# Critique Toolbox – GSM@MGW11

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# State Good

## State Good

### Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it --- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that facilitates resistance against its worst abuses

Donovan and Larkin ’06 (Clair and Phil, Australian National University, *Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide clear and useful insights that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

### Change outside the state is temporary --- only engaging institutions produces lasting remedies

Milbrath ’96 (Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But lasting personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is likely to weaken as they perform day-today within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is not likely to be effective.

### State power is flexible and open to reorientation

Krause and Williams ’97 (Keith, Professor of Political Science – York U., and Michael, Professor of Political Science – U Southern Main, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, p. xvi)

Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of ef­fective political action. In the realm of organized violence, states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to under­stand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reori­entation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and ca­pable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical per­spective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.

### Only debating state policies can avert nuclear conflict --- this doesn’t mean accepting the system

Spanier ’90 (John, PhD – Yale and Teacher – U Florida, Games Nations Play, p. 115)

Whether the observer personally approves of the "logic of behavior" that a particular framework seems to suggest is not the point. It is one thing to say, as done here, that the state system condemns each state to be continually concerned with its power relative to that of other states, which, in an anarchical system, it regards as potential aggressors. It is quite another thing to approve morally of power politics. The utility of the state-system framework is simply that is points to the "essence" of state behavior. It does not pretend to account for all factors, such as moral norms, that motivate states. As a necessarily simplified version of reality, it clarifies what most basically concerns and drives states and what kinds of behavior can be expected. We, as observers, may deplore that behavior and the anarchical system that produces it and we may wish that international politics were not as conflictual and violent as the twentieth century has already amply demonstrated. We may prefer a system other that one in which states are so committed to advancing their own national interests and protecting their sovereignty. Nevertheless, however much we may deplore the current system and prefer a more peaceful and harmonious world, we must first understand the contemporary one if we are to learn how to "manage" it and avoid the catastrophe of a nuclear war.

### Ignoring the state is politically disastrous --- only opposition to specific institutions can meaningfully challenge domination

**Grossberg ’92** (Lawrence, Professor of Communication – U Illinois, We Gotta Get Out of This Place, p. 390-1)

But this would mean that the Left could not remain outside of the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against and with in bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immensely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; membership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle of the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes continuing) dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions, and it depended upon a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people’s attitude and everyday practices (e.g. the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g. banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic relations of bleack an immigrant populations in place and which condition people’s everyday practices. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the system of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making power. Otherwise the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act with organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as responsibility) to fight them. Without such organizations, the only models of political commitment are self-interest and charity. Charity suggests that we act on behalf of others who cannot act on their own behalf. But we are all precariously caught in the circuits of global capitalism, and everyone’s position is increasingly precarious and uncertain. It will not take much to change the position of any individual in the United States, as the experience of many of the homeless, the elderly and the “fallen” middle class demonstrates. Nor are there any guarantees about the future of any single nation. We can imagine ourselves involved in a politics where acting for another is always acting for oneself as well, a politics in which everyone struggles with the resources they have to make their lives (and the world) better, since the two are so intimately tied together! For example, we need to think of affirmation action as in everyone’s best interests, because of the possibilities it opens. We need to think with what Axelos has described as a “planetary thought” which “would be a coherent thought—but not a rationalizing and ‘rationalist’ inflection; it would be a fragmentary thought of the open totality—for what we can grasp are fragments unveiled on the horizon of the totality. Such a politics will not begin by distinguishing between the local and the global (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. Resistance is always a local struggle, even when (as in parts of the ecology movement) it is imagined to connect into its global structures of articulation: Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, one is always acting both globally and locally: Think globally, act appropriately! Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency. “Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of immanence.” This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a question of individual rights (i.e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up “trumping” politics, bringing it to an end. The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared “responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now.” The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democracy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. The construction of an affective commonality attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority.

## State Good (Environment)

### The immediacy of environmental degradation makes state action essential --- anti-statist critiques fail and reproduce violence

Eckersley ‘04 (Robyn, Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, THE GREEN STATE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY, p. 90-93)

It might be tempting to conclude from this general critique that states are part of the problem rather than the solution to ecological degradation. With its roots in the peace and antinuclear movements, the green movement has long been critical of the coercive modality of state power—including the state-military-industrial complex—and might therefore be understandably skeptical toward the very possibility of reforming or transforming states into more democratic and ecologically responsive structures of government. The notion that the state might come to represent an ecological savior and trustee appears both fanciful and dangerous rather than empowering. Yet such an anti-statist posture cannot withstand critical scrutiny from a critical ecological perspective. The problem seems to be that while states have been associated with violence, insecurity, bureaucratic domination, injustice, and ecological degradation, there is no reason to assume that any alternatives we might imagine or develop will necessarily be free of, or less burdened by, such problems. As Hedley Bull warns, violence, insecurity, injustice, and ecological degradation pre-date the state system, and we cannot rule out the possibility that they are likely to survive the demise of the state system, regardless of what new political structures may arise. ‘9 Now it could be plausibly argued that these problems might be lessened under a more democratic and possibly decentralized global political architecture (as bioregionalists and other green decentralists have argued). However, there is no basis upon which to assume that they will be lessened any more than under a more deeply democratized state system. Given the seriousness and urgency of many ecological problems (e.g., global warming), building on the state governance structures that already exist seems to be a more fruitful path to take than any attempt to move beyond or around states in the quest for environmental sustainability.20 Moreover, as a matter of principle, it can be argued that environmental benefits are public goods that ought best be managed by democratically organized public power and not by private power.2l Such an approach is consistent with critical theory’s concern to work creatively with current historical practices and associated understandings rather than fashion utopias that have no purchase on such practices aid understandings. In short, there is more mileage to be gained by enlisting and creatively developing the existing norms, rules, and practices of state governance in ways that make state power more democratically and ecologically accountable than designing a new architecture of global governance de novo (a daunting and despairing proposition). Skeptics should take heart from the fact that the organized coercive power of democratic states is not a totally untamed power, insofar as such power must be exercised according to the rule of law and principles of democratic oversight. This is not to deny that state power can sometimes be seriously abused (e.g., by the police or national intelligence agencies). Rather, it is merely to argue that such powers are not unlimited and beyond democratic control and redress. The focus of critical ecological attention should therefore be on how effective this control and redress has been, and how it might be strengthened. The same argument may be extended to the bureaucratic arm of the state. In liberal democratic states, with the gradual enlargement, specialization, and depersonalization of state administrative power have also come legal norms and procedures that limit such power according to the principle of democratic accountability. As Gianfranco Poggi has observed, at the same time as the political power of the state has become more extensive in terms of its subject matter and reach, so too have claims for public participation in the exercise of this power widened.22 This is also to acknowledge the considerable scope for further, more deep-seated democratic oversight. Indeed, it is possible to point to a raft of new ecological discursive designs that have already emerged as partial antidotes to the technocratic dimensions of the administrative state, such as community right-to-know legislation, community environmental monitoring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public environmental inquiries. Each of these initiatives may be understood as attempts to confront both public and private power with its consequences, to widen the range of voices and perspectives in state administration, to expose or prevent problem displacement, and/or to ensure that the sites of economic, social, and political power that create and/or are responsible for ecological risks are made answerable to all those who may suffer the consequences. This is precisely where an ongoing green critical focus on the state can remain productive. Insofar as any agency of the state (military, police, or environmental protection agencies) is no longer properly accountable to citizens (whether directly and/or via the executive or the parliament), then the democratic state is failing its citizens. Seen in this light, the green critique of the administrative state should be understood not as a critique of the state per se but rather a critique of illegitimate power. It is a power that is no longer properly accountable to citizens according to the ideals of liberal democracy. The ultimate challenge for critical political ecologists should not be simply to bring liberal democratic practice into alignment with liberal democratic ideals (although this would be a good start) but to outline a distinctively green set of regulative ideals, and a green democratic constitutional state that is less exclusionary and more public spirited than the liberal democratic state. The concern should not be the mere fact that states exercise power but rather how this power can be made more accountable and hence more legitimate.

# Offense to the Alternative

## Political Action Good

### Abdicating political engagement creates a vacuum that will be filled by violent elites

Cook in 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor, Georgetown Law, New England LR, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

### Their alternative grants tacit support to neo-liberal violence --- political engagement is necessary to check statist abuses

Barbrook in 97(Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, “More Provocations”, 6-5,

<http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html>)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

### Only concrete action can prevent mass suffering

Ling in 01 (LHM, Professor, The New School, New York, Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West)

Without concrete action for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti­cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro, 1992: 49), the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do *they* have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac­tice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en­sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti­cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28) Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic­tims of the West's essentialist conceits (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it' (Spegele, 1992: 174).

## Micropolitics Fail

### Micropolitics fail – they prevent coalition building that is essential to achieving real goals, this ensures groups continual existence on the margins of power and eventual cooptation by dominant power structures

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future” http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production

## Micorpolitics Fail – Perm Solvency

### The permutation solves – a combination of macro and micropolitics is best

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future” http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

Yet we would insist that it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an either/or proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation While postmodern politics and theory tend to polarize into either the extremely negative or excessively affirmative, key forms of postmodern literature have a more dialectical vision. Indeed, some of the more interesting forms of postmodern critique today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism. Cyberpunk, a subgenre within science fiction, brings science fiction down to earth, focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future, but the social problems facing people on earth in the present.[17] Cyberpunk writers such as Bruce Sterling and William Gibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characterized by transnational capitalist domination, Social Darwinist cultural settings, radical environmental ruination, and the implosion of the body and technology, such that humans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Yet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future, in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control, and to offer hope for alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. Similarly, magical realism examines the wreckage of centuries of European colonialism, but also maintains a positive outlook, one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit, social solidarity, and spiritual and political transcendence. Like cyberpunk novels, magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic mixture that fuses postmodernism with social critique and models of resistance. But it is also a mistake, we believe, to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarity that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Yet the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project)

## AT: Ontology Stuff

### Preventing widespread death precedes ontological questioning

Davidson ’89 (Arnold L., Associate Prof Philosophy – U Chicago, Critical Inquiry, Winter, p. 426)

I understand Levinas’ work tosuggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face… Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.” Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others: “As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470].” The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will. So Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.” And Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do**.**” Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valery’s aphorism, “Les evenements ne sont que l’ecume des choses’ (‘Events are but the foam of things’).” I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

### It’s impossible to determine an answer to being –-- ontological questioning results in an infinite regress and total political paralysis

Levinas and Nemo ’85 (Emmanuel, Professor of Philosophy, and Philippe, Professor of New Philosophy, Ethics and Infinity, p. 6-7)

Are we not in need of still more precautions? Must we not step back from this question to raise another, to recognize the obvious circularity of ask­ing what isthe “What is . .?“ question? It seems to beg the question. Is our new suspicion, then, that Heidegger begs the question of metaphysics when he asks “What is poetry?” or “What is thinking?”? Yet his thought is insistently anti-metaphysical**.** Why, then, does he retain the metaphysical question par excellence? Aware of just such an objection, he pro­poses, against the vicious circle of the *petitio principi,* an alternative, productive circularity: hermeneutic questioning. To ask “What is. . .?“ does not partake of onto-theo-logy if one acknowledges (1) that the answer can never be fixed absolutely, but calls essen­tially, endlessly, for additional “What is . . .?“ ques­tions. Dialectical refinement here replaces vicious circularity. Further, beyond the openmindedness called for by dialectical refinement, hermeneutic questioning (2) insists on avoiding subjective impositions, on avoid­ing reading into rather than harkening to things. One must harken to the things themselves, ultimately to being, in a careful attunement to what is. But do the refinement and care of the herme­neutic question — which succeed in avoiding onto­theo-logy succeed in avoiding all viciousness? Certainly they convert a simple fallacy into a produc­tive inquiry, they open a path for thought. But is it not the case that however much refinement and care one brings to bear, to ask what something is leads to asking what something else is, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum*?* What is disturbing in this is not so much the infinity of interpretive depth, which has the virtue of escaping onto-theo-logy and remaining true to the way things are, to the phenomena, the coming to be and passing away of being. Rather, the problem lies in the influence the endlessly open horizon of such thinking exerts on the way of such thought. That is, the problem lies in what seems to be the very virtue of hermeneutic thought, namely, the doggedness of the “What is . . .?“ question, in its inability to escape itself, to escape being and essence**.**

# \*\*\*AT: Specific Ks\*\*\*

# AT: Heidegger

## AT: Heidegger

(NOTE: ep·i·gone: n. A second-rate imitator or follower, especially of an artist or a philosopher.)

### No Link and Turn – only the negative forgets Being when they engage in a totalizing account of technologization – abandoning empiricism and the traditional sciences is the fastest path to their impacts

Latour in 93 (Bruno, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, We Have Never Been Modern, pp 65-67)

Who Has Forgotten Being? . In the beginning, though, the idea of the difference between Being and beings seemed a fairly good mçans of harbouring the quasi-objects, a third strategy added to that of the modernizing philosophers and to that of linguistic turns. Quasi-objects do not belong to Nature, or to Society, or to the subject; they do not belong to language, either. By deconstructing metaphysics (that is, the modern Constitution taken in its isolation from the work of hybridization), Martin Heidegger designates the central point where everything holds together, remote from subjects and objects alike. ‘What is strange in the thinking of Being is its simplicity. Precisely this keeps us from it’ (Heidegger, 1977a). By revolving around this navel, this omphalos, the philosopher does assert the existence of an articulation between metaphysical purification and the work of mediation. ‘Thinking is on the descent to the poverty of its provisional essence. Thinking gathers language into simple saying. In this way language is the language of Being, as the clouds are the clouds of the sky’ (p.242). But immediately the philosopher loses this well-intentioned simplicity. Why? Ironically, he himself indicates the reason for this, in an apologue on Heraclitus who used to take shelter in a baker’s oven. ‘Einai gar kai entautha theous’ — ‘here, too, the gods are present,’ said Heraditus to visitors who were astonished to see him warming his poor carcass like an ordinary mortal (Heidegger, 1977b, p.233). ‘Auch hier namlich wesen Götter an.’ But Heidegger is taken in as much as those naive visitors, since he and his epigones do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest Holzwege. Being cannot reside in ordinary beings. Everywhere, there is desert. The gods cannot reside in technology — that pure Enframing (Zimmerman, 1990) of being [Ge-Stell], that ineluctable fate [Geschickj, that supreme danger [Gefahr]. They are not to be sought in science, either, since science has no other essence but that of technology (Heidegger, 1977b). They are absent from politics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, history — which is the history of Being, and counts its epochs in millennia. The gods cannot reside in economics — that pure calculation forever mired in beings and worry. They are not to be found in philosophy, either, or in ontology, both of which lost sight of their destiny 2,500 years ago. Thus Heidegger treats the modern world as the visitors treat Heraclitus; with contempt. And yet — ‘here too the gods are present’: in a hydroelectric plant on the banks of the Rhine, in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in agribusiness as well as in time worn landscapes, in shopkeepers’ calculations as well as in Hölderlin’s heartrending verse. But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them? Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us. The modems indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-Stell], that economics is pure calculation, capitalism pure reproduction, the subject pure consciousness. Purity everywhere! They claim this, but we must be careful not to take them at their word, since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distils what the work of hybridization supplies. Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure ‘stock’. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone’s power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modem, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes; anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, ‘the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believes in barbarism.’ (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987, p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences .of language, and you hunker down in your forest — then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger’s epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. ‘We don’t know anything empirical, but that doesn’t matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.’ On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modem Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modem world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter- revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: ‘Einai gar kai entautha theous.’

### Heidegger’s alternative can never yield positive change – it tips the balances toward dogmatic authoritarianism

Thiele in 03 (Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters)

The pursuit of knowledge continues unabated for the skeptic. Yet it proceeds with a suspicious eye. There are inherent limitations toand a price to pay for-the pursuit of knowledge. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this regard: "Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable ... genealogies embody a sense of the historical limits that define our capacities for knowing and believing. Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs."" Both Heidegger and Foucault maintain[s] that there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism, Heidegger states, consists merely in an "addiction to doubt."? The skeptical nature of political philosophical thought, in contrast, is grounded in the imperative of endless inquiry. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-political costs of any "knowledge" that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skeptical inquiry degenerates into a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideologies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side, and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm, on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a "tool kit" whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's "hyperactive" tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system," Foucault stipulates. "Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject."!" One might worry whether action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, Heidegger obviously stumbled off it. In the 1930S, Heidegger enclosed himself within an authoritarian system of thought grounded in ontological reifications of a "folk" and its history. Heidegger's historicization of metaphysics led him to believe that a new philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly called for a philosophical Fuehrer who could put an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting. The temptation for Heidegger to identify himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and political movement capable of sustaining cultural renewal proved irresistible. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosophizing was wholly undermined by his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational gods, and political authority. 12

### The alternative will destroy ethics and only cause suffering

Thiele in 03 (Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters)

The complementarity of Heidegger's and Foucault's accounts of modern demons and saving graces should not be too surprising. Foucault's indebtedness to and fascination with Heidegger is well documented.' My intent in this chapter is neither to focus on the complementarity of these visions, nor to outline the striking philosophical and political differences that remain in Heidegger's and Foucault's work. Rather, I attempt to make a claim for what at first blush might appear a lost cause. Despite their originality and intellectual brilliance, Heidegger and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-political dead-ends. They are criticized for their unwillingness or inability to supply the grounds for sound moral and political judgment. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism, in particular, is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anything, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charge is that his highly abstract form of philosophizing, empyrean ontological vantage point, and depreciation of "das Man" undermines moral principle and political responsibility. From his philosophical heights, it is suggested, Heidegger remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and political practicalities. He immunized himself against the moral sensitivity, compassion, and prudence that might have dissuaded him from endorsing and identifying with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophy, critics warn, court similar dangers. In like fashion, it is held that Foucault dug himself into an equally deep, though ideologically relocated, moral and political hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The sticky, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" quashed any hope of gaining the ethical and political high ground.? As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of panoptic power that shapes wants, needs, and selves, critics worry, one would have no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for.' In sum, Heidegger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and the greatest social and political theorist of the twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced from political responsibility. Critics argue that Heidegger's statements and actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism, as displayed in his discussions of popular justice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is capable of supplying us with the resources for sound moral and political judgment.

### Their alternative can’t solve their links – waiting for the world and existence to reveal itself only cedes the battle to the very forces of destructive hyper-capitalism that their links and impacts indentify

Graham in 99 (Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, “Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace”, [Conference paper] Identities in action! 10-12 December, 1999, University of Wales, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview:

this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997).

Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

# AT: Security

## Consequentialist Security 2AC

### The negative’s wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting a framework of issue-specific consequentialist evaluation of securitization can solve the neg’s impacts while still solving the case

Floyd in 07 (Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)

Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security, whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent hereby does not mean that, for example, all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive (negative) – indeed this article will show how differently securitisations in the environmental sector can turn out – it rather means that every incidence of securitisation is unique. Since this is the case, however, security in general is neither as good nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag. In the approach proposed here, principles that determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have been the alternative solution. Given that for the Copenhagen School, securitisation is nothing but ‘an extreme version of politicisation’,45 the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done? It is important to note here, that ‘more and better’, is not equivalent to the success of the speech act (successful securitisation can still be negative), but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral philosophies, which hold ‘that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action’.47 Or, put slightly differently ‘a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.’48 These premises capture well what is meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative do not refer to the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy the idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious (see also fn. 46). The question that arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for example, rights as deontologists would have it, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author’s opinion that the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather scholars from both the schools discussed above, with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be the consequences of security. That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists. However, and as this article aims to show, the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run, particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily positive view of security, whilst the other school’s framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether, therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather issue dependent is the key hypothesis of this article. If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school, a provision of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been said so far it should have become clear that the herewith proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ less important, as it enables the analyst to critically evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than his/her simply speaking and writing security. This approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral rightness of the respective securitisation’s consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory nature of the Welsh School’s security studies becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of security, for – under this approach – it is the task of the analyst to fight ignorance (or, put differently, false consciousness) on the part of existing and/or potential securitising actors and inform (or better enlighten) them of the best possible actions. But how does the analyst know what the best possible actions are? Or, put differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? Is it enough to problematise securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for positive/negative securitisation? One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot be ascertained as the only general principle. After all, majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent in the different sectors of security. Here, by working out the specific security relations in the competing discourses that make up the individual sector – who or what is the referent object of security, who is the securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – it should be possible to determine the most and the least advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security (in the individual sector) is the best (most positive) all-round – morally, ethically, effective – strategy. A consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that ‘every moral theory invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,

## 1AR Ext.: Consequentialist Security

### Critiques of security are a rigged game – they pre-determine the outcome of securitization, making them normatively powerless

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html>)

Since the end of the Cold War security studies has changed greatly and by now nontraditional security issues such as the environment have become established alongside more traditional military security issues.2 The debate characteristic for the 1990s between the so-called ‘wideners’ and the ‘traditionalists’ of security has been ‘won’ by the former, with security both widened and at the same time deepened to include alongside the state other referent objects of security, for example, the individual.3 Non-traditional or alternative approaches to the study of security -at least in Europe have become firmly established alongside more traditional security studies, with the latter now more commonly referred to by the label strategic studies.4 No longer primarily concerned with the debate of ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’, analysts working with such approaches have had time to develop their research agendas and with the so-called Copenhagen-, Welsh- and Paris schools5, as well as with the human security approach four distinct, if at times overlapping approaches, have emerged. Proponents of each of these four different approaches to security are concerned with the consequences of securitisation and desecuritisation in so far as in each case their anticipation of these consequences forms the basis for their normative position, with the latter informing their policy-making recommendations. The constructivist security analyst is necessarily concerned with the consequences of securitisation and desecuritisation, because any such analyst realises that she contributes to the coconstitution of social and political reality simply by virtue of writing about security. Despite this realisation, however, and as the remainder of this section shows, each of the four alternative approaches’ view of the consequences of desecuritisation and securitisation is one-sided, as in each case these anticipated consequences are already enshrined into the individual theoretical framework of the respective approach, disallowing conceptual room for alternative consequences of either. As a result all current normative security theory is fundamentally limited. The here proposed consequentialist evaluation of security takes this shortcoming of all exiting alternative security theories as its point of departure.

## 1AR Ext.: Consequentialist Security

### Consequentialist evaluation of securitization is legitimate when the securitization is value neutral and affects all persons equally

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html>)

In summary then, CES builds on the assumption that not all securitisations are the same, but rather that they differ in terms of who or what they benefit. In line with consequentialism, under CES, securitisation has no intrinsic value; rather its moral value is entirely dependent on its consequences. Consequences are evaluated in terms of who or what benefits from any given securitisation, an approach that moves the hitherto largely ignored question ‘securitisation for whom’ into the foreground. So doing, brings with it one important problem/question. Hence, whilst the agent-neutral consequentialist fashion facilitated or indeed enabled the conceptualisation of positive and negative securitisation in the environmental sector of security, it complicates the same for the other sectors of security. Thus, in the other sectors of security we do not have the obvious luxury of an agent-neutrally valuable entity; rather in each sector we have different groups of people each claiming a right to survival. The research question this paper thus seeks to answer is: what within contemporary international relations is agent-neutrally valuable and as such informs the concept of positive securitisation?

## AT: Dillon/DerDerian

### Post-structuralist critiques of security are incapable of making material change in the world – they leave the victims of violence helpless and leave power where it is in the world

Booth 2005 (Ken, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales–Aberystwyth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-71, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and faux radicalism.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure.31

*Cut to footnote on page 277—*

31. Examples of the approach are Dillon, *The Politics of Security*; and Der Derian, “The Value of Security,” in Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*.

In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

## Perm Solvency

### Permutation solves – only making positivist judgments about the nature of securitizations creates space for normative critique – only a “securitization plus” theory offers any solvency

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html>)

In said book, informed by the Coxian idea that ‘theory is always for someone for some purpose’27 Booth explicitly denies the possibility that the security analyst and the securitising actor can be functionally distinct entities. Indeed, Booth argues that because ‘ontology is always for someone for some purpose’28; the choice of referent object of security tells us something about an individual theorist’s normative commitments.29 On that basis Booth criticises the Copenhagen school and their ‘statedominated analyses’30 as elitist, which is nothing but a slightly new variant of an old Welsh school (and others) critique of alleged state centricism in the Copenhagen school. In place of focusing on the state, Booth suggests, security analysts must exercise ‘ontological imagination’ and conceive of other referent objects of security altogether. He argues: Ontology […] is not a matter of abstract philosophy; it is what we take to be real, and so in security policy it is the basis of what we believe needs to be protected. This in turn impacts directly on such important issues as what we consider to be relevant knowledge, what the chief struggles are deemed to be, and how we might act. This is why the debate over understandings of ‘security’ is so important and why ontology must be turned into one of the battlefields in the study of international relations.’31 What Booth fails to see here, however, is that the ‘battleground’ he sketches out is not primarily one of ontology; rather it is one of epistemology. Thus unlike its Welsh school counterpart, the Copenhagen school is not interested in making normative prescriptions for what ought to be securitised, rather they are interested in analysing what is securitised, in who securitises, by what means and to what effect.32 Informed by the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitising actor the Copenhagen school do not choose the referent object of security as a result of their normative preference, instead it is a reflection of what goes on in practice.33 In other words, if the state features heavily in the Copenhagen school’s analysis it is neither a sign of elitism, nor is it a personal preference on the part of Wæver et al (the security analysts); rather it is a description of the way the world is.34 Be that as it may, Booth ostensibly finds further confirmation for his belief that all theory is necessarily normative35 (which would make the above an ontological battle) in the existence of the ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’.36 In so doing, however, he fails to take the dilemma for what it is, namely an involuntary co-constitution of social and political reality on the part of the security analyst. In order to transcend ‘the normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ Booth suggests that a theorist must achieve a ‘critical distance’, which he defines as follows: The idea of attempting to achieve a degree of critical distance […] is to step back from one’s context [….], while realising that one is not stepping onto neutral ground, an Archimedean point, from which to describe and observe matters of interest. While the aim of critical distance shares the aims of objectivity (trying to free oneself from biases and so on) it recognises what is possible and what is not, and in that sense begins from a categorically different place.37 Without doubt the attainment of ‘critical distance’ is not only a valid idea; rather it is a necessary requirement for security analysis. Unless, that is, a functional distinction between the role of the security analyst and that of the securitising actor is maintained it is extremely difficult to achieve such ‘critical distance’. The collapse of analyst and actor into one entity is likely to affect not only the nature of the security analysis offered, but also likely to influence how practically viable the normative security theory developed is. In other words, normativity must be limited to what is possible. We can determine what is possible in security relations only by separating the task of the analyst from that of the securitising actor, hence by looking at who can securitise, by what means and under what circumstances. Only after we have done this, in a second step, can we move onto normative territory and, in the light of what is, suggest feasible scenarios for what ought to be the case. Given that out of the above named approaches to the study of security the functional distinction between security analyst and securitising actor is maintained by the Copenhagen school only, their securitisation theory is the only approach that allows us to analyse what is. This is the main reason why I choose securitisation theory as the bedrock for my own normative security theory. Considering that securitisation theory’s utility begins and ends with its analytical utility, it should be clear that it can be no more than the bedrock for my approach. What is needed thus is a securitisation theory plus approach, whereby the ‘plus’ designates the missing normative element.38 Such an approach should be able to account for a range of possible consequences of securitisation, allowing the theorisation of both positive and negative securitisation. Such an approach is offered by the here proposed consequentialist evaluation of security.

## No Alt Solvency

### Criticisms of security are incapable of reconfiguring securitization discourses – disconnection from empirical study renders them impotent

Hyde –Price in 01 (Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor in the Institute for German Studies @ University of Birmingham, Europe’s New Security Challenges, 2001. p. 38-39)

Another conceptual innovation from the Copenhagen school—one associated in particular with Ole Wæver—is the notion of securitization. This concept has been presented as the solution to the problems involved in broadening the definition of security without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility. Wæver and his colleagues start from the assumption that security is not a concept with a fixed meaning or a determinate social condition. Security, in other words, cannot be objectively defined. Rather, they argue that it constitutes a distinctive form of politics. To securitize an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means. Moreover, security is not just any threat or problem. Rather, security issues are “existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, It suggests that security studies - or what Wæver calls securitization studies - should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can constitute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria, that is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perceptions of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

## AT: Environmental Security

### Security rhetoric is key to mobilizing political will to solve

Dabelko and Dabelko in 93 (Geoffrey and David, Fellows at Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda, HTTP://WWW.BSOS.UMD.EDU/HARRISON/ PAPERS/ PAPER0L.HTML)

Recent U.S. history does indicate that the term national security has often been an honorific concept. Security labels have been effective for 'mobilizing resources for programs that do not typically fall under the rubric of national security. Despite being critical of this tactic, Simon Dalby (1992: 4) acknowledges that "security is a very useful term partly because it resonates with widely held personal desires to be unthreatened." Because security calls up fundamental issues of survival, the term has often been employed to create a sense of crisis and to engender a subsequent willingness to sacrifice for meeting all important challenges. President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, justified the interstate highway system as critical to national defense. Congress passed funding for education as the National Defense Education Act of 1958. This tactic does have potential drawbacks. For environmental security, the feared downside would come if the struggle to increase environmental awareness were tied too tightly to the rise and fall of popular on in ion and government attention.

### Using environmental security creates a political climate that solves best

Matthew in 02 (Richard, Prof. of IR and Env. Poliics at UC-Irvine, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research”, ECSP Report, Summer, p 119)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literrature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potential allies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan & Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.'

### Environmental securitization empirically promotes international cooperation and solves

Matthew in 02 (Richard, Prof. of IR and Env. Poliics at UC-Irvine, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research”, ECSP Report, Summer, p 119)

Finally it is worth briefly noting that the literature on environment and security has also made contributions to a range of more specific intellectual, policy, and activist pursuits. For example, efforts to harness security assets to environmental goals have been praised in some quarters' These efforts fall into two broad categories: (1) greening the military, and (2) making trdlitary and intelligence assets available for environmental activities. In the first case,: Kent Butts argues that compliance with environmental regulations, military base clean-up, and green technology research have all increased in the U.S. Department of Defense as part of the effort to integrate environmental security into its programs. The most widely cited example of the second case is the Medea Project initiated by Vice President Al Gore, which brought together CIA analysts and civilian scientists to assess the value of archived satellite imagery for assessing phenomena such as deforestation rates and climate change. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has publicized (perhaps excessively) its role in restoring the ecology of the Chesapeake Bay area; and reforestation programs have been undertaken throughout the world with military support.

### Only by taking into account security concerns as well as other interests can we achieve the best policies.

Dabelko and Simmons 1997 (Geoffrey and P.J., Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland and founding Director of the Environmental Change and Security Project (WWICS) and Editor of the Environmental Change and Security Project Report, “Environment Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Government Initiatives,” Johns Hopkins University Press, < http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html>) July 11, 2008

At the same time, there are serious limitations to the environment and security conceptual and linguistic framework. As convincing as certain security-related arguments may be, they are not the only reasons why the American public, decisionmakers, and other nations should care about the environment. Value-oriented considerations about the aesthetics of nature, human responsibility for global stewardship, and humanitarian concerns are also important. These considerations [End Page 141] can greatly enhance the process of formulating effective solutions and winning sustained public attention and support for international environmental action. Policymakers might therefore be best served by framing international environmental priorities in terms of a broad set of interests, including, but not limited to, security concerns. They should resist the temptation, common in security analyses, to examine environmental problems solely in terms of crises and "threats." Though helpful in setting priorities, threat-based analyses can have the unintentional effect of encouraging decisionmakers to pay attention to issues only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective interventions and corrective measures. Examining how environmental preservation will enhance security and other interests over time might lead decisionmakers to adopt more appropriate long-term strategies to address the underlying causes of problems. International environmental issues will be most effectively addressed in the decades to come through a combination of conceptual clarity, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving, an emphasis on long-term strategies, and an improved willingness and ability among leaders to explain the complexity of environmental change. As the debates on environment and security continue, environmentalists' arguments will be strengthened if they resist the temptation to place all their priorities under the attention-grabbing security rubric. Meanwhile, skeptical foreign policy experts will benefit from recognizing the real and potential effects of environmental change and their relevance to many critical interests. As the United States considers security expenditures and priorities for the twenty-first century, the vibrant debates concerning environment and security matters will continue to be instructive.