# Answers to Ks Toolbox

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# Generics

## Impact Level

### AT: Value to Life

#### Value to life impossible to determine – infinite factors and only individuals can quantify

L. Shwartz; Professor of Medicine, Dartmouth; 2002; “A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?” Medical Ethics; [www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf](http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf) ET

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests.

### Death Outweighs

#### Death outweighs ontology – existence is a prerequisite to expression

Paul Wapner; associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University; Winter 2003; “Leftist Criticism of "Nature" Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age;” Dissent; <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm> ET

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

### Util Good

#### Utilitarianism key to just solutions – accepting mass death for morals is corrupt

Kai Nielsen; Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary; 1993; “Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics;” ed. Joram Graf Haber, p. 170-2 ET

Forget the levity of the example and consider the case of the innocent fat man. If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man and if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in the cave will drown, then, innocent or not, he should be blasted out. This indeed overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life, for the people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such extreme action is not taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery will obtain. Moreover, the people who do such a horrible thing or acquiesce in the doing of it are not likely to be rendered more callous about human life and human suffering as a result. Its occurrence will haunt them for the rest of their lives and is as likely as not to make them more rather than less morally sensitive. It is not even correct to say that such a desperate act shows a lack of respect for persons. We are not treating the fat man merely as a means. The fat man's person‑his interests and rights are not ignored. Killing him is something which is undertaken with the greatest reluctance. It is only when it is quite certain that there is no other way to save the lives of the others that such a violent course of action is justifiably undertaken. Alan Donagan, arguing rather as Anscombe argues, maintains that "to use any innocent man ill for the sake of some public good is directly to degrade him to being a mere means" and to do this is of course to violate a principle essential to morality, that is, that human beings should never merely be treated as means but should be treated as ends in themselves (as persons worthy of respect)." But, as my above remarks show, it need not be the case, and in the above situation it is not the case, that in killing such an innocent man we are treating him merely as a means. The action is universalizable, all alternative actions which would save his life are duly considered, the blasting out is done only as a last and desperate resort with the minimum of harshness and indifference to his suffering and the like. It indeed sounds ironical to talk this way, given what is done to him. But if such a terrible situation were to arise, there would always be more or less humane ways of going about one's grim task. And in acting in the more humane ways toward the fat man, as we do what we must do and would have done to ourselves were the roles reversed, we show a respect for his person. In so treating the fat man‑not just to further the public good but to prevent the certain death of a whole group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)‑the claims of justice are not overriden either, for each individual involved, if [she] is reasonably correct, should realize that if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no question of being unfair. Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt herethough for a quite different purpose‑an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt."" Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he [it] allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his `moral purity' and [to] avoid `dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called `double‑mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.

### Predictions Good

#### Predictive thought key to assess the desirability of policies

Christopher J. Fettweis; assistant professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College; 2010; “Dangerous Times: The International Politics of Great Power Peace;” Georgetown University Press, p.59 ET

No scholar worthy of the title would assert that the particulars of human behavior are predictable in the prophetic sense, and any attempt to do so would be as easily dismissible as the babblings of Edgar Caycee or a circus palm-reader. But the inability to employ a crystal ball should not entirely preclude the attempt to extrapolate the theories of international politics into the future. Political scientists will never be able to predict specific events, for their subject, like the weather, is too complex to be anticipated with any degree of certainty. Assessing probabilities, however, is well within their range. Rather than meteorologists, perhaps scholars of international relations can reasonably aspire to be like climatologists, who may be unable to predict individual events but can certainly identify a range of options that are more likely given certain expected conditions. No one will be able to say with any certainty what the weather will be like in Columbus, Ohio on a given day in July a decade hence, but we can say, because of our ability to extrapolate past trends into the future, that there is a high likelihood of warm temperatures and an extremely low probability of snow.

## Alternative Level

### No Alt Solvency

#### Kritik can’t solve alone - mechanisms key to incite change and analyze current issues

Richard Wyn Jones; Critical Security Studies; 1999; “Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory;” Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.151; http://books.google.com/books?id=RYgi4GOgy\_0C&pg=PA9&source=gbs\_toc\_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q=Because%20emancipatory%20political%20practice%20is%20central%20to%20the%20claims%20of%20critical%20theory&f=false ET

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

### Cede the Political

#### Despite current political issues we must engage the state to solve global problems – the alternative is elitism and war

Carl Boggs; Professor of Social Sciences at National University in Los Angeles; 1997; “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America;” Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, December, Springer ET

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here—localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology—intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. [end page 773] The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved—perhaps even unrecognized—only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites—an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise—or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### Individual Strategies Fail – Monbiot

#### Relying on individual-level strategies fails and guarantees global politics is dominated by violence

George Monbiot, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, 2004, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we participate in it or not. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown. There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

## Framework Level

### Limits Good – Dialogue

#### Predictability is key to any good framework for debate – our framework guarantees a predictable site for clash, which is the key starting condition for any effective dialogue

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 182-3

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational per­suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consen­sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not com­municating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree­ments. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under­standing of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony. The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. Foragreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

### Policy Good – Serial Policy Failure

#### Debate should only include discussions that are policy relevant – rejecting policy focus causes widespread political disengagement and bad policymaking

Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

### Policy Good – Slap Down

#### Academics should focus on government policies – prevents abusive politics and policy slap down

David E. McClean, 2001, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

# Specifics

## AT: Capitalism

### AT: Capitalism – Perm Solves

#### Working within the capitalist system is the only way to solve for any of the impacts of their kritik.

John K. Wilson, Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe, 2000, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People”

**Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms**, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these **groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits**. But **the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential**. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly won’t have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. **One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy**. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." **Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies**. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. **Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them**. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. **The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense.** Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, **progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth. If Americans were convinced that social programs and investment in people** (rather than corporate welfare and investment in weaponry) helped create the current economic growth, **they would be far more willing to pursue additional progressive policies.** Instead, the left allows conservatives to dismiss these social investments as “too costly” or “big government.”

### Capitalism Good – War

#### Capitalism is good – it prevents war

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at Cato institute and assistant to President Reagan, 11-10-2005, “Spreading Capitalism is good for peace” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5193)

However, **democracy alone doesn't yield peace. To believe is does is dangerous**: There's no panacea for creating a conflict-free world. That doesn't mean that nothing can be done. But promoting open international markets - that is, **spreading capitalism - is the best means to encourage peace as well as prosperity.** Notes Gartzke: "**Warfare among developing nations will remain unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain fettered by governmental control." Freeing those economies is critical**. It's a particularly important lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to encourage peace. If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets - prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; **globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.** Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that **peace is good business. And capitalism is good for peace.**

### Capitalism Good – Democracy

#### Capitalism is key to the transparency needed for the successful functioning of democracy

Jim Chen, Professor of Law University of Minnesota Law School, November/December, 2000 Fordham International Law Journal, PAX MERCATORIA: GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217, Lexis

**Globalization advances democracy not only by raising overall wealth, but also by improving the political climate within nations. The ability of multinational corporations and skilled workers to adopt "fight or flight" strategies encourages governments to adopt transparent policies and to broaden political participation**. Businesses and nongovernmental organizations respond by cooperating with the government to form "transnational epistemic communities." Even where they are despised as scourges against local businesses, **multinational corporations introduce moral values in countries that have yet to realize globalization's full benefits**. At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, even as unstable governments plunge into kleptocracy and anti-Western terrorists flourish, nongovernmental organizations have stepped into the resulting power vacuum in order to help police the morals of globalized society.

#### And democracy solves genocide, terrorism, war, and is necessary for the continued existence of life on earth.

Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, 1995

Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, Online

**Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy,** with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another**. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. **Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations**, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. **Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another**. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another.

## AT: Anthropocentrism

### AT: Anthro – Inevitable

#### The alt fails – human nature ensures that we will never be able to accept a non-anthropocentric viewpoint

Beth **Mendenhall,** student of philosophy and pol sci at KSU, 4-2009. “The Environmental Crises: Why We Need Anthropocentrism” Stance Volume 2, http://www.bsu.edu/libraries/virtualpress/stance/2009\_spring/5Menderhall.pdf

As humans, it is probably impossible to escape a human-centered ethic to guide our decision-making. Our subjectivity means we can only experience the world from one perspective, and this perspective colors everything we do. Our self-preservation instincts lead us to value ourselves above the rest of the world. What person would reasonably kill themselves, or their children, friends, and neighbors, to save an ecosystem? Or two ecosystems? Though some radical environmentalists have chained themselves to trees and bulldozers, this is generally a statement to express the direness of the environmental situation, instead of an actual bodily sacrifice. Would the same environmentalist give their life to save two gorillas, or two earthworms? We are all responsible for the world, but we are first and foremost responsible for ourselves. More than that, our subjectivity means that one deep ecologist will observe value in the world differently than the next. Even those who subscribe to the idea that objective deliberations are possible, admit that we can rarely access them.7 Believing we can have knowledge of intrinsic value that we cannot access in any meaningful way would require the adoption of moral realism, the idea that we can have knowledge of objective moral facts.

### Anthro Good – Environment

#### Anthropocentrism is necessary to get people on board with environmental policies

David Watson, Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa, 2007. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis\_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm.

**Opponents of a** conservative **anthropocentric environmental ethic will object to the priority of human survival in an environmental ethic.** Those who oppose any anthropocentric ethic would look to the concept of value to support their argument. **They would claim that other members of the biosphere possess intrinsic value and that their value cannot be considered less than that of a human**. Thus, other members of the biosphere cannot be sacrificed for the betterment of humanity. According to such arguments, the intrinsic value of these other members prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Emotionally the arguments of the non-anthropocentrists have great appeal. Philosophically justified, moral and ethical theorists often gravitate to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. **However, there are several problems** with the concepts they assert. **Non-anthropocentrists claim that other members of the biosphere have intrinsic value, and this prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic**. Compelling examples along these lines are often cited to justify non-anthropocentrism. The ‘slaughtering’ of animals such as cows, deer, or chickens for human use is wrong because the chickens and cows possess as much value as humans. However, **whether or not these arguments are valid and justified is not the only consideration necessary. The discussions of philosophers and intellectuals are not the end of environmental ethics.** **The people of Western societies**, as consumers of vast amounts of resources, **must realize the importance of the other members of the biosphere if this issue is to be addressed**. **Humans are part of nature**, or the biosphere, as are all other living and non-living entities on the earth. Though humanity often seems separate and distinct from nature, humans emerged from the already thriving biosphere. This earth has been the only home to humanity. **Without the earth and its parts, the necessary conditions for the existence and survival of humanity are lacking.** **Environmental anthropocentrism does not necessitate an adversarial relationship between humans and the rest of nature**, contrary to popular opinion. **In fact, humanity has a great interest in the welfare of the biosphere:** There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it. (Massanari 45) **Environmental ethics need to embrace anthropocentrism** and the insights of conservation ethics. Human self-interest, regardless of its moral status, is present in human nature and culturally around the world. However, this self-interest and the direct relation it should have with the welfare of the biotic community is often overlooked. **Instead of continuing the debate of whether to champion all members of the biosphere or to promote the advancement of humanity, we need to embrace all members of the biosphere in order to promote the advancement of humanity.** There are many different factors that allow for life on earth, particularly human life. The ‘resources,’ as they are often called, necessary for the survival of humanity are limited. If the finite resources necessary for human life are gone, then the existence of humanity will no longer be viable on Earth. The recent trend of human attitude toward and interaction with the environment is frighteningly shortsighted. Only a sector of the scientific community attempts to address the potential environmental problems facing humanity in the near and distant future. Those that do, however, often express what seems like helpless concern: A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. (“Warning to Humanity” 783) Looking only as far as twenty-five to fifty years into the future of the environment is commonly considered long-term thinking. More than likely, this will only be an intermediate point in the environmental change humans have caused. **The future viability of life on the planet is necessary for human survival, and humanity can yet have a say in this future**. Humans came about among a preexisting world of living and non-living agents. We are just one of many species that have inhabited, or do inhabit the earth. These various species serve different functions in the biosphere and are interdependent upon one another for the survival of themselves and the biosphere.

## AT: Biopower

### AT: Biopower – Perm Solves

#### Positive social transformation along the lines Foucault approves of only occur within the state order. Only the perm solves the alternative.

Michael Walzer, Social Sciene Prof @ Princeton, 1988, *Company of Critics*, p. 207-9

Foucault is certainly right to say that the conventional truths of morality, law, medicine, and psychiatry are implicated in the exercise of power; that is a fact too easily forgotten by conventionally detached scientists, social scientists, and even philosophers. But those same truths also regulate the exercise of power. They set limits on what can rightly be done, and they give shape and conviction to the arguments the prisoners make. The limits are important, even if they are in some sense arbitrary**.** They aren’t entirely arbitrary, however, insofar as they are intrinsic to the particular disciplines (in both senses of the word). It is the truths of jurisprudence and penology, for example, that distinguish punishment from preventive detention. **It is the truths of psychiatry that distinguish the internment of madmen from the internment of political dissidents**. And it is the commitment to truth itself, even if it is only local truth, that distinguishes the education of citizens from ideological drill. A liberal or social democratic state is one that maintains the limits of its constituent disciplines and disciplinary institutions and that enforces their intrinsic principles. Authoritarian and totalitarian states, by contrast, override those limits, turning education into indoctrination, punishment into repression, asylums into prisons, and prisons into concentration camps. These are crude definitions, but they can easily be elaborated or amended. They indicate, in any case, the enormous importance of the political regime, the sovereign state. For the state is the agency through which society acts upon itself, It is the state that establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate. It is the state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local resistance.\* The agents of every Disciplinary institution strive, of course, to extend their reach and and augment their discretionary power. In the long run, only political action and state power can stop them. Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention from the center. **Consider**, for example, **the factory revolts of the 1930s that led (in the United States) to the establishment of collective bargaining** and grievance procedures, **critical restraints on scientific management, which is one of Foucault’s disciplines**, though one that he alludes to only occasionally. **Success required not only the solidarity of the workers but also the support of the liberal and democratic state**. And success was functional not to any state but to a state of that sort; we can easily imagine other “social wholes” that would require other kinds of factory discipline. A genealogical account of this discipline would be fascinating and valuable, and it would undoubtedly overlap with Foucault’s accounts of prisons and hospitals. But if it were complete, it would have to include a genealogy of grievance procedures too, and this would overlap with an account that Foucault doesn’t provide, of the liberal state and the rule of law. Here is a kind of knowledge—let’s call it political theory or philosophical jurisprudence— that regulates disciplinary arrangements across our society. It arises within one set of power relations and extends toward the others; it offers a critical perspective on all the networks of constraint. The possibility of knowledge of this sort, specific to institutions and political cultures rather than to “points” in the power network, suggests that **we still require** (I don’t mean that society requires, or capitalism or even socialism requires, but you and I require) **Foucault’s general intellectuals.** We need men and women who tell us when state power is corrupted or systematically misused, who cry out that something is rotten, and who reiterate the regulative principles with which we might set things right. General intellectuals don’t inhabit a realm of pure value, such as Bends described; Foucault is right to insist that there is no such place, no value untouched by power. **They stand among us, in this place, here and now, and they find in our laws and norms reasons for argument**. But Foucault stands nowhere and finds no reasons. Angrily, he rattles the bars of the iron cage. But he has no plans or projects for turning the cage into something more like a human home. But I don’t want to end on this note. I don’t want to ask Foucault to be uplifting. That is not the task he has set himself. The point is rather that one can’t even be downcast, angry, grim, indignant, sullen, or embittered with reason, one can’t be critical, unless one inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively, its codes and categories. Or unless, and this is much harder, one constructs (along with other men and women) a new setting and works out new codes and categories. Foucault refuses to do either of these things, and that refusal, which makes his genealogies so relentless, is also the catastrophe of his political theory and his social criticism.

## AT: Feminism

### AT: Feminism – Perm Solves

#### Perm solves - adopting multiple views on gender allows for most effective political change

Margaret A. Baldwin, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,”

However salutary the postmodern goal of de-essentializing women, **postmodern theory ultimately effaces the specific situation of public women, and forfeits altogether any account of gender along the way. This difficulty**, and its implications for political strategy, **is often spoken of but rarely addressed seriously within postmodern feminism.** Denise **Riley offers the diktat that at such junctures women can know amongst themselves "that 'women' don't exist – while maintaining a politics** of **'as if they existed'** -- since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did." 434 Judith **Butler makes the same tactical concession when she affirms the continued necessity of asserting "a generally shared conception of 'women'"** 435 as a political strategy: Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics operates, and . . . lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to identity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make claims in the name of women. 436