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### **FRAMEWORK 1NC**

1) INTERPRETATION- THE PLAN MUST BE A YES/NO QUESTION THAT DEFENDS THE RESOLUTION AS THE ENDPOINT OF THE AFFIRMATIVES ADVOCACY

2) EXTRA-TOPICALITY- ALL THEIR ADVANTAGES STEM FROM AN ACTION WHICH IS NOT BASED ON THE UNITED STATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INVESTING IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE- THIS IS GROUND WE DO NOT GET TO ACCESS THAT THEY USE TO NO LINK OUR ARGUMENTS AND PLAY OFFENSE AGAINST OUR IMPACTS- MEANS WE CAN NEVER COMPETE WHICH HAS 2 IMPLICATIONS

A) AFF’S ALWAYS WIN- THIS MAKES DEBATE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE NO ONE WOULD COMPETE IF THEY ONLY WIN HALF OF THEIR DEBATES- MAKES ELIMS COME DOWN TO A COIN FLIP

B) EXCLUSION- IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ENGAGE THEIR ARGUMENT IT MEANS WE HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM A DEEPER POLITICAL DISCUSSION- MEANS THEIR ADVOCACY IS MONKEY-WRENCHED BECAUSE IT IS ONE-SIDED- DESTROYS ALL REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL

3) PREDICTABLE GROUND- THE AFF WILL ALWAYS WIN THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THEIR ADVOCACY ARE GOOD IN THE ABSTRACT—WE CAN ONLY DEBATE THE MERITS OF THEIR FRAMEWORK IF THEY DEFEND THE SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT PREDICTABLE GROUND DEBATE BECOMES MEANINGLESS AND PRODUCES POLITICAL STRATEGY THAT IS WEDDED TO VIOLENCE AND FAILS TO ACHIEVE PRODUCTIVE CHANGE

SHIVELY 00

(Ruth, Former Assistant Prof of Poly Sci, “Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity,” Political Theory and Partisan Politics, pg. 182-3)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.

But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that *some* kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and *some* ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps *all* orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a **necessary ground for all further contest.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.

Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they arc activities premised on the building of progressive agreements.

Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discuasiw1 At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control isabout; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree-and they do so simply by entering into debate-that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.'

4) TOPIC EDUCATION GOOD – LEARNING THE SPECIFICS OF POLICY PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE IS KEY TO BECOMING CONSCIOUS VOTERS AND CITIZENS. TO SOME DEGREE WE ALL BENEFIT FROM TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUTURE POLICY, SOME MORE THAN OTHERS, BUT THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE THAT INEQUITY IS TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS TRANSPORATION INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY.

5) COMPETITIVE EQUITY- OUR ARGUMENT IS NOT REALISM GOOD OR A CALL FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE TO DEFEND A SPECIFIC FORM OF PRESENTATION IN THE 1AC. THE AFF CAN READ POETRY, PERFORM OR USE SOME OTHER MEDIUM FOR EVIDENCE AS LONG AS THEY DEFEND THAT THE UNITED STATES INCREASE INVESTMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUTURE- THIS IS VITAL TO THE NEGATIVES ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN ANY FORM OF COMPETITIVE ARGUMENT WITH THE AFFIRMATIVE. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT REASON TO VOTE NEGATIVE- THE FAIRNESS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE’S ADVOCACY MUST PRECEDE CONSIDERATION OF ITS MERITS OR ELSE ALL CONTESTATION IS MEANINGLESS.

6) PREDICTABLE LIMITS- ABANDONING THE RESOLUTION MEANS THEY CAN TALK ABOUT PONIES AND UNICORNS- WE CANNOT BE PREPARED TO DEBATE ALL OF THESE POSSIBILIES- ALSO MEANS THEY CAN OUT-WEIGH ALL OUR OFFENSE WITH THEIR ADVOCACY WHICH MEANS NEGATIVES NEVER WIN- THE TERMINAL IMPACT IS EDUCATION

7) COMPETNG INTERPRETATIONS GOOD- IT’S THE ONLY FAIR WAY TO EVALUATE OFFENSE AND DEFENSE- THE ALTERNATIVE IS REASONABILITY WHICH IS WORSE BECAUSE IT HAS NO BRIGHTLINE AND IS VAGUE

8) VOTE NEGATIVE

A) COMPETITIVE EQUITY- DEBATES ARE ALREADY SKEWED BEFORE WE ENTER- SOME SQUADS ARE LARGER AND HAVE MORE EVIDENCE- IT IS KEY TO PRESERVE THE REMAINING COMPONENTS OF COMPETITIVE EQUITY IN ORDER TO ENSURE FAIR DEBATES

B) APRIORI- FRAMEWORK SHAPES HOW THE DEBATE OCCURS- IT MUST BE EVALUATED FIRST BECAUSE IF WE ARE LOSING THE SUBTANTIVE DEBATE IT IS BECAUSE THEY HAVE SKEWED OUR ABILITY TO COMPETE

### FRAMEWORK 2AC(1/3)

**a. is the INTERPRETATION** - THE AFF SHOULD WIN IF THE PLAN READ IN THE 1AC IS THE MOST DESIRABLE POLICY OPTION. THE NEGATIVE SHOULD WIN IF THEY PROVE THE PLAN WOULD BE WORSE THAN THE STATUS QUO, OR THEY OFFER A COMPETITIVE, Fiated ALTERNATIVE THAT IS MORE DESIRABLE THAN THE PLAN. we’ll clarify

**b. is FIAT Good:**

**1. Fairness—**Fiating immediate passage of the plan is the only way to guarantee that the federal government actually does something which is the only predictable starting point for all negative ground. There are also an infinite number of movements and no one writes cards about activism at a debate tournament on this issue by them. At a minimum, it double the research burden because now we have to research the effects of their policy and its advantages as well as whether or not their activism to do that policy is good.

**2. Education—**Fiat is key to being informed citizens, without it we never learn about the political process and don’t take responsibility for the possible bad outcomes of our actions. Simulating policy solves all their offense, allowing people a safe space to test new ideas **Joyner,** Professor of International Law at Georgetown**, 1999** [Christopher C., “Teaching International Law,” 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377, l/n]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team.

These **debates ask** undergraduate **students to examine the** international legal **implications of various** United States **foreign** **policy actions.** Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. **Debate questions are formulated as resolutions**, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein**." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature** of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate.

**3.** **NEGATIVE HAS BURDEN OF REJOINDER** – THE NEGATIVE MUST ANSWER THE question PRESENTED IN THE 1AC as a debate necessity to speaking first and clash

**4. aff choice is best –** allows debaters a chance to shape half of their debates and provides for the best depth and PREPARATION which are key to education

**5. Limits –** there are limitless contexts through which the negative can advocate their position, making it impossible for us to debate them on it; fairness must

### FRAMEWORK 2AC (2/3)

preclude all consideration of their advocacy or else all contestation becomes meaningless.

#### Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K (Ruth Lessl, *Political Theory and Partisan Politics*, p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they **must reject and limit—some ideas and** **actions**. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational per­suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consen­sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. **We agree on** some matters but not on others, on **generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications,** and so on. And **this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate.** As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. **There can be no argument except** on the premise, and **within a context, of agreement**. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, **we cannot argue about something** if we are not com­municating: **if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence** or good argument. At the very least, **we** **must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it**. For instance, **one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group**. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested**. Resisters, demonstrators, **and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree­ments**. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under­standing of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreement** or harmony.

**6. Ground –** they will always win their principles are better in the abstract; debating the merit of their framework is only possible if they defend specific consequences of implementation like our PLAN.

Ignatieff, **Carr prof. of human rights at Harvard,** 2004 **(Michael**, **Carr professor of human rights at Harvard,** 2004 ***Lesser Evils* p. 18-19)**

As for **moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide** **between lesser and greater evils**. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that **articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases**. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? **Even when legal and moral distinctions** between these **are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice**. Furthermore, the problem with **perfectionist standards** is that they **contradict each other**. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. **To stick to a perfectionist** **commitment** to the right to life when under terrorist attack **might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers.** Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus **respect for one right might lead us to betray another.**

### FRAMEWORK 2AC (3/3)

**7. COMPETNG INTERPRETATIONS GOOD**- IT’S THE ONLY FAIR WAY TO EVALUATE OFFENSE AND DEFENSE- THE ALTERNATIVE IS REASONABILITY WHICH IS WORSE BECAUSE IT HAS NO BRIGHTLINE AND IS VAGUE

**8. VOTE ON IT-** REJECT THE TEAM NOT THE ARGUMENT FOR GROUND AND REASONS EXPLAINED ABOVE.

### TOPIC EDUCATION GOOD

**by manipulating the topic to access their political project they skirt debate about the implementation of policies by the government. Their education is distrusting of institutional study and pragmatic reform. Even if their intentions are noble, their message results in fascist totalitarianism**

**Lewis, 92** (Martin, Green Delusions p 247)

A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today’s students may embrace only the new creed’s rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism’s contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors’ intentions.

### FIAT GOOD

**FIAT is critical to policymaking through public reason – the wider it’s practiced, the more likely world peace.**

John **Rawls**, Harvard University James Bryant Conant University Professor Emeritus, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, **1999**, p 54-7.

Distinct from the idea of public reason is the ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote directly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental questions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

### ROLE PLAYING GOOD

**Focusing debate on the interaction between individuals and governments allows us to challenge real-world policies.**

Andrew **Moravcsik**, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Fall, **1997**, p. 516-7, <http://clausvistesen.squarespace.com/regional-integration-in-eu-and/taking%20preferences%20seriously.a%20liberal%20theory%20of%20int.%20politics%20-%20moravcsik%201994.pdf>

The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence. Liberal theory rests on a ‘‘bottom-up’’ view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics. Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social commitments, and resource endowments. Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action. Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare. For liberals, the definition of the interests of societal actors is theoretically central. Liberal theory rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society; scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition. Where social incentives for exchange and collective action are perceived to exist, individuals and groups exploit them: the greater the expected benefits, the stronger the incentive to act. In pursuing these goals, individuals are on the average risk-averse; that is, they strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains. What is true about people on the average, however, is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational. Liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict. Conflictual societal demands and the willingness to employ coercion in pursuit of them are associated with a number of factors, three of which are relevant to this discussion: divergent fundamental beliefs, conflict over scarce material goods, and inequalities in political power. Deep, irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods, such as borders, culture, fundamental political institutions, and local social practices, promote conflict, whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation. Extreme scarcity tends to exacerbate conflict over resources by increasing the willingness of social actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them. Relative abundance, by contrast, lowers the propensity for conflict by providing the opportunity to satisfy wants without inevitable conflict and giving certain individuals and groups more to defend. Finally, where inequalities in societal influence are large, conflict is more likely. Where social power is equitably distributed, the costs and benefits of actions are more likely to be internalized to individuals—for example, through the existence of complex, cross-cutting patterns of mutually beneficial inter- action or strong and legitimate domestic political institutions—and the incentive for selective or arbitrary coercion is dampened. By contrast, where power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods, incentives arise for exploitative, rent-seeking behavior, even if the result is inefficient for society as a whole.

### SWITCH SIDE DEBATE GOOD

**Switch-side debate is critical to education.**

Star **Muir**, Communications Professor, George Mason, Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC*,***1993**, p. 282-5

The debate over moral education and values clarification parallels in many ways the controversy over switch-side debate. Where values clarification recognizes no one set of values, debate forces a questioning and exploration of both sides of an issue. Where cognitive-development emphasizes the use of role playing in the inception of moral judgment, debate requires an empathy for alternative points of view. Where discussion provides an opportunity for expressions of personal feelings, debate fosters an analytic and explicit approach to value assessment. Freelev describes the activity this way: Educational debate provides an opportunity for students to consider the significant problems in the context of a multivalued orientation. They learn to look at a problem from many points of view. As debaters analyze the potential affirmative cases and the potential negative cases, including the possibility of negative counterplans, thev being to realize the complexity of most contemporary problems and to appreciate the worth of a multivalucd orientation; as they debate both sides of a proposition under consideration, they learn not only that most problems of contemporary affairs have more than one side but also that even one side of a proposition embodies a considerable range of values. The comparison between moral education and debate is useful because it contextualizes the process of moral development within an educational setting. Several objections have been raised about the practice of moral education, and these objections have direct relevance to the issue of switch-side debate. A view of debate as a form of moral education can be developed by addressing questions of efficacy, isolation from the real world. and of relativism. The first issue is one of effectiveness: Do clarification activities achieve the espoused goals? Social coercion and peer pressure, for example, still occur in the group setting, leaving the individual choice of values an indoctrination of sorts. Likewise, the focus of clarification exercises is arguably less analytic than expressive, less critical than embroyonic. The expression of individual preferences may be guided by simple reaction rather than by rational criteria. These problems arc minimized in the debate setting, especially where advocacy is not aligned with personal belief. Such advocacy requires explicit analysis of values and the decision criteria for evaluating them. In contemporarv debate, confronted with a case they believe in, debaters assigned to the negative side have several options: present a morass of arguments to see what arguments "stick," concede the problem and offer a "counterplan"a s a better way of solving the problem, or attack the value structure of the affirmative and be more effective in defending a particular hierarchy of values. While the first option is certainly exercised with some frequency, the second and third motivations arc also often used and are of critical importance in the development of cognitive skills associated with moral judgment. For example, in attacking a case that restricts police powers and upholds a personal right to privacy, debaters might question the reasoning of scholars and justices in raising privacy rights to such significant heights (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut and other landmark cases), offer alternative value structures (social order, drug control), and defend the criteria through which such choices are made (utilitarian vs. deontological premises). Even within the context of a "see what sticks" paradigm, these arguments require debaters to assess and evaluate value structures opposite of their own personal feelings about their right to privacy. Social coercion, or peer pressure lo adopt certain value structures, is minimized in such a context because of competitive pressures. Adopting a value just because everyone else does may be the surest way of losing a debate. A second objection to debate as values clarification, consonant with Ehninger's concerns about gamesmanship, is the separation of the educational process from the real world. A significant concern here is how such learning about morality will be used in the rest of a student's life. Some critics question whether moral school knowledge "may be quite separate from living moral experience in a similar way as proficiency in speaking one's native language generally appears quite separate from the knowledge of formal grammar imparted by school." Edelstein discusses two forms of segmentation: division between realms of school knowledge (e.g., history separated from science) and between school and living experience (institutional learning separate from everyday life). Ehninger's point, that debate becomes a pastime, and that application of these skills to solving real problems is diminished if it is viewed as a game, is largely a reflection on institutional segmentation. The melding of different areas of knowledge, however. is a particular benefit of debate, as it addresses to is considerable importance in a real world setting. Recent college and high school topics include energy policy, prison reform, care for the elderly, trade policy, homelessness. and the right to privacy. These topics are notable because they exceed the knowledge boundaries of particular school subjects, they reach into issues of everyday life, and they are broad enough to force student to address a variety of value appeals. The explosion of "squirrels," or small and specific cases. in the 1960s and 1970s has had the effect of opening up each topic to many different case approaches. National topics are no longer of the one-case variety (as in 1955's "the U.S. should recognize Rcd China"). On the privacy topic, for example, cases include search and seizure issues, abortion, sexual privacy, tradeoffs with the first amendment, birth control, information privacy, pornography, and obscenity. The multiplicitv of issues pavs special dividends for debaters required to defend both sides of many issues because the value criteria change from round to round and evolve over the year. The development of flexibility in coping with the intertwining of' issues is an essential component in the interconnection of knowledge, and is a major rationale for switch-side debate

### CALCULATIVE THOUGHT GOOD

**CALCULATION MUST BE NOTED – RESPONSES ARE BASED ON CALCULATING RISK**

[Art **Hutchinson**, 3/23/**06**, Mapping Strategy: “Terrorism, Creative Uncertainty and Rational Prediction,” http://cartegic.typepad.com/mapping\_strategy/2006/03/a\_few\_months\_ag.html]

The rub? Nobody can say that the peak casualty figure from a single terrorist incident won't go up again by another order of magnitude (or two, or three) tomorrow morning... or in ten years... or not at all (begging the recursive question of our ability to prevent such a jump by investing prudently in a wide range of broadly geopolitical to highly targeted countermeasures.)

As of the 10th of September, 2001 **any rational calculation of the risk and cost** of terrorism based on historical data would use numbers in the low 100's **for possible deaths and develop countermeasures that were commensurate**. After 9-11, the same rational, backwards-looking calculations might use 1000's. **Both would be subject to so much uncertainty as to be laughable - because they rely on the same flawed approach to assessing the magnitude of such a risk**. (A similar if largely forgotten leap in awareness of the risk occurred in the early '70s)

Terrorism is fundamentally not a forecastable thing. That's especially true during a period of innovation and expansion in that sad, sick "industry". **The fact that the peak death number changed so suddenly makes a conservative rational calculation based on past history just as tenuous as any radical emotional guess based on fear**. Given that the trend is clearly up however, and that the last jump was by 10X, it is only prudent that we err to the side of assuming high and being wrong than assuming low and waving bye-bye to New York or Los Angeles.

### A2: Calculative Thought Bad

**Calculative thought must be used on behalf of the Other- it’s key to feed the world’s population**

**Campbell**, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, **99** \*Apologize for gendered language in card

(David, Moral Spaces pg. 56)

104. Ibid., 76-79. Levinas has also argued for a politics that respects a double injunction. When asked “Is not ethical obligation to the other a purely negative ideal, impossible to realize in our everyday being-in-the-world,” which is governed by “ontological drives and practices”; and “Is ethics practicable in human society as we know it? Or is it merely an invitation to apolitical acquiescence?” Levinas’s response was that “of course **we inhabit an ontological world of technological mastery and political self-preservation.** Indeed**, without these political and technological structures of organization we would not be able to feed ~~mankind.~~ This is the greatest paradox of human existence: we must use the ontological *for the sake of the other*, to ensure the survival of the other we must resort to the technico-political systems of means and ends**.” Kearney and Levinas, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,”28.

### UTILITARISM GOOD

#### UTIL EVALUATES CONSEQUENCES TO MAKE THE MORAL ACT

[Dale **Jamieson**, New York University, 5/14/**07**. Cambridge Journals: “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists, “http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=1015132&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=02&aid=1015128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820807002452]

For present purposes I assume that our problem is a moral problem. I investigate utilitarian approaches to our problem because utilitarianism, with its unapologetic focus on what we bring about, is relatively well positioned to have something interesting to say about our problem. Moreover, since utilitarianism is committed to the idea that morality requires us to bring about the best possible world, and global environmental change confronts us with extreme, deleterious consequences, there is no escaping the fact that, for utilitarians, global environmental change presents us with a moral problem of great scope, urgency and complexity. However, I would hope that some of those who are not card-carrying utilitarians would also have interest in this project. Consequences matter, according to any plausible moral theory. Utilitarianism takes the concern for consequences to the limit, and it is generally of interest to see where pure versions of various doctrines wind up leading us. Moreover, I believe that the great traditions in moral philosophy should be viewed as more like research programs than as finished theories that underwrite or imply particular catechisms. For this reason it is interesting to see how successfully a moral tradition can cope with problems that were not envisioned by its progenitors.

### **A2: Reps/Discourse 1st**

#### Policy analysis should precede their discursive criticism – it’s the most effective way to challenge power and injustice – life is a pre-requisite to their alternative, which breeds social ignorance and complacency

Jill **Taft-Kaufman**, Speech prof @ CMU, 19**95**, [Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”]

**The postmodern passwords of** "polyvocality," **"Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire**. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, **despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice**. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them.

Merod (1987) decries **this** situation as one which **leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism**. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? **Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the **postmodern elevation of language** to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion **is an even stronger indictment against the trend**.

Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: **I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms.** It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) **The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.**(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. **Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups.

Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "**the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation**" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. **People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas**, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

### A2: PREDICTIONS BAD

**HUMAN JUDGEMENTS BASED ON EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ARE INEVITABLE AND GOOD. WE SHOULD KEEP AS MANY DOORS OPEN AS POSSIBLE. THEIR EPISTEMOLOGY GUARANTEES MEANINGLESS INCOMMENSURABLE DEBATES**

Rudra **Sil,** Associate Professor & Undergraduate Chair in the Dept. of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, **2000**

[Beyond Boundaries: Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies, p.161]

**In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements**—whether we call it "data" or "narrative"—**for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible than the audience would allow at the outset.** In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and inter­pretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically consis­tent" hypotheses "supported by data" and the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others.

**Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate, and refine general inferences**—be they in the form of models, par­tial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—**in order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience**. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, **it is important to keep as many doors open as possible.** This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but **perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by schol­ars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.**

### A2: Speech Ks

**Policy analysis should precede their discursive criticism – it’s the most effective way to challenge power and injustice – life is a pre-requisite to their alternative, which breeds social ignorance and complacency**

Jill **Taft-Kaufman**, Speech prof @ CMU, 19**95**, [Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”]

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### A2: Ontology 1st

**Preventing widespread death through the aff takes precedence to ontological**

**questioning**

Arnold I. **Davidson**, coeditor of Critical Inquiry, Assoc Prof of Philosophy, U of Chicago, 19**89**. [Critical Inquiry, Winter p.426]

I understand **Levinas’** work to **suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads**

**through or toward other human beings:** “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face…

Hence **metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted**- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the

height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole

signification they admit of.” **Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face**: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, **he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country** with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, **Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others**: “As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470].” **The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts**, I believe, **for the absence**, in his writing after the war, **of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will**. So **Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.”** And **Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do**.” Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah **Arendt associates Heidegger with** Paul **Valery’s aphorism**, “Les evenements ne sont que l’ecume des choses’ (‘**Events are but the foam of things’**).” I think one understands the source of her intuition. **The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop**.

### A2: SOCIAL ACTIVISM

**THEIR MODEL OF DEBATE FOSTERS POLITICAL INACTION—2 REASONS**
**Tonn, 2K5**

[Mari Boor Tonn, Assoc. Prof of Communication at the Univ. of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3, p.418-419, JT]

**Approaching public controversies through a conversational model** informed by therapy also **enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution.** As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, **an unstructured, informal discussion “leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there.”**70 **Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency.** “Therapy,” Cloud argues, “offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action**.” Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, “locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere**.”

### A2: BADIOU

Badiou has no way to separate between different types of ethics, causing him to ignore human rights

Brown 04 [Nicholas, Professor at University of Illinois at Chicago. “{∅} ∈ {$} ? Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen” CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3]

This apparatus is a powerful lens, and there can be no doubt that Badiou is describing something important; perhaps it is even an aspect of evil. But is it really Evil (Mal) itself? Badiou's evil, like his truth, is indifferent to content, a merely formal label. In its formalism, its insistence on fidelity to any Event whatever—on "ethical consistency" itself as a value—Badiou's good is almost an aesthetic rather than an ethical category. (At one point, in an echo of Kant's purposeless purpose, ethical consistency is even described as "disinterested interest.") While there is something undeniably attractive in ethical consistency (and something ugly in its lack), the most important thing for a modern ethics may be to push these sentimental considerations aside. The value of ethical consistency is authorized by Lacan's well-known dictum not to give up on one's desire [ne pas céder sur son désir]. But we should not forget that this maxim derives from the reading of Antigone in Séminaire VII. Yes, Sophocles' Antigone, in her awful ethical consistency, is a captivating figure. Brecht's Galileo, on the other hand, in his opportunism and wavering inconsistency, is a bit distasteful. But Antigone is a reactionary, and Galileo invents physics.

Further, Badiou has no way of sorting out different evils beyond his tripartite division. Ethics tells us what Nazism and scientific obscurantism [End Page 300] have in common. But an ethics would have to be able to tell them apart. The distinction between, say, the abandonment of a social movement by its leader and the abandonment of a poem by its author cannot be made without some kind of qualitative supplement. Since, as we shall see, Badiou's philosophy is predicated precisely on the subtraction from consideration of all qualitative predicates, this supplement can only be vulgar, nonphilosophical. Perhaps the supplement it requires is the language of human rights, which, whatever its faults, can tell the difference between a concentration camp and a creationist textbook. (What if, as Žižek suggests, the international war-crimes tribunal were simply to refuse the de facto bifurcation of the subject of human rights which is currently written into its constitution: "arrest Kissinger or shut up!" [Revolution, 266]?) Or perhaps, genuinely spurning such a supplement, it is really no different than Pauline faith. Since Badiou himself uses the language of grace when speaking of the Event, he cannot regard it as very damning that his conception of the Event shares something with religious revelation. But can we be satisfied with an Ethics that remains in the "category of pious discourse"?

### A2: NO VALUE TO LIFE

**Life has intrinsic value – ignoring it denies any possibility of ethics**

JERROLD **LEVINSON,** Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, **2K4**

“Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 62 Issue 4, Page 319  - October 2004 http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1540-594X.2004.00165.x/abs/

**Why,** though, **should we care about intrinsic value,** either what it means, or what has it, or whether there is any at all? I remind you of some reasons. First, **almost everyone is interested in having a good life, in being happy, in having compelling reasons to live, and there seems to be an intimate relationship between those things and something having intrinsic value**. On the view defended here, that intrinsic value has something fundamentally to do with lives, and the sorts of lives that humans enjoy in particular, this is not at all surprising.

Second, intrinsic value looks to be required as a foundation for value generally. That is to say, **it seems reasonable to think that all nonintrinsic value has its valuableness on loan, or with a promissory note attached, so that if nothing were intrinsically valuable, nothing would be valuable at all**.3 Some have attempted to evade this conclusion, proposing that value might not ultimately rest on what is intrinsically valuable, values instead forming a kind of web of mutual support, with no sort of value serving as foundation of the value of the whole. Although this picture has its attractions, as does a similar one concerning the structure of knowledge, it is a picture that, like an Impressionist painting, only looks good at a distance. Viewed close up, I suggest, its attractiveness dissolves. **If we ask ourselves why we value something, we try to identify what we value it for, and then we ask why we value that, and so on, until we get to something regarding which the question no longer makes sense, that is, something we evidently regard as intrinsically valuable.** We are not satisfied, in other words, when we query our valuing, until we arrive at something that strikes us as valuable *tout court*, something we simply regard the world as better for containing, something pursuit of which seems self-justifying. Where values are concerned, we need what Wittgenstein called bedrock, something against which our spade turns. And that seems to mean intrinsic value.4

Third, **most ethical theories seem to presuppose a conception of that which is intrinsically valuable,** valuable in itself, or valuable for its own sake. Moral good is often explained in terms of nonmoral good, for example, as the disposition or propensity to produce such nonmoral good. **Thus utilitarianism clearly regards pleasure as intrinsically good, and attempts to construe moral value in terms of its maximization. Kantian ethics, for its part, views willing in accord with duty, or treating others as ends, as the foundation of morality, because that, by its lights, is the only thing that is intrinsically good. And virtue ethics holds that being a certain kind of person, or having certain kinds of motivations, is the basis of moral worth, presumably because those, too, are regarded as intrinsically good. So ethical theory appears not to be complete without an adequate conception of intrinsic value** and how it might be assessed.

### A2: NO VALUE TO LIFE

**ACTING AS IF LIFE HAS AN INTRINSIC VALUE IS THE BEST WAY TO VIEW THE WORLD & ACHIEVE ETHICS**

**Levinson 2K4** ( Jerrold, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland. “Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 62 Issue 4, Page 319  - October 2004; BlackwellSynergy)

It is true that what may sensibly be valued as an end may not have intrinsic value—for we may value as an end something that does not have value in itself, but only in relation to other things, as perhaps when we value a keepsake. But if one says that the keepsake is valued as an end, though not regarded as intrinsically valuable, valuable only for its associations or history, then in what sense, really, is one valuing it as an end, or for its own sake? Is not one rather valuing it precisely *for* the sake of those associations or that history, and thus evidently *not* for its own sake? Or is valuing as an end supposed to come apart from valuing for its own sake? But then what *does* valuing as an end amount to? The mark of valuing as an end is sometimes held to be an attitude of *irreplaceability* adopted toward the object valued as an end. Thus it is said that in valuing a wedding ring, say, in such a way one values precisely *it*, and not just something *about* it that some qualitatively indistinguishable object might provide. But if what one values about it is, say, the object’s ability to link one to a loved one, root one in the past, or anchor one’s identity, it is not surprising that an attitude of irreplaceability should be adopted toward the object in question, since evidently *only* that object can secure the benefit just articulated. That is, *nothing* without its unique historical properties can do so. And that benefit— connection to the past, anchoring of personal identity, linkage to a loved one—is arguably something that goes to making a life intrinsically more valuable. Thus, once more, with only a little probing beneath the surface, something valued as an end but not regarded as intrinsically valuable ends up disclosing something that can plausibly be regarded as of intrinsic value. Cases where something without intrinsic value is sensibly valued as an end, I suspect, are all cases where something intrinsically valuable is, so to speak, in the wings. In the case just discussed, what is intrinsically valuable is the preservation of certain life-enhancing memories or connections to one’s past—or, more exactly, one’s life’s having a certain character as a result—something that retention of the keepsake helps to effect. Perhaps good health can serve as another example. Good health might reasonably be valued as an end, yet be held not to be intrinsically valuable, because it is only valuable in conjunction with acceptable conditions of life. Thus if one were being tortured, with no hope of escape, one might wish for a weak heart, with the prospect it offered of a fatal heart attack, that would bring one’s suffering to a close and provide deliverance. Still, this does not so much show that different things are picked out by the final and intrinsic value detectors as that there just needs to be an adjustment of scope to get the right object of value into view: what is perhaps intrinsically valuable, and also perhaps reasonably valued as an end, is good health provided acceptable life conditions.9 If what one claims to value as an end does not seem to be intrinsically valuable, most likely something has been left out of the description of what one so values. If X is the ostensible object of valuing as an end, despite not seeming to possess intrinsic value, most likely there is some Y such that it is really X-in-relation-to-Y, or X-given-Y, or X-in-conditions-Y, that is the true object of valuing as an end. Thus, even if something not intrinsically valuable can sensibly be valued as an end, it seems there is always a fuller description of that something that one must be prepared to give in order to make sense of the final valuing in question. And that fuller description of the object of final valuing, I suggest, will generally point to some larger whole, a complex of which the object is a part, that is arguably of intrinsic value. In any event, if we reflect on what should be valued as an end, push comes to shove, the natural answer is, that which we take to have intrinsic value. For only then, it seems, are we justified in valuing it, as we say, “for its own sake.” In other words, valuing as an end something that one regards as intrinsically valuable seems self-legitimating, whereas valuing as an end something that one recognizes not to be intrinsically valuable seems odd and, at the least, in need of special pleading.

### A2: BIOPOWER

**BIOPOWER DOES NOT LEAD TO GENOCIDE**

**Ojakangas 2005** ((Mika, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland; “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault” *Foucault Studies*, No 2, May, pp. 5-28)

For Foucault, the coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life was something puzzling: “It is one of the central antinomies of our political reason.” 110 However, it was an antinomy precisely because in principle the sovereign power and bio‐power are mutually exclusive. How is it possible that the care of individual life paves the way for mass slaughters? Although Foucault could never give a satisfactory answer to this question, he was convinced that mass slaughters are not the effect or the logical conclusion of bio‐political rationality. I am also convinced about that. To be sure, it can be argued that sovereign power and bio‐power are reconciled within the modern state, which legitimates killing by bio‐political arguments. Especially, it can be argued that these powers are reconciled in the Third Reich in which they seemed to “coincide exactly”. 111 To my mind, however, neither the modern state nor the Third Reich – in which the monstrosity of the modern state is crystallized – are the syntheses of the sovereign power and bio‐power, but, rather, the institutional loci of their irreconcilable tension. This is, I believe, what Foucault meant when he wrote about their “demonic combination”. In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of bio‐power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio‐ political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.” 112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio‐political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio‐political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio‐political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present‐day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio‐political thinking and practice.

### A2: BIOPOWER

#### BIOPOWER DOESN’T EMERGE FROM THE SOVEREIGN, BUT FROM SOCIAL RELATIONS THAT ARE BEYOND PLAN

Lazzarato 5/25/04 (Maurizio, “From Biopower to Biopolitics,” Trans. Ivan A. Ramirez, www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/csisp/papers/lazzarato\_biopolitics.pdf)

Foucault needs a new political theory and a new ontology to describe the new power relations expressed in the political economy of forces. In effect, biopolitics are “grafted” and “anchored” upon a multiplicity of disciplinary [de commandemant et d'obéissance] relations between forces, those which power “coordinates, institutionalizes, stratifies and targets,” but that are not purely and simply projected upon individuals. **The fundamental political problem of modernity is not that of a single source of sovereign power, but that of a multitude of forces that act and react amongst each other** according to relations of command and obedience. The relations between man and woman, master and student, doctor and patient, employer and worker, that Foucault uses to illustrate the dynamics of the social body are relations between forces that always involve a power relation. **If power, in keeping with this description, is constituted from below, then we need an ascending analysis of the constitution of power dispositifs**, one that begins with infinitesimal mechanisms that are subsequently “invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed and institutionalized by ever more general mechanisms, and by forms of global domination.” Consequently, **biopolitics is the strategic coordination of these power relations** in order to extract a surplus of power from living beings**. Biopolitics is a strategic relation; it is not the pure and simple capacity to legislate or legitimize sovereignty.** According to Foucault the biopolitical functions of “coordination and determination” concede that **biopower**, from the moment it begins to operate in this particular manner, **is not the true source of power. Biopower coordinates and targets a power that does not properly belong to it, that comes from the “outside.” Biopower is always born of something other than itself.**

### A2: TECH Ks

TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IN NATURE IS INEVITABLE REJECTION IS IMPOSSIBLE AND PARALYZING

KEULARTZ **19**98 Jozef Keulartz is an associate professor in the department of applied philosophy at Wageningen Agricultural U Struggle for Nature 145-146 MM

This view was inspired chiefly by Cements’ theory, in which **climax and civilization were represented as essentially incompatible. Taken to its logical extreme, however, the theory leads to a paralyzing dilemma, either to perish along with nature or reverse the course of human civilization and renounce many of its technical achievements.** In view of this unpalatable message it is no wonder that Clements’ theory came under heavy fire in the course of the 1930s. Cements’ chief opponent was Arthur G. Tansley, a prominent botanist from Oxford. Tansley was convinced that any single climatic region could give rise to not one but several types of vegetation and proposed replacing Cements’ ‘monoclimax’ theory by a ‘polyclimax’ theory. But what bothered Tansley most was the fact that Cements portrayed man as an exclusively negative force in nature. Though Tansley acknowledged that man was increasingly upsetting existing ecosystems, he also believed that man was capable of forming new ones. In Britain, where Tansley conducted his field work, but also **on the European continent and elsewhere, the original wilderness had long been replaced by ecosystems incapable of autonomous reproduction and requiring permanent human effort for their maintenance.** Tansley refused to continue to designate such artificial ecosystems as ‘disturbance climax’ or ‘disclimax’ formations and instead termed them ‘anthropogenic’. **These formations, he asserted, could be just as stable and balanced as Cements’ climax formations. Human intervention, in short, was not by definition destructive, which was just as well, since such intervention was absolutely inevitable. Save for a few exotic exceptions, the nature that surrounds us is socially constituted and in such a situation we simply cannot afford to be technophobic** (cf. Bohme and Schramm, 1985).

### A2: ECO-CRISIS RHETORIC BAD

APOCALYPTIC IMAGERY IS NECESSARY TO MOTIVATE PEOPLE TO THE GREATEST LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION–SAYING “APOCALYPSE” REALLY DOES PREVENT APOCALYPSE

FOSTER 1998 (John Bellamy Foster, a member of the Board of the Monthly Review Foundation, teaches sociology at the University of Oregon and is coeditor of

Organization & Environment, Monthly Review, April)

Having said this, however, Gould goes on to suggest that **this way of thinking - predicated on a geological time-scale - is irrelevant where human time-scales are concerned.**

**"We cannot threaten at geological scales,"** Gould writes,

but such vastness has no impact upon us**. We have a legitimately parochial interest in our own lives, the happiness and prosperity of our children, the suffering of our fellows.** The planet will recover from a nuclear holocaust, but we will be killed and maimed by billions, and our culture will perish. **The earth will prosper if polar icecaps melt under a global greenhouse, but most of our major cities, built at sea level as ports and harbors, will founder, and changing agricultural patterns will uproot our populations.**(3)

Our vision in contemporary society is normally limited to our own lifetime and that of a few generations that come before or after us. **As a teacher in the realm of social science I know how difficult it is to get students to think in terms of historical time, which often means perceiving things on a scale of centuries or millennia. All of this, however, falls far short of a geological time scale, which exceeds the average life span of most species. In this sense it is reasonable to speak metaphorically of a world in which** there is no more spring, or of a "vulnerable planet" when as Gould **says the threatened reality is one of the elimination of human society and even the human species,** along with innumerable, "higher" species of direct significance to human beings, as a result of the destruction that humanity is wreaking on its own life support systems. We are definitely speaking parochially: of "our ecological crisis" and not of the demise of the earth or of the biosphere on a geological time-scale. **Yet behind this concern lies the fact that even the basic biogeochemical processes of the planet** - which human beings have come to see as quite fixed - **are "vulnerable" to human transformation in ways that are likely to destroy the planet as a place for human habitation.**

None of this of course is meant to deny the reality that, as Gould says, we can "barely dent bacterial diversity and will surely not remove many million of species of insects and mites." But to say that we cannot claim that the planet or the biosphere is "vulnerable" because such "lower" life forms will survive, or because the biosphere will recover over tens of millions of years is to deny the right of human beings to identify their fate and that of the species with which they are most closely connected with the fate of the planet. It is to insist on a geological way of thinking (the peculiar professional reality of geologists and paleontologists), which though of great scientific importance has little direct relevance for humanity's own existence. It is as if one were to take the deep ecological viewpoint, which insists that we should view human beings as no more important - even in our own eyes - than any other species, to the level of absolute absurdity of denying that it matters whether we as a species utterly destroy our own moment on earth**. It is to deny an essential anthropocentrism without which it is probably impossible for human beings to respond to the ecological crisis on the scale at which we must - that is in the largest human terms, which identifies our fate with that of the planet.**

### A2: STATE Ks

**Moralistic crusades aimed at changing the state are misleading about the nature of oppressive forces. This obfuscation denies the potential for radical transformation**

**Brown,** Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, **2K1**

(Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)

But here the problem goes well beyond superficiality of political analysis or compensatory gestures in the face of felt impotence. **A mor­alistic, gestural politics often inadvertently becomes a regressive poli­tics. Moralizing condemnation** of the National Endowment for the Arts for not funding politically radical art, of the U.S. military or the White House for not embracing open homosexuality or sanctioning gay marriage, or even of the National Institutes of Health for not treat­ing as a political priority the lives of HIV target populations (gay men, prostitutes, and drug addicts) **conveys at best naive political expecta­tions and at worst, patently confused ones. For this condemnation implicitly figures the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have specific political and economic investments, as if it were not the codification of various dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided parent who forgot her promise to treat all her children the same way.** These **expressions of moralistic outrage implicitly cast the state as if it were or could be a deeply demo­cratic and nonviolent institution;** conversely, **it renders** radical art**, rad­ical social movements, and various fringe populations as if they were not potentially subversive, representing a significant political chal­lenge to the norms of the regime, but rather were benign entities and populations entirely appropriate for the state to equally protect, fund, and promote.** Here, **moralism’s objection to politics as a domain of power and history rather than principle is not simply irritating: it re­suits in a troubling and confused political stance. It misleads about the nature of power, the state, and capitalism; it misleads about the nature of oppressive social forces, and about the scope of the project of transformation required by serious ambitions for justice. Such ob­fuscation is not the aim of the moralists but falls within that more general package of displaced effects consequent to a felt yet unac­knowledged impotence. It signals disavowed despair over the pros­pects for more far-reaching transformations.**

### A2: STATE Ks

**We must not reject the state- limited and strategic use of the state is vital to successful politics**

**Derrida,** French philosopher, **2K**

(Jacques, “Intellectual Courage: An Interview” Culture Machine http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j002/articles/art\_derr.htm)

Q: Two essential problems of globalisation are the dissolution of the state and the impotence of politics. In your recently published text '*Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!*', you develop certain ideas concerning a new right to asylum and a new balance of power between the different places of the political in view of a possible new role of the city. How do you think philosophy could and should react to the problems mentioned with a kind of institutional fantasy?

JD: I am not sure I understand what you call 'institutional fantasy'. All political experimentation like the initiative of the 'refugee city', despite its limits and its inevitably preliminary character, has in it a philosophical dimension. It requires us to interrogate the essence and the history of the state. All political innovation touches on philosophy. The 'true' political action always engages with a philosophy. **All action, all political decision making, must invent its norm or rule**. Such a gesture traverses or implies philosophy. Meanwhile, at the risk of appearing self-contradictory, I believe that **one must fight against that which you call the 'dissolution of the state' (for the state can in turn limit the private forces of appropriation, the concentrations of economic power, it can retard a violent depoliticisation that acts in the name of the 'market'), and above all resist the state where it gives in too easily to the nationalism of the nation state or to the representation of socio-economic hegemony. Each time one must analyse, invent a new rule: here to contest the state, there to consolidate it. The realm of politics is not co-extensive with the state, contrary to what one believes nowadays. The necessary repoliticisation does not need to serve a new cult of the state. One ought to operate with new dissociations and accept complex and differentiated practices.**

### A2: STATE Ks

**Permutation- Do the plan and the alternative. Our advocacy is the first temporary expression of the critique alternative. The division between critcism and transformation is a disabling one. Instead, the perm should be embraced as a necessary reform allowing for the critique to become joined to the political sphere.**

**Foucault,** French Sociologist, 19**88**

(Michel, “On Criticism” in Michel Foucault: Politics Philosophy Culture Interviews and other writings 1977- 1984)

D.E. You mean it will be possible to work with this government?

 FOUCAULT**: We must escape from the dilemma of being either for or against**. **After all, it is possible to face up to a government and remain standing. To work with a govern­ment implies neither subjection nor total acceptance. One may work with it and yet be restive**. I even believe that **the two things go together.**

D.E. After Michel Foucault the critic, are we now going to see Michel Foucault the reformist? After all, the reproach was often made that the criticism made by intellectuals leads to nothing.

FOUCAULT First I’ll answer the point about “that leads to nothing.” **There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a number of problems that are now on the agenda. To say that this work produced nothing is quite wrong.** Do you think that twenty years ago people were considering the problems of the relationship between mental illness and psychological normality, the problem of prison, the problem of medical power, the problem of the relationship between the sexes, and so on, as they are doing today?

Furthermore**, there are no reforms as such. Reforms are not produced in the air, independently of those who carry them out. One cannot not take account of those who will have the job of carrying out this transformation.**

And, then, above all, I believe that an opposition can be made between critique and transformation, “ideal” critique and “real” transformation.

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncon­sidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.

**We must free ourselves from the sacrilization of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and in human relations as thought**. Thought exists independently of systems and structures of discourse. It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits.

**Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.**

**In these circumstances, criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A transform­ation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation.**

**On the other hand, as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible**.

It **is not therefore a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are forced to make the necessary concessions to reality**. In fact I **think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.**

D.E. But do you think the intellectual must have a programmatic role in this transformation?

FOUCAULT **A reform is never only the result of a process in which there is conflict, confrontation, struggle, resistance.** To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. His role, since he works specifically in the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality.

**It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a reform.** If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same.

### A2: STATE Ks

**JUST BECAUSE WE TALK ABOUT THE STATE DOES NOT MEAN WE GRANT IT LEGITIMACY. THAT DISCOURSE IS A PRE-REQUISITE TO YOUR ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY. YOUR LINK MEANS YOU DON’T SOLVE, BUT THE PERM DOES**

Mervyn **FROST,** Professor, University of Kent, **’96**

[Ethics In International Relations A Constitutive Theory, pp. 90-91, JT]

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan's approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded. **By having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them**. As I have said, my argument is that **whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states.** Thus, for example, any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally **there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.**

### A2: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION

**USING THE LANGUAGE OF SECURITY IS KEY TO ENVIRONMENTALISM’S SUCCESS—SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR GREEN POLITICS GARNERS SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEMANDS**

**MATTHEW 2002**

(Richard A., associate professor of international relations and environmental politics at the University of California at Irvine, Summer 2002 *ECSP Report* 8:109-124; P.119)

In addition, environmental security’s language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development.36 Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control. For the first time in its history, the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potential allies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military—as well as its environmental record—raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence. Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases—areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan & Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.37 Conclusions Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer- Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflict and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finally, environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain. Rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, now is the time to recognize and to build on the remarkable achievements of the entire environmental security field.

### A2: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION

**ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY BOLSTERS POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT & exposes flaws of unchecked globalization—the alternative shortcircuits the study of environmentalism and security**

**MATTHEW 2002** (Richard A., associate professor of international relations and environmental politics at the University of California at Irvine, Summer 2002 *ECSP Report* 8:109-124; P.109-110)

The following pages argue that the retreat is premature. Environmental security has reinvigorated important elements of security research and policy that were marginalized or abandoned during the Cold War period. Much of the recent research also has made important and pioneering contributions to understanding the shifting sources of violence and changing requirements of security in an age of unprecedented inequality and interdependence. Work on environmental security thus contributes to a broader—and crucially important—debate about the social and political effects of globalization and other processes of transnational change. Moreover, the environmental security literature has recovered connections between environmentalism and peace that were prominent 40 years ago and that continue to be valuable; brought new perspectives and stakeholders into debates on environmental change; underscored the possible security implications of global phenomena such as climate change and biodiversity loss; and boosted the political capital of certain sectors of the environmental movement. Criticisms of the research and policy efforts of the 1990s have raised many valid points that have enriched the discourse and sharpened the insights of this field. Unfortunately, the field has also been characterized by intense rivalry and remarkable pettiness, both of which have focused undue attention on those imperfections, overstatements, and other weaknesses that are an inevitable but often inconsequential part of any ambitious research and policy undertaking. It is important to assess the general and constructive contributions of this work and not to be misled by efforts to discredit it that rely heavily on distortion and misrepresentation.

### A2: NIETZSCHE

**NIETZSCHEAN THEORY IGNORES LINGUISTIC DIMENSIONS BEYOND THE CONSTAINTS OF AGGRESSION—IT IS NOT THE PRIMORDIAL FEATURE OF EXISTENCE**

**BUTLER 2005** (Judith, PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric & Comparative Literature @UC-Berkeley; Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press; pg. 13-15)

Importantly, Nietzsche restricts his understanding of accountability to this juridically mediated and belated attribution. Apparently he fails to understand the other interlocutory conditions in which one is asked to given an account of oneself, focusing instead on an original aggression that he holds to be part of every human being and, indeed, coextensive with life itself. Its prosecution under a system of punishment would, in his view, eradicate this truth about life. The institution of law compels an originally aggressive human to turn aggression “inward,” to craft an inner world composed of a guilty conscience and to vent that aggression against oneself in the name of morality: “in this psychical cruelty there resides a madness of the will which is absolutely unexampled; the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for” (GM, 93). This aggression, which Nietzsche regards as native to every human animal and to life itself, is turned against the will and then assumes a second life, imploding to construct a conscience that generates reflexivity on the model of self-beratement. That reflexivity is the precipitate of the subject, understood as a reflexive being, one who can and does take him or herself as an object of reflection. As I mentioned above, Nietzsche does not consider other linguistic dimensions of this situation. If I am held accountable through a framework of morality, that framework is first addressed to me, first starts to act upon me, through the address and query of another. Indeed, I come to know that framework through no other way. If I give an account of myself in response to such a query, I am implicated in a relation to the other before whom and to whom I speak, Thus, I come into being as a reflexive subject in the context of establishing a narrative account of myself when I am spoken to by someone and prompted to address myself to the one who addresses me.

### A2: NIETZSCHE

**NIETZSCHE’S ARGUMENT OF THE SELF AS ‘CAUSE’ INVOKES A REDUCTIONIST VIEW OF ETHICS THAT FAILS TO UNDERSTAND OUR PRIMARY RELATION TO OTHERS AS A PRODUCTIVE PRECONDITION TO ETHICS—ONLY THE AFF SOLVES BY ASKING QUESTIONS THAT CONSTITUTE HUMANITY**

**BUTLER 2005** (Judith, PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric & Comparative Literature @UC-Berkeley; Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press; pg. 135-136)

What perhaps emerges most emphatically from the conjunction of these very disparate positions (Adorno, Foucault, Laplanche, Levinas, Nietzsche, Hegel) is that the response to the demand to give an account of oneself is a matter of fathoming at once the formation of the subject (self, ego, moi, first-person perspective) and its relation to responsibility. A subject who can never fully give an account of itself may well be a result of being related at non-narratable levels of existence to others in ways that have a supervenient ethical significance. If the “I” cannot effectively be disjoined from the impress of social life, then ethics will surely not only presuppose rhetoric (and the analysis of the mode of address) but social critique as well. The Nietzschean postulation of the self as a “cause” has a genealogy that must be understood as part of the reduction of ethical philosophy to the inward mutilations of conscience. Such a move not only severs the task of ethics from the matter of social life and the historically revisable grids of intelligibility within which any of us emerge, if we do, but it fails to understand the resource of primary and irreducible relations to others as a precondition of ethical responsiveness. One might rightly quarrel with the postulation of a preontological persecution by the Other in Levinas or offer an account that challenges the primacy of seduction in Laplanche. But either way, one must ask how the formation of the subject implies a framework for understanding ethical response and a theory of responsibility. If certain versions of self-preoccupied moral inquiry return us to a narcissism that is supported through socially enforced modes of individualism, and if that narcissism also leads to an ethical violence that knows no grace of self-acceptance of forgiveness, then it would seem obligatory, if not urgent, to return to the question of responsibility to the question “How are we informed within social life, and at what cost?” Perhaps most importantly, we must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes our change of becoming human. To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession. If we speak and try to give an account from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be forgiven.

### A2: NIETZSCHE

**Double-bind – either Nietzsche only rejects a particular form of morality which means**

**no link, or he requires a rejection of all morality which means the alternative links**

Maudemarie **Clark**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University, 19**94**, Nietzsche, Genealogy,

Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, p. 15-16

**Although Nietzsche** quite explicitly **claims to be an immoralist** (for example, EH LV:2-A; BT P:5), many serious and sympathetic interpreters have denied that he is. This is understandable because **immoralism is a difficult position to take seriously. An immoralist** does not simply ignore morality, or deny its right to our compliance, but **claims that morality is a bad thing that should be rejected. Immoralism** therefore **seems to be defensible only from the viewpoint of a morality, which makes it appear to be as self-refuting as another notorious Nietzschean claim, that truths are illusions**. I have argued in my recent book that **Nietzsche actually overcame this paradoxical claim about truth in his later works**, starting with his Genealogy of Morals.2 **But this approach will not work for his immoralism,** which is clearly expressed in the Genealogy and in later works, and in fact is more clearly expressed in later works than in earlier ones. Nietzsche moved toward, not away from, immoralism over the course of his work. **Sympathetic interpreters have** therefore usually **tried** another tack, **suggesting that Nietzsche is an immoralist only in** a very qualified sense: namely, **that he rejects a particular kind of morality** (say, Christian morality) or a particular theory or conception of morality, but not morality itself. There is now evidence of a change of direction on this issue within Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship. At least three important Nietzsche scholars, Philippa Foot, Alexander Nehamas, and Frithjof Bergmann, have argued that the qualified interpretation trivializes Nietzsche’s position on morality. Consider, for instance, his prediction in the preface to the Genealogy that one who begins as he did by raising questions about the morality of compassion, but also stays with the issue and learns to ask questions, will experience what he experienced: “A tremendous new prospect opens up belief in morality, in all morality, falters—finally a new demand becomes audible ... we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values must itself for once be called into question”(GM P:6). **Nietzsche here makes clear that he distinguishes “all morality” from specific moralities**—in this case from one he had earlier, under Schopenhauer’s influence, identified with morality itself.4 The qualified interpretation of his immoralism therefore seems to trivialize what Nietzsche himself wants to say. Those who interpret him instead as a full-fledged immoralist agree that his position is perplexing and confusing. But they also suspect that there is a major issue here that will never get confronted unless we try to understand why **Nietzsche thought that morality itself, rather than a specific morality, was the object of his attack**. Although Foot certainly does not expect to agree with Nietzsche, she emphasizes that we are bound to receive some enlightenment about morality if we try to confront such a brilliant critic’s rejection of it. To do this, we need to try to understand how Nietzsche could find it plausible that he rejected all morality.

### A2: NIETZSCHE

**Regardless of anti fascist intent, Nietzsche’s celebration of hierarchy and opposition to democratic values make his philosophy easy to exploit by the far Right. Democracy and progressive change must be defended for social equality.**

**Stackelberg, 2K2** Professor of History at Gonzaga University (Roderick, *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy*, “Critique as Apologetics” ed. by Jacob Golomb, Robert Solomon Wistrich)

Nietzsche’s significance and continuing relevance throughout the twentieth century is the result of the widespread recognition that his works are perhaps the most representative statement of the late nineteenth century sense of crisis induced by the “death of God,” the perceived collapse of objective meaning and universal truth. His prophetic call for a “transvaluation of values” could appeal to a great variety of alienated individuals and groups by no means restricted to the political right. This was due at least in part to the nature of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which is deliberately perspectival and open-ended and therefore subject to a variety of interpretations. Nietzsche made a definitive rendering of his ideas virtually impossible by refusing to foreclose any experimental options in the process of thinking and self-overcoming. His thought can not be classified as simply destructive and reactionary or emancipator and progressive. A great variety of political causes have found inspiration in Nietzschean thought, and even today there is nothing approaching complete consensus on Nietzsche’s politics. However, if advocacy or rejection of human equality as a social idea determines the place of individuals or movements on the political spectrum, Nietzsche clearly belongs well on the Right, perhaps even on the extreme Right. Nietzsche and the Nazis (and their Germanomanic precursors as well as Christian conservatives) shared the same political enemies—the democratic, and socialist movements that emanated from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This is probably the most important reason that Nietzsche’s philosophy could be so readily exploited by the Nazis, despite his unequivocal condemnation of nationalism, anti-Semitism, the German Reich, Wagnerian Germanophilia, and romanticism. It is also the main reason Nietzsche has been anathema to the Left, especially the Marxist Left, which has traditionally viewed Nieztsche as one of the major precursors of fascism. As a political thinker Nietzsche has always appealed mostly to political conservatives who value hierarchy and rank, the authority of elites, and the subordination of the masses. His works, as much as Wagner’s, reflected the undemocratic tenor of German society in his day. Though he may have thought of his “herd animals” and “last men” as members of oppressive “silent” or “moral” majorities, not excluded or exploited groups, and though he may have opposed democracy at least in part because of his apprehensions of the destructive form that the mobilization of the masses was bound to take in Germany, his approach was too apolitical to make these essential distinctions clear. Nietzsche’s rejection of progress and equality made aspects of his philosophy usable for the Nazis without having to distort them. Though a critic of idealist “self-deception” and national vanity, he shared the idealist disdain for merely political freedoms. True to the idealist heritage, Nietzsche’s formula for human salvation was not to change material conditions through reform for human salvation was not to change material conditions through reform or revolution, as progressives would have it, but to change human ideals. His precepts aimed not at the creation of a just society, but at the development of a higher type of human being. To him, as to the idealists he criticized, politics (i.e., agitation for social and political reform) was a debased activity. The field of Nietzsche interpretation will continue to provide the terrain as it has throughout the twentieth century, on which fundamental issues are symbolically fought out. Diverse movements and schools of though will continue to appeal to his thought. It is precisely because of his radical denial of ultimate truth that today he is hailed as the philosopher of postmodernism. But the criticisms that have been raised against postmodernism—that its political implications even in its left-wing appropriations are profoundly conservative—can be leveled against Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche’s failure to provide any concrete social analysis renders futile all efforts to pin down his substantive political position and leaves concepts like “herd animals,” “blond beasts,” “supermen,” “the will to power,” “party of life,” and “destruction of all that is degenerate and parasitical” to be filled with substantive meaning by his various interpreters. This lack of political consciousness made his philosophy useful to the Nazis and it makes his thinking serviceable to their apologists today.

### A2: HEIDEGGER

**The search for constant truth is the reason Germans became Nazis. This blind attitude assures that calls for an ontological shift will inevitably fail**

Slavoj **Zizek**, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences in Ljubljana, 19**99** *\*sexist language*

[The Ticklish Subject, p. 13-15]

Apropos of this precise point, I myself run into my first trouble with Heidegger (since I began as a Heideggerian - my first published hook was on Heidegger and language). When, in my youth, I was bombarded by the official Communist philosophers' stories of Heidegger's Nazi engagement, they left me rather cold; I was definitely more on the side of the Yugoslav Heideggarians. All of a sudden, however, I became aware of how these Yugoslav Heideggarians were doing exactly the sauce thing with respect to the Yugoslav ideology of self-management as Heidegger himself did with respect to Nazism: in ex-Yugoslavia, Heideggerians entertained the same ambiguously assertive relationship towards Socialist self- management, the official ideology of the Communist regime - in their eyes, the essence of sell-management was the very essence of modern ~~man,~~ which is why the philosophical notion of self-managemrnt suits the ontological essence of our epoch, while the standard political ideology of the regime misses this 'inner greatness' of self-management ... Heideggerians are thus eternally in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth, a strategy which **inevitably leads to error** (which, of course, is always acknowledged only retroactively, post factum, after the disastrous outcome of one's engagement). As Heidegger himself put it, those who carne closest to the Ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level ... err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference - who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) - fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man. The standard defence of Heidegger against the reproach of his Nazi past consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple personal error (a ‘stupidity [Dummheit]', as Heidegger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project; the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger's own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social systems (capitalism, Fascism. Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology, and the secret privileging of a concrete sociopolitical model (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some 'Heideggerian Marxists') as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch. Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger's defenders, who dismissed Heidegger’s Nazi engagement as simple an anomaly, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more 'environmentally sound' technology. etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project 'in spite of' his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it; this engagement was not 'beneath' his philosophical level - on the contrary if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Hegelese: 'speculative identity') between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate 'ontic' Nazi political engagement. One can now see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true 'inner greatness' of the Nazi movement, he repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text - of claiming that there is something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel: ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this very insistence that the Cause we adhere to is not 'merely' ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Heidegger turns away from active engagement in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of its 'inner greatness', but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideology. In other words, what he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its 'inner greatness'. And the problemlies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontological foundation is possible. This expectation, however, is in itself profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize that the gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement from its 'inner greatness' (its historico-ontological essence) is *constitutive,* a positive condition of its 'functioning'. To use the terms of the later Heidegger, ontological insight necessarily entails **ontic blindness and error**, and vice versa - that is to say, in order to be 'effective' at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one's activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that 'science doesn't think' and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, what Heidegger seems **unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement** that would *accept* its necessary, constitutive blindness - as if the moment we acknowledge the gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engage­ment, any ontic engagement is depreciated, loses its authentic dignity.

### A2: HEIDEGGER

**Defending an anti-Semitic assumption is even worse than being anti-Semitic. It justifies the Holocaust**

Slavoj **Zizek**, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences in Ljubljana, **2K1**

[The Fragile Absolute, p. 130-131] Rein

Let us specify this crucial point by reference to a well-known tasteless defence of Hitler: 'True, Hitler did some horrible things, like trying to rid Germany of Jews, but we should not forget that he none the less did some good things, like building highways and making the trains run on time!' The whole point of this defence, of course, is that although it formally denounces anti-Semitic violence, it is **covertly anti-Semitic**: the very gesture of comparing the anti-Semitic horrors to building highways, and putting them together in a statement whose structure is that of 'Yes, I know, but none the less . . .', makes it clear that praising Hitler's construction of highways is a displaced way of praising his anti-Semitic measures. The proof is that the cri­tique of Hitler which *turns around* the terms of the first one (popular in some extremely conservative ecological circles) is no less acceptable, but **implies an even stronger *defence* of Hitler**, albeit in the form of criticism: 'True, Hitler did some good things, like trying to rid Germany of Jews, but we should not forget that he none the less did some horrible things, like build­ing highways and thus ruining Germany's environment . . .'. And is not a similar reversal also the true content of the standard defence of the perpetrators of extreme-Right racist violence: 'True, he did participate in lynchings of African-Americans, but we should not forget that he was also a good and honest family man who went regularly to church . . .' - instead of this, one should read: 'True, he did do some good things, like trying to get rid of the nasty African-Americans; none the less, we should not forget that he was just a common family man who went regularly to church ...'. The key to this reversal is that in both cases we are dealing with the tension between the publicly acknowledged and acceptable ideological content (building highways, going to church) and its obscene disavowed underside (Holocaust, lynch-ings): the first, standard, version of the statement acknowledges the public content and disavows its obscene underside (while secretly endorsing it); the second version openly dismisses the public aspect and endorses the obscene underside.

### A2: HEIDEGGER

**Heidegger’s Nazism can’t be separated from his philosophy**

**Thiele 03**[Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters**]**

Heidegger was a Nazi and a rather unrepentant one at that. Some suggest Heidegger’s Nazism cannot be separated from his philosophy, that indeed the former follows from the latter. The argument, in short, is that Heidegger’s political biography pretty well tells the whole story.This position has been rearticulated periodically since the end of the Second World War, each time creating something of an academic row. To be sure, the story of Heidegger’s life does not well illustrate an education in sound moral and political judgment**,** except perhaps as an example of a lesson left unlearned. Yet the story that Heidegger himself tells about human life, about human being in history, can do much to cultivate moral and political judgment. I assert this despite insightful critiques of Heidegger that accuse him of ignoring and eliding phronesis as human potentiality. My argument, then, is not that Heidegger’s work explicitly celebrates prudence, but that his philosophical narrative facilitates its cultivation.

### A2: HEIDEGGER

**The alternative will destroy ethics and only cause suffering**

**Thiele 03**[Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters**]**

The complementarity of Heidegger's and Foucault's accounts of modern demons and saving graces should not be too surprising. Foucault's indebtedness to and fascination with Heidegger is well documented.' My intent in this chapter is neither to focus on the complementarity of these visions, nor to outline the striking philosophical and political differences that remain in Heidegger's and Foucault's work. Rather, I attempt to make a claim for what at first blush might appear a lost cause. Despite their originality and intellectual brilliance, Heidegger and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-political dead-ends. They are criticized for their unwillingness or inability to supply the grounds for sound moral and political judgment. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism**,** in particular, is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anything, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charge is that his highly abstract form of philosophizing, empyrean ontological vantage point, and depreciation of "das Man" undermines moral principle and political responsibility. From his philosophical heights, it is suggested, Heidegger remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and political practicalities. He immunized himself against the moral sensitivity, compassion, and prudence that might have dissuaded him from endorsing and identifying with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophy, critics warn, court similar dangers. In like fashion, it is held that Foucault dug himself into an equally deep, though ideologically relocated, moral and political hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The sticky, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" quashed any hope of gaining the ethical and political high ground.? As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of panoptic power that shapes wants, needs, and selves, critics worry, one would have no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for.' In sum, Heidegger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and the greatest social and political theorist of the twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced from political responsibility. Critics argue that Heidegger's statements and actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism, as displayed in his discussions of popular justice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is capable of supplying us with the resources for sound moral and political judgment.

### A2: HEIDEGGER

**Heidegger’s philosophy has moral consequences and leads to paralysis – It justifies sitting back and allowing for the Holocaust while criticizing the technology used to kill the Jews**

Murray **Bookchin**, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor at Ramapo College, 19**95** [Re-enchanting Humanity, p. 168-170]

"Insofar as Heidegger can be said to have had a project to shape human lifeways, it was as an endeavor to resist, or should I say, demur from, what he conceived to he an all-encroaching technocratic mentality and civilization that rendered human beings 'inauthentic' in their relationship to a presumably self-generative reality, 'isness', or more esoterically, 'Being' *(Sein).* Not unlike many German reactionaries, Heidegger viewed ‘modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' *(Gefallen)* from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled,’ remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with ‘the Gods’, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for noth­ing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state counts for everything.'22 As a member of the Nazi party, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, his antihumanism reached strident, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, he readily adopted the *Fuehrer*-principle of German fascism and preferred the title *Rektor-Fuhrer*,hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.’28 His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.’30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter­pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when *techne* is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir­itually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is *not* being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power. Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – into **quietism**. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things *be* and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno­logical intervention into the 'world'. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized *(motorsierte)* food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial *means* by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially displaces the barbarism of a *specific* state apparatus, of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute *to the world at large!* These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today. Indeed, technophobia, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, finally devolves into a **dark reactionism** – and a **paralyzing quietism**. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – the choice between supporting **barbarism** and enlightened humanism has **no ethical foundations to sustain it**. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a **quasi-religious antihumanism**, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the **anguish of six million** once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.

### A2: Whiteness Ks

CRITIQUES OF WHITENESS INEVITABLY DEVOLVE INTO COMPARING OPPRESSIONS—THIS IS AN INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL DEAD END

Karenga, May 13, 1999

Dr. Maulana Karenga was one of the scholars who pressed for Black studies in the late 60's and early 70s, founder of Kwanzaa, and currently professor and chair of the Black studies department at California State University-Long Beach, “Whiteness Studies: Deceptive or Welcome Discourse?,” Black Issues, http://diverseeducation.com/article/139/, ACC. 11-11-10, JT

Closely related to this conceptual misadventure, Whiteness studies might also revive the Hegelian doctrine of the master's struggle for recognition as master as a kind of social and moral equivalency of the enslaved person's struggle for recognition as a human being.  Again, such studies must be careful not to suggest such social or moral equivalence with the peoples' of color ongoing struggle against White supremacy and for human freedom and human flourishing.  Otherwise, Whiteness studies again deteriorates into a problematic comparative study of the oppression of people of color and Whites which cannot be sustained intellectually or morally.

THERE IS NO CONSISTENT DEFINITION OF WHITENESS

Rasmussen, Et al, 2K1

Birgit Brander Rasmussen, PhD, Dept. of Comparative and Ethnic Studies, UCal-Berkeley, “Introduction,” The making and unmaking of whiteness, p.8, JT

There is an inherent definitional slipperiness and instability to whiteness, just as there is with all categories of race.18 Like any other racial label, whiteness does not exist as a credible biological property. But it is a social construction with real effects that has become a powerful organizing principle around the world, it is not always dear what we mean when we refer to race or whiteness because both empirical and theoretical accounts define them inconsistently or not at all. In practice, this means that readers and audiences are left too apply their own conceptions of race to every analysis they confront. But the multiple definitions of race that people draw on—what we might identify as “folk,” “analytical,” and “bureaucratic” definitions—acquire different and sometimes contradictory meanings.

### A2: WHITENESS K

THEIR KRITIK OF WHITENESS AS A CONCEPT DIVERTS ATTENTION FROM CHALLENGING WHITE SUPREMACY AS THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY. THIS MERELY PSYCHOLOGIZES WHITE SUPREMACY AND FOSTERS COMPARATIVE VICTIMIZATION. BY OBSCURING THE OPPRESSOR/OPPRESSED DICHOTOMY THE ALTERNATIVE DECENTERS WHITE SUPREMACY

Karenga, May 13, 1999

Dr. Maulana Karenga was one of the scholars who pressed for Black studies in the late 60's and early 70s, founder of Kwanzaa, and currently professor and chair of the Black studies department at California State University-Long Beach, “Whiteness Studies: Deceptive or Welcome Discourse?,” Black Issues, http://diverseeducation.com/article/139/, ACC. 11-11-10, JT

MK: The new focus on the study of Whiteness by Whites and other scholars engenders ambivalence on several levels.  It immediately raises questions about its intent, methodology and effect.  As a Black studies scholar, my tendency is to be ambivalent about new calls for the study of White people when the majority of the curriculum is about them and usually in the most Eurocentric and vulgarly self-congratulatory forms.  Certainly, my colleagues in Black studies and I have been consistent in our calls for the critical study of the pathologies of White society, especially its addiction to racism and White supremacy.  So, in as far as Whiteness studies offers an additional critique of the source and character of White domination and contributes to public policy initiatives to correct wealth and power inequities, we see this as a reaffirmation of our ongoing contentions and a useful addition to our own work and we welcome the discourse.
However, such a thrust carries with it a capacity to become both conceptually diversionary and intellectually deceptive. First, such studies of "Whiteness" as a concept as distinct from White supremacy as thought and practice of domination can end up psychologizing White domination in counterproductive ways.  This begins with one's rediscovering and trotting out the old liberal argument that Whites are victimized like the people of color they victimize.  This leads to comparative victimization discourse and thus, the intentional or inadvertent cultivation of an empathetic understanding of the oppressor. Whatever merit this approach may have in mitigating White angst about their power and privilege, it tends to diminish the necessary moral and social distinction between oppressor and oppressed, and thus moves away from the central issue of White domination.

### A2: Whiteness Ks

THEIR DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS AS A MONOLITHIC IDEA OVERSIMPLIFIES INTERSECTIONS OF OPPRESSION

Rasmussen, Et al, 2K1

Birgit Brander Rasmussen, PhD, Dept. of Comparative and Ethnic Studies, UCal-Berkeley, “Introduction,” The making and unmaking of whiteness, pp. 7-8, JT

As these recent debates over resources and opportunities in California make clear, it is important to be critically attentive to the language used to make claims about race and race-based privilege. The shift from "affirmative action" to "racial preferences" was more than a linguistic shift. It also reinforced a political consolidation of previously disparate groups of white and conservative people of color voters. In this campaign it became clear that monolithic notions of whiteness not only oversimplified the issues and did a disservice to the ways in which race intersected with other axes of social power and inequality—they also hampered the ability of those struggling to maintain affirma­tive action to mount an effective political countercampaign.

Definitions of whiteness, as many contributors to this book argue, will always be dynamic and context-specific. This is why the work of explaining what happened to the groups who "became white" but who did not profit from it is becoming a more important part of the study of whiteness. For example, the question of how whites themselves are internally differentiated, how the same white skin that has facilitated the integration, assimilation, and enrichment of some docs not guarantee that others—such as poor whites and queer whites—might not also experience deprivation, stigmatization, and subjugation.16 Scholars of “multiraciality" have helped to show how race is simultaneously connected to and disconnected from bodies and narratives about bodies, especially when those bodies can "pass" for while. Moreover, scholars of sexuality and difference, such as Cherne Moraga, have argued that lesbian or gay whiteness does not guarantee. nor does it entirely abrogate, access to white skin privilege.

### A2: WHITENESS Ks

WHITENESS CRITICS CONSTRUCT WHITE PRIVILEGE AS A MONOLITHIC NORM OF JURIDICAL POWER. EVERYTHING GETS LABELED “WHITENESS” IF WE THINK RACISM ORIGINATES IN SUBJECTIVITY

Ladelle McWhorter, Prof. University of Richmond, 2K5

“Where do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies,” PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM • vol 31 nos 5–6 • pp. 533–556, JT

As good students of Omi and Winant, Whiteness Studies theorists believe that racism operates much of the time without the consent or even the knowledge of white subjects. But they still take white subjects to be responsible for racism; they still believe that racism originates in subjectivity, not in structures or institutions or practices. This belief is implicit in their search for a psychological account of racism’s persistence. The account offered in virtually every Whiteness Studies theorist’s work can be summed up in two words: white privilege. The story goes that white people exercise power not so much by exercising their capacity to harm non-white people but by exercising the privileges that hundreds of years of racism have put in place for them. They are in fact deploying racist power, but they do not see it as such because to them it seems that they are simply claiming for themselves the goods to which they are entitled, and they have a deep investment in being able to continue to do so. Across the very different social analyses that Whiteness Studies theorists put forth and across their very pronounced disagreements over political strategy, this concept of white privilege stretches; it, like the claim that whiteness functions as a norm, unites theorists who otherwise have very little in common. My contention is that wherever we see the concept of white privilege operating, we can be sure the conception of power that is also operating is the traditional juridical conception that construes power as the possession of a preexistent subject.

RACISM DOES NOT ORIGINATE IN SUBJECTIVITY, BUT IN NON-SUBJECTIVE NETWORKS OF BIOPOWER. FAILURE TO RECONCEIVE POWER MEANS WHITENESS WILL NEVER DECONSTRUCT WHITE SUBJECTIVITY

Ladelle McWhorter, Prof. University of Richmond, 2K5

“Where do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies,” PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM • vol 31 nos 5–6 • pp. 533–556, JT

If I felt especially cynical I might suggest that Whiteness Studies covertly seeks not so much to destabilize race and end white supremacy as to find ways of being white (or of ceasing to be white) that purify individuals of racial complicity or guilt, that the movement is more about innocence than about justice or transformation. But I do not want to be that dismissive, both because it is always risky to guess at scholars’ motives and because regardless of their motives much of the work that Whiteness Studies theorists are doing is extremely valuable and important. Rather, I think it is just inevitable that unless we place the juridical conception of power in question as Foucault did and look at racism as part of a vast system of non-subjective, non-intentional networks of biopower, we will be pushed toward the untenable intellectual and political positions that Whiteness theorists find themselves in, calling for voluntary divestiture of ‘privileges’ or ‘unearned assets’. We will not be able to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it. We have to make historical transformations of power primary over both conscious and unconscious subjectivity in order to create an account of how racism functions in modern society. I would argue that what we need instead of avowals and exposés of whiteness as a racial identity is a genealogy of race and a network of counter-memories to begin to build alternative accounts of raced existence and possibilities of living race differently. That will require a thorough critique of traditional conceptions of power, an undertaking in which knowledge of Foucault’s work is essential.

### A2: PERSONAL EXPERIENCE GOOD

**THEIR FETISHIZATION OF MATERIAL LIVED EXPERIENCE DEGENERATES INTO A CRUDE BIOLOGISM THAT NATURALIZES IDENTITY CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE AND VIOLENCE. DEBATE DEVOLVES INTO FACTIONALIST POLITICS, WHERE THEIR PRESUMED IMMEDIACY OF ADDRESSING LIVED EXPERIENCE ENDS UP IN THE SAME HYPER-COMPETITIVENESS THAT THEY SAY DEVALUES AGENCY AND RESISTANCE. THIS FORM OF POLITICS NATURALIZES BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE THAT FORM MICROFACISMS**
Craig **Ireland, 2K2**
[“THE APPEAL TO EXPERIENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES VARIATIONS ON A PERSISTENT THOMPSONIAN THEME,” cultural critique, 52 fall 2002. P. 87-89]

**More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience**, Thompsonian **experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity**—bases that can as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. **If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchère of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward** what Michael Piore’s Beyond Individualism calls **“biologism”—an increasingly common trend whereby “a person’s entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality”** (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away.

**The step from a wager on immediate experience**, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, **to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one**; and the link between these two trends is certainly not one of affinity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that **in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy**—by appealing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because **the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door—it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.**

**The tendency in appeals to experience toward naturalizing the historical have already been repeatedly pointed out by those most sympathetic to the motivations behind such appeals**. Joan W. Scott—hardly an antisubaltern historian—has argued, as have Nancy Fraser, Rita Felski, and others, that **it is precisely by predicating identity and agency on shared nonmediated experiences that certain historians of difference and cultural theorists in fact “locate resistance outside its discursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals”—a move that, when pushed to its logical conclusion, “naturalizes categories such as woman, black, white, heterosexual and homosexual by treating them as given characteristics of individuals”** (Scott, 777). Although such a tendency within experience-oriented theories is rarely thematized, and rarer still is it intended, it nevertheless logically follows from the argument according to which group identity, specificity, and concerted political action have as their condition of possibility the nonmediated experiences that bind or are shared by their members. On the basis of such a stance, it is hardly surprising that currents of gay identity politics (to take but one of the more recent examples) should treat homosexuality, as Nancy Fraser has noted, “as a substantive, cultural, identificatory positivity, much like an ethnicity” (83).

**It may seem unfair to impute to certain experience-oriented theories an argument that,** when carried to its logical conclusion, **can as readily foster an emancipatory politics of identity as it can neoethnic tribalism.** The potential for biologism hardly represents the intentions of experience-oriented theories; these, after all, focus on the immediacy of experience, rather than on the essence of a group, in order to avoid strong structural determination on the one hand, and the naturalizing of class or subaltern groups on the other. But **if there cannot be a discursive differentiation of one experience from another—the counterhegemonic potential of experience is predicated on its prediscursive immediacy,** and mediation is relegated to a supplemental and retrospective operation—and if a nondiscursive or ideologically uncontaminated common ground becomes the guarantor of group authenticity, then the criterion for group specificiy must be those elements that unite groups in nondiscursive ways. And such elements can as readily be those of a group’s shared nonmediated experience, such as oppression, as they can be those of a group’s biological characteristics. **At best, “the evidence of experience**,” Scott notes, **“becomes the evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how differences are established**” (796); at worst, **the wager on the immediacy of experience fosters tribalistic reflexes that need but a little prodding before turning into those rabid, neoethnic “micro fascisms”** against which Félix Guattari warned in his last essay before his death (26–27).

### A2: PERSONAL EXPERIENCE GOOD

**PRIVILEGING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS THE STARTING POINT OF DISCUSSION REPLICATES THE SAME NETWORKS OF POWER AND EXCLUSION IN DEBATE THEY CRITICIZE. THIS MIRRORS THE SAME TEMPLATE FOR HEGEMONIC DOMINATION THEY CRITICIZE. THEIR DISMISSAL OF POLICY DELIBERATION DEBILITATES PROGRESSIVE DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS**

**Tonn, 2K5** [Mari Boor Tonn, Assoc. Prof of Communication at the Univ. of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3, p.423-24, JT]
This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet **the** conversational model's **emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but,** as Freeman pointed out, **the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color.** Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102

**The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues**—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—**can be steep**. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103

The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, **"A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process,** he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 **Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.**

### A2: RACE Ks

**RACIAL CATEGORIES ARE MECHANISMS FOR DOMINATION. THEIR SOCIAL LOCATION POLITICS CREATE A RACIAL OTHER, RELEGATED TO THE MARGINS OF SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH THEY SEEK TO REINTERPRET THE DOMINANT DYNAMIC, THEIR FETISH OF MATERIALITY FALLS ALONG RACIALIZED LINES—TURNS 100% OF THEIR ARGUMENT**

**Powell, ‘97**

[John A. Powell, Professor of Law University of Minnesota, Executive Director of the Institute on Race and Poverty, SYMPOSIUM: Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin: The " Racing " of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, Law and Inequality, Winter, 15 Law & Ineq. J. 99, JT]

**The shifting concepts of race in the history of the United States demonstrate the socially constructed nature of race and its socio-historical contingency.** Despite its varying manifestations, however, the role or function of race in the United States has remained relatively constant. **Groups of people have been "raced" as a mechanism for implementing and justifying domination and subjugation. The defining of racial categories in our society has concurred with the distribution of the right to participate in the body politic and access opportunity structures. Racial minorities have simultaneously been defined as the racial Other and denied the benefits of membership in American society. This concurrent racing and excluding has caused the adverse effects of exclusion to manifest along racial lines so that the White majority is then able to use these effects to justify the original definition and exclusion.** n23 Thus, **the history of America is replete with what Omi and Winant refer to as "racial projects": "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines."** n24

### WEST IS BEST

**America has linked the world, opened the markets, and control information.**

DAVID **ROTHKOPF**, director of Kissinger Associates and professor at Columbia University. senior official in the U.S. Department of Commerce during the Clinton administration. (**1997**)

 (“In praise of cultural imperialism” Foreign Policy, Number 107, pp. 38-53 <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/protected/rothkopf.html>)

[It is in the general interest of the United States to encourage the development of a world in which the fault lines separating nations are bridged by shared interests. And it is in the economic and political interests of the United States to ensure that if the world is moving toward a common language, it be English; that if the world is moving toward common telecommunications, safety, and quality standards, they be American; that if the world is becoming linked by television, radio, and music, the programming be American; and that if common values are being developed, they be values with which Americans are comfortable.

These are not simply idle aspirations. English is linking the world. American information technologies and services are at the cutting edge of those that are enabling globalization. Access to the largest economy in the world--America's--is the primary carrot leading other nations to open their markets.

Indeed, just as the United States is the world's sole remaining military superpower, so is it the world's only information superpower. While Japan has become quite competitive in the manufacture of components integral to information systems, it has had a negligible impact as a manufacturer of software or as a force behind the technological revolution. Europe has failed on both fronts. Consequently, the United States holds a position of advantage at the moment and for the foreseeable future.]

**Our style of democracy is inevitable and far stronger than other nations perceive**

[**Victor Davis Hanson**](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/author/victor_davis_hanson/), classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 05/24/**07**

(Is the sky falling on America, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/05/is\_ sky\_falling\_on\_ america.html) Accessed 06/30/07

After the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, America proclaimed itself at the "end of history" -- meaning that the spread of our style of democratic capitalism was now inevitable. Now a mere 16 years later, some are just as sure we approach our own end. But our rivals are weaker and America is far stronger than many think. Take oil. With oil prices at nearly $70 a barrel, Vladimir Putin, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chavez seem invincible as they rally anti-American feeling. But if we find alternate energy sources, or reduce slightly our oil hunger, we can defang all three rather quickly. None of their countries have a middle class or a culture of entrepreneurship to discover and disseminate new knowledge. Russia and Europe are shrinking. China is an aging nation of only children. The only thing the hard-working Chinese fear more than their bankrupt communist dictatorship is getting rid of it. True, the economies of China and India have made amazing progress. But both have rocky rendezvous ahead with all the social and cultural problems that we long ago addressed in the 20th century.

### WEST IS BEST

**Democracy is key for genuine social change and preventing conflicts within nations.**

Martin **Shaw**, professor of international relations and politics University of Sussex, **1999**

(The unfinished global revolution, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/unfinished.pdf) 06/29/07

Finally, there is the generalized pacifism of anti-Cold War politics. To my mind, this is the element of this position with by far the greatest continuing salience. The horror at aerial bombardment has deep roots in modern history – for many older people based on childhood experience77, for others resonating from the nuclear threat. Objections to the use of airpower are compounded by complaints about ‘the fastidiousness articulated about the loss of American lives’, which Said was not alone in finding ‘positively revolting’.78 Nevertheless, this concern too often remains at the level of abstract criticism, and fails to specify the kinds of alternative power-projection that might address the dire situations of people like the Kosovans or Timorese. A simple pacifism was only partially viable during the Cold War (even then there were reasonable demands for ‘alternative defence policies’). It does little to address the realities of global politics, in which a relatively modest use of military power may protect a threatened civilian population. 77 For an interesting reflection of this dimension, see the interview with Harold Pinter, The Observer, 5 September 1999. 78 Said, ‘Protecting the Kosovars’, p. 75 38 Underlying these specific positions, of course, is the continuing socialist critique of a capitalist world. Democratization is often seen as a new form of Western or American power.79 Ironically, this functionalist approach attributes too much power to the West, and too little to the movements that are forging global-democratic change. It is a very limited sort of socialist understanding that fails to grasp the potential of democracy to open up social reform. This socialism has not learnt the fundamental lesson of its twentieth-century failures: no genuine social change is possible without political democracy and individual freedom.

### WEST IS BEST – HUMAN RIGHTS

**Arguing that all cultural values are equivalent and that Western culture is not superior is absurd and justifies FGM, slavery, oppression of women, and the destruction of human rights**

**WILLIAMS** **‘03**, award winning PhD in Economics, (Walter, 11/5, "The Absurdities Underlying Multiculturalism", http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3275, <6/29/07>)

The multiculturists are right in saying that in a just society people of all races and cultures should be equal in the eyes of the law. But their argument borders on idiocy when they argue that one culture cannot be judged superior to another and to do so is eurocentrism. For them different cultural values are morally equivalent. That's unbridled nonsense. Ask your multiculturalist friends: Is forcible female genital mutilation, as practiced in nearly 30 sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East countries, a morally equivalent cultural value? Slavery is practiced in Northern Sudan; is it morally equivalent? In most of the Middle East, there are numerous limits placed on women such as prohibitions on driving, employment and education. Under Islamic law, in some countries, women adulterers face death by stoning and thieves face the punishment of having their hand severed. Are these cultural values morally equivalent, superior or inferior to ours?

Western values are superior to all others. Why? The indispensable achievement of the West was the concept of individual rights. It's the idea that individuals have certain inalienable rights and individuals do not exist to serve government but governments exist to protect these inalienable rights. It took until the 17th century for that idea to arrive on the scene and mostly through the works of English philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume.

While western values are superior to all others, one need not be a westerner to hold Western values. A person can be Chinese, Japanese, Jewish, African or Arab and hold Western values. It's no accident that western values of reason and individual rights have produced unprecedented health, life expectancy, wealth and comfort for the ordinary person. There's an indisputable positive relationship between liberty and standards of living.

Western values are by no means secure. They're under ruthless attack by the academic elite on college campuses across America. These people want to replace personal liberty with government control; they want to replace equality with entitlement; they want to halt progress in the name of protecting the environment. As such they pose a much greater threat to our way of life than any terrorist or rogue nation. Multiculturalism and diversity are a cancer on our society and ironically, with our tax dollars and charitable donations, we're feeding it.

**Movements against slavery, sexism, and other bigotry are all uniquely founded in WESTERN values**

**D’SOUZA ’97** Immigrant from India and Robert and Karen Rishwain Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (Dinesh, “A Minority Point of View”, http://www.boundless.org/1999/departments/the\_podium/a0000016.html, <6/29/07>)

The historical irony is that the movement against these universal evils—the movement against slavery, the movement for the liberation of women—these emancipation movements are uniquely western, and they’re uniquely western because they make unique claim to the western notion of equality. And the western notion of equality originated essentially in Christianity. Christianity posits that all men are created equal in the eyes of God. Originally that view was thought to apply only to the next world. It was thought to apply only in a spiritual equality. But what distinguished the early anti-slavery movements was that they said, "No, this equality is not just a spiritual equality in the next, it is a moral equality that should be respected politically. That no man has the right to be governed without his consent."

### WEST IS BEST – HEG GOOD

**Even international observers recognize that the US’s hegemony is benevolent and BETTER for the world than the alternative**

**KAGAN ’98** Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “Benevolent Empire”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275>, <6/29/07>)

And neither of them, one suspects, is very seriously intended. For the truth about America's dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans —- and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony: "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs."

**The US as a superpower is better than multipolarity**

**KAGAN ’98** Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “Benevolent Empire”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275>, <6/29/07>)

We need not enter here into the endless and so far unproductive debate among international-relations theorists over the relative merits of multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar international "systems" for keeping the peace. It is sufficient to note that during the supposed heyday of multipolarity —- the eighteenth century, when the first "Concert of Europe" operated -— war among the great powers was a regular feature, with major and minor, and global and local, conflicts erupting throughout almost every decade.

We should also not forget that utopian fancies about the obsolescence of military power and national governments in a transnational, "economic" era have blossomed before, only to be crushed by the next "war to end all wars." The success of the European Union, such as it is, and, moreover, the whole dream of erasing boundaries, has been made possible only because the more fundamental and enduring issues of European security have been addressed by the United States through its leadership of NATO, that most archaic and least utopian of institutions. Were American hegemony really to disappear, the old European questions -— chiefly, what to do about Germany -— would quickly rear their hoary heads.

But let's return to the real world. For all the bleating about hegemony, no nation really wants genuine multipolarity. No nation has shown a willingness to take on equal responsibilities for managing global crises. No nation has been willing to make the same kinds of short-term sacrifices that the United States has been willing to make in the long-term interest of preserving the global order. No nation, except China, has been willing to spend the money to acquire the military power necessary for playing a greater role relative to the United States -— and China's military buildup has not exactly been viewed by its neighbors as creating a more harmonious environment.

**The US might not be perfect but its better than any other superpower would be**

**KAGAN ’98** Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “Benevolent Empire”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275>, <6/29/07>)

Whatever America's failings, were any other nation to take its place, the rest of the world would find the situation less congenial. America may be arrogant; Americans may at times be selfish; they may occasionally be ham-handed in their exercise of power. But, excusez-moi, compared with whom? Can anyone believe that were France to possess the power the United States now has, the French would be less arrogant, less selfish, and less prone to making mistakes? Little in France's history as a great power, or even as a medium power, justifies such optimism. Nor can one easily imagine power on an American scale being employed in a more enlightened fashion by China, Germany, Japan, or Russia. And even the leaders of that least benighted of empires, the British, were more arrogant, more bloody-minded, and, in the end, less capable managers of world affairs than the inept Americans have so far proved to be. If there is to be a sole superpower, the world is better off if that power is the United States.

### WEST IS BEST – DETERRENCE

**U.S. primacy makes the world a more peaceful place due to the burdens it places on other powerful nations’ ability to violently compete for hegemony with the far more powerful America**

Stephen M. **Walt**, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs. BA in international relations from Stanford University; MA and PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Spring, **2002**

(“American primacy: its prospects and pitfalls - prominence of United States in economic, international affairs” , Naval War College Review) (accessed 6/30/07)

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is.

For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons.

One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try. (8)

The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave. (9)

Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

### WEST IS BEST – ECONOMY

**American primacy causes widespread economic growth and prosperity because the peace caused by U.S. primacy leads to the fostering of economic relationships and overall gains for all nations.**

Stephen M. **Walt**, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs. BA in international relations from Stanford University; MA and PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Spring, **2002**

(“American primacy: its prospects and pitfalls - prominence of United States in economic, international affairs” , Naval War College Review) (accessed 6/30/07)

By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence--by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. (10) Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. (11) By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. (12) The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American pow er. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Without America on duty, there will be no America Online."

### A2: CAP

#### **Capitalism promotes peace**

**Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He served as a special assistant to President Reagan. (“Spreading Capitalism is Good for Peace”, Korea Herald on November 10, 2005)**

http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5193

 [That doesn't mean that nothing can be done. But promoting open international markets - that is, spreading capitalism - is the best means to encourage peace as well as prosperity.

Notes Gartzke: "Warfare among developing nations will remain unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain fettered by governmental control." Freeing those economies is critical.

It's a particularly important lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to encourage peace.

If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets - prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.

Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business. And capitalism is good for peace.]