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Security K 1NC (1/3)

**The 1AC logic of security is the dominant western ontology of being - the metaphysics of security permeates all understanding of international relations.**

James Der Derian, Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University and Professor of Political Science at UMASS/Amherst 1995 “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard” On Security)

Yet **the center**, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us**, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything**—trans portation capital and information flows, change itself—**have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said**—that is, until the 1992 Pres identia election went into full swing—”**The enemy is unpredictability The enemy is instability”** One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future con flict ranging from *latino* small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT (“Reemergent Global Threat’). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah- state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the *International Studies Quarterly****,* the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders**.3 After acknowledging that “the boundaries of intellectual - disciplines ate permeable” the author proceeds not only to raise the draw bridgebut also to caulk every chink in the moat.4 **Recent attempts to ‘broaden the concept of” security” to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening “to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.”**5 The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. .3 t.9 Ll\_1 The suthor of the essay, Stephen WalChas written one of the better books **00** alliance systems;6 here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against “foreign” others, with the “postmodernist” as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on “political correctness,” the “liberals” of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves.7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of “reflectivism,” to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: “As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers ‘have delineated. . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.’ “ By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that **the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a “security crisis” in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. ‘What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is**, *other than us?* ‘What might such a dialogue sound like? **Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present to reinrerpret and possibly construct through the reinterpretation—a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.**

Security K 1NC (2/3)

**The ontology of security makes obliteration inevitable.**

David Dillon & Michael Campbell, Prof of International Politics @ U of Newcastle, and Prof of Politics and Lancaster U, 1993 The political Subject of Violence, 163-165)

It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful—indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point. But **having reached** what Foucault has called **society's 'threshold of modernity', 'we' now face a prospect that radically refigures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction.** As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold **because the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, [hu]man remained** what he was for Aristotle**: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modem [hu]man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question. How the prospect of extinction might materialised itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not.** The double bind of this prospect is that **modernity's alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of** (inter)national **life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason's success**: not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously **in setting the parameters of the political** (la politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (la politique). **The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension**. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust**.** For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis' genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, **there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of** this **horror**. In so far as **modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the 'civilising process**'. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, **the Holocaust 'was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity**; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house.

Security K 1NC (3/3)

**All progressive thought is neutralized by modern realism. You should vote negative as an active gesture against securitization towards a more imaginative international relations.**

Michael Dillon, Senior Lecturer In Politics And International Relations At The University Of Lancaster, 1996 The Politics Of Security

**Reimagining politics is**, of course, **easier said than done. Resistance to it - especially in International Relations - nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Remaining politics therefore means thinking differently.** Moreover, the **project of that thinking differently leads to thinking 'difference' itself.** Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, as much as it does from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialization and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so- called suspicion of thought - I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought - is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity: that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards **rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is,** therefore, **to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, bv departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought.**

\*\*Links\*\*

Borders Link

Concepts of state sovereignty reified in border ontology constructs the world as a series of static identities. These notions create a basis of otherization and securitization legitimizing endless violence.

Michael J. Shapiro, Proff @ University of Hawaii, ’99, “Samuel Huntington’s Moral Geography”

Most significantly, the norms prescribing constraints and codes of decency, which initially related primarily to within-society class dynamics as well as to state-sponsored aspect of pacification, acquired a collective, ontological significance; they **became part of a cluster of ideas about nationaln distinctiveness.** George Mosse argues that the norms comprising civilite' needed a broader warrant; they "had to be informed by an ideal if they were to be effective...In most timely fashion, nationalism came to the rescue." And **since** the epoch of **state-formation,** in which these codes and nationalism have been interconnected, **the civilizational map has served** various expressions of **domestic anxiety about dangers to** the nation and/or to **Western civilization** as a whole. Modernity in western nations is therefore a period in which we witness the coalescence of the codes of civilization and decency. Historically, the triumph of bourgeois classes has been associated with their specific codes of decency. Added to that since then, however, has been the post hoc **moralizing of** those **codes** which has **allowed them to be a basis for judgment of** both **deviance** within the state **and dangers** from without. **As a result, the** modern **state** **has** in various ways **performed its commitment to possessing a distinctive national culture.** Huntington's **attempt to consolidate a cultural singularity for the U.S.** and "the West" **constitutes** another **such** performance with a different cartographic spin. **It is an attempt to impose** a **unity on** a **diversity** that keeps the nation and its preferred global "ethnic" neighborhood whole. **Nevertheless**, as Etienne Balibar has noted, **"No nation**, that is no national state, **has an ethnic basis**...**but** **they** do **have** to institute in real (and therefore in historical) time their **imaginary unity** against other possible unities." 28 . In order to produce such an imaginary unity, Huntington must freeze-frame culture. His **fear of an assault on** western **culture** **requires** **a static version of** "**culture**," which he construes as a more or less fixed civilizational characteristic, based primarily on mentalities - for example "shared beliefs."29 **If one focuses instead on dynamics of acculturation**, **it becomes difficult to fix** either "**American**" or "western" **culture.** Over time, "culture" in the sense of practices of space, memory, subjectivity, and collective responsibility (among other things), alters as various different peoples share proximity as well as engaging in both direct and mediated encounters. What has produced "western civilization" has been a dynamic of adjustment as various cultural practices, often attributed to the non West, inflect "western" cultural practices. **In short, Huntington conjures away the foreignness within "the West."** This is not the place to treat his various oversimplifications and depluralizations of the so-called non-West. A critical literature has increasingly addressed these shortcomings.30 It is his geographic imaginary, his practice of line-drawing that one must address to recognize how Huntington, and indeed the security analyst in general, manages to conceptually isolate what is ambiguous with respect to civilizational groupings. **In constructing a "fortress community"**31 by drawing lines between the West and the rest, **Huntington denies the interdependencies involved in** producing and reproducing **the West** **and** the rest as well as the ambiguities of the **cultural orientations within** the **various groupings.** The consequences of this kind of boundary fixation can be demonstrated with reference to the retrospective treatment of one source of the barbarian anxiety that those who worry about "cultural security" manifest, the story of the fall of ancient Rome. Contrary to the familiar story of the fall of ancient Rome - that it succumbed to the barbarians at the gates, Rome could not be understood as circumscribed by sharp boundaries. As C. R. Whittaker has shown, Roman frontiers were not precise lines of defense or enforcement, which radically separated what was Rome from non-Rome. Roman frontiers were more zonal than wall-like.32 The ancient world had been, in varying degrees, Romanized, and the place between Rome and non-Rome was a zone, not a wall of defense. Nevertheless, one contemporary security analyst, relying on the mythic, barbarians at the gates story and preoccupied with modern geopolitical lines, succumbed to the temptation to see Rome in terms of strict geopolitical boundaries rather than ambiguous zonal frontiers. In like manner, Huntington has drawn **a** sharp **boundary** **around** "**western** **culture**." In order to do so, he too **must rely on an ethnographically dubious story**, one about the development of "the West." His emphasis is on the establishment of a harmonious and consensual order rather than on, for example, the struggles that remain within the order.While he ethnicizes the conflicts abroad, based on mythic histories of such global arenas as the Balkans, which never had the sharp ethnic divisions that he and other security analysts ascribe to them, **he de-ethnicizes the western peoples**capes and constructs the civilization of the West on the basis of abstract principles such as "equality before the law."

China Link

The normalized logic of the 1AC presumes to represent China as an objective and knowable subject of inquiry for security politics. This is part of a larger policy of xenophobic nationalism that constructs external threats to America hegemony in order to legitimate an ever expanding military interventionism and makes a self-fulfilling prophecy inevitable.

Chengxin Pan Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, 2004 “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China pre­cisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, **they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means**. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often con­flicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations**, sug­gests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3** Secondly, associated with the first assumption, **it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality.** And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, **they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is."** That is, **the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt.** I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "obser­vation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" ver­sus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that **U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves** (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, **they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are bet­ter understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality.** In other words, **it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe.** In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other con­structions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.4 Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implica­tions for international politics.5 It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how **this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the uni­versal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute cer­tainty and security.** Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dan­gerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.

Death Link (1/2)

The affirmatives anxiety towards death is only intelligible from a position of ontological anxiety. Their impact scenarios prevent an authentic relationship to death which makes the fear their 1ac inspires inevitable

James Park, University of Minnesota and activist in Unitarian Church, 2K1Our existential predicament; loneliness, depression, anxiety & death pg. 183-184

**The 'fear of death' is a composite experience encompassing**: (1) **the abstract**, objective, external, empirical **fact of** **biological death;**(2) **our personal**, subjective, emotional **fear of ceasing-to-be**, **which arises from our awareness of our own finitude;** & (3) **our own most ontological anxiety**, our Existential Predicament **disguised as the fear of ceasing-to-be**. **This least understood and most repressed existential dimension of death** (which has also been called "being-towards-death" and "the anxiety of nonbeing"), will be the focus of this phenomenological investigation. **Whenever "death" is mentioned**, **we think first of biological death, but this tendency to focus exclusively on the objective, terminal fact of dying might well be a trick of thought designed to protect us from noticing our fear of ceasing-to-be or our even deeper ontological anxiety**. We have other protective techniques as well: religious illusions, philosophical desensitization, & diversionary small-talk. Most of **these distracting ploys amount to seeing death exclusively as an objective event**, **which befalls all plants, animals, & people** eventually. **All such attempts to picture and talk about death as a fact are** (at least in part) **attempts to evade the two deeper dimensions of death by interpreting death only from the point of view of a spectator**. Even our scholarly symposia about death often provide only an objective understanding of death. **Such approaches keep death outside of ourselves -a phenomenon we know about only as observers, never as participants**. **Here,** however, **we will push in the opposite direction**: First, we will attempt **to get beyond the objective fact of death** **to our** deeper, **subjective response to finitude-our fear of ceasing-to-be**. **And,** not being satisfied with that dimension, **we will seek to probe even deeper behind our fear of ceasing-to-be to uncover our repressed ontological anxiety -the threatening inner state-of-being that possesses us continuously from the time we become aware of ourselves but which has very little connection with the fact of death**. It will be relatively easy to move beyond the objective, public, external, spectator's vision of death as a once-in-a-life-time event-in fact, the end-event of life to feeling subjectively our deep fear of ceasing-to-be. But it will be more difficult to separate the deeper dimensions of death: our terrifying fear of ceasing-to-be and our underlying ontological anxiety. If we probe even below our personal fear of ceasing-to-be-in-the-world, we might discover the cause of much of our evasive talk and deceptive posturing; we might pull the covers off our trembling, naked ontological anxiety. If we find ways to look deeply into ourselves, exposing even our most clever tricks of thought, then not only will we begin truly to fear our own deaths, but we might even confront our underlying ontological anxiety. This ontological anxiety is obscurely felt by all of us as a subjective awareness drifting up from our inner depths, a pervasive haunting of our whole being, which we are reluctant to confront because we have no easy way to handle it. This continuous inner state-of-being is not the result of the fact of dying; it is not worry arising from the inevitability of actual death. Rather, **our ontological anxiety is the deepest truth of our existence, obviously deeper than the external, objective, empirical fact of biological death, but even deeper than our inward, subjective, personal fear of ceasing-to-be.** **Our ontological anxiety does not arise from the fact of death, but much of our concern about death arises from our ontological anxiety**! (This paradoxical statement should become clear in the next 70 pages.) If our ontological anxiety truly grips us, **we can go either of two possible ways:** (1) **We can organize our lives around this all-pervasive 'threat', courageously embracing our ontological anxiety,** moving ourselves toward "Authentic Existence". **Or** (2) **we can be freed from our ontological anxiety after having fully acknowledged it (and attained some Authenticity), thereby coming into the new inner state-of-being "Existential Freedom".**

Death Link (2/2)

**This confrontation with anxiety outweighs their extinctions scenarios because destruction has already occurred in the inner-space**

Walter a. Davis, Professor of English at Ohio State, 2001, Deracination: historocity, hiroshima, and the tragic imperative, p. 103-104

We begin with an effort to describe what is the deepest experience—the one most deeply denied. **Catastrophic anxiety is that fear that haunts us from within**,7 **the fear that one has already been annihilated**; that, like Beckett, one has “never been born properly” and never will be because inner paralysis is the psyche’s defining condition—a truth attested each time when, striving to cohere as a subject, one collapses before the tidal wave of an aggression against oneself that rises up from within. **An unspeakable dread weds the psyche to terror.** All other forms of anxiety are pale after-thoughts. There **is a threat worse than extinction. The deepest self-knowledge we harbor, the knowledge that haunts us as perhaps our deepest self-reference is the fear that our inner world is ruled by a force opposed to our being.** **Death is the icy wind that blows through all we do. This is the anxiety from which other anxieties derive as displacements, delays, and vain attempts to deny or attenuate our terror before a dread that is nameless and must remain so lest despair finalize its hold on us.** In catastrophic anxiety the destruction of one’s power to be and the ceaseless unraveling of all attempts to surmount this condition is experienced as an event that has already happened. That event forms the first self-reference: the negative judgment of an Other on one’s being—internalized as self-undoing. Postmodern posturing before the phrase “I am an other” here receives the concretization that shatters “free play.” There is a wound at the heart of subjectivity, a self-ulceration that incessantly bleeds itself out into the world. The issue of the wound is a soul caked in ice, in a despair that apparently cannot be mediated: the nightmare state of a consciousness utterly awake, alone and arrested, all exits barred, facing inner paralysis as the truth of one’s life. **We ceaselessly flee this experience because if it ever comes down full upon us an even more terrifying process begins: an implosion in which one’s subjective being is resolved into fragments of pure anxiety that leave one incapable of existing as subject except in the howl to which each suffered state descends in a final, chilling recognition—that everything one has done and suffered is but sound and fury, signifying nothing. One has become a corpse with insomnia. Identity and self-reference thereafter ceaselessly circle about that void.**This is the hour of the wolf, where one is arrested before the primary fact: at the deepest register of the psyche one finds a voice of terror. Fear **of psychic dissolution is the ground condition of our being as subjects. Subjectivity is founded in anguish before the dread of becoming no more than bits and pieces of pure horror, fleeing in panic a voice that has already overtaken us, resolving our subjective being into traumatic episodes of pure persecution. At the heart of inwardness a malevolent spirit presides**. To put it in nuclear metaphors**: catastrophic anxiety is the threat of implosion into the other’s unlimited destructiveness.** To complete the picture we need only add Winnicott’s point: **people live in dread of this situation, projecting fear of a breakdown into the future, because the breakdown has already occurred**.8

Economy Link

**Economic securitization is always the precursor to military aggression. Each are different tactics towards the same strategy of global domination.**

Ronnie Lipschutz, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, 1998 “On Security” p. 11-12

**The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security."** What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how **strategic economic interdependence**--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--**undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that,** it is often argued, **are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening.** (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have*  been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, **state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state *autonomy*  through self-reliance** although, **in doing so, they are likely to undermine state *strength*  via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies,** although this begins to include pretty much everybody. **It** also **threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former** approach **may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market,** and not military, **forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable.** All else being equal, **in all three cases, the** **state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned.** But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

**Economic crisis is a state of exception in which mass violence may be committed in order to fulfill the demand for an imminent response to economic problems.**

Giorgio Agamben, prof. philosophy European Graduate School, 2000 Means Without End, Univ. Minnesota Press, p. 133

**Nothing is more nauseating than the impudence with which those who have turned money into their only raison d'etre periodically wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis**: the rich nowadays wear plain rags so as to warn the poor that sacrifices will be necessary for everybody. And the docility is just as astonishing; those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous with the imbalance of the public debt, by handing all their savings over to the state in exchange for bonds, now receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash and ready themselves to tighten their belts. And yet those **who have any lucidity left in them know that the crisis is always in process and that it constitutes the internal motor of capitalism in its present phase, much as the state of exception is today the normal structure of political power.** And just as the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents deprived of political rights and that in fact at the outer limit all citizens be reduced to naked life, in such a way **crisis, having now become permanent, demands not only that the people of the ~~Third World~~ become increasingly poor, but also that a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job. And there is no so-called democratic state today that is not compromised and up to its neck in such a massive production of human misery**.

Focus on Political/State Link (1/2)

The affirmatives framing of the question in terms of what the government should do obfuscates our own personal responsibility for the violence that surrounds us. The continual search for grand stages of action for solutions to violence elides the fact that we create the conditions that allow violence in our everyday thoughts. We as individual must recognize and focus on our own ethical responsibility for war and violence

Susanne Kappeler, associate professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al-Akhawayn University, 95 The Will to Violence from the opening chapter “Violence and the Will to Violence”

**War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society**; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world other­wise just to children. **The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.** 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulie" at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relation­ships, values — in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 `**We are the war' – and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifesta­tions in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen `We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society** — which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.6 **On the contrary**, **the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible** for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet **our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility** — leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens —even more so those of other nations — have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia — since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere.Yet **our insight that** indeed **we are not responsible** for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president **tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all,** **not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action.** In particular, **it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events**, **or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions**. It not only shows that **we participate in** what Beck calls **'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences**. **It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers**. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is

**[Continues]**

Focus on Political/State Link (2/2)

**[Continued]**

perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I *could* do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'?`**We are this war'**, however, **even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks**, namely as Drakuli6 says, **in our `non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer**. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' — our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.**

**Violence on levels of extreme magnitude does not differ and is actually the natural extension of the violence of everyday life. Disrupting this process requires we re-center our political thinking around the individual will**

Susanne Kappeler, associate professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al-Akhawayn University, 95 The Will to Violence from the opening chapter “Violence and the Will to Violence”

**This does not** mean that I **deem** the **obvious and systematic forms of violence** – from the violence of men against women and children, the racist violence of whites against Black people and people of the Third World, to the violence of the state and its military forces, or violence against animals and nature (which is hardly even discussed in the context of violence) – **a less urgent problem than individual beha­viour**. Rather**, the obvious importance and magnitude of 'social' problems of violence cannot be the pretext for considering apparently `lesser' or more 'harmless' forms of 'personal' violence (our own) a matter for postponement until the major problems have been solved.** **Violence cannot be measured as larger or smaller, more or less, even if the consequences of violence differ enormously**. The consequences differ, however, neither in their measurable size as 'damage' nor in the size or measure of the violence which caused them, but in terms of the means used on the one hand, and in their specificity, uniqueness and incomparability as experience on the other. **Violence as the struc­ture of action is neither greater nor lesser: it either is or is not violence**. Moreover, **personal behaviour is no alternative to 'political' action; there is no question of either/or**. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider 'normal' but which betray our own will to violence – the connection, in other words, be­tween our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely **because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to 'political issues' or to 'personal behaviour', the question of the politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique.**  **Violence** – what we usually recognize as such – **is no exception to the rules,** no deviation from the normal and nothing out of the ordinary, **in a society in which exploitation and oppression are the norm**, the ordinary and the rule. **It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for 'harmless' consump­tion by humans.** It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. **Violence as we usually perceive it is 'simply' a specific** –and to us still visible – **form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and everyday life.**

Heg Link

**Inscribing the United States with the identity of a global hegemony constructs the globe as a series of endless threats in need of securitization.**

David Campbell, Professor International Politics at University of New Castle, 1998 "Writing Security; United States Foreign Policy the Politics of Identity," p. 31-33

Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten. **The contours of** this **identity have been the subject of** constant (re)writing; no rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of **inscribing something so that which is** contingent and **subject to flux is rendered** more **permanent.** While one might have expected few if any **references to national values or purposes** in confidential prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, **and the responsibilities** and duties **thrust upon** the gleaming example of **America**. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy **did more than** simply **offer** strategic analysis of the "**reality**" they confronted: **they** actively **concerned themselves with** the **scripting** of **a particular American identity.** Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations. In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment: The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on anxiety, of course. **Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach acceptance of fixed social norms.** But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of *un*fulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome. Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the political and military threat of communism and the Society Union. **More recently**, with **Pentagon planners concerned about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the United States**, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been no less insistent. **As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world."** And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption" and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered mission stands as testament. **The cold war**, then **, was both a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates**, regardless of their strategic capacity, **were slotted as a threat**. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming, or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that **the phrase cold war** was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, **we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity**: a struggle that is no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American) interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - **with their zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of** internal **challenge** and subversion**, the tendency to militarize all response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them - were not specific** to one state or ideology. **As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.**

IR/Ontology Link

Dominant understanding of IR foreclose the relationship to Being – producing a series of policy actions that misunderstand the world and generate violence

Jim George, a lecturer in the Dept. of Poly Sci @ Australian National Univ., 93 “Of Incarcaeration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order” Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol.22 No. 2

This paper seeks to contribute to this debate in a manner which compliments the general concerns of diverse commentators such as Lapham, Havel, Post, Hoffmann, Strange and Vasquez, but which develops and extends their perspectives to take into account an even greater diversity of contemporary critical works on these issues." It does so, primarily, in relation to a Critical Social Theory (CST) literature which over **the past two decades has sought to locate IR**, **and its contemporary politico-strategic problems, as part of a much larger critical debate over dominant approaches to theory and practice in Anglo-American societies in particular**:8 In broader terms, the paper aims to establish that the issues **at stake in these various commentaries on US identity, the continuance of stilted traditionalism in thinking** on Bosnia and Eastern Europe **and the predictable violence** of the Gulf War **are,** as Havel recognises, **an integral part of that larger and more profound conversation about modern ways of thinking and Being**. In particular, it argues that **post-Cold War issues of political `practice' resonate with questions of modern philosophical discourse and the dominant traditions by which we have come to know and give meaning to the world and represent that meaning as reality**. The suggestion, more precisely, is that **the questions and issues of ontology and epistemology**—of the way we think and act in the world and understand reality—**have either been ignored in IR, or rendered marginal and barely relevant by an orthodoxy which has interpreted the Western historical and philosophical story in a narrow, exclusionary and superficial manner**. **The result: the continued incarceration of the IR community within a regime of both discursive closure and analytical/policy paralysis.**

IR/Patriarchy Link

International relations are based on a patriarchal concept of power and being - the feminine is excluded from political discourse and marginalized justifying endless cycles of violence

J. Ann Tickner, Professor of International Relations at USC. 2001 Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era. Columbia University Press: 2001 <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tia01/>

**In an era characterized by the hegemony of neoliberal ideology, structural- adjustment policies have placed further burdens on women as government programs have been scaled back and women have taken on unremunerated welfare and caregiving functions previously assumed by the state**. Gender analysis highlights that structural-adjustment programs, along with other economic policies and consequences of economic globalization, are not gender neutral. Local resistances to these adverse effects, which often go unnoticed, are acting as generators of new knowledge upon which feminists are drawing to counter the growing neoliberal consensus. **Globalization involves more than economic forces; it has also led to the spread of Western-centered definitions of human rights and democracy. Feminist scholars are questioning whether these definitions are gender biased: for example, until very recently violence against women was not considered part of the international community’s human-rights agenda**. Additionally, **postcolonial feminists are drawing attention to the ways in which Western feminism may itself be complicit in imposing a Western view of democracy and rights that ignores issues of race and cultural differences.** Conversely, it is important to recognize that cultural reassertions against Westernization are often framed in terms that result in the regulation and control of women. **Feminists also claim that, while democratization is being celebrated by Western liberals, new democracies are not always friendly toward women. Feminists have traditionally been suspicious of what they see as the legacy of the Western liberal-democratic tradition that they claim is patriarchal and that, historically, has favored men’s over women’s interests.** Additionally, **since women have traditionally had less access to formal political institutions, the focus on state institutions by scholars of democratization may miss ways in which women are participating in politics—outside formal political channels at the grassroots level.**

**Patriarchal conceptions of international relations create endless militaristic violence, massive ecological destruction and sustain oppression.**

J. Ann Tickner, Professor of International Relations at USC. 92 Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, , <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/>

In previous chapters I have argued that **traditional notions of national security are becoming dysfunctional. The heavy emphasis on militarily defined security, common to the foreign policy practices of contemporary states and to the historical traditions from which these practices draw their inspiration, does not ensure, and sometimes may even decrease, the security of individuals, as well as that of their natural environments. Many forms of insecurity in the contemporary world affect the lives of individuals, including ethnic conflict, poverty, family violence, and environmental degradation; all these types of insecurity can be linked to the international system,** yet their elimination has not been part of the way in which states have traditionally defined their national security goals. Previous chapters have also called attention to the extent to which these various forms of military, economic, and ecological insecurity are connected with unequal gender relations. **The relationship between protectors and protected depends on gender inequalities; a militarized version of security privileges masculine characteristics and elevates men to the status of first-class citizens by virtue of their role as providers of security**. An analysis of economic insecurities suggests similar patterns of gender inequality in the world economy, patterns that result in a larger share of the world's wealth and the benefits of economic development accruing to men. **The traditional association of women with nature, which places both in a subordinate position to men, reflects and provides support for the instrumental and exploitative attitude toward nature characteristic of the modern era, an attitude that contributes to current ecological insecurities. This analysis has also suggested that attempts to alleviate these military, economic, and ecological insecurities cannot be completely successful until the hierarchical social relations, including gender relations, intrinsic to each of these domains are recognized and substantially altered.** In other words, **the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations.**

Middle East Link (1/2)

**The media representations the 1ac calls to support their plan are built upon the historical belief that the Middle East is a place of blood thirsty barbarians. Not only are these representations racist forms of imposition of identity, they also serve to justify imperial interventions that violently attempt to extinguish difference.**

Mohammed Hirchi, Assistant Professor of Arabic and French at Colorado State University, USA, where he teaches Arabic language, literature and cultures, “Media representations of the Middle East,” WACC, 2002, <http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/publications/media_development/2007_2/media_representations_of_the_middle_east>

**Media representations of Middle Easterners** in the United States **have been instrumental in the construction of** a number of **negative stereotypes portraying them as carnal, enigmatic, exotic, unpredictable and violent. After** the attacks of **September 11**, 2001 **and the** American **invasion of Iraq, these images have been intensified through a** well structured **network of television and film depictions.** Within this particular historical and political context, **images are loaded with ideological propaganda and are constructed to articulate, transmit, promote and legitimize knowledge and information about this** geographical **location. They are subject to manipulation by various political apparatuses and to tight government control**.  So how have these images that represent ‘difference’ in popular culture been elaborated to classify and to locate Middle Easterners in the realm of ‘Otherness’? In what terms do the mass media create or reflect negative perceptions and/or (mis)understandings of Middle Eastern realities? What are the issues or problems that such representations create? In what ways does media coverage within the Middle East differ from or conflict with media coverage outside the region? Is it true that only Middle Easterners can understand the Middle East?  In this article, I will draw on an anthropological model that suggests that culture depends on giving things meaning by assigning them to particular positions within a classificatory system. According to Stuart Hall, ‘the marking of “difference” is the basis of that symbolic order which we call culture’ (1997: 236). In this context, **binary oppositions are crucial for maintaining difference which is fundamental for producing cultural meaning**.  **This marking of difference is articulated within clear boundaries; it does not tolerate ambiguous, unstable or hybrid spaces of indeterminacy.** According to Hall: ‘Stable culture requires things to stay in their appointed place. Symbolic boundaries keep the categories ‘pure’, giving cultures their unique meaning and identity. What unsettles culture is “matter out of place”– the breaking of our unwritten rules and codes’ (1997: 236). **This process of purification legitimizes exclusion, intolerance and racism**. **It also allocates marginal identities to individuals who do not conform to the values of the West** as a geographical and a cultural space. In this perspective, symbolic representations are necessary to maintain difference:  ‘Symbolic boundaries are central to all culture. **Marking “difference” leads us**, symbolically, to close ranks, shore up culture and **to stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure**, strangely attractive precisely because it is forbidden, taboo, threatening to cultural order’ (Hall, 1997: 237).  Throughout the centuries, symbolic boundaries have been very powerful in maintaining separation between nations and individuals. **Since its first contacts with the Arab world, the West has developed a set of stereotypes depicting Arabs as uncivilized and violent.** One of the most prominent texts that capture this historical encounter is the 12th century French epic poem ‘The Song of Rolland.’ The Enlightenment, a period during which philosophers ranked societies along an evolutionary scale from ‘barbarism’ to ‘civilization’, enormously contributed to the vulgarization of this ideology. With the spread of colonization during the 19th century, a well organized scholarship devoted to the representation of ‘Otherness’ emerged as a defining moment in this cross-cultural history.  In the United States, a similar ideology evolved throughout the 20th century. From 1945 onward, the United States became increasingly involved with the Arab world and Israel. As a staunch supporter of Israel, America found itself in a difficult position to negotiate its preeminence in a world of competitive interests. Media corporations took an active role in redefining American cultural and political agendas.  Representation of the Middle East in mainstream American media  Many **media** experts **in the U**nited **S**tates would argue that American media **cover the Middle East within the worldview of a primarily Western audience**. **The coverage will thus remain negative and stereotypical unless a redefinition of cultural differences** between the United States and the Middle East **is negotiated.** **Diplomatic historians approach U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East from a** rational **perspective privileging American interests in the region.** Culture, in this context, plays a subordinate role.  In this institutional framework, **news media can be seen as a driving force behind political mobilization,** both domestically and internationally. **The media fosters stereotypical representations of Middle Eastern cultures and peoples and promote misunderstanding and intolerance in** the mainstream **American culture**. **Since 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, these negative representations became even more anchored in the American cultural imaginary. Media** apparatuses **contribute** enormously **to the construction of** these images and **symbols rather than construct a conceptual model that sheds light on the** complex **relationship between the media, culture, and the political process**.  In the United States, despite the fact that Arabs have significantly contributed to the well being of this nation for at least the last two centuries, negative representations of this ethnic group abound in scope and intensity. **The constructed images** manipulated **throughout time have delegated Arabs to second degree citizens**, **unable to embrace the secular ideals of the Western worldview**.  In this respect, **the representation of Middle Easterners in the American media is articulated within the framework of a binary oppositional dynamics where the Middle East is classified as** an **undesired** space of **barbarism and tyranny**. As cultural critic Stuart Hall puts it, ‘binary oppositions are crucial for all classification/establish a difference to facilitate the tasks of organizing systems of perceptions and classifications’ (1997: 226). **[Continues]**

Middle East Link (2/2)

**[Continued]**

**This system of classification is elaborated to maintain oppositional relationships between the civilized and the uncivilized, etc. and to create an atmosphere of fear and discomfort to enhance ‘difference’ for the purpose of controlling the Other**. In this context, misrepresentation becomes an effective instrument for advancing political agendas. **Throughout the history of the West, negative portrayals have been used to develop means by which the imperial project can be achieved through visual representations. These representations serve as a popular medium to create a link between the Imperial eye and the domestic imagination.**  In France for example, the Colonial Exhibition at the end of the 19th century served to capture the relationship between the empire and its ‘domestic other’. Representation is a complex phenomenon, especially when dealing with cultural differences. It engages emotions, attitudes, reactions and tries to control the viewer’s fears and questions. It also promotes a set of cultural values that respond to the anxieties of the viewer.  In this context, **the Middle-Easterner in American** popular **media is defined according to these historical and cultural paradigms. Besides his barbarism and his violence, he is also depicted as belonging to the realm of emotions, violent savage and blood thirsty. Mainstream images of the Arab in the American media operate according to a dynamics of cultural distortions; the Arab is always portrayed as closer to nature than culture,** genetically **incapable of ‘civilized’ refinements.** The concept of ‘Naturalization’ connotes the impossibility of Arabs to embrace culture. Therefore, they are imprisoned in a space of stability and of fixed ‘difference’ and meaning. They are beyond history and incapable of embracing cultural emancipation.

Nuclear War Focus Link (1/2)

Your focus on the nuclear war to come effaces ongoing destruction and nuclear violence in the status quo - this process that delocalizes nuclear conflict and ignores the destruction that has been wrought on 3rd world / 4th world and indigenous peoples

Masahide Kato, Department of Political Science Univ. of Hawaii, 93, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze” Alternatives 18

**The vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulation into the last vestige of relatively autonomous space in the periphery under late capitalism is propelled not only by the desire for incorporating every fabric of the society into the division of labor but also by the desire for "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery."** The penetration of capital into the social fabric and the destruction of nature and preexisting social organizations by capital are not separable. However, **what we have witnessed in the phase of late capitalism is a rapid intensification of the destruction and extermination of the periphery**. In this context, capital is no longer interested in incorporating some parts of the periphery into the international division of labor. The emergence of such "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery can be **explained**, at least partially, **by** another problematic of late capitalism formulated by Ernest Mandel: **the mass production of the means of destruction."** **Particularly, the latest phase of capitalism distinguishes itself from the earlier phases in its production of the "ultimate" means of destruction/extermination, i.e., nuclear weapons.**Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. **Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized**. **The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki**, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, **the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery**. **And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion** at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth.28 **The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (**936 times), **the former Soviet Union** (715 times), **France** (192 times), **the United Kingdom** (44 times), **and China** (36 times).29 **The primary targets of warfare** ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) **have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples.** Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, **if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include** any kind of **violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators** and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. **Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity**. Nevertheless, **ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community.** Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's *Nuclear Playground,* which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . .

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Nuclear War Focus Link (2/2)

**[Continued]**

were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself." Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkable study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. **This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized**. **The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished,** ironic as it may sound, **by nuclear criticism**. Nuclear criticism, **with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.**

Prolif Link (1/2)

**Prolif discourse creates a violent dichotomous relationship – states are defined as immature villains in order to construct our own identity as law abiding heroes**

**Mutimer 2k** - Ph.D., Political Science, York University

[David, “The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security”, p 93-95]

**The U.S. military appears to have been central in the construction of a new category of threat, the rogue state governed by an outlaw regime.** The timing of that construction was unfortunate for Iraq. As has been widely reported, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie met the Iraqi leadership a few days before the invasion of Kuwait. The message of that meeting seems to have been that the United States was not overly concerned with Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait. Even if the meeting could not be read as a tacit approval of the invasion (and it is not impossible to read it that way), it did not indicate the sort of response the United States mounted after 2 August." The problem is that the Rogue Doctrine was a construction of the military and had not yet been formally announced. It is reasonable to assume that a diplomat in a relatively minor posting would not be aware of the reworking of U.S. military doctrine the president was about to announce. There is, of course, a much more cynical interpretation of these events, which would argue that **the U**nited **S**tates **sought a convenient illustration of its newfound enemy.** Either way, in July 1990 there were no rogue states because the category had not been articulated. In July 1990, as Glaspie met Hussein, Iraq was a regional power that had been employed by both superpowers during the Cold War and that had a not unreasonable grievance with one of its neighbors. On 2 August President **Bush announced a new category, a new set of markers by which the identity of states could be interpreted**. On 2 August Iraq acted in a fashion that fit this contemporaneously articulated set of markers. Other **Iraqs, rogues, and outlaws are now the currency of the international discourse of proliferation that grew out of the Western response to the Gulf War. These are the labels, drawn from the debate in the U**nited **S**tates, **applied to states whose behavior causes serious concern to the Western powers in their supplier groups**. What sort of labels are they? What lines of difference do these labels establish? To answer these questions, **we can look at rogues and outlaws as metaphors that link the proliferation image to other, more widespread discourses and discover the entailments they draw from these discourses**. Rogues and outlaws are used similarly in everyday language. A rogue is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as: "\. One belonging to a class of idle vagrants or vagabonds. ... 2. A dishonest, unprincipled person; a rascal. ... 5. An elephant driven away, or living apart from, the herd and of a savage or destructive disposition." Similarly, an outlaw is "one put outside the law and deprived of its benefits and protection .... More vaguely: One banished or proscribed; an exile, a fugitive." Both **rogues and outlaws are used in everyday language to identify criminals,** although generally not the worst and most hardened criminals. Indeed, a certain romanticism is attached to both the rogue and the outlaw. **The rogue is one who steps outside the limits of acceptable behavior** but in a way that tends to be appealing to those who do not dare to commit such transgressions-thus, for example, the definition of rogue as rascal. Similarly, the outlaw is a common figure in U.S. romantic Western literature. Outlaws roamed the frontiers of the central United States, at once dangerous and admired for the rugged individualism they portrayed. Little of this romanticism seems to remain in the use of rogues in official discourse, however. U.S. Secretary of State Warren **Christopher** did not seem to admire the rugged individualism of potential rogues, for instance, when he **told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "nuclear weapons give rogue states disproportionate power, destabilize entire regions, and threaten human and environmental disasters.** They can turn local conflicts into serious threats to our security. In this era, weapons of mass destruction are more readily available-and there are fewer inhibitions on their use."39 Nevertheless, the use of rogue carries with it marked condescension. **Rogues are, as often as not, young men, indeed even little boys, who are acting naughtily-in the former case often in a sexual manner. One of the many ironies that emerge in stories of proliferation is that at the same time the primary international rogue, Iraq, was under intense U.S. pressure** because of its refusal to allow UNSCOM unfettered access to its presidential palaces, **the U.S. president was being labeled a rogue for reports that he had perhaps allowed too much access to presidential parts**. "Some of the President's intimates note his remarkable ability to compartmentalize his life: The policy wonk who genuinely admires his wife resides in onc space; the rogue who risks political standing through personal indiscretion occupies another."4o Put another way, **the mature adult resides on the one side and the rather indiscreet little boy on the other. The use of rogue to label states behaving in ways deemed unacceptable identifies those states as immature compared with the mature states doing the labeling-foremost among these the United States. Such an entailment fits well with the practices established for proliferation control**. The mature elders gather together to determine which states are sufficiently responsible to be trusted with advanced technologies and military equipment-indeed, the practice smacks of Star Trek's Prime Directive. **This notion of maturity is then reflected in academic commentary on contemporary security,** as Charles Krauthammer's characterization of the weapon state threat illustrates: "relatively small, peripheral and backward states will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional, but to world, security."41 Similarly, **a repeated concern in the literature has been that new nuclear states would lack the maturity to control their weapons adequately, unlike the old nuclear states**.42 Perhaps the most interesting definition of rogue and outlaw is the one they share: both terms are used to describe members of a community expelled from that community or no longer living within

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Prolif Link (2/2)

**[Continued]**

the constraints of communal life. In medieval Europe the outlaw was outcast, placed beyond Entailing Self and Other 95 the protection the law provided as punishment. Later, the outlaw in the mythology of the American West fled from life within the community to escape the (often rough) justice of the frontier. Similarly, **the rogue animal is one that has been forced from the herd or that for some reason has left the herd, Evoking these terms in the proliferation discourse clearly marks the logic of identity and difference, of inside and outside, which were evident in the practices examined earlier. For there to be rogues and outlaws there must also be a larger, settled community whose rules the outlaws refuse to follow. It would seem that the U.S. military's concern with defending its budget following the Cold War threw up a powerful new marker of identity/difference for the contemporary practice of international security**. The idea of the rogue state has achieved wide currency in popular discussion of international affairs. Klare cites a U.S. Congress study to the effect that in major newspapers and journals, the use of rogue nation, rogue state, and rogue regime increased more than 1,500 percent between 1990 and 1993.43 **The label originally devised to categorize potential military opponents was quickly drawn into the construction of the new proliferation control agenda following the Gulf War**, as Iraq was identified as the first of the rogues. **The notion of the rogue state provides agency in an image of an international security problem largely devoid of agency. The term is used to label states whose behavior causes serious concern to the members of the supplier group, identifying them as outsiders, immature states unable or unwilling to follow the rules of civilized state action rules policed by that same core of supplier states.**

Relations Link

**Mapping relations and resources is a tool of colonial bio-politics used for management and the enforcement of docility.**

Arjun Appadurai, Director of humanities institute and Prof of humanities at Univ Chicago, 1993 Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, Eds. Carol Breckenridge & Peter van der Veer, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” U Penn Press: Philadelphia, p. 333-334

**The net result was something critically different from all other complex state-apparatuses in regard to the politics of the body and the construction of communities as bodies.** Put very simply, **other regimes may have had numerical concerns** and they may also have had classificatory concerns. **But these remained largely separate**, and it was only in the complex conjuncture of variables that constituted the project of the mature colonial state that these two forms of "dynamic nominalism" came together, to create a polity centered around self-consciously enumerated communities. **When these communities were also embedded in a wider official discourses of space, time, resources, and relations that was also numerical in critical ways, what was generated was a specifically colonial political arithmetic, in which essentializing and enumerating human communities became** not only concurrent activities but **unimaginable without one another. This arithmetic is a critical part of colonial bio-politics** (at least as regards the British in India) **not only because it involved abstractions of number whereas other state regimes had more concrete numerical purposes** (such as taxes, corvee labor, and the like). **The modern colonial state brings together the exoticizing vision of orientalism with the familiarizing discourse of statistics.** In the process, **the body of the colonial subject is made simultaneously strange and docile. Its strangeness lies in the fact that it comes to be seen as the site of cruel and unusual practices and bizarre subjectivities. But colonial body-counts** **create** not only types and classes the first move toward domesticating differences, but also **homogeneous bodies** (within categories), **because number,** by its nature, **flattens idiosyncrasies and creates boundaries around these homogeneous bodies**, since it performatively limits their extent. In this latter regard, statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are to territories: they flatten and enclose. **The link between colonialism and orientalism**, therefore,is most strongly reinforced not at the loci of classification and typification (as has often been suggested) but **at the loci of enumeration, where bodies are counted, homogenized, and bounded in their extent.** Thus the unruly body of the colonial subject (fasting, feasting, hook-swinging, abluting, burning, and bleeding) is recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these very bodies to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the humdrum projects of taxation, sanitation, education, warfare, and loyalty.

War Link (1/2)

**The representation of war as an isolated and identifiable event produces an ontology of war that is predefined in modern defense policy. The affirmative crisis politics creates a notion of conflict that marginalizes and remove social and economic violence from consideration in security studies leading to an ever-present military aggression and structural violence.**

Chris Cuomo, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, 1996 War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence, Hypatia 11.4, (1996): 30-46

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi­cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities *within* war. **The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times**. Not surprisingly, **most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event—an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations**. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, inten­tions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen­dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies—cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a *presence* (Schott 1995). Schott argues that **postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics**, aswell as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, **render an event-based conception of war inadequate**, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto­logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances) **Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every­day effects of militarism** on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. **These effects** are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help **construct** gendered and **national identity, and** because they **justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime.** **Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and** other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current **ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.** **Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics** and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. **Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief.** The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and

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War Link (2/2)

**[Continued]**

at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. **Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war** might actually **keep resisters complacent** about and complicitous **in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state**. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, **investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and** the following: **how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities**, cities, and nations **are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances**. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connec­tions among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, tech­nocratic states.' Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the impor­tance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But **the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of mili­tary institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical dis­cussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism**.

\*\*Impacts\*\*

Biopolitics Bad – Extinction

**The biopolitical logic of securitization is the root of all modern conflict and makes continued massacre vital**

Michel Foucault, professor of philosophy at the college de france, The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, 1978, pg. 136-137

**Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power.** “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in **the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly.** This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of t**he right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody** as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, **never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations**. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of **a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula­tions are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars**, causing so many men to be killed. **And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence.** The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. **If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.**

**Biopolitics leads to extinction**

Michael Dillon, University of Lancaster Politics Prof., 2004 “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower,” in Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics, Ed. Edkins, Pin-Fat, and Shapiro, p. 41

Power is commonly associated with regimes of government and governance that regularly claim universal, metaphysical status for the rights and cornpetences that comprise them; regimes whose very raison d'etre, in the form of state sovereignty and raison d'etat, for example, seek to limit and confine if not altogether rid us of politics. **Sovereign power, a form of rule gone global, has also come to develop and deploy modes of destruction whose dissemination and use it finds increasingly impossible to control because these have become integral to its propagation and survival; modes of destruction that put in question the very issue of planetary survival for the human as well as many other species.** Despite the fashion of speaking about the demise of sovereignty, political thought and practice have to still struggle with terrains of power throughout which the legitimating narratives, iconography and capabilities of sovereign power remain amongst the most persistent, and powerful and threatening globally. As it has come to dominate our understanding of rule, so **sovereign power has come to limit our imagination in relation to the possibility and to the promise of politics.**

Calculation Bad - ZPHC

Calculability of the subjects value is the logic of the zero point of theholocaust

Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster. 99 "Another Justice," in Political Theory, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 164-165

Quite the reverse. (Me subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti­mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. **The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.**" They trade in it still to devastating global ffect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global **Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability**." Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. **Once rendered calculable**, however, **units of account are necessarily submissible** not only to valuation but also, of course, **to devaluation**. Devaluation, logi­cally, can extend **to the point of counting as nothing**. Hence, no mensuration without dcmensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: **the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. How­ever liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life.** Herewith, then, the neces­sity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."" But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of .another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Death Drive Bad – Genocide/Extinction

**This creates a death drive that results in sacrificial genocide**

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, leading Portuguese social theorist, the director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, and has written and published widely on the issue of globalization, 2003, Issue #63, April, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2003/63/santos.html

According to Franz Hinkelammert, **the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it**. **This is** a salvific and **sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given** social and political **reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples,** and the African slaves. This is how it was **in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths** in two world wars **and many other** colonial **wars**. This is how it was under Stalinism, with the Gulag, and under Nazism, with the Holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. **It is** above all **appropriate to ask if the new illusion will** not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the Western illusion: **destro**ying **all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality, and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic** of development **to ultimate consequences**. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists**. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it** is ultra-conservative in that it **aims to reproduce infinitely the status quo**. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the state and international institutions in their favor. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, **a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other**. Paradoxically, **the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes.** In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation**. It is** as **though hegemonic powers**, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, **legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where**, by definition, **there is no room for what must be destroyed**. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. **The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.**

Ethics Loss Bad – Extinction

**Endorsing an ethical system that legitimates any act of violence leads to nuclear destruction and extinction**

Edmund F. Byrne, Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University, Indianapolis, 1973 “THE DEPERSONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY” The Journal of Value Inquiry 7.3 September)

The adequacy of a systematic ethics has, of course, been seriously challenged by any of a variety of recent approaches, some of which go under the heading of a situation ethics.5 But not even situation ethics has entirely overcome the rationalist flaws of the classical ethical system, and this is especially apparent when the issue is one concerning acts of violence. In the first place, **the very notion of a concrete situation is itself an abstract ingredient** **of an** (admittedly more flexible) **system that is all the more dangerous for not being recognized as inevitably rationalist and often ethnocentric**. Secondly, the obligation to love on one hand and the variability of circumstances on the other are indeed norms and are presented as such. **That they are as inadequate as any other norms is obvious if we stop to consider how much maiming and killing has been justified on the basis of some estimation of a situation or**, for that matter, even as a noble if not sacred deed of love. Thus **we are faced with a problem which**, though seemingly insoluble, mankind **must nonetheless resolve if it is to survive**. On the one hand, no known ethical system is truly universal in scope because none can account for its built-in ambivalence with regard to acts of violence. On the other hand, **so long as the human community is willing to grant as a valid principle that there are situations in which violence is rationally justifiable, then it is in principle possible for anyone to justify any act of violence whatsoever, including even the nuclear destruction of this planet**.6 So if not even the survival of our species can be taken as in any sense ultimate, what possible function does the notion of a common good now play in human affairs? Could it perhaps be the case that the common good is a myth that transforms the depersonalized bloodletting of electronically aided Neanderthals into a sacred offering to the unknown Moloch of our galaxy?

Impearilism Bad – Extinction

**Unrestricted imperialism leads to extinction**

Richard Falk, University of California, Santa Barbara, “Imperial Vibrations, 9/11, and the Ordeal of The Middle East,” Global & International Studies Program, Year 2005, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=gis

Part of what makes this book valuable, beyond its explicit concerns, is Gregory's gift for theorizing in ways that give the reader enduring tools for understanding the unfolding world order, a globality that defies the traditional interpretative categories of international relations. Gregory's sophistication as a political geographer is put to excellent use, especially in his description of `**imaginative cartographies'** (e.g., p. 117), **the places and non-places depicted by the colonial mind** at its worst **as spaces without rules where `killing fields' can be established**. [omit? yes]. In this vein Gregory does not hesitate to connect Israel's occupation of the West Bank and America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with each other and, more dramatically, with the chilling recall of Nazi atrocity and mentality (see pp. 117-43). The chapter on the Israeli occupation of Palestine is uncompromising in its critique of the behavior of an occupying power and as a model for American behavior toward its adversaries since 9/11. Gregory's geographical imagination is illuminating. His contrast between the territorializing of an essentially non-territorial enemy in the terror war with the `aggressive deterritorializing' of the world economy, thereby liberating market forces to wreck havoc on various communities around the world, is of the utmost importance in grasping the changing nature of world order. In the end, Gregory gives a dark reading to the trends associated with the colonial present that are the preoccupation of his book. He contends that **the American project**, properly understood, **is totalizing in its situating the entire world within the imaginative borders of its empire.** Part of **the reason it can do this is its elimination of** any sense of **an `outside' that has** traditionally **set limits on the reach of aspirants to** world **empire** (p. 255). If Gregory offers a note of hope, it comes at the very end of his book in the form of a signpost pointing to a more benevolent future and calling for “the destruction of the architectures of enmity that have been produced and have been sustained by those dreadful events [the 9/11 attacks]” (p. 262). And finally, “it will be necessary to explore other spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and enhance our sense of the world and enable us to situate ourselves within it with care, concern, and humility.” (p.262). Like Mamdani, Gregory counsels that **America will have to learn how**, in Derrida's words, `**to live together well' in this** turbulent **world** of the 21st century--**if it is to live at all! This will require a far stronger sense of human solidarity and spirit of geopolitical humility** than have hitherto been demonstrated. For this to be possible, **a surge of inventiveness will be required to devise new categories for construing and adjusting to an unfolding world order that is best understood as transitional and beset by contradictory tendencies**. There is a common message and motif in these fine books, and that is that **the path of empire is littered with corpses and will end in mass burials.** Further, **dividing the world along civilizational lines of friends and enemies leads to self-destructive authoritarianism at home and fierce wars abroad**. Will we have the wisdom, imagination, and strength to construct a sustainable imaginative geography that replaces the nightmares of exterminationist scenarios and grandiose visions of global empire with a quest for `humane governance'? These questions are posed by these authors in sweepingly general language, but also are depicted by them on the ground by reference to frighteningly concrete imagery of violence and destruction. And so we are wisely instructed!

Loss of Being Bad – Extinction

Loss of our relation to being results in extinction

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 94 Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, 119-20

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.53 **Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth**."54 This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines**: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself.** Further**, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55 Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy**.56 The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. **If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise**. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

Realism Bad – Extinction

Realism’s desire for security leads to extinction.

Gearoid O Tuathail, Prof of Geography @ Virginia Tech, 2000, “The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 90, Iss. 1, p. 175

One way of understanding this concern with proliferating weapons of mass destruction is within the terms offered by Ulrich Beck’s notion of “risk society” (1992). **Risk society**, for Beck, **is a new order of modernity**, a second modernity following the classic or simple modernity that produced industrial society, where the “side effects” and unintended consequences of modernization are encountered and confronted. **This involves** what Beck terms **the “reflexive modernization” of industrial society, a second wave of modernization that attempts to grapple with the unprecedented** and heretofore unacknowledged and invisible **risks produced by the institutions, structures, and attitudes that characterized simple modernity.** Although simple modernity had always produced dangers in the form of social and environmental side effects for industrial communities, **the development and the subsequent problems of nuclear and biochemical technologies in the second half of the twentieth century marked a revolutionary but unremarked transition** to a borderless, global risk society, a social order where hazards are no longer re-strained by borders. The defining event of this social order was the Chernobyl nuclear accident, which spewed toxic radioactivity across Europe and the world. Beck comments surprisingly little on the specific origins of global risk society, but it can be said to have begun in 1945 with the development of the first atomic bombs. **A technological triumph for industrial modernity now offered the means of destroying modern cities and states. The very success of modernity generated its potential to destroy itself. Geopolitical conflict provoked the birth of global risk society, but its radical implications were contained as Cold War geopolitics displaced questions about qualitative change in the nature of modernity itself**. As Beck (1998: 145) notes, the Cold War “gave order to a world that had skidded into the atomic age, an order of terror to be sure, but one that made it possible to shift internal crises off on to external causes, that is, enemies.” The revolutionary implications of the continued operation of technoscientific modernization were never fully grasped. National**-security discourses justified development of some of the most deadly weapons and substances ever invented by technoscientific civilization.** Blindly produced and conveniently legitimated during the Cold War, these technoscientific achievements have now diffused, as a consequence of spying and “normal scientific progress,” beyond the laboratories and states that invented them.

Security Bad - Cycles of Violence

**The logic of security is the most pernicious ontology in human history. Existential and rational discourse combine to create a system of endless war and guaranteed annihilation.**

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW Sydney, 2007 Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory & Event 10:2, Muse

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two **'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification** mobilised in the Lebanon war **are more than merely arguments**, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly **they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale**. But they run deeper than that. **They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, *statements about truth and being* which claim a rarefied privilege to state what *is* and how it must be maintained as it is.** I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a *statement about the nature and ideality of being* (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as *a statement of epistemological truth and certainty*, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being *qua* being and its essential attributes'.[**17**](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.utdallas.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn17) In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful *claim* to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence *and* action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, **ontology is the 'politics of truth'**[**18**](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.utdallas.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn18) in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, **when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such.** The second is its intimate relation with violence**: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence.** Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two** ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.**

Security Bad - Root Cause of War

**Flows of power and territorialization have created a permanent state of crisis in world politics. Securitization is the framework which creates the conditions for war to occur.**

Giorgio Agamben, Proff of philosophy at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris and at the University of Verona in Italy, 2002 Security and Terror, Theory & Event 5:4, Muse

Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. **While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them**. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while **security wants to guide disorder**. **Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative**, Foucault can show that **the development of security coincides with the development of liberal ideology**. **Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity**. What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. **Security reasoning entails an essential risk**. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic. We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions. **The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation** -- created by the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- **security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is**, in fact, **the worst of all disorders**. But there is yet another danger. **Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society**. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy. **Nothing is** therefore **more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics**. European and American **politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror.** Maybe **the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control.** Today, **there are plans for all kinds of emergencies** (ecological, medical, military), **but there is no politics to prevent them**. On the contrary, we can say that **politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.**

\*\*Alternatives\*\*

Rethink Methodology

**We must interrogate our methodology to prevent the reproduction of domination thru academic practice.**

Carol A. Breckenridge & – ed. of Public Culture and teacher at U Chicago, Peter van der Veer – comparative religion prof at Univ Amsterdam & director of the Centre for the Comparative Study of Religion and Society 1993, Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, U Penn Press: Philadelphia, p. 1-2

**The postcolonial predicament in which students of society and his­tory find themselves stems from a growing awareness of the role of their academic disciplines in the reproduction of patterns of domination.** For scholars who think with and about the (ex)colonial world, this awareness is strongest when applied to colonial scholarship (e.g., the recent turn to "colonial discourse") and weakest when it comes to a critique of the present and to the formulation of critical alternatives and methods for approaching the study of other world regions. In fact, **the investigation of the power of colonial knowledge is**, in an interesting way, **often matched by a mood of impotence and irrelevance in sparse reflections on the present**. Indeed, one aspect of the postcolonial predicament is that critiques of colonialism have not really led to a reflection on the evolution of knowledge that brings us into the postcolonial (or neocolonial) present. The present volume poses the problem of knowledge and power from a historical perspective by showing the contradictory relations-intellectual, administrative, and cultural-between the (colonial) past and the (postcolonial) present. Our proposition is not so much the usual historical one, that we have to understand social and cultural processes historically, but rather that **we have to rethink our methodologies and the relation between theories, methods, and the historical conditions that produced them.** The postcolonial predicament has two dimensions: the first is that the colonial period has given us both the evidence and the theories that select and connect them; and, second, that **decolonization does not entail immediate escape from colonial discourse.** Despite all the recent talk of "third-world voices," **this predicament defines both the ex-colonizer and the ex-colonized.** To some extent this is tantamount to saying that we cannot escape from history, but this volume goes on to demonstrate that in the Indian subcontinent-and the study thereof-**we cannot escape from a history characterized by a particular discursive formation that can be called "orientalism."**

Rethink War

Their oversimplification of geopolitics produces passive agents of change - focus on policy solution by non-state scribes ensures the replication of a violent status sqo

David Campbell, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University in the UK, 2007 Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy, Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 405-422

**To understand the power of the imaginative geographies guiding** current **US strategy it is important to look** back **at** the recitation, **reiteration** and resignification of previous strategic formulations. During the Clinton years, a number of figures who had been involved in various guises in previous Republican administrations wrote widely on the geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era. From specifications of the threat posed by international terrorism, ‘failed states’ and ‘rogue regimes’, to the dangers posed by cultural/civilisational conflicts. **The individuals and institutions we choose to examine** in this section **are those whose geographical imaginations have been central in laying the ground for** some of the **securitizing strategies** of the current Bush administration and, specifically, **whose work** has been key in specifying the importance of “integrating” a chaotic world where conflict is inevitable. The writers whose work we highlight here **occupy a liminal position within policy circles. While not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such positions in the past or were aspiring to them in the future. They do not,** therefore, **directly speak for the state** (a position that grants them a veneer of “objectivity”), **and they navigate in the interstices between academic and “policy-oriented” research: a location that**, in turn, **absolves them from the rigors of a scholarly discipline, including disciplinary critique.** By the term ‘non-state scribes’ **we wish to indicate those who occupy a liminal zone between academic and non-academic work, working in a range of governmental and private research centres, think-tanks and study groups. What we would like to highlight are some of the ways in which their influence problematises simple, secure understandings of the state and the constitution of ‘state-interest’.** While these individuals appear as impartial commentators-cum-advisers-cum-analysts, their access to policy circles is open, if not privileged. **To the extent that their geographical imaginations are invoked by state power, they are also today's consummate “intellectuals of statecraft”: those who “designate a world and ‘fill’ it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas**” ([Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG2-4N1SP7W-1&_user=108452&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2007&_rdoc=1&_fmt=full&_orig=search&_cdi=6026&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000059732&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108452&md5=eabf7935a74b48e3e9ad110756632411#bib55): 192).

\*\*2NC\*\*

Reps First (1/2)

**Evaluate discourse first - linguistic choices in security politics order the world in ways that have material effects on state organization.**

David Campbell, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University in the UK, 2007 Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy, Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 405-422

However, we wish to reposition the terms of the debate by arguing that in the discursive production of imaginative geographies it is *performativity* rather than *construction* which is the better theoretical assumption. **Discourse refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced,** identities constituted, **social relations established**, **and political** and ethical **outcomes made more or less possible**. Those employing the concept are often said to be claiming that ‘everything is language’, that ‘there is no reality’, and because of their linguistic idealism, they are unable to take a political position and defend an ethical stance. These objections demonstrate how understandings of discourse are bedevilled by the view that interpretation involves only language in contrast to the external, the real, and the material. These dichotomies of idealism/materialism and realism/idealism remain powerful conceptions of understanding the world. In practice, however, a concern with discourse does not involve a denial of the world's existence or the significance of materiality. This is well articulated by [Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG2-4N1SP7W-1&_user=108452&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2007&_rdoc=1&_fmt=full&_orig=search&_cdi=6026&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000059732&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108452&md5=eabf7935a74b48e3e9ad110756632411#bib45): “**the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition**…**What is denied is not that**…**objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence**.” This means that while nothing exists outside of discourse, there are important distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena. There are also modes of representation which are ideational though strictly non-linguistic, such as the aesthetic and pictorial. It is just that there is no way of comprehending non-linguistic and extra-discursive phenomena except through discursive practices. Understanding discourse as involving both the ideal and the material, the linguistic and the non-linguistic, means that discourses are performative. Performative means that discourses constitute the objects of which they speak. For example, **states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches and economic investments. The meanings, identities, social relations and political assemblages that are enacted in these performances combine the ideal and the material. They are either made or represented in the name of a particular state but that state does not pre-exist those performances.** As a consequence, appreciating that discourses are performative moves us away from a reliance on the idea of (social) construction towards *materialization*, whereby **discourse “stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface**” ([Butler, 1993](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG2-4N1SP7W-1&_user=108452&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2007&_rdoc=1&_fmt=full&_orig=search&_cdi=6026&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000059732&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108452&md5=eabf7935a74b48e3e9ad110756632411#bib18): 9, 12). **Discourse is thus not something that subjects use in order to describe objects; it is that which constitutes both subjects and objects.**

Reps First (2/2)

**Discourse should be the starting point for political analysis. Our world is virtual, international relations are ordered around systems of complex images constructing political sovereignty and ensuring global violence.**

James Der Derian, Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University and Professor of Political Science at UMASS/Amherst, 1999 “A VIRTUAL THEORY OF GLOBAL POLITICS, MIMETIC WAR, AND THE SPECTRAL STATE” journal of the theoretical humanities 4:2 1999

In war, **diplomacy, and the media, the real morphs with the virtual**. Not even the state, the foundation of Real politick, is immune from virtualization. Sovereignty, the primary means by which the supreme power and legitimate violence of the state is territorially fixed, declared once, many-times dead, now seems only able to regain its vigor virtually, through media spawns which oppose ordered, identical "heres" to external, alien "out-theres" through representations which are real in time, not space. Instant scandals, catastrophic accidents, "live-feed" wars, and quick-in, quick-out interventions into still-born or moribund states provide the ephemeral. virtual seuiblartce of sovereignty. Once upon a space, war was the ultimate reality-check of international politics; now, seamlessly integrating battlefield simulations and public dissimulations through the convergence of PC and TV, war is virtualized and commoditized as pure war, infowar, netwar, cyherwar. For the intractable problems of post-Cold War politics, the technical fix has acquired a new lustre: primetime as well as C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence**) networks bring us "virtual war"; beltway think-tanks and information technology industries promote a "virtual diplomacy.**" And, according to a recent Time cover-story on high-finance, money verges toward the virtual: one financial expert emphatically states that "the distinction between software and money is disappearing." to which a Citibank executive responds "it's revolutionary - and we should be scared as hell." To be sure, **questions of power and identity, space and borders, legitimacy and meaning will continue to be framed by the necessitous narratives of personal and public security couched in the legal imperative of sovereignty.** But in the new hyper-realms of global politics produced by economic penetration, technological acceleration, and new media, these questions now entail virtual investigations. Will the sovereign state become so spectral as to disappear all together, one more unholy relic for the museum of modernity? Or will it re-emerge in global, virtual forms? Does globalization enhance the prospects of a democratic peace? Or does virtu-alit ion assure the continuation of war by other means? Has Clausewitz been repudiated - or merely brought up to speed? Is virtuality replacing the reality of war? Is it the harbinger of a new world order, or a brave new world? Most importantly, will processes of virtualization help to close or to further open the gulf between those who have the technology and those who do not? **New thinking often lags behind transitions driven by new technologies**, and, as Albert Einstein famously remarked about the atom bomb, **the results can be catastrophic. The virtual technologies of new media warrant a commensurate critical scrutiny.** New media, generally identified as digitized, interactive, networked forms of communication, now exercise a global effect if not ubiquitous presence, through instant video-feeds, satellite link-ups, TI-T3 links, overhead surveillance, global mapping, distributed computer simulations, programmed trading, and movies with Arnold Sehwarzenegger in them. Virtual media represent the most penetrating and sharpest - to the point of invisibility - edge of globalization. The power of virtuality lies in its ability to collapse distance, between here and there, near and far, fact and fiction. Moreover, the virtual effect of bringing "there" here in near real-time and with near-verisimilitude adds a strategic as well as comparative advantage to the production of violence - what one futurist at a recent military conference referred to as the "fifth dimension" of global warfare. However, **like all complex systems, there is potential for catastrophe, from what organizational theorists call negitive synergy, of the sort that produced a Three Mile Island or a Chernobyl. The spatialist, materialist - that is, realist - bias of thinking in international theory renders it less than adequate for a critical inquiry into the temporal, representational, deterritorial, and potentially dangerous powers of virtual technologies. Semiotic, critical, and discourse theories offer a better perspective, having led the way in tracing the reconfiguration of power into new representational, immaterial forms.** They have helped us to under-stand how acts of inscription and the production of information tan reify consciousness, float signifiers, and render concepts undecidable. However, as the realities of international politics increasingly are generated, mediated and simulated by successive technical means of reproduction, there is not so much a distancing from some original, truth-bearing source as there is an implosion, where meaning disappears into a media black hole of insignificance. As the globalization and virtualization of new media sunder meaning from conventional moorings, and set information adrift as it moves with alacrity and celerity from phenomenal to virtual forms, one searches for new modes of understanding. Attenuated by cant and deemed too popular for serious scholarship, the virtual has already become an academic taboo. **All the more reason,** I believe, **to extend the reach of critical approaches.** Derrida and Nietzsche are valuable because they provide a philosophical perspective which links public space with a responsive as well as responsible private space.

Predictions Fail (1/2)

**Predictive scenario planning is almost always wrong - default to our specific and empirically observable impacts**

Louis Menand, prominent [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) writer and academic, best known for his book [The Metaphysical Club](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Metaphysical_Club) (2001), an intellectual and cultural history of late [19th](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/19th_century) and early [20th century](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th_century) America, [Ph.D.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ph.D.) from [Columbia University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University) in 1980. He thereafter taught at [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University) and held staff positions at [The New Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_Republic) and [The New Yorker](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_Yorker), “Everybody’s An Expert,” The New Yorker, December 5, 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo\_books1?currentPage=al

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that **people who make prediction their business**—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—**are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it,** either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the **better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and,** beyond a certain point, **depth of knowledge**. **People who follow current events** by reading the papers and newsmagazines **regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as** the **specialists** whom the papers quote. **Our system of expertise** is completely inside out: it **rewards bad judgments over good ones**. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. **Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study** that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring**. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world**, in other words, **are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys**, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that **specialists are not** significantly **more reliable than non-specialists** in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that **knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge** disconcertingly **quickly**,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, **there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals**—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are **any better than journalists or attentive readers** of the New York Times **in ‘reading’ emerging situations.”** And **the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts**. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate**.**

**[Continues]**

Predictions Fail (2/2)

**[Continued]**

**There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of** the **evidence**. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. **When** television **pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet**. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because **long shots are their business.** More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most **people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe**. Tetlock found that his **experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it**. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. **If you look backward, the dots that lead up to** Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on **September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots**, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. **If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less.** The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one.  **Plausible detail makes us believers**. When subjects were given a choice between an insurance policy that covered hospitalization for any reason and a policy that covered hospitalization for all accidents and diseases, they were willing to pay a higher premium for the second policy, because the added detail gave them a more vivid picture of the circumstances in which it might be needed. In 1982, an experiment was done with professional forecasters and planners. One group was asked to assess the probability of “a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983,” and another group was asked to assess the probability of “a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The experts judged the second scenario more likely than the first, even though it required two separate events to occur. They were seduced by the detail.

A2: Perm (1/2)

Sequencing is vital- reforming existing institutions prior to rethinking thinking crushs solvency for the alternative

michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Phil @ Tulane Univ, 1994 Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity pg. 109

**Because modern humanity's openness for being has become so constricted that things can only show themselves one-dimensionally** as flexible raw material, **modern humanity has become oblivious to its highest possibility**, namely, **to let things be by holding open the clearing in which they can reveal themselves**. Like a deep ecologist, Heidegger argued that **reforming existing institutions would only reinforce the destructive urges of the control-obsessed subject**. Claiming that **anthropocentric humanism underestimates humanity***,* he **favor**ed **a "higher humanism" that lets things be, instead of disclosing them as instruments serving the power-interests of the human subject** .2" Like many deep ecologists, he said that the **ethics** needed to improve our treatment of nature **cannot arise from the metaphysical framework of humanism, but only from a new ethos, a new way of understanding what humans and nonhumans are. In thy sense, ontology proceeds ethics.**

**The perm overly abstracts the criticism - crushing solvency**

Jens Bartelson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Stockholm, 2000 A Genealoay of Sovereignty, pp. 47-48

**The synthesis advocated by structurationists and scientific realists not only holds out the hope of resolving conceptual conflicts within existing fields of knowledge. It also makes the breaching of disci­plinary boundaries look virtuous, since it promises to settle the ontolo­gical differences underlying their compartmentalization into distinct fields. What makes this promise look attractive is the quite naive assumption that the way a problem in political philosophy is formula­ted is independent of the way in which solutions to it are presented.** The general incommensurability between agency and structure, first ele­vated into a problem of imperial proportions by structurationists, is then opened to a glorious peace-by-interdependence between con­flicting concepts and estranged fields of knowledge. From a decon­structive viewpoint, however**,** it is the 'undisputed truth' underlying the 'agent-structure problem' that is the real problem,since it is the former which makes the latter look like a chicken-and-egg debate. To say that all social and political life is ultimately composed of two kinds of stuff is simply to presuppose that essence is essential to social and political theory. **Ontological questions invariably yield ontological answers, since they drag the political philosopher into a quest for firm foundations and proper origins. Starting with the assumption that agency and structure are radically different in essence, which it is necessary to do in order to depict all prior theoretical efforts to wrestle with this conceptual zero-sum game as vain**, the structurationist then solves his problem by pointing to the fact that what is different always shares one thing in common, namely, the fact of being different. At this point, the 'agent-structure' debate seems to deconstruct itself; being centred on the quest for essence, it pushes us back in an infinite series of reversals. Whenever a structure is identified, its existence is conditioned by a prior agency, which in turn is made possible by yet another structure, and so forth. However far back we push in this series in search of a foundation, what appears as essential will always prove to be supplementary, in a way that deprives it of the authority of ontological simplicity**. The attempted synthesis tries to overcome the same ontological difference that nourishes it: if the problem could be solved, the solution must also indicate that there was no problem in the first place. The reconceptualization of sovereignty that comes with the structu­rationist effort to relate the domestic inside and the international outside can be regarded as symptomatic of the quest for essence that governs it**. The very problem that the conceptualization of sovereignty in relational terms hopes to solve, merely crops up again at a more certain depth, but now beyond the reach of critical concepts. To say that sovereignty is constitutive with respect to both the domestic and the international by being that which makes the internal internal and the external external, is either to turn sovereignty into an agency that structures or a structure that acts; in both cases the original problem is restored.

A2: Perm (2/2)

**Appeals to state based solutions proliferate possibilities within instrumental rationality in order to maintain its smooth functioning.**

Jayant Lele, Poli Sci prof @ Queens Univ, Canada, 1993 Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, Eds. Carol Breckenridge & Peter van der Veer, “Orientalism and the Social Sciences,” U Penn Press: Philadelphia, p. 51-52]

Thus one notices a general shift away from overt adherence to larger paradigms about the functioning or transformation of societies. Specific issues in political economy, **studies of policy alternatives**, and rational choices **are in vogue. Research is increasingly focused on specific problems, pos­sible solutions, likely outcomes, and the capabilities of the state apparatus to meet these challenges. The result has been a dramatic increase in the flexibility of information generation and processing.** It is consistent with and complements the "complexity-reductive" requirements of the more sophisticated forms of systems and related theories such as Luhmann's (see Luhmann 1982; Bell 1980). **Both theorists and practitioners of the systems enterprise conceive of social evolution as a process of expanding problem-solving capabilities** through structural change. **They disavow normative commitments and seek to judge the outcomes of problem-solving pro­cesses only in terms of survival and stability of the designated systems.** The success of differentiation (of personality, roles, norms, values, and institu­tions) is determined by the capacity for complexity reduction and crisis management. **Advocacy for democracy** (with attendant moralistic notions of freedom, equality, justice) **has yielded to sheer instrumentalism as the only evaluative standard.**