Friend Enemy K

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Friend Enemy K 1NC Shell 1/3

**1NC Link- The Affirmative is engaged in a ‘war against war’. The strive towards peace is an insidious goal resulting in the elimination of anything that stand outside our concept of morality. Recognizing political enmity is the only way to bracket this internalization of difference resulting in biopolitical violence**

Rasch in 5 /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, Spring]

In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt concludes that ‘‘all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.’’2 This anthropological fiction—and Schmitt is aware of the claim’s fictional status—serves as the logical premise that secures Schmitt’s definition of the political as the friend/enemy distinction. We live in a world, he says, in which associations with likeminded others are our only means of security and happiness. Indiscriminate concourse of all with all cannot be the foundation for necessary political discriminations. Thus, the anthropological presupposition of evil, guilt, and violence is designed to expose what Schmitt sees as the duplicity of liberal theory, which consists in using the promise of formal equality to camouflage political power by displacing it in the realms of economics and morality. Liberal theory denies original enmity by assuming the innate goodness of the human being. Those—communitarians and liberals alike— who say there is no war presuppose a counterfactual ‘‘ontological priority of non-violence,’’ a ‘‘state of total peace’’ 3 that invites universal inclusion based on the ‘‘essential homogeneity and natural virtue of mankind.’’ 4 If, in such a benign state of nature, violence were to break out, such common Equity.’’ Such a ‘‘Criminal’’ has ‘‘declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ 5 The violence would be considered a perversion and, if all else were to fail, would have to be extirpated by an even greater violence. To cite John Locke, this ‘‘State of perfect Freedom’’ and universal ‘‘Equality,’’ governed solely by reason and natural law, can be disturbed only by an ‘‘Offender’’ who ‘‘declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and political, on this view, emerges only as the result of the Fall—that is, emerges **only to fight the war against war**, a war always initiated by a sinful or bestial other. It seeks to make itself superfluous by restoring or, more progressively, establishing for the first time this natural order of peace. Should one demur and find the perfect state to be less than advertised, then one’s demurral would most assuredly be recognized not as legitimate political opposition, but rather as evidence of greed, moral perversity, or some other pathological behavior. With its pacific presuppositions, liberalism, according to Schmitt, dissolves the specificity of the political and hides the necessarily asymmetric power relations that mark all political maneuverings. By way of an anthropological sleight of hand, liberalism represents itself as an ethos, a moral and economic emancipation, and not as what it really is, namely, a power-political regime with traditional power-political aims. For Schmitt, distinctions, rather than the effacement of distinctions, structure the space within which we live, including the space of the political. Only within structured space, space literally marked by human activities, by human groupings and the boundaries they draw, do terms achieve their meanings. Norms, he repeatedly stated, are derived from situations, normal situations; they are not derived logically from underived first principles. Categories like ‘‘liberty’’ and ‘‘equality’’ can have political significance only when defined and delineated within the sphere of the political. They are neither natural nor innately human qualities; they are not self-evident truths. Consequently, Schmitt’s suspicion of liberalism, pacifism, or any other -ism that denies an initial and therefore ever-present potential war of all against all is a suspicion of those who wish to make their operative distinctions invisible, and thus incontestable, by claiming the immorality or illegality of all distinction. Schmitt’s insistence, then, on our ‘‘evil’’ nature is evidence neither of his existential misanthropy nor even, necessarily, of his conservative authoritarianism, but rather of his desire to secure the autonomy and necessity of that human mechanism called ‘‘the political.’’ To the question of whether there is a war, Schmitt emphatically answers ‘‘yes’’—by which he means to affirm not armed conflict or bloodshed as a virtue in and of itself, but rather the necessity of the view that the proverbial state of nature is, as Hobbes knew, a state marked by imperfection, and that this imperfection manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it.

Friend Enemy K 1NC Shell 2/3

The goal of the alternative is to erase the friend enemy distinction through the universalization of their ethical claim. But rather than create a harmonious world, free of violence, they create the conditions for the extermination of those who oppose the alt. This turns the state into a killing machine.

**Thorup in ‘6** / a lecturer in the History of Philosophy Department at Aarhus University

[Mikkel, In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism]

A world in which there is no possibility of such a [real] fight would be a definitively pacified globe. It would be a world without any distinction between friend and enemy and, therefore, a world without politics. (Schmitt 1996a: 35)

Depoliticization cannot recognize limits to itself. Each limit questions the depoliticization already instituted. It hints at the possibility of enmity or alternative - and thereby puts the whole of the depoliticized in question. For liberalism, the foremost limit to depoliticization has always been the state and most notably the nation state in its Weberian sense. Taken to its outermost conclusion contemporary liberal globalism aims at a post-political globe. The obstacle, the barrier for universal depoliticization and eternal pacification, is thought to be the nation state: For many people the idea of global organization means nothing else than the utopian idea of total depoliticalization. Demands are therefore made, almost always indiscriminately, that all states on earth become members as soon as possible and that it be 'universal'. Universality at any price would necessarily have to mean total depoliticalization and with it, particularly, the non-existence of states. (Schmitt 1996a: 56) I stated earlier that any political movement is (in its end goal) anti-political and that every political critique must be eminently political. This calls for a short explanation. My claim is that every political movement seeks to universalize and decontest their programme. At some level everyone wants to eternalize their politics. Trotsky's idea of permanent revolution or Mao's of uninterrupted revolution show an awareness of the dangers of any revolution to ossify and bureaucratize the revolutionary energies. Everyday life returns inevitably, routine becomes endemic. In the words of Agamben, the successful revolutionary party "tends to appear as a duplicate of the State structure" (1998: 42), thereby transforming the constituting power into manageable forms. William Rasch asks very pointedly: "Does not the successful revolution ... also represent the successful elimination of politics?" (2004: 65). Once successful further contestation is repressed; the bureaucrats of revolution takes over. Marx's work can be said to contain two notions of the political. One that interprets history as struggle; conflict is a fundamental and inescapable feature of social reality. Class war is the driving force of history. Conflict is in history. Then there is another notion of the political, the post-historical and anti-political, which comes to the fore after the successful revolution. Here is harmony, no repression, no state nor conflict. The communist society is the fully developed liberal society; it's the idea of spontaneous self-organization brought to its conclusion. It's a society beyond history and politics.

The critique of depoliticization reminds us to pay close attention to the use of words, to legitimization strategies and discourses in politics - as evidenced in Schmitt's discussion of the very political difference between the word 'tribute' and 'reparations' in the German debate on its payments to France after WWl (1996a: 31, note 12). Words are politically charged even when, or rather especially when, they present themselves as non-political. And they have direct political consequences. It's all important what one is called in the world of politics. Naming is the first game of politics. It determines if you're taken seriously as an equal, opponent or friend or disregarded, acted upon, exterminated even. As James Aho says: ... defamatory words rarely, if ever, simply describe things; they also rhetorically 'accomplish' them. And what they accomplish is a victim, an evil-doer, ready for violation. In short, the child's ditty - 'Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me' - is patently untrue. **Defamatory language prepares audiences cognitively and emotionally to take up sticks and stones.** (1990: 20)

My aim is to discuss the use of depoliticization as a 'defamatory practice' in the field of international politics. I want to argue an apparently contradictory claim: That depoliticization can be a revolutionary instrument - although it consistently presents itself as the opposite. Depoliticization is not reducible to a reaction against politicizations. Depoliticization revolutionized the pre-liberal world through seemingly anti-revolutionary means. What I aim to show is that contemporary liberal globalist depoliticization is in the midst of a parallel revolutionary depoliticization. What liberal globalist depoliticization aims at is the global denial of an outside. There is no longer to be any legitimate position outside the liberal order. The denial of the enemy is the denial of the legitimate outside and other. I want to trace the re-appearance of the enemy in its 'non-political' forms and to trace the return of the political in anti-politics. The 'barbarian' in its various forms is the nonpolitical enemy, the enemy not recognized as being within the same horizon as us. This opens for a wholly different arsenal of engagement.

Depoliticization is basically about denying the existence of the political enemy. That, however, does not make a world of friends. Denying political enmity tend to make enemies appear in other 'perverted' forms. The same goes for the political and sovereignty. Once denied, they re-appear in other guises. What happens once the political enemy is depoliticized, that is, brought from a political to a non-political register? The thesis is, that the denial of political enmity tends to turn states, even liberal states, into what Giorgio Agamben calls 'killing machines' (2005: 86).

Friend Enemy K 1NC Shell 3/3

Text: Recognize the Friend Enemy distinction as fundamental to human existence and refuse peaceful politics.

Only through abandoning the drive for peace can totalizing violence be contained

**Rasch in 5** /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, Spring]

What is to be done? If you are one who says there is a war, and if you say it not because you glory in it but because you fear it and hate it, then your goal is to limit it and its effects, not eliminate it, which merely intensifies it, but limit it by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and noncombatants. There are, of course, legitimate doubts about whether those ideal lines could ever be drawn again; nevertheless, the question that we should ask is not how can we establish perpetual peace, but rather a more modest one: Can symmetrical relationships be guaranteed only by asymmetrical ones? According to Schmitt, historically this has been the case. ‘‘The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth’’ (39). We have since gone to the moon and have found nothing on the way there to exploit. We may soon go to Mars, if current leaders have their way, but the likelihood of finding exploitable populations seems equally slim. Salvation through spatially delimited asymmetry, even were it to be desired, is just not on the horizon. And salvation through globalization, that is, through global unity and equality, is equally impossible, because today’s asymmetry is not so much a localization of the exception as it is an invisible generation of the exception from within that formal ideal of unity, a generation of the exception as the difference between the human and the inhuman outlaw, the ‘‘Savage Beast, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ We are, therefore, thrown back upon ourselves, which is to say, upon those artificial ‘‘moral persons’’ who act as our collective political identities. They used to be called states. What they will be called in the future remains to be seen. But, if we think to establish a differentiated unity of discrete political entities that once represented for Schmitt ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power,’’ then we must symmetrically manage the necessary pairing of inclusion and exclusion without denying the ‘‘forms of power and domination’’ that inescapably accompany human ordering. We must think the possibility of roughly equivalent power relations rather than fantasize the elimination of power from the political universe. This, conceivably, was also Schmitt’s solution. Whether his idea of the plurality of Großräume could ever be carried out under contemporary circumstances is, to be sure, more than a little doubtful, given that the United States enjoys a monopoly on guns, goods, and the Good, in the form of a supremely effective ideology of universal ‘‘democratization.’’ Still, we would do well to devise vocabularies that do not just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of painless, effortless, universal equality. The space of the political will never be created by a bloodless, Benjaminian divine violence. Nor is it to be confused with the space of the simply human. To dream the dreams of universal inclusion may satisfy an irrepressible human desire, but it may also always produce recurring, asphyxiating political nightmares of absolute exclusion.

A/T Enmity Not Inevitable

**The Status of the Enemy is fundamental to the human condition**

Prozorov in 6 /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/

[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

While these modalities of enmity are historically contingent, what remains necessary is the act of distinction as such, whatever form it takes. If one must accuse Schmitt of something, it should not be essentialism but rather an idiosyncratic form of transcendentalism, which seeks to negate the absolutisation of immanence in modern political metaphysics by positing as foundational the act of exceptional decision, and which by definition may not be subsumed under the self-immanence of order.19 With respect to the question of enmity, this moment of eruption of transcendence within immanence is offered by what Schmitt terms the ‘most extreme possibility’,20 the ‘real possibility of physical killing’21 that arises in every encounter with the Other, whose singularity cannot be subsumed under the immanence of the Same. It is the very existence of radical alterity that poses an ever-present possibility of killing or being killed, which in turn calls for a decision, in each concrete sense, on whether the Other is the enemy: ‘it is sufficient for his [enemy’s] nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible’.22 What makes Schmitt’s thought disconcertingly original is this singular move of grounding a political order in the affirmation of the ever-present possibility of violent death rather than its disavowal of the kind practised by the contractarian political philosophy – in this aspect, Schmitt is best grasped as the diametrical opposite of Hobbes.23 Thus, the enemy is neither an unproblematic empirical given nor a contingent effect of a belligerent fantasy, done away with through the global progress of cosmopolitanism. Enmity as such is a perennial feature of the human condition, **being**, in its transcendental function, nothing more than a vigilant receptivity to the existence of the Other.24 However, the concrete form that relations of enmity take is historically variable and dependent on the distinction at work at concrete historical moments. Ironically, yet another misreading of Schmitt, particularly evident in today’s discussion, consists precisely in attributing to him a highly intense and violent construct of enmity.

A/T Violence Not Inevitable

**War is the fundamental structure of human ontology. It determines the thoughts and patterns of all the aspects of human existence. This makes violence inevitable.**

**Hillman in ‘4** /professor, yale/

[James, Terrible Love of War, pg. 2]

War is also psychological task because philosophy and theology, the fields supposed to do the heavy thinking for our species, have neglected war's overriding importance. "War is the father of all" said Heraclitus at the beginning of Western thought, which Emmanuel Levinas restates in recent Western thought as "being reveals itself a war". If war is a primordial component of being, then war fathers the very structure of existence and out thinking about is: our ideas of the universe, of religion, of ethics; war determines the thought patters of Aristotle's logic of opposites, Kant's antinomies, Darwin's natural selection, Marx's struggle of classes, and even Freud's repression of the id by the ego and superego. We think in warlike terms, feel ourselves at war with ourselves, and unknowingly believe predation territorial defense, conquest, and the interminable battle of opposing forces are ground rules of existence.

A/T Enmity=Violence

**Recognizing enmity lays bare the power relations among peoples and brackets war. The aff serves to drive distinctions underground, creating an infinite justification for violence**

**Thorup in ‘6** /lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Aarhus in Denmark/

Mikkel, In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism, Ph.D. Dissertation]

This is what we've been trying to show, using enmity as a central category, and taking political enmity as our point of departure. Not because political enmity is inherently benign, far from it. It comes with problems of its own, which liberal globalism is set on this earth to emphasize and criticize. The use of political enmity here is, so to speak, not political but scientific. Political enmity is a theoretical, not a real-historical, concept. It is implied in the logic of diplomacy, classical international law and regularized warfare and it has some relevance in actual events on the battleground, at least before industrialized warfare. But, this has been no exercise in nostalgia for a lost warrior ethics. Theoretically, we have to presuppose the political enmity, no matter how much it in actual practice has been contaminated by the other forms of enmity.

Politically, it serves as a critical corrective and, perhaps, as a minimal utopia (as one of my fellow PhD-students called it); the best to hope for. Instead of the current liberal monopolization of legitimacy, we should perhaps learn to recognize "legitimate non-democratic regimes that have the authority to contain tensions but can also respect a minimum of social and political rights" (Hirst 2002: 8). Postmodern state or chaos and war are not the exclusive options of a global era. Most nonliberal regimes do not engage in continuous war-making; they do not sponsor terrorism or engage in constant repression. Most people, even in non-liberal regimes, do live good lives. l in an interview conducted by myself and Frank Beck Lassen, John Gray said: "People can live peaceful, productive, creative lives without a global liberal society" (Thorup & Lassen 2005: 12). This is the truth, which liberalism refuses to see. Paul Hirst (2002: 8) insists: "It is what regimes do that matters" and in this, liberal democracies may have less reason to claim moral superiority. Just as there is no necessary connection between liberalism and democracy, there is none between liberalism and pacifism. This is the illusion of liberalism, radicalized by liberal globalism. And it's the illusion we're attempting to undermine by insisting on the political nature of post-political liberalism. Politics as conflict is not inherently despotic or violent. That is just the liberal way of understanding and presenting it (like politics as technique is understood and described as inauthentic in much liberalism critique). Here, politics as conflict has served us as a counternarrative to a hegemonic politics as technique and as a way to see the workings within politics as technique of the exact same dangers, that is being delegated to politics as conflict, that IS, repression, exclusion, creation of 'others', war internally and externally.

The liberal-humanitarian discourse becomes the language of intervention; and "thinking their interventions benign or neutral, they intervene more often than they otherwise might" (Kennedy 2004: 23); and often in areas and ways, which doesn't help the 'victims' intended. This is not to deny the need, often, of intervention of various kinds, and it is certainly no questioning of the humanitarian motive. The ideology critique of this text is not to seek the real, hard reason behind the soft spoken words but to take the humanitarian language and motivation serious and then to look critically at the implications of good intentions. It's my thesis that a not insignificant part of the problem lies in an insufficient understanding of power. David Kennedy says that the humanitarian blindness "often begins at the moment the humanitarian averts his eyes from his own power" (2004: 329, my italics). Humanitarians and liberal opinion-makers wield enormous power, also military power, but this goes unnoticed in and through the liberal-humanist discourse, which consistently cast off any appearance of own power and names power as evil and as the problem to be overcome. This is the understanding of self and power constitutive of liberalism, that I've told.

A/T Schmitt= War on Terror

**Turn- You have it backwards- the War on Terror is the product of liberalism**

**Prozorov in 6** /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/

[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

For a thinker still stuck with an asinine label ‘the crown jurist of the Third Reich’, Carl Schmitt certainly receives a lot of attention in the contemporary discussion. In recent years, the neoconservative policy course of the Bush presidency has been frequently read in terms of the resurgence of the ‘Schmittian’ orientation in foreign policy that allegedly consists in the valorisation of the friend–enemy distinction and the open manifestation of conflict as an indicator of ‘authentic politics’ or ‘authentic life’ more generally.1 The association of the present American administration with the philosopher who, despite abundant evidence to the contrary,2 remains linked with Nazism in much of the liberal discourse, apparently lends credence to the intense, if superficial, criticism of the Bush administration as effecting a disastrous rupture in domestic and international politics, which can only be mended through a return to liberal cosmopolitan policy orientations that dispense with the concept of enmity in the project of ‘world unity’. In this manner, the binary opposition between realism and idealism or ‘liberal internationalism’3 is reproduced and fortified by subsuming contemporary American exceptionalism under the heading of ‘realism’. This, in turn, is delegitimised through its originary association with Schmitt’s political thought. Although this article engages with very specific aspects of Schmitt’s thought, it may be read as an attempt to problematise the operation of this opposition by demonstrating both the dependence of the liberal idealist position on the very ‘Schmittianism’ against which it defines itself and the continued urgency of Schmitt’s own criticism of the tendencies that are erroneously attributed to him. The facile and historically inaccurate character of the identification of Schmitt with contemporary neoconservatism has been addressed by contemporary critical approaches, which point to a fundamental heterogeneity between the two theoretico-political projects.4 Yet, rather than rehearse this critique here, it is important to note that even the critical discourse, which fortunately avoids the liberal pathos of compulsory denunciation of Schmitt, remains tied to some of the constitutive presuppositions of the liberal (mis)reading of Schmitt that relate specifically to the theme highlighted in the present discussion of Schmitt’s thought, i.e. the problematic of enmity. In this article we shall both rely on critical-theoretical readings of Schmitt and attempt to go beyond them in deconstructing the politics of enmity with which Schmitt’s thought is erroneously associated. Against the argument that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism logically leads him to the valorisation of authoritarian and violent politics, founded on the friend–enemy distinction, we shall assert that the contemporary politics of enmity is decidedly un-Schmittian but rather inherent in the rationality of liberal rule that has been the object of Schmitt’s criticism. Thus, our argument does not simply dismiss the straw figure of a ‘Schmittian’ politics of enmity as having little to do with Schmitt, but rather returns this message to the sender in a demonstration of the uncanny proximity of this straw figure to the liberal mode of the friend–enemy distinction.

A/T Nation States bad

**Turn- Nation-States are a superior model to liberal cosmopolitanism**

**Rasch in 5** /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, Spring]

In Nomos, Schmitt describes the now much maligned and seldom mourned European nation-state system as ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power’’ (187). Historically, the territorial state developed as a response to the religious civil wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Once thought of as a unity called Christendom, Europe became fractured by the events of the Reformation and Counter- Reformation. The old asymmetrical distinction between believers and nonbelievers that governed the relationship not only between Christians and non-Christians, but also between Christian orthodoxy and heresy, now threatened to regulate the distinction between Catholics and Protestants. Yet, miraculously (one might be tempted to say), with the conclusion of religious warfare in 1648, a symmetrical relationship among the European nation-states prevailed—in theory, if not always in fact. It is this symmetrical ordering of internally differentiated Europe that Schmitt highlights. In effect—and Hobbes had already described it in these terms—the war of all individuals against all individuals in the state of nature, which perennially threatens to resurface within the state as civil discord, is elevated into a war of all states against all states in a second-order state of nature. In theory and practice, then, the individual is protected from arbitrary and irrational, because incalculable, violence by states acting as moral persons living in an unregulated but serendipitously achieved balance of power. We might best update Schmitt’s description of this order as an ideally anarchic, self-regulating coexistence of antagonistic powers, an emergent, horizontal self-organization of sovereign systems with no one system serving as sovereign over all the others—a plurality of states that refused to coalesce into one single state but rather achieved relative security without relinquishing autonomy. The ‘‘medium’’ of this self-organization was violence (war); yet, by virtue of mechanisms of reciprocity, by virtue, that is, of a similarly emergent self-regulation of violence called international law (the jus publicum Europaeum of which Schmitt sings his praises), the conduct of warfare among European states was restrained and controlled. Thus, the nation-state way of organizing earlymodern Europe served as the katechon, the political as restrainer, establishing relative stability and peace to stave off chaos and civil war.

A/T Schmitt was a nazi

Claims that Schmitt legitimizes violence and Nazism is just a way for critical theorists to avoid how theory ultimately looks like neo-conservative interventionism.

**Chandler in ‘7** /Professor of International Relations, University of Westminster/

[David, “Friend or Enemy? Rethinking Schmitt's Understanding of the Relationship between Ethics, Law and the Use of Force in International Relations”, September 12-15]

Brown wants to avoid normative theory being discredited by the use of Just War justifications for militarism. Like Devetak, he seeks to draw Schmitt into the same camp as the neo-cons and to draw out his distinction between them both. To do this, Brown argues that Schmitt stood opposed to any external or international attempts to limit war;17 and that therefore this approach which legitimised violence was just as unacceptable as the neo-con claims to use unlimited violence for ethical ends. Both Schmitt and the neo-cons are implicitly seen to be evading political and ethical responsibility. Marking out a ground for a morally informed practical political approach, Brown draws on the neo-Aristotelianism of Stephen Toulmin.18 Again, a case-by-case approach is advocated, evading the need for universal ethical claims and held up as recognizing the inseparability of politics and ethics.

For these international political theorists, who want to defend international intervention on moral grounds but to distinguish themselves as ‘critical’ in relation to US moral justifications for military intervention, Schmitt is talked up as a great theorist and then condemned as the logical end product of the rejection of liberal attempts to tame power through law and ethics. Schmitt’s role here is as the whipping boy; as a warning to those who seek to critique critical, liberal and normative international relations theorizing.

In fact, I don’t think it would be going too far to say that there is an implicit threat that to use Schmitt uncritically, would be to fall into the far greater error of being an apologist for the crimes of sovereign states against their own people, with Schmitt implicitly condemned for condoning or marginalising the Holocaust, seeing the key crime of the Second World War as the undermining of the European order in the Allied aerial bombing of German cities to force an unconditional surrender.19 This, I argue, is an opportunist use Schmitt to close down debate and to legitimise a critical cosmopolitan position morally rather than intellectually. By this, I mean that Schmitt is used defensively, to limit critiques of their position and to close down or narrow discussion, privileging the ethical need for an alternative, in the spirit of ‘something must be done’, and downplaying the political poverty of their evasive position of ‘case-by-case’ consideration. The more critical cosmopolitan theorists are put on the defensive, over the gap between their normative aspirations and the real world of American military and political dominance, the more their ‘interest’ in critiquing Schmitt has appeared to revive.

A/T Alt=Tyranny

Schmitt’s ideas had nothing to do with the fall of the Weimar Republic

Buck Morris 08 (Susan, is professor of political philosophy and social theory in the department of government, Cornell University

In the proliferation of debates that have surrounded Carl Schmitt in recent years, his positions have become stereotyped, and his critical acumen has been diluted.[40](http://oboler.isu.edu:2202/journals/cultural_critique/v069/69.buck-morss.html" \l "f40) Particularly problematic is the frequency with which Giorgio Agamben is taken as a substitute for Schmitt himself, as Agamben has been part of the stereotyping and diluting process. The same can be said for the figure of Leo Strauss, who trained Paul Wolfowitz and his neoconservative cohorts in what is claimed to be a diabolical Schmittian realism. The whole issue of the Weimar democracy’s dissolution into fascism which dominates the most influential secondary accounts (Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception; McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique; Kennedy, Constitutional Failure) pays too little attention to that part of Schmitt’s critique that had little to do with the end of the Weimar Republic, and a great deal to do with our own political situation. Schmitt focused on the international terrain, and we will benefit if we do likewise—because however Schmitt may have changed his tune during the late years of Weimar or missed the real danger regarding German politics, and however indefensible his political loyalties may have been, he saw with consistent accuracy the dangers of the new and rising global power of the twentieth century, the United States.

A/T Enmity Now

The Alt is still needed- we have not sufficiently thought of the enemy

Anidjar 04 (Gill, Columbia University, “Terror Right”, The New Centennial Review 4.3, Muse)

We have not sufficiently thought of the enemy.1 In fact, a history of the enemy remains to be written. Schmitt, who comes close to writing it when elaborating its basic concept—a concept of the enemy—nonetheless refrains from doing so for reasons that are only now beginning to be clarified or understood. And yet, some of the necessary steps have been taken; markers have been identified that have contributed to a production of the conditions that would enable such a historiographic task.One will recall, for example,the numerous reflections made after the end of the Cold War announcing the promise (or the threat, as it not so surprisingly turned out) constituted by the alleged disappearance of the enemy in and for the West (an issue the "clash of civilization" was, of course, intended to control and resolve**).** In another register, Schmitt himself (along with the persistent, if often concealed, followers of his work) continued to underscore the importance of a notion and a dynamic of enmity for political thought and practice. Finally, one may now and increasingly take the measure of the extensive reach of Jacques Derrida's thought in Politics of Friendship (1997), where friendship and enmity are meticulously read in a sustained interrogation of the political bond. Derrida undoes the lines of continuity that would locate the enemy at the opposite end, as the negative image of the friend. He examines the tradition that links friendship to hostility and fraternity, as well as the exclusion (hostility, perhaps) of sisters and, more generally, of women in the definition and the operations of what some still call the social bond.2The enemy, the other, would also be the excluded one.

A/T Non-Violence Good

True peace necessitates some unavoidable violence – violence is key to dignity and other virtues

Rummel, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, 81 (R.J., The Just Peace, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkil1s/TJP.CHAP 10.HTM)

Such are major subprinciples of peacemaking. Conflict engages what the parties want and can and will do in a situation in which relevant status quo expectations are disrupted. Situational perceptions, expectations, interests, capabilities, and will are the elements of the conflict--and of peacemaking. Material things--land, people, wealth, ports, borders--are merely the tools or objects of conflict. And material conditions, such as the topography of a country or a mountainous border between states, only frame and physically limit conflict. The essence of conflict is an opposition of minds. The arena of conflict is the mental field. The principles and rules for its resolution are psychological. Now, peacemaking is not necessarily the best and most immediate response to conflict. Doubtlessly, some conflicts are unnecessary, some needlessly intense and long-lasting. But some also are a real and unavoidable clash, the only means through which one, as a partisan, can protect or further vital interests and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious just peace. For example, war against Hitler’s Germany from 1939 to 1945 cost millions lives, but it prevented the greater misery, the terror, the executions, the cold-blooded murders which probably would have occurred had Hitler consolidated his control of Europe and subjugated the Soviet Union. We always can end a conflict when we want by surrender. But some ideas are more important than peace: Dignity. Freedom. Security. That is, peace with justice--a just peace. There is another relevant qualification. The term "peacemaking" is well established, and I used it accordingly. Unfortunately, the verb "make" can imply that peace is designed and constructed, as a house is planned and erected brick by brick or a road engineered and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is seen as manmade (rather than having evolved),9 and many believe that communities should be centrally planned and managed. But peace is not constructed like a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What the leaders of a group or nation honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, are really capable of achieving are unknown to others--and perhaps only partially to themselves. Nonetheless only they can best utilize the information available to them to justly satisfy their interests. For a third party to try to construct and enforce an abstract peace imposed on others is foolhardy. Such a peace would be uncertain, forestall the necessary trial-and-error balancing of the parties themselves, and perhaps even create greater conflict later. The best peace is an outcome of reciprocal adjustments among those involved. At most, peacemaking should ease the process. A final qualification. Pacifists believe that violence and war cannot occur if people laid down their arms and refused to fight. But this ignores unilateral violence. Under threat, a state or government may try to avoid violence by submission. The result may be enslavement, systematic execution, and elimination of leaders and "undesirables." The resulting genocide and mass murder may ultimately end in more deaths than would have occurred had people fought to defend themselves. I agree that in some situations nonviolence may be an effective strategy for waging conflict,10 as in the successful Black civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s in America; or the successful nonviolent, civil disobedience movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. In some situations refusal to use violence may avoid unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However, there are also conflicts, especially involving actual or potential tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which nonviolence cannot buy freedom from violence by others or a just resolution of a dispute. Then a down payment on such a peace requires public display of one's capability and a resolve to meet violent aggression in kind

A/T Non-violence good Cont.

Non Violence would have had no chance to stop the Nazis – Denmark’s strategy wouldn’t have worked on a global scale – a thousand year Reich would of resulted

Futterman, Former U.S. Nuclear Weapons Scientist, 94 (J.A.H., “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb”, Virtual Church of the Blind Chihuahua, www.dogchurch.org/books/nuke.html)

The Nazis, who with their "Master Race" ideology admitted only so-called "Aryans" to the category of human, provide an example counter to that of the British. There were some successful acts of non-violent confrontation against the Nazis, like King Christian of Denmark's public declaration that he would wear the yellow star if it were introduced in his country. He did so in response to the Nazi practice of ordering Jews to wear yellow-starred armbands so that the Nazis could more easily isolate them from their surrounding society. That many Danes followed their king's example helped camouflage many Jews until they could escape to Sweden in fishing boats. [5] Now this resistance worked partly because the Nazis considered the Danes to be "Aryans" like themselves. Had the Poles tried the same thing, the Nazis would have been perfectly happy to use the event as an excuse for liquidating more Poles. Rather than awaken the Nazis' moral sense, non-violent confrontation on the part of the Poles would probably have enabled the Nazis to carry out their agenda in Poland more easily. The other reason these acts succeeded was that overwhelming violence of the Allies had stretched the Nazi forces too thin to suppress massive action by a whole populace, and eventually deprived the Nazis of the time they needed to find other ways to carry out their "final solution." In other words, non-violence resistance alone would have been very slow to work against the Nazis, once they had consolidated their power. And while it slowly ground away at the evil in the Nazi soul, how many millions more would have died, and how much extra time would have been given to Nazi scientists trying to invent atomic bombs to go on those V-2 rockets? The evil of Nazism may well have expended itself, but perhaps after a real "thousand-year Reich," leaving a world populated only by blue-eyed blondes. In other words, if the world had used non-violence alone against the Nazis, the results may have been much worse those of the war.[

You can’t imagine the world as peaceful – this self deception begets more violence

Laren 2K1 (Carter, “Pacificism Empowers Terrorism”, Capitalism Magazine, October 4, http://www.CapMag.com/article.asp?ID= 1128)

Pacifists would argue that they are idealists, as if being an idealist meant being excused from having to defend those ideals. Consider an individual engaged in the following line of reasoning: "It would be ideal if all people knew how to perform open- heart surgery, so I am going to behave as if everyone is a heart surgeon. I am an idealist." Although this may be idealism, it is also idiocy (and self-destructive). Pacifists think that by pretending that violence doesn't exist, eventually it won't. This is not just silly; it is a vicious, deadly lie. Aggression cannot be defeated by rewarding it. Organizers of "Don't turn tradgedy [sic] into a war" rallies across the country would have Americans believe that the proper response to the murder of thousands of innocent lives is a candlelight vigil and impromptu poetry readings. This is mass suicide. It is an invitation to the Hitlers, the Stalins, the Attilas, and the Bin Ladens of the world to slaughter the American people and to gut their corpses. Implicit in the pacifist's drivel is the implication: "may the worst man win." Only two types of people can accept a philosophy like this: a fiend or a fool. A fiend hates everyone, including himself, and so doesn't care if the "worst man" wins. A fool believes that if he smiles sheepishly at Adolf Hitler, Hitler will suddenly change his mind and decide to take-up knitting. They are both wrong, and they are both evil, [because in both cases such a policy can only lead to the destruction of the good. To promote this evil in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks, pacifists have added a few extra deceptions to their arsenal. One of these is the equation of war and racism. "War and Racism are Not the Answer," reads an anti-war poster at a San Francisco university. This statement blatantly implies that those who support war against terrorist-harboring nations are racist. It relies on the insecurity of the reader by convincing him to oppose war for fear of being (unjustly) labeled "racist." A war against the Afghan, Iranian, and other terrorist-supporting governments does not constitute racism. It constitutes self-defense. Racism is clearly wrong, but pacifism doesn't hold a monopoly on that idea.

A/T Non Violence Good Cont.

Nonviolence risks appeasement which results in more conflict

Rummel, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, 81 (R.J., The Just Peace, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkil1s/TJP.CHAP 10.HTM)

Violent conquest is usually wrong (the Just Package). Forcibly imposing one's values and goals on another, aside from its general immorality, can create smoldering resentment, grievance, and hostility that later may burst into greater conflict and violence. Nonetheless, in some exceptional conflict situations, the only resolution possible or desirable may be through conquest: a test of strength and the unambiguous violent defeat of the other side--as of Hitler's Germany. To believe that conflict should always be resolved through negotiation, mediation, and compromise invites an aggressor to assume that what is his is his, but what is yours is negotiable. Resisting aggression forces a test of interests, capabilities, and will--if the aggressor so wants it. And this may be a faster, ultimately less conflictful, less violent way of resolving conflict than conciliation or appeasement. In resisting aggression, gauge different power responses. Do not automatically respond to aggression in kind. The most effective response is one which shifts power to bases which can be employed more effectively, while lessening the risk of violent escalation. And respond proportionally. To meet aggression in equal measure is legitimate, while overreaction risks escalation to a more extended and intense conflict, and underreaction appears weak and risks defeat and repeated aggression.

A/t Essentialism Bad

**Schmitt is the ultimate anti-essentialist because he rejects all foundations and only the sheer force of becoming. The friend/enemy distictions cannot be essentialied.**

Prozorov in 6 /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/

[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Extreme Alterity: Revisiting the Friend–Enemy Distinction

Let us begin with revisiting Schmitt’s concept of the friend–enemy distinction in order to isolate the singular modality of enmity that was targeted by Schmitt’s criticism and yet remains attributed to him even by the more sympathetic readers. In an insightful adaptation of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy for the purposes of contemporary critical theory, Chantal Mouffe notes as the fundamental weakness of Schmitt’s thought his ‘essentialisation’ of the friend–enemy distinction. ‘His distinction between us and them is not really politically constructed; it is merely a recognition of already-existing borders.’14 Thus, while Mouffe correctly dissociates Schmitt from contemporary ‘neoconservatism’, she remains committed to the image of the friend–enemy distinction as an essentially static concept, a reflection of the allegedly existing state of affairs, rather than a contingent political act. It is, however, difficult to find support for this reading in Schmitt’s work, particularly insofar as we read ‘The Concept of the Political’ in conjunction with ‘Political Theology’, understanding the act of the friend–enemy distinction as the prime expression of the sovereign decision on exception.

From this perspective, the friend–enemy distinction is an unfounded yet foundational act of the sovereign decision, which logically ‘emanates from nothingness’ and therefore cannot find ground or support in the anterior reality and draw on substantive (economic, moral or aesthetic) criteria to define the enemy.15 This purely formal decisionism famously led Leo Strauss to characterise Schmitt’s conception of the political as ‘liberalism preceded by a minus sign’.16 Similarly, Slavoj Zizek argues that Schmitt’s decisionism is entirely heterogeneous to any form of traditional conservatism but rather unfolds in the thoroughly disenchanted space of nihilism: This is the first feature of modern conservatism, which sharply distinguishes it from every kind of traditionalism: modern conservatism, even more than liberalism, assumes the lesson of the dissolution of the traditional set of values and/or authorities – there is no longer any positive content which could be presupposed as the universally accepted frame of reference.17In this context of ‘modern conservatism’, Mouffe’s reading of Schmitt as an essentialist is hardly plausible; if anything, Schmitt may rather be read as an extreme and logically consistent anti-essentialist, since the progressive denial of essences ultimately leaves one with nothing other than the pure force of becoming, which is precisely the sole ‘substance’ of Schmitt’s decision: What is properly modern in Schmitt’s notion of the exception is thus the violent gesture of asserting the independence of the abyssal act of free decision from its positive content. What is ‘modern’ is the gap between the act of decision and its content – the perception that what really matters is the act as such, independently of its normative content, … a purely formal abyssal act of decision, without any grounds in the actual properties and acts of those concerned.18 Thus, neither the friend nor the enemy may be argued to pre-exist the act of their distinction, which, as a decisionist act, acquires primacy in relation to its particular content. Besides dropping the charge of essentialism, this understanding leads us to a distinction between the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction and its empirical, historically contingent modality. It must be emphasised that this distinction is more intricate than the difference between an invariable form and historically variable content. What individualises an empirical modality of the friend–enemy distinction is not its substantive content, which remains irrelevant for Schmitt, but rather the specific form that it takes in a concrete situation.

A/T Utopian Alts/Affs

Keep Dreaming- waiting for the ‘new politics’ of the aff to produce a perfect world without enmity is a waste as Rome burns.

**Rasch in 5** /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, Spring]

What Schmitt describes as an enviable achievement—that is, the balanced order of restrained violence within Europe—presupposed the consignment of unrestrained violence to the rest of the world. That is, desired restraint was founded upon sanctioned lack of restraint. If Schmitt, by concentrating on the development of European international law after the religious civil wars, highlights an admirable local result of a disagreeable global process, this can be attributed to his explicit Eurocentrism. But even non- Eurocentrics may be dismayed by the twentieth-century reintroduction of unrestricted violence within Europe itself. The epitome of this return of the repressed may be the midcentury death camp, as Giorgio Agamben maintains, 9 but its initial breakthrough is the Great War of the century’s second decade. For how else can one explain that a traditional European power struggle that started in 1914 as a war fought for state interest should end in 1918–19 as a war fought by ‘‘civilization’’ against its ‘‘barbarian’’ other? And how else can one explain that we have been so eager to replicate this distinction in every war we have fought ever since? If, in other words, we are rightly horrified by the distinction between civilized and uncivilized when it is used to describe the relationship of Old Europe and its colonial subjects, and if we are rightly horrified by the distinction between the human and the in- or subhuman when it is used to discriminate against blacks, Jews, Gypsies, and other so-called undesirables, then why do we persist today in using these very distinctions when combating our latest enemies? Is it merely ironic or in fact profoundly symptomatic that those who most vehemently affirm universal symmetry (equality, democracy) are also more often than not the ones who opt for the most asymmetrical means of locating enemies and conducting war—that is, just wars fought for a just cause? But how are we to respond? For those who say there is no war and who yet find themselves witnessing daily bloodshed, Adornoian asceticism (refraining from participating in the nihilism of the political) or Benjaminian weak, quasi, or other messianism (waiting for the next incarnation of the historical subject [the multitudes?] or the next proletarian general strike [the event?]) would seem to be the answer. To this, however, those who say there is a war can respond only with bewilderment. Waiting for a ‘‘completely new politics’’ 10 and completely new political agents, waiting for the event and the right moment to name it, or waiting for universal ontological redemption feels much like waiting for the Second Coming, or, more accurately, for Godot. And have we not all grown weary of waiting? The war we call ‘‘the political,’’ whether nihilist or not, happily goes on while we watch Rome burn. As Schmitt wrote of the relationship of early Christianity to the Roman Empire, ‘‘The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the Germanic kings’’ (60). One does not need to believe in the virtues of that particular ‘‘historical monolith’’ to understand the dangers of eschatological paralysis.

But as Max Weber observed firsthand, ascetic quietude leads so often, so quickly, and so effortlessly to the chiliastic violence that knows no bounds;11 and as we have lately observed anew, the millennial messianism of imperial rulers and nomadic partisans alike dominates the contemporary political landscape. The true goal of those who say there is no war is to eliminate the war that actually exists by eliminating those Lyons and Tygers and other Savage Beasts who say there is a war. This war is the truly savage war. It is the war we witness today. No amount of democratization, pacification, or Americanization will mollify its effects, because democratization, pacification, and Americanization are among the weapons used by those who say there is no war to wage their war to end all war.

Alt Solvency- Police Actions

Alt solvency- Violence is inevitable- the only questions is unending police actions generated by a drive for peace or controlled interstate military violence

Prozorov in 6 /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/

[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as **it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed.** Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the establishment of a world autocracy that would no longer be political due to its disavowal of the constitutive criterion of enmity. ‘The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be transformed in a world police power.’46 This ominous prophecy finds a perfect contemporary illustration in Wendt’s argument on the effacement of political enmity in the world state: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, **are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state**, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’ , <CONTINUED>.

Alt Solvency- Police Actions

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Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world into a terrifying dystopia of a self-immanent, totally administered world without an outside and hence without a possibility of flight. At the same time, the practical implementation of such a project is hardly conceivable as encountering no resistance. The project of world unity and the effacement of exteriority is therefore bound to have its own enemies, insofar as alterity is ontologically ineradicable. Letting the Other into the global ‘homeland’ does not eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict but makes it impossible to manage it through the pluralistic disjunction of the Self and the Other. In the world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, radical alterity has no place, both literally and figuratively. In this setting, conflict appears no longer merely possible but actually inevitable, as the Other is certain to resist its violent inclusion into the homeland of liberal humanity. Yet, having disposed of genuine political pluralism, liberalism finds itself lacking in any instruments to protect its universal homeland other than the absolute existential negation of the Other that parallels the conceptual negation of alterity in liberal monism. Thus, the universalisation of the liberal disposition to embrace the entire humanity actualises the ‘most extreme possibility’ either by exposing the Self to the resentful violence of the Other or by annihilating the Other to eliminate the former existential threat. It is here that enmity, foreclosed in the symbolic register of liberalism with its monistic universalism, returns with a vengeance, since the sole consequence of the deployment of the concept of humanity as the referent of the liberal political project is the inevitable designation of the adversaries of this project in terms of the negation of humanity as, in a strict sense, **inhuman beings**: When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress and civilisation in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy.50 Indeed, denial is a central category in the discursive transformation of the enemy into the foe – through manifold gestures of denial the enemy is reduced to the purely negative figure that reminds us of Agamben’s homo sacer, a bare life that is both worthless and undesirable: ‘The enemy is easily expropriated of his human quality. He is declared an outlaw of humanity. … The absolute enemy encounters an undivided humanity that regards him as already always proscribed by God or by nature.’51 The effect of the liberal foreclosure of enmity, i.e. **its bracketing off from the political discourse, is ironically the de-bracketing of violence, its deregulation and intensification, whereby the enemy is absolutised as the inhuman monster**, ‘the negative pole of the distinction, [that] is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’.52 In line with Zizek’s diagnosis of ultra-politics, depoliticisation brings about nothing other than an extreme politicisation, which can no longer be contained within the symbolic dimension of potentiality but must pass into the actuality of existential negation: “Depoliticisation is a political act in a particularly intense way.”53 It is thus the liberal ‘peace project’ itself that produces its own opposite or perhaps reveals its own essence in the guise of its antithesis. As Schmitt notes, the practice of the constitution of the foe through the exclusion of ‘concrete Others’ from the abstract category of ‘humanity’ lends itself to infinite replication and generalisation: while one of the justifications for the extermination of American Indians consisted in the attribution to them of the crime of ‘eating human flesh’, ‘as civilisation progresses and morality rises, even less harmful things than devouring human flesh could perhaps qualify as deserving to be outlawed in such a manner. Maybe one day it will be enough if a people were unable to pay its debts.’54 In the following section we shall discuss the way in which Schmitt’s prophecy is being fulfilled through the proliferation of categories of population, whose acts and properties are deemed to be ‘proscribed by nature itself’.

Alt solvency- relationship with the other

**Only through recognition as enemy can the other be respected**

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[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Having dropped the charge of essentialism, Zizek is quick to press another charge against Schmitt: disavowing the ‘proper’ political antagonism through a paradoxical act of depoliticisation through ‘extreme’ politicisation that Zizek refers to as ‘ultra-politics’: In ultra-politics, the ‘repressed’ political returns in the guise of the attempt to resolve the deadlock of political conflict by its false radicalisation – by reformulating it as a war between Us and Them, our enemy, where there is no ground for symbolic conflict. … The clearest indication of this Schmittian disavowal of the political is the primacy of external politics (relations between sovereign states) over internal politics (inner social antagonism) on which he insists.25 We have argued elsewhere that, despite this type of criticism, Schmitt’s thought may be read as properly deconstructive with respect to the ‘domestic’ social order, highlighting its ‘inner antagonism’ precisely through the insistence on the aporetic foundations of any order that preclude its consolidation into a self-immanent system.26 What interests us presently is Zizek’s notion of ultra-politics, understood in terms of an intense conflict, in which there is no common ground that would permit recasting conflict in symbolic terms, i.e. as an internal structure of regulated antagonism that sustains a certain order rather than destroys it. In contrast to Zizek’s diagnosis, Schmitt’s work on international relations has persistently articulated both a possibility and the actual historical existence of such a ‘common ground’. The most famous example is of course the Westphalian states’ system and the juridical arrangement of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, which established a structure of managing antagonism that Schmitt termed the ‘bracketing’ (Hegung) of war: its limitation through rationalisation and humanisation.27 The Westphalian system delegitimised the recourse to the theological discourse of ‘just war’, responsible for the intense violence of the ‘wars of religion’, and instead relegitimised interstate war, as long as both sides in such a conflict approached each other as a ‘just enemy’ (justus hostis), existentially equal to the Self. The mutual recognition of the principle of sovereignty among European powers created the possibility of limiting the violence and intensity of military conflicts by virtue of the absence of any possibility that either party could appropriate the title of ‘just war’ for its own actions and thereby stigmatise, demonise or criminalise the enemy, depriving it of equal status and permitting its indiscriminate treatment. War was therefore by definition treated as ‘just on both sides’ and whatever was permitted to one party was also permitted to the other: ‘The essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. Such wars are the opposite of disorder.’28 What interests us in this modality of the friend–enemy distinction is the explicit requirement of equality between opponents in the common space of the ‘regulated contest of forces’. Indeed, the ontological equality of the self and the enemy is a fundamental characteristic of Schmitt’s thought that strongly contrasts with the asymmetric constellation of the self–other interaction in the ‘poststructuralist ethics’ of Levinas and Derrida.29 While for the latter the asymmetrical relation, whereby the Other calls the Self in question, is a prerequisite for the assumption of a genuinely ethical ‘responsibility’, for Schmitt any asymmetry, privileging either the Self or the Other, paves the way for absolute enmity and the actualisation of the ‘most extreme possibility’ of existential negation. For Schmitt, **being called in question by the Other is not in itself an ethical but simply a horrifying experience of the possibility of violent death**. What makes the encounter with the Other contingently ethical is precisely the possibility of the resolution of this asymmetry in the establishment of an empirical equality that actualises the equality that is always already inscribed in the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction: after all, in Schmitt’s ontology of radical alterity any two subjects are equal simply by virtue of being wholly different from each other.30 Schmitt’s normative preference for the Westphalian modality of enmity is therefore conditioned both by its correspondence to the ontological condition of equality-in-alterity and the desire to avoid the absolutisation of hostility that is inherent in any asymmetrical self–other interaction. What made possible the actualisation of ontological equality in the Westphalian period was the exclusion of all substantive (moral, economic or aesthetic) criteria, on the basis of which the properties or actions of any party could be deemed ‘unjust’, thus permitting the appropriation of the justa causa by the other party. In contrast, the ultrapolitical constellation, discussed by Zizek, is marked precisely by the presence of positive normative content in the positions of the opponents, whose incommensurability precludes the existence of a common ground between them. In this constellation, the Self inevitably perceives the Other not as a legitimate existential equal, but as a pure negation of the normative principles of the Self, the otherness of the Other reduced to a mere denial of the Self. Insofar as these normative principles are treated by the Self as unproblematic and unchallengeable, the enemy, viewed in solely negative terms of their refusal, becomes not merely the adversary in a regulated contest but an object of hate and revulsion, or, in Schmitt’s terms, an inimicus rather than a hostis.

Alt Solvency- New Politics

**And, Enmity is here to stay. Only by recognizing this can we forge new politics**

Thorup in ‘6 /lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Aarhus in Denmark/

[Mikkel, In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism, Ph.D. Dissertation]

This has not really been a defence of enmity; at least not of enmity as such. Rather, it has been, firstly, an insistence on enmity as an important category of scientific investigation and, secondly, of the political enmity as a critical corrective to the other forms discussed above. Only it that sense has it been a defence. Enmity is a neglected category of investigation, unless one includes the many moralist denunciations. It seems fair to presume that enmity is here to stay. If this is so, then we have to find ways to live with it. One very significant way is the liberal translation of enemies into conflict partners. This is a true humanist achievement. Yet it comes fraught with dangers or shadow sides. One of those is the uneventful life, mediocrity, the debased beings of liberal sociability; another is the ossifying of political life. I've been concentrating on some of the exclusionary effects of this translation of enmity and not least on the claim of a complete end of enmity proclaimed by liberal internationalism and then again by liberal globalism. In this way, the insistence on the persistence or returns of enmity, and not least on the political enmity as a contained and manageable one becomes a critical tool of informing liberalism of how, paradoxically, the embedding of its project keeps undermining its proclaimed goals: Liberal globalism becomes anti-pluralist; democratic peace becomes an instrument and argument of war; freedom becomes an excuse for bombardment; critique of nationalism helps force the vilified into more hardened, intransigent forms; critique of sovereignty becomes a new sovereigntist language; self-determination becomes the recipe for neo-colonial protectorates; the war on terror produces ever more terror; legitimacy becomes an instrument of dis-recognition; establishment of a new international law institutionalizes sovereign inequality; the move from politics to morality reintroduces the just war; finally, the end of enmity produces new enemies, also, and not least, the moral enmity of good and evil, competent and incompetent, self-determining and other-determining.

Alt Solvency- Value to Life

Enmity retains recognizes the need for both the self and other. Our ethic is the only way to preserve a value to life.

Rasch in 3 /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy”, Cultural Critique 54, pg. 120-147]

But while affirmative theorists like Habermas and Rawls are busy constructing the ideological scaffolding that supports the structure of the status quo, what role is there for the "critical" theorist to play? Despite the sanguine hopes of Hardt and Negri (2000) that "Empire" will all but spontaneously combust as a result of the irrepressible ur-desire of the multitude, can we seriously place our faith in some utopian grand alternative anymore, or in some revolutionary or therapeutic result based on the truth of critique that would allow us all, in the end, to sing in the sunshine and laugh everyday? Do, in fact, such utopian fantasies not lead to the moralizing hubris of a [End Page 142] Rawls or a Habermas? 16 In short, it is one thing to recognize the concealed, particular interests that govern the discourse and politics of human rights and quite another to think seriously about how things could be different, to imagine an international system that respected both the equality and the difference of states and/or peoples. Is it possible—and this is Todorov's question—to value Vitoria's principle of the "free circulation of men, ideas, and goods" and still also "cherish another principle, that of self-determination and noninterference" (Todorov 1984, 177)? The entire "Vitorian" tradition, from Scott to Habermas and Rawls, thinks not. Habermas, for instance, emphatically endorses the fact that "the erosion of the principle of nonintervention in recent decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights" (1998, 147), a "normative" achievement that is not so incidentally correlated with a positive, economic fact: "In view of the subversive forces and imperatives of the world market and of the increasing density of worldwide networks of communication and commerce, the external sovereignty of states, however it may be grounded, is by now in any case an anachronism" (150). And opposition to this development is not merely anachronistic; it is illegitimate, not to be tolerated. So, for those who sincerely believe in American institutional, cultural, and moral superiority, the times could not be rosier. After all, when push comes to shove, "we" decide—not only about which societies are decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of violence are "terrorist" and which compose the "gentle compulsion" of a "just war."

What, however, are those "barbarians" who disagree with the new world order supposed to do? With Agamben, they could wait for a "completely new politics" to come, but the contours of such a politics are unknown and will remain unknown until the time of its arrival. And that time, much like the second coming of Christ, seems infinitely deferrable. While they wait for the Benjaminian "divine violence" to sweep away the residual effects of the demonic rule of law (Benjamin 1996, 248-52), the barbarians might be tempted to entertain Schmitt's rather forlorn fantasy of an egalitarian balance of power. Yet if the old, inner-European balance of power rested on an asymmetrical exclusion of the non-European world, it must be asked: what new exclusion will be necessary for a new balance, and is that new exclusion tolerable? At the moment, there is no answer to [End Page 143] this question, only a precondition to an answer. If one wishes to entertain Todorov's challenge of thinking both equality and difference, universal commerce of people and ideas as well as self-determination and nonintervention, then the concept of humanity must once again become the invisible and unsurpassable horizon of discourse, not its positive pole. The word "human," to evoke one final distinction, must once again become descriptive of a "fact" and not a "value." Otherwise, whatever else it may be, the search for "human" rights will always also be the negative image of the relentless search for the "inhuman" other.

Alt Solvency-Dehumanization

The Enemy is to be respected as it is a part of us not annihilated and dehumanized

Galli 09 (Carlo, “On War and the Enemy”, The New Centennial Review Vol. 9 Number 2, Fall)

Niccolò Machiavelli is the creator of the first great modern political tradition, a radicalization of the republicanism of Florentine humanism. In Chapter XX of The Prince he maintains that a new prince must first of all arm his citizens. The image of armed citizens is typical in Machiavelli, not only in The Prince but even more in the Discourse on Livy. This image does render Machiavelli "modern," but in the sense of an agonistic and republican modernity whose objective is not to realize an Order deprived of conflict but an Order in which mankind's political energy manifests itself. Men may conflict with each other because of glory, love of their fatherlands, for political passion. This diffused energy—tempered but not neutralized by laws—is la virtù, the conceptual and institutional opposite of the exclusive concentration of power that modern sovereignty would come to be. According to Machiavelli, it is internal political conflict and not absolute unity that makes the city powerful toward the outside. This theory makes war for freedom on the inside, and for glory and memory on the outside, basically identical to politics (as is apparent from Machiavelli's recurrent hendiadys, in The Prince and in other works, "good laws and good arms"). In this theory, the enemy is not at all Other, and even less inhuman. It is rather an alter ego, since despite their mutual hostility, "enemy" and "friend" are functionally reversible and politically inseparable: indeed, in war and in the enemy we witness the manifestation of the universal logic of human nature and the nonanthropocentric common destiny of history

Link- Lines in the sand

**Link- The affirmative is an attempt to erase difference between the self and other and establish peace- we must reject this for clear lines in the sand between us and them**

Rasch in 5 /Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies, Indian University Bloomington, Ph.D. U of Washington/

[William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, Spring]

Schmitt, then, starts from the premise of imperfection and acknowledges an ontological priority of violence. If, he reasons, one starts with the rather biblical notions of sin and guilt, not natural innocence, then homogeneity, being contingent, historical, and not the least natural, must be predicated on heterogeneity. That is, citizenship or participation or community must be constructed, not assumed, and can only be local, circumscribed, not global. One recognizes one’s own in the face of the other and knows the comfort of inclusion only as the necessary result of exclusion—though in modern, functionally differentiated society, those inclusions and exclusions may be multiple, contradictory, and not necessarily tied to place. ‘‘An absolute human equality,’’ Schmitt writes in his Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, ‘‘would be an equality without the necessary correlate of inequality and as a result conceptually and practically meaningless, an indifferent equality. . . . Substantive inequalities would in no way disappear from the world and the state; they would shift into another sphere, perhaps separated from the political and concentrated in the economic, leaving this area to take on a new, disproportionately decisive importance.’’ 6 This, Schmitt’s, is not a popular sentiment, even if it echoes somewhat the Marxist distinction between a political and a social democracy, between a formal and substantial equality. But if one acknowledges that at least within modernity all inclusion requires exclusion, that inclusions and exclusions in addition to being unavoidable are also contingent and malleable, then rather than react with dismay, one might see in this ‘‘logical fact,’’ if fact it is, both the condition for the possibility of dissent and the condition for the possibility of recognizing in the one who resists and disagrees a fellow human being and thus legitimate political opponent, not a Lyon or Tyger or other Savage Beast.

For it is not that exclusions are miraculously made absent once distinctions are not formally drawn. On the contrary, unacknowledged distinctions, and those who are distinguished by them, simply go underground, become invisible, and grow stronger, more absolute, in their violent and explosive force. When the retrograde and condemned distinction between the ‘‘Greek’’ and the ‘‘barbarian’’ becomes a simple, sanguine affirmation of humanity, this ideal affirmation actually turns out to be nothing other than a distinction drawn between all those who, by their right behavior, show themselves to be truly ‘‘human’’ and those who, alas, by their perverse dissent, have revealed themselves to be evildoers, to be ‘‘inhuman.’’ Deliberate, visible, ‘‘external’’ distinctions that demarcate a space in which a ‘‘we’’ can recognize its difference from a ‘‘they,’’ preferably without marking that difference in a necessarily asymmetrical manner, are to be preferred, in Schmitt’s world, to the invisible and unacknowledged distinctions that mark those who are exemplary humans from those who, by their political dissent, show themselves to be gratuitously perverse. For reasons, then, of making difference visible, Schmitt favors lines drawn in the sand, or, in the ‘‘mythical language’’ used in The Nomos of the Earth, ‘‘firm lines’’ in the ‘‘soil,’’ ‘‘whereby definite divisions become apparent,’’ and, above them, on the ‘‘solid ground of the earth,’’ ‘‘fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses, and other constructs,’’ so that the ‘‘orders and orientations of human social life become apparent’’ and the ‘‘forms of power and domination become visible.’’7

Link- Pacifism

Link- Anti- War Pacifism the worst of all worlds – causes millions of deaths, appeasement of enemies, and there is no alternative

Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, ’02 (Alex, 12-9 “Peacenik Warmongers,” Ayn Rand Institute, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7458)

**Pacifism necessarily invites escalating acts of war against anyone who practices it. There is an increasingly vocal movement that seeks to engage America in ever longer, wider, and more costly wars--leading to thousands and perhaps millions of unnecessary deaths. This movement calls itself the "anti-war" movement. Across America and throughout the world, "anti-war" groups are staging "peace rallies" that attract tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of participants, who gather to voice their opposition to an invasion of Iraq and to any other U.S. military action in the War on Terrorism.** The goal of these rallies, the protesters proclaim, is to promote peace. "You can bomb the world to pieces," they chant, "but you can't bomb it into peace." If dropping bombs won't work, what should the United States do to obtain a peaceful relationship with the numerous hostile regimes, including Iraq, that seek to harm us with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? The "peace advocates" offer no answer. The most one can coax out of them are vague platitudes (we should "make common cause with the people of the world," says the prominent "anti-war" group Not in Our Name) and agonized soul-searching ("Why do they hate us?"). The absence of a peacenik peace plan is no accident**. Pacifism is inherently a negative doctrine--it merely says that military action is always bad.** As one San Francisco protestor put the point: "I don't think it's right for our government to kill people." In practice, this leaves the government only two means of dealing with our enemies: to ignore their acts of aggression, or to appease them by capitulating to the aggressor's demands.

Attempts at pacifism fail – evil exists in the world – attempts at utopianism are suicidal

Mersereau, served in the enlisted and officer ranks of the United States Marine Corps from 1990 to 1995; now an attorney, ’03 (Adam, “Down with the Peace Movement: The trouble with the antiwar warriors,” National Review Online, January 15, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-mersereau011503.asp)

Many members of the peace movement also hold tightly to a loosely defined utopianism. They believe that the human race (save conservative Republicans) is evolving toward a higher and more noble plane of social existence. The activists themselves are, of course, at the forefront of the evolutionary curve; while the Cro-Magnon in the White House and his Cabinet of Neanderthals stubbornly resist progress. Although the Left has largely declared the concepts of "good" and "evil" to be passé, the peace activist believes that the heart of man is intrinsically "good," and that it would be "evil" if we do not give Saddam Hussein every chance to let his goodness shine through. Utopianism is dead in the minds of most people, because as veterans of the 20th century, which was the bloodiest century ever, we cannot deny that "good" and "evil" are entangled within the hearts of men and many of his ideologies, and that peace is little more than a welcome respite between wars. We also know that unless the Saddam Hussein's and Kim Jong-il's of the world are Utopians too, then to champion utopianism in America or Europe is useless. Utopianism is folly; unilateral utopianism is suicidal. But rather than adjust their policy to reflect reality, the peace activists will march in circles, carry their signs, and wait for reality to reflect their policy.

Link- Peace

Peace and War form a zone of in distinction, one justifying the other

Galli 09 (Carlo, “On War and the Enemy”, The New Centennial Review Vol. 9 Number 2, Fall)

The second hypothesis is that, while the category of "enemy" certainly has to do with individual and collective self-identity—that is to say, with the Us—the enemy is nonetheless never fully alien: it is never the bearer of a dissimilarity so radical that, through its mere existence, it could strengthen the identity of the Us from the outside. The enemy is instead, and more often, the pole of a relation, although a hostile one: if, **to produce a fully formed Us, we need an enemy to exclude, this means that we cannot do without the enemy, that the enemy is somehow constitutive of our own identity, that it [End Page 195] is therefore always internal to the Us.** The friend bears the enemy inside, not outside of itself. The enemy is bound up with our identity, not only because it makes it be, but also because it has the potential to make it not be: the enemy not only determines our own identity, but also threatens it from within. The enemy is not then radically dissimilar to the Us. Rather, even though it brings subtle and deadly differences into the Us, it is similar to the Us to the point of being disquieting and anguishing. The enemy is, in short, not only feindlich but also unheimlich. **The disturbing implication of this relationship between friend and enemy—the one being internal to the other—is that peace is potentially infiltrated by war, and that war and peace, even if so apparently distant from one other, in reality have a secret relation that always poses the risk of collapsing them into indistinction.**

Link- Humanity

Link- Actions carried out in the name of humanity create a subhuman other that must be annihilated

Rasch 03 (William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, “Human Rights as Geopolitics Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy”, Cultural Critique, 2003)

For Schmitt, the Christianity of Vitoria, of Salamanca, Spain, 1539, represents a concrete, spatially imaginable order, centered (still) in Rome and, ultimately, Jerusalem. This, with its divine revelations, its Greek philosophy, and its Roman language and institutions, is the polis. This is civilization, and outside its walls lie the barbarians. **The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars?** We can understand Schmitt's concerns in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become believers, they must be of the same category of being. **To be human, [End Page 135] then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies *beyond* that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike—can only, in other words, be *in*human. As Schmitt says:**

**Only with the concept of the human in the sense of absolute humanity does there appear as the other side of this concept a specifically new enemy, the inhuman.** In the history of the nineteenth century, setting off the inhuman from the human is followed by an even deeper split, the one between the superhuman and the subhuman. In the same way that the **human creates the inhuman, so in the history of humanity the superhuman brings about with a dialectical necessity the subhuman as its enemy twin**

Link- Human Rights

Human Rights become a tool to exclude those we view as subhuman- this is the logic that caused us to military intervene in the first place

Rasch 03 (William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, “Human Rights as Geopolitics Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy”, Cultural Critique, 2003)

And yet, despite—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the *First World*" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his *The Law of Peoples* (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). [13](http://oboler.isu.edu:2202/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html" \l "FOOT13) That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What **are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, [End Page 140] liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world**. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty. As Rawls states, "Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and historically profound changes in how the powers of sovereignty have been conceived since World War II" (79). Yet, what Rawls sees as a postwar development in the notion of sovereignty—that is, its restriction—could not, in fact, have occurred had it not been for the *unrestricted* sovereign powers of the victors of that war, especially, of course, the supreme power of the United States. The limitation of (others') sovereignty is an imposed limitation, imposed by a sovereign state that has never relinquished its own sovereign power. What for Vitoria was the sovereignty of Christendom and for Scott the sovereignty of humanity becomes for Rawls the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself. [14](http://oboler.isu.edu:2202/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html" \l "FOOT14)

Link World without Enemies

A world without enemies is one of total annihilation

Moreiras 05 (Alberto, Anne and Robert Bass Professor of Romance Studies and Literature and director of the Center for European Studies at Duke University, “Beyond the Line: On Infinite Decolonization”, American Literature History, 2005)

**If all enemies are unjust enemies, all enemies must be exterminated. There is no end and no limitation to war: war is total, and that is so both for the friends of the nomos and for their unjust *enemies*.** But total war cannot be a fundamental orientation and a principle of order. The notion of total war announces the end of any possible reign of nomic order. It also announces a radicalization of the political, precisely as it **opens itself to its most extreme determination of war, total war. But a total war without a nomos is a totally unregulated, totally non-discriminatory war, without legality. And a war under those conditions cannot abide by a concept of friendship since it has generalized the friend-enemy division into its complete disruption.** Friendship presupposes legality. Faced with total war, humanity finds itself deprived of amity, just as it finds itself deprived of enmity. At the logical end of the concept, the political division finds its own end. Total war is the end of the political.

Link- Morality

MORALITY RESULTS IN BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL BY THE STATE  
Day 01 (Richard, Ethics, affinity and the coming communities. B.A.Sc.(UBC), M.A.(York,Toronto), Ph.D.(SFU) Associate Professor, 2001)

Contemporary Western societies are not only societies of the tree; they are also societies of the state form. Since it is impossible to do justice to this concept here, I will restrict the discussion to the couplet war-machine/state form, and the relations of this couplet with the arborescent/rhizomatic distinction. State forms, at the highest level of generality, are apparatuses of capture that bring ‘outside’ elements ‘inside’ by connecting them up with an arborescent system. While Deleuze and Guattari do provide elements of a genealogy (1986: 424–37), they are careful to point out that the state form cannot be traced back to a point of origin. Rather, ‘there have been states always and everywhere’ (429), coexisting in relations of competition and cooperation with war-machines, forces that are exterior to the state apparatus and attempt to ‘untie the bonds’ of capture (352), to ‘destroy the State and its subjects’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1983: 104). In terms of social and political effects, states tend to perpetuate already instantiated (arborescent) forms, while war-machines tend to destroy old forms and instantiate new ones through rhizomatic connections. 103). This is the ‘special danger’ of the war-machine: if it does not succeed in warding off the development of a state form, it must pass into the service of the state or destroy itself (104). It is here, in the form of ecstatic injunctions accompanied by somber warnings, that Deleuze and Guattari, like Foucault, present not only a ‘negative’ call to resistance, but also a consistent and ‘positive’ ethicopolitical stance. At times, they take us even further than this, advocating what Keith Ansell-Pearson has called ‘novel images of positive social relations’ (Ansell-Pearson, 1998: 410). Thus Deleuze: ‘We have no need to totalize that which is invariably totalized on the side of [dead] power; if we were to move in this direction, it would mean restoring the representative forms of centralism and a hierarchical structure. We must set up lateral affiliations and an entire system of networks and popular bases’ (Foucault, 1996: 78). This system of networks and popular bases, organized along rhizomatic lines and actively warding off the development of arborescent structures, would provide bases for social forces that neither ask for gifts from the state (as in the liberal-democratic new social movements) nor seek state power themselves (as in classical Marxism). Unlike the molar forms of social transformation, these molecular movements would resist the will to domination in Foucault’s sense, in favour of affinity; that is, they would take up ethico-political positions but refuse to try coercively to generalize these positions by making moral, ontological, or other foundational claims.

MORALITY AND CLAIMS OF PEACEFUL TRUTHS CAN BE CATASTROPHIC   
Huijer 99 (Mark, The aesthetics of existence in the work of Michel Foucault. Centre for Gender and Diversity, University of Maastricht Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 1999)

It would have been only logical to round off this ’political technology of the body’ with the ’death of man’ or the ’death of the body’. Because no matter how much insight Foucault’s analysis might provide into the disciplining forces that are operative in Western societies, the individual with his docile body, as it came to the fore in Surveiller et punir, has just as negligible a right to exist as the ’man’ from Les mots et les choses. But perhaps, as Franqois Ewald proposed, we should conceive of Foucault’s genealogical analysis as a genealogical critique, as a weapon against that power that divests it of all its masks and takes it to pieces (Ewald, 1975: 1235). For Foucault, this experience is not a case of being-subjected-to something or someone, nor is it a case of being-linked-to one’s own identity, it is an experience that comes into being in an interplay of truths and power relations. In these games of truth and power relations, the human being constitutes a relationship to himself (experiences himself) through a certain link to ’truth’. This last thought movement makes the declaration of the death of ’man’ superfluous: ’man’ can be perceived as one of the figures in a multifarious series of subjectivities. A bit more than a decade later, Foucault referred to his philosophical statementin Les mots et les choses that ’man’ had all but perished as a mistake. Instead of stating that ’man’ or ’the subject’ was dead, what he wanted to say was ’that in the course of history, human beings have never ceased to construct themselves, in other words to perpetually alter the level of their subjectivity and constitute themselves in a manifold and infinite series of differing subjectivities that will never reach a final point and will never position us eye to eye with man’ (Foucault, 1980a, DE IV: 75). The aesthetics of existence is a stylization of the relation to oneself, existing side by side with other formations. It is not a prescription or an ideal to be strived for by everyone. According to Foucault, ’ The search for a form of morality acceptable for everyone - in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it - seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault, 1984j, DE IV: 706)