# Anthropocentrism K

## 1NC

#### The rhetoric of the affirmative leads to unconstrained human interference in natural systems and human activity in isolation from nature

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, 1993, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology” pg 463-475, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409312345442

Deep ecology has been stimulated largely, as the name 'ecology' suggests, by discoveries¶ in natural science. For it is the biological sciences, and the science of ecology¶ in particular, which have revealed a complex web of interdependencies in the¶ biological world which support the life of individuals and populations. And it is the¶ extravagant and reckless interference with these life support networks which has¶ motivated many of the writers mentioned above to call for a new set of moral constraints¶ to curtail our destructive behaviour with respect to the natural world. It is¶ precisely the failure of traditional moral constraints to curtail human behaviour, and¶ to allow intricate biological interdependencies to be compromised, that exposes a¶ profound deficiency in the received moral view. Or so it is widely claimed. It is¶ therefore natural to think of deep ecology as the ethical impact of contemporary¶ biology: In fact biologists have been calling for substantial changes in our treatment¶ of nature for several centuries: the roots of Western environmental concern¶ can be traced back to seventeenth and eighteenth century European naturalists [8].¶ There are several very plausible elements in the concerns of deep ecology. First,¶ there is the worry about the effects of unconstrained human interference in natural¶ systems impoverishing and degrading them. Human interference and human action¶ is often contrasted with the wisdom of natural cycles and natural development.¶ Contrast the violence of a strip-mined hillside, or a clear-felled forest with the tranquil¶ majesty of a climax ecosystem such as a tropical rain forest or a coral reef.¶ 'Nature knows best', it is said.¶ A second worry focuses on the way that we tend to treat humans and human¶ activity in isolation from, rather than as a part of nature. This is often characterized¶ as an atomistic conception of humans as discrete and separate interacting units, in¶ contrast to the holistic organic conception of organisms as nodes in complex biotic¶ webs. The sharp separation between humanity and nature is said to be one of the¶ characteristic deficiencies of shallow thought, which is often accompanied by the¶ denial that the nonhuman world possesses intrinsic value.¶

#### The alternate is to reject the 1AC’s rhetoric and their prioritization of Anthropocentrism and to vote neg based on a philosophy of Deep Ecology.

#### This conceptualization of anthropocentrism leads to a sorts of ecological holocaust – we end up severing our ties to nature in favor of ecocide, and is the root of uncaring violence

Roger Gottleib, professor of humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Cross Currents, “Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology” 1994 <http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm>

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources.¶ The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other -- as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child.¶ We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother.¶ What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests?¶ To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them.¶ Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25)¶ One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world.¶ Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life.¶ The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27)¶ Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28)¶ Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to.¶ The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29)¶ In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer:¶ Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind,¶ Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light,¶ You have come here, my beloved one. . . . ¶ You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums;¶ but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32)¶ In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz -- is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

## Links

### General

#### Humanity’s framing is amplified by the use of science based technology

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, 1993, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology” pg 463-475, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409312345442

Moral philosophy aims to provide a rational critique or justification of the principles¶ which guide or govern human conduct. In this inquiry it is of course assumed that¶ these principles are accessible to reason. Human activity, particularly when amplified¶ by sophisticated science-based technologies, now extends far beyond the stone¶ age boundaries which constrained our actions for most of human history. The chain¶ saw and the drift net have transformed biological systems far more rapidly and violently¶ than the neolithic axe and spear. The rapid and accelerating technologically driven¶ modification of our natural surroundings has changed them beyond the¶ wildest neolithic dreams. It is these changes which have prompted the question¶ whether constraints on human conduct should take into consideration more than¶ purely human interests. Environmental philosophers have proposed a critique of traditional Western¶ moral thought, which, it is alleged, is deficient for providing a satisfactory ethic of¶ obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. This concern, it is claimed, needs¶ to be extended, in particular, toward nonhuman individuals, wilderness areas, and¶ across time and species. The project of extending our concern in the latter two cases¶ -- over time and over species -- is a central concern of this paper.

#### Everything you run is way linkage

Dr. Victoria Bennett, ANU College of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; Winston Smith, research wildlife biologist; Matthew Betts, assistant professor of landscape eulogy; 2011 “Toward Understanding the Ecological Impact of Transportation Corridors” http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw\_gtr846.pdf

Transportation corridors (notably roads) affect wildlife habitat, populations, and¶ entire ecosystems. Considerable effort has been expended to quantify direct effects¶ of roads on wildlife populations and ecological communities and processes. Much¶ less effort has been expended toward quantifying indirect effects. In this report, we¶ provide a comprehensive review of road/transportation corridor ecology; in particular,¶ how this new field of ecology has advanced worldwide. Further, we discuss¶ how research thus far has shaped our understanding and views of the ecological¶ implications of transportation infrastructures, and, in turn, how this has led to the¶ current guidance, policies, and management options. We learned that the impacts of¶ transportation infrastructures are a global issue, with the potential to affect a wide¶ variety of taxonomically diverse species and ecosystems. Because the majority of¶ research to date has focused on the direct and more aesthetic and anthropocentric¶ implications of transportation corridors, mainly wildlife-vehicle collisions, it is a¶ fairly standard practice to incorporate underpasses, green bridges (i.e., overpasses),¶ fencing, and barriers into road corridors to alleviate such impacts. Few studies,¶ however, have been able to demonstrate the efficiency of these structures. Furthermore,¶ it is becoming increasingly evident that the indirect implications of transportation¶ infrastructures (i.e., behavioral responses of wildlife individuals to roads)¶ may be more pervasive, at least from the standpoint of biological diversity. Understanding¶ how road corridors influence the functional connectivity of landscapes¶ is crucial if we are to effectively manage species of concern. With these issues in¶ mind, we propose a program of study that addresses the indirect and cumulative¶ implications of transportation infrastructure on species distributions, community¶ structure and ecosystem function.

#### Moar links

Dr. Victoria Bennett, ANU College of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; Winston Smith, research wildlife biologist; Matthew Betts, assistant professor of landscape eulogy; 2011 “Toward Understanding the Ecological Impact of Transportation Corridors” http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw\_gtr846.pdf

A transportation corridor can reduce the quality of the immediate surrounding¶ habitat and potentially the quality of habitat farther afield (see below). This is¶ referred to as habitat degradation and is often considered to be another form of¶ habitat loss. Habitat degradation can be brought on by pollution, generally caused¶ by the movement and emissions of vehicles along existing transportation corridors¶ (Forman 2004, Forman and Alexander 1998). In addition, a few studies have shown that the materials and products used to construct such corridors can be a source of¶ pollution (e.g., salts, sediments, and other materials) to surrounding land, air and¶ water resources (van Bohemen and van de Laak 2003). Habitat degradation can also¶ occur through light and noise pollution.

#### Even moar links

Dr. Victoria Bennett, ANU College of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; Winston Smith, research wildlife biologist; Matthew Betts, assistant professor of landscape eulogy; 2011 “Toward Understanding the Ecological Impact of Transportation Corridors” http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw\_gtr846.pdf

Studies have also shown that dust generated and disturbed by moving vehicles¶ can influence the composition of vegetation and distribution of wildlife species¶ near roads. The dust that settles on the leaves of vegetation can have two different¶ effects. The first is to reduce the ability of some plants to photosynthesize. In¶ certain species, this may inhibit growth rates, whereas in others, it may cause death¶ (Hirano et al. 1995, Nanos and Ilias 2007, Sharifi et al. 1997). Those plant species¶ able to thrive under such conditions become dominant, replacing dust-sensitive species¶ and thus changing the composition and dynamics of the vegetation community¶ near roads (Farmer 1993, Thompson et al. 1984). The second immediate implication¶ of dust deposition on vegetation is that many wildlife species will not graze on¶ plants covered in dust (Ndibalema et al. 2008). In short, it degrades habitat quality¶ within an area of influence from the road rendering it unsuitable for certain wildlife¶ individuals. The result is that the impacted area is avoided, which in turn may affect¶ the distribution of wildlife across the landscape (Bissonette and Rosa 2009, Eigenbrod¶ et al. 2009, Laurance et al. 2008).

### Sustainability

#### Sustainability causes a framework of anthropocentrism by placing the focus of our action on maintain ourselves on a living level

Annie Pearce, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Georgia Institute of Technology, 3-1-2001, Sustainability and the Indigenous Materials Heuristic, http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd29/heuristic.pdf

No definition of sustainability is complete without considering the rational self-interest of the¶ actors who seek to change their context to achieve it. Accordingly, anthropocentric slants on¶ the thermodynamic requirements for sustainability are inherent in most, if not all, definitions of¶ sustainability in the literature (see Pearce 1988 for a blatant example). The various operational¶ objectives found in the literature can be summarized in three general directives: maintain¶ standards of living at least as good as the ones which currently exist, leave the Earth in at least¶ as good a condition as we found it, and bring everyone else up to at least a “decent” standard¶ of living.¶ The first of these directives, maintain standards of living at least as good as the ones which¶ currently exist, is borne of practical considerations. By definition, no rationally self-interested¶ person will voluntarily sacrifice his or her own standard of living without some compensating¶ benefit of equal or greater utility (Simon 1983). Moreover, reliance on such constructs as¶ conscience or guilt to motivate human behavior to become more sustainable is unwise, since¶ such motives tend to be generally unreliable and often self-extinguishing (Hardin 1968).¶ Therefore, in order to foster acceptance of any proposal for sustainability, assurances must beincluded that those who undertake to change their lifestyles to achieve sustainability will not¶ suffer as a result of their commitment.¶ The second directive, leave the Earth in at least as good a condition as we found it, is aimed at¶ achieving intergenerational equity. By leaving the Earth as good as or better than it was when¶ we arrived, we ensure that future generations will not only have the same set of resources with¶ which to work that we have, but also the accumulated body of knowledge that we have¶ developed as a result of our life experiences. However, the phrase “at least as good” has been¶ interpreted in various ways in the sustainability literature, ranging from leaving the nonrenewable¶ resource base completely unchanged from its present state (e.g., Daly 1994) to using¶ nonrenewable resources as necessary provided that we create adequate substitutes (e.g., Solow¶ 1991, Mikesell 1992). Adopting the more conservative view of Daly, our ultimate goal should¶ be to strive to leave our resource base as unchanged as possible while working toward¶ achieving the first and third directives.¶ The third directive, bring everyone else up to at least a “decent” standard of living, is concerned¶ with the issue of intragenerational equity. Achieving intragenerational equity is important not¶ only because of ethical considerations for the welfare of people in developing nations, but also¶ because we cannot hope to develop common goals and a coordinated course of action for¶ achieving sustainability when people are concerned for their very survival and lacking in basic¶ human rights (e.g., Jacob 1994). Common goals and coordinated action are required to¶ achieve sustainability because no action within the Earth system is entirely without ramifications¶ for other entities and processes in the system. Due to the contextual nature of sustainability,¶ actions which seem rational and sustainable to one party acting in isolation may actively conflict¶ with the rational actions of other parties in the interconnected “real world”. Thus, global¶ objectives and cooperative actions are needed to reach a state of sustainability, and achieving¶ some degree of intragenerational equity is essential to elicit that cooperation (Ruckelshaus 1989,¶ etc.).

### High Speed Rail

#### Railways damage the environment around them, ultimately prioritizing the anthropocentric need for mobility above the area around them

Andreas Seiler and Lennart Folkeson “Habitat Fragmentation Due to Transportation Infrastructure” 2006 Pg 33 http://www.vti.se/sv/publikationer/pdf/biotopfragmentering-till-foljd-av-transportinfrastrukturen-cost-341-svensk-nationell-kunskapsoversikt.pdf

Imagine a new railway that is to be built through a forest. On a topographical map, the¶ forest may comprise a rather homogeneous green area. From a biological point of view,¶ however, the forest is home to numerous local populations of animals, such as beetles¶ that live on old growth trees (see Figure 2.8), and it forms the territory of an individual¶ lynx. A new railway through this landscape will affect the beetle primarily at the¶ population level due to the destruction of their habitat and increased separation of local¶ populations. Disturbance and barrier effects of the new infrastructure may drive some of¶ the local populations to extinction, but the metapopulation may still persist. For the¶ lynx, the railway matters mostly at the individual level. Traffic increases mortality risk¶ and the railway barrier may dissect the lynx’s home range into smaller, unviable¶ fragments. The lynx is a relatively rare species, in which the loss of one single¶ individual can be significant to the population in a region.

### Highway

#### The use of the car separates humanity from the natural world by reducing the amount of time it spends outside of technology

Nicholas Low, Associate Professor, Environmental Planning, University of Melbourne. 2003 “Is Urban Transport Sustainable?” p. 13

There are also indirect health effects of motor vehicle use. The private¶ car/public roads solution to transport problems has two systemic effects: it¶ leads both to a spreading out of interacting land uses and the reduction of¶ walking as a component of journeys between them. People have to travel¶ further and they get less physical exercise doing so. This loss of physical¶ exercise in the normal course of daily life can itself make people less healthy.¶ The private car is particularly to blame because it provides a door to door¶ travel option and its engine pollutes the atmosphere with noxious chemicals.¶ This is quite different from public transport systems which can¶ more readily accommodate electric powered, non-polluting vehicles (both¶ rail and road systems) and in which there is always a need to walk short¶ distances.¶ Finally, the door to door conception of car/road transport tends to demote¶ urban public space to the status of an awkward gap between domestic¶ space and the car. Yet it is also well understood that some of the finest¶ achievements of the great cities are the squares and boulevards designed for¶ people on foot. When public space is occupied by masses of parked¶ and moving vehicles its environmental quality is destroyed. The movement¶ to reclaim public space for people on foot has made great progress, particularly¶ in Europe where the cultural value of public urban space is well¶ appreciated.¶ Transport systems therefore create local environments of varying quality¶ for their human occupants. But an exclusive focus on the environment of¶ humans is regarded by many environmental philosophers as ‘anthropocentric’:¶ that is, the only reason for valuing the human species above all others¶ is that we are members of it (see Eckersley, 1992). As an ethical position that¶ is unsatisfactory and probably does even not correspond with most people’s¶ ethical regard for non-human species (Low and Gleeson, 1998). Prudentially¶ also we need non-human species in many known ways and many ways that¶ are not yet discovered. The urban environment, and especially the periurban¶ environment on the edge of great cities provides a habitat for many¶ rare and endangered species. The car/road solution sprawls the city further¶ and further into the peri-urban region, damaging the habitats of these¶ species and threatening in some cases species extinction.

#### Your highways are a bad thing

Andreas Seiler and Lennart Folkeson “Habitat Fragmentation Due to Transportation Infrastructure” 2006 Pg 33 <http://www.vti.se/sv/publikationer/pdf/biotopfragmentering-till-foljd-av-transportinfrastrukturen-cost-341-svensk-nationell-kunskapsoversikt.pdf>

Artificial lighting, traffic noise, chemical pollutants, microclimatic and hydrological¶ changes, vibration and movement are just a few sources of disturbance that alter the¶ habitats adjacent to infrastructure. **In many situations, such disturbances are probably of¶ marginal importance to wildlife, and many animals habituate quickly to constant¶ disturbance (as long as they do not experience immediate danger). This does not imply,¶ however, that disturbance should not be considered during the EIA process. On the¶ contrary, because measures to mitigate against these types of disturbance are usually¶ simple and inexpensive to install, they can easily be considered and integrated during¶ the planning and design process. Many of the studies cited above were not specifically¶ designed to directly investigate the disturbance effect of infrastructure, nor to inform the¶ development of tools for impact evaluation or mitigation. However, to assess the width¶ and intensity of the road-effect zone, research is needed that specifically addresses the¶ issue of the spread of disturbance and the effect thresholds for individual species. Until¶ there is a better understanding of such issues, the precautionary principle should be¶ applied in all cases to prevent unnecessary negative effects.**

#### **Highways link**

Andreas Seiler and Lennart Folkeson “Habitat Fragmentation Due to Transportation Infrastructure” 2006 Pg 33 http://www.vti.se/sv/publikationer/pdf/biotopfragmentering-till-foljd-av-transportinfrastrukturen-cost-341-svensk-nationell-kunskapsoversikt.pdf

Motorways may consume more than 10 hectares (ha) of land per kilometre of road and¶ as a large part of that surface is metalled/sealed it is consequently lost as a natural¶ habitat for plants and animals. Provincial and local roads occupy less area per kilometre,¶ but collectively they comprise at least 95 % of the total road network and hence their¶ cumulative effect in the landscape can be considerably greater. If all the associated¶ features, such as verges, embankments, slope cuttings, parking places, and service¶ stations etc. are included, the total area designated for transport is likely to be several¶ times larger than simply the paved surface of the road (Figure 3.2). In most European¶ countries, the allocation of space for new infrastructure is a significant problem for¶ landuse planning. It is not surprising therefore that landtake is a fundamental¶ consideration in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) studies and forms a baseline¶ for designing mitigation and compensation measures in modern infrastructure projects¶ (OECD 1994, see also Section 4.7).¶ The physical occupation of land due to infrastructure is most significant at the local¶ scale; at broader scales it becomes a minor issue compared to other types of landuse.¶ Even in rather densely populated countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium or¶ Germany, the total area occupied by infrastructure is generally estimated to be less than¶ 5–7 % (Jedicke 1994). In Sweden, where transportation infrastructure is sparser, roads¶ and railways are estimated to cover about 1.5 % of the total land surface whilst urban¶ areas comprise 3 % (Seiler and Eriksson 1997; Statistics Sweden 1999).

#### Car lights link

Andreas Seiler and Lennart Folkeson “Habitat Fragmentation Due to Transportation Infrastructure” 2006 Pg 33 http://www.vti.se/sv/publikationer/pdf/biotopfragmentering-till-foljd-av-transportinfrastrukturen-cost-341-svensk-nationell-kunskapsoversikt.pdf

The effects of traffic also include visual disturbance e.g. from artificial lighting or¶ vehicle movement but these impacts do not generally receive as much attention as¶ traffic noise or toxins. Artificial lighting has a conflicting effect on different species of¶ fauna and flora: it can act as a valuable deterrent to deer and a readily accessible insect¶ food supply to bats, but at the same time it can disrupt growth regulation in plants¶ (Campbell 1990; Spellerberg 1998), breeding and behaviour patterns in birds (Lofts and¶ Merton 1968; Hill 1992), bats (Rydell 1992), nocturnal frogs (Buchanan 1993), and¶ moth populations (Frank 1990; Svensson and Rydell 1998). A study on the influence ofroad lights on a black-tailed godwit (Limosa limosa) population in The Netherlands, for¶ example, indicated that the breeding density of this species was significantly reduced in¶ a zone of 200 to 250 metres around the lights (De Molenaar et al. 2000).¶ Certain types of road lights, such as white (mercury vapour) street lamps are especially¶ attractive to insects, and therefore also to aerial-hawking bat species such as pipistrelles¶ (Pipistrellus pipistrellus) (Rydell 1992; Blake et al. 1994). This increases the exposure¶ of bats to traffic and may entail increased mortality due to collisions with vehicles.¶ Furthermore, lit roads can constitute linear landscape elements, which bats may use to¶ navigate in open areas

## I/L

### Apathy

#### Anthropocentrism leads to apathy. A philosophy voids us of any reason to evaluate the debate.

Christie Karpiak and Galen Baril, Department of Psychology, University of Scranton, “Moral Reasoning and Concern for the Environment” 12-12-2007 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494401902051

The relationships we observed between the three scales¶ of the environmental measure are fully consistent with¶ those reported by Thompson and Barton (1994). Ecocentrism¶ is strongly negatively correlated with apathy, while¶ anthropocentrism is unrelated with ecocentrism and¶ positively correlated with apathy. Individuals who assign¶ intrinsic value to the environment are less likely to be¶ apathetic, while those who value the environment for its¶ utility to humans are more likely to be apathetic. These¶ results regarding anthropocentric motivations are consistent¶ with analyses by Schultz and Zelezny (1999), and with¶ the findings of Axelrod (1994), who used ecological¶ dilemmas to test hypotheses about value orientations and¶ found that socially oriented individuals ‘‘appear to place¶ the needs of many before the needs of any one individual or¶ the natural environment (p. 101).’’ A better understanding¶ of these intriguing patterns is potentially important in¶ promoting environmentally friendly behavior, since¶ Thompson and Barton (1994) found that ecocentric¶ attitudes are predictive of such behavior while anthropocentric¶ attitudes are not.

## Impact Debate

#### **We’re talking about morals right now – the universe doesn’t depend on humanity to keep spinning. Your extinction impacts are totally irrelevant**

Keekok Lee, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, “The Natural and the Artefactual” 1999

We should not delude ourselves that the humanization of nature will stop at biotic nature or indeed be confined only to planet Earth. Other planets in our solar system, too, may eventually be humanized; given the technological possibility of doing so, the temptation to do so appears difficult to resist on the part of those always on the lookout for new challenges and new excitement. To resist the ontological elimination of nature as 'the Other,' environmental philosophy must not merely be earthbound but, also, astronomically bounded (at least to the extent of our own solar system). We should bear in mind that while there may be little pristine nature left on Earth, this does not mean that nature is not pristine elsewhere in other planets. We should also be mindful that while other planets may not have life on them, this does not necessarily render them only of instrumental value to us. Above all, we should, therefore, bear in mind that nature, whether pristine or less than fully pristine, biotic or abiotic, is ontologically independent and autonomous of humankind--natural forms and natural processes are capable of undertaking their own .trajectories of existence. We should also remind ourselves that we are the controllers of our science and our technology, and not allow the products of our intellectual labor to dictate to us what we do to nature itself without pause or reflection. However, it is not the plea of this book that humankind should never transform the natural to become the artefactual, or to deny that artefacticity is not a matter of differing degrees or levels, as such claims would be silly and indefensible. Rather its remit is to argue that in systematically transforming the natural to become the artefactual through our science and our technology, we are at the same time systematically engaged in ontological simplification. Ontological impoverishment in this context is wrong primarily because we have so far failed to recognize that nature embodies its own funda¬mental ontological value. In other words, it is not true, as modernity alleges, that nature is devoid of all value and that values are simply humanly conferred or are the projections of human emotions or attitudes upon nature. Admittedly, it takes our unique type of human consciousness to recognize that nature possesses ontological value; however, from this it would be fallacious to conclude that human consciousness is at once the source of all values, or even the sole locus of axiologically-grounded intrinsic values. But most important of all, human con¬sciousness does not generate the primary ontological value of independence in nature; nature's forms and processes embodying this value exist whether human¬kind is around or not.

## AT Perm

### Framing

#### Incorporation of the plan invalidates the post-humanist gesture of our alternative—causes it to be lost in human-centered politics.

Dimitris Papadopoulos, Reader in Sociology and Organisation University of Leicester, Epherema vol 10 “Insurgent posthumanism” 2010

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of idea and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

### Perm Bad

####  A moral system which flip-flops on it’s values destroys the values themselves and is morally flawed

Mark Lupisella, masters degree in philosophy of science at Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center; and John Logsdon, Director Space Policy Institute the George Washington University, Washington, “Do we need a Cosmocentric Ethic?” 1997

**Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view** combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life. **Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable** and perhaps even desirable especially **when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics**. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. **However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and allembracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”**