**LOST CP**

**CP Text:**

**The United States federal government should sign and ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty.**

**The counter plan can resolve military tensions, encourage cooperation on environmental problems and scientific research, and allow the international sharing of icebreakers
Asia News 12** (News Agency, no author given, <http://www.bakutoday.net/arctic-policy-between-the-united-states-and-russia-rivalry-and-cooperation.html>, July 6, 2012 5:08 pm)

Contradictions (explicit and implicit) between Russia and the United States on Arctic exist on several fronts. Like many other States, United States aspire to the status of the Northern sea route, passing along the Arctic coast of Russia, became international. In case of realization of these plans, RUSSIA will lose significant income not only for the use of the route of other States, it is objectively raise military-strategic vulnerability with North direction. Differently by Moscow and Washington are the leading regional organization, the Arctic Council. If Russia is interested in expanding the powers of the Council, in 2009, the Directive expressly states that the United States believed Council only forum for discussion and oppose giving it the status of an international organization, a gauntlet that produces binding decisions. On the other hand, the United States strongly supported the intensification of NATO in the Arctic, effectively pushing out other international organizations (the Arctic Council and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic region where the United States is not involved). When an existing relationship between NATO and Russia such moves will have negative consequences for Russia, which has no reliable allies in the Arctic. Until the United States has not ratified the UN Convention on the law of the sea, it remains possible aggravation of disputes with Russia on distinguishing lines in Arctic seas and on the edge of the shelf. It should be remembered that the United States would belong to RUSSIA’s attempts to extend his shelf by Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev-raising. In 2001, the Department of State under pressure at the UN Commission on the limits of the continental shelf, his application was rejected. Russia has not ratified the Treaty with the United States on the boundary line in the Bering Sea. But in the United States and Russia have relations and the considerable potential for cooperation in the Arctic. Its foundation many experts see a declaration signed by the “Arctic five ‘ in the town of Ilulissat in May 2008, which suggests that the legal basis for dividing lines is recognized by the 1982 Convention on the law of the sea, and the parties intend to solve the problem through negotiations. In line with the common aspiration of Barack Obama to reset relations with Russia and the President’s statements, the United States and the Secretary of State’s intention to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic. However, most likely, cooperation should be expected only on areas where the United States cannot do without Russian participation. In particular, this concerns the safety of marine and aviation operations in Arctic latitudes, as in May 2011, Member States of the Arctic Council, signed the agreement. Each of the signatories undertook to create assets to ensure security in its segment and the rapid exchange of information. Planned large-scale cooperation in the development of the Russian Arctic resources. The Russian company “Rosneft” and American Exxon-Mobil “in April 2012, signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Kara Sea. Russia is attracting scarce financial resources (capitalization of Exxon-Mobil-400 billion) and modern technologies for exploration and drilling in the northern latitudes. Another joint project by Rosneft and the American company Conoco-Phillips “in Nenets autonomous district, where a promising Ardalinskoe deposit and investment is expected to increase from the American side. Another area of cooperation is the development of the Transantarctic routes for flights involving infrastructure development and maintenance, modernization and construction of new airports in the territory of Russia. This segment is considered to be the fastest growing air travel market. Mutually beneficial cooperation has been and remains the United States and Russia in the scientific research and environmental protection in the Arctic. It is obvious that any decisions relating to the economic development of the far North must rely on scientific analysis of the vulnerability of Northern nature and difficult weather, social, domestic and other conditions. In this respect Russia can offer the icebreaker fleet and rich experience of Arctic expeditions. In military-political dimension in relations between Washington and Moscow could strengthen the mutual confidence in the Arctic in the military and political fields. Such measures should include mutual warning about plans to move military forces at fleets “sensitive” areas, limiting the military presence in the Arctic. At the moment it is difficult to predict how the relationship United States and Russia in the Arctic. This will depend, first, on the overall mood in u.s.-Russian relations that might change with the coming to power in the United States the Republicans. Secondly, the efficiency of the Russian economic policy in the Arctic to attract foreign investment and technology. And there are already a number of positive steps. Thirdly, whether the United States will remain at the current course predominantly unilateral actions in the region, or they will make a choice in favour of multilateral cooperation.

**AT: Perm**

**LOST is failing to control problems in the Arctic now because the US refuses to recognize it as a serious forum for cooperation rather than just a means for informal discussion. A US commitment is key to solve – the perm would be perceived as no better than the status quo if the US joins the treaty and then still just does whatever they want. That’s the Asia News evidence from the 1NC.**

**And, Arctic countries are fostering cooperation now but relations are still on the brink, faith in multilateral agreements is key
Stevens et al 10** (Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Managing Global Order May 2012, [www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones\_arctic.pdf](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf), Andrew Hart is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado. Bruce Jones is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (NYU/CIC). David Steven is a Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project.)

As the Cold War receded, so too did the strategic significance of the Arctic, once a zone of U.S.-Soviet contestation. In recent years, tensions have once again been rising. From the infamous planting of the Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean in 2007 to Secretary Clinton’s appearance at the May 2011 Arctic Council ministerial, states have turned their attention to the North. The drivers of this shift are rapidly melting ice and the consequent prospects for the development of energy resources; its facilitators have been innovating in extraction technologies and marine transportation systems to move cargoes of hydrocarbons and hard minerals along previously inaccessible sea routes. Rising oil prices in 2004- 2008 generated investment resources. These changes have created a complex and, to some, worrying political picture. Many fear the Arctic will see an intensifying battle for sovereign control and commercial advantage.1 While such a view may be “more alarmist than alarming,” insecurity in the far North has increased risks of political and military conflict and highlighted the need for a stable maritime security system to manage disputes and other security concerns.2 The bleakest forecasts have overlooked positive developments in the region. Despite the Arctic’s dangerous mix of great power competition, unresolved territorial disputes, and increasingly accessible oil and gas reserves, there has to date been little actual discord. Unlike in the South China Seas, whichfaces a similar mix of uncharted energy resources and contested boundaries, Arctic states have pledged to solve disputes in an orderly process, managed the peaceful resolution of a major territorial conflict, and concluded a binding agreement to cooperate on search and rescue. This is not to say there is no reason for worry. The most contentious issues are yet to be resolved. There is scope for strategic miscalculation, a loss of faith in multilateral processes that deliver unwelcome findings, or an environmental disaster triggering a spiral of mistrust. The Arctic therefore emerges as a rich case study of current and potential areas of international cooperation and tension, with implications for energy security, global trade, global power politics, sustainable development, and climate change. In this paper, we first address the Arctic’s growing strategic relevance and its potential conflict dynamic. Second, we offer background on the existing institutions and legal regimes, assessing their strength and effectiveness, and then reviewing recent negotiations. Finally, we examine ongoing risks in the region, assessing their likely scale and evolution. We conclude that—for now—the prospects for continued cooperation outstrip the potential for conflict among Arctic states, and that the Arctic offers lessons, and even elements of a model, for tackling evolving challenges in other regions.

**Ext. Solvency**

**The plan will only increase problems by inviting international disputes; the CP alone is key to effective power projection
Peele 97** (Reynolds B., Lieutenant, USMC, The Importance of Maritime Chokepoints, Parameters, Summer)

National security interests in having a stable oceans regime are, if anything, even more important today than in 1982, when the world had a roughly bipolar political dimension and the US had more abundant forces to project power to wherever it was needed. . . . **Without international respect for the freedoms of navigation and overflight set forth in the [Law of the Sea] Convention, exercise of our forces' mobility rights would be jeopardized**. Disputes with littoral states could delay action and be resolved only by protracted political discussions. The response time for US and allied/coalition forces based away from potential areas of conflict could lengthen. . . . Forces may arrive on the scene too late to make a difference, affecting our ability to influence the course of events consistent with our interest and treaty obligations.

**Signing LOST is the best way for the US to maintain its military prominence at sea**

**Hamilton 07** (Lee, 8/27/07, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington and director of the center on congress at Indiana University, [www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070827/Opinion/708270327/-1/LOCAL17](http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070827/Opinion/708270327/-1/LOCAL17))

Next month, the Senate will vote on whether the United States will join the Law of the Sea Convention, which lays out a comprehensive international framework to govern the world's ungoverned spaces: our deep and vast oceans. This is a critical opportunity that must not be missed. The United States has taken a long and winding road to this moment of decision. The Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated for decades and agreed to in 1982. President Reagan directed the country to follow the Convention, with the exception of some rules on mining. After these rules were amended to meet U.S. demands, President Clinton agreed to sign the Convention, but it stalled in the Senate. Now, the Convention has the support of President Bush and the unanimous approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. More than 150 nations are members -- including every major power except the United States. The only obstacle to U.S. entry is full Senate ratification. The arguments in favor of ratification are overwhelming. First, the treaty is critical to our national security. The U.S. military depends upon freedom of movement on the high seas so that our navy can have right of passage, and so we can transport military forces and equipment. The Convention guarantees that freedom, doing away with burdensome and varying rules from coastal nations, and ensuring that we need not seek a permission slip to pass through territorial seas. This also helps America -- and the world -- avert conflict. The Convention also benefits the U.S. economy. Global commerce depends upon shipping, with $700 billion worth of goods passing through U.S. ports alone each year. The Convention codifies and guarantees freedom of navigation for the world's shipping industry. And, at a time when new sea-lanes are opening up in the Arctic because of global climate change, the Convention's framework will be central in resolving disputes. Furthermore, the Convention guarantees U.S. access to resources. Once the treaty is ratified, we would have rights to resources extending 200 miles out from our shoreline. That means we will obtain internationally recognized jurisdiction over nearly 300,000 square miles -- more than the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska combined. Given the fact that one-third of the world's oil and gas is offshore, including an estimated 400 billion barrels of oil and gas in the Arctic alone, America stands to reap a windfall, while ensuring that our interests are protected in the changing Arctic region. Similarly, the Convention would confirm U.S. jurisdiction over highly profitable fisheries. These economic benefits are accompanied by environmental considerations. Pollution of our oceans has led to the disappearance of scores of species, including some that are important to our food supply, and threatens to have devastating consequences on the global environment. The Convention puts a framework in place to reduce pollution, including a set of standards that America already adheres to. By joining, we will strengthen our leverage to press others to do more. These benefits add up to an unusually broad base of support. In addition to President Bush, former President Clinton, and a broad bipartisan group of senators, the Convention is strongly supported by the U.S. military, the energy industry, and a coalition of leading environmental organizations. Each recognizes that the Convention is favorable to U.S. interests. Yet a small but determined group of opponents continues to argue against ratification. Often, these arguments ring hollow. Opponents argue that that the Convention weakens U.S. sovereignty, taxes Americans, creates a huge international bureaucracy and restricts our ability to interdict materials at sea. Yet the Convention actually extends U.S. sovereignty over a dramatically larger portion of the earth, levies no taxes on Americans, has created an institution with only 35 full-time employees, and expands our rights of interdiction. America cannot advance its interests in a globalizing world without strong international partnerships and legal frameworks. When we turn our back on the world, we weaken our ability to lead, and we miss important opportunities to press our case. The Law of the Sea is an international framework that advances American interests on many different fronts. It's time to reap the full rewards of that success. It's time to ratify this treaty.

**And, we solve their oil spills, shipping lanes, and research advantages too. Our 1NC Asia Times evidence specifically cites scientific research and environmental protection in the Arctic as issues which the US and Russia can cooperate on, but a forum for communication is key. It also says that Russia would allow the US to use its icebreakers – erasing any marginal solvency deficit of the CP – but this all relies upon the two nations fostering good relations through multilateral agreements.**

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**The Russians have empirically allowed the US to use its icebreakers**

**Kime 05** (Patricia Kime 2/28/05, “Icebreakers plow channel to reach Antarctic station Russian ship lends a hand with 80 miles of frozen sea” www.ar15.com/forums/t\_1\_5/326942\_US\_and\_Russian\_Icebreakers\_plow\_channel\_to\_reach\_Antarctic\_station\_McMurdo.html)

The Coast Guard has wrapped up its icebreaking operations at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, for the year, with the help of a Russian icebreaker. Or, as readers of the Russian press learned, the Russian icebreaker Krasin “saved” the U.S. research outpost at McMurdo after the U.S. cutter Polar Star broke: “Russian icebreaker Krasin only hope for American polar explorers,” announced a Russian news agency TASS headline Jan. 13.The National Science Foundation hired the Vladivostok-based Krasin in December to help clear the route to McMurdo Station. The icebreaking operation, an annual event known as Deep Freeze, clears the way for a fuel tanker and supply ship to restock the research station. Normally, the Coast Guard is the sole agency on the task. But this year, with one of the Coast Guard’s two 399-foot Polar class icebreakers in drydock, the NSF, which runs McMurdo and shares icebreaking expenses with the Coast Guard, contacted the Far Eastern Shipping Co. in Vladivostok when ice conditions forced the need for a second icebreaker. The Russians sent the 449-foot Krasin, while the Coast Guard dispatched the 399-foot Polar Star. At the pole, however, Polar Star developed problems with its hydraulic system and a gas turbine engine. And the Russian press couldn’t resist indulging in some Cold War-style rhetoric.

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**US unilateral action in the arctic is perceived as a move to control resources
Stevens et al 10** (Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Managing Global Order May 2012, [www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones\_arctic.pdf](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf), Andrew Hart is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado. Bruce Jones is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (NYU/CIC). David Steven is a Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project.)

These objectives were in turn the backdrop to a challenge posed to us in 2010 by then Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. Where bilateral relations on security and economic issues had long been the bread and butter of American diplomacy, the new international realities increasingly require the United States to better understand how to foster and mange what Steinberg called “the infrastructure for collective action.” His charge to the MGO program was to chart those issues where collective action was most needed and where the frameworks to generate it most absent. Among his top priorities was the Arctic. This paper is our response. It is also a down payment on a broader analysis of the changing challenge of maritime security and the naval order, part of an ongoing MGO workstream. For sixty years, naval dominance has been the bedrock of American power projection and the place where U.S. hard power most directly protects a common economic good, freedom of trade and the free flow of energy. Will the high seas remain a domain of U.S. dominance? Become a terrain of acute competition for energy resources and regional security, between the U.S. and the rising powers? Or is there a prospect that regional and global multilateral architecture, formal and informal, can help to manage those tensions? The answer will be crucial to the overall balance between order and disorder in the international system. The evolution of arrangements to manage rising competition in the Arctic gives us some grounds for cautious optimism about that broader challenge ahead.

**Ext. US Hasn’t Joined**

**The US is the only Arctic country to have not signed LOST**

**The Miami Herald 09** (“U.S. Senate must act on sea treaty”08-12**-**09 [www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/story/1181940.html](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/story/1181940.html))

And in 2009, despite strong support from the U.S. military, the oil and gas industries, the national Chamber of Commerce and both the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Senate still hasn't taken up the treaty for consideration. It should, and quickly. The treaty does many things, all of them beneficial to U.S. interests. It provides protections for freedom and navigation and overflight of the world's oceans, for example. America's armed forces rely on these rights; protecting and upholding them is important to our national security. From a commerce vantage, more than 28 percent of all U.S. exports and 48 percent of U.S. imports are transported by sea. The treaty also sets out the rights of nations to establish territorial claims up to 12 nautical miles from their coasts and claim sovereign and exclusive economic rights up to 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Such rights have always been important when it comes to oil and gas extraction and fishing, but they have taken on a new urgency in the Arctic. If the United States doesn't sign the treaty it could miss out on claiming its share of resources that are becoming accessible because the ice cap is melting. The Arctic is bordered by Russia, Canada, Norway, the United States and Greenland, which is controlled by Denmark. All have military and natural-resource claims in the Arctic, but only the United States among them has failed to sign the treaty.

**161 countries have ratified LOST but not the US**

**Tennant 12** (Michael Tennant, 7/13/12, “More LOST Opposition Found Among GOP Senators” [www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/congress/item/12065-more-lost-opposition-found-among-gop-senators](http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/congress/item/12065-more-lost-opposition-found-among-gop-senators))

LOST, officially known as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), was drafted in 1982. Because of opposition from conservatives, beginning with the Reagan administration, it has never been ratified by the Senate. Thus, though 161 other countries and the European Union have joined LOST, the United States remains outside the convention to this day.