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\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – 1NC

Karzai – 1NC

Karzai is in a holding pattern – the next move by Petraeus will determine Karzai’s credibility

Candace Rondeaux, 6-24-10 – Senior Analyst with the International Crisis Group based in Kabul. “Afghans Don't Expect Petraeus To Change Strategy [DP].” National Public Radio. NOTE: MONTAGNE = Interviewer.

RENEE MONTAGNE, host: We are going to carry the conversation now to Afghanistan and to Candace Rondeaux. She's a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group based in Kabul. And thanks for joining us. Ms. CANDACE RONDEAUX (International Crisis Group): Thanks for having me, Renee. MONTAGNE: After the Rolling Stone article came out, Afghanistan President Karzai spoke out in support of General McChrystal. He spoke of him quite warmly, as a matter of fact, and as someone who cared about and understood Afghans. What was their relationship like? Ms. RONDEAUX: Yeah. The relationship between President Karzai and General McChrystal was very close, certainly a lot closer than Karzai had had with any of his other American interlocutors. Of course, it's well-known that there was some level of animosity or at least mistrust between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Karzai, and of course Ambassador Eikenberry. Now, for Karzai, the most comfortable relationship is one in which he can somewhat manipulate his interlocutor. You know, tough love is not something that flies very well in Afghanistan in general. Culturally speaking, you know, there's not a lot of room for public displays of force, as it were, diplomatically speaking. So it's no surprise that Karzai would have a stronger relationship with somebody like McChrystal, who really needed him as a partner in order to make his counterinsurgency strategy work here. MONTAGNE: And Karzai, though, very quickly embraced the new commander, General Petraeus yesterday. Does that suggest that the relationship between the U.S. and Karzai will not suffer with McChrystal gone? And I guess you can also say, and does it matter? Ms. RONDEAUX: Well, I mean there's no doubt that General McChrystal's departure from the scene is going to have a major impact on, one, momentum of the mission - but two, right now Karzai's in a situation where he's not certain that his international partners are in it for the full long haul. Given that, this kind of change of personnel, as stunning a blow as it was, is certainly going to have little effect in the administration. And while I think that there's probably enormous respect for General Petraeus because his reputation precedes him, Karzai certainly will be stepping carefully until he can feel out for sure where General Petraeus stands, both on strategy, but also on this tough love issue. Because, you know, it's not clear necessarily that General Petraeus will carry the same kind of social license that General McChrystal did while he was working with Karzai. It's not clear that General Petraeus shared the same idea of Karzai as a credible partner as General McChrystal did. One way or the other here, this is a major bump and it will certainly not go unnoticed in relations between Karzai and the U.S. government.

The US has pledged that it will \*shift\* but \*not withdraw\* forces – this provides the window of peace necessary to promote reunification

MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, 6-17-10 – UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY. “REP. IKE SKELTON HOLDS A HEARING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN,” Roll Call, Inc. Political Transcript Wire. Lexis.

Needless to say, the purpose of these efforts is to ensure a gradual transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government. And as we told President Karzai and 14 members of his cabinet during our strategic dialogue last month, transition does not -- does not -- mean abandonment or withdrawal. We are committed to supporting the Afghan people over the long haul, and we will not walk away from this commitment. Nonetheless, we cannot and should not remain in a combat role indefinitely. As the international military presence begins to shift from a lead combat role to an advise and assist role, it will be absolutely vital to ensure a robust and long-term security assistance program, as well as an international civilian assistance efforts focused on capacity-building, governance, and development. We are working closely with the Afghan government to plan for this transition process. At the Kabul conference in July, the Afghan government will present plans for achieving further progress in governance and development across four ministerial clusters. We'll also expect to hear from President Karzai regarding actions to be taken with regard to corruption, as well as plans for reconciliation and reintegration. Let me say a few words about the latter, since I know it's an issue that's generated a lot of interest. All parties to the conflict in Afghanistan recognize that, in the end, some political resolution will be required to bring the conflict to a close. This recognition has driven the Afghan government to begin to develop plans to reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate low-level fighters. In early April, President Karzai presented his interim plans for reintegration. And in May, a consultative peace jirga gave President Karzai a conditional mandate to pursue reconciliation. The U.S. supports an Afghan-led process that seeks to bring back into society those who cease violence, break ties to Al Qaida, and are willing to live under the Afghan constitution. Let me conclude by underscoring our overall assessment that we are heading in the right direction in Afghanistan. Of the 121 key terrain districts identified by COMISAF in December 2009, 60 were judged as sympathetic or neutral to the Afghan government at the time. By March of this year, that number had climbed to 73. This and other indicators suggest that we are beginning to regain the initiative and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum. That said, the outcome is far from determined, and these are still early days for the administration's new strategy. When I testified before this committee six weeks ago, I said at the time, inevitably, we will face challenges, possibly setbacks. Even as we achieve successes, we need to recognize that things may get harder before they get better. And I stand by that assessment.

Karzai – 1NC

US- Afghan military alliance is key to Karzai’s political credibility

David 5/11 [Ignatius, Associate Editor and Columnist for The Washington Post, 2010, The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition\_id=10&categ\_id=5&article\_id=114714#axzz0sE0ooRbf] KLS

Kandahar, the next big test of the United States’ strategy, will be even harder. The plan is to work with the existing power structure inside the city, even as US troops pound Taliban strongholds to the west and south. But a senior administration official cautions that the Kandahar strategy is “still a work in progress.” He explains: “We’re still working our way through how much you can salvage [in the local government] and how much you have to rebuild.” Karzai’s visit this week will push US and Afghan officials to focus on these hard questions about the war. The goal is to signal a “strong, deep and broad partnership” between the two countries, which will give Karzai some political capital back home, according to a top Afghan adviser. The senior administration official agrees that this week should “solidify our partnership with Karzai.”

Reconciliation is popular but Karzai needs political capital to push it to the finish

Hossani 6/4 [Massoud, Paige, National Consultive Peace Jirga in Kabul, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/164212/analysis/20100604\_afghanistan\_peace\_conference\_concludes] KLS

Twenty-six committees formed by the 1,600 delegates (1,400 local, 200 foreign) at Afghanistan’s National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration, known as a jirga in local terms, presented their findings June 4 at the close of the conference in Kabul. While the conference began with a Taliban attack, the consensus of the proposals presented at the conclusion was overwhelmingly pro-Taliban. Among the proposals was the establishment of an amnesty program for rank-and-file Taliban if they turn over their weapons, a ban on “un-Islamic” television programs and the removal of senior insurgents from U.S. and U.N. blacklists. Delegates also proposed the closure of foreign military installations such as the Bagram Airfield and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. Virtually all of the proposals were concessions to the Taliban — with the key exception being a demand that the Taliban cut ties with al Qaeda. However, the conference was not without its critics. High-level Afghan politicians such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and former presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah criticized the conference as an attempt by Karzai to handpick supporters who would agree with and support his plans for Taliban reconciliation. Neither Dostum nor Abdullah attended the conference. Even if Karzai had hand-selected the delegates, he still managed to find 1,400 highly placed local officials who supported him, a collection that cannot be easily ignored. Additionally, Dostum and Abdullah had come out in support of negotiations with the Taliban before the conference, so despite their criticisms of how the conference was conducted, they do not necessarily disagree with its outcome. The conference’s participants supported Karzai’s calls for the quick implementation of [high-level talks with the Taliban](http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20081116_geopolitical_diary_peace_processes_proceed_iraq_and_afghanistan?fn=6616421275). Although the United States had long opposed this strategy, U.S. Central Command Gen. David Petraeus indicated for the first time in February that the United States would be willing to deal with Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar, so these proposals actually support both positions. Public calls for a timetable of withdrawal and other political pressures give the United States the ability to expedite its withdrawal while mitigating criticism from others that it is leaving Afghanistan behind with a strong insurgency. The jirga itself is unlikely to lead to any real solutions to the government’s conflict with the Taliban, but it did serve as a kind of referendum that will give Karzai the political capital and the United States the public support to go ahead with negotiations with the Taliban. Unlike past jirgas, this one acknowledged the power of the Taliban and the need to reconcile with the Afghan jihadist movement, and the Taliban likely view this jirga as a positive development. This could create conditions conducive to negotiations with the Taliban that would allow for a drawdown of Western forces in keeping with Washington’s timetable.

Karzai – 1NC

Reconciliation turns the case and prevents a new government takeover by terrorists

Mojumdar 6/3 [Aunohita, Indian freelance journalist, 2010, Asian Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/LF03Df01.html] KLS

Tired of the long military engagement, both have latched onto "reconciliation and reintegration" as the next big plan, and appear willing to subsume their differences to find a way out of the morass. The panacea, however, is yet another refrain of the old song that a military solution alone cannot work. That song has been sung to different beats for several years now, though earlier versions included development, governance, rule of law and accountability as necessary measures to complement military achievements. Now, apparently, those goals are being sidelined as the international community chooses to further curtail its ambitions regarding Afghanistan, reconciling itself with existing realities even when they subvert the goals of nation-building. The goals, now pared down, are to ensure that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Western nations, either as a staging post of international terrorist strikes or as a sanctuary for anti-Western groups to take hold. While these aims have always been core to the Western intervention for a number of years, there was an understanding that in pursuit of those aims Afghanistan could and would be rebuilt with a new state structure, since this represented the best bet of making sure Afghanistan became a stable state, and not one vulnerable to being subverted by terrorist groups. The safety of Afghans and internal cohesion within Afghanistan were therefore seen as being coterminous with the goal of security for the West. However, somewhere along the way the goals have diverged as the costs of the intervention have steadily risen in Western capitals.

Takeover sparks fundamentalist uprisings necessitating terrorism, border clashes and Pakistan-India nuclear strikes, culminating in global nuclear war  
Morgan 7 [Stephen J, Former Member of British Labour Party Executive Committee, June 3, <http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>] KLS

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – UQ

UQ – Karzai Cred Up

Karzai credibility on the rise- moderate approach winning him support

CNN 6/4 [2010, http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/04/karzai-faces-credibility-balancing-act-after-peace-jirga/] KLS

KABUL, Afghanistan — When he walked in to the peace jirga tent, President Karzai took up his place in the front row – in a very comfortable looking arm chair. To his left and right, Afghanistan's elder statesmen. Most had long white beards; a good handful were former warlords. Karzai had come to hear what the 1,600 delegates he'd invited were recommending he do to make peace with the Taliban. He'd had a lukewarm reception when he inaugurated the event three days earlier. It was, however, not as frosty as the reception the Taliban gave him. A serenade of rockets and gunfire greeted his opening speech. One rocket landed just 200 meters away.

Public support for Karzai renewed- overtures for decreased corruption

AP 6/13 [Associated Press, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=karzai-seeks-support-for-kandahar-operation-2010-06-13]

President Hamid Karzai called Sunday on community leaders in Kandahar to support a NATO campaign to bolster security in this Taliban stronghold, urging people to work with his government to "bring dignity back." NATO has already begun an operation to ramp up security in Kandahar, and the campaign is expected to accelerate the coming months. Many of the estimated half million Kandahar residents are skeptical of the operation, fearing it will lead to more bloodshed. During a meeting in a stuffy conference hall in Kandahar city, several hundred people including tribal chiefs and religious leaders cheered as Karzai denounced corruption among police and local powerbrokers. He pounded the podium as he said corruption was undermining security as his government and its international partners struggle to turn back a resurgent Taliban. The majority of the crowd stood and raised their hands as Karzai asked for their support.

Karzai’s credibility on the brink- calls for “unity” after Rahman’s death sustain it

Synovitz 2/18 [Ron senior correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, 2010,Radio Free Europe http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1098837.html] (Abdul Rahman= civil aviation minister) KLS

"The people that the minister of defense and the minister of the interior announced [as the primary suspects] were basically people who were their friends for many years. So they brought those people forward. It was a very committed act of patriotism for Afghanistan that the ministers [demonstrated] in the cabinet meeting there. So there are no political implications [of a cover-up]. The cabinet is very, very much united in an Afghan straight way. I'm glad for that." Indeed, the interim administration put on an impressive display of unity during the weekend. At Rahman's funeral on 16 February, Karzai stood side by side with Fahim, Qanooni, Abdullah, and Rabbani. It was the first time the five had been seen together at a public event since the inauguration of the interim administration in December. But tension and uneasiness between Karzai and the others was clear to all who attended the funeral. Anatol Lieven, an analyst from the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who is in Kabul this month to observe political developments, told RFE/RL today that Karzai had no choice but to project an image of cabinet unity on the issue of bringing Rahman's killers to justice. "Otherwise, his own credibility and, indeed, the whole idea of the interim administration would have been simply been in tatters. You can't have a group of senior police and security officers murdering a minister and simply ignore it or treat it as of minor importance." Lieven says the killing has been a disaster for the image of the interim administration, but adds that Karzai so far has succeeded, at least, in minimizing negative backlash from abroad. He says a vital part of that effort has been to get the Defense Ministry to arrest those involved. "For the moment, things are sticking together. But of course, it's a very worrying sign of what could happen when rivalries -- personal rivalries, ethnic rivalries -- really come to the fore at the time [when a transitional government is named by] the Loya Jirga in June."

UQ – Karzai Cred Up

Karzai’s credibility high now- investment deals

Mull 6/19 [Josh, Staff Writer, 2010, Enduring America http://enduringamerica.com/2010/06/19/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-joining-the-taliban-the-story-behind-the-headline-mull/] KLS

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though [maybe not American investors](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/asia/18mines.html)), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan’s resources as well as manage the funds properly “within Afghanistan,” which of course means pay-off for the Taliban that legitimizes Karzai’s presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country’s resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a *coalition government*, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

Karzai’s legitimacy on the rise- overtures to Taliban

Siddiqi 4/29 [Shahid R, Staff Writer, 2010, Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/04/29/is-karzai-heading-for-the-end-game/] KLS

He is reluctant to subvert loyalties of Taliban foot soldiers and reintegrate the defectors into Afghan society, a task given by Obama’s commanders, fearing that a backlash from the Taliban leadership could scuttle his chances of future accommodation with them. Against the wishes of the Obama administration, he publicly insists on directly initiating negotiations for a power sharing arrangement with Mullah Omar that could confer legitimacy on his government. Mullah Omar, however, refuses to deal with him, and Karzai’s overtures to Mullah Omar have angered Obama, who considers this a premature step.

UQ – Karzai Push Now

Karzai is committed to pushing Reconciliation agreements

Castillo 6/24 [Graciana del, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, 2010, Project Syndicate http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0032.htm]

It may or may not be coincidental, but as US President Barack Obama's military offensive in Afghanistan gets underway, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has at long last embarked on a serious effort at national reconciliation. The prime focus of this process is to find some means to reintegrate at least parts of the Taliban into society and into productive activities. In order to qualify for reintegration, members of the Taliban will need to lay down their weapons, renounce their connection with Al Qaeda, and agree to respect Afghan laws.

UQ – Reconciliation Will Pass

Public support the reunification push

Masood 5/6 [Ahmad, Staff Writer, 2010, Reuters, http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?tag=president-hamid-karzai]

Ninety-one percent of the respondents supported the convening of a “Loya Jirga,” or “grand assembly” of leaders as a way of ending the conflict, with 54 percent “strongly” supporting it, and 37 percent “somewhat” supporting it. That figure appears to reflect support for President Karzai’s proposal for a “peace Jirga” in which the Taliban would be invited to participate.

Karzia’s Reconciliation and Reintergration strategy is poised to be implemented

Flournoy 6/15 [Michèle P, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2010, Senate Armed Services Committee http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/06%20June/Flournoy%2006-15-10.pdf] KLS

We have seen other positive indicators in the last year, as well. Of the 121 key terrain districts identified by ISAF in December 2009, 60 were assessed as sympathetic or neutral to the Afghan Government. By March of this year, that number had climbed to 73 districts. Nonetheless, the Afghan public still considers government corruption a serious problem, and extends the blame to ISAF and the rest of the international community. Corruption in Afghanistan remains a widespread problem. As stated in DoD’s April 2010, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has achieved some progress in its anti-corruption efforts. But substantive change remains elusive. Despite this and other serious problems that remain unaddressed, there are reasons for optimism. A national survey completed in March indicates that 59% of Afghans believe their government is headed in the right direction, an increase of 8% over September 2009. All parties to the conflict in Afghanistan recognize that there is a limit to what military activities alone can accomplish. In the end, some political resolution will be required to bring the conflict to a close. This recognition has driven the Afghan government’s efforts to reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate low-level fighters. This effort must be Afghan-led. In early April, President Karzai presented his interim plans for reintegrating lower-level insurgents who renounce violence and disassociate themselves from terrorists back into Afghan society. In May, a Consultative Peace Jirga, a traditional Afghan method of gaining national consensus, was held to address reconciliation. The Jirga’s final report gave President Karzai a conditional mandate to pursue talks with the Taliban. In recognition of this progress, the Department has released Afghan Reintegration Program Authority funding (authorized under the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act) to fund DoD reintegration activities in support of this Afghan government initiative. Along with contributions from the international reintegration trust fund, co-managed by the British and Japanese governments, the Afghan Reintegration Program Authority will play an important role in supporting reintegration opportunities as they emerge on the battlefield.

UQ – Reconciliation Will Pass

Reintegration gaining momentum- International support

IRAOP 6/19 [2010 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, http://www.president.gov.af/Contents/88/Documents/1905/joint\_statment\_Afg\_Japan\_eng.html] KLS

President Karzai stressed that, for stability and peace in Afghanistan, it is important to realize the reintegration of those who renounce violence and join the peace process as an important component of sustainable political reconciliation.  President Karzai also shared the latest developments made with regard to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program following up upon the recent National Consultative Peace Jirga.  Prime Minister Kan expressed his appreciation for convening the Jirga as an important step forward toward the reconciliation, in light of the importance of a political resolution seeking stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.  Prime Minister Kan, recognizing the importance of reintegration for the recovery of security and development in rural areas, expressed Japan’s readiness to actively support the implementation of the reintegration program, utilizing its achievements and experience as the leading country of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups).

Reconciliation is on the path to being implemented- but Karzai still needs credibility to overcome slight opposition

Siddique 2/26 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

Alexander Thier, who oversees Afghanistan and Pakistan at Washington's U.S. Institute of Peace, says for the first time since the U.S. invasion in 2001, the idea of talking to the Taliban is being taken seriously in Washington. "Clearly they have managed to disrupt the peace in Afghanistan enough that the idea of negotiation with the Taliban is appealing to the Afghan government and the international community," Thier says. But just because the idea is being taken seriously does not mean concerns have evaporated. Looking to possible obstacles to Kabul's reconciliation efforts, Thier says the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama and Karzai's "loyal" opposition -- Afghan leaders who are not part of the insurgency -- are "more concerned about the approach that would essentially share power with the Taliban." Elements within Karzai's government and some opposition figures who fought against the Taliban for years have expressed more immediate concerns. On February 20, Afghanistan's main opposition leader, Abdullah Abdullah, told Reuters: "The Taliban are not ready to enter talks. They think that they have the upper hand militarily." Exasperation over Karzai's reconciliation/reintegration efforts could be having ripple effects as well.

UQ – Reconciliation Will Pass

Reconciliation is on the move but Karzai needs to keep steady stream of support to make it pass

Siddique 2/26 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

The council and its upcoming grand assembly are signs that Kabul is moving ahead with its effort to reconcile with the Taliban. But the goal that Western countries involved in Afghanistan want to see pursued -- the reintegration of moderate Taliban into society -- appears to have hit a wall. The joint initiative attracted substantial backing from the international community, which pledged $140 million for its implementation at a London conference in January. But the Afghan administration has been slow to produce and implement a comprehensive reintegration program, even after promising immunity, jobs, and peaceful civilian lives to insurgents who lay down their arms. Just Getting Started The Helmand Taliban commander who spoke to RFE/RL says that promises of security for insurgents and their families would be of primary importance to any insurgent thinking of switching sides. He explains that Al-Qaeda and hard-line Taliban "spotters" within insurgent ranks quickly eliminate individuals who even attempt to contact Afghan authorities. The insurgent spy network also keeps a close watch on Afghan government offices in battleground provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan, he says, adding that any Taliban associates spotted there are eliminated. "Even if you praise an Afghan government leader in private, your standing will be undermined permanently," he says. Helmand Governor Gulab Mangal juggles the complexities of overseeing a province that is currently hosting NATO's biggest anti-Taliban operation to date with the task of bringing insurgents back into the fold. Mangal says Kabul has empowered him to grant Taliban members security and cash once they stop fighting. But he says an overarching national strategy that would provide guidelines on how to deal with former rebels is not yet ready. "The Afghan government is keen on dealing with groups and individuals who want to join the national reconciliation program following the London conference," he says of the January forum. "President Karzai is also keen on strengthening this program. In the coming month or two we will have guidelines and specific strategy for doing that, but we don't have it yet." Karzai adviser Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, who is in charge of the effort to put together a reintegration plan, tells RFE/RL that the reintegration program "will take some more time" to start bearing fruit.

Reconciliation will be implemented- Obama lobbying for success

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

President Obama new policy is paving way for national reconciliation in Afghanistan. That simply means reconciliation with Taliban. In American corridors of power now a days discussions of involvement of Taliban in Afghan government, are taking place. America has again issued a “Fatwa” that there are two different types of Taliban. But it must be in our minds that now a days Afghani people has started questioning the American way of bringing peace to Afghanistan. Recently I was watching a video of Matiullah Turab – an Afghani poet- he severely criticized American presence in Afghanistan while he was telling his poem to a gathering of Afghani officials and public.

Reconciliation will pass- US support

Labott 5/13 [Elise, CNN Senior State Department Producer, 2010, CNN News http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/12/labott.afghanistan.analysis/index.html]

For his part, Karzai sees American involvement in Afghanistan as being driven solely by national interests. He is concerned -- and many Afghans fear -- the United States will abandon the country once it starts pulling out troops in July 2011, just as it cut off funding and support after the war that drove out the Soviets in the 1980s. Karzai wants the United States to demonstrate that it's there for the long haul. And he needs its support for his efforts toward political reconciliation with the Taliban, a plan still in its infancy that the U.S. wants to help shape.

UQ – Reconciliation Will Pass

Reconciliation on track, but Karzai needs support to win over militant opposition

Massoud 6/5 [Waheedullah, Staff Writer, 2010, Agency French Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBld6N8Da\_\_f8T64xeZuVSNQ\_EJQ] KLS

Some analysts and diplomats consider the jirga a success for giving Afghan President Hamid Karzai broad-based public support for his peace plan and for applying pressure on the militants. The jirga also decided that a shura (council) should be established to implement a peace process and co-ordinate the jirga's decisions with the international community's representatives in Afghanistan.

UQ – AT: McChrystal

Karzai’s connection to the US military is wavering – general disputes can be overcome as long as there’s a united front behind Karzai

AFP, 6-24-10. Agence French Press, “Dismay in Kabul over McChrystal sacking,” Lexis.

The dismissal of NATO commander General Stanley McChrystal was greeted with dismay in Kabul where Afghans and foreign diplomats praised his bold efforts to change the course of the war. But the Taliban vowed the change in command would not halt their fight against foreign troops, as NATO marked a grim milestone with June becoming the deadliest month for its soldiers since the war began almost nine years ago. McChrystal's counter-insurgency strategy, which brought sweeping changes aimed at cutting civilian casualties and winning over the population, had been credited with bringing some order to a chaotic and spriralling conflict. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government had publicly urged the White House not to remove McChrystal over disparaging remarks he made about officials in US President Barack Obama's administration in a Rolling Stone profile. A spokesman for Karzai -- whose relations with the White House have been troubled -- praised McChrystal as a "trusted partner of the Afghan people" and said his removal would "not be helpful" at this critical juncture. Spokesman Waheed Omar, speaking before McChrystal's removal on Wednesday, said Kabul believed the US general had made a mistake but it should not detract from the urgency of trying to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. "For the continuation of the process in Afghanistan and the critical time that we've ahead -- his presence is going to be greatly important." However the Afghan government later said it respected Obama's decision and welcomed the appointment of David Petraeus, the general credited with changing the direction of the Iraq conflict, to succeed McChrystal. "His replacement General David Petraeus is someone who knows Afghanistan, who knows the region very well and is an experienced general," said Karzai's spokesman Waheed Omar. "We are looking forward to working with him." US Senator Carl Levin, who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, said lawmakers were working to organise a confirmation hearing on Petraeus's nomination no later than next Tuesday. NATO's announcement of the deaths of four troops in a vehicle accident in southern Afghanistan made June the deadliest single month for US-led foreign forces in the nearly nine-year conflict, according to an AFP tally. The incident brought to 79 the number of foreign troops who have died as a result of the conflict in Afghanistan so far this month, eclipsing the previous most deadly month last August, when 77 NATO soldiers were killed. The US military has warned that casualties will inevitably mount as foreign forces build up their campaign to oust militants from the southern province of Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual home and a hotbed of violence. The removal of McChrystal, a brilliant former special operations chief who was appointed commander in June last year of what has become America's longest war, saw the Taliban react with customary defiance. "We don't care whether it's McChrystal or Petraeus," Taliban spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi told AFP by telephone from an undisclosed location. "We'll be fighting the invading forces until they leave." NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan Mark Sedwill called McChrystal "one of the finest men I have ever known" who "was pivotal in creating and driving forward NATO's strategy in Afghanistan". Vygaudas Usackas, EU special envoy to Afghanistan, told AFP McChrystal would be remembered for "shaping a new paradigm for the military in defence of civilians and empowering the Afghan nation". McChrystal's strategy poured tens of thousands of extra troops into Afghanistan to win over civilians and train local forces. He won early praise for a drop in civilian casualties, for reaching out to Afghans and for working overtime to bring Karzai on board. The Afghan presidency credited McChrystal with helping to "increase the level of trust" with the Afghan people since he assumed command last year. Karzai and Obama have endured months of discord and worsening relations, but made an effort to present a united front during the Afghan leader's last visit to Washington on May 12.

US- Karzai pact still in tact- Karzai’s spokesperson proves

Youseff, Shah and Landay, 6/23 [Nancy A., Saeed, Jonathan S., Staff Writers, Kansas City News, http://www.kansascity.com/2010/06/23/2039834/obamas-afghan-strategy-remains.html#ixzz0rtmJrjIg] KLS

Karzai, who on Tuesday lobbied Obama to keep McChrystal and publicly lavished praise on the U.S. general, late Wednesday was having to adjust to the new reality. "This is an internal United States government issue and a decision by President Obama that we respect," said Waheed Omar, Karzai's spokesman. "We respect the choice (Obama) made. Petraeus is very experienced, and he has very good knowledge of Afghanistan. We hope this marks the continuation of the improvements that McChrystal brought." While officials in Afghanistan stressed that key members of McChrystal's team will stay on, including Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, McChrystal's top deputy, Petraeus won't have some of his key advisers who worked beside him in Iraq.

UQ – AT: Withdrawal Inevitable

Timetable a lie- troops positioned to stay

McManus 6/17 [Doyle, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, 2010, Lexis] KLS

But so far, Afghanistan has refused to operate on an American timetable, and that's unlikely to change. Experts in counterinsurgency -- the labor-intensive, winning hearts-and-minds form of warfare we are trying to wage -- say it typically takes at least a decade, not 18 months, of serious commitment to turn a country around. When Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East (and McChrystal's boss), appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, he couldn't muster much enthusiasm for the Obama timetable. He offered only "a qualified yes" when asked if he supported the president's plan. "We have to be very careful about timelines," he said. And then Petraeus fainted -- because he was jet-lagged, aides said, not because of the questioning.

Brink – Now = Key

Timing is critical- Karzai’s credibility will be decided within 18 months

Wood 9 [Allan, Staff Writer, November 20, Toronto Star, Lexis] KLS

A decade-long military effort in Afghanistan will be lost if Western forces cannot turn around the deteriorating situation by 2011, Canada's former top soldier says. Gen. Rick Hillier, the former chief of defence staff, and U.S. Senator John McCain said the NATO coalition must use the months ahead to head off the Taliban's resurgence, help Afghan President Hamid Karzai restore credibility and convince Pakistan to make a serious effort to flush out insurgents hiding across the Afghan border. "We've got one shot to do it," Hillier said Saturday. "If we haven't changed in 18 months, then we will not change." The thrust for that change is expected in about two weeks when the U.S. announces its new strategy for Afghanistan, one that could include tens of thousands of additional American soldiers to better secure and rebuild the country, McCain said at a security conference here. "I think we can show our friends and allies some signs of success," he said. "It's not going to be easy. Casualties will go up ... and it will require a degree of steadfastness that will try the governments not only of our allies, but in the United States as well, as public opinion may be not totally in favour of what we're doing."

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – Link Stuff

2NC Links

Withdrawal wrecks Karzai’s credibility after going to bat for McChrystal – no unified base makes turns impossible

EJ Dionne, 6-25-10. “The wound McChrystal opened,” CSM, Lexis.

In practice, the president's advisers continued to feud. Those who had been against McChrystal's proposed buildup said Obama's deadline of July of next year for beginning troop withdrawals was firm. McChrystal's backers said the deadline was flexible. The administration was openly divided over how effectively it could work with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Unlike McChrystal, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, think Karzai is a hopeless and hapless leader. Given the factional war inside the administration, Karzai felt perfectly free to weigh in on the controversy let loose by the Rolling Stone article. He let it be known he saw McChrystal as "the best commander the United States has sent to Afghanistan." Paradoxically, Karzai's supportive comments underscored why McChrystal had to be relieved. One little-noted passage in Michael Hastings' Rolling Stone article underscored McChrystal's central problem. "The most striking example of McChrystal's usurpation of diplomatic policy is his handling of Karzai," Hastings wrote. "It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with the man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan. The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government, and since Karzai is not considered credible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so." A military strategy is supposed to fit the facts on the ground. But McChrystal was trying to invent an alternative reality to fit the facts to his counterinsurgency strategy, trying to turn Karzai into something he isn't. A piece of this sort was destined to undercut whatever McChrystal was trying to do, and the arrogance that came through in the article plays badly, given that McChrystal's military strategy hasn't seemed to work so far. But Obama is not off the hook. On the contrary, he stuck with McChrystal, despite ample evidence that the general would go around the White House to push his own preferences. Moreover, Obama's approach to Afghanistan was always a delicate balance, a Goldilocks strategy that was neither too hawkish nor too dovish: Escalate now to speed withdrawal. It was a nice idea, and maybe it can still allow us to leave a modestly improved situation behind. The problem is that this careful equilibrium required everyone in the administration to pull together, accepting that the policy was settled and not open to challenge. It required very big egos to get along. It required Karzai to change. It required Obama to have real authority over our military. Obama asserted that authority in a statement that was gracious but firm, and he reminded his fractious team of the importance of a "unity of effort." But he still needs to make his objectives clearer, beginning with an answer to the question: Are we serious about beginning withdrawals next July? Given what's happened so far, we should be.

2NC Links – Public

Public supports troops, sustaining Karzai’s credibility

King 4/27 [Laura, Staff Writer, 2010, Los Angeles Times, Lexis ] KLS

President Hamid Karzai, on a state visit to India, condemned the Kandahar attacks. American officials have said the military campaign around the city will not move ahead without the Afghan leader's approval.

Karzai has provided qualified public support for the military push in Kandahar, his home province. He has appealed to the West to do more to prevent civilian casualties in the course of the fighting, and has told tribal elders from Kandahar that Western troops will not move in unless the Afghan people want them there.

2NC Links – Pashtuns

Pashtun support for US troops

Charney 3/1 [Craig, President of Charney Research, 2010, Charney Research http://www.charneyresearch.com/2010Mar1\_Newsweek\_Surge\_Working.htm] KLS

These developments undercut the common belief that America is doomed to fail in a land of fiercely tribal, pro-Taliban Pashtuns who hate infidel invaders. In fact, Afghanistan’s demography, sociology, military situation, and politics all favor Obama’s counterinsurgency strategy. That’s why it's working. The strategy, devised by U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, aims to win over Afghans by protecting them from the Taliban, restraining firepower to limit civilian casualties, and speeding up development, along with seizing Taliban sanctuaries like Marja. It has six things going for it. Most Afghans aren’t Pashtuns—and most Pashtuns oppose the Taliban. Three fifths of Afghans are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethnicities who suffered under Taliban rule and dread its return. What's more, while most Taliban fighters are Pashtun, 70 percent of Pashtuns dislike the Taliban. Only one Pashtun in four favors the insurgents. Most Pashtuns desire closer ties with the West. Why? Polls say they, like other Afghans, mainly want jobs, electricity, and reconstruction—none of which the Taliban offers. Civilian casualties are down. Despite tragedies like last week's errant airstrike that killed 27 noncombatants, McChrystal’s strategy cut civilian deaths from U.S. and NATO action by 30 percent, to 596 last year. The Taliban killed many more civilians in 2009: 1,630, a 60 percent jump from 2008. Afghans noticed. Over the course of 2009, polls show, they started blaming Afghanistan’s violence on the Taliban instead of the Americans. Afghans feel more secure when U.S. troops are around. As U.S. forces have surged in Afghanistan, so has their popularity. Support for the U.S. military presence climbed 5 points in 2009 to 68 percent, reversing three years of decline. Polls show that Afghans have confidence in U.S. forces when they think the American presence is strong in their area. Civilian casualties worry them, but Afghans’ chief gripe about our forces is their absence, not their presence.

Pashtuns control Karzais legitimacy- dominate party

Trefzger 6/11 [Henderson, Wake Forest University, 2010, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-karzai] KLS

The fact is that the sectarian environment in Afghanistan makes it impossible for any viable contender to emerge and compete against Karzai. Since he is a member of the country’s majority ethnic group, the Pashtuns, Karzai has been able to obtain significant electoral support and strike pragmatic alliances with a large part of the Afghan electorate. This creates a situation in which, despite decreasing public support for him recent years, Karzai will never lose the support of the majority Pashtun community to a competitor or a minority candidate. According to a February 12th 2009 article of the *Economist*, Karzai has maintained high approval ratings with the vital Pashtun tribes of southern and eastern Afghanistan. As long as this president can maintain this credibility in the Pashtun tribes, no other Pashtun will run against him and no other ethnic minority candidate will be able to unseat him

Link > Turn – 2NC

Petraeus solves the link – he’ll broker deals with the Taliban, increasing his credibility

Rubin and Filkinsn 6/25 [Alissa, Dexter, Staff Writers, 2010, Inernatioanl Herald Tribune, Lexis] KLS

Indeed, to prevail in Afghanistan, General Petraeus will need all of his skills - and a dose of good fortune at least as big as the one he received in Iraq. At the moment, every aspect of the war in Afghanistan is going badly: The military's campaign in the strategic city of Kandahar has met with widespread resistance from the Afghan public; President Hamid Karzai is proving erratic and unpredictable; and the Taliban are resisting more tenaciously than ever. To turn the tide, General Petraeus will almost certainly continue the counterinsurgency strategy he devised with General McChrystal: protecting Afghan civilians, separating them from insurgents and winning public support. But he will also have to convince his own troops, who are increasingly angry about the restrictions on using firepower imposed to protect civilians. And General Petraeus will probably also try to employ some of the same novel tactics that worked so well in Iraq. Most notably, he will continue to coax Taliban fighters away from the insurgency with promises of jobs and security. And he may even try to strike deals with senior leaders of the Taliban as well as with the military and intelligence services in Pakistan.

Link – Karzai Cred

US troops sustain Karzai’s government

Kindy and Wollman 1/20 [Cliff and Neil, Ph. D.; Senior Fellow, Peace Studies Institute, Psychologists for Social Responsibility Blog, http://psysr.wordpress.com/page/2/] KLS

After an intense review, President Obama recently ordered about thirty thousand more U.S. troops to Afghanistan. The question is, should this decision have been made by the U.S. government? The goals for the United States are to prevent an Al Qaida threat in the homeland and to stabilize the Afghan situation, allowing for some level of central government control and a face-saving withdrawal. But who else could or should have weighed in on this decision, and what are their motivations? The Afghan government realizes that any downsizing of the U.S. presence could threaten its hold on political power. President Karzai recently stated that he expects the U.S. military presence to continue until 2024. The U.S. public is split, mainly along party lines, between those who want an early withdrawal of troops to prevent a quagmire, and those who support the U.S. military presence and fear that withdrawal would squander the investment already made.

US- Afghan military alliance increases Karzai government credibility

Garamone 9 [Jim, Staff Writer, December 8, American Forces Press Service, http://www.vmwusa.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=512:afgsurge&catid=41:headline-news] KLS

The increased forces will allow faster training of Afghan security forces. The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division – whose deployment was announced yesterday – has a training mission. Other U.S. forces will partner with Afghan army and police and expand security zones in key areas to reverse insurgent momentum and deny the Taliban the access to the population they require to survive, the general said. “The additional capability we are building translates into credibility in the minds of Afghans, who demand proof not only that we want to protect them, but that we can,” McChrystal said. “In a war of perceptions where the battlefield is the mind of an Afghan elder, the hope of an Afghan mother, the aspirations of an Afghan child, this can be decisive.”

US troops ensure stability, proving Karzai’s alliance strategic, renewing his credibility- Obama’s visit reaffirms

Gomez 5/30 [Alan, Staff Writer, 2010, USA Today, Lexis ] KLS

After meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Obama spoke briefly to a crowd of U.S. service members at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. His remarks were carried live on Afghan television. Shafiqllah Anwari, 36, a Kabul house painter, said the visit gave him hope that the Americans won't forget about Afghanistan. "His trip assured me that U.S. support will continue," Anwari said. "It shows that the American people continue to support Afghanistan

Karzai’s contribution to US military campaigns renews credibility- Al Maliki proves

Rosenburg and Spiegel 2/20 [Matthew, Peter- Staff Writers, 2010, Weekend Australian, pg 22, Lexis] KLS

It all represents a major gamble on Mr Karzai, a politician whose record as an ally is spotty at best. Relations with the US hit a low after the presidential vote last year, in which he was ultimately re-elected but not before US officials had pressed him to acknowledge widespread voting fraud and participate in a runoff. Since the election, however, Mr Karzai has been eager to play a more high-profile role outside Kabul. In addition, Mr Karzai has taken some steps, including an inaugural address in which he promised to tackle corruption and governance problems. US officials have concluded they must find a way to make Mr Karzai lead if they are to succeed. ``General McChrystal likes to say he is not the president of Afghanistan,'' a coalition officer said. Giving Mr Karzai a high-profile role in the Marjah operation is seen as the best hope for rebuilding the relationship and cleaning up his government. Some officials note that Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, once criticised as ineffectual, went through a transformation in how he was perceived, winning credibility among Iraqis seeking a strong leader after he ordered a 2008 offensive in Basra against Shi'ites allied with Iran.

Link – Karzai Cred

Troop presence allows Karzai to piggy back US heg, restoring US credibility

Rosenburg and Spiegel 2/20 [Matthew, Peter- Staff Writers, 2010, Weekend Australian, pg 22, Lexis] KLS

Western officials hope giving Mr Karzai responsibility for key elements of the campaign will prompt him to seize the battlefield advantage given to him by the arrival of thousands of fresh US troops and turn it into a chance to re-establish his government's -- and his own -- credibility. Mr Karzai has been briefed repeatedly on the battle plans, meeting frequently with General McChrystal and speaking often with senior officials from Washington, including National Security Adviser James Jones. ``We want to make him own this. What we need is to make him into a Winston Churchill who can rally his people,'' said one source. Western officials also are bringing in Afghan cabinet members to strategy discussions, allowing them to select the officials who will run Marjah once it is cleared of Taliban, and pushing them before the cameras to emphasise the participation of Afghan troops.

Link – DEA

DEA increases Karzai’s credibility and garner public support- ensure transparency, corruption mitigation

Lake 6/18 [John, Chicago Journalist, 2010, <http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/corruption-in-afghanistan-now-being-addressed1/#ixzz0sDazdIMW>] KLS

Now we see the development of Task Force 2010, the military’s intelligence network, aimed at the elimination of Afghan corruption from the outlying towns and periphery to top of the Afghan Government. Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency too, is now involved in the elimination of corruption, the installation of transparency, and accountability. Documents are being seized; captured fighters are being interrogated, firstly about battle plans, and suicide missions, but also about financial corruption. In Afghanistan there are few high tech devices to scrutinize: hard drives and cell phone records, as there were in Iraq. Perversion of authority is described as a plague on the effort to build a competent government and to win the support of the Afghan people. NATO officials moved to the creation of the anti-corruption task force last October, and already a number of provincial officials have been brought to trial. In one such instance the task force, headed by Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the alliance’s director of military intelligence in Afghanistan, placed charges against a border police commander accused of having ghost personnel on his payroll; this commander also was charged with stealing money meant for widows of police officers killed in action.

DEA agents legitimize current Afghan government

Greenspan 8 [Alyssa, J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Summer, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 16 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 493, Lexis] KLS

The interdiction pillar was implemented to "build Afghan capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan through the arrest and prosecution of the command and control elements of these organizations." [n75](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n75) To that end, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has helped train officers in Afghanistan to identify and disrupt drug trafficking organizations. [n76](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n76) DEA Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) have been deployed to Afghanistan "to provide guidance and conduct ... investigations ... [of] illcit drug trafficking organizations." [n77](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n77) Currently, the U.S. military has a limited role in targeting drug production facilities. [n78](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n78) The final pillar of the Plan is the law enforcement and justice reform pillar, which was established to provide "a framework of laws and processes that will support counternarcotics law enforcement in Afghanistan." [n79](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n79) The pillar's objective is in line with the goal of prosecuting and punishing drug traffickers as established in Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Drug Law. [n80](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n80) Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Drug Law outlines the process for adjudicating  [\*506]  drug-related offenses. [n81](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n81) Article 34(1) establishes Narcotics Tribunals within Kabul's Primary Provincial Court and Appellate Provincial Court. [n82](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n82) The Narcotics Tribunals have "exclusive jurisdiction throughout Afghanistan over drug trafficking offenses" where the trafficked substance meets specified weight requirements. [n83](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n83) In cases where the trafficked substance does not meet the specified weight requirements, Public Security Tribunals of Provincial Courts have jurisdiction. [n84](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n84) The judicial reform program supports this newly formed judicial structure and aims to strengthen the formal court system. [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n85) The judicial reform pillar aims to professionalize Afghanistan's formal justice system in order to improve the criminal justice system in Afghanistan. [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n86) Professionalizing the formal justice system is also important to the new Afghan government, as evidenced by Article 118 of the Afghanistan Constitution, which provides that judges "shall have a higher education in law or in Islamic jurisprudence,...sufficient expertise and experience in the judicial system of Afghanistan ... [,] high ethical standards[,] and a reputation of good deeds." [n87](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n87) In furtherance of this objective, the U.S. has dispatched advisors, including senior prosecutors from the Department of Justice, to Kabul to provide guidance for building the Vertical Prosecution Task Force (VPTF). [n88](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n88) The goal is to comprise the VPTF with "judges, prosecutors, investigators and support personnel, who will be organized, trained and mentored by the [U.S. Department of Justice] prosecutors." [n89](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n89) The second prong of the  [\*507]  Justice Reform program is fostered by the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), which provides direction to help establish Afghanistan's corrections program. [n90](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n90) The program also aims to assist in operating prisons and correctional facilities with great attention to drug trafficking areas. [n91](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277755293302&returnToKey=20_T9641355200&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.731909.4935947408" \l "n91)

Link – Opium

US- Karzai military alliance to decrease poppy trade has strengthened his position in governance

Choi et al 7 [Mike Choi, Brett Elko, Jeff Krentel, Natasha Lander, Amy Valenti, George Mason University, Volume IV, http://journals.gmu.edu/index.php/newvoices/article/viewFile/100/97] KLS

Political efforts by the US to curb opium production and trade in Afghanistan have met some success. One of the strategies the US has employed to strengthen the central government has been working with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to bring down particularly dangerous regional leaders. Known as “warlords,” these leaders use profits from narcotics trafficking to purchase arms that sustain their local militias. In 2004, Karzai was successful in removing one of these leaders, Atta Mohammad Noor, from power within a militia in Mazar-e-Sharif. Although Noor was resistant to central government control, Karzai marginalized his power by installing him in the less influential post of governor of Balkh province, which has been “cultivation free” of opium since August 2007.36

Link – PMCs

PMC’s restore legitimacy and credibility in governance

DCAF 4 [May 2004, Geneva Centre For the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc/proj\_privmilitary.pdf] KLS (**NOTE: PMF’s= Private Military Forces)**

• Contracting out to private companies, agencies, or other intermediate types of administration has a place in efficient government. And there are functions that PMFs perform better than governments. According to US SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, using contractors saves money and frees up the military to concentrate on its core mission. • In some circumstances, PMFs are better placed for rapid deployment and may be able to provide training, resources and security services more efficiently and effectively than states are able to. Such PMFs have the potential to make a legitimate and valuable contribution to international security. • PMFs can bring stability to conflicts in the developing world. Stabilizing “failed states” is important for reducing the threat of international terrorism and organized crime, and the provision of security is a prerequisite for such stabilization. Despite the prevailing distaste for mercenaries, the record of some military provider firms speaks to their potential for resolving conflicts and establishing peace and order in countries that would otherwise be ignored by the world’s leading powers.

PMCs promote security and protection, ensuring Karzai’s success

Fickes 9 [Aaron J, Editor, Summer, Temple Law Review, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 525, Lexis] KLS

Since the 1990s, reductions in military personnel after the fall of the Soviet Union "mean that the requirement for [PMC] support has seen exponential growth," n119 especially during the wars in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq. n120 In Afghanistan, PMC employees "deployed with U.S. forces on the ground[,] ... maintained combat equipment, provided logistical support, and routinely flew on joint surveillance and targeting aircraft." n121 PMCs continue to play a prominent role in Afghanistan, with one contractor providing protection for Afghan President Hamid Karzai. n122 In Iraq, the United States has relied upon three categories of contractors to support reconstruction efforts. n123 The first category includes "private security providers" which include U.S. or foreign staff who provide a range of services including "security for government employees, contractor employees, or others as they move through Iraq." n124 The second category is constituted by "reconstruction contractors," who provide, for example, construction infrastructure assistance. n125 The third category includes "contractors accompanying the force" which include contractors providing fuel-transportation services within military-operated convoys. n126

PMCs strengthen local governance legitimacy- information, security

Leander 5 [Anna, 2005, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/33/3/803.pdf] KLS

Twenty years ago, the position that private military contractors were as (if not more) competent than the state military was a minority position, even within the US where private control over the use of force has deeper roots and more legitimacy than it does in Europe.74Today it is far from clear that it is still a minority position, even outside the US. If private military voices weigh heavily in the security debate at all levels from the narrow military to the general public, this is a major change in terms of who produces legitimate security knowledge. It is also a major change in terms of who is systematically empowered and disempowered by governance in the field of security. It has been the contention of this section that to pass sound judgement on the significance of PMCs for the security state this power ‘construct security’ needs to be integrated. If it is, it makes PMCs stand out as highly significant security actors.

Public Link XT

Continued troop presence boosts Karzai public faith in Karzai

BBC 6/22 [BBC Asian Monitoring, 2010, Lexis] KLS

General Stanley McChrystal, the head of coalition forces in Afghanistan, has spoken of possible delay in launching the long anticipated Kandahar operation to attack the Taliban's most important stronghold. Hamed Karzai travelled to turbulent province this week and petitioned public support for the operation. Having achieved enormous tactical successes in Helmand military operation, the international forces are now hoping to achieve major psychological and strategic advantage by taking Kandahar. According to military commanders, the delay in starting a new offensive is caused by the fact that the coalition needs more time to secure public support. With President Hamed Karzai adopting a more assertive role to bring peace to the country, the emphasis has been on prioritising political objectives. Having convened a three-day peace jerga in Kabul recently, Karzai wanted to get wide-ranging consensus for his Reconciliation and Reintegration strategy that include negotiations with insurgents. There have been speculations that Karzai was under pressure from Jerga participant to offer more incentive for Taliban to renounce violence. There is fear that the man is making secret deal with insurgent leaders and that could have caused operation delay. As yet no specific date has been unveiled for launching the offensive. General McChrystal has however hinted that the plans might even be rolled back by a few months.

Siddiqi 4/29 [Shahid R, Staff Writer, 2010, Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/04/29/is-karzai-heading-for-the-end-game/] KLS

Leaders who place themselves in the service of imperialist masters are in fact weaklings, despite their trappings of power. They can break free or follow an independent course only at the peril of their lives. Refusal to fall in line may lead to an accident or a military putsch. Afghanistan has been witness to many such actions. Karzai cannot survive without U.S. support and is in no position to threaten, confront or defy it. Yet if he does, one doesn’t have to be a Nostradamus to predict his fall.

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – Genero Links

1NC Link – Presence k2 Allies

US military presence is vital to relations

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

In the mid-1990s, Zakheim et al. [1996] conducted an extensive assessment. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that US presence, especially naval presence, provides strong assurance value to friends and allies in many parts of the world. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. This feeling was said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995, Thomason et al. found two principal things: first, US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true. Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8] As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence. Overall, these US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy and national security strategy. They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. They cited continuous, face-to-face involvement and relationships—both military and civilian—as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong friendships, partnerships, and coalitions. Many of the interviewees noted that the establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another’s intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think.

2NC Link – AT: Turns\*\*

Multiple reasons they can’t access a link turn –

Won’t work without compensation and consultation

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

In discussions with over 50 representatives of 22 countries1 we found that US friends and allies were generally comfortable with current levels and forms of US military presence in their countries and regions. In this chapter we summarize and assess— • These representatives’ attitudes regarding continuous US military presence levels in their countries and regions • Relations between these representatives’ views of security threats facing their countries and their attitudes regarding US military presence • Relation between their views of the need to deter a conventional military threat to their countries and their perspectives on the value of US military presence • The types of US military presence forces that they most valued, by country and region • The purposes for which they valued US military presence • US military presence (and related) activities that these representatives valued The chapter concludes, with respect to potential changes in US military presence posture, that latitude can be found to substitute less personnel-intensive forms of presence for the current ones. However, to avoid undercutting the assurance objectives of US national security policy, it cautions that changes in US presence numbers need to involve consultations with our allies and very likely will require compensatory changes in activities, capabilities, and non-military diplomacy.

It paints a snapshot of uniqueness, while the link is an enduring trend

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Looking at SEA/Australia, South Asia, and even some of SWA in Figure V-1, we are not saying that all countries in this great sweep would unequivocally oppose a continuous in-country US military presence of any kind. We do say that under the circumstances they foresee, almost all their governments would very much prefer not to receive a proposal from the US for a continuous visible military presence in their countries, and if one is received, the shorter the proposed duration, the better. Again, that does not mean opposition to all US military-related presence. For example, Australia clearly is willing to consider US use of its facilities, including training ranges and repair facilities; Singapore welcomes port visits and aircraft transits; and so on.

Post-op tradeoffs fail

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Second, if there is no capability assessment, US earnests of mutual suffering and risk sharing may become salient for assurance of the foreign expert. The Korean affinity for boots on the ground clearly relates to this. The European preference for boots on the ground may be colored by the intra-NATO debates on peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. In our discussions with representatives of countries in which US military presence is valued, we also encountered an unwillingness to consider increased military technical or reinforcement capabilities as substitutes for numbers of US military personnel present. This was rarely an explicit rejection of specific tradeoffs; rather, it was either an early statement to the effect that nothing could substitute for physical presence or a dismissive comment or gesture when the idea of a tradeoff was raised.

2NC Link – AT: Turns\*\*

Most experienced observers concur with the link

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Most experienced observers believe that US overseas military presence is effective (to some degree) in strengthening deterrence, assuring friends and allies, positioning the US to be able to protect key interests in crisis situations, stabilizing the security environment, preserving an open international economic environment, and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The arguments and hypotheses of Colin Powell, Joseph Nye, Robert Art, Bradford Dismukes, and Richard Haass over the last decade are illustrative.

Colin Powell concurs

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Colin Powell Writing in 1991 in Foreign Affairs, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered an eloquent statement of the importance of a continuing overseas military presence. Our forward presence is a given—to signal our commitment to our allies and to give second thoughts to any disturber of the peace…. Economic power is essential; political and diplomatic skills are needed; the power of our beliefs and values is fundamental to any success we might achieve; but the presence of our arms to buttress these other elements is as critical to us as the freedom we so adore. [p. 36]

The Joint Chiefs concur

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

QDR 2001 is a recent official manifestation of a long-standing general hypothesis regarding US military presence activities: that they can and regularly do help promote fundamental security objectives of the nation. Another illustration of this kind of belief and hypothesis appears in a recent doctrinal publication of the Joint Staff: “In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.”

2NC Link Wall – Presence k2 Allies

Military presence is crucial to allied assurances – the 1NC IDA evidence cites two wide-reaching, long-term studies that show near-universal backing for US presence

Presence is vital to relationship building – without it, trust collapses

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Our interlocutors valued relationships with Americans at all levels. Thus, in addition to high-level visits, presence activities of many kinds were valued in large measure for their role in relationship building. In particular, building personal relationships was seen by foreign experts as a co-equal goal for many activities that are seen from the US side as focused mainly on substantive training. One of our interlocutors characterized the goal of relationship building as developing a capability so that when problems arise one can move quickly with people who are already known quantities to solve the problems. Most interlocutors, however, were not precise, seeing relationship building in terms of a more diffuse comfort level. International military education and training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and similar programs were seen as valuable as much for their relationship building aspects as for substantive learning. Exchange programs and combined exercises also were seen as important relationship building activities.

The opposition to the plan is uniform and unforgiving

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Overall, the kinds of activities described here were clearly highly valued by essentially all our friends and allies. However, among allies where US military forces are present, no one volunteered that there is a tradeoff between activities and numbers in US military presence. In nearly all cases our interlocutors were clearly opposed to any reductions and had no interest in discussing what might compensate for reduced numbers. It seems clear, however, that if numbers are to be reduced, in the vast majority of cases these findings on activities can point the way to a less painful process if they are taken into account. At a minimum, consultation should be a part of the process. In general, the US should consider significant tailored increases in the areas of relationship building and institutional interoperability to compensate, at least in part, for any reductions in numbers.

Military presence is key to the most important and enduring foreign relationships

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

There was broad agreement that one of the highest payoffs of past US military presence activities has been the establishment of favorable long-term relationships with key foreign officials. In many cases these relationships were initially established years before the foreign officials rose to high positions. The value of such relationships has repeatly been proven when the US has needed to quickly establish military and diplomatic coalitions and to gain access to operating bases and sources of supply. The web of such relationships was also cited as an effective vehicle for assuring friends and allies of continuing US interest in their security situations. As one official said, “We need US Army generals to visit countries that are being run by generals.”

2NC Link Wall – Presence k2 Allies

Troops are a key expression of commitment and will – senior US decision-makers agree

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Among these senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident: strong, continuous, high-quality personal level interactions and relationships are necessary to promote the reassurance objective. But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of US will and ability to be there to help when needed. On this latter point, however, no real consensus was evident regarding the essentiality of any one particular level (or type) of presence forces for effective reassurance. This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.

1NC Link – Presence k2 Asia

Military presence is vital to Asian allies – sudden withdrawal produces a cascade of negative effects

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

A second major hypothesis in the literature posits that more presence assets (of one kind or another) can and do promote higher levels of allied and friendly assurance (or reassurance)11 that the US is committed to helping protect them against potential threats. Assurance of allies and friends as to our commitment and ability to help them is a key security goal of the United States. What evidence exists as to how much military presence, of what kinds, is necessary, or desirable, in order to assure friends and allies on these points? In a 1992 study of various US presence posture alternatives for the Asia Pacific region, Winnefeld et al. characterized the views of major foreign governments’ and opposition parties’ views toward regional security issues and toward US military presence. Then the authors assessed the likely foreign responses of key regional players to the postulated presence alternatives. To develop their assessments, the study team drew upon a variety of sources, including public statements of foreign officials, regional specialists’ assessments, and off-the record discussions. To illustrate their findings, they depicted the situation in Northeast Asia at the time as follows: For US allies like Japan and South Korea, [political, military and economic] uncertainties clearly argue in favor of continued close political and military links with the United States, including a long term military presence in Northeast Asia. Even for states whose views of the United States are currently more complex or even oppositional (i.e., North Korea, China, and the former Soviet Union), the ‘Japan factor,’ growing internal problems, and the likelihood of significant changes in the overall regional security environment all underscore the need to avoid sudden, destabilizing external shifts, particularly in military force levels. China and Russia in particular may increasingly recognize the positive role played by US regional forces. [p. 42]. “Support for a visible, forward-deployed US force presence will remain strong, both to reassure and to deter.” [p. 53] “there will probably be pressure to reduce those aspects of the US presence especially provocative in a Japanese and South Korean domestic context.” “There will probably be greater overall acceptance of a considerably smaller forward deployed presence, as long as the security alliance with Japan remains intact and some significant US air and naval presence remains based on the Japanese islands.” “Extreme changes would be viewed as highly destabilizing; less drastic reductions will likely produce a more mixed response.” “All changes will require the United States to take a sophisticated approach that employs appropriate compensating policy and program initiatives.” [p. 51]…“The most destabilizing US force posture for Northeast Asia would be …the elimination of virtually all bases in the western Pacific. [p. 53] “…this change would likely produce a range of negative military and political responses—such as pressures in Japan for full-scale rearmament, greater Chinese emphasis on military development, closer RoK political and military association with the former USSR.” “A gradual withdrawal, over a longer period, might produce a less destabilizing set of reactions, but significant tensions would remain—most notably intense rivalry between Japan and Korea and the overall issue of Japanese remilitarization.” [p. 57]

2NC Link – Presence k2 Asia

Political leadership in Asia strongly supports presence and oppose withdrawal

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Turning to Northeast Asia, all the Korean and Japanese political and military experts with whom we met strongly supported the current US military presence in their countries, with one exception. Okinawa was seen as a special problem. Our Japanese interlocutors recognized it in every discussion and Koreans in most.5 Also, the vast majority of the NEA experts were dismissive of those of their countrymen who did not agree with maintaining current US military presence levels. However, in addition to Okinawa, we see evidence of a growing body of opposition to US military presence in both Japan and Korea that should be taken into account in planning US military presence in NEA. This is based less on comments made by our interlocutors than on a range of press reports, public opinion polls, and the estimates of US experts on the region.6

1NC Link – Presence k2 Middle East

Withdrawing presence causes severe political backlash

IDA, ‘2. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

As for the Middle East, the NDU study emphasized a likely increasing threat to maritime forces there, a need for better TMD, force protection, more WMD detectors, an increase in naval presence (especially TMD-capable surface ships), and a possible shift to more amphibious forces in lieu of some ground forces in the region. Flournoy’s group considered the value of increasing long-range strike capabilities (from Diego Garcia) as well, but warned that a “reduction in visible presence” in the region could have “a severe and deleterious political effect, eroding both deterrence and regional support.” The threat environment in the Middle East was said to be increasingly likely to feature WMD; the study team expressed serious concerns regarding WMD attacks on US forces, host nation citizens and others, including Host Nation Support (HNS) personnel. Overall, the study concluded that the long-term US ground presence prospects in the region are quite uncertain.

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – Reunification Good

Lack of Reconciliation replicates their harms- economic fragmentation, cultural rifts

Castillo 6/24 [Graciana del, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, 2010, Project Syndicate http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0032.htm]

This policy change is a necessary parallel to the military action now taking place. It is also a belated recognition that the "development as usual" policies followed in Afghanistan up to now have failed. Indeed, as has been painfully demonstrated, the old policies were never going to be enough to galvanize Afghan public support, particularly for a new military "surge." Eight years ago, Afghanistan embarked on four distinct transitions: a security transition away from violence and insecurity; a political transition toward a society based on participatory government and the rule of law; a social transition from tribal and ethnic confrontations toward national reconciliation; and an economic transition to transform a war-torn and unstable economy into a viable one in which people can make a decent and legal living. Because economic reconstruction takes place amid this multi-pronged transition, what has been happening in Afghanistan is fundamentally different from normal development processes. The current Afghan situation reflects the failure until now to make national reconciliation - rather than optimal development policies - the bedrock priority of the government and the international community.

Reconciliation takes precedence- political stability supersedes financial feasibility and determines Afghan success  
Castillo 6/24 [Graciana del, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, 2010, Project Syndicate http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0032.htm]  
Because the main short-term challenge in any transition to peace is national reconciliation, the political objective of peace should prevail at all times over the economic or financial objective of development if the two ever clash, as they often do. Peace-related activities - particularly reintegration and other reconciliation programs - need to be given priority in budget allocations. Failure to do so has proved a major factor in countries' relapse into war, because, in the absence of peace, there can be no sustainable development. So success in Afghanistan demands reintegration of the Taliban. This requires careful planning, bold and innovative solutions for inducing the Taliban to give up their arms, and a commitment to "stay the course" with the right policies, possibly for many years.

Internal – Karzai Cred k2 Taliban Peace Talks

Credibility key to Taliban peace talks

CNN 6/4 [2010, http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/04/karzai-faces-credibility-balancing-act-after-peace-jirga/] KLS

After the debacle of last year’s deeply flawed presidential elections, the Afghan leader wanted the jirga to bolster his political standing. So balancing the demands of the delegates and the expectations of the international community is critical for him. And that’s everyone’s dilemma, not just Karzai’s; it's the international community’s, too. Without credibility, Karzai can hardly lead a peace initiative, or at the very least expect the Taliban to get real about ending the fight. So without listening to his delegates - and he invited a largely loyal and moderate cross section of the country - he can’t expect to build that credibility. But, if he goes along with hard line requests he’ll struggle for international support. And if he doesn’t go along with those far-reaching requests, he’s unlikely to convince the Taliban that now is the time to make peace. Like it or not, Karzai’s fate is deeply tied to the international communities right now. Many diplomats in this city have had to swallow their misgivings about him and, while privately, they are very guarded in their expectations, at the jirga they are publicly supporting it.

Internal – Karzai Cred k2 Reconciliation

Karzai leads Reconciliation plans- his image is key to implementation

David 5/11 [Ignatius, Associate Editor and Columnist for The Washington Post, 2010, The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition\_id=10&categ\_id=5&article\_id=114714#axzz0sE0ooRbf] KLS

Karzai’s arrival also highlights one of the trickiest issues in the Afghanistan strategy – namely, the process of reconciliation with the Taliban that could lead to an eventual settlement. Karzai plans to hold a “peace jirga” and a Kabul conference this summer, to encourage outreach. US officials will probe this week about whom he plans to include in this dialogue, and what the agenda will be. If Afghanistan’s strategy for reconciliation is fuzzy, the Obama administration’s is nonexistent, at least publicly. “We don’t have a plan yet,” worries the senior military official. The White House believes that while the administration has policy outlines on reconciliation, the US must leave some flexibility for Karzai. “To be durable, this has to be an Afghan plan,” stresses the senior administration official. One big problem with framing a reconciliation strategy now is that US officials want to bargain from a position of strength. “We aren’t there yet,” the senior military official says bluntly.

Karzai is committed to Taliban reconciliation but he needs public support to overcome dissent against

BBC 6/22 [BBC Asian Monitoring, 2010, Lexis] KLS

After election, President Karzai's top priority was negotiation with the Taliban who have persistently rejected his offer. The luxurious peace jerga was held with millions of dollars to pave the way for Taliban's inclusion in the government. While the work for this Jerga was underway, the government was deliberately creating and expanding crisis in to peaceful areas of the country like central parts where Taliban-backed armed Kuchis displaced thousands of families and razed their houses and properties. President Karzai said that he would do everything to include "moderate Taliban brothers" in the government.

Support for Reintegration but Karzai needs credibility to ensure sucess

Castillo 6/24 [Graciana del, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, 2010, Project Syndicate http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0032.htm]

Two serious problems make reconciliation in Afghanistan particularly challenging. First, the Karzai government must overcome credibility issues related to the broken promises it made in the past to former Taliban who laid down their weapons. Second, the $140 million pledged by donors at the London Conference for the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund is blatantly insufficient for effective reintegration.

Karzai needs credibility to implement Reconciliation plans

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

According to American new policy all Taliban are not terrorists but there are some moderate Taliban too. So President Hamid Karzai can start negotiations with those so called moderate Taliban – pro American Taliban, so that coalition government can be established in Afghanistan. But now questions arise that whether Hanid Karzai has the required credibility and tribal support to convince Taliban for reconciliation and coalition government? Can some one guarantee that Taliban after being part of the government will abide by the rules of civilized world and will go together with modern world? Because this change is not being occurred in the philosophy of Taliban but rather America has taken this step. Can some one guarantee that after this American brand reconciliation there will be peace in the region?

Internal – Karzai Cred k2 Reconciliation

Karzai key to Reconciliation- Taliban intergration only feasible under him

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

Wisdom demands that this task of reintegration be left to President Hamid Karzai. Several Afghan leaders I have talked to in recent weeks are convinced that there is no better leader in Afghanistan, the charges of corruption and inefficiency against him notwithstanding, and that the Taliban's return to Kabul, in any guise whatsoever, will mean bloodshed. Mr. Karzai should therefore be strengthened, not humiliated. There are quieter, more effective ways of dealing with corruption in high places.

Internal – Public k2 Reunification

Public sentiment towards Karzai and his reconciliation key to implementation

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

But he also acknowledged that the jirga would discuss how to approach at least some in the Taliban leadership about peace talks. Karzai said, ”Those within the Taliban leadership structure who, again, are not part of al Qaeda or the terrorist networks, or ideologically against Afghanistan’s progress and rights and constitution, democracy, the place of women in the Afghan society, the progress that they’ve made… are welcome.” The ”peace consultative jirga”, he said, would be ”consulting the Afghan people, taking their advice on how and through which means and which speed should the Afghan government proceed in the quest for peace”. Karzai thus made it clear that he would be taking his cues on peace talks with the Taliban from popular sentiment rather than from Washington.

Reconciliation Good – Afghan Stability

Reconciliation immediately stops insurgency- statement by Taliban leader proves

Siddique 2/26 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

The leader of a band of about 40 fighters in Afghanistan's most violent province, Helmand, indicated that, given the chance, he would tell Hamid Karzai what the thinking is within the insurgent ranks. He says Taliban minds are changing after having fought Afghan and international forces for seven years. "There are a lot of people like me," he says. "We have decided to cooperate with the government, but the government has to trust and cooperate with us." Despite troubling signs in the form of fresh and well-coordinated attacks, the Afghan government has already extended the olive branch that Taliban fighters like this Helmand commander are seeking. During a major policy speech in parliament on February 20, President Karzai repeated his administration's message. 9," he told lawmakers. "They should participate in the development and reconstruction of their country along with their brothers and sisters." In the course of his speech, Karzai announced the establishment of a high-level Peace and Reconciliation Shura that would hold a consultative peace jirga this spring to "establish permanent peace."

Reconciliation key to success in Afghan War

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

One of the things I emphasised to President Karzai,” said Obama, adding ”however”, to indicate that it was a matter of disagreement, ”is that the incentives for the Taliban to lay down arms, or at least portions of the Taliban to lay down arms, and make peace with the Afghan government in part depends on our effectiveness in breaking their momentum militarily.” Obama asserted that ”the timing” of the reconciliation process was linked to U.S. military success, because that success would determine when the Taliban ”start making different calculations about what’s in their interests”. Neither Obama nor Karzai gave any hint that the Afghan president had agreed with that point. Karzai openly sided with tribal elders in Kandahar who were vocally opposed to the U.S. military occupation of Kandahar City and surrounding districts at a large shura Apr. 4.

Reconciliation Good – Afghan Stability

Reconciliation promotes economic, social and political developments to ensure Afghan stability

Clinton 5/11 [Hilary, US Secretary of Defense, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22104/clinton\_and\_karzais\_usafghanistan\_strategic\_partnership\_discussion\_may\_2010.html]

As we work with our Afghan and international partners, Mr. President, your government can begin to assume greater responsibility for security starting next year, but aided by our continued support. A sustained focus on economic, social, and political development as well as continued training of Afghan security forces is essential to help build the effective and durable institutions necessary for long-term stability. So let me be clear. As we look toward a responsible, orderly transition in the international combat mission in Afghanistan, we will not abandon the Afghan people. Our civilian commitment will remain long into the future. I’d like to speak just briefly about our key priorities -- security, development, governance, and reintegration and reconciliation. Each is integral to achieving and sustaining stability and progress. Improving security is the essential first step. Today, courageous Afghan soldiers are fighting side by side with the brave men and women of the United States and more than 40 other countries. This partnership will help Afghans build capacity so they can assume lead responsibility for security over time as conditions permit. And we will continue to equip, train, and support the Afghan national security forces after our combat role winds down.

Reconciliation Good – Heg Good

A. Reconciliation key to winning Afghan war

MacDonald 1/31 [Myra, Staff Writer, 2010, Reuters, http://qa.blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/] KLS

The other truism is that if you can’t win outright victory on the battlefield, then you have to negotiate with your enemies. President Hamid Karzai set the ball rolling by announcing he would hold a peace council to which, according to an Afghan government spokesman, the Taliban leadership would be invited.  Karzai has made such suggestions before, and it is by no means clear the Taliban leadership will send representatives. What was different this time, however, was the context.  Karzai’s suggestion no longer met with the same resistance from war-weary governments, who stressed that it was up to the Afghans themselves to lead the process of reconciliation.  He also coupled his call for a peace council with an appeal to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to bring peace to Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia is a trusted interlocutor between the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership; Pakistan is the only country which still has some measure of leverage over them. Thus Karzai’s call for a loya jirga, though not dramatic in itself, became emblematic of a broader shift towards seeking a political settlement to end the war.

B. Success in the Afghan War is critical to US leadership

Eley 9 [Tom, Staff Writer, Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11642] KLS

During his campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama made the expansion of the US war in Afghanistan his central foreign policy objective. In so doing, he spoke for a section of the political establishment that believed the Bush administration's overriding emphasis on the war in Iraq had come at the expense of its position in Central Asia vis-à-vis China and Russia. The need for additional troops in Afghanistan has since become a consensus policy within the American ruling elite. The US attempt to reverse its fortunes in Central Asia is being driven by very definite geo-strategic interests that will be pursued all the more aggressively under an Obama administration. Current Bush Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, who has been retained in the same position by Obama, outlines such a deepening war in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. "To be blunt," Gates writes, "to fail—or to be seen to fail—in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries ... Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq—one that ... will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time."

**C. Extinction**

**Khalilzad 95** [Zalmay, RAND analyst and now U.S. ambassador to Iraq, The Washington Quarterly]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Reconciliation Good – HR Promo

Reconciliation promotes human rights and constitutionality

Moore 2/1 [Una, Sponsor, Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organization, 2010, http://www.undispatch.com/node/9515]

At a BBC-sponsored forum, an Afghan university student asked Karzai how he plans to safeguard human rights during negotiations with the Taliban. The president reiterated that the offer of reconciliation would be extended only to Taliban who accept the Afghan constitution, including its guarantees of fundamental rights. “They are not coming to take over the government against the Afghan constitution,” he said. Afghan civil society activists hope the president will keep that promise.

Reconciliation Good – Impact Calc\*\*

The timeframe is six months- regional stability and current government vital to success

Siddique 10 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe 2/26 http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

Stanekzai adds that the future of peace efforts in Afghanistan is closely tied to the fluid situation inside the country and in the region. He remains optimistic that the reintegration program will be well established within six months with visible momentum and an organization to lead the effort. Afghan affairs expert Thier suggests that the ultimate success of plans to reconcile with and reintegrate Taliban centers on three key questions. The first, he says, is whether everybody wants peace. He lists the Afghan government, the Taliban, Afghan opposition, the Americans and their Western partners, and Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan, as the key actors involved in the three decade-old conflict. The second big question is what that peace might look like.

Reconciliation Good – Pakistan

Reconciliation key to deter Pakistan NRO influence

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html] KLS **(NRO= National Reconciliation Order)**

Afghan reconciliation has an immense effect on Pakistan. Pakistan Army has avoided supporting NRO – the brain child of Pak Army. This has opened a gateway of problems for the sitting government. On one side America and its allies are supporting reconciliation with criminal Taliban and on the other side America issued a statement that NRO is Pakistan internal issue. This American lack of interest reveals its designs for next Pakistani government. America had issued the same statement about Musharaf too, when he was confronted with crisis.

Reconciliation Good – Terror/Democracy

Reconciliation solves terrorism, promotes democracy, women’s rights and transparency

Karzai 5/12 [2010, http://www.besternews.com/related/Bester\_News\_-\_Top\_News/What\_President\_Obama,\_Gen.\_Stanley\_McChrystal\_will\_say/?ref=top] KLS

Ma’am, exactly the last part of your question is my answer. (Laughter.) Afghanistan is seeking peace because through military means alone we are not going to get our objectives of bringing stability and peace to Afghanistan and the defeat of terrorism. Now, there are thousands of the Taliban who are not ideologically oriented, who are not part of al Qaeda or other terrorist networks, or controlled from outside in any manner troublesome to us. There are thousands of them who are country boys who have been driven by intimidation or fear caused by at times misconduct by us, or circumstances beyond their control or our control. It is these thousands of Taliban who are not against Afghanistan, or against the Afghan people, or their country -- who are not against America either, or the rest of the world, and who want to come back to Afghanistan if given an opportunity and provided the political means. It’s this group of the Taliban that we are addressing in the peace jirga. It is this group that has our intention. Those within the Taliban leadership structure who, again, are not part of al Qaeda or the terrorist networks, or ideologically against Afghanistan’s progress and rights and constitution, democracy, the place of women in the Afghan society, the progress that they’ve made -- and are willing to march ahead with the rest of their people and their country towards a better future for Afghanistan, are welcome. And the jirga, the peace consultative jirga is intended for consulting the Afghan people, taking their advice on how and through which means and which speed should the Afghan government proceed in the quest for peace.

The War on Terror’s stage is now Reconciliation- success critical to winning the war and American credibility

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

America is not working for bringing peace to the region but rather America is trapped in its own war on terror. That’s why before escaping or pretending to escape from Afghanistan America is struggling hard to accommodate Taliban in Afghanistan. Regarding war on terror regional powers had encircled America and Pakistan was so successful in eliminating Taliban from its territory that soon American plans were going to be disclosed but all of a sudden America changed its policy and announced its new Afghan policy. War on terror got new face “Reconciliation”.

Reconciliation Good – Women’s Rights

Reconciliation efforts jumpstart female societal inclusion- promotes stability

Clinton 5/11 [Hilary, US Secretary of Defense, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22104/clinton\_and\_karzais\_usafghanistan\_strategic\_partnership\_discussion\_may\_2010.html]

And we look forward, Mr. President, to the inclusion of women in all aspects of your reintegration and reconciliation efforts and in all aspects of Afghan society. We share your perspective that Afghanistan’s women are critical to the country’s reconstruction and stabilization and must be afforded opportunities to contribute fully. And I am delighted that we have two women ministers from Afghanistan with us today. And women’s issues will be considered in all of the discussions as well as in a separate session co-chaired by Ambassador Verveer and Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Afzali.

A2 Reconciliation Bad\*\*

Reconciliation inevitable- just matters if Karzai’s in charge

Hill 5/13 [Evan, Middle East expat journalist, The Majis, http://www.themajlis.org/2010/05/13/karzais-visit-patching-up-or-papering-over] KLS

Long term, both Obama and Karzai seem to realize that the Afghan government will have to reconcile with the Taliban. Obama acknowledged this during his remarks, saying that he "supports the efforts of the Afghan government to open the door to Taliban." Karzai presented a draft of his Taliban reconciliation plan to Obama during his visit, and though Obama seemed to express his approval, it came with conditions that seemed at odds with what might be Karzai's vision for the plan.

Reconciliation inevitable- US can’t win the war

Coghlan 6/22 [Tom, Staff Writer, 2010, The Times, Lexis] KLS

The most senior British diplomat in Afghanistan has stepped down weeks before an important conference on the future of the country. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles spent two years as Ambassador in Kabul before becoming the Government's Special Envoy to the region in 2009. He was previously Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and to Israel. His departure comes a month before the first international conference in Kabul, which will be headed by President Hamid Karzai and the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon. It is expected to discuss peace negotiations with the Taleban as well as international aid. Sir Sherard initially found himself at odds with US diplomats over his insistence that the West should pursue a negotiated settlement with the Taleban. Regarded as a pragmatist, he was known to have become deeply sceptical that a US-led military victory would be possible in a timeframe acceptable to Western public opinion.

Whitehall sources claim that he also felt the scope of his position as Afghan-Pakistan Special Envoy was insufficiently wide to justify a full-time job, particularly after the appointment of another senior British diplomat, Mark Sedwill, in an enhanced Nato Civilian Representative role in Kabul. In recent months, however, it is suggested that the US has moved closer to accepting the importance of reconciliation with the Taleban in accordance with his views. He is expected to apply for one of the top jobs in the Foreign Office in the autumn and is well regarded by senior members of the new Government.

A2 Reconciliation x Af-Pak

Reconciliation key to prevent Taliban- Pakistan alliances

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

In war, it is legitimate to sow dissension and look for deserters in the enemy ranks. So, in principle at least, one cannot quarrel with the policy of “reintegration and reconciliation” enunciated at the London Conference. Clearly, Pakistan is being encouraged to get involved in selecting the Taliban to be reintegrated and reconciled. It will naturally sponsor its own proxies for “reintegration and reconciliation.” How can anyone forget that Pakistan created, trained and armed the Taliban, and it still serves as the base for Islamabad's operations in Afghanistan? The sole purpose of Pakistan's protégés will be to subvert the Karzai government and take over the country once again.

A2 Reconciliation = Expensive

Reconciliation financially feasible- Keynesian economics prove

Castillo 6/24 [Graciana del, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, 2010, Project Syndicate http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0032.htm]

To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, the economic price of establishing peace is large, but it is indeed a good investment. That investment would save thousands of lives, and it would be a pittance compared to the hundreds of billions of dollars spent by the international community in military and peacekeeping expenditures since the so-called "war on terror" began in 2001.

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – Credibility Impacts

Impact – AIDS

A. US Troops sustain Karzai’s credibility which is key to preventing collapse, warlord, opium trade

The Guardian 2 [February 19, "Afghan staying power: Karzai needs friends he can count on", The Guardian Newspapers, Lexis] KLS

Amid all this uncertainty and strife, on-off American bombing raids and ground operations persist in the forlorn hope of snaring, even now, the many se nior al-Qaida and Taliban leaders who escaped the Pentagon's dragnet. Such officially sanctioned violence, while too frequently victimising civilian innocents, delays efforts to turn the page on two decades of warfare and start afresh. The longer the Karzai administration fails to take charge and impose order, and the longer Afghanistan remains the US military's biggest, best shooting range and hunting ground, the smaller the chances that the Bonn process can succeed. Nobody could reasonably have expected an Afghan restoration to be either quick or problem-free. But current trends point to two conclusions. One is that Mr Karzai is right to ask the US to send its troops to join Britain in an expanded stabilisation force and that President George Bush is woefully wrong to refuse him. The second is that if security continues to deteriorate, Mr Karzai will ineluctably lose credibility, then control. His downfall will trigger the collapse of most if not all the grand international rehabilitation schemes. With the returning, resurgent warlords, proxy forces and opium barons will come fanatics, ideologues and terrorists. And then, for want of staying power and a bit of nous, it really could be back to square one.

B. Continued Opium trade risks escalation of the AIDS pandemic

Chelala 5/7 [Cesar, Editor, the Globalist, 2010, Women’s International Perspective http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/05/07/opium-addicted-children-pay-heavy-price-for-afghan-war.html] KLS

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) no other country in the world produces as much heroin, opium, and hashish as Afghanistan, a sad distinction for a country already ravaged by war. This may explain why control efforts so far have been concentrated on poppy eradication and interdiction to stem exports with less attention paid to the rising domestic addiction problem, particularly in children. Both American and Afghan counter narcotic officials have said that such widespread domestic drug addiction is a relatively new problem. Among the factors leading to increased levels of drug use is the high unemployment rate throughout the country, the social upheaval provoked by this war and those that preceded it and the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan who became addicts while abroad. Those who are injecting drug users face the additional risk of HIV-infection through the sharing of contaminated syringes. “Drug addiction and HIV/AIDS are, together, Afghanistan’s silent tsunami,” declared Tariq Suliman, director of the Nejat’s rehabilitation center to the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs. There are about 40 treatment centers for addicts dispersed throughout the country but most are small, poorly staffed and under-resourced.

Impact – AIDS

C. AIDS risks extinction, Black Death is kid stuff comparatively

Mathiu 00 [Mutuma, Staff Writer, Africa News, July 15, 2000, http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:6tm\_9OIp4c8J:www.healtoronto.com/mbeki/Kommentare.rtf+Every+age+has+its+killer.+But+Aids+is+without+precedent.+It+is+comparable+only+to+the+Black+Death+of+the+Middle+Ages+in+the+terror+it+evokes+and+the+graves+it+fills.+But+unlike+the+plague,+Aids+does+not+come+at+a+time+of+scientific&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us]

Every age has its killer. But Aids is without precedent. It is comparable only to the Black Death of the Middle Ages in the terror it evokes and the graves it fills. But unlike the plague, Aids does not come at a time of scientific innocence: It flies in the face of space exploration, the manipulation of genes and the mapping of the human genome. The Black Death - the plague, today easily cured by antibiotics and prevented by vaccines - killed a full 40 million Europeans, a quarter of the population of Europe, between 1347 and 1352. But it was a death that could be avoided by the simple expedient of changing addresses and whose vector could be seen and exterminated. With Aids, the vector is humanity itself, the nice person in the next seat in the bus. There is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. Every human being who expresses the innate desire to preserve the human genetic pool through the natural mechanism of reproduction is potentially at risk. And whereas death by plague was a merciful five days of agony, HIV is not satisfied until years of stigma and excruciating torture have been wrought on its victim. The plague toll of tens of millions in two decades was a veritable holocaust, but it will be nothing compared to the viral holocaust: So far, 18.8 million people are already dead; 43.3 million infected worldwide (24.5 million of them Africans) carry the seeds of their inevitable demise - unwilling participants in a March of the Damned. Last year alone, 2.8 million lives went down the drain, 85 per cent of them African; as a matter of fact, 6,000 Africans will die today. The daily toll in Kenya is 500. There has never been fought a war on these shores that was so wanton in its thirst for human blood. During the First World War, more than a million lives were lost at the Battle of the Somme alone, setting a trend that was to become fairly common, in which generals would use soldiers as cannon fodder; the lives of 10 million young men were sacrificed for a cause that was judged to be more worthwhile than the dreams - even the mere living out of a lifetime - of a generation. But there was proffered an explanation: It was the honour of bathing a battlefield with young blood, patriotism or simply racial pride. Aids, on the other hand, is a holocaust without even a lame or bigoted justification. It is simply a waste. It is death contracted not in the battlefield but in bedrooms and other venues of furtive intimacy. It is difficult to remember any time in history when the survival of the human race was so hopelessly in jeopardy.

Impact – Biodiveristy

Strong Karzai key to global biodiversity

WCS 7 [Wildlife Conservation Society, http://www.wcs.org/internationa l/Asia/afghanistan] KLS

A four-year drought has compounded the infrastructural damage caused by fighting, emptying rivers and irrigation canals. With the recently installed government of President Hamid Karzai still exerting only very limited central authority, the hunting of endangered species and widespread smuggling of rare animals that flourished during the chaos of fighting continues unabated. As for the trees, "after very few years the forest will all be gone," says Adil. In their place, the nearly barren land is seeded with mines and unexploded bombs.

Impact – Central Asia

Collapse of Karzai’s credibility causes Central Asian conflicts – competition ensures escalation.  
Weinbaum 6 [Marvin, June, Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute http://www.usip.org/resources/afghanistan-and-its-neighbors-ever-dangerous-neighborhood] KLS

The study posits that over much of the last four years Afghanistan's neighbors have assessed that support for a stable, independent, and economically strengthening Afghan state is preferable to any achievable alternatives. None have directly opposed the internationally approved Hamid Karzai as president or seriously tried to manipulate Afghan domestic politics. All have pledged, moreover, some measure of development assistance. Undoubtedly, the presence of foreign military forces and international attention has contributed to their restrained policies. The strategic approaches to Afghanistan by its neighbors are, however, always subject to readjustment. No regional state is prepared to allow another to gain a preponderance of influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, each retains links to client networks that are capable of fractionalizing and incapacitating an emerging Afghanistan. States in the neighborhood may well sponsor destabilizing forces in the event that Kabul governments fail over time to extend their authority and tangibly improve people's lives, or should Afghanistan's international benefactors lose their patience and interest. More immediately, as described below, political currents in several regional countries may be overtaking the economic forces on which more optimistic projections for regional cooperation have been based. Poorly considered policies by international aid givers and the Kabul government have in some cases helped to increase suspicions and tensions with neighbors.

Impact – China

Weak central government ignites a border war with China

Bhadrakumar 3/30 [M K, Indian Ambassador to Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey*,* 2010, Asian Times, http://inthesenewtimes.com/2010/03/30/karzais-china-iran-dalliance-riles-obama/] KLS

The chaos caused by the war in Afghanistan is threatening security in China’s northwestern region. A weak government in Kabul could mean a poorly manned border, which in turn would facilitate drug trafficking and arms smuggling and allow “East Turkmenistan” separatists to seek shelter in Afghanistan after causing trouble in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Impact – Democracy

Karzai’s credibility is key to cultivating democracy

National Post 9 [November 3, pg A14, Lexis] KLS

The West has rushed to legitimize the election results. Yesterday, U.S. President Barack Obama called Mr. Karzai to congratulate him, something he had refused to do after August's disputed result. The UN has also signed off on Mr. Karzai's win, as has the country's domestic election office. Mr. Obama even told reporters in the Oval Office that he had extracted a pledge from the re-elected Mr. Karzai to go "boldly and forcefully forward" to end corruption and speed the pace at which Afghan military and police are taking over national security from NATO forces, including Canada's. But it is not Mr. Karzai's legitimacy in Western eyes that will determine the ultimate success or failure of efforts to build Afghanistan into a functioning democracy with a self-sufficient economy. Democracy and success cannot be imposed from above and from outside; they must come from the people of a country. The best the West can do is maintain internal stability while Afghans work out for themselves how best to structure their affairs. And it is not clear if the Afghan people will give enough support to Mr. Karzai and the Afghan parliament to achieve those desirable goals. Mr. Karzai now must work doubly hard to maintain the support of his nation's Western allies while also attempting to win credibility with his own citizens. Over the next year or two, he must show tremendous progress, particularly toward rooting out his own corrupt officials, or he risks pulling all the progress that has been made in the past eight years down on his head and turning NATO nations off the idea of sending their troops to defend his country.

Democracy solves environment – accountability, information flow and markets.

Li and Reuveny 7 [Quan, Professor of Political Science at Penn State and Rafael, Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana, Vol. 24, No. 3, University http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219] KLS

Moving to the view that democracy reduces the level of environmental degradation, one set of considerations focuses on the institutional qualities of democracy. The responsiveness argument is that democracies are more responsive to the environmental needs of the public than are autocracies due to their very nature of taking public interests into account (Kotov and Nikitina, 1995). It is also argued that democracies comply with environmental agreements well, since they respect, and respond to, the rule of law (Weiss and Jacobsen, 1999). The freedom of information channel is offered by Schultz and Crockett (1990) and Payne (1995). They theorize that political rights and greater freedom for information ﬂows help2 to promote the cause of environmental groups, raise public awareness of problems and potential solutions, and encourage environmental legislation to curtail environmental degradation. Democracies also tend to have market economies, which further promotes the ﬂow of information as economic efﬁciency and proﬁts requires full information. Hence, unlike the above argument, this channel expects that proﬁt-maximizing markets will promote environmental quality (Berger, 1994).

Democracy solves environment – less war, famines and more repsonsiblity.

Li and Reuveny 7 [Quan, Professor of Political Science at Penn State and Rafael, Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana, Vol. 24, No. 3, University http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219] KLS

A second set of considerations on the positive role of democracy on environmental quality focuses on the effects of democracy on human life and crisis situations. The famines argument (Sen, 1994) observes that famines tend to promote environmental degradation because they divert attention away from longer-term environmental concerns. Since famines typically do not occur in democracies, argues Sen, environmental quality is expected to be higher in democracies than in autocracies. The human life argument (Gleditsch & Sverdlop, 2003) suggests that since democracies respect human life more than autocracies, they are more responsive to life-threatening environmental degradation. A related argument, the war channel, reasons that to the extent that democracies engage in fewer wars, they should also have a higher level of environmental quality (Gleditsch & Sverdlop, 2003), since war often destroys the environment of the warring parties (Lietzmann & Vest, 1999).

Impact – Hegemony

Afghanistan instability leads to terrorism, nuclear attacks and loss of US leadership

Engelhardt 9 [Tom, Founder of the American Empire Project , October 4, Asian Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/KK04Df01.html] KLS

Now, Afghanistan has become the first domino of our era, and the rest of the falling dominos in the 21st century are, of course, the terrorist attacks to come, once an emboldened al-Qaeda has its "safe haven" and its triumph in the backlands of that country. In other words, first Afghanistan, then Pakistan, then a mushroom cloud over an American city. In both the Vietnam era and today, Washington has also been mesmerized by that supposedly key currency of international stature, "credibility".

**“Sing along if you know the words” -Leah**

**Khalilzad 95** [Zalmay, RAND analyst and now U.S. ambassador to Iraq, The Washington Quarterly]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Impact – Iran Nuclearization

B. Continued Afghan instability prompts Iranian nuclearization

Foer 4 [Frank, Senior Editor of the New York Times December 14, The Bellow http://bellows.blogspot.com/2004\_12\_12\_archive.html] KLS

There are several points worth making on the Iranian situation. First, wouldn't it have been nice if we'd paid some attention to this crisis in the making? Second, trouble in Iran is collateral damage in the continuing Iraq insurgency (and in continuing Afghanistan instability). How much stronger would our position be if we'd taken Iraq with appropriate strength and quickly pacified the country. With decisive victories in Iraq and Afghanistan we have Iran surrounded, both by democracies and by victorious troops. Instead, Iran has the option of assisting the insurgents, nickel and diming our troops to death, and diminishing everyday the will of Americans to take on another military venture should one prove desirable but not absolutely necessary. What do we do? Having put ourselves in this situation, I think the best solution is diplomatic. Not only is invading off the table, but from the sound of things a tactical strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would also have more costs than benefits. It seems to me we should work with Europe, and perhaps try to win assistance from Russia or China, to stall Iran's nuclear development as long as possible, and shine an international light on opposition crackdowns. In the meantime, we need to throw everything we have into establishing safe, prosperous, and secure nations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The longer a power vacuum persists in those regions, and the stronger Iran is allowed to become, the more we invite Iran to directly assert its influence, a move that could have catastrophic effects.

C. Iranian nuclearization ignites Middle Eastern war- 28 million dead in 21 days, 33 million to follow, global economy destroyed- extinction

Walker 7 [Martin Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council November 22 Middle East Times http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2007/11/22/analysis\_a\_mideast\_nuclear\_war/4411/ ] KLS

He has now turned his laser-like research and forensic intelligence skills to studying the real implication of the endless diplomatic minuet at the United Nations over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the real world, this matters mainly because an Iranian nuclear capability would transform the power balance in the wider Middle East, and leave the region and the rest of us living under the constant prospect of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. This would mean, Cordesman suggests, some 16 million to 28 million Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage. It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes. The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1 megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get through. The difference in yield matters. The biggest bomb that Iran is expected to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an airburst of such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way, would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.) Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3 Dolphin-class submarines. The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin, Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. <CONTINUED>

Impact – Iran Nuclearization

<CONTINUED>

Israel would also likely target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground." But it does not end there. Cordesman points out that Israel would need to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can capitalize on Iranian strike." This means Israel would have to target "key Arab neighbors" - in particular Syria and Egypt. Cordesman notes that Israel would have various options, including a limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days; Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000 Israelis, but Israeli society would recover. An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and almost certainly destroy the Aswan Dam, sending monstrous floods down the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of Egypt as a functioning society. Cordesman also lists the oilwells, refineries and ports along the Gulf that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow. Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the global economy. So in clear, concise and chillingly forensic style, Cordesman spells out that the real stakes in the crisis that is building over Iran's nuclear ambitions would certainly include the end of Persian civilization, quite probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age. This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty.

Impact – Opium

A. Karzai key to stopping Opium trade- failure ensures democratic and economic collapse and terrorism

Teasedale 9[Jenna, Contributor, July 22, POLIS Student Journal, Vol.1 (1), http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/jenna-teasdale-summer-09.pdf] KLS

The huge boom in opium poppy cultivation has led Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the U.K. and the U.S. to declare that drugs now constitute the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s democratic consolidation and economic development.9 President Karzai has stated that ‘either Afghanistan destroys opium or opium will destroy Afghanistan,’ emphasising the importance of the link between opium production and future security for Afghanistan.10 As future security and reintegrating Afghanistan as a responsible member of the community are aims of the war on terror, eradicating opium production has been seen as extremely important. There are both short-term and long-term consequences of soaring drug production, in the most part for Afghanistan, but also for other regions. It is quite clear that the intended reduction in opium production plays an important part in the global war on drugs. However, as one of the aims of the global war on terror is to improve economic, social and political factors of life in Afghanistan, reducing opium production also plays a part in the fight against terrorism.

B. Terrorism causes extinction

Alexander 3 [Alexander, Professor and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, August 28, Lexis ] KLS

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Impact – Pakistan

Karzai credibility key to deterring state collapse

Donnelly 7[ Thomas, Resident Fellow – AEI, February 13, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25613,filter.all/pub\_detail.asp] KLS

Second, we must stop undermining the Karzai government. It has become increasingly fashionable for inside-the-beltway types to lament the Afghan president’s many weaknesses. Yes, he has made a political alliance with corrupt factional leaders, and yes, the problems of the drug trade complicate Kabul’s authority. But state-building in Afghanistan is marathon work, and without a political coalition that crosses ethnic divides, the process could well collapse. Karzai, a Pashtun, enjoys a unique level of trust across Afghanistan’s minorities, not least from the Tajik Panjshiris, the dominant force of the Northern Alliance that resisted Taliban control. Maintaining a Tajik-Pashtun front in Kabul is delicate work, and Karzai remains, in the words of longtime Afghanistan observer David Isby, the “indispensable man.”[16]

Collapse of Afghanistan government collapses Pakistan sparking regional war

Watt and Temko 7 [Nicholas and Ned, Political Editor and Chief Political Correspondent, July 15, The Guardian UK, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2126817,00.html] KLS

Britain's most senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure, a development that could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in neighbouring Pakistan. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, would present a grave threat to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. 'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. 'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'

Impact – Pakistan

Pakistan collapse leads to terrorism and nuclear war  
Brookes 7 [Peter, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, August 2, New York Post <http://www.nypost.com/seven/08022007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/baracks\_blunder\_opedcolumnists\_peter\_brookes.htm?page=2] KLS

But an attack on Pakistan's terrority that isn't unauthorized by that nation's government - which is what Obama seemed to be suggesting - is a pretty risky proposition, especially if it involved a large number of U.S. troops pouring over the Afghan border into Pakistan. Taking this sort of large-scale action - or any other unilateral action - without prior consultation with Islamabad could easily lead to the downfall of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's government. Musharraf is already on shaky ground. His government has faced a number of crises in recent months - including the seizure of the Red Mosque, terror attacks and the (now overturned) firing of a the country's top justice - leading to a serious slide in his popularity. The fall of Musharraf's government might well lead to a takeover by pro-U.S. elements of the Pakistani military - but other possible outcomes are extremely unpleasant, including the ascendance of Islamist factions. The last thing we need is for Islamabad to fall to the extremists. That would exacerbate the problem of those terrorist safe havens that Obama apparently thinks he could invade. And it would also put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal into the wrong hands. That could lead to a number of nightmarish scenarios - a nuclear war with India over Kashmir, say, or the use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group against any number of targets, including the United States.

Impact – Turns Case

Karzai key to Afghanistan stability

Fang 4 [November 8, U.S. News and World Report Correspondent http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/041108/8afghan.htm] KLS

Karzai is not the only one afraid of his death. If he is assassinated, the presidency would pass to Vice President Ahmed Zia Massoud, whose only redeeming political quality, many believe, is that he is the brother of late resistance hero Ahmed Shah Massoud. "If Massoud becomes president, then Afghanistan goes back to '92, with mujahideen ruling the country," says Tarzi. "If Karzai dies tomorrow, the system would fall apart. All the plans of the international community are tailored to Karzai, not to the future of the country." The hope, eventually, is that the two will become intertwined.

A2 Other Stability Measures

Karzai’s credibility is the only say to sustain Afghan government

Wood 9 [Allan, Staff Writer, November 20, Toronto Star, Lexis] KLS

There are elements of the Taliban that want to pursue peace with the Afghan government, but they are losing that debate to insurgent hawks who see coalition resolve wavering, said Semple, now a research fellow at Harvard University. Convincing local Afghans to stop supporting the Taliban and instead back Karzai's government, which is widely viewed as hopelessly corrupt, will happen only by instilling the belief that foreign nations are committed to the fight for as long as it takes. "It's the discussions inside (local Afghan) houses that's going to decide the fate of the Afghan government," Semple said.

\_\_\_\*\*Karzai – Aff Answers

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai credibility gone- pro-American activities destroyed his Pashtun base

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

 Hamid Karzai is walking on a tight rope. Ever grateful to Washington for getting the prized post of president of Afghanistan , he has been pursuing American dictates faithfully. He agreed to give all the major portfolios to non-Pashtun Northern Alliance members in his government and to sideline his own Pashtun community enjoying distinct majority. He allowed Indian influence to expand in his country on American insistence and let Afghan soil to be used for subversive activities against Pakistan . Mossad was also allowed a firm toehold in Afghanistan . On the prompting of his mentors he has all along maintained a hostile stance towards Pakistan . By following pro-American policies he became highly unpopular in his country.

 To make himself useful, he fed an idea to Washington that given the resources and backing, he would be able to win over majority of Taliban leaders through bribes and incentives and would affect an in-house coup within Taliban ranks after isolating Mullah Omar led hardliners. Once he was given a green signal in 2007, he began to establish contacts with former and current members of Taliban Shura and other resistance groups. By 2009 he was able to make good gains among former Taliban ministers, Hizb-e-Islami and others. Among present Shura, Mullah Ghani Baradar was his big catch. He had made secret contacts with him through his half brother Ahmad Wali Karzai but didn’t disclose this breakthrough to USA . His efforts got stalled because of unexpected successes achieved by Taliban against coalition forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan from June to September 2009 putting ISAF on the back foot.

US- Karzai relations dead and credibility gone- elections, mandates

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

The US leaders began to have second thoughts about Karzai when situation in Afghanistan began to slip out of their hands. He failed to muster requisite votes in August 2009 presidential election. Although he managed to get re-elected in November because of rigging he further lost his credibility. He however felt convinced that it was America ’s doing to weaken his political standing. He was warned by Obama to improve governance, get rid of corruption in various departments and to improve his standing among Pashtuns in particular and Afghans in general so as to become a bridge between Americans and Pashtuns. These unfriendly acts gave second thoughts to Karzai about US sincerity as well.

Karzai credibility gone- corruption

McManus 6/17 [Doyle, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, 2010, Lexis] KLS

The news from Afghanistan has been bad lately. The military campaign to win control of Kandahar, the country's second-largest city, has slowed to a crawl. Taliban insurgents have filtered back into parts of southern Afghanistan that U.S. Marines had cleared in the spring. President Hamid Karzai, the erratic leader of Afghanistan's civilian government, has given only halfhearted support to the U.S.-led military effort -- and has done little to clean up the corruption that undermines public support for his regime

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai’s credibility lost- distant, erratic, unfocused

King 6/7 [Laura, Staff Writer, 2010, Los Angeles Times, Pg 1, Lexis] KLS

But other analysts regard the president's behavior as erratic, and they attribute it to various factors: Karzai's isolation in his presidential palace, his over-dependence on an insular clique of advisors, a tendency toward emotionalism that is exacerbated by stress and weariness. "Some of those in the [presidential] palace try to keep him happy with the wrong analysis, the wrong information," said lawmaker Shukria Barakzai. "And there is the problem of micromanagement, of not enough thinking of the country's broader interests." Observing Karzai at close range, some see years of pent-up frustration bursting forth. "He was very unhappy and very, very angry," said lawmaker Daoud Sultanzoy, recounting Saturday's stormy meeting with parliament members. Parliament's lower house had sought to curtail Karzai's power to pick the overseers of parliamentary elections scheduled to take place this year, and the president reacted with fury. Some senior Western diplomats in Kabul are sanguine about Karzai's heated language, calling it an effort to blow off steam and create a bulwark against criticism from opponents if he accedes to the wishes of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization on some points. There are ample opportunities for Karzai to disassociate himself from specific Western actions, such as military actions that cause civilian casualties, while not challenging overarching policy goals. NATO said Tuesday that four civilians had died in an airstrike in southern Afghanistan. Separately, it said it was investigating the deaths of a child and three other apparent civilians during fighting with insurgents in the east. Also this week, NATO acknowledged responsibility for the February deaths of five civilians in Paktia province, including a teenage girl and two pregnant women. But even if Karzai can rally public support on issues such as civilian casualties, many observers see him as essentially adrift in his leadership role. "He has never had a real agenda; he just reacts to events," said Aziz Rafiee, the director of the Afghan Civil Society Forum, a pro-democracy group. "There is no long-term vision for the country."

Massive public support for Taliban, Karzai hated

Duff 6/22 [Gordon, UN Diplomat, Defense Specialist, Senior Editor, 2010, Veteran’s Today http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/22/gordon-duff-mid-east-sitrep-time-to-walk-away-and-clean-our-own-house/] KLS

Do we actually call what we are doing in Afghanistan a war?  Recent estimates are that 88% of the people support what we call “the enemy.”  The German’s were much more popular than us during their occupation of France during World War 2.  What does that say about our friends?  Even Petain and Laval, the French Vichy traitors, had more public support that Karzai has in Afghanistan. There is some indication that Afghanistan would rather have us change sides, fight Karzai, our Indo-Israeli puppet, and let us leave, believing we had won.  What have we accomplished?  We have created the greatest narcotics empire in the history of the world, recruited tens of thousands to fight against us and have bankrupted, not only ourselves but fragile Pakistan, whose flirtation with democracy is being smothered.  We could have simply attacked ourselves and cut out the middle man, unless, of course, the plan was for things to end up exactly as they are right now.

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai’s credibility gone- corruption, dirty brother, 8 year lame duck prove

Murphy 6/24 [Dan, Staff Writer, 2010, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis] KLS

Petraeus will be saddled with a strategic partner - the administration of President Hamid Karzai - that is increasingly unpopular and at times seems out of touch. The election that brought Karzai to power was badly marred by fraud. After the "clear" phase in Marjah, where the Taliban were partly able to take power because of the predations of corrupt central government officials and local warlords, the government McChrystal sought to install has yet to take root. In Kandahar, the next major push for the international effort, Mr. Karzai's half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, is one of the local warlords and has grown wealthy since the war began. Locals have accused him of seizing land by force and being involved in smuggling. Many Afghans say he's involved in the opium trade, a charge he has denied. "In eight years [President Karzai] hasn't been able to bring democratic, accountable government so I don't know why anyone would think he will now," says Rahman Oghli, a member of parliament from the northern Faryub Province and an opponent of the government. "The people in government and around Karzai have been lining their pockets and the people know this." In a leaked diplomatic cable last year, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, said Karzai was an ineffective partner that called into question the ability to carry out COIN successfully.

Karzai ineffective, corrupt, lacks credibility- no risk of an impact

Robinson 6/18 [Eugene, Staff Writer, The Washington Post, Lexis] KLS

Which he has not done. Karzai, who seems not to have gotten the memo on how a U.S. puppet should behave, alternates between grudging cooperation and petulant defiance. Most alarming is that Karzai is effectively sabotaging the effort to win hearts and minds in Kandahar, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency, by leaving the local power structure in the hands of his thuggish and corrupt half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai. In Washington, the hawkish interpretation of events is that the timeline itself is now the problem -- that, in the words of Sen. John McCain, it tells "the key actors inside and outside of Afghanistan that the United States is more interested in leaving than succeeding in this conflict." This sounds like a reasonable argument until you think about it. Karzai, the Taliban, the warlords and the Afghan public already know that U.S. and NATO forces will leave someday. The only way to make them think otherwise would be to announce that we intend to stay forever -- and clearly that's not the case. From the Afghan point of view, it doesn't make much difference whether the interlopers depart in one year or in five. It might make a difference, of course, if there were an honest, capable Afghan government that could use more time to build its capacity and earn the people's trust. Everyone knows, however, that such a government does not exist.

Afghans and the international community have lost faith in Karzai

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

When he dared to accuse his allies of eight years, including UN, EU and U.S. representatives, of "massive fraud" to undermine him, Karzai crossed the Rubicon to become seriously unreliable in the eyes of those who have spent more than $200 billion of taxpayers money and lost more than 1,700 soldiers supporting him. Fourth, he is therefore now much more a problem than a solution; this includes his brother. Fifth, he has become a 'loose cannon' in the fight for freedom in Afghanistan. He is now another risk factor, as seen in his infamous Kandahar speech to tribal elders, where he spoke of appeasement to them and challenged the long-planned offensive against the Taliban by both his own troops and ISAF. It is hard to manage too many risks concurrently, and makes failure of both the latest offensive and ISAF itself more likely.

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai lacks credibility- corruption, poppy production

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Seven, only two ministers were not corrupt in Karzai's previous government. Corruption remains endemic, as does poppy production, and the quality of his rule is low indeed. The West was naïve to hand over billions of dollars of aid without direct control. When the German Minister for Development met him two weeks ago, Karzai asked once more for free money - he will not change his demands.

Karzai’s credibility shot- loss of Pashtun community

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Nine, his reputation in Pakistan is near zero and remains very low even within the Pashtun community that is the backbone of the insurgency. He never stopped hating Pakistan.Yet peace without both Pakistan and a consensus with the Pashtuns, peace-making is impossible for NATO.

Karzai Collapse Inevitable

Karzai collapse inevitable

Coghlan 6/22 [Tom, Staff Writer, 2010, The Times, Lexis] KLS

In October 2008, while Ambassador in Kabul, he was alleged to have told a diplomat:"The foreign forces are ensuring the survival of a regime which would collapse without them... They are slowing down and complicating an eventual exit from the crisis, which will probably be dramatic." According to the account, which was denied by the Foreign Office, he said that only "an acceptable dictator" would bring order to the country and that public opinion should be primed for this.

Reunification No Pass – 2AC

No chance of Reconciliation- Karzai’s credibility shot, Taliban ideologically opposed

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Afghanistan needs a fresh, unconsumed and credible president. It needs good leadership, not someone jumpy and nervous at the top. Second, Karzai's hopes for a personal reconciliation with the Taliban are naive. There is unfortunately no chance at all for this. Hardcore Taliban will hate him forever; they have tried to kill him several times, and will continue trying. Third, his brutal manipulation of the 2009 elections was not a sin so much as an act of incompetence and hunger for power. It destroyed his credibility - or what remained of it - primarily in the eyes of his own people.

Reconciliation wont be implemented- Taliban won’t negotiate

Massoud 6/5 [Waheedullah, Staff Writer, 2010, Agency French Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBld6N8Da\_\_f8T64xeZuVSNQ\_EJQ] KLS

Leaders of the Taliban insurgency have said they will negotiate with the Afghan government only after foreign forces have left the country and the Afghan constitution has been amended. "I do not think the decisions made at the jirga will convince the opposition to come and join the peace process," said another political analyst and commentator, Waheed Mujda. "Most of the points in the declaration were a repetition of what has been said over the past years... the decisions made means that the Taliban must come and surrender and I don't think the Taliban will accept this," he said.

Reconciliation won’t pass- no faith in Karzai

ICG 5/12 [International Crisis Group, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190-a-force-in-fragments-reconstituting-the-afghan-national-army.aspx]

Where the Afghan government might once have had limited potential to be a legitimate guarantor of a broad negotiated peace, the Karzai regime’s unrestrained pursuit of power and wealth has bankrupted its credibility. Under these conditions, reconciliation and reintegration, as currently conceived by Kabul and the U.S.-led coalition, does not represent a route to a permanent peaceful settlement of the conflict. Nor is it an exit strategy. Rather, it is an invitation for the country to descend further into the turmoil that led the Taliban to give succour to al-Qaeda and other violent extremists in the first place. The current debate on reconciliation with the Taliban also threatens to widen factionalism within the army.

Reconciliation won’t be implemented- Obama opposed

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

WASHINGTON, May 13 (IPS) – U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai sought to portray a united front on the issue of a political settlement with the Taliban in their joint press conference Wednesday. But their comments underlined the deep rift that divides Karzai and the United States over the issue. Karzai obtained Obama’s approval for the peace jirga scheduled for later this month – an event the Obama administration had earlier regarded with grave doubt because of Karzai’s ostensible invitation to the Taliban to participate. On the broader question of reconciliation, however, Obama was clearly warning Karzai not to pursue direct talks with the Taliban leadership, at least until well into 2011.

Reunification No Pass – 2AC

Obama deeply opposed to Reconciliation- it’s a no go

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

An administration official who is familiar with the Obama-Karzai meeting confirmed to IPS Thursday that the differences between the two over the issue of peace talks remained, but that the administration regards it as positive that Karzai was at least consulting with Obama on his thinking. Before the Karzai-Obama meeting, the official said, ”A lot of people were jumping to the conclusion that [Karzai and the Taliban] are talking about deals. Now he is talking to us before making any back room deals.” The official indicated that the Obama administration is not open to the suggestion embraced by Karzai that reconciliation might be pursued with some of the Taliban leadership. ”We’d have a lot of problems with someone saying ‘these Taliban are acceptable, but these people aren’t',” the official told IPS.

Link UQ – 2AC

No link- Troop withdrawal going to happen already

McManus 6/17 [Doyle, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, 2010, Lexis] KLS

Yet when Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. military commander in Kabul, delivered an assessment of the state of the war last week, he said -- very cautiously -- that he is succeeding at his initial goal: interrupting the Taliban's momentum. "We see progress everywhere, but it's incomplete," McChrystal said. "It is slow, but it's positive." In McChrystal's words lies the central dilemma President Obama will face later this year, when he reviews his policy in Afghanistan: The war isn't being lost anymore -- but it isn't being won yet, either.When Obama agreed to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, he imposed an American timetable on the war. He gave his generals a year to show results, saying he'd review the situation in December 2010. He also set a target date of July 2011 for starting to draw down U.S. troops.

Mitigated link- military support decreasing in the squo

Siddiqui 9 [Haroon, Staff Writer, February 12, Toronto Star, Lexis] KLS

A fundamental shift is underway in American policy on Afghanistan. And Canada should be scrambling to be part of the process. If we don't, Barack Obama will be handing us, and all the NATO members in the Afghan mission, a fait accompli in about two months. We saw what he did Monday at his first presidential press conference. He greased the skids under Hamid Karzai. And he committed the U.S. to a broad military, diplomatic and development strategy in a "regional approach," with Pakistan as "a stalwart ally." That was only a hint of what's happening behind the scenes in Washington and publicly in Asia, where Obama's special envoy Richard Holbrooke is on the road. The Harper government seems clued out. There was a touch of naivete when Admiral Mike Mullen, chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, came calling Tuesday. Ottawa's reaction was: Whoopee! He didn't ask for our military commitment beyond February 2011. In fact, the U.S. has not only given up on the allies contributing more troops, it has decided to fight the Taliban with an overwhelmingly American force rather than co-ordinate the NATO forces.

Link D – Plan not Key

Kandahar operation key to stopping insurgency and winning the war- last chance

DeYoung 5/23 [Karen, Staff Writer, 2010, The Washington Post, Lexis]

The Obama administration's campaign to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan's second-largest city is a go-for-broke move that even its authors are unsure will succeed. The bet is that the Kandahar operation, backed by thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars, will break the mystique and morale of the insurgents, turn the tide of the war and validate the administration's Afghanistan strategy. There is no Plan B.

Link Turn – 2AC\*\*

Plan is the only way to restore Karzai’s political capital and pass Reconciliation and Reintegration program

BBC 6/7 [BBC Asian Monitoring, 2010, Lexis] KLS

Afghanistan's Jirga for Reconciliation and Reintegration overwhelmingly supported Afghan President Hamid Karzai's plan to negotiate with Taliban. The Jirga went smoothly with minor incident of the Taliban's attack on the first day of the meeting. However, it was a tactical failure and did not succeed to disrupt the conference in any way. There were 1600 members with 200 foreign dignitaries. The Jirga was part of President Karzai's efforts to broadly shape public opinion in Afghanistan and the region for getting a mandate to engage with the Taliban. Afghan President has firm eyes on the post-US Afghanistan. Karzai is trying to bring an end to insurgency. The Jirga aimed at three layers of the Taliban. The first is the foot soldiers whom the President wants to "peel away" from the insurgents by providing more economic opportunities and incentives. The Jirga proposed an amnesty for these Taliban and promised help if they turned over their weapons. Because of poor economic conditions, there are a lot unemployed youth who have joined hands with the Taliban for good pay, food and clothing. The Jirga sent a message to the second layer of Taliban by saying they be involved in any peace negotiations: this group comprise the famous Taliban commanders like Jalaluddin Haqqani with whom Pakistan might have an influence. Here the US has accepted Islamabad's role to help distinguish between the reconcilable and the irreconcilable Taliban given Pakistan decades long relations and hobnobbing with Afghan militants who could potentially act as proxy for Islamabad in extending its influence in Afghanistan. The third category is the Taliban's top leadership layer led by Mullah Mohammad Umar. His role is important: we do not know to what extent he is under the influence of al-Qaeda. Though some senior level Taliban who are not fighting now had indicated that Mullah Mohammad Umar may not be on the same page as as al-Qaeda is when it comes to launching transnational attacks. The Jirga was aiming at this layer when it demanded of President Karzai to announce a timetable for the US withdrawal. The Jirga demanded immediate talks with high level senior Taliban. Earlier, the US was opposed to any such move but in February the US Central Command Gen David Petraeus for the first time indicated the US would be willing to deal with senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Umar. So the Jirga's proposal is a kind of support for both Mr Karzai's and the US position. Another proposal was removal of senior Taliban insurgents from the US and UN blacklists. The senior Taliban leaders, including its ex-foreign minister Abdul Wakeel Mutawakel cannot travel internationally because of travel restrictions by the UN and the US. It was part of UN sanctions on Taliban regime imposed in the wake of 9/11 attacks. The Jirga also demanded a time table for handing important military installations, including Bagram air base. If the US starts to withdraw from Afghanistan, part of first symbolic gestures will be handing over of these bases to Afghan hands. Hence the Jirga wanted to know when these measures are going to be announced. All these proposals were aimed at the Taliban. The Jirga for the first time recognised Taliban as opposition group that needed to be co-opted in the post-US Afghanistan. However, Jirga did not touch upon the US's big demand that Taliban part ways with al-Qaeda. But we already know that senior Taliban in the past intimated that they would be willing to confine themselves within the territories of Afghanistan if the US was prepared to leave the country. Hence, there might already be a tentative understanding reached. But there were critics of the Jirga as well. The ex-presidential candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah rejected the Jirga. However, he could not disagree more with the outcome of the Jirga so as General Rashid Dostum who had also opposed the holding of the Jirga. The Jirga, however, boosted the hands of President Karzai. Although the Jirga's decisions are not binding but it was a referendum for Karzai to have a political capital to engage w ith the Taliban and a support for the United States to be part of any high level negotiations with them. The Jirga offered maximum concessions to the Taliban. And it is highly likely that the Taliban would view the Jirga in a positive light. For the first time the Jirga set bench marks for the US to create conducive conditions in line with its drawdown time table. Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, would have closely followed the developments as Jirga's proposals sign posted the way ahead in diffusing the Taliban insurgency. By holding this Jirga, Karzai has set off a momentum for a process that may end up seeing Taliban joining a broadbased set up in Afghanistan.

Link Turn – 2AC\*\*

American withdrawal key to reconciliation

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan is inevitable; the sooner it comes, the better for all concerned. An honourable way of achieving it with peace and stability in Afghanistan is still available. President Obama should convene a conference in Kabul, attended by heads of state or government of all countries sharing borders with Afghanistan, as well as China, India, Russia, Britain, France and the U.N. Secretary General. The conference should give credible guarantees for Afghanistan's integrity, independence and sovereignty, and for immunity against interference or intervention by any of its neighbours and, indeed, any other power. The result should be formally endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, which should also station in Afghanistan an adequate peace-keeping force for a sufficient period to allow the Afghan Army and police to assume full responsibility for internal and external security. The conference should then convert itself into a consortium for aiding Afghanistan's rapid economic development over 10-15 years.

Plan is the first question – Karzai needs the perception of stability to implement Reconciliation plans

Massoud 6/5 [Waheedullah, Staff Writer, 2010, Agency French Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBld6N8Da\_\_f8T64xeZuVSNQ\_EJQ] KLS

The challenge now facing the jirga was the implementation of its proposals, said political commentator Janan Mamozai. "What remains to be seen, though, is whether the Afghan government and the international community -- the Americans in particular -- honestly and sincerely make efforts to implement the recommendations," he said.

Link Turn – Cred

US troops reaffirm Karzai as a puppet President

DeYoung 5/23 [Karen, Staff Writer, 2010, The Washington Post, Lexis]

Shaping" operations for the offensive began late last winter as Special Operations forces began killing or capturing insurgent leaders. The Taliban has also begun an assassination campaign against people working for foreigners or the Afghan government. U.S. civilian officials are simultaneously trying to wrest control from local power brokers and to correct imbalances that favor one tribal group. They plan to set up 10 administrative districts, each with a representative council and money to spend. Success has been only vaguely defined, and progress will be monitored through what the military calls "atmospherics reporting," including public opinion polls and levels of commerce in the streets. A senior military official said the central question, which the administration will pose and answer for itself, is: "Are we moving toward a solution in Kandahar that the people support?" Public descriptions of the balance between the offensive's military and civilian aspects have fluctuated in response to Afghan sensibilities in a region that is arguably more hostile to foreign intervention and the government in Kabul than to the Taliban. Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched. But Afghan President Hamid Karzai said last week that military force would be used only "if and when and where needed . . . in consultation with the community." Although the administration has pledged to consult with Karzai every step of the way, and Karzai with Kandaharis, it remains unclear whether consultation equals a veto. "It's not a military operation in the normal sense of the word," an administration official said. "Maybe they just should have done it," and not talked about it first, "but you couldn't . . . bring so many troops in" without an explanation, he said, referring to the 10,000 additional U.S. troops that have begun to flow into the Kandahar area. The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."

US presence cripples governmental credibility, harboring ill will

Constable 9 [Pamela, Washington Post Foreign Service, October 4, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis] KLS

A melon vendor named Turan Amoor complained that as Western influence has grown in Afghanistan, "we have begun to see the open faces of women in the bazaars and a lot of un-Muslim activities." "This shows that the foreign troops are a bad influence," Amoor said. "If we get a better government, maybe things will settle down. Otherwise, one day we will go for jihad against the foreigners, and they will leave as they came." Shomali has not been a focus of insurgent attacks, in part because it is home to the vast U.S. military base at Bagram Airfield. Yet even though the base has provided protection, jobs and funding for community projects, such efforts have failed to create much goodwill among local Afghans. Meanwhile, reports of civilian casualties and allegations of abuses by foreign troops seem to be instantly believed. Many people here associate the international forces with Karzai's government, which has increasingly lost credibility because of corruption, poor performance and the latest charges of electoral fraud. During his Western-backed tenure, they have seen aid money vanish, drug traffic flourish and security worsen. Now they worry that the next five years will bring more of the same.

Link Turn – Cred

**Troop presence hurts Karzai’s credibility- growing anti- American sentiment**

Landay 9 [Johnathon S. Staff Writer, November 2, McClathy NewsPaper, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/11/02/78214/exclusive-us-drafts-afghan-compact.html]

As long as the population views its government as weak or predatory, the Taliban's 'alternative' style of delivering security and some form of justice will continue to have traction," says a U.S. government document that outlines part of the proposed Compact and was obtained by McClatchy. "We would have to see some really concrete actions on the part of Karzai to be able to take this seriously," said Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department intelligence analyst, now at the Middle East Institute. "It looks great on paper." Bolstering the credibility of Karzai's government is essential to the Obama administration's efforts to curb the worsening Taliban-led insurgency amid growing casualties and shrinking public support for a war that entered its ninth year last month. The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has requested as many as 80,000 additional U.S. troops as part of an ambitious counter-insurgency plan to strengthen the Afghan government and expand its security forces. "Increasing our military footprint will exacerbate the perception among Afghans that the U.S. intends to occupy their country in support of a government many see as illegitimate," said Sen. Russ Feingold,

Link Turn – DEA

US involvement in counter opium production decreases the legitimacy of the Afghan government

Feickert 6 [Andrew, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, December 11, CRS Report for Congress http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33503.pdf] KLS

Counternarcotics Operations The current U.S. military policy on counternarcotics operations and NATO’s mandate for participating in counternarcotics operations may come under congressional scrutiny. While “burning poppy fields” and conducting combat operations on narcotics-related facilities might be too extreme a course of action for U.S. and NATO troops, a more active role short of direct action might have an impact on insurgent activities. According to one report, while the solution to the illegal opium problem requires an interdisciplinary approach due to the central role opium production plays in Afghanistan’s economy, NATO [and U.S. forces] should play a greater role “in targeting drug laboratories, opium stockpiles, and trafficking routes” as this would “not only help Afghan counternarcotics efforts but also curtails the flow of drugs to Europe, which gets 90 percent of its heroin from Afghanistan.”73 Opponents of a more active U.S. and NATO counternarcotics role could argue that these efforts would shift resources and focus away from helping to stabilize the security situation, which could undermine the credibility of the Afghan central government.

Link Turn – Parliament

Plan increases Karzai’s credibility- appeases parliament

Siddiqi 4/29 [Shahid R, Staff Writer, 2010, Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/04/29/is-karzai-heading-for-the-end-game/] KLS

Looking beyond the American withdrawal, Karzai, like many other collaborators, must begin to move to the center, distancing himself from the U.S. to improve his acceptability among Afghans opposed to American occupation. To survive in the treacherous political environment of Afghanistan, he must have a supportive new parliament and neutralize the threat from Taliban groups led by Mullah Omar. This explains his desperation to control the Election Commission and lead the reconciliation effort.

Link Turn – Pashtun Module

A. Pashtuns control Karzais legitimacy- dominate party

Trefzger 6/11 [Henderson, Wake Forest University, 2010, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-karzai] KLS

The fact is that the sectarian environment in Afghanistan makes it impossible for any viable contender to emerge and compete against Karzai. Since he is a member of the country’s majority ethnic group, the Pashtuns, Karzai has been able to obtain significant electoral support and strike pragmatic alliances with a large part of the Afghan electorate. This creates a situation in which, despite decreasing public support for him recent years, Karzai will never lose the support of the majority Pashtun community to a competitor or a minority candidate. According to a February 12th 2009 article of the *Economist*, Karzai has maintained high approval ratings with the vital Pashtun tribes of southern and eastern Afghanistan. As long as this president can maintain this credibility in the Pashtun tribes, no other Pashtun will run against him and no other ethnic minority candidate will be able to unseat him.

B. Withdrawal appeases pashtuns

UNHCR 3 [December 31, UN Refugee Agency http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MARP,,AFG,4562d8cf2,469f3a5112,0.html ] KLS

Pashtuns have a high risk for continued rebellion. They are geographically concentrated, have multiple militant organizations with standing militias, and do not feel they are adequately represented in the current government. Furthermore, the Afghan government remains weak and unable to exert control over extensive areas of territory. Pashtuns also resent the continued presence of U.S. military personnel in the country.

Link Turn – Public

Public opposition to troop presence- Taliban sympathy

Barnes 4/29 [Julia, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, Lexis] KLS

The next phase of U.S. strategy is expected to begin in the coming weeks, as U.S. and Afghan forces step up operations around the city of Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban movement. The new report offers a grim take on the likely difficulty of establishing lasting security, especially in southern Afghanistan, where the insurgency enjoys broad support. The conclusions raise the prospect that the insurgency in the south may never be completely vanquished, but instead must be contained to prevent it from threatening the government of President Hamid Karzai. The report concludes that Afghan people support or are sympathetic to the insurgency in 92 of 121 districts identified by the U.S. military as key terrain for stabilizing the country. Popular support for Karzai's government is strong in only 29 of those districts, it concludes.

Appeasement to the West promotes hatred of Karzai

Toronto Star 4/6 [Pg A16, Lexis] KLS

In a claim that defies belief, Karzai blamed the United Nations and other "foreigners" last week for conspiring against him in last year's tainted election. That's absurd, if only because the ballot-stuffing mostly favoured him. He sounded frankly delusional. He also warned that Canadian troops and others who risk their lives to support his government are walking a fine line between "invasion and co-operation," and that the Taliban gains respect as "a national resistance" if they misstep. He even went so far as to threaten to "join the Taliban" if the Afghan parliament refuses to strengthen his authority over elections, and if he comes under more foreign pressure. That sounded both delusionary and erratic. Finally, he promised tribal leaders in Kandahar that a military campaign against the Taliban this summer won't go ahead "until you are happy." That just sounded improbable. It's no coincidence that Karzai's sudden bravado comes on the heels of U.S. President Barack Obama's trip to Kabul 10 days ago. Far from being a moment for Karzai to bask in reflected glory, it was a humiliation. Obama told Karzai that he must provide better, cleaner, more lawful rule, and get more insurgents to give up the fight. Now Karzai is pushing back in a bid to recover domestic credibility and insulate himself from criticism over the Kandahar campaign. He wants Afghans to believe that he was elected "despite foreign opposition and therefore enjoys full legitimacy," as the Afghan newspaper Hasht-e Sobh put it. Fair enough. But this is a short-sighted strategy. Making the UN and coalition the enemy and legitimizing the Taliban will confuse Afghans, embolden the insurgents, and erode fragile foreign support. That doesn't bode well as Karzai prepares to convene a loya jirga, or major council, to discuss the nation's future.

Link Turn – Withdrawal

US troops decrease Karzai’s waning credibility

Rubin and Filkinsn 6/25 [Alissa, Dexter, Staff Writers, 2010, Inernatioanl Herald Tribune, Lexis]

But Afghanistan is a very different war in a very different country. Where Iraq is an urban, oil-rich country with an educated middle class, Afghanistan is a shattered state whose social fabric and physical infrastructure have been ruined by three decades of war. In Iraq, the insurgency was in the cities; here, it is spread across the mountains and deserts of the country's forbidding countryside. Indeed, to prevail in Afghanistan, General Petraeus will need all of his skills - and a dose of good fortune at least as big as the one he received in Iraq. At the moment, every aspect of the war in Afghanistan is going badly: The military's campaign in the strategic city of Kandahar has met with widespread resistance from the Afghan public; President Hamid Karzai is proving erratic and unpredictable; and the Taliban are resisting more tenaciously than ever.

Withdrawal plans inspire Karzai to improve his political standing

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Once Obama announced withdrawal timeline of July 2011 and stuck to it despite strong opposition from Karzai , India and Israel , he realized that the US would again leave Afghanistan in a lurch and his fate will not be different to Babrak Karmal or Dr Najibullah. He also assessed that US-Nato had lost the will and was not in a position to defeat Taliban movement.  It was in the backdrop of these lurking fears that he hurtled some anti-US and pro-Taliban statements to win the confidence of latter. He also tried hard to allay the heart burnings of Pakistan by making series of friendly statements. While throwing feelers of goodwill towards Taliban and Pakistan , he is still not ready to lose the goodwill of USA and India since the situation at the moment is highly fluid. While he has smelt that USA has lost the war, coming six months are crucial. In this period, it will be decided which side the balance tilts.

Link Turn – US Relations

End of relations increases Karzai’s credibility- appeases Taliban

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Arrest of Baradar, deputy of Mullah Omar, by Pak security forces in January at the pointing of CIA was a setback for him since Baradar’s participation in loya jirga scheduled at Kabul in April would have made a huge difference. When he failed to get him released, he went ahead with the jirga on 2 June which was attended by 1600 people from almost all strands of Afghan society. His plan of re-integration of Taliban through negotiations was endorsed by all. His plan is however not entirely in line with US plan which hinges on first defeating the Taliban on battlefield and then negotiating with them from a position of strength. Americans are sticking to this plan since they want to leave behind a regime of their choice which could safeguard their future interests and also agree to a sizeable military presence in Baghram and Kandahar air bases.

US input cripples Karzai’s credibility, fueling Taliban counterattacks

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Rocket attacks on the jirga were certainly the handiwork of anti-Karzai and anti-Taliban forces. The chief suspect is Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh who was very peeved over Karzai’s change of stance towards Pakistan . He is completely influenced by RAW and Mossad and is a vehement enemy of Pakistan , particularly ISI. He has contributed a lot towards coloring perceptions of US officials based in Afghanistan against Pakistan and in assisting RAW in recruiting agents and launching them into Balochistan and FATA. Interior Minister Hanif Atmar is another anti-Pakistan Afghan official. Both are US men and have been taking commands from Washington and New Delhi . Their sacking by Karzai is a big loss for USA and India especially because of highly turbulent security situation and the US having no clear cut strategy for exit. In the wake of Marjah operation and much hyped operation Kandahar planned in September, the Taliban instead of going on the defensive have become more assertive. Rate of attacks have accelerated and so is the casualty rate of occupation forces. June is proving to be the most deadly month since 2001. In case Kandahar operation turns into another fiasco, it will have grave ramifications for USA . It will lose whatever leverage it still has on certain groups and spaces it controls. The situation has become dicey because of ouster of Gen McChrystal who had conceived the offensive plan and was making hectic preparations. Morale of occupation troops is already very low. Many feel that their civil leaders and war merchants have turned them into sacrificial lambs to upkeep their mercantile interests. Disgraceful dismissal of their commander may be resented by them and further erode their resolve to fight a losing battle.

 In 1989, the US abandoned Afghanistan in haste since it was a victor and had fulfilled all its objectives. The situation now is altogether different. It has not achieved even a single objective and is bound to lose the war. Under such adverse circumstances, it may not be possible for coalition troops to pullout easily and safely. It will be highly costly withdrawal. Afghans revenge against defeated foe is horrifying since they believe in total massacre and that too in most brutal ways.

Impact D – Karzai Not k2 Stability

Afghan stability doesn’t rest with Karzai- other Presidential options

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Six, Karzai is not needed. Several others could do a much better job. Diplomatic dogma so far has been that there is no alternative to him. This is totally wrong. One option is Abdullah Addullah, but there are several others. Afghanistan needs a new beginning and a credible, not rotten, government. A relatively unknown newcomer, coming out of the blue like Obama, could achieve this. Afghanistan needs a new and younger man representing hope for this ancient land, not a burned-out, unreliable president.

Impact D – Reunification Fails

Reconciliation fails- Taliban refuses to comply

Pratt 6/11 [David, Staff Writer, 2010, The Herald, Lexis] KLS

Not only were there few grass roots representatives invited, but those that were present came at great personal risk. Knowing full well that the coalition are relying on recruiting local officials to try to build up the Afghan government in contested provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, the Taliban have been ratcheting up a campaign of targeted assassinations on those from within that very community. One tribal elder at the recent peace jirga told of how another was killed by unknown armed men after returning from a similar meeting just a few weeks ago. Yesterday, David Cameron congratulated President Hamid Karzai on convening the jirga, and trying to encourage elements of the Taliban to come back into the political mainstream. But the inescapable fact remains that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani network the three main forces fighting international troops in Afghanistan all refuse to recognise the jirga process and were never going to be part of that meeting.

Reintegration has been a farce since 2005

Siddique 2/26 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi the head of Afghan Senate and a key Karzai ally, resigned from his post on February 20, claiming his "advice" was not being taken. But Kabul insiders have told RFE/RL that the octogenarian cleric and former president had sought to head the foreign-backed reintegration effort. The Karzai administration, the sources say, was reluctant to give him the sensitive post because of his failures in delivering tangible results while overseeing a government reconciliation body since 2005.

Impact Turn – Karzai Bad

Support of Karzai’s crooked government legitimizes Taliban insurgency, sparks war between Pakistan and India

Mull 6/19 [Josh, Staff Writer, 2010, Enduring America http://enduringamerica.com/2010/06/19/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-joining-the-taliban-the-story-behind-the-headline-mull/] KLS

It’s worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan’s military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

Karzai encouraging opium production- opposed to eradication measures

Feickert 6 [Andrew, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, December 11, CRS Report for Congress http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33503.pdf] KLS

Perhaps in recognition that Afghan government and NATO efforts to combat drug trafficking are proving to be inadequate, other approaches are reportedly being considered. The Afghan government has reportedly sought assistance from the Colombian government, seeking advice in how to improve its counternarcotics operations.65 Colombian counternarcotics police visiting Afghanistan have reportedly suggested ways which the Afghan government can improve their training, organization, airport surveillance, and evidence-gathering procedures.66 Despite reported opposition from President Karzai and many Afghan officials, the Afghan government is reportedly considering the possibility of spraying poppy fields with herbicide — including aerial spraying — to help reduce the size of next year’s poppy crop.67

Impact Turn – Reconciliation Bad – Karzai\*\*

Reconciliation plans are a guise to destabilize Karzai’s government

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

Actually imperialist powers need any leadership for specific time. After achievements of objectives that leadership is ignored or removed from the scene. It happened after Afghan Jihad too. Now as America has decided or pretends to get out of Afghanistan so they need new leadership of Taliban that can make new promises. These new promises are not possible to make for the previous leadership. As Mullah Omer has constantly repeated his demand of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan so Taliban support for coalition government under Mullah Omer is not possible. ISI is also excluded from these new American decisions. That’s why Nawaz Sharif has recently said that Pakistan could start these negotiations. Taliban has also rejected London Conference.

Impact Turn – Reconciliation Bad – China

Reconciliation viewed as threatening to Chinese interests

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

This new development has also disturbed the regional powers. Chinese journalists have expressed their views regarding Chinese military bases in Pakistan. We know that whatever is published in Chinese media that will have to come across strict censorship. It means that there is some truth in this news. China might get frightened by the new American policy about Afghanistan that’s why she is going to take this step. But regional powers must understand one thing that American game can only be contested by making political policies rather than military one.

Reconciliation brings Sino-Afghan relations to a high, ending US input

Bhadrakumar 3/30 [M K, Indian Ambassador to Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey*,* 2010, Asian Times, http://inthesenewtimes.com/2010/03/30/karzais-china-iran-dalliance-riles-obama/] KLS

On the eve of Karzai’s departure for Beijing, he received a delegation from the opposition Hizb-i-Islami group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Washington is ambivalent about Hekmatyar, but in the joint statement issued after Karzai’s visit, Beijing expressed support for the reconciliation and reintegration process in Afghanistan and affirmed “respect for the Afghan people’s choice of development road suited to their national conditions”. Ahmadinejad’s consultations in Kabul, followed by Karzai’s dash to Islamabad, and now his visits to Beijing and Tehran – the sudden spurt of high level exchanges suggest a pattern. What should alarm Washington most is that the Chinese position on Afghan national reconciliation meshes with Karzai’s political agenda and accords with Iran’s overlapping concerns and interests. The China-Afghan joint statement affirms Beijing’s readiness to expand economic cooperation, trade and investment while upholding the principle of “respect for the Afghan people’s choice of development road suited to their national conditions”. Washington will factor in that it is quite within China’s financial capacity to reduce Karzai’s dependence on Western largesse, in turn encouraging the Afghan leader to shake off the West’s attempts to dominate him.

Impact Turn – Reunification Bad – Af-Pak 2AC\*\*

A. Reconciliation sparks civil war that escalates, drawing in regional hegemons ending in a partition of Afganistan

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

The strategy devised at the London Conference in January 2010 on Afghanistan — “reintegration and reconciliation” — is a veiled scheme to hand over Afghanistan, once again, to Pakistan. President Obama's rhetoric on the “Way Forward in AF-PAK” has the same thrust. The consequences of this dangerous scheme are not hard to foresee: the return of the brutal Taliban rule in Kabul, the resumption of a civil war which will suck in the neighbouring countries; and spread of terrorism and bloodshed farther afield. The end result will be a virtual partition of Afghanistan into Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon countries and the eventual rise of a larger, independent Pushtoonistan incorporating Pakistan's own Pushtoon lands. I would not wish that fate for Afghanistan or Pakistan.

B. Partition of Afghanistan sparks fundamentalist uprisings necessitating terrorism, border clashes and Pakistan-India nuclear strikes, culminating in global nuclear war  
Morgan 7 [Stephen J, Former Member of British Labour Party Executive Committee, June 3, <http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>] KLS

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Impact Turn – Reunification Bad – Af-Pak XT

A Pakistan controlled by extremists sparks Indian pre-emptive strike- 25 war games prove

Ricks 1 [Thomas E. Washington Post Staff Writer,Washington Post. Oct 21, 2001. Page A19. \_\_http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27875-2001Oct20?language=printer\_\_] KLS

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.

AT: Afghanistan Instability

No impact escalation- Afghanistan still protected by extended US security

Phalnikar 5/11 [Sonia 2010, Deutsche Welle http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5553954,00.html] KLS

In the first of a series of meetings, Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Tuesday met US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who reassured him that the US would remain committed to providing security in Afghanistan even after US troops have left. "As we look toward a responsible, orderly transition in the international combat mission in Afghanistan, we will not abandon the Afghan people," Clinton said. Karzai, meanwhile, reiterated that his country would stick to its responsibility to further develop Afghanistan's civilian and democratic structures.

Jirga will stop terrorism and bringing peace but Karzai’s credibility key to implementation  
Niazi, 7 [Tarique, Staff Writer, August 17, Asian Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IH17Df03.html] KLS

If the jirga was not a complete success, it was not a failure, either. After all, it was the grandest gathering of Pashtun leaders since the Durand Line was drawn in 1893 to divide Pashtun territories between Afghanistan and the British Raj. The lineup included pre-eminent Pashtun leaders who tower over even Karzai and Musharraf: Senator Asfandyar Wali Khan, who leads the Awami National Party, and Mehmood Khan Achakzai, who heads the Pashtun Milli Awami Party. Both scorn Musharraf for dumping Arab and non-Arab al-Qaeda members into Pashtun tribal areas and then committing what they call genocide against Pashtuns by ruthlessly bombing them. The jirga, which represented the 50 million Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, further bolstered the standing of Karzai as a Pashtun leader. His embrace by the leading lights of the Pashtun nation sends a strong message to the Taliban that they do not have a monopoly on Pashtun nationalism. Finally, from the US standpoint, the jirga was a success for its unequivocal commitment to end terrorism and eliminate al-Qaeda from Pashtun territories. Since September 11, 2001, no such commitment was ever made at such a grand forum of Pashtun leaders. The jirga's call shatters the vogue idiom of "Pashtun terrorists", "tribal badlands", and "lawless tribal areas" that cast Pashtuns in bad light. At the jirga, Pashtuns demonstrated their stake in peace within and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet the jirga was "long on generalities and short on specifics". US and NATO leaders should engage this institution to supply the missing "specifics" to foster peace. It is deceptively simple to dub the Afghan resistance "Taliban militancy" or "al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism". Although Pashtuns reject al-Qaeda and its terrorism, as the Kabul jirga resoundingly demonstrated, they are resentful of their loss of power in Kabul, which they held for 200 years, to the ethnic-minority-dominated and US-backed Northern Alliance. The Taliban, who are predominantly Pashtuns, are drawing on this sense of exclusion among the majority community to sustain their struggle. An ethnic balance to the current distribution of power, therefore, would help drain the Afghan resistance of energy and serve as well the long-term security interests of the Northern Alliance. Karzai, aided by the 50-member Tribal Council, is best placed to pull off this feat. He is a devout Muslim, a former cabinet officer of the Taliban government, a member of the Pashtun royalty, a nominee of the ruling Northern Alliance, and the only hope for the international community to bring peace in Afghanistan.

AT: Cred k2 Democracy

Plan solves the DA and ensures democracy- puppet Karzai illegitimate

Pape 9 [Robert A, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, October 15, Lexis] KLS

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies for Afghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough. America will best serve its interests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, which relies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on the ground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years. General McChrystal's own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, ''over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.'' Second, the central government led by America's chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, is thoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: ''Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those individuals are protected by senior government officials.''