Security K Aff Answers

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2AC – Security Good

**Security is key to preventing mass violence and authoritarian control. Securitizing state actions is vital to creating a new inclusive political community free of the fear of the other which has plagued previous forms of social organization**

Ian Loader And a professor of criminology at Oxford and Neil Walker a professor of European law European University Institute (Florence), 2007 Civilizing Security pg. 7-8

OUR argument in this book is that **security is a valuable public good, a constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good**. **The state**, and in particular the forms of public policing governed by it, **is**, we shall argue, **indispensable to the task of fostering and sustaining liveable political communities in the contemporary world**. **It is**, in the words of our title**, pivotal to the project of civilizing security***.*By invoking this phrase we have in mind two ideas, both of which we develop in the course of the book. The first, which is relatively familiar if not uncontroversial, is that **security needs civilizing**. **States** - even those that claim with some justification to be 'liberal' or 'democratic' - **have a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called 'security' to act in a fashion injurious to it**. **So too do non-state 'security' actors**, a point we return to below and throughout the book. They proceed in ways that trample over the basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach of the state - and security discourse - over social and political life. **As monopoly holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and security they are constituted to protect**. **Under conditions of fear**, such as obtain across many parts of the globe today, **states and their police forces are prone to deploying their power in precisely such uncivil, insecurity instilling ways. If the state is to perform the ordering and solidarity nourishing work** **that** we argue **is vital to the production of secure political communities then it must**, consequently, **be connected to forms of discursive contestation, democratic scrutiny and constitutional control**. The state is a great civilizing force, a necessary and virtuous component of the good society. But if it is to take on this role, **the state must itself be civilized - made safe by and for democracy.** But our title also has another, less familiar meaning - the idea that **security is civilizing**. **Individuals who live**, objectively or subjectively, **in a state of anxiety do not make good democratic citizens**, as European theorists reflecting upon the dark days of the 1930s and 1940s knew well (Neumann 1957). Fearful citizens tend to be inattentive to, unconcerned about, even enthusiasts for, the erosion of basic freedoms. They often lack openness or sympathy towards others, especially those they apprehend as posing a danger to them. They privilege the known over the unknown, us over them, here over there. They often retreat from public life, seeking refuge in private security 'solutions' while at the same time screaming anxiously and angrily from the sidelines for the firm hand of authority - for tough 'security' measures against crime, or disorder, or terror. Prolonged episodes of violence, in particular, can erode or destroy people's will and capacity to exercise political judgement and act in solidarity with others (Keane 2004: 122-3). **Fear**, in all these ways, **is the breeding ground, as well as the stock-in-trade, of authoritarian, uncivil government**. But there is more to it than that. Security is also civilizing in a further, more positive sense. Security, we shall argue, is in a sociological sense a 'thick' public good, one whose production has irreducibly social dimensions, a good that helps to constitute the very idea of 'publicness'. **Security**, in other words, **is simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities**. **The state**, moreover, **performs vital cultural and ordering work in fashioning the good of security conceived of in this sense**. **It can**, under the right conditions**, create inclusive communities of practice and attachment,** while **ensuring that these remain rights-regarding, diversity respecting entities**. **In a world where the state's pre-eminence in governing security is being questioned** by private-sector interests, practices of local communal ordering and transnational policing networks, **the constitution of old- and new-fashioned forms of democratic political authority is**, we shall argue, **indispensable to cultivating and sustaining the civilizing effects of security**.

2AC – No Impact to Security

**Your fatalistic interpretation of security ignores the host of ways the state provides the guarantee of commitments necessary for existence in a civil society while checking the excesses of the elites**

Ian Loader And a professor of criminology at Oxford and Neil Walker a professor of European law European University Institute (Florence), 2007 Civilizing Security pg. 190-192

**The danger**, borne out many times in the history of the modern state, **that state officials** may exploit the police to **undermine rather than promote the security of those they are charged to protect** - the deepest paradox of police power - arises out of just this connection. **Yet we need not succumb to fatalism** in the face of this paradox. Instead, **two sets of answers are called for. The first is a prudential answer**. **It** simply **reiterates the importance of the other functions of the state considered above in securing the preconditions of security as a public** **good**, including, minimally **and** most immediately, **the prevention of a 'police state'**. As we have seen, the police can be shaped and civilized against this possibility by political culture, by resource decisions, by deliberative processes and deliberated decisions, and by the general authority of rules. **The second response** is more difficult but equally necessary. It **stresses that while the dangers of state excess can indeed be addressed with some confidence through the proper deployment of the state's other security functions**, **the idea of** the state bedrock of **the 'legitimate use of force' as referring to something other than everyday police capacity remains a viable one**, and one that is valuable precisely in terms of its indication of an independent mechanism to underpin the proper and effective use of that everyday police capacity. What is more, **it is a mechanism which needs itself to be separately acknowledged within the litany of the state's priority functions.** This we set out to do under the heading of 'commitment'. What do we mean by commitment as an indispensable and priority function of the state and how precisely does it connect with the legitimate use of force? Drawing in very broad terms on the insights of institutional economics, **we may think of the state as an institution or as a cluster of institutions involved in ensuring 'credible commitments'** (e.g. North 1993). Furthermore, we may understand the capacity to ensnre the credibility of commitments as applying both to the actions of the state itself and, in a close reciprocal dynamic, to the actions of others - institutions and individuals - with whom the state stands in a relationship. **For the likelihood that these other actors will honour their commitments to the state will**, in some measure at least, **depend upon the degree of confidence and trust they have that the state** can and will keep its own promises as registered in the array of positive and negative incentives at its disposal, whether through the constancy of its rule following, the effectiveness of its rule enforcement, or the continuing guarantee of its capacity to raise and deploy resources. Of course, like all forms of power, this is most effective when it operates in latent mode, based on 'the rule of anticipated reactions' (Friedrich 1963: 199) rather than upon repeated shows of strength. Nevertheless, it remains the case that **the state's ultimate and overriding capacity to deploy force does help to secure the credibility of its commitments to tax, to apply rules, and to enforce sanctions and so to underpin the credibility of the commitments of others to comply with the rules and directives of the state**, which in turn further reinforces the credibility of the commitments the state can make, and so on. In this regard, crucially, there is nothing special about policing and security. The meta-level coercive potential operates in the area of policing in exactly the same way as it operates in respect of other public goods under state influence, such as education or health, which unlike policing are *not* also coercive at the point of delivery. In all cases, **the ordering and resourcing infrastructure needs some kind of coercive underpinning in the final instance for reasons which bear upon effectiveness and reliability of delivery in general without influencing the detailed enforceability of any particular operation**. **What the state's priority role in ensuring its commitments provides**, in short, **is just that guarantee of the security of its security** (or health, education, etc.) **ordering and resourcing powers that allows people to invest in them and their civilizing qualities with a degree of confidence in their effectiveness.**

2AC – Perm Solvency

**The perm solves - our vision of security and state creates a path between the criticism and the inevitability of working though institutional practices**

Ian Loader And a professor of criminology at Oxford and Neil Walker a professor of European law European University Institute (Florence), 2007 Civilizing Security pg. 216

Our task in this section is to address this question and suggest an affirmative answer to it. In so doing, **we are not seeking to offer a ready-made -** still less utopian **- blueprint for institutional design** that call somehow be packaged, exported and transplanted into whatever national setting one might wish to embed it in. **We have no option, in seeking to civilize security** and to release its civilizing potential, **other than to begin with actually existing institutional practices of state and civil society, with all their attendant vices, and to act through and upon them**. **One cannot**, in other words, **create a civilized security politics ex nihilo***;* **one has to work, instead, with the institutional materials at hand along the lines suggested by the metaphor of 'rebuilding the ship at sea'** (Elster *et al.* 1998; Shapiro 2003: 54). Conversely, however, we are not in the business of trying to specify in fine-grained detail- with the 'i's' dotted and 't's' crossed - the precise shape and *modus operandi*of the institutions of democratic security practice, or to work through the implications of our argument for contemporary debates in policing and security policy in their diverse national settings (d. Patten 1999). **We are seeking**, in short, **to chart a course between**, on the one hand, **being unduly and conservatively hemmed in by the constraints that extant political realities impose upon our capacity to think imaginatively beyond the present and, on the other, writing what can rapidly be dismissed as a letter to Santa Claus**. **Our purpose is to set out the elements of an institutional matrix that seems capable of mobilizing and allocating the policing and other collective resources that security requires; democratically governing the demands**, appetites, expectations, resentments **and conflicts that attend contemporary struggles in the security field**; **and subjecting to scrutiny and account the coercive power that individual and collective security sometimes inescapably entails in ways that contribute towards a practical realization of the idea that security is a thick public good.** We shall call these elements - whose beneficial effects are optimized only when they are combined together - the four Rs of civilizing security practice: resources, recognition, rights and reasons. Our task in what remains of this chapter is to describe each of them - and their purpose, value and relation to each other - in turn.

2AC – Cede the Political

**The alt/framework arguments over-determination of the debate round prevents action on all social problems and culminates in extinction. Their retreat to the local is a depoliticized form of politics that fragments macropolitical struggles**

Carl Boggs, National University, 1997, “ The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century America”   Theory and Society 26.6 December)

**The decline of the public sphere** in late twentieth-century America **poses a series of great dilemmas** and challenges. **Many ideological currents** scrutinized here - **localism, metaphysics**, spontaneism, **post-modernism**, Deep Ecology - intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they **all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over-come alienation**. **The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change**. **As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved** - perhaps even unrecognized - only to fester more ominously into the future. And **such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases,** technological displacement of workers) **cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context** of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, **the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impo-tence**. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num-bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. **By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions**.74I n the meantime, **the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling** and even fashionable in the United States**, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies**.

2AC - State Good

**The modern political system has produced an unprecedented level of peace- the level of violent conflict is at a historical low**

K.J. Holsti, University of British Columbia, 1985 “The Necrologists of International Relations” Canadian Journal of Political Science 18.4 (dec.) pg. 681-683

**Today we have 159 states compared to 51 in 1945, and only about 18 in post-Napoleon Europe.** **It should come as no surprise that the incidence of organized state conflict has increased.** The more traffic, the greater the possibility of accidents. This would certainly seem to be an artifact of the states system. But there is other evidence that suggests certain qualifications to the conclusion. Singer and Small provide data indicating that **when we control for the number of states in the system, the incidence of war has declined**, albeit not significantly." More recent evidence also shows that **the incidence of great power conflict has declined**. 12 There are other qualifications. Although they are not so systematic, they are more than fleeting impressions gained from diplomatic history. **Since the Second World War, we have had more than four decades of peace between the major powers. This is historically unprecedented.** While **the first two decades of the Cold War were characterized by a series of crises,** whether real or mock (Quemoy-Matsu), **there has been no direct confrontation** since 1962 and only a single potential crisis surrounding the 1973 Middle East war. There is considerable evidence that both sides have learned important lessons from earlier clashes, and that capabilities and skills for conflict-management have developed substantially.13 Since Malenkov was relegated to obscurity for having admitted publicly that there could be no winner in a nuclear war, **the leaders of all the major powers have repeatedly renounced nuclear war as a means of settling international conflicts.** **This is also historically unprecedented.** We are left with the problem of accidental or inadvertent war, and escalation, so one cannot be overly optimistic. But perhaps, as a minimum, there is some validity to Kant's prediction that man would not deal practically with the overriding problem of war until he had experienced certain levels of costs and miseries. The two world wars have certainly been important learning events, as have Korea and Vietnam. Public attitudes toward war have also changed fundamentally in the last two or three generations. War is no longer seen as a normal instrument of foreign policy, to be employed to defend or advance state purposes ranging from minor questions of prestige, frontier disputes, and settling irredentist claims, to more important issues such as major tracts of territory or gaining imperial domains. The major powers have, it is true, intervened against small states, or for or against revolutionary movements, but as the aftermath of the Vietnam agony has suggested at least illustratively, a major intervention involving prolonged combat is not going to be undertaken lightly. We could speculate that in the 1990s someone in the Politburo or Central Committee will argue the line, "No more Afghanistans!" In the 1920s Europe experienced a number of small wars (Poland vs. Lithuania, Greece vs. Bulgaria, and the like) that arose over relatively minor issues. In contrast, the Soviets and Chinese moved quickly to mute the conflict generated by the Ussuri River incident in 1969. Fifty years earlier, a similar incident would likely have led to general war. Despite some evidence that Kant's learning hypothesis does not hold,14 my impression is that diplomatic practice and thought since the Second World War have changed fundamentally. Certainly the literature on international political economy has proven satisfactorily that the whole range of welfare issues on the international agenda will be dealt with by means other than the threat or use of force. Military hardware is irrelevant to tariff questions, the broad range of issues comprising the "north-south" dialogue, monetary stabilization, debt relief, the law of the sea, and many other concerns. In other words, **many of the types of issues that in previous centuries led to the use of force** (for example, access to markets and sources of supply) **no longer can be dealt with in that fashion, even when the stakes are high**.15 Kant's hypothesis may not be the entire explanation for the decreased likelihood of major war, but it is at least one avenue that needs comparative and systematic exploration. I am suggesting, then, that the patterns of the past are not necessarily a good predictor for the future. **While cycles of growth and decline of nations may continue, we must carefully scrutinize any deterministic or even probabilistic assertion that hegemonic wars are the most prominent outcome of certain "inflection points'** or constellations of power. **There have been fundamental alterations in the costs and risks of war**. Our intellectual furniture about the problem of war has also changed;"1 the realm of ideas must count as much as past patterns of practice. The inference from these comments-if they are plausible-is that whatever the historical experience, **the contemporary states system is not necessarily a war system, and certainly not a system which will inevitably generate hegemonic wars**. **If one examines** not only **the aggregate statistics about war** incidence, but the nature of the issues underlying conflicts since 1945, **one is struck by the extent to which most wars have had little to do with the operation of a traditional states system, that is, with balances of power, spheres of influence, claims for strategic territory**, and the like. A surprisingly **high proportion of the conflicts have been associated with the birth of states**. **We are witnessing**, in fact, **the formative years of a global international system, not its transcendance.** Indonesia, the Arab-Israel conflict, Cyprus, India-Pakistan, the Congo-these and many more are or have been essentially conflicts over who will become new members of the states system, when, and how. These wars have few parallels in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, and they certainly challenge the idea that today we have a "global village." They have everything to do with the pronounced aspiration of peoples to achieve statehood. **War and instability occur not because of some inherent fault in a politically fragmented world, but because we have an immature system populated in part by all sorts of infant states, unborn states** (the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO]), weakling states, and a few aborted states (Lebanon). The chronicle of wars since 1945 has not included a hegemonic war, a war over a balance of power, or any of the types of major wars identified in the power cycle theories.

2AC - Extinction First

**Existence comes first**

Dr. Nick, Bostrom. Philosophy Professor, Yale, 2002, Department of Philosophy @ Yale University "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9 - March 2002, <http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html>

**Existential risks are distinct from global endurable risks**. Examples of the latter kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earth’s ecosphere, moderate global warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as the “dark ages”, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the section on “Shrieks” below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious**. A world war fought with conventional weapons or a Nazi-style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could eventually recover.** (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for persecuted ethnic groups.)  I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. **An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come.**2 The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about.  The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3]  **A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals** in the US and the USSR. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal.** There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] **Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation**, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:  \***Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach** – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – **is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions.** \***We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters**.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.  \*Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk.  \***If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor**, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

2AC - Consequentialism Good

Outcome of the plan is the most significant consideration

[Jeffrey C. Isaac, Prof of Poly Sci & director of the center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life @ Indiana University, “Ends, Means, and Politics, Dissent Vol. 49 Issue 2 pg. 32-38, EBSCO, 2002

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.** **The concern may be morally laudable**, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, **but it suffers from three** fatal **flaws: (1) It fails to see that** the **purity of** one’s **intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends**. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (**2) it fails to see that in a world of** real **violence and injustice, moral purity is not** simply **a form of powerlessness; it is** often **a form of complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as **the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil**. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: **it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere** or idealistic; **it is equally important**, always, **to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.**

Democracy Good – Peace & the Political

**Your critique rushes to extremes while ignoring the host of ways that democracy has been crucial to a peaceful world - the alternatives fostering of difference ends with the collapse of democratic institutions and the embrace of intolerant thinking**

Seyla Benhabib, Department of Government at Harvard, 1994 “Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida” The Journal of Political Philosophy 2.1)

In the present article I want to explore this question: **what, if anything, has the postmodernist critique of normative thinking contributed to the current task of understanding and reconstructing democracy** on a world-scale? My argument is that **although the problem or set of issues suggested by the vague terminology of "difference," "otherness**," "heterogeneity" or "le differend" **are crucial for the ethos of contemporary democratic communities**, **theorists of difference have not indicated where the line is to be drawn between forms of difference which foster democracy and forms of difference which reflect anti-democratic aspirations**. In the transformed world political context of **today, it is more essential than ever that the critique of democracy in the name of difference developed by oppositional intellectuals be formulated so carefully that these thoughts cannot be exploited for nationalist, tribalist, and xenophobic purposes**. **It is imperative that the politics of the "differend" not be settled beyond and at the margins of democratic politics**. In a recent article entitled "The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe," Jacques Derrida voices the concerns and fears which motivate my reflections here. Derrida writes: Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely, in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violences, those that we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or national fanaticism, are being unleashed, mixed up, mixed up with each other, but also, and there is nothing fortuitous in this, mixed in with the breath, with the respiration, with the very "spirit" of the promise.6 **The question though is whether the "meta-politics" which follow from certain theories of "difference**," Derrida's not excluded, **and** in particular **their undermining of the universalist premises of liberal-democratic theory, do not reduce such concerns about xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism to good moral and political intentions which cannot be supported by** philosophical arguments and **strong reasons**.7 May it be that **the critique of the universalist political tradition,** developed by Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, **is so radical that it undermines the rational defensibility of these ideals and reduces them to sheer existential choices for which we cannot give reasons with good grounds**? May it also be that **this critique claims to be radical but is, in effect, curiously powerless to deal with the radical power of history and the historicity of political modernity since the American and the French Revolutions**? May it be that **the price of a certain kind of hyper-radicalism is an aloofness of institutional and social critique**? 8 Let me be very clear what my questions are not intended to imply. I am not suggesting that there is any deductive or conceptual link between certain philosophical positions and political practices and movements which we may consider objectionable.9 To put it bluntly, **theorists of difference are not responsible for** the degenerate form of the politics of difference pursued at the present in Bosnia Herzegovina for example and it would be tendentious to suggest so. One cannot criticize philosophical positions for their imputed, real or imaginary, **political consequences in the hands of others**. Neither am I suggesting that we should judge, evaluate, or question the commitment of theorists of difference to democratic ideals and aspirations. What I will be arguing **instead** is that Jean-Francois Lyotard and, to some extent, Jacques Derrida, privilege **in their writings on the political** **a certain perspective, a certain angle, a certain heuristic framework, which itself has deep and ultimately**, I think, **misleading consequences for understanding the rational foundations of the democratic form of government**. **They attempt to illuminate political phenomena through an experience which is a limit condition: an extraordinary and foundational moment**. **In doing so, they repeat an epistemic and ultimately meta-political problem** which Richard Wolin has very aptly characterized with reference to another group of thinkers, at a different time: ... **a general fascination with 'limit situations'** (Grenzsituationen) **and extremes**; an interest in transposing the fundamental experiences of aesthetic modernity shock, disruption, experiential immediacy; an infatuation with the sinister and the forbidden, with the "flowers of evil"-to the plane of everyday life, thereby injecting an element of enthusiasm and vitality in what had otherwise become a rigid and lifeless mechanism. to **It is this fascination with the "limit situation**" in republican politics that I want to document in the writings of Lyotard and Derrida, and **which I wish to criticize for its inadequacy for understanding democratic politics.**

Fear of Death Good – Extinction

Fear of death prevents extinction

Louis Rene **Beres**, PhD Princeton, **1996**, “No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety,” www.freeman.org/m\_online/feb96/beresn.htm

**Fear of death**, the ultimate source of anxiety, **is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance**. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, **confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself**. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument. **Anxiety**, after all, **is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we** (states and individuals) "**are**." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. **Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing.** An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "**Anxiety is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized.**" This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a national self-delusion which augments enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the Jewish State, **a lack of pertinent anxiety**, of the positive aspect of Angst, has already led its people to what **is likely an irreversible rendezvous with extinction.**

Fear of Death Good – Value of Life

The Fear of death is key to the value of life

Kate Arthur, Doctoral Candidate University of St. Michael’s College, 2002 “Terror of Death in the Wake of September the 11th; Is This the End of Death Denial?Probing the Boundaries: Making Sense of Dying and Death Conference, Saturday 16th November 2002, http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/arthur%20paper.pdf

This insight from a simpler time in America is more than a quaint remnant of a pastoral sensibility of the past. It is a truth that the people of our world must integrate into daily living. We can think of the dust as the transient things of the world, and the Spirit is that part of us that trusts in the Eternal. For me, the overcoat of clay is the memory of all departed souls. I recognize that many people are unwilling to recover meaning from the horror of terror. But **the** **eventual challenge is to find meaning in death, and plum our innate spiritual resources to move from** despair and **fear into hope**. **We can retrieve a sense of living in the presence of death that evokes ultimate meaning, mystery and wonder** evoked by the poetry of Emily Dickinson. Change, loss and mutability are present everywhere, in everything we do. Two **pioneers in palliative care**, Dr. Derek Doyle and Dr. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, **speak of the increased spirituality among people who work with the dying. By being ever mindful of death in life, we can discover or recover a sense mystery.**

Predictions Good - Extinction

Predictions prevent extinction – they inject flexibility and notions of fallibility into policy

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University, 2004 “Cautionary Tales: The Global Cultural of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations Volume 11, Number 4, 2004, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.00389.x>

Salient in discussions of environmental and techno-scientific risks, the precautionary principle posits prudence and vigilance as deontological counterweights to the multiplication and intensification of sources of danger in the contemporary world. **From a precautionary standpoint**, the lack of absolute certainty about **a serious danger should not deter us from erring on the side of caution and taking reasonable measures to address it.**38 Consequently, the instrumental-strategic orientation to action must be balanced out by a two-part moral injunction: act prudently (in a manner that aims to avoid mass human suffering and ecological damage), and do no harm (in a manner that worsens the existing state of affairs or moves us closer to catastrophe). Kant’s bold cry of “Sapere aude!” comes faceto- face with Jonas’s humble pleas of “beware!” and “preserve!” **Built into any precautionary stance is a participatory and reflexive concept of “measured action,” which stipulates that we should only decide on a particular course of action after extensive public input, deliberation, and informed consideration of the range of options and their probable effects**.39 **This kind of participatory reflexivity forthrightly acknowledges the fallibilism of decision-making processes about the future, notably because of the existence of unexpected and unintended consequences**. As such, measured action is an intersubjective practice that is always subject to revision through decisional feedback loops incorporating factors that may emerge out of a subsequent broadening of collective horizons (better arguments, new evidence, unforeseen or inadvertent side-effects, shifting public opinion, etc.). **Additionally, the norm of precaution’s self-limiting character allows us to advocate turning away from certain possibilities if they are likely to introduce large-scale risks without proper steering mechanisms to control or alleviate them – endangering human survival, potentially creating greater problems than the ones targeted by the original action, or risking mass human suffering and ecological destruction**.

Predictions Good – Political Action

Predictions open space for new visions of the future a reshape and prevent dystopian realities.

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University, 2004 “Cautionary Tales: The Global Cultural of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations Volume 11, Number 4, 2004, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.00389.x>

Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that **the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability** (II). **From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism** – of solidarity that extends to future generations – **can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason** (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that **the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order** (IV).

Predictions are key to political action and discourse.

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University, 2004 “Cautionary Tales: The Global Cultural of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations Volume 11, Number 4, 2004, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.00389.x>

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, **the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary** (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 **And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear.** **Quite the opposite**, in fact, since **the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts**.13 **Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling**. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). **Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight**.

A2: Predictions Inaccurate

Even inaccurate predictions prevent catastrophes

Peter Bishop, "What are Future Studies," 1998 MediaMente, Chicago, 21-07-1998, http://www.mediamente.rai.it/mediamentetv/learning/ed\_multimediale/english/bibliote/intervis/b/bishop.htm

People often ask me how right I am, when I go back and look at the predictions that I have made in the past, and unfortunately they are not asking the right question. The question we ask in Future is: how useful is a forecast? **A forecast can be wrong and still be useful, particularly** a negative forecast, **forecasting problems or catastrophes**. **If people take a forecast seriously, they will work to prevent and avoid those problems. The forecast itself is wrong, but the forecast is useful, because it created a better future. Which are the forecasts that give people images of the future that are not necessarily accurate predictions** of what is going to happen**, but give them an understanding of the dynamics of change, and how things could occur**, given certain circumstances, **and secondly empower them to choose the right future for them**, and begin to try and create that? **Those are useful forecasts which, whether they are correct or not, can** still **be useful for making a better future.**

Even if we don’t know the outcome we have an obligation to the future other.

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University, 2004 “Cautionary Tales: The Global Cultural of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations Volume 11, Number 4, 2004, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.00389.x>

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. **Acknowledging** the fact **that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon** and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. I**n fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs** of disaster **and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences** (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, **the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations**. **The future** no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It **becomes**, instead, **a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors**.

A2: Reps First

**Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power**

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq

**The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire**. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, **despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice**. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries **this** situation as one which **leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism**. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: **Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the **postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend**. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies:  **I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror** (what else do we do but speak?), **but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous**....(pp. 2-27) **The** realm of the **discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols**.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. **Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "**the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual**" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "**the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation**" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. **People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas**, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

A2: Root Cause of Violence

No single root cause of violence & the alternative leads to more violence

[Brian Martin, London: Freedom Press, 1984. 310 pages. ISBN 0 900 384 263, “Uprooting War,” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/

War does not have a single root - In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters **I have examined a number of** structures and **factors which have some connection with** the **war** system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: **attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done** for example **by** some **Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and** other **social problems, and by** some **feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy**. **The danger of monocausal explanations is that they** may **lead to an inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the** persistence or even **expansion of** many **problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective**. **The one connecting feature** which I perceive in the structures **underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military**. Furthermore, **these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other**, and sometimes conflict. This means that **the struggle against war** can and **must be undertaken at many different levels**. **It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community**. Furthermore, **the different struggles need to be linked together.** That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

Scientific method proves there is no root cause of violence

Thomas Homer-Dixon holds the Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada, and is a Professor in the Centre for Environment and Business in the Faculty of Environment, University of Waterloo., 2001 Environment, scarcity and violence, p 7)

Some skeptics argue that **environmental scarcity is rarely an important cause of violent conflict**. 19 Clearly, as I will stress in the following chapters, **environmental scarcity by itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause: there are many conflicts around the world in which environmental scarcity plays little role; and, when it does play a role, it always interacts with other contextual factors—be they physical or social—to generate violence**. But this fact should not lead analysts to the conclusion that environmental scarcity is always unimportant. After all, **it is hard to identify any cause of violence that is, by itself, either necessary or sufficient; the causes of specific instances of violence are always interacting sets of factors, and the particular combination of factors can vary greatly from case to case. If we want to gauge the causal power of environmental scarcity's contribution to a specific instance of violence,** therefore, **we must gauge its power relative to the other factors contrib­ uting to that violence.**

A2: State Bad

The negative’s problematizing of the state’s identity has no alternative

Juan R. I. Cole, professor of History @ Univ of Michigan, 1995  “Feature Review: Power, Knowledge, and Orientalism” Diplomatic History Vol. 19 No. 3 Summer

In short, Campbell’s imaginative and innovative approach places “the politics of identity” at the very core of U.S. Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, this reviewer must express a few doubts about his inflection of poststructuralist principles and Possibilities. **Even if the “struggle over identity” formed the core of contemporary politics** on the national and international levels, **the crisis of politics could not be reduced to the “crisis of representation**.” As much as we learn from *Writing Security* **about the production of identity, as little do we learn about the reconstitution of politics.** Diplomats, policymakers, industrialists, intellectuals, and social activists, to name but a few, enter the arena of identity politics under conditions that are uneven and change over time. **Campbell**, however, **treats identity struggles, and the strategies of otherness and particular forms of representation that go along with them, as having neither origins nor agency and as being unaccountable to multiple patterns of causality and specific historical moments**. **Some** might **argue that the omissions of the question of agency** **and of conven­tional causal explanations are the very trademarks of poststructuralism The lack of attention to historical details and peculiarities, and to the non­progressive movement of history through time, however, is certainly not an inevitable price of poststructuralist analysis**. **Campbell’s alternative to the realist notion of an essentialist and universalist search for power is a univer­sal and ahistorical search for identity and differentiation from the Other**. Images of the American frontier, for instance, have no doubt a different purpose and significance in an emerging as opposed to a late capitalist order. Furthermore, Campbell’s critique of state- and nation-centered politics is curiously at odds with his focus on the “American” identity.20 Such a sys­temic approach toward the history of identity struggles is perhaps “natural” to political science, but not to poststructuralism. **By claiming that an only vaguely specified2l poststructuralist attitude “sees theory w practice**” (em­phasis in original) (p. **iç), Campbell takes a shortcut and tends to deny any meaningful understanding of the mediation between theory and practice, or between the discursive and the non-discursive.**

A2: Biopolitics K

Zero solvency for the alternative- their talk of freedom and rethinking of the political are rhetorical flourishes that lack the substance necessary to found a new politics

John T. Parry, visiting professor Lewis & Clark Law School, 2005  “PAPER SYMPOSIUM: FEDERALISM AFTER GONZALES V. RAICH: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE "SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]": BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH” Lewis & Clark Law Review Winter 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 853

My goal so far has not been to convince readers that biopolitics is good or bad, although the tone of the preceding section leans toward the negative. Instead, I have tried to argue not only that the idea of biopolitics reflects our current social arrangements, but also that constitutional doctrine accepts it, makes room for it, and sometimes endorses it. That said, I want to close by suggesting **that biopolitics, while perhaps not necessarily good, is at least not wholly bad. Absent realistic alternatives, this claim is certainly worth considering. Foucault**, for example, **never charted a way out of biopolitics beyond developing an individual aesthetic of self-discipline and regulation - the "care of the self."** **[94](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=993c85d9d985fb59854985293bb37c33&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAA&_md5=2b870f41f45f934d059c87fc96ed682d" \l "n94#n94" \t "_self)** **Other writers speak of achieving something like a "new politics," which usually means some combination of personal freedom that includes the substance - but often not the legal baggage - of individual human rights, combined with an ideal of community that fits uneasily with the ideal of personal freedom** (thus the "politics," which are likely to be anything but new), **as well as a more egalitarian economic arrangement and the social safety net of the modern welfare state, but without the modern state itself. Even assuming this vision is desirable, no one has any practical idea how to make it happen.** **[95](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=993c85d9d985fb59854985293bb37c33&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAA&_md5=2b870f41f45f934d059c87fc96ed682d" \l "n95#n95" \t "_self)**

A2: Value to Life

Value to life inevitable – existence key to maximize it

David Pizer 2001“Argument that life has inherent value”, July 8, <http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/dsp.cgi?msg=16930>

Argument that life has inherent value 1. The concept of value comes from what living beings will pay for something. How much one being is willing to give in order to get something he wants is a way to think of the value of that thing. What a being is willing to pay for something depends on how much he desires that thing. So indirectly, desire is what actually sets the value of something. 2. **In order to desire something, the thing doing the desiring must be alive - it must be a living being. So value, the end of desire, is dependent on life. Only living things (living beings) can give value to something else.** 3. In order for any first thing to give something to a second thing, the first thing must first have it to give. So if only living things can give value, then living things must have value. 4. **Desire can only come from, (and so must be in), living beings**. So when living things desire something, that desire must be inherent in the living things. **If desire in living things is what gives value to other things, and that desire is inherent in the living thing, then living things, or life, has inherent value in it**. Or to say it another way: If an object gives something value, that object must have value in it as a quality to give. Example: For me to love my dog, I must first have love in me. For me to value my dog, I must first have value in me. 5. Put another way, i**f a living being has some quality, that quality is a part of what makes that being what it is**. 6.**If life gives value to life, than one of the parts of life is value.** Put another way, v**alue cannot exist without life, so value is life and life is value**. 7. If value is only relative, then saying life being valuable relative to life is the same as saying life has worth relative to life. **Anything that is relative to itself is an unconditional part of itself and therefore has "inherentness**". 8.THEREFORE, **anyway you look at it, life is value and value is life - and life has inherent value.**