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Presence Solves Modernization Impact

US presence prevents conflict in the face of Chinese modernization

Ross 05 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

**These** new **capabilities pose a danger to U.S**. naval **security**. **But China's recent acquisitions** from Russia also **reveal** the PLA's **limitations**. Chinese **modernization** enhances a coastal sea-denial capability but **does not contribute to a blue-water sea-control capability. Its aircraft** and short- and medium-range missiles **are tethered to Chinese territory**. Its next generation of Russian surface-to-air missiles have a limited range of 200 kilometers. And even in its coastal waters, **China's capability is at best limited**. **It continues to lack** the **sophisticated guidance capability** to allow its missiles to strike moving targets at sea, such as a U.S. aircraft carrier, and baUistic missiles are an ineffective anti-ship weapon. Despite the improvements in China's air force, **the United States** has finished testing and **is preparing to deploy the F-22** aircraft, **which is** far **superior to any aircraft in the world**, including Russia's most advanced. **China's full complement of** Kilo **submarines may become** fully **operational** sometime **in the next decade**. At that time, U.S. aircraft carriers and destroyers may well have to operate at a greater distance from the Chinese coast to minimize casualties— **but this will not prevent the United States from establishing air superiority along the Chinese coastline**. Moreover, advances in U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities will degrade the capability of China's Kilo submarines and help sustain U.S. abihty to operate in coastal waters.

Modernization won’t escalate to conflict with Taiwan with US deterrence

Ross 05 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

**CHINA IS** also **developing indigenous platforms**. For example, it recently launched its first post-Mao submarine, the Yuan class. **But** the **capabilities** of the Yuan submarine **remain limited**. Its hiding and attack capabilities are less advanced than the capabilities of the Russian Kilo, limiting it to a supplemental role in sea denial. China has also completed development of its first post-Mao fighter jet, the J-10. But because the J-10 took over twenty years to develop, it is based on the 1970s technology of the cancelled Israeli Lavi jet program, and it remains beset with problems. It is an inferior aircraft compared to both of the aircraft China has purchased from Russia and compared to U.S. carrier-based aircraft in the western Pacific. Although Chinese manufacture of Yuan-class submarines and of the J-10 represent major breakthroughs for the Chinese defense industry, they rely on imported technologies. They are only breakthroughs because the industry began from such a backward position in the aftermath of the Maoist era. **China's indigenous missiles are also fairly primitive.** Its anti-ship cruise missile technologies still reflect 1960s and 1970s capabilities, and its development of long-range naval surface-to-air missiles for ship defense confronts enduring problems. **In the end, China's development of a coastal-water sea-denial capability neither undermines U.S. sea control nor contributes to a war-winning capability**. **True, Chinese modernization has transformed the cross-strait balance, but this was all but inevitable once rapid economic development began.** In any case, **Taiwan has never depended on its own capabilities for security, but rather on the likelihood of U.S. intervention and its deterrence of a Chinese attack. In this respect, Taiwan is as secure as ever**.

China Modernization Good

Chinese military modernization promotes peace

Xinhua News Agency 9 (“China to militarize space for peace” Nov 3 http://www.military.com/news/article/china-to-militarize-space-for-peace.html?ESRC=topstories.RSS) JL

BEIJING, Nov 01, -- China will develop an air force with integrated capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations in space as well as in air, the commander of China's air force says. Calling militarization in the space and in air "a threat to the mankind," Gen. Xu Qiliang said on Sunday that China must develop a strong force in the two arenas in order to face challenges of that threat. "Only power could protect peace," the 59-year-old air force commander said in an interview with Xinhua, 10 days ahead of 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army air force. Superiority in space and in air would mean, to a certain extent, superiority over the land and the oceans, Xu said. "As the air force of a peace-loving country, we must forge our swords and shields in order to protect peace," he said. According to Xu, not only major air force powers in the world are currently eyeing space and air superiority, some developing countries are also changing their military strategies to gain upper ground in the two arenas. A country without adequate power would have no say when faced with challenges posed by the militarization in the space and air, he said. The PLA air force would improve its detection and early warning, air striking, anti-missile air defense, strategic delivery capabilities in order to effectively protect China's interests and help maintain regional and world peace, Xu said. Xu meanwhile stressed that the PLA air force was peace-oriented. "The Chinese people is a peace-loving people, and China is a responsible developing country which upholds a national defense policy that is defensive in nature," he said. A powerful PLA air force would protect China's sovereignty, safety and territorial integrity, and would play a major part in maintaining regional stability and world peace, he said. "The PLA air force will pose no threat to any other country," Xu said. This year marks the 60th founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Its naval force was founded on April 23, 1949, and its air force on Nov. 11 that year. Previous report said the PLA air force would put its most advanced warplanes on display in the suburbs of Beijing in November, to mark its 60th founding anniversary.

China is committed to becoming a peaceful superpower

Bijian 5 (Zheng, Chair of China Reform Forum, Foreign Affairs, “China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status) MAT

Despite widespread fears about China's growing economic clout and political stature, Beijing remains committed to a "peaceful rise": bringing its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace -- a peace that its development will in turn reinforce. China's rapid development has attracted worldwide attention in recent years. The implications of various aspects of China's rise, from its expanding influence and military muscle to its growing demand for energy supplies, are being heatedly debated in the international community as well as within China. Correctly understanding China's achievements and its path toward greater development is thus crucial. Indeed, China has achieved the goal it set for itself in 1978: it has significantly improved the well-being of its people, although its development has often been narrow and uneven. The last 27 years of reform and growth have also shown the world the magnitude of China's labor force, creativity, and purchasing power; its commitment to development; and its degree of national cohesion. Once all of its potential is mobilized, its contribution to the world as an engine of growth will be unprecedented.

China Modernization Good

Despite attempts to compete with America as regional military hegemon, it is only to establish a strong, peaceful, and defensive military posture

Tkacik 7 (John J. Jr., Sr Research Fellow in China Policy, The Heritage Foundation, “A Chinese Military Superpower?”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower) MAT

On March 4, China's National People's Congress announced that it would increase the country's military budget 17.8 percent in 2007 to a total of $45 billion.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) Despite the fact that this was the biggest single annual increase in China's military spending,[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) the Chinese government reassured the world that this spending hike was normal and need not worry anyone. "[China](http://www.heritage.org/Places/Asia-and-the-Pacific/China) is committed to taking a path of peaceful development and it pursues a defensive military posture," a spokesman said.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) But the evidence suggests instead that China's intent is to challenge the United States as a military superpower. A closer look at China's military spending raises profound questions about China's geopolitical direction. In terms of purchasing power parity ([PPP](http://www.heritage.org/Issues/Economy/Global-Economy/Purchasing-Power-Parity)), China's effective military spending is far greater than $45 billion, or even the U.S. Department of Defense's $105 billion estimate.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) In fact, it is in the $450 billion range, putting it in the same league as the United States and far ahead of any other country, including Russia.[[5]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/A-Chinese-Military-Superpower%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5)

AT: Modernization 🡪 Conflict

China military modernization remains purely defensive

Kamphausen & Scobell 7 (Roy, Sr. Vice prez for political and security affairs, Andrew, Research professor of national security affairs “Right sizing the PLA: Exploring the contours of China’s military” Pg 18 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub784.pdf) JL

Cataloguing the advances in China’s strategic systems and doctrines, plus its Army, Air Force, and Navy capabilities, enables us to see how the Chinese military’s size and composition accord with its rhetoric, and to evaluate the parameters within which China determines the appropriate scale for the PLA. In accord with a military strategy based on deterrence and denial, and focused on enhancing China’s broader national objectives, the rapid modernization undertaken by the PLA over the past 10-15 years has been calculated and gradual, yet comprehensive and broad. In Chapter 12, “The ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: To What Ends?” Ellis Joffe takes one last look at the drivers of PLA modernization. While many analysts will agree that the primary impetus for China’s military buildup over the past decade or so has been the need to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence, the specter of war along the Strait has diminished dramatically since 2006—and with it the immediate need for military muscle. Why then does China continue to build and update its armed forces? Joffe reiterates that the development of a more robust military force is part and parcel of China’s unalterable, long-range objective of achieving “great power” standing among the international community. Because this goal is longitudinal and generational, efforts to build a force commensurate with the country’s international prominence are seen as a gradual process, composed of a series of short-term steps and activities. The first of these objectives, writes Joffe, might be the attainment of a preeminent position in the East Asian region. Driving this aspiration are the same forces—physical presence, nationalism, and economic power—that underlie the country’s global motivations. Although China’s present-day regional strategy has converged on Taiwan—preventing the province from seceding and interdicting any U.S. naval intervention—PLA forces have so far failed to demonstrate an outright intention to compete with U.S. dominance in the Western Pacific. Instead, China has been engaging in defensive maneuvers designed to protect the country’s maritime security interests—and to hedge against increasing U.S. military might in the region. Thus, while the speed and scope of China’s military modernization may change in the future, its direction will probably not. Joffe reminds us that China’s security interests vis-à-vis the United States will continue to drive PLA missions, functions, and organization for years to come.

AT: China Modernization 🡪 Taiwan

Modernization is key to prevent Taiwan separatism

Feng 10 (Zhu, research fellow for Center for Peace and Development in China, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” ,May 10 http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia) JL

Many China watchers in the West contend that the weak legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spurred its military buildup. But this is mostly an attribution error. Despite a great number of challenges from home and abroad, the CCP’s ruling legitimacy has not suffered from any shock. The Chinese people do not believe that a change of ruling party or the party’s relinquishing of power will resolve their complaints. Even if domestic unrest flares up, China would likely turn inward rather than outward, even at the cost of effectively muting an assertive foreign policy. China’s advent on the world stage, however, has brought a number of formidable obsessions to its thinking on security and the upsurge in its investments in the military. These include the enduring separatist threats from Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and Chinese perceptions of “foreign intervention” behind them. Also important are an increasing dependence on the world market, the need for the safe transportation of oil and raw materials, and the consequent focus on maritime security. Of course, China’s economic development in fact allows the government to devote a bigger share of swelling national revenue to the defense budget. In general, these policies enjoy majority consent in the country. China’s military aspirations, in other words, derive from its current transition. These motivations have less to do with specific strategic goals or some desire to change or preserve the status quo. Rather, they have to do with Beijing’s sense of national pride, the imperative of the state to counter separatist pressure and address potential contingencies arising from this pressure, and the need to develop a capability to cope with “uncertain war.” China’s expanded military capabilities and its flexible strategic goals will continue to affect its international standing for some time. Going deeper into the core of Chinese “insecurity” dilemma, it is not hard to understand Beijing’s heavy investment in the military. Domestically, military modernization is a reliable and visible way to deter ethnic and separatist rebel movements and enhance national cohesion; internationally, it reflects a preoccupation of the leadership to counter ideological antagonism.

AT: China Modernization 🡪 Arms Race

Modernization doesn’t cause an arms race – particularly with US presence

Feng 10 (Zhu, research fellow for Center for Peace and Development in China, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” ,May 10 http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia) JL

As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race. No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a regional “security dilemma,” whereby the “defensive” actions taken by one country are perceived as “offensive” by another country, which in turn takes its own “defensive” actions that the first country deems “offensive.” As long as the region doesn’t split into rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call “competitive arms processes.” The history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending. Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwan’s defense budget for fiscal year 2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget. Australia’s twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. China’s two-digit increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant great-power rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into “arms races.” The security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably induce “risk-taking” behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture—the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based security networking—any power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status quo. China’s military modernization, its determination to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best,” hasn’t yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic engagement with China, though “balancing China” strategies can be found in almost every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic.

Modernization 🡪 China Stability

Chinese modernization is critical to maintaining stability within China

Feng 10 (Zhu, research fellow for Center for Peace and Development in China, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” ,May 10 http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia) JL

Going deeper into the core of Chinese “insecurity” dilemma, it is not hard to understand Beijing’s heavy investment in the military. Domestically, military modernization is a reliable and visible way to deter ethnic and separatist rebel movements and enhance national cohesion; internationally, it reflects a preoccupation of the leadership to counter ideological antagonism. Essentially, Beijing has only two choices. One would be to toss out the ruling CCP, embark on democratization, and become a full-blown follower of Anglo-American preeminence. The other would be to maintain its current policy and help formalize the “Beijing consensus” by all means, including military muscle. China’s historical grievances, its opaque patriotic culture, and the great-power legacy emanating from its long history all push it toward its current strategic choice. Therefore, China’s military budget increase falls into a different category. It is neither a hedge strategy nor flashpoint-driven, but could be summed up as “governance driven.” No one can deny the political function of the Chinese military buildup in the domestic arena. Beijing’s military parade on October 1, 2009 was impressive by any standard, given the sheer number and force on display and the seeming lack of individuality. The outcome has been predictable: stoking patriotism and helping build up the popularity of the Chinese leadership at a time of social unrest. But Beijing has spent less effort anticipating the international response. There is no sign that the Chinese leadership is aware of international fears of its military buildup. Possibly, the leadership’s superficial blindness to international reaction derives from its domestic focus and its desire to play to a domestic audience.

China K2 Regional Stability

China is key to maintaining regional stability, which is on the brink

Tum Gazeteler 8 (“East Asian Perception of China”6/24, http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=3819542) JL

Though not as popular as US, China still means a lot both for South Korea and Japan. As one of China"s largest trade partners, South Korean economy greatly depends on China market. More importantly, China"s active participation as the major mediator in solving North Korean nuclear problems renders South Korea"s cooperation with China inevitable. Similarly, the recent rapprochement between China and Japan proves growing awareness within Japan of the importance in further cooperation with China. Following the recent reciprocal high-level visits, deeply rooted tension between these biggest rivals in the region seems to be ameliorating, creating a positive atmosphere in the East Asian region as a whole. The East China Sea gas deal soon to be signed, for instance, would not only bring huge economic benefits to both contractors, but would also offer China an important opportunity to enhance its image in the region as a whole. Both South Korea and Japan are aware of the necessity to cooperate and unite with China under a common roof East Asia. East Asia has successfully made huge economic improvements, but conflicts still remain. Regional threats such as nuclear problems regarding North Korea, military competitions if not contentions, and instability in the neighboring region Southeast Asia where many dictators are still in hold of power nurturing various terrorist groups all offer good reasons why cooperation under united East Asia is necessary. From South Korean and Japanese perspective, cooperation with China, who has the veto power as the member of the UN Security Council and also has immense influence in Southeast Asian region seems to be the rational choice for securing regional stability. The Asia Soft Power Survey 2008 reveals that the East Asian countries perceive further regional integration to be extremely positive. The survey results show all China, South Korea, and Japan are willing to establish a free-trade zone, and going beyond economic terms wish to form a EU-like East Asian community with political impacts. According to the Asia Soft Power Survey 2008, majority of Asian countries and US expect China to become the leader of Asia in the near future. Especially with the help of 2008 Beijing Olympics, as assessed in the survey, most Asian countries believe the Olympic Games would play an important role in enhancing China image. Aware that its neighbors including South Korea who was the host of 1988 Olympic Games and one of the major supporter of 2008 Beijing Olympic Games are closely watching, Chinese government is being extremely careful in protecting its image faced with serious challenges, such as Tibet incident and Sichuan earthquakes, hoping that its power would one day be truly recognized by all in the region.

China K2 Regional Stability

China is key to peace and stability in the Asian region

Bandow 10 (Doug, Sr Research Fellow, CATO Institute, “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia”, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11845>) MAT

While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace. For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict. Less obvious but potentially more serious is the future status of Taiwan. The People's Republic of China insists that the island, separated from the mainland by Japanese occupation and civil war, return to Beijing's authority. The Taiwanese people are never likely to support control by the PRC. How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S.

China Encirclement Good - Deterrence

US military presence in Japan key to deter China

Hughes 8 (Christopher, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, InformaWorld, “[Adelphi series](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713662270) V[48](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713662270~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D48#v48) Issue [403”, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a910844467&fulltext=713240928) CBC](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg910845812)

Taken together, this book presents a set of comprehensive and objective indicators which point towards Japan's continuing remilitarisation has important ramifications for international security. The use here of the term 'remilitarisation' should not be read as an alarmist warning that Japan is necessarily intent on reverting to the kind of state it became between 1931 and 1945. Japan remains a constrained military actor, reluctant to pursue the full potential panoply of national military capabilities, limited by its junior alliance relationship with the US and its strong residual antimilitaristic sentiment. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that Japan, judged by the objective international yardstick of the key indicators of remilitarisation, which in turn are **Japan'**s own benchmarks, **is set upon a long-term trajectory that will see it assuming a more assertive regional and global security role**. Japan can certainly in no way be said to be demilitarising or to have reached stasis in its security policy. All the long-term indications point to activism and expansion in its military capabilities and international commitments. Such **expansion clearly affects the East Asian power balance**; indeed, in some respects Japan is engaged in a low-key arms race with China, and is hedging its nuclear stance vis-agrave-vis North Korea. Japan's attempts to enhance security ties with Australia, South Korea and India also impact upon the regional security landscape. Just as crucial, though, is Japan's approach to its alliance with the US. **Japan's increasing support for, and participation in, US regional power projection holds the key to** Washington's **attempts to deter a nuclearising North Korea and** a **rising China. Similarly, the expanding functional and geographical scope of US-Japan alliance cooperation increasingly holds the key to efforts by US** administrations **to maintain** their state's **global military hegemony. This logic is likely to induce Obama's administration and its Japanese counterparts to keep pushing ever outwards the envelope of bilateral military cooperation.**

U.S. presence in Japan deters China

**Dujarric 5** (Robert, Research Fellow Japan Institute of International Affairs, KOREA OBSERVER, “U.S. Military Presence and Northeast Asian Regional Stability: Comparative Perspective between U.S.- Japan Alliance and U.S.-Korea Alliance and the Future of the Alliances”, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/\_dsp/dsp\_authorBio3.cfm?authID=132) CBC

**In Japan’s case, the U.S. military played a much more active role in setting up the post-1945 state.** Until 1952, when the Occupation ended, ultimate sovereignty in Japan resided in the United States, which was represented in Japan by an army general (Dou- glas MacArthur until President Truman relieved him of command in 1951). In the years that followed, the U.S. military retained the right to intervene in Japanese domestic affairs in case of internal disorder. Gradually, this U.S. military role in this sphere disappeared as the country became politically stable. **The** **third role of U.S. forces, and one which remains very much valid, is to insure regional stability**. In the case of Korea**, the U.S. military deployment** on the peninsula and **in Japan** **has reassured** Koreans who fear, however irrational such sentiments may be, that Japanese imperialists may pose a threat to Korea. With the U.S. military enjoying **regional hegemony,** Koreans know they have fewer reasons to be anxious about Japan. Similarly, Japanese who expect the worse from South Korea, and are disturbed by the possibility of an anti-Japanese unified Korea, know that American m**ilitary superiority protects Japan.** **In the case of the USFJ, they also play an important role in providing part of the U.S. military infrastructure that deters China from attacking** Taiwan. **The defense** of Taiwan **would be far harder if the U.S. did not have bases in Japan as well as the advantage of rear-area support by Japan.** Overall, it is **the U.S. alliance system that has allowed** North-U.S. Military Presence and Northeast Asian Regional Stability **east Asia to prosper**. **Without American military hegemony in the region, the peaceful international regime that allowed Japan**, then the ROK, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, **and later China, to grow** economically **would not exist**. Like the police force in a city, the U.S. military has provided, in conjunction with its allies, the security infrastructure which allows the population to engage in trade and industry knowing that its property is safe from bandits and criminals.1

China Encirclement Good - Deterrence

Despite escalation dominance the US must maintain a strong presence in Asia to deter Chinese expansion and aggression

Ross in 2k5 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

**U.S.** naval preponderance and **dominant strategic presence** in maritime East Asia **both deter war and maintain a favorable balance of power**. Continental powers that have tried to become naval powers by challenging maritime powers have failed throughout history. **China might try to become a naval power, but it would be foolish and costly and would** almost certainly **end in failure**. **Chinese leaders seem to understand this**; the United States should understand this as well and should draw confidence from it. Moreover**,** the **United States is strengthening its deployments in East Asia**. Over the past five years the Pentagon has moved attack submarines and cruise missiles to Guam. The Air Force is building an operations center on Guam to serve the entire Pacific. It plans to form a strike force there, with six bomber aircraft and 48 fighters redeployed from continental U.S. bases, as well as twelve refueling aircraft, supplementing U.S. carrierbased aircraft and U.S. aircraft in Japan. The Air Force also plans to deploy Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft on Guam. **The U.S. Navy plans to deploy to Japan an advanced aircraft carrier to replace the Kitty Hawk and has allocated funding for deployment of a second carrier in East Asia. The Navy is also converting Trident ballistic missile submarines into platforms for stealth cruise missiles to be deployed in the western Pacific. All of these measures contribute to long-term U.S. sea control throughout East Asia**.

US presence deters Chinese aggression-withdrawal ensures expansion and conflict with China

Ross 05 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

So far, **the United States has responded well to the rise of China. It has maintained its deterrent** and stabilized the regional order. **But the greatest challenge to the status quo and the greatest contribution to the rise of China as a maritime power may well be shortcomings in U.S. defense policy.** Recent attention to the Pentagon's inability to acquire planned numbers of next-generation aircraft carriers and fighter planes, and the escalating costs of these programs, is disturbing. As Secretary Rumsfeld observed, **"Something's wrong with the system." In addition, deployment of U.S. forces in hostilities in peripheral areas weakens our presence in East Asia**. **If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the U.S. presence, it will grab it. The United States should be under no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should its relative power increase. But if the United States does what it can and should do—if it strengthens its regional military presence and continues to modernize its forces—it can maintain its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional balance of power and U.S. security**,

China Encirclement Good - Deterrence

US presence is critical to solving oncoming crises with China

Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Staff Writer and Master’s Degree in Int’l Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Countering China’s Military Modernization”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9052/countering\_chinas\_military\_modernization.html#p2) MAT

China clearly complicates U.S. defense planning in Asia, says CFR's Senior Fellow for China Studies, [Adam Segal](http://www.cfr.org/bios/8863/adam_segal.html). The Pentagon's 2008 [report](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15667/) to Congress states: "Current trends in China's military capabilities are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances, and could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia-well beyond Taiwan." Most countries in the region have some degree of caution in their relationship with China, says [James Mulvenon](http://www.defensegroupinc.com/cira/Personnel.cfm?personnel=mulvenon), director of Washington-based Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. However, none of them, he adds, want to engage in any form of containment policy with the United States. Meanwhile, though China is wary of U.S. military presence close to its border, its troubles with Uighurs has led it to support U.S. military actions inside Afghanistan, say experts. The best way for the United States to ensure that its security interests in the region are not compromised by China's growing military capabilities is to strengthen security alliances with China's neighbors, notes the 2007 Council Task Force report. The report says the United States should better coordinate U.S.-South Korea-Japan security planning, give greater attention to ASEAN, work with ASEAN members to help draw China into constructive security relationships, and pursue a deeper military relationship with India.

China Encirclement Good - Deterrence

U.S. presence deters China-prevents potential escalation

Ikenberry and Moon 8 (John and Chung, Prof. of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Rowman &Littlefield Publishing, “The United States and Northeast Asia”,http://books.google.com/books?id=3XAx3UyoNSEC&pg=PA266&lpg=PA266&dq=%22U.S.+presence%22+%22deters+China%22&source=bl&ots=1eD5kdw0vl&sig=kctHD5anularieQUxjk7WKuqFg&hl=en&ei=3TcuTPfyJ8SLnQeazMiMBA&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%20presence%22%20%22deters%20China%22&f=false) CBC

U.S. troop presence at approximately 100,000 and the maintenance of a dominant naval presence. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. naval presence is secured by alliances with South Korea and

Japan. In Southeast Asia, it is secured through a series of naval agreements with states. induding Indonesia, Singapore- Malay-sia, and the Philippines. The U.S. hegemonic strategy has provided public goods and contributed to regional order in several ways. The U.S. presence has helped to deter major powers from developing or intensifying dangerous rivalries. Japan and China, most obviously, have a history of antagonism and mutual recrimination. Negative sentiment is not far from the surface even some sixty years after the Second World War.. Ideally for China, the U.S. presence constrains Japan, serving as the "cork robe bottle" to suppress possible Japanese aggression." Similarly, for Japan the U.S. presence deters China horns bid for regional dominance commensurate with its growing economic power and political influence. U.S. officials have also worked to manage regional conflicts with the potential to escalate to local and even broader wars. The United States took the initiative throughout the 1990s to stabilize security crises through diplomacy and the implied threat of military force. The critical U.S. role was evident in the China-Taiwan crisis of 1590 the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1099. and the India-Pakistan crises over Kashmir in 1958 and again in 5001. Finally- the United States has worked to discourage the nationalist economic competition that often results when states find themselves in economic distress.

US military presence in Japan deters China and results in US victory

Ross in 2k5 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

**Improved Chinese capabilities will expose U.S. forces to greater losses** than five years ago and will thus complicate U.S. naval operations. **Nevertheless, U.S. aircraft deployments** at Kadena Air Force Base in Japan and **in Guam and the ability to deploy multiple aircraft carriers in East Asia with port facilities in Japan** and Singapore **assure the U.S. Navy of continued maritime supremacy in the western Pacific**. And China's recent advances have not improved its ability to operate in sea lanes of communication. According to the 2005 Pentagon report on Chinese military power, **the Chinese navy is vulnerable to attack when it patrols in the Malacca Strait and among the disputed territories in the South China Sea. U.S. maritime supremacy also enables the United States to plan for its fighter planes and bombers to carry out strikes against Chinese territory and place at risk Chinese coastal and interior civilian and military assets, including ships remaining at port**.

China Encirclement Good – K2 Alliance

**US action against Chinese aggression is key to maintaining the US-Japan alliance**

Tkacik 8 (John, Sr Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation “Clear signal needed on disputed isles”, June 27 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/06/Clear-signal-needed-on-disputed-isles) JL

China's territorial aggressiveness in the East China Sea has alarmed Japan. Japan's national security bureaucracy clearly sees China as the primary challenge in Asia and is diverting large amounts of funding into missile defense, naval systems and new fighter aircraft. But Beijing's diplomats are skilled --they have happily eased their pressures on Japan to woo it away from its concerns, and allies. And while Beijing now avoids antagonizing Tokyo directly, it certainly welcomes Taiwan's recent involvement in the Senkakus dispute. It helps China make the point that the issue is truly about "Chinese nationalism," not self-serving propaganda. China's revered strategist of Confucian times, Sun Tzu, pointed out that while countering the enemy's strategy is of supreme importance, "next best is to divide him from his allies." The Senkakus issue threatens to alienate Taiwan from Japan. It also has the potential to strain Japan's trust in the US-Japan relationship. If the US views the recent flare-up as a minor spat between an immature Taiwan and a boorish Japan, and mutes its position, China may well begin to pressure Tokyo directly. Timidity on the part of the US could serve as a catalyst for a situation that goes against its Japanese ally, and ultimately its own interests, over the longer term. Nothing good can come of a complacent Washington that allows Beijing to fill the leadership vacuum in Asia. The terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty are explicit regarding the Senkakus. It is time for Washington to face up to its responsibilities as an "ally" and make clear its sympathies on the Senkakus issue.

China Encirclement Good - Taiwan

U.S. containment deters China-prevents Taiwan invasion

**Yee and Storey 2** **(**Herbert and Ian, prof. editor, Taylor &Francis Group, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality”, http://books.google.com/books?id=2OMF7rsP7PkC&pg=PA220&lpg=PA220&dq=%22U.S.+presence%22+%22deters+China%22&source=bl&ots=Ne6NBzLmx9&sig=AFgeZlLyDFi5LlIbgAZB4htEAgk&hl=en&ei=3TcuTPfyJ8SLnQeazMiMBA&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCQQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%20presence%22%20%22deters%20China%22&f=false) CBC

regional stability, with **the United States acting as the key balancer**. Despite political differences over human rights Rm.,. **Singapore regards the US as a largely benign powe**r**, as it makes no territorial claim**s M Asia and has a vested interest in maintaining freedom of navigation. The US-Japan Security Treaty not only keeps the United Statas engaged in the region but also prevents Japan from pursuing a more independent strategic policy, something the ASEAN states would not welcome given their experiences of World War Two, and because of the tension it Peoria generate in Sino-Japanese relations. The US military presence also deters China from adopting a more aggressive stance on the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. Singapore has also argued that the US military presence actually benefits China. The withdrawal of US forces would **inevitably precipitate a Japanese arms build-up. China would be forced to respond, diverting valuable resources away from economic modernization**.' When the Cold War ended, Singapore argued that **US forward deployed forces were still vital to regional security**. In the early 1990s, with the downsizing of US and Russian military forces in the area, many in Southeast Asia feared thc creation of a power vacuum. This idea certainly found currency among Singaporean ministers. Brigadier Lee Hsien Loons, son of Lee Ku. Yew and second minister for defense, warned: **Without** a pemuasive **US presence, there will be a power vacuum which other powers would scramble to fill**'.' In 1991, Singapore was the only ASEAN country willing to publicly support the continued presence of US bases in the Philippines. Prime Minister Gob urged President Corazon Aquino to persuade the Philippine Senate to extend the lease on the bases, as their presence played 'a major role in maintaining peace and stability' and that ASEAN should not 'abandon mod and tested formula for regional stability'." Singapore has been ASEAN's most enthusiaztic supporter of **the US military presence in East Asia, and bas played a significant role in facilitating that presence.** In November 1990 Singapore and the United States signed an agreement ving US naval vessels and aimmfi access to Singaporean military bases.-

\*\*\*AT: China Advantage\*\*\*

US China Relations Good – Interdependence

U.S. China relations good-leads to trust and a better global economy

China View 8-1-8 (Xinhua, senior editor, China View, “Bush: U.S.-China relations “good” and “important””, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/01/content\_8885617.htm) CBC

U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that **U.S.-China relations are good and important,** and he is "honored" to be invited to attend the Beijing Olympics. "The fact that both countries are honoring the 30th anniversary of the relationship is a statement about good relations," he told reporters from China, South Korea and Thailand at the White House ahead of his upcoming trip to the three countries. Also, the fact that **both China and the United States are opening new embassies in each other's capitals is "a signal of how important the relationship is**," Bush added. Bush said that during his stay in Beijing, he would attend the opening ceremony of the new U.S. embassy, together with his father, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush. "Isn't that interesting, two new embassies open the same year, obviously to celebrate the 30th anniversary of what has been a very important relationship," he said. In retrospect of the development of U.S.-China relationship during his presidency, the president said two things are most important. One is that he and the Chinese leaders have forged a good personal relationship featured by "sincerity and honesty," as they have met many times during Bush's tenure. Secondly, **the two nations have worked hard to put strategic economic dialogues in place in a bid to broaden and enhance bilateral relations.** To some extent, the president said, **China and the United States have become increasingly interdependent as their relationship is becoming more and more interwoven**, **particularly in the economic field.** He said whoever follows him as the president will continue the policy of "active engagement" (with China) with a constant reminder of the belief in human freedom and liberty." **And it's an opportunity for our two countries ... to be able to work through common problems and to seize common opportunities**," he added. Moreover, Bush said he has always been committed to broadening defense cooperation and exchanges between China and the United States. The president believed **it was very important for U.S. generals, especially younger U.S. officers, to conduct exchanges and make more contacts with their Chinese counterparts so as to create a feeling of trust.**

US China Relations Good – Interdependence

China is interested in long-term peace in international waters

Lieberthal 7 (Kenneth, Prof of Business Administration at Ross School of Business (UMich), “How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact”, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnbrforums.nbr.org%2Fpublications%2Fstrategic\_asia%2Fpdf%2Fxs0708%2FChina\_Lieberthal.pdf&ei=UnkqTOf8H9WCnQe-6uWLAQ&usg=AFQjCNEHXdH8U6UcMqZerdrHz6FPBsob6g&sig2=kXWXxqIp9b3Ifw6VDYVmBg](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnbrforums.nbr.org%2Fpublications%2Fstrategic_asia%2Fpdf%2Fxs0708%2FChina_Lieberthal.pdf&ei=UnkqTOf8H9WCnQe-6uWLAQ&usg=AFQjCNEHXdH8U6UcMqZerdrHz6FPBsob6g&sig2=kXWXxqIp9b3Ifw6VDYVm)) MAT

China’s grand strategy seeks to sustain rapid domestic economic development for another decade or more. Economic success has vastly enhanced the PRC’s global importance. Internal requirements strongly affect the PRC’s approach to and impact on the international arena. These concerns make credible China’s declared need for long- term peace to achieve national development goals. The nature of China’s development and the measures to sustain it, however, pose challenges for the U.S. and others. Given the momentum of its development, barring major disruptions China’s international importance will continue to grow rapidly in the next five years. The U.S. and China share fundamental interests in many traditional and nontraditional security and economic areas and have developed an impressive capacity for collaboration. Underlying mutual distrust is growing, however, with potentially costly future consequences. Traditional U.S. engagement of China is no longer sufficient. “Focused engagement”⎯according far greater importance to the extent to which Beijing partners with Washington on issues most critical to the future relationship⎯would be a more effective new approach. China will more likely act as an international stakeholder if the U.S. frames U.S.-China issues objectively, initiates serious efforts to address them, and credibly signals a willingness to engage in long-term bilateral cooperation. By resuscitating its regional diplomacy and addressing Asia’s critical regional economic, environmental, and nontraditional security issues, Washington can strengthen the U.S. position in Asia and reduce the negative effects of China’s growing role and influence there.

US-China Relations Good - Economy

Openness in international trading between China

Economy, Oksenberg 99 (Elizabeth C., Dir of Asia Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, Michel, Sr Staff Member of the National Security Council and Chinese Scholar, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, p. 11-12) MAT

Neoliberals are confident that an open international trading system, with minimal constraints on trade, will promote American and international economic growth, and that the openness and growth in turn will promote liberalizing tendencies and democratic values around the world. Moreover, the telecommunications and transportation transformations make an open trading system and international financial system more feasible than in the past; foreign trade is physically easier to carry out than in the past. To the neoliberals, China’s rise cannot be compared with the rise of earlier major powers; it is occurring in a totally different international context. Neoliberals believe that unprecedented opportunities exist to integrate China into various international arrangements that will constrain its future latitude. Their preferred strategy in an increasingly interdependent world is to encourage China’s openness to external influences, so that domestic Chinese constituencies linked to the outside world will influence the course of their government. Thus China’s increasing involvement in international trade is to be encouraged and accommodated, since the nation’s leaders then will have greater incentive to support the existing international trade regime. Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is therefore a priority objective, as is opening the country to foreign direct investment, assisting it to develop its capital markets, and securing foreign access to the service sector of its economy. Neoliberals also stress the importance of cooperating with China in resolving transnational problems that interdependence intensifies: environmental degradation, drug trafficking, illegal population migration, and so on. Most neoliberals recognize that forging ties with China will proceed slowly and be vulnerable to reversal. They are prepared to be patient, in recognition of the fact that the full benefits of these policies become evident after years rather than months of persistence. Moreover, most recognize that the effort to integrate China into the world community on mutually acceptable terms may fail. Therefore, while they welcome China’s desire to participate, they stress that the terms of entry must protect the purposes of the systems they seek to join. And the United States must retain an insurance policy in case the effort fails, especially through maintenance of robust bilateral alliances with its partners in the region and a credible, forward-deployed military presence in the region.

US China Relations Good

U.S. China relations are good-promote nonproliferation, and good foreign policy

Xinhua 7 (News Source, staff writer, ThePeople.com/cn, “U.S. China relations good, headed in a positive direction: Kissinger”, http://english.people.com.cn/200702/01/eng20070201\_346656.html) CBC

**Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Alfred Kissinger struck an upbeat note** on Tuesday **when describing the current U.S.-China relationship. Kissinger said the relationship was good and will continue to get better,** as he inaugurated the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society. The 83-year-old veteran politician said **the two countries cooperate in many areas and the bilateral ties were now good and cooperative, and he was optimistic about the future of the relationship. The relationship is significant to both countries and it will continue to develop in a positive direction given the continuity of both countries' foreign policy**, he said.Kissinger also reviewed former U.S. President Richard Nixon's ice-breaking visit to China in 1972 and Chinese leader [Deng Xiaoping](file:///C%3A%5Cdata%5Cpeople%5Cdengxiaoping.shtml)'s visit to the [United States](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/usa.html) in 1979.He expressed hope that **the two countries will play an active role in exerting a positive influence in the international arena on issues of nuclear non-proliferation, energy and the environment.** The Center on U.S.-China Relations is funded by Asia Society trustee Arthur Rose, who said it was his intention that the center will study and promote the U.S.-China relationship on multiple levels and from many perspectives.The new center will conduct original research, distribute timely information on critical issues, inform the American and international public on U.S.-China-related issues and comment on critical issues and current events. It will also engage key Chinese and American leaders in critical dialogue.

**China-US relations are good**

Curtis 10 (Gerald, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, “Getting the Triangle Straight: China, Japan, and the United States in an Era of Change”, May, Pg 5 http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/1\_curtis.pdf) JL

It is not surprising that the attention of policymakers and of media opinion makers should be drawn more to crisis situations than to the less headline-grabbing issues of how to manage relations among the great and the lesser powers of East Asia—not surprising, but worrisome nonetheless. East Asia is too important to be treated with a kind of benign neglect, approached with the easy assumption that since the region is at peace and is economically vibrant, what has worked in the past to keep it that way can be relied upon to do the same well into the future. This is especially true for relations among the United States, China, and Japan. The consequences for the region and for the world of China’s remarkably rapid transformation are at this point impossible to gauge. China’s rise to great power status by definition upsets the status quo. That does not make conflict inevitable, but whether there is conflict or cooperation will depend on how policymakers respond to the history-changing reality of China’s emergence, or rather reemergence, as one of the world’s most powerful countries. In terms of domestic politics, economics, and social structure, both Japan and the United States are undergoing transformations more far-reaching than anything either of them has experienced for decades. Though still the world’s singular military superpower, the United States’ unilateral moment has passed. The distribution of national power—a combination of economic strength, military capability, political will, and diplomatic skill—among the United States, China, and Japan is shifting. And it is doing so in a regional and global environment that itself is changing in dramatic ways. A new and complex multilateral international system is in the process of formation, but its structure is as yet inchoate; the old world order is gone and a new one has not yet been created. Bilateral relationships within the China-Japan-US triangle, and the trilateral relationship itself, are free of major discord at the current time, but it would be facile to assume that they necessarily will continue to be so. Managing relations among the three great powers of the Asia Pacific so as to deepen and expand cooperation and reduce the dangers of discord will test the abilities of the leaders of all these countries—none more so than that of the United States.

US China Relations Good

**US-Japan Alliance Key to security and peace**

Xinhua ‘9 (Correspondents from a news Agency quoting the japans prime minister, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/02/content\_11639501.html) PR

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso said Tuesday the alliance between Japan and the United States is key to Japan's national security and peace in the Far East. Japan and the United States should continue to ensure the alliance work in an effective way, Aso told a forum organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.   Soundbite: Taro Aso, Japanese Prime Minister "Japan's security and prosperity can't be guaranteed by Japan itself. It is necessary to make sure the Japan-U.S. alliance work in an effective way. The alliance is meaningful and cannot be bound by just one agreement. Japan and the United States should work continuously together to ensure the alliance work properly.” Aso attacked the opposition party's claim that the U.S. 7th Fleet is sufficient to secure the U.S. presence in east Asia. He also defended his cabinet's decision of sending troops abroad, such as the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and the anti-piracy mission in waters off Somalia. On the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Aso said Japan needs to work closely with other members of the six-party framework to guarantee a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In addition, Aso insisted that Japan expand its "soft power" like animation, fashion and education.

US China Relations Good

**US-Japan Alliance key to peace, security, economic and social reforms**

Kyodo News International ’99 (News agency citing the prime minister at that time, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Obuchi+says+Japan-U.S.+alliance+key+to+peace+in+Asia.-a054563112) PR

Japanese Prime Minister [Keizo Obuchi](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Keizo%2BObuchi) said Thursday that Japan and the [United States](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/United%2BStates) must cooperate closely as if they are in a "three-legged race" to bring peace and prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region. In a speech at a dinner hosted by six local groups including the Japan-America Society, Obuchi said a "firm security alliance" between Japan and the U.S. is indispensable for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The premier added that partnerships should also be built with other countries based on the foundation of Japan-U.S. ties, and proposed establishing confidence-building measures in the region through dialogue. As an example of Japan's maturing relations with other Asia-Pacific countries, he cited his meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung last October, which he called "a big step forward" toward the future. In his meeting with Kim, Obuchi apologized for Japan's 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, while the two leaders agreed to hold top-level talks more frequently, among other steps, to promote bilateral ties. Obuchi also said Japan and the U.S. can cooperate in helping Asian countries recover from the financial crisis that struck the region nearly two years ago. Toward this end Japan must also prop up its own weak economy, Obuchi said. "Since assuming the office of prime minister, I have boldly implemented every kind of measure aimed at achieving Japan's economic recovery," Obuchi said. "I am determined to ensure a successful revitalization of the Japanese economy through overcoming, with unwavering resolve, any obstacle we may encounter in the process." Obuchi said Japan and the U.S. should also cooperate to help the poor, the disabled, the elderly and the children of Asian countries -- those worst hit by the economic crisis. "Responding to human security-related issues is a pressing task for which further cooperation between Japan and the U.S. is necessary and possible," he said.

US China Relations Up

Japanese-Sino relations are mending and are on a positive trend

Armstrong 10 (Shino, ANU, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/18/improving-japan-china-relations-and-the-global-trading-system/#more-9328) PR

 The Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) secretary general and power broker Ozawa Ichiro [recently](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/09/AR2010010902063.html) took 645 DPJ members and other leaders to China in an unprecedented move for both countries. This is a big step in following up on the DJP’s promise to mend relations with China. There is talk now of making progress on the difficult history issue and of moving beyond it. Other rumours have Prime Minister Hatoyama visiting Nanjing this year — the site of Japanese imperial war atrocities — in exchange for a visit by President Hu to Hiroshima. The Sino-Japanese relationship has come a long way since a decade ago. Between 2001 and 2006 tensions rose, there were no leadership visits between the two countries and relations reached a low point in 2005, with anti-Japan protests and isolated boycotts of Japanese products throughout China. Much has happened and changed in the Sino-Japan relationship in recent times. As the political relationship has fluctuated since normalisation in 1972, the latest upswing over the last five years could be the start of a longer term positive trend.

US China Relations Up

US-Sino Relations are looking up

Anderson 10 (Eric, Author of China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-c-anderson/us-sino-relations-finally\_b\_535889.html) PR

There is a wisdom in delay that is rarely acknowledged in this age of the 24-hour news cycle. The Obama administration is now busily attempting to apply this insight when it comes to dealing with Beijing. I just wonder if we could convince the White House that certain stall tactics might best be employed on a permanent basis. I refer here, of course, to Treasury's forthcoming currency report and the Department of Defense annual statement on Chinese military power. Neither document suffers a surplus of academic honesty nor serves to enhance decision-making. So, at the risk of sounding rational, I would argue we do away with both and consider more appropriate means of engaging audiences at home and abroad. Thinking of foreign affairs, who misplaced the charts and furloughed the skipper charged with managing our relationship with China? Over the last four months, Washington has seemed determined to run aground on any and all issues related to China. First, Secretary of State Clinton fires off a speech on internet freedoms that appeared more intent on serving Google's bottom line than protecting America's national interests. Then the White House notifies Congress of a decision to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion in new armaments. Not less than two weeks later the Dalai Lama shows up at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Add to that a disagreement over how to deal with Tehran and a letter from 130 members of Congress demanding Chinese currency reform, and one is left to conclude the crew sailing Washington's China policy is underway without a rudder. But at the seeming last moment, we have been spared the shoals. On 31 March, Beijing agreed to serious negotiations with Washington and other Western nations on proposed United Nations sanctions aimed at Iran's nuclear program. On 1 April, China announced President Hu Jintao would attend the 12-13 April nuclear security summit, a move accompanied by a one-hour phone conversation between Hu and Obama. And then we get Treasury Secretary Geithner's 3 April decision to delay publication of the currency report. Suddenly things are looking up for Sino-U.S. relations--cooler heads do seem to have once again seized control of Washington's foreign policy apparatus. That said, Beijing should have been able to predict Geithner's decision. In early March, the World Journal reported the Department of Defense annual report on Chinese military power would likely not be released until May--a 60-90 day delay. The reason for this stall tactic? A White House campaign to win Hu's support for the mid-April nuclear security conference. Having succeeded in the short term, Mr. Obama should now consider leaving the Pentagon report in a storage locker for another six months. As I note in China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" first hit the street in 2002. Foisted upon the Secretary of Defense in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the report is a bit of political theater intended to hype the Chinese threat

No China War – Deterrence

Nuclear weapons prevent escalation of conflict between US and China

Friedberg 10 (Aaron,“International Security” June 10, Pg 43 muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/.../30.2friedberg.pdf) JL

Fortunately, a number of the factors to which the optimists point seem likely to continue to act as a brake on what might otherwise be an unchecked slide toward mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation. Assuming that they persist and grow, the mutual gains from an expanding economic relationship will remain the single most important peace-inducing force at work in U.S.-China relations. The potential costs of a conflict between the two powers, especially given that both possess nuclear weapons, should also help to keep competitive impulses within bounds and to make both sides very wary of embarking on any course that could risk direct conlict. The emergence of a group of Chinese “new thinkers” could also contribute to a less zero-sum, hard realpolitik approach to relations with the United States. As with the Soviet Union during the era of perestroika, so also in this case changes in high-level thinking could have a calming effect on bilateral relations, even if they were not accompanied immediately by more profound and far-reaching domestic political reforms.

US presence deters China

US military in Japan deters Chinese aggression—key to regional stability

Koinishi 9 (Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs, Weston S. Konishi Analyst in Asian Affairs July 23, 2009, Congressional Research Service, The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf)BAF

The U.S.-Japan alliance, forged in the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. 1 Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S. forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region. The security landscape of East Asia is changing, driven by China’s ascendance. With the organizing principles of the Cold War obsolete and a resurgence of nationalism in countries with a history of conflict, uncertainty is increasing. The Bush Administration designated the U.S.-Japan alliance as the fulcrum of American presence in the region. Obama Administration officials have stated their desire to continue this approach. Yet this policy holds both promises and risks. Some strategists see a strong advantage to employing Japan’s help as part of a containment strategy to deter China from asserting itself in ways hostile to U.S. interests. In addition, the Japanese SDF may alleviate some of the burden on the U.S. military by expanding its role in non-combat missions overseas. On the other hand, Japan’s neighbors harbor historical distrust of Tokyo’s ambitions. Japan’s relations with Beijing and Seoul reached a low point under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), leading to concern that regional rivalries could become destabilizing. Although relations have improved under Koizumi’s successors, China and South Korea remain wary of any sign of Japanese ascendance. As Japan under successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders has considered taking a more active role in contributing to global stability, perhaps through increased coordination with the U.S. military, leaders in Beijing and Seoul have expressed concern that the Japanese military will benefit from enhanced capabilities and challenge their own sense of security. Further, after enjoying a period of extremely close relations, the U.S.-Japan relationship slipped somewhat when the Bush Administration adjusted its policy on North Korea. As the Bush Administration moved aggressively to reach a deal on denuclearization with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks, distance emerged between Washington and Tokyo. The Obama Administration has subsequently sought to reassure Tokyo that the United States remains committed to the bilateral alliance. Political uncertainty in Tokyo calls into question how robustly alliance reform efforts will proceed. Specifically, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) appears poised to take over the government in August 30 Lower House elections. As discussed below, members of the DPJ have objected to an active role in coordination with the U.S. military. Thus, political changes, both in and between Washington and Tokyo, could undermine a regional security strategy that depends on unwavering ties.

US presence deters China

Only U.S. presence can deter China

Ikenberry and Chung-In 08 (G. John and Moon, Prof of Politics and Int’l Affairs @ Princeton University, The United States and Northeast Asia, <http://books.google.com/books?id=3XAx3UyoNSEC&dq=U.S.+%22presence+deters+china%22+Japan&source=gbs_navlinks_s> pg 266)BAF

The other institutional feature of hegemony has been the forward U.S. military presence. By 1995, U.S. officials had made clear their intention to maintain a political and military commitment to East Asia that would be of indefinite duration. This commitment included the stabilization of the U.S. troop presence at approximately 100,000 and the maintenance of a dominant naval presence. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. naval presence is secured by alliances with South Korea and Japan. In Southeast Asia, it is secured through a series of naval agreements with states, including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The U.S. hegemonic strategy has provided public goods and contributed to regional order in several ways. The U.S. presence has helped to deter major powers from developing or intensifying dangerous rivalries. Japan and China, most obviously, have a history of antagonism and mutual recrimination. Negative sentiment is not far from the surface even some sixty years after the Second World War. Ideally for China, the U.S. presence constrains Japan, serving as the “cork in the bottle” to suppress possible Japanese aggression. Similarly, for Japan the U.S. presence deters China from a bid for regional dominance commensurate with its growing economic power and political influence. U.S. officials have also worked to manage regional conflicts with the potential to escalate to local and even broader wars. The United States took the initiative throughout the 1990s to stabilize security crises through diplomacy and the implied threat of military force. The critical U.S. role was evident in the China-Taiwan crisis of 1996, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, and the India-Pakistan crises over Kashmir in 1998 and again in 2001.

US presence deters China

US presence in Japan deters China because withdraw causes a regional security void

Brown 7/9 (Peter, Asia Times, China flexes its naval muscle, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG09Ad03.html>, July 9, 2010)

"The US and Japan should show China that it has gone far enough and needs to back off. In that sense, terminating the current stalemate was one good sign, and announcing a joint exercise with Korea, though postponed, was another," said Yoshikawa. "But the US should do more, and anything that demonstrates that the US is still committed to the security of Northeast Asia is necessary, including proceeding with the deployment of a US carrier in the joint exercise with Korea." Yoshikawa also recommends that military-to-military exchanges between the US and China "should be resumed, more seriously, in order to not escalate the situation any further". In terms of the US military posture in the western Pacific, Yoshikawa supports the status quo. "The US should be in the picture, since all the neighboring countries have designed and planned their defense structures under the assumption that the US would be stationed in Japan, the ROK," said Yoshikawa. "In order for the US military presence to fade, Japan needs to enhance its military capabilities that are now designed to rely on the US, while discussing arms reduction with China, the ROK, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations], and making collective agreements on sea-lane defense between Japan and the Middle East. As far as none of this is happening, the US needs to stay." At the same time, mounting concerns in Japan over China's activities and recent behavior should not be misunderstood as somehow transforming China into some sort of a direct threat to Japan in the eyes of the Japanese. "The reality is that while Japan cannot overtly say China is a threat because Japan already depends heavily on China economically, Japan has not given enough serious thought to China, nor its future and its military ambitions," said Yoshikawa. "This concern will be expressed more indirectly as 'the US military role is and continues to be important to Japan', rather than saying 'China is a threat, so we need to team with the US to contain China'. This is a lesson from former Japanese prime minister Junichiri Koizumi's time in office."

US presence deters China

US forces in Japan stop China from becoming a super power

Scales and Wortzel 99 (Robert H, Major General in the U.S. Army, Ph.D. in History, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from Duke University and Larry M, Colonel in the U.S. Army, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00072.pdf>)

There are some who believe that to map out a strategic future in the next century, the U.S. military must be prepared to draw back to a security zone extending from Alaska through Hawaii to Guam. This would involve dismantling the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 2 Other strategic thinkers around Asia and in the United States, in contrast, recognize the benefits of maintaining U.S. forces Korea and Japan. 3 Michael O’Hanlon, a Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, notes that keeping forces in the region helps retain influence for Washington. 4 The U.S. presence, O’Hanlon maintains, serves as a deterrent against instability in Northeast Asia. 5 This article will argue that for the United States to isolate itself and withdraw militarily from Asia would be disastrous for the stability of the region and for the security of the United States. The point is made in the paper that a robust land presence in Northeast Asia provides a strategic weight into the 21st century. A U.S. withdrawal from Northeast Asia would leave a major void in the strategic architecture that would lead to a serious arms race, competition for control of the Korean Peninsula, competition for control of the sea and air lines of communication in the western Pacific, and would probably create a nuclear arms race. The United States needs a balanced military presence in Asia, including air, sea, and land forces.

US presence deters China

US military presence in Japan stops Chinese leaders from taking over the Korean peninsula

Scales and Wortzel 99 (Robert H, Major General in the U.S. Army, Ph.D. in History, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from Duke University and Larry M, Colonel in the U.S. Army, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00072.pdf>)

 In Asia, the debate over the utility of American bilateral alliances and the presence of U.S. forces, for some, is still on- going. 14 The presence of the U.S. military is still welcome, despite some popular dissent. 15 Many in Asia believe that American military presence inhibits the rise of a power that could dominate either the mainland of continental Asia the maritime lines of communication through the South China Sea. The people of Asia are concerned about China and its future potential strength. 16 But like the Europeans, who are watchful of Germany, Asians are mindful of history and have not forgotten Japan, the Sino-Japanese War 1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the creation a puppet state in Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of China in 1937, and World War II. 17 U.S. friends and allies in Asia do not openly talk about the fact that a U.S. presence in Japan inhibits its remilitarization, but many people in Asia are thankful that the stationing of American forces in Northeast Asia serves that purpose. 18 While China publicly states its principled objection to the stationing of forces on foreign soil, privately Chinese leaders acknowledge that the American presence in Japan acts as a guard against remilitarization. 19 These same Chinese leaders privately acknowledge that the presence of U.S. ground forces stabilizes the Korean peninsula. 20

US presence deters China

Without US military presence in Japan, China would take over the entirety of Southeast Asia.

Scales and Wortzel 99 (Robert H, Major General in the U.S. Army, Ph.D. in History, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from Duke University and Larry M, Colonel in the U.S. Army, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00072.pdf>)

 Visualize what the strategic landscape might look like without an U.S. presence in Northeast Asia: U.S. forces would probably be anchored along a line stretched from Alaska, through Hawaii, to Guam. If this sort of American withdrawal left any confidence in a traditional ally, perhaps there would be pre-positioned supplies in Australia. 21 Deployment times by sea to the main shipping lines in the region would be longer, and the ground presence, which really demonstrates the depth of the American commitment to the region, much thinner. The sea lines of communication beyond the “first island chain” in the western Pacific would probably be part of an expanded security perimeter controlled by China. (The “first island chain” is defined as the waters west of the Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo.) 22 This is important because today, China’s “brown water” navy has a sea-denial mission inside the “first island chain,” which defines China’s littoral. China’s maritime objectives, however, are to develop a Navy that can control the South Pacific and Western Pacific out to what China has called the “second island chain” stretching from Alaska to the Marianas, through the Fiji Islands to Australia. People’s Republic of China (PRC) control of this area would subject critical maritime lines of communication open for free, uninhibited navigation to an expanded seadenial role by China’s submarine and surface fleets supported by shore-based (and even by then carrier-based) aircraft. If Russia recovers from its current economic woes, it too would become a major actor in a race for primacy in the Western Pacific. Japan, under the geostrategic alternative presented in the paragraph above, would no longer be adequately assured of the U.S. commitment to Asian security. Because Tokyo could not allow its maritime lines of communication to be dominated or controlled by interrupting freedom of navigation and denying use of the sea, it would probably expand Japan’s own naval patrol areas and strengthen its naval, air, and ground forces. This would alarm the rest of Asia and revive the memories of World War II. Korea, whether reconciled in a confederation, reunified or divided, mistrusting of both China and Japan, would probably expand its own military in anticipation of the potential for conflict with, or between, its neighbors. Southeast Asian countries, wary of a certain military buildup by China or a resurgent Russia and the corresponding response by Japan, would probably build their own military forces, if they could afford to do so. The Asia-Pacific region would be a far more dangerous, less stable and secure place than it is today without the presence of U.S. forces. Moreover, much of what China claims as its maritime territory in the South China Sea would come under the control of the naval forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

US presence deters China

US forces in Japan deter China and North Korean aggression

Haselden 2 (Carl, US army war college, Parameters, The effects of Korean unification on the US military presence in Northeast Asia, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_4_32/ai_95447365/pg_3/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

In Asia, Japan has the largest defense budget, the most modern forces, and the greatest economic resources devoted to force improvement. (21) Until recently, however, Japan has strictly adhered to its constitutional clause nine that prohibits it from having "normal" armed forces and allows for only self-defense forces. (22) Japan has relied on the US military to protect its interests and access to overseas markets, such as the sea lines of communication through the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Strait. In exchange for regional security and stability, Japan has granted the United States basing rights in Okinawa and on the mainland of Japan. (23) Domestic and international events, however, continue to pick at the US-Japan alliance. Japan has been under tremendous domestic pressure to reduce the US military presence on Okinawa, despite its strategic geographic location. (24) While the Japanese have placed some pressure on the United States with regard to Okinawa, the United States has responded with its own pressure on Japan. The United States has pushed for Japan to become a more "normal" nation and assume a greater role in regional and international security. Five external developments have created an impetus for Japan to move in this direction: \* The US diplomatic rift with Japan for providing primarily financial support to the coalition during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. \* The NKPA ballistic missile test over Japan in 1998 that demonstrated Japan's vulnerability to other countries. \* China's increased military spending and move to become a regional power with air and maritime capability. (25) \* The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, which underscored the significant danger posed by The sinking of a suspected North Korean vessel after an exchange of gunfire with the Japanese Coast Guard in December 2001. (26) Any move by Japan toward normalcy would undoubtedly be portrayed by some in China and Korea as a reemergence of its militaristic past. Because of Japan's economic and technological capabilities, it has the capability to transform its military from a self-defense force into one capable of power projection. This transformation could be accomplished in a relatively short time. Although it is ultimately up to the Japanese to allay the concerns of their neighbors that Japan will not repeat its earlier transgressions against them, a continued US presence on Japan would go a long way in providing needed reassurance.

US presence deters China

US presence key to deter China and North Korea

Auslin 10 (Michael, AEI's director of Japan Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929)BAF

Of greater concern for the long-term viability of the alliance is whether Washington and Tokyo continue to share common political and security goals for maintaining East Asian stability and prosperity. As the North Korean nuclear crisis continues to drag on, both sides retain their focus on missile defense, which now has resulted in several successful interception tests by Japanese Maritime SDF destroyers outfitted with Aegis antimissile systems.[8] Yet, with Tokyo beginning to reduce its commitment to future missile-defense systems and with no current political movement on negotiations with North Korea (the six-party talks), it is unclear whether Washington and Tokyo share the same vision for dealing with Pyongyang. Further, Japan's demand that the status of its citizens abducted by North Korea be fully resolved has also caused strains within the alliance, since the Bush administration treated such concerns as secondary to the goal of achieving North Korean denuclearization. Considering the failure so far to end Pyongyang's nuclear programs, U.S. unwillingness to pressure North Korea on the abductees issue has resulted in subdued, yet real, resentment on the part of some Japanese officials. That said, Japanese support for the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (to stop the export of illicit materials) and United Nations sanctions against North Korea have allowed the allies to work together to control the maritime domain in Northeast Asia. Japan and the United States share the same strategic conundrum regarding China: how can each country maintain and develop economic relations with China while attempting to hedge against its growing military capabilities? The U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime SDF are particularly concerned about the power of China's Navy, which now has over sixty submarines and increasing numbers of destroyers, patrol ships, Coast Guard–equivalent vessels, and the like. With China stating that it plans to build several aircraft carriers, alliance military planners are questioning why Beijing is developing power-projection capabilities that could be used to deny access to U.S. naval ships and to control strategic waterways.[9] Similarly, the growth of the Chinese Air Force's fighter squadrons, including advanced 4.5 generation fighter planes, indicates that the United States, along with alliance partners like Japan, may not have air superiority in the case of a conflict with China (such as over the Taiwan Strait) in the future. This, combined with the expansion of China's strategic rocket forces, complicates the alliance's plans for ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. On top of such strategic changes, the Obama administration's decision to halt America's F-22 Raptor fleet at 187 planes and not to allow export variants of the Raptor also leaves Japanese planners uncertain about whether the United States will continue to maintain a credible regional force to protect Japan. One way to maintain the alliance's importance in coming years is to create some regional trilateral or quadrilateral mechanisms with the U.S.-Japan alliance at the core. These security-related issues raise important political questions for the future of the alliance. Neither Washington nor Tokyo wants to see trade and political relations with China deteriorate, but both naturally question why Beijing continues to build such powerful military capabilities. When Japanese and U.S. leaders inserted a clause on their interest in peaceful resolution of territorial issues in the Taiwan Straits in their 2005 Security Consultative Committee joint statement, Beijing's negative reaction led them to remove the words in subsequent official statements.[10] Given the alliance's stated commitment to respond to "situations in areas surrounding Japan,"[11] however, concerns over Beijing's unwillingness to work more closely with regional powers on security issues have raised the question of how the alliance can work together to shape Chinese behavior in positive ways for regional stability. Beyond issues of China and North Korea, it appears the grander aspirations of the early Bush-Koizumi years to create a "global U.S.-Japan alliance"have now been scaled back. As evidence of this, observers point to the Hatoyama administration's decision to end the Japanese Maritime SDF's eight-year Indian Ocean refueling effort in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It is perhaps more correct, however, to recognize today that each partner in the alliance has global interests that each can work with the other to protect. Tokyo's recent decision to contribute nearly $5 billion toward reconstruction in Afghanistan is a symbol of the Hatoyama administration's attempts to play a leading role in nontraditional security operations. Similarly, the recent Japanese Maritime SDF mission off the coast of Somalia to conduct antipiracy operations is a good example of Japan rethinking its global security role. Tokyo determined that such a commitment was in Japan's national interests and dispatched two destroyers and two P-3 airborne surveillance planes to protect Japanese shipping. These ships are interacting with the U.S.-led international Combined Task Force 151, providing information and maintaining open sea lanes. While this is not an alliance operation, Japan's working alongside U.S. naval vessels indicates how political priorities the alliance partners share can be expressed in ad-hoc activities in and outside of the Asia-Pacific region. This may portend a relationship in which Washington cannot take Tokyo's support or participation for granted; instead, both sides will have to work out how best to interact, even over shared concerns, after each has chosen a particular policy. Still, the various challenges the alliance faces in Asia should occupy the attention of strategists and operations planners and should lead to continued close cooperation and a set of shared strategic objectives. The ballistic-missile threat from North Korea and the steady growth of Chinese missile, maritime, and air forces will only increase in coming decades. These threaten regional stability and can be used to target not just population centers, but also Japanese and U.S. military forces that could be used to deter or defeat such threats. Thus, continued cooperation on ballistic-missile defense should be of the utmost priority to the alliance. Indeed, missile and air defense, along with antisubmarine warfare, should be expanded to encompass other friendly countries, such as South Korea and Australia, thereby building off of current maritime-cooperation activities. Ultimately, however, the credibility of the alliance will rest on the combination of military capability and willingness to maintain stability in Asia that each partner possesses. In this regard, then, the Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missile-defense plans naturally raise questions about long-term U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific. Will the Obama administration maintain U.S. force levels in Asia at their current strength? Moreover, what are the Hatoyama administration's defense-spending plans? Japan must make decisions regarding its fighter-experimental (F-X) fighter program, but will Japan commit to building more surface ships and the surveillance systems needed to maintain its own capabilities? The Obama and Hatoyama administrations must decide if they view the alliance as a key element in their security strategies or as an outdated relic of a bygone era. In this regard, the alliance must continue to rest on a basis of traditional "hard power."Clearly, the two allies should continue to research, develop, and deploy missile-defense systems on land and sea. Moreover, they must keep up their conventional forces, including advanced fighter aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and intelligence and surveillance systems. This is, and will continue to be, expensive, especially in a time of reduced budgets, but the goal of preserving peace requires a formidable military deterrent to any country that may be thinking of employing force to obtain its objectives or to obtain asymmetric advantages that can negate U.S. and Japanese military superiority.

US presence deters China

American military presence key to stop proliferation throughout Eastasia

Scales and Wortzel 99 (Robert H, Major General in the U.S. Army, Ph.D. in History, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from Duke University and Larry M, Colonel in the U.S. Army, graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00072.pdf>)

 The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S. nuclear deterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the stationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension. American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. China’s military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China; but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit. 23 China’s leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea. 24 Threatened by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons. Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such a case. 25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans, make this same argument: “. . . Japan’s leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure.” 26 Strong U.S. diplomacy combined with continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japan’s strategic thinkers, might convince the regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the North has built instead of improving them.

No China War – Interdependence

US-China economic interdependence reduces risk of conflict

Truman 8 (Tim, writer, International Trade Administration, “Economic Engagement with China Brings Benefits to U.S. Businesses”, http://trade.gov/press/publications/newsletters/ita\_1208/jcct\_1208.asp) CBC

**Partnerships** that **benefit our citizens and our economies**.” **The trade relationship between China and the United States will continue to grow** through bilateral initiatives that will address market barriers when they arise. Those initiatives facilitate increased trade and help resolve problems. **The U.S.–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) is the primary trade dialogue between the two countries**. On September 15, 2008, Gutierrez; Susan C. Schwab, U.S. trade representative; and Wang Qishan, vice premier of China, convened the 19th JCCT meeting in Yorba Linda, California. During the talks, both sides reached an agreement on steps that will promote increased trade flows. At the meeting, both sides discussed the importance of making progress on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. China reaffirmed its commitment to advancd negotiations to join the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement. Chinese officials also agreed to streamline the approval process for setting up new foreign retail outlets, to lower the minimum capitalization requirements for telecommunications services (although more needs to be done), to postpone regulations that bar U.S. information technology companies from selling in China, and to accept from certain U.S. states some poultry products that had previously been banned. **This year marked the JCCT’s 25th anniversary**. **Since its inception** in 1983, **the JCCT has been a useful forum** for engagement **and has delivered meaningful results for U.S. businesses, workers, and farmers. Perhaps most important, the JCCT has ensured that U.S. and Chinese senior economic and trade officials continue to interact regularly, and those relationships have improved both countries’ abilities to address trade-related misunderstandings and problems.** **The JCCT has contributed to the dramatic trade growth between China and the United States.** In addition to annual senior-level meetings, the JCCT comprises more than a dozen working groups and subgroups, which meet throughout the year to discuss a range of trade and investment issues.…(CONTINUES)…**Both countries have much to gain from this collaboration. China will become better suited to meet its goals to reduce air emissions, waste, and water consumption, while the United States can collectively address global environmental concerns and facilitate trade in the environmental sector.** The JCCT’s Environment Working Group organized the event and will develop tangible action items to address the issues discussed.The U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) is another important mechanism that guides the long-term development of the U.S.–China economic relationship. In 2006, presidents George W. Bush and Hu Jintao established the SED as a framework to address issues of mutual concern. The SED takes a long-term and strategic look at the economic relationship, while the JCCT focuses on specific trade issues. The SED has helped establish the 10-year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework and has increased transparency in publishing trade-related rules and regulations.The fifth SED took place on December 4–5, 2008, in Beijing, and it focused on balanced growth, energy and environmental protection, challenges to trade, and investment. **“Through the JCCT and SED, we continue to work with our Chinese counterparts to ensure we both pursue policies of openness that have helped drive our growth**,” Gutierrez said. **“I believe that in such an economic environment U.S. firms would welcome the opportunity to do even more business in—and with—China, thus expanding consumer choices and driving growth and job creation. This would be to the mutual advantage of both the United States and China.”**

No China War – Interdependence

Economic interdependence between US and China ensures pacification

McCarthy 5 (Mary M., Ph.D at Columbia University, The Impact of Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations, p. 33-34, <http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=5c70a746646de8f7ae7ef78b5170775a>) MAT

As hypothesized, my analyses show that high levels of interdependence reduce the likelihood of high-intensity conflict in the US-China relationship. It is the interaction between salience and symmetry that produce this result. On the other hand, I cannot state with any degree of confidence that there is a relationship between interdependence and cooperation. Looking at the impact of dependence on the actions of China and the US separately, my analyses show that China is pacified by its own increasing dependence and by the interdependence of the bilateral relationship, but emboldened by high levels of US dependence. This statement cannot be said with confidence about the US. In fact, although anecdotal evidence illustrates that the US does use trade as a weapon, that use does not seem to have anything to do with a decrease in symmetry or an increase in the dependence of one’s partner. This finding, combined with the consistent lack of statistical significance when the US was the initiator of actions, suggests that the case of the US provides some support for the realist theory that, although a state will use trade to pursue its interests, economic interdependence is not a good explanatory factor when trying to explain conflict. As Russett (2003) remarks, we should be exploring how to use our analyses to create policy prescriptions that would illustrate what types of incentives would dissuade China from the use or threat of military force. My tentative conclusions are that engaging in a more interdependent relationship with China and increasing China’s economically important trade will have pacific benefits. However, states with economically important dependence on trade with China must not expect a cordial relationship, but be prepared for that dependence to be used against them as a tool of statecraft when it suits China’s purposes.

Economic relations prevent war

Oksenberg 99 (Elizabeth C., Dir of Asia Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, Michel, Sr Staff Member of the National Security Council and Chinese Scholar, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, p. 10-11) MAT

Other analysts attach primacy to economic considerations and believe that the very nature of international relations is changing fundamentally. The prior centrality of military might is yielding to the growing importance of trade, international finance, and economic competitiveness. Further, nation-states are losing their previous autonomy and power in an increasingly interdependent world; leaders of nations are decreasingly able to control the glow of people, ideas, and money across their borders. National governments are less relevant actors than they used to be in organizing world affairs; they are losing out to multinational corporations, financial markets, international organizations especially in the economic realm (specifically the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the new World Trade Organization), non-governmental international associations or communities that exert considerable influence on national governments (i.e., environmentalists, human rights organizations, women’s rights groups, or religions), and international drug cartels, crime syndicates, and terrorists intent upon subverting international order. However, those who attach priority to the economic dimension of Sino-American relations are sharply divided between the neoliberals, who embrace and wish to foster economic interdependence, and the economic nationalists, who insist, while American strength is still supreme, that the new world must be crafted carefully to protect American interests.

No China War – Interdependence

Economic interdependence is key to peaceful Chinese international relations

McCarthy 5 (Mary M., Ph.D at Columbia University, The Impact of Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations, p. 17-19, <http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=5c70a746646de8f7ae7ef78b5170775a>) MAT

On the other hand, a liberal approach to US-China relations emphasizes the potential to integrate China into the international system through economic interdependence as a peaceful, active partner whose actions are constrained by external influences. In addition, proponents claim that as China’s participation in the international system increases, so will its support for the maintenance and continuation of existing international regimes.28 It is this belief that has been the cornerstone of official US policy towards China since the Nixon administration. As Oksenberg describes, “Our strategy toward China since 1971 has been to draw it out of its isolation and to integrate it in the international community . . . By building strong links to China strategically, intellectually, commercially, and even militarily in this early stage in its rise, we would reduce the chances of China’s becoming a disruptive, expansionist power as it grew stronger militarily” (quoted in Foot, 223). Evidence that this policy may prove successful was witnessed in 1995 and 1996 during the Taiwan Strait crisis. While China was conducting missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait to warn Taiwan against expressing its sovereign desires, it was also “busy reassuring both Western and Taiwanese investors that its domestic reform policies had not changed and that it had not embarked down a reckless road to conflict” (Lampton, 8). The Chinese government views economic growth as a requisite for its continued survival. This mode of thinking is based on the assumption that prosperity satisfies people (even those without democratic political rights). The economic growth that China actively pursues is dependent on trade. Therefore, China will not behave in such a way that it threatens the continuation of international trade and investment. In other words, economic interdependence makes it less likely that China will behave recklessly. As Goldstein discusses, “China’s rising power in the late twentieth century is based on rapid economic development fueled by dramatically increased levels of international trade and investment. Sharp reductions in international economic activity would seriously damage China’s ability to sustain the high rates of growth that are necessary, if not sufficient, for its emergence as a great power. Thus, because of the easily understood consequences of provoking sanctions among its most valued . . . economic partners . . . China’s leaders will continue to be constrained in their efforts to resolve international disputes (70).” Since the US is such a significant trade and investment partner for China, this relationship is of the utmost importance to Chinese economic growth. It is thought to be too important to China to risk creating conflict. At the same time, this school of thought maintains that the US does not want to promote undue conflict with China because its interests lie in integrating China into the international system as an active member. “America needs to sell its technology, import comparatively inexpensive goods, productively employ its capital, foster peace and stability in Asia (Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the subcontinent), and effectively address a plethora of global issues . . . As the 1997-1999 Asian financial crisis demonstrated, the United States also increasingly needs China to be a responsible macroeconomic manager and engine of regional economic growth” (Lampton, 11). Its interests are best served in promoting cooperation and not conflict with China.

No China War – Interdependence

Cooperation increases and conflict decreases as interdependence between China and US increases

McCarthy 5 (Mary M., Ph.D at Columbia University, The Impact of Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations, p. 30-33, <http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=5c70a746646de8f7ae7ef78b5170775a>) MAT

Next I conducted the analysis of my second hypothesis about economically important trade. First, I examined the impact of trade dependence on levels of conflict when the US was the initiator. As Table 5 illustrates, none of the variables were statistically significant. However, we do see that the direction of the effect of trade dependence conflict is that which I hypothesized. As bilateral trade with China becomes more important to US GDP, the US is more likely to initiate conflict. As bilateral trade with China becomes more important to China’s GDP, the US is less likely to initiate conflict. However, this claim cannot be made with confidence. Also as illustrated in Table 5, the results from the analysis of the impact of trade dependence on conflict when China was the initiator reveal that both measures of trade dependence are statistically significant and in the direction that I hypothesized. As US bilateral trade dependence increases, China is more likely to initiate conflict. As Chinese bilateral trade dependence increases, China is less likely to initiate conflict. This can be said with a 95% level of confidence. In Table 6, we see the results of an analysis of the impact of trade dependence on levels of cooperation. When the US was the initiator, the variables of trade dependence were not statistically significant. In addition, while the coefficient on bilateral trade/US GDP has the sign that I hypothesized, bilateral trade/China GDP does not. As bilateral trade with China becomes more important to US GDP, the US is more likely to initiate cooperation. As bilateral trade with China becomes more important to China’s GDP, the US is less likely to initiate cooperation. But, once again, this cannot be said with confidence. The capabilities measure was statistically significant and revealed a positive relationship with cooperation, as also shown in the earlier models testing economic interdependence. Also as illustrated in Table 6, the results from the analysis of the impact of trade dependence on conflict when China was the initiator reveal that both measures of trade dependence are statistically significant. While bilateral trade/US GDP is in the direction I hypothesized, bilateral trade/China GDP is in the opposite direction. As US bilateral trade dependence increases, China is more likely to initiate cooperation. As Chinese bilateral trade dependence increases, China is less likely to initiate cooperation. This is a surprising finding.

No China War – Interdependence

No Risk of US/China conflict because of economic and foreign policy interdependence.

Canrong 10 (Jin, Prof Renmin University, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/14/reason-for-optimism-in-sino-american-relations/) PR

After US President Barack Obama’s visit to Shanghai in November 2009, there are reasons to be optimistic about the state of the Sino-American relationship into the foreseeable future. Wide-ranging talks provided an in-principle framework for future cooperation. Obama is the first US president to visit China in the inaugural year of his term. Before Obama was elected, the Chinese made enthusiastic contact with his policy team. Since his election there have been numerous and close exchanges at the top level. This has made an important contribution to a good beginning in the Sino-American relationship under the new US administration. As President, Obama has been a vigorous promoter of ‘smart power’ diplomacy. An important manifestation of this approach has been Washington’s engagement in multilateral relationship building. This will allow the Sino-American relationship to develop under a more substantive cooperative framework. The gap between Chinese and American power has been reduced, providing the material preconditions for a more equal bilateral exchange. Especially after the Olympic Games, the success of China’s model of development is increasingly apparent. Comprehensive national power is on the rise and China’s growing military and defence capabilities were showcased by the national day military parade in October 2009. Simultaneously, the global financial crisis damaged the United States’ financial position. US economic recovery depends on rapid economic growth in China and cooperation from Beijing. US interests in China have increased as a result and Beijing’s crisis management skills which have earned Beijing credibility in the eyes of Washington. Yet despite promising beginnings under the Obama administration, there are still many problems in the relationship. The first is trade. With the global financial crisis as the pretext, American protectionism is showing signs of revival. There are increasing instances of trade disputes, and the overall trade environment is deteriorating. Human rights issues are a long-stansding political problem plaguing the relationship. Different perspectives on Tibet and democracy are unlikely to be resolved soon. US concern over Chinese military power is also increasing, and pressure for military transparency is growing. Issues of climate change, alternative energy sources, and disputes over emissions reduction and responsibility sharing are pervasive. The United States used the ASEAN regional forum in July 2009 to publicly announce that its return to Southeast Asia was politically motivated. The US also worries that the active promotion of East Asian regional cooperation could lead to it being excluded from this process of regional integration. Finally, there is Taiwan. Although China and the US engaged in limited cooperation on containing the radical Taiwanese independence movement, this issue continues to be a crucial challenge in the bilateral relationship. The US has come to realise that its strategic clout has declined as a result of diplomatic blunders and the financial crisis. Domestically, Washington is trying to use the development of alternative energy sources as a new economic growth point. It is also attempting to build a more equitable society through a national medical insurance scheme and to regain America’s position as the leading financial power by reforming the financial services sector. Internationally, it is using ‘smart power’ to outsource its responsibilities and to use mechanisms such as engagement, listening and negotiation to enlist support for American policies. China is one of the principal targets of ‘smart power’. Sharing international responsibility will be a point of difference between the two countries. Nevertheless, China is not yet prepared to share responsibility with the US. The collective conscience of the Chinese public and elite is that China is still a developing country and sources of most major concerns are still of domestic origin. In the foreseeable future, Chinese foreign policy will still be largely defensive in nature. Its goal is to create a stable international environment in order to resolve domestic issues and it has no intention to engage in ‘territorial expansion’. In the creation of a new international order, the dispute over the sharing of responsibility will be the biggest source of conflict between China and the US. Though there are still numerous problems, the Sino-American relationship is maturing quickly. There are many ‘stabilisers’ in the relationship which provide a secure basis for its medium-term development. Objectively speaking, China and the US share many common interests, bilaterally, regionally and globally. Bilaterally China and the US are each other’s second largest trading partner. Though there are frictions in bilateral trade, the sheer volume of trade between the two countries demonstrates the level of economic co-dependency and common interest they share. Regionally, China and the US share common interests in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the stabilisation of Asian financial and economic orders and security in the East Asian region. In terms of American global strategy, China is at the lower end of the priority list of problems that need attention and ranks highly as a cooperative partner. The US needs China’s support in countering foreign policy challenges. This new framework of the relationship undoubtedly contributes to the stability of Sino- American ties.

No China War – Peaceful Modernization

China to avoid conflict with US at all costs, modernization is priority

Johnson 9 (Kenneth D., Col in US Army, China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States, p. 8) MAT

The most fundamental strategic interest of China is to modernize. Since 1978, when Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic approach to China’s many political and socioeconomic problems and sharply reduced the role of ideology in economic policy, the results have been impressive. China has been the world’s fastest growing economy for almost 3 decades, expanding at an average pace of almost 10 percent per annum, and is now the world’s fourth largest economy as measured in dollars.47 China’s leaders regard the time between now and the year 2020 as a strategic opportunity to develop the economy and achieve “relatively well-off” (xiaokang) status.48 Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has reformed the economy from a Soviet-style centrally planned economy that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that has a rapidly growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy. In 2007 the United States imported $312 billion in goods from China and exported $61 billion in goods, making the United States China’s largest export market (the United States also receives more imports from China than from any other country), and making China the third largest U.S. export market.49 China’s strategic objective to modernize directly translates into China’s key foreign policy objective of improving China’s political, economic, and security standing in Asia and the world, so that it may continue to build relationships with states to enhance its image and influence to ensure the supply of strategically vital raw materials and the flow of Chinese exports.50 China’s foreign policy seeks to maintain open access to markets, enable the PRC to acquire needed technology, and avoid international conflict, especially with the United States. Chinese leaders recognize that continued rapid economic development and an improved capacity to generate new technologies will not only enhance the PRC’s international stature but also raise concerns in other countries regarding China’s capabilities and intentions. Therefore, Chinese leaders have taken deliberate steps to shape China’s foreign policy around the goals of “peaceful development” and international engagement.51

No China War – China Wants Peace

US and China committed to peace in the region

Carpenter and Dorn 3 (Ted Galen, Vice Pres, James A., Vice Pres, CATO Institute, “CATO

Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th Congress”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-57.pdf) MAT

It would be a major mistake, however, to backslide from a policy of engagement into one of containment and to treat China as an adversary rather than as a normal great power. Managing relations with China and avoiding the extremes of confrontation or wishful thinking will be one of the key challenges facing U.S. policymakers in the next decade. China’s economy has grown precisely because Beijing has allowed greater economic freedom. The rapid growth of trade has increased per capita incomes in China and provided the Chinese people with new opportunities. In 1978 the total value of Chinese imports and exports amounted to only $20.6 billion. By the end of 2001, their value had increased to $509.8 billion (Figure 57.1). China’s desire to compete in world markets is good for consumers and poses no threat to U.S. security. Protectionists in the United States who point to large and growing trade deficits with China and to increased U.S. investment in China should not be allowed to block trade liberalization by injudicious use of national security and human rights arguments. Further liberalization of U.S.-Chinese trade is a win-win strategy and can play an important role in promoting peace and prosperity. Containment would do the opposite

No China War – China Wants Peace

China doesn’t want war with the US, not even with North Korea’s support

Stanton 9 (Joshua, Attorney and U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea, “The One Solution to North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis”, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/StaffordEngJanFeb08.pdf>) MAT

China, which has spend the last two decades sustaining Kim Jong Il’s misrule, probably views the prospect of an occupation of North Korea with a mixture of greed and dismay. The Chinese like North Korea’s minerals and its seaports, but aside from Sheyang’s brothel patrons, they [have little use for its people](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aPussYeHH2DQ&refer=japan). When it fears that refugees may surge across the border, China periodically [increases troop strength](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/96b55558-b111-11dd-8915-0000779fd18c.html) in the area. Yet [persistent reports](http://www.freekorea.us/2009/09/10/open-radio-china-prepares-n-korea-occupation-force/) have it that in the event the North Korean regime collapses, [the Red hordes will move in](http://www.rjkoehler.com/2008/01/08/must-read-china-will-send-troops-to-north-korea-in-emergency-study/) and establish the Outer Chosen Autonomous Zone or somesuch. China’s newly revisionist view of ancient Korean history has [stirred fears in South Korea](http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200312/200312120020.html) that China is preparing to claim that North Korea is, like Tibet and Xinjiang, historically a part of China. China [promises to ”cooperate” with the West](http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200801/200801090020.html) in the event of an “emergency” in the North, but admits that it might move into North Korea to “restore order,” or for strictly humanitarian reasons, of course ([they’re such humanitarians](http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?subm=&ssm=&cid=1577), the rulers of today’s China). [A Financial Times editorial](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79102c0a-b411-11dd-8e35-0000779fd18c.html) calling for contingency planning notably includes China in the states to be involved joint contingency planning, but this wrongly assumes that China means us well and shares our interests in the region. It won’t participate in a spirit of cooperation or collegiality, and it will probably do its utmost to frustrate the goal of a unified and democratic Korea. But China doesn’t want war any more than we do, which should be an incentive for our diplomats to reach some quiet understandings about minimizing foreign intervention. After all, determined U.S. and South Korean opposition could fan much North Korean discontent against a Chinese occupation. The converse is also true.

China wants peace no matter the circumstances

Xia, No Date (Ming, Staff Writer, The New York Times, “‘China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise of China’”, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html) MAT

The combination of stunning economic growth and unpredictable political governance causes deep concerns about China among the nations in the world. The Chinese leadership has realized the urgency to calm down these concerns and to build a supportive international environment for its ascendancy. To make its rise less a threat, the Chinese government has sponsored many PR events, such as exhibitions in foreign countries, promoting Chinese language programs, and so on. But most importantly, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao put forward the thesis of "China's peaceful rise" in his speech to a Harvard University audience in December 2003. Under this thesis, there are several points: First, China's development depends upon and in return will contribute to the world peace; second, China will resort to peaceful means for development; third, China's development will rely more on its own resources and market; fourth, China is prepared for a long-term process of hard work, even several generations, for economic prosperity. Finally, even as China has achieved its economic development, it will not seek hegemony in the world or come out as a threat to any country. Under the guiding principle of "China's peaceful rise," the Chinese government has conducted actively diplomacy at four (at least) different levels: (1) Creating strategic partnerships with the second-tier powers. China has signed strategic partnership treaties with the EU, Russia and India to strengthen their relationships as well as to balance the American power. (2) Promoting "good neighbor policy" in the Asian Pacific region. By increasing trade with the Asian-Pacific region and also let these countries enjoy trade surplus with China, China has positioned as an important trading partner with these countries. Besides, China has entered into various mechanisms of regional cooperation with these countries. During the 1997 Asian financial crises, that China refrained from devaluing its currency and helped stabilize the regional economy by mobilizing its foreign currency reserve won positive reactions from this region and the U.S. (3) Seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation with the U.S. The Chinese side basically has sent to Washington a clear message that China is a conservative power and has no intention to upset the status quo—namely the U.S. as the sole superpower in the world. (4) Neglecting Japan. As China has successfully managed relationships with the sole superpower, the second-tier strategic partners, and neighboring countries, China is able to afford to ignore Japan and occasionally show some toughness.

No China War— Relations

No risk of Japan-Sino conflict, new administrations in both countries help better bilateral relations.

EIN 10 (Eurasia Information Network, group of staff writers and social reporters, The Shifting Paradigm of Sino-Japanese relations) PR

In March 2005 Jian Zemin stepped down as chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, and in September 2006, the cabinet of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi resigned en mass. In the United States, meanwhile, Barack Obama took over as president from George W. Bush in January 2009. Several years have already elapsed since Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine cast a chill on Japanese-Sino relations, and the leaders at that time have all been replaced by their successors. Over the years, the paths taken by Japan and China have “crisscrossed” (that is, collided) every time bilateral historical or territorial issues came to the fore. But immediately after over from Koizumi, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a surprise visit to China in October 2006, an overture that led to the “ice-thawing” visit to Japan by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2007. These mutual visits have eased tensions in the bilateral relationship, so at a glance, the improved ties appear to be result of Abe taking over as head of government from Koizumi. During the years when bilateral ties were frigid, the relationship was described as being “chilly politically but hot economically,” since political ties remained cool despite the growing closeness of the economic relationship. Many feared that the chill in the political arena would spill over into the economic relationship as well. A review of economic statistics reveals that Japan’s exports to China continued to grow. The share of total exports to the Chinese market—which was a mere 2.1% in 1990—jumped to 16.0% in 2008, while the share to the US market declined from 31.6% to 17.8% over the same period. Interestingly, the share of China’s exports to Japan fell from 14.7% in 1990 to 8.1% in 2008, while exports to the United States more than doubled from 8.5% to 18.4%. At the end of March 2006, moreover, China’s foreign currency reserves reached $875.1 billion, surpassing Japan’s $850.5 billion to become the world’s largest. Of this total, some 70% to 80% are believed to be held as US Treasury bonds. Quite apart from the thaw in Japanese-Sino political relations, China has grown into a global economic power with increasingly close ties to the United States.

AT: China Modernization Threatens US

Modernization isn’t a threat to US interests

Eland 3(Evan, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute “Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?” Jan 23 Pg 4, http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/webmanager/wkfiles/2070\_1\_paper.pdf) JL

The United States fears any attempt by China to increase its influence in East or Southeast Asia. Yet, as the Chinese economy grows and China becomes a great power, it will naturally seek more control over its external environment. As Michael O’Hanlon and Bates Gill, both then at the Brookings Institution, perceptively noted, most of China’s ambitions are not global and are no longer ideological; they are territorial and confined to exerting more regional influence over the islands and waterways to the south and southeast of its borders.7 The United States could accommodate such limited ambitions as long as they did not snowball— an unlikely scenario—into a conflict that drastically altered the power balance in East Asia. China has given no indication that it would like to make an attempt at imperial conquest of East Asia. In the past, wars occurred when an established power refused to acknowledge the great power status of a rising nation—for example, Britain’s refusal to acknowledge the kaiser’s Germany in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The United States should not make the same mistake with a rising China. China should be allowed, as all great powers do, to develop a sphere of influence in its own region—that is, East Asia. Within limits, an expanded sphere of Chinese influence should not threaten U.S. vital interests, if defined less grandiosely than at present. Unfortunately, the United States regards even the smallest change in the status quo in East Asia (unless the change expands the already overextended U.S. defense perimeter) with suspicion. The United States does have a vital interest in ensuring a diffusion of power in East Asia so that no hegemonic great power— like imperial Japan in the 1930s—arises. But, unlike the situation before World War II, when China was weak and the French and British colonial powers were spread too thin, centers of power in East Asia other than the United States exist to balance a rising China. Japan, alone or in combination with South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, could balance against China.

AT: China Modernization Threatens US

Modernization is not threatening

Thompson 10 (Drew, is director of China studies at the Nixon Center “It’s not time to panic yet”, April, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think\_again\_chinas\_military) JL

Not yet. After two decades of massive military spending to modernize its armed forces, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, China increasingly has the ability to challenge the United States in its region, if not yet outside it. But the ability to project force tells us very little about China's willingness to use it. Certainly, China has made moves over the last few years that have stoked the China-is-a-dangerous-threat crowd in Washington. In 2007, for instance, Beijing launched a missile that obliterated a communications satellite -- a dramatic and unexpected display of capability -- and then kept mum for 12 days before a Foreign Ministry spokesperson finally admitted it took place, stating: "This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country." In May 2008, satellite imagery revealed that China had constructed a massive subterranean naval base on the southern island of Hainan, presumably a staging point to launch naval operations into the Pacific. This January, China conducted another anti-missile test, shortly after the United States announced arms sales to Taiwan. Similar developments have reliably shown up in annual Pentagon reports on China's military expansion, not to mention in articles such as Robert Kaplan's alarmist 2005 essay: "How We Would Fight China." Even Robert Gates, the mild-mannered U.S. defense secretary, warned last year that China's military modernization "could threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them." Last fall, Adm. Robert Willard, the new head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that "in the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability," implying that maybe the alarmists are onto something. At the same time, China's leaders vehemently denounce any suggestion that they are embarked on anything other than what they have referred to as a "peaceful rise" and haven't engaged in major external hostilities since the 1979 war with Vietnam. But they also don't explain why they are investing so heavily in this new arms race. Beijing's official line is that it wants to be able to defend itself against foreign aggression and catch up with the West, as it was famously unable to do in the 19th century.

No China Modernization

No impact to modernization-China is years away from power projection capability

Ross 05 (Robert, expert on Chinese Foreign Policy at Boston College, National Interest, Assessing the China Threat, http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Ross\_-\_Assessing\_the\_China\_Threat\_-\_National\_Interest.pdf)

Only when Moscow expanded its Pacific fleet and attempted to develop blue-water power-projection platforms did Washington begin to assess the Soviet Navy as a serious threat. In much the same way, **for China to pose a threat to U.S. security it must move beyond coastal sea-denial capability and develop** a similar blue-water **power-projection** navy. However, **China faces considerable long-term constraints** in pursuing such an objective. **First, it has to overcome the technological obstacles**. Unlike sea-denial capabilities, **power-projection** capabilities **cannot be imported**; they must be developed indigenously. **No country will sell China a capable carrier** and the necessary aircraft and support ships. Moreover, **maintenance** of advanced carrier technologies and effective management **of a carrier** task force **require a large contingent of** civilian and military **personnel** with highly advanced training. The limited capability of China's Yuan-class submarines and J-10 aircraft reflects its ongoing struggle to develop 21''^-century weaponry, including advanced aircraft for deployment on carriers. Indeed, Pentagon officials recently testified that **China still must overcome many obstacles before it can use its existing Russian weaponry to improve its operational capabilities.** It has yet to develop the personnel that can maintain the equipment and use it to its full potential. **Chinese submarines have the worst safety record in the world**; in the past three years the Chinese navy has lost one submarine and disabled another. In addition, **China must contend with a daunting geopolitical environment in which it has 13 land neighbors**, **including Russia,** which Chinese leaders cannot and have not dismissed as a future rival, **and India**, as well as smaller but nonetheless potentially capable states. It also faces multiple disaffected minority movements on its periphery. Should China seek bluewater capabilities, it would have to simultaneously maintain its costly effort to ensure territorial security. **Finally, any Chinese effort to develop power-projection capabilities must consider the U.S. response**, which would likely be a determined commitment to victory in a naval arms race. The outcome of this race would significantly reflect overall economic capacity. According to the Pentagon, if China sustains its current economic rate of growth until 2025, its GDP would still be approximately 30 percent oftheU.S. GDPin2025.

Turn: Withdrawal 🡪 China Modernization

China will exploit US vulnerabilities-this prompts Chinese modernization

Bob Pfaltzgraff in 2k9 (dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC STABILITY, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc\_us\_china3.pdf)

So back to the core question. **If China seeks to extend its power** and influence in and beyond the Asia Pacific region, **it follows that it will attempt to do so by building capabilities not so much to counter U.S. strengths but instead to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities**. He cites one piece of a very abundant literature in China about exploiting vulnerabilities of strong adversaries, and concludes that **these are** indeed **guiding principles for China’s force modernization**, and then comes to his closing arguments on how to get strategic stability. This leads me to the conclusion that **to the extent that the United States perpetuates its vulnerabilities, it provides an open invitation to China, to Chinese efforts to exploit such vulnerabilities.** Let me be more specific, he said. There is considerable discussion to the effect that the United States should maintain or develop with China a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability, and that increased emphasis, notably on missile defense on our part, will lead China to increase its own programs in order to counter such U.S. systems. Aside from the shaky empirical basis for such an assertion, he argues, **the Chinese emphasis on exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities argues** basically – I’m sorry, argues **logically for efforts on our part to cut off such U.S. vulnerabilities wherever possible, and the forces that will shape the China-U.S. strategic military relationship. I could even argue that the conscious perpetuation of U.S. vulnerability in the mistaken belief that the results will be strategic stability makes no sense. It may even encourage China to attempt to exploit vulnerability at a time of crisis and leave to undesired escalation based on miscalculation**.

Turn: Alliance 🡪 China Modernization

Alliance leads to China militarization and conflict

Caryl 10 (Christian, contributing editor to Foreign Policy, “One reason why it's probably too early to declare the end of the U.S.-Japan alliance: China.” May 18)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/18/naval\_gazing\_in\_asia?page=0,1) JL

There is one more layer to the maneuvering, though, and that has to do with Japan's role as America's closest and most powerful ally in the Western Pacific. China's present leadership seems to have made a strategic decision that the Middle Kingdom no longer has to hide its light under a bushel-- and that projecting military power is a legitimate way of defending its expanding interests. John Tkacik, who headed China intelligence analysis at the U.S. State Department during the Clinton administration, says, "China is now asserting that it, not Japan, is the preeminent Asian power and that both the Chinese people and the masses of Asia must acknowledge China's new preeminence." He notes that many of the recent Chinese maneuverings have taken place in waters near those islands that are claimed by both China and Japan. The Chinese, he says, are testing to see how far the Americans are really prepared to stand up for Japan's side of the argument. "China is probing the U.S.-Japan alliance for fissures." Of late the Chinese military has become more assertive in Southeast Asia, unnerving some countries there by using naval forces to assert its claims to the contested Spratly Islands, for example. Beijing has also demonstrated that it's prepared to stake out strategic strong points in the Indian Ocean region, even when that aggravates its biggest regional rival, India. And, of course, ensuring Taiwan's eventual accession to mainland rule remains a paramount goal of Chinese state policy -- so the PLA has been busily working to acquire the technology (like long-range anti-ship missiles) to ensure that it can push back against the U.S. Seventh Fleet if it needs to. (Chinese leaders have a painfully clear memory of how the Clinton administration forced them into a humiliating climbdown over Taiwan back in the mid-1990s, when the United States deployed its then-unassailable fleet to the Taiwan Strait. That was then.)

Turn: Alliance 🡪 China Modernization

US-Japan alliance angers China and causes it to modernize

Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Staff Writer and Master’s Degree in Int’l Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Countering China’s Military Modernization”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9052/countering\_chinas\_military\_modernization.html#p2) MAT

Japan: Japan and China compete over a host of issues, from regional security to international trade to access to energy. The two countries have a centuries-old history of conflict, including two Sino-Japanese wars that began in 1894 and 1931, and a bloody Japanese occupation of China during World War II. As this [Backgrounder](http://www.cfr.org/publication/8025/) points out these animosities surface in recurring cycles, often involving Chinese anger over Japan's perceived lack of contrition for wartime crimes. But concrete territorial and economic issues also aggravate the relationship, including Japan's close alliance with the United States, trade frictions, and ongoing disputes over ownership of various islands in the East China Sea. In 2007, China and Japan ranked third and fifth respectively in [national defense expenditures (PBS)](http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/japans-about-face/data-global-military-expenditures/1220/), both spending only a small fraction of the U.S. budget even after adjusting for gross underreporting by Beijing. China's military modernization fuels Japanese fears that China will use its growing economic leverage and military prowess to throw its weight around and dominate the region. Tanaka Akihiko of the University of Tokyo, speaking at a December 2008 CFR symposium on U.S.-Japan relations said China's growing military forces might [change the balance of power](http://www.cfr.org/publication/17911/) in East Asia, which "would necessitate for Japan and the United States to readjust its force structure and other military management." Japan has significantly upgraded capabilities over the past 15 years, deploying the Aegis radar and accompanying missile systems for its navy and warplanes armed with advanced air-to-air missiles for its air force. Since 1998, when a North Korean missile test violated Japanese airspace, Tokyo has been working in partnership with the United States to develop theater missile defenses which have obvious application in the event of any conflict with China. Over the past decade the U.S.-Japanese security alliance has been strengthened through [revised defense guidelines](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp04.html), which expand Japan's noncombatant role in a regional contingency, allows for the deployment of an X-Band radar system in Japan as part of a missile defense system, expands bilateral cooperation in training and intelligence sharing, and allows a nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier in the Yokosuka Naval Base. In September 2007 Japan joined a multinational naval exercise with the United States, Australia, Singapore, and India in the area west of the Malacca Straits. The exercise reinforced the U.S.-led campaign of strengthening security ties among its democratic allies and "the [strategic countering (PDF)](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf) of Chinese military power," argues a December 2008 U.S. Congressional Research Service report. In 2005, a [joint statement](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp10.html) by U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 2005 for the first time included Taiwan as a common strategic objective where the parties would "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues" through dialogue. Though Japan's foreign affairs ministry said this did [not change](http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2005/2/0225.html#6) the country's position on Taiwan, many experts believe the shift indicates that Japan is increasingly concerned with China's growing military capabilities.

Modernization Nevit

External pressure spurs modernization

Chuanqi 7 (He, director of Research Group of China Modernization Strategy, Oct 26“A study on the International modernization” http://www.modernization.com.cn/cmr2008%20overview.htm) JL

To a great extent, the startup of China’s modernization was a reaction to external pressure and challenge. In early 19th century, the industrial modernization in the world outside was still new for old China, and people had disputes about how to handle external challenges. The international strategy in late Tsing Dynasty can be roughly described in three words: delay, bear and sell. After defeated in the First Opium War, the rulers took the delaying tactics in handling international affairs, imagining the invaders would be tired out in the end. After beaten in the Second Opium War, they posed self-bore and initiated westernization movements, attempting to strengthen the country and army with western techniques. After the failure of the first Sino-Japanese War, they adopted the strategy of suppressing one foreign country through another country, sold the country for profits and maintain their feudal ruling. The outstanding feature of the international relations during the Tsing Dynasty was inequality.

\*\*\*US-Japan Relations\*\*\*

Alliance Won’t Collapse

US-Japan alliance won’t collapse – good relations

Soeya in 9 (Yoshihide, Keio University Law Faculty, *Asian Econ. Policy Review,* 4(2), p. 294-296) PL

The USA–Japan alliance has been an integral and indispensable component of the US strategies toward East Asia and the world throughout the post-war years. Although the global and regional strategic environments have shifted over the years, the basic fact that the US strategies are never complete without Japan as an ally has not been shaken. Under normal circumstances, no alliance is perpetual. But the USA–Japan alliance has lasted for almost 60 years and has not shown any signs of dwindling or weakening. As a result, policy-makers in bothWashington and Tokyo have tended to take the alliance for granted, often resulting in the mishandling of and the lack of explicit attention to the delicacy of the political management of the alliance. The tendency on the part of the US administration has been that the lack of appreciation of the political delicacy of the alliance management would lead to the overexpectation of the Japanese role as a “normal” ally and eventually to disappointment and frustration because of the expectation gap. For many Japanese observers, including the author, this was the initial worry vis-à-vis the Obama foreign policy team because apparently the Obama team attempted to construct a new global approach from scratch, so to speak, and without some appreciation and sympathy toward the peculiarities of Japanese security policy, this approach would have led to the overexpectation of the Japanese role and the subsequent usual disappointment. Fortunately, however, this has not been the case, at least so far. For instance, in her tour of Asia in February 2009, the first foreign trip as Secretary of State, Mrs. Clinton handled the case rather well. Particularly, she succeeded in easing Japanese concerns prevalent in the political circle as well as the general public over the possibility of “Japan passing” concerning US relations with China and the North Korean problem (Clinton, 2009a,b,c,d). This was not necessarily a creative diplomacy per se but was still a skilled diplomacy, which was possible only with a solid appreciation of the value of the alliance for its broader regional and global policies. The decision to come to Japan before China was also tactful, with the intention to ease Japanese concerns first and then to visit China for a serious business. Japanese domestic politics have tended to be preoccupied with the concern of “Japan passing,” which is not quite relevant from a broader strategic perspective based on the USA–Japan alliance (Smith, 2008). It may sound paradoxical, but this is often the case precisely because Japanese strategy does not have an alternative to the alliance as its foundation. This is despite the fact that recent changes in the Japanese society are remarkable including rather frank debates on security matters where former taboos are not taboo anymore and actual improvement in Japan’s defense capabilities in quality if not in terms of the defense budget (Hughes, 2007; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007). In this process of change, Japanese political actors have become quite diversified in terms of their policy preferences and assertiveness, but the overall policy framework is still sustained by the alliance with the USA and the post-war constitution (Soeya, 2008; Wilkins, 2008). While the dominant function of the USA–Japan alliance has always been to sustain the US military presence for the American regional and global strategies, the primary role of the USA–South Korea alliance has been to defend South Korea against the threat from North Korea. As such, the latter has been quite susceptible to the challenge of Korean nationalism where the North Korea factor has played a significant role. Despite this apparent South Korean logic, however, the USA has always felt a strong strategic imperative with which to see the role of the alliance with South Korea beyond that of defending South Korea. In recent years this American urge became quite explicit during the Bush administration, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA in 2001. In early 2005, therefore,Washington and Seoul launched the Strategic Policy Initiative to enhance cooperative efforts to meet new security threats in the post-9/11 security environment, to restructure the US military presence in South Korea as part of its global military transformation, and to adjust the command structure of the alliance. The South Korean side tended to highlight the importance of the third aspect, particularly the extent of enhanced autonomy on the part of South Korea, but the regional and global implications of these efforts beyond the Korea Peninsula were obvious (Calder, 2007). Another aspect of importance of these new developments for Washington has been possible security ties between Japan and South Korea under the broader framework of US alliance policies. In retrospect, Washington has constantly been pushing for a closer security relationship between Tokyo and Seoul, and this was part of the US consideration in encouraging diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea since the 1950s that was realized in 1965. In the early 1970s, when the Nixon administration’s new initiatives to reduce its military presence from Asia under the overall scheme of USA– China rapprochement alarmed both Tokyo and Seoul, they in fact became closer, looking for some possible forms of security cooperation. Victor Cha has seen in this the budding of a virtual alliance between Japan and South Korea in the post-war era (Cha, 1999). At least logically from a dominant US perspective, the end of the ColdWar and the rise of new security challenges have naturally added to the importance and the necessity of greater security cooperation between Japan and South Korea under the US alliance structure in East Asia. Along this strategic logic, the like-minded security experts from the three countries have actually begun intellectual endeavors at the track-II level toward conceptualizing the security relationship among the three as a “virtual alliance” (Cossa, 1999). The US security policies toward East Asia under the Obama presidency also articulate these premises rather explicitly by grouping Japan and South Korea in the same category of US allies. This is quite apparent in the Obama diplomacy toward North Korea as well as in a global context where an explicit emphasis is given to the importance of international cooperation on Afghanistan rather than the unilateral handling of Iraq (Obama, 2006).

Relations resilient

Japanese-US relations are resilient— Japan’s reaction to recession proves

Japan Institute of International Affairs 9 (Japan-U.S. Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance, http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights\_v09n14.pdf)

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Pacific Forum CSIS were pleased and honored to again co-host the 15th annual Japan-U.S. San Francisco Security Seminar on March 27-29, 2009. It was a timely and important discussion, coming at a time when we jointly face a global economic crisis on a scale not seen since the Great Depression. This has fueled (mis)perceptions of a decline in U.S. power and influence. Decision makers in Tokyo worry that the Obama administration may be shifting focus from Japan to China, turning from an ally unable to act because of domestic political turmoil toward a more confident and assertive partner in Beijing. Those doubts magnify concerns about the U.S. commitment to protect Japan and the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent. Nonetheless, our participants remain committed to the bilateral alliance, while pressing for renovation of the security partnership to keep it relevant and resilient. Japan and the U.S. should reach out to other security partners – China and South Korea in particular – to diminish suspicions about our bilateral security alliance and to build a stronger foundation for multilateral security cooperation. Japan must forge a national consensus on its place in the world, the role of the alliance in its foreign policy, and its role within the alliance. Integral to this process is rethinking the definition of security. By focusing on nontraditional challenges, Japan can develop ways to contribute to peace, security, and stability that do not conflict with its constitutional constraints. Not only does this afford Japan more options, but it better aligns with the new U.S. administration’s agenda and thinking.

Relations resilient

Japanese-US relations are resilient. 2001 submarine accident proves

The Japan Times 1 (<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20010216a2.html>)

Departing Foley praises resilient ties, says relations will survive sub accident The United States is determined to find out the cause of last Friday's accident in which a Japanese fisheries training ship was sunk when it was hit by a surfacing U.S. submarine off Hawaii, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Foley said in an interview with The Japan Times. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Foley discusses bilateral ties. At the same time, Foley, who will leave his post around March 1 after three years and four months as the U.S. envoy, voiced confidence that overall bilateral ties will not be hurt by the accident, saying, "I believe the U.S.-Japan relationship will survive this most recent tragic accident." Foley cited the U.S. government's repeated apologies over the accident, in which nine of the 35 people aboard the Ehime Maru remain unaccounted for. He also said an investigation into why the USS Greeneville hit the ship during its emergency surfacing drill has been launched upon President George W. Bush's orders, adding that its results will be made available to the Japanese government. He predicted that the transition from the Bill Clinton administration to that of Bush will not bring about fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward Japan, noting that ties with Tokyo have been a cornerstone of Washington's foreign policy for decades. "The (Bush) administration has taken a very positive attitude toward maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship. It has made it clear . . . that we don't have any stronger alliance or partnership anywhere in the world than we have with Japan, and specifically that our principal partner (in the Asia-Pacific region) is Japan, not China," he noted. Many observers have said Clinton placed greater emphasis on improving ties with Beijing than on furthering relations with Tokyo, noting that he did not make a stopover in Japan when he made a trip to China in 1998 and called the U.S. relationship with China a "strategic partnership." But Foley countered such views by pointing out that Clinton visited Japan five times -- more than any other U.S. president -- during his eight years in office. "Both (Japan and the U.S.) want to improve relations with China, but the reason we do that is because of the strength of our own bilateral relationship," he said. Looking back on developments during his tenure here, Foley said bilateral economic and trade relations have deepened, despite some outstanding disputes, and are more positive than in the past. Foley also said Japan and the U.S. "have never institutionalized security arrangements to the degree that they now exist," citing the updated bilateral defense cooperation guidelines adopted by the two governments in 1997.

Withdrawal Damages Alliance

**Withdrawal from Japan damages US- Japan relations**

Melchoir 10 (Jillian, writer for Commentary Magazine “Naoto Kan’s Foreign Policy” 6/4, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/jillian-melchior/306656) JL

But Naoto Kan, the man chosen today to replace Hatoyama as Japanese prime minister, has made statements in the past that suggest cause for further concern. If Kan meant what he has said in the past, the United States can expect him to pursue a foreign policy of diminished U.S. military presence in Japan, low Japanese support for U.S. war efforts in Iraq, and further Japanese outreach to allies other than the United States. Kan has ridden to power on a rapid change in Japanese public opinion. In August, the DPJ won after over half a century of LDP ascendency. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had played to populism, running his campaign partially on promises to reduce American presence in Japan. That backfired. Hatoyama initially tried to backtrack on an agreement with the United States about a military base in Okinawa, undermining American confidence. He eventually bowed to U.S. pressure, meeting public uproar. That concession, along with economic mismanagement and funds scandals, finally ended in Hatoyama’s resignation from office. But Kan holds what Americans would perceive as a mixed record about the U.S.-Japan relationship. Like Hatoyama, Kan seems to support the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan. In 2001, he said that “a pullout of the Marines ‘should not have a major impact on the US strategy for the Far East. We should perhaps formerly propose through diplomatic channels that (the Marines) return to US territory.” Likewise, in 2003, Kan said that “security in the Far East can be maintained without U.S. bases in Okinawa and the marines stationed there. We are eyeing having them moved out of Japan.”

Indecision over US withdrawal creating tension in US-Japan relations

Melchoir 10 (Jillian, writer for Commentary Magazine “Naoto Kan’s Foreign Policy” 6/4, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/jillian-melchior/306656) JL

Finally, Kan has consistently advocated for stronger relations with alternative allies besides the United States. That constitutes a significant shift in Japanese foreign policy, which has considered the United States its primary ally since the aftermath of WWII. In 2003, he said, “Our ties with the United States are vital, but our relations with Asian countries are equally important.” In 2006, he criticized Japanese foreign policy for “lean[ing] too much toward the U.S,” as the Japan Times reported. Kan said: “Our relations with the United States are definitely important. But at the same time, we also have to build relations with Asian countries and resume top-level dialogue with them.” It is encouraging that today he said: “I believe the Japan-U.S. relationship is the foundation of Japan’s diplomacy. … The course we need to take is to maintain a trusting relationship with the United States and at the same time to consider China as equally important. I think that’s the right course for Japan’s future as well.” Japan has every right to pursue the policies that best fit its interests. And Naoto Kan the prime minister might be much more measured in his statements and actions than Naoto Kan the opposition leader. But many of the statements Kan has made in the past suggest more contention between the United States and Japan regarding security and defense issues. Hatoyama left many defense and security issues unresolved, although his concession to the United States was one of his last acts as prime minister. Among broader Asian security concerns, Kan will have to work with the United States immediately to determine many details about U.S. military placement in Okinawa; yet to be determined is the configuration of the base, the exact location of its placement, and how to mitigate its possible environmental impacts, to name a few. Kan would do well to learn from Hatoyama’s failure, acknowledging the controversial nature of these discussions but establishing a consistent and moderate foreign policy before addressing them. He will have to clarify his position on the issues he has in the past made statements about. Otherwise, he risks disapproval both in Washington and among his people.

**Withdrawal of US forces would strain US-Japan relations**

Taiwan News 10 (“Resignation offers U.S. new chance on Japan” 6/4 http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news\_content.php?id=1276597&lang=eng\_news) JL

But faced with U.S. opposition, Hatoyama gave up on plans to renegotiate the accord, leading to furor among erstwhile supporters in Okinawa, the withdrawal of the left-wing coalition partner and, eventually, his resignation. Many experts - and, according to polls, Japanese voters - fault Hatoyama, saying he should not have insisted on renegotiating the Futenma accord without offering an alternative. Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation, said Obama needed to "better explain" to Japan's ruling party the benefits of the alliance. "A Japanese decision to again abandon the bilateral accord would exacerbate tensions with Washington and seriously degrade U.S. abilities to defend Japan and maintain peace and stability in Asia," he said. The Obama administration had initially been mindful of relations with Japan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose Tokyo as her first foreign destination and Obama invited Hatoyama's conservative predecessor, Taro Aso, as his first foreign guest at the White House. But relations deteriorated to the point that in April, when Obama held a major summit in Washington nuclear security, Hatoyama's only chance to speak to the U.S. president was over the first course of a working dinner.

Withdrawal Damages Alliance

US presence preserves the US-Japan alliance

Klingner 9 (Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, November 9 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Japans%20Security%20Policy%20Navigating%20the%20Troubled%20Waters%20Ahead) JL

 The two nations should discuss areas where Japan can play a greater security role in both Afghanistan and globally. One possibility is to assume a greater leadership role in defending sea lines of communication with its naval forces. The shortcomings of Japan's contribution to combating Somali pirates points to the need for realistic rules of engagement. It is critical for the U.S. to point out that disagreements in one area can pervasively poison the atmosphere of the relationship. The DPJ-led government could share characteristics with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's strained relations with the U.S. Although Roh eventually softened his rhetoric and contentious issues were resolved, his initial gaffes left a residue of underlying tension in the relationship which made subsequent progress on other topics difficult. Strong U.S.-South Korea economic interaction was unable to compensate for strains in the security relationship. Washington should also counsel the DPJ about the danger of unintended consequences and make clear that there are ramifications to its statements and policies. If the DPJ insists on moving Marine air units from Okinawa, it would degrade U.S. deterrent and warfighting capabilities, which are, after all, in place to defend Japan, maintain peace and stability in Asia, and constrain Chinese adventurism. A senior U.S. defense official warned in October that DPJ revisions to the existing U.S. force realignment agreement could cause the U.S. Congress to halt funding for the larger redeployment to Guam and well as damage the bilateral relationship of trust.

Withdrawal leads to tension on alliance

Japan Times 10 (“Japan could pay big price for hurting American pride” Jan 25 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100125a1.html) JL

There are four major problems with the Hatoyama administration's pursuit of its policies toward the U.S.: (1) Hatoyama's lack of understanding of America and Americans, the result of which has led to mismanagement of the alliance relationship and damaged Americans' self-esteem, (2) failure by Hatoyama and his colleagues to build personal ties with the right people in Washington, (3) the Hatoyama administration's inability to draw up long-term strategies for bilateral relations, and (4) Hatoyama's failure to appreciate the cost to Japan if the U.S. withdrew its troops from the country. Hatoyama does not seem to understand that Americans, who are sometimes criticized for being arrogant, are quite easily hurt. For example, even the administration of President George W. Bush was openly upset when France and Germany did not fully support his war efforts in Iraq. Bush jumped at Japan's decision to support him. It was against this background that President Barack Obama experienced utter shock when his junior partner in the Pacific appeared to be trying to renege on an earlier promise. At their meeting in November, Hatoyama told Obama to "trust me" in handling the base relocation issue. Hatoyama is to blame entirely for the discord that ensued. He should have known that Obama would interpret the words from a presumably competent politician as reassurance that the issue would be resolved before yearend, and that Hatoyama would forfeit respect if he intentionally betrayed Obama. Mutual trust is the prerequisite to any alliance between nations. Should Tokyo lose Washington's trust, Japan would face serious consequences — involving shared military information, commerce, exchange rates and resolution of global issues. Hatoyama has forgotten that his predecessors such as Zenko Suzuki and Morihiro Hosokawa strained relations with the U.S. by hurting Americans' pride.

Withdrawal Damages Alliance

Tensions rise as Japan considers US withdrawal

Cossa 10 (Ralph A., President of Pacific Forum CSIS, PacNet, “Obama's East Asia Policy: So Far, So Good”, http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1005.pdf) MAT

Let’s look at the exceptions first. The one relationship that has gotten worse under President Obama is perhaps the most important one, that between Washington and Tokyo. The fault lies primarily (but not exclusively) with Japan; a new government took power there, led for the first time by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which ran against the policies of the past. While Prime Minister Hatoyama still pays rhetorical allegiance to the US-Japan alliance relationship as the foundation of his foreign policy, in practice tensions have grown over his decision to reevaluate an Okinawa base relocation agreement negotiated between the Bush administration and the previous Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government which had been accepted and further formalized by the Obama administration. Hatoyama could have “reluctantly accepted” this government-to-government agreement and then focused his attention on greater “equality” in the future. Instead he choose to take on Washington from the opening days of his administration, creating what appears more and more like a lose-lose situation for both sides and which has also distracted from what should have been a forward-looking commemoration last month of the alliance’s 50th anniversary. Hatoyama has promised a decision on the Futenma airbase relocation plan by May and few are predicting a happy ending. A decision to go back to the drawing board (or even to delay a final decision until after this summer’s Upper House elections) will further strain the alliance and Hatoyama’s credibility and could also backfire politically; middle of the road voters that abandoned the LDP in droves in last fall’s Lower House elections may come flocking back if the DPJ – already plagued by scandal and its failure to effectively deal with the economic situation – is further seen as threatening the still highly popular bilateral security alliance.

Withdrawal damages alliance

Japan Times 10 (“Japan, U.S. need closer cooperation”May 15 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100515d1.html) JL

There is concern in Washington over the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance at a time when the two countries should be working close together on a broad range of international issues, including North Korea and Iran, U.S. foreign policy experts said at a recent symposium in Tokyo. The handling of the relocation of the U.S. Marine base Futenma by the eight-month-old government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has triggered worries that Tokyo may be moving to dilute the strategic value of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, said Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution. Talbott and two other experts from the Washington-based think tank were joined by University of Tokyo professor Fumiaki Kubo during the April 26 symposium on the U.S. foreign policy of the administration of President Barack Obama and Tokyo-Washington ties, which was jointly organized by the Brookings Institution, the Keizai Koho Center and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Tsuyoshi Sunohara, a senior writer for the financial daily, served as moderator of discussions. Talbott, a former deputy U.S. secretary of state, noted that both Obama and Hatoyama, who came to power in 2009 promising change, face domestic political difficulties with the prospect of setbacks in key elections this year — the midterm congressional elections in November and the Upper House election in July. Obama's challenges in securing congressional approval of key legislation that he favors could hinder his foreign policy and national security agenda, including climate change and arms reduction, Talbott said. "These are uncertain times in the U.S. — just as they seem to be here in Japan," he added. Talbott observed that, meanwhile, there is "deep concern" in Washington about the state of the U.S. relations with Japan — or specifically a "concern about the future direction of our alliance." That concern, he said, is "broadly shared among Democrats, Republicans and independents." The attempt by Hatoyama's ruling coalition to change a 2006 Japan-U.S. agreement — concluded by the then Liberal Democratic Party-led government — and move the Futenma base functions out of Okinawa has soured bilateral relations. Hatoyama recently gave up on the bid and is reportedly seeking slight modifications to the original 2006 plan for relocating the base within the prefecture, but strong local ire makes it unlikely that the dispute would be resolved by his self-imposed deadline of the end of May.

Contructivism Prevents Rearm

Constructivism has shaped the attitudes of the people of Japan and prevented military expansion

Lind 2004 (Jennifer, postdoctoral Research Fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, International Security, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v029/29.1lind.html#authbio) CBC

**Scholars have drawn upon theories from the constructivist and realist paradigms to explain Japan's security policy**.22 **The constructivist school holds that norms and identities have a powerful effect on a state's security policy**. Constructivist scholars have argued that **a state's international and domestic political experiences** may **produce norms or a "culture of antimilitarism," an aversion to the military establishment and the use of military force, which becomes entrenched through the development of institutions and laws**.**23 In an antimilitarist state, proposals to expand military capabilities or roles will confront opposition from the general public and political groups, and will run up against institutional or legal restraints; these factors will obstruct proposals for military activism**. A number of scholars argue that **Japan's disastrous World War II defeat created antimilitarist norms that, more than the international system, shaped Japan's postwar security policy**.24 Glenn Hook highlights **the "persistent strength of anti-militaristic attitudes" in Japan, includ**ing **"resistance to a major build- up in the military**."25 Katzenstein argues that **"there exists no observable relation between Japan's relative position and its security policy,"** and that **"Japan's security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power."**26 Sun-Ki Chai writes, "The incompleteness **[End Page 101]** of systemic explanations suggests that **domestic factors are essential to explaining the anomalous nature of Japanese defense policy**."27 Constructivist scholars argue that **Japan's military policy has been**—and will continue to be—**highly constrained by antimilitarist norms**. Katzenstein claims that "strong reactions to anything that smacks of Japanese militarism act as asocial restraint on national security policy," and that "a series of taboos curtail the growth of the military."28 Berger argues that **because of Japanese antimilitarism, "in each instance efforts to significantly expand... Japanese defense establishments and international roles foundered on the shoals of domestic opposition**."29 Hook argues that "**mass attitudes have been of crucial significance in constraining the normalization of the military as a legitimate instrument of state power**."30 Chai highlights **the constraining effects of institutions such as article 9 of the Japanese constitution (which prohibits Japan fromowning military forces or using them in the conduct of foreign policy**). Arguing that article 9 "**inhibits full-scale armament**," Chai asserts that **antimilitarist institutions in Japan are "important barriers to changes in Japanese defense policy**."31 In sum, **constructivist scholars argue that since World War II, domestic Japanese norms have prevented major expansion of Japanese military capabilities and roles.**

Presence Prevents Rearm

US presence key to alliance and preventing Japan militarization

Green 6 (Michael, Sr. Advisor at CSIS, “U.S.-Japanese Relations after Koizumi: Convergence or Cooling?” Pg 105 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington\_quarterly/v029/29.4green.html) JL

For the first few decades of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, Tokyo was extremely careful to avoid becoming entrapped (makikomareru) in the U.S. competition with China. Now the U.S. side must, for the first time, make decisions about how it positions itself as an ally of Japan in the growing competition between Tokyo and Beijing. This is particularly important as Japanese and Chinese warships and aircraft have been maneuvering at close ranges around the contested Senkaku/Diaoyutai island chain in response to Chinese unilateral, exploratory oil drilling and the subsequent dispatch of Japanese military and coast guard patrols. Japan does trade more with China now than with the United States, but this fact has done little to improve Japanese public opinion about China or to soften the Japanese Defense Agency's warnings about China's military buildup, given the increase of People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines and surface combatants in disputed territorial waters around Japan. On the diplomatic front, the Chinese-Japanese rivalry has heated up, with Beijing organizing international efforts to block Japan's UN Security Council bid and Tokyo pulling other democracies such as India, Australia, and New Zealand into the new East Asian Summit to balance Chinese influence. Japan and China have never been powerful in Asia at the same time, and these two giants will struggle to find a stable equilibrium for years to come. If there is a possibility for divergence between Tokyo and Washington regarding Northeast Asia in the years ahead, it will not be because Japan takes the Asian threat environment less seriously than the United States, which was always the U.S. concern during the Cold War. Instead, the challenges may come in areas where Japan reacts to regional threats with greater sensitivity than the United States. In short, to keep the alliance strong, the United States will have to demonstrate continually that the U.S.-Japanese alliance remains Japan's most credible line of defense against regional threats. The North Korean nuclear and missile programs and the PLA military buildup will continue to preoccupy the United States and will almost certainly lead future administrations to continue strengthening U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. For the United States, the key question may be whether future governments in Japan can live up to Koizumi's standards. After the successful dispatch of Japanese forces to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, U.S. military planners and senior officials have come to see the dispatch of the SDF as the rule rather than as the exception. In Japan, however, future dispatches of forces [End Page 105] could become prisoner to other priorities or crises in the Diet if a separate bill is required for each mission. Moreover, polling evidence suggests that although the Japanese public was impressed with the efforts of the SDF in Iraq, they still see the dispatch of Japanese forces as the exception rather than the rule and remain averse to casualties. U.S. confidence in Japan could also be shaken by a failure to implement the May 2006 "Two-Plus-Two" agreement on the realignment of bases in Okinawa. Bush and Koizumi lauded the agreement during their June 2006 summit, but there is opposition in Okinawa and from members of the Diet unhappy about the price tag, which is estimated at up to $6 billion. On the whole, the international threat environment is likely to continue pushing the United States and Japan closer together as alliance partners. Already, the depth of coordination in areas ranging from development assistance to missile defense and export controls is unprecedented and reflects a shared assessment of the challenges both nations face. Yet, the nature of the threats will continue to test traditional ways of managing the alliance, and each side has high expectations for mutual security cooperation. It will take continued high-level attention in both governments to ensure that the U.S.-Japanese alliance lives up to those expectations in the next major crises to come.

No Rearm

The Japanese won’t rearm because amending article 9 would create constitutional pressure and controversy in East Asia

WSU 10 (Washington State University, Honors Thesis proposal, http://honors.wsu.edu/academics/thesis/library/HCwebthesisproposalKincaid11-07PDF.pdf)

The other side of the debate, against amendment, also has a strong basis. The Japanese government has not officially apologized for some of the atrocities committed by Japan before and during WWII. Some issues, such as the Nanjing Incident, have not even been recognized as a true event in world history, causing friction between Japan and China. Over these and other issues China, North and South Koreas, and other Asian countries do not trust Japan. If Japan were to try to amend article 9, these countries would protest strongly. Another argument against change is the right to live in peace. The constitution of Japan is based on an ideal of peace: the preface states, “We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want.” The Japanese Peace Constitution is seen as an important document leading the world towards a world peace. Many people believe that instead of changing or deleting article 9, Japan should be convincing other countries to adopt the same principle. The last reason not to change the article is due to simple indecision. Change is supported by only half of the Japanese people. Even if this percentage were to go up the question of how to amend article 9 would still be a source of debate. The issue of article 9 in the Japanese constitution is one that the Japanese are currently wrestling with. The question of whether the article should be amended, and if amended, how it should be amended is a very complicated question with ramifications not only for Japan, but also for the world. This research thesis will pursue the questions of if article 9 should be amended and also how it should be amended.

No Rearm

**The Japanese want to stay neutral and peaceful and oppose the US and rearmament requests**

Peng 5 (Tao, Minnesota State University, “ASSESING THE PEOPLE’S DIPLOMACY AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE US-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE,” http://historia-actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/viewFile/101/92) MJ

In response to the Chinese friendship, more and more Japanese called for foreign and domestic policies "more appropriate" to Japan's interests. Japanese leftist forces, especially the influential Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), echoed PRC's call for Japan's independence and demanded for the closer "cooperation with Asian countries" and an independent and neutral foreign and defense policy which had become more appealing to the Japanese. Even within the pro- American conservative forces, many conservative leaders like Hatoyama Ichiro, Kono Ichiro, Miki Takeo and Matsumura Kenzo, and Ishibashi Tanzan to various degrees advocated expanding Japan's relations with mainland China15. But the Yoshida government, sticking to its "following-America" policy and ignoring the Communist overture, finally lost popular support and collapsed in December 1954. The new government, headed by Hatoyama, expressed its willingness to establish "normal relations" with Communist China "on mutually acceptable terms"16. Beijing welcomed Tokyo's new attitude and sent a highranking trade delegation to Japan in March 1955 and signed the third non- governmental trade agreement with the Japanese17. In the Bandung Conference at the same time, the Japanese delegation even held secret talks with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and acquired from the top PRC leader the first-hand information which showed the Chinese hoped to establish the "friendly relationship" with Japan18. As a result, the Japanese neutralist forces became increasingly influential. They not only opposed the existence of US military bases and the rearmament request raised by Washington but also firmly opposed Japan's subordination to US cold war policy and made an irresistible appeal for Japan's independence and neutrality21. The left wing JSP even wrote to Zhou Enlai to express its determination to continuously struggle for Japan's "peace, freedom, and independence." Echoing China's People's Diplomacy, many leading Japanese intellectuals also opposed US non- recognition policy to China and thought Japan's best chance to avoid war in the nuclear age "lies in doing nothing, in remaining immobile and inoffensive," as the country needed "peace to grow again." Their prevailing sentiment was to keep peace through neutrality. If Japan sided with any nation, it would offend other nations. It should contribute to the peace of the world "by remaining neutral"22. Through their propaganda, these neutralist and leftist groups fostered to "a remarkable degree" the anti- American sentiment among the Japanese23.

Japan doesn’t want to rearm

Ricketts and Tickmae 3 (Robert, Penn State Senior Lecturer in Kinesiology, Eiji, Foreign Affairs, “The allied occupation of Japan,” pg 524) MJ

In early July 2000, a US Marine broke into an Okinawan home and molested a 14-year-old girl in her sleep, sparking renewed outrage and calls for a US pullout. Occurring just before the Group of Eight summit in Okinawa, the incident highlighted once again the plight of Ryukyuans. **One of the paradoxes of Japan’s postwar democracy is that, while the Japanese people as a whole disapprove of rearmament and the stationing of US troops on their soil, they seem indifferent to the American bases in Okinawa and the problems they create for the island’s 1.3 million inhabitants. Displaying a lamentable lack of principle, Japan’s foreign policy supinely accommodates every US demand and refuses to address this problem**.

Withdrawal 🡪 Rearm

US withdrawal leads to Japan rearm

Miller 05 (John, associate professor in the Regional Studies Department at the Asia-

Pacific Center for Security Studies “Will the Real Japan Please Stand Up” Pg. 45 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=11&sid=1b727d02-722c-4463-a3d3-c5cfa09c7ca6%40sessionmgr11) JL

Considered from the latter standpoint, nothing short of a comparable external crisis is likely to shake the Japanese out of their historically ingrained preference for cautious and incremental change. One such crisis that might have this effect is the breakdown of the American alliance, which more than anything else—including Japan’s residual postwar pacifism—underpins its attachment to the status quo and reluctance to break with the past. The loss of their U.S. protector would force the Japanese to confront the military dimension of their external security, which they have not had to do in a serious way since 1945. If a Japan bereft of its American security guarantee were to see itself threatened by a hostile combination of neighbors centered on a resurgent and belligerent China, the reviving militarism hypothesis could become more plausible than it seems today. Indeed, one can easily imagine a scenario in which a rightward tilt of its electorate puts in power ultranationalists bent on playing the military card to reassert Japan’s regional dominance. Given Japanese economic and technological capabilities, this has to be China’s, and indeed all of East Asia’s, nightmare scenario. If the American alliance remains strong —as seems probable in the near term—fullscale “remilitarization” and engagement in the rough-and-tumble of international power politics are unlikely to hold much appeal for the majority of Japanese. Whether or not they remain dyed-in-the-wool pacifists as the conscientious objector hypothesis suggests, there is no compelling reason for them to embark on this course. Doing so, moreover, would mean assuming novel burdens and risks that run counter to their innate conservatism. Like the institutions of “Japan Inc.,” their Cold War pacifist isolationism is dysfunctional in the more fluid and unpredictable conditions of the post– Cold War world, including the higher expectations of their U.S. ally. Rather than abandon that link, however, their preferred approach is to gradually adapt it to changed conditions. Koizumi has had considerable success in pushing this process toward political- military normalcy, largely because he has been willing to accept compromises and half-measures. But the inevitable result is a high level of ambiguity regarding Japan’s intentions, not least among Japanese themselves. Although they have so far been spared the necessity to make hard choices, a regional military crisis, which is no longer unthinkable, could change this situation, forcing the real Japan to stand up.•

Withdraw 🡪 Rearm

Withdrawal leads to Japan increasing security interest

Preble 5 (Christopher, director of [foreign policy studies](http://www.cato.org/foreignpolicy/index.html) at the Cato Institute, “America's New Strategic Relationship With Japan,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5173) MJ

More far-reaching than these specific issues was the underlying strategic logic behind the agreement. **By moving forward with the removal of some U.S. troops from Okinawa, the United States has signaled that Japan will have greater responsibility for its own security. The Japanese have accepted this responsibility**, and have also agreed to become more integrated in planning joint activities with the U.S., although there are no details as yet as to precisely what sort of joint activities are envisaged. Yoshinori Ono, director-general of the Japanese Defense Agency, spoke only of cooperation "in various areas" to improve peace and security. **These recent negotiations reveal an increasingly mature and sober-minded approach to East Asian security on the part of policymakers in both Tokyo and Washington**. In recent years, J**apan has broadened its horizons beyond its direct defense and is taking an increasing interest in security throughout the region. This transformation has occurred despite the reluctance of some in the United States to allow Japan to assume a more significant role in world affairs**. For instance, The Project for the New American Century, a Washington-based think tank, declared in a 2000 report that it was "essential to retain the capabilities U.S. forces in Okinawa represent." It expressed concern that a withdrawal from Cold War-era obligations, "would call America's status as the world's leading power into question." Others fear the supposedly innately militaristic nature of Japanese society, and see the U.S. troop presence as a "cap in the bottle" designed to prevent the rise of a more assertive and militarized Japan.

If US leaves Japan, Japan would rearm

Brooks 90 (Roger, CEO, Destination Development, “The Case for Continued U.S. Engagement in Asia,” http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/12814.pdf) MJ

U.S. military presence in the Philippines makes much cheaper U.S. naval deployments to the Persian Gulf, and complements supply routes to Northeast Asia. For now, **U.S. presence also blocks Soviet and potential Chinese ambitions to control sea lanes in Southeast Asia**. Sixth, **the need to keep Japan from filling a vacuum left by American disengagement from the region. Instability in the region**, particularly in place like China, **could re-awaken and invite Japanese re-armament were the United States to become strategically disengaged and thus increasingly irrelevant in the region.** **Japan is still the principal economic power in the region and would not idly sit by if political instability were to threaten their long-term access to commercial markets in Asia**. For this reason, and the reasons which I outlined this morning, **I believe that it would be ill advised for the United States to risk strategic disengagement in the Asia-Pacific region.**

Withdrawal 🡪 Rearm

US key to prevent rearmament

Roehrig 10 (U.S. Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The US Nuclear umbrella over South Korea”, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/5/7/pages416574/p416574-1.php) CBC

It is important to note here that similar to the days of the Cold War, **South Korean and** Japanese security are linked.  By providing reassurances of the nuclear umbrella to South Korea,  **Washington also helps to reassure Japan and keep Tokyo from considering nuclear weapons**[**.**](http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/1/6/5/7/pages416574/isa10_proceeding_416574-23.html) Moreover, **if Japan were to go nuclear,  pressure would mount on South Korea to follow suit.  In the wake of the**2006 **nuclear test, a**nanonymous **South Korean official noted “we are studying our options very seriously in case Japan is armed with nuclear weapons.” The offical also noted that “we believe the Japenese government has been discussing options for a long time on the assumption that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.**

Japan rearming is inevitable-the technology cannot be unlearned

Lim 00 (Robyn, Prof. of international relations at Hiroshima Univ., The Japan Times, LN) CBC

Abolitionists, of course, hope that if the U.S. dismantles its nuclear arsenal, others will follow. But that is akin to believing in tantric flying. **Nuclear weapons cannot be abolished, because their technology is known and will not be unlearned. Nuclear weapons are also an inescapable part of Japan's future, as they are of its past. During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear weapons helped preserve Japan's independence by deterring Soviet ambitions for hegemony over Eurasia.** Victory in the Cold War did not end security problems in East Asia, where nuclear weapons remain highly salient. **If the U.S. did abolish its nuclear arsenal, would Japan deter the nuclear-armed powers of East Asia by waving its three nonnuclear principles?** While Berlin was always the main locus of superpower tension during the Cold War, the East Asian dimension of this global strategic contest grew progressively more important**. Nuclear weapons, maritime power and bases in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia allowed the U.S. to target the Soviet Union's vulnerable eastern flank, thus presenting Moscow with the credible threat of a two- front war.** Like all enduring alliances, **the U.S.-Japan alliance is built on a congruence of strategic interests**. **For Japan, alliance with the dominant maritime power has always represented optimal security.** Without U.S. maritime and nuclear protection, postwar Japan would have been rapidly brought to heel by the Sino-Soviet alliance, which was specifically targeted at Japan. The 1952 U.S.-Japan security treaty permitted the U.S. to store nuclear weapons in Japan and to launch them without consultation. At Japan's behest, the treaty was revised in 1960. After that, the U.S. was supposed to consult Japan about changes in the equipment supplied to its forces in Japan, which meant nuclear weapons. In 1969, reassured by renewed U.S. pledges of continued nuclear protection after China went nuclear, Japan announced its three nonnuclear principles: that it would not make or possess nuclear weapons or allow them to be introduced into Japan. Nuclear weapons were removed from Okinawa when it was returned to Japan in 1972. But Japan, dependent on an alliance critically reliant on U.S. nuclear weapons and maritime power, continued to turn a blind eye when nuclear-capable U.S. warships entered its ports. In such an alliance, it could not have been otherwise. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, while steadily building up its own nuclear arsenal long after it achieved parity with the U.S. in 1971, sponsored "peace" campaigns. These sought to convince Western and Japanese voters that it was U.S. nuclear weapons, rather than Soviet ambition, that chiefly threatened their security. The focus on weapons also perpetuated the fallacy that wars are caused by arms races, rather than by the ambitions of authoritarian regimes. Subscribing to this myth, concerned scientists **started their Doomsday Clock, which purported to show how close the world was to nuclear war. Had Japan believed that nuclear weapons represented an unacceptable threat, it could have abrogated its alliance with the U.S. any time after 1971**. Fearing isolation in a dangerous neighborhood, it did not do so. Japan's geography also reduced Moscow's ability to play the antinuclear card. In 1992, with the Cold War won, the removal of nuclear weapons from U.S. warships further facilitated the political management of nuclear issues in Japan. But the end of the Cold War brought neither perpetual peace nor the abolition of nuclear weapons. To the contrary, Russia seeks to compensate for its retrenched conventional power by putting greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, one of its few remaining claims to great- power status. North Korea is a rogue state with growing missile capabilities and nuclear ambiguity. Pyongyang's test of a nuclear-capable three-stage missile over Japan in August 1998 means that every part of Japan is exposed to missile and nuclear attack from North Korea. China, supplier of missile and other technology to North Korea, seeks strategic dominance over East Asia and rattles its nuclear and missile arsenal at Taiwan. Yet China insists that Japan must remain nonnuclear, and must not participate in developing nonnuclear missile defenses to protect itself and U.S. forces in Japan. **Japan cannot escape nuclear weapons. It will either continue to rely on the U.S.' extended deterrence, which provides nuclear protection in ways that do not alarm Japan's neighbors. Or it will lose confidence in the U.S. alliance and will acquire nuclear weapons and long-range maritime capability of its own**, as advocated by its recently sacked parliamentary vice minister for the Defense Agency, Shingo Nishimura.

Japan Rearm 🡪 Invade Taiwan

Withdrawal leads to Japanese militarism and an invasion of Taiwan

Kazuko 7 (Mori, researcher for Research and Development Activities “New Relations between China and Japan: A Gloomy, Frail Rivalry” March http://dspace.wul.waseda.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2065/12812/1/44\_070409-mori-e.pdf) JL

Zhou urged Kissinger of the need to beware of Japan, stating that if the US military forces were to withdraw from Asia, Japan in its newly found economic prosperity would return to Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula in military regalia, and demanding that Kissinger promise such a scenario would not come about, at least in Taiwan (9 July).Thus there is a great possibility that before the U.S. forces have withdrawn from these areas and from Taiwan, armed forces of Japan shall enter. Entry into Taiwan would be possible because Japan and Taiwan still have a treaty, concluded with Chiang Kai-shek – the so-called Peace Treaty, and they are now stressing that fact．１ ０ Zhou cited Japan’s imperial institution as the basis of Japanese militarism, and severely criticized US policy and the strengthening of the US-Japan security agreement as supporting the gradual revival of militarism there. Even in October, during the final stages of drafting the Communique, Zhou was adamant about gradual US withdrawal promoting the deployment of Japanese troops to Taiwan. In response, Kissinger repeated that the presence of US troops was a deterrent (“bottle cap”) to Japanese military escalation and that the US-Japan Security Agreement existed for that purpose.

Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

North Korean threat triggers nuclear rearmament in Japan

Green 3 (Shane, Senior writer and editor, The Age, “Tokyo’s nuclear bind; THE ARMS RACE”, LN) CBC

**North Korea's threats have led Japan to think the unthinkable - developing its own nuclear arms.** Shane Green reports from Hiroshima. On the walls of the ground floor at Hiroshima's Peace Memorial Museum, there are copies of 585 protest letters from mayors of Hiroshima to foreign governments each time the world has edged closer to nuclear war. In the main, they concern nuclear tests, although the last letter, in January, was to North Korea's "dear leader" Kim Jong-il, after Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The protests are part of a mission for peace from the city that suffered the first atomic bomb attack in 1945. Consider this: in the next 12 months, the mayor of Hiroshima is forced to draft a protest letter over the development of nuclear arms not to Kim Jong-il, George Bush or Vladimir Putin, but to Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi. **Faced with the threat of nuclear attack by North Korea, Japan has decided to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Once this scenario would have been unthinkable for postwar Japan, with its war-renouncing constitution and dark and painful memories of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US.** But **in North Korea, Japan is facing its greatest post-war security threat.** **The talk in Japan is of preparing for the worst: a missile attack, possibly nuclear, from North Korea.** And a nuclear Japan is part of the debate on how to deter its unpredictable Stalinist neighbour from following through on threats to unleash nuclear weapons. There are two levels to the nuclear Japan debate. Outside Japan, there has been open and robust discussion about the possibility. In the past week, the prospect of a nuclear Japan was raised by outgoing South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, Washington's top Asian envoy James Kelly, and Republican Senator John McCain. Kim spoke of Japan and South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. Kelly said North Korea had forced Japan to "rethink all its positions", although he believed it would stay non-nuclear. The two debates have different targets and agendas. **The discussion of a nuclear Japan appears aimed at pushing China to become much more active in pressuring North Korea**, the state it has mentored and supported. "What they are really talking about is the potential for the non-proliferation regime to come tumbling down, I think, **as a result of North Korea's behavior and not being able to contain (its) nuclear ambitions**," said Dr Sheila Smith, a regional security expert from the East-West Centre in Honolulu. McCain's comments went to the core of this issue: "I think the Chinese have to understand that unless they become very engaged with North Korea and bring about a quick resolution to this crisis then the Japanese will have no choice but to nuclear arm themselves." The theory is that nuclear China will be so alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear Japan - of which it still holds a deep distrust because of Japan's war-time actions - it will act. An added motivation for Beijing is that a nuclear Taiwan could soon follow. Within Japan, the debate has been more tentative, reflecting the sensitivity of the issue. And rather than pressuring Beijing, the focus has been on the very real issue of self-defense. The most strident call came in an article in last month's Voice magazine, "A nuclear declaration for Japan", written by Kyoto University Professor Terumasa Nakanishi and literary critic Kazuya Fukuda. "**The best way for Japan to avoid being the target of North Korean nuclear missiles**," it said, "**is for the Prime Minister to declare without delay that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons."** It was a bold statement, and in Japan, much easier to make than implement. Being the target of the world's only nuclear attacks has had a profound impact on Japan. In 1970, Tokyo adopted a non-nuclear weapons policy, which prevents Japan from possessing or producing nuclear weapons, or allowing any country to bring them into Japan. Back then, it was an easy stance to adopt. The battle to be won was economic, and postwar pacifist Japan was secure under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella and US forces. In the three decades since, any discussion of a nuclear Japan has been taboo, an almost certain end to a political career. But even before the North Korean crisis, there were signs of change, with the issue being tentatively raised, most notably by the Japanese Government's top spokesman and possible leadership aspirant Yasuo Fukuda. In a briefing to reporters last June, he ventured that **Japan may claim the right to possess its own nuclear arsenal in the future as the international security environment changed.** Fukuda set off a storm of protest, and faced demands for his sacking. Koizumi, resisted, but restated his support for the non-nuclear policy…. (**CONTINUES)…**And when US Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Tokyo next week, a joint US-Japan missile defense system to counter North Korea will be a central issue. Yet**, as the past few months have shown, things are changing quickly in north Asia. 3North Korea has forced Japan to adopt its most aggressive stance since World War II. If Pyongyang starts to make good its threats, a Hiroshima mayor may end up writing the hardest protest letter of all.**

Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan is already expanding its military and rearming

Gedye and Joyce 3 (Robin and Colin, Foreign Affairs writers, The Daily Telegraph, LN) CBC

**TOKYO'S threat to launch a pre-emptive attack against North Korea if it fears imminent attack appears to have finally drawn a line under Japan's post-war pacifism.** Until yesterday's declaration by Shigeru Ishiba, its defense minister, **Japan's planned reaction to a missile attack by North Korea would have been to alert the population to an imminent attack - if possible - and then send its "self-defense forces" to clean up the debris. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,** originally drafted by the American occupation authorities in 1947, **states: "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. "Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." That prohibition has long since been abandoned with the advent of Japan's strangely titled self-defense forces, now 250,000 strong. By comparison, Britain's armed forces are a mere 205,000.** For years, Japan's self-defense forces were designed to do just that, but the changing climate in east Asia is forcing a swift rethink.

The threat was rammed home on Monday when Howard H Baker, the American ambassador in Tokyo, gave warning that North Korea could well fire another test missile over Japan as part of a pattern of rising provocation**. The message was clear enough** for Mr **Ishiba to take a major step away from Japan's post-war pacifist tradition which, under its constitution, bans war as a means to settle international disputes.** While Mr Ishiba was keen to stress that **Japan's launch of a missile against North Korea would in no way be "pre-emptive"**, he was clearly playing with words.Adam Ward, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said: "Today's statement by the military is representative of a more assertive Japan that is stretching the limits of its constitution." America has long been keen for Japan, one of its closest allies in the region, to punch its military weight and join with Washington in developing a missile shield. **Tokyo has been reluctant to move the missile shield programme into the development stage because of concerns over its costs and fears of upsetting the delicate strategic balance with China. Mr Ishiba**, who took over the defence portfolio last September, **appeared to be moving towards a more muscular defence policy when he conceded that, in the longer term, Japan could boost its military strength in order to reduce dependence on America for its defence.** "There is nothing like a free ride in the post-Cold War era," he said.Mr Ishiba also said earlier this year that the government would press for enactment by the Diet, Japan's parliament, of so-called crisis legislation, which would broaden the ability of the military to act in the case of a direct attack on Japan."**This is the legislation designed to prevent war . . . We must prepare so we will not b exposed to attacks,"** he said. Such legal changes are highly contentious in Japan, given memories of the suppression of civil rights before and during the Second World War.With the advent of the Cold War, America encouraged Japan to rearm. **Tokyo obliged by reinterpreting its constitution to mean that it had the right to defend itself but not to wage offensive war. North Korea's threatening behavior has given that interpretation even greater flexibility. Since Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister, the role of the Japanese military has been expanded to allow it to support its allies in overseas wars.** This started with the war against the Taliban. The legislation that supported the change was rushed through with little resistance from a public shocked by the September 11 attacks.

Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Japan is passing rearming policies and has the intent to acquire nuclear weapons

Kin 94 (Kwan Weng, Tokyo Correspondent, The Straits Times, “Tokyo ministry “has N-arms policy”, LN) CBC

**Contrary to Japan's longstanding official declaration that it would not condone the manufacture, ownership or use of nuclear weapons,** **its Foreign Ministry favours** the country **maintaining** the potential to build **nuclear arms**, according to a report by a major newspaper yesterday. The Mainichi Shimbun, one of Japan's top-selling national dailies, said the ministry's stance on nuclear arms was spelt out clearly in a top secret 1969 policy paper authored by senior officials. **The document, which spells out the framework of the country's diplomatic policy, showed that Japanese diplomats insisted on having the use of the "nuclear card" in their policy-making,** the daily said. "For the time being, we will adopt the policy of not possessing nuclear weapons. But **we will always maintain the economic and technological potential for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and at the same time take care not to allow interference by others on this issue,"** the document said. It also said the Japanese people should be taught that nuclear policies were based on calculations of international political and economic interests. The Mainichi did not reveal how the confidential document came into its hands. Senior Foreign Ministry officials, quoted by the newspaper, did not deny the existence of the secret policy paper. But they said it was "unrealistic" and "impossible" for Japan to endorse the manufacture of nuclear weapons in this day and age**. The** Mainichi **report** appears to **confirm previous suspicions of the Japanese harbouring the intent to acquire a nuclear arsenal in the future**

Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Rearmament will take the form of nuclear weapons

Bakanic 9 (Elizabeth, Board of Atomic Scientists, The Bulletin, “The end of Japan’s nuclear taboo”, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo) CBC

**Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons**. **Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been** practically **nonexistent**, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: **As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons**. And despite mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle--thus, possessing the necessary nuclear technology and expertise to develop nuclear weapons--and maintaining complicated relationships with growing and unstable neighbors such as China, Tokyo has rejected even considering nuclear weapons. More largely, this "nuclear allergy" has existed alongside a rather pacifist society that has highly constrained itself militarily and politically following World War II. Yet, **in recent years, Japan has sought to become a more "normal" country--especially involving matters of defense and diplomacy, where Tokyo is transitioning from pacifism to assertiveness**. In many ways, **the nation is** attempting **to come out from the shadow of World War II. Growing nationalism has led Japan to take less apologetic stances in regards to its** history and **neighbors-**-evidenced by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring the country's war dead, Japanese strikes on North Korean spy vessels, and continued controversies over distorted portrayals of World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Further, **Japan has shown more interest in becoming a regional leader and global player--even expanding its military capability,** often with encouragement from the United States. **And most surprisingly, the attitude toward nuclear weapons has begun to change. The attitude shift is evident in the growing prevalence and acceptance of the subject in public discourse**. **High-level Japanese officials** such as current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his predecessor Shinzo Abe **have made** several **open statements** in recent years **regarding the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, the need for deterrence in the region, and the nuclear threat presented by Japan's neighbors.** As cabinet secretary for the Koizumi administration, Fukuda stated, "**In the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the [three non-nuclear] principles is** also **possible."** During his administration, Abe commented that it wouldn't violate Japan's pacifist constitution to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In addition, **the policy chief of the Liberal Democratic party has called for "active discussions" of possible nuclear weapons development.** **Just a few years ago, breaching these subjects openly would have been unpopular and near political suicide, but the Japanese public is now less condemning. Not surprisingly then, nationalist parties that advocate for a nuclear weapons capability are gaining popularity and traction in Japanese politics.**

Japan Rearm 🡪 Nukes

Rearmament in Japan will result in nuclear weapons

Johnson 5 ( Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute “The Real China Threat” Mar 19 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html) JL

A major goal of the Americans is to gain Japan's active participation in their massively expensive missile defense program. The Bush administration is seeking, among other things, an end to Japan's ban on the export of military technology, since it wants Japanese engineers to help solve some of the technical problems of its so-far-failing Star Wars system. The United States has also been actively negotiating with Japan to relocate the US Army's 1st Corps from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Camp Zama, southwest of Tokyo in the densely populated prefecture of Kanagawa, whose capital is Yokohama. These US forces in Japan would then be placed under the command of a four-star general, who would be on a par with regional commanders such as Centcom commander John Abizaid, who lords it over Iraq and South Asia. The new command would be in charge of all US Army "force projection" operations beyond East Asia and would inevitably implicate Japan in the daily military operations of the American empire. Garrisoning even a small headquarters, much less the whole 1st Corps made up of an estimated 40,000 soldiers, in such a sophisticated and centrally located prefecture as Kanagawa is also guaranteed to generate intense public opposition as well as rapes, fights, car accidents and other incidents similar to the ones that occur daily in Okinawa. Meanwhile, Japan intends to upgrade its Defense Agency (Boeicho) into a ministry and possibly develop its own nuclear-weapons capability. Goading the Japanese government to assert itself militarily may well cause the country to go nuclear in order to "deter" China and North Korea, while freeing Japan from its dependency on the US "nuclear umbrella". Military analyst Richard Tanter notes that Japan already has "the undoubted capacity to satisfy all three core requirements for a usable nuclear weapon: a military nuclear device, a sufficiently accurate targeting system, and at least one adequate delivery system". Japan's combination of fully functioning fission and breeder reactors plus nuclear-fuel reprocessing facilities gives it the ability to build advanced thermonuclear weapons; its H-II and H-IIA rockets, in-flight refueling capacity for fighter bombers, and military-grade surveillance satellites assure that it could deliver its weapons accurately to regional targets. What it currently lacks are the platforms (such as submarines) for a secure retaliatory force in order to dissuade a nuclear adversary from launching a preemptive first strike.

Japan’s rearmament will go nuclear due to North Korea’s proliferation

Ha and Shin 6 (Yong and Beom, prof. at Internat. Relations at Seo ul Nat. Univ. and Ass. Prof. of Polt. Science at Univ. of Incheon, Strategic Studies Institute, “Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula”, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub747.pdf) CBC

In addition, **the issue of nuclear proliferation is very important in Northeast Asia.** Setting aside the two North Korean nuclear crises, **the largest two major nuclear powers—the United States and Russia—are involved deeply in this region, and China is trying to raise its nuclear capability.** **This condition may make vertical nuclear proliferation more serious in this region.** Moreover, **Japan and South Korea possess enough capability of potential nuclear armament and have a special interest in North Korea’s nuclear program.** Thus, **if North Korea becomes a nuclear power, Northeast Asia is more likely to experience serious vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Such a situation will not only cause instability in Russia’s eastern border but also give Russia the extra burden of adapting itself to the new competition for nuclear weapons.**

Japan Rearm 🡪 China War

Rearmament creates conflict between China and Japan

Japan Policy of Reasearch Institute 05 (Johnson Chalmers, March, “No Longer the "Lone" Superpower: Coming to Terms with China” http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp105.html

I recall forty years ago, when I was a new professor working in the field of Chinese and Japanese international relations, that Edwin O. Reischauer once commented, "The great payoff from our victory of 1945 was a permanently disarmed Japan." Born in Japan and a Japanese historian at Harvard, Reischauer served as American ambassador to Tokyo in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Strange to say, since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W. Bush, the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japanese rearmament. Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the two superpowers of East Asia, sabotages possible peaceful solutions in those two problem areas, Taiwan and North Korea, left over from the Chinese and Korean civil wars, and lays the foundation for a possible future Sino-American conflict that the United States would almost surely lose. It is unclear whether the ideologues and war lovers of Washington understand what they are unleashing -- a possible confrontation between the world's fastest growing industrial economy, China, and the world's second most productive, albeit declining, economy, Japan, one which the United States would have both caused and in which it might well be consumed.

Japan rearmament spurs major war with the US and China

Johnson 5 ( Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, “The Real China Threat” Mar 19 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html) JL

I recall 40 years ago, when I was a new professor working in the field of Chinese and Japanese international relations, that Edwin O Reischauer once commented, "The great payoff from our victory of 1945 was a permanently disarmed Japan." Born in Japan and a Japanese historian at Harvard, Reischauer served as US ambassador to Tokyo in the administrations of presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Strange to say, since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W Bush, the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japanese rearmament. Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the two superpowers of East Asia, sabotages possible peaceful solutions in those two problem areas, Taiwan and North Korea, left over from the Chinese and Korean civil wars, and lays the foundation for a possible future Sino-American conflict that the United States would almost surely lose. It is unclear whether the ideologues and war lovers of Washington understand what they are unleashing - a possible confrontation between the world's fastest-growing industrial economy, China, and the world's second-most-productive, albeit declining, economy, Japan; a confrontation that the United States would have caused and in which it might well be consumed. Let me make clear that in East Asia we are not talking about a little regime-change war of the sort that Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney advocate. After all, the most salient characteristic of international relations during the last century was the inability of the rich, established powers - Great Britain and the United States - to adjust peacefully to the emergence of new centers of power in Germany, Japan and Russia. The result was two exceedingly bloody World Wars, a 45-year-long Cold War between Russia and the "West", and innumerable wars of national liberation (such as the quarter-century-long one in Vietnam) against the arrogance and racism of European, US and Japanese imperialism and colonialism. The major question for the 21st century is whether this fateful inability to adjust to changes in the global power structure can be overcome. Thus far the signs are negative. Can the United States and Japan, today's versions of rich, established powers, adjust to the re-emergence of China - the world's oldest continuously extant civilization - this time as a modern superpower? Or is China's ascendancy to be marked by yet another world war, when the pretensions of European civilization in its US and Japanese projections are finally put to rest? That is what is at stake

Japan Rearm 🡪 China Modernization

**Rearmament in Japan prompts China modernization and could trigger tensions**

Feng 10 (Zhu, research fellow for Center for Peace and Development in China, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” ,May 10 http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia

Japan’s international behavior and calculations, meanwhile, have been premised on a strong U.S.-Japan security alliance. In return, domestic political dynamics have done little to modify Japan’s geostrategic perspective. In the short and medium term, maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance is important mainly due to the China factor. Nevertheless, in the long run, it remains unclear if the comprehensive improvement of the PLA’s power capability both in quantity and quality will eventually undermine Japan’s confidence, shake up alliance politics, and prompt Tokyo to embark on a significant rearming process. Reinforcing Japan’s military commitment to its alliance with the United States would be one way of addressing the growing China concern. On the other hand, a rejuvenated nationalism in Tokyo could push the country into assuming a more independent role in security. In either case, China might be less motivated to slow down its pace of military modernization. The major powers in East Asia might increase their struggle for geopolitical gain in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and perhaps the entire East Asian region. Thus, a looming great-power rivalry will overshadow the region.

Japan Rearm 🡪 Conflict

Japanese rearmament bad-spills over to other countries causing nuclear conflict

Varner 9 (Sean, Grad. Fellow C.F.V.A.V.A.G.C.C., The Center for Vision & Values at Grove City College, “A Nuclear Japan?”, http://www.visandvals.org/A\_Nuclear\_Japan.php) CBC

Tokyo justifiably feels threatened by Pyongyang and Beijing. At the same time, it is almost completely dependent on Washington for deterrence. **Japanese officials stated** to the Strategic Posture Commission **that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was dependent on its “specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk.” Japan was greatly concerned when** **President Bush cut nuclear warheads to 2,200. If President Obama cuts warheads to below 1,700, and without consulting Tokyo, as outlined by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START agreement), Japanese officials may perceive the U.S. "extended deterrent" to be insincere and unreliable. And what if Japan decided to go nuclear?** The **consequences would be far-reaching:** First, **it would be a major blow to the NPT**. **Japan has served as the epitome of nonproliferation and, as the only victim of nuclear attack, carried a moral authority in its calls for nuclear disarmament. Without that voice, the NPT becomes a largely meritless system of haves and have-nots. Second, a nuclear arms race would seem almost inevitable. Not only would China and North Korea respond by ramping up capabilities, but South Korea and Taiwan might be compelled to go nuclear as well. The spillover effects would likely ratchet up the arms race between India and Pakistan, too.**

Japanese rearmament bad-leads to an escalation of conflict

DiFilippo 2 (Prof. of sociology at Lincoln University, East Gate Publishing, “The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement”, Google Books) CBC

Because of its militaristic and imperialist past. **Japan has to worry about much more than just verbal criticism front its East Asian neighbors. Japan's past still raises too many unpleasant memories throughout the region.** **Just the appearance of Japan's independent rearmament would send shock waves throughout parts of Asia**. Indeed, **if either Beijing or Pyongyang believed that Japan was fully pursing independent military capability, existing regional tensions and problems would escalate very quickly**. Right now, **any movement by Japan to increase the sophistication of its military sends shock waves through East Asia and precipitates tension**. **When the Japanese government approved the V25 Billion ($220 billion plus) five-year defense plan in December 2000, Beijing and Pyongyang quickly became alarmed**, as 90 billion of this had been earmarked for four in-flight refueling plane, These planes will extend Japanese military caps.

**Rearmament leads to global conflict**

Halperin 2000 (Morton, Director of Policy Planning at State Department, “The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance”, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/Halperin-US-Japan.pdf) CBC

However, **any realistic appraisal of nuclear dangers would suggest that neither rogue states/terrorist groups nor a deliberate Russian attack is the right focus if the goal of U.S. national security policy is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world**. The most immediate danger is that India and Pakistan will stumble into a nuclear war following their nuclear tests and their apparent determination to deploy nuclear forces. A second danger will continue to be that Russian missiles will be fired on the United States by accident or as a result of unauthorized action. **Over the longer run, these threats will be eclipsed by the danger that the non-proliferation regime will collapse and other states will develop nuclear weapons. A terrorist threat should**, in my view, **become a matter of serious concern only if there is much wider dispersal of nuclear weapons among states stemming from an open collapse of the nonproliferation regime.**

Japan Rearm 🡪 Instability

Japan rearming leads to an arm race that spurs instability worldwide

MSNBC 6 (staff writer, “N. Korea nuke test fans fears of Asian arms race”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15192696/) CBC

**The specter of an Asian atomic arms race loomed over the region** Monday **after** communist **North Korea shocked its neighbors by announcing it conducted its first-ever nuclear test**. **Raising the nuclear stakes from Pyongyang to Tokyo would put some of the world’s biggest cities in the shadow of atomic weapons. It might also put nuclear arms in the hands of previously reluctant powers like South Korea or Taiwan. On a wider scale, North Korea’s dabbling with atomic weapons** could **spur other nuclear powers, including the United States, India or China, to resume their own nuclear testing, a move that raises** the risk of **proliferation.** “If the test was true, **it will severely endanger not only Northeast Asia but also the world stability**,” Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said. **Officials from Washington to Seoul had warned of an arms race even before North Korea said it fulfilled its threat to join the elite club of nuclear powers South Korea fears Japan would be the first to go nuclear, triggering countermoves by suspicious Asian neighbors in a cascade that upends regional security.** **“There’s no equalizer like the bomb**,” said Peter Beck, head of the Seoul office of the International Crisis Group think tank. “It’s safe to say **it will lead to an arms race — will push all the governments in the region to increase defense spending.”**

Japan rearmament destabilizes the region

Henderson 9 (Bruce, writer for *And Still I Persist*, “Assessing the North Korean Threat” July 10, http://newledger.com/2009/07/assessing-the-north-korean-threat/) JL

The most important threat that North Korea represents is its ability to destabilize east Asia, particularly in the effect their militant displays have on the true regional power (and sleeping giant), Japan. Since the end of World War II, the United States has spent billions of dollars to maintain a presence in the region, in part to convince Japan that as long as Uncle Sam is guarding the door, they can maintain the pacifist veneer that has kept the most successful martial culture of the region in check for over 60 years. In a move that is dangerous for everyone, Japan is beginning to re-examine the benefits and risks or outsourcing their national defense, in part driven by our tepid response to Korea and Chinese expansion. The United States cannot afford to have Japan re-arm itself or worse yet become a regional nuclear power. Neither China and Korea have forgotten that tiny Japan has successfully conquered and occupied both countries multiple times over the last 1,000 years. The time for action is at hand; something must be done to contain and dismantle the North Korean regime before it can further degrade the future of the region. Sadly this would take a much more aggressive foreign policy stance than is likely from the inwardly focused Obama administration, and it would require a joint effort with China, which we are in no position to request and they are in no mood to grant. Expect this situation to continue to fester, with this region of the world slowly becoming a much more dangerous place.

Japan Rearm 🡪 Instability

Japan will rearm as a result of proliferation resulting in instability

Ha and Shin 6 (Yong and Beom, prof. at Internat. Relations at Seo ul Nat. Univ. and Ass. Prof. of Polt. Science at Univ. of Incheon, Strategic Studies Institute, “Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula”, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub747.pdf) CBC

In addition, **the issue of nuclear proliferation is very important in Northeast Asia.** Setting aside the two North Korean nuclear crises, **the largest two major nuclear powers—the United States and Russia—are involved deeply in this region, and China is trying to raise its nuclear capability.** **This condition may make vertical nuclear proliferation more serious in this region.** Moreover, **Japan and South Korea possess enough capability of potential nuclear armament and have a special interest in North Korea’s nuclear program.** Thus, **if North Korea becomes a nuclear power, Northeast Asia is more likely to experience serious vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Such a situation will not only cause instability in Russia’s eastern border but also give Russia the extra burden of adapting itself to the new competition for nuclear weapons.**

Japan Rearm violates NPT

Japanese rearmament violates the NPT

Turquet 06 (Olivier, interview with Angelo Baracca, Professor of Physics at the University of Florence and studied the problems of nuclear weapons and international relations, Against Nuclear Rearmament, http://www.europeforpeace.eu/en/149\_against-nuclear-rearmament)

What happened to the non-proliferation treaty? Unfortunately the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has never managed in the slightest to fulfil the function it was conceived for. It was substantially a compromise between non-nuclear states, which renounced the possession of nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment by the nuclear states, under the terms of Article VI, to “negotiate in good faith to find effective measures to end the nuclear arms race as soon as possible; and for nuclear disarmament, including a Treaty for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. The NPT has only apparently, and partially, limited proliferation; bearing in mind that apart from those countries which have recently acquired the bomb ( Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, North Korea) many others possess the materials and the scientific and technological know-how to build advanced nuclear weapons immediately. In the first place, but not alone, are Japan, Germany and Brazil. The IAEA recognises that at least 44 states now have the know-how to develop nuclear weapons, even if many cannot do this immediately. Today Washington is doing its best to keep the NPT in mothballs. It is scandalous that it has solemnly and officially recognised the nuclear status of India outside the framework of the NPT - which India has not ratified – by means of the nuclear partnership underwritten by Bush a few months ago. This was clearly aimed against China. It would also have done the same with Pakistan if its regime was not so untrustworthy. Even more scandalous was its support for the not very well hidden militarist, nuclear aspirations of Tokyo, which already possesses at least 40 tons of plutonium, and has just inaugurated a new reprocessing plant which will produce 8 tons of it every year. Today the gravest military risks weighing on humanity are those produced by a vicious circle involving the refusal of nuclear disarmament, the determination to use such arms, the incontrollable nuclear proliferation at a world level and research for new types of weapons. The only solution lies in the resumption of the movement for nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of these weapons, under international control.

Japan Rearm violates NPT

If Japan violated the NPT, by rearming, it would become a slipperys slope

The Global 6 (Debate blog, http://debate.uvm.edu/debateblog/doctortuna/Blog2006/Entries/2006/11/24\_THIRD\_NORTHEAST\_ASIAN\_OPEN\_IN\_KOREA\_IS\_HELD.html)

In the beginning of the grand final round on the motion ¡°THBT Japan should build nuclear weapons, both teams showed equally matched debating skills. Tokyo offered a complicated chain of argument, suggesting that the current nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) had failed to stop proliferation and suggesting, as an alternative, a revised NPT allowing nuclear weapons if certain safeguards were met. This, they said, would allow Japan, with its peace constitution and high level of safety technology, to set a good example for the world and develop a few carefully-monitored defensive weapons without provoking a regional arms race. The opposition countered by citing regional tensions over Japan’s militaristic history and by opposing relaxation of current NPT regulations as the beginning of a slippery slope toward rearmament both in and outside Japan.

\*\*\*AT: US-Japan Relations Advantage\*\*\*

Presence K2 Alliance

Military bases key to alliance – Kan is on board

Green 10 (Michael, Sr. at the CSIS, “Mr. Kan Can Fix U.S.-Japan Ties”, June 13 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html) JL

 To say the United States-Japan alliance has been strained under the Democratic Party of Japan's leadership is an understatement. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama opened his term in September with promises to counterbalance American influence through a closed "East Asia Community" and sowed doubt about Japan's commitment to America's forward presence in Asia by blocking implementation of a plan to build a new air base to replace a Marine Corps facility on Okinawa. He threw the policy-making process into chaos with an antibureaucracy campaign that had inexperienced ministers doing the work of clerks and a collection of playwrights and television pundits in the Prime Minister's Office trying to decide security policy. Worst of all, Mr. Hatoyama let then DPJ Secretary-general Ichiro Ozawa reverse key government decisions based on the wishes of the DPJ's anti-alliance and antimarket coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the People's New Party. Mr. Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, has virtually no track record on foreign- and security-policy, but he appears keen to fix these mistakes. In his first week, he called the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; pledged to follow through on building the replacement for the Futenma air base; cancelled a trip to the Shanghai Expo so that he can meet President Obama before going to China; and presented plans at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade-ministers' summit for a Pacific free-trade area that includes the U.S. Even more encouraging, Mr. Kan has weakened the influence of Mr. Ozawa and shifted the party's center of gravity toward national-security realists associated with Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara. These are all positive signs, yet some American pundits still charge that the Obama administration undercut Mr. Hatoyama and will now reap the vengeance of the Japanese people. Not quite: Washington exhibited as much "strategic patience" with the DPJ government as it could without jeopardizing the prospects for finding a realistic alternative to the troop realignments on Okinawa. Across the board, the Japanese media have put the blame for the deteriorating bilateral relationship squarely on the Hatoyama government. Meanwhile, public opinion polls about the alliance and the U.S. held steady while Mr. Hatoyama's support collapsed to less than 20%. The greater problem now is that the Obama administration might breathe a sigh of relief at Mr. Kan's rise to power and slip into complacent auto-pilot mode on bilateral relations. The last nine months have been hard on a White House overwhelmed by foreign policy challenges from Afghanistan to Iran. In the former Bush administration National Security Council, where I served, there was one high level strategy session on Japan relations early on and after that coordination with Tokyo fell smoothly to officials who understood the joint strategy and had confidence in shared values and interests with Japan. The Obama National Security Council has apparently had numerous high-level sessions struggling to keep the alliance relationship with Japan on track. Now that things appear to have stabilized, Japan fatigue in Washington is a real danger. This is not the time for the U.S. to ratchet down attention to the alliance. While Washington has been playing defense with Tokyo for the past nine months, Beijing has been on the move in the East and South China seas and Kim Jong Il has shown what he thinks of deterrence on the Korean peninsula now that he has nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang's sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan has once again focused attention on security issues in North Asia. The U.S. and Japan need to build a new strategy for preventing further erosion of the strategic equilibrium in the Pacific. Tokyo is preparing a midterm defense plan with an initial advisory board panel report due in a few months. The panel is now likely to advise strengthened security cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded states in Asia. The Obama administration should synchronize its Asia strategy with this effort so that President Obama's visit to Japan in November on the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty provides clear future vision for the alliance. Key elements should include strengthening bilateral roles and missions for defense of the maritime commons; coordinating support for democratic norms and sustainable development in Asia; and working for a bilateral U.S.-Japan economic partnership agreement and trade liberalization in the region. Both governments will also need a strategy to rebuild support in Okinawa for the air base replacement facility. Mr. Hatoyama's flip-flopping and populism have left Mr. Kan with a real political mess on the island. In the worst-case scenario, an antibase candidate could capitalize on mounting frustration with Tokyo to win the gubernatorial election in November. Mr. Kan would then have to abandon his pledge to Washington on base realignment or pass legislation in the Diet overruling the governor. The damage to Mr. Kan and the alliance would be bad either way. Things are looking better for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Mr. Kan has taken important steps to remove uncertainty about Japan's foreign policy trajectory under the DPJ. Now the rest of Asia—friends and foes alike—will be watching to see if the Obama administration has a strategy with Japan that goes beyond defense of the status quo.

Presence good- F-22 Airpower

US bases in Japan are needed for F-22 deployment-this is the lynchpin of US airpower

Axe in 10 (David, independent military correspondent based in South Carolina, The Diplomat, Why Allies Need US Base, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/)

The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawa’s most important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air. F-22s flying from Okinawa could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to Kadena. ‘There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems,’ Tolliver says. ‘What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities…and we need to roll back those integrated air defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces.’ The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’

Presence Popular

Japan fears North Korea and wants to preserve US presence

Fackler 10 (Martin, Staff Writer, The New York Times, “Japan’s Premier Will Quit as Approval Plummets”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02japan.html?\_r=1) MAT

Prime Minister [Yukio Hatoyama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/yukio_hatoyama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) of [Japan](http://www.nytimes.com/info/japan/?inline=nyt-geo), who swept into power last year with bold promises to revamp the country, then faltered over broken campaign pledges to remove an American base from Okinawa, announced Wednesday that he would step down. Mr. Hatoyama took power with vows to challenge the bureaucracy’s grip on postwar governing and revive Japan’s economy. Instead, his inexperienced government appeared to become consumed by the issue of the Okinawa base and a series of investigations into the political financing of Mr. Hatoyama and his backer in the party, Ichiro Ozawa. The contention over the American base, which dragged on for months, was emblematic of Mr. Hatoyama’s inability to make up his mind, or follow through on ambitious campaign promises. He was critic of American-style globalization, and talked of transforming Japan’s public works-driven politics into something closer to a European-style social welfare state. During the election campaign, he had drawn attention by pledging to end Japan’s postwar dependence on the United States, and to build closer ties with China and the rest of Asia. His vow to build a more equal partnership with Washington was symbolized by his pledge to move the United States Marine Air Station Futenma and its noisy helicopters off Okinawa, or out of Japan altogether. In the end, it was the base, and a prolonged dispute with Washington, that proved Mr. Hatoyama’s undoing. Japan’s public did not support altering the military alliance with the United States at a time when neighboring North Korea was testing nuclear weapons, and an increasingly assertive China was sending warships on training exercises near Japanese islands.

\*\*\*AT: Hegemony Advantage\*\*\*

Japan Doesn’t Fund Bases

Bases are funded by the US, Japanese aid is artificial

Meyer 10 (Carlton, “Outdated US Military Bases in Japan” June 28, author of G2mil former Marine Corps officer, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm) JL

The irony is that closing or downsizing some of these bases would save the USA millions of dollars a year and shift thousands of jobs to the U.S. economy. However, many powerful Japanese and American corporations support the status quo from which they profit. They work with American Generals and Admirals to argue that Japan helps defray the cost of U.S. bases in Japan by paying for some utilities and the salaries of some Japanese workers. In reality, Japan never pays one cent to the U.S. military, and most of the claimed contributions are artificial. For example, goods imported for sale at U.S. military stores are not taxed by the Japanese government, so this is counted as a financial contribution. Another major "contribution" is rent paid to Japanese landowners. Cost sharing contributions have been reduced in recent years, and further cuts have been promised to prod the American military to reduce its presence. Maintaining 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan requires millions of dollars each year to rotate GIs for three-year tours, which includes shipping their children, pets, and household goods. In addition, mainland Japan is an unpopular duty station because of cold weather, high costs, and polite yet unfriendly locals. Since housing costs for military families and American civilian employees are twice that of the USA, the U.S. military also spends millions of dollars for additional housing costs and "locality" pay.

Burden Sharing Impossible

Attempts at equal burden-sharing fail

Schoff 7 (James L., Dir of Asia-Pacific Studies at IFPA, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, “Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance”, 31(1), p. 88-90, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CBsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffletcher.tufts.edu%2Fforum%2Farchives%2Fpdfs%2F31-1pdfs%2FSchoff.pdf&ei=jLsrTIqQHI6gnwfKuN29CQ&usg=AFQjCNGhHsYF7nyCDlTdTz37PyU8J\_WeHw&sig2=bYhGEkWPTX8AePrwFAscrQ) MAT

Generally speaking, the result of each ﬂurry of dialogue often failed to meet the initial optimistic expectations of U.S. policymakers. This was certainly true after the 1990s episode, as the ink had barely dried on Japanese implementing legislation, when incoming U.S. officials emphasized that “The Defense Guidelines are the floor, not the ceiling, for determining U.S. and Japanese roles and missions.”5 In 2004, expectations were even higher. The United States was in the process of transforming and repositioning its forces around the world, which coincided with Japan’s development of a new blueprint for its defense infrastructure, the “National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), FY 2005.” More specifically, diplomats and defense planners from both countries saw opportunities to increase the SDF’s legal and physical ability to carry out a wider range of regional and international non-combat missions (e.g., minesweeping, search and rescue, supply and logistics, and peacekeeping) for the purposes of promoting not only Japan’s security, but also broader economic and political stability, human rights protections, and democratic development. In addition, it was believed that closer bilateral planning, command, and operational relationships were needed to enhance effectiveness and to elevate Japan’s role to that of a more equal or “normal” security partner. Based on this broad understanding, the strategic dialogue proceeded relatively smoothly (though slowly) at ﬁrst, culminating in the announcement of a set of common strategic objectives at a high-level bilateral meeting on February 19, 2005.9 The apparent initial success of the strategic dialogue led many U.S. ofﬁcials to believe that this round of talks was a new beginning for a more equal security relationship and that Japan was looking to become a partner in a wider range of non-offensive military activities. The dialogue moved forward to discuss roles and missions, but that conversation revealed a number of underlying misperceptions, mostly caused by an unresolved debate in Japan that would make it difﬁcult to achieve quickly the promise of the strategic dialogue. The strong desire by the U.S. side to move quickly made it difﬁcult to reconcile these differences before the framework for transformation was outlined.

Presence K2 Hegemony

US bases in Japan are key to US hegemony.

Hughes in 9 (Christopher, Research associate at Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan’s Remilitarisation)pl

Japan’s continuing remilitarisation has important ramifications for international security. The use here of the term ‘remilitarisation’ should not be read as an alarmist warning that Japan is necessarily intent on reverting to the kind of state it became between 1931 and 1945. Japan remains a constrained military actor, reluctant to pursue the full potential panoply of national military capabilities, limited by its junior alliance relationship with the US and its strong residual antimilitaristic sentiment. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that Japan, judged by the objective international yardstick of the key indicators of remilitarisation, which in turn are Japan’s own benchmarks, is set upon a long-term trajectory that will see it assuming a more assertive regional and global security role. Japan can certainly in no way be said to be demilitarising or to have reached stasis in its security policy. All the longterm indications point to activism and expansion in its military capabilities and international commitments. Such expansion clearly affects the East Asian power balance; indeed, in some respects Japan is engaged in a low-key arms race with China, and is hedging its nuclear stance vis-à-vis North Korea. Japan’s attempts to enhance security ties with Australia, South Korea and India also impact upon the regional security landscape. Just as crucial, though, is Japan’s approach to its alliance with the US. Japan’s increasing support for, and participation in, US regional power projection holds the key to Washington’s attempts to deter a nuclearising North Korea and a rising China. Similarly, the expanding functional and geographical scope of US–Japan alliance cooperation increasingly holds the key to efforts by US administrations to maintain their state’s global military hegemony. This logic is likely to induce Obama’s administration and its Japanese counterparts to keep pushing ever outwards the envelope of bilateral military cooperation.

Withdrawal from Japan collapses U.S. hegemony.

Morley in 9 (Robert, writer for The Trumpet, Trumpet, Japan's Reorientation, http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=6592.0.119.0)pl

Hatoyama has authorized a wide-ranging review of the U.S. military presence on Japanese soil. He is reexamining the agreement that permits U.S. warships to dock at Japanese ports and has said Japan should reassess why it is spending billions to house and transfer U.S. troops between its islands. Hatoyama has also moved to quickly end Japan’s fueling support for the U.S. naval anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The day Hatoyama assumed office, U.S. and Japanese officials confirmed that discussions were underway to remove all U.S. fighter aircraft from Japan. These dramatic moves are triggering alarm bells in Washington. The Australian reported the U.S. administration has requested “immediate clarifying discussions” on just how far Japan wants to take the disengagement. But America may not be able to do much if Japan is intent on reducing its presence there. Regarding the two nations’ security relationship, Richard Armitage, former U.S. deputy secretary of state, said: “If the government of Japan asked us to change things, we’d argue, we’d kick and scream, but ultimately we’d have to do it.” Japan is a major platform for American power projection. It is America’s most important forward base in the Pacific. It is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which American task forces can operate to secure the flow of trade and resources across the Pacific. Losing it would be devastating to U.S. security. At a time when China is increasingly challenging American authority in the East and South China Sea, when North Korea is brandishing nuclear weapons, when Islamic terrorism is on the upswing in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, America can ill afford to lose Japanese military and logistical support. But it is losing it.

\*\*\*AT: Politics Advantage\*\*\*

Kan Has Pocap

Kan has political capital

MSNBC 6/18 (Tobias Harris, 2010, “Yes He Kan?” http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/18/yes-he-kan.html) JL

With the election of Naoto Kan, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has achieved a miracle. Following the resignations of embattled Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and scandal-tainted secretary-general Ichiro Ozawa, the public has returned to the party that won a majority of historic proportions less than a year ago. According to Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun, the new government boasts a 60 percent approval rating, compared with 17 percent for the Hatoyama government in May. The Yomiuri Shimbun, another daily, found that government support among independent voters—by far the most important bloc—swelled from 9 to 52 percent. More significantly, the DPJ’s chances of winning a majority in upper-house elections in July have improved dramatically. The lesson is that the public has by no means lost faith in the DPJ as an agent of political change. If anything, low public approval reflected the idea that Hatoyama and Ozawa were insufficiently distinct from LDP rule and its pathologies. Kan does not suffer from that problem. Having begun his career as a member of a small center-left party and earned a reputation as a crusader for clean government and participatory democracy, Kan will enable the DPJ to reclaim the platform that first brought it to power: the creation of a transparent government that answers to the public’s fears about Japan’s economic future.

\*\*\*AT: Spending Advantage\*\*\*

Non Unique- Econ Good

Japan’s econ high now—manufacturing sector

Nielsen 09 (Flemming J., Japan: Resilient consumer despite weak labour market, http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/economic-indicators/japan-resilient-consumer-300709/2009-07-30.html)

Another batch of economic data was released overnight. JMMA manufacturing PMI increased less than we expected. In light of industrial production growing at record pace in April and May and very strong export volumes we expected manufacturing PMI to have finally jumped above 50 in June. This did not happen, but both the current output component and new export orders jumped above 50 in June.

The details in the manufacturing PMI remain very strong. The finished goods inventory declined to its lowest level ever since the survey started in 2001 and the new order inventory balance continues to improve, suggesting the current strong momentum in industrial activity will be maintained in coming months (see chart next page). Despite the modest increase in PMI in June in Japan, the overall picture in manufacturing PMIs is that the Japanese economy is currently rebounding faster than Euroland and the US. Today’s labour market report confirmed that the labour market continues to deteriorate. In line with expectation the unemployment rate in May increased to 5.2% from 5.0% (see chart on next page) and according to our calculations seasonally adjusted employment decreased 0.6% m/m.

The biggest surprise in today’s numbers was the 0.3% y/y (Consensus: -1.5% y/y) increase in household spending. In line with other recent data it suggests that private consumption has stabilised and possible even recovered slightly despite the continued deterioration in the labour market. The main reason is probably the positive impact from tax cuts currently being implemented as part of Japan’s fiscal stimulus. Hence, questions of sustainability remain as the weak labour market might ultimately gain the upper hand when the impact from tax cuts wanes.

Non Unique- Econ Bad

Non unique- the Japanese economy is already in a recession

Fackler 08 (Martin, New York Times Staff Writer, Japanese economy enters recession, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/worldbusiness/17iht-yen2.1.17879012.html)

Japan, the world's second-largest economy, has officially slipped into recession, hurt by weak export growth and steep cuts in corporate spending amid the worsening global slowdown, the Japanese government said Monday, as economists warned of more problems ahead. The Japanese gross domestic product shrank at an annual rate of 0.4 percent from July to September after declining a revised 3.7 percent in the previous quarter, the government said. It was the first time since 2001 that Japanese economy has contracted for two quarters, the most common definition of a recession. The results were worse than expected by many economists, who had predicted the $5 trillion economy would narrowly avert a recession by posting slight growth. "Downside risks to the economy are growing further," Kaoru Yosano, the Japanese economic minister, told reporters. "Japan is in a very serious situation." Economists say the worst is yet come, in Japan and abroad. The results Monday do not include most of the global financial panic this autumn, which sent Tokyo stock markets to 26-year lows. Economists said they expect Japan to suffer an even severer contraction in the current quarter, ending in December, as spooked American consumers and businesses cut back even further on spending. The weakness is also expected to feed into the Japanese domestic economy, economists said, as declining exports hurt corporate profits, pushing many smaller companies into bankruptcy. This could lead to more cuts in corporate spending as well as declining wages and rising unemployment, further undermining the already sluggish domestic economy. "The really dark period hasn't even reached us yet," said Hideo Kumano, chief economist for Tokyo-based Dai-Ichi Life Research Institute. "The stock declines are going to have a freezing effect. The end-of-year retail sales season will be miserable." Kumano and other economists predicted the downturn will keep worsening until about the middle of next year. That is when economists expect the benefits from government spending packages in Japan and its biggest export markets, China and the United States, to revive economic activity. Economists said the decline would likely increase calls for Tokyo to take additional steps to stimulate growth, beyond the $70 billion in stimulus already pledged. But few economists said they expected more action as politicians gird for national elections that must be held before next September. The Bank of Japan, the central bank, also moved last month to help the economy by cutting overnight lending rates to 0.3 percent. Some economists said a true recovery will take another year at least, as the United States fixes deep structural problems in its housing market and banking system. Takahide Kiuchi, senior economist at Nomura Securities in Tokyo, said he expects the downturn to last until late 2010, with some respite next year from stimulus measures. "This will be a long but uncomplicated downturn for Japan," Kiuchi said. "Japan will take a hit on exports, but it has no big structural problems to fix, unlike the United States." That would make it one of the longest economic contractions here since World War Two. Even during the so-called Lost Decade in the 1990s, the Japanese economy seesawed between short recessions and stretches of anemic growth. The downturn's severity is underscored by numerous other signs of mounting distress in the economy. Data last week showed that corporate bankruptcies rose 13.4 percent in October from a year before, while machine tool orders plunged 40.4 percent in the same month. Rent prices in new commercial buildings in Tokyo also declined in October for the first time in six years. Until now, Japan has stood apart from most other developed nations because its banks were relatively unscathed by the financial crisis, which saddled financial institutions and investors in Europe and the United States with risky housing debt. But the data Monday showed that the U.S. economic woes reached Japan through its exports, as American consumers and companies spent less on Japanese vehicles, televisions and machine tools. Japan is particularly sensitive to these swings in the United States, the world's largest economy, because the Japanese economy has been largely dependent on sales abroad for growth. Domestic consumption has remained weak in this rapidly aging society, keeping the overall economic growth rates low even during its long expansion that extended from 2002 until this year. Faltering overseas demand and higher imported energy prices reduced economic growth in Japan by 0.2 percentage points in the July-September quarter. In apparent anticipation of declining exports, Japanese companies cut spending on new factories and machinery by 1.7 percent from the previous quarter, its third straight decline. Household consumption, which reflects consumer behavior, rose 0.3 percent from the previous quarter. The decline adds to the increasingly grim outlook for the global economy, after Hong Kong and the European Union released data Friday that showed their economies were in recession. The largest European economy, Germany, also announced separately last week that it was in recession. The United States may soon follow, after Washington said last month that the American economy contracted in the July to September quarter. Still, economists said they expect the Japanese recession to be milder than in the United States, reflecting the fact that the Japanese financial system and housing markets so far appear healthy. The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has forecast the Japanese economy will shrink by 0.1 percent next year, versus declines of 0.9 percent in the United States and 0.5 percent in the European Union. The OECD, an association of democratic nations, also predicted that the combined economies of its 30 member nations would contract by 0.3 percent next year before rebounding to growth in 2010.

Non Unique- Econ Bad

Japan’s economy low now- Hashimoto’s tax raises

Ito 6/30 (Aki, Staff Writer for Bloomberg, Kan May Face Ghost of Hashimoto as Japan's Economy Weakens Before Tax Rise, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-30/kan-may-face-ghost-of-hashimoto-as-japan-s-economy-weakens-before-tax-rise.html)

Japan’s slowing recovery from its worst postwar recession is signaling the world’s second-biggest economy may be too weak to sustain the higher consumption taxes under consideration by Prime Minister [Naoto Kan](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Naoto%20Kan&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja). Reports this week showed the [jobless rate](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=JNUE:IND) reached a five- month high in May, and wages, factory output and household spending fell, showing little sign of revival in domestic demand more than a year after the economy stopped shrinking. A gain in the Tankan business-sentiment index today reflects a post- recession rebound in manufacturers’ earnings led by exports. The risk is that without an end to [deflation](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=JNCPIXFF:IND) and rebound in spending, the economy won’t be able to withstand the higher levy Kan plans in as soon as two years. Kan, facing midterm elections July 11, is in danger of repeating the error of his late predecessor [Ryutaro Hashimoto](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Ryutaro%20Hashimoto&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), whose 1997 tax rise helped cause a recession, according to Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co. “Hashimoto raised taxes as soon as he thought the economy had gained back just a bit of its health, and that ended up sinking the Japanese economy into a bottomless abyss,” said [Akio Makabe](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Akio%20Makabe&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), an economics professor at Shinshu University in Matsumoto, central Japan, who has written books on behavioral finance. “If the government doesn’t get its priorities straight, we’ll see another 1997.” Evidence of a weakening rebound has contributed to a sell- off in Japan’s equities, with the [Nikkei 225 Stock Average](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=NKY:IND) losing 6.8 percent in the past two weeks, to 9,382.64 at yesterday’s close in Tokyo. Eroding Support Kan is also feeling the impact, with eroding public support before the vote for the upper house of parliament. His approval rating fell to 50 percent last week, 18 percentage points lower than when he took office last month, a Nikkei newspaper poll showed June 26. The poll was taken on June 24-25, days after the premier said he would consider an increase in the sales tax to 10 percent from the current 5 percent. Tax changes will be unveiled “soon,” the government said in a medium-term fiscal strategy June 22. The administration also pledged to balance the budget by fiscal 2020 and cap public spending for the next three years. Policy makers need to implement a pro-growth overhaul of business regulations and prod the Bank of Japan to stimulate credit expansion before considering a tax increase, according to Morgan Stanley and Barclays Capital. “More aggressive monetary and regulatory policies are needed in Japan if 1997-style economic consequences of fiscal retrenchment are to be avoided,” Morgan Stanley economists led by [Robert Feldman](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Robert%20Feldman&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), who previously worked at the U.S. Federal Reserve, wrote in a report yesterday. Setting the Goal “Strengthening the economy is the goal here -- fiscal rehabilitation is only a result of that,” said [Kyohei Morita](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Kyohei%20Morita&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), chief economist at Barclays Capital in Tokyo. He also advocates cutting corporate taxes, a move Kan is also considering. [Koji Miyahara](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Koji%20Miyahara&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), president of the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and chairman of [Nippon Yusen K.K.](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=9101:JP), said last month that the country’s companies need a corporate tax cut to continue competing in the global economy. The government should “offset the loss” of revenue from the corporate tax cut by increasing the sales tax, he said. Sales taxes can be an effective way of raising revenue in developed economies, according to the International Monetary Fund. More than half of gross domestic product typically comes from consumer spending in the developed world. Fighting Deflation Higher sales taxes, introduced gradually, could help the economy by spurring inflation expectations, according to [Masamichi Adachi](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Masamichi%20Adachi&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1&partialfields=-wnnis:NOAVSYND&lr=-lang_ja), an economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. in Tokyo. An annual 1 percentage point increase from next year, eventually reaching a 20 percent level, would minimize the impact on consumer spending, he said. “When people get used to the fact that the consumption tax rises a percentage point every year, they’ll begin to assume that prices will keep rising,” Adachi said. “That way, deflationary expectations will turn into inflationary ones.” In 1997, Hashimoto boosted the consumption levy by 2 percentage points, an increase followed by a recession that led to his resignation. Kan, 63, has said he’s considering the opposition Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal to double it to 10 percent, and called for cross-party talks on the issue. Japan’s dilemma is echoed around the world in developed nations with swelling public debt loads and historically high unemployment. U.K., U.S. The U.K. plans to boost its value-added tax to 20 percent from 17.5 percent in January. Spain is raising its main VAT rate in July to 18 percent from 16 percent. By contrast, American officials have warned that policies need to sustain a recovery in domestic demand. Morgan Stanley analysts, who weren’t immediately available to respond to questions, said Japan’s economy is in worse shape than 1997, when the jobless rate was around 3.3 percent compared with 5.2 percent now. Deflation is more entrenched, with consumer prices slumping 1.2 percent in May, more than the 0.5 percent drop on the eve of the tax increase 13 years ago. “Vulnerability to premature tightening is high,” the bank’s economists said.

Japan Spending K2 Econ

Japan's increased spending benefits the global economy.

Moffett and Hayashi in 6 (Sebastian and Yuka, Contributors to Wall Street Journal, The Wall Street Journal, Japan's spending boom confers global benefits, )pl

Soichiro Takaoka, flush with cash from a successful consulting business, is an extreme example of the new Japanese consumer: He is splurging on expensive goods, many of which were imported. The 31-year-old just bought a $200,000 Ferrari Spider convertible and a $30,000 Cartier watch. He wears a pink and lavender Hermes cravat, green Berluti shoes and a brown Louis Vuitton suit. Mr. Takaoka's spending shows how Japan's economy has started to grow in a way that could benefit the rest of the world. When Japan was booming nearly 20 years ago, the biggest indications were Tokyo's rocketing stock and land prices. Japanese people didn't buy as much from overseas as foreigners wanted. After a decade of slump, the recovery that began in 2002 was initially led by exports rather than domestic spending. Now, consumers and businesses are spending more. That is important, because their activity makes economic growth more sustainable: Even if exports were to slow due to problems in the U.S. or Chinese economies, domestic spending could keep Japan's economy chugging along. The new spending reflects big structural changes in Japan. Upstart local companies and those from overseas have taken advantage of the sharp drop in land prices during the 1990s downturn to buy stores or offices. Japan has also deregulated industries from financial services to food, sometimes under pressure from the U.S. It has loosened restrictions on large stores and opened the way for new types of financial products. Once known as a fortress for home-grown products, Japan's market is now more open to overseas companies and entrepreneurs. In the year ending March 31, 2005, imports were worth 10.2 percent of gross domestic product, the widest measure of economic activity, up from 6 percent a decade earlier. The figure is on track to reach 11 percent in Japan's current fiscal year, which ends Friday. That means Japanese growth may this time be a boon for the rest of the world. The effects could be particularly strong in the rest of Asia, where Japan buys everything from clothes made in China to microchips made in South Korea. Japan's demand will likely boost its exports from the rest of Asia and raise prices of manufactured goods there, says Sun Bae Kim, a Goldman Sachs economist. He forecasts this could add between 0.4 and 2.5 percentage points to growth in Asia outside Japan between 2004 and 2006. "Japan could be an important extra source of demand if the U.S. economy slowed," he says. To be sure, the world economy still depends heavily on purchases by American consumers. Because of their unabated appetite, the U.S. current-account deficit with Japan hit a record level of $99 billion last year. The figure reflects the total value of goods traded between the two countries as well as money flows in services such as tourism. Japan's growth benefits other countries in ways besides trade. Some U.S. fund managers are scooping up Japanese household savings by offering new investment products with potentially higher returns than their Japanese competition. Pacific Investment Management Co., of Newport Beach, California, a unit of Germany's Allianz AG, has doubled the fixed-income assets it manages for Japanese clients to $40 billion over the past two years. Japan's economy still has major long-term problems, including government debt that amounts to 160 percent of annual GDP -- the highest indebtedness in the developed world. Worse, the work force is declining as the number of elderly Japanese increases. That puts a greater burden on working people to support those on pensions. But growth increases Japan's chances of coping successfully. It grew 2.7 percent last year -- close to the U.S. figure of 3.5 percent -- and economists forecast an even bigger Japanese expansion in 2006. Following several years of upturn in manufacturing, Japanese service industries are now investing more and demand for new homes is forecast to rise. And the end of Japan's long banking crisis removes a problem that crippled earlier upturns. When Japan's stock-market and real-estate bubble popped in the early 1990s, banks were left with mountains of bad loans on their books and they didn't want to lend money. Since Japanese businesses depend heavily on banks for financing, economic growth ground to a halt. As banks finally cleaned up their books over the past three years, they began to lend again. Meanwhile, exports boosted profits at manufacturers, leading to higher wages -- which in turn are letting consumers spend more. The average household headed by a wage earner spent 74.5 percent of its income last year, the highest level since 1990, according to the government. Such a virtuous cycle is normal for a growing economy like the U.S., but in Japan, nothing like this has happened for more than a decade

No Impact – Japan Econ Won’t Collapse

Collapse of the Japanese economy impossible-global leader and China prevent

McMorris 9 (Brian, contributor to Seeking Alpha, Seeking Alpha, “Sovereign Debt Downgrades Won't Bring Down the Global Economy”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/177813-sovereign-debt-downgrades-won-t-bring-down-the-global-economy) CBC

**Japan,** **that would be a much more serious event than Dubai**, only because of the size of the Japanese economy and the relative importance of the yen. **Bu**t I think **the global central bank leaders have an eye on this and will prevent a Japanese economic collapse.** As long as all major economies pull together, there is no reason to think we will have a financial calamity. Economic collapses require the public to panic (and stop spending). Panic is totally a psychological phenomena and can only be brought about by careless or reckless political actions (or inactions). It is very important to note that the countries that are in danger of defaulting, are not key world economies. **The talk of a major economic power like Germany, Japan or the USA being forced into insolvency is from someone ignorant of what it takes to force a financial default. Defaults don't just happen, they are initiated by a creditor. If the debtor is large enough as compared to the creditor, then it is nonsensical or impossible for the creditor to force the default.** The punishment will fall as much or more on the creditor as compared to the debtor. To force a smaller debtor to default, though, makes sense. Assets can be seized and held or resold to recoup the investment. **Just who would force the USA, Germany or Japan into default?** **Who could gain? Who could manage the assets that were forfeited for the debt? There is no private money** (hedge funds, ala John Paulsen) **with the size to force a large sovereign to default. China is the only creditor nation with the size to force such a default. But China won't do it because it would be suicidal. China, the creditor, needs the developed world as much as the debtors need China and other developing, export-driven creditor nations. It is totally symbiotic, or co-dependent if one wants to be cynical about the situation.**

Japan's economy is resilient. 🡪Spending won't cause recession.

New York Times in 8 (Bank Chief Says Japan’s Economy Resilient, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22rtyen-web.html)pl

The governor of the Bank of Japan, Toshihiko Fukui, said on Friday that the global economy continued to expand but that a slowdown in the United States, if it deepens, could affect growth in other parts of the world. “We need to bear in mind the possibility that further disruptions in global financial markets or a slowdown in the U.S. economy may have adverse implications not only for major economies but also for emerging economies,” Mr. Fukui said at a seminar. He said there was no change to the bank’s basic monetary policy stance, which is to adjust rates by closely examining upside and downside risks. Market adjustments amid repricing of risks would take time, making it unavoidable for banks to incur losses, Mr. Fukui said. At a financial committee in parliament’s lower house, Mr. Fukui said that Japan’s economy had become more resilient to external shocks, but that “downside risks to the global economy are heightening and their impact on Japan’s economy remains uncertain.” “We will fully examine not just our main economic scenario” but the risks to the country in guiding monetary policy, said Mr. Fukui, whose term expires next month. The Bank of Japan has long said it will raise rates gradually, as its current policy rate of 0.5 percent is so low it could lead to overheating in the economy in the long term. But shaky global markets, concern over slowing American growth and growing pessimism over Japan’s economic outlook have kept the bank from raising rates for a year. A recovery in share prices since late January has led investors to cut back expectations of a rate cut this year. Mr. Fukui said Japan’s growth was slowing partly because of a slump in domestic housing investment. But it has become more resilient to external shocks than in the past and a positive cycle of output, incomes and spending remains intact, he said. “It is highly likely that the Japanese economy will continue to expand moderately,” he said. Some economists say the upbeat tone is becoming harder to swallow given growing concern that the American economic slowdown could gradually affect global growth and hurt exports.

No Impact – Japan Econ Won’t Collapse

Japanese economy resilient

Reuters 08 (Bank Chief Says Japan’s Economy Resilient, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22rtyen-web.html)

TOKYO (Reuters) — The governor of the Bank of Japan, Toshihiko Fukui, said on Friday that the global economy continued to expand but that a slowdown in the United States, if it deepens, could affect growth in other parts of the world. “We need to bear in mind the possibility that further disruptions in global financial markets or a slowdown in the U.S. economy may have adverse implications not only for major economies but also for emerging economies,” Mr. Fukui said at a seminar. He said there was no change to the bank’s basic monetary policy stance, which is to adjust rates by closely examining upside and downside risks. Market adjustments amid repricing of risks would take time, making it unavoidable for banks to incur losses, Mr. Fukui said. At a financial committee in parliament’s lower house, Mr. Fukui said that Japan’s economy had become more resilient to external shocks, but that “downside risks to the global economy are heightening and their impact on Japan’s economy remains uncertain.” “We will fully examine not just our main economic scenario” but the risks to the country in guiding monetary policy, said Mr. Fukui, whose term expires next month. The Bank of Japan has long said it will raise rates gradually, as its current policy rate of 0.5 percent is so low it could lead to overheating in the economy in the long term. But shaky global markets, concern over slowing American growth and growing pessimism over Japan’s economic outlook have kept the bank from raising rates for a year. A recovery in share prices since late January has led investors to cut back expectations of a rate cut this year. Mr. Fukui said Japan’s growth was slowing partly because of a slump in domestic housing investment. But it has become more resilient to external shocks than in the past and a positive cycle of output, incomes and spending remains intact, he said. “It is highly likely that the Japanese economy will continue to expand moderately,” he said. Some economists say the upbeat tone is becoming harder to swallow given growing concern that the American economic slowdown could gradually affect global growth and hurt exports.

No Impact – Japan Econ Won’t Collapse

Japanese econ structure resilient to downturns

Barker 10 (Willy, Japan Economic Series, Historical Perspective Post WWII Prosperity, http://www.wallybarker.com/Keizai.html)

Welcome to the debut of my new series on the Japanese economy - a topic in Japan second on the "weather", but discussed with less enthusiasm and definitely less clarity. Let me first say that despite the gloom and doom held by most regarding that state of the Japanese economy, I am a "big fan" of the Japanese economy. Structurally I think the country is very stable and resilient. The country will probably never create the success of the late 20th century, but neither will America or the European Union. That said, I truly believe that Japan is well positioned to take care of the general welfare of it's citizens, something that I think western country are going to stuggle with for at least a decade. Anyway, there are numerous deeply engrained myths about the Japanese economy, held by those domically and well as in America. Over time I hope to dispel them and bring clarity and insight to this important issue. First let's start with per person GDP adjusted for inflation, specifically nominal GDP per capital adjusted to 2008 real yea by Japan CPI. See technical not below. The graph of the data is from 1952 tell a remarkable story. A few points worth noting:

Japan Military Spending Low

US bases do not cause Japan to overspend.

Preble 91 (Christopher, Dir. of foreign policy studies at Cato Institute, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html)pl

Japan remained aloof while the U.S.-led international coalition waged war against Iraq, and Tokyo's cautious policy has attracted a great deal of criticism. The contributions of the Japanese, relative to their capabilities and to what they stand to lose from a protracted struggle in the Persian Gulf region, have raised serious questions about the nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship and about Japanese foreign policy as a whole. Long before the onset of Operation Desert Storm, members of Congress, as well as the people who elected them, asked why Japan, a nation clearly capable of providing substantial military and economic assistance for the massive military build-up in the gulf, remained only a nominal player. With the federal budget deficit and other economic problems looming ever larger, there is no shortage of criticism of Japan. "The Japanese," said Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), during the early weeks of the Persian Gulf crisis, "are laughing all the way to the bank." Tokyo's initial pledge of $4 billion to help offset the costs of Operation Desert Shield and its subsequent pledge of an additional $9 billion to defray some of the $500 million to $1 billion a day expenses of Operation Desert Storm have only marginally placated American critics. The reluctance of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's government to provide greater support for the U.S.-led intervention in the Persian Gulf is not entirely due to the influence of domestic constituencies that have traditionally opposed the use of military force. To be sure, those constituencies remain strong, but Kaifu and his ministers have insisted that Japan, which receives over 60 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, has too much at stake to remain on the sidelines, and at one point the government cautiously proposed sending a small contingent of noncombat personnel to the gulf. Resistance to Kaifu's message on the part of a significant portion of the Japanese population is one reason for Japan's relative inaction. There is another as well--the policy "hangover" from the longstanding U.S. opposition to any manifestation of Japanese military initiative. It is inappropriate for U.S. leaders who created, nurtured, and insisted upon Japanese diffidence regarding military affairs for four and a half decades to now complain about that diffidence. The crisis in the gulf offers both nations opportunities for a complete reassessment of their security relationship. The imbalance between what is at stake for the Japanese and what they have been willing to contribute militarily and economically only underscores the imbalance in all U.S. security agreements with Japan. Domestic political factors in Japan will not, alone, lead to a major foreign policy shift. Also needed is Washington's encouragement of a departure from the current security arrangement whereby the United States assumes most of the responsibility for Japan's defense. With budget pressures weighing heavily on President Bush and the congressional leadership, the push for cuts in the U.S. defense budget now that the gulf war has ended will inevitably affect the support given to overseas allies. The administration would be wise to ease the Japanese into defensive self-sufficiency. The Bush administration is aware of the political pressures on Kaifu and his government. It is unlikely, however, that members of Congress, still smarting from the budget fiasco and facing even more red ink because of the expensive Persian Gulf operation, will deal with the Japanese so delicately. One early indication of growing impatience came in September when the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan unless Tokyo greatly increased its financial support for the maintenance of those forces. The economics of the current U.S.-Japanese defense arrangement cannot be overstated. Although Japan's contribution to its defense appears sufficient in absolute terms, roughly $26 billion, it is inadequate in relative terms. Tokyo's allocation of slightly over 1 percent of GNP to defense contrasts sharply with the 6 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the 5.3 percent spent by the United States, Japan's protector. An appreciation of how the U.S. defense of Japan affects competition between the number-one and number-two economic powers in the world is paramount. Edward A. Olsen writes: The United States cannot mandate Japan's future strategy any more than Japan can shirk its responsibilities indefinitely. Neither should the United States subsidize a prosperous ally's economy, providing funds for Japan's defense so that Tokyo does not need to spend from its own resources on Japan's defense and can allocate them to economic purposes. Much is still made of Japanese domestic fears of the resurgence of military power. At times the Japanese seem even more concerned about militarism than are the nations formerly occupied by the armies of the Rising Sun. And, given the resentment and mistrust of the military that still persist in Japan more than 45 years after the end of World War II, it could be argued that the Japanese will never willingly assume a greater military role. Today domestic opinion in Japan sends mixed signals. The Japanese people as a whole remain wary of military action; in a recent poll, 67 percent opposed sending Japanese forces to the Persian Gulf, even in noncombat roles. At the same time, younger Japanese voters, those born after World War II, press for greater Japanese autonomy. Japan's reluctance to assume a military role in the gulf must also be placed in a larger context. After all, the United States has obligingly assumed the costs and risks of defending Japanese interests there, thus sparing the Japanese government and people difficult decisions about how to defend their interests.

\*\*\*Withdrawal Bad\*\*\*

Presence K2 Diplomacy

Despite angered citizens on Okinawa demanding a relocation of US troops, the Japanese realize the necessity of the security alliance

Fujioka 10 (Chisa, Staff Writer, Reuters, “Japan PM seeks to quell Okinawa anger over U.S. base”, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100623/wl\_nm/us\_japan\_politics\_okinawa) MAT

Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan apologized to the residents of Okinawa on Wednesday for the concentration of U.S. military bases on the island, in an effort to soothe local anger that contributed to his predecessor's fall. Kan took over earlier this month from Yukio Hatoyama, who quit after sparking public outrage for breaking a promise to move a U.S. airbase off the southern island, reluctant host to about half the 49,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan. It has also hurt the popularity of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with voters ahead of a July 11 upper house election, which it needs to win for smooth policymaking, including efforts to rein in huge public debt. After months of wrangling, Japan and the United States reached an agreement shortly before Hatoyama quit for the two sides to go ahead with a 2006 deal to shift the Futenma airbase to a less crowded part of Okinawa. Kan has said he will stick to the agreement, but keeping the base on the island, strategically located close to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, faces strong resistance from residents who complain of noise, pollution and crime associated with bases. Kan, who has said U.S.-Japan ties are the core of Tokyo's diplomacy, is expected to touch on the issue when he meets President Barack Obama on the sidelines of a summit of G8 and G20 leaders this weekend in Canada.

Presence K2 Stability

Presence key to stability

Tarumi 10 (Tatsuo, Visiting Fellow Stimson Center, Stimson Center, “The Japan-US Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief - In what area, and how-“, http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Japan-US\_Cooperation\_in\_HA\_DR.pdf) CBC

**The Japan-US Alliance constitutes an indispensable foundation for the security of Japan and contributes to regional stability in Northeast Asia.** **Japan and the US clearly share common strategic objectives and responsibilities, particularly in the Northeast Asia, and a steady development of the alliance will continue to be required to maintain stability in the region.** Japan and the US are working closely together and cooperating with their partners through various international forums including the Six-Party Talks to deal with the threat from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as well as to address humanitarian issues.1 Japan and the US will work to advance cooperative relations with China, encouraging it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena.**2 Japan** **and the US continue to adapt their defense** **presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and to assure the alliance of its security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to** **Japan along with the ROK- US alliance. Along with diplomatic and economic efforts, both bilateral military relationships,**

Nothing but the US presence is providing stability in Asia

Samuels 3 (Richard J., Prof of Political Science at Ford Int’l, Global Asia, “Wing Walking: The US-Japan Alliance”, <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fglobalasia.org%2Fpdf%2Fissue9%2FRichard_J._Samuel.pdf&ei=D6cqTOuEAciRnwespYjWDg&usg=AFQjCNEdJY_DNhW5_tHMXw0Sdh0HCTk4QA&sig2=hmrBx7y0wpQMnxkWiueeSw>, 4(1) p. 17-18) MAT

These are good questions, each long overdue for a close examination that may well generate different answers for different regions. Certainly, US planners must contemplate a new strategic order in the region. Japanese strategists are already doing so.5 However, there are several reasons why “restraint” may not be the best near-term option for the US in East Asia. First, although US security guarantees undoubtedly encourage “reckless driving” by indemnifying the private interests of states, this has not been the case in Asia. Here, South Korea and Japan were prime candidates to act upon such a moral hazard, but America’s principal allies focused instead on becoming rich. Even Taiwan, where reckless driving was most feared under independence-minded President Chen Shuibian, kept within bounds. The US presence (and its open market) provided an indivisible public good — stability in the world’s fastest growing region that undergirded widespread and sustained global prosperity. Consumers and producers in every state were significantly better off, not least those in the US. Second, balancing is rarely smooth and often is extremely costly in blood and lucre — especially for a distant great power forced by circumstance to return to the theater. It is not self-evident why states faced with the withdrawal of the US would resolve themselves into a similarly stable and mutually enriching East Asian system, rather than intensifying security dilemmas and increasing hedging — each of which generates uncertainty. The resultant instability would be neither short in duration nor cheap to the US. Fourth, there are as yet no viable multilateral institutions that might plausibly ameliorate a regional arms race or that might provide the transparency needed for Washington to be confident that restraint would be less costly than the status quo. As I shall explore below, the stability of the region’s security architecture depends on the robust bilateral hub and spokes provided by the US. While a change in this architecture will surely come, US interests are best served in the near-term if Washington remains a player in the region, with a seat at the head of the table where the new arrangements are negotiated.9

**Presence K2 Stability**

**US bases s**ecu**re the region**

The Diplomat 10(David Axe 10, I-nat’l current-affairs for the Asia-Pacific region. 6/8

http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/) JL

In that context, the prime minister’s vague election promise to Okinawan base-detractors was a ‘miscalculation.’ So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing of Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored the lasting, even growing, importance of US military facilities in Okinawa—not only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As China’s economic and military rise continues and tensions mount over North Korea’s nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever.

Bases promote peace and security

The Diplomat 10 (David Axe 10, I-nat’l current-affairs for the Asia-Pacific region. 6/8

http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/) JL

The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’ All this planning for air wars with China and North Korea doesn’t mean that planners in the United States, Japan or anywhere else believe such conflict is inevitable. Pyongyang remains predictable only in its volatility, but Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are all working hard to forge peaceful and lasting ties. The strategic uncertainty is in the margins. ‘There’s no question you want to engage China, but (we should) hedge against an uncertain future,’ Nicholas Szechenyi of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says. It’s as a hedge that Okinawa remains indispensable to the US and its allies—so much so that the shared international need for the island’s bases must trump any Japanese domestic political calculations. Hatoyama ignored that truth at the expense of his job. The question now is will Kan?

**US bases deter against threats**

Austin News 10 (Malcolm Foster“US, Japan keep Marine base on Okinawa” May 28 http://www.kxan.com/dpps/military/US-Japan-to-keep-US-military-air-base-on-Okinawa\_3384459) JL

Under a 1960 security pact, American armed forces are allowed broad use of Japanese land and facilities. In return, the U.S. is obliged to respond to attacks on Japan and protect the country under its nuclear umbrella. The U.S. and Japan "recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability," said the joint statement, which was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. The Futenma move is part of a broader plan to reorganize American troops in Japan that includes moving 8,000 Marines to the U.S. territory of Guam by 2014. But U.S. officials had said that the other pieces cannot move forward until the Futenma issue was resolved.

**Presence K2 Stability**

**US presence in the region is still necessary to maintain stability**

Przystup 09 (James, Sr Fellow and Research Professor, Institute of National Strategic Studies, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: National Interests and Strategic Imperatives”May, pg 3,

The United States bilateral alliance structure remains the foundation of regional stability and prosperity and the starting point for U.S. security engagement with the region. The alliances allow the United States to maintain a significant forward-deployed presence, and the basing structure in Japan and South Korea, reinforced by access agreements with nonallied Asian friends, makes credible the U.S. security commitment to the region. Operating from bases in Asia, U.S. forces are able to extend their operational reach to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy to recall that the first U.S. forces to reach the Persian Gulf in 1991 and in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 were based in Japan.During the Cold War, the alliance structure stood as a vital link in the U.S. global containment strategy. Success in the Cold War did not put an end to interstate tensions and rivalries in East Asia. In the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the area experienced a series of challenges to regional stability and security—the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, and North Korea’s Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan in 1998—that affected the security interests of the United States, its allies, and friends.Today, Cold War legacy issues in East Asia—China-Taiwan relations and a divided Korean Peninsula, with North Korea now possessing a demonstrated nuclear capability—continue to pose challenges to U.S. security interests and commitments. In dealing with the hard security challenges facing the region, the alliance structure is irreplaceable. This will remain true for the foreseeable future.

Presence K2 Stability

Presence in Japan allows for operations that secure the region

Global Security in 7 (Global Security, U.S. Army Japan (USARJ), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarj.htm)pl

The strategic geographic location of Japan provides the U.S. an excellent location for forward-basing, enabling power projection forces in the event of contingencies. Combined with the current agreements the U.S. has with Japan for basing rights for both air and sea forces, the U.S. Army in Japan is capable of a greatly expanded logistical support role throughout the Pacific theater. Japan occupies a key strategic location in the Pacific, which is vitally important to the U.S. both economically and militarily. U.S. forward presence in Japan is vital to ensuring access to this strategic location. The U.S. Army's forward presence in Japan enables it to meet U.S. bilateral engagement responsibilities under the Mutual Security Treaty and the Defense Guidelines to defend Japan from outside aggression in wartime, and to provide deterrence and stability in peacetime. It also demonstrates the U.S. commitment to other allies and friends in the Pacific. Being in Japan, approximately 5,000 nautical miles closer to potential trouble spots than the West Coast of the U.S., means USARJ & 9th TSC can respond to crises and support regional contingencies as a strategically located base and staging area. Japan is a generous U.S. defense partner, providing in excess of $5 billion annually for labor cost sharing, utilities, facilities improvement and other related costs. The Government of Japan also provides rent-free facilities and support by a highly skilled, dedicated Japanese national work force to offset the limited number of Army personnel assigned to Japan. USARJ & 9th TSC conduct over 140 bilateral engagements every year and this list is growing each year. The dynamic exercise program of USARJ & 9th TSC offers exercise participants a "one-of-a-kind" bilateral training experience. Three major bilateral training exercises are conducted each year \_ Yama Sukara, Orient Shield and North Wind. These exercises seek to refine key interoperability issues between the U.S. Army and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). The most important annual exercise, Yama Sakura, usually held at the beginning of the calendar year, is a command post exercise (CPX) designed to enhance bilateral contingency planning. As many as 1,100 U.S. soldiers take part in the exercise each year, including hundreds of Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers from more than 27 states. First Corps is a key player and participates as a fully operational Army Corps headquarters, with assigned units to exercise with the JGSDF. Computer technology plays a key role in Yama Sakura. The exercise, as with most CPXs, uses the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) for tactical play. This system enhances and "drives" the scenario. It tracks the results of the command and staff actions and decisions. CBS allows USARJ & 9th TSC to link up with participants in various locations throughout the Pacific area of operations. CBS also allows a link to the JGSDF participating units to show the same picture for all, making it truly a bilateral operation.

Presence K2 Stability

Bases in Japan provide security and increase U.S. power projection ability.

Okamoto 02 (Yukio, special adviser to the cabinet of the Japanese prime minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, The Washington Quarterly, 25(2), p. 60-61)pl

The alliance between Japan and the United States represents the primary bilateral security relationship for both governments. For the United States, the alliance anchors U.S. power projection in the region surrounded by the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Bilateral ties with other Pacific nations such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, though significant, are national in character, not hemispheric. Neither involves the permanent stationing of U.S. naval fighting forces within the country. Japan hosts the only U.S. carrier battle group homeported outside the United States as well as a complete amphibious attack group, including a full Marine Expeditionary Force. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships with home ports between Honolulu and the Mediterranean, 18 called Japanese ports home in August 2001.1 Japan plays host to a significant mass of U.S. airpower, including F-15 and F-16 fighter wings. Additionally, Japan provides facilities support to a vast array of U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering resources, as was amply demonstrated when a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter downed a U.S. Air Force E-3 flying out of Okinawa. For Japan, the value of its alliance with the United States is even more obvious. Since abandoning its sovereign right to the use of force other than for purely defensive purposes, Japan considers the alliance the sine qua non of the country’s security. The Japan-U.S. alliance is not just Japan’s primary security relationship—it is its only one. The alliance is a beneficent arrangement. Its goal is not to combine the might of two powers into a single great force bent on transforming the region. The Japan-U.S. alliance is dedicated to preserving the status quo in the Far East, that is, deterring the use of force as a means of altering political borders. In this regard, the goals of Japan and the United States differ from those of other great powers in the area. One complaint that has been raised against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is that its obligations are asymmetrical. According to the treaty, in response to any armed threat, the United States is committed to the defense of Japan under the doctrine of collective security. Japan, however, does not allow itself to participate in collective security. U.S. critics of the treaty cease investigating the relationship at this point, declaring that the alliance is nothing less than Japan getting a free ride in the security sphere. The Japanese and U.S. governments share the following understanding: Japan’s provision of bases and facilities to U.S. forces—allowing those forces to implement the basic U.S. strategic plan in the region—balances out the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. That exchange is the core of the agreement, and neither side considers the arrangement unfair. The alleged asymmetry is not dangerous to the relationship between the two countries. If an asymmetrical nuance exists, it is the relative importance each party places on Article 5 and Article 6 of the treaty. The United States, sees the security treaty as a component of its overall global strategy, places a greater priority on the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East (Article 6) than in the narrower defense of the territory and territorial waters of Japan (Article 5). The U.S. side believes that a direct attack on Japan is one of the least likely scenarios for an outbreak of hostilities. In the U.S. view, a threat to Japanese security will come as the result of a buildup of tensions or an outbreak of violence elsewhere in the region; thus, for overall security, preparing for contingencies outside of Japan is more important. For obvious reasons, the Japanese government puts a priority on the defense of Japan. In practical terms, the two sides have tried to reconcile these nuanced interpretations of the agreements’ statements on the supporting roles Japanese forces must play in “situations in areas around Japan” (shuhen jitai in Japanese). In a future Diet session, legislators must consider measures that will establish a legal framework allowing such coordination. Areas of cooperation should include providing food, logistical support, fuel, and landing areas for the crisis response of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), as well as rescue equipment to the USFJ.

Presence K2 Stability

Presence is critical to maintaining stability in East-Asia

Porth 7 (Jacqueline, USINFO Staff Writer “U.S. Military Bases Provide Stability, Training, Quick Reaction” Feb 27

http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070227132836sjhtrop0.6571466.html) JL

Besides engagement, deterrence and maintaining a U.S. presence, 34 major U.S. military bases (those worth more than $800 million with hundreds of personnel assigned) enable quick-reaction forces to respond to a crisis or natural disaster ranging from earthquakes in Iran and Pakistan to tsunami devastation or landslides in Asia. Bases give the U.S. military the flexibility to respond rapidly to any contingency within a theater of operation or across regions as needed whether for humanitarian relief or defensive purposes. Former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said fast response time, as the United States demonstrated in quickly aiding tsunami-stricken countries in the Indian Ocean, would not have been possible without long-term, pre-existing working relationships with militaries in South and Southeast Asia. Addressing requirements in Asia, Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry told members of Congress in 2006, “We would like to have enough capability forward and provide enough stability in the region that other countries won’t feel that it is necessary to build up their militaries” for defensive or offensive purposes. A key component of the U.S. National Security Strategy is focused on strengthening the role of U.S. allies and building and sustaining partnerships to deal with existing and emerging threats, from terrorism to smuggling weapons of mass destruction.

Presence in Japan is critical to stability in East Asia

Christensen 99 (Thomas, writer for *International Security,* “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia” March 22 http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-61557378/china-u-s-japan.html

If security dilemma theory is applied to East Asia, the chance for spirals of tension in the area seems great, particularly in the absence of a U.S. military presence in the region. The theory states that, in an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats. This can lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one's security environment. [2] If we look at the variables that might fuel security dilemma dynamics, East Asia appears quite dangerous. From a standard realist perspective, not only could dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities in East Asia increase uncertainty and mistrust, but the importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional actors could encourage a destabilizing competiti on to develop power-projection capabilities on the seas and in the skies. Because they are perceived as offensive threats, power-projection forces are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation's homeland. [3] Perhaps even more important in East Asia than these more commonly considered variables are psychological factors (such as the historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors) and political geography issues relating to the Taiwan question, which make even defensive weapons in the region appear threatening to Chinese security. [4] One way to ameliorate security dilemmas and prevent spirals of tension is to have an outside arbiter play a policing role, lessening the perceived need for regional actors to begin destabilizing security competitions. For this reason, most scholars, regardless of theoretical persuasion, seem to agree with U.S. officials and local leaders that a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia is the continuing presence of the U.S. military, particularly in Japan. [5] The historically based mistrust among the actors in Northeast Asia is so intense that not only is the maintenance of a U.S. presence in Japan critical, but the form the U.S.-Japan alliance takes also has potentially important implications for regional stability. In particular, the sensitivity in China to almost all changes in the Cold War version of the U.S.-Japan alliance poses major challenges for leaders in Washington who want to shore up the alliance for the long haul by encouraging greater Japanese burden sharing, but still want the U.S. presence in Japan to be a force for reassurance in the region. To meet these somewhat contradictory goals, for the most part the United States wisely has encouraged Japan to adopt nonoffensive roles that should be relatively unthreatening to Japan's neighbors.

Withdrawal 🡪 Instability

Presence preserves power structures in East-Asian, preventing conflict

Carpenter 95(Ted, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO “Paternalism And Dependence:The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”Nov 1http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) JL

Indiscreet comments by some U.S. political and military leaders in recent years suggest that the United States still does not trust Japan, nor does it want a more activist Japanese security policy. Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole, onetime commander of Marine Corps forces in Japan, for example, stated bluntly that "no one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan." The United States is "the cap in the bottle," preventing Japan from embarking on that course, according to Stackpole. "If we were to pull out of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," he warned, "it would definitely be a destabilizing factor in Asia."(27) Suspicions of Japan (albeit in a somewhat more subtle form) were evident in the initial draft of the Pentagon's defense policy guidance planning document for 1994-99, which was leaked to the press. The authors warned that a larger Japanese role in East Asia would be destabilizing and argued that a major purpose of U.S. strategy should be to prevent the emergence of such a political or military competitor.(28) Takashi Inoguchi, a professor of political science at the University of Tokyo, observed that the Pentagon document showed that the United States was creating "a covert barrier to Japan's assumption of a greater role in world affairs," although Washington "has for many years publicly argued that Japan should assume more of the collective defence burden."(29) The same undertone of determination to preserve U.S. hegemony was evident in the Pentagon's 1995 East Asia strategy report. "If the United States does not provide the central, visible, stabilizing force in the Asia and Pacific region, it is quite possible that another nation might--but not necessarily in a way that meets America's fundamental interests," the report warned.(30) Given the power potential of states in the region, there are only two credible candidates for the role of substitute stabilizing force: China and Japan. (Russia's massive political and economic woes disqualify it for the next several decades, and, in any case, Moscow's geopolitical priorities are now concentrated in Central Asia and Eastern Europe rather than the Pacific.) Since U.S. policymakers openly worry that China is more likely to become a revisionist, disruptive power than a preserver of the status quo, it is highly probable that the other nation cited in the report is Japan. Washington's smothering strategy still appears to be alive and well. Unfortunately, Japanese officials determined to preserve the defense subsidy frequently encourage U.S. fears about a rearmed Japan. It would not be in America's best interests for Japan to strengthen its forces and play a more active military role, they insist. Some even warn that the termination of the alliance would play into the hands of militarist and ultranationalist elements in Japan.(31) There is something indescribably sad about such a "stop us before we conquer again" mentality. Those who use that argument probably do so because they know that it is likely to get the desired reaction from their American counterparts and minimize the chances that the U.S. security shield will be withdrawn.

Withdrawal 🡪 Instability

Withdrawal leads to destability in the region

Samuels 3 (Richard J., Prof of Political Science at Ford Int’l, Global Asia, “Wing Walking: The US-Japan Alliance”, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fglobalasia.org%2Fpdf%2Fissue9%2FRichard\_J.\_Samuel.pdf&ei=D6cqTOuEAciRnwespYjWDg&usg=AFQjCNEdJY\_DNhW5\_tHMXw0Sdh0HCTk4QA&sig2=hmrBx7y0wpQMnxkWiueeSw, 4(1) p. 18) MAT

For these several reasons, then, the bilateral security alliance does not seem more costly than its likely alternatives. To have more confidence in this claim, one would have to review US and Japanese interests in greater detail than is possible here. Instead, let me stipulate that the shared goals of preserving stability, openness and security in Northeast Asia have not changed. The US and Japan are still stronger together than apart. My argument here is straightforward. As in the case of the Depression Era “wing-walkers” in the United States who entertained crowds high above state fairs with their airborne acrobatics, in matters of national security it is dangerous to let go with one hand before having a secure grasp with the other. Not only should Washington not let go of the alliance until it has a firm hold on a new security architecture, it should strengthen the alliance as a means toward that end. The US needs to be engaged in the region if a multi-polar balance of power in East Asia is to be established that does not increase the risks of miscalculation and war. The first step toward ensuring that engagement is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

The relatively substantial US military presence is necessary to prevent destabilization in the region

Samuels 3 (Richard J., Prof of Political Science at Ford Int’l, Global Asia, “Wing Walking: The US-Japan Alliance”, <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fglobalasia.org%2Fpdf%2Fissue9%2FRichard_J._Samuel.pdf&ei=D6cqTOuEAciRnwespYjWDg&usg=AFQjCNEdJY_DNhW5_tHMXw0Sdh0HCTk4QA&sig2=hmrBx7y0wpQMnxkWiueeSw>, 4(1) p. 21) MAT

I have argued here that the near- and mid- term health of the bilateral US-Japan alliance is, ironically, the key to the sort of long-term transformation toward multilateralism that restraint proponents — and all of us — should welcome. As a precondition, the Obama administration needs to sort through four issues. First, it must determine how much of a forward presence the US needs in order to maintain stability in East Asia. Less may be better than more, but too little could be destabilizing. The “force transformation” initiated during the Bush administration should be continued. The move of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam is a measured step in this direction. Second, Washington must consider how credibly to threaten the exercise of restraint so that Tokyo reverses its long-standing lassitude on matters of regional and global security and figures out how to do more in other areas as well. Next, strategic planners will need to understand that the status quo — Japan’s cheap ride, US overextension and Chinese mistrust — cannot be allowed to persist unaddressed. And, finally, in the event that alliance managers fail to transform the relationship in time, they must draw a clear bead on its first derivative. For, by then, it will be too late for “restraint” on Washington’s terms.

Presence K2 Deterrence - North Korea/China

US presence in Japan needed to deter North Korea and China

Axe in 10 (David, independent military correspondent based in South Carolina, The Diplomat, Why Allies Need US Base, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/)

The decision to stick with the 2006 deal represented the belated recognition on Hatoyama’s part that ‘there was no other good option’ for the strategically-vital Marine presence and for the US-Japanese alliance in general, according to Michael Auslin, an Asia expert with the American Enterprise Institute. In that context, the prime minister’s vague election promise to Okinawan base-detractors was a ‘miscalculation.’ So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing of Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored the lasting, even growing, importance of US military facilities in Okinawa—not only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As China’s economic and military rise continues and tensions mount over North Korea’s nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever. ‘The US, South Korea and Australia have been very vocal to Japan, saying, “Hey, be careful what you’re doing,”’ Sheila Smith, an analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, says. ‘This isn’t a good moment to be taking large numbers of US forces out of Japan.’

Presence K2 Deterrence - North Korea

Bases key to deter North Korea

Lee 9 (Marvin,“The Urgent Need for Deterrence and Diplomacy in Korea” 4/6 http://www.newuniversity.org/2009/04/opinion/the\_urgent\_need\_for184/) JL

It is undeniable that the presence of U.S. military troops in South Korea deters the North. Currently, the U.S. has about 27,000 troops stationed there, according to The Korea Times. Recently, the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command undertook a 12-day military exercise from March 9 to 20. The North protested by closing the border and threatening any civilian aircraft that entered their airspace. North Korea has signed non-aggression pacts with the South more than once. Yet, they continuously violate them by engaging in naval skirmishes off the western coast of the Korean peninsula. On land, there have been firefights in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Due to the North’s recent aggression, South Korea has increased patrol along the DMZ. It is also worth mentioning that the North has kidnapped two Asian-American journalists along the Chinese-North Korean border. During the airspace threat in early March, North Korea shut down the military hotline and later reopened it. The hard stance of the South’s President Lee Myung-Bak makes it very difficult for diplomatic efforts. In addition, North Korea, a recipient of U.S. food aid, declined further aid due to the political tensions rising in the Korean peninsula. Most likely, North Korea’s behavior is an attempt to grab the attention of Barack Obama’s administration and usher in a new era of diplomacy. The back-and-forth changes are a common feature of North Korea’s political tactics. Such tactics are the reason why the U.S. and its allies are increasing military activities near the Korean peninsula to prevent North Korea’s missile launch, despite the North’s claim of testing a communications satellite. North Korean officials told the U.S. that they are weaponizing plutonium, as reported in The New York Times. U.S. and South Korean military officials believe that the North is testing its Taepodong-II ballistic missile, which is capable of reaching Alaska, Hawaii and possibly the West Coast of the U.S..

US presence deters North Korea’s want for war and nukes

Logan 8 (Justin, Asst Dir of Foreign Policy, CATO Institute, “Obama Adviser Advocated War with North Korea”, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/06/18/obama-adviser-advocated-war-with-north-korea/) MAT

If North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched. This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead. The blast would be similar to the one that killed terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. But the effect on the Taepodong would be devastating. The multi-story, thin-skinned missile filled with high-energy fuel is itself explosive — the U.S. airstrike would puncture the missile and probably cause it to explode. The carefully engineered test bed for North Korea’s nascent nuclear missile force would be destroyed, and its attempt to retrogress to Cold War threats thwarted. There would be no damage to North Korea outside the immediate vicinity of the missile gantry. [...] We should not conceal our determination to strike the Taepodong if North Korea refuses to drain the fuel out and take it back to the warehouse. When they learn of it, our South Korean allies will surely not support this ultimatum — indeed they will vigorously oppose it. The United States should accordingly make clear to the North that the South will play no role in the attack, which can be carried out entirely with U.S. forces and without use of South Korean territory. South Korea has worked hard to counter North Korea’s 50-year menacing of its own country, through both military defense and negotiations, and the United States has stood with the South throughout. South Koreans should understand that U.S. territory is now also being threatened, and we must respond. Japan is likely to welcome the action but will also not lend open support or assistance. China and Russia will be shocked that North Korea’s recklessness and the failure of the six-party talks have brought things to such a pass, but they will not defend North Korea. …The United States should emphasize that the strike, if mounted, would not be an attack on the entire country, or even its military, but only on the missile that North Korea pledged not to launch — one designed to carry nuclear weapons. We should sharply warn North Korea against further escalation. North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to act on that threat. Why attack South Korea, which has been working to improve North-South relations (sometimes at odds with the United States) and which was openly opposing the U.S. action? An invasion of South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong Il’s regime within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows. Though war is unlikely, it would be prudent for the United States to enhance deterrence by introducing U.S. air and naval forces into the region at the same time it made its threat to strike the Taepodong. If North Korea opted for such a suicidal course, these extra forces would make its defeat swifter and less costly in lives — American, South Korean and North Korean.

Presence K2 Deterrence – North Korea

US nuclear umbrella deters North Korea, a lack of this would see rampant violence and war

Yong-ok 10 (Park, Sr Research Fellow, Sejong Institute, “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions”, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCMQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.koreafocus.or.kr%2Fdesign2%2Flayout%2Fcontent\_print.asp%3Fgroup\_id%3D102814&ei=zy4uTODeOoOonQef0sHdAw&usg=AFQjCNFpfjn8mhHG\_DZFe2Se2qSoG2uy-g&sig2=UfeP4ZbcdNNGyC0anjIGeg) MAT

North Korea is now a nuclear state that declares that it won’t give up its arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist in other countries. As long as North Korea keeps nuclear weapons South Korea must remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Although the umbrella deters a North Korean nuclear threat, it has limited effect against nonnuclear military provocations. Hence, the Korean and U.S. governments recently adopted a new concept, “extended deterrence,” to supplement the protection provided under the nuclear umbrella. Depending on the result of the Obama administration's ongoing "2009 Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR), the concept and operational doctrine of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence may be rewritten. Unlike previous administrations, it is anticipated that the Obama administration would favor deterrence by conventional weapons rather than by nuclear weapons, and it would expect an increased allied role rather than unilateral U.S. commitment in any future international military actions. In the fast-changing international situation, Korea should comprehend its role and share and build up commensurate capabilities. So far, the United States has proclaimed its strategic commitment to Korea by providing the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence. The Korean national defense authorities must maintain close coordination with the United States to keep abreast of the modus operandi.

US solely responsible for avoiding conflicts with North Korea, a lack of US presence would lead to unchecked war

Bandow 10 (Doug, Sr Fellow, CATO Institute, “Taming Pyongyang”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11739) MAT

Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. The potential, even if small, of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today's status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North's neighbors. The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. No peace treaty was ever signed; over the years the Democratic People's Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war, most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. Conflict was avoided because the United States, long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance, refused to risk igniting a new conflict. Still, for at least two decades Pyongyang had eschewed military action. Shots were fired between South and North Korean ships last November near the disputed boundary in the Yellow Sea, but no harm was done. Brinkmanship was the DPRK's standard diplomatic strategy. Triggering a new war was not. Why the North would sink a South Korean vessel is a matter of speculation. More critical is the response. Now what? The result not only would mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions, but could end any chance — admittedly today very slim — of reversing North Korean nuclear development. Moreover, a military strike would entail a chance of war. Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control. The potential consequences are horrifying.

Presence K2 Deterrence – North Korea

US presence prevents North Korea war

Carpenter 3 (Ted Galen, Vice Pres, CATO Institute, “Are We Headed for War with North Korea?”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=3136) MAT

During his recent visit to South Korea, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced Washington's intention to "reposition" some of its military forces stationed in South Korea. Currently, most U.S. troops are deployed in the northern part of the country, between the capital, Seoul, and the Demilitarized Zone that separates South Korea from communist North Korea. The redeployment would entail moving those forces farther south. Wolfowitz offered only a vague justification for such a move, contending that repositioning forces would make them more effective in meeting the threat posed by North Korea. That is a curious argument. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the principal rationale for stationing the troops near the DMZ has been that they would serve as a tripwire in case of a North Korean attack, guaranteeing U.S. involvement in any conflict. North Korea, knowing that it would then face war not only with South Korea but also with the United States, would be deterred from taking such a reckless gamble. Indeed, the national security strategy document approved in September 2002 clearly would seem to apply to the North Korean situation. "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends," the document affirmed. The administration's policy on combating weapons of mass destruction, adopted in December 2002, stated the point even more succinctly, emphasizing that the United States would not "permit the world's more dangerous regimes" to pose a threat "with the world's most destructive weapons." Nuclear weapons in the hands of secretive, Stalinist North Korea fill that category. If diplomacy fails, it is not clear how that result can be prevented except through military force. The Bush administration may not be committed to such a course as yet, but in deciding to move U.S. forces away from the DMZ, it is creating a precondition for pursuing that option. South Koreans, who know how horribly their country would suffer if the United States launched preemptive strikes on the North, now have reason to be very, very nervous.

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Withdrawal 🡪 North Korea Nukes

US nuclear umbrella deters North Korea, a lack of this would see rampant violence and war

Yong-ok 10 (Park, Sr Research Fellow, Sejong Institute, “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions”, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCMQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.koreafocus.or.kr%2Fdesign2%2Flayout%2Fcontent\_print.asp%3Fgroup\_id%3D102814&ei=zy4uTODeOoOonQef0sHdAw&usg=AFQjCNFpfjn8mhHG\_DZFe2Se2qSoG2uy-g&sig2=UfeP4ZbcdNNGyC0anjIGeg) MAT

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At: relocation to Guam solves

Okinawa is key-relocation to Guam is too far away. It undercuts power projection capabilities

Axe in 10 (David, independent military correspondent based in South Carolina, The Diplomat, Why Allies Need US Base, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/)

Aside from US forces in South Korea (which are exclusively focused on the North Korean land threat) there are just two significant concentrations of US troops in East Asia: in Okinawa and on the Pacific island of Guam. Okinawa lies just an hour’s flight time from both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; Guam, by contrast, is 1000 miles from any potential theatre of war. ‘It may be easier for us to be there [in Guam], as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned,’ says Air Force spokesman John Monroe. ‘But if we’re in Guam, we’re out of the fight’ due to the distance. For combat forces to be capable of reacting quickly to the most likely crises, Okinawa is the only realistic option. Without its 2 Okinawan air bases and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military—and by extension, US allies—would depend almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels.