## Biopower Kritik

Biopower Kritik 1

1NC Shell 2

Links 6

Securitization 7

Capitalism 8

Capitalism Cont. 9

Environmental Managerialism 11

Time 12

Time Cont. 13

Terrorism 15

Biopolitics 17

Link-Predictions 19

Link-Mapping 20

Impacts 21

Biopolitics-Violence 22

Biopolitics- Value to Life 23

Alternative 24

Solvency-Postmodernism 25

Solvency- Environment 26

Solvency-Localism 27

Solvency- Future transportation thought 28

A/T Perm 29

Framework – Alt First – Policymaking Fails 31

Framework – Discursive Analysis Key 32

A/T Calculations Good 34

## 1NC Shell

First, the link. The Aff’s support of transportation infrastructure policies are enframed in biopolitical approaches to life that attempt to control the population through systems of security and management

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical/necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere “animal husbandry” (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of “correct living” and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—“politics is the extension of war by other means”—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9/11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what “quality of life” must mean: ...the defense of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defense of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the “system of systems” in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to “normal” conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of “terrorist threats” in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

### ;Second, the impact. This biopolitical structure created by the aff establishes a kill-to-live mentality that justifies massive conflict and violence in the name of the protection and promotion of life

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library

Dillon and Reid begin their book by characterizing liberalism as a “systemic regime of... power relations,” which, although committed to peace-making, is nevertheless marked by an equal commitment to war, continuous state of emergency, and constant preparedness for conflict (Dillon and Reid 2009:7). From this perspective, war and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of rule can be understood as: “a war-making machine whose continuous processes of war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal way of life” (Dillon and Reid 2009:9). As such, the liberalism–war complex acts as a grid for the production of knowledge, preoccupations, and political subjectivities. Taking their lead from Foucault’s later work, Dillon and Reid argue that the basic referent object of liberal rule is life itself. From this perspective, the liberal way of rule/war is inherently biopolitical: “its referent object is biological being and its governmental practices are themselves, in turn, governed by the properties of species existence” (Dillon and Reid 2009:20). They stress, however, that the properties of species existence are not givens, but rather subject to changes in power/knowledge. Over the last 20 years, the Revolution in Military Affairs, accompanied by developments in the life sciences, has changed the way that life is viewed and understood. The move to “informationalize” life has led to the reduction in what it means to be a living being to a code, and as a result: “the very boundaries which long distinguished living from not living, animate from inanimate and the biological from the non-biological have been newly construed and problematized...” (Dillon and Reid 2009:22). The corollary of this account is that the informationalization of life has, in turn, changed the way in which war is waged by liberal rule: The development of the life sciences in general, and of complexity science in particular, comprising new knowledge about the complex emergent adaptive processes and properties of open living systems, has transformed the ways in which liberal regimes have come to understand that very nature of war, and of the relation of war to complex adaptive evolutionary models of rule and order. (Dillon and Reid 2009:111) The military is as interested now... in life-creating and life-adaptive processes as it is in killing, because, like the liberal way of rule and war more generally, it locates the nature of the threat in the very becoming-dangerous of the vital signs of life itself. (Dillon and Reid 2009:125) In other words, development in the life sciences has been embraced by liberal regimes, which, in turn, has affected the way that they view and fight wars. The move in life sciences away from Newtonian physics to complexity has enabled new biopolitical technologies of governance. Complexity science stresses the “anteriority of radical relationality,” the “dynamic and mobile nature of existence” and the “contingencies of bodies-in-formation” (Dillon and Reid 2009:72). Liberal biopolitical rule takes these problematizations of life as a starting point for securing its own existence. Thus, in a development of Foucault’s account of biopolitics as “making live and letting die,” Dillon and Reid argue that liberalism only promotes the kind of life that is productive for its own enterprise in light of new power/knowledge relations. A liberal biopolitical problematization of life entails security practices that can “pre-empt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life” (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as “virtual”: “the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-information; becoming-dangerous” (Dillon and Reid 2009:44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live.

#### Third is the alternative. Reject the 1ac’s management of life through transportation infrastructure in favor of the 1nc’s critical mapping of power.

#### The alternative solves—The alternative’s criticism of power allows biopolitics to be exposed and resisted

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online]

Blomley and Sommers (1999) also bring together the insights of governmentality studies (Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993; 1996) and Marxian critiques of the production of abstract space (Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1996) in their study of ‘cartographic struggles’ in Vancouver. They argue that property relations have a ‘special significance in governmental discourse’ and that cartographic mapping not only represents ‘reality’ but is a strategy for ‘acting upon the real’ in order to govern the conduct of conduct (Blomley and Sommers, 1999: 263–65). Blomley and Sommers examine the practice of mapping as a field of contestation and struggle, rather than solely as a top-down imposition of state power. Their analysis of the spatial politics of urban mapping takes seriously the possibility that governmentality is not confined to the state but rather that non-state actors (such as community groups) can utilize technologies of government to suit their own ends. In his recent book, The political mapping of cyberspace, geographer Jeremy Crampton (2003: 17) suggests that governmentality should be conceptualized not merely as a tool of state power but instead as a ‘contact point’ between ‘technologies of the self ’ and ‘technologies of power and domination’. Whereas Hannah’s (2000) focus is the federal census, Crampton explores the possibility of a ‘critical politics’ of cartographic mapping in the digital age. Crampton critiques the manner in which maps have been used as normalizing devices, and he argues that a critical politics of mapping ‘opens and allows intervention in the struggle over the deployment of powerknowledge effects’ (Crampton, 2003: 61). One of the aims of such a critical politics, for Crampton (2003: 61), is to question, or problematize, the necessity of viewing cartography only in terms of the mapping out of ‘a Cartesian set of things located in space’. Similar to Blomley and Sommers (1999), Crampton views the production of cartographic knowledge as a site of political struggle. This recognition of struggle over the use of cartographic technologies of government moves beyond strictly state-centered conceptions of governmentality and examines how both state and non-state actors play a significant role in constructing governmental rationalities.

#### Finally is our framework. The evaluation of each side’s discourse is the subject of the debate—discursive analysis must come prior to any other form of analysis because it produces the world as an object of study

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online]

Governmentality scholars also consider the ways in which political rationalities structure the sphere of governmental action by establishing ‘discursive fields characterized by a shared vocabulary within which disputes can be organized’ (Rose, 1999: 28). Political rationalities aim to render reality intelligible and, thereby, amenable to government. There are, of course, multiple grids of intelligibility, and it is in the struggle between competing political rationalities that the politics of truth is played out. An analytics of 474 Governmentality, geography, and the geo-coded world government does not take the truth for granted as the basis of its analyses; instead, the aim is to decipher the ways in which truth operates within the field of government and how political rationalities produce material effects through the deployment of technologies of government. Combining Latour’s (1986; 1997) discussion of ‘inscriptions’ with Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, Miller and Rose emphasize the materiality of discourse and insist that analyses of governmental rationalities should devote: attention to the particular technical devices of writing, listing, numbering and computing that render a realm into discourse as a knowable, calculable and administrable object. ‘Knowing’ an object in such a way that it can be governed is more than a purely speculative activity: it requires the invention of procedures of notation, ways of collecting and presenting statistics, the transportation of these to centres where calculations and judgements can be made and so forth. It is through such procedures of inscription that the diverse domains of ‘governmentality’ are made up, that ‘objects’ such as the economy, the enterprise, the social field and the family are rendered in a particular conceptual form and made amenable to intervention and regulation. (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5) Technologies of government are of central importance to governmentality studies, because they operationalize governmental rationalities and construct the very ‘objects’ of government as in some sense ‘knowable’. Foucault takes the development of statistics during the eighteenth century as the quintessential example of a ‘technology’ of government, yet governmentality scholars have subsequently explored a multiplicity of such governmental technologies. Miller and Rose (1990) argue that technologies of government should not be seen as forming a unified matrix of governmental control. They suggest that the analysis of technologies of government should not overgeneralize the unity of such technical apparatuses of government, nor should their effectiveness be overestimated. On the other hand, if one fails to take into account the manner in which technologies of government construct fields of visibility that render governmental rationalities operable, then the relation between knowledge and power is obscured.

## Links

### Securitization

#### Framing infrastructure as vital to security is biopolitical

Collier and Lakoff 08 (Stephen and Andrew, The New School and UC San Diego, “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How “Critical Infrastructure” Becomes a Security Problem”, online, 2008)

#### In this chapter we ask: Where did this distinctive way of understanding and intervening in security threats come from? How did “critical infrastructure” come to be regarded as a national security problem? We argue that critical infrastructure protection is best understood as one response to a relatively new problematization of security. As Foucault writes, a new problematization occurs when something has “happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating” (Foucault 1994: 598). As we will show, at pivotal moments in the twentieth century, technological and political developments rendered prior security frameworks inadequate, and forced experts to invent new ways of identifying and intervening in security threats. Specifically, what emerged was a way of understanding security threats as problems of system-vulnerability. The task of protecting national security came to include attention to the ongoing functioning of a number of vulnerable systems that were seen as vital to collective life.

### Capitalism

#### Framing mobility and transportation as central to human freedom and progress is rooted in capitalist logic

Goodwin 10 (Katherine J., American University’s School of International Service, “Reconstructing Automobility”, Global Environmental Politics, November)

Contradictions of freedom and mobility aside, there is a second important point to make regarding the link between mobility and human flourishing. While humans have always been mobile creatures, the contemporary assumption that extensive movement is a necessary part of social well-being has fairly recent origins. The convergence in the nineteenth century of modern capitalist industry, the development of the railroad and telegraph, and the institutionalization of time by factories and states significantly changed the sense of space and time in which people lived.[55](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f55) Two significant transformations concern us here. The first is the emergence of the daily commute between home and work or school, whereby routinized intraurban movement became habitual.[56](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f56) The second is tourism. Before the nineteenth century, "the idea occurred to no one to go off to the seaside … Except for a few English aristocrats (considered perfectly eccentric), one did not travel for pleasure. One took to the road for business, for the service of the king, or to join—if one was a lady—one's husband."[57](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f57) In the era of railroads and leisure time, however, touring other cities became feasible and desirable. These two transformations—commuting to work and travelling for pleasure—led to another new phenomenon: "the increasing experience of landscape from a moving rather than stationary vantage-point" and an "increasing sense of the body as an anonymized parcel of flesh which is shunted from place to place."[58](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f58)At the most intimate scale, mobility became a daily embodied experience, eventually to be taken for granted as a natural part of human life. On a larger scale, Nigel Thrift points to the shifting symbolism of the era, where circulation became a prevalent metaphor and was understood to be "causally connected to progress" in the way that the circulation of blood is causally **[End Page 72]** connected to life.[59](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f59)This perceived connection to progress was heightened and intensified by the modern capitalist impetus towards accessing markets. Fundamental to capitalism is the idea that "the ability of workers and machines and financial capital to find their best employment is essential to well-functioning markets, to efficient markets … a productive society is a mobile society."[60](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f60) Beginning in the nineteenth century, urban planners with the light of progress in their eyes "produced elaborate plans to improve roadways, build canals, improve river navigation and so on, in order to improve the 'circulation' of goods and people."[61](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f61) The state became invested in mobility on an unprecedented scale.

## **Capitalism Cont.**

#### The aff’s creation of infrastructure is produced by the security industry to maintain global capitalism and neo-liberalism

#### Aradau 10 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at The Open University (UK), “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection”, *Security Dialogue*, 2010)

#### These brief notes do not simply trace multiple meanings, but are indicative of different materializations of infrastructure: in military practices, development, culture or state modernization. They are indicative of how infrastructure matters within material practices of capitalist expansion and geopolitical division of the world. In this sense, the materialization of (in)security is also the effect of material and ideological practices of neoliberal globalization (Agathangelou, Bassichis & Spira, 2008; Agathangelou & Ling, 2004). Critical infrastructure is also generated by the ‘security industry’ as part of a commercial enterprise that produces security as a commodity (Neocleous, 2007). Yet, the commodification and fetishization of security and its inclusion in circuits of neoliberal political economy is not independent of the materialization of particular objects. Agency is also not thought in opposition to structures, but as possibilities for changing particular relations, differences and configurations of the world.

#### The aff’s support of “critical infrastructure” results from the securitization of thought and global capitalism which reproduce exclusion and violence

#### Aradau 10 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at The Open University (UK), “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection”, *Security Dialogue*, 2010)

**The securitization of critical infrastructure reconfigures materialities in the world and creates new hierarchies and forms of exclusion**. I**nterconnectivities and interdependencies do not exist independent of particular materialities – the material-discursive practices that securitize connectivity and dependency exclude materialities of the production of objects,** for example. At the same time, **these materializations of objects to be protected also intra-act with materialities of economic and geopolitical structures**. While Barad’s conceptualization of matter as materialization offers the possibility of analysing security practices as constituted and constitutive of matter and meaning,subjects and objects, she does not offer an understanding of how differences play out in the very production of security practices. **Matters of capital accumulation, neoliberal governance, commodification and labour practices are intra-actively entangled with matters of circulation, flows, nodes, grids, and so on.** Although it is beyond the scope of the present article to explore how such entanglements are not equal and are themselves differentially enacted rather than just producing of difference, this remains an issue that Barad’s work does not directly address. However, her analysis of matter **allows for an understanding of how practices of (in)security come to matter in ways that are simultaneously less contingent and less stable than theories of security have thought them to be.**

## Environmental Managerialism

#### The aff’s investment in infrastructure treats the Earth as a commodity for human consumption

#### Edwards 03 (Paul, University of Michigan, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organizations in the History of Sociotechnical Systems”, online, 2003)

**Infrastructures constitute an artiﬁcial environment, channeling and/or reproducing those properties of the natural environment that we ﬁnd most useful and comfortable**; providing others that the natural environment cannot; and **eliminating features we ﬁnd dangerous, uncomfortable, or merely inconvenient.** In doing so, **they simultaneously constitute our experience of the natural environment, as commodity, object of romantic or pastoralist emotions and aesthetic sensibilities, or occasional impediment. They also structure nature as resource, fuel, or “raw material,” which must be shaped and processed by technological means to satisfy human ends.**

#### The construction of transportation infrastructure and territory is part of the project of enframing nature and the commodification of the landscape

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online]

If Hannah can justly be criticized for not focusing on ‘the mastery of territory’, this criticism cannot be made of Braun’s engagement with the governmentality literature. In his article ‘Producing vertical territory: geology and governmentality in late Victorian Canada’ (2000), Braun draws on the governmentality literature to examine the geological survey of Canada conducted by George Dawson in 1878 while also linking his discussion to recent debates concerning the social construction of nature (Braun and Castree, 1998; Castree and Braun, 2001). Braun (2000: 12, italics removed) critiques the current governmentality literature by arguing that few have explored how governmentality and biopolitics ‘brought the state directly into contact with its territory – and more precisely with the qualities of this territory’. Braun argues that Foucault himself took ‘territory’ and ‘nature’ as a given and did not thoroughly problematize them – focusing instead on notions of human ‘population’. As Braun (2000: 13, italics in original) puts it, ‘one cannot understand “governmentality” apart from how the territory of the state is brought into being as a space of difference, any more than one can understand forms of state rationality apart from the historical emergence of “population” as a problem of government’. Geologic surveys, says Braun (2000: 28), were an important governmental technology which ‘involved bringing the qualities of the state’s territory into the domain of political rationality’. His main point is to argue that: ‘To Foucault’s concept of governmentality must be added the problem of nature’s intelligibility’ (Braun, 2000: 28). Braun demonstrates how the discourse of geology in nineteenth-century Canada produced the notion of ‘verticality’ as a way of seeing geologically so as to increase the ‘productive’ capacities (in a capitalistic sense) of the population. Braun is breaking new ground here because much of the current governmentality literature coming out of sociology and the other social sciences focuses much more on the ‘social’ to the neglect of governmental knowledges of the physical sciences (including physical geography). Braun also recognizes that issues of class and capital accumulation cannot simply be disregarded. However, although he does find common ground with the Marxist notion of the ‘production of nature’, he argues that this view is ‘insufficient’ and too narrow (Braun, 2000: 13). Braun (2000: 14) seeks to provide a broader definition of the social production of nature by focusing on ‘how nature is continuously reconstituted at the intersection of multiple, interwoven practices’. In particular, Braun explores how nature is ‘enframed’ in a variety of ways, and he argues that ‘[s]cience, governmentality and capitalist production comprised different, interwoven threads of nature’s production’ (Braun, 2000: 39). Braun’s attempt to bridge the gap between governmentality studies and Marxian geography in order to re-examine the question of territory highlights the importance of geographical knowledge both to the establishment of governmental power and the commodification of the landscape.

## Time

#### The affirmative’s reliance on the socially constructed concept known as “time” represents the ultimate domination of the mind by biopolitical forces

#### Zerzan No Date (University of Oregon, “Time and Its Discontents”, [www.primitivism.com/time.htm](http://www.primitivism.com/time.htm)”, online)

The dimension of time seems to be attracting great notice, to judge from the number of recent movies that focus on it, such as *Back to the Future*, *Terminator*, *Peggy Sue Got Married*, etc. Stephen Hawking's *A Brief History of Time* (1989) was a best-seller and became, even more surprisingly, a popular film. Remarkable, in addition to the number of books that deal with time, are the larger number which don't, really, but which feature the word in their titles nonetheless, such as Virginia Spate's *The Color of Time: Claude Monet* (1992). Such references have to do, albeit indirectly, with the sudden, panicky awareness of time, the frightening sense of our being tied to it. Time is increasingly a key manifestation of the estrangement and humiliation that characterize modern existence. It illuminates the entire, deformed landscape and will do so ever more harshly until this landscape and all the forces that shape it are changed beyond recognizing. This contribution to the subject has little to do with time's fascination for film-makers or TV producers, or with the current academic interest in geologic conceptions of time, the history of clock technology and the sociology of time, or with personal observations and counsels on its use. Neither aspects nor excesses of time deserve as much attention as time's inner meaning and logic. For despite the fact that time's perplexing character has become, in John Michon's estimation, ``almost an intellectual obsession'' (1988), society is plainly incapable of dealing with it. With time we confront a philosophical enigma, a psychological mystery, and a puzzle of logic. Not surprisingly, considering the massive reification involved, some have doubted its existence since humanity began distinguishing ``time itself'' from visible and tangible changes in the world. As Michael Ende (1984) put it: "There is in the world a great and yet ordinary secret. All of us are part of it, everyone is aware of it, but very few ever think of it. Most of us just accept it and never wonder over it. This secret is time.'' Just what is "time''? Spengler declared that no one should be allowed to ask. The physicist Richard Feynman (1988) answered, ``Don't even ask me. It's just too hard to think about.'' Empirically as much as in theory, the laboratory is powerless to reveal the flow of time, since no instrument exists that can register its passage. But why do we have such a strong sense that time does pass, ineluctably and in one particular direction, if it really doesn't? Why does this "illusion'' have such a hold over us? We might just as well ask why alienation has such a hold over us. The passage of time is intimately familiar, the concept of time mockingly elusive; why should this appear bizarre, in a world whose survival depends on the mystification of its most basic categories? We have gone along with the substantiation of time so that it seems a fact of nature, a power existing in its own right. The growth of a sense of time--the acceptance of time--is a process of adaptation to an ever more reified world. It is a constructed dimension, the most elemental aspect of culture. Time's inexorable nature provides the ultimate model of domination. The further we go in time the worse it gets. We inhabit an age of the disintegration of experience, according to Adorno. The pressure of time, like that of its essential progenitor, division of labor, fragments and disperses all before it. Uniformity, equivalence, separation are byproducts of time's harsh force. The intrinsic beauty and meaning of that fragment of the world that is not-yet- culture moves steadily toward annihilation under a single cultures-wide clock. Paul Ricoeur's assertion (1985) that "we are not capable of producing a concept of time that is at once cosmological, biological, historical and individual,'' fails to notice how they are converging.

## Time Cont.

#### The Concept of “saving time” is rooted in Newtonian thinking and pure capitalism

#### Zerzan No Date (University of Oregon, “Time and Its Discontents”, [www.primitivism.com/time.htm](http://www.primitivism.com/time.htm)”, online)

Newton's clockwork universe was the crowning achievement of the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century, and was grounded in his conception of "Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flowing equably without relation to anything eternal.'' Time is now the grand ruler, answering to no one, influenced by nothing, completely independent of the environment: the model of unassailable authority and perfect guarantor of unchanging alienation. Classical Newtonian physics in fact remains, despite changes in science, the dominant, everyday conception of time. The appearance of independent, abstract time found its parallel in the emergence of a growing, formally free working class forced to sell its labor power as an abstract commodity on the market. Prior to the coming of the factory system but already subject to time's disciplinary power, this labor force was the inverse of the monarch Time: free and independent in name only. In Foucault's judgment (1973), the West had become a ``carceral society'' from this point on. Perhaps more directly to the point is the Balkan proverb, ``A clock is a lock.'

#### Linear time is a foundation of society and capitalism

#### Zerzan No Date (University of Oregon, “Time and Its Discontents”, [www.primitivism.com/time.htm](http://www.primitivism.com/time.htm)”, online)

The clock descended from the cathedral, to court and courthouse, next to the bank and railway station, and finally to the wrist and pocket of each decent citizen. Time had to become more ``democratic'' in order to truly colonize subjectivity. The subjection of outer nature, as Adorno and others have understood, is successful only in the measure of the conquest of inner nature. The unleashing of the forces of production, to put it another way, depended on time's victory in its long-waged war on freer consciousness. Industrialism brought with it a more complete commodification of time, time in its most predatory form yet. It was this that Giddens (1981) saw as "the key to the deepest transformations of day-to-day social life that are brought about by the emergence of capitalism.'' "Time marches on,'' as the saying goes, in a world increasingly dependent on time and a time increasingly unified. A single giant clock hangs over the world and dominates. It pervades all; in its court there is no appeal. The standardization of world time marks a victory for the efficient/machine society, a universalism that undoes particularity as surely as computers lead to homogenization of thought. Paul Virilio (1986) has gone so far as to foresee that ``the loss of material space leads to the government of nothing but time.'' A further provocative notion posits a reversal of the birth of history out of maturing time. Virilio (1991), in fact, finds us already living within a system of technological temporality where history has been eclipsed. "...the primary question becomes less one of relations to history than one of relations to time.'' Such theoretical flights aside, however, there is ample evidence and testimony as to time's central role in society. In "Time-- The Next Source of Competitive Advantage'' (July-August, 1988 *Harvard Business Review*), George Stark, Jr. discusses it as pivotal in the positioning of capital: "As a strategic weapon, time is the equivalent of money, productivity, quality, even innovation.'' Time management is certainly not confined to the corporations; Levine's 1985 study of publicly accessible clocks in six countries demonstrated that their accuracy was an exact gauge of the relative industrialization of national life. Paul Adler's January-February, 1993*Harvard Business Review* offering, "Time-and-Motion Regained,'' nakedly champions the neo-Taylorist standardization and regimentation of work: behind the well-publicized "workplace democracy'' window dressing in some factories remains the "time- and-motion discipline and formal bureaucratic structures essential for efficiency and quality in routine operations.''

## **Terrorism**

#### The Affirmatives discourse surrounding the supposed threat of terrorism to critical infrastructure is a managerialist and securitized way of life

Aradau 10 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at The Open University (UK), “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection”, *Security Dialogue*, 2010)

THE POTENTIAL FOR CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS that affect critical infrastructures is increasing’ (European Commission, 2004). **Thus is the threat of terrorism described in a European Commission communication on critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism.** In Europe, **critical infrastructures have emerged as an increasingly important priority in counter-terrorism activities since 9/11**. The European Commission lists the protection of infrastructures alongside the protection of borders and that of citizens. Unlike the protection of citizens, critical infrastructure is mainly concerned with physical and cyber-based systems; things and their material connectivities have become instrumental in the understanding of what it means to secure societies against terrorist attacks and other risks and hazards. **Although ‘critical infrastructure’ is generally considered a new coinage that goes back to US developments in the mid-1990s, since 9/11 innumerable documents have been produced by international organizations, governments and research institutions on the vulnerabilities and protection of critical infrastructure. These largely concur in the definition of critical infrastructure as predominantly about the role of things in society, their functioning as well as their resilience. Material objects appear to support the provision of services, societal cohesion and the reproduction of national identity.** Questions of critical infrastructure protection (CIP) have given prominence to the role of things – from computers to transport and energy infrastructure to the daily TV set – to such an extent that security scholars acknowledge that ‘the (core) rationality of CIP is associated with physical objects’ (Dunn Cavelty & Kristensen, 2008: 11). However, **the importance of materiality in discussions of critical infrastructure protection has largely remained within the remit of managerial responses**. These ask for the invention of modalities of protection to safeguard pre-existing things and their functionalities. **In critical analyses of the protection of critical infrastructure, materiality is supplanted by social, cultural and political discourses and practices. Even when its materiality is acknowledged, critical infrastructure protection is nonetheless ultimately about social and political action and human life** (see, for example, Lipschutz, 2008). **Or it appears to be subsumed under the semiotics of the virtual, thus displacing both the materiality of physical infrastructure and that of virtual infrastructure** (Der Derian & Finkelstein, 2008). As the main purpose of CIP is to ensure that critical operations can continue without ‘undue interruption and that crucial, sensitive data are protected’ (Dacey, 2002: 33), **security experts have focused on the measures and technologies deployed to ensure the robustness and resilience of critical infrastructure. These initiatives to protect infrastructure from catastrophic breakdowns obliterate a series of other practices and their constitutive role in the functioning or disruption of critical infrastructures**. Mark Salter (2008: 22) has argued, **for example, that thinking of airports as a series of technical, managerial, bureaucratic and regulatory problems left out questions of market, the state and society.** How is materiality to be understood between these two poles: one of technical positivity and the other of social practices of governance? **Critical infrastructure is not just the result of a complex assemblage of social practices and values** (Burgess, 2007) – although this is not to say that social and cultural practices do not play a crucial role – **but it emerges as an object whose materiality has both enabling and constraining effects on what can be said and done to secure it.** **The protection of critical infrastructure enacts particular distinctions between infrastructure and society**, ‘hard’ things and ‘soft’ relations, **human and nonhuman**, matter and meaning. In this materialization of what is to be made secure, **infrastructure plays an agential role, both constraining and enabling particular configurations.**

## **Biopolitics**

#### The aff’s concept of “critical infrastructure” is part of the biopolitical and managerial process that defines human and non human

#### Aradau 10 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at The Open University (UK), “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection”, Security Dialogue, 2010)

The Foucault-inspired literature on the biopolitics of security and risk has also paid scant attention to the materiality of infrastructures. For Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 267), for example, **biopolitics takes ‘species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge’**. While they show how a dispositif of security is dependent upon the development of life sciences and they locate historical transformations of biopolitics given the changes in scientific knowledge about the nature of living material (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 273), materiality as such is not discussed. The things in the security dispositif are relegated to the margins of analysis. As noted previously, a **dispositif is a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of the said as much as the unsaid; ‘things’ are relegated to the margins of analysis, and the focus of analysis is shifted upon institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification and modes of characterization** (Foucault, 2002: 49**). Critical infrastructure protection as a dispositif would similarly bring together a heterogeneous array of discourses about terrorism, natural disasters, protection, risk management and security institutions, alongside architecture, design and construction experts, new regulations and laws, administrative measures, scientific knowledge about materials, and moral propositions about ‘objects of protection’**. As a methodological and epistemological tool, **the dispositif could shed light on how critical infrastructure protection emerges as a heterogeneous construction**. At the same, **critical infrastructure is**, in a sense, **subsumed to the logic of circulatory practices. The securitization of critical infrastructure is ultimately deriving from the practices that separate good from bad circulations and the associated forms of life**.

#### Increased transportation infrastructure goes hand in hand with observation and management of the population in the United States

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online]

Hannah concentrates mainly on biopolitical projects instigated by the state and combines Foucault’s analysis with critical state theory. His chief aim is to utilize the governmentality perspective as a means of illustrating his own theory of the ‘cycle of social control’, which consists of three ‘moments’: observation, judgment, and regulation (Hannah, 2000: 39). In order to regulate conduct, state officials must first construct the material and institutional infrastructure to collect statistical knowledge of the population, which provides the basis for making ‘normalizing judgments’ (Hannah, 2000: 40). Hannah (2000: 39) argues that the organization of space, or territory, is absolutely essential to the process of social control and that governmentality is based upon securing ‘epistemological access to all parts of the territory and everything in it . . . [in order to] make it possible to pin down and distinguish different units of resources and especially people, to make them susceptible to enumeration’. He recognizes, however, that such an epistemological project did have its limits and that governmentality was not based upon a ‘perfect’knowledge of population and territory. Nevertheless, he contends that the collection of statistics, mapmaking, and the rationalization of space were fundamental prerequisites for the consolidation of state power. Hannah emphasizes that such spatial orderings were not simply repressive impositions but were also enabling to the governed population itself (see Mann, 1993). As Hannah (2000: 128) explains, ‘an act of observation associated with a census requires that the agents of vision travel to their objects using the same infrastructure available to the objects themselves. The easier it is for government agents to move about, the easier it is likewise for the population at large.’ If this is true, then the rationalization of space cannot merely be reduced to an expression of repressive power as Lefebvre (1991) contends.9 Instead, the production of abstract space – while repressive in numerous ways – not only establishes the epistemological basis for state centered disciplinary projects; it also provides a system of orientation, or frame of reference, for the ‘population at large’.

## Link-Predictions

#### Predictions from “experts” are epistemologically flawed—transportation infrastructure attempts than manage complex series of movement and relationships that are unknowable—recent blackouts prove predictions are impossible

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

Here we seek an additional layer to the biopolitical problematique outlined and applied to the analysis of CIs by Lentzos and Rose (2009) and Dillon and Reid (2009). To do so, we resist the idea of a totalizing biopolitical structure and point to the instability and unpredictability of resilient CIs as fundamentally open—and often dysfunctional—systems. In this regard, we find it instructive to first revisit Bennett’s conceptualization of the “life force” of materiality. From a vital materialist perspective, Bennett is careful not to develop an analysis in which a totalizing structure ultimately determines the force of things. Rather, by emphasizing the vital materialities underpinning the movement of bodies—human as well as nonhuman, people as well as technology, the animate as well as the inanimate—it is precisely the uncertain and unpredictable interplay of different forces that she argues deserves critical exploration. Consequently, from Bennett’s perspective, it is also necessary to reject the notion of a superior and totalizing structure, since such a structure would automatically subordinate all forces and life movements to a particular telos or overarching goal. As Bennett notes, a “structure” is “unable to give the force of things its due: a structure can act only negatively, as a constraint on human agency, or passively, as an enabling background or context for it” (Bennett 2010:29). In other words, to impose the notion of a superior, totalizing structure is to neglect the potential forces that reside in the materiality of things—forces that can produce unpredictable outcomes and strange effects. One such outcome, referred to earlier, is the case of the 2003 electrical power blackout. It was noted how the electrical power grid expresses a lifeworld of its own, in which different forces interact. Crucially, in this example there is no totalizing structure within the lifeworld of the grid—no “system of systems” that can determine the exact behavior and movement of electricity. The latter depends on a complex and unpredictable assemblage in which various forces—nonhuman as well as human—interact. As Bennett (2010:28) notes: “Electricity sometimes goes where we send it, and sometimes it chooses its path on the spot, in response to the other bodies it encounters and the surprising opportunities for actions and interactions that they afford.” Referring to a superior and totalizing structure in this context would be highly misleading, since no such structure could possibly account for the uncertain and unpredictable interaction of forces, which led to the power blackout.

## Link-Mapping

#### The cartographic mapping of space through transportation projects is the expansion of power into new modes of governmentality

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online]

In examining the historical emergence of technologies of government, various governmentality scholars highlight the importance of cartographic mapping and the rationalization of space as key strategies of governmentality. ‘To govern,’ says Rose (1999: 36), ‘it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised.’The ordering and mapping of space as well as the rise of communication networks enabled the practice of ‘governing at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990; Barry, 1996; Rose, 1999).7These networks were directly linked to the production of ‘striated’ space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), or what Barry (1996: 127–28) describes as ‘a space within which movements and flows are regulated in ways which enable authorities to act; a space that is measured, directed and standardized’. Likewise, a number of recent anthropological studies have acknowledged the importance of spatial ordering as a strategy of neoliberal governmentality in the age of privatized security systems and ever increasing global economic disparities (Merry, 2001; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Robins, 2002).

## Impacts

## Biopolitics-Violence

#### Biopolitical liberalism inevitably ends in violenc

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

Bennett’s problematization of the notion of a superior, totalizing structure and her appreciation of the life force of materiality calls for a radical reconsideration of what “life” itself refers to in the biopolitical problematique. Earlier we noted that for Dillon and Reid liberal biopolitical rule only promotes the form of life that is productive for its own enterprise. On their view, the concern of such rule is the “potentiality” of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living “should” involve according to the liberal paradigm. It is for this reason that liberalism, paradoxically, can be characterized as a violent mode of governance that is prepared to “kill” in order to “make life live.” In this context, then, “life” refers not just to something expendable but also to something controllable, calculable, and adaptable within the biopolitical machine. Hence, while acknowledging the unpredictability and contingency of life, Dillon and Reid rely on a rather limited notion of what “life” may actually refer to—as something that may always “become” dangerous and emerge as a threat. Consequently, their analysis is reduced to a concern with a form of life that is forced to obey and adapt within the biopolitical system.

## Biopolitics- Value to Life

#### Biopolitics allows the sovereign to devalue life to the point where it’s not politically relevant, allowing it to eliminated

Agamben, 98 (Giorgio, philosopher and bad ass, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.” 1998, Stanford University Press)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicality with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of "life devoid of value" (or "life unworthy of being lived") corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction:---to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every "politicization" of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only "sacred life," and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its "sacred men" will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceptio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

## Alternative

### Solvency-Postmodernism

#### The alternative solves- postmodern planning provides a model for transportation that removes western hegemonic influence and is rooted in local values and cultures

Sharma 09 (Sameer, author for the Economic Times and Indian Administrative Services Officer, “Post-modernism and Transport Planning”, <http://cityrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/04/post-modernism-transport-planning.html> April 19th)

Western transport planning is based on creating “traffic zones” to achieve consistency, conformity and predictability in auto and pedestrian movement. Roads are categorised into a hierarchy of road types, suitable for various functions, speeds, and traffic volumes (e.g., national highways, neighbourhood roads). Furthermore, there is segregation between traffic and pedestrian networks on roads. The principles of categorisation and segregation were operationalised by the west during the last 75 years. Commonly, Eugene Henard is considered to be the progenitor of modern traffic engineering, and Holroyd Smith introduced these principles to the US, which were later codified by Arthur Tuttle and Edward Holmes. Segregation between traffic and pedestrian networks was first tried in Radburn, New Jersey, and the separation principle was further developed in the Buchanan report, Traffic in Towns. Undoubtedly, such “traffic zones” are required for the exclusive use of vehicles on highways, but recent postmodern practices in Europe are also looking at roads as “social zones”. Unlike traffic zones, social zones integrate car and pedestrian movement. The combination of traffic with pedestrian movements, children’s play, and social activities is based on the “woonerf principles” developed by Niek de Boer and Joost Vahl in the Netherlands. Similar postmodern concepts were also experimented in the UK in the “Home Zones” programme. Traditionally, transport planning is based on the 3Es — enforcement, education, and engineering. The common belief is that traffic will flow smoothly if traffic rules are enforced, public educated, and roads upgraded to universal standards. On the contrary, woonerf principles envisage streets to be social zones. For instance, the city of Christiansfeld, Denmark used “ambiguity and urban legibility” in street design to reduce high death rates on the town’s central traffic intersection. Instead of erecting warning signs, road markings, and traffic signals, Bjarne Winterberg and the engineering firm Ramboll removed traffic signals and road markings. No mode of transport was given priority and pedestrians, buses, cars, and trucks used eye contact to negotiate the junction. Surface treatment, lightning columns, and junction corners were squared up. The purpose was to make the intersection resemble the centre of the town or to create a public realm. Expectedly, the number of killed or seriously injured (KSI) during the last three years was reduced to zero, moreover, traffic backups were reduced. Compared to junctions having traffic signals, ambiguous junctions prevent accidents, reduce delays, and are cheaper to construct and maintain. Shared space is another woonerf principle that is applied to transform busy traffic intersections. In Friesland market town of Oosterwolde, different types of traffic intermingle giving an impression of chaos and disorder, in fact, traffic negotiates the junction using eye contact and care for other types of transport. No state regulation or control is visible and traffic movement depends on informal convention and legibility. Living in an urban environment in which kerbs are used to prevent interaction of pedestrian activity with carriageway and painted lines show places humans should walk and cross streets, people coming from the high-income countries are appalled by the absence of kerbs, road markings, bollards, traffic signals, barriers, and signs in India. What they fail to understand is that the traffic, as it is in Indian cities, reflects the local values and cultural history of the place leading to lack of uniformity and ambiguity, requiring a different set of rules to reconcile competing and conflicting claims for safety, efficient movement, and the quality of the built environment. In this setting, real improvement in traffic congestion is only possible by using contextual designs, based on postmodern ideas, to influence traffic speeds and driver behaviour.

Solvency- Environment

#### Alternative Solvency- Delinking transportation and human flourishing solves resource use and global environmental disaster

Goodwin 10 (Katherine J., American University’s School of International Service, “Reconstructing Automobility”, Global Environmental Politics, November)

Recasting automobility as the constantly shifting work of human hands suggests that the car may not inevitably create "ever deepening dependencies on itself."9 This is of fundamental importance to anyone concerned with transforming what is now a profoundly unsustainable spiral of production and consumption. Because they have been constructed socially over time, the links between gasoline, cars, mobility and human flourishing represent possibilities for change. Delinking gasoline from cars (e.g. with plug-in hybrids) makes significant headway into reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Delinking cars from mobility (e.g. with bikes or public transit) reduces the material impact of the production, use, and discarding of vehicles. Finally, delinking mobility from human flourishing would have a tremendous impact on resource use. All modes of transportation (even bicycles) are created through the extraction and production of metals, plastics, rubber, paints, lubricants, and innumerable other materials—a process which inevitably leaves its footprint in the ecosystems in which we live.

Solvency-Localism

#### Localism presents a challenge to the idea that mobility is human flourishing and industrialized capitalism

Goodwin 10 (Katherine J., American University’s School of International Service, “Reconstructing Automobility”, Global Environmental Politics, November)

Underlying all of these projects is a shared understanding that small-scale community life is worthwhile and fulfilling in its own right, yet difficult to come by in a highly mobile and individualistic society. People involved in local projects seem to enjoy their modicum of self-sufficiency and their sense of place; perhaps, not least, they are motivated by a concern to reduce their carbon footprint. These orientations towards "the local" reflect a clear if modest cultural shift. Certainly, this cultural shift is not a universal phenomenon (it is interesting to speculate whether such a thing as universal localism could even exist). Thus far, "the renewed local economy exists as a series of points," a constellation against the backdrop of the industrialized world's mainstream. Yet the challenge raised by localism to mobility plays a crucial role in the project of transforming automobility. Moving beyond the engineering problems presented by reducing the impact of gasoline and cars, adherents of localism dismantle the very concept that expansive movement makes us happy and free. The idea that mobility constitutes freedom contains as many conceptual difficulties as it implies ecologically negative consequences. Furthermore, it is somewhat short-sighted historically to claim that constant and wide-ranging mobility is an absolute requirement for human well-being. Though humans have certainly always been creatures of movement (and what animal, vegetable, or mineral on Earth is not in constant motion?), it is only in the modern era that they have institutionalized extensive and frequent travel. In other words, however deeply ingrained the habit of seeing mobility as highly desirable, there are certainly opportunities to redefine the good life—as many communities are discovering.

## Solvency- Future transportation thought

#### The alternative criticism is necessary to understand the ways that transportation infrastructure works that shape and manage everyday life

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

Shifting the register of analysis from molar to molecular yields a number of significant outcomes that challenge extant ways in which we study not only resilient CIs, but practices of (in)securitization to which they relate more generally. First, a molecular frame posits a radically relational ontology, which encourages greater sensitivity toward the active role that material forces play in the composition of contemporary social and political life. The stuff that is part of our everyday milieu of interaction shapes behaviors, conditions the possibility of different outcomes, and is performative of different types of subjectivities. Moreover, the shared reliance on access to CIs indicates their vital function in reproducing certain forms of life and communities based around those visions. For this reason, CI and attempts to securitize it must be read as performing a political role in the fashioning of global security relations.

## A/T Perm

#### The perm fails—Institutions can only recreate power, not analyze or restructure it

John D. Caputo and Mark Yount, Villanova University, St. Joseph’s University, “Institutions, Normalization, and Power.” Foucault and the Critique of Institutions. 1993; mac//

The connection between Foucault and institutions seems an obvious one, but not because he wanted to make the institution the basic unit of analysis. On the contrary, Foucault situated institutions within the thin but all-entangling web of power relations. He did so explicitly in Discipline and Punish, and he subsequently read his later analysis between the lines of his earlier works. In this genealogy, institutions are the more readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for the finer, more elemental workings of power. Power is the thin, inescapable film that covers all human interactions, whether inside institutions or out. Institutional structures are saturated with sexual relations, economic relations, social relations, etc., and are always established of these power relations: relations between men and women, old and young, senior and junior, well-born and starved, colorless and colored, Occident and Orient. Institutions are the means that power uses, and not the other way around, not sources or origins of power. The analysis of power is thus always more fine-grained than any analysis of classes, of states, or of institutions in their own terms would be. That is why for Foucault--and for all of the studies that follow here--the workings of power cannot be described from the standpoint of a master discipline, especially a perspective that would seek an origin for power, or take political power to be its initial or privileged form. It is always a question of analyzing institutions from the standpoint of power, and not of analyzing power from the standpoint of institutions.' But we ought not to speak of power in the substantive, for there is no such thing. Instead, sets of "power relations" bathe the structures and edifices of human life, without power ever amounting to a thing or substance. It is not the very substance- and- subject of the historical process, like the Hegelian spirit, not the driving movement of contradictory social relations, as in Marx, not the unifying- gathering power that holds sway over all in Heidegger's history of Being. (The similarities might not be entirely accidental, though: see Mohanty's paper herein, 'Foucault as Philosopher, 1) Power is not one thing, but multiple and multiplied, scattered and disseminated. This means that power is not concentrated at a central point of organization and domination. Power is not first of all the power of the sovereign, There is power over freedom, and action on the action of others, but this is a domination that traverses the fields of power, that operates variably in various relationships. "In so far as power relations are an unequal and relatively stable relation of forces, it's clear that this implies an above and a below, a difference of potentials."' These potentials of power cannot be understood as brute force, though brutality is among their possible outcomes-as is seduction. Power relations are embedded in the very heart of human relationships, springing into being as soon as there are human beings. Power need not be harsh and abrasive or constrain narrowly and painfully; without overt violence it seeks its objectives in the more subtle, thus all the more effective, mode of "suasion," of "conduction " Power relations clear the ways for human behavior (conduire) to be subtly conducted (conduit), so that human actions are led as surely and effortlessly through their channels as water through a "duct" (ducere).

#### Perm fails—reforms only create state power, only analyzing outside these structures solves the criticism

Agamben, 98 (Giorgio, philosopher and bad ass, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.” 1998, Stanford University Press,)

Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty ("Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception") became a commonplace even before there was any understanding that what was at issue in it was nothing less than the limit concept of the doctrine of law and the State, in which sovereignty borders (since every limit concept is always the limit between two concepts) on the sphere of life and becomes indistinguishable from it. As long as the form of the State constituted the fundamental horizon of all communal life and the political, religious, juridical, and economic doctrines that sustained this form were still strong, this "most extreme sphere" could not truly come to light. The problem of sovereignty was reduced to the question of who within the political order was invested with certain powers, and the very threshold of the political order itself was never called into question. Today, now that the great State structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the time is ripe to place the problem of the originary structure and limits of the form of the State in a new perspective. The weakness of anarchist and Marxian critiques of the State was precisely to have not caught sight of this structure and thus to have quickly left the arcanum imperii'aside, as if it had no substance outside of the simulacra and. the ideologies invoked to justify it. But one ends up identifying with an enemy whose structure one does not understand, and the theory of the State (and in particular of the state of exception, which is to say, of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the transitional phase leading to the stateless society) is the reef on which the revolutions of our century have been shipwrecked.This book, which was originally conceived as a response to the bloody mystification of a new planetary order, therefore had to reckon with problems—first of all that of the sacredness of life— which the author had not, in the beginning, foreseen. In the course of the undertaking, however, it became clear that one cannot, in such an area, accept as a guarantee any of the notions that the social sciences (from jurisprudence to anthropology) thought they had defined or presupposed as evident, and that many of these notions demanded—in the urgency of catastrophe—to be revised without reserve.

## Framework – Alt First – Policymaking Fails

#### The Alt comes first—Policy approaches to transportation infrastructure are the wrong questions—we need to examine the ways that security and infrastructure intersect and the social world they construct

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

In recent years, Western governments have invested signiﬁcantly in the enhancement of critical infrastructures (CIs). One prominent deﬁnition of CIs is offered by the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as ‘‘the framework of physical structures and cyber information networks that provides a continual ﬂow of information, goods, and services essential to the defense and economic security of the US’’ (DHS 2004:1). Similar deﬁnitions can be found in the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) contexts, all of which stress the importance of such networks for the functioning of everyday life and the return to ‘‘normality’’ in the event of natural disasters, accidents, or terrorist attacks. 2 Of course, the provision and maintenance of adequate CIs is not a ‘‘new’’ phenomenon, nor one conﬁned to the ‘‘West’’ (Dufﬁeld 2011). Rather, CIs are associated with the quintessence of statehood both historically and globally Nevertheless, what is arguably signiﬁcant about recent efforts to enhance CIs in the West is both the scale of investment and the extent to which developments in this context have come to permeate and structure economic, social, military, and political sectors. It is no coincidence that such trends have intensiﬁed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (2001), and the bombings in Madrid (2003) and London (2005)—attacks that struck multiple blows precisely at the heart of essential (and highly symbolic) ﬁnancial and transportation networks vital for the ‘‘continual ﬂow of information, goods and services.’’ Alongside investment in CIs has emerged the concept of ‘‘resilience’’ around which current security planning, design, policy, rhetoric, and practice increasingly revolves. Here resilient CIs are commonly understood in terms of systems that demonstrate the ‘‘ability... to withstand and recover from adversity’’ (Sir Michael Pitt, quoted in Cabinet Ofﬁce 2010:7). In this context, metaphors of ‘‘recoiling,’’ ‘‘bouncing back,’’ and ‘‘returning to normal’’ abound. 3 The inter-disciplinary study of CIs and resilience planning is developing rapidly. What this literature tends to focus upon, however, is the effectiveness of systems in place and prospects for better policy prescription. Thus, for example, a 2007 special issue dealt with the efﬁciency of international disaster management planning (Laporte 2007), the potential effects of social breakdown following the collapse of CIs (Boin and McConnell 2007), new design principles to better protect the management of CIs (Schulman and Roe 2007), and prospects for future European strategy (Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin, and Rhinard 2007). Elsewhere, Coaffee (2006) has charted the emergence of the concept of resilience from an urban planning perspective: ﬁrst as a metaphor for how ecological systems cope with stress induced by external factors; and later in its application to disaster management, economic recovery, and the embedding of emergency preparedness into the built environment of the city. Other work has considered the conceptual history of resilience (Handmer and Dovers 1996), the relation between resilience and risk (Schoon 2006), and legal dimensions of infrastructure (Likosky 2006). What has so far received less attention, however, is the broader political signiﬁcance of the reorientation of Western security relations around CIs and resilience planning: How do sovereign attempts to secure CIs enable certain forms of governance? How do these attempts interact with and produce the populations they seek to govern? How do CIs and resilience planning reveal assumptions about contemporary political life in the West? 4

## Framework – Discursive Analysis Key

#### The discursive-materialist approach is key—we need to interrogate the relationship between non-human transportation structures and their impact on social life and politics

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library]

The world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the “spectacular” to the “banal.” Instead of high-profile speech-based acts of securitization, here we are dealing with telecommunications, transportation, and financial networks, water treatment and sewage works, electricity, and so on: semi-invisible phenomena that are often taken-for-granted as the fixtures and fittings of society, yet nonetheless vital for the maintenance of what is considered to be normal daily life. For this reason, our subject matter calls for a re-thinking of the very “stuff” considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analyzing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the IPS-related literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualized (Bigo 2002, 2008; Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008). As well as pushing the referent object of security beyond the “spectacle” of high-profile speech acts, the study of CIs prompts a further methodological question about what resources exist for the analysis of “material” phenomena. Arguably, the prominence of the “speech act” as a theoretical device for studying securitization is a reflection of the legacy of the so-called linguistic turn in social and political theory, which came to impact upon security studies—along with the broader discipline of International Relations (IR) of which it is largely a sub-field—from the late 1980s. Much of the literature associated with the linguistic turn in IR (Shapiro 1981; Der Derian 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Campbell 1992; Connolly 1993) relied on “discourse” as a key methodological as well as theoretical tool. However, “discourse,” for these authors, did not only concern texts and words in a strictly linguistic sense. Rather, they invoked a more expansive conception of discourse to include the general “context” in which linguistic phenomena acquire their meaning. While such treatments of discourse have thus existed for quite some time, only recently have ideas about how to incorporate materiality in discursive studies of politics become popular. A small but growing number of theorists in political anthropology (Navaro-Yashin 2009), political philosophy (Bennett 2004, 2010; Braun and Whatmore 2010; Coole and Frost 2010), and IR (Coward 2009; Aradau 2010; Duffield 2011; Walker and Cooper 2011) have argued for the incorporation of nonlinguistic phenomena in political analysis generally. This work stresses that materiality exists—as a force, a spatial arrangement, an element in relations of power, and an object of knowledge. It exists, moreover, not as a passive background or object whose content and meaning can be captured, represented, or constructed by language, but rather as something that is both active and alive. According to Bennett (2004, 2010), materiality expresses a “life force” of its own: the affective quality of the thing itself. Rather than positing “a separate force that can enter and animate a physical body,” the notion of the “life force” is equated with the materiality of the thing or object as such (Bennett 2010:xiii). Referring to the “force of things” along these lines, Bennett contests the common assumption that “things are always already humanized objects” (2004:357) or that the force of materiality only can be grasped in relation to a social and economic context as per an historical-materialist perspective. Nor can its value or meaning be fully determined by humans: the nonhuman, on Bennett’s view, should not automatically be reduced to the human. Challenging the anthropocentrism that dominates much of contemporary political theory, she argues that it is important to maintain a distinction between them—in order to explore what things actually do, what kinds of effects they generate, but also to allow “nonhumanity to appear on the ethical radar screen” (2004:357). While stressing the importance of exploring the vitality and potentiality of the nonhuman, the form of “naive realism,”“onto-story” or “ecology of matter” that Bennett seeks to develop also emphasizes the need to examine “ways in which human being and thinghood overlap” (2004:349). Thus, alongside accounting for what things actually do, it is also necessary to explore the interaction or interplay between the “human” and the “nonhuman.” Indeed, an important theme running throughout not only Bennett’s work but much of the literature associated with the so-called materialist turn in political theory is the notion that a clear line between the “human” and the “nonhuman”cannot be easily drawn and maintained. In this sense, one of the main assumptions underpinning this literature is that materiality is always already implicit in the production and ongoing formation of what we commonly refer to as “human.” Hence, the materiality of the nonhuman is not something that supplements an already existing human entity: “The human body and its capacities emerge as such in relation to a technicity that precedes and exceeds it: there is no body, no original body, no origin outside this relation; no thinking, no thought, no logos, without that which forces thought” (Braun and Whatmore 2010:xix). On this view, it is necessary to consider how materiality is imbued in the network of relations that constitutes the human–nonhuman interaction, which is precisely what we seek to do in our treatment of the contemporary politics of CIs and resilience planning.

## A/T Calculations Good

#### Utilitarian calculation makes the destruction of life possible

Dillon ‘99

[Political Theory, Another Justice – April 164-165]

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Here with, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.