# Pan K Aff Answers

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## Realism

#### Realism describes northeast Asia and China

Hochul Lee, Department of Political Science at the University of Incheon, 3-5-2005, “Realpolitik Swinging between Interdependence and Nationalism: China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Northeast Asia,” http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/6/9/9/7/pages69970/p69970-1.php

Realpolitik can be conceived of as general rules of state behavior motivated by system-level dynamics. It is steered by prudent calculus of cost and benefit of policy options. In a mulipolar system, it articulates into a balance of power politics. In the post-Cold War northeast Asia, where neither a system of collaboration nor any multilateral collective security is in existence, balance of power politics operates as inevitable state reactions to assure minimum level of security. China may well be considered as ‘the high church of realpolitik’ in the post-Cold War world (Christensen 1996). We could find a politics of power balancing evident in the post-Cold War northeast Asia, especially between China and Japan with their competitive increase in defense spending.

## China Threat Increase

#### Ending U.S. securitization of China would heighten allied fears of Beijing

Johnathan Holslag, Research Fund Flanders fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, July 2009, “Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions,” The Washington Quarterly, 32:3

At the same time, Washington needs to be attentive to concerns of countries such as Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. Distrust of China’s modernizing armed forces is mounting, and they will see closer cooperation with the United States being done at the expense of their own strategic interests. The Indian military has already reacted negatively to Washington’s support for the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan fears that allowing China’s military to expand its clout in the Western Pacific threatens its own maritime corridors and might embolden Beijing to exert military pressure in the East China Sea dispute. Even Moscow is now prioritizing refurbishing its military presence in the Russian Far East. Easing one security dilemma might thus foster another. Washington needs to engage all four regional powers simultaneously. Unlike counterbalancing, by using Taiwan as a forward fortress and fostering new alliances to contain China, inclusive balancing implies working with all the main players of the Asian system so that the multipolar order imposes sufficient costs to thwart military adventurism. Transcending different political systems, inclusive balancing seeks to give each player the scope to develop, resist military revisionism, address non-traditional threats, and protect an open trade system. Only such a posture will permit Washington to foster truly strategic military cooperation with China and to avoid the high costs of traditional containment and confrontation while also reassuring its traditional allies.

## Domination

#### The K of “China Threats” creates new boundaries that reify systems of domination

William A. Callahanis professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714

doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say.

## Solvency Takeout

#### U.S. attempts to diminish security dilemma with China fail – Taiwan

Johnathan Holslag, Research Fund Flanders fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, July 2009, “Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions,” The Washington Quarterly, 32:3

The United States has recognized that cooperation is the best solution. In December of 2008, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Gen. Timothy Keating expressed his hope ‘‘to work closely’’ with the Chinese Navy in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and offered to share intelligence.31 Earlier that year, PACOM invited the PLA to explore a coordinated response to future humanitarian disasters in Asia. For the first time, Chinese military observers attended the Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand. By inviting China, the United States confirmed its earlier promulgated objective to encourage China ‘‘to play a constructive, peaceful role’’ and ‘‘to serve as a partner in addressing common security challenges.’’32 Beijing, however, has been reluctant to accept such invitations by the United States. While it sent a top-ranked general for the first time to the U.S.—China Strategic Dialogue in January 2008, and agreed to step up exchanges at various levels, it minimized interaction almost immediately after the Pentagon announced its new arms deal with Taiwan in October 2008. A call to Beijing by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney in December 2008 failed to immediately bring the top Chinese military generals to the negotiating table. When they did arrive, they did so with many reservations. The expected interaction between both navies in eastern Africa also ended in disappointment for the Pentagon. China obviously blames Washington’s ambivalence. ‘‘America is reaching out one hand to us, while supporting our arch-enemy with the other,’’ an expert at the Chinese Defense University asserted.33 Even the most moderate voices in China’s security community decry the recent $6.5 billion package to Taiwan. ‘‘It was less than the Taiwanese government asked for, but as the decision came at a moment when cross-strait relations were steadily improving, we cannot but conclude that America wants to contain China in spite of its amicable statements,’’ an influential security expert stated.34 The Chinese military is not willing to reach out to the United States as long as it backs the Taiwanese armed forces, whereas the United States will stick to its unsinkable aircraft carrier if China’s military does not open up. As long as this security dilemma over Taiwan persists, Washington should not expect that Beijing is going to turn its global military strategy into a cooperative one. To mitigate this security dilemma, the United States needs to show restraint in providing military support to Taiwan, as long as relations with the mainland continue to improve. It can afford to do so because it does not need Taiwan as a military balancer. As posited earlier, it can prevent peaceful development turning into an aggressive rise by maintaining a supreme position along China’s economic lifelines. This does not imply that the Taiwanese people are left to the mercy of Beijing. This just implies that deterrence becomes symbolically less sensitive, though just as effective.

## Impacts Inevatible

#### Proves their impacts are inevitable

Xin Benjian, Faculty at Loyouang, September 2001, “Security Dilemma, Balance of Power,” online pdf

The arms race and security dilemma between Taiwan and the Mainland gave a very good excuse for the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific. China’s moderate military modernization efforts (i.e. buying some fighters and warships from Russia), aimed at deterring the Taiwan independent forces, are unfortunately mistaken by its neighbors as a security threat or indication of ambition. By making use of such concerns and exaggerating the so-called “China Threat,” the US not only justified its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific but also maintained the ideal state—“relations among Asian countries are far less close than their respective bilateral relations with the US.”6 In addition to consolidating military bases in Japan and South Korea, the US has succeeded in strengthening its military presence in Southeast Asia. For example, in 1998, US troops went back to the Philippines according to a newly signed agreement of warship port-calls; in March 2001, the Kitty Hawk Aircraft Carrier combat group anchored at Singapore’s naval base. These activities have obviously revealed that the US would like to interfere in the affairs of the South China Sea and entrap China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines into security dilemmas and arms races over their conflicting territorial claims.

#### They don’t solve American perception of itself – U.S. efforts to control Asia are inevitable

Chengxin Pan, Australian National University, 2004, “Discourses of China in International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, Doctoral Thesis

In this thesis, I will seek to argue that this conventional field routinely takes ‘China’ as a pregiven starting point for its empirical analysis, and has as a result become increasingly inadequate in theory and potentially dangerous in practice in the new century. This is because the dominant ways in which China and its foreign relations are understood and acted upon are inextricably linked to the particular ways in which the West in general, and the United States in particular, imagine themselves in relation to China and seek to project this self-identity on the world stage. The way that America perceives itself as the indispensable nation with a special mission to lead the world and shape its future, for example, is intrinsic to the ways in which China is understood as a ‘great opportunity’ and/or as an ‘emerging threat.’ The main function of this knowledge of China is, therefore, effectively autobiographical, designed to illuminate ‘who we are.’ In this context, I argue that mainstream Western discourses are neither objective knowledge nor an innocent, apolitical intellectual endeavour. Rather, they are engaged in the formation and legitimation of particular attitudes and policies towards China. These strategies, whether called ‘engagement,’ or ‘containment,’ or something in between, are predicated on the particular ways of constructing self and the Chinese ‘Other,’ rather than a necessary or natural response to an objectified China ‘out there’ in the real world. They are necessary only to the extent that they act to legitimate and sustain the power preponderance of America (and the West in general) in the post-Cold War world, a world in which the invocation and control of the Chinese ‘Other’ has come to be considered crucial for that self-identity to function.

#### Alt fails

Anna M. Agathangelou, Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof @ Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Inst. For Social Studies @ Hague, Fall 1997, Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, p 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden power-mongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in ready-made alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

## Plan key

#### K isn’t the root cause of the aff – their argument is overdetermined generalization, plan is key

Scott D. Sagan – Department of Political Science, Stanford University – ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE – 2000 – available via: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc

To make reasonable judgements in such matters it is essential, in my view, to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war and argue that the likelihood of conflict was so high that the war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors. The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a bizarre false warning incident in the U.S. radar systems facing Cuba led officers at the North American Air Defense Command to believe that the U.S. was under attack and that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida. Now imagine the counterfactual event that this false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and resulted in a U.S. nuclear "retaliation" against the Russians. How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given the deep political hostility of the two superpowers, the conflicting ideology, the escalating arms race, nuclear war would have occurred eventually. If not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, or the Middle East, or Korea. From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.

## Predictions key

#### Our predictions are accurate

Bryan Caplan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, 12-26-2005, EconLog, http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling\_tetloc\_1.html

Philip Tetlock, one of my favorite social scientists, is making waves with his new book, Expert Political Judgment. Tetlock spent two decades asking hundreds of political experts to make predictions about hundreds of issues. With all this data under his belt, he then asks and tries to answer a bunch of Big Questions, including "Do experts on average have a greater-than-chance ability to predict the future?," and "What kinds of experts have the greatest forecasting ability?" This book is literally awesome - to understand Tetlock's project and see how well he follows through fills me with awe. And that's tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock's work as a great refutation of my own. Most of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public, and defends the simple. "The experts are right, the public is wrong," interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that the average expert is an embarassingly bad forecaster. In fact, experts barely beat what Tetlock calls the "chimp" stategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. Tetlock's sample suffers from severe selection bias. He deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. As his methodological appendix explains, questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who? The implicit answer is "Dumb according to the typical expert in the field." What Tetlock really shows is that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus. This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it: "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what Tetlock really shows is that experts can raise their credibility if they stop overreaching.

## Consequentialism key

#### Consequences can be assessed

Tyler Cowen, GMU, December 2006, “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism,” Utilitas, 18:4, pq

The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances. This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. At the same time, the epistemic critique appears to be using a more plausible assumption, namely that of a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument. The original force came from the assumption of no information about major events of consequence. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack and one million children have contracted smallpox.We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 children. Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. We do not say: ‘We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.’ Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of 300,000–600,000 children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important.We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected to cure the greater number of children. This example may appear excessively simple, but it points our attention to the non-generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.

#### Death outweighs

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. “Leftist Criticism of "Nature" Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age,” Dissent Winter 2003 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### Reality outweighs representations – Montezuma proves

Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security at Ohio State University, 1999, “Social theory of international politics,” gbooks

The effects of holding a relational theory of meaning on theorizing about world politics are apparent in David Campbell's provocative study of US foreign policy, which shows how the threats posed by the Soviets, immigration, drugs, and so on, were constructed out of US national security discourse.29 The book clearly shows that material things in the world did not force US decision-makers to have particular representations of them - the picture theory of reference does not hold. In so doing it highlights the discursive aspects of truth and reference, the sense in which objects are relationally "constructed."30 On the other hand, while emphasizing several times that he is not denying the reality of, for example, Soviet actions, he specifically eschews (p. 4) any attempt to assess the extent to which they caused US representations. Thus he cannot address the extent to which US representations of the Soviet threat were accurate or true (questions of correspondence). He can only focus on the nature and consequences of the representations.31 Of course, there is nothing in the social science rule book which requires an interest in causal questions, and the nature and consequences of representations are important questions. In the terms discussed below he is engaging in a constitutive rather than causal inquiry. However, I suspect Campbell thinks that any attempt to assess the correspondence of discourse to reality is inherently pointless. According to the relational theory of reference we simply have no access to what the Soviet threat "really" was, and as such its truth is established entirely within discourse, not by the latter's correspondence to an extra-discursive reality 32 The main problem with the relational theory of reference is that it cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for representational failures or misinterpretations. Worldly resistance is most obvious in nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can't fly. But examples abound in society too. In 1519 Montezuma faced the same kind of epistemological problem facing social scientists today: how to refer to people who, in his case, called themselves Spaniards. Many representations were conceivable, and no doubt the one he chose - that they were gods - drew on the discursive materials available to him. So why was he killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own? The realist answer is that Montezuma was simply wrong: the Spaniards were not gods, and had come instead to conquer his empire. Had Montezuma adopted this alternative representation of what the Spanish were, he might have prevented this outcome because that representation would have corresponded more to reality. The reality of the conquistadores did not force him to have a true representation, as the picture theory of reference would claim, but it did have certain effects - whether his discourse allowed them or not. The external world to which we ostensibly lack access, in other words. often frustrates or penalizes representations. Postmodernism gives us no insight into why this is so, and indeed, rejects the question altogether.33 The description theory of reference favored by empiricists focuses on sense-data in the mind while the relational theory of the postmoderns emphasizes relations among words, but they are similar in at least one crucial respect: neither grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content.34 Both privilege epistemology over ontology. What is needed is a theory of reference that takes account of the contribution of mind and language yet is anchored to external reality. The realist answer is the causal theory of reference. According to the causal theory the meaning of terms is determined by a two-stage process.35 First there is a "baptism/' in which some new referent in the environment (say, a previously unknown animal) is given a name; then this connection of thing-to-term is handed down a chain of speakers to contemporary speakers. Both stages are causal, the first because the referent impressed itself upon someone's senses in such a way that they were induced to give it a name, the second because the handing down of meanings is a causal process of imitation and social learning. Both stages allow discourse to affect meaning, and as such do not preclude a role for "difference" as posited by the relational theory. Theory is underdetermined by reality, and as such the causal theory is not a picture theory of reference. However, conceding these points does not mean that meaning is entirely socially or mentally constructed. In the realist view beliefs are determined by discourse and nature.36 This solves the key problems of the description and relational theories: our ability to refer to the same object even if our descriptions are different or change, and the resistance of the world to certain representations. Mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world.

#### There’s always value to life

L. Shwartz “A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?” Medical ethics: a case-based approach 2002 www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests.