# Anthropocentrism Answers

## 2AC

#### Plan Focused debate is good – reject non policy alternatives and links not based off the plan text.

1. Topic Specific education – Antropocentrisisum Ks don’t change from year to year – this is our only chance to discuss infrastructure
2. Aff Viability – non-plan focused debate removes 8 minutes of faff offence – negatives aren’t handicapped in the same was because they can alter their 1NC response
3. Utopian fiat – non-policy alts can alter global mindset which is unfair – not a germane point of comparison and structurally winning on the aff impossible

### Perm

#### **Perm do the plan and the alternative – A combination of Anthropocentrism and Deep ecology leads to the most sensible philosophy and trades off with their impacts**

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, 1993, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology” pg 463-475, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409312345442

This is one of the points where deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems - - that is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from¶ the natural world -- means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally¶ flows on to concern for the nonhuman world. If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world.¶ That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and¶ values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this¶ parochialism, we are invited to assume an 'ecocentric' [2, 25] or 'biocentric' [30] perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our¶ anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive.¶ We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called 'shallow' views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion. Consider some extreme cases: should we be concerned about the fate of the planet¶ several billion years hence, or about the welfare of bacteria? I think not. Such concern¶ would be pointless and misdirected for the simple reason that there's nothing¶ we can do to affect the fate of the planet in the very long term, or to seriously disrupt¶ the welfare of single-celled creatures. Bacteria have been the dominant life¶ form on the planet for more than three billion years -- about five sixths of evolutionary¶ history -- and will almost certainly continue long after the demise of our¶ species. It is often said that we live in the Age of Mammals; but, as Gould has¶ pointed out, it is now, as it has always been, the Age of Bacteria. There are more e.¶ coli in every human intestine than there have ever been homo sapiens. Multicellular¶ life is a comparatively recent arrival in the biosphere, having evolved only within¶ the last half billion years or so.¶ It is instructive to pause and reflect on life on the planet from the expansive billion-¶ year geological perspective. Human occupancy of the biosphere thus viewed is but a blink of geological time. Some have concluded after ruminating on our comparatively¶ modest spatial and temporal occupancy of the world, that we are, after all,¶ not very significant in the scheme of things. If in the long run time overwhelms all,¶ does not that reduce our concerns to insignificance? The billion-year perspective¶ troubled some thinkers, such as Russell, but as Frank Ramsey [22, p.291] pointed¶ out, it should not have. Ramsey conceded that the scale of stars and galaxies is¶ impressive, but pointed out that for all their size celestial objects were, on the¶ whole, rather boring, since they lack interesting properties like the capacity to think¶ and to love. The billion year time frame and the galactic spatial perspective are the¶ wrong scale for judgements about importance; and one of the things wrong with¶ them is that they are not recognizably human.

#### Perm solves – a combination of deep ecology allows us to treat the symptoms of our impacts, as well as for the exaggerations of their deep ecology philosophy

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, 1993, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology” pg 463-475, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409312345442

'Deep ecology' is a phrase coined by Arne Naess [16] to encapsulate a perceived¶ problem about the impact of human populations and technology on the natural environment.¶ It was originally articulated, in Naess's words, by seven 'rather vague¶ generalizations' [16, p.94]. Deep ecology was the name for a complex set of problems,¶ as well as a political manifesto for change in the rather vaguely delineated¶ directions of global harmony and ecological wisdom. Deep ecology calls for a substantial¶ reduction of human populations, and change to our high energy consumption¶ and profligate resource use.¶ In drawing the distinction between shallow and deep, Naess laid great stress on a¶ distinction between the short term and the long term. Shallow views are unsatisfactory¶ because short term considerations can distract from the important longer term¶ issues and because they incline one too much towards compromise positions. Deep ecology, in contrast to shallow positions, is concerned to treat causes, not symptoms.¶ The attempt to articulate Naess's 'vague generalizations' with greater clarity¶ and precision has not however produced an integrated and unified conception of¶ deep ecology, but a discordant clamour of competing conceptions. 'Deep ecology'¶ is a resonant phrase which has generated a lot of muddle. The task of tracing the¶ complex web of alternative conceptions however is not germane to the present argument.¶ 7 For a critical survey of deep ecology see Richard Sylvan [29].¶ A great deal of hyperbole has been deployed in articulating the claims of deep¶ ecology. It is common, for example, to encounter claims that destructive human¶ activity -- and in particular human technology -- is threatening life on the planet;¶ that we are disrupting the delicate fabric of the ecosphere, and driving it towards¶ collapse. Such claims are exaggerated. There have been far more traumatic disruptions¶ to the planet than any we can initiate. From a long-term planetary perspective,¶ this is alarmist nonsense. However from an anthropocentric point of view such¶ fears may be well founded. If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates of deep¶ ecology are expressed as concerns about the fate of the planet, then these concerns¶ are misplaced. From a planetary perspective, we may be entering a phase of mass¶ extinction of the magnitude of the Cretaceous. For planet Earth that is just another¶ incident in a four and a half billion year saga. Life will go on -- in some guise or¶ other. The arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost certainly¶ be around for a few billion years more. And with luck and good management,¶ some of the more complex and interesting creatures, such as ourselves, may¶ continue for a while longer as well. Of course our present disruptive and destructive¶ activities are, or should be, of great concern to us all. But that is a quite properly¶ human concern, expressing anthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspective.Life will continue; but we should take steps to maintain and preserve our sort¶ of living planet; one that suits us and, with a few exceptions, our biotic co-existents.¶ I will illustrate the way that allegedly non-anthropocentric points of view incorporate¶ a covert anthropocentrism with some representative examples which, I¶ believe, reveal the inevitability of anthropocentrism and show that it is not necessarily¶ something to be deplored. Anthropocentrism is natural and inevitable, and when¶ properly qualified turns out to be perfectly benign. The first illustration concerns a¶ proposal to develop a non-anthropocentric basis for value by grounding it in the naturalness¶ of an historical process.

#### Perm solves – when we care about ourselves, we care about the stability of the world around us

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Other natural properties -- such as biodiversity, beauty, harmony, stability, and¶ integrity -- have been proposed to provide a non-anthropocentric basis for value.¶ But unless we smuggle in some anthropocentric bearings, they fare no better than¶ the property of being the outcome of a natural process in providing an intuitively¶ plausible ordering of better and worse states of the world. For example, if biodiversity¶ is taken as a basic value-giving characteristic, then the state of the planet just¶ after the Cambrian explosion (about 570 million years ago) would be rated much¶ more highly than the world of the present, as it was far richer in terms of the range¶ and diversity of its constituent creatures. Most biology textbooks recognize¶ between twenty and thirty extant animal phyla -- the phylum being the fundamental¶ design plan of an organism (and the second broadest classification, following 'kingdom',¶ in biological taxonomy). Yet the Burgess Shale, one small quarry in British¶ Columbia dating back some 530 million years, contains the remains of fifteen to¶ twenty organisms so unlike one another, or anything now living, as to each constitute¶ a separate phylum [7]. In terms of basic diversity, a far greater range of radically¶ different anatomical types existed at that epoch of evolutionary development.

### Anthro Necessary

#### Asteroids

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, 1993, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology” pg 463-475, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409312345442

There is of course an excellent reason for us to retrospectively evaluate these¶ great planetary disruptions positively from our current position in planetary history,¶ and that is that we can recognise their occurrence as a necessary condition for our¶ own existence. But what could be more anthropocentric than that? However, as¶ Gould has pointed out, mass extinctions are awful for those who are caught up in¶ them.¶ Suppose that astronomers detect a modest asteroid or comet, say five or ten kilometres¶ diameter, on collision course with planet Earth. 8 The impending collision¶ would be perfectly natural all right, and cataclysmic enough to do to us what another¶ one rather like it probably did to the dinosaurs. Such periodic disruptive events¶ are natural all right, though they probably destroy most of the then extant large life¶ forms. These times of renewal provide opportunities for smaller, flexible organisms¶ to radiate opportunistically into vacated niches, and life goes on. From a biocentric¶ or ecocentric perspective there is little doubt that our demise would provide comparable¶ opportunities for development which we currently prevent. Should we, in such circumstances, step aside so that evolution can continue on its majestic course?¶ I think not, and I think further that interference with the natural course of events, if¶ it could be effected, would be no bad thing -- at least from our point of view and in¶ terms of our interests, which it is quite legitimate to promote and favour.

#### Ice Age

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Suppose again that we are entering one of the periodic epochs of reduced solar¶ energy flux. An ice age is imminent, with massive disruptions to the agriculturally¶ productive temperate zones. However suppose further that by carefully controlled¶ emissions of greenhouse gases it would be possible to maintain a stable and productive¶ agriculture. No doubt this would be to the detriment of various arctic plant and¶ animal species, but I do not think that such interference, though 'unnatural' would¶ be therefore deplorable. Nature in and of itself is not, I suggest, something to be¶ valued independently of human interests. It could be argued moreover that in thus¶ modifying our natural environment, we would be following the precedent of three¶ billion years of organic evolution, since, according to the Gaia hypothesis of¶ Lovelock [14], the atmosphere and oceans are not just biological products, but biological¶ constructions.

### Alt offense

#### There is a distinction between human chauvinism which you criticize, and human-centeredness which is inevitable.

Wendy LynneLee**,** Professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, Spring 2009, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of language to Ecological Feminism,” *Ethics &the Environment* 14.1 LV

Whatever the strengths of each of these approaches—and there are many—**none**, I think**, can accomplish an effective critique of human chauvinism** [End Page 30] **and its related forms of oppression without initiating a divorce of it from human-centeredness**. There are at least two reasons why. First, there are very good reasons to think that **human-centeredness is not** in any **sense a voluntary feature of human being, but rather an indigenous feature of human consciousness—unchosen and ineradicable**. Second, I'll argue, **not only do no negative consequences follow from this divorce, but rather the very positive consequence of an opportunity to rethink and re-value human-centeredness as a locus of practicable moral responsibility. However plastic and evolving the somatic, perceptual, cognitive, psychological, epistemic and affective capacities native to Homo sapiens, they are still specific to human**—and not Chimpanzee or dolphin—**being. Human consciousness is**, in other words, **informed by the unique articulation and interaction of capacities that characterize human embodiment, capacities whose exercise creates the conditions for human experience.** To be clear, I am not suggesting that what defines human-centeredness is that human beings have capacities that other species of creatures do not—this may or may not be true given any particular comparison. What I am suggesting is that **the unique configuration of capacities that describes Homo sapiens informs an experience unique to this species and thereby define this consciousness in terms of this configuration. A human-centered consciousness cannot then be displaced, disavowed, or disowned—the notion that we could get "outside" of human centeredness makes as little sense as the notion that there's an "outside" for human consciousness** (other than permanent coma or death). Hence, I can care profoundly about the welfare of chimpanzees—**I can try to imagine what it might be like to be a chimpanzee,** and I might make excellent guesses given all of the perceptual, somatic, and psychological similarities we do appear to share in light of the behavioral, anatomical, and other evidence. **But I cannot experience the world like a chimpanzee because there is no "outside" to my experience as a member of Homo sapiens.**2

#### Human-centeredness does not necessitate -isms.

Wendy LynneLee**,** Professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, Spring 2009, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of language to Ecological Feminism,” *Ethics &the Environment* 14.1 LV

Second, then, is that **however indigenous, no necessary implications for ethnicity, gender, sex, or sexual identity follow from human-centeredness** (or follow for our concepts of ethnicity, etc.). That we are, for instance, bipedal, color vision equipped, big-brained, sentient mammals implies no particular trajectory for human institutions other than for what falls within the range of physical, cognitive, and epistemic possibility for this species of animal. That we cannot see out the backs of our heads no doubt affects our experience of our somatic and existential conditions, that we are sentient creatures able to experience not only physical but psychological pain certainly contributes substantially to the ways in which our points of view identify us as specific loci of experience. **Specific capacities and limitations are not, however, determinations—while species membership delimits the possible, it does not define, for example, the "normal" or "natural" in any other terms but what can be. Nothing necessarily follows for human institutions like government, marriage, or family, however otherwise chauvinistic, sexist, racist, or heterosexist they may be. While human-centeredness is a defining characteristic of human consciousness, the ways in which we realize it is not.**

#### Ecocentrism can’t deal with political institutions or the human experience, especially as raced/sexed/gendered subjects. Once we come to terms with this then we can craft better tools to critique bad environmental practices and institutions.

Wendy LynneLee**,** Professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, Spring 2009, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of language to Ecological Feminism,” *Ethics &the Environment* 14.1 LV

The right response to the Ecocentrist's dilemma is to simply cut what is really just a chimerical Gordian knot by severing centeredness from chauvinism, a task made simple when we realize that the former does not, in fact, imply the latter. So why, then, have more environmental philosophers not taken this course? I think part of the answer lay in taking too little seriously—despite protestations to the contrary—the specifically embodied, raced, sexed, gendered, and epistemically situated configuration of capacities and limitations we really are**. It is one thing to assert our physical "encapsulation," but quite another to explore of what this consists—especially in light of the social and political institutions that inform specifically human experience.** Ironically, **what the ecocentrist fails to adequately appreciate is precisely what ecofeminists have long recognized, namely, the extent to which our physical dependency informs our very experience of the world not merely as corporeal, but as raced, sexed, and gendered—these too form a crucial aspect of residence or place.** **Liberated from this** two-headed bull, **we are now in a position to craft better tools for the critique of practices and institutions that concern environmental activists across virtually any approach not committed to ecocentrism** (ecofeminism, environmental pragmatism, the stewardship movement). **My aims**, then, **are to articulate a human-centered environmental conscience capable of sustaining the activism we want without wasting precious time and energy in the forlorn effort to deny our human experience. It includes an implicit sensibility for matters of social justice precisely because its aim is to comprehend the relationship between environmental destruction; the human institutions responsible for such destruction; and the effects on human beings, nonhuman, animals, and the ecological systems upon which we all depend. Such an approach can show that matters of social justice are such an intimate part of understanding the causes of environmental destruction that any theory that eschews the former is likely to distort its evaluation of the latter.**6 Taking, then, the concept of "liberation" as my point of departure, my next task is to articulate [End Page 41] in just what such better tools consist, and why they make possible a more effective environmental activism.

#### Can’t just ignore other oppressions/priveleges. The way that anthropomorphism and heterosexism are interlinked shape epistemic and linguistic situations.

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**The critique of the heterosexualizing function of anthropomorphizing language is vital to the ongoing struggle to resist sexism, heterosexism, and all other forms of oppression**.8 **It can show us not only one basic way that institutions and practices which privilege and reinforce sexism and heterosexualism become defined as normative, but how heterosexualism itself has become a naturalized feature of our expectations, of our epistemic and linguistic situations** (our "place and purpose in the world"), **and thus of the ways in which we experience ourselves as perceiving, "residenced," embodied beings. It is no wonder that the ecocentrist interprets as chauvinistic human actions characterized by their oppressive consequences**—what ecofeminist critiques shows, however, is that **oppression itself is governed not only by human privilege, but by the sexed, raced, and heterosexualized epistemic conditions of human experience and language.**

#### There’s a distinction between human-centeredness and human chauvinism. Failure to recognize white, male, Westernism is what causes chauvinism.

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What analyses like Martin's show is that, even at a level of description taken to be objectively testable, not only chauvinistic, but heterosexist constructions of the "real" come to be understood as a reflection of nature "her" self. It is unsurprising, then, that **the ecocentrist mistakes chauvinism for human-centeredness** per se. **Failing to recognize the primarily white, male, and Western face of chauvinism, it matters less to the ecocentrist how human institutions become implicated in environmental destruction, only that they do**—**yet this is precisely what invites the determinism that jeopardizes the ecocentrist approach.** This lacuna is made poignantly clear in Bender's discussion of ecofeminism where, although he rightly credits Karen J. Warren's insight that dualisms of mind and body, male and female, human and animal, civilization and nature solicit oppression (2003, 364–5), he nevertheless erects a false dichotomy of his own by pitting ecofeminism's concern for social justice against the ecocentrist's preoccupation with avoiding ecocide (2003, 365–70).