactly where America stands with regard to Taiwan. China understands this, yet continues to build and modernize its forces.

In 1991, the Cable News Network (CNN) provided China with a first-hand look at the remarkable capabilities of U S. forces, technology, and firepower used during Operation Desert Storm. This capability sent shocks through China, as its leaders realized how inferior their forces and equipment were in comparison. During this period, China reformed and modernized the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA}. Since then, China has acquired more technologically advanced equipment and has developed improved capabilities. For example, China continues to work on increased range and accuracy of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). China has also purchased three decommissioned aircraft carriers, adding to a growing naval capability of their destroyers and submarines. There is no doubt that this is a concern to the U.S.

North Korean Prolif Bad

Expanded North Korean weapons program leads to regional proliferation

Christopher W. Hughes, associate professor at the University of Warwick, U.K., January 2007; (*Asia Policy,* Number 3, pg 75-104)

http://asiapolicy.nbr.org

In turn, it is clear that also close to the forefront of regional policymakers’ minds is the long-held apprehension that if North Korea is allowed the unbridled maintenance of its nuclear program then this will have a broader impact on nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. It is often speculated that the current non-nuclear weapon states in Northeast Asia, whether “reversal” or “threshold” states, may be provoked by North Korea to embark on their own nuclear weapons programs. This “nuclear cascade” might begin with Japan reconsidering its nuclear option, closely followed by South Korea reacting to the change of stance by both North Korea and Japan. The possible further upgrading by China (People’s Republic of China or PRC) of its nuclear capabilities and doctrine, in reaction to a nuclearized Japan and Korean Peninsula, might then trigger renewed interest by Taiwan in a nuclear weapons capacity. Since October of 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test has refueled this type of speculation. In mid-October, almost as if on cue, Nakagawa Shoichi, Chairman of the Policy Research Council of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Foreign Minister Aso Taro attempted to initiate a debate in Japan on the utility of nuclear weapons. Abe Shinzo, the new prime minister, moved to reaffirm Japan’s non-nuclear principles, but not before Japan’s purported nuclear intentions had attracted the interest of China and South Korea. The leadership of both states expressed their appreciation of the need for Japan to preserve its non-nuclear stance. President George W. Bush on October 16 noted his concern that Japan’s possible reconsideration of its nuclear stance would cause anxieties for China and that North Korea’s nuclear weapons might produce an arms race in Northeast Asia. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on October 10 voiced similar concerns, although expressing confidence that Japan would not go nuclear. Meanwhile, in the United States there is a willingness to exploit again the so-called Japan card of encouraging talk of Japan’s breaching of its non-nuclear stance as a means to punish China for its failure to pressure North Korea on its nuclear program.

Futenma Key to Democracy

Base protests good- increase Japanese participation in the democratic process.

Aurelia George Mulgan, professor on Japanese politics and Northeast Asian security issues at University of New South Wales, 2000; (“Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy”, Japanese Studies, pg. 159-177) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713683781

Popular protests against the US bases in Okinawa, the resort to citizen-initiated referenda under the auspices of local government to determine public sentiments regarding base-related issues, and the challenge thrown down to central government power by the defiance of Governor Ota in refusing to cooperate with procedures required for the renewal of base leases are very much in the tradition of citizens’ movements in Japan which have been integral to the development of indigenous ideas of decentralization and the development of local autonomy.76 The Okinawa base problem has actually served to strengthen participatory democracy in Japan, with copycat strategies being employed by other local protest movements.

An increasingly popular weapon in the hands of local activists has been the use of non-binding referenda. Although it is argued that Japanese citizens have the right to initiate referenda under Chapter 8, Article 95 of the Constitution pertaining to Local Self-Government,77 providing due procedures laid down in the Local Autonomy Law are followed, the constitutional status of plebiscites is not established in Japan, and ballot results are not legally binding.78

Politically, however, it is a different story. Exercises in direct participatory democracy, such as the plebiscites held in Okinawa, represent expressions of popular will that are difficult for the central government to ignore. Although the LDP has opposed the holding of these referenda and has actively campaigned against them (or, as in Nago, tried to configure plebiscite questions to bring about the desired result), it has not been able totally to reject the sentiments they contain. Plebiscites are becoming a standard weapon in the arsenal of local government politicians who seek to reject citizens’ views on central government development proposals.

Heg Dead

US heg is already falling- proven in Europe, Africa, and South America

John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, March 6, 2010; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html

During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the US war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon's new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the US out of its air base in Manta.

All of these are undoubtedly symptoms of the decline in respect for American power that the US military is experiencing globally. But the current pushback in Japan is the surest sign yet that the American empire of overseas military bases has reached its high-water mark and will soon recede.

Aff – AT: Consult Japan

The counterplan is normal means. This is from the Status of Forces Agreement that governs the military relationship between the US and Japan that we signed in 1960.

Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, 1/19/1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf cp

1. (a) The United States is granted, under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the use of facilities and areas in Japan. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas shall be con-cluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee pro-vided for in Article XXV of this Agreement. "Facilities and areas" include existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary to the operation of such facilities and areas.

(b) The facilities and areas of which the United States has the use at the time of expiration of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, shall be considered as facilities and areas agreed upon between the two Governments in accordance with subparagraph (a) above.

2. At the request of either Government, the Governments of the United States and Japan shall review such arrangements and may agree that such facilities and areas shall be returned to Japan or that additional facilities and areas may be provided.

More evidence—same source.

Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, 1/19/1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf cp

1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement. In particular, the Joint Committee shall serve as the means for consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required for the use of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Here’s even more ev from the treaty.

Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, 1/19/1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf cp

Either Government may at any time request the revision of any Article of this Agreement, in which case the two Governments shall enter into negotiation through appropriate channels.

Aff – Japan Politics

Kan is the right man to restore political credibility to the DPJ and pass their financial reform

Tobias Harris, a PhD candidate in political science at MIT, June 3, 2010; http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/03/japan-the-virtues-of-kan/print/

Kan has said fairly little over the years about foreign policy and Japan’s relations with the US and its neighbors. To the extent that he has talked about foreign policy, for instance on previous occasions that he led the DPJ, his views have been virtually at the center in terms of the spectrum of opinion within the DPJ. He as acknowledged the importance of the alliance and the US forward presence on multiple occasions, but when Koizumi was prime minister, he criticized the government for its slavish subservience to the US and for not balancing the US-Japan relationship with the other ‘pillars’ of Japanese foreign policy, multilateral cooperation at the UN and bilateral and multilateral relations within Asia. He isn’t exactly dovish, but he’s no hawk either. Accordingly, I would not be surprised if Okada Katsuya either stays on as foreign minister or continues to play an important foreign policy role in another capacity.

However, the details of Kan’s policy beliefs may be less important at this juncture than his biography. Given that he is a conviction politician, given his ministerial experience (something that Hatoyama lacked), and given his emphasis on open politics, Kan may be the right man to restore public trust in the DPJ-led government and lead his party to a respectable showing in next month’s upper house election. The central task for the Hatoyama government was the restore public faith in government after years of LDP misrule. The central task for a Kan government would be to restore public faith in government after years of LDP misrule — and nine months of Hatoyama misrule. If the public does not trust the government, it is difficult to see how Japan will escape its economic stagnation. As I’ve said before, if the public cannot trust the government to be honest about its intentions and forthright about how public money is spent, no government will be in a position to ask for something like a consumption tax increase.

Kan certainly has the right biography for this purpose — and having been a cabinet minister before, he should be more capable of managing the cabinet than Hatoyama was, avoiding the self-inflicted wounds that ultimately destroyed the Hatoyama government.