K Answers

K Answers 1

\*\*\*Frontlines\*\*\* 3

Predictions Frontline (1/3) 3

Predictions Frontline (2/3) 4

Predictions Frontline (3/3) 5

Statism Frontline (1/4) 6

Statism Frontline (2/4) 7

Statism Frontline (3/4) 8

Statism Frontline (4/4) 9

Threat Con Frontline (1/3) 10

Threat Con Frontline (2/3) 11

Threat Con Frontline (3/3) 12

Epistemology Frontline (1/2) 13

Epistemology Frontline (2/2) 14

Feminist K Frontline (1/2) 15

Feminist K Frontline (2/2) 16

Deontology Frontline (1/2) 17

Deontology Frontline (2/2) 18

Ontology Frontline (1/1) 19

Value to Life Frontline (1/2) 20

Value to Life Frontline (2/2) 21

Realism Good (1/2) 22

Realism Good (2/2) 23

\*\*\*Predictions Extensions\*\*\* 24

Predictions are best 30

Alt. is the status quo 31

Predictions key to checking the state 32

Predictions good 33

\*\*\*Statism Extensions\*\*\* 34

Alt. fails 34

Must fight within the state 35

States can be rational 36

\*\*\*Threat Construction Extensions\*\*\* 37

\*\*\*Epistemology Extensions\*\*\* 38

Perm Extensions 38

Specifics > Epistemology 39

\*\*\*Feminism Extensions\*\*\* 40

Differences Turn Extensions 40

Alt. fails 41

\*\*\*Deontology Extensions\*\*\* 42

Deontology Fails 42

Consequential Ethics are better 43

AT: Intervening Actors 44

\*\*\*Ontology Extensions\*\*\* 45

Focus Turn 45

Ontology Fails 46

\*\*\*Value to Life Extensions\*\*\* 47

Value to Life Extensions 48

\*\*\*Realism Extensions\*\*\* 49

Realism is best 49

Realism is best 50

Realism is best 51

\*\*\*Misc. Arguments\*\*\* 52

Specific Scenarios > Root Causes 52

Specific evidence should be preferred 53

Ethical Policies are policies with results 54

IR Perms 55

\*\*\*Frontlines\*\*\*

Predictions Frontline (1/3)

Alternative doesn’t solve: Rejection of prediction dooms all policymaking

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

Various IR theorists have also argued against prediction. For example, Donald Puchala contends that IR theory ‘does not, because it cannot in the absence of laws…invite us to deduce, and it does not permit us to predict’ (Puchala 1991: 79). Interpetivist and reflectivist IR theorists like Ashley (1986), Onuf (1989), Walker (1993) and others, following the lead of critical theorists and prediction-sceptic philosophers of social science, argue that IR theory (discussed in Chapter 3) is able to facilitate an interpretive understanding of events and deny that IR theory is capable of prediction or scientific-style explanation. Even though many of these authors hope that IR theory can lead to ‘human emancipation’, their meta-theory undercuts its ability to do so. This trend in the theoretical literature in IR severs the link between IR theory and any significant ability to aid policy-makers to bring about emancipation or any other foreign policy goal. If they do not leave room for rationally grounded expectations about the future, that is, scientific-style prediction, then it will be impossible to formulate policies that can be expected to achieve various aims, including the emancipation of oppressed groups. Without the ability to say that a given action option has a higher probability than any of the other options of achieving the objective, e.g., a greater degree of emancipation of the target group, these theorists cannot recommend courses of action to achieve their desired goals. The loss of this essential capability has been largely overlooked by constructivsts and reflectivists in the IR literature. All policy decisions are attempts to influence or bring about some future state of affairs. Policy-making requires some beliefs about the future, whether they are called ‘expectations’, ‘predictions’, ‘forecasts’ or ‘prognostications’. The next step in the argument is to show how such beliefs can be justified.

Perm: Do the plan while creating emergencies plans in case of an incorrect prediction

Predictions can still work even if we acknowledge that it is impossible to know the future 100% of the time.

**Kurasawa 2004** (Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University. “Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight”. Constellations, 11:4, p. 458-459)

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

Predictions Frontline (2/3)

Turn: Arms build up

**A rejection of predictions extends into the political sphere and cause a variety of problems including arms build-ups, wasting of resources, and low strategic flexibility**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

If the effects of stressing uncertainty were limited to contradictory statements in strategic-planning documents and speeches, the harm would be small and redress would be of largely academic interest. But there is strong circumstantial evidence that these effects extend beyond the rhetorical domain. Three examples illustrate problems arising from an aversion to prediction in strategic planning. Current nuclear-weapons policy and posture illustrate the strategic costs that uncertainty can exact in the form of keeping options open. The 2006 QDR shows how uncertainty can inhibit clear strategic choice in the allocation of resources. Finally, the use of intelligence and expert advice in planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq shows how uncertainty can actually serve to privilege pre-conceptions over analysis and thereby undermine strategic flexibility. Uncertainty in the future security environment has been a key organising principle for the posture and planning of the US nuclear arsenal. In an effort to leave Cold War nuclear-force-sizing logic behind, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adopted from the 2001 QDR a 'capabilities-based approach' to establishing requirements for US nuclear weapons. The premise of the capabilities-based approach is that threats cannot be predicted reliably. As a result, in the words of then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, 'instead of our past primary reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence, we will need a broad array of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for an era of uncertainty and surprise'.17 In practical terms, this meant that the numbers and alert levels of deployed nuclear weapons would need to be considerably higher than would be necessary simply to deter Russia and China.

This argument is empirically true: conservatives have filled in the gap in the past and weapons build ups cause proliferation and nuclear war

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

While the NPR is classified, the extent to which its policy is underpinned by the strategic importance of uncertainty is made very clear in a private report published in January 2001 by several strategists who, only months later, were writing nuclear policy in the Pentagon.18 The report, published by the National Institute for Public Policy, identifies a variety of plausible ways in which the future security environment might change from the status quo, especially in dangerous directions, and evaluates the potential utility of nuclear weapons in adapting to those changes. It does not attempt to assess the likelihoods of any of those alternative futures and, indeed, dismisses the utility of any such assessment, concluding that 'there can be no logical integrity in the confident assertion that any given force level, even if judged to be appropriate today, will continue to be so in the future'.19 The problem with this logic, while laudably cautious, is that it does not leave a great deal of scope for deciding on or justifying any course of action whatsoever about weapons deployment. If there were no trade-offs involved with having large numbers of nuclear weapons on high alert, this might be a minor problem. But, of course, this is not the case. Beyond the resources they consume, large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert may be unnecessarily provocative in crises, may hamper non-proliferation efforts, and may raise the risk of accidental launch by other nuclear powers prompted to maintain high alert levels themselves. The risks of being underprepared for unexpected warfighting contingencies must be weighed against these. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences report summarised this trade-off: 'During the Cold War, reducing the risk of a surprise attack appeared to be more important than the risks generated by maintaining nuclear forces in a continuous state of alert. With the end of that era, the opposite view is now more credible.'20

Predictions Frontline (3/3)

The alternative is in a double bind: either the alternative affects too few people to solve or it uses utopian fiat, which is bad for the following reasons:

Not real world: they fiat a mindset change/movement that would never happen, and real world education is crucial because it is the only thing that helps debaters outside the context of debate

Unfair: utopian fiat justifies fiating an utopian world, a debate that the affirmative could obviously never win.

**Explanations of International Relations that rely upon individual causal forces should be rejected in favor of explanations that are nuanced and specific to the situation.**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online)

While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces, this is not what defines science in natural sciences: this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.41

Turn: Dogma

Failure to use empirical standards of analysis causes dogmatic personal beliefs of policymakers to fill the void.

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic surprise, in 'an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation hellip The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.'16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and 'rigorous assessment' can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

Statism Frontline (1/4)

**Alternative doesn’t solve: states are still the center of the international relations system. Efforts to end violence most focus on the actions of the state**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 9)

It should be emphasized that “state-centrism” in this sense does not preclude the possibility that non-state actors, whether domestic or transnational, have important, even decisive, effects on the frequency and/or manner in which states engage in organized violence. “State-centrism” does not mean that the causal chain in explaining war and peace stops with states, or even that states are the “most important” links in that chain, whatever that might mean. Particularly with the spread of liberalism in the twentieth century this is clearly not the case, since liberal states are heavily constrined by non-state actors in both civil society and the economy. The point is merely that states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system. It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens *through* states. In that sense states still are at the center of the international system, and as such it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric.”

**Perm: Do the plan and use the state as a focal point for radical change.**

**The permutation is the best option: Focusing on the state does not block out the potential for structural change**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 10)

This state-centric focus is not politically innocent. Critics might argue that its insights are inherently conservative, good only for “problem-solving” rather than radical change. That is not my view. Neorealism might not be able to explain structural change, but I think there is potential in IR to develop state-centric theories that can. A key first step in developing such theory is to accept the assumption that states are actors with more or less human qualities: intentionality, rationality, interests, etc. This is a debatable assumption. Many scholars see talk of state “actors” as an illegitimate reificiation or anthropomorphization of what are in fact structures or institutions. On their view the idea of state agency is at most a useful fiction or metaphor. I shall argue that states *really are* agents. Decision-makers routinely speak in terms of national “interests,” “needs,” “responsibilities,” “rationality,” and so on, and it is through such talk that states constitute themselves and each other as agents. International politics as we know it today would be impossible without attributions of corporate agency, a fact recognized by international law, which explicitly grants legal “personality” to states. The assumption of real corporate agency enables states actively to participate in structural transformation.

Statism Frontline (2/4)

**Turn: Anarchy**

**Civilization is based upon the idea of a nation-state.**

**Kelly 1999** (Michael, Director of Legal Research @ Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06)

Consequently, it is premature to announce the **demise of the nation-state** as the pre-eminent creature in the international arena. Indeed, while seeking to redefine and defend the continued relevancy of the nation-state, publicists noting that “there are indications that could suggest that the nation-state, the universally realized form of political organization of societies (people), may become obsolete” conclude that it is still the nation-state that is both the primary actor on the international plane and the organizing principle around which civilizations are built.

**Collapse of the nation state causes extinction.**

**Rubin** **2008.** (Dani, Earth Editor for PEJ News, Master’s student at the University of Victoria, and Associates holder in Chemistry. “Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism,” January 9th, <http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>)

Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot. **A quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown**. When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature’s slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet’s surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world’s dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances. If we get a “fever” and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond “ugly”; they would be horrific and enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones. Imagine 100 Chernobyl’s spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy post-civilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.

**Empirically denied – Nation-states have been around for thousands of years and extinction has not happened yet.**

Statism Frontline (3/4)

**Turn: Morality**

**Collapse of the nation-state causes tribalism that makes protecting morality and equality impossible**

**Addis 2001** (Adeno, Professor of Law @ Tulane University, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, Fall Nexis. Accessed May 16, 06)

It is not quite clear what the institutional response of the cosmopolitan liberal is other than to rejoice in the **demise of the nation-state,** which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. What institutional structures replace the nation-state and how do those institutions precisely resolve the language problem of minorities? There are perhaps two alternative institutional consequences of the **demise of the nation-state.** One consequence may be the ultimate in decentralization. Nation-states fragment into the lowest possible linguistic components. Each linguistic group will be allowed to form its own political community. This is what Professor Thomas Franck has called “postmodern tribalism.” Of course, this would resolve the question of linguistic minorities, but at a higher price of political chaos. Given the fact that there are thousands of linguistic minorities in the world this voluntary separation is likely to lead us to political chaos and instability, precisely the problems that dealing with linguistic minorities is supposed to solve. True, there is a chance that after being allowed to separate, these linguistic groups could actually reconstitute themselves voluntarily as larger multilingual and politically viable communities. But in that case we are back to the question of which language is to be chosen as a national or official language, the very issue that the cosmopolitan liberal claims would be resolved (or would be irrelevant) with the process of decentralization. In any case, it appears that decentralization may in fact make it harder, not easier, to treat all individuals with equal moral concern. Decentralization intensifies and multiplies divisions and boundaries. This is not exactly the structure one would want to put in place if one were trying to ensure that individuals have a global moral stature and are treated equally as units of moral concern.

The alternative is in a double bind: either the alternative affects too few people to solve or it uses utopian fiat, which is bad for the following reasons:

Not real world: they fiat a mindset change/movement that would never happen, and real world education is crucial because it is the only thing that helps debaters outside the context of debate

Unfair: utopian fiat justifies fiating an utopian world, a debate that the affirmative could obviously never win.

Statism Frontline (4/4)

**Turn: Free Trade**

**The nation-state is key to the continual existence of many international organizations, including the WTO, the promotes freedom by protecting free trade and international law.**

**Bacchus 2003** (James. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Summer. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06)

The **demise of the nation-state** has been much exaggerated. For the most part, the Westphalia System still prevails. The WTO is not by any means alone among international institutions in being member-driven by nation-states. The future of the WTO will be shaped by the shared will of the nation-states and other customs territories that comprise the members of the WTO. Their combined will to achieve a multilateral consensus is the key to the future of the WTO as both an engine for the trading system and an exemplar for the international rule of law. Their will is the key to unlocking the way to freedom.

**Free trade ends the nationalism that drives conflicts – a global body politic ensures peace**

**Brook 1999** (Jason, Department of Journalism at Carleton University, Independent Institute “Make Trade, Not War” http://www.independent.org/tii/students/GarveyEssay99Brooks.html)

Different people have different solutions to war; none are as logical as free trade. The war hawks have pursued a policy of mutual assured destruction, arguing that bigger weapons make better deterrents. Others have argued for disarmament. While the causes of war are undoubtedly varied, protectionism clearly invites conflict. To this, free trade is a remedy. While diplomacy is important, there can be no better diplomacy than that which exists between common citizens of the world every day in a thousand spheres of life. The more free trade we have, the more the invisible hand of the market helps us to, while working for our own advancement, create a world of peace. The wellbeing of others becomes our own. There is no reason why, in a world of perfect free trade, people worldwide shouldn't get along as well as the citizens of the happiest, most prosperous democracies. For in a world of free trade it matters little where borders are drawn. "Make love, not war," was a slogan once bandied about as an answer to war. It was a catchy phrase -- and an appealing message given the two options. But it wasn't too practical. The real solution to war, if condensed to the size of a placard, would instead read, "Make trade, not war."

Threat Con Frontline (1/3)

The alternative is in a double bind: either the alternative affects too few people to solve or it uses utopian fiat, which is bad for the following reasons:

Not real world: they fiat a mindset change/movement that would never happen, and real world education is crucial because it is the only thing that helps debaters outside the context of debate

Unfair: utopian fiat justifies fiating an utopian world, a debate that the affirmative could obviously never win.

**Perm: Do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative**

**Extreme paranoia is can lead to conflict, but a certain degree is necessary to protect the population of a state.**

**Berke 1998** (Joseph, Founder and director of the Arbours Crisis Centrel. Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6)

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.

**Turn: Enemies are real and pose a danger to other groups. We must recognize these threats to prevent atrocity.**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p.261-2)

Enemy images have a long pedigree, and some states continue to position each other in such terms today. The Greeks represented the Persians as “barbarians”’ the Crusaders perceived the Turks as “infidenls”; medieval Europeans feared their defeat at Liegnitz at the hands of the Mongols heralded Armageddon; later Europeans treated the peoples of the Americas as savages; conservatives though civilization was threatened by the French Revolution; and in our own century, we have the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the early Cold War, Northern Ireland, Pol Pot, Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalists, the Bosnian Civil War, Hutus and Tutsis—all based on representations of the Other as intent on destroying or enslaving the Self. It is important to emphasize that this concept implies nothing about whether enemy images are justified. Some enemies are “real,” in that the Other really does existentially threaten the Self, as the Nazis did the Jews, and others are “chimeras,” as the Jews were to the Nazis. This difference may affect the dynamic of enmity and whether it can be overcome, but it does not affect the reality of Hobbesian cultures. Real or imagined, if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences.

Threat Con Frontline (2/3)

**Alternative doesn’t solve: it is impossible to break down powerful social constructions due to psychological and system reasons**

**Wendt 2000** (Alexander, Professor of International Security, Dept. of Political Science at Ohio State University. International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, edited by Andrew Linklater, p. 629)

Let us assume that processes of identity- and interest-formation have created a world in which states do not recognize rights to territory or existence-a war of all against all. In this world, anarchy has a "realist" meaning for state action: be insecure and concerned with relative power. Anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change. The fact that worlds of power politics are socially constructed, in other words, does not guarantee they are malleable, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others. Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism. The possibility of change depends on whether the exigencies of such competition leave room for actions that deviate from the prescribed script. If they do not, the system will be reproduced and deviant actors will not. The second reason is that systemic change may also be inhibited by actors' interests in maintaining relatively stable role identities. Such interests are rooted not only in the desire to minimize uncertainty and anxiety, manifested in efforts to confirm existing beliefs about the social world, but also in the desire to avoid the expected costs of breaking commitments made to others-notably domestic constituencies and foreign allies in the case of states-as part of past practices. The level of resistance that these commitments induce will depend on the "salience" of particular role identities to the actor. The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as "leader of anticommunist crusades" than to its identity as "promoter of human rights." But for almost any role identity, practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat, and these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social change. For both systemic and "psychological" reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend. This does not change the fact that through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously "choosing now the preferences [they] will have later." But it does mean that choices may not be experienced with meaningful degrees of freedom. This could be a constructivist justification for the realist position that only simple learning is possible in self-help systems. The realist might concede that such systems are socially constructed and still argue that after the corresponding identities and interests have become institutionalized, they are almost impossible to transform.

**Threats are inevitable: It’s impossible to solve every threat. Even in this debate round, my partner and I are threatened by you.**

Threat Con Frontline (3/3)

**Confronting threats early prevents escalation—WWII proves.**

**Yoon 2003** (Young-Kwan, Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea. “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8*)*

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

Epistemology Frontline (1/2)

**Perm: Do the plan and adopt epistemological pragmatisim**

**Adopting a middle-ground approach to epistemology is key to dialogue between intellectual communities, which is necessary to gain valuable knowledge.**

**Sil 2000** (Rudra, assistant professor of political science @ University of Pennsylvania. Beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 166 )

In the final analysis, it may be best to regard the entire process of social research as an ongoing collective search for meanings by a community of scholars. This search may not result in any definitive answers to theoretical or practical questions given the diverse foundations informing the puzzles, texts, and models that preoccupy members of this community. Nevertheless, thanks to the mediating role played by those subscribing to a pragmatic epistemological middle-ground, the process can still yield valuable insights, partial explanations, and even modest “lessons” and that can be judged as *more* or *less* convincing in the eyes of one’s audience whether this audience consists of academic peers, the lay public at large, or the policy-making community. In an era of increasingly divided disciplines, scholars adopting a more pragmatic epistemological “middle ground,” by virtue of their agnosticism, are likely to make the most critical contributions to whatever cumulation of knowledge is possible in the social sciences. These scholars are in a better position than those at the extreme ends for the purpose of generating and sustaining greater dialogue across different disciplines, theoretical approaches and intellectual movements precisely because their assumptions prevent them from hastily dismissing a study on grounds that are only meaningful to a subgroup within the wider community of scholars. In the absence of meaningful dialogue across different intellectual communities—whether delimited by disciplines, paradigms or methodological schools—the social sciences risk becoming permanently “balkanized,” with scholars passing up opportunities to glean valuable insights from intellectual products developed on the basis of different foundational assumptions.

**Radical epistemological kritiks of International Relations are premature and should be rejected. We can combine the different viewpoints they try to polarize.**

**Niarguinen 2001** (Dmitri, professor of IR at Central European University. “Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations”. Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http:// venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/ ~rubikon/forum /dmitri.htm)

For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either ‘Sokal-hoax’ type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism [may] be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant[51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature.

Epistemology Frontline (2/2)

**Turn: Privileging concepts like epistemology hides flaws in postmodern approaches to international relations. Their authors prefer dogmatic faith over critical investigation.**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 138)

First, I must acknowledge that any theoretical critique of Ashley’s project, including this one, is destined to failure, at least in its ability to affect the course of debate within postmodernism. This problem is not endemic to the nature of the critique(s), but reflects the fact that postmodern theory is as much driven by ideological commitment as by theoretical innovation. Moreover, within international relations theory the postmodernist perspective exists independently of contending approaches, hermetically isolated if only because of its specialized nomenclature and distinctive ideological hue that encloses participants in a select and self-absorbed theoretical-ideological discourse. Membership to this discourse is exclusive and limited to those who promise to take up the faith and propagate it, not question it critically. Thus, regardless of how erudite critiques migh be, or how serendipitous critical analysis proves, we can scarcely expect Ashley to be convinced by intellectual mustings when they are contrary to his political ambitions. For in Ashley’s writings we are confronted as much by ideological intransigence as we debate over ontological and epistemological issues. The postmodernist/modernist divide is more ideological than theoretical, a battle not between contending ontologies so much as between political loyalties. The façade of ontological and epistemological debate has thus been used deceptively to shield the underlying ideological axis upon which these debates ultimately rest. For this reason, we should not be surprised that postmodernists remain unconvinced by modernist theory, or vice versa, or that each is largely uninterested in the others perspective, theory, or arguments. Those views, theories, or paradigms not in accord with one’s own worldview or basic values are rarely considered, let alone studied. And while Ashley would have us believe that these failings are the exclusive prsever of modernist/positivist theory, postmodernist theory too is just as guilty, having evolved in isolation, cocooned by technical nomenclature, reticent to engage contending perspectives in useful dialogue, and trigger happy in rejecting opposing perspectives without first understanding them.

**The lack of absolute truths doesn’t deny the necessity of logic and data. Limited truths are possible, and incomplete knowledge is still useful**

**Sil 2000** (Rudra, assistant professor of political science @ University of Pennsylvania. Beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 161)

In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it “data” or “narrative”—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation *more plausible* than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and interpretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of “logically consistent” hypotheses “supported by data” and the ordering of facts in a “thick” narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate and refine *general* inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more “sensible” or “plausible” to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

Feminist K Frontline (1/2)

**Turn: Essentialist feminism reinforces gender stereotypes through valorization of women’s differences, preventing efforts to end oppression, killing the transformative power of their critique, and harming ourselves and those listening.**

**Young 1990** (Iris, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. THROWING LIKE A GIRL ANDOTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHYAND SOCIAL THEORY, pg. 89-90)

Within the context of antifeminist backlash, the effect of gynocentric feminism may be accommodating to the existing structure. Gynocentric feminism relies on and reinforces gender stereotypes at just the time when the dominant culture has put new emphasis on marks of gender difference. It does so, moreover, by relying on many of those aspects of women's traditional sphere that traditional patriarchal ideology has most exploited and that humanist feminists such as Beauvoir found most oppressive--reproductive biology, motherhood, s domestic concerns. Even though its intentions are subversive, such renewed attention to traditional femininity can have a reactionary effect on both ourselves and our listeners because it may echo the dominant claim that women belong in a separate sphere. Humanist feminism calls upon patriarchal society to open places for women within those spheres of human activity that have been considered the most creative, powerful, and prestigious. Gynocentric feminism replies that wanting such things for women implies a recognition that such activities are the most humanly valuable. It argues that in fact, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy, competition for recognition, and the instrumentalization of nature and people entailed by these activities are basic disvalues.24 Yet in contemporary society, men still have most institutionalized power, and gynocentric feminism shows why they do not use it well. If feminism turns its back on the centers of power, privilege, and individual achievement that men have monopolized, those men will continue to monopolize them, and nothing significant will change.

**Perm: Do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative.**

**Acting through the state is key to ending oppressive masculine forces. Non-state actions fail**

**Young 1990** (Iris, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. THROWING LIKE A GIRL ANDOTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHYAND SOCIAL THEORY, pg. 89-90)

Feminists cannot undermine masculinist values without entering some of the centers of power that foster them, but the attainment of such power itself requires at least appearing to foster those values. Still, without being willing to risk such co-optation, feminism can be only a moral position of critique rather than a force for institutional change. Despite its intention, I fear that gynocentric feminism may have the same consequence as the stance of moral motherhood that grew out of nineteenth century feminism a resegregation of women to a specifically women's sphere, outside the sites of power, privilege, and recognition. For me the symptom here is what the dominant culture finds more threatening. Within the dominant culture a middle-aged assertive woman's claim to coanchor the news alongside a man appears considerably more threatening than women's claim to have a different voice that exposes masculinist values as body-denying and selfish. The claim of women to have a right to the positions and benefits that have hitherto been reserved for men, and that male dominated institutions should serve women's needs, is a direct threat to male privilege. While the claim that these positions of power themselves should be eliminated and the institutions eliminated or restructured is indeed more radical, when asserted from the gynocentric feminist position it can be an objective retreat. Gynocentrism’s focus on values and language as the primary target of its critique contributes to this blunting of its political force. Without doubt, social change requires changing the subject, which in turn means developing new ways of speaking, writing, and imagining. Equally indubitable is the gynocentric feminist claim that masculinist values in Western culture deny the body, sensuality, and rootedness in nature and that such denial nurtures fascism, pollution, and nuclear games. Given these facts, however, what shall we do? To this gynocentrism has little concrete answer. Because its criticism of existing society is so global and abstract, gynocentric critique of values, language, and culture of masculinism can remove feminist theory from analysis of specific institutions and practices, and how they might be concretely structurally changed in directions more consonant with our visions.

Feminist K Frontline (2/2)

**Explanations of international relations that rely upon individual causal forces should be rejected in favor of explanations that are nuanced and specific to the situation**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online)

While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces, this is not what defines science in natural sciences: this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.41

[parsimony: Adoption of the simplest assumption in the formulation of a theory or in the interpretation of data, especially in accordance with the rule of Ockham's razor. American Heritage Dictionary 2009]

**Feminist theories pointing to female superiority or male inferiority reify gender differences Gergen 1993** (Kenneth, Prof. of Psychology at Swarthmore College, “The limits of Psychological Critque” as included in Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology, Volume III. Accessed in Google Books)

As many have pointed out, arguments against male dominance simultaneously reify a distinction between men and women; they operate to essentialize gender as a factual difference. Similarly, as various criticisms are couched in the language of racial conflict, the concept of essential differences between races is sustained; to speak against upper-class domination is to engender the reality of class differences. Once reality has been struck in terms of the binary, the contours of the world are fixed.

Deontology Frontline (1/2)

**Alternative doesn’t solve: morality causes political paralysis and leads to no effective change**

**Issac 2002** (Jeffery, professor of political science @ Indiana University. Dissent, Spring 2002, 49: 2, p. 32)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters ; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics — as opposed to religion— pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century : it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**Perm: Do the plan and all non mutally-exclusive parts of the alternative.**

**Morality and political theory not mutually exclusive: best mechanism for solvency is a combination of both**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 18-19)

Indeed, moral principles, imperatives and theories require both descriptive and predictive theories, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. One must know what is possible and probable in order to make or appraise foreign policy decisions. One may not morally condemn the lifeguard for rescuing only one of the two drowning swimmers if it was physically impossible to save both. Similarly, in international politics one may not blame a state dedicated to just and egalitarian democratic rule for not creating a just and egalitarian order throughout the system, if that state does not have the resources to do so. One must have causal and descriptive theories in order to understand what the state has the capacity to do, even when it comes to appraising how well it lives up to its moral obligations. Policy-making unavoidably requires both theories that are primarily moral and theories that are primarily empirical. This book endorses a proper role for normative theory in world politics in appraising past decisions and in choosing the best future courses of action, though it focuses on the primarily empirical form of theory. Theories of IR inspired by critical theory and postmodernism are on stronger ground when they offer strictly normative arguments. One might object that the emphasis here on the need for empirical theories and the need to know consequences would be vulnerable to charges that it endorses ethical consequentialism, which some philosophers reject. But the position here is clearly not that actions are to be evaluated as morally good or bad in terms of their consequences. Even anti-consequentialist positions generally recognise that a moral agent must have knowledge of conditions to perform moral deeds, even if those actions are appraised on the basis of the agent’s motivations rather than the actions’ consequences.

Deontology Frontline (2/2)

**No link: Deontology is concerned with doing something rather than what is good**

**Gaus 2001** (Gerald, Prof. of Philosophy @ Tulane. THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY. Number 35, p.179-193. Online. Internet. Accessed May 29, 06. <http://www.springerlink.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>)

To maintain that we have a reason to act in some way just because so acting instantiates a rule, principle, or maxim that instructs us to do so implies that our reason to act does not depend simply on our goals, values, or desires. As Prichard stressed, deontic reasons are imperatival rather than attractive: they instruct us to perform our duties because performance is required, not because we find the action attractive. It is relevant that “[t]he term ‘deontology’ derives from the Greek words *deon* (duty) and *logos* (science).” In the broadest sense, then, an ethical theory is deontological if it constitutes a science of duty and obligations. As Charles Fried says, “the whole domain of the obligatory, the domain of duty, [is] the domain of deontology as opposed to the domain of the good.” Thus whereas teleology is the science of what is good and worthy, deontology is the science of duty and obligation. Charles Larmore has argued that in this expansive sense deontological ethics is the distinctively modern view of ethics: deontologists understand ethics as juristic, issuing demands or imperatives regarding what we *must* do.

Ontology Frontline (1/1)

**Postmodernists concede that physical impacts outweigh theoretical concerns – if we win our impacts then our advantages outweigh the Kritik**

**Wapner 2003** (Paul, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at Ameri**can** University. Leftist Criticism of. Accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539>)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

**Perm: Do the plan and all non mutually-exclusive parts of the alternative**

**Alternative doesn’t solve: An ontological focus will forever delay political action**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 139-140)

This we might interpret as faceless description without meaning, commitment without purpose, and theory without reason. As William Connolly notes, Ashley creates a poststructuralism bereft of logic, direction, or mission, where “theory does not ‘impose’ a general interpretation; it does not offer ‘a guide’ to the ‘transformation’ of life ‘on a global scale.’” Well might we ask then, what does it do? After all, is this not the purpose of theory? Apparently not. It is enough for Ashley that we simply fret against transcendental grounds, universal projects, and grand designs. But, as Connolly observers, buy imposing “this set of interwoven self-restrictions, Ashley may have reduced ‘poststructuralism’ to one perpetual assignment to ‘invert the hierarchies’ maintained in other theories. One might call this recipe for theoretical self-restriction ‘post-ponism.’ It links the inability to establish secure ontological ground for a theory with the obligation to defer indefinitely the construction of general theories of global politics. And it does so during a time when the greatest danger and contingencies in the world are global in character.

Value to Life Frontline (1/2)

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equal and unconditional human dignity**

**Cummiskey 1996** (David, Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College. Kantian Consequentialism. Pp. 145-146)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

**Because different people have different conceptions of a good value of life, politics cannot be responsible for creating a good value to life. Any attempt to do so will be totalitarian**

**Szacki 1996** (Jerzy, Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University. Liberalism After Communism, p. 197)

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that – as Joseph Raz wrote – ‘there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible’ It recognizes that—as John Rawls put it—‘a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’. What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of; he or she is ready to acknowledge that ‘now this variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different’. Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, ‘political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.’

Value to Life Frontline (2/2)

**Perm: Do the plan and feel remorse about the fact that we have to make choices that destroy the value of life.**

**Consequentialism, combined with remorse, is the best ethical choice**

**Cummiskey 1996** (David, Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College. Kantian Consequentialism. Pp. 150-151)

Consequentialism thus provides an indirect justification for our intuitive conviction that we should not demand that the innocent sacrifice themselves, and also that we should not sacrifice the innocent. Kant’s moral theory, however, simply does not provide a more direct and indefeasible justification for deontological constraints. In principle, a conscientious Kantian moral agent may be required to kill one in order to save two. Nonetheless, if someone is unable to do so, this may well not be grounds for reproach. Similarly, if I cannot amputate a leg to save a life—either my own or that of another—I may not be blameworthy for my failure, although it is true that I should have done the nasty deed. Still, in such a situation I must try to force my attention on the good I am doing and thereby enable myself to act. Similarly, in the highly unusual case where it would truly be best to kill some to save others, a good person should also try to focus on the lives to be saved rather than becoming fixated exclusively on those who will be killed. Nonetheless, even though sacrificing some to save others is sometimes the right thing to do, one should still feel regret and mourn the people who are lost. After all, the goal is to save each and every person; thus, one should indeed feel the loss of even one. According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that in deciding what to do, one must give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings leads to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices that a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that in the moral consideration of conduct, one’s own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

Realism Good (1/2)

Studies and pragmatism illustrate that nations act in a realist manner.

**Mearsheimer 2001** (John, professor of international relations at the University of Chicago. “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. Accessed at <http://www.irchina.org/xueke/fangfa/view.asp?id=114>)

The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great-power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

Alternatives to realism risk fascism by not providing a clear alternative

**Mearsheimer 1994**(John, professor of international relations at the University of Chicago.

 “The false promise of international institutions”. Winter Accessed via Academic OneFile)

There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act...such expectations are almost never realized in practice." (160) Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

Realism Good (2/2)

The global spread of democracy will check the negative aspects of realism.

**Lieber 1993**(Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

Third, democratization can operate to mitigate the anarchic nature of the international system. In this case, genuinely democratic states have had a laudable record of not making war against one another. Why this should be so is a matter of conjecture, but one evident factor is that by making policy processes more transparent, democracy eases some of the uncertainty about state intentions that drives the security dilemma. The spread of democratization thus holds the potential for very significantly reducing the level of interstate violence. Indeed, at a conceptual level, democratization may represent a profound challenge to the assumptions on which existential realism is based. At the same time, however, it is essential to note that democratic states do continue to find themselves in conflict and sometimes at war with nondemocratic states. Moreover, the idea of democratization implies the adoption of a genuinely effective constitutional democracy as widely understood in the West, and not the kind of plebiscitary charade that authoritarian systems sometimes adopt in a bid to provide their rulers with greater legitimacy. Nor does the concept of democracy really include instances when elections are no more than a means by which a group or movement consolidates power and then closes off the process against other competing groups (“one man, one vote, one time”).

Realism is not amoral: this is merely a false dilemma set up by critics.

**Solomon 1996** (Hussein, Senior Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW. Online. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06)

It has been argued by Walker that realism’s concentration on power-politics results in the development of a dichotomy between power and morality. He also asserts that realism negates the usefulness, or indeed, the relevance of ethics in the international arena. Vale65 makes a similar point on the power *versus* morality issue. He even goes further by implying a link between realism and immoral apartheid. Is this true? Does realism, both as theory and as practice, separate power from ethics? Does realism advocate immorality in international politics? On the theoretical side one could repudiate this challenge by simply turning to Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919 -1939* which is one of the chief scrolls in the realist faith. It is generally regarded that this text effectively repudiated the tenets of Wilsonian idealism and set the basic principles of power politics on which Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Reynolds and others had built. However, a closer examination of the book itself provides a more tempered view of the role of power and an appreciation of morality in international politics. For instance, Carr puts forward the notion of a combination of power and morality, basing thoughts on elements of both utopia and reality, and he describes politics and law as a ‘meeting place’ for ethics and power.

\*\*\*Predictions Extensions\*\*\*

**Predictions can work**

**Even if strategizing is uncertain, we should plan for the MOST LIKELY future events by looking at a robust range of evidence.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic planning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and international political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well prepared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the challenges of the most likely future events.

**The future is not shrouded in mystery—we can make some predictions about future events in international relations.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

Additionally, the notion that today's future is less certain than yesterday's is overdrawn. There is more nostalgia than truth behind the characterisation of the Cold War as 'a time of reasonable predictability'. Presidents from Harry Truman to George H.W. Bush might have taken exception to that description, as might soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines deployed to Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama and Iraq, among other places, while Pentagon strategists refined plans for war in Central Europe. By the same token, today's future may not be shrouded in complete mystery. Indeed, much of recent official rhetoric surrounding the 'war on terror' echoes that of the Cold War, identifying the emergence of a mortal enemy, in the form of violent radical Islam, and the prospects for a generational struggle against that enemy.11 This rhetoric contrasts sharply with claims that uncertainty is central to strategic planning. The 2006 QDR flirts with a little logical tension when it introduces the term 'the long war' and the notion of 'an era of surprise and uncertainty' within one page of each other.12 In sum, the justification for emphasising uncertainty in strategic planning is questionable. Strategic uncertainty is neither novel to the current security environment nor overwhelming in the face of some clear challenges facing US national security.

**We do know certain things about the security environment.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

In spite of its intuitive appeal, applying uncertainty to strategic planning quickly becomes problematic and can even inhibit the flexibility it was meant to deliver. The first question we must ask here is: granting the inevitability of surprise, can we learn anything about the future from the current security environment? We do know a great deal about that. We know, for example, that transnational terrorist networks are actively targeting US interests and allies throughout the world. Also, Iran, a nation with a track record of xenophobic foreign policy and support for terrorism, is building nuclear weapons. The paranoid, totalitarian regime in North Korea continues to threaten its neighbours with nuclear weapons, sophisticated missile systems, a million-man army, and thousands of artillery tubes within range of Seoul, the heart of one of Asia's largest economies. None of these conditions is likely to disappear in the near future.

**Predictions can work**

**The impossibility of absolute truth doesn’t deny the possibility of productive discourse and action.**

**Ferguson and Mansbach 2002** (Yale H. and Richard W., profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State. Reconstructing theory in global politics: Beyond the postmodern challenge. In International Relations and the “Third Debate” edited by Darryl Jarvis.)

The task is daunting, as the historian Fernandez-Armesto readily acknowledges: “Historians like me know, at least as well as practioners of any other discipline, how elusive objectivity is. Even if we perform miracles of self-immolation, we are left with sources which derive from other hands and bear the imprint of other subjects—witnesses, reporters, compilers of data and hearsay” (1997:227). However, to stand paralyzed and utterly ignore history because of the magnitude of the challenge would be absurd. It is nonetheless important to admit that historical research is inevitably to some extent theory-dependent and subjective, to look at as many sources as possible, to get a firm notion of the range of interpretations, and then to make one’s own informed judgment as to which interpretation(s) appear(s) to be the most plausible. The result is few givens—only probabilities, likelihoods, and sometimes only possibilities. We have to live with that ambiguity and proceed as best we can. If our investigations seem to provide a more convincing view of political reality than other constructions, then that may be the most we can hope for. The more varied the cases we consider, the less chance there is that errors of fact or interpretation will completely invalidate our conclusions.

**Making careful efforts to predict consequences can be effective, especially compared to any alternative which risks randomness.**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

Experience does seem to support (non-point) predictions of human behaviour. For example, there seems to be little problem with predictions of the behaviour of individual humans such as: the hungry baby will cry some time during the night; or of states such as: France will not invade China in the coming year. Any theory that prohibits prediction will, like the metaphysics of Parmenides and Zeno, require an extraordinarily high standard of proof, because the alternative appears to be so well confirmed. The examination of anti-predictive arguments drawn from a variety of sources (such as non-linearities, social complexity, the absence of governing regularities) showed that there is no conclusive argument against the possibility of predictive theory. And prediction indeed seems possible in international relations, albeit with certain qualifications. The foregoing has acknowledged qualifications on the predictiveness of social science theory. Predictions are probabilistic and their strength is limited by the value of observed empirical associations and by the future temporal frame (since they are less reliable as the time-frame is extended, which follows from the axioms of the probability calculus). However, the calculations produce better results than randomly chosen policies. And random policies are the alternative if one rejects belief in rational calculation and causation on which it is based. The review of the attacks on prediction showed the arguments to be fundamentally flawed. Either they derive their conclusions by means of a straw man (an uncommonly narrow definition of ‘prediction’ that presupposes many unreasonable conditions) or the accounts supposedly inconsistent with prediction in fact allow, on closer inspection, room for prediction.

**Predictions can work**

**Predictions are essential to international relations policy, even accounting for any imperfections.**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

This chapter has thus sought to show that the arguments against prediction offered by each author are flawed and that the sound elements of the foundational positions sketched out by the various authors (especially Bohman and Bernstein et al.) can consistently be brought into line with some notion of ‘prediction’, when that notion is founded on probabilistic rather than deterministic generalisations. Bernstein et al. attempt to discredit ‘prediction’ by arguing that IR is much more similar to evolutionary theory than to physical sciences like classical mechanics. Is IR very like classical mechanics or evolutionary biology? It shares many features with both but also has many dissimilarities to both and consequently is ‘very like’ neither. A major part of the strategy of the critique of Bernstein et al. has been to show that a further probing of the character of physical science reveals that the dissimilarities that Bernstein et al. claim do not hold. This is not to say that an unrestricted naturalism is justified. Far from it. Comprehensive theories like those of the physical sciences are not likely to emerge in IR. Nevertheless, theoretical and scientific-style investigation in IR has great value and holds out the possibility, at least within tightly circumscribed domains, to achieve natural-science-like consensus and well-founded prediction. Indeed, prediction is necessary for good policy-making, even though there are limitations due to hermeneutic interpretation, lack of governing regularities and non-linearities. These considerations lead to the conclusion that there are limitations on the types of predictions one might propose and the confidence that should be displayed in them but not to conclude that policy-makers should avoid prediction. While prediction is necessary for policy-making, prediction alone is not sufficient, since normative considerations must always be addressed. Probabilistic predictions may inform one of things like ‘socialist states go to war with non-socialist states less often than democratic states go to war with non-democracies’. But normative analysis is clearly required in order to determine whether this is a good or bad thing and what policy initiatives should be pursued.

**AT: Tetlock**

**Philip Tetlock’s “monkeys make better predictions than experts” theory is flawed.**

**Caplan 2005** (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, “Tackling Tetlock”, EconLog, <http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html>)

And that's tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock's work as a great refutation of my own. Most of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public, and defends the simple "The experts are right, the public is wrong," interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that the average expert is an embarassingly bad forecaster. In fact, experts barely beat what Tetlock calls the "chimp" stategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. Tetlock's sample suffers from severe selection bias. He deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. As his methodological appendix explains, questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who? The implicit answer is "Dumb according to the typical expert in the field." What Tetlock really shows is that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus. This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it: "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what Tetlock really shows is that experts can raise their credibility if they stop overreaching.

**Even if sources are wrong on specific predictions, it doesn’t mean their core beliefs are untrue**

**Caplan 2005** (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, “Tackling Tetlock”, EconLog, <http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html>)

And yes, Tetlock has data, drawing upon twenty years of observation of 82,361 forecasts.  Tetlock also finds that "foxes" forecast better than "hedgehogs" and that only the forecasts of foxes have positive value. This is one of the (few) must-read social science books of 2005. My caveat: Assume that the experts are usually wrong in their novel predictions.  The consensus views of a science still might be worth listening to.  Economists cannot forecast business cycles very well, but you should listen when they tell you that a deflationary shock is bad news.  Each new forecast or new theory is an example of individual hubris and in expected value terms it is stupid.  But the body of experts as a whole, over time, absorbs what is correct.  A large number of predictions creates a Hayekian discovery process with increasing returns to scale.  Social knowledge still comes out ahead, and in part because of the self-deceiving vanities put forward every day.  You can find that point in Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels.

**Turn: Marginalization**

**Rejection of problem solving is elitist and locks in oppression of the marginalized.**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 128-9)

Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of those theorists and these theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

**The alternative fails: Rejection of theories of casuality would cripple social change—there would be no point in studying language or society if we rejected casuality.**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online.)

Indeed, collaboration with critical realists on causation does not endanger the logic of post-positivist explanations. For example, accepting discourses as causal in that they shape, constrain and condition the possibility of agential actions does not downgrade poststructuralist arguments on the political consequentiality of discourses – rather (nonpositivist, non-deterministic) causality can be seen as an implicit claim within their theorisations.50 Also, accepting reasons as a type of cause on a critical realist basis does not downgrade Fierke’s constructivist arguments on world politics. While her argument against the use of causal language is persuasive against the positivist conception of causality, it does not refute the critical realist account of causation, which does not entail a ‘when A, then B’ notion of causality, nor does it refute the critical realist argument that reasons must be causal in some sense for agents to possess intentionality.51 Fierke’s account, it seems, is also dependent on a non-positivist conception of causality in that Fierke seems to emphasise ‘justificatory reasons’ agents give precisely because these reasons have consequences for public language and debate on legitimate actions – and hence on the critical realist basis can be conceived to condition identities and actions causally. Recognising language of causality does not downgrade post-positivist arguments: it simply denies the validity of the positivist meaning of the concept of cause in talking about these kinds of complex conditioning situations and, in fact, opens up the usefulness of the wider causal language developed by the critical realists, such as recognising differences between agential causation, intentional causation, and conditioning causation. Beyond these theoretical defences of the critical realist position there might also be an important further reason for critical realists to maintain their belief in causal language and science, a reason that post-positivist critics, but also many critical realists themselves, have overlooked. Critical realism seems, albeit implicitly, to affirm the political consequences of applying the notion of causation in social analysis. Social science for critical realists is an inherently evaluative process, as it is for many other critical social theorists, but critical realists reinforce the link between causal analysis and critical evaluation of social structures and discourses. Critical realists argue that when social scientists study causation they inevitably form ethical judgements, positive or negative, regarding the causal powers of social structures and discourses they study. It follows that in the light of critical realism, the arguments of critical social theorists – for example the Critical Theorists’ analyses of capitalism or poststructuralists’ analyses of discourses of terrorism – can be seen as forms of causal analysis that seek to identify structures and discourses that enable and constrain actors within them in such ways that are adversely consequential on certain groups of people. If certain structures, ideas or discourses were not causally consequential on the world and in an adverse way for some actors, why would these theorists ‘waste their breath’ in criticising them?52 Implicit in the very notion of critical theorising seems to be an acceptance of causality: it seems that accepting social causation, although in a non-positivist way, is not only consistent with the aims of critical theorising (generally conceived) but also provides something of a justification for the underlying political drive of critical theorising. This political justification of talking about causation, even if a possible point of disagreement (for poststructuralists for example), has been ignored by most post-positivist critics. It follows that the ‘politics of causal analysis’ have not really been engaged with in IR as well as many post-positivists would like to think. This is a shame since it seems that the convergences of critical realism and post-positivism are significant: they both share a critique of positivist science, both emphasise methodological openness in social inquiry, both recognise inherent politics of social analysis and both seek critical engagements with social forces in world politics. Yet so far critical realism has not been engaged with seriously by the post-positivists and adequate engagement with critical realist justifications for their position has not been achieved. Through a more constructive appreciation of the critical realist justifications for their position it is be possible that more constructive alliances can be formed in the discipline between critical realists and existing IR theorists.

Predictions are best

**Acting on our best guesses is preferable to endless criticism and relativism.**

**Ferguson and Mansbach 2008** (Yale H. and Richard W., profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State. A world of polities: Essays in global politics. Pg. 59)

Yet in truth (pun intended), both the positivists and extreme relativists fail to convince us, although the latter would insist that that is proof positive of the validity of their arguments. As a gesture of goodwill, we similarly suggest that one familiar criticism of postmodernists does more to affirm the position of the extreme relativists than to refute them, to wit: with no standards for evidence, why should an observer accept their perspective more than any other? Or, as Roger Scruton (cited in Fernandez-Arnesto, 1997: 203) put it: “The man who tells you truth doesn’t exist is asking you not to believe him. So don’t.” Ah yes, but why then should we believe Roger Scruton? Martin Hollis (1994: 241) sums up: “All interpretations become defensible but at the price that none is more justifiable than the rest. If this is indeed the upshot, the circle turns vicious and the hermeneutic imperative to understand from within leads to disaster.” It is precisely this disaster that is unacceptable, especially when there would appear to be more constructive alternatives. Can we not discuss and debate ideas as well as we can, given our personal biases, weasel language, and imperfect information? For instance, we hope the readers of this chapter would agree that, whether or not they accept the arguments we are making, they understand what we are saying well enough—and that there are only a limited number of counterarguments worthy of admission to the dialogue. To be sure, we may all be wrong, but we are not all normally engaged in tales told by idiots or nonsense games.

Alt. is the status quo

**Dismissing predictive models locks in the status quo—turning the kritik.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Moreover, this style of decision-making is self-reinforcing. A strategist dismissive of explicit models of prediction or cause and effect is likely to have a much higher threshold of resistance to adjusting strategy in the face of changing circumstances. It is much harder to be proven wrong if changing or emerging information is systematically discounted on the grounds that the strategic environment is inherently unpredictable. The result may be a bias toward momentum in the current direction, toward the status quo. This is the antithesis of flexibility. Facts on the ground change faster than belief systems, so the extent to which a strategy is based on the latter rather than the former may be a reasonable measure of strategic rigidity. In this way, undue emphasis in planning on uncertainty creates an intellectual temptation to cognitive dissonance on the one hand, and confirmatory bias on the other. And the effect, both insidious and ironic, is that the appreciation for uncertainty subverts exactly the value that it professes to serve: flexibility.

**Rejecting prediction won’t usher in a utopian alternative—it will merely lock in the status quo.**

**Kurasawa 2004** (Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University. “Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight”. Constellations, 11:4, p. 458-459)

But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian ‘Not-Yet’ remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future.

Predictions key to checking the state

**Reliance on predictive tests requires decision-makers to expose their beliefs—this makes them easier to challenge.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'hellip If someone says 'a fair chance'hellip ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differenceshellip Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.'35

**Emphasizing strategic uncertainty re-entrenches bureaucratic political power.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Admittedly, the role played by strategic uncertainty in the decision-making processes at the highest levels in this case is speculative. And, to be fair, neither of the two previous QDRs was notable for codification of difficult choices either. There are considerable inertial political forces, both inside and outside the Pentagon, that slow efforts to implement major programmatic change. Nevertheless, the gap between the QDR's aspiration and its achievement in terms of driving transformational change raises the questions: might different choices have been made if advocates for change could have mustered stronger arguments about the potential bases for making controversial trade-offs? And on what grounds might advocates of paring back procurement of expensive weapon systems have justified their views, if not the diminishing likelihood of conventional conflict with peer or near-peer military competitors? But, if claims about differential likelihoods of various types of major military contingencies are drowned out by the noise of uncertainty, then the intellectual grounds for debating strategic choice become quite slippery. In the process, strategic choice becomes more susceptible than it would otherwise be to the dynamics of bureaucratic political power.

Predictions good

**Denying strategic predictions precludes strategy altogether.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy.

**Skepticism toward the validity of prediction marginalizes analysis.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

\*\*\*Statism Extensions\*\*\*

Alt. fails

**Reforming the state is a strategic necessity – non-state alternatives will either be crushed by the state or result in less accountable tyrannies**

**Chomsky 1998** (Noam, Professor of Linguistics at MIT. The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian, p. 84-85)

So Argentina is “minimizing the state”—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn’t popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you’re simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is “expanding the floor of the cage.” They understand that they’re trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it’s under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they’re so vulnerable, they’ll get murdered. That’s something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don’t understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we’re not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

**Abolishing the state won’t solve patriarchy, class oppression, or racism**

**Dixon 2005** (Chris, author. “Reflection of Privilege Reformism, and Activism” Accessed at: <http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html>)

Meanwhile, the opposing 'liberatory' vision offered is no better. Take, for instance, sasha's version of an "anarchist ethics": "an affirmation of the creativity, desire and power of the individual; it is an affirmation of the ability of individuals to come together and decide their own fate without the need of any imposed decision coming in from the outside whether in 'totalitarian' or 'democratic' form." Again, a noble sentiment, but what about culture, gender, class, sexuality, race, and the so many other differences and ties between us? Whether we are generalized as the "exploited and excluded" or abstracted as one-dimensional "individuals," the systems of power that differentiate and exploit us don't disappear; and neither does resistance firmly situated in marginalization and difference, from the Lesbian Avengers to the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria.

Must fight within the state

**Power and oppression circulate through institutions like the state – we must fight within these structures in order to challenge domination**

**Grossberg 1992** (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservativsm and Postmodern Culture, p. 390-391)

But this would mean that the Left could not remain outside the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against, and within bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immensely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; membership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes, continuing) dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions, and it depended upon a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people’s attitudes and everyday practices (e.g., the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g., banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic relations of Black and immigrant populations in place and which condition people’s everyday practices. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left has assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range or apparatuses of decision making and power. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as the moral responsibility) to fight them.

**The state should be included in larger progressive agendas**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 10)

In sum, for critical IR theorists to eschew state-centric theorizing is to concede much of international politics to Neorealism. I show that state-centric IR theory can generate insights that might help move the international system from the law of the jungle toward the rule of law. It is true that knowledge always is more useful for some purposes than for others, and knowledge gained from an analysis of states and organized violence might do little to empower non-state actors interested in trade or human rights. But that simply means that state-centered IR theory can only be one element of a larger progressive agenda in world politics, not that it cannot be an element at all.

States can be rational

**States can function as rational actors**

**Koh 1997** (Harold, Professor Emeritus @ Harvard, YALE LAW JOURNAL, June. Nexis. Accessed 06/01/06)

A close reading of Henkin's discussion of the “politics of law observance” shows that his defense of international law rests largely on utilitarian, rationalistic premises. Starting with the assumption “that nations act deliberately and rationally, after mustering carefully and weighing precisely all the relevant facts and factors,” Henkin posited “that barring an infrequent non-rational act, nations will observe international obligations unless violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost.”

\*\*\*Threat Construction Extensions\*\*\*

**Real threats exist: Aggressor states are common and can cause conflict**

**Jervis 1999** (Robert, Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. “Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation” *International Security* 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile)

In many cases, it is the interactive process among states that generates conflict rather than merely reveals or enacts the preexisting differences in goals. Both sides would be satisfied with mutual security; international politics represents tragedy rather than evil as the actions of states make it even harder for them to be secure. This is not true in all cases, however. Aggressor states are common; security and other interests often create differences that are irreconcilable. In these and only these instances, defensive realists see conflict as unavoidable.

**Threats are real – debating them is key to survival in the modern world**

**Beres 2003** (Louis Rene, professor of international law at Purdue. “Anarchy and international law on an endangered planet” Journal and Courier. June 5. Nexis)

For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

\*\*\*Epistemology Extensions\*\*\*

 Perm Extensions

**The permutation solves best: endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the blindspots of international relations theory**

**Stern & Druckman 2000** (Paul and Daniel, National Research Council & Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.“Evaluating interventions in history: The case of international

conflict resolution.” International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under 52Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985); Reilly and Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. 62 Stern and Druckman what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “critical multiplism.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as partial correctives for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

Specifics > Epistemology

**Epistemological indictments of international relations theory ignore the specific contexts in which the affirmative operates – we should priviledge specificity over sweeping indictments Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 663-4. )

Dalby’s third point builds upon what he suggests earlier about discourses of IR as a powerful part of the Cold War, an argument he inflates even further in pointing to their importance in ‘policing the global order and maintaining injustice, poverty and violence’. The crucial point that I apparently miss is ‘the function of the discipline’s knowledges as practices of hegemony’. There are two points to be made in response to these exceedingly general claims. First, I would argue that evocations of ‘hegemony’ and ‘power’ often function in decontextualizing ways in some poststructuralist writing. Pronouncing something as hegemonic does not tell us very much about the nature and mechanisms of hegemony; in fact, it seems to substitute for the necessity of documenting the precise nature of hegemony in many instances. I recognize that this is not always possible but, in this case at least, the claim is so broad as to be meaningless. Certainly, the concept of hegemony needs to be carefully considered within critical geopolitics. Second, if we get more precise and examine the specific case of IR, there is an argument to be made that this subfield was actually not as powerful a discursive support for Cold War policies as Dalby claims. The number of top-level US foreign-policy decision-makers with PhDs in international relations is actually quite tiny. Most have backgrounds in industry, finance, law, diplomatic service and the military. The disciplining significance of IR and of academia in general is overestimated by Dalby.

\*\*\*Feminism Extensions\*\*\*

Differences Turn Extensions

**The negative’s associations of women with peace are wrong and cause further subordination of women**

**Tickner 1992** (J. Ann, Associate professor of political science at the College of the Holy Cross. GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 59)

Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents are eliminated. One such myth is the association of women with peace, an association that has been invalidated through considerable evidence of women's support for men's wars in many societies. 79 In spite of a gender gap, a plurality of women rally support war and national security policies; Bernice Carroll suggests that the association of women and peace is that has been imposed on women by their disarmed condition. In the West, this association grew out of the Victorian ideology of women's moral superiority and the glorification of motherhood. This ideal was expressed by feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman whose book Herland was serialized in The Forerunner in 1915. Gilman glorified women as caring and nurturing mothers whose private sphere skills could benefit the world at large.81 Most turn-of-the-century feminists shared Gilman's ideas. But if the implication of this view was that women were disqualified from participating in the corrupt world of political and economic power by virtue of their moral superiority, the result could be the perpetuation of male dominance. Many contemporary feminists see dangers in the continuation of these essentializing myths that can only result in the perpetuation men's subordination and reinforce dualisms that serve to make men more powerful. The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation.

Alt. fails

**Alternative doesn’t solve: Using the state is key to the feminist movement. A lack of political engagement will collapse the movement.**

**Epstein 2001** (Barbara, Professor of History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz. MONTHLY REVIEW, Accessed online from monthlyreview.org)

The anarchist sensibility has made important contributions to the radical tradition in U.S. history. It has brought an insistence on equality and democracy, a resistance to compromise of principle for the sake of political expediency. Anarchism has been associated with efforts to put the values of the movement into practice and to create communities governed by these values. Anarchism has also been associated with political theater and art, with creativity as an element of political practice. It has insisted that radical politics need not be dreary. But the anarchist mindset also has its doctrinaire side, a tendency to insist on principle to the point of disregarding the context or likely results of political action. In this regard the anarchist sensibility has something in common with the outlook of Christian radicals who believe in acting on their consciences and leaving the consequences to God. The moral absolutism of the anarchist approach to politics is difficult to sustain in the context of a social movement. Absolute internal equality is hard to sustain. Movements need leaders. Anti-leadership ideology cannot eliminate leaders, but it can lead a movement to deny that it has leaders, thus undermining democratic constraints on those who assume the roles of leadership, and also preventing the formation of vehicles for recruiting new leaders when the existing ones become too tired to continue. Within radical feminism a view of all hierarchies as oppressive led to attacks on those who took on the responsibilities of leadership. This led to considerable internal conflict, and created a reluctance to take on leadership roles, which weakened the movement. Movements dominated by an anarchist mindset are prone to burning out early.

\*\*\*Deontology Extensions\*\*\*

Deontology Fails

**Deontology is severely flawed in the context of public policy**

**Woller 1997** (Gary, professor of economics @ BYU. Policy Currents, June 1997. Accessed at <http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7_2/72.pdf>, p. 11)

At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary basis for public policy in a democracy.

Consequential Ethics are better

**An ethic of consequences enables political responsibility and freedom**

**Williams 2005 (**Michael, professor of international politics @ University of Wales The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

AT: Intervening Actors

The intention to result in certain consequences is morally irrelevant—we must look at what is actually caused.

**Rule 2005** (James, professor of sociology @ SUNY “‘Above all, do no harm’ The war in Iraq and dissent” Dissent, Summer, accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2005/su05/rule.htm>)

The least inspiring figures of all are those who have tried to have it both ways—supporting the invasion of Iraq in advance, while dissociating themselves (also in advance) from the atrocities. In the run-up to the onslaught, Thomas L. Friedman praised Bush’s “audacious” war plan as “a job worth doing,” but only “if we can do it right.” Only Friedman could believe that the war then being readied would be carried out to his specifications. In fact, as for other commentators, his only real choice was to endorse what was clearly in store or to count himself out. Once that or any other war began, no one could claim to know its ultimate directions. But its immediate conduct would clearly be in the hands of a political and military establishment that had already amply displayed its colors. Those who supported the invasion signed over their political power of attorney to these figures. Perhaps—I am not sure—some of the intellectual apologists for the Iraq invasion really did understand that it would be as horrific as it has proved to be. Perhaps they were thoughtful enough to realize that the nature of the oppositions involved, the complexity of the objectives, the ruthlessness of the figures on both sides would guarantee the massive death and repression of civilians, the destruction of vast cityscapes, and the institutionalization of torture. Perhaps this was what Paul Berman had in mind when he characterized the Baath Party as “nearly a classic fascist movement” and (for good measure) “so is the radical Islamist movement, in a somewhat different fashion—two strands of a single impulse, which happens to be Europe’s fascist and totalitarian legacy to the modern Muslim world.” (“A Friendly Drink in a Time of War,” Dissent, Winter 2004, p. 57). Any response short of military assault on these influences, Berman seems to feel, involves “clinging to attitudes that can only be regarded as racist against Arabs.” When the stakes are so high—liberation of the Muslim world from both godly and godless fascism—even the greatest costs en route are acceptable. This is a page from the apocalyptic scriptures of the neoconservatives. We of the democratic left should be first to decry this reasoning. It is much akin to what horrified Karl Popper half a century ago, when he inveighed against what he called historicism. This is the certain conviction that wished-for historical outcomes warrant any and all measures to hasten their arrival. We must always fear those convinced of the certainty and moral superiority of the world they think they are making, Popper held, u. His key target, of course, was Marxist visions that condoned everything from political assassination to mass murder, if such actions could be portrayed as speeding the day when the evils of capitalism were definitively swept away—and with them, presumably, the roots of all human suffering. Popper’s doctrine can be abused, developed into a doctrinaire ideology in its own right. But properly qualified, it provides what ought to be a key tenet of the democratic left. Hypothetical goals of sweeping and definitive cures for political ills can rarely be regarded as certain outcomes of any political action. Political programs favoring massive human costs in the short run in the interest of revolutionary progress later on warrant searing skepticism. Given a measure of humility about our ability to predict the consequences of massive interventions, we do better to favor moderate steps toward incremental improvement than sweeping and costly measures whose consequences, we must admit, we cannot be sure of.

The intervening actors position is morally hollow.

**Gasper 1999** (Des, Institute of Social Studies @ The Hague European Journal of Development Research, 11:2, p. 98-99.)

The ‘mission-bounded’ approach claims ‘it’s not our problem’ how others use the resources provided. Evaluation of relief aid stops at the Purpose level, or below, and is restricted to intended effects. Disastrous unintended effects, especially at the higher Goal level, become someone else’s problem, even when foreseeable and foressen. By declaring a narrow set of intentions, one escapes responsibility for other effects. This is a version of ‘the doctrine of double effect’” ‘Where one course of action is likely to have two quite different effects, one licit or mandatory and the other illicit, it may be permissible to take that course intending the [former] one but not the other’ [Pan, 1979]. This handy tool could equally support non-supply to the Rwandese camps, since harm to the non-combatant camp residents is not intended. Pushed hard, as a way of living with the deontological proscriptions in Roman Catholicism, the doctrine has generated much casuistry (such as ‘Contraceptive slot machines labeled “For the prevention of disease only’” (ibid.) and corresponding criticism. For if some effects of one’s actions are the reactions of other actors, and some of their reactions are considered forced.

\*\*\*Ontology Extensions\*\*\*

Focus Turn

**An ontological focus causes us to ignore major problems like famine, environmental degredation, poverty, and genocide**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 2)

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of “theory” which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looking and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront people around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination. These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorist of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the “manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed.” To be concerned with the latter is to be “on the cutting edge,” where novelty has itself become an “appropriate form of scholarship”

Ontology Fails

**Placing ontology first freezes intellectual development**

**Chernoff 2007** (Fred, Professor in the Department of Political Science at Colgate University. Millennium Journal of International Studies. 35: 406. Accessed via Sage Publications)

Wight opposes ‘unnecessary closure’ that could result from the specification of methodological criteria in advance of ontology. It is, however, difficult to see how, on his view, he can explain the development of theories that postulate entities which do not seem at all plausible, given our previous background knowledge and theories, such as the quantum concept of the atom or relativistic character of the physical universe. The requirement that we must start by specifying the theoretical ontology would restrict all theories that postulate entities that are extremely unfamiliar; those theories could not be considered no matter how much more fully, simply and clearly they explain the observable world and no matter how much better they produce correct predictions of the outcomes of experiments. SR, if understood as requiring a specification of the theoretical ontology before competing theories are tested, would be the approach that leads to closure. It is important to be clear about what commitments investigators must make at various stages of inquiry. In my view, the only possible ontological commitments we should have to start with are commitments to common-sense objects (dogs, cats) and pre-theoretical objects (wars, chess matches). We then formulate precise questions about the observable world and devise theories to answer those questions. The theory that answers the questions best, based on specifiable criteria and available evidence, is accepted. If we are supporters of SR we may include the theoretically postulated entities in our ontology; if we reject SR, we will not. Real-world scientists who endorse SR infer the reality of the entities that the best theories postulate only after the theories are shown, on the basis of available evidence and the accepted criteria of scientific theory choice, to be superior to their rivals. Scientists do not specify a theoretical ontology in advance of inquiry. The key point is that the theoretical entities we include in our ontology are given by our best theory and cannot be specified in advance. There is an interactive process of developing a theoretical ontology out of a common-sense ontology, observations, and a set of methodological and epistemological principles. We have no grounds on which to accept a hegemonic trade regime in nineteenth-century Europe or quarks other than the fact that they play a role in a theory that we value.

\*\*\*Value to Life Extensions\*\*\*

**Existence and choice come first. People should be able to choose their value to life**

**Kymlicka 2003** (Will, professor of philosophy @ Queens University. Contemporary Political Thought: A Reader And Guide. Edited by Alan Finlayson, pp. 496-498)

The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life. Why should people be free to choose their own plan of life? After all, we know that some people will make imprudent decisions, wasting their time on hopeless or trivial pursuits. Why then should the government not intervene to protect us from making mistakes, and to compel us to lead the truly good life? There are a variety of reasons why this is not a good idea: governments may not be trustworthy; Some individuals have idiosyncratic needs which are difficult for even a well-intentioned government to take into account; supporting controversial conceptions of the good may lead to civil strife. Moreover, paternalistic restrictions on liberty often simply do not work — lives do not go better by being led from the outside, in accordance with values the person does not endorse. Dworkin calls this the ‘endorsement constraint’, and argues that ‘no component contributes to the value of a life without endorsement … it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them’ (Dworkin 1989: 486). However, the fact that we can get it wrong is important, because (paradoxically) it provides another argument for liberty. Since we can be wrong about the worth or value of what we are currently doing, and since no one wants to lead a life based on false beliefs about its worth, it is of fundamental importance that we be able rationally to assess our conceptions of the good in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance. This assumption that our beliefs about the good life are fallible and revisable is widely endorsed in the liberal tradition — from John Stuart Mill to the most prominent contemporary American liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. (Because of their prominence, I will rely heavily on the works of Rawls and Dworkin in the rest of this chapter.) As Rawls puts it, individuals ‘do not view themselves as inevitable tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time’. Instead, they are ‘capable of revising and changing this conception’. They can ‘stand back’ from their current ends to ‘survey and assess’ their worthiness (Rawls 1980: 544; cf. Mill 1912: 122; Dworkin 1913). So we have two preconditions for leading a good life. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment. Hence the traditional liberal concern with individual privacy, and opposition to ‘the enforcement of morals’. The second precondition is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life.

Value to Life Extensions

**Choice is fundamental – deciding some lives have no value negates the value of life**

**Gould 1995** (Carol, Professor of Philosophy and Government @ George Mason University. Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, p. 130)

Acts of choice are, however, not merely the ground or source of those values with which the things chosen are endowed. In addition, they are reflexive affirmations of the agent’s capacity of choice as characteristic of his or her mode of activity or mode of being. The act of choice thus necessarily affirms its own value in the act of choosing. The objective ground of freedom is thus the exercise of this freedom itself. And since the exercise of choice is, as I argued earlier, the characteristic mode of being human, this freedom has its objective ground in the nature of human activity as such. One may say further that this freedom as the characteristic mode of life activity of human beings is of primary value in the sense that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of any other value and is moreover valued in itself. Freedom is thus necessarily affirmed in the mode of being of human beings. As I argued earlier, the exercise of this freedom, however, is not merely a repetition of this bare capacity of choice in one instance after another but rather involves the development of the individual through the activities that such choices engender. It also involves the development of a world created by the activities of these individuals, a world which embodies the values that they have given it. Thus the capacity for choice becomes concretely realized in the self- development of individuals which thus constitutes the meaning and the value of freedom in the full sense. Self-development may therefore be seen as the highest value to which a process of individual acts of choice tends.

\*\*\*Realism Extensions\*\*\*

Realism is best

**Realism is empirically valid—the reason why the state and balance of power are analyzed is because the analysis of contemporary empirically conditions indicate this is the best strategy for accuracy and defense of moral principles.**

**Murray 1997** (Alastair, lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea. Reconstructing Realism, pp. 187-188)

Realism does not cease to consider the empirical; rather, its continued analysis of it is vital to its identification of the appropriate mode of practice and to its continued defence of it. Consequently, we arrive back at our starting point with a viable external standard against which the continued appropriateness of the balance of power as a practical scheme can be assessed. If realism does contain the potential to address changes in base conditions, the central argument with which Ashley is left is that it actively seeks to avoid doing so. He suggests that, because the balance of power scheme involves what is effectively an acceptance of the traditional 'rules of the game', it actively reproduces, by its very success, the traditional statist terms of the game, such that realism becomes complicit in a conservative perpetuation of an iniquitous statist order by its endorsement of it.46 Ashley would, of course, like to treat this as design, and end the matter there. Yet this is to equate implication with purpose. If the balance of power scheme implies the reproduction of the state, this does not prove its dedication to this objective. Realism advocated a scheme for an interstate balance of power not because of any concern to reproduce the state, but because its analysis of contemporary empirical conditions indicated that such a strategy offered the best available fulfilment of moral principles: if states represent the principal receptacles of power in the modern environment, the best level of justice can be achieved by establishing some equilibrium of power between states.47 Consequently, its position not only moves beyond the state, de-privileges it, and demands its compliance in principles which privilege the individual, but, furthermore, this position is open to the possibility of progress beyond it towards some more universal order. If the state must be employed as the principal agent of international justice and international change, it is only because of its current centrality to international politics.

**Realism is inevitable, and is the best explanation of state behavior.**

**Solomon 1996** (Hussein, Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW Internet)

These cases illustrate the fact that power, or the lack of it, is the central organising principle of international politics, not international law or organisation; and that international law and world bodies like the UN are cynically used and abused by the powerful to further their own interests - as it has been done for centuries. Even more prosaically, it underlines the correctness of the realist paradigm which views the structure of the international system as a hierarchy based on power capabilities; where the principle of equality between states is non-existent since states have different power capabilities; and where weak states are at the mercy of more powerful states.

Realism is best

Realism is the best way to describe how leaders act.

**Lieber 1993** (Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University. WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

As a consequence of the anarchy problem, states find that they dwell in a kind of self-help system. They either must be prepared to defend their own interests and those of their people, or to seek means of doing so through alliances. These realities of existential realism do not yield iron laws, but they do create a series of propensities shaping state behavior. Recognition of these propensities, and appreciation that they are not rigidly deterministic but that they condition the environment in which states and their leaders act, is crucial to an understanding of international relations.

Postmodern and critical theories of international relations are flawed compared to realism.

**Solomon 1996** (Hussien, Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06.)

Although ridiculed by critics wearing the mantle of post-modernism and critical theory, it is argued that realism ― both the classical realism of Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and the structural or neo-realism of Waltz and Krasner ― are best suited as tools to understand the turbulent world in which we live. At all times, the interface between theory and practice is exposed.

Realist approaches to state policymaking are justified and the key to solving real problems.

**Lieber 1993** (Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06).

As a means of making sense of the external world and the requirements of foreign policy, realism provides no iron laws of human behavior, but it does offer an approach to reality in which both theory and policy can be grounded. In the post-cold war world, **patterns of interdependence** and significant areas of cooperation among states are of fundamental importance. But a continuing realm for power politics exists simultaneously as an enduring feature of the same world, and international relations remain subject to the basic existential problems identified by realism: states exist in an international system without an overall authority to provide order; this “self-help” system creates imperatives that shape foreign policy behavior, especially in security matters, and sometimes in other realms; conflicts, which are inevitable in human affairs, and for which externally devised solutions are unavailable, have the potential for erupting into violence and war. Recognition of these realities is a precondition both for understanding the dynamics of international affairs and for developing policies that are to have any hope of achieving peace and protecting the national interest.

Realism is best

Critics of realism fail to offer a better alternative to realism.

**Mearshemier 1995** (John, Professor of Political Science @ Univ. of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1995. Nexis. Accessed June 6, 06)

Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction. Critical theorists, on the other hand, focus on the social structure of the international system. They believe that “world politics is socially constructed,” which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that “material resources like gold and tanks exist,” but he argues that “such capabilities . . . only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever, and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways. The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in “False Promise.” Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions.

Even assuming the rise of new movements, realism is still the best way to describe international relations.

**Lieber 1993**(Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

Together, these factors (the global economy, international institutions, democratization, transnational and subnational forces, nuclear weapons, and learning) have been significant either in eroding the ability of states to act autonomously, or in shaping state behavior. Frequently, they have the effect of mitigating or even precluding conflict and war, although they are not always necessarily conducive to cooperation. Nevertheless, authority still resides with the state, hence the propensities described by existential realism continue to condition state behavior. Moreover, subnational regional and ethnic groups typically speak in the language of statehood and often see this as the goal for which they strive.

\*\*\*Misc. Arguments\*\*\*

Specific Scenarios > Root Causes

**Explanations of international relations that rely upon individual causal forces should be rejected in favor of explanations that are nuanced and specific to the situation**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online)

While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces, this is not what defines science in natural sciences: this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.41

[parsimony: Adoption of the simplest assumption in the formulation of a theory or in the interpretation of data, especially in accordance with the rule of Ockham's razor. American Heritage Dictionary 2009]

**International Relations are empirically proven to be complex and context specific – specifics of a situation should be preferred over grand theories of international relations**

**Jervis 1999** (Robert, Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. “Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation” *International Security* 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile)

Often more fine-grained distinctions about preferences are required to understand what needs to change to increase cooperation. Because states have ladders of means-ends beliefs, some preferences over outcomes are, from a broader perspective, preferences over strategies. Thus many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences. For example, it can be argued that at bottom what Japan sought in the 1930s was security: dominance over the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was desired not as an ultimate value or even for national wealth but as a source of strength and security. This in turn was needed not because Japan was under immediate Western pressure - this was an effect not a cause of Japan's policy - but rather because of the expectation that eventually the West would menace Japan. Cooperation would have been possible if the United States and Great Britain had been able to reassure Japan of their continuing goodwill (assuming that Japan did not engage in military adventures), but this was difficult if not impossible for states in anarchy. Although Japan's ultimate goals would not have to have changed to produce cooperation, "mere" alterations in images of the other side and the deployment of conflict-reduction strategies could not have kept the peace. Similarly, even if the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately sought security during the Cold War, deep internal changes were a prerequisite for far-reaching cooperation because each believed that the other would be a menace as long as its domestic system was in place.

Specific evidence should be preferred

**Postmodern criticisms must be contextualized to the individual circumstances – specificity should be privilidged over sweeping generalizations**

**Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby” Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 661).

In so doing, I hope to illustrate some of my earlier concerns about postmodern narratives and historical complexity using his very comment as an example. If I must state our positions as a divide, I would characterize this divide as one between an approach that skims history to illustrate certain sweeping poststructuralist narratives and an approach that seeks to move beyond the generality of these narratives into a genuine dialogue with what Michael Mann has termed the ‘patterned mess’ of history (Mann, 1986, 1993).

**Academics must engage with the specificities of international relations**

**Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby” Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p.663)

Dalby’s second point about the importance of disciplinary context merely reinforces my own caution about the utility of certain metatheoretical forms of early dissident IR within the distinct disciplinary context of political geography. I accept his point that these deconstructions may have been necessary within the context of IR’s canon, but the method of these deconstructions inevitably reproduced even as they challenged the very project of ‘theories of international relations’. This is why I found David Campbell’s attempt to move beyond metatheoretical interrogations of elite theorists to engage histories of the practice of foreign policy so welcome and worthy of note within political geography (and also why I prefer Walker 119881 over Walker 119931).

**Hypothesizing about the complex inner working of government is key to creating space for radical politics**

**McClean 2001** (David, “The cultural left and the limits of Social Hope,” AM Phil Conf, www. American philosophy.org/archives/pass conference programs/ pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Ethical Policies are policies with results

**The only way to decide if a foreign policy is ethical is if it gives good results. Aiming for good motives has led to atrocities in the past**

**Gyosdev 2005** (Nikolas, Executive Editor of The National Interest, SAIS REVIEW, Winter-Spring. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/sais\_review/v025/ 25.1gvosdev.pdf.)

Realism accepts the reality of imperfect compromises. It does not dismiss as immoral the need to adjudicate conflicts between various preferences and assign priorities consistent with available resources, even if it means that some tasks are left unaddressed. There is no doubt than an emotional idealism—reinforced by horrific television images broadcast on 24-hour news channels—seems much more appealing. Having a policy or “taking a stand” that appears to be “doing something” in the face of violence or suffering is a temptation few officials can resist, even if the end results worsen the situation. In assessing the track record of humanitarian interventions in Africa during the 1990s, J. Peter Pham concluded: Intervention can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis. In fact, an ill-timed humanitarian military intervention can cause the very tragedies it was supposed to prevent, intensifying the level of violence Idealists and moralists were forced into all sorts of intellectual contortions to explain how Kosovo Albanians differed from Kurds, Chechens, Rwandans, and Timorese. within a conflict and thus increasing the domestic security threat and spreading regional instability.27 Idealists dismiss many of these concerns. If only the United States would deploy more troops, commit more resources, muster the “will” to act, then there would be no need for setting priorities and making choices. They argue that it is better to have “tried and failed” than not to have tried at all. But with regard to foreign policy, it is difficult to make moral judgments without the benefit of hindsight. This is why realists insist on a morality of results rather than one of intentions in assessing policy. Morgenthau concluded: We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? This ought to be our guide.

**The affirmative gives voice to an ethical version of American foreign policy based on global cooperation and conflict resolution**

**Condron 2000** (David, special technical advisor in the Department of Defense. JOURNAL OF POWER AND ETHICS, July 2000. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>.)

In the same way, long-term commitment internationally reinforces moral behavior among nations. Thus, an ethical foreign policy would stress long-term commitment in order to further the moral behavior and “character development” of nations. An ethical foreign policy would also promote international order by establishing a forum for discussion of issues and actively utilizing that forum to reach consensus on potentially divisive issues. This helps expand the natural localism of the moral sense toward the universals prevalent in Western ideals. It does this by allowing participation in the process of conflict resolution. While individual nations may still act according to raw self-interest, the point is that they will find it increasingly more difficult to do so when confronted with people on which they depend. International law and order may be inconvenient in many cases, but proves to be in the long-term interest of every nation by allowing them to assess with common standards what is expected of them and what they can expect from others with whom they have a continuing relationship. To further foster international relationship, ethical foreign policy would promote cultural exchanges. This increases sympathy among peoples, developing and maintaining organic relationships, which are so important for application of the moral sense to people who are very different. The planks of an ethical foreign policy are summarized in Table 1 with their corresponding application to the moral sense. Many of these are elements of current U.S. foreign policy. What is provided in this article is a basis for why they should be important parts of U.S. foreign policy. Unless an adequate case is formulated and communicated repeatedly to the American public and influential persons in society, these policy goals will continue to be pursued on an ad hoc basis. By providing a coherent framework for ethical foreign policy, it will be possible to maintain a consistent U.S. foreign policy based on national consensus and validated by universal biological principles. Such is an urgent need in these turbulent times of change.

IR Perms

**The permutation is the best option: realism as a bridge to understanding the world that is necessary for their Kritik to function**

**Niarguinen 2001** (Dmitri, professor of International Relations at Central European University. “Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations.” Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http:// venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/ dmitri.htm)

Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be 'yes.' I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “the approach of ‘rational behavior,’ as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory…”[65]. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the 'middle ground' and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, …Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure – structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices – the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics”[71].

**The permutation of traditional, positivist international relations theories and critical international relations theories offers the best hope for solutions to IR dilemmas**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online.)

There are a number of defences that critical realism would resort to against the positivist criticisms. However, need the relationship between critical realism and positivism be acrimonious? While critical realists disagree with the positivist legacies that inform much of contemporary social science, they do not think that positivist knowledge is ‘useless’ in IR, but simply that it does not exhaust the analysis of complex causes in world politics and needs to be complemented by more holistic ontological and methodological avenues. Critical realism emphasises that positivists need to open their minds to different ways of doing causal analysis in IR and engage with alternative causal methodologies and questions in a more serious manner. Yet much room for dialogue with the positivists also remains: both views recognise the importance of science and causal analysis in shaping our understandings of the world around us, value critical evaluation of existing explanations and emphasise importance of empirical evidence gathering (though with different methodological emphasis). Critical realism, as an anti-positivist philosophy, does not support a positivist view of science of IR; however, it can understand the partial relevance of positivist knowledge claims, provide tools for complementing these claims with more pluralistic methods and introduce positivists to the possibility of a more open and reflective model of science.