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\_\_\_\*\*Japan QPQ – 1NC

Japan QPQ – 1NC

TEXT: The United States Federal Government should offer to <do the plan> if Japan agrees to adopt a self-defense force, whose tasks include, but are not limited to, a guarantee to support the United States in any future confrontation with China over Taiwan.

Japan will say yes – the Okinawa bargains prove

Japan Visitor, ’10. JapanVisitor.com is a subsidiary of Soccerphile™ Limited and is a member of the American Chamber of Commerce (ACCJ) Japan. <http://japanvisitor.blogspot.com/2010/04/us-to-pull-out-of-okinawa-japan.html>.

United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced today that all US military forces will be pulling out of Okinawa. All US bases, facilities, and land will be returned to Okinawa, in a graduated withdrawal to begin this summer and be complete by the end of 2012. The surprise announcement came after tense negotiations between the Obama Administration and the new government of Yukio Hatoyama. "In close consultation with our Japanese partners, we have come to a detailed and comprehensive agreement that will in two years remove all US troops from Okinawa. This will end more than 50 years of US bases in Okinawa," Gates said. The presence of the bases - and the accompanying crime, noise, and general disruption - has been a thorn in the side of many Japanese governments and the bane of life for residents of the smallest Japanese prefecture. US forces are set to move air operations to Guam, and land troops to an uninhabited island near Hawaii. To appease Hatoyama's coalition partners, among them the People's New Party, the US originally agreed to the proposal that Camp Futenma's functions be moved to the US Marine Corps' Camp Schwab in Nago, also in Okinawa. However that would have involved constructing a helicopter runway in an inland area within the camp. Environmental groups and local activists squashed that. At that point, both sides appeared to be out of ideas. A solution emerged from an unlikely source: Tokyo governor and revisionist historian Shintaro Ishihara. He suggested that, in exchange for a complete US withdrawal, Japan itself agree to carry more of the defense burden. Ishihara: "Young men in Japan today are make-up wearing, vegetable-eating, testerone-deprived, cell phone-obsessed mamma's boys. This agreement will rid Okinawa of the colonial power, and at the same time put our boys back in uniform - and make men out them. It's a win-win situation for Japan." Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) are now preparing for an onslaught of conscripts. All 18-year-old males will have to register, and beginning January 1, 2011, enlist for a period of one year. Both sides immediately agreed to Ishihara's proposal, though vocal protests are expected in leftist circles in Japan and demonstrations are scheduled this week at Kyoto University.

The US is losing ground in Japan over the failure to close bases – this is driving Japan towards China – the result is abandoning the US over future Taiwan conflicts

Martin Fackler, 1-24-10. “In Japan, U.S. Losing Diplomatic Ground to China,” NYT, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24japan.html?pagewanted=print>.

TOKYO — When Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited Japan’s new leaders in October, not long after their historic election, he pressed so hard and so publicly for a military base agreement that the Japanese news media labeled him a bully. The difference between that visit and the friendly welcome that a high-level Japanese delegation received just two months later in China, Japan’s historic rival, could not have been more stark. A grinning President Hu Jintao of China took individual photos with more than a hundred visiting Japanese lawmakers, patiently shaking hands with each of them in an impressive display of mass diplomacy. The trip, organized by the powerful secretary general of Japan’s governing Democratic Party, Ichiro Ozawa, was just one sign of a noticeable warming of Japan’s once icy ties with China. It was also an indication that the United States, Japan’s closest ally, may be losing at least some ground in a diplomatic tug-of-war with Beijing. Political experts say Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s greater willingness to engage Beijing and the rest of Asia reflects a broad rethinking of Japan’s role in the region at a time when the United States is showing unmistakable signs of decline. It also reflects a growing awareness here that Japan’s economic future is increasingly tied to China, which has already surpassed the United States as its largest trading partner. “Hatoyama wants to use Asia to offset what he sees as the declining influence of the United States,” said Yoshihide Soeya, director of the Institute of East Asia Studies at Keio University in Tokyo. “He thinks he can play China off the United States.” Mr. Soeya and other analysts say warmer ties with China are not necessarily a bad thing for Washington, which has long worried about Japan’s isolation in the region. But some are concerned that the new openness toward China may also be driven by a simmering resentment within Mr. Hatoyama’s left-leaning government of what some here call the United States’ “occupation mentality.” Those feelings have been stoked by what many Japanese see as the Obama administration’s high-handed treatment in the dispute over the air base on Okinawa. The White House is pressing Japan to follow through on a controversial deal to keep a base on the island that was agreed to by the more conservative Liberal Democrats who lost control to Mr. Hatoyama’s party last summer after decades of almost uninterrupted power. “If we’re worrying that the Japanese are substituting the Chinese for the Americans, then the worse thing you could do is to behave the way that we’re behaving,” said Daniel Sneider, a researcher on Asian security issues at Stanford University. <CONTINUED>

Japan QPQ – 1NC

<CONTINUED>

The new emphasis on China comes as Mr. Hatoyama’s government begins a sweeping housecleaning of Japan’s postwar order after his party’s election victory, including challenging the entrenched bureaucracy’s control of diplomatic as well as economic policy. On security matters, the Liberal Democrats clearly tilted toward Washington. Past governments not only embraced Japan’s half-century military alliance with the United States, but also warned of China’s burgeoning power and regularly angered Beijing by trying to whitewash the sordid episodes of Japan’s 1930s-1940s military expansion. American experts say the Obama administration has been slow to realize the extent of the change in Japan’s thinking about its traditional protector and its traditional rival. Indeed, political experts and former diplomats say China has appeared more adept at handling Japan’s new leaders than the Obama administration has been. And former diplomats here warn that Beijing’s leaders are seizing on the momentous political changes in Tokyo as a chance to improve ties with Japan — and possibly drive a wedge between the United States and Japan. “This has been a golden opportunity for China,” said Kunihiko Miyake, a former high-ranking Japanese diplomat who was stationed in Beijing. “The Chinese are showing a friendlier face than Washington to counterbalance U.S. influence, if not separate Japan from the U.S.” Some conservative Japan experts in Washington have even warned of a more independent Tokyo becoming reluctant to support the United States in a future confrontation with China over such issues as Taiwan, or even to continue hosting the some 50,000 American military personnel now based in Japan. Despite such hand-wringing among Japan experts in the United States, Mr. Hatoyama continues to emphasize that the alliance with Washington remains the cornerstone of Japanese security. And suspicions about China run deep here, as does resentment over Japan’s losing its supremacy in Asia, making a significant shift in loyalty or foreign policy unlikely anytime soon, analysts say. But in the four months since Mr. Hatoyama took office, there has been an unusual flurry of visits back and forth by top-ranking Chinese and Japanese officials, including one last month to Tokyo by China’s heir apparent, Vice President Xi Jinping. The new mood of reconciliation is also evident in the novel ideas that have been floated recently to overcome the differences over wartime history that have long isolated Japan from the region. These include a recent report in the Yomiuri Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, based on unidentified diplomatic sources, of a Chinese initiative for reconciliation that would include a visit by Mr. Hatoyama to Nanjing to apologize for the 1937 massacre of Chinese civilians there by invading Japanese soldiers. President Hu would then visit Hiroshima to proclaim China’s peaceful intentions. While both countries dismissed the report as speculation, it spurred wide talk here that the report might be a trial balloon by one of the two countries that could signal a new willingness to make some sort of diplomatic breakthrough on the history issues. And a week after the visit to Beijing by Mr. Ozawa and his parliamentary delegation, which Mr. Hu heralded as the start of a smoother era in Japan-China relations, Tokyo reciprocated with its own display of eager hospitality during a visit to Tokyo by Mr. Xi, the Chinese vice president. Mr. Hatoyama arranged a meeting between Mr. Xi and Emperor Akihito at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo on short notice, breaking protocol that such audiences be arranged more than a month in advance. Mr. Ozawa, a shadowy kingmaker whose power rivals Mr. Hatoyama’s, is said to have warm feelings for China, where he has often visited, and he is widely seen as the force behind Japan’s latest overtures to Beijing. Other members of Mr. Hatoyama’s cabinet remain less convinced that any drift away from the United States is a good idea. One of the skeptics is Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, who has stressed the need for the American military presence to offset China and a nuclear-armed North Korea. Last month, Mr. Kitazawa brought in Yukio Okamoto, a widely respected former diplomat and adviser to Liberal Democratic prime ministers, to advise Mr. Hatoyama on security issues. “The Democrats have to realize the threat we have on the Korean Peninsula, and that China is not a friendly country in military matters,” Mr. Okamoto said. Mr. Soeya, of Keio University, warned that the new Japanese government should at least think hard before sidling closer to China, saying, “Mr. Hatoyama does not have a clear sense of what relying on China would really mean, or whether it is even actually desirable.”

An independent Japan aligned with the US solves Taiwan conflict--restricts Chinese sphere of influence

**Preble, ‘6** [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>]

But **lingering hostility toward** and suspicion of North Korea **in the near term** pale in comparison **with Japanese concerns over** the medium to long term with respect to a rising **China. Beijing is exerting greater influence** in the political, economic, and diplomatic realms **and** simultaneously **threatening to use force against Taiwan** if the island proceeds on its current path toward greater independence. **Japan would look upon Chinese annexation of Taiwan as a national security threat**, but it is less clear how it would respond to more subtle Chinese challenges to Japanese economic and security interests in and around Taiwan. **The trajectory of China’s rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition** for influence in East Asia **will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific.** According to Eugene Matthews, a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and now president of the international educational firm Nintai, Japan’s growing self-reliance is indicative of resurgent nationalism. Matthews urges that U.S. policy be directed at blocking such sentiments, or at least attempting to channel them in a particular direction.3 But it is hardly unreasonable for Japan to seek some measure of independence from the United States.4 A desire that one’s country be capable of defending itself might be a sign of nationalism, but if it is, it is no different from the nationalism expressed by the United Kingdom and dozens of other countries that have maintained a robust defensive capability in spite of security assurances from the United States. Fortunately, the Bush administration has encouraged a more assertive stance on the part of the Japanese government, even at the risk of arousing regional fears of a resurgent Japan. Although such fears cannot be dismissed entirely, **both the U**nited **S**tates **and Japan should continue their efforts to establish Japan as an independent pole of power in East Asia, a “normal country” that is no longer dependent on a distant patron for its defense.**

Japan QPQ – 1NC

Most recent Chinese policy guarantees nuclear war over Taiwan

AFP 10 (Feb 21, <http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?noframes;read=1721>) LL

BERLIN -- China is ready to engage in war and even nuclear conflict with the United States should fighting break out over Taiwan, Der Spiegel magazine reports on the basis of a supposedly-secret Chinese file. "Document No. 65", allegedly produced by the military sub-committee of the Chinese Community Party's central committee, discussed the possible course of a war over the disputed island claimed by China. "We would have to make a military intervention as early as possible, before the American troops are fully operational," according to the document cited by the German magazine. Faced with US bombardment of key sites and military installations, the document stressed that China has roughly the same level of conventional forces and would benefit from a fight close to its own territory. While arguing that the US would have little interest in starting a nuclear war over the island, the file said that Beijing would be ready to turn to its nuclear arsenal should circumstances demand. "We are ready to defend every square centimetre of our country," said the document. Dated August last year, the analysis would appear to have been drafted during a low point in relations between Beijing and Taipei caused by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's insistence that his country should enjoy "state-to-state" ties with China. China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly warned that it would use force if necessary to ensure its return to the mainland. -- AFP

\_\_\_\*\*Say Yes/Solvency

Japan Say Yes – Governor’s Election\*\*

Popular support for withdrawal will force Kan’s hand- governor election means Kan will say yes

Asahi Shimbun 6/29 (http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006290378.html)

Seen from the larger picture of Japan-U.S. relations, it was unfortunate for both partners that it took just one base-related issue to sour their relationship, not to mention that it also resulted in the replacement of Japan's top leader. Because of this background, both Kan and Obama must have positioned their meeting in Toronto as the first step toward rebuilding a relationship of trust. Kan promised to honor the Japan-U.S. agreement made by his predecessor. Obama responded that he appreciates the difficulty this matter poses for Tokyo, and that he will strive to make the U.S. military presence more acceptable to the region. Obama urged Kan to visit the United States. We presume Obama wants to rebuild summit diplomacy with Japan that fell into dysfunction during the Hatoyama administration. But the political challenge of relocating the Futenma base has not become any easier for Tokyo. The great majority of Okinawans are opposed to the proposed move to the Henoko district in Nago under the current Japan-U.S. agreement. Should the Kan administration go along with this plan and decide on the location of the new runway and the method of construction by the end of August without obtaining the understanding of the people of Okinawa, the Okinawans are naturally going to resent this bitterly. And should the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November be won by a candidate opposed to the relocation within the prefecture, the prospects of executing the plan will become even more remote. Kan is hoping to win the understanding of Okinawans by doing his utmost to lighten their burden while proceeding with the plan under the Japan-U.S. agreement. In Toronto, he personally sought Obama's cooperation. But Kan should have been more direct in his conversation with Obama. He should have told Obama frankly how hard it is for Okinawans to accept the present situation and why it is absolutely necessary to alleviate their burden, if the Japan-U.S. security framework is to be stably maintained. We understand it was their first meeting, and the time was limited, too. Still, we got the unmistakable impression that playing hardball with Obama was the last thing Kan wanted. But how can the two leaders build an ideal relationship for their countries if they dodge any difficult issue? They agreed on continuing to discuss ways to "deepen" the bilateral alliance. The discussions are expected to be mainly about how to deal with new global threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and major disasters, but these discussions could also develop into a review of the roles of the U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Kan told Obama, "It is important for the Japanese public themselves to think really about the significance of our alliance, and for them to think about the decisions for the future of our alliance." We, the people, need to keep seeking a solution to Okinawa's base-related problems in the bigger picture. The deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the alleviation of Okinawa's burden must be discussed as a package, and the entire nation must start the discussion. And it is Kan's responsibility to lead the discussion.

Japan Say Yes – Kan

**Kan would accept security guarantees- keeping troops emboldens political opposition against him**

Green 6/13 (Michael, senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Wall Street Journal Opinion, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html?mod=wsj\_india\_main)

The U.S. and Japan need to build a new strategy for preventing further erosion of the strategic equilibrium in the Pacific. Tokyo is preparing a midterm defense plan with an initial advisory board panel report due in a few months. The panel is now likely to advise strengthened security cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded states in Asia. The Obama administration should synchronize its Asia strategy with this effort so that President Obama's visit to Japan in November on the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty provides clear future vision for the alliance. Key elements should include strengthening bilateral roles and missions for defense of the maritime commons; coordinating support for democratic norms and sustainable development in Asia; and working for a bilateral U.S.-Japan economic partnership agreement and trade liberalization in the region. Both governments will also need a strategy to rebuild support in Okinawa for the air base replacement facility. Mr. Hatoyama's flip-flopping and populism have left Mr. Kan with a real political mess on the island. In the worst-case scenario, an antibase candidate could capitalize on mounting frustration with Tokyo to win the gubernatorial election in November. Mr. Kan would then have to abandon his pledge to Washington on base realignment or pass legislation in the Diet overruling the governor. The damage to Mr. Kan and the alliance would be bad either way. Things are looking better for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Mr. Kan has taken important steps to remove uncertainty about Japan's foreign policy trajectory under the DPJ. Now the rest of Asia—friends and foes alike—will be watching to see if the Obama administration has a strategy with Japan that goes beyond defense of the status quo.

Kan will say yes- reversing Hatoyama’s policies on the alliance and China

Mainichi Japan 6/18 (http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/editorial/news/20100618p2a00m0na001000c.html)

The DPJ's policy toward Japan-U.S. relations in its manifesto is not much different from that adopted by the largest opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), except the governing party's call for revisions to the bilateral status-of-forces agreement. In other words, the DPJ's latest manifesto shows particular consideration for the U.S. position on the bilateral security arrangement. This is obviously what Prime Minister Naoto Kan calls "realistic diplomacy." There are three major points in which the DPJ's diplomatic and security policy in its manifesto for the upcoming Upper House race is different from that for the Lower House election last year. Firstly, the "close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship," which was stated right at the beginning of its diplomatic policy in its Lower House manifesto is only mentioned in a section of its Upper House election manifesto that calls for revisions to the status-of-forces accord. Instead, the new manifesto places more emphasis on "deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance." Secondly, "a review of the realignment of U.S. forces and the roles of U.S. bases," which was stated in the DPJ Lower House manifesto, is never mentioned in the latest edition. Instead, the phrase, "The DPJ will do its utmost to reduce the burden on Okinawa in accordance with the Japan-U.S. agreement (to relocate U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa Prefecture)," has been incorporated into the latest manifesto. The DPJ apparently deems that the bilateral agreement on the relocation of Futenma has settled the issue of reviewing U.S. forces in Okinawa and that Washington is highly unlikely to agree to any further review of U.S. forces in Japan, considering the regional security environment. Thirdly, calls on China to ensure the transparency of its national security policy were incorporated in the DPJ's new manifesto, while continuing to pursue an East Asian Community. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's East Asian Community plan along with his pursuit of an equal Japan-U.S. relationship was viewed in the United States as Japan distancing itself from the U.S. and attaching more importance to its relations with its Asian neighbors and adopting pro-China policies. The DPJ apparently expressed concern in its new manifesto about China's military buildup to counter such arguments. The policy reversal has given the impression that Japan will seek close cooperation with the United States rather than make assertions on its positions in its dialogue with Washington.

Japan Say Yes – China Fear

Japan says yes- sees withdrawal as a way to balance power in Asia and concerned about rising China

Talmadge 6/22 (Eric, Associated Press, Tokyo bureau chief of the Associated Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5islkPj\_84APsquFWNdqr2kuTwDQwD9GG68080)

TOKYO — Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a post-World War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyo's new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. "Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region," Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. "Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Under the pact, promulgated 50 years ago Wednesday, nearly 50,000 American troops are deployed throughout Japan. The U.S. forces include a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has its home port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than 10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island of Okinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere — a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world's second-largest economy. "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there — more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details are undecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it. Kan was scheduled to visit Okinawa on Wednesday for ceremonies marking the end of the 1945 battle there that hastened Japan's surrender. Recent tension on the Korean peninsula and China's growing military assertiveness have undoubtedly driven home the importance of the U.S. security pact with Japanese leaders. Before he stepped down, Hatoyama suggested that the March sinking of a South Korean warship, allegedly by a North Korean torpedo, contributed to his decision keep Futenma on Okinawa — reversing a campaign pledge to move it off the island. Tokyo was alarmed in April when a Chinese helicopter came within 300 feet (90 meters) of a Japanese military monitoring vessel in the vicinity of a Chinese naval exercise. That same month, Chinese ships were also spotted in international waters off Okinawa.

Japan Say Yes – Presence

Kan pledges to strengthen the Japan-US alliance; he also strongly wants a reduction in the US military presence in Japan

Jiang 10 (Jiang, Xinhau, June 11, <http://english.cri.cn/6966/2010/06/11/189s576169.htm>) LL

Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan vowed to deepen Japan-U.S. alliance in his first policy address Friday, saying the alliance is the "axis" of Japan's foreign policy. "The Japan-U.S. alliance is not only vital for Japan's defense, but also an asset for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region," Kan said. The newly-elected prime minister also said Japan will deepen the strategic mutually beneficial relations with China. On the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture, Kan reiterated that he will honor the agreement reached late last month with Washington. But Kan said he will also try to reduce the burden shouldered by the prefecture in hosting the air base and the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan under a bilateral security accord. "The relocation of Futenma U.S. air base, return and relocation of some of the U.S. marines to Guam has to be realized at any rate,” he said. Kan said he will visit the prefecture on June 23 to attend a ceremony to mark the 65th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, in which more than 200,000 were killed during the closing stages of World War II.

Both Kan and Obama value the US-Japanese alliance, but US military intervention in Japan has empirically been an issue of contention

AFP 10 (June 6, <http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=330250&catid=37>) LL

President Barack Obama held a telephone conversation in which they discussed "the many issues facing both nations" and the Japan-US alliance, the White House announced. Mr Obama yesterday congratulated Mr Kan on his election on Friday and shared with him "the conviction that the partnership and close ties between the United States and Japan greatly benefit the citizens of both nations and contribute significantly to stability and prosperity throughout the world," White House spokesman Mr Robert Gibbs said in a statement. They "agreed to work very closely together to address the many issues facing both nations and the global community, including the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran" and looked forward to meeting at the upcoming G8 and G20 summits in Canada, he said. The statement made no further reference to specific issues Mr Obama and Mr Kan touched on, but Japanese media said they affirmed ties strained by a row over a US base in Okinawa. Jiji Press said that during the the 15-minute call, Mr Obama told Mr Kan the two countries needed to strengthen co-operation based on their equal partnership.

Japan Say Yes – Presence

US-Japanese alliance strong – but US military presence in Japan poses a key threat to stability

Talmadge 10 (Eric, The Associated Press, June 22, <http://www.canadaeast.com/rss/article/1104542>) LL

TOKYO - Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a post-World War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyo's new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. "Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region," Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. "Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defence of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Under the pact, promulgated 50 years ago Wednesday, nearly 50,000 American troops are deployed throughout Japan. The U.S. forces include a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has its home port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than 10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island of Okinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defence spending low, to about 1 per cent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere — a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world's second-largest economy. "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there — more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details are undecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it. Kan was scheduled to visit Okinawa on Wednesday for ceremonies marking the end of the 1945 battle there that hastened Japan's surrender. Recent tension on the Korean peninsula and China's growing military assertiveness have undoubtedly driven home the importance of the U.S. security pact with Japanese leaders.

US bases unpopular; Hatayama’s downfall and public protest prove

Mercier 9 (Gilbert, News Junkie Post, Nov 8, <http://newsjunkiepost.com/2009/11/08/japanese-want-the-us-military-out-of-japan/>) LL

Sixty four years after the end of World War II, 47,000 US troops are still stationed in Japan. Today, an estimated 21,000 Japanese rallied in Okinawa in protest of the US military base on the island. The rally is putting pressure on the new center-left government just days before the visit of President Obama. The US military base in Okinawa is often called “the US unsinkable aircraft carrier” due to its strategic proximity from China, Taiwan and North Korea. Okinawa continues to host more than half of the 47,000 US troops stationed in Japan. A recent Japanese poll revealed that 70 percent of Okinawans want the US troops out. The election of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and of his center-left coalition government, ending 40 years of conservative rule, has brought the issue front and center of Japan’s national political debate while putting some strain to Japan’s relation with Washington. “I urge Prime Minister Hatoyama to tell President Obama that Okinawa needs no more US bases. I urge Prime Minister Hatoyama to make a brave decision and put an end to Okinawa’s burden and ordeal,” said Ginowan’s Mayor Yoichi Iha at today’s rally. The crowd of thousands applauded the Mayor’s speech. The Futenma base is located in a densely populated urban area. Okinawans have been angered by aircraft noise, pollution, the risk of accidents, and crimes committed by the US military. Okinawans reacted with outrage after the rape of a school girl by 3 US soldiers in 1995. The demands to close the base grew even stronger when a US helicopter crashed in the ground of a university in 2004. Prime Minister Hatoyama has vowed to adopt a less subservient relationship with Washington. Hatoyama has said he wants the base moved off the island or even out of the country.

Japan Say Yes – Presence

Japan hates the bases – Hatayama’s removal proves

Sweeney 10 (Claire, Times Online, May 23, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7134220.ece>) LL

Japan’s embattled prime minister has apologised to the people of Okinawa for ditching his campaign promise to move a U.S. military base off the island - a concession that is likely to further erode his grip on power. During his party’s campaign for last year’s elections that swept him to power, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had promised to relocate U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station off of Okinawa, perhaps even out of Japan. But he has recently conceded that the government will be going back to an earlier plan, or a slightly modified version of that plan, chiseled by the former governing party: Building another base on Okinawa, but in a coastal area less crowded than the residential sector where Futenma is now located. “The relocation of Futenma will have to stay in Okinawa,” Mr Hatoyama said in a meeting with Okinawa prefectural chief Hirokazu Nakaima. “I apologise from the bottom of my heart for the confusion that I have caused the people of Okinawa in not being able to keep my promise.” “I must tell you that your decision is extremely regrettable and very difficult to accept,” Mr Nakaima said. The people of Okinawa have long complained about the noise, jet-crash dangers and worries about crime that come from housing more than half of the 47,000 U.S. troops in Japan, stationed under the bilateral defense alliance. Mr Hatoyama has seen his popularity ratings plunge in recent months - as voters increasingly are disenchanted with his failure to act on a number of campaign pledges, including the Futenma issue as well as promises for toll-free highways and cash payments for babies.

US military bases immensely unpopular

Anti-Imperialist News Service 10 (May 10, <http://www.anti-imperialist.org/japan%20protests%20us%20military%20bases_5-10-10.htm>) LL

On April 24, 100,000 people in Okinawa demonstrated against U.S. bases on the island and against the 50-year old "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty". Demonstrators expressed outrage that Prime Minister Hatoyama, under pressure from the U.S. State Department, backed down on a promise to move the U.S. Marine Corp Air Base Futenma off the island. Over the last several months the Japanese people have organized hundreds of protests and mass actions, all across the country, to demand the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Okinawa and Japan. The main demands of the growing movement in opposition to U.S. military presence in Japan include an end to the 50-year old "security" treaty which permits U.S. bases, and the removal of the nearly 100 U.S. military installations throughout the country. From 1945 to 1972, the Japanese island of Okinawa was occupied and ruled directly by the U.S. military. Today, the U.S. still maintains over 47,000 troops in Japan, with over half stationed on the island of Okinawa. Although opposition to the bases is growing amongst the Japanese people, both the Japanese and U.S. governments are committed not only to keeping U.S. troops and bases in Okinawa and Japan but also to strengthening U.S.-Japanese military cooperation. This includes plans to enhance the integration and "interoperability" of U.S. and Japanese forces. The U.S. military occupation of Japan is not only a constant danger and threat to the Japanese people, but to the peoples throughout Asia. U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan remain one of the principal means through which U.S. imperialism projects its military power in the region. Today especially, when the dangers of war are growing, both as a result of imperialism's implacable opposition to the demand of the oppressed nations and peoples for sovereignty and independence, as well as from the intensifying rivalries between the various imperialist powers themselves, the struggle of the Japanese people against U.S. military bases is an important part of the world-wide struggle against militarism and war. It deserves the support of people everywhere.

Japan Say Yes – Will Help w/ Taiwan

Japan is seeking to redefine its relationship with Taiwan- the counterplan is an opportunity to help relations

Taiwan News 6/10 (http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news\_content.php?id=1282771&lang=eng\_news&cate\_img=46.jpg&cate\_rss=news\_Editorial)

Instead, a greater appreciation has emerged in Tokyo for the formulation of diplomatic policy that is based on Japan's national interests and this reorientation has been transformed into careful consideration in diverse policies of how best to manage interaction with both China and Taiwan in concrete issues. Therefore, Taiwan must approach Japan from the standpoint of enhancing common interests and not remain mired in preoccupations of who is "pro-China" or "pro- Taiwan." Kan's assumption of office provides a new starting point as the new DPJ prime minister enters office as positive expectations from the Japanese citizenry revived to early 62 compared to Hatoyama's dismal exit approval rating of just over 19 percent. The Taiwan government should take advantage of the entry of a new but more experienced DPJ administration to expand the scope of common interests and joint cooperation with Tokyo. In the field of economics, Japan has already replaced the U.S. as Taiwan's second largest trading partner after the PRC, while the continued importance of Taiwan to Japan's national security strategy cannot be questioned. Before the PRC became today's "great power," Japan's security was almost entirely in the hands of the U.S. while China was merely an important economic partner. However, Japan is now actively concerned with the security of all of Asia, especially East Asia, and has begun to directly participate in Asian security affairs, such as the question of nuclear proliferation with North Korea or the sinking of the South Korean corvette "Cheonan" in March. As a result, Japan's security interests with relation to Taiwan are being enhanced as well, a development which should be seen as positive for Taiwan's own security. Moreover, the Taiwan government should devote greater attention to reviving tourism between Taiwan and Japan, especially given the proximity and historical and cultural ties between our two countries and the attractions of Taiwan's democratic and pluralistic society to Japanese travellers, including individuals or small groups. With the assumption of power by the DPJ and of Kan Naoto's new Cabinet, the bilateral relationship has entered a new era in which Tokyo no longer has to choose between Beijing or Taipei but can promote deeper and wide-ranging substantive dialogue and interaction with Taiwan. If the past urban and consumer activist can fulfill the promise implicit in T-shirts proclaiming "Yes, We Kan!", the new DPJ grassroots prime minister may indeed bring a new fresh breeze that can open the door for Tokyo to manifest more progressive and assertive global leadership.

Japan Say Yes – Wants to Keep the Alliance

Japan will say yes- trying to improve its international image and keep the alliance

Auslin 7/1 (Michael, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Wall Street Journal Opinion, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575337661778908390.html)

Of equal interest, and challenge, is Mr. Kan's national-security agenda, or as he terms it, his plan for "realizing enlightened national interest through responsible foreign policies." Here, there are subtle changes to the Hatoyama manifesto. At the top of the list is deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance across the board, followed directly by acknowledging the 2006 agreement to move Marines out of the Futenma Air Station and into a new facility in the north of Okinawa. Mr. Kan thus has made it clear that he will try to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. over the Futenma replacement plan. But he cannot ensure that local elections in Okinawa slated for September and November may not result in the emergence of officials opposed to the relocation agreement, or that the final plans for the new runway facility will be finished and approved by August, a concern expressed to me by senior DPJ officials. The foreign policy section of Kan's manifesto shows a more nuanced approach to overseas issues than previously expressed by the DPJ. The party promises to examine how Japan's Self Defense Forces can play a larger role in peacekeeping operations, and at the same time calls for establishing mutual trust with Japan's neighbors, as a step toward a broader East Asian Community. Alliance managers will also look for action on the promise to finish Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of this year, thus ending the limbo in security planning that began under Mr. Hatoyama. Equally importantly, Mr. Kan plans to "maintain and stimulate the development of defense-related manufacturing technologies," and it is rumored that senior DPJ officials will soon propose the abandonment of the restriction on foreign defense industrial cooperation that has so hampered Japan's industrial base. These changes, if carried out, would signal a significant shift in how the DPJ views the country's role in the world and the future possibility of contributing to regional and global stability, while also helping to boost higher valued-added parts of the economy.

Japan wants to preserve its alliance with the US but is reaching out to China

Panda 6/9 (Rajaram, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Eurasian Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.html)

It may be remembered that Hatoyama tried to push for “close and equal” relationship with the US, while striving to reach out to neighbours, especially China. In contrast, Kan has said that though Japan’s ties with the US will continue to remain the core of Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s ties with China would also be valued. There are divergent opinions in Japan on this, however. For example, Motofumi Asai, President of Hiroshima Peace Institute, a premier research centre on peace, is of the opinion that Japan needs to end its overly dependent relationship with the US and “start taking a fresh look at US relations from a fundamental point of view.” Asai finds fault with past governments for not taking a stronger stance towards the US. Asai observes: “Japan needs to take a stand against the US and say that the Japanese public is saying ‘no’ and that if the situation doesn’t improve, bilateral ties could be strained.”6 As regards relations with China, Kan recognizes the importance of economic interdependence between the two countries. At the same time, Japan is aware of the tensions in the East China Sea, where the Chinese Navy and the Japanese Self Defence Forces look at each other with suspicious eyes. Some China watchers in Japan, including Asai, however, do not see China as a threat and blame the media for “overreacting”. Far from seeing China as a threat, Japan seems to be more concerned by the world perception of itself as an “economic dwarf” and a “political pigmy” vis-à-vis China, as a China analyst recently described to the author about Japan’s present status in the world.

Japan Say Yes – Wants to Keep the Alliance

US presence in Japan is the only site of contention between an otherwise strong US-Japan alliance; Japan would likely support the US in security measures

Yokota 10 (Takashi, Newsweek, Jan 22, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/21/a-pacific-squall.html>) LL

In the run-up to the 50th anniversary of the security alliance between Tokyo and Washington last week, the conventional wisdom was that the U.S.-Japan relationship was in a downward spiral. Since taking power in September, Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has insisted on revising a 2006 military realignment agreement that would relocate a controversial Marine air base on Okinawa known as Futenma from a densely populated residential area to an offshore site of another base on the island. That prompted fear in Washington that the entire deal would unravel and undermine its military realignment plans. Pundits speculated the alliance was adrift, particularly as U.S. officials seemed miffed about their new partners in Tokyo. Yet the relationship between the U.S. and Japan is not nearly as bad as it seems. Yes, there is disagreement on one issue. But the fate of a small air base on Okinawa is not the only thing that matters. On North Korea, cooperation between Japan and the U.S. is better than ever. A key part of the Obama administration's North Korea policy is to restrengthen its cooperation with Tokyo, after the Bush administration hastily pursued a nuclear deal with Pyongyang in 2008 at the expense of Japan's dearest issue: the North's 1970s abductions of Japanese citizens, who have yet to be accounted for. Despite Pyongyang's attempts to lure the U.S. into talks, Washington is treading cautiously so that the North will be unable to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies, as it has done before. Moreover, there is little, if any, difference between Tokyo and Washington on global issues like nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, and terrorism. In November, Hatoyama and Obama agreed to cooperate closely on nonproliferation efforts and clean-energy development. Despite Japan's decision to withdraw its refueling ships from the Indian Ocean, it has pledged $5 billion in aid to Afghanistan, a commitment Washington welcomed. Both sides also agree on the fundamentals of the security alliance. Despite the squabbling over the Futenma base, Tokyo and Washington agree on the importance of having American troops in Japan. They also agree that the burden on Okinawa—which hosts 75 percent of U.S. military bases in the nation—must be mitigated. For all the ranting by the Hatoyama administration's coalition partners—namely the Social Democrats—key cabinet members have no intentions of weakening the alliance. As Katsuya Okada said in one of his first news conferences as foreign minister, he wants to address the Okinawa problem to make the bilateral relationship sustainable "for the next 30, 50 years." So why the gloom and doom? Obviously it's tempting to make headlines out of a rare spat between steadfast allies. In particular, the Japanese media establishment perpetuated the angst, as it is accustomed to viewing the relationship as a cozy friendship between pro-American conservatives in Tokyo and so-called Japan hands in the U.S. Truth be told, the commotion was more about inexperienced governments than fundamental differences. Having won a historic election in August, an elated Hatoyama government got carried away by its promise to carve out a "more equal" partnership with the U.S. and insisted on the Futenma issue in a way that made it look like it was taking the relationship for granted. Washington overreacted by allowing the frustrations of the Pentagon to dominate its posture. "Both capitals have lost sight of the fact that the bilateral relationship is not about housekeeping issues like the length and shape of a runway in Okinawa," says Evans Revere, an Asia expert formerly at the State Department. Now officials on both sides of the Pacific are refocusing their attention on the big issue: how the countries can meet the challenges in a changing regional-security environment. At their meeting in Honolulu earlier this month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington is "respectful" of Tokyo's decision-making process, and Okada made it clear that Tokyo is not ruling out the current agreement—which Washington wants implemented—he just wants to explore the options. Hatoyama later said Japan should be "thankful" for the security alliance with the U.S. Next month both capitals will start talks to "deepen" that alliance. As for Futenma, expect more headlines from the Japanese press, as Hatoyama tries to craft a palatable compromise plan by May. But don't believe any hype about a crisis.

Japan Say Yes – Wants to Keep the Alliance

Japan has honored the US-Japan alliance, but would welcome the removal of bases

AP 10 (May 28, <http://www.mauinews.com/page/content.detail/id/110351.html?isap=1&nav=5024>) LL

TOKYO (AP) — Washington and Tokyo agreed Friday to keep a contentious U.S. Marine base in the southern island of Okinawa, reaffirming the importance of their security alliance and the need to maintain American troops in Japan. In a joint statement, the two allies agreed to move the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko, in a less crowded, northern part of the island. The decision is broadly in line with a 2006 deal forged with the previous, conservative Tokyo government, but represents a broken campaign promise on the part of Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Hatoyama came to office last September promising to create a "more equal" relationship with Washington and move the Marine base off the island, which hosts more than half the 47,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan under a 50-year-old joint security pact. But after months of searching and fruitless discussions with Washington and Okinawan officials, the prime minister acknowledged earlier this month that the base needed to stay in Okinawa. His decision, which he had pledged to deliver by the end of May, has angered tens of thousand of island residents who complain about base-related noise, pollution and crime, and want Futenma moved off the island entirely. U.S. military officials and security experts argued it is essential that Futenma remain on Okinawa because its helicopters and air assets support Marine infantry units based on the island. Moving the facility off the island could slow the Marines' coordination and response in times of emergency. Under a 1960 security pact, American armed forces are allowed broad use of Japanese land and facilities. In return, the U.S. is obliged to respond to attacks on Japan and protect the country under its nuclear umbrella. The U.S. and Japan "recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability," said the statement, which was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. Reaffirming the 2006 deal comes as a relief for Washington. In a phone conversation with President Barack Obama Friday morning Japan time, Hatoyama said Obama "expressed appreciation that the two countries could reach an agreement." The Futenma move is part of a broader plan to reorganize American troops in Japan that includes moving 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents to the U.S. territory of Guam by 2014. But U.S. officials had said that the other pieces cannot move forward until the Futenma issue was resolved. The two countries said an environmental impact assessment and construction of the replacement facility should proceed "without significant delay." The statement called for a logistical study to be completed by the end of August. The base, whose plans call for a 1,800-meter (5,900-feet) runway built partly on reclaimed land off the coast of Henoko, faces intense opposition from residents and environmentalists. The joint statement called for sensitivity to Okinawans' concerns. "The Ministers recognized the importance of responding to the concerns of the people of Okinawa that they bear a disproportionate burden related to the presence of U.S. forces, and also recognized that the more equitable distribution of shared alliance responsibilities is essential for sustainable development of the alliance," they said. They said they would consider moving military training facilities off of Okinawa, possibly to nearby Tokunoshima, or out of Japan completely. The accord called for more environmental stewardship, through which U.S. bases in Japan might incorporate renewable energy technology. Hatoyama faces some dissent to the plan in his Cabinet. Gender Equality Minister Mizuho Fukushima, leader of a junior coalition party, refuses to support it and has in the past threatened to leave the coalition over the matter.

Japan Say Yes – Wants to Keep the Alliance

Japan supports the US – the militaries of the two countries are becoming increasingly cooperative

Klinger 9 (Bruce, Aug 26, Sr Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance>) LL

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world. Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

**US-Japan alliance strong**

**Global Security 10** (Jan 13, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/01/mil-100113-nns03.htm>) LL

YOKOSUKA, Japan (NNS) -- On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the U.S. Navy's senior commander in the Western Pacific called the alliance the "cornerstone of peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region." "I consider our alliance with Japan to be critical to the security and stability of this region, and I know our Sailors do as well," said Vice Adm. John Bird, commander, U.S. 7th Fleet. "For the past half century this treaty has successfully deterred aggression, while promoting common values of freedom and democracy, and creating the conditions that have allowed the economies of Japan and nations around the region to flourish." Jan. 19 marks the 50th anniversary of signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan. Signed in Washington D.C. in 1960 and ratified later that year by both nations, the document has served as foundation for the U.S. Navy's strong working relationship with the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force. JMSDF and 7th Fleet forces work together on daily basis to train, share information, coordinate operations, and plan for contingencies. The bilateral Annual Exercise (ANNUALEX), held last November with nearly 30 ships participating to focus on enhancing command and control and air, undersea and surface warfare, has been conducted more than 20 times since its inception. U.S. Navy and JMSDF ships throughout Japan will be in full dress ship on Jan. 19 to mark the anniversary. Additionally, the destroyers USS Lassen and JS Oonami will conduct a joint colors ceremony in Yokosuka. Other celebrations will be held throughout the year, to include personnel exchanges, sister ship and squadron events, community service projects and port visits. Bird said the commemoration of the alliance symbolizes how the maritime relationship is honed, tested and strengthened on a daily basis. "Our mutual understanding of commitments to each other under the security treaty is the reason for this incredible bond between our Sailors and between our nations," said Bird. "This alliance has served as the basis for our strong relationship with the JMSDF, arguably the most critical navy-to-navy partnership in the world."

Japan S Taiwan

Japan is key to convoy and logistics efforts – this ensures a diplomatic compromise if tensions rise

Clinton H. Whitehurst, ’99. Emeritus Professor of Management and Economics @ U of Clemon, Ph.D. in Economics, completed post-doctoral work in Defense and Strategic Studies, former Visiting Research Scholar in Taiwan, former lecturer at the Chinese Naval Academy, National Defense University, and the National Defense Management College. “AMERICAN MILITARY OPTIONS IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT,” <http://www.strom.clemson.edu/opinion/whitehurst/taiwan.pdf>.

Scenario #l (1999-2004) The People’s Republic of China threatens to halt ships calling at Taiwan ports without prior PRC clearance. The Republic of China begins to convoy ROC-flag ships and offers protection to foreign flag merchant ships in Taiwan waters. European Union member nations and most East Asia countries, including Australia and New Zealand, accede to the PRC demand. Japan and the United States do not comply. The likely U.S.-Japanese response would be to convoy or otherwise protect their ships in Taiwan waters. Initially, Japan’s support would be limited to logistic support for engaged American naval forces. In a 1999-2004 time frame the United States and Japan have this capability. American carriers would be positioned east of Taiwan but could, at some risk, enter the Taiwan Strait. The likely outcome of this scenario, assuming no American or Japanese naval or merchant ship losses, would be a diplomatic compromise, but one with Taiwan’s security left in doubt. There would be no clear winner.

Also key to anti-sub and escort duties – this is the key to limiting Taiwan war

Clinton H. Whitehurst, ’99. Emeritus Professor of Management and Economics @ U of Clemon, Ph.D. in Economics, completed post-doctoral work in Defense and Strategic Studies, former Visiting Research Scholar in Taiwan, former lecturer at the Chinese Naval Academy, National Defense University, and the National Defense Management College. “AMERICAN MILITARY OPTIONS IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT,” <http://www.strom.clemson.edu/opinion/whitehurst/taiwan.pdf>.

Scenario #2 (2004-2020) The People’s Republic of China threatens to halt ships calling at Taiwan ports without prior PRC clearance. Most nations accede to the PRC demand. Of the major nations, only the United States and Japan refuse to comply. In a 2004-2020 time frame, the PRC would have the capability of sustaining a submarine threat in the waters east of Taiwan. Its air force and ballistic missile force (DF15/M9 and DF-21) would be capable of inflicting losses on hostile naval forces in the Taiwan Strait, Yellow Sea and the northern South China Sea. American carriers would operate further to the east, outside the range of PRC cruise missiles. The U.S.-Japanese response would be to protect their merchant ships entering and clearing Taiwan ports. Anti-submarine capability would be crucial as would the ability to escort shipping. Any United States deficiencies in this capability would quickly become apparent.[3] In addition to logistics support for engaged American naval forces, Japanese naval units would be called upon to perform anti-submarine and escort duties. Mine hunters and escort capable ships would be taken from other U.S. fleets and theaters of operation. Should the confrontation become prolonged, PRC mining of waters around Taiwan could logically be expected. Mine hunting would be tasked to Republic of China naval units. At this point it is probable that U.S. mine hunters would be based at the Taiwan ports of Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Hualien. An American option would be to mine major mainland China ports, but one that would be vigorously opposed and condemned in the United Nations. The likely outcome of this scenario would be ship losses much like the losses that occurred in 1941 when U.S. naval units escorted UK bound convoys part way across the North Atlantic.[4] Convoy tactics would depend on the extent of PRC-claimed territorial waters around Taiwan, in particular waters to the east of the island. A reasonable assumption is that the PRC would claim a minimum of 200 miles eastward and would interfere or attack shipping within this zone. A favorable outcome for the United States would depend upon its ability to protect shipping within this zone. Assuming this ability, time would be on the side of the U.S. and Japan. In summary, the strategies and tactics that won the “Battle of the Atlantic” in World War II would be replayed in the Western Pacific. As in the case of the 1999-2004 scenario, the confrontation would likely end in a compromise, but one that guaranteed Taiwan’s security.

Japan S Taiwan

Even in the worst scenario, Japan can corner China into a ceasefire

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Scenario #3 (l999-2004) The People’s Republic of China announces an air and sea blockade of Taiwan, including mining of Taiwan waters. Most nations accept the blockade and end commercial intercourse with the Republic of China. The United States and Japan are the exceptions. The United States begins convoy operations in cooperation with ROC naval units. Initial Japanese support is logistical in nature for engaged U.S. naval units. The ROC provides air cover for commercial ROC air carriers entering and leaving Taiwan. The PRC threatens Japan if U.S. air bases in Japan are used in air operations over Taiwan. The American response is to give the ROC Air Force sole responsibility for air cover operations but agrees to replace ROC planes losses. American carriers provide air cover for U.S., ROC and Japanese ships and planes entering and leaving Taiwan ports and airports. The carriers also become delivery vehicles for replacing ROC fighter aircraft losses. Should the blockade be prolonged, Japanese naval units could be expected to provide escorts for commercial shipping moving between Japan and Taiwan. In a 1999-2004 time frame the United States, Japan and the Republic of China have the capability to break a PRC air and sea blockade. As in the case of previous scenarios, ships from other fleets would augment 7th fleet capabilities. To the extent that the 5th and 6th fleets are vital to American national security interests, then to that extent would transfer of units to the 7th fleet compromise those interests. The likely outcome of this scenario would be a Korea-type cease fire. There would be no winner or loser. Taiwan would remain free but at a very high cost to its economy. The United States would realize it might not prevail should two major naval undertakings against hostile forces occur simultaneously.

Security assurances drive a wedge between China and Japan

Chu 8 (Shulong, Prof of political science and international relations, Brookings, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/01_east_asia_chu/01_east_asia_chu.pdf>)

And if the Sino-Japanese relationship deteriorates seriously, it will not lack for problems that could trigger crises. The disputes over islands and Exclusive Economic Zones and resources could escalate. The Taiwan issue could become a more serious problem between Beijing and Tokyo than the historical issues, if Japan decides to follow the American model to develop political, military, and security relations with Taiwan (either unilaterally or in conjunction with the United States). China may not be able to launch a retaliatory attack on American soil if the United States attacks China in a conflict over Taiwan, but it is easier for China to mount a serious attack on Japan if the latter uses military means to protect Taiwan and attack China or Chinese forces in Taiwan situation. China is worried about increasing Japanese involvement on the Taiwan issue. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told a news conference on January 5, 2007, that China has “grave concern” regarding the Japanese report that the United States and Japan will discuss a contingency plan for a crisis situation arising in areas around Japan, including the Taiwan Strait. The Kyodo News Agency report quoted several sources familiar with Japan-U.S. military cooperation as saying that the two sides have reached consensus on the necessity for such a contingency plan and will soon begin discussing the details. The two countries have identified Taiwan as a “common strategic objective” and are now working on a joint war plan for the Taiwan Strait.14 If Japan and China continue to expand military activities in the East China Sea and Western Pacific, the risk of incidents between their navies and air forces will increase, just as incidents have occurred between the United States and China (most notably, the EP-3 spy plane incident in 2001).

Japan S Taiwan

US backing of Japan would push China away

Chu 8 (Shulong, Prof of political science and international relations, Brookings, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/01_east_asia_chu/01_east_asia_chu.pdf>)

Overly close bilateral relations between the United States and one of the two Asian giants may weaken the American relationship with the other, and that will greatly increase the difficulty of promoting American interests and the American agenda in Asia and in the world. If China and Japan engage in strategic rivalry and the United States chooses to support one side, then the U.S. will obviously become a party to Sino-Japanese competition in Asia and in the world. In that situation, as in the Cold War during the 1950s and 1960s, surely the Chinese side would suffer more than either the United States or Japan if the U.S. sided with Tokyo, but American interests would also suffer greatly. As Kent Calder observes, “The ultimate danger is that Japanese diplomatic isolation in the Western Pacific, coupled with the clear security challenges that Tokyo faces, and its ongoing internal political shifts, could drive Japan either toward an assertive and counter-productive unilateralism, or toward an unhealthy, overly militarized variant of the US-Japan alliance that will greatly intensify tension within Asia.”16 Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine observe that, “[m]ore broadly, an intensified rivalry could divide Asia by driving a wedge between the United States and Japan on one side, and China and much of the rest of Asia on the other.”17 Even if the United States does manage to remain aloof from a China-Japan rivalry, it is not in Washington’s interest for Asia’s two most powerful and influential states to engage in a deteriorating relationship that could that could hamper or even reverse growth, create instability, and even lead to a new cold war. Intense and overt Sino-Japanese competition would severely limit the U.S. ability to maneuver in the region.

Japan k2 China

Japan plays a key role in US military affairs the relation to China

Chanlett-Avery and Konishi 9 (Emma and Weston, Specialist in Asian Affairs and Analyst in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Services, July 23, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>) LL

Although the U.S.-Japan security partnership grew out of a need to contain the Soviet Union and has endured in large part because of North Korea’s threat, many analysts see countering China as the primary driver of the campaign to enhance cooperation today. The U.S. approach to rising China is often characterized by observers as having two prongs that roughly correspond to the “engagement” and “containment” camps. The “engagement” approach includes the “responsible stakeholder” concept outlined most prominently by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, which aims to convince Beijing to contribute peacefully to the international system that has allowed its economic and political rise. The “containment” aspect of U.S. policy seeks to counter a China that could develop in ways inimical to U.S. interests. The U.S.-Japan alliance plays a role in both approaches. In the former, Japan could serve as a model of responsible multilateral engagement as well as a key economic partner for China in the region. In the latter, enhanced joint defense capabilities from neighboring Japan could deter any aggressive behavior by China’s military. U.S. forward deployment in Japan plays a particularly important role in contingency strategies for a conflict with China over Taiwan.

Japan Support Key

Japan has the potential to “balance the power” in a war over Taiwan

Hu 8 (Shaohua, Institute of World Economy and Politics and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Apr 12, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/m6426716168466m2/>)LL

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts – national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan’s three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo’s decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option.

Japan could effectively serve as a counterweight to Chinese aggression

Eland 3 (Ivan, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, Feb 5, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb74.pdf>) LL

There is currently no commitment on the part of the United States to intervene if China attacks Taiwan, but President Bush has recently made the traditional ambiguity about a U.S. response a little less ambiguous. Bernstein and Munro’s assertion that if Taiwan fell all of East Asia would be open to Chinese domination is wildly exaggerated. As this paper indicates, the Chinese military probably cannot successfully invade Taiwan, let alone dominate the rest of East Asia. Furthermore, Japan, alone or in combination with other prosperous states in East Asia (such as Australia and South Korea), could act as a counterweight to a China that increased its military power over time.

Japan’s technology will be key in any upcoming conflicts

Pillsbury 0 (Michael, National Defense University Press, January 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html>) LL

Chinese books on the U.S. military are plentiful and largely descriptive. (205) Some Chinese military textbooks about the U.S. Armed Forces begin with a sentence that declares U.S. military technology is the best in the world, (206) but this apparent praise is misleading. The main point of all writings about U.S. forces is to emphasize their weak points and their vulnerability to defeat by China. Not one of the more than 200 books reviewed for this study admitted that the United States could defeat China by force in any scenario--but many techniques can supposedly defeat U.S. forces. (207) There are frequent references to China's "defeat" of U.S. forces in both Korea and Vietnam. The United States is said likely to fall behind others in the RMA. It is said that even Japan is developing better military technology than the United States in several areas and that the United States is "dependent" on Japan for military technology. (208)

Japan Support Key

**Japan support key on a variety of issues, including Chinese aggression**

IIPS 9 (International Institute for Population Sciences, Sep 2009, <http://www.iips.org/jussec/J-US-SEC2009e.pdf>) LL

Functioning as an international public good, the Japan–US alliance is naturally (for Japan and other Asia–Pacific nations) a bedrock for security and prosperity in East Asia. For the USA, it represents the cornerstone that secures its influence in East Asia. Moreover, considering China’s rise as a state that challenges US hegemony in East Asia, as far as the USA is concerned, Japan is an indispensable alliance partner. Once Japan and the USA have thus re-affirmed the need for the Japan–US alliance, the problems of how Japan should handle various issues in the wider world beyond the Asia–Pacific region, and of how this might affect Japan–US relations, must be considered. With respect to global issues such as terrorism, global warming, resource and energy problems, infectious diseases, aid to the very poorest nations, financial stability issues, and the control and abolition of weapons of mass destruction—there are numerous roles that Japan should be playing—both independently and in cooperation with the USA. An active contribution by Japan in these areas will help to increase Japan’s influence internationally and lead to closer Japan–US relations. Consequently, this will likely form an important part of any twenty-first-century national strategy for Japan.

Japan and the US must maintain cooperation in the face of Chinese threats

Tisdall 10 (Simon, The Guardian, Mar 8, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/08/china-us-alliance-under-pressure>) LL

But the official consensus is firm that the US relationship will continue to form the "cornerstone" of Japan's defences, as foreign minister Katsuya Okada put it – a position shared by Hatoyama.The main reason behind this confidence that, despite all the stresses and strains, the alliance will endure is not hard to discern: growing mutual fear of China. If Obama has mismanaged ties with Japan, his problems with China are infinitely greater by comparison, ranging from security issues such as Iran, Taiwan, North Korea and Tibet to fair trade, currency valuations, human rights and climate change. Obama wants to befriend China and work with it. But if China chooses a diverging path, as it often appears inclined to do, the help and assistance of Japan in containing it will be indispensable to the US – and vice versa. Underscoring this point, last week's exchanges over Okinawa coincided with the latest, unsettling broadside from the People's Liberation Army that, according to some Japanese analysts, calls the shots in Beijing. "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one, the top power," wrote PLA senior colonel Liu Mingfu. China, he said, was determined to become the "global champion" while conflict with the US over "who rises and [who] fails to dominate the world" was inevitable. This may be bluster. But it is safer to assume it is not. With this unruly giant bellowing on the doorstep, Japan and the US need each other more than ever. What they lack is new thinking about how to make their relationship work better.

Japan Support Key

Japan help will be key in countering Chinese aggression

Stratfor Global Intelligence 4 (Oct 13, <http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/74438/japan_u_s_strengthening_alliance_protecting_taiwan>) LL

The United States and Japan could be preparing to move military forces to Shimoji, an island about 200 miles east of Taiwan. The strategic realignment demonstrates the evolution of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance to include a more active Japan and Taiwan. Analysis: As part of the U.S. force restructuring in the Pacific, the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is preparing to move its air wing to Shimoji, an island southwest of the main island of Okinawa, about 200 miles east of Taiwan, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation reported Oct. 13. That same day, Taiwan’s ET Today Web site reported the United States and Japan have established an outpost on Xiadi Island (Shimoji) and that Japan’s Department of Self-Defense has decided to station four Air Force units, including F-15C squadrons, on the island. The proposed movement of U.S. and Japanese air assets westward demonstrates the evolution of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance that includes not only more active participation by Japan, but also Taiwan. U.S.-Japanese discussions over the U.S. force restructuring have been ongoing for more than a year; plans for the future U.S. military presence in the Pacific are unfolding slowly. Negotiations to establish a cooperative security outpost at Shimoji reportedly began recently, but were not discussed publicly until mid-September — after China began laying a 290-mile pipeline from Shanghai to the offshore Chunxiao gas field, which could stretch into waters claimed by Japan. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage warned Oct. 13 that talks between Washington and Tokyo might have begun too early and as a result the two countries are having difficulties. (Translation: Nothing is decided yet, and if you want to know what is going where and when, wait for the press release.) With that said, it must be noted that for a number of reasons, Shimoji is an ideal location for a U.S.-Japanese air base. First, the 4 square-mile island has a population of only about 75 people, which means U.S. forces and Tokyo will not have to worry about local backlash from the presence of U.S. soldiers — unlike the situation in Okinawa. The island also already has a 10,000-foot concrete runway, which would be sufficient to service a variety of military aircraft, including Japan’s F-15C fighter jet. The security interests of Japan, Taiwan and the United States — which have been aligned since the end of World War II — are now beginning to evolve into a more balanced relationship where the two regional powers not only assist the United States with some heavy lifting, but also protect each other. While addressing the opening ceremony of the 2004 Forum on Taiwan-Japan Relations on Oct. 10, Taiwanese Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun said Japan should develop into a “normal nation” (meaning it should drop its pacifist constitution) and play an active role in the region’s security and defense. The prime minister said Taiwan hopes to enhance the relationship among the United States, Japan and Taiwan to create an alliance. Taiwan is interested in a strong Japanese military because it hopes its northern neighbor will rush to its assistance in the event of an attack from China — or at least keep Beijing occupied and give Taiwan room to carry out its own military and political plans. Japan, as it continues to transcend the strategic limitations placed on it by its pacifist constitution, would probably heed Taiwan’s call for protection. Tokyo would not sit idly by while China moved to reclaim Taiwan and potentially cut off Japan’s access to the South China Sea and the waterways that carry the country’s critical oil and natural gas imports. The United States is trying to bolster Taiwan’s defenses against China’s growing naval and air forces — including approximately 600 ballistic missiles targeting the island — with an $18.2 billion arms package that includes four Kidd Destroyers, 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, eight diesel-electric submarines and six PAC-3 anti-missile batteries. The new weapons systems, however, likely would not be enough to protect Taiwan a decade from now as the military balance continues to slip out of Taiwan’s favor, but it does contribute significantly to the trilateral coalition. The combined capabilities and mutual security interests of Japan and Taiwan will help the United States counter a potential Chinese military threat in the 21st Century while it continues to keep forces spread globally to meet threats from militant Islamist groups and regional flare-ups.

Japan Brink of Choosing

Japan is at a crossroads- strengthening the alliance while reaching out the China

Ito 6/5 (Masami, Japan Times, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100605a6.html)

On Thursday, Kan said the Japan-U.S. relationship would remain the core of Tokyo's foreign policy but that ties with China would also be valued. "I think that Japan's diplomacy is founded on Japan-U.S. relations, (but) at the same time, Japan is in East Asia and we are seeing a historic development in Asia," Kan said. "Japan needs to go in the direction of building a trusting relationship with the U.S. while placing particular importance on China. I think that is the correct way for Japan's future." But Motofumi Asai, president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, a research center, said Tokyo needs to end its overly dependent relationship with Washington and start taking a fresh look at U.S. relations from a fundamental point of view. The former diplomat, who noted that Okinawa still hosts most of the U.S. bases in the country, said past governments are at fault for not taking a stronger stance toward the U.S. "The U.S. thinks it is natural (for Japan to shoulder the bases) because the Japanese government hasn't said anything," Asai said. "Japan needs to take a stand against the U.S. and say that the Japanese public is saying 'no' and that if the situation doesn't improve, bilateral ties could be strained." Asai also stressed the importance of staying close to China. Experts agree that while overall relations are good, the media are paying close attention to tensions in the East China Sea, where the Chinese navy, the Japan Coast Guard and Self-Defense Forces appear to be antagonizing each other. Nevertheless, Asai and other experts on Sino-Japanese relations don't see the tensions as a threat and say the media are "overreacting." "Japan is located so closely to China and the two countries are (economically) interdependent," Asai said. "There is no peace and stability in Japan without friendly ties with China." He also expressed deep concern about the revolving door of Japan's leadership over the past several years, saying the world will eventually lose trust in Japan. "Japan's reputation as a major power is wearing thin and the image of Japan as an economic superpower but a political minnow is growing," Asai said. "It is a very serious situation."

**Japan is moving closer to China- but tensions over North Korea threaten the relationship**

Kyodo International 6/27 (http://newsystocks.com/news/3567448)

Japan and China agreed Sunday to beef up dialogue between defense authorities to build mutual trust amid disputes such as those caused by recent Chinese military activities around Japanese waters, a Japanese official said. In his first face-to-face meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan also called for China's cooperation in responding to the fatal sinking of a South Korean warship for which North Korea has been blamed. ''I would like to send a clear message to North Korea at the U.N. Security Council and I want to ask for a forward-looking response from China,'' Kan was quoted by the official as telling Hu. Hu said the sinking of the naval vessel was ''a very unhappy incident.'' But he told Kan that each country should respond calmly from a broader perspective on the matter, underlining the gap between the two countries' position on the issue, according to the official. China, one of the five veto-holding permanent members of the Security Council, remains reluctant to take tough action on Pyongyang as the two countries are strategic allies. In the meeting held on the sidelines of a two-day Group of 20 summit in Toronto through Sunday, Hu said he wants to reinforce dialogue between the defense authorities, governments, parliaments and political parties of the two countries, in an attempt to enhance mutual trust. Kan responded that he agreed with the idea and said he ''would like to strengthen dialogue between defense authorities and build a trustful relationship,'' the official said.

Japan Chooses China Absent QPQ

Diplomatic changes indicate that Japan will not assist the US in a US-China war

Fackler 10 (Martin, The New York Times, Jan 23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24japan.html>) LL

TOKYO — When Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited Japan’s new leaders in October, not long after their historic election, he pressed so hard and so publicly for a military base agreement that the Japanese news media labeled him a bully. The difference between that visit and the friendly welcome that a high-level Japanese delegation received just two months later in China, Japan’s historic rival, could not have been more stark. A grinning President Hu Jintao of China took individual photos with more than a hundred visiting Japanese lawmakers, patiently shaking hands with each of them in an impressive display of mass diplomacy. The trip, organized by the powerful secretary general of Japan’s governing Democratic Party, Ichiro Ozawa, was just one sign of a noticeable warming of Japan’s once icy ties with China. It was also an indication that the United States, Japan’s closest ally, may be losing at least some ground in a diplomatic tug-of-war with Beijing. Political experts say Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s greater willingness to engage Beijing and the rest of Asia reflects a broad rethinking of Japan’s role in the region at a time when the United States is showing unmistakable signs of decline. It also reflects a growing awareness here that Japan’s economic future is increasingly tied to China, which has already surpassed the United States as its largest trading partner. “Hatoyama wants to use Asia to offset what he sees as the declining influence of the United States,” said Yoshihide Soeya, director of the Institute of East Asia Studies at Keio University in Tokyo. “He thinks he can play China off the United States.” Mr. Soeya and other analysts say warmer ties with China are not necessarily a bad thing for Washington, which has long worried about Japan’s isolation in the region. But some are concerned that the new openness toward China may also be driven by a simmering resentment within Mr. Hatoyama’s left-leaning government of what some here call the United States’ “occupation mentality.” Those feelings have been stoked by what many Japanese see as the Obama administration’s high-handed treatment in the dispute over the air base on Okinawa. The White House is pressing Japan to follow through on a controversial deal to keep a base on the island that was agreed to by the more conservative Liberal Democrats who lost control to Mr. Hatoyama’s party last summer after decades of almost uninterrupted power. “If we’re worrying that the Japanese are substituting the Chinese for the Americans, then the worse thing you could do is to behave the way that we’re behaving,” said Daniel Sneider, a researcher on Asian security issues at Stanford University. The new emphasis on China comes as Mr. Hatoyama’s government begins a sweeping housecleaning of Japan’s postwar order after his party’s election victory, including challenging the entrenched bureaucracy’s control of diplomatic as well as economic policy. On security matters, the Liberal Democrats clearly tilted toward Washington. Past governments not only embraced Japan’s half-century military alliance with the United States, but also warned of China’s burgeoning power and regularly angered Beijing by trying to whitewash the sordid episodes of Japan’s 1930s-1940s military expansion. American experts say the Obama administration has been slow to realize the extent of the change in Japan’s thinking about its traditional protector and its traditional rival. Indeed, political experts and former diplomats say China has appeared more adept at handling Japan’s new leaders than the Obama administration has been. And former diplomats here warn that Beijing’s leaders are seizing on the momentous political changes in Tokyo as a chance to improve ties with Japan — and possibly drive a wedge between the United States and Japan. “This has been a golden opportunity for China,” said Kunihiko Miyake, a former high-ranking Japanese diplomat who was stationed in Beijing. “The Chinese are showing a friendlier face than Washington to counterbalance U.S. influence, if not separate Japan from the U.S.” Some conservative Japan experts in Washington have even warned of a more independent Tokyo becoming reluctant to support the United States in a future confrontation with China over such issues as Taiwan, or even to continue hosting the some 50,000 American military personnel now based in Japan.

Japan Chooses China Absent QPQ

Japan doesn’t think we care about their opinion and more willing to support China

Curtis 9 (Gerald, expert in Japanese politics, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/1\_curtis.pdf)

Ever since the Meiji period, when Yukichi Fukuzawa argued that Japan had to “get out of Asia,” the Japanese people have debated whether to give priority to relations with Asia or with the West. But for younger politicians, and for a considerable number of older ones as well, the idea that Japan has to choose one or the other does not ring true. Close relations with the United States are vital for Japan, but so too are close relations with China. The leaders now in power in Tokyo, and even more so those who are going to succeed them, take the view that it is Japan’s leaders and not America’s who are to decide the terms of Japan’s Asian engagement. In an important sense, it is far easier for American officials to talk with Japan’s younger politicians, especially those who have lived in the United States and are English speakers. But American officials are used to dealing with an older generation of Japanese political leaders for whom the preservation of Japan’s “special relationship” with the United States was seen as the nation’s primary foreign policy goal. They need to recognize that that is no longer the case and that the dynamics of the relationship are changing. For the eight years of the Bush administration, both American and Japanese officials crowed that US-Japan relations had never been better. And that is certainly true for the relationship between officials in the Bush administration and those in the Japanese government who constantly reassured them that this was indeed the case. But it was not true for the Japanese public. The belief that Japanese policy is subservient to the United States, that Japanese foreign policy is made in Washington even as Washington pays less and less attention to Japan, grew stronger over the past decade. When Yasuhiro Nakasone was prime minister in the 1980s, the “Ron-Yasu” relationship between him and President Ronald Reagan was widely seen by Japanese as a source of leverage for Japan. But to many Japanese, all Prime Minister Koizumi’s close personal relationship with President Bush seemed to have accomplished was to get Japan to send Self-Defense Forces to support the United States in an unpopular war in Iraq. There is a serious reconsideration of Japan’s foreign policy currently underway in Tokyo. The Obama administration is doing far too little to tune in to this debate and too little to reach out beyond Japanese whom American officials know well to engage people who now are in power and those who have influence with those in power in a strategic dialogue about the alliance’s future and about the region.

Relations with China are improving but the US could shape the outcome

Curtis 9 (Gerald, expert in Japanese politics, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/1\_curtis.pdf)

Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama share a similar worldview in the importance they attach to so-called nontraditional security threats—global warming, environmental degradation, pandemics, and other issue areas that provide opportunities for meaningful cooperation between the United States and Japan. There is also an essential commonality in their views of China. The DPJ government is enthusiastic about deepening relations with China, but this is less of a departure from the policies pursued by recent LDP governments than some people are wont to assume. Political leaders in both the LDP and the DPJ are well aware that Japan’s prosperity is increasingly dependent on its economic relations with its Asian neighbors and with China in particular. Like the United States, Japan is deepening economic ties with China and at the same time striving to maintain a balance of power in the region. Given Japan’s constraints—constitutional restrictions on the roles and missions of its military, severe budgetary conditions that have frozen defense spending, and continued public opposition to a larger Japanese regional security role—Japan’s hedging strategy toward China depends on maintaining a strong security alliance with the United States. The Obama administration has ratcheted up the economic dialogue that the Bush administration had initiated with the Chinese into a more encompassing “Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” It needs to initiate an equally high-level and broad-based dialogue with Japan. Japan should not be taken for granted. The United States cannot afford to put relations with Japan on a kind of autopilot and expect to avoid a lot of turbulence. The US-Japan relationship will change, but whether that change results in a stronger alliance or not depends on the leadership exercised by both Washington and Tokyo.

Japan Chooses China Absent QPQ

Japan is trending toward China- but is still stuck between the US and China

Curtis 9 (Gerald, expert in Japanese politics, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/1\_curtis.pdf)

For one thing, bilateral relations have a way of refusing to stay bilateral. In the interconnected world in which we live, those relationships are more akin to a game of billiards than they are to the more familiar chessboard of international politics. Billiards is a two-person game in which when one hits a ball it hits another, setting that ball in motion and moving other balls on the table. It is an apt metaphor for international politics, where what may be intended as a solely two-party interaction, whether between the United States and China, the United States and Japan, or some other combination, takes on the characteristics of a multiparty game. As the United States deepens its relations with China, it has to reassure Japan that this does not amount to a downgrading of the US-Japan relationship, that America’s relations with China and with Japan are a positive-sum and not a zero-sum game. Conversely, as the DPJ government of Prime Minister Hatoyama emphasizes its desire to strengthen relations with China and to build an East Asia community, there is a need for Japan to reassure a suspicious Obama administration that this does not amount to a downgrading of the US alliance or an effort to build a regional structure that excludes the United States. The only way to do that is to enhance a strategic dialogue between Japan and the United States, not just on bilateral issues but also on regional and global issues and on policy toward third countries such as China.

Japanese and Chinese cooperation increasing over military issues

Japan Today 10 (June 28, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/japan-china-agree-to-enhance-defense-dialogue>) LL

Japan and China agreed Sunday to beef up dialogue between defense authorities to build mutual trust amid disputes such as those caused by recent Chinese military activities around Japanese waters, a Japanese official said. In his first face-to-face meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Naoto Kan also called for China’s cooperation in responding to the fatal sinking of a South Korean warship for which North Korea has been blamed. ‘‘I would like to send a clear message to North Korea at the U.N. Security Council and I want to ask for a forward-looking response from China,’’ Kan was quoted by the official as telling Hu. Hu said the sinking of the naval vessel was ‘‘a very unhappy incident.’‘ But he told Kan that each country should respond calmly from a broader perspective on the matter, underlining the gap between the two countries’ position on the issue, according to the official. China, one of the five veto-holding permanent members of the Security Council, remains reluctant to take tough action on Pyongyang as the two countries are strategic allies. In the meeting held on the sidelines of a two-day Group of 20 summit in Toronto through Sunday, Hu said he wants to reinforce dialogue between the defense authorities, governments, parliaments and political parties of the two countries, in an attempt to enhance mutual trust. Kan responded that he agreed with the idea and said he ‘‘would like to strengthen dialogue between defense authorities and build a trustful relationship,’’ the official said. Touching on the stalled six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs, Kan noted it is important to settle the sinking of the 1,200-ton Cheonan in the Yellow Sea in March which killed 46 South Korean sailors. On the economic front, Kan and Hu reaffirmed the need to launch formal negotiations on signing a bilateral treaty over gas exploitation in the East China Sea at an early date, the official said. The dispute stems from the unsettled demarcation of the East China Sea, where the exclusive economic zones claimed by the two countries overlap. Hu also indicated he will visit Japan when it hosts a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November, the official said. During the 45-minute talks, the two leaders also agreed to enhance strategic, mutually beneficial relations. They also agreed that Japan and China need to promote a ‘‘win-win’’ relationship through economic cooperation. Kan and Hu also shared the view that the two countries should continue efforts toward the creation of an East Asian community.

Japan Chooses China Absent QPQ

Japan and China are seeking to develop a “neighborly friendship”

Japan Today 10 (May 7, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/hu-arrives-in-japan-on-visit-of-reconciliation>) LL

Chinese President Hu Jintao called Tuesday for bolstered trust and cooperation with Japan as he arrived in the country for the first visit by a Chinese head of state in a decade. Hu, who arrived on a special Air China flight, is scheduled to hold summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda on Wednesday afternoon, after a meeting with Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko. ‘‘The development of long-term stable and good neighborly friendship between China and Japan is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and the two peoples,’’ Hu said in a statement upon arrival at Tokyo’s Haneda airport. ‘‘I hope that during this visit, we can increase mutual trust, strengthen friendship, deepen cooperation, plan the future and open the way for a new stage of overall development in the Sino-Japanese strategic, mutually beneficial relationship.’’ Hu met with Fukuda for an informal dinner Tuesday at a Tokyo restaurant known for its links with Sun Yat-sen, China’s revolutionary hero, before the start of his official schedule with a welcoming ceremony on Wednesday morning. The Chinese president is also to give a speech at Waseda University in Tokyo, visit a Chinese school in Yokohama and tour historic sites in Nara.

Attempts to form an East Asian Community are key; Japan would likely support China

Wang 10 (Yusheng, China Daily, June 8, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-06/08/content_9946723_2.htm>) LL

The recent meeting between leaders of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held in Jeju, ROK, marked the beginning of a new era of cooperation in East Asia. Agreements reached on several issues at the meeting will undoubtedly inject new energy into the region's economy and help revive it and build an "East Asian Community" (EAC). The meeting achieved four important things. First, it strengthened mutual political trust among China, Japan and the ROK. It showed that the leaders of the three countries are determined to strengthen cooperation and coordination, consolidate mutual trust and share a more prosperous future. The triangular bond will thus provide a solid political foundation for future international cooperation. Second, the main objectives and strategic directions of an EAC were spelt out more clearly at the meeting. The Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2020, which maps out a blueprint for the next 10 years, has elevated the triangular ties to a new level. The emphasis on cooperation was demonstrated clearly too. And the special attention paid to mutual trade is a big step toward building a free trade area. Third, the decision to set up a secretariat is an important step toward establishing a more stable mechanism for cooperation, which will ensure that the ideas shared by the leaders of the three countries are turned into more concrete action. Last, the joint declaration on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, confirming that its denuclearization was crucial to long-lasting peace, security and prosperity for all, has done much to stimulate cooperation. Speaking at the meeting, ROK President Lee Myung-bak said the three countries agreed, while discussing the recent sinking of an ROK warship, that negotiations and dialogues were essential to preserving peace and stability in East Asia. Besides, the three countries talked about the possibility of better communication and dialogues on defense and other security related issues, which would help defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Japan Chooses China Absent QPQ

Japan would oppose Taiwanese independence – likely they would side with China

Miller 8 (Andrew, The Trumpet, Mar 3, <http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=4889.3162.0.0>) LL

After years of giving each other the cold shoulder, the militaries of Japan and China are entering into a new area of cooperation. On February 27, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (sdf) Chief of Staff Takashi Saito met with China’s Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan in Beijing. At this meeting the two military leaders agreed to enhance military cooperation between Japan and China. Such cooperation, Takashi said, is significant to both regional and global stability. The Chinese defense minister took this meeting as an opportunity to reiterate to the Japanese military leader how important it was to China to have Japanese support in opposing Taiwanese independence. Takashi said Japan would continue to oppose any move toward independence on Taiwan’s part. While in Beijing, Takashi also visited Chen Binde, the chief of general staff for China’s People’s Liberation Army. They agreed to implement a views and ideas exchange program between the two militaries as they each build up their defense forces. Military cooperation between Japan and China is the start of a 180-degree realignment in Japanese military politics. Japan’s post-World War ii constitution theoretically bars Japan from maintaining “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential.” This, however, has not prevented Japan from building a sizeable defense force and deploying personnel in non-combat peacekeeping roles internationally. Even now, Tokyo is considering sending peacekeeping troops to southern Sudan as a way to boost the international presence of its military.

Japan and China have pledged to promote a strong, bilateral relationship

Navrozov 10 (Lev, Newsmax, Apr 15, <http://www.newsmax.com/navrozov/Navrozov-China-Japan-alliance/2010/04/15/id/355832>) LL

For a while it was widely believed in the democratic West that the “China-Japan relationship” is for trade and for peace and friendship. But recently on a Web site, I saw a banner with an inscription in big white Chinese letters, with a translation below it, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.” The name of the document the Ministry has printed is “China-Japan Joint Statement on All-Round Promotion of Strategic [!] Relationship to Mutual Benefit.” How did this “strategic” document come into being? “President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China paid a state visit to Japan from 6 to 10 May [2008] at the invitation of the Japanese government. During the visit, President Hu Jintao met with Emperor Akihito and held talks with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. They reached broad agreement on promoting China-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit in an all-round way. Two sides issued the following joint statement.” Of course, the Ministry cannot publish this “joint statement” in order to explain the term “strategic” because this would “disclose military secrets.” But the reiteration of the word suggests that the military cooperation between the two countries is to be as extensive as possible, and it should be remembered that Japan is one of the world’s most technologically and scientifically developed countries. What is noteworthy is that Japan spent many years trying to conquer China, but the two allies of today have crossed this out of history or, indeed, out of reality. Let me quote the last paragraphs of this introduction to a “joint statement”: “The two sides reaffirmed that enhancing mutual political and security trust is important to growing China-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit. The two sides agreed on the following: “Establish a mechanism of regular exchange of visits between leaders of the two countries. The two sides will, in principle, have annual summit that will alternate between Beijing and Tokyo, and the leaders will have frequent meetings on multilateral occasions. “A mechanism of exchanges and strategic dialogues between governments, parliaments, and political parties of the two countries will be set up to strengthen consultation on bilateral relations, respective domestic and foreign policies and the international situation with a view to enhancing policy transparency.” In its “Countries and Regions of the World from A to Z,” Yahoo! says that “there are 194 independent sovereign states in the world, plus about 60 dependent areas, and five disputed territories.” The list of 249 items follows.

\_\_\_\*\*Taiwan War Internals

Independent Japan S

Independent Japan solves North Korean proliferation and checks all regional conflict

Preble 6 (Christopher, the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 9/1, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8791)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) various weapons programs have been of concern for Americans for some time, but they pose a far more urgent threat to Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese have still other reasons for distrusting Kim and his duplicitous regime: the DPRK refuses to account fully for the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Continued strong opposition within Japan to the use of the military for offensive ends suggests that unilateral pre-emptive action by Japan against North Korea, for example, is highly unlikely. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect that Tokyo would wait for U.S. permission to respond to a direct attack. It is only slightly more plausible that the Japanese would refrain from using force in response to credible evidence of an imminent threat. Following the North Korean missile test in July, chief cabinet secretary, Shinzo Abe, a leading candidate to replace Koizumi as prime minister, hinted that the constitutional restrictions on the use of force would not prevent Japan from waging pre-emptive attacks against North Korean missile sites. "If we accept that there is no other option to prevent a missile attack", he told reporters, "there is an argument that attacking the missile bases would be within the legal right of self-defense. I think we need to examine this from the perspective of defending the Japanese people and nation." Short of pre-emptive strikes, a Japanese military, operating independently of the United States, could deter North Korea from attacking Japan. An independent and empowered Japan might also succeed in convincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The potential gains are speculative and Japan's actions will still be constrained by the anti-militarist impulses of the Japanese public, but the prospects for a more credible deterrent or threat coming from a "normal" Japan should be considered relative to U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure, which has been completely ineffective in halting North Korea's bellicosity. Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future, more serious challenges to the regional security order. Japan's lingering hostility toward and suspicion of North Korea in the near term pales in comparison with its medium- to long-term concerns of a rising China. The trajectory of China's rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition for influence in East Asia will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific.

Japan has a huge stake in East Asian affairs and can deal with it

Preble 6 (Christopher, the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 9/1, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8791)

If the United States is to focus on a few areas of particular concern related to the War on Terror, especially the Middle East, then U.S. policymakers must seek ways to quietly devolve security responsibilities to wealthy, stable, democratic allies. Japan is at the top of that list. The object of U.S.-Japanese strategic relations should be a more equitable distribution of the burdens of defense between the two allies, with each assuming primary responsibility for its most urgent security interests. Japan's interests in East Asia greatly exceed those of the United States. Japanese businesses have developed extensive economic ties in the region, and Japanese citizens value friendly, peaceful relations with their Asian neighbors. They are also mindful of potential threats. North Korea's nuclear program, and its ongoing missile development, is an urgent concern. According to some polls, the Japanese public is impatient with the Koizumi government for having not taken a harder line against Kim Jong-il. Then there is Taiwan. The island is less than 175 miles west of Ishigaki, the southernmost island in the Japanese archipelago, and it sits astride crucial sea-lanes. Military conflict there would disrupt the free flow of raw materials and goods to and from Japan. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would likely alter the strategic balance in East Asia. Thus, it is not surprising that Japan cares greatly about the ongoing dispute between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Japan is well positioned to address the myriad security challenges in East Asia. Its existing capacity for projecting military power beyond its shores is considerable, and could be expanded. Because of Japan's deep and abiding interest in continued peace in the region, and because it has more at stake in the region than the United States, Japan should increasingly take the lead, with the United States moving into a secondary and supporting role.

Independent Japan S

Japan can contain China given the power

Preble 6 (Christopher, the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 9/1, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8791)

Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future, more serious challenges to the regional security order. Japan's lingering hostility toward and suspicion of North Korea in the near term pales in comparison with its medium- to long-term concerns of a rising China. The trajectory of China's rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition for influence in East Asia will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific. Common economic interests within Asia may lead to China's peaceful integration into the region. Or China could turn away from its current course of political and economic liberalization and revert to economic autarchy imposed by military force. It is even possible that China could become a revisionist power, no longer content to accept regional security configurations in their present form. That could occur even if the PRC holds to a course of economic reform. Against those unlikely but dangerous possibilities, Japan's neighbors should welcome a potential counterweight to a rising China. Many already do. Attitudes toward Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Filipinos and Malays much more favorably disposed than are Koreans to the notion of a wider security role for Japan. These attitudes could evolve further if China's behavior grows more threatening. The decades-long U.S.-Japan strategic partnership is changing. Americans are becoming increasingly anxious about the costs and risks of our permanent global military presence. We welcome changes that will allow the U.S. military to step back from its role as the world's policeman, and are looking for ways to devolve security responsibilities and reduce our risk exposure. The Japanese — while retaining a strong anti-militarist disposition — are willing to play a more assertive role. They are anxious for their country to behave, and to be treated as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are already highly capable, and Japanese military capabilities could quickly expand if the security environment grows more threatening.

Japan is ready and willing to defend itself against North Korea

Preble 6 (Christopher, the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 9/1, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8791)

What, then, is Japan likely to do? Continued strong opposition within Japan to the use of the military for offensive ends suggests that unilateral preemptive action against North Korea is highly unlikely, but not beyond the realm of possibility. Following the North Korean missile test in July, then-chief cabinet secretary Abe hinted that the constitutional restrictions on the use of force would not prevent Japan from waging preemptive attacks against North Korean missile sites. "If we accept that there is no other option to prevent a missile attack," he told reporters, "there is an argument that attacking the missile bases would be within the legal right of self-defense. I think we need to examine this from the perspective of defending the Japanese people and nation." Then, in his first speech as prime minister, Mr. Abe elaborated on this point. Japan's responsibilities now extended beyond self-defense, he explained. Given "the rising expectations" that Japan must contribute to international security, Mr. Abe pledged to "thoroughly study individual, specific cases to identify what kind of case falls under the exercise of the right of collective self-defense which is forbidden under the Constitution." In other words, future military ventures, similar to the deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq, could be deemed legitimate even if the current Constitution remains unchanged. Despite the popular conception of Japan as a "pacifist" country, the Japanese boast one of the most capable militaries on the planet. Japan's defense expenditures trail those of the United States, China and the United Kingdom, but are nearly equivalent to France's military budget. Japan spends more than Russia and more than twice as much as India, the country often seen as a rising power (and a prospective U.S. strategic ally) in the region.

Independent Japan S

Japan is modernizing- perceived ties to China accelerate development of military power

Chu 8 (Shulong, Prof of political science and international relations, Brookings, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/01_east_asia_chu/01_east_asia_chu.pdf>)

Japan may increase its military force substantially, and go beyond its bilateral alliance with the United States in search of a bigger role in Asia and in the world. Not only may Japan become a strong conventional military power again, but it may also become a nuclear power. As the world’s second largest economy, Japan certainly has the economic, financial, and technological capability to substantially expand its military power and become a “normal” country, when it feels the need to do so. It may also feel the need to react to China’s military buildup And it may have to increase its military power substantially if it suspects that the protection afforded by its alliance with the United States is no longer firm or sufficient. Japan is now on its way to becoming a “political power” in Asia and in the world, following its rise to economic power twenty or thirty years ago. Once Japan believes it has become a regional and global political power, then it may also want to become much stronger military power. Japan does not currently pursue such a strategy, but it may when the situation in Asia changes in the future. Japan’s potential to become a greater military power has been noticed by certain Chinese, American, and Japanese observers. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Matthews wrote that the December 18, 2001, North Korean spy ship event demonstrated “that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force,” which suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense.… rising nationalism has taken hold in one of America’s closest allies. This development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan. … Japan is clearly moving in a different direction.2 Matthews argues that Japanese resentment over the United States’s shift of attention to China, coupled with Japan-China strategic tensions, has strengthened the hand of Japanese nationalists who think their country should once more possess military power to rival that of its neighbors. The lack of recognition of Japan in international institutions strikes many Japanese as profoundly unjust, and leads some to wonder whether military rearmament might be one way to help their country get the respect it deserves. In the words of Kitaoka Shinichi, a University of Tokyo law professor whom Matthews cites, “Remilitarization is indeed going on.”3

War Inevit.

If trends continue, China-US conflict will be inevitable

Walt 10 (Stephen, Foreign Policy, Apr 26, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/25/chinas_new_strategy>) LL

For the past fifteen years or so, there's been a continuing debate on the likelihood of a serious rivalry between the United States and China. On one side are realists who believe that if China continues to increase its economic power, then significant security competition between the two countries is virtually inevitable. On the other side are those (mostly liberal) theorists who believe that the potential for trouble will be muted by economic interdependence and the socializing effects of China's growing participation in various international institutions. (This was Bill Clinton's rationale for getting China into the World Trade Organization, for example). And if China were to make a gradual transition to democracy, so the argument runs, then democratic peace theory will kick in and there's nothing to worry about. On Saturday, the New York Times published an important story supporting the realist view. It described the rapid expansion of China's naval capabilities (a classic manifestation of great power status), as well as the more ambitious new strategy that this growing capacity is designed to serve. Briefly, as China's economic power and dependence on overseas raw materials (e.g., oil) has grown, it is seeking to acquire the ability to protect its access. In practice, China's new strategy of "far sea defense" means acquiring the ability to project naval power into key ocean areas (including the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf), while denying other naval powers the ability to operate with impunity in areas close to China. Needless to say, this is precisely what realism would predict, and some prominent realists (e.g., my co-author John Mearsheimer) have already explained the logic behind this prediction very clearly. And the one country that shouldn't be at all surprised is the United States, because China appears to be doing something akin to what we did during the latter part of the 19th century. To be specific: Beijing is seeking to build its economy, then expand its military capacity, achieve a position of regional dominance, and then exclude other major powers from its immediate neighborhood. In the U.S. case, we expanded across North America ("Manifest Destiny") and other great powers to stay out of the Western hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine). It took a long time before the United States was strong enough to enforce the latter idea, but eventually we could and we did. This position has been a huge strategic advantage ever since: not only is the United States the only great power that didn't have to worry about foreign invasion (because it had no great power rivals nearby), this position also allowed us to intervene all over the globe without having to devote much blood or treasure to defending our own shores. If you were a Chinese strategist, wouldn't you like to be in similar position? Ideally, you'd like to be the strongest power in East Asia and you wouldn't want any other great powers (like the United States) to have a major strategic role there. Achieving that goal is not easy, however, because China has some strong neighbors (Japan, India, Vietnam, etc.) and many Asian states already have close security ties with the United States. So here's what I'd expect to see over the next few decades. I'd expect China to speak softly (for the most part) while it builds a bigger stick. If they are smart, they won't throw their weight around too much lest they provoke more vigorous balancing behavior by their neighbors (and the United States). I would also expect them to continuing developing military capabilities designed to make it more dangerous for the United States to operate near China, and eventually build power projection capabilities that will complicate our operations in other areas that matter (like the Persian Gulf). At the same time, look for them to forge relations in some areas that have been traditional U.S. "spheres of interest," so that the United States has to devote more time and attention to these regions too. I'd expect them to play "divide-and-conquer" closer to home as well, and try to persuade some of their neighbors to distance themselves from Washington. Lastly, Beijing would dearly love to keep the United States bogged down in places like Afghanistan, distracted by disputes over Iran's nuclear program, and stymied by the interminable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while they exploit the anti-American sentiments that these problems exacerbate and stay focused on the bigger picture. So don't expect a lot of help from them on those fronts.

War Inevit

War is inevitable; military build-up proves

Winslow 9 (Lance, World Think Tank, Sept 2, <http://ezinearticles.com/?expert=Lance_Winslow>) LL

Many military analysts and observers, and historical studiers of Chinese culture, anthropology, and even Sun Tzu believe that one day the United States of America will go to war against China. Interestingly enough, I am one of those individuals which believes this, and my observations China's behavior in the world are what lead me to this conclusion. First, China has no adversaries and is the United States largest trading partner, thus, the United States would protect her against any foreign military that was dumb enough to try to attack her. Of course, these days, well she could easily handle herself. Unfortunately, China has other plans and is building up her war machine. The nation currently has more ships than the United States Navy, soon it will have more jet aircraft fighter planes, bombers, and transports. China has the world's largest standing army. China is also building aircraft carriers, but China doesn't need any aircraft carriers to protect itself, those would only be used to project force outward, offensively, not defensively. China has also been very busy selling weapons to rogue nations, and even Al Qaeda. China has been forcing its will in places along its disputed borders. Chinese military generals have threatened that if the United States protects Taiwan against a Chinese forced reunification, that "China would be forced to use nuclear weapons on the Americans." I'm not sure about you, but I don't like the tone of that, and China needs to be punished for this behavior. The military theory of Sun Tzu which is often thought highly of amongst the older military Chinese professionals states that it is better to win by default, then to fight a war. Does this mean that China is building up its "military might" to challenge the United States hoping that the United States backs down? I believe so, and I believe that they are projecting a long-term strategy which might even be 50 to 75-years out. Nevertheless, I wouldn't be surprised if the United States of America gets into a war with China before then. Karl von Clausewitz the famous military historian and military philosopher once wrote his theory for preemption. He stated that if an opposing force was building up its power to attack you by surprise, that it was better for you to attack them first and maintain the element of surprise before they did. And he warned if action was not taken; it would be done so at the expense of your own people. In other words in this case it would mean that if China is building up its military to someday fight the United States of America, it would be better for the United States to stop any such action in advance, by force if necessary. These are harsh realities and we live in a politically correct world now where everyone wants to be touchy-feely and work through diplomatic channels and relationships. Indeed, it makes sense to go through such diplomatic channels and to not have conflict that results in political impasse, and by all means go through the process in a calm and collective way. However, when a Chinese military general makes a statement like that against the United States, it is time to put our foot down and stop that nonsense. Interestingly enough, the Chinese are not politically correct, they don't think like us, they have a long-term strategy, and it includes them ruling the world for their own benefit, regardless of what happens to America. In fact, in this case it would be in China's best interest once it secures its "economic might" to take the United States added the equation once and for all; eliminating such a threat. Denial of facts simply because they are not fun to think about is no reason to run and hide from reality.

War Inevit.

China and the US have no choice but to go to war; external security interests prove

Generational Dynamics 4 (Jul 6, <http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.i.taiwan040706>) LL

If you look carefully, you can almost feel the generational dynamics at work here. China and America are both entering generational crisis periods, with leaders who have no personal memories of the major world wars of the 1940s. As usual during crisis periods, brinkmanship is taking place, leading to increasing risk of conflict on both sides. China is acting too belligerently towards Taiwan; the Committee notices this, and concludes that the the solution is to act belligerently back. What makes this so extraordinary to watch is that neither side has any choice. Neither China nor America want war with each other, but it's as if China, Taiwan and America are puppets being controlled by some great generational puppetmaster in the sky to move, step by step, towards war. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian is a veteran of Taiwan's 1990 Wild Lily Rebellion, a student separatist movement that began as a reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown in China. As the USCC report notes, Chen is moving towards Taiwan independence. Even if "nothing happens" in the military confrontation this summer, the continuing generational change led by Chen makes increasing moves to Taiwan independence inevitable. China's western provinces (Tibet and Xinjiang) have their own separatist movements. So China must move against Taiwan in order to keep its western provinces in line. China has no choice. America's treaty with Taiwan calls for full defense of Taiwan in case of an attack from China. America has similar treaties with Japan and South Korea, and if America failed to defend Taiwan, then its treaties with Japan and South Korea would lose all credibility. So America has no choice.

**China war inevitable- history and rising influence prove**

**Smith 2** (Charles R., expert on cyber technology and its implications for war, Newsmax.com, 3/14, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/14/133903.shtml)

The **China apologists** in the United States **assure us that the communist state is not a threat**, that it is a peaceful nation prepared to take its place in the world. **Their simplistic view of Chinese history omits the past 40 years of confrontation with America**. They refuse to see **Beijing's growing inventory of advanced missiles, warships and planes**. They ignore **years of espionage and covert political influence** through contributions to U.S. political campaigns. They continue to seek appeasement despite the **overwhelming evidence of missile and nuclear weapon proliferation**. In the next 40 years, **China will attempt to take its place** among the world's superpowers. **China's growing arsenal of advanced weapons will enable it to do so in a forceful and violent manner**. It is time that we recognized what the People's Liberation Army already knows – that **America is its No. 1 target**.

Taiwan Conflict Inevit.

Taiwan crisis inevitable – long term trends prove

Shlapak 9 (David, Sr International Policy Analyst, RAND, 2009, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG888.pdf>) LL

The factors described in this chapter present something of a mixed bag, and their collective impact, in terms of the future stability of the cross strait relationship, is somewhat unpredictable. But we believe that, in general, the “tense stability” that characterized the cross-strait confrontation prior to the mid-1990s is suffering from gradual erosion. The debate concerning sovereignty over Taiwan has evolved dramatically. Today, this dispute pits a Beijing government that insists there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part against a Taiwan that still retains many formal trappings of being a Chinese state but increasingly develops an independent national identity. Notwithstanding the collapse of voter support for the DPP, nearly all significant political parties in Taiwan now accept the notion that any future arrangement with China must receive the separate approval of Taiwan’s 23 million voters. For Beijing, the emerging Taiwanese national identity raises the profoundly worrisome prospect that if unification is delayed for too long, the Taiwanese people will be unwilling to accept any arrangement that subsumes them within a “Chinese” state or confederation. Gradual changes along these lines seem unlikely to provide the spark for conflict, but they could provide a backdrop for crisis if Beijing concludes that long-term trends are turning powerfully against them. The rapidly growing cross-strait economic relationship means that Beijing can now inflict significant pain on Taiwan if it so chooses. But, to date, Beijing has had difficulty translating this economic leverage into meaningful political results, other than as a device for signaling its irritation with Taipei. If Beijing loses hope that economic and social maneuvers can slow or reverse forces on Taiwan that run athwart of at least eventual reunificaton, the attractiveness, in a crisis, of military options is likely to increase. In Taiwan, meanwhile, advocates of greater independence fear that growing economic ties will mean “time is not on their side,” and they may feel the need to push more provocative measures when political circumstances give them the chance. Beijing’s anger at what it saw as Chen Shui-bian’s provocative behavior encouraged a dangerous shift in the PRC’s “red lines” for threatening force against Taiwan. Beijing sees Chen and his allies as pathological “envelope-pushers” constantly looking for ways to promote the island’s independence, and the perceived need to keep Chen boxed in caused China to shift away from the four clear, relatively easy to follow “red lines” that it warned Taiwan not to cross in the past. Instead, China has gravitated toward more vague, ambiguous “red areas” and it is more likely to define (or redefine) these situationally and reactively during periods of crisis. This ambiguity and improvisation could become dangerous sources of misperception during a crisis. The combination of more than a decade of PRC military modernization and flat Taiwanese defense spending have transformed the balance across the strait away from one that had long favored Taiwan. In the heat of any future cross-strait crisis, this shift in the perceived balance of forces seems to remove an important impediment to Chinese use of force.

**Taiwan Conflict Inevit.**

**Tensions over Taiwan are likely to cause conflict**

Friedberg 5 (Aaron, International Security, MIT Press, Fall 2005, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v030/30.2friedberg.html>) LL

As regards Taiwan, China’s goal may be only to prevent that island from sliding toward independence. The PRC’s leaders may be perfectly willing to live with the status quo indefinitely, but they may believe that they have to issue periodic threats to prevent Taiwan from breaking free. The U.S. objective may be only to prevent forceful reunification. But China’s threats and ongoing military buildup may increase fears that Beijing will eventually feel capable of achieving its objectives through the use of force. To maintain deterrence, Washington may then feel compelled to increase military assistance to Taipei and to take other measures designed to make it appear more likely that the United States would intervene if Taiwan were attacked. But these steps will almost certainly make the PRC more fearful of a Taiwanese bolt for independence, which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military efforts and heighten its rhetoric, and so on. China’s aim in deploying large numbers of theater ballistic missiles may be primarily to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. But those deployments inevitably appear threatening not only to Taiwan but also to Japan, the United States, and others in the region. Conversely, the U.S. aim in moving toward deployment of some kind of theater missile defense (TMD) system may be to provide a measure of protection to U.S. friends and allies and to its bases and forces in the Western Pacific. But the possibility of such a deployment is obviously deeply threatening to the Chinese, who see it as undermining their ability to prevent unfavorable regional developments, especially if a U.S.- orchestrated TMD system is extended to include Taiwan. Beijing’s concerns about TMD will be further heightened by the deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system, which the Chinese could see as reducing their ability to deter an attack on their own territory. The Chinese response to these developments is likely to include steps to augment both their theater- and intercontinental-range strike forces, which will tend to heighten U.S. anxieties about their intentions.

Taiwan Conflict Inevit.

**US-China war over Taiwan is a “real” threat**

O’Hanlon 5 (Michael, Sr Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, May 1, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0501asia_ohanlon.aspx>) LL

Nonetheless, Mr Zoellick is more right than wrong. In the absence of strong constraints on future high-technology sales, lifting the European arms embargo on China would be a big mistake. There really is a chance of a Sino-US war over Taiwan, which may ebb and flow month to month but nonetheless remains quite real. And any European decision to lift the embargo could make any war more likely and more costly in lives and assets. The reasons are simple. First, China is serious about being willing to risk war to prevent Taiwan's secession. Second, although many in China as well as Europe cannot quite believe it, the US is just as serious about defending Taiwan. And third, even though American military power remains far superior to that of China, the Chinese do not need to equal US power to make any war over nearby Taiwan very challenging for American forces. Given the right catalyst from Taipei, therefore, US deterrence of China could fail and the world's first true war between nuclear weapons states could ensue. It is not just China's ruling communist party that considers Taiwan a part of China; an increasingly nationalistic population does as well. In fact, the Chinese see themselves as patient and restrained because they are simply demanding that Taiwan not secede, rather than insisting on immediate reunification. They worry that if Taiwan broke away, it would encourage other separatist movements in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang province, and weaken China strategically at the very moment it is poised to regain its status as a global power. China's leaders operate on the assumption that Taiwanese secession would doom their own prospects for holding on to power. At a minimum, they would have to show they had gone the extra mile to try to prevent secession, meaning that even an unsuccessful military operation might be preferable to inaction. And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered. This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction to China's firing of missiles near the island. Unfortunately, many Chinese doubt America's real commitment to Taiwan. Some argue that the US is casualty averse (despite the evidence from Iraq) and would back down from a fight over a distant island—especially a fight against another nuclear-armed state. They realise there is no binding treaty obliging the US to defend the island, and that the language of America's 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as well as other policy statements would give Washington numerous excuses not to fight (especially if, in Chinese eyes at least, Taiwan had clearly provoked the war). Other Chinese believe their recent successes in diplomatically and economically wooing much of the Asia-Pacific region—and Europe—mean that the US, rather than China, would be isolated in any future conflict. Even the military balance gives China hope that it would emerge successful in a crisis over Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains highly unlikely, given the inherent difficulties of amphibious assault in an era of 24-hour reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. But China has other military tools and options. In addition to threatening missile attacks, for example, it may be able to conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan. Estimates differ over the strength of the American force needed to defeat such a Chinese attempt, and the losses that would be incurred. But this very uncertainty may give Beijing hope, and a lifting of Europe's arms embargo could give it even more hope. The chances of a Sino-US war over Taiwan are not enormous, but are sufficiently real to be taken seriously. It is for Europeans to determine their future policy on selling arms to China, of course. But the US is on solid ground in asking that any new policy be made with eyes wide open about the huge strategic and military stakes at play.

Taiwan Conflict Inevit.

US and China are preparing for war over Taiwan

Lowther 10 (William, Tapei Times, Feb 25, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/02/25/2003466586>) LL

A new study published this week by Foreign Policy magazine concludes that Taiwan remains the one place in the world where China and the US “could conceivably come into direct conflict.” Drew Thompson, director of China studies at the Nixon Center in Washington and author of the study, wrote: “Some wonder whether China and the United States are on a collision course. Unquestionably, there is deep strategic mistrust between the two countries. China’s rapid economic growth, steady military modernization and relentless nationalistic propaganda at home are shaping Chinese public expectations and limiting possibilities for compromise with other powers.” However, Thompson also makes clear in the study that while conflict is not inevitable, it is cause for long-term concern. Taiwan is “an obvious point of disagreement,” he wrote, but there is a growing recognition that the US and China “should engage one another and seek to avoid a conflict that would almost certainly be destructive to both sides.” The study comes in the wake of Washington’s decision to sell a new US$6.4 billion arms package to Taiwan and just as the administration of US President Barack Obama is believed to be seriously considering the sale of F-16C/D fighters to Taipei. Thompson said China conducted another anti-missile test last month shortly after the US announced arms sales to Taiwan. At the same time, China’s leaders vehemently denounced any suggestion that they were embarking on anything other than what they have referred to as a “peaceful rise.” “But they also don’t explain why they are investing so heavily in this new arms race,” he said. “Taiwan, long claimed as Chinese territory and well within range of Chinese ballistic missiles and conventional forces, certainly has cause to feel threatened. Even as cross-strait relations have warmed in recent years, Beijing has positioned more medium-range missiles facing Taiwan than ever. When asked why, Beijing demurs,” he said. The study said that Chinese military leaders have focused on preparing their armed forces to fight a limited war over Taiwan “fully expecting that the United States would enter the conflict.” “Many weapons systems the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] acquired or developed, as well as the exercises it trained for, were largely aimed at fighting a technologically superior enemy — with particular emphasis on developing tactics to keep the United States from bringing naval assets to China’s shores,” it said.

War inevitable – history proves

Southerland 5 (David, Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force, Mar 18, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA431735&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) LL

For well over a decade, the United States has been the undisputed hegemon in a unipolar world. Many experts believe that the current unipolarity cannot last as historically the world’s powers will seek a balance of power. In the coming decade, that great power, or near-peer competitor could arise in the form of China. However, a major question in a world evolving to bi- or multi-polarity is, does that change necessarily constitute a coming conflict in the same vein as the previous Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union? If history is an accurate indicator, the answer is most likely yes due to a number of factors. First, there are already a number of major potential sources of conflict between the United States and China such as China’s human rights record, its growing economic influence in the global market, and China’s ever increasing military capabilities. Second, and arguably the most critical, is the United States’ policy in regard to Taiwan. Given the accuracy of the above two statements, this paper will examine the U.S./China relationships from a historical perspective, discuss the sources of potential conflict, and conclude with three alternatives for future relations between these two great powers. Finally, the paper will select the best alterative for the Unites States and Chinese relations in terms of the elements of national power.

Taiwan Conflict Inevit.

China is preparing for war

Southerland 5 (David, Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force, Mar 18, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA431735&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) LL

While U.S. military spending is certainly the largest in the world, China’s increased military spending and force improvements are pacesetting in East Asia;19 part of that spending comes in the form of technology transfers. China plays a central role in the transfer of both conventional and non-conventional weapons to many states—most notably of recent concern is increasing exports to Muslim states. These transfers include: construction of a secret, heavily defended nuclear reactor in the Algerian desert; the sale of chemical weapons to Libya; providing CSS-2 medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia; supply of nuclear technology or materials to Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea; and the transfer of large numbers of conventional weapons to Iraq20. Not only do these transfers make other militaries much stronger, they allow the Chinese to make significant investments into their own military. China is already by far the most militarily powerful nation in Asia and it is rapidly becoming even more powerful. It faces no credible military threat to any of its neighbors, almost all of which are relatively weak, and its defense spending is growing faster than any major county on the planet. China’s military spending growth is virtually unprecedented for a nation that is not in open conflict with any other major power.21 China’s military budget remains cloaked in secrecy and what is known is very misleading. The disclosed 1994 military budget was $5.9 billion; experts speculate that the actual budget was closer to $12 billion to $18 billion. Moreover, military spending in China goes further than in the West because the average Chinese soldier earns less than $20 per month. Even given this factor, the Chinese 1994 military budget was ranked #3 in the world with the U.S. as #1 and Russia as #2.22 Last year, the State Department issued a report that as of 1999, the U.S. was the #1 military spender with China now ranked as #2…U.S. spending was $281 billion that year while China’s reported spending was approximately $89 billion.23 In 2004, the U.S. military budget was $400.1 billion (and the U.S. is a nation at war) while China’s reported budget was nearly $100 billion. In terms of real growth, China has given its military double-digit budget increases for 14 out of the last 15 years.24 Based on these increases, what China has done is increasingly use its military as a foreign policy tool. In its campaign to isolate Taiwan, China sent water supply technicians to Liberia after the West African nation cut its ties with Taiwan.25 Additionally China also has the ability to leverage its nuclear arsenal as a policy tool in that it is the only regional actor that has deployed nuclear response.26 Given the accuracy of the above information, just what is China preparing for? Many experts believe China is preparing for an eventual military conflict with the West and is acting to secure its regional interests. Others believe China is preparing for an eventual showdown with the U.S. over Taiwan. The current U.S. stance toward Taiwan makes this assessment almost inevitable from a military perspective. In preparing for a U.S. showdown, China routinely holds annual training exercises in the area of Taiwan and has been known to mass troops along the Eastern coastline of the mainland as a “mock” amphibious landing scenario. In the event that China makes overtures to conduct more than exercises and actually move on Taiwan, the U.S. will have little choice but to come to Taiwan’s aid or risk collapse of its credibility with other friendly, economic important states in the region--and that could mean real war between the U.S. and China under the right circumstances. While some believe such a confrontation between the two nations is improbable, in 1996 the world nervously watched a face off between the U.S. and China in the Taiwan Straits. In March 1996, China showed off the development of accurate medium-range missiles and used them as a scare tactic against Taiwan.27 China conducted missile tests and live-fire naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait aimed at disrupting Taiwan’s first free and democratic election of a president in its history. In retaliation, the U.S. announced the aircraft carrier Independence and its battle group were only 200 miles away. When China continued with the exercises, the U.S. sent a second aircraft carrier, the Nimitz, to the region. China then threatened the U.S. to stay out of the strait; the U.S. exercised its rightful freedom of navigation rights and sent a ship through the area.28 In this particular instance, China chose not to engage the U.S.; however, the confrontation is precedent setting. Is the U.S. now obligated by its actions to come to Taiwan’s aid whenever this sort of event occurs again in the future? China’s continuing local adventurism will at a minimum assure some real chance of a limited naval or air engagement between the U.S. and China, especially in regards to Taiwan. While military action is possible, the hope is that careful diplomacy will help diffuse the situation whenever the potential for a military option presents itself. Unfortunately, U.S. and Chinese diplomatic tensions are yet another major source of potential conflict between the two nations due to major differences in ideology and other factors.

War over Taiwan in 2010

War will erupt in 2010

Sub-Media 4 (Brain Fertilizer, Dec 4, <http://brain.mu.nu/archives/057392.php>) LL

Everything is falling into line with 2010 being the optimal year for China to invade Taiwan. Sure, It might be a little earlier. They might go right after the Olympics are completed, depending on some residual good-will to temper criticism. It also might be a little later. But there are two essential problems facing China: securing Taiwan militarily, and keeping the US out of the fray until they can accomplish said securing of Tawain. The United States has agreed to the One China Policy. We don't act like it, because we sell arms to Taiwan and otherwise treat them as the separate state they are (does China collect any taxes from Taiwan? No? They aren't one nation then, are they?). But faced with a forcibly re-united Taiwan and a piece of paper signed by the President and approved by Congress that says Taiwan is a part of China, what could we do? Our main strategy in earlier tense moments was to send a carrier fleet into the Taiwan Strait, betting that China couldn't do anything without infringing on our personal space, which would give us the pretext we needed to get involved on Taiwan's side. But now they have Sunburn Anti-ship missiles, Su-27s and Su-30s, advanced attack submarines, and are increasing the accuracy of their short range ballistic missiles. All of the new and advanced weapon systems will be ready to go, on-line, and integrated into their battle plan between 2009-2012. I'm picking 2010 as a nice round figure.

Taiwan Conflict Escalates

Conflict escalates- misperception creates unintended escalation

Roberts 5 (Brad, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1/26 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=740

The extent to which these conflicting lines of thinking are actually reflected in war plans, or would inform the decisions of key leaders in times of crisis, cannot of course be known. But they point to the possibility of significant misperception and miscalculation in times of crisis over Taiwan. Many of these ideas seem to be the result of wishful thinking and “Groupthink.” They appear largely untested in the way that most of the key strategic concepts of the Cold War were tested through continuous investigation and debate. Cumulatively, they point to a significant potential for surprise and miscalculation by one or both sides in any future military confrontation over Taiwan. On the Chinese side, Beijing may underestimate the manageability of a nuclear Taiwan crisis and overestimate its ability to exert escalation control. Indeed, even if there exists an asymmetry of interests vis-à-vis Taiwan, an attack on Taiwan may alter that asymmetry. With U.S. credibility as a security guarantor on the line and with potentially strong domestic pressure for the U.S. to retaliate, the willingness of U.S. leadership to counter a Chinese nuclear attack could be higher than what Beijing might expect. But the surprises and miscalculations might not all be on China’s side. The United States may be surprised by China’s willingness to demonstrate its resolve and pay a high price by prolonging and exploiting the crisis situation. The United States might also be caught off-guard by China’s likely perception of an American attack on its command-control capacity as an assault on the regime itself. Finally, the U.S. may also miscalculate by discounting Taiwan as an independent actor, which could undertake its own acts of escalation or even choose to quit the conflict even as the U.S. seeks to continue.

Taiwan Conflict Escalates

China’s conflict strategy means war will escalate

Schmitt and Sullivan 8 (Gary, director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at AEI and Ph.D from University of Chicago, and Tim, manages Center for Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute, January, http://www.aei.org/outlook/27339)

And while the CCP has in the past employed a strategy of staggered escalation--allowing for pauses between each escalatory step in a conflict--often as not, the People's Liberation Army has used these pauses to assess its military situation, consolidate gains if possible, and--most importantly--reposition so as to retain an element of surprise before resuming hostilities.[17] Following initial engagements with American forces on the Korean Peninsula in late October 1950, for example, Chinese forces halted their advances. The purpose of the pause, revealed in a series of messages between Mao and the commander of the Communist forces in the region, was to foster American misperceptions of Chinese weakness and lack of commitment.[18] Similarly, in the course of the 1962 border dispute with India, China instituted a brief pause after two successful offensives. The Indians interpreted the pause as a signal that the Chinese were too weak to continue mounting a broad offensive and were potentially open to some sort of cease-fire. Within weeks, however, the Chinese military resumed operations.[19] Indeed, China's adversaries have frequently interpreted such halts in operations as a sign of an imminent drawdown or an attempt at negotiation when just the opposite is true. In short, neither Taipei nor Washington, in a cross-Strait crisis, can be quite sure that a pause by Beijing reflects a desire to look for a way out of the conflict. To say that China's strategy of staggered escalation and surprise might complicate current prescriptions for managing a crisis is, if nothing else, an understatement. Finally, as Abram Shulsky points out, in the past, "the Chinese have often shown a willingness to resort to force precisely because they see the resulting tension as being in their interest."[20] It is precisely because others desire to avoid a possible conflict that China's leaders see it as giving China an advantage. Indeed, given the CCP's past willingness to accept, manipulate, and capitalize on the threat of violence, it could be argued that the PRC perceives crises as opportunities to achieve policy objectives, rather than something to be avoided. According to Shulsky, "the key element here seems to be China's confidence that it can control the level of tension and the risk of escalation, rather than avoid them altogether."[21]

War escalates

The Straits Times 0 (2000, June 25, Lexis) LL

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

\_\_\_\*\*Impacts

Independent Japan Good – Asian Stability

Independent Japanese forces are the most effective route to conflict stability in Asia

**Carpenter, ‘2** [Ted, Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security” CATO, 1-8-2002, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3364>]

**The standard argument against Japan playing a more active military role is that it would upset its neighbors in East Asia.** The nations of that region, it is said, still remember the outrages committed by imperial Japan during the 1920s and 1930s and would react badly to any manifestations of "Japanese militarism." **But that argument oversimplifies reality.** True, a few countries (most notably South Korea) are still paranoid about Japan. China also opposes any military role for Japan. Indeed, if Beijing had its way, the Japanese SDF would not even exist. But **China's strident objections are self-serving;** **PRC officials realize that an** active, **assertive Japan would be a major obstacle to Beijing's own ambitions** to become the dominant power in the region. **Other East Asian countries are beginning to mute their objections to Japan playing a more active security role.** Successive Australian governments have said that the time has come to bury the fears about renewed Japanese militarism. Singapore earlier this year offered Tokyo the use of its naval facilities -- a strong signal that it accepts the reality that Japan no longer poses a threat. Similar accommodating statements have been emanating from the Philippines over the past year. Those changes are gratifying. They show a recognition that **the era of Japanese imperialism ended more than a half century ago, and that** 21st century **Japan bears no resemblance to the rapacious, expansionist Japan of that earlier era. Modern Japan is a conservative**, status quo **power that would be a stabilizing force against aggression, not a source of aggression.** Japan needs to seize the opportunity afforded by the changing attitude of its neighbors. **It is time for the SDF to play a realistic security role in East Asia** and beyond. **No rational person would object if Tokyo provided combat forces for the struggle against** Osama bin Laden and his **terrorists.** It is time for Japan to fully rejoin the ranks of the great powers. And **the U**nited **S**tates **needs to help with that transition. U.S. officials have** not only **allowed Japan to get away with free riding on the U.S. security guarantee**, they have openly discouraged Japan from venturing beyond the status of being Washington's logistical helpmate. **That attitude must be discarded. U.S. leaders ought to make it clear to Japan -**- and to that country's neighbors -- **that Washington no longer objects to Japan's playing a full-fledged security role.** Indeed**, the U**nited **S**tates **should state explicitly that it expects Japan to do so.**

**Nuclear instability in Asia outweighs – presence of great powers**

Paul **Dibb, ‘1**. Prof – Australian National University, Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads, Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review...r/art2-w01.htm

**The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia**, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. **The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain** and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, **it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s**; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. **Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia’s security is at a crossroads**: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. **There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control**. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

Independent Japan Good – Asian Stability XT

Independent Japan would tackle regional security issues

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

A U.S.-Japan strategic relationship that more closely resembles an alliance in the traditional sense of the term, as opposed to the current patron-client relationship, is likely to be an enduring model for U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in the future, especially if it is based on popular support. Fortunately, popular sentiment within Japan offers still more clues about how the three cases discussed above might play out in a future in which Japan behaves as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests, and not dependent on the United States. Of the three cases discussed above, popular support for an active role by Japanese military forces is weakest with respect to Iraq. Japanese elites place great importance on retaining the favor of their security patron. It is unlikely that there would be Japanese forces operating in Iraq today were it not for U.S. pressure, and the Japanese may be reluctant to become involved in similar military missions in the future. However, lingering anti-militarism within Japan does not proscribe the SDF from serving in the more ambiguous role of security provider in postconflict settings, with or without U.S. encouragement. If the pattern of SDF peacekeeping established in the 1990s were to continue, or even expand, that should not be seen as a manifestation of resurgent Japanese militarism. On the other hand, it seems more likely that, in the absence of U.S. pressure to become more actively involved around the world, a more independent Japan would use its military forces to deal with issues more directly relevant to its own national security. That would be beneficial to both the United States and Japan. To be sure, an equitable strategic partnership could make things more difficult for U.S. policymakers in certain instances, but that is a chance worth taking in the interest of devolving security responsibilities away from the United States and lowering U.S. risk exposure. Reducing the global U.S. military presence is essential to alleviating the considerable burdens on U.S. taxpayers, who collectively spend more than 10 times as much on defense as do the Japanese. U.S. policy should seek to accelerate Japan’s emergence as a more effective military ally in the region. Within the context of a more equitable U.S.-Japan alliance, if Japanese forces were deployed to any country far outside the East Asian region, their dispatch would be dependent on Tokyo’s assessment of Japanese security interests and therefore would be far more likely to enjoy the support of the Japanese public. Under the current patron-client relationship, Japanese and American officials alike have bent over backwards to place the small number of SDF troops in a location where they are unlikely to be exposed to harm; by extension, this small number of troops is not measurably contributing to the completion of the mission in Iraq; nor are they substantially reducing the threat to other Coalition forces. In short, their presence is almost entirely symbolic and has little, if any, strategic value. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi risked some political capital, as well as time and attention, rallying a modicum of public support for an exceedingly modest, even token, military deployment. And while the Japanese agonized over the dispatch of a few hundred troops to a country thousands of miles away, China ratcheted up its threats against a democratic entity a few hundred miles away from Japan and North Korea continued to process nuclear material. At best, Japan’s conduct seems a case of misplaced priorities and confusion over Japan’s strategic interests; at worst, Japan has subordinated its own interests to those of its distant patron.

Independent Japan Good – North Korea

**Independent Japan prompts China to solve North** **Korea**

**Mauro 10** (intelligence analyst with the Asymmetric Warfare and Intelligence Center, Ryan, June 2, FrontPageMag.com, <http://frontpagemag.com/2010/06/02/promoting-a-free-korea/> )

The West faces a dilemma. **The North Korean government feels it needs a crisis in order to survive, and** therefore**, ignoring them will only result in greater provocations.** At the same time**, Kim Jong-Il must react to the retaliation by appearing stronger than his enemies by heating things up further. The result is an inevitable series of increasing crises with unforeseen consequences. The solution is to hasten the day when the regime falls, but the weaker the regime becomes, the more likely it is to lash out as it has this year. The unfortunate conclusion is that further clashes are unavoidable.** There are multiple ways that the West can weaken the regime’s grip. Colonel Cucullu said that the North expects to “be rewarded by Western nations once again.” **This behavior cannot be encouraged through appeasement.** He also raised the point that **Japan is also fearful and will not rely on the U.S. for its safety. The possibility of chaos on the Korean Peninsula and the potential for Japan to rapidly re-arm can be used to pressure China into reigning in its partner**. Joshua Stanton makes a wise suggestion that cell phones be smuggled into North Korea’s markets and towers erected in the South so they have reception. Scholte said that there are 17,000 North Koreans who left their country for the South that can be used to send information into their original homeland. Refugees can be mobilized for similar efforts.

Independent Japan Good – North Korea

Japanese sanctions on North Korea would induce action on the nuclear program—Japan has huge role in Korean economy

Cronin 5 (Richard, Specialist in Asian Affairs, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 29 No. 1, <http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/Cronin_The_North_Korean_Nuclear_Threat_and%20the_US_Japan_Security_Alliance.pdf>

A number of initiatives by the Koizumi government to strengthen Japan’s own military capabilities vis-á-vis North Korea, and its cooperation with the United States on measures aimed at putting pressure on Pyongyang to change its course, go well beyond what Japan has been prepared to do even in the recent past. In February and June 2004 Japan’s Diet passed legislation that would give the government the authority to impose economic and financial sanctions on Pyongyang, including measures against the pro-Pyongyang Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), such as cutting off financial remittances, and banning North Korean ships from Japanese ports under certain circumstances. The legislation regarding port visits appears to be aimed at the Mangyongbong-92, the North Korean ship that provides the only ferry connection between the two countries. 20 As stated earlier, several political leaders and government officials have openly described the proposed legislation as a “bargaining chip” in negotiating the nuclear and abduction issues, but others, who have low expectations of Pyongyang, also view sanctions as simply a means of punishing Pyongyang for its recalcitrance. The potential value of these measures as negative incentives and bargaining chips could be significant, as Japan is North Korea’s third largest trading partner after China and South Korea. North Korea’s exports to Japan have shrunk from $43 million in 1990 to only $23 million in 2002. Even in the best of times North Korea’s exports to Japan have been paltry compared with other East Asian countries, but sales to Japan still represent a significant source of hard currency, as do remittances from North Koreans living in Japan. Moreover, as the overall North Korean economy steadily declines, the hard currency earned by exports to Japan could be relatively more important. It also cannot be lost on Pyongyang that just as Japan has steadily squeezed both North Korean exports and remittances from ethnic Koreans in Japan in recent months, the country could also reap substantial benefits in return for abandoning its intransigence regarding its nuclear program and the abductee question

US-China War 🡪 Extinction

Comparatively, Taiwan is the most dangerous place in the world; ends in extinction

Johnson 1 **(Chalmers, former prof of poli sci @ UC-Berk and former Chairman of the Dep and Chair of the Center for Chinese Studies, The Nation, May 14,** [**http://www.thenation.com/article/time-bring-troops-home?page=0,1**](http://www.thenation.com/article/time-bring-troops-home?page=0,1)**) LL**

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Since any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally would be viewed as a challenge to China's sovereignty, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect. The United States uses satellites to observe changes in China's basic military capabilities. But the coastal surveillance flights by our twelve (now eleven) EP-3E Aries II spy planes, like the one that was forced down off Hainan Island, seek information that is useful only in an imminent battle. They are inherently provocative and inappropriate when used to monitor a country with which we are at peace. The United States itself maintains a 200-mile area off its coasts in which it intercepts any aircraft attempting similar reconnaissance.

Nuclear war with China would escalate to extinction- wipes out major population centers

Gertz 2k (Bill, Washington Times, 11/15, http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/excerpt3.html)

A nuclear war with China over its dispute with Taiwan is a real danger. And even though the Clinton administration went to great lengths to ignore it, that danger is growing. Shortly after the beginning of the simulated Chinese nuclear combat, five red lines emanating from western China streaked across the computer map in the command center. Each line represented the flight path of a Chinese CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, headed directly for the United States. China's 24 silo-based missiles are old by American standards. But they can hit targets more than 8,000 miles away and are the backbone of China's strategic nuclear force. The missiles are based on the design of America's first generation of missiles, which China obtained from a defecting U.S. missile engineer. Each of the CSS-4s carries a huge, 5-megaton warhead with the equivalent of 5 million tons of TNT - enough to blow up an entire city. NORAD's computerized attack-warning network plotted the targets of the incoming ICBMs and they appeared as dots on the giant map: Seattle, Colorado Springs (site of the Cheyenne Mountain complex), Chicago, New York and Washington. Air Force Col. Allen Baker, NORAD's director of operations, explained that confirmation of Chinese missile launches would be followed by a call to the White House. ``At this point, I'd be telling the president how many minutes until Washington, D.C., is gone,'' Col. Baker said. Flight time from China to the capital: about 35 minutes. Asked whether the U.S. military had the means to shoot down the incoming missiles, Col. Baker said, ``Absolutely nothing.''

China would Attack Cities

China would attack cities

Shambaugh 4 (David, Prof of Poli Sci and Internat. Affairs @ George Washington University, 2004, p. 91, questia) LL

Following the detonation of an atomic bomb in October 1964, China faced an increasingly worrying two-front threat from the Soviet Union and United States. China had the bomb but not a nuclear doctrine. By virtue of necessity, China's strategists formulated the doctrine of “minimum deterrence,” whereby Chinese nuclear forces could be assured of absorbing an initial first strike while still being able to retaliate with intercontinental missiles into the Soviet heartland or against American targets in East Asia or the North Pacific (after 1980, China achieved the capability to hit the continental United States with ICBMs). This minimum deterrent doctrine was a “countervalue” one, because China's weapons did not have the accuracy to represent a true counterforce threat against Soviet or U. S. nuclear installations

Nuclear war between US and China risks millions of casualties and fallout

Kristensen et al 6 (Hans M., Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Robert S. Norris, senior research associate with Natural Resources Defense Council, Matthew G. McKinzie, scientific consultant to the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, November, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-173-196.pdf)

The nuclear strike scenarios presented in this chapter using the HPAC computer code provide insight into what is certainly the most significant and problematic aspect of the current nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and China From the perspective of Chinese nuclear war planners, the destruction inflicted by just a few DF-5A ICBMs delivering their warheads to their intended city targets ought to represent a robust deterrent. From these calculations, which Chinese war planners can easily do themselves, it becomes apparent why China determined that its relatively small number of ICBMs is an adequate deterrent against the United States and anyone else. The Chinese deterrent may be called “minimum,” but there’s nothing minimum about the destruction it can inflict, and a no-first-use policy could naturally evolve from a quantitative assessment of the nuclear weapons effects. The forthcoming modernization of the Chinese ballistic missile force with the introduction of the DF-31, DF-31A and JL-2 will significantly affect the deterrent against the United States. But not in ways normally assumed in the public debate. A “several-fold” increase in the number of warheads “primarily targeted” against the United States would not also result in a “several-fold” increase in the number of casualties that China could inflict in the United States. Our calculations described above show that if China decided to deploy the maximum number of warheads envisioned by the U.S. intelligence community (100) due to the replacement of large-yield warheads with smaller-yield warheads, the results would be a nearly 70 percent reduction of the total megatonnage on the force and a 25 percent to 50 percent reduction in the number of potential casualties resulting from a countervalue strike against the continental United States. Although this ought to be more than adequate to deter the United States (or anyone else) from using nuclear weapons against China, it suggests that the objective of the current Chinese modernization may not be so much to increase the threat as to ensure the continued effectiveness of the force. From the point of U.S. nuclear planners, it may not matter much whether China can hit the United States with 94 Mt or 25 Mt. Their job is to implement White House guidance and hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk. Yet the hypothetical Chinese strike scenarios described above underscore that even a pre-emptive U.S. first strike against China’s DF-5A ICBMs would need to disable all of the missile silos (and in the future all of the DF-31As as well) or risk a retaliatory Chinese attack on U.S. cities resulting in millions of casualties. The fallout from such a U.S. strike – even against purely military targets in a remote area – would cause millions of civilian casualties and widespread radioactive contamination across three large Chinese provinces. As if such a level of destruction would not be sufficient to deter the Chinese leadership, the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60) ordered the U.S. military to broaden nuclear targeting against Chinese facilities, and the U.S. Navy has since moved several strategic submarines from the Atlantic into the Pacific, upgraded the submarines to carry the more accurate Trident II D5 missile, and begun equipping W76 warheads with a new fuze to enable the weapon to strike a wider range of targets. The effects from a wider U.S. attack against China’s entire nuclear force structure and political leadership would be significantly greater than the scenario described in this report and also result in fallout on allied countries in the region.

China Expansion 🡪 War

Chinese expansion over Taiwan will raise regional tension – US-Japan cooperation is a key counterweight

Christian Caryl, ’10. “Naval Gazing in Asia,” *Foreign Policy*, 5-18, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/18/naval_gazing_in_asia?page=0,0>

Of late the Chinese military has become more assertive in Southeast Asia, unnerving some countries there by using naval forces to assert its claims to the contested Spratly Islands, for example. Beijing has also demonstrated that it's prepared to stake out strategic strong points in the Indian Ocean region, even when that aggravates its biggest regional rival, India. And, of course, ensuring Taiwan's eventual accession to mainland rule remains a paramount goal of Chinese state policy -- so the PLA has been busily working to acquire the technology (like long-range anti-ship missiles) to ensure that it can push back against the U.S. Seventh Fleet if it needs to. (Chinese leaders have a painfully clear memory of how the Clinton administration forced them into a humiliating climbdown over Taiwan back in the mid-1990s, when the United States deployed its then-unassailable fleet to the Taiwan Strait. That was then.) Sumihiko Kawamura, another Japanese ex-admiral, says that the U.S., Japan, and their regional allies should respond by conducting more joint naval maneuvers, coordinating efforts to monitor Chinese naval movements, and pushing the Chinese "to observe the international standard of modus operandi at the high sea." Kawamura also points out that the Chinese have been mysteriously reluctant to conclude an "incidents at sea" agreement with the Japanese and the Americans. The first such agreement, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in dramatically reducing the sorts of in-your-face naval maneuvers that could have easily led to accidental escalation with potentially disastrous consequences. Establishing some sort of hotline between naval headquarters on both sides of the East China Sea might not be a bad idea, either. Pretty much all of the experts agree that war remains unlikely. One thing is reasonably certain, though: As China rises, a certain degree of tension with its neighbors is probably unavoidable. The trick will be keeping such tensions at a manageable level. And that is precisely the reason why it's probably a bit early to be worrying about the end of the U.S.-Japan alliance. For better or for worse, Tokyo and Washington still have clear reasons for making common cause in the realm of security.

Taiwan ! Boosters – 2NC

China-Taiwan conflict would draw in every major power and cause WW3

Hunkovic 8 (Lee, American Military University, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Arms sales put the conflict at the brink and take out all impact defense

Weitz, 6-21-10. Richard – director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/21/china-overplaying-taiwan-arms/2/>.

Gates argued that military exchanges and other defence ties were essential for avoiding misunderstandings and miscalculations between the two nations, as well as for preserving stability in a tense region. In response, Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, argued in a subsequent forum that continuing US arms sales to Taiwan, congressional restrictions on bilateral military exchanges and regular surveillance operations by US warships and warplanes were the reasons for the lack of progress in Sino-US military relations, which he said exhibited a pattern of ‘development, standstill, another development, another standstill.’ But it’s the arms sales to Taiwan that Ma singled out as the biggest sticking point, stating that ‘US arms sales to Taiwan is not just an ordinary issue.’ So is this true? Chinese officials and commentators have repeatedly accused the United States of violating the US-China joint communiqué of August 17, 1982, which established the principles that were supposed to govern US-Taiwan arms sales. The most recent Chinese defence white paper, issued in January 2009, warned the incoming Obama administration that US military sales to Taiwan presented a serious impediment to improved China-US relations and accused Washington of worsening tensions by continuing ‘to sell arms to Taiwan in violation of the principles established in the three Sino-US joint communiqués.’ China has also been willing to act on these complaints, suspending various military visits, exchanges and other defence contacts with the Pentagon in retaliation for major US arms exports to Taiwan, including freezing military cooperation for the remainder of the Bush administration after the White House notified Congress in October 2008 of its plans to sell Taiwan $6.5 billion in defence equipment. But the US claims that the sales are actually an effort at maintaining stability in the region, with Gates arguing in Singapore that the Obama administration was merely continuing a longstanding policy in the face of China’s ‘accelerating military build-up.’ Although the United States severed its formal defence alliance with Taipei when it recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government continues to sell arms to the country under the Taiwan Relations Act, an approach it says helps sustain the peaceful status quo by balancing the PLA’s growing capabilities. Washington fears that declining to assist the Taiwanese military would encourage China to adopt more aggressive policies toward Taiwan, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation. It has become clear in recent years that further defence exchanges or confidence-building measures can’t by themselves overcome what both sides view as fundamentally issues of principle—preserving regional security for the Americans, and defending national sovereignty and rights as an emerging great power for the Chinese (although as Gates noted, their persistent defence differences haven’t prevented the two sides from collaborating on other important issues, especially in the economic realm).

Taiwan ! Boosters – 2NC

US-China war over Taiwan is the most likely scenario for great power nuclear war

By Monte R. Bullard, ‘4. Senior Fellow @ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Strait Talk : Avoiding a Nuclear War between the United States and China over Taiwan,” Online Book, December, <http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/index.htm>.

War between the United States and China is unthinkable, but not totally impossible. The above scenario, described in more detail in Chapter Four, is conceivable. It is one of the most likely situations in the world that could bring two mature nuclear powers into direct conflict and cause both sides to contemplate the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The principal effort that has to be undertaken to prevent war between the United States and China is to prevent armed conflict between China and Taiwan. The best policies for preventing armed conflict between China and Taiwan are to reduce the rhetoric and to not increase the arms to establish a deterrence environment. The best policies by all three actors (the US, China and Taiwan) are broad and patient policies that go beyond the military realm and include a more comprehensive and coordinated military, political and economic approach. The title of this book is a bit misleading because it does not focus on the traditional topics of nonproliferation. Instead of focusing on arms control and disarmament subjects like export controls, agreements, treaties and regimes it examines factors that trigger the decisions to enter a conflict that could escalate into nuclear confrontation. The central point is that the fundamental causes of conflict, not just the various means of controlling nuclear arms, must be considered. It is a slightly different approach to the issue of nonproliferation. It goes to the causes of proliferation rather than the processes of arms control.

China would do anything to win the conflict- Taiwan win would trigger destabilizing consequences

Hunkovic 8 (Lee, American Military University, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

Despite its small size, Taiwan holds much strategic value to the PRC. If it were to establish full independence, Taiwan would be free to not only challenge to power of China and gain UN membership, but would also be free to establish much close military ties with the United States, which would quite possibly include an American military presence in Taiwan, eighty miles from the coast of China. This presence could also include strategic weaponry, including a nuclear arsenal capable of hitting anywhere within the PRC and would effectively end any ambitions of China expanding its territory into the Pacific or Southeast Asia. Such a scenario would have grim national security implications for the PRC. China’s national security issues could possibly go beyond the loss of Taiwan and American military encroachment, if Taiwan were able to gain full independence. After being defeated by a tiny country with a fraction of the military might as the PLA, the PRC could find itself facing a chain reaction of breakaway province trying to secede, including Xinhua and possibly even Tibet. Furthermore, while the international standoff with North Korea over its nuclear program has officially ended, the next leader after the reportedly ailing Kim Jung Il could see a weakened China as an opportunity to resume the development of a nuclear arsenal, which would leave China in a precarious national security situation if relations with North Korea were to deteriorate in the future. In other words, the national security concerns for China regarding Taiwan are potentially grave. If China were to lose Taiwan, at best, its ability to expand into the Pacific would be curtailed and it would most likely find itself encroached upon by the U.S. military and at worst, it could find itself losing other territories, in a similar fashion to the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and facing a nuclear arsenal or arsenals just beyond its borders, which would effectively end any reign of military supremacy that the PRC currently enjoys. If such were to occur, the CCP could easily lose control of their country, given their loss of power and territory and be in no position to make any demands of the United States on any issues, including the democratization of China, as the U.S. could gain a first-strike nuclear capability against them. Considering these facts, the People’s Republic of China may not be desirous of a war with Taiwan under the current conditions, but absolutely must militarily defend their interests if an attempt at secession occurs, as failing to do so could reduce their formerly powerful nation to a fraction of its former self, as well as incite revolution within the country and a possible overthrow of the CCP.

Taiwan War 🡪 Nuclear War

Taiwan conflict would lead to nuclear war—US and Chinese commitments ensure escalation

O’Hanlon 5 (Michael, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, 5/1, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0501asia\_ohanlon.aspx)

Nonetheless, Mr Zoellick is more right than wrong. In the absence of strong constraints on future high-technology sales, lifting the European arms embargo on China would be a big mistake. There really is a chance of a Sino-US war over Taiwan, which may ebb and flow month to month but nonetheless remains quite real. And any European decision to lift the embargo could make any war more likely and more costly in lives and assets. The reasons are simple. First, China is serious about being willing to risk war to prevent Taiwan's secession. Second, although many in China as well as Europe cannot quite believe it, the US is just as serious about defending Taiwan. And third, even though American military power remains far superior to that of China, the Chinese do not need to equal US power to make any war over nearby Taiwan very challenging for American forces. Given the right catalyst from Taipei, therefore, US deterrence of China could fail and the world's first true war between nuclear weapons states could ensue. It is not just China's ruling communist party that considers Taiwan a part of China; an increasingly nationalistic population does as well. In fact, the Chinese see themselves as patient and restrained because they are simply demanding that Taiwan not secede, rather than insisting on immediate reunification. They worry that if Taiwan broke away, it would encourage other separatist movements in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang province, and weaken China strategically at the very moment it is poised to regain its status as a global power. China's leaders operate on the assumption that Taiwanese secession would doom their own prospects for holding on to power. At a minimum, they would have to show they had gone the extra mile to try to prevent secession, meaning that even an unsuccessful military operation might be preferable to inaction. And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered. This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction to China's firing of missiles near the island. Unfortunately, many Chinese doubt America's real commitment to Taiwan. Some argue that the US is casualty averse (despite the evidence from Iraq) and would back down from a fight over a distant island—especially a fight against another nuclear-armed state. They realise there is no binding treaty obliging the US to defend the island, and that the language of America's 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as well as other policy statements would give Washington numerous excuses not to fight (especially if, in Chinese eyes at least, Taiwan had clearly provoked the war). Other Chinese believe their recent successes in diplomatically and economically wooing much of the Asia-Pacific region—and Europe—mean that the US, rather than China, would be isolated in any future conflict. Even the military balance gives China hope that it would emerge successful in a crisis over Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains highly unlikely, given the inherent difficulties of amphibious assault in an era of 24-hour reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. But China has other military tools and options. In addition to threatening missile attacks, for example, it may be able to conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan. Estimates differ over the strength of the American force needed to defeat such a Chinese attempt, and the losses that would be incurred. But this very uncertainty may give Beijing hope, and a lifting of Europe's arms embargo could give it even more hope

AT: China Practices NFU

China is ready for a nuclear war- constantly updating nuclear arsenal

Smith 2 (Charles R., expert on cyber technology and its implications for war, Newsmax.com, 3/14, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/14/133903.shtml)

The Chinese military took quick notice of the U.S. carriers, and in 1999 the communist army Office of the Central Military Command wrote a report on future nuclear combat with the United States. "China is not only a big country, but also possesses a nuclear arsenal that has long since been incorporated into the state warfare system and played a real role in our national defense," states the Chinese military commission report. "During last crisis across the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. tried to blackmail us with their aircraft carrier(s), but when their spy satellites confirmed that our four nuclear submarines which used to be stationed at Lushun Harbor had disappeared, those politicians addicted to the Taiwan card could not imagine how worried their military commanders were," notes the Chinese army report. "In comparison with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, our disadvantage is mainly numeric, while in real wars the qualitative gap will be reflected only as different requirements of strategic theory. In terms of deterrence, there is not any difference in practical value. So far we have built up the capability for the second and the third nuclear strikes and are fairly confident in fighting a nuclear war. The PCC has decided to pass through formal channels this message to the top leaders of the U.S. This is one of the concrete measures that we will take to prevent the escalation of war in the spirit of being responsible." Chinese General Wants to Nuke L.A. There is little question that China is "responsible" when it comes to nuclear war. Since 1996, the Chinese army has not stopped its acts of atomic-tipped aggression and intimidation. For example, two years after firing missiles at Taiwan, Gen. Xiong, then second in command of the People's Liberation Army, threatened to vaporize Los Angeles. Not once during the entire 40-year Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. did any Soviet general threaten to vaporize an American city. It is certain that the Kremlin would have fired any officer who made such a statement, because of the threat to global peace. In contrast, Gen. Xiong remains second in command of the People's Liberation Army, ready to hurl his nuclear forces into battle with America on a moment's notice. According to the CIA, China is expected to continue its rapid deployment of ballistic missiles along the Chinese mainland, within striking distance of Taiwan. China's short-range ballistic missile arsenal could reach "several hundred" by the year 2005, stated Robert Walpole, a national intelligence officer, during a Senate hearing on international security. The CIA intelligence analyst also revealed that Beijing is working on three new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Dong-Feng 31, a longer-range variant of the Dong-Feng 31, and the submarine-launched JL-2. The DF-31 and JL-2 both have an estimated range of over 7,000 miles and can shower the U.S. West Coast with nuclear warheads.

\_\_\_\*\*Theory Supplement

Conditions CPs Good

1. Counter-interpretation: The neg can advocate a conditions counterplan if there is literature supporting the condition in exchange for reduction in presence.
2. We meet- our 1nc evidence indicates Japan would trade withdrawal for security assurances
3. Topic-specific ground- solvency advocate means it’s a predictable and limited part of the literature
4. Tests opportunity costs of the plan- vital to decision-making skills – it’s basis for sound policy

Falaschetti and Parsons 4 (Dino and Steve, Encyclopedia of Health Care Management, <http://www.parsonsecon.com/parsonsecon/EncyclopediaofHealthCareManagement.pdf>)

In making decisions, an agent (such as a person, organization, or firm) chooses actions from a set of competing alternatives. By choosing any particular action, an agent must forgo others. For example, spending an evening dining precludes one from simultaneously attending a movie. The value of such forgone alternatives is a decision's "opportunity cost.” Continuing the present example, dining's opportunity cost is the utility (or value) one would have received from attending a movie. Opportunity cost is, perhaps, economics' most fundamental notion. To see this, recognize that if resources are scarce (which they almost certainly are), then acting in a manner that "does no harm" is logically impossible. Any action causes resources to be employed in one way but not another. Consequently, even actions that produce tremendous benefits must simultaneously do so at some cost. In using the term "opportunity cost" people frequently refer only to relatively obscure costs (such as the value of lost time). Strictly speaking, however, all economic costs are opportunity costs. Some are simply more obvious than others. For example, if one pays $1000 for medical supplies, then that $1000 can no longer be allocated to other uses (such as meeting payroll). Such obvious costs are sometimes called "explicit" opportunity costs. These costs usually involve a market transaction with an explicit dollar payment. In contrast, "implicit" opportunity costs emerge from lost opportunities but do not necessitate a corresponding market transaction or payment. Often a single decision and consequent action create both explicit and implicit opportunity costs. Extending the present example, the value of time spent checking and stocking medical supplies adds an implicit opportunity cost to the $1000 explicit opportunity cost. Identifying a prospective action’s full opportunity cost (both explicit and implicit) is essential for making sound decisions. Consider how physicians allocate time. Time spent with a particular patient necessarily precludes that time from being allocated to an alternative endeavor. The opportunity cost of spending time with a patient is thus the value of, say, treating a different patient, contributing to a community outreach event, or even enjoying the company of family members. Even the best decision must produce an associated cost (lost opportunity) in this sense. Despite this necessity however, a decision may still be "optimal" if the consequent action's opportunity cost is less than the ensuing benefit. Identifying full opportunity costs is also essential for promulgating sound policy. Advocates sometimes extol a proposed policy's virtues by, in effect, arguing that the policy will be worthwhile if it "saves only one person." Although the magnitude of the policy's benefits may be difficult to measure, the advocate understands that even a poorly designed policy is likely to produce benefits for at least one person. By this standard, almost any policy's appearance can be made attractive. What our hypothetical advocate ignores, however, is that allocating resources to his or her cause necessarily precludes those same resources from producing alternative benefits. If these forgone benefits (the policy's opportunity cost) exceed those produced by the policy, then the policy will reduce welfare. Notice that this net reduction occurs even if the policy truly saves at least one person! In this light, activities such as “fund raising" might be more accurately characterized as "fund transferring."

1. Key to test the immediacy and certainty of the plan- aff must defend ‘resolved’ and the entirety of the plan
2. Key to check the topic size- limits out small unpredictable affs
3. At worst reject the arg, not the team

Conditions CPs Good – Opp Cost Good

Cost-benefit analysis based on opportunity cost models is the best way to evaluate policy actions

Environmental Economics 5 (July 13, <http://www.env-econ.net/2005/07/costbenefit_ana.html>) LL

The notion that a zero pollution objective is not necessarily ideal policy is one of the more difficult concepts for environmental economists to convey. After all, if pollution is bad shouldn’t we design policy to completely eliminate it? Many of us are drawn to the field based on a genuine concern for the environment and the belief that economics provides a powerful tool for helping solve environmental problems. Yet we are often in the position of recommending policies that appear on the surface to be anti-environmental. How can these observations be reconciled? The answer lies in understanding scarcity: we have unlimited wants, but live in a world with limited means. Economists in general study how people make decisions when faced with scarcity. Scarcity implies that resources devoted to one end are not available to meet another; hence there is an opportunity cost of any action. This includes environmental policy. For example, funds used by a municipality to retrofit its water treatment plant to remove trace amounts of arsenic (a carcinogen) cannot also be used to improve local primary education. Environmental economists are tasked with recommending policies that reflect scarcity of this type at the society level. For both individuals and societies scarcity necessitates tradeoffs, and the reality of tradeoffs can make the complete elimination of pollution undesirable. Once this is acknowledged the pertinent question becomes how much pollution should be eliminated. How should we decide? Who gets to decide? To help provide answers economists use an analytical tool called cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis provides an organizational framework for identifying, quantifying, and comparing the costs and benefits (measured in dollars) of a proposed policy action. The final decision is informed (though not necessarily determined) by a comparison of the total costs and benefits. While this sounds logical enough, cost-benefit analysis has been cause for substantial debate when used in the environmental arena (see the online debate between Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman, and Kerry Smith). The benefits of environmental regulations can include, for example, reduced human and wildlife mortality, improved water quality, species preservation, and better recreation opportunities. The costs are usually reflected in higher prices for consumer goods and/or higher taxes. The latter are market effects readily measured in dollars, while the former are nonmarket effects for which dollar values are not available. In addition to complicating the practice of cost-benefit analysis (dollar values for the nonmarket effects must be inferred rather than directly observed) this raises ethical issues. Should we assign dollar values to undisturbed natural places? To human lives saved? To the existence of blue whales and grey wolves? If we decide such things are too ‘priceless’ to assign dollar values we lose the ability to use cost-benefit analysis to inform the decision. What then is the alternative? How do we decide? Who gets to decide? Environmental economists tend to favor cost-benefit analysis in the policy arena because of the discipline and transparency it provides in evaluating policy options. It is easy to evaluate absolutes. Most would agree that reducing nitrogen contamination of groundwater wells, limiting the occurrence of code red ozone alerts, and preserving habitat for grizzly bears are worthy goals. Determining the relative merits of any one of these compared to the others, or compared to non-environmental goals such as improving public education, is much more daunting. Because policy making is ultimately about evaluating the relative merits of different actions some mechanism is needed to rank the alternatives. Without the discipline of cost-benefit analysis it is not clear how the interests, claims, and opinions of parties affected by a proposed regulation can be examined and compared. Criterion such as ‘moral’ or ‘fair’ do not lend themselves well to comparison and are subject to wide ranging interpretation. Who gets to decide what is moral or fair? Cost-benefit analysis is far from perfect, but it demands a level of objectivity and specificity that are necessary components of good decision making.

Opportunity costs are a necessary part of decision making- limited resources

Berlin and Uhlin 3 (Daniel, economics grad student, and H. E. prof of business management, http://www.apec.umn.edu/documents/HansUhlinF03.pdf)

Accordingly, in the strategic application there is a variety of underlying constraints. A number of considerations and choices between alternatives have to be made. The direct use of limited resources, such as land, will lead to a choice between different use alternatives. If all recourses were unlimited and all options were available to us the problem of choosing between alternatives would not exist. However, most resources are limited and this forces us to make choices and choices entail sacrifices, namely the sacrifice of the alternative not chosen – the opportunity cost. In other words it is the benefit or the value of the opportunity forgone that constitute the opportunity cost. Hence, the opportunity cost does not necessarily need to be expressed in monetary terms.

Conditions CPs Good – Opp Cost Good

Opportunity costs determine the best decision

Lee 6 (Kylen, 9/17, Introduction to Economics, http://www.econguru.com/introduction\_to\_economics/scope-method.html)

Opportunity cost is one of the most frequently used tools for modern economic analysis, deriving many important economic theories and models. It is also a powerful tool in analyzing individual decision-making process. Whoever you are, an individual, a company or a nation, you face opportunity cost when making decisions. Nearly all decisions involve trade-offs. When we are choosing, we are also giving up. Every action and choice is associated with advantages and disadvantages, costs and gains. A key concept that recurs again and again in analyzing the decision-making process is the notion of opportunity cost. The full cost of making a specific choice is what we give up by not taking the alternative. That which we forgo, when making a choice or decision is called the opportunity cost of the decision. More precisely, opportunity cost is not all that we are not choosing added up, instead, it is the most valued one among all that we let go. Sometimes opportunity cost can be measured in terms of money, although money is usually not the only part of it.

Limited resources necessitate opportunity costs in decision making

Henderson 9 (James, academic director for Baylor's Robbins MBA Healthcare Program, Health Economics and Policy, pg. 456, Google Books)

Scarcity and Choice Economics recognizes the problem of limited resources and unlimited wants and desires. Without enough resources to satisfy all the desires of all the people, we are faced with the challenge of allocating those resources among competing objectives. We must face the fact that resources used in the delivery of medical care have alternative uses that are also beneficial. To strike a balance between scarce resources and unlimited wants involved making choices. We cannot have everything we want. In the world where most of us live, trade-offs are inevitable [2]. Opportunity Cost Everything and everyone has alternatives. Time and resources used to satisfy one set of desires cannot be used to satisfy another set. The cost of any decision or action is measured in terms of the value placed on the opportunity forgone. Medical care decisions involve costs as well as benefits. For many clinicians, allowing cost considerations into treatment decisions is morally repugnant. To counter this feeling, it is essential that practitioners have a knowledge of the fundamentals of economics to provide a foundation for understanding the issues that affect medical care delivery and policy.

Opportunity costs are an essential part of decision making

Sagara and Rosen 2k (Jean A. and Arnold G., Dental Economics, http://www.dentaleconomics.com/index/display/article-display/149251/articles/dental-economics/volume-92/issue-7/features/opportunity-cost-making-the-right-choices-to-keep-your-practice-in-balance.html)

Let's take a look at what an opportunity cost is and the impact it can have on a dentist's income - that paycheck that goes home at the end of the week. According to www.xrefer.com, an opportunity cost is "the income or benefit foregone as the result of carrying out a particular decision, when resources are limited or when mutually exclusive projects are involved." Economists generally agree that opportunity cost is "the next highest valued alternative foregone in the pursuit of an activity." (David Henderson, www.econlib.org) Simply stated, an opportunity cost is the cost of doing one thing instead of another. We either have a direct, incremental cost or we lose the opportunity for additional revenues because we make certain choices. Opportunity cost can be measured in dollars or nonmonetary values. For example, when the crown didn't fit and had to be redone, the dentist lost the opportunity to capture additional revenue from those hours. Perhaps the scene played differently with a personal opportunity cost to that same dentist: When the crown didn't fit, that same dentist added more billable hours to make up for his lost time. However, he lost the chance to go to a child's baseball game. Missing the game was an opportunity cost. The activity lost was something that contributes to the balance of work and recreation for that dentist. Sacrifices to wholesome living are absolute opportunity costs; we all make them in our lives.

Conditions CPs Bad

1. Infinitely Regressive –kills predictability– no limit on what QPQ they could run – this is bad because the aff is forced to turn the net benefit – conditionality makes this an impossible 2AC

2. It’s a delay cp – plan isn’t implemented until outcome of consultation – means they can spike out of disad links – forces teams to go for theory and perms because they can’t generate offense, killing topic specific education

3. Moots the 1ac - the plan is the only guaranteed aff ground - destroys argument development and shifts the focus to a contrived net benefit, killing opportunity cost assessment

4. C/I – neg gets these arguments as disads – solves all their offense

Solves education – neg still gets to debate about bargaining leverage

Solves ground – neg gets any literature that substantiates a trade-off

5. All the reasons why conditionality is bad apply- conditions forces the aff to debate in multiple worlds

6. Limits the topic to the margins and forces teams to read bad affs with quick timeframes to answer the CP

Conditions CPs Bad – Perms

1. Perm do both

2. Perm do the CP

3. Perm do the plan and condition

4. Perm condition and do the plan anyway

5. Perm do plan and roll it back if they say no

6. Logic Perm- the cp has 2 parts- a) condition with the intention of implementing the outcome b) implement the outcome. Perm do the plan and condition with the intention of implementing the outcome

Conditions CPs Bad – AT: Lit Checks

1. Infinite amounts of literature on all subjects – the ‘we have a card’ standard sets the bar way too low, especially without any common conception of what a ‘solvency’ advocate is

2. Not reciprocal – just because some journalist invents an idea doesn’t mean there is an active debate in the literature

Conditions CPs Bad – AT: Policy-Making

1. We’re not policy-makers; fairness comes first and short-circuits neg education claims – competitive equity must be maintained or else the neg would always win and everyone would quit

2. Policy education is something we inevitably solve and its not intrinsic to debate – clash is – unpredictable CPs kill clash

Conditions CPs Bad – AT: Core Ground

1. C/I solves – neg can still get offense on the affirmative

2. Cross-apply answers from AT – Lit Checks

\_\_\_\*\*Japan QPQ – Aff Ans

Arms Race T/

China will start an arms race if it perceives a threat from Japan or the US

Chu 8 (Shulong, Prof of political science and international relations, Brookings, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/01_east_asia_chu/01_east_asia_chu.pdf>)

However, China may change its national strategy in the future. First, it will accumulate more and more resources to increase its military buildup dramatically. Economically speaking, China today and in coming decades is in the position of the former Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, with the economic and financial resources to engage in a sort of arms race with Japan or the United States. Second, aside from military capacity, China may feel it needs to do much more in the area of military modernization when it changes its assessment of the security environment, and if it sees that Japan or the United States have both the capacity and the will to threaten China’s security and China’s role in Asia and in the world. China may also feel it needs to react to the rise of military power and militarism of Japan, in order to maintain the military balance in Asia, which currently features a degree of some Chinese superiority over Japan. Thirdly, China may need a much stronger military capability to compete with the United States if Chinese nationalism leads China to challenge America’s status and role in Asia or in the world, or if America adopts a strategy of comprehensive containment against a rising China.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 2AC

Japanese and Chinese cooperation would promote prosperity in East Asia

Japan Federation of Economic Organizations 1 (Feb 20, <http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2001/006.html>i) LL

In the relationship between Japan and China, from time to time, partly because of historical circumstances, there is a tendency to regard it as a special relationship. Even in business relations, there is a tendency to give China special consideration, on grounds that China is a socialist country and has one-party rule. However, in today's globalized economy, there is increasing pressure for international cooperation in a multilateral setting. China too is actively taking part in world economic affairs on a global basis, as witnessed by its effort to join the World Trade Organization. In a WTO-guided global economy, China has to abide by global standards and increase the transparency of its domestic laws and business practices. This is a challenging job. To enlarge the world economy, Japan and other major developed countries should continue to back up China's efforts and smooth its way into WTO membership. In terms of the regional economy, cooperation between Japan and China, both major economies in Asia, will promote stability and prosperity in the region. In this sense, cooperation between Japan and China in APEC, the ASEAN-plus-three forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum will be good for the stability and prosperity in East Asia. Over the long run, Japan and China could perhaps explore the possibility of setting up an East Asia free trade area and broaden the sphere of economic cooperation in the region. One possibility is to form a cooperative framework among countries adjoining the Sea of Japan, which, one day, could even encompass a unified Korea and Russia's Far Eastern Region. During his visit to Japan in October 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, in a meeting with Japanese business leaders, said he wishes Japan would seek to play a larger role in the world and in regional affairs. "China attaches importance to the influence Japan has in the Asian economy and the economic role it plays in the region. We would like to work more closely with the Japanese side under the framework of East Asia cooperation so that it could embark on projects of importance to our region. This is the kind of role we can play to promote economic development in Asia," he said. These remarks, in a departure from the past, suggest that China also hopes Japan would take a leading role to promote regional economic cooperation in East Asia.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 2AC

Japanese-Chinese economic ties key – Japan would gain more from Chinese prosperity than from American prosperity

Xinhau 9 (June 7, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/08/content_11504768.htm>) LL

TOKYO, June 7 (Xinhua) -- The second China-Japan high-level economic dialogue closed here Sunday, sending a clear message that the two sides will make continued efforts to forge strategic and mutually beneficial relations in trade and economy. The one-day dialogue, co-chaired by Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone, focused on a wide range of topics including energy conservation, environmental protection, finance, trade and investment and intellectual property as well as regional and international economic issues. Profound changes have taken place in the international economic and financial sectors since the first China-Japan high-level economic dialogue in December 2007. Coping with the ongoing global financial crisis has become the major concern for both countries. Faced with the grave challenges posed by the crisis, the two countries agreed that they should implement the consensus reached at G20 Washington and London summits and adopt more effective measures to ensure stability in financial markets and promote their own economic growth and contribute to the early recovery of the world economy. As each other's major trade partner, the two nations have become increasingly interdependent in economy and trade. Notably, the current dialogue highlighted potential cooperation in energy conservation and environmental protection. As the world's second largest economy, Japan is also a leader in energy conservation and environmental protection technologies, whereas China is the world's largest developing country with huge market demands. The two countries are highly complementary economically. Both sides have agreed to expand cooperation in environmental protection. Meanwhile, they expressed readiness to further remove barriers of various kinds, and enhance cooperation in such areas as technology trade, small and medium-sized businesses, quality control and food safety. During the current economic dialogue, the two sides signed eight important documents, including the MOU for International Property Protection Exchanges and Cooperation, Meeting Minutes on Agriculture Cooperation between China and Japan, and the MOU on Strengthening Science and Technology Cooperation in the Field of Seismology. As Japan and China are the two largest economies in East Asia, the advancement of their cooperation is of great importance in maintaining the region's economic stability, tackling the global financial crisis and boosting cooperation between developing and developed countries. During the talks, both sides also reached consensus on tackling regional and global economic issues, and reiterated their will to take responsible approach and strive to enhance regional and international economic and financial cooperation. Such consensus and endeavors will undoubtedly play a constructive role in the development of both regional and global economies. The success of the second China-Japan high-level economic dialogue once again proved that such a mechanism is playing an important role in advancing bilateral ties. Under this mechanism, the two sides discussed strategies on economic growth and macroeconomic policies, coordinated cross-sector economic cooperation, and enhanced policy exchanges on major regional and international economic issues. The mechanism is expected to elevate bilateral cooperation in economy and trade to a new high and have even greater positive impact on the economic stability and prosperity of Asia and the world at large.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 2AC

**Japanese econ decline collapses the US econ- forced further into debt, security revenue gone**

**Auslin 9** [Michael Resident Scholar at American Enterprise Institute, February 17, Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483257056995903.html]

Recently, many economists and **scholars** in the U.S. **have been looking backward to Japan's banking disaster** of the 1990s, hoping to learn lessons for America's current crisis. Instead, **they should be looking ahead to what might occur if Japan goes into a full-fledged depression.** [The Opinion Journal Widget](http://www.widgetbox.com/widget/opinion-journal?newBlidget=true&__fsk=1491914529) [Download Opinion Journal's widget and link to the most important editorials and op-eds of the day from your blog or Web page.](http://www.widgetbox.com/widget/opinion-journal?newBlidget=true&__fsk=1491914529) **If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories.** Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, **Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years.** For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far. **The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating.** In **the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back** and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, **middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power**. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential **for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region.** This is the backdrop upon which the U.S. government is set to expand the national debt by a trillion dollars or more. **Without massive debt purchases by Japan and China, the U.S. may not be able to finance the cost of the stimulus package, creating a trapdoor under the U.S. economy.**

**US economic collapse causes nuclear war**

**Cook 7** [Richard C., Writer, consultant, and retired federal analyst in U.S. Treasury Dept.; “It’s Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun,” Global Research, June 14. Accessed: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index/php?context=va&aid=5964>]

**Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the economic music . The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II. Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then**. **We could have a really big war if the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they don't want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?**

Japan-China Alliance Good – 1AR Asian Stability XT

China-Japan cooperation key to Asian stability

Xinhua 8 (May 7, <http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t450457.htm>) LL

TOKYO, May 7 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda signed here Wednesday a six-point Sino-Japanese joint statement on all-round promotion of their strategic and mutually beneficial relations. Both sides agree that the Sino-Japanese relationship is one of the most important bilateral ties for both countries. China and Japan have great influence and shoulder solemn responsibilities for peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Long-term peaceful and friendly cooperation is the only choice of the two countries. Both sides are dedicated to promoting a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship in an all-round way to realize the lofty goal of peaceful coexistence, friendship from generation to generation, mutually beneficial cooperation and common development. Both sides reiterate that the China-Japan Joint Statement issued on Sept. 29, 1972, the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on Aug. 12, 1978, and the China-Japan Joint Declaration released on Nov. 26, 1998 constitute the political basis for the stable development of Sino-Japanese relations and the opening up of a bright future. The two sides reaffirm their continuous adherence to the consensus reached in joint press communiques between Oct. 8, 2006 and April 11, 2007 and their commitment for the comprehensive implementation of the consensus. The two sides agree to face history squarely, look forward to the future and make continuous joint effort to open up new prospect in their strategic mutually beneficial relations. The two sides will continue to build up mutual understanding and trust, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, and make sure that the future development of Sino-Japanese relations conforms with the trend of the world's development, and jointly create a bright future for Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The two countries reaffirm that they are cooperation partners, with neither side posing threat to the other. Both countries reiterate that they will support each other in its peaceful development and both are convinced that China and Japan, with both countries committed to peace and development, will bring enormous opportunities and benefits to Asia and the world. Japan highly evaluates China's development since its reforms and opening-up and its commitment to contribute to building a world of lasting peace and common prosperity. While China speaks highly of Japan's adherence to the path of a peaceful country in the past six decades and more since World War II and its contribution, through peaceful means, to world peace and stability. Both sides agree to strengthen dialogue and communication on the U.N. reform and seek more consensus. China values Japan's status and role in the United Nations and is willing to see Japan play a bigger and more constructive role in international affairs. Japan reiterates adherence to its stance declared in the Japanese-Sino Joint Statement on the Taiwan issue. Both sides agree to a mechanism for high-level regular visits between leaders of the two nations, strengthen communication and dialogue between the governments, parliaments and political parties of the two countries, enhance exchange of views on bilateral ties, domestic and foreign policies, and the world situation. The two sides will also increase the exchange of high-level visits in the security sector to promote mutual understanding and trust. The two sides pledge to expand the exchanges of media, sister cities, sports and civilian groups between the two countries, and consistently promote exchanges of youngsters in a bid to enhance mutual understanding between the two peoples. Both sides decide to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, including energy, environment, trade, investment, information and communication technology, finance, food and product safety, protection of intellectual property right and business environment. They are also keen on the development of bilateral cooperation in farming, forestry, fishery, transportation, tourism, water resources, medical care and others sectors. Japan and China will make an effective use of the summit economic talks between the two countries proceeding from a strategic perspective. The two nations also pledge to work together and make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship. The two sides agree that China and Japan, as two important countries in the Asia-Pacific region, will keep close communication over regional affairs and strengthen coordination and cooperation. The two sides decide to jointly safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia and facilitate the process of six party-talks. The two sides agree that the normalization of relations between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is of great significance for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. China welcomes and supports the two countries efforts to resolve relevant issues and realize normalization of their bilateral ties. The two sides agree to promote regional cooperation in East Asia and contribute to building a peaceful, prosperous, stable and open Asia in line with the principle of opening-up, transparency and tolerance.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 1AR Asian Stability XT

Japan and China cooperation is key to a peaceful Asia

Burns 0 (Katherine, Stimson: independent, nonprofit, public policy institute, 2000, <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/burnspdf.pdf>) LL

Japan and China are the giants of Asia. The future of their relationship is absolutely critical to the peace and security of Asia. That relationship is complex: for over two millennia, beginning in the third century BC, the pair has maintained cordial relations. For fifty years during that period, from 1894 to 1945, they were at war. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, both struggle with the legacies of war and peace as they seek to define their roles in a rapidly changing world. Economic relations have played a pivotal role in their relationship, solidifying the foundation on which political relations are built, providing a balm in times of trouble, and marking the way to formal diplomatic relations. This essay explores the interaction of economic and political forces in Sino– Japanese relations. It is divided into five sections corresponding to five distinct phases of the relationship. In the first section, I focus on the building blocks forged by China and Japan over two millennia of interaction until the outbreak of war in 1894. I show how initial trading relations between the mainland and the archipelago blossomed into cultural and political exchange in a process which brought massive learning and change to Japan. I argue that these ties sustained Sino–Japanese relations in times of conflict, as they slipped seamlessly into an informal realm which allowed both countries to keep relations on an even keel even in the face of formal political discord. In the second section, I focus on the fifty years of conflict, showing that during this time, Japan's economic ambitions ran roughshod over past patterns of interaction, even as Japan's imperial armies overran the continent in a devastating war which would scar the relationship indefinitely. In the third section, I discuss Sino–Japanese relations during theCold War era, focusing in particular on the period from the end of the war in 1945 to the normalization of relations in 1972. I describe how the US–Japan Security Treaty dominated relations between China and Japan, and argue that both countries attempted to bolster economic ties with an eye to eventual political reconciliation. In the fourth section, I examine the brief period between 1972 and 1978 when Japan seized the diplomatic initiative to normalize relations and sign a peace treaty with China. I explain how both China and Japan reaped the fruits of their earlier endeavors and experienced a surge in economic interaction. In the final section, I focus on the complex period from 1979—when China "opened its door"—to the present. I argue that economic interaction continues to provide the foundation for the political relationship, but also affirm that both countries are struggling to come to terms with a legacy of war and define their roles in an evolving post-Cold War security framework.

Chinese-Japanese cooperation leads to “peace, stability, and prosperity”

Tang and Satho 8 (Shiping and Haruko, sr fellow at S. Rajaratnam of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China and Ph.D. candidate at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, and formerly research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan, 2008, <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~lchung/Can%20China%20and%20Japan%20Think%20Together%20by%20Tang%20and%20Satoh.pdf>) LL

Historical reconciliation between China and Japan would be truly transformational for East Asia, representing the most important development after the Second World War. Franco-German reconciliation and its impact on peace and prosperity of the European continent and beyond are proof of the stakes. Without it, the future of East Asia will be in peril. Asia’s destiny will be in non-Asian hands as it has been in the last two centuries, if mutual suspicion and antagonism continue to shape Sino-Japanese relations. And, one must not lose sight of the fact that enduring peace between China and Japan is no small contribution to world security. There is – at least we hope – now sufficient momentum in the bilateral relationship for the two sides to seriously map a path toward a robust and genuine reconciliation. After Koizumi, it has become difficult for any politician, nationalist, rightwing or otherwise, to gamble with relations with China. Moreover, the nationalist revival that seemed to echo the neo-con revolution in the U.S. has now lost momentum with the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The trajectory the Japanese leadership has taken since Koizumi via Abe to Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo suggests that the Japanese elite is finally grasping that Japan, as an Asian country, cannot escape from geography, even though it may cherish ‘special’ ties with extra-regional powers (first with Britain and now the U.S.). On the Chinese side, the new leadership has internalized the notion that only a robust reconciliation between China and Japan can guarantee the peace, stability, and prosperity of East Asia. The visit by Premier Wen and the coming visit of President Hu to Japan symbolize the triumphant return of “New Thinking” toward Japan – in a more sophisticated embodiment – in China. The Chinese leadership and most of its foreign policy elite are ready for and look forward to a true partnership with a “normal” Japan that is based on equality.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 1AR Asian Stability XT

Chinese and Japanese cooperation maintains stability in Northeast Asia

China Embassy 10 (May 30, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t705311.htm>) LL

The three leaders spoke highly of the rapid expansion and growth of the trilateral cooperation in recent years, made planning for the direction and priority areas of trilateral cooperation for the next ten years, exchanged in-depth views on current major international and regional issues and reached broad consensus. The three leaders pledged to make unremitting efforts in pushing trilateral ties towards the direction of good-neighborly mutual trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development and advance the cooperation to a new high. In his remarks, Wen said currently the world is undergoing profound and complex changes and this region is facing many new challenges and difficulties. The three countries should proceed from the fundamental interests of the three peoples and long-term prosperity and stability of the region, enhance communication and coordination, take into account one another's major concerns and properly handle sensitive issues so as to enhance political mutual trust and maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This, he stressed, constituted the most important basis for deepening trilateral cooperation. Wen noted that in tackling global financial crisis, the three countries have maintained close communication and coordination in their joint efforts to oppose trade protectionism, deepened and broadened cooperation in all fields, thus achieving economic revival and growth in bilateral trade. The trilateral cooperation has withstood the tests of the crisis and shown a sound momentum of all-round development and constant deepening. Currently there are still many uncertain factors in the world economic recovery. Wen called for greater input by the three countries to consolidate the economic recovery while continuing to implement appropriate policies. Meanwhile, they should adopt a long-term approach to the steady recovery and future growth of region's economy, and work together to create a favorable condition for this end and inject strong vitality into the building of the East Asia Community, Wen said. Premier Wen suggested the three countries make efforts in the following three aspects. First, the Chinese premier called for further efforts to establish the mechanism and framework of cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea in line with a blueprint mapping out cooperation in the region over the next decade. He urged the three countries to encourage joint researches by officials, businessmen and scholars on a free trade area, strive to reach a trilateral investment agreement at an early date, and enhance cooperation on standardization and establishment of a secretariat for trilateral cooperation. Second, while serving as major manufacturing and trade powers, the three countries should push for sustainable development, Wen said. They should accelerate their economic restructuring and the transformation of pattern of economic growth by vigorously developing green economy, recycle economy and conducting scientific and technological innovation in a bid to ensure sound and rapid economic growth of the three countries and push for a new round of economic growth of East Asia, he added. Third, the premier also called for greater efforts to promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges among the three countries. They should join hands to promote the ideas of friendship, tolerance and harmony, broaden the exchange and cooperation in youth, culture, education, tourism, media and encourage friendly exchanges among different cities so that cooperation among the three countries will enjoy broader and more solid popular support. Wen said that as both neighbors and regional powers, the three East Asian nations should treat each other with respect and on an equal footing to achieve a win-win result, which is the only right way. “We have got off to a good start.” said Wen, expressing the confidence that as long as the three nations work together for their common goal, their future will be bright indeed. The South Korean president and Japanese prime minister made it clear that the interests of the three countries have become more interwoven, exchanges between them more frequent than ever before and the three nations share ever greater responsibility. In the new situation, the three nations must uphold the concept of mutual benefit and win-win outcome and enhance pragmatic cooperation. They should further build up mutual understanding and trust, expand cooperation in a wide range of areas including economy, trade, investment, finance, environmental protection and recycle economy and encourage cultural and people-to-people exchanges. The three countries should also keep closer communication and coordination in regional and international affairs, join hands to cope with the global financial crisis, climate change and other major issues and challenges. Lee and Hatoyama said increased cooperation between the three countries will not only benefit their own peoples but will also promote the East Asian cooperation process as well as peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world at large. The three leaders also exchanged views on the Cheonan incident and offered condolences over the death of the sailors killed in the sinking of the South Korean warship. The Chinese and Japanese leaders said they attach importance to the joint investigation by South Korea and some other countries into the incident, and have taken note of the responses from concerned parties. The three nations promised to maintain communication and properly handle the incident in the interest of regional peace and stability. "We must spare no effort to promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Short of this precondition, development will be out of the question, and the hard-won achievements will be lost again," he stressed. "The pressing task for the moment is to properly handle the serious impact caused by the Cheonan incident, defuse tensions in the region, and most importantly of all, avoid possible conflicts," Wen said. "China will continue to enhance communication with relevant parties (over the Cheonan incident) in order to steer the situation toward a direction which is conducive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This is in our best common and long-term interests," Wen said. The three leaders agreed that a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula would be conducive to achieving lasting peace, security and economic prosperity in Northeastern Asia. The three pledged to continue to work together through the six-party talks toward the materialization of the goals, set forth by the joint declaration of the six-party talks on Sept. 19, 2005.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 1AR Econ XT

Japan and China relations key to regional cooperation in economics

Masafumi 98 (Iida, Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, Nov 28, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html>) LL

China shares significant interests with Japan in enhancing political stability and economic prosperity in East Asia, which makes China regard Japan as an important partner for advancing regional cooperation in the region. The process of APT cooperation, started in 1997, has been mainly led by the ASEAN. Both China and Japan admit the ASEAN’s leading role in regional cooperation. For instance, APT countries expressed their conviction that the APT would be the main vehicle to realize an East Asian community “with ASEAN as the driving force,” in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the APT Summit held in December 2005.13 China and Japan let the ASEAN take the initiative in managing the APT because political antagonism between the two countries hampered their policy coordination regarding the APT, while neither China nor Japan had sufficient power to dominate the process of regional cooperation. As the bilateral relationship between China and Japan shifted and improved with a common objective for enhancing a strategic partnership of mutual benefit, there appeared optimistic views among Chinese scholars on possible policy coordination between the two countries for advancing East Asian cooperation. China Foreign Affairs University hosted a symposium entitled “East Asia Cooperation: Progress, Prospect and Procedure” in December 2007. According to a summary report of this symposium, many participants asserted that cooperation between Beijing and Tokyo was indispensable for further promotion of East Asian cooperation.14 For example, one scholar who participated in the symposium maintained that efforts to improve the bilateral relationship and promote East Asian cooperation by both governments would have great significance on the progress of regional integration.15 The Chinese government, as a matter of fact, has initiated some functional cooperation with the Japanese government with a view to deepening regional integration in East Asia. Coordinated economic assistance on infrastructure of regional developing countries is one of the prospective functional cooperation measures between the two governments. There exist various types of countries in East Asia in terms of degrees of economic development. Some of the countries in the region like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in Indochina remain far less developed compared to the others including Japan and China. This wide development gap among the countries in the region raises concern that the process of regional integration in East Asia would be constrained. With a common interest in forging East Asia cooperation, China and Japan share a rational reason for assisting less-developed countries in the region that are desperate for foreign capital to build their infrastructures.

Japan and China are economically inseparable; they have also been successful in diffusing Asian tension

Reuters 10 (May 31, <http://arabnews.com/world/article59648.ece>) LL

TOKYO: Japan and China agreed on Monday to set up an emergency hotline and set in place ways to prevent maritime friction sparked by Beijing's growing naval reach from getting out of hand. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao held to Beijing's cautious stance on the sinking of a South Korean warship, which Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has joined Seoul and Washington in saying was certainly torpedoed by North Korea. Ties between the world's second- and third-largest economies have improved since 2006, when they set aside years of rancor centered on Japan's wartime occupation of Asia. At Monday's summit, wartime historical disputes did not come up. Instead, the two leaders agreed on steps aimed at easing military tensions that have continued to keep a cool distance between the two Asian neighbors. The two nations "must strengthen maritime crisis management and avoid the occurrence of antagonism and clashes," Wen told Hatoyama, according to China's official Xinhua news agency. They also agreed to resume talks on jointly exploring disputed gas fields in seas between them. Hatoyama came to office less than a year ago, vowing a more equal relationship with the United States and closer ties with China and other Asian powers. The summit with Wen, however, brought small steps, not big breakthroughs. The hotline between Beijing and Tokyo would allow leaders to discuss quickly what Wen called "important issues" between the two nations, a Japanese government official said. Wen later told Japanese business executives the huge economic flows between the two nations, with bilateral trade worth $238.7 billion last year, would cement closer ties. "China and Japan have very close economic and trade ties. One could say they are at the point where neither could do without the other," said Wen.

Japan-China Alliance Good – 1AR Econ XT

Japanese and Chinese relations strongly influence development of Asia

Masafumi 98 (Iida, Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, Nov 28, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html>) LL

With a view to realizing sustainable development, China needs to make efforts to

assist regional economic growth, overcome the serious problems of energy and

environment and stabilize the regional financial system through enhancing East Asia

cooperation. To promote regional cooperation in East Asia, cooperative relations with

Japan are indispensable for China. On a bilateral basis, China and Japan are faced

with some difficult problems including anti-Japanese sentiment, historical issues, and

discontent over the East China Sea. However, from the East Asian perspective, both

countries share significant interests, which presents Japan as a partner for China.

Japan and China are economically dependent

Japan Federation of Economic Organizations 1 (Feb 20, <http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2001/006.html>i) LL

A new century is now upon us. Looking back on the relationship between Japan and China, we see a long history of contact and interaction between the two neighboring countries, particularly so in the economic sphere, where there have been dramatic developments after China adopted reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s. Today, the economies of Japan and China have become highly complementary to each other. Nevertheless, distrust lingers. Although mutual misgivings lie primarily in the political area, in issues such as "understanding history" and national security, on many occasions the lack of trust between the two countries has turned into barriers for advancing economic ties. We must realize that the relationship between Japan and China has become one of the most important in bilateral relations for both countries, in the political sense as well as in economic and many other ways. As China prepares for membership in the World Trade Organization, the Chinese leadership must tackle many issues that come with the globalization of the world economy. As two countries have strong economic bonds, Japan must work with China to resolve these issues so that the benefits of a globalized economy can be fully enjoyed and both countries become more prosperous. To achieve these goals, we must strengthen mutual trust and remove the barriers that have impeded the development of our economic relations. The Japanese and the Chinese economy are the two largest in Asia, and the shape of their relations has strong repercussions on the prosperity and stability of the region as a whole. With a new century now upon us, we take this opportunity to review our past ties and present a series of recommendations on ways to strengthen mutual trust and further develop our economic relations.

Japan Says No

Japan wouldn’t turn against China- committed to building a new partnership

Japan Times 6/28 (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100629a7.html)

TORONTO (Kyodo) Prime Minister Naoto Kan Japan and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to beef up defense dialogue to build mutual trust amid recent Chinese military activity around Japanese waters, a Japanese official said. In his first face-to-face meeting with Hu, Kan also called Sunday for China's cooperation in responding to the fatal sinking of a South Korean warship that has been blamed on North Korea. "I would like to send a clear message to North Korea at the U.N. Security Council and I want to ask for a forward-looking response from China," Kan was quoted by the official as telling Hu. Hu said the sinking was "a very unhappy incident." But he told Kan that each nation should respond calmly from a broader perspective on the matter, underlining the gap between the two countries' position on the issue, according to the official. China, one of the five veto-holding permanent members of the Security Council, remains reluctant to take tough action on Pyongyang. In the meeting, held on the sidelines of the two-day Group of 20 summit in Toronto, Hu said he wants to reinforce dialogue between the defense authorities, governments, legislatures and political parties of the two countries, in an attempt to enhance mutual trust. Kan said he agreed with the idea and that he "would like to strengthen dialogue between defense authorities and build a trustful relationship," the official said. Touching on the stalled six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, Kan noted the importance of settling the sinking issue. In March, the 1,200-ton Cheonan corvette was sunk in the Yellow Sea. Forty-six South Korean sailors were killed. On the economic front, Kan and Hu reaffirmed the need to launch formal negotiations on signing a bilateral treaty at an early date over gas exploitation in the East China Sea, the official said. The dispute stems from the unsettled demarcation of the East China Sea, where the exclusive economic zones claimed by the two countries overlap. Hu also indicated he will visit Japan when it hosts a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November, the official said. During the 45-minute meeting, the two leaders agreed to enhance strategic, mutually beneficial relations. They also agreed that Japan and China need to promote a "win-win" relationship through economic cooperation.

Decade long commitment between China and Japan ensure solid alliance

Xinhau 10 (May 29, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-05/29/c_13322927.htm>) LL

JEJU, South Korea, May 29 (Xinhua) -- Leaders of China, Japan and South Korea on Saturday issued a document outlining a blueprint for cooperation within the coming 10 years. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who are meeting in South Korea's southern resort island of Jeju for an annual trilateral summit, made joint pledges to further trilateral cooperation in such areas as economy, security, environmental protection and cultural exchange. The leaders of the three nations agreed that after making clear the detailed objectives and long-term goals within the next decade, all sides need to concentrate efforts on boosting trilateral cooperation to a new height, so as to further consolidate partnership, achieve more in mutually beneficial cooperation in all aspects and enhance friendship between the peoples of the three countries. The three leaders agreed to set up a more cooperative mechanism to increase strategic mutual trust, which involves setting up a trilateral cooperation secretariat in South Korea in 2011 to jointly tackle natural disasters, discuss the possibility of a mechanism of trilateral defense dialogue to enhance security contacts, strengthen political dialogue and cooperation in police affairs, and boost government exchanges at local levels among the three nations. On developing sustainable economic cooperation and common prosperity, the leaders pledged efforts to finish by 2012 a joint feasibility study of trilateral free trade agreement, which was launched in May 2010, and to expand trade volume ahead of 2020 for the benefit of regional economic growth and integration. The leaders said the three countries will complete negotiations on investment agreement and provide a favorable investment environment to facilitate the operation of enterprises in the region. They also reiterated the importance of customs cooperation, and vowed to further cooperation in finance, science and technology, innovation, as well as policy cooperation and negotiations in such areas as energy efficiency and resources. "An open, fair and liberalized multilateral trade system is not only conducive to China, Japan and South Korea, but also important for the world. We must oppose protectionism of any form to safeguard and consolidate the system," said the document. On cooperation in environmental protection, the leaders said the three countries should jointly push for achievements at the climate change summit to be held in Mexico this year, including an effective international cooperation framework in this regard after 2012, under the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

Japan Says No

Japan’s “economy first, politics later” stance on foreign policy ensures that it would not attack China, its largest trading partner

Li 10 (Xue, China Daily, Jan 19, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-01/19/content_9339782.htm>) LL

If Hatoyama makes the trip, he will become the first serving Japanese prime minister to visit Nanjing after World War II. Though Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano subsequently denied the news, it is obvious that of late China-Japan relations have progressed fairly. High-level reciprocal visits between the two countries have become frequent over the past two months. Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Japan within 25 days of each other. During that time, Japan sent a super-large delegation of 630 people (including 143 Democratic Party of Japan's Diet members) to China. The media said that Ichiro Ozawa had brought "half of Japan's legislature" to China. Economic cooperation between China and Japan is now a matter of interdependence, with China becoming Japan's largest trade partner, largest export market and most favorite outbound investment destination. Japan, on the other hand, is China's third largest trade partner and second largest source of foreign investment. China's investment in Japan has seen a fast growth, too, and the global economic recession could further deepen their interdependence. In the fields of culture, education, science and technology, arts and the media, the two sides have established a closer partnership with frequent exchanges. Take education for example. About 60 percent of the international students in Japan are from China, while Japan is the second largest source of foreign students in China. And the two governments plan to attract more students from each other's country. In politics, since Hatoyama has made it clear that he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, Sino-Japanese relations are not likely to experience major fluctuations in the short run. Emperor Akihito's audience with visiting Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping was an exception and showed that Tokyo attached great importance to maintaining stable political relations with Beijing. The two sides have realized that the establishment of an East Asian Community is inevitable, though China suggests that the process first be conducted within the framework of 10+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), while Japan wants India, Australia and New Zealand (or 10+6), too, to be part of it. Military ties act as a barometer of diplomatic relations between any two countries. After the Cold War, countries without military alliances have tried to strengthen military ties through various channels, such as reciprocal visits of generals and warships, joint maritime search and rescue operations and counter-terrorism drills. Viewed from these perspectives, Sino-Japanese military cooperation has progressed, too. During Defense Minister Liang Guanglie's visit to Japan, the two sides reached a few agreements: Japan's defense minister will visit China within 2010, mutual visits between chiefs of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and their Japanese counterparts will continue, annual consultations on defense and security will be held, exchange visits of warships will continue, joint maritime search and rescue training will be held at an appropriate time, and maritime liaison mechanism of defense sectors will be established as early as possible. Therefore, we are confident that the Beijing-Tokyo partnership will be further strengthened in the next decade as long as Japanese leaders do not follow "the disastrous road of Junichiro Koizumi". Currently, the urgent task for the two countries is how to build a long-term framework that could steer bilateral relations toward a more solid cooperation. Japan's national development path of "economy first, politics later" was established during Shigeru Yoshida's administration. In the 1980s, based on Japan's global economic status, Yasohiro Nakasone put forward that Japan should become a "political power", but that goal was frustrated by the "lost decade" of the 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century, Junichiro Koizumi attempted to realize this goal (the amendment of the Japanese Constitution and the bid to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council) by"firmly following the US lead", but achieved no significant results.

Japan Says No

China and Japan are committed to an alliance for the next decade.

China Embassy 10 (May 30, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t705311.htm>) LL

From May 29 to 30, the third trilateral summit of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was held in ROK's Jeju island. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Lee Myung-bak attended the meeting, which was chaired by Lee Myung-bak. The three leaders spoke highly of the rapid expansion and growth of the trilateral cooperation in recent years, made planning for the direction and priority areas of trilateral cooperation for the next ten years, exchanged in-depth views on current major international and regional issues and reached broad consensus. The three leaders pledged to make unremitting efforts in pushing trilateral ties towards the direction of good-neighborly mutual trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development and advance the cooperation to a new high.

China and Japan have taken steps toward solidifying an alliance based on strategic and economic interests

Xinhua 9 (Sep 22, <http://frankfurt.china-consulate.org/det/zgyw/t605899.htm>) LL

China and Japan, Hu said, are friendly neighbors separated only by a narrow strip of water. He pointed out that both nations are important countries in Asia and the world. Hu noted that China-Japan relations are among each country's most important bilateral ties. He said cooperation and bilateral exchanges between China and Japan have reached unprecedented levels in a variety of fields since the two countries normalized relations 37 years ago. Leaders of the two countries, Hu said, have maintained close exchanges of visits and contacts, especially since 2006, as they decided to build a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship. "This was the first time that the two sides made positioning and planning of bilateral relations on a strategic level," Hu said. "During the state visit that I paid to Japan last year, the two sides worked out the blueprint for future development of China-Japan relations and pointed out the direction of the growth of bilateral relations in the 21st century by issuing the fourth political document between the two countries," Hu said. The improvement and development of bilateral relations has not only brought major benefits to China and Japan, it also has contributed positively to peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world, Hu said. China has always viewed and developed China-Japan relations from a strategic and long-term perspective. Hu said China will continue to pursue its policy of China-Japan friendship and work with Japan to realize the goal of peaceful coexistence, friendship for generations, mutually beneficial cooperation and common development. Hu, noting that the world is currently undergoing complicated and profound changes, said China and Japan are sharing increasing common interests and challenges. "Bilateral relations are facing major opportunities for development at higher levels and in greater space," Hu said. He said China is ready to work with Japan to advance their mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests in a sustained and in-depth way by proceeding from the fundamental interests of both peoples and conforming to the trend of world development. President Hu put forward five propositions on developing China-Japan relations. First, Hu said, the two countries should enhance high-level communication so as to improve political trust. Leaders of the two countries should maintain contact and continuously add political impetus to the development of bilateral ties. Second, Hu said, the two countries should promote trade and economic cooperation and strengthen the ties of interests. China and Japan are both major world economies and important trade partners to each other. Strengthening trade and economic cooperation will be conducive for both countries to overcome the international financial crisis and to encourage recovery for both economies and the economy of the world at the earliest possible date, he said. Hu said the second high-level economic dialogue between China and Japan held in Japan in June set goals of trade and economic cooperation for the future. Relevant government departments of the two countries, Hu said, should take practical measures to fully implement the results of the dialogue so as to advance bilateral trade and economic cooperation to a higher level. Third, Hu said, the two countries should improve the feelings of their people towards each other to consolidate the basis of public opinion. Hu said the two sides should focus on the good trend of China-Japan friendship by carrying out exchanges between their young people, cadres, cultures and media so as to push for the improvement of the feelings of their people towards each other. Fourth, Hu said, the two countries should enhance cooperation on Asian affairs and push for coordination in international affairs. As two important countries in the region, Hu said, China and Japan should jointly work for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The two sides should also carry out dialogue, coordination and cooperation on global challenges such as the international financial crisis, climate change, environment and energy, he said. Fifth, Hu said, China and Japan should properly deal with their differences and maintain their friendship. As neighbors with close contact, China and Japan inevitably have some problems and differences in bilateral relations. The two countries should have an overall point of view and deal with these problems prudently and properly so as to prevent them from affecting the steady development of the bilateral relations.

Japan Says No

**China and Japan have a mutually beneficial and interdependent relationship**

Abe 8 (J, PHP Foreign Policy, February 2008, <http://research.php.co.jp/research/foreign_policy/policy/data/seisaku01_teigen34_01.pdf>) LL

On the one hand there is China, a country continuing to achieve remarkable economic growth and gradually expanding its global “presence.” On the other hand, there is Japan, a nation searching for direction in the context of the collapse of the ’55 system and transformed post-cold war international order. We have entered into an era in which Japan and China must face one another directly and cooperate in creating a mutually-constructive relationship. Economic ties between Japan and China have already achieved a level of interdependence that neither nation wishes to upset. Both countries can ill afford to overlook the interests of the other. Far from limiting cooperation to the economic sphere, the two powers have much to gain by also enhancing collaboration in other areas and contributing to regional and global development. It can be said that the relationship between the two countries is a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”

No NB – US-Japan Relations High

US-Japanese relations strong now – both countries benefit

AP 10 (June 27, <http://two--plus--two.blogspot.com/2010/06/strong-japan-us-alliance-good-for.html>) LL

(AP) - TORONTO, June 27 (Kyodo) — U.S. President Barack Obama said Sunday a strong alliance between Japan and the United States is good for the security of both countries and Asia as a whole. "The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and vibrant. It is good for Japan's security, it is good for America's security," Obama told a press conference following a two-day summit of the Group of 20 advanced and emerging economies in Toronto. Washington and Tokyo marked the 50th anniversary of their security treaty this year. Obama said he expects the bilateral alliance to "sustain itself for another 50 years." Asked whether Japan should be more responsible for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama said he wants to make sure that all countries in the area "are meeting their responsibilities" through dialogue at such forums as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. "I think if we adhere to that basic principle, then a strong U.S.- Japan alliance is something that can continue to be a cornerstone of a peaceful and prosperous Asia, which will benefit all people," Obama said.

No NB – Japan Wouldn’t Side with China

In the event of a war, Japan’s relationship with the US takes precedence over its relationship with China

Singh 10 (Assistant Prof @ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, April 8, <http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000185>) LL

Despite these problems, Japan is not tilting toward China. The U.S.-Japan relationship is still very strong politically, economically, and, increasingly, in strategic terms as well. On this 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the relationship continues to display strong shared objectives and interests, which are institutionalized in many ways. All relationships suffer from ups and downs, and the U.S.-Japan relationship is no different. The nature of the relationship is strong enough to weather occasional disagreements, which are necessary to recalibrate the way the relationship functions. The important point to note here is that strategic military issues will increasingly become sources of tension as the bilateral security relationship matures. Japan sees the value of a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. The United States has successfully provided security cover for Japan since the onset of the post-war period. This function has become even more pronounced in light of Japan's main security challenges today—North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program and China's economic, political, and military rise. Moreover, Japan has made significant strides toward assuming a more active security role in international affairs. Much of this development has materialized through the active support of the United States. The continued support of Washington for Japan's bigger security role is essential for Tokyo, as well as its neighbors who harbor suspicion and mistrust against Japan stemming from their colonial history.

No NB – Japan Wouldn’t Side with China

Japan-China tensions mean Japan would likely assist the US in the event of a China-US war

Caryl 10 (Christian, Foreign Policy, May 18, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/18/naval_gazing_in_asia?page=0,1>) LL

There's undoubtedly an element of truth to this. Yet one suspects that parochial interests don't explain the whole story. As Kaneda points out, the Japanese government's defense policy over the past decade has been anything but hawkish: The Japanese military has watched defense spending slide for each of the past seven years. China's defense budget, meanwhile, has risen sharply -- admittedly from a relatively small base. And the trend of Chinese naval ships pushing their way into areas they used to shun is clear enough. One Japanese government official told the Financial Times that the incidents involving Chinese vessels passing through that same area off Okinawa has been steadily climbing over the past three years. Beneath the two countries' wrangling on the high seas lies a complicated tangle of legal and political issues. There are, for example, still unresolved territorial disputes between the two governments -- especially the one involving a set of islands (known as Diaoyutai to the Chinese and as the Senkakus to Japan) located between Taiwan and the tip of Japan's southern Ryukyu Island chain (of which Okinawa Island is part). Perhaps even more contentious, though, is the issue of natural resources. Both China and Japan are desperate for energy to power their industries. (The jury is still out, by the way, but it looks likely that China overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy recently -- which presumably makes the tensions between the two a matter of some relevance to the world at large.) Tokyo and Beijing adhere to starkly different definitions of their respective EEZs -- and both fear establishing bad precedents if they give up so much as a square inch of ocean. In short, even though many economic issues bring the two closer together, there are others that drive them apart. There is one more layer to the maneuvering, though, and that has to do with Japan's role as America's closest and most powerful ally in the Western Pacific. China's present leadership seems to have made a strategic decision that the Middle Kingdom no longer has to hide its light under a bushel-- and that projecting military power is a legitimate way of defending its expanding interests. John Tkacik, who headed China intelligence analysis at the U.S. State Department during the Clinton administration, says, "China is now asserting that it, not Japan, is the preeminent Asian power and that both the Chinese people and the masses of Asia must acknowledge China's new preeminence." He notes that many of the recent Chinese maneuverings have taken place in waters near those islands that are claimed by both China and Japan. The Chinese, he says, are testing to see how far the Americans are really prepared to stand up for Japan's side of the argument. "China is probing the U.S.-Japan alliance for fissures." Of late the Chinese military has become more assertive in Southeast Asia, unnerving some countries there by using naval forces to assert its claims to the contested Spratly Islands, for example. Beijing has also demonstrated that it's prepared to stake out strategic strong points in the Indian Ocean region, even when that aggravates its biggest regional rival, India. And, of course, ensuring Taiwan's eventual accession to mainland rule remains a paramount goal of Chinese state policy -- so the PLA has been busily working to acquire the technology (like long-range anti-ship missiles) to ensure that it can push back against the U.S. Seventh Fleet if it needs to. (Chinese leaders have a painfully clear memory of how the Clinton administration forced them into a humiliating climbdown over Taiwan back in the mid-1990s, when the United States deployed its then-unassailable fleet to the Taiwan Strait. That was then.) Sumihiko Kawamura, another Japanese ex-admiral, says that the U.S., Japan, and their regional allies should respond by conducting more joint naval maneuvers, coordinating efforts to monitor Chinese naval movements, and pushing the Chinese "to observe the international standard of modus operandi at the high sea." Kawamura also points out that the Chinese have been mysteriously reluctant to conclude an "incidents at sea" agreement with the Japanese and the Americans. The first such agreement, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in dramatically reducing the sorts of in-your-face naval maneuvers that could have easily led to accidental escalation with potentially disastrous consequences. Establishing some sort of hotline between naval headquarters on both sides of the East China Sea might not be a bad idea, either.

No NB – Japan Not Key – US Would Win

China is twenty years behind in military capabilities

Brown et al 3 (Harold, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2003, <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf>) LL

The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power finds that the People’s Republic of China is pursuing a deliberate and focused course of military modernization but that it is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability. Moreover, if the United States continues to dedicate significant resources to improving its military forces, as expected, the balance between the United States and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next twenty years. There are multiple drivers of China’s military modernization. The PLA, along with the People’s Armed Police and the People’s Militia, helps maintain domestic stability and ensure regime security. China is developing limited power-projection capabilities to deal with a range of possible conflict scenarios along its periphery, especially in maritime areas. The PLA is acquiring military capabilities designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial interests and to pose a credible threat to Taiwan in order to influence Taiwan’s choices about its political future; or, failing that, to prevent Taiwan from achieving political independence. These capabilities are also intended to deter, delay, or complicate U.S. efforts to intervene on behalf of Taiwan. In addition, military modernization is expected to enhance China’s international prestige. China is a regional power, and the Task Force does not envisage China becoming a globally committed military power in the next two decades. If current trends continue (e.g., if Japan continues to eschew a role as a major regional military power), the Task Force expects that China will become the predominant military power among the nations of East Asia. China’s current force structure and doctrine provide effective “defense-in-depth” against any effort to invade and seize Chinese territory. The PLA possesses power projection across land borders against smaller region- al powers and the ability to dislodge those powers from nearby disputed land and maritime territories. In the next two decades, the Task Force expects China will acquire a greater capability to hold and seize such territories against combined regional forces. However, the Task Force also notes that although China will have the enduring advantage of proximity to Asia, Beijing has traditionally been weakest and the United States has traditionally been strongest in the maritime, aerospace, and technological dimensions of military power. Consequently, although China is already the strongest continental military power in East Asia and destined to become an even greater power beyond its littoral borders, a sustained and robust U.S. naval and air presence can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into a real advantage against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years, if not longer.

Taiwan Conflict ≠ Escalate

Taiwan conflict won’t escalate- US won’t use nukes and China would control the conflict

Roberts 5 (Brad, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1/26 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=740

In Roberts' assessment, there are at least five elements in this picture. While there is no official Chinese description of a possible nuclear confrontation, these elements seem to inform the thinking of Chinese experts both inside and outside their government. The first is the assumption that the burden of crisis escalation would fall on the U.S. The Chinese believe that they would largely hold the initiative in a crisis and would be able to choose the time and manner of engagement. In other words, it would be left to the United States to react to a losing situation by choosing whether or not to escalate. The second element is a belief that that because of the asymmetry of interests, it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis. Whereas Taiwan is vital to Beijing’s sense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its regime survival, the U.S. interest in Taiwan is seen as less than vital. Thus, they believe that the United States would be unwilling to “trade Los Angeles for Taipei.” Third, the Chinese believe that the threshold for U.S. nuclear retaliation is high. As a consequence, they debate the possibility that there might be ways that China could use nuclear weapons without facing U.S. retaliation. Fourth, Chinese analysts tend to believe that any unwanted escalation would be manageable on their part. This has something to do with Chinese strategic culture and their belief in China’s skill in creating, exploiting, and if necessary prolonging crisis. Moreover, some Chinese analysts cite the experience of 1968 when China confronted the Soviet Union as proof of China’s nuclear crisis management ability. In particular, Beijing could seek to counter U.S. nuclear deterrence by demonstrating its resolve through its own nuclear attacks. The essence of such a tactic would be to exert escalation control by instilling escalation uncertainty. Fifth, and finally, Chinese analysts seem to believe that the final outcome of a worst case scenario in a nuclear Taiwan crisis would be the reversion to the status quo ante. Beijing, thus, would be no worse off than what it started with.

No China-US War

China is not a threat; no escalation

Steketee 8 (Mike, The Australian, Aug 19, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/china-wont-fight-over-taiwan-expert/story-e6frg6t6-1111117233275>) LL

CHINA is unlikely to be a military threat and the chances of a conflict over Taiwan are diminishing, according to a US defence expert. Jonathan Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific studies at the US Naval War College, told The Australian that China would become a much more potent military force in the long run. "They see this as an inevitable and logical outgrowth of their economic emergence," Professor Pollack said. "For all the shiny new systems they are acquiring, China has not gone to war for 30 years. I don't see them as a kind of budding overlord of East Asia. I don't think that is the way they conceptualise these things." China has reported average real increases in military spending of 9.6per cent in the 15 years to 2005; outside estimates are much higher. The US Defence Department has been among those expressing concern about a military build-up that could put regional balances at risk. Professor Pollack, who has been visiting China for 30 years, said he could not preclude China becoming a military threat, but added: "I just don't see it as terribly likely." Professor Pollack is in Australia as a guest of the Centre for International Security Studies and the US Studies Centre, both at Sydney University. He recently visited Taiwan, whose Government, elected this year, comprised realists who knew they had to try to find a means of dealing with China. "They have to find a way to give China clear incentives to collaborate with them, hopefully in a transition to some longer-term accommodation, the terms of which they don't know yet," Professor Pollack said. "As long as you have a Government in Taipei that is going to work hard to not provoke the Chinese, I would see the probability (of China using military force against Taiwan) diminishing, not increasing, even as China becomes much more capable militarily."

China’s No First Use policy prevents escalation into nuclear warfare

Lieggi 5 (Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, [http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_70.html#fn4#fn4](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_70.html#fn4)) LL

Keeping in mind Beijing's rebuff of Zhu's comment, the question remains as to what his statement meant—if anything—about Chinese nuclear doctrine.[20] To fully assess the current status of China's NFU policy, it is important to go beyond the rhetoric coming from all sides of the debate. The NFU policy has been a part of China's nuclear doctrine for over four decades. Despite massive changes in China since then, many of the factors that dictated Beijing's doctrine in the past still impact policies today. These factors—including deterrence capabilities, resource limitations, regional stability, and perceptions of what is best for China strategically—continue to guide China's nuclear doctrine.

China has nothing to gain in a conflict with the US

Lieggi 5 (Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, [http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_70.html#fn4#fn4](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_70.html#fn4)) LL

There is no doubt that Taiwan remains the top most national security issue for the Chinese leadership and Beijing is willing (though not anxious) to risk a military conflict with the United States to keep the island from permanent separation. But this acknowledgement does not equate to Beijing discarding decades-old doctrines, such as NFU. Chinese political leaders, as well as many military leaders, recognize that China has nothing to gain if a conflict with the United States turned nuclear. At that point, China would quickly lose any ability to control the escalation of the conflict. If Beijing were to attack first with nuclear weapons, even in a situation where Chinese conventional forces were certain to lose the fight for Taiwan, there is no way for the leadership to predict the extent to which Washington would retaliate. The United States would see any nuclear attack by China, even on purely military targets, as provocation to escalate the conflict further, a step that could likely mean the collapse of the current leadership in Beijing. Ultimately, Taiwan would be lost either way. The NFU policy has served China well by assuring strategic stability, assisting in a relatively more efficient allocation of limited resources, and allowing Beijing to take the high moral ground on nuclear weapons use. Despite speculation about a shift in China's nuclear doctrine, a careful analysis of official Chinese positions and recent trends in Chinese nuclear weapons modernization would suggest Major General Zhu Chenghu's remarks do not provide any new clues to China's nuclear doctrine, nor do they indicate a move towards building a more offense-capable and war-fighting nuclear posture. A look at the history of China's no-first-use policy, nuclear program, and doctrine, along with its current military planning and modernization, indicate that a move away from the NFU policy is not likely in the near-to-mid-term. Even in the long-term, China's resources and planning will likely be considered better spent on other priorities, and not the costly expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

No China-US War

U.S.-China war won’t happen- 4 reasons

Dyer 9 (Gwynne, Jakarta Post, Mar 29, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html>) LL

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. China cannot project a serious military force even 200 miles (km) from home, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about China's ""military build-up"" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end result is not going to be a military machine that towers above all others. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. China has almost never been militarily expansionist beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and its border clashes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the first decades of Communist rule generally ended with a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from the disputed territories. The same moderation has usually applied in nuclear matters. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's great restraint. The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but there is no massive military build-up and no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.

No China-US War

US cooperation and diplomatic strength can prevent confrontation

Rosemont 8 (Henry, Asia Times, Feb 12, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JB12Ad01.html>) LL

Head to Head? A significant number of people profit greatly from the present U.S. defense budget. Since even people with little knowledge of military tactics realize that aircraft carriers and nuclear attack submarines are worthless for deterring ideologically driven young people from strapping IEDs to their waists, a more compelling threat must be conjured up is to justify increased Pentagon spending. Since the end of the Cold War, China has become the candidate of choice among illusionist hawks.15 Confrontation with China is not, however, inevitable. Perhaps the best reason for China not to seek a blue-ocean navy comes from an initially most unlikely source: The U.S. Navy. Its former head, Admiral Michael Mullen proposed a “Thousand Ship Navy” (TSN) that would mark “a new chapter in cooperation as it emphasizes the management of shared security interests of all maritime nations.” China could become a significant component of this TSN, and thus keep its shipping lanes secure at relatively little cost beyond present expenditures. Given the fact that 90% of all world trade and almost 70% of all petroleum is transported by sea, it clearly behooves both countries to cooperate closely to keep the maritime commons free of pirates, terrorists, and drug traffickers. Cooperation at sea is equally needed for missions of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Unfortunately, the highly invasive foreign policies of the United States, combined with its overwhelming military superiority, provide the Chinese with very good reasons to continue distrusting U.S. motives (including the TSN). It is therefore the responsibility of the United States to take meaningful initiatives to build support for closer cooperation with the soon-to-be world’s second largest economic power. Some of those initiatives would deal directly with China, such as providing materiel and advanced training for the Chinese military to conduct search-and-rescue missions. The United States could also foster far greater trust and cooperation specifically with the Chinese by clarifying the U.S. position toward Taiwan. Taipei should understand that the United States will come to its immediate aid in case of attack. But should Taipei seek independence and a seat at the UN, Washington will use all its diplomatic strength to insure that other nations do not recognize these claims. The United States could also signal to China that it is willing to be a more cooperative international player. For instance, the United States could significantly reduce its nuclear stockpile and renounce the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as China did long ago. It should also sign and ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as 155 nations have done (including China) since it was promulgated in 1982. Ending the brutal occupation of Iraq is another global measure, as would placing U.S. troops in Afghanistan under UN administration and signing a peace treaty with North Korea (55 years after the cease-fire). Holding out an olive branch to Iran, and stopping the one-sided U.S. support of the Israelis would also provide clear signals to the Chinese and the rest of the world of a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. A reduction of U.S. threats to the world – from nuclear weapons, regional wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and potential conflicts with Iran and North Korea – would decrease the likelihood of confrontation with China as well as undercut any rationale for China’s own increased military spending. Such a shift in U.S. national security strategy would not only increase the security of China and the United States but the world as well.