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# \*\*\*2AC Case\*\*\*

# \*DRONES BAD\*

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Instability Good (Kurds)

## 1AC Gompert evidence indicates Kurds are working with Sunni and Shia to prevent any risk of corruption within the political process.

## And the political process is stable amongst factional groups

Gompert M.A. in Public Affairs - Et Al 2010

( David C., Terrence K. Kelly, Jessica Watkins. Senior Fellows for Rand, David Gompert has an MA from Princeton University, served as Vice President of RAND and Director of the National Defense Research Institute. Terrence Kelly is a senior researcher at RAND with a M.A in strategic studies and Ph.D in mathematics. Jessica Watkins is a doctoral student in War Studies at the ICSR, BA in Oriental Studies. “Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave” Accessed from the RAND Corporation URL - <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf>) MFR

## As already noted, this cycle began to break when jihadi terror against fellow Sunnis produced a backlash, leading Sunni insurgents to turn against their erstwhile extremist collaborators. At the same time, a change of leadership at the MoI ended the activities of para-official Shi’a death squads, and JAM was ordered by Muqtada al-Sadr to cease fire. Three years on, the main groups—Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd— have settled into an uneasy political order and eschewed large-scale violence, as shown in Figure 2.3. These groups command far greater political support, resources, and fighting capabilities than the Sunni and Shi’a extremists that persist outside the core. Although extrem- ists still depend on violence, they have, it appears, lost their ability to foment fighting by and among the main groups. This has reduced violence, brought a semblance of order, permitted political progress, and strengthened government. It has also improved the safety, well-being, and outlook of most ordinary (and war-weary) Iraqis—a factor that favors continued moderation and stability.

## Additionally the Turkish offensive is now

## AP 6/16/10

## (<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/0616/breaking52.html>) MFR

Turkey has sent hundreds of elite soldiers across the border into northern Iraq to chase a group of Kurdish guerrillas escaping after a failed attack on a Turkish unit near the border. The soldiers killed four rebels, the military said, and it did not report any of its own casualties. The soldiers, supported by Turkish warplanes, would remain in northern Iraq, the military said. "The search operation of the units in the area are still under way," the military said. It did not say when the troops would withdraw. The military has repeatedly staged air and ground assaults against Kurdish rebel bases in northern Iraq. The last major incursion was in February 2008, when thousands of ground forces staged a week-long offensive into Iraq. The military said on its website that three commando companies and one special forces battalion penetrated 2 miles (3 kilometers) into Iraq. Turkish warplanes also pounded Kurdish rebel positions and mortar and anti-aircraft units deeper inside Iraqi territory on Wednesday, the military said. The offensive was ordered after the rebels, who had steamed across the border, attempted an unsuccessful attack on troops near the Turkish border town of Uludere, the military said. "The air operation was monitored from the command headquarters and it was noted that the targets were successfully hit". The Turkish military estimates around 4,000 rebels of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, are based just across the border in Iraq and that about 2,500 operate inside Turkey. Last month, Turkey killed at least 19 Kurdish rebels in an airstrike on rebel hideouts in northern Iraq. The PKK has freely operated in northern Iraq, a semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdish entity since the Gulf War, benefiting from a power vacuum for decades. The last ground offensive in 2008 yielded mixed results, with many guerrillas making a comeback to bases along the border after the Turkish units withdrew. The incursion also worried the region's Iraqi Kurds who feared that a prolonged Turkish military presence could destabilise the relatively safer Iraqi territory. Turkey occasionally co-ordinates attacks with Iran on Kurdish rebel bases on Mount Qandil, which sits on the Iranian-Iraqi border and from where a sub-rebel group stages hit-and-run attacks on Iranian targets in a similar war for Kurdish rights in Iran. Syria long harboured the rebels but forced guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan to leave the country after Turkey threatened war in late 1998, eventually leading to the capture of the rebel chief in 1999. Earlier this month, Turkey offered greater economic co-operation with Iraqi Kurds, pressuring the region's president, Massoud Barzani, to jointly combat Turkish Kurdish rebel hideouts in northern Iraq that the rebels have used as a springboard for attacks. Turkey also wants Iraqi Kurds to shut down the Makhmur refugee camp, which houses an estimated 10,000-11,000 Turkish Kurds who fled to Iraq in the early 1990s during fighting between Turkish troops and Kurdish rebels. Turkish authorities accuse Kurdish guerrillas of indoctrinating children in the camp to become rebels. A Kurdish interior ministry official, however, said there were no plans to close the Makhmur camp. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorised to speak to media.

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Instability Good (Kurds)

## And the Kurds won’t secede – several reasons

## Gunter PhD in IR 2004 (Michael, “Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely” FROM Middle East Policy) MFR

The following briefs are edited versions of papers presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in Anchorage, Alaska, November 8, 2003. The editors were Hakan Yavuz and Michael Gunter, whose papers are included below. With the possible exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish statehood is unlikely in the near future for several reasons. In the first place, Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds) is completely contained within already existing states - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To create an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these preexisting states. No state on earth would support a doctrine that sanctions its own potential breakup. Thus, the international community has generally been hostile to any redrawing of the map that was not part of the decolonization process. Between Iceland's secession from Denmark in 1944 and the collapse of communism in 1991, the only successful secessionist movements were in Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1991). The collapse of colonialism after World War II and the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, led to two waves of state creation. However, there are no more empires to collapse and accordingly very few possibilities for further state creation today. A Kurdish state would probably only emerge if there were a major collapse of the existing state system of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East. With the exception of Iraq, this is highly unlikely to happen. The Kurdish situation, therefore, is reminiscent of that of the Poles between 1795 and 1919. It took the upheaval of World War I to shake loose a Polish state from the shackles of internal colonialism imposed by Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia. Although the Gulf War in 1991 did result in a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq (more on this below), only a total re-rolling of the international dice that might follow another world war would be likely to lead to the creation of an independent Kurdistan for all the Kurds. Unless this realignment happens soon, many actually fear for the long-term survival of the Kurdish people themselves as a distinct entity, because the states that contain them may assimilate them. Crawford Young, for example, has analyzed how the artificial states created by the colonial powers in Africa in time came to help mold new senses of ethnic selfdefinition.1 Both Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have argued that states, in effect, create nations. "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist";2 or, as Anderson puts it, nationalism "imagines" nations.3 Demonstrating how the state can be used to create the nation, Massimo d'Azeglio, an Italian nationalist leader during the Risorgimento, supposedly declared: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians."4 Again, the point is that the state can mold its ethnically diverse citizens into a single nation. All this would suggest that in time the arbitrary states that include the Kurds might assimilate them, a process that is already occurring in part.5 Thus, the Kurds continue to suffer from a form of internal colonialism that has stunted the full development of their nationalism. Many different observers have also noted the negative effect of such primordial divisions as tribe, clan, language and locality on the creation of a Kurdish state and nation.6 Kurdish nationalism seems stuck in a time warp from which others emerged more than a century ago. Even as a nation, the Kurds remain divided, as were the Germans before 1871 and the Italians before 1861. The Kurds also lack a Bismarck or a Garibaldi. No contemporary Kurdish leader has been able to rise above the level of tribal warlord to true statesman. Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan - the three main Kurdish leaders during the past quarter century - have fought against each other as much as they have fought against the states that deny Kurdish self-determination. Tongue in cheek, Jonathan Randal even "suspectfed] a rogue chromosome in Kurdish genetics causes . . . fissiparous tendencies."7 The Kurdish tendency for infighting certainly allows the neighboring states to use divide-and-rule tactics against them. In the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), for example, each side used the other's Kurds as a fifth column. Since the 1990s, Turkey has repeatedly played the Iraqi Kurds off against its own rebellious Kurds and supported one Iraqi Kurdish group against another. Given such a situation, it is difficult to envision a united Kurdistan. What Kurdish desiderata, then, can we reasonably expect to occur?

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Foreign Aid Turn

## No link – military presence will still continue post plan, we just get rid of drones

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: PMC

## Even if the PMCs control the use of the drones, the drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan are OWNED by the U.S. military, thus they are physically military presence

## Additionally there’s no link, PMCs won’t harm or hate Iraqi people if they controlling the drones in Nevada

## And it doesn’t turn case – stability is high in places like Afghanistan and Iraq due to increasing Civil Military Relations - we still access the root cause of resentment through targeted killings and deaths of Civilians, PMCs don’t commit those actions

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Morality

## This is dumb, 1AC Jones, Thalif, and Dressler evidence indicates Drones cause large amounts of collateral damage due to the hellfire missiles they use, that shouldn’t be ethical when the alternative could save more lives in the future, that’s Byland

## Additionally the government attacks without any questions or considerations taken through the premeditated killing process – this makes increases the risk of collateral damage and lets us decide who gets to live and die without understanding the implications.

## Additionally, it’s not moral

## Jenkins – Masters in History 87

(Brian M., M.A. and B.A. in history, University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Advisor to the President at the RAND Corporation “Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assasination?” Accessed from the RAND Corporation. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P7303.pdf>) **MFR**

1. Assassination is morally wrong. Admittedly, an arguable point. The actions of terrorists also are morally wrong—not that this makes assassination right. But at the very least, many people would view assassination as immoral. Take the following example. Judging by the bumper stickers and T-shirts one sees, more than a few Americans would be happy to see Qadaffi eliminated. Not since the Ayatollah during the hostage crisis in Iran, perhaps not since Adolf Hitler, has any single leader aroused more personal animosity. But just imagine the President appearing on television one evening to announce, “Some time ago I authorized the assassination of Muamar Qadaffi. I am pleased to report to you tonight the American agents have successfully carried out this mission.” Without entering into a philosophical debate, let me assert that a large number of Americans would find such a spectacle morally repugnant. If assassination can be justified, why must it always be covert? Why must our role be concealed? And why does the world get stuck in our throat? Even advocates of assassination have difficulty saying the word right out, cold naked. They wrap it in euphemisms like “executive action” or “wet operations,” or cushion it with redundant adjectives as in “selective assassination.” That sounds good, like “surgical strike,” but it is operationally meaningless. What is unselective assassination?”

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Drones Accurate/don’t kill Civilians

## Drones kill civilians, Jones, Thalif and Dressler is indicative of status quo drone use killing civilians – even if you win they might not in the future through smaller missiles, that’s in the future and theres no timetable for those drones to come out.

## Drone killings and the resulting collateral damage motivates terrorists such as the Times Square terrorist to attack us, only we control impact uniqueness

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Hegemony DA

## We’ll impact turn their form of hegemony –

## UAVs create adventurism

Singer 2009 [Peter Warren Singer is an American Political Scientist and international relations scholar, he is currently a senior fellow at the Brookings institution, where he is the director of the 21st century Defense Initiative; “Robots at War: The New Battlefield’; Winter 2009; <http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?aid=1313>; 6/29/2010; K.C.]

Such changed connections don’t just make a public less likely to wield its veto power over its elected leaders. As Lawrence Korb observed, they also alter the calculations of the leaders themselves. Nations often go to war because of overconfidence. This makes perfect sense; few leaders choose to start a conflict thinking they will lose. Historians have found that technology can play a big role in feeding overconfidence: New weapons and capabilities breed new perceptions, as well as misperceptions, about what might be possible in a war. Today’s new technologies are particularly likely to feed overconfidence. They are perceived to help the offensive side in a war more than the defense, plus, they are improving at an exponential pace. The difference of just a few years of research and development can create vast differences in weapons’ capabilities. But this can generate a sort of “use it or lose it” mentality, as even the best of technological advantages can prove fleeting (and the United States has reasons for concern, as 42 countries are now working on military robotics, from Iran and China to Belarus and Pakistan). Finally, as one roboticist explains, a vicious circle is generated. Scientists and companies often overstate the value of new technologies in order to get governments to buy them, but if leaders believe the hype, they may be more likely to feel adventurous. James Der Derian is an expert at Brown University on new modes of war. He believes that the combination of these factors means that robotics will “lower the threshold for violence.” The result is a dangerous mixture: leaders unchecked by a public veto now gone missing, combined with technologies that seem to offer spectacular results with few lives lost. It’s a brew that could prove very seductive to decision makers. “If one can argue that such new technologies will offer less harm to us and them, then it is more likely that we’ll reach for them early, rather than spending weeks and months slogging at diplomacy.” When faced with a dispute or crisis, policymakers have typically regarded the use of force as the “option of last resort.” Unmanned systems might now help that option move up the list, with each upward step making war more likely. That returns us to Korb’s scenario of “more Kosovos, less Iraqs.” While avoiding the mistakes of Iraq certainly sounds like a positive result, the other side of the tradeoff would not be without problems. The 1990s were not the halcyon days some recall. Lowering the bar to allow for more unmanned strikes from afar would lead to an approach resembling the “cruise missile diplomacy” of that period. Such a strategy may leave fewer troops stuck on the ground, but, as shown by the strikes against Al Qaeda camps in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, the Kosovo war in 1999, and perhaps now the drone strikes in Pakistan, it produces military action without any true sense of a commitment,lash-outs that yield incomplete victories at best. As one U.S. Army report notes, such operations “feel good for a time, but accomplish little.” They involve the country in a problem, but do not resolve it. Even worse, Korb may be wrong, and the dynamic may yield not fewer Iraqs but more of them. It was the lure of an easy preemptive action that helped get the United States into such trouble in Iraq in the first place. As one robotics scientist says of the new technology he is building, “The military thinks that it will allow them to nip things in the bud, deal with the bad guys earlier and easier, rather than having to get into a big-ass war. But the most likely thing that will happen is that we’ll be throwing a bunch of high tech against the usual urban guerillas . . .. It will stem the tide [of U.S. casualties], but it won’t give us some asymmetric advantage.” Thus, robots may entail a dark irony. By appearing to lower the human costs of war, they may seduce us into more wars.

## The impact is global great power wars

Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

The larger long-term cost of selective engagement is the risk of involvement in faraway great power wars. Great power conflicts will continue to be a rare occurrence, but when they happen, the United States is much better off staying as far away from the combatants as possible. World War II resulted in the deaths of 400,000 Americans, many times that number wounded, and nearly 40 percent of GDP devoted to defense (compared to 4 percent today).76 A new great power conflict, with the possibility of nuclear use, might exact even higher costs from the participants. World War II was fought to prevent the consolidation of Europe and Asia by hostile, fanatical adversaries, but a new great power war would not raise that specter. The biggest cost of selective engagement is the risk of being drawn into someone else’s faraway great power war. The global economy may be disrupted by war, depending on who is involved, but even in the worst case, the costs would be manageable. Trade accounts for roughly 20 percent of the American economy,77 and sudden, forced autarky would be devastating for American prosperity. But no great power war could come close to forcing American autarky: essentially all goods have substitute sources of supply at varying marginal increases in cost. Furthermore, wars never isolate the fighting countries completely from external trade. Some dislocation is a real possibility, but these short-term costs would not justify the risks of fighting a great power war. The risk of nuclear escalation is a reason to worry about great power war, but it is a highly suspect reason to favor a military policy that puts U.S. forces between feuding great powers. Nuclear weapons may not be used in a future great power war; the fear of retaliation should breed great caution on the part of the belligerents.78 But the larger point is that the possibility of a faraway nuclear exchange is precisely the reason that America should keep its military forces out of other country’s disputes.79 An Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would be a terrible thing, but it makes no sense to get in the middle. Distant wars would be costly, but not nearly as costly as the solution that selective engagers propose.

# 2AC – Drones Bad – A2: Hegemony DA

## U.S. Adventurism Leads to Imperial Backlash and an Unending Cylce of Wars for Savage Peace Collapsing Hege

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 54-5

In this chapter, I argue that primacy and empire is a strategy that will leadto bad consequences for the United States. Rather than bringing the UnitedStates peace and security, the pursuit of primacy and empire will result in a geopolitical backlash against the United States. It already has. The 9/11 attacks were a violent reaction against America's primacy—and specifically against its imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, the quagmire in Iraq also is a direct consequence of U.S. imperial aspirations. And it will not end there. Because it is premised on the belief that the United States must embarkon assertive policies to bring about regime change by imposing democracyabroad, the pursuit of primacy and empire will drag the United States into otherwise avoidable wars—what one proponent of the strategy has termed"savage wars for peace." Looking ahead, if the United States continues to fol-low its current strategy of primacy and empire, it almost certainly will find itself on a collision course with Iran (and possibly North Korea and Syria)and—more importantly—China.

# 1AR – Drones Bad – A2: Hegemony DA

## UAV’s make war easier, encouraging adventurism and invasion of countries out of want instead of necessity. That’s Singer. Gholz and Press indicates that causes global great power wars, it involves us into other issues that can anger other states. That escalates to a nuclear exchange.

## Additionally, we turn the disad – Layne indicates adventurism results in a geopolitical backlash against the U.S., status quo states will become angered with the U.S. and counterbalance, destroying the stability of hegemony

More evidence, case turns the disad

Jack Snyder May 12, 2003 “Imperial Temptations,” <http://www.antiwar.com/rep/snyder1.html>

Proponents of the new preventive strategy charge that such realists are out of touch with a world in which forming alliances to balance against overwhelming U.S. power has simply become impossible. It is true that small rogue states and their ilk cannot on their own offset American power in the traditional sense. It is also true that their potential greatpower backers, Russia and China, have so far been wary of overtly opposing U.S. military interventions. But even if America's unprecedented power reduces the likelihood of traditional balancing alliances arising against it, the United States could find that its own offensive actions create their functional equivalents. Some earlier expansionist empires found themselves overstretched and surrounded by enemies even though balancing alliances were slow to oppose them. For example, although the prospective victims of Napoleon and Hitler found it difficult to form effective balancing coalitions, these empires attacked so many opponents simultaneously that substantial de facto alliances eventually did form against them. Today, an analogous form of selfimposed overstretch – political as well as military – could occur if the need for military operations to prevent nuclear proliferation risks were deemed urgent on several fronts at the same time, or if an attempt to impose democracy by force of arms on a score or more of Muslim countries were seriously undertaken. Even in the absence of highly coordinated balancing alliances, simultaneous resistance by several troublemaking states and terrorist groups would be a daunting challenge for a strategy of universal preventive action. Highly motivated small powers or rebel movements defending their home ground have often prevailed against vastly superior states that lacked the sustained motivation to dominate them at extremely high cost, as in Vietnam and Algeria. Even when they do not prevail, as on the West Bank, they may fight on, imposing high costs over long periods.

# \*Afghanistan\*

# 2AC – Afghanistan – A2: No Escalation

## Doesn’t assume Russia and NATO. Their evidence is only specific to smaller countries, Russia will seek to increase spheres of influence due to the resulting instability from the counterinsurgency. This makes NATO and US intervention inevitable and escalates to conventional and nuclear war.

## Additionally doesn’t assume our Szeyza evidence – even if the larger powers didn’t intend to go to war, the resulting entanglement increases the risk of it

## Additionally intervention by larger powers escalates to use of WMD

Valery Tsepkalo (Ambassador to the United States, Belarus) 1998 “The Remaking of Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs

The scramble for the spoilsof the Soviet heritagecould cause serious conflict between major geopolitical playersand threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any "world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use it, to maintain the whole. The challengefor Europe and the world in the post-Soviet spaceisaverting further disintegration andkeeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze**.** It is clearly to the West's advantage to promote certain kinds of regional integration in Eurasia. The rapid rise of any player, especially China or Iran, or a radical Islamic revolution could harm Western interests. Western unity would be shaken if one or more of its own, whether Germany, Turkey, or Japan, tried to secure its own zone of influence. The intervention **of** NATO forces in future conflicts in the region, probably at the request of the parties involved, could cause further disintegration, perhaps resulting in loss of control over weapons of mass destruction. The West has levers that it can push to help shape politics in Russia and other CIS states today, including influence over opposition leaders. With NATO expanding to the borders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and so long as Russia is weakened militarily and increasingly dependent on the West economically, Western influence is likely to grow. Economic integration supported by the West would be a powerful stabilizing factor in the region.

# 1AR – Afghanistan – A2: No Escalation

## Their evidence is not specific to great powers. Russia and NATO stakes increase the risk of entanglement resulting in a global nuclear conflict – Russia has already indicated they will use nukes in the region, tahts Tespkalo

## Aditionally the conflict goes global

## Safi 6/29/10

Saleem Safi, works for Geo T.V., “Afghanistan: Interests and Stakes”, The News, 6/29/10, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=247749>, 6/29/10, K.D.K.

The Arab-led Al-Qaeda and the US are in Afghanistan to settle scores with each other. The US and its Western allies have deployed forces in Afghanistan on the pretext of fighting against Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and their supporters. On the other hand, Arab, Asian, African, Western, Central Asian and other enemies of the US across the world, have flocked here to fight against the western forces. Afghanistan is rich in natural resources which still remain unexploited. Therefore, every regional and international player is eyeing this wealth. Afghanistan is also key to Central Asian natural resources. Therefore, there is no regional or international player without stakes in Afghanistan.

## The U.S. will get involved

## Safi 6/29/10

Saleem Safi, works for Geo T.V., “Afghanistan: Interests and Stakes”, The News, 6/29/10, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=247749>, 6/29/10, K.D.K.

The US is interested in controlling Central Asian and Afghan natural resources. Strategically, the US had planned to sit in this country to prevent the future rise of Iran, counter the rising world power China and control Pakistan from Afghan soil. It is fearful of Afghanistan becoming an Al-Qaeda sanctuary once again. It also fears a Taliban government opposed to the Western concepts of democracy and human rights. Other Western countries also define their interests from this perspective. So their interests and concerns are similar to those of the US.

## And Russia will too

## Safi 6/29/10

Saleem Safi, works for Geo T.V., “Afghanistan: Interests and Stakes”, The News, 6/29/10, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=247749>, 6/29/10, K.D.K.

Russia and the neighbouring Central Asians states have economic, cultural and security stakes in Afghanistan, just like Iran. They would not like the US and the allies to stay in Afghanistan for longer than necessary. Russia feels "encircled" by Nato and the US forces. At the same time, these states are concerned about the possibility of a Taliban-style government emerging in Kabul that would export an extremist interpretation of Islam to the Central Asian states and provide active support to or work as motivation and inspiration for extremists in the Central Asian countries. These states have close economic interests in the future Afghanistan. They would not like the US and Western allies to exploit Central Asian resources. A longer stay of these forces would strengthen the perception that they are eyeing Central Asian natural resources.

# 2AC – Afghanistan – A2: I/L/T

## No risk of an internal link turn – 2 reasons

## A. Credibility – Destroys Afghanistan sovereignty and constitutional role, creating backlash against the Afghani government due to alienation – this increases the risk of a insurgent overthrow

## B. Emboldening - Deaths of leaders and civilians create stronger and more irrational leaders in the future, they are regarded as martyrs and increases incentivization of the population to join the insurgency due to collateral damage

# \*Terrorism\*

# 2AC – Terrorism – A2: I/L/T

## Terrorism increases with targeting killings - creates martyrs and civilian casualties that make more irrational actors the leader and increasing recruitment.

## Cross-apply Bylan – killing leaders doesn’t matter – Al Qaeda and the Talabani are decentralized and just depend on ideological fervor.

## Additionally doesn’t turn the advantages – even if you win you kill terrorist leaders civilian backlash will still create instability within the middle eastern political systems.

# 2AC – Terrorism –A2: I/L/T (Nuke Terr Module)

## We access the critical internal link to nuclear terrorism – Pakistani coup by the Taliban due to their refuge from drone attacks in the Pakistani region leads to their attainment of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

## Additionally their evidence isn’t in the context of nuclear terrorism – it doesn’t say anything make sure their evidence is set up to a higher threshold

# 2AC – Terrorism – A2: Al Qaeda Weak

## We’ll concede Al Qaeda is weak – we control terminal impact uniqueness.

## New increases in civilian military relations are solving the risk of Al Qaeda operations within the population and disrupts new recruitment levels, however drones destroy civil military relations increasing incentivization to join Al Qaeda.

# 2AC – Terrorism – A2: Killing One Terrorist solves all

## Doesn’t assume chain of command, martyrdom and succeeding command will create a more violent regime frenzied by the death of their leader.

## Additionally the alternatives better – even if you kill the leader there are still risks from decentralized pockets that increase the risk of terrorism, our second piece of byman evidence indicates interrogation and arrest lets us gain knowledge from key terrorist activities and future attacks without the backlash that results in instability

# 2AC – Terrorism – A2: Israel

## Doesn’t assume the entirety of our backlash arguments – status quo proves there’s no ceasefire or prevention of retaliation – increasing instability in Iraq and Afghanistan prove. We are the only ones winning the context of the U.S. drone presence. Israel had to agree to stop using drones in order to get toward a ceasefire first.

## Aditionally they’re wrong

## Gross ’03 (Michael, Department of Political Science, Division of International Relations, University of Haifa, “Fighting By Other Means in the Mideast: a Critical analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy”, Political Studies (2003) vol. 51. pp. 350-368, Ebsco) DM

On the other hand, it is easy to see that assassinations are often followed by waves of terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens. The connection is increasingly evident as the conflict continues. In late November 2001, after a relative lull in the fighting, Israeli forces assassinated Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, a high-ranking Hamas commander, on the grounds that he perpetrated and planned attacks against Israeli civilians. Palestinian leaders accused Israel of provoking militants so as to scuttle American mediation efforts and warned they could not be held accountable for Hamasbacked retaliation (Lahoud, 2001). Regardless of the merits of the Palestinian (or Israeli) claim about the motives of assassination, bloody terror attacks killing 40 civilians soon followed the assassination. The same scenario repeated itself a month later following the assassination of the Tanzim leader Raed Karmi. In the aftermath, ten civilians died in publicly announced retaliatory terror attacks that eventually led the Israeli army to reoccupy an entire Palestinian city, Tulkarm, for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities.9

# \*Pakistan\*

# 2AC – Pakistan – A2: No Coup

## Even if the ISI is able to stand against the current insurgency – it cannot when the internal link is magnified by Drone killings. Morgan and Jones indicates drone killings near the Afghan-Pakistan border push the Taliban closer toward the Pakistani institutional structure because the insurgency regroups there.

## Additionally Jones subsumes their end-strength arguments – the ISI would become overwhelmed by fundamentalist Islamic fervor against Drone attacks because they think the Pakistani government condones it, public backlash can overwhelm the government

# 2AC – Pakistan – A2: Permission Was Given

## Their evidence doesn’t cite Pakistani politicians, default to our Jones evidence it indicates that politicians, the public and the Taliban backlashes against the use of targeted killings and drones. They view it as irresponsible of civilian life and an imposition against Pakistan’s sovereignty.

# \*Iraq\*

# 2AC – Iraq – A2: Middle Eastern Instab

## Our impact outweighs - it spills over globally and leads to Iranian and Israeli strikes, the impact is perception based, if instability breaks the threshold to make actors act irrationality, extinction is inevitable without the plan.

## And it’s likely

Charles F. Doran is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 139—52

What is frightening about this possibility, however, is that, as nuclear weapons proliferate, major wars may take place in areas where they would not previously have been expected: the Middle East for example. These new nuclear powers will possess relatively small nuclear forces for some time. They will still not have deterrent forces approaching second-strike capabilities. The populations and states in the region are relatively concentrated, and there is a history of surprise attack. Much of the proliferation is ‘paired’ between rivals, and it is very difficult for other states to control this dynamic, either in terms of the possible outbreak of war or in terms of the proliferation process itself

# \*\*\*2AC Counterplans\*\*\*

# 2AC – Transparency CP

## 1. Permutation do both

## 2. No solvency – the counterinsurgency will continue to become emboldened even if drone attacks are made transparent. Drones still kill civilians and still kill leaders incentivizing joining a terrorist group due to destruction of civil military relations and increasing fundamentalist fervor that risks instability.

## 3. Additionally, their Israeli examples fail

## Gross ’03 (Michael, Department of Political Science, Division of International Relations, University of Haifa, “Fighting By Other Means in the Mideast: a Critical analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy”, Political Studies (2003) vol. 51. pp. 350-368, Ebsco) DM

On the other hand, it is easy to see that assassinations are often followed by waves of terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens. The connection is increasingly evident as the conflict continues. In late November 2001, after a relative lull in the fighting, Israeli forces assassinated Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, a high-ranking Hamas commander, on the grounds that he perpetrated and planned attacks against Israeli civilians. Palestinian leaders accused Israel of provoking militants so as to scuttle American mediation efforts and warned they could not be held accountable for Hamasbacked retaliation (Lahoud, 2001). Regardless of the merits of the Palestinian (or Israeli) claim about the motives of assassination, bloody terror attacks killing 40 civilians soon followed the assassination. The same scenario repeated itself a month later following the assassination of the Tanzim leader Raed Karmi. In the aftermath, ten civilians died in publicly announced retaliatory terror attacks that eventually led the Israeli army to reoccupy an entire Palestinian city, Tulkarm, for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities.9

## 4. And the extra judicial nature of drones trumps credibility – in fact transparency supercharges the backlash against it

Proulx 2005

[Vincent-Joel Proulx, University of Ottawa, International Legal Studies at New York University, he is also a doctoral candidate at McGill University Institute of Comparative Law, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, May 2005, <https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=56+Hastings+L.J.+801&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=b77fa1105fbf136d086e4c1c0ab57e37>, 6/24/2010, K.C.]

It is no secret that both the United States and Israel have been engaging in a policy of targeted killing of terrorists. n344 This policy has been sharply criticized as an impediment to peaceful relations and other initiatives conducive to stability, especially in the case of Israel. n345 In 2002, the High Court of Justice of Israel unanimously refused to intervene in the state's policy of targeted killing, n346 which it saw as a non-justiciable issue. n347 Under this policy, the military identifies a particular terrorist and proceeds to remove that person through an aerial strike n348 or other means of assassination. n349 Because this type of practice is incompatible with international law, which categorically prohibits extra-judicial executions, governments often dissimulate their actions. n350 Such is the case in Israel, [\*874] where the death sentence has only been judicially imposed once, in the trial of Adolf Eichmann. n351 Nevertheless, senior Israeli officials have admitted that targeted killing is often used to thwart future terrorist attacks, to punish suspected terrorists, and to deter further terrorist activity. n352 Some scholars argue that Great Britain, too, although not resorting to capital punishment of suspected terrorists through judicial channels, might have engaged in extra-judicial execution of individuals involved in activities hostile to the security of the state. n353

## 5. Additionally - links to the net benefit, Judicial review makes it harder for constituents that support extra-judicial killings to engage in them, the process kills the reason why drones are popular which is fast response and lack of transparency.

# 2AC – Internal Review CP

## 1. Permutation do both

## 2. No solvency – the counterinsurgency will continue to become emboldened even if drone attacks are made transparent. Drones still kill civilians and still kill leaders incentivizing joining a terrorist group due to destruction of civil military relations and increasing fundamentalist fervor that risks instability.

## 3. Multi-Actor fiats a voting issue

## A. Ground – multiple actors are unpredictable and impossible to generate negative disads, the negative needs disads to the actor as a whole.

## B. Predictability – No stable solvency advocate for all actors working at the same time, making it impossible for the affirmative to predict and generate arguments against

## 4. Additionally - links to the net benefit, Judicial review makes it harder for constituents that support extra-judicial killings to engage in them, the process kills the reason why drones are popular which is fast response and lack of transparency.

# 2AC – Judicial Review CP

## 1. Permutation do both

## 2. No solvency – the counterinsurgency will continue to become emboldened even if drone attacks are made transparent. Drones still kill civilians and still kill leaders incentivizing joining a terrorist group due to destruction of civil military relations and increasing fundamentalist fervor that risks instability.

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# 2AC – Consult Japan

## Permutation do the counterplan – our interpretation is that counterplans have to be both functionally and textually competitive.

## If you don’t justify the permutation, consultation counterplans are a voter

## A. Plan focus – consultation counterplans destroy in depth examination of the plan and stable links

## B. Aff Ground – counterplans that include the entirety of the affirmative make it impossible for the affirmative to garner offense

## C. Topic Specific Education – we learn about a random actors consultation policy instead of the plan’s application to the topic

## D. Infinitely Regressive – thousands of different actors you can consult creates a unpredictable burden on the affirmative.

## E. No literature basis – no solvency advocate on the consultation of our specific plan, encouraging lower thresholds of evidence and skewing the debate to the negative.

## Relations disad should solve your offense, Counter-interpretation consultation counterplan with specific solvency advocate and normal means evidence based off our plan solves your offense and our fairness claims.

## Permutation do both

## Permutation do the plan consult Japan on Futenma – its reciprocal, they garner competition outside of boundaries of the plan text means we should be able to garner a permutation off the consultation process in their solvency advocate.

## Permutation – do the plan in the world that they say yes

## Not severance – Consult counterplans fiat the consultation, provide literature for the result, and then fiat the result. We defend the certainty of the plan by only permuting in the world in which they say yes and permute the consultation, preventing severance of immediacy.

## Permutation – do the plan if they say yes, do the plan if they say no

## Japan will say no to the counterplan.

Green 2010

(Michael J., Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS and is concurrently on the faculty at Georegown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council from 2001 through 2005 and was special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs from January 2004 to December 2005. Japan’s Confused Revolution The Washington Quarterly – 33:1 pp 319)

The DPJ’s promise to move closer to Asia also sends confusing signals. Hatoyama made news after his bilateral summit on the margins of the September 2009 UN General Assembly with President Hu Jintao of China by promising to create a new ‘‘East Asian community’’ that would, by implication, exclude the United States. This, however, was not a new proposal16 since LDP governments had already agreed to this vision in regional summit meetings held as far back as 2007.17 Nor is an exclusive East Asia community likely to become a reality any time soon, judging from polling done by CSIS in late 2008 that demonstrated deep skepticism across the region, especially in Japan, about whether security and economic prosperity could be sustained over the coming decades without the United States.18 Indeed, from the perspective of U.S. national interests, more positive ties between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors would be a welcome development, particularly Hatoyama’s pledge not to inflame regional emotions about Japan’s historical aggression. The problem has been that the DPJ has often chosen to articulate its Asianist vision as a kind of counterbalance to the United States, a theme that worked well during the campaign when the party was trying to portray Koizumi as a U.S. lapdog, but one that now sends confusing signals to Washington.19

## Consultation creates rising expectations—not following up will undermine relations

**Edwards** 19**89** (Geoffrey; Centre of International Studies - Cambridge) The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East p. 227

Ringing declarations and exhortations to consult closely and to develop more harmonious if not harmonized positions have regularly emerged from the multilateral fora of Western Europe and the Atlantic. In 1951, for example, it was declared that: There is a continuing need . . . for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the activities and interests of all members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation rests on the more powerful members of the community. Much of the same could be, and is being, said today both on matters coming within the NATO area and especially on matters that fall outside it. And yet the channels of multilateral consultation have grown considerably, not only between those countries that make up the European Community but also between Western Europe and the United States. Such multilateral channels are, of course, in addition to those bilateral links that the countries of Western Europe have maintained with the United States. The existence of such a multitude of channels raises expectations that consultation will take place. Disappointment and some resentment is often the result when it does not. Equally, perhaps, when consultations do take place, they raise expectations that the views of those being discussed will be taken into account. Again, resentment is caused when they are not.

## Consulting Japan results in massive delays

## Baker 92, Former US Senator and Law Firm Partner, Foreign Affairs

The Japanese political process makes creative policymaking difficult and rapid decisions impossible. What counts at the highest level is not issues or leadership, but money from interest groups and deals between factions. The socialists and the communists, who have no real chance of governing, seek opportunities to embarrass the government whenever they can. To break the frequent deadlocks, Japanese policymakers are forced to invoke foreign pressure. All this adds up to a glacial and seemingly grudging pattern of decision-making that undermines Japan in American eyes and tarnishes the value of the concession or contribution in question.

## Consultation destroys leadership

**Carroll ‘9**

(James F. F., attorney for the Huddleston Law Firm, Notes & Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D., with Honors, Emory University School of Law, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, lexis)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does **not mean**, however, that **foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S.** foreign or domestic **policies**, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. **Allowing** foreign countries or international institutions **to veto or modify** unrelated **U.S. policies would** make a mockery of our foreign policy and **destroy the credibility of American leadership**. International cooperation does **not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations**. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

## Nuclear war.

Zalmay Khalilzad**,** RAND policy analyst, Spring 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, “ Losing the Moment?”

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world’s major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# 2AC – Consult NATO

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## A. Plan focus – consultation counterplans destroy in depth examination of the plan and stable links

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## D. Infinitely Regressive – thousands of different actors you can consult creates a unpredictable burden on the affirmative.

## E. No literature basis – no solvency advocate on the consultation of our specific plan, encouraging lower thresholds of evidence and skewing the debate to the negative.

## Relations disad should solve your offense, Counter-interpretation consultation counterplan with specific solvency advocate and normal means evidence based off our plan solves your offense and our fairness claims.

## Permutation do both

## Permutation do the plan consult NATO on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey – its reciprocal, they garner competition outside of boundaries of the plan text means we should be able to garner a permutation off the consultation process in their solvency advocate.

## Permutation – do the plan in the world that they say yes

## Not severance – Consult counterplans fiat the consultation, provide literature for the result, and then fiat the result. We defend the certainty of the plan by only permuting in the world in which they say yes and permute the consultation, preventing severance of immediacy.

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Consultation destroys leadership

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## Relations are resilent

## Sloan Visiting Scholar at Middlebury College ‘10

## (Stanley, UNISCI Discussion papers, January 2010, proquest, 6/25/10, EL)

Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship. While NATO, the European allies and the European Union can all be faulted for either ineffective or insufficient contributions to the effort in Afghanistan, the United States carries part of the blame for not making Afghanistan a higher priority. There is plenty of blame to go around, and the "failures" in this effort may unite the allies as much as dividing them. For its part, the United States does not want the Afghan problem to be "Americanized," and the formal involvement of NATO and NATO allies in helping shape an acceptable outcome helps ensure that the conflict remains internationalized. NATO's involvement, even as flawed as it may be, provides a critical link to international legitimacy for US policy objectives. That link runs through NATO directly to the United Nations, hopefully (from the US point of view) ensuring that the broader international community will share responsibility for ensuring that Afghanistan does not return to a failed state that offers a welcoming habitat for future terrorist operations. As far as the European allies are concerned, most if not all governments appear to recognize that the future of Afghanistan does hold the key to the level of threat likely to be posed by international terrorism in the coming years. They also recognize that bailing out of responsibility for the outcome in Afghanistan would call into question the vitality of the security links among them and to the United States. They too want the broader international community to remain committed to a positive outcome in Afghanistan, and the NATO role provides and important link to international legitimacy and assistance for the European allies as well. The bottom line, therefore, is that the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early 21st century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure.66

**Rising expectations with NATO destroys relations**

**The National Journal 2002**

**(**Clive Crook, “One thing that did not change: how the world sees america” vol 34 no 37, sept 14)

President Clinton’s support for the Kyoto accord on global warming was a much-praised instance of international cooperation. He took foreigners’ concerns seriously. He backed the agreement, knowing it was unworkable and would never be implemented, to appease critics at home an abroad and to affirm his multilateralist outlook. Did the pretense serve America’s longer-term insterests? Just the opposite. IN due course, when American stepped back from its commitments under the plan-as it was bound to do-it was reviled all the more furiously for reneging on its promises.

## No solvency – Three reasons

## A. NATO doesn’t want to deal with challenges

## Hamilton et al, Director Center for Transatlantic Relations SAIS – JHU, 2009

## (Daniel, Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century The Washington NATO Project, February, accessed: June 25, TS)

Taken together, these reforms promise to reinforce each element of NATO’s enduring purpose, while repositioning the Alliance within a broader, reinvigorated Atlantic partnership that is more capable of responding to the opportunities and challenges of the new world rising. To succeed in this new world, Europeans and Americans must define their partnership in terms of common security rather than just common defense, at home and away. This will require the Alliance to stretch. Depending on the contingency at hand, NATO may be called to play the leading role, be a supporting actor, or simply join a broader ensemble. Even so, NATO alone -- no matter how resilient -- simply cannot stretch far enough to tackle the full range of challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community. It must also be able to connect and work better with others, whether they are nations or international governmental or non-governmental organizations. And if NATO is to both stretch and connect, it will need to generate better expeditionary capabilities and change the way it does business.

## B. Consensus

## Ullman, UPI Outside View Commentator, 2010

## (Harlan, Outside View: NATO’s future – backbone is needed, February 24, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Analysis/2010/02/24/Outside-View-NATOs-future-backbone-is-needed/UPI-60831267016940/ , accessed: 6/23/10, TS)

The easier political course is to assume the former. Unfortunately, merely assuming that the alliance is as or even more relevant to the future needs of its members will not sit well with a public that is skeptical and even cynical about the need for NATO in the light of [Afghanistan](http://www.upi.com/topic/War_in%3Cafghanistan/) and so-called out-of-area [operations](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/2010/02/24/Outside-View-NATOs-future-backbone-is-needed/UPI-60831267016940/) against enemies that possess no armies, navies or air forces. The decision by the Netherlands to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan this summer underscores these reservations. Whether relic or relevant very much depends on whether NATO can continue as a military alliance conceived to counter a military threat that no longer exists or whether it will expand further to conform with security threats and dangers that exceed these traditional military boundaries. Given the current economic crisis that now must deal with possible financial insolvency in Greece, Spain, Portugal and perhaps Italy, defense is not the first priority of NATO's members. And, as some members fear Russia above all, NATO must reconcile often powerfully conflicting and opposite perceptions of threat that make gaining consensus very difficult. Hence, the absence of an agreed-upon threat such as the old Soviet Union greatly confounds and impedes winning consensus among each member state required for approval by the alliance as a whole.

## C. They’ll just say no

## Kolko, research professor emeritus at York Univeristy, 2003

## (Gabriel, counter punch “A geopolitical earthquake”, feb 18 [www.counterpunch.org/kolko02182003.html](http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko02182003.html) )

The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium’s refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudge the Security Council’s decision on war and peace is only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for many years. The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point has been made: some NATO members refuse to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy, whatever it may be.

# 2AC – Consult China

## Permutation do the counterplan – our interpretation is that counterplans have to be both functionally and textually competitive.

## If you don’t justify the permutation, consultation counterplans are a voter

## A. Plan focus – consultation counterplans destroy in depth examination of the plan and stable links

## B. Aff Ground – counterplans that include the entirety of the affirmative make it impossible for the affirmative to garner offense

## C. Topic Specific Education – we learn about a random actors consultation policy instead of the plan’s application to the topic

## D. Infinitely Regressive – thousands of different actors you can consult creates a unpredictable burden on the affirmative.

## E. No literature basis – no solvency advocate on the consultation of our specific plan, encouraging lower thresholds of evidence and skewing the debate to the negative.

## Relations disad should solve your offense, Counter-interpretation consultation counterplan with specific solvency advocate and normal means evidence based off our plan solves your offense and our fairness claims.

## Permutation do both

## Permutation do the plan and consult China on North Korea – its reciprocal, they garner competition outside of boundaries of the plan text means we should be able to garner a permutation off the consultation process in their solvency advocate.

## Solely consulting over military presence fails – frequent dialogue over other major issues is key.

## Wenfeng '07 (Wang, Researcher with China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. "China-US dialogue best way to deal with issues", China Daily. Jun 20, 2007.

China and the US must maintain regular dialogue to expand consensus and manage differences. As two great countries, China and the US share common interests on such critical international issues as sustaining regional peace and international security, fighting terrorism and extremism, promoting the development of the global economy, securing the global energy supply and dealing with climate change. The two sides need to develop joint action plans to maintain effective cooperation. At the same time, as the two countries differ greatly in ideology, social systems and stages of development, it is natural for them to harbor suspicions and misunderstandings as well as different stands on some issues. China and the US must exchange views regularly and frankly in order to increase mutual trust and minimize differences that could impact on bilateral ties and wreck cooperation on critical international issues.

## Permutation – do the plan in the world that they say yes

## Not severance – Consult counterplans fiat the consultation, provide literature for the result, and then fiat the result. We defend the certainty of the plan by only permuting in the world in which they say yes and permute the consultation, preventing severance of immediacy.

## Permutation – do the plan if they say yes, do the plan if they say no

## Non-binding consultation makes for the best foreign policy.

## Krauthammer, 01 (Charles Krauthammer, won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary in 1987, “From a No-Wobble Bush”, Washington Post, June 18 2001)

Ask yourself: If you really wanted to reassert American unilateralism, to get rid of the cobwebs of the bipolar era and the myriad Clinton-era treaty strings tying Gulliver down, what would you do? No need for in-your-face arrogance. No need to humiliate. No need to proclaim that you will ignore nattering allies and nervous ex-enemies. Journalists can talk like that because the truth is clarifying. Governments cannot talk like that because the truth is scary. The trick to unilateralism -- doing what you think is right, regardless of what others think --is to pretend you are not acting unilaterally at all. Thus if you really want to junk the ABM Treaty, and the Europeans and Russians and Chinese start screaming bloody murder, the trick is to send Colin Powell to smooth and soothe and schmooze every foreign leader in sight, have Condoleezza Rice talk about how much we value allied input, have President Bush in Europe stress how missile defense will help the security of everybody. And then go ahead and junk the ABM Treaty regardless. Make nice, then carry on. Or, say, you want to kill the Kyoto protocol (which the Senate rejected 95-0 and which not a single EU country has ratified) and the Europeans hypocritically complain. The trick is to have the president go to Europe to stress, both sincerely and correctly, that the United States wants to be in the forefront of using science and technology to attack the problem -- but make absolutely clear that you'll accept no mandatory cuts and tolerate no treaty that penalizes the United States and lets China, India and the Third World off the hook. Be nice, but be undeterred. The best unilateralism is velvet-glove unilateralism. At the end of the day, for all the rhetorical bows to Russian, European and liberal sensibilities, look at how Bush returns from Europe: Kyoto is dead. The ABM Treaty is history. Missile defense is on. NATO expansion is relaunched. And just to italicize the new turn in American foreign policy, the number of those annual, vaporous U.S.-EU summits has been cut from two to one.

## Consultations and incentives can't solve because major powers don't agree on rules, and it leads to ineffective policy

## Haass 99 (Richard N. Haass, Chair in International Security at the Brooking Institutions “What to do with American Primacy?”, American Future, http://americanfuture.net/?page\_id=139)

Still, consultations alone--even consultations buttressed by incentives-will not bring about consensus in every area. Persuasion has its limits. The major powers may not agree on senera1 rules; even when they do, they may not agree on how to apply them in a particular situation. In such circumstances, it makes little sense for the United States to work in vain for the emergence of international consensus, guaranteeing only inaction or a lowest common denominator and hence ineffective foreign policy.

Consultation destroys leadership

**Carroll ‘9**

(James F. F., attorney for the Huddleston Law Firm, Notes & Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D., with Honors, Emory University School of Law, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, lexis)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does **not mean**, however, that **foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S.** foreign or domestic **policies**, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. **Allowing** foreign countries or international institutions **to veto or modify** unrelated **U.S. policies would** make a mockery of our foreign policy and **destroy the credibility of American leadership**. International cooperation does **not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations**. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

Nuclear war.

Zalmay **Khalilzad,** RAND policy analyst, Spring **1995**, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, “ Losing the Moment?”

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world’s major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# 2AC – Consult China NK Prolif Turn

## Turn – Strong U.S.-Chinese relations speed up North Korean proliferation – its strategic value to China disappears if the U.S. and China can cooperate.

## Shen, 09 (Dingli, Professor of International Relations, Executive Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, & Director of Center for American Studies at Fudan University, October, “Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4, pg. 183-4, FT & RV)

It seems obvious that North Korea’s survival could serve China’s national security interests, especially in light of the Taiwan issue and the security dilemma it poses. Despite the improvement in relations between China and the United States since 1979 and the increasing interaction and cooperation across the Pacific, the issue of Taiwan has remained a sour point. While the mainland claims Taiwan as part of China’s territory, the government in Taiwan continues to view itself as an independent state and the sole representative of its citizens. Though Beijing has garnered more international support than Taiwan, continued U.S. support to Taiwan, especially in terms of arms deals, has angered China on more than one occasion. More significantly, China feels that the United States is using Taiwan to indirectly threaten China and force it to take a military stance toward Taiwan at a time when it is trying to peacefully integrate into the world’s economy. As a result, China has played down the Taiwan issue so long as Taiwan does not seek de jure independence, while making great leaps in economic development that can be translated to comprehensive national and military strength, which will be helpful if Taiwan declares independence. China and the United States, therefore, have a very complicated relationship. While the United States is the main source of China’s economic modernization, both have hedged against uncertainty. They have made significant efforts to forge dialogues and promote communication, while each military is still built to deal with each other professionally in the battlefield. Lately there have been an increasing number of skirmishes between the two navies in the South China Sea. The U.S. armed forces feel more need to understand the development of the Chinese navy (the submarine force in particular) while the Chinese army is increasingly assertive in its claim of Chinese rights in its Special Economic Zone. This simply indicates mutual hedging and asks for a mechanism to avoid naval conflict. But given the growing maturity of U.S.—China relations, North Korea may feel more isolated and pressed to accelerate its nuclear weapons program before it becomes a geostrategic liability to China.14 Also, the declining tension across the Taiwan Strait since the Taiwan election in May 2008 has undercut Pyongyang’s chance to secure China’s economic aid unconditionally. In other words, time is running short for North Korea.

# 1AR – Consult China – P/OtherThings XT

## Wenfeng indicates the China-US relationship is multifaceted, areas like energy, terrorism, economic engagement must be consulted upon to sustain relations – one time consultation does nothing to prevent Chinese resentment.

## More evidence – multiple issues key

VOA News 3-10-07. "US Not Worried About China's Growing Presence in Africa" http://www.huliq.com/10238/us-not-worried-about-Chinas-growing-presence-in-Africa

"Deepening our cooperation in these areas is going to require extended consultations, and our view is in many cases, the Chinese have been quite reluctant to coordinate their assistance programs and to collaborate with other major donors in trying to arrange for a cohesive approach in various countries in Africa," he said. At the same time, Swan said there are more thorny areas of disagreement that may prove to be more difficult for Washington and Beijing to resolve. "There are also areas where our approaches differ greatly, especially with respect to democracy and to governance issues, human rights issues, transparency issues," noted James Swan. "And in these areas, too, we need to be prepared for a sustained dialogue with the Chinese, since they clearly are viewing their foreign policy objectives over a much longer time horizon."

## And the permutation is legit – they garner competition outside of the plan text, means our permutations should be able to garner net benefits outside the realm of the counterplans consultation status and into the solvency evidence contextualization of the consultation process.

# 2AC – Consult China A2: KWar Impact

## China and the US can’t cooperate over North Korea – they’re too difficult to deal with

Pan '06

Ester, English and International Relations from Stanford, "The China-North Korea Relationship", Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/#5>

Pyongyang is not an ally Beijing can count on. Kim Jung-Il's foreign policy is, like its leader, highly unpredictable. "North Korea is extremely difficult to deal with, even as an ally," says Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former longtime foreign correspondent specializing in Asia. "This is not a warm and fuzzy relationship," he says. "North Korean officials look for reasons to defy Beijing." Some experts say the missile tests were just one example of North Korea pushing back against China's influence. ""It was certainly a sign of independence [and] a willingness to send a message to China as well as everyone else," Segal says. The Chinese, who favor "quiet diplomacy" with North Korea instead of public statements, took the unusual step of making public the fact that Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, warned North Korea not to launch their missiles. The fact that Pyongyang did anyway has hurt China's image, other experts say. What kind of leverage does Beijing have over Pyongyang? Not as much as outsiders think, experts say. Beijing has bullied or bribed Pyongyang officials to get them to the negotiating table at the Six-Party Talks many times. "It's clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage on North Korea in many respects," Sneider says. "But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not." Pinkston says that for all his country's growing economic ties with China, Kim still makes up his own mind: "At the end of the day, China has little influence over the military decisions." What are China’s goals for its engagement with North Korea? "For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities," Sneider says. "From that point of view, the North Koreans are a huge problem for them, because Pyongyang could trigger a war on its own." Stability is a huge worry for Beijing because of the specter of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into China. "The Chinese are most concerned about the collapse of North Korea leading to chaos on the border," Segal says. If North Korea does provoke a war with the United States, China and South Korea would bear the brunt of any military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Yet both those countries have been hesitant about pushing Pyongyang too hard, for fear of making Kim's regime collapse. "They're willing to live with a degree of ambiguity over North Korea's military capability," Sneider says, as long as Pyongyang doesn't cross the "red line" of nuclear testing. Even then, "the Chinese can live with a nuclear North Korea, because they see the weapon as a deterrent against the United States, not them," agrees Segal. But North Korea's military moves could start an arms race in Northeast Asia and are already strengthening militarism in Japan, which could push for its own nuclear weapons if North Korea officially goes nuclear. How does Washington factor into the relationship? The United States has pushed North Korea to verifiably and irreversibly give up its uranium enrichment activities before Washington will agree to bilateral talks. Experts say Washington and Beijing have very different views on the issue. "Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics," Pinkston says. "They tend to see public measures as humiliating and counterproductive." Since U.S. officials have repeatedly refused North Korean invitations to establish bilateral talks, "the Chinese have some sympathy for the North Korean view that the United States is not interested in negotiating," Segal says. Pinkston says the adversarial Pyongyang-Washington ties will likely not improve. "I don't think the relationship with the Bush administration is reparable," he says. "It's a complete disaster, and someone else has to pick up the pieces. We can only hope it doesn't degenerate more, but that the status quo will be maintained" until a new U.S. administration takes over, he says. In the meantime, U.S. pundits and lawmakers who push China to take what it sees as destabilizing actions in its region—i.e. support punitive actions or sanctions against North Korea—"are living in a different world," Pinkston says.

# 2AC – Consult China A2: China Prolif Impact

## China won’t proliferate – they’re making strides towards arms control

## Jones ’07.

## Rodney W, author of Modern Weapons and Third World Powers, 98. “China's Proliferation Record” Proliferation Brief, Volume 3, Number 21. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=367>

China made notable strides to join formal arms control regimes in the 1990s—beginning with its accession to the NPT in 1992, its signature in 1993 and ratification in 1997 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and its cessation of nuclear weapon explosive testing and signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September, 1996. China has supported the multilateral negotiations on a fissile-material production cutoff convention. China also acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. Moreover, China has gradually clarified and upgraded the commitments it makes through export controls to nuclear and missile non-proliferation objectives. These nuclear export control clarifications and practical improvements are worthy of note, as are the areas of continued divergence.

# 1AR – Consult China A2: China Prolif XT

## Jones indicates China has taken steps toward arms control. They won’t irrationally subject themselves to rampant proliferation after accession to the NPT, CTBT, CWC, and BWC, which prevents them from upgrading and utilizing weapons of mass destruction.

## China is committed to non-proliferation

PRC '04. (People’s Republic of China, "China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures" Permanent mission of the people's republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other international organizations in Switzerland. 2004-04-16. <http://www.China-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjzfbps/t85404.htm>)

While sparing no effort to implement the non-proliferation policy, strengthening and improving the non­proliferation laws and regulations and export control mechanism, the Chinese Government is fully aware that the above efforts should proceed in a systematic way and advance step by step. The international non-proliferation effort is inseparable from the policies and measures of the countries involved, and the building of the domestic mechanisms in various countries is inseparable from the establishment of international non-proliferation standards. China will continue to take an active part in international non­proliferation endeavors, and exert great efforts to maintain and strengthen the existing non-proliferation international law system within the UN framework. It will constantly increase consultations and exchanges with the multinational non-proliferation mechanisms, including the "Nuclear Suppliers' Group," the MTCR, the "AustraliaGroup" and the "WassenaarArrangement," and continue to take an active part in international discussions related to non-proliferation. The Chinese Government will continue to keep in touch and hold consultations with other countries on non-proliferation issues, and is willing to strengthen its exchange and cooperation with all sides in the fields related to non-proliferation export control to keep improving their respective non-proliferation export control systems. Confronted with the complicated and changeable international security situation, China stands for the fostering of a new security concept of seeking security through cooperation, dialogue, mutual trust and development. Non-proliferation is an important link in the preservation of international and regional peace and security in the new century. China will join the members of the international community who love peace and stability in making contributions to accelerating the development and improvement of the international non-proliferation mechanism and to promoting world peace, stability and development through unremitting international efforts and cooperation and by persisting in settling the issue of proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery through peaceful means.

# 2AC – Consult China A2: Iran Prolif

## US-China relations can’t solve Iranian proliferation – Chinese interests in Iran prevent definitive action.

## Kessler, 6/9/10

## (Glenn, Washington Post Staff Writer, “U.N. vote on Iran sanctions not a clear-cut win for Obama”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060903742.html)

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA -- The [12 to 2 vote in the U.N. Security Council](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060902876.html) on Wednesday to impose a modest tightening of sanctions on Iran poses a conundrum: How could an administration that spent months reaching out to Iran and its allies to build international unity end up with a more uncertain result than when George W. Bush was president? Bush refused to engage with Iran, his administration was perceived as acting unilaterally in international affairs, and his U.N. ambassador was John R. Bolton, who once famously said he wanted to eliminate 10 stories of the U.N. headquarters. But not a single Security Council resolution on Iran that passed on Bush's watch contained a dissenting vote. By contrast, President Obama had argued that engagement from the start would persuade Iran to negotiate seriously and if that did not happen, would demonstrate that Tehran was the problem, not Washington. Yet Turkey, a NATO ally, and Brazil, a major regional power, voted against Wednesday's resolution. Lebanon, a beneficiary of U.S. aid, abstained. Administration officials say they are pleased with the resolution, noting that it includes such elements as a conventional arms sales ban, a ban on certain nuclear and missile investments abroad and measures that could thwart Iranians' banking and shipping activities and hinder the growing role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in proliferation activities. Moreover, officials note, Brazil and Turkey will be required to abide by these sanctions, despite their no votes. U.S. officials also say that Bush's resolutions failed to halt Iran's drive toward a nuclear weapon, and that this resolution at least holds the potential to put new pressure on Tehran. The administration's diplomatic engagement, they add, leaves open the possibility of talks to resolve the dispute -- while Bush's failure to engage was a dead end. U.S. officials also say it is a significant achievement to win over Russia and China, which had been skeptical of new sanctions when Obama took office. The administration did have to pay a price to win Russian and Chinese cooperation. U.S. sanctions were ended against Russian firms that had been linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programs, and China's economic interests in Iran were walled off from the sanctions. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, traveling in Latin America, told reporters here that the administration's efforts at engagement were responsible for the positive vote. "When we started this effort, there was no appetite in the international community for further pressure in the form of sanctions on Iran," she said. The outreach effort was "politically difficult" but helped to demonstrate that the United States was serious about diplomacy, she said, persuading Russia and China to join the sanctions drive. Clinton said the new sanctions will make it easier to "slow down and interfere" with Iran's nuclear program in the meantime, since the "ultimate goal" is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. She described the administration as "open to effective diplomacy" that could involve adding countries such as Brazil and Turkey to the negotiating table. The administration's critics say the uncertain result in the Security Council vote stems from U.S. weakness in international diplomacy, while its defenders say Obama inherited a weak hand from Bush. "It is ironic that Bush had a far better record at the U.N. than Obama, as there was a unanimous UNSC vote under Bush, and Obama has lost it," said Elliott Abrams, a deputy national security adviser under Bush. He said the reason is not that the Iranians' behavior has improved, because "the clock keeps ticking, and Iran gets closer and closer to a bomb." The reason, Abrams said, "is simply that American weakness has created a vacuum, and other states are trying to step into it." Bolton argues that the administration's willingness to operate within the U.N. system left it at a negotiating disadvantage. "Everyone believes the Obama administration is joined at the hip to the council, which is a position of negotiating weakness," he said. "Weakness produces today's result." But Martin Indyk, vice president for foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, said that the no votes were "a product of the shifting templates in international affairs that is in part a result of Bush's policies that squandered American influence when it was at its height, allowing for regional powers to emerge with greater ambitions and independence." Indyk said that the fact that Russia and China -- two of the five permanent Security Council members with veto power -- have yet again joined in new sanctions "should serve to underscore the Obama administration's considerable achievement in maintaining P5 consensus in a new era in which the United States can no longer dictate outcomes." Mark Hibbs, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that "the sanctions vote serves notice that the process of building a case against Iran in the international community is continuing." He noted that nonaligned nations refused to back Iran at a recent review conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Brazil's and Turkey's "no" votes Wednesday were widely anticipated. "All these developments seem to indicate right now that the NAM group of countries is not a bloc which Iran can count on for support at crucial decision making moments," Hibbs said. "Clearly the world is not unified in opposing Iran's nuclear posture," said Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "But it won't hide the fact that Iran's diplomacy with Brazil and Turkey wasn't able to avoid the new Security Council sanctions or to break China and Russia away from the U.S.-led posse." Nevertheless, it took the administration 16 months to reach this point, during which time Iran added to its stockpile of enriched uranium and even began to enrich at higher levels. In the meantime, Obama wrote two letters to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and tried hard to win Tehran's agreement on a confidence-building measure. The administration also exposed the existence of a secret Iranian facility near the city of Qom, which it said demonstrated anew how Iran was deceiving the world about its nuclear ambitions. None of that seemed to matter to the dissenters at the council. Turkey and Brazil, in fact, took the administration's confidence-building measure -- a swap of nuclear material for an Iranian medical research reactor -- and revived it last month over U.S. objections. So in this case, one of the administration's efforts at engagement may have backfired. Administration officials, however, say such messy outcomes are sometimes the consequence of diplomatic ingenuity. The administration might have won the same result -- or even better -- if it had moved for new sanctions last year. Brazil and Lebanon are new members on the council this year. Brazil replaced Costa Rica, which is very amenable to American persuasion. Lebanon replaced Libya, which had actually supported a sanctions resolution on Iran in 2008. Lebanon's government includes members of Hezbollah, which is closely linked to Iran, and might have been expected to also vote "no," though it may have been swayed by a phone call from Clinton to Lebanese President Michel Suleiman on Wednesday morning. Administration officials insist the U.N. vote represents just the first stage of a widening web of sanctions that will be imposed by the European Union and others. But unless China seriously joins the effort, that could mean that the United States and its allies are just opening up Iran to extensive Chinese investment.

# 2AC – Consult China A2: GWOT Impact

## China wont support the US with the war on terror – they see it as containment

## Miller, 02 (Alice Lyman, Research fellow at the Hoover Institution and visiting associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford, “Beijing and the American War on Terrorism”, *Strategic Insights*, Volume 1 Issue 5, 2002)

At the same time, the course of the American war on terrorism has increasingly unsettled Chinese security and foreign affairs analysts, who see Washington using the war to enhance what they see as American predominance-"hegemonism"-in the international system. They also are suspicious that Washington is using the war on terrorism not only to root out al-Qaida and its supporters, but also to extend a decade-long effort to encircle China strategically. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Beijing has worried about the implications of the resulting "unipolar" world order-one in which the United States remains as the sole superpower, now able to dominate the international system and pursue unilateral policy courses unconstrained by counter-balancing great powers. Since the early 1990s, therefore, Beijing has sought to dilute overarching American power globally in two ways. First, it has tried to play to a presumed interest of other significant centers of power in the international system-Russia, European states like Germany and France, India, and others-in limiting U.S. power. These efforts are usually couched in the rhetoric of promoting "multipolarity" in the international order and are manifested in the "strategic partnerships" Beijing has established with Moscow in 1997, Paris in the same year, Sao Paolo thereafter, and others.

# 2AC – Consult China A2: China War

## War with China is impossible – globalization

## Garrett '04. Banning, director of Asia programmes at the Atlantic Council of the United States. "Going Global Compels US, China to Cooperate" Straits Times, Feb. 18, 2004

While this strategic straitjacket is evident within the European Union, it also affects the relationships of other countries, including the US and China. There are those in the US who continue to view the world in Realist terms and maintain that a rising power such as China is inherently threatening. They argue that China will pursue military power to match its growing economic power and seek to expand its defence perimeter, sharply reduce US military and political influence in Asia, and redraw international norms and institutions to advance its own narrow national interests. China, in short, is a long-term threat to the US that must be kept weak and contained. Similarly, there are strategists in China who think the US will seek to thwart a rising China and foresee an eventual military clash. However, such views fail to appreciate the changing basis of national power and national interests under conditions of globalisation. Moreover, they fail to account for how Chinese leaders view the country's long-term national interests and strategy. China has no viable alternative to engagement with the US. This strategic straitjacket is likely to tighten, not loosen, even though China's growing economic power seemingly widens its options and enhances its military potential.

# 1AR – Consult China A2: China War

## Garrett indicates there’s 0 risk of US-China war, realism fails, China is co-opting military engagement in favor of economic engagement, increased participation in multilateral institutions, and investment in globalization, China’s leaders realize long term interests include absence of conflict with the US.

## More evidence – mutual goals prevent the impact

Kane ’06. “The Strategic Competition For The Continent Of Africa.” Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C., United States Army. Colonel Patrick O. Carpenter, Project Adviser. U.S. Army War College. 15 MAR 2006 2, USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449648

Even though the preceding pages have laid out evidence of competition between the two economic giants, this situation does not need to lead to a confrontation. Like it or not, China and the United States are in a symbiotic relationship and have many common objectives. Both countries need economic growth and prosperity to maintain their current forms of government and maintain their positions in the world order. In order to ensure growth, a stable world energy market is necessary. China’s industrial success is dependent on access to raw materials for manufacturing and a strong consumer market for their exports. And while the United States is 15 not China’s only trading partner, it is a large consumer of Chinese manufactured goods, which in turn generates surplus capitol for further domestic and international investment. An interruption in supply or a precipitous price spike of oil will have a dampening effect on all the western economies. Further, since China’s dependence on imported oil is growing – nearly 50% of domestic consumption is now imported –a supply interruption would have devastating consequences on the Chinese economy. Chinese exports would decline leading to unemployment and political unrest, the very situation the Beijing authorities do not want. And the United States needs a prosperous China to continue to purchase US securities and Treasury bills (or not cash in the nearly $600 billion they currently hold).

# \*\*\*\*2AC – Disadvantages\*\*\*\*

# \*\*\*Airpower DA\*\*\*

# 2AC – Airpower DA

## No link – we don’t reduce bases, air platforms will still be used in a world of the plan.

## No airpower now

## Thompson 2008

## Loren B., “Decaying Air Power Reflects Larger Problems” <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/97942/decaying-us-air-power-reflects-larger-problems.html>

During the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Air Force simplified the discussion of its mission capabilities by dividing them into three categories -- global strike, global mobility, and global awareness. If we look at each of these areas, we see that age-related decay has now become generalized across the entire force. With regard to strike capabilities, Rebecca has already noted that we have very few stealthy fighters in the force today, and the plan of record is to terminate the most capable next-generation fighter at less than half the stated requirement. While the service will soon begin receiving a sizable number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to replace aging F-16s, the F-35 was designed to operate in tandem with the more capable F-22, so the fact that we may purchase less than half of the F-22s required does not bode well for the tactical air fleet. The F-15 that the F-22 is supposed to replace has grown so aged that it trains on flight restriction due to metal fatigue, and has literally begun falling out of the sky. These problems are made worse by the inability of the service to afford a next-generation escort jammer, since electronic warfare is our main alternative to stealth in protecting penetrating airframes. The situation in the long-range bomber force is even worse, with less than 200 airframes remaining to cover the world. Only 10% of the heavy bomber force is fully stealthy, and yet many observers doubt the service will be able to afford the recently announced next-generation bomber that is supposed to debut in ten years.

## And Russia and China are co-opting our air power

## Grant 2009

## “U.S. Air Dominance Eroding” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2355783/posts

Speaking to the more traditional realm of air-to-air combat, so dear to his audience’s heart, Deptula contends that the U.S. technological edge there is eroding. While “fourth generation” fighters are no match for the most advanced U.S. fighters, Deptula reminded the audience of the Russian export success with the MIG-21, some 12,000 of which were built, and operated by over 50 countries. Russia and China are both developing “fifth generation” fighters that will be widely exported at prices that will undercut the F-35 price tag. Both nations will thus acquire “near F-22 performance… while attempting to proliferate the [aircraft] to perhaps near F-35 like quantities,” he said. “We may be facing a fighter threat capability in quantities we’ve never experienced before.” Its not just in the technology realm that America’s enemies are seeking advantage. Unable to counter the U.S. dominance in long-range strike, enemies in wars among the people use information operations to influence perceptions about civilian casualties and deny the U.S. ability to leverage its asymmetric advantages. Deptula said media savvy opponents who skillfully manipulate global public perception are an example of successful “Effects Based Operations,” a doctrinal term that has recently fallen into disfavor, except among air power advocates.

## UAV Air power is an impact turn to the disad – creates instability undermining the counterinsurgency due to collateral damage and martyrdom.

# 1AR – Airpower DA – N/U

## Airpower is low – 2 reasons

## A. Capability – Thompson indicates we are not investing or buying new fighters and stealth bombers necessary to keep our force modernized, additionally they can’t access the long timeframe arguments, it will take 10 years to increase our capability, means you have no impact in the short term.

## B. China and Russia – Russia exportation and investment in new air technology and China’s development of fifth generation fighters will surpass U.S. capabilities in air power.

## No Dominance now

## Goure 2010

## Daniel, Ph.D., “Say Goodbye To U.S. Air Dominance -- And Perhaps To Victory In The Next War” http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/say-goodbye-to-us-air-dominance----and-perhaps-to-victory-in-the-next-war?a=1&c=1171

The United States may be replicating the French experience. Rather than maintaining control of the high ground and with it control of the initiative in future conflicts, the U.S. Air Force is choosing to just get by. In a recent interview with Air Force Magazine, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz made the following startling statement: “To handle multiplying missions without more people, the Air Force won’t be able to do all its assigned tasks as comprehensively as it once did, and will be aiming instead for simple sufficiency in areas where it’s been accustomed to dominance.” This is akin to the head of the French Air Force saying in the late 1930s that he was willing to cede air superiority to the Luftwaffe. In essence, the Air Force (like the other services) is being worn down by a political leadership that does not know how to limit its international commitments or to limit its employment of the military instrument of national power. The Secretary of Defense has made plain his desire to employ the other instruments of national power, particularly diplomatic and economic, in ways that would take some of the strain off the Department of Defense. He has even offered up resources, something almost unheard of in Washington but necessary as a bribe to the other departments and agencies to pull more weight. Yet, whether it is the war against Al Qaeda, the security of vital U.S. overseas interests or assistance to earthquake-ravaged Haiti, it is the U.S. military that continues to carry the burden. The U.S. Air Force is faced with a series of challenges in the next several decades that could well undermine the ability of the United States to deter aggression, defend key allies and interests or project power into vital regions. First, there are the growing anti-access and air denial threats, including that to U.S. systems. Second is the development of fourth and almost fifth-generation aircraft by potential adversaries. Third is the growing capability and interest of rogue regimes to disperse, conceal and bury critical assets. Finally, there is the effort by current and future adversaries to use complex and inaccessible terrain such as cities, mountains and jungles as their primary defense against ground attack leaving the U.S. with no way to access the enemy except through the air.

## More evidence – no political support

## Thompson 2008

## Loren B., “Decaying Air Power Reflects Larger Problems” <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/97942/decaying-us-air-power-reflects-larger-problems.html>

But by the end of the century, it was clear that much of the cold war arsenal would need to be replaced in the near future due to operational fatigue and technological obsolescence. It was at precisely this moment that the Bush Administration took office with an ill-timed agenda to cut taxes and transform the joint force. The reason it was ill-timed was that within months, the terrorist attacks of 9-11 had falsified the central premise of transformation -- that we had entered an era of diminished danger -- while greatly increasing the funding needs of the joint force. But Bush was committed to his priorities, and sought to pursue a multi-front war on terror without increasing taxes or backing away from transformation. The resulting triptych of tax cuts, transformation and counter-terrorism proved lethal to American air power, because the government lacked both the resources and the political will to arrest the decay of cold war air fleets.

# 2AC – Airpower DA – Afghan ! Turn

## Airpower causes airpower, undermining Afghan stability

## **Politics Daily 2009**

(“Moving Target: The Pitfalls Facing U.S. Air Power in Afghanistan”, <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/05/20/moving-target-the-pitfalls-facing-u-s-air-power-in-afghanistan/>, accessed 6/2/10)

The problem, painfully obvious with the rising civilian death toll from air strikes in Afghanistan, is that almost nobody knows who is inside that house -- Taliban insurgents, local militiamen, or schoolchildren. In Iraq, the war against insurgents was largely fought on city streets, by infantrymen, and the role of air power was limited. In Afghanistan, there are fewer U.S. troops and a lot more territory to cover -- perfect conditions, it would seem, in which to use America's formidable power to strike from the air. But it is more difficult than it seems. This is bad news for the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. It's not something easy to fix, like tweaking strategy, inventing a new target sensor, or selecting a 250-pound bomb instead of the[2,000-pounder](http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=108). The problem is that the United States doesn't know who, exactly, it is fighting in Afghanistan, and it doesn't know where they are. That problem of identifying people becomes even more difficult in a pitched battle, when part-time insurgents may throw down their weapons and become "civilians,'' when the enemy likely will shelter in family households, and when American infantrymen pinned down under fire are calling desperately for help and there isn't time to back off and carefully sort things out. [Marine Lt. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik](http://www.iimefpublic.usmc.mil/), a former sergeant who rose to command the Second Marine Expeditionary Force, has thought deeply about this issue. Ten thousand of his Marines currently are pouring into southern Afghanistan and grappling with this very problem: Who's the enemy? Last year, hours before I accompanied U.S. troops into battle in southern Afghanistan, I asked an intelligence officer to describe the enemy. He shrugged and answered: "Whoever is shooting at us.'' I recently put the same question to Hejlik: do his Marines have solid, ground-level intelligence to identify who are the hard-core Taliban, who are the part-time fighters who have been coerced into service, and who are civilians, and to track each category? Hejlik exploded in frustration. "Heck no, we don't,'' he growled. Afghanistan today, he said, is like Iraq in the months after the U.S. invasion in 2003: the American ground-level understanding of the enemy was primitive at best. Hence Donald Rumsfeld's initial dismissal of them as "dead-enders.'' The irony in Afghanistan, of course, is that the insurgents kill many more civilians than American bombs do. Taliban insurgents last year killed 1,160 Afghan civilians, many by suicide bombs, while U.S. and allied air strikes took the lives of 552 civilians, according to an [exhaustive study by the United Nations](http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/UNAMA_09february-Annual%20Report_PoC%202008_FINAL_11Feb09.pdf)(pdf). U.S. combat commanders in Afghanistan complain that the insurgents deliberately hole up in compounds with civilians, and then when the civilians are killed, display their bodies as evidence of American "atrocities'' that is hard to refute. That matters. In the tricky kind of war the U.S. is trying to wage, winning popular support is crucial, as [Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted bitterly this week](http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1184). "We cannot succeed in Afghanistan,'' Mullen said Monday, "by killing Afghan civilians.'' The Air Force, along with Navy and Marine aviators, has struggled for years to fix the problem. Air-strike plans are reviewed by military lawyers who can nix a mission considered too risky for civilians. Pilots can vary a bomb's glide path to minimize unintended damage. A bomb fuse can be set by the pilot to detonate above the ground, to create a maximum killing range, or below ground to limit the destruction if there are civilians nearby.

## Cross apply Blank – leads to global nuclear war.

# 2AC – Airpower DA – Terrorism Turn

## Airpower causes terrorist attacks

## ARKIN 2002

## (William, Senior Military Adviser, Human Rights Watch, NPR, July 24)

However, here's the other side of this coin. Why are people so uncomfortable with air warfare sometimes? Why are they uncomfortable with this remote mode of warfare in which it appears as if the United States does not take the risks in order to achieve its military and political objectives? And I think the answer is September 11, that the very fact that al‐Qaeda and Osama bin Laden attacked the United States in this asymmetric way, not attacking our military military‐to‐military, but attacking the civilian population, I think derives, to some degree, from this sense that exists in many parts of the world that the United States has this vast military capability and is unapproachable militarily, and therefore, the only way that you can attack is is by attacking its civilian population. Now I'm not for one minute suggesting, therefore, that we should somehow put our boys at risk on the ground in order to remedy this, but I think we should recognize and understand that the cost that we pay additionally for the exclusive use of air‐ and missile power in the conduct of warfare is that we provide sort of fodder, if you will, confirmation on the part of those who believe that the United States is conducting military operations and being an imperial superpower without ever putting itself at risk. And so, therefore, there is a greater desire to conduct terrorism and to conduct strikes against the United States. And that's just the world we live in. Again, I think this would be an important factor then to take into consideration. For instance, in a war against Iraq, if you were going to try to think through what you want the endgame to be, beyond just the toppling of Saddam Hussein, how would you want a war in Iraq to be seen in the Arab world? And so, therefore, you might actually decide to fight a certain type of war with a certain type of strategy merely because you want the political outcome to be a certain thing, and it might not necessarily be the most efficient military strategy. It might be something that fulfills your larger political aims.

## The US would retaliate, causing extinction

## Easterbrook 2001

visiting fellow - Brookings Institute, [Gregg, CNN,November 2, 2001, p. lexis]

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.

# 1AR – Airpower DA – Terrorism Turn

## Arkin indicates casualty aversion and collateral damage emboldens terrorist groups to fight against a perceived cowardly imperialist power. This is a internal link booster to the entire affirmative and increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil causing internal pressure to retaliate escalating to global nuclear war. That’s Easterbrook.

## And here’s some more internal link evidence

## RECORD 2002

(Jeffrey, teaches strategy at the Air war College, Parameters, June 22)

The strategic consequences of elite casualty phobia as well as itsimplications for the military ethic have been treated elsewhere. (33) Suffice it to say here that the consequences include: political vacillation in war‐threatening crises, degraded military effectiveness, discouraged friends and allies, and emboldened enemies. A perceived American reputation of casualty dread fostered by defeat in Vietnam and humiliation in Lebanon encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait and to resist all American efforts to expel him. Saddam believed he could inflict more casualties on US forces than the domestic American political traffic would bear. (34) Osama bin Laden also believed, at least before the US military reaction to the 11 September attacks, that the Americans could not standthe sight of their own blood. He interpreted the US withdrawal from Somalia as proof that, as in Afghanistan, it was possible to expel a superpower from a Muslim country. Indeed, he told correspondent Robert Fisk in 1997 that "our battle against America is much simpler than the war against the Soviet Union, because some of our mujahideen who fought here in Afghanistan also participated in operations against the Americans in Somalia‐‐and they were surprised at the collapse of American morale. This convinced us that the Americans are a paper tiger."

## Aditionally Air power trades off with better ways to solve terrorism

## SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE 8­1­2006

"Israel succumbed to the exact same fallacy that the U.S. forces succumbed to under (Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld," Hughes said. "At the end of the day, you still have to send guys down the hole and have the really nasty hand‐to‐hand‐style fighting." Kalev Sepp, a counterinsurgency specialist at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, said over‐reliance on air power can make it impossible to achieve equally important political goals ‐‐ such as weaning the civilian population away from groups like Hezbollah. "If military objectives come to dominate decision‐making," said Sepp, "then you lose your way, as the Israelis seem to have with the indiscriminate use of firepower."

# 2AC – Airpower DA – Hege Turn

## Airpower trades off with land power which is key to Hegemony

## AUSA LAND WARFARE INSTITUTE 2002

## (Association for the United States Army, “A First Look at President Bush’s June 2002 West Point Speech,” June, http://www.ausa.org/ilw)

Second, the President’s demand that the United States not leave the safety of America and the world in the hands of a few “mad terrorists and tyrants” will clearly, at times, require the projection of land combat power and subsequent occupation of the territory of enemy nations or uncontrolled areas where terrorist organizations flourish. While in some instances surrogate land forces may be available, the United States cannot be dependent upon local groups with their own political agendas.\* Taking and holding terrain, controlling resources that our enemies find valuable and intend to use to strike America, and removing hostile regimes from power will require the continued existence and maintenance of powerful land combat forces. American aerospace and naval power will also play a crucial role in such preemptive actions, but maintaining the capability to strike at enemies in all terrain, weather and political circumstances will require potent and effective land combat forces.

## Key to prevent nuclear war

## Khalilizad 1995

## Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Defense Analyst WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1995, p.84

U.S leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# \*\*\*Readiness DA\*\*\*

# 2AC – Readiness DA

## No link – the link evidence is in the context of removing large parts of troops and boots on the ground presence, we only remove drones and prevent targeted killing missions and operations.

## Readiness low now – credit crisis

## Carden, 5/20/2010 (Michael, Army Sergeant First Class, “Official equates financial, military readiness”, American Forces Press Services, US Air Force Website, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123205564>)

WASHINGTON (AFNS) -- Through outreach and a robust system of educating servicemembers, Defense Department officials are working to keep troops financially fit to fight and protected from predatory lenders, a Pentagon official said May 19 here. Since the downward turn of the credit market in recent years, Defense Department officials and lawmakers have grown more concerned with service members falling into bad financial standing, said Marcus Beauregard, a senior program analyst for the Pentagon's military community and family policy office. Officials hope Congress soon will pass legislation that puts auto dealers under the scrutiny of a proposed watchdog agency that also would oversee banks and lending institutions, Mr. Beauregard said. Poor financial situations among troops can greatly affect military readiness and the ability of service members to accomplish their mission, he said. "Financial stability helps service members (and the DOD)," he said. "If they're paying more attention to their financial concerns, they're paying attention less to their primary mission and their primary jobs." Commanders have voiced concerns to defense policy makers, making them more aware of issues troops have had in buying automobiles and repaying short-term loans, Mr. Beauregard said. Leaders also have learned certain products perpetually have caused problems for their servicemembers and they hope to prevent issues from becoming problems.

## Non Unique – Iraq pullout by August should’ve triggered the link

## Budget and priority shifts now causes realignment

## Freier, 2009 (Nathan, Visiting Professor of Strategy, Policy, and Risk Assessment at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy”, August, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub934.pdf>)

As DoD corporately assesses the President’s priorities and the coming decade’s mounting defense demands, something will have to give.8 Over the next year, DoD will make macro-decisions on strategy, force planning, and joint force missioning. The wider USG will also make key decisions on greater burden sharing across the interagency.9 All of these will ultimately be grounded by necessity in risk-informed choice. Current fiscal and operational realities no doubt constrain the defense decision space. It may be more realistic to view the coming era as one of general defense and national security evolution, complemented by some targeted revolution in DoD missions and capabilities. Most agree that discretionary defense spending will either decline or plateau in real terms in this administration. This would be true regardless of which party occupied the Oval Office. According to Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert Gates, “[T]he spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 [September 11, 2001] is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department.”10 With growing and more diverse defense challenges and decreasing defense resources, DoD will be in the business of risk management and risk allocation for the foreseeable future. Risk elimination is both cost-prohibitive and impossible. Consistent with the worldview of Secretary Gates, Flournoy and 3 Brimley observe: “With the U.S. economy sliding toward recession and the national deficit and foreign debt rising to unprecedented levels, [President Obama and Secretary Gates] will need to **avoid overstretch and make difficult decisions about where to place emphasis and how to prudently balance risk.”**11

# 1AR – Readiness DA – N/U

## Their DA is non unique – the explanation is twofold

## A. Readiness – Carden indicates the vast majority of troops have poor resources and luck with financial institutions undermining their ability to focus on the battlefield

## B. Force Realignment – New budget issues and force planning with Obama and Gates new military agenda changes the ability for the troops to maintain cohesion.

## Readiness low - DADT

## SLDN, 2010 (Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, “Tell Congress: Pass the Military Readiness Enhancement Act”, <http://www.sldn.org/page/s/congress>)

I urge you to repeal "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the federal law which bans open military service based on sexual orientation. On March 3, 2010, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) introduced the Military Readiness Enhancement Act (S. 3065) in the U.S. Senate. Sen. Lieberman is joined by 32 cosponsors -- including the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin (D-MI). In the U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Patrick Murphy (D-PA) is quarterbacking parallel legislation, alson known as the Military Readiness Enhancement Act (H.R. 1283). Rep. Murphy is joined by 191 bipartisan cosponsors and counting. I urge you to support these measures by becoming a cosponsor now. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the only federal law that mandates firing a person because of their sexual orientation. The ban denies patriotic Americans with the critical skills we need the freedom to serve during a critical time of war. No one willing to defend our country should have to hide who they are as a condition of their military service. **"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a discriminatory law that weakens our military. The time for repeal is now**. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" applies to all Americans serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, including active duty, Reserve, and National Guard personnel. More than 2,000,000 Americans serving in uniform today are bound by this law; among them, an estimated 65,000 lesbian, gay, and bisexual Americans in uniform live with the constant threat of a career-ending discharge. More than 13,500 Americans have been discharged under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the last 17 years. Our government has wasted at least $363 million in taxpayer dollars firing desperately needed military linguists, pilots, doctors, intelligence analysts, nurses, and others with critical skills we need in this time of conflict. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is wasteful, discriminatory, and harms our military. I urge you to support the Military Readiness Enhancement Act by becoming a cosponsor.

# 2AC – Link Turn

## Forward deployment trades off with readiness

## Spencer, 2000 (Jack, Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, Heritage Foundation, September 15th, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>)

Effect on Readiness. This dramatic increase in the use of America's armed forces has had a detrimental effect on overall combat readiness. According to General Shelton, "our experience in the Balkans underscores the reality that multiple, persistent commitments place a significant strain on our people and can erode warfighting readiness."26 Both people and equipment wear out faster under frequent use. For example, units deployed in Somalia took 10 months to restore their equipment to predeployment readiness levels.27 According to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) survey of Army leaders who participated in peace missions, almost two-thirds said that their units' training readiness had declined.28 Training is a key component of readiness, and frequent missions cause the armed forces to reduce training schedules. For example, Operation Allied Force caused 22 joint exercises to be cancelled in 1999. Joint training exercises were reduced from 277 in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to 189 in FY 2000. Inadequate training has resulted in the Air Force exceeding its annual deployment goals for Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) crews. Thirteen of the Air Force's 40 AWACS crews were inadequately trained, forcing the 27 remaining crews to carry the workload of all 40. For U-2 pilots, the situation is equally bad. Because only 40 of the Air Force's 54 authorized U-2 pilots are fully trained, many experienced crewmembers leave the force due to an excessive workload.29 The frequent deployments also take funding away from ongoing expenses. The Department of Defense funds about 80 percent of the cost for operations other than warfare from its "operations and maintenance" accounts,30 although the funds in the account are supposed to pay for training, fuel, and supplies to forward-deployed troops--all of which are readiness-related. Every dollar spent in Kosovo or Somalia takes 80 cents away from training America's troops for war, buying spare parts for aging equipment, or providing a high quality of life for troops in foreign lands protecting America's interests abroad. The remaining funding for operations other than warfare comes from personnel accounts.31 This 20 percent is money that could be used to pay pilots or computer programmers.

# 1AR – Link Turn

## First, Spencer indicates forward deployment around the world destroys combat readiness – creates overstretch and strain on our warfighting readiness and undermines re-equipment measures necessary to sustain stable deployments. Aditionally the funds become stretched thin for re-supplying around the world after frequent deployment.

## And decreasing military presence solves funding issues – that’s key to readiness

## DoD, 2003 (Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Base Realignment and Closure, DOD BRAC Home, September 22nd, <http://www.defense.gov/brac/02faqs.htm>)

QUESTION: Why do we need a BRAC round? ANSWER: The Department’s position that significant excess capacity remains in the defense infrastructure is supported by independent agencies. The specific level of excess is very dependent on the assumptions used in the analysis. Past experience indicates that more extensive study of joint basing use and cross-Service functional analysis could further increase the level of excess through better utilization of the remaining infrastructure. The Department estimates that a future BRAC round, based on the costs and savings experiences of BRACs 93/95 and a reduction in installation infrastructure of approximately 20 percent, could generate approximately $7 billion if annual recurring savings in today’s dollars. Resources currently being spent on excess installation infrastructure could be allocated to higher priority requirements, such as efforts to modernize weapons, enhance quality of life, and improve readiness. Additionally, another BRAC round will afford the Department a significant transformation opportunity. September 11, 2001, reinforced the imperative to convert excess capacity into warfighting ability. The performance of our forces in Iraq underscores the benefit of transformational war fighting. The Department must be allowed to reconfigure its infrastructure to best support the transformation of our warfighting capability. The Department must be allowed the opportunity to assess its installation infrastructure to ensure it is best sized and placed to support emerging mission requirements for our national security needs.

[\*\*\*BRAC = Base Realignment and Closure\*\*\*]

# 2AC – Readiness DA – A2: Iraq

## Military investment fails at shaping Iraqi behavior – it only emboldens violent actors

## Dodge, 2010 (Toby, Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East at the IISS and Reader in International Politics at

## Queen Mary, University of London, “The US and Iraq: Time to Go Home”, Survival, March 25th, InformaWorld)

The treatment of Joe Biden in Baghdad in January brings to mind the comments of veteran Iraq watcher Patrick Cockburn that the ‘Americans have always over-estimated the extent to which they make the weather in Baghdad’. US influence in Iraq was at its height during the 2003–04 rule of the Coalition Provisional Authority and then again during George W. Bush’s ‘surge’ in 2007–08. During the surge the number of US combat troops increased and they were aggressively repositioned amongst the Iraqi population. This change in US policy and troop posture did lead to a steady decline in Iraqi civilian deaths. But throughout the surge, at the peak of American influence, US ability to shape the behaviour of Iraq’s ruling elite remained minimal. Today, key actors in the sectarian violence of 2005–07 remain unpunished and retain senior positions in the Iraqi cabinet. Ricks is right to argue that the surge represented ‘a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done … and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions’.27 Those sharply reduced ambitions targeted the most violent non-state actors in and around Baghdad and succeeded in breaking the capacity of both al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the Jaish al-Mahdi. The surge could not, however, alter the political logic that has shaped Iraqi politics since 2005, change the main players at the head of the state or force leading Iraqi politicians to engage in meaningful reconciliation.

# 2AC – Readiness DA – A2: Japan

## Bases in Japan won’t help prevent conflict – troop levels are not high enough

## Shimoji, 2010 (Yoshio, M.S. Georgetown University, “The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective”, Asia-Pacific Journal, May 3rd, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354>)

Of course, the Marines alone may not work as deterrents against outside threats; they may be an integral part of the USF Japan together with the Navy and the Air Force. However, if contingencies occurred in the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Straits, they would certainly have to increase their number substantially, probably to 500,000 troops at a minimum. But assembling troops takes several weeks or even months as the Persian Gulf War and the initial stage of the Iraq War demonstrated. Consequently, the explanation by the Marines and Washington that a helicopter squadron must be deployed within a 20-minute distance from a base where ground forces stand by and, therefore, the claim that Henoko is the best relocation site for Futenma's operations lacks credibility.

# Impact Defense - Korea

**No risk of war – current tensions are just sabre-rattling and won’t escalate**

**Keating, 6/2/2010** (Joshua, Associate Editor at Foreign Policy, “Was the North Korean crisis all talk?” Foreign Policy, Passport, <http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/02/was_the_north_korean_crisis_all_talk>)

In a week when international headlines are so dominated by one story -- in the case, the flotilla disaster -- it can be easy to forget that last week's major international crisis was never really resolved.

In the case of last week's tensions on the Korean peninsula, what seemed like a major international incident seems to have just quieted down on its own. The whole mess is largely out of international headlines and the Korea Times reports that President Lee Myung-bak is softening his rhetoric as well:

"When we say national security, words such as confrontation or face-off tend to come to our minds. I think now is the time for us to chart a security strategy that can usher the nation into reunification," he said. Lee put priority on reunification, not confrontation, at a time when tensions are mounting on the peninsula. Seoul also toned down the nature of the retaliatory U.N. Security Council (UNSC) measure it was seeking Wednesday by shifting its focus from opening both options of binding and non-binding measures earlier to a non-binding resolution. The stance came a day after the Ministry of Unification eased sanctions on North Korea by allowing the shipment of four kinds of products, including garlic and garments, which were processed in North Korean manufacturing factories from North to South Korea.

The South has also put off plans to escalate its propaganda campaign by dropping leaflets and broadcasting radio messages into the North and despite earlier reports, the jointly staffed Kaesong industrial plant has remained open. The North Korean government has certainly been its usual bellicose self lately, but U.S. intelligence officials say they never actually saw any evidence of unusual North Korean troop movements.

So what exactly just happened? It's important to remember that the main crisis was set off not by the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March, but by the release of the South Korean report blaming North Korea for the sinking on May 20. With Lee's party seeming to gain from the "Cheonan effect" in today's local elections, it's hard not to be a little suspicious of the timing.

That's not in any way to say that the incident was manufactured. The evidence that North Korea was behind the sinking of the ship is pretty compelling. But it does seem like both governments seemed to gain from the affair. Lee's pro-American conservative party got a political boost, and Kim Jong Il got to show that he can take out a South Korean ship without serious consequences.

**As the tensions dissipate, it's starting like these occasional blowups are just a part of the status quo on the peninsula -- happening just frequently enough to keep a certain level of tension, but never getting serious enough to involve major violence**. It might not be the healthiest arrangement, but it's one these two countries seem to have gotten used to.

# \*\*\*Iran DA\*\*\*

# 2AC – Iran DA

## No link – we only decrease targeted killing missions and drones, military presence will still be sufficient post plan in the context of your link

## We’ll internal link turn perception – Middle Eastern instability gives Iran leeway to increase it’s regional spheres of influence over the failure of the U.S. Plan decreases the root cause of counterinsurgency failures, that’s Byland.

## Non Unique – Power vacuum now

## Frank J. **Gaffney**, Jr. (President of the Center for Security Policy) April 5 **2010** “Who lost Iraq?”, Center for Security Policy, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p18352.xml?genre_id=1>

The signal of American abandonment was made the more palpable by Team Obama's decision to dispatch Christopher Hill as its ambassador to Iraq.  Hill is the diplomat best known for his determination during the Bush 43 years to appease, rather than thwart, the despot most closely enabling the realization of Iran's nuclear ambitions: North Korea's Kim Jong Il.  The unreliability of the United States as an ally - a hallmark of the Obama presidency more generally - is reinforcing the sense that it is every man for himself in Iraq

## Non Unique – Iraqi drawdown in August should trigger the Israeli strikes and Iranian hegemony impact.

## Presence won’t solve aggression

## Wiens – US Army Major 2006 (Mark G., School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College “U.S. Policy Towards an Emerging Iranian-Shia Hegemon” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA450836>) MFR

The current U.S. policy has proven ineffective as it has not produced the desired effect. In fact it has left the United States little options outside escalating to military options. This undesirable position reflects the lack of flexibility to get tougher or requires second parties to implement one’s own strategy. “Escalation dominance: the ability to increase the threatened costs to the adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to negate those costs or to counterescalate.” The United States will not win with escalation dominance, if it fails to gather a coalition of nations to bandwagon against Iran. The use of a surrogate or second order coercion runs a higher risk of failure as it requires intense pressure on the middleman (China or Russia) to achieve the desired effect. Indirect coercion, of course, requires far more effort that indirect diplomacy. Coercion through a third party requires the coercer to induce or compel the third party to become a coercer itself (or to use brute force) against an adversary. Because third-party coercion requires coercion or suasion to work twice, the problem facing coercers generally multiply. The coercer must be able to shape the behavior of the third party in such a way that the third party’s response will effectively shape the adversary’s will in accord with the coercer’s overall objectives.

## No attack from Israel

## Christopher **Layne** (grandson of realism and deterrence theory, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 4/10/**2006** "Iran: The Logic of Deterrence" THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE <http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_04_10/cover.html>

The administration has flirted with the idea of farming-out to Israel the task of attacking Iran’s nuclear installations. But this—to recall what one Soviet official said about Nikita Khruschev’s decision to deploy missiles in Cuba—truly would be “harebrained scheming.” To reach targets in Iran, Israeli planes would have to overfly Iraq, which would require not only American consent but active co-ordination between the Israeli air force and the U.S. military. Absolutely no one would be fooled into thinking the U.S. was an innocent bystander. The whole world—and most important, the whole Islamic world—would know that Washington’s hand was the directing force behind an Israeli strike on Iran, which means that the U.S. would be the main target of an Islamic backlash.

# 1AR – Iran DA – Presence Cant Solve

## Presence doesn’t solve Iranian adventurism – Escalatory dominance and regional stakes of power fails to gather a coalition necessary to counterbalance against Iran. Potential counter-balancers are afraid it will prevent any risk of middle eastern peace

## Aditionally containment doesn’t solve

Wiens – US Army Major 2006 (Mark G., School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College “U.S. Policy Towards an Emerging Iranian-Shia Hegemon” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA450836>) MFR

The U.S. strategy for the region and its impact on Iran requires a comparison of policies, risks, and goals. This examination provides clarity for points of friction and points of consensus. The United States has three general policy options vis-à-vis an Iranian hegemon: engagement, containment, or confrontation. Engagement is a policy marked by a warming of relations between the United States and Iran. This can include a retiring of sanctions and embargos in combination with a reliance on “soft power.” Joseph Nye defined soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”10 Engagement would require a long-term commitment and constant attention to the region. This policy in conjunction with containment by the U.S. and allies was successful in co-opting Libya to discontinue its nuclear program. This approach has not worked towards Iran, as other nations have instituted policies of containment. Containment is a policy which contains both positive and negative sub-options with in a larger framework of isolating the target state. Stephen Biddle described containment as a policy that settles for modest goals instead of high costs, while lowering mid-term risks.11 In this instance the costs would include rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq, in order to reestablish a balance of power in the Persian Gulf. “(T)he chief risk is near-term chaos resulting from failed political engineering in the Mideast.”12 Biddle made a slight distinction between containment and rollback however, for simplicity; elements of both policies will be referred to as containment. Containment continues to be the current policy option applied to Iran. The policy requires a relatively high expenditure to maintain forces in the region and diplomatically encouraging other states to apply a policy of containment on Iran in order to be effective. However the effectiveness of this policy is doubtful as Iran continues to pursue nuclear status, while our major allies are not applying a similar economic and diplomatic policy.

# 1AR – Iran DA – No Strike

## Layne indicates Israeli strikes would be impossible – Iraqi airspace intrusion would require U.S. permission and they’re not willing to aid in Iranian strikes due to Islamic backlash

## Political and military deterrence prevents Israeli first-strike.

## Ehsaneh I. Sadr (graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park) SUMMER 2005 “THE IMPACT OF IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL” MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 2

The military and political ramifications of an attack on Iran cannot, however, be so easily remedied by clever planning or arms acquisitions. The worst-case scenario, which cannot be entirely dismissed, is that Iran already has a deliverable nuclear weapon that might survive and be used in retaliation for an Israeli attack. A more likely result is that the Israeli attack, far from permanently eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, will delay it by only a few years while simultaneously stimulating (and justifying) Iranian efforts to acquire such weapons as quickly as possible. Conventional responses are also likely. Iran’s medium-range Shahab-3 missiles are likely to be launched at Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor or at an easier target like Tel Aviv. Shorter-range Scuds might be fired by the Iranian-supported Hezbollah from its bases in south Lebanon. Even more troubling is the possibility of attacks against military or civilian targets by sleeper cells of Israeli Arabs that would be activated by Israeli actions against Iran. An indication that such attacks are well within the realm of the possible is the recent arrest of Israeli Mohammad Ghanem for alleged espionage on behalf of Iran.34 The United States, widely perceived as the source of Israel’s power and protection, is also likely to bear the brunt of retaliatory action. U.S. vulnerabilities in Iraq would surely be exploited by an Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) that is intimately familiar with the players and how they might be motivated or manipulated to cause trouble for the United States or its allied Iraqi government. Were the Islamic Republic to seriously commit its resources to the funding and training of anti-Western jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, Americans might even be confronted with further attacks on the homeland. The political consequences of Israeli action are sure to include increased anti- Americanism and anti-Zionism, not only among Arabs but also Europeans and much of the developing world. Increased instability in the Middle East will strengthen the hand of extremists, making a political solution to the Palestinian issue much more difficult and likely precluding any possibility of Arab-Israeli peace. Given the difficulty of military action against Iran, the very small likelihood of its nuclear capabilities being damaged in any meaningful and non-recoverable way, and the exceedingly high military and political costs associated with such an attack, it is important and necessary that Israel consider whether the costs of allowing Iran to go nuclear might not be more tolerable.

## The United States won’t green-light Israeli preemption.

## World Tribune 1/5/2007 “Security official: U.S. no longer trusts Israel to strike Iran nukes” SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/07/front2454104.08125.html>

The former Israeli official said he doubted whether the White House, out of fear that the operation would fail, would approve Israeli air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. "There is a harsh disappointment of us in the United States," Eiland said. "We didn't supply the goods. It embarrassed our friends in the United States, our friends in Congress. It has long-range repercussions."

# 2AC – Iran DA – Iran Hege Unsust

## Iranian hegemony is unsustainable – 2 reasons

## A. Limited resources

## **Chubin** Ph.D in International Relations **2009** (Shahram, Shahram Chubin is a Senior Non-resident Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ph.D., Columbia University; B.A., Oberlin College “Iran’s Power in Context” Survival | vol. 51 no. 1 | February–March 2009 | pp. 165–190 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/shahram_survival20090201.pdf>) MFR

Iran’s regional influence has come from a convergence of several factors: US mistakes and vulnerability, regional anger and the appearance of an ideological government in Tehran with access to unprecedented resources. None of these are permanent. Iran’s resources have already shrunk, the conservative government is being discredited and the United States is in the process of rehabilitation. The structural constraints on Iran have become more evident. The Arab Sunni states, though divided and ambivalent, are all concerned by Iran’s forward policy and nuclear ambitions. None of them wishes to exchange the United States for Iran as a security manager of the region. The limits to Iranian influence are also clear. Hizbullah, as a militia, may be dependent on Iran for arms and training but is also a Lebanese political party. It is thus a partner rather than client. The same applies to Iran’s relations with Syria, its sole Arab friend. In troubled times this relationship appears solid, but with a more flexible attitude on the part of Israel and the United States, Syria may drift away from Tehran’s embrace.

## B. Blowback

## **Chubin** Ph.D in International Relations **2009** (Shahram, Shahram Chubin is a Senior Non-resident Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ph.D., Columbia University; B.A., Oberlin College “Iran’s Power in Context” Survival | vol. 51 no. 1 | February–March 2009 | pp. 165–190 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/shahram_survival20090201.pdf>) MFR

In Iraq, Tehran has considerable influence. This is normal given the number and complexity of ties between the two neighbours. But even here, too much Iranian interference or overreaching risks a backlash. Favouring a particular militia in Iraq risks alienating others and creating blowback, for once they become strong, militias cannot easily be controlled. Even the vaunted region wide ascendancy of the Shi’ites, which appears to favour Iran, in fact reveals the constraints on any putative leadership role for Tehran. Sectarian polarisation, whether in Iraq or throughout the wider region, would limit Iran to (at most) a sectarian constituency – a minority in the region – and constitute a setback to Iran’s Arab street strategy designed to transcend the sectarian divide. Moreover, any emphasis on sectarian issues would range the Arab states defensively against Iran and bury any Iranian regional project in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s perceived arrogance and attitude of ‘blatant superiority’, which treats the Arab states as ‘hostages’, is widely felt and resented, hampering any Iranian leadership potential.94 In short, Iran remains a limited threat. Hyping Iran’s power and importance encourages its parasitical policy of feeding on disorder and understates its vulnerabilities.95

# 2AC – Iran DA – A2: Shia I/L

## Iran doesn’t have shia support

## **Gause** – PhD in Political Science **2007** (F. Gregory, Dr. Gause is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont. “THREATS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION” Accessed from the Journal: MESA ROUNDTABLE: MUTUAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN THE GULF) MFR

The current focus on the “Shia threat” in the Middle East is only the latest example of regional states overestimating the danger emanating from transborder political/ideological challenges. Undoubtedly, the fall of Saddam’s regime has allowed Iraqi Shia to have a political voice for the first time in decades. That is a huge change in Iraqi politics. But how much of a ripple effect will this change have in the region as a whole? First, an analysis that emphasizes the transnational sectarian character of this political phenomenon does not give enough attention to the state. It does not recognize that Iranian foreign policy is a major element in the regional fears about a “Shia crescent.” Iranian foreign policy could change. Tehran tried to export the revolution in the 1980s, but it failed. Then Iran pursued a foreign policy based more on conventional state-to-state relations with its Arab neighbors (for the most part). Now Iranian policy seems to be a bit more forward leaning, not pushing revolution, but putting more emphasis on challenging the status quo. That could change, of course, as Ahmadinejad is already having problems at home. Such an analysis also leaves out the Arab states. The two places in which Shia social movements have had the most political success are Lebanon, where the state has always been weak, and Iraq, where the United States destroyed the state. But other Arab states have quite a few resources, both coercive and cooptive, with which to deal with their Shia minorities (or majority, in the case of Bahrain). The "rise of the Shia" must be interpreted through the lens both of Iranian foreign policy and Arab state structures. Second, if there is a rising Shia sociopolitical movement in the Arab world, it very likely has already peaked: • Iraqi Shia groups have taken the power that their numbers give them in the new Iraq, but they have not been able to consolidate that power. There are differences among them that will be submerged as long as they are in a civil war, but will undoubtedly surface from time to time and become more prominent as they eventually consolidate power. As Iraqi Shia do consolidate their power, they will need their ties to Iran less and less, and frictions in what are now fairly stable patron-client relations will arise. • Hezbollah has ridden a wave in Lebanon, but it has reached the high-point of its power. It cannot “take over” the Lebanese state, given demographic and regional realities. It is doubtful that it can long sustain its ongoing crisis with the Lebanese state. And, once General Aoun gets what he wants, Hezbollah loses its only cross-sectarian ally. The fact that Iran seems to be reaching out to Saudi Arabia (in March 2007) is one indication that Hezbollah’s mentor is looking for a way to de-escalate the Lebanese crisis. • Iran undoubtedly has regional ambitions, but it does not have the power to be a regional hegemon. If the United States cannot pull that off, Iran — with all its economic problems and political divisions — cannot pull it off, either. Iran will overplay its hand, much as the United States has, if it overreaches. • Finally, where does the “Shia wave” go from here? There is only one other state in the Arab world with a Shia majority: Bahrain. But there is a fairly effective state in Bahrain that will prevent a Shia takeover; and if it cannot, there is that long bridge connecting the island to Saudi Arabia. The Shia minority in Kuwait seems to be fairly well integrated into Kuwaiti politics, and the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia does not seem to have much revolutionary potential right now.

# 2AC – Iran DA – Link Turn

## Presence emboldens Iran to become a regional hegemon

Hadar – International Relations Professor - 1/25/08 (Leon T., Leon Hadar is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, an adjunct professor in the School of International Service ofthe American University, and the author of Quagmire: America in the Middle East “Forget about War with Iran?” <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9115>) MFR

It could be argued that the spooks in Washington just provided the Bushies with an excuse not to do what they had already decided not to do (which explains why some conspiracy theorists have suggested that the Bushies were the driving force behind the decision to release the NIE report). But consider the following: Does anyone really think that President Bush would like to read the following Wikipedia entry 10 years from now: George Walker Bush (born July 6, 1946) was the 43rd US president. His decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein resulted in the disintegration of Iraq and in the emergence of its neighbor and rival Iran as the main military power in the Persian Gulf, turning the Shi'ite-headed regime in Baghdad as well as the Shi'ite-led groups in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East into political satellites of Tehran. The invasion of Iraq accelerated Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear military capability (which it did in 2009 immediately after President Barack Obama entered the White House), posing a major threat to US allies in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Western strategic and economic interests in the oil-rich region. In short, President Bush proved to be Iran's most faithful ally. Indeed, President Bush recognizes that the mess he has made in Iraq, combined with the rising power of radical Shi'ite forces there, has played into the hands of the Iranians. That, together with the failure of Israel to deal a military blow to the Hezbollah in Lebanon has helped shift the balance of power in the Persian Gulf toward Iran and its Shi'ite allies in the Middle East, in a way that threatens the interests of key regional US allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Hence the current status quo is only making Iran more assertive, inducing it to continue its nuclear programs, and threatening the "legacy" of President Bush (see the above Wikipedia entry). That means that the Bushies are hoping that they'll be able to "do something" that would change the status quo, and remove that smirk from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. At the minimum, Bush wants to be recalled as someone who "kicked some ass" in the Persian Gulf before leaving office. That doesn't mean an all-out war with Iran or even an attack on its suspected nuclear installations. If you followed the recent bizarre encounter between the US Navy and the Iranians in the straits of Hormuz, you get an idea of the opportunities that are opened to the Bushies if and when they decide to orchestrate or exploit a crisis in the Persian Gulf that could lead to an American retaliation against an Iranian "provocation". That kind of opportunistic approach is not different from the way the Bush Administration took advantage of September 11 to mobilize public support for going to war against Iraq. Just change the nationality of the 15 sailors who were seized by the Iranians in March last year, imagine that they would have been Americans and not British and you here we are watching CNN's Wolf Blitzer reporting on "Day 15: American Held Hostage" ("We have an exclusive interview with the mother of Sergeant Brittany Steele ... " and before you know it, Congressional and public pressure builds-up and US troops are storming into a headquarters of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. And it's possible that a "provocation" could turn to be a (real) provocation if and when elements in the Iranian leadership who are looking forward towards a military confrontation with the US would make sure that Iranian forces do take military action against the forces of the Great Satan. Iran will hold parliamentary elections on March 14, 2008, and you don't have to be an expert in Iranian politics to figure out that the political parties associated with President Ahmadinejad who has been under attack at home for his mismanagement of the country's economy could benefit politically from rising tensions with between Tehran and Washington.

# 1AR – Iran DA – Link Turn

## Presence and continued sustainment of the Shiite state and incentivization to join Iran as satellites encourages Iranian expansion. Aditionally defense mechanisms make Iran increase their spheres of influence by building up nuclear weapons.

## 2 More reasons –

## A. Rejectionism

Chubin Ph.D in International Relations 2009 (Shahram, Shahram Chubin is a Senior Non-resident Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ph.D., Columbia University; B.A., Oberlin College “Iran’s Power in Context” Survival | vol. 51 no. 1 | February–March 2009 | pp. 165–190 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/shahram_survival20090201.pdf>) MFR

But American policies – and non-policies – have had the greatest effect on the regional landscape. US misjudgement and incompetence, exemplified by the country’s entanglement and overextension in Iraq, is generally acknowledged. The effects on America’s moral standing and credibility as a leader and ally have been devestating. Those elites in the region who believed in the United States have been discredited. Other policies, such as the failed ‘freedom agenda’ and the war in Lebanon, have fared little better. Neglect of the Palestine issue has allowed the ‘two-state solution’ to slip away as a realistic alternative for Israeli and Palestinians alike,16 which has in turn fed extremism, rage and anti-Americanism.17 The growing strength and appeal of the rejectionist front led by Iran is directly attributable to US policies.18 Meanwhile, by shattering the Iraqi state, the United States eliminated Iraq as an effective regional buffer vis-à-vis Iran, whose influence over its neighbour immediately increased.19 It meant that the old triangular system, in which the three large Gulf powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq balanced one another, was replaced by a bipolar structure pitting Iran and Saudi Arabia directly against each other.20 Moreover, by empowering Iraqi Shi’ites, the US occupation emboldened this traditionally suppressed community in the Gulf, a sensitive security issue for Saudi Arabia and even more so for Bahrain.21 (This is not to say, however, that the Saudis see Iran primarily as a Shia threat – on the contrary, Iran is mostly seen as a rival for political power in the region.

## B. Resentment

Chubin Ph.D in International Relations 2009 (Shahram, Shahram Chubin is a Senior Non-resident Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ph.D., Columbia University; B.A., Oberlin College “Iran’s Power in Context” Survival | vol. 51 no. 1 | February–March 2009 | pp. 165–190 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/shahram_survival20090201.pdf>) MFR

Many Iranians believe that their country has turned a corner and reached a new stage internationally. Commentators point to ‘the gradual transfer of power and influence from America’s camp to Iran’s camp’ and see the spread of Islamism in the region going hand-in-hand with ‘the inclination of regional states to gravitate towards Iran’.33 Hossein Shariatmadari, editorin- chief of the Iranian newspaper *Keyhan* and a confidant of Iran’s Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei**,** has described the Middle East as a platform to demonstrate US ‘failures and disappointments’.34 Others have called for Iran to challenge the United States for leadership of the region through a ‘proactive and aggressive foreign policy’.35 The necessary condition for Iran’s ‘advancement’ and greater freedom of action, in Ali Larijani’s words, is the collapse of the America’s ‘exclusive hegemony while suffer[ing] a defeat’.36 A sense of growing power, new to Islamic Iran, has led to a certain braggadocio and recklessness and a coarsening of language that in fact does little to advance Iran’s interests.37 In what has been called the ‘Palestinisation’ of Iran’s foreign policy,38 Iran has insisted that Israel has no right to exist; that only one solution can work in Palestine, namely the one-state solution, whatever the Palestinians might decide; that the Holocaust is a myth; and that Iran’s ‘international mission’ is to limit Israel’s power.39 In brief, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made ‘anti-Israeli rhetoric the defining characteristic of his presidency’.40 Khamenei has blessed all of this, arguing that Iran has a duty to stand up to US bullying and ‘the iniquities of the Zionist regime’.41 Khamenei’s international-affairs adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, amplifies this thinking: ‘to support Palestine is to support Iran … To support Lebanon is to support Iran … To support Iraq is to support Iran.’42 Iranian officials, believing that ‘regional and global developments have created new situations in Iran’s favour’,43 have made tireless efforts to cash in by spreading the message that the United States is ‘hated in the region’.44 But Iran’s greater involvement in Middle Eastern affairs has not been merely opportunistic but also motivated by defence considerations. Though eager to spread its model, Iran was also impelled to extend its influence further afield by its sense of encirclement and the need to engage the enemy in ‘forward defense, so as to avoid fighting on its borders. Palestine, in this view, is not a matter of solidarity but strategy: it is now a bulwark – a frontline – in Iran’s defense’.45 Thus, in recent years Iran has increased its support of the Palestinian resistance. It has been helped in this project by two factors: firstly, the absence of any substantive peace process; and secondly, the fading prospects of a two-state solution.46 This has meant that Iran has effectively filled a vacuum. What used to be provocative support for a ‘one-state solution’ now appears less extreme. When there is no peace process to oppose, looking at alternatives appears more reasonable. The controversial enhanced US military presence in the region and Washington’s extraordinary neglect of the Palestinian issue have provided fertile ground for Iran to pose as Palestine’s protector and to generalise its conflict with the United States. The anger and frustration of many Arabs and Palestinians at the blatant disregard for their concerns have made some susceptible to extremist solutions. Iran’s willingness to activate the rejectionist front, and to stand up to America, thus has regional resonance, which it would not have had in a different context or with different US policies.

## C. GCC will check any risk of your turn

## Amland – US Army Colonel 4/7/03 (George S., USMC, United States Army War College “GLOBALIZATION AND US FOREIGN POLICY WITH IRAN” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA413445>) MFR

The US has not been in as favorable a position for reducing its overall presence in the Gulf in over a decade. Not withstanding any resolution in the current situation between the US and Iraq, the GCC is adequately postured to cope with the future emergence of a regional hegemon. It is merely a case of the US cutting the umbilical, providing the proper motivation to the GCC and moving back to less friction-producing areas such as Oman and Diego Garcia. Any additional requirements to provide for regional stability should be provided by the long-term recipients of Persian Gulf resources, i.e. Asia and the EU. Reductions in US presence will reduce regional tensions and eliminate one of the pillars that Iranian terrorism is founded on. Iranian terrorist activities appear to be in check at this time, and the US should not provide any incentive to reinstate them. As Iran attempts to reenter the global economy, the desirability of Iran to continue the support of terrorism will be further undermined; and the US can accelerate this process. It has already been noted that the popular vote in Iran is on the side of the Khatami presidency. As Khatami is the proponent of a more economically viable Iran, it is up to the US to nurture this aspect of future US-Iranian relations. In doing so, it will be possible to drive the wedge deeper into the gap that is now marginalizing the influence of the theocracy and their support of terrorism. Even a very subtle US information operations campaign could further accelerate the effects of globalization by ensuring the Iranian public is aware of which of the two Iranian political camps the US is sitting in.

# 2AC – Iran DA – Withdrawel = Deterrence (Naval P)

## **U.S. troop presence should be limited to reduce anti-American sentiment and allow for a robust naval presence to deter Iranian aggression**

Ariel Cohen and James Phillip, 2001 (“Countering Russian-Iranian Military Cooperation”, Cohen is a  Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and Phillip is a Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Heritage foundation, accessed 6/27/10)-Wey

Maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf to deter and defend against military threats from Iran. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has targeted Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf with terrorism and subversion. It has sought to intimidate smaller neighbors with periodic naval exercises and has seized three islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates. To deter Iran from aggression and protect the free flow of oil exports, the United States must maintain a robust naval presence in the Gulf. As long as the United States stands by its allies, the chances of attack from Iran are low. A vigilant and robust naval presence in the Gulf would deter Iranian aggression, reassure nervous Arab states that the United States is committed to peace in the region, and help contain Iraq. The United States currently has deployed forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, and it has pre-positioned military equipment in Qatar. The United States should deploy as few ground troops as necessary in the region to avoid a political backlash that Iran, Iraq, or local anti-Western movements could exploit. U.S. naval forces should limit their time in port and restrict refueling and resupply operations to only the most secure facilities to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

# 2AC – Iran DA – A2: Central Asia Expansion

## Iran can’t expand into Central Asia, there are differences in Islamic ideology

## **Amland** – US Army Colonel 4/7/**03** (George S., USMC, United States Army War College “GLOBALIZATION AND US FOREIGN POLICY WITH IRAN” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA413445>) MFR

On the northern borders of Iran, a different form of economic globalization is affecting US containment policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US took immediate steps to recognize the independence of all the former Central Asian Republics. By mid-1992 all 5 new states received US diplomatic missions and in October 1992 the US Congress had passed the Freedom Support Act to provide aid to the new Eurasian states. Ostensibly the US also admitted to the dangers the region faced from Iranian sponsored fundamentalism and was determined not to let the opportunity of exerting regional influence pass by.73 An interesting phenomenon of this northern Iranian geo-strategic region is that while the adjoining states are predominantly Muslim, the long term secular Russian presence has made their form of religious ideology incompatible with that of Iran.74 Across central Asia, a parallel form of Islam existed during the Soviet domination. Sufi orders established a pervasive form of Islam that is founded on private piety and not in political activism.75 Iran erroneously assumed that with the fall of the Soviet Union it would fill the void with a more fundamentalist and revolutionary Islamic presence in order to consolidate its position in the Caspian region. Fortunately for US policy, the years of Marxist ideology and Russian technocracy appears to have irretrievably altered the religious complexion of regional Muslims.76 The best that Iran can hope for in the future is some form of economic cooperation with its northern neighbors.77 An interesting political irony also has evolved throughout this process. Despite the overwhelming Islamic prominence in this region, the acceleration of the integration of Central Asia into the global economy is strongly supported by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. As this is one of the founders of the Jewish political lobby in the US, this support has sent strong signals to the European, Asian and Middle East Jewish communities and created implications for Iranian integration in the process.78

# \*\*\*Israel DA\*\*\*

# 2AC – Israel DA

## No link – we don’t remove all military presence, only drones. Their evidence is not in the context of withdrawing drones.

## Non Unique – Drawdowns in Iraq by the August deadline should’ve made Israel irrational now

## US Security irrelevant – Israeli resentment

## Wieseltier 6-3

## [Leon. Literary of the New Republic, PhD from Harvard. “Operation ‘Make the World Hate Us’” The New Republic, 6/3/10//MGW-JV]

Israel does not need enemies: it has itself. Or more precisely: it has its government. The Netanyahu-Barak government has somehow found a way to lose the moral high ground, the all-important war for symbols and meanings, to Hamas. That is quite an accomplishment. Operation Make the World Hate Us, it might have been called. I leave it to others to make the operational criticisms of the Israeli action, and will say only that even my amateurish understanding of the tactical challenge posed by the interdiction of the boats suffices to suggest that there were other ways to do this. I also will not pretend to a perfect grasp of what happened on board the Mavi Marmara. I have pondered the videos that both sides have released, and concluded that the Israeli soldiers sliding down that rope had no intention of attacking the people on board and that the people on board had no way of being confident of this. I cannot expect Palestinians and their supporters to believe the best about the Israeli army. (This is what Israeli hardliners call “the restoration of deterrence.”) I do not doubt that some of the activists on the ship welcomed a confrontation with Israel, but the Israelis should not have obliged them. In any event, what took place on that deck looks to me like a tragic misunderstanding. Yet there was no reason to think that anything else would have transpired. The important point is that the killing of civilians on the Mavi Marmara—I understand that they were “armed” with metal bars and a knife, but still they were civilians, and soldiers are trained to respond unlethally to the recklessness of a mob—cannot be extenuated by reference to “asymmetrical warfare” and Israel’s right to defend itself. This was not warfare, at least of the physical sort. Israel was not under attack. A headline in [The Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/31/AR2010053103445.html) yesterday reported that “Israel says Free Gaza Movement poses threat to Jewish state.” Such a claim is absurd. It is true that the movement has grown in recent years, and is now troublesome to Israel’s policy in Gaza; and it is also true that the Turkish charity that sponsored the “Freedom Flotilla” has ties to Islamicist groups. But this is hardly what Israel likes to call, in the Iranian context, and there quite plausibly, an “existential threat.” The extension of the definition of a security threat to include hostile activities that have little or no bearing upon security is an ominous development.

## No Internal Link – their internal link is indicative of disarmament causing Israel backlash, not drawdowns in troops

## No Unique Link – Israel isn’t confident in security now

## Wieseltier 6-3

## [Leon. Literary of the New Republic, PhD from Harvard. “Operation ‘Make the World Hate Us’” The New Republic, 6/3/10//MGW-JV]

It is also the inevitable consequence of Benjamin Netanyahu’s cunning pronouncement last year that Israel is now endangered by “the Iran threat, the missile threat, and the threat I call the Goldstone threat.” The equivalence was morally misleading, and therefore dangerous. Ideological warfare is not military warfare. I have studied the entirety of the Goldstone Report, and whereas I do not doubt (and [wrote in this magazine](http://www.tnr.com/article/75284/the-window) in the days before Goldstone) that Operation Cast Lead caused the unjustifiable death of non-combatants, I also do not doubt that the Goldstone Report, which was nastily indifferent to Israel’s security predicament and to the ethical challenges of Israeli self-defense, was an instrument in a broad campaign of delegitimation against Israel—and yet the threat of delegitimation is not like the threat of destruction. It is different in kind. A commando operation is not an appropriate response to an idea. “This was no Love Boat,” Netanyahu [said yesterday](http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=177286). “It was a hate boat.” He is right, but so what? The threat of delegitimation is not a military problem and it does not have a military solution. And the attempt to give it a military solution has now had the awful consequence of making the threat still greater. The assault on the Mavi Marmara was a stupid gift to the delegitimators. You do not have to be a general to grasp these distinctions. In fact, judging by Israel’s recent history, it might help not to be one. But the militarization of the Israeli government’s understanding of Israel’s situation—this has been the most sterile period for diplomacy in all of Israel’s history—is not all that led to the debacle at sea. Rules of military engagement that allow soldiers to fire on political activists (I leave aside the question of their humanitarianism for a moment) may signify something still deeper and even more troubling. It is hard not to conclude from this Israeli action, and also from other Israeli actions in recent years, that the Israeli leadership simply does not care any longer about what anybody thinks. It does not seem to care about what even the United States—its only real friend, even in the choppy era of Obama—thinks. This is not defiance, it is despair. The Israeli leadership seems to have given up any expectation of fairness and sympathy from the world. It is behaving as if it believes, in the manner of the most perilous Jewish pessimism, that the whole world hates the Jews, and that is all there is to it. This is the very opposite of the measured and empirical attitude, the search for strategic opportunity, the enlistment of imagination in the service of ideals and interests, that is required for statecraft.

## Disad is not intrinsic – rational policymaker can pull drones out and maintain the security alliance

## Relations low - spies

## Mearsheimer and Walt ‘6

## [John – Prof IR @ U of Chicago and Stephen – Prof IR @ Harvard. The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy 2006, PG 6-7//MGW-JV]

A final reason to question Israel’s strategic value is that it does not act like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders (including past pledges to halt settlement construction and to refrain from “targeted assassinations” of Palestinian leaders).20 Moreover, Israel has provided sensitive U.S. military technology to potential U.S. rivals like China, in what the U.S. State Department Inspector‐General called “a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorized transfers.”21 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, Israel also “conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the U.S. of aany ally.”22 In addition to the case of Jonathan Pollard, who gave Israel large quantities of classified material in the early 1980s (which Israel reportedly passed onto the Soviet Union to gain more exit visas for Soviet Jews), a new controversy erupted in 2004 when it was revealed that a key Pentagon official (Larry Franklin) had passed classified information to an Israeli diplomat, allegedly aided by two AIPAC officials.23 Israel is hardly the only country that spies on the United States, but its willingness to spy on its principal patron casts further doubt on its strategic value.

No attack from Israel

Christopher Layne (grandson of realism and deterrence theory, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 4/10/2006 "Iran: The Logic of Deterrence" THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006\_04\_10/cover.html

The administration has flirted with the idea of farming-out to Israel the task of attacking Iran’s nuclear installations. But this—to recall what one Soviet official said about Nikita Khruschev’s decision to deploy missiles in Cuba—truly would be “harebrained scheming.” To reach targets in Iran, Israeli planes would have to overfly Iraq, which would require not only American consent but active co-ordination between the Israeli air force and the U.S. military. Absolutely no one would be fooled into thinking the U.S. was an innocent bystander. The whole world—and most important, the whole Islamic world—would know that Washington’s hand was the directing force behind an Israeli strike on Iran, which means that the U.S. would be the main target of an Islamic backlash.

# 1AR – Israel DA – Rltns Low

## Israel’s disregard for U.S. requests and promises in the middle east and spy operations undermine U.S. and Israel civil relations. This is a bigger internal link – proves the alliance isn’t genuine

## Obama statements make the DA non unique

## Leibler 5-25

## [Isi. “The US-Israel Crisis is far from Over” The Assc Press, 5/25/10. ln//MGW-JV]

We are currently being subjected to a chorus of proclamations by government spokesmen, American Jewish leaders and Obama administration representatives reassuring us that Israeli-US relations are back on track. Ironically, these frenetic denials that any problem exists merely highlight the severity of the crisis. Having recently gained direct insight into the American political scene and met a wide cross-section of American Jewish leaders and opinion makers, it is frustrating to observe how in response to a few friendly strokes and reassuring words, we still grasp straws to avoid facing unpleasant realities and accept at face value meaningless incantations that all is well. The truth is that there is no tangible evidence that the US has diverted from its policy of “engaging” or appeasing Islam by distancing itself from us. It is however reassuring that contrary to the predictions of President Barack Obama’s Jewish advisers, American Jewish protest at grassroots levels has emerged, deploring the bias and hostility displayed toward the Netanyahu government. This contrasted with Jewish leaders most of whom privately expressed dismay with Obama breaching his pre-election commitments relating to Israel but refused to publicly reprimand their president. It was somewhat bizarre to hear traditionally highly vocal American Jewish leaders rationalizing their inaction on the grounds that protests would have been counterproductive and that it was preferable to operate quietly behind the scenes. In fact, aside from Abe Foxman of the ADL, a curtain of silence initially enveloped the shocked Jewish establishment. Only weeks later did a number of high-profile Democratic supporters like Alan Dershowitz and former New York mayor Ed Koch publicly express their protest. Subsequently World Jewish Congress president Ronald Lauder, Elie Wiesel and, most recently on Jerusalem Day, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations also gave vent to their feelings in full-page newspaper advertisements. It was only then that the administration grasped the extent of the backlash against Obama’s Middle East policies and realized that the Democratic Party was in danger of losing the support of committed Jewish voters and donors. The concerns of the administration were further heightened when opinion polls showed that the broad American public opposed Obama’s Middle East policies and strongly supported Israel – even displaying overwhelming support for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. This was reaffirmed in petitions signed by the vast majority of members from both Houses of Congress calling on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to end the public disputations against Israel. This led to frantic efforts by the administration to reassure the public that Obama had not betrayed Israel.

## Rhetoric of high relations wrong, policies show they’re low

## Leibler 5-25

## [Isi. “The US-Israel Crisis is far from Over” The Assc Press, 5/25/10. ln//MGW-JV]

PROCLAMATIONS OF support for Israel by the administration are of course welcome. But regrettably there is no evidence of any change in USpolicy . Pressure continues to be exerted on Israel to make further unilateral concessions with no commensurate effort to modify Palestinian intransigency. The administration seems to have given up on preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power and instead appears to be implicitly endorsing efforts to neutralize Israel’s ambiguous nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, the State Department has begun ominously threatening to hold “to account” any parties indulging in acts “of provocation” leading to a breakdown in the proximity talks. Yet the incitement, repeated aggressive initiatives and breaches of existing commitments by Palestinian Authority leaders, including the recent effort to block Israel’s entry into the OECD, continue to be ignored. The situation is aggravated when government circles which hitherto denied an imprimatur for J Street suddenly conceded that the organization is becoming “mainstream.” It is surely not “mainstream” for a Jewish organization to lobby the US government to pressure Israel to make unilateral concessions. In fact only a few days ago, J Street posted messages to its members reiterating the damaging demagogic statement that the Arab-Israeli conflict was endangering US troops and called on congressmen to sign a petition calling onObama to continue pressuring Israel. It is thus surely time for Israeli leaders, including the prime minister, to spell out the truth. One cannot expect the American public or even American Jews to be critical of the policies of their government while Israeli leaders express unqualified praise for an administration which fails to act evenhandedly. The harsh reality is that despite all the babble about peace, there is currently no light at the end of the tunnel and these wretched proximity talks in lieu of direct negotiations make prospects for a genuine settlement more remote than ever. Alas, even if PA President Mahmoud Abbas had the power or inclination to genuinely reach a settlement, no Israeli government could accommodate the more intransigent demands being promoted on the basis of undertakings allegedly received from the Americans. Unless the Palestinians once again shoot themselves in the foot, the almost inevitable outcome is that the talks will collapse and Israel will be blamed and depicted as the obstacle to peace. Obama has already suggested that if the talks collapse, he would convene an international conference with the Quartet. In the climate of the Goldstone Report and intensified efforts to demonize and delegitimize the Jewish state, the US and the Europeans would seek to impose a solution and unilaterally create a Palestinian state. Moreover, the US has already hinted that if Israel fails to extend the settlement freeze after September, it should no longer take for granted that the US would continue exercising its veto to neutralize hostile resolutions at the UN Security Council.

# 1AR – Israel DA – No Strike

## Layne indicates Israeli strikes would be impossible – Iraqi airspace intrusion would require U.S. permission and they’re not willing to aid in Iranian strikes due to Islamic backlash

## Political and military deterrence prevents Israeli first-strike.

## Ehsaneh I. Sadr (graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park) SUMMER 2005 “THE IMPACT OF IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL” MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 2

The military and political ramifications of an attack on Iran cannot, however, be so easily remedied by clever planning or arms acquisitions. The worst-case scenario, which cannot be entirely dismissed, is that Iran already has a deliverable nuclear weapon that might survive and be used in retaliation for an Israeli attack. A more likely result is that the Israeli attack, far from permanently eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, will delay it by only a few years while simultaneously stimulating (and justifying) Iranian efforts to acquire such weapons as quickly as possible. Conventional responses are also likely. Iran’s medium-range Shahab-3 missiles are likely to be launched at Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor or at an easier target like Tel Aviv. Shorter-range Scuds might be fired by the Iranian-supported Hezbollah from its bases in south Lebanon. Even more troubling is the possibility of attacks against military or civilian targets by sleeper cells of Israeli Arabs that would be activated by Israeli actions against Iran. An indication that such attacks are well within the realm of the possible is the recent arrest of Israeli Mohammad Ghanem for alleged espionage on behalf of Iran.34 The United States, widely perceived as the source of Israel’s power and protection, is also likely to bear the brunt of retaliatory action. U.S. vulnerabilities in Iraq would surely be exploited by an Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) that is intimately familiar with the players and how they might be motivated or manipulated to cause trouble for the United States or its allied Iraqi government. Were the Islamic Republic to seriously commit its resources to the funding and training of anti-Western jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, Americans might even be confronted with further attacks on the homeland. The political consequences of Israeli action are sure to include increased anti- Americanism and anti-Zionism, not only among Arabs but also Europeans and much of the developing world. Increased instability in the Middle East will strengthen the hand of extremists, making a political solution to the Palestinian issue much more difficult and likely precluding any possibility of Arab-Israeli peace. Given the difficulty of military action against Iran, the very small likelihood of its nuclear capabilities being damaged in any meaningful and non-recoverable way, and the exceedingly high military and political costs associated with such an attack, it is important and necessary that Israel consider whether the costs of allowing Iran to go nuclear might not be more tolerable.

## The United States won’t green-light Israeli preemption.

## World Tribune 1/5/2007 “Security official: U.S. no longer trusts Israel to strike Iran nukes” SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/07/front2454104.08125.html>

The former Israeli official said he doubted whether the White House, out of fear that the operation would fail, would approve Israeli air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. "There is a harsh disappointment of us in the United States," Eiland said. "We didn't supply the goods. It embarrassed our friends in the United States, our friends in Congress. It has long-range repercussions."

# 1AR – Israel DA – No Strike (Mo Cards)

## Israel is far more likely to strike conventional Iran – perceived Iranian nuclear development is enough to politically shackle Israeli military aggression.

Devin T. Hagerty (lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Sydney, Australia) 1998 “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; Lessons from South Asia” p 34-5

PREVENTIVE WAR SCENARIOS. The most likely scenario- involving nuclear weapons in asymmetrical situations is one in which an estab­lished nuclear power launches a preventive strike against the nuclear facilities of an aspiring nuclear state. Table 1 depicts four possible preventive war scenarios. Two pairs of variables are germane to this problem. First, the preventive strike could be conventional or nuclear. Second, the target nation could be in Waltz's first (nonnuclear) or sec­ond (possibly nuclear) stage of weapon development. In the northwest corner of this matrix is the possibility of a conven­tional preventive attack against a target country that is in the earliest stages of the proliferation process. This is at once the most plausible and least worrisome possibility. History offers two examples of this type of attack: Israel's Osirak strike and the allied coalition's 1991 air war against Iraq.59 Neither threatened to escalate to a nuclear exchange, because both were nonnuclear strikes against a nonnuclear country. It is unlikely that either attack would have been ordered had Iraq been judged capable of nuclear retaliation. One may support or oppose conventional preventive strikes for reasons of personal poli­tics or national interest, but the fact remains that the strategic consequences of the strikes against Iraq were limited. The northeast quadrant of Table 1 houses the possibility of a pre­ventive nuclear strike against a nonnuclear state. Restraint in the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations is a firmly embedded element of the post-1945 nuclear taboo. Despite numerous wars between nuclear and nonnuclear states, nuclear weapons have never been used by the country enjoying the advantage. Nuclear preven­tive strikes against nonnuclear states are extremely unlikely, both because it is unnecessary to use nuclear weapons in such an attack and because of the international outcry that would engulf the attack­ing state. Imagine if Israel were to destroy Iran's nascent nuclear research and development facilities with nuclear weapons. The dev­astation and loss of life would be immense, and Israel would overnight become an international pariah. No political objective could be worth the isolation that would result. If Israel felt threatened by Iran's nuclear progress, it would likely resort to sabotage or anoth­er Osirak-style conventional raid.

Israel will not use nuclear weapons on Iran – it has had decades to do so – why wait until nuclear retaliation is possible?

Sean P. Smeland Spring, 2004 "Countering Iranian Nukes: A European Strategy" The Nonproliferation Review http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Security\_Challenges/WMD/Academic\_Papers/Smeland.pdf

From Israel, Iran has only to fear a quick strike by missile or aircraft (presumably through Turkish airspace, though the Islamic Justice and Development [AK] Party which presently holds power would be unlikely to allow this). Such a strike could be preemptive, as Ray Takeyh has suggested; however, such a contingency would be a response to Iran’s proliferation efforts, not a security threat that calls for proliferation. The only genuine preexistent threat posed by Israel is one of retaliation, either for a direct attack or, more likely, for support of anti-Israeli terrorism. However, the notion that Israel would respond to terrorism (or even a direct attack) with a nuclear strike is undercut by the fact that Israel has, in all likelihood, had nuclear weapons since the mid-1960s, but has never—through two full-scale wars and thousands of terrorist attacks—seriously considered nuclear retaliation. 23 Any such retaliation would be by conventional arms, would fall well short of endangering the existence of Iran, and would not be deterred by an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Iranian nuclear weapons clearly have no purpose with respect to any genuine threat posed by Israel (though they could be marketed to the Iranian public as anti-Israel weapons).

## Iranian proliferation will cause a deterrent balance in the Middle East with Israel.

Hugh White (visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, professor of strategic studies at ANU) 7/7/2005 "The concern is no longer if, but when" http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/the-concern-is-no-longer-if-but-when/2005/07/06/1120329505126.html

Nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea poses four kinds of risk. The first risk is that either government would choose to use their weapons deliberately. To guard against this we have no alternative but to rely on old-fashioned deterrence. The men who rule in Tehran and Pyongyang will need to be brought to understand they cannot use their nuclear weapons without risking nuclear retaliation. Deterrence is not foolproof, because there is always a chance of miscalculation. But the long dangerous decades of the Cold War showed that it can work. There is no reason why Israel and Iran, for example, should not establish the kind of more or less stable nuclear deterrent balance that characterised the Cold War. Fortunately that is what seems to be happening between India and Pakistan. We need to look for ways to strengthen deterrence in these situations.

# 1AR – Israel DA – No Strike (Mo Cards)

## U.S. announcement not to invade Iran is a tacit message of Israeli pacifism.

The Bulletin 6/7/2007 "Has the U.S. decided against attacking Iran?" http://www.thebulletin.us/site/news.cfm?newsid=18441417&BRD=2737&PAG=461&dept\_id=576361&rfi=6

The Middle East Newsline reports from U.S. administration sources that President George Bush has decided that, barring a "catastrophic development," the United States would not attack Iran. The sources said the administration has been relaying the decision to U.S. allies in the Middle East. "The United States has decided that Iran's cooperation was needed for a withdrawal from Iraq," an administration source said. "There won't be a situation where there will be cooperation and then war with Iran." The sources said the administration plans to discuss its decision with Israel during their annual strategic dialogue, which took place yesterday in Washington. The Israeli delegation would be headed by Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, a former defense minister and military chief of staff. Mofaz was scheduled to meet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other senior administration officials. The administration decision marked a rejection of more than two years of Israeli appeals for a U.S. military option against Iran. The sources said Bush was swayed by his intention to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq as well as an intelligence assessment that an airstrike would not destroy all or most of Iran's nuclear weapons facilities. "The hidden message [to Israel] was that if we don't do it [strike Iran], you definitely don't do it," the source said.

Israel’s military leaders are far less aggressive than their evidence assumes.

Jordan Seng (University of Chicago) June, 1998 “Strategy for Pandora’s Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States” online

We have already seen how both Israel and Iraq have made use of concealment strategies which, as my theoretical discussions have made clear, are time insensitive strategies. So, the heavy reliance on concealment strategies is one positive sign in terms of command and control stability. But it is only one positive sign among several. The historical evidence also shows that control systems in the Middle East are not compromised by militaries’ organizational biases, and it supports the view that minor proliferators are not prone to hair-triggered launch procedures. There are no indications of pernicious militarism in Israel’s nuclear control systems, but rather quite the opposite. As in India, nuclear weapon have been expressly kept our of the Israeli military’s warfighting strategies, and nuclear decisionmaking has been solidly insulated from military officers. Further, what we know of Israeli command systems indicates that there is a sensible structure of checks and balances.

## Israeli warfighting doctrine excludes nuclear use.

Jordan Seng (University of Chicago) June, 1998 “Strategy for Pandora’s Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States” online

Yair Evron has worried that the pattern of frequent warfare in the Middle East may lead proliferators to integrate nuclear weapons into war-fighting doctrines, and thereby increase the chances of nuclear escalation even in relatively minor conflicts: “the military establishments (in the Middle East), because of their inbuilt bureaucratic conservatism, and because of the centrality of the war-fighting mission for the armed forces, may consider nuclear weapons as instruments for warfare rather than as deterrents. - But, as Evron himself has discussed in print,’33 Israel’s nuclear policymaking has shown a firm tendency to exclude nuclear weapons from war-fighting strategies. The foundations for Israeli nuclear doctrine were laid at a famous 1962 Cabinet meeting, which we have already mentioned above. Ar the meeting, Ben-Gurion, though sold on the general value of a nuclear option, listened to guidance on nuclear strategy. The prevailing view was that championed by Yigal Allon and Israel Gall, who were themselves closely allied with the Israeli military establishment. As with the military establishments in the U.S. and India, Allon’s camp argued against the military efficacy of nuclear weapons and for the exclusion of nuclear bombs from military doctrine in general. Among the arguments against nuclear integration into war-fighting strategies were those stipulating that it would weaken the military’s self-image, destroy morale and corrupt military resource allocation. It was also recognized that nuclear weapons were poor instruments for taking and protecting territory.’ The upshot of the meeting was that nuclear weapons would in no way be integrated into standard military operations. Recent scholarship indicates that this condition has held to the present and shows no signs of changing.’35 Even Evron plainly agrees that nuclear weapons are “not incorporated into Israeli military doctrine.”

## Mutual deterrence is more likely than attacks.

Jason D. Söderblom (an Analyst for the Terrorism Intelligence Centre, and is the Director of the

World-ICE Group) 10/1/2004 “NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY: IRAN AND THIRD TIER NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”http://world-ice.com/Articles/Iran%20Deterrence.pdf

Ultimately Israel's options to counter an Iranian threat are limited, and vice versa. A pre-emptive strike against Iran's missile or nuclear assets is problematic because the targets are hidden and well protected, as some of them are in deep underground installations. Thus, the remaining Israeli option (if Iran were a nuclear power) would be mutual deterrence which, given that Iran lacks expansionist desires, makes mutual deterrence Iran’s ultimate goal in any event. Therefore, by nuclear deterrence theories’ logic, Iran will not strike at Israel (and/or the United States) unless provoked by a direct attack on their homeland.

# 1AR – Israel DA – No Strike (Mo Cards)

## Israel will not first-strike – political and military ramifications.

Ehsaneh I. Sadr (graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park) SUMMER 2005 “THE IMPACT OF IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL” MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 2

Despite Israel’s strategically understandable claims regarding its ability to preempt Iranian nuclearization through unilateral military action, many experts foresee complications that make a singlestrike success extremely difficult if not impossible.5 Furthermore, even if Iran’s nuclear capabilities were eliminated or significantly impaired in such an attack, the military and political ramifications for Israel and its allies are likely to be much more costly than they were in 1981.6 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the costs and opportunities associated with the emergence of a nuclear Iran might not be more tolerable than those associated with military action.

## Israeli air-strikes will not eliminate Iranian nuclear capabilities.

Ehsaneh I. Sadr (graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park) SUMMER 2005 “THE IMPACT OF IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL” MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 2

The elimination of Iran’s nuclear program through a unilateral Israeli military strike will be much more difficult than the 1981 action against Iraq.29 Having learned from that precedent, Tehran has gone to great lengths to safeguard its nuclear program by dispersing important elements throughout the country, deep underground and in areas well protected by its airdefense systems.30 Iran is also a more distant target that will be difficult to reach without the (unlikely) cooperation of countries such as Jordan, Iraq or Turkey in allowing overflight of or refueling within their territories. Iran’s political isolation from the Western world has meant that there are fewer diplomats, business people, and spies inside the country to provide accurate intelligence as to the location and character of its nuclear capabilities. Finally, unlike its Arab neighbors, Iran continues to house significant Jewish communities in Tehran and Shiraz that the Israeli leadership would not wish to harm. These problems were recently underscored by Brigadier General (reserves) Shlomo Brum, a senior researcher at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Iran is far away, and to reach it you have to pass over Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq or other Persian Gulf states. You can get entangled along the way. It is hard for me to imagine that the Americans would coordinate or cooperate with us, because if that was ever published it would greatly harm their position, which is already at a low point in the Middle East.31

# 2AC – Israel DA – Case Turns DA

## Case turns the DA – backing off security commitment to Israel diffuses the Middle East

## Hedges ‘7

## [Chris. Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times, Fellow @ Anschutz. “US Must Make a Declaration of Independence from Israel” The Arab American News, Vol 23 No 117. Proquest//MGW-JV]

The alliance between Israel and the United States has culminated after 50 years in direct U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. This involvement, which is not furthering American interests, is unleashing a geopolitical nightmare. American soldiers and Marines are dying in droves in a useless war. The impotence of the United States in the face of Israeli pressure is complete. The White House and the Congress have become, for perhaps the first time, a direct extension of Israeli interests. There is no longer any debate within the United States. This is evidenced by the obsequious nods to Israel by all the current presidential candidates with the exception of Dennis Kucinich. The political cost for those who challenge Israel is too high. This means there will be no peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It means the incidents of Islamic terrorism against the U.S. and Israel will grow. It means that American power and prestige are on a steep, irreversible decline. And I fear it also means the ultimate end of the Jewish experiment in the Middle East.

# 2AC – Israel DA – A2: Iran Strike Impact

## Iran strikes won’t cause extinction – targeted and no nukes

## AP ‘6

## [The Assc Press. “What a War with Iran would Look Like” The AP, 9/17/6.ln//MGW-JV]

So what would it look like? Interviews with dozens of experts and government officials in Washington, Tehran and elsewhere in the Middle East paint a sobering picture: Military action against Iran's nuclear facilities would have a decent chance of succeeding, but at a staggering cost. And therein lies the excruciating calculus facing the U.S. and its allies: Is the cost of confronting Iran greater than the dangers of living with a nuclear Iran? And can anything short of war persuade Tehran's fundamentalist regime to give up its dangerous game? No one is talking about a ground invasion of Iran. Too many U.S. troops are tied down elsewhere to make it possible, and besides, it isn't necessary. If the U.S. goal is simply to stunt Iran's nuclear program, it can be done better and more safely by air. An attack limited to Iran's nuclear facilities would nonetheless require a massive campaign. Experts say that Iran has between 18 and 30 nuclear-related facilities. The sites are dispersed around the country -- some in the open, some cloaked in the guise of conventional factories, some buried deep underground. A U.S. strike would have a lasting impression on Iran's rulers. U.S. officials believe that a campaign of several days could set back Iran's nuclear program by two to three years. Hit hard enough, some believe, Iranians might develop second thoughts about their government's designs as a regional nuclear power. Some U.S. foes of Iran's regime believe that the crisis of legitimacy that the ruling clerics would face in the wake of a U.S. attack could trigger their downfall, though others are convinced it would unite the population with the government in anti-American rage.

## If we don’t strike, Iran will with nukes.

## Clawson and Einstadt ‘7

[Pat – Dir of Research and Michael – Director of Security Studies @ the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. “Deterring the Ayatollahs” Policy Focus #72, June 2007. INFORMAWORLD//MGW-JV]

For reasons related to the nature of the regime in Tehran, the regional security environment, and the challenges of coalition formation and maintenance, deterring a nuclear Iran is likely to prove particularly challenging and much more difficult than deterrence was during the Cold War. Regime factionalism raises potential command-and-control problems, while the likelihood that Iran’s nuclear weapons would be controlled by some of the most radical elements in the regime raises the possibility that Iran might lack restraint in brandishing its nuclear arsenal, and that some of these weapons might find their way into the hands of terrorists. Moreover, because Tehran has shown a distinct preference for indirection and dissimulation in its foreign policy, the possibility of covert, deniable delivery is particularly acute with the Islamic Republic. For this reason, the development of a credible postevent attribution capability is a vital necessity for the United States and its allies, and it is absolutely critical that decisionmakers in Tehran and elsewhere understand that the United States has such capabilities. The regional security environment in the Middle East hardly offers promising conditions for stable deterrence. The United States and Israel are still reeling from the impact of wars in Iraq and Lebanon, respectively, that have undermined their deterrent image and emboldened adversaries and enemies such as Syria and Iran. Such circumstances could increase the likelihood of a miscalculation that could spark a crisis between an increasingly assertive Iran and the United States or Israel, with the attendant possibility of escalation, an exchange of nuclear threats, or worse.

# 1AR – Israel DA – A2: Iran Strikes Impact

## AP indicates strikes on Iranian facilities would be precise and without use of nuclear weapons. This prevents Iran’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and gives them second thoughts about their programs. Iran’s lack of restraint of their nuclear weapons would make nuclear war inevitable. That’s Clawson

## Your strikes fail arguments don’t assume precision

## Brown ‘6

## [Drew. Staffer for the New York Times, Specializes in Iranian Affairs. “No Easy Military Option to Stop Iran” [www.ninronline.com](http://www.ninronline.com), 1/26/6. //MGW-JV]

Many analysts say that in that case, an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would be relatively easy to carry out. With U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with war planes and ships scattered throughout the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces essentially have Iran hemmed in on three sides. U.S. cruise missiles and stealth aircraft with precision-guided bombs likely would overwhelm Iran's air defenses. The key questions, however, are whether such an attack would be very effective and how Iran and the rest of the world would respond. Some experts say an attack would delay, not destroy, the Iranian program and would only reinforce Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Iran, taking lessons from the Israeli air attack that destroyed Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981, has dispersed its atomic research and development facilities in dozens, if not hundreds, of locations above and below ground. Regardless of the total number of Iran's nuclear facilities, Isfahan and Natanz are the most important because they constitute the "two weak links" in Iran's program, Cliff Kupchan, an Iran expert and former State Department official in the Clinton administration said. Isfahan, a facility that converts uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride gas, could be bombed easily, said Kupchan, now at the New York-based Eurasia Group, a political risk advisory and consulting firm. The other, Natanz, is a research facility where experts are trying to master the technique of converting uranium hexafluoride gas into enriched uranium. Low levels of enriched uranium are used for civilian nuclear plants, and more highly enriched fuel is used in nuclear weapons.

# 1AR – Israel DA – A2: Iran Strikes Impact

## More evidence – Iran nukes are worse

## Kurtz ‘6

## [Stan. Senior Fellow @ Ethics and Public Policy Centre. “Our Fallout Shelter Future” The National Review, 28 Aug 2006. Lexis//MGW-JV]

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Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you’ve got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. We’re familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states — like Pakistan’s intelligence services or Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis “enjoy” an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world’s non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait’s oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many “hot” proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations.

# 2AC/1AR – Israel DA – A2: Iranian Retaliation

## Iran can’t retaliate – they don’t military capacity, organizational ability, or the balls to cause significant damage.

Martin van Creveld, professor of military history at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Tribune Media ServicesPublished: October 24, 2007. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/24/opinion/edcrevald.php>

Should the U.S. strike at Iran - we are talking about a strike by cruise missiles and manned aircraft, not about an invasion for which Washington does not have the troops - then Iran will have no way to hit back. Like Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, Iran's most important response may well be to attack Israel, which probably explains why Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his generals keep making threats in that direction. Even so, they have few options. Iran's ground and naval forces are irrelevant to the mission at hand. Iran may indeed have some Shihab III missiles with the necessary range, but their number is limited and their reliability uncertain. Should the missiles carry conventional warheads, then, militarily speaking, the effect will probably be close to zero. Should they carry unconventional ones, then Iran, to quote former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir speaking not long before the first Gulf War, will open itself to "awesome and terrible" retaliation. Iran's air force is in an even sorrier state. Already in 1988, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran's fleet of old American-built aircraft was barely operational. Since then, the only imports may have been some Russian-built fighters. Few people have actually seen these aircraft. Even if Iran has them, they cannot reach Israel without air-to-air refueling, making them vulnerable to being shot down. Iran must be unhappy with the Russian aircraft, or else it would hardly have embarked on building its own. This Iranian aircraft is known as the Saeqeh, or Thunderbolt. Recently shown on parade, it is a version of the American F-5 Tiger. Designed in the 1950s and upgraded in the 1960s, the F-5 was rejected by the U.S. Air Force. Instead it was sold to countries such as Iran and Jordan and several Latin American ones that did not have what it took to operate more sophisticated craft. The Saeqehs do not stand a chance against modern jets. They are only available in very small numbers, and, like the Russian fighters, they can reach Israel - if at all - only with air-to-air refueling. Another option open to Tehran is to stir up trouble in the Gulf. Presumably that is what the Revolutionary Guards' missile commander, General Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, had in mind when he said he could launch "11,000 rockets. . . within a minute." This is nonsense. Short-range and inaccurate Katyushas apart, no country has nearly that many rockets. Nor is it easy to see what would be gained by launching all of them simultaneously. Even if doing so were feasible, all it would achieve is to leave the country defenseless. Trouble in the Gulf will cause the price of oil to skyrocket, but it will not save Iran from being heavily bombed. Moreover, the missile threat is something the U.S. armed forces and its allies in the Gulf should be able to handle. Why else keep 40,000 troops (not counting those in Iraq) and two or three carrier task forces with over 25,000 personnel in the region? Iran's final option is to launch terrorist attacks against the West. However, their strategic impact will be close to zero; after all, 9/11, the largest such attack of all time, did not reduce the capability of the U.S. armed forces one bit. A coordinated terrorist campaign, unlike individual pinpricks, is easier to talk about than to organize, since too many things can go wrong. Back in 1991, people feared that Saddam Hussein was about to launch such a campaign. In the end, not one attack took place.

# 1AR – Israel DA – A2: Iranian retaliation

## Iranian threats to destroy Israel are ideological bluster.

## Ted Galen **Carpenter 2007** “Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran” MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY

## <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v018/18.1carpenter.html>

Such a comment is certainly reprehensible, but does it negate the long-standing realities of deterrence? Israel has between 150 and 300 nuclear weapons of its own. Even if Iran can go forward with its nuclear program, it will not be able to build more than a dozen or so weapons over the next decade—even assuming that the most alarmist predictions of the current state of the program prove valid. Moreover, Israel is moving to expand its submarine fleet to have at least one nuclear-armed submarine on station at all times, giving the country a secure second-strike capability.15 Once that process is complete, Tehran could not hope to launch a "decapitation" sneak attack based on the (already remote) possibility that Israel would be unable to retaliate. As in the case of contemplating an attack on the United States, it would be most unwise for Iran to contemplate attacking Israel. The same realities of deterrence apply, albeit on a smaller scale. In all likelihood, Iranian rhetoric about wiping Israel off the map is merely ideological blather. Israel has more than a sufficient capability to deter an Iranian nuclear attack.

## Iran will not attack Israel – fear of retaliation is too strong.

## Barry R. **Posen 2006** “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem” CENTURY FOUNDATION <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/posen_nuclear-armed.pdf>

A few fission weapons would horribly damage the state of Israel, and a few fusion weapons would surely destroy it. But neither kind of attack could reliably shield Iran from a devastating response. Israel has had years to work on developing and shielding its nuclear deterrent. It is generally attributed with as many as 200 fission warheads, deliverable by several different methods, including Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile.12 Were Iran to proceed with a weapons program, Israel would surely improve its own capabilities. Though Iran’s population is large, and much of it is dispersed, about a quarter of Iranians (over fifteen million people) live in eight cities conservatively within range of Israel’s Jericho II missile.13 Much of Iran’s economic capacity is also concentrated in these cities.14 Nuclear attacks on these cities, plus some oil industry targets, would destroy Iran as a functioning society and prevent its recovery. There is little in the behavior of the leaders of revolutionary Iran that suggests they would see this as a good trade.

## Iran won’t attack Israel with nuclear weapons – would be vulnerable to U.S. retaliation.

## Barry R. **Posen 2006** “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem” CENTURY FOUNDATION <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/posen_nuclear-armed.pdf>

On the other hand, it is virtually impossible for Iran to achieve a first-strike capability versus the United States. Any risks that Iran took in its basing mode and alert posture to get ready for a first strike against Israel could easily make it more vulnerable to a first strike from the United States. Spending its nuclear forces on Israel would leave Iran politically and militarily vulnerable to a huge U.S. retaliation. By striking first, it would have legitimated a U.S. nuclear attack, while simultaneously weakening its own deterrent with the weapons it had expended. The United States is the greater threat to Iran because it is much more powerful than Israel, and has actual strategic objectives in the Gulf. It is strategically reasonable for Iran to focus its deterrent energies on the United States, which it can only influence with a secure retaliatory force, capable of threatening U.S. forces and interests in the region.

# 2AC – Israel DA – Hege ! Turn

## The alliance destroys hege

## Hedges ‘7

## [Chris Humanities Fellow @ Anschutz. “A Declaration of Independence from Israel” [www.truthdig.com](http://www.truthdig.com), 2007//MGW-JV]

The alliance between Israel and the United States has culminated after 50 years in direct U.S. military involvement in the Middle East.  This involvement, which is not furthering American interests, is unleashing a geopolitical nightmare.  American soldiers and Marines are dying in droves in a useless war.  The impotence of the United States in the face of Israeli pressure is complete.  The White House and the Congress have become, for perhaps the first time, a direct extension of Israeli interests.  There is no longer any debate within the United States.  This is evidenced by the obsequious nods to Israel by all the current presidential candidates with the exception of Dennis Kucinich.  The political cost for those who challenge Israel is too high. This means there will be no peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  It means the incidents of Islamic terrorism against the U.S. and Israel will grow.  It means that American power and prestige are on a steep, irreversible decline.  And I fear it also means the ultimate end of the Jewish experiment in the Middle East.

## Nuclear war

## Khalizhad 95

## [Zal. Rand Guy. “Losing the Moment” WQ, Spring 95. Lexis//MGW-JV]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# 2AC – Israel DA – Oil Access ! Turn

## US-Israeli relations choke oil access and increase prices

## Martin ‘3

## [LG. Middle East Specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute. “Assessing the Impact of US-Israeli Relations on the Arab World” Summer 2003. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB104.pdf> //MGW-JV]

The fundamental problem of the close U.S.-Israeli alliance for the moderate Arab states is that, at times of conflict between Israel and an Arab country (or in this instance, during the Intifada involving a proto-Palestinian state), it is very difficult for moderate Arab states to sustain their alignment with the United States which they need for their own external national security, and at the same time maintain their domestic political legitimacy in the face of popular hostility to Israel and the United States It therefore makes no sense for any U.S. administration to tilt so much towards Israel that it risks compromising the U.S. national interest in securing access to reasonably priced Gulf oil by furthering that hostility and increasing the chances that radical Islamists may come to power in one or more GCC states.

## Supply disruptions wreck the economy

## Diamond ‘5

## [Robert. President of Securing America’s Energy Future. “Committee on House International Relations” CQ Congressional Testimony, July 27, 05. ln//MGW-JV]

It is useful to review some of the key findings from Oil ShockWave. We did not seek to reach unanimous conclusions among the participants, however, a majority of participants would most likely embrace most of the findings and recommendations. First, there is really no such thing as "foreign oil." Oil is a fungible global commodity. A change in supply or demand anywhere will affect prices everywhere. Second, we discovered that taking such a small amount of oil off the market could have significant impact on crude oil prices and gasoline. Oil markets are currently precariously balanced. Small supply/demand imbalances can have dramatic effects. We essentially took only 3.5 million barrels off a roughly 84 million barrel global daily market. This means that a supply shortfall of approximately 4% could cause prices to rise to $161 per barrel of oil or to $5.74 per gallon of gasoline. This would create tremendous national security and economic problems for the country. Third, the prices of crude oil rose quickly. It would not necessarily take much to go from $60 to $123 or even $161. Fourth, once oil supply disruptions occur, little can be done in the short term to protect the US economy from its impacts. There are few good short-term solutions. Fifth, there are a number of supply-side and demand-side policy options available that would significantly improve US oil security. Benefits from these measures will take a decade or more to mature, and thus should be enacted as soon as possible. This is the reason we must act now to end this national and economic security vulnerability.

## Nuclear war

## Cusick ‘9

## [James. Staffer @ the Sunday Herald (Scotland). “Don’t Bank on Financial Trouble Being Resolved without conflict” 3/18/9. ln//MGW-JV]

I'm not saying that America is about to declare war on China, or that Germany is going to invade France. But there are profound economic stresses in central Europe that could rapidly turn into conflict in the bankrupt Baltic states, Hungary, Ukraine. And if the Great Recession, as the IMF's Dominique Strauss-Kahn called it last week, turns into a Great Depression, with a prolonged collapse in international trade and financial flows, then we could see countries like Pakistan disintegrate into nuclear anarchy and war with neighbouring India, which will itself be experiencing widespread social unrest. Collapsing China could see civil war too; Japan will likely re-arm; Russia will seek to expand its sphere of economic interests. Need I to go on?

# 1AR – Afghan Instab T/DA

## Afghan instability turns the disad

## Wiener ‘8

## [Robert. Staffer for the New Jersey Jewish News. “Menendez Sees Threat to Israel in Afghanistan” 28 Aug 08. ln//MGW-JV]

One week after returning from an Aug. 6-13 fact-finding tour of Afghanistan, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) said “it is an incredibly unstable time” for the United States, for Israel, and for their allies. Menendez joined four other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a weeklong trip that included visits to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Germany. In a broad-ranging telephone interview from his office on Capitol Hill, the senator told NJ Jewish News that American forces are “in a quagmire in Iraq.” As a result, he said, the Bush administration “took our eyes off the prize. It has allowed the Taliban and al Qaida to reconstitute themselves to pre-Sept. 11 strength” and has “let the Russians know we can do nothing more than bluster at this point.” Those factors, in turn, have increased the threat to Israel, he said. “The problem is that we are bogged down in Iraq and facing the new challenges in Afghanistan. That has led other countries who do not have the same type of alliance with Israel to thwart us in our attempts to move in a direction that relates to Iran,” Menendez argued. “All of these elements have a consequence in terms of Israel’s security challenge as we look at what Iran is doing in the world.”

# \*\*\*NATO Cohesion DA\*\*\*

# 2AC – NATO DA

## No Link – their evidence isn’t indicative of targeted killings or drone attacks, NATO doesn’t conduct either of those, cohesion will still exist.

## And cohesion is non-unique – 3 reasons

## A. Central Europe

## Dempsey, Staff Writer for the New York Times, 2010

## (Judy, East Europe feels ignored by NATO, Report says, NYTimes <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/europe/17iht-nato.html?pagewanted=print>, accessed: 6/23/10, TS) May 16, 2010

<BERLIN — NATO is ignoring the security concerns of its Central and East European members to such an extent that several of those countries are pursuing separate bilateral security arrangements with the United States, says a report issued by a group of experts on the eve of the presentation of a major new proposal on strategy for the alliance. If the alliance continues to play down the security concerns of the region, several of these countries will remain reluctant to conduct NATO missions outside Europe because they do not feel safe at home, says the report, published by the Center for European Reform, an independent research institute in London. “If they feel secure at home,” the report says, “they will have less need to invest in equipment needed for self-defense and have more reasons to buy the hardware needed for far-off missions such as Afghanistan.” >

## B. Weak U.S. leadership

## Andrusyszyn, former director for central and northern Europe at the National Security Council, 2010

## (Walter, America’s debt is creating a security threat to Europe; The US and the west need vigorous economic growth. In order to do that, the US must first reduce the tax and debt burdens of unsustainable entitlement programs such as social security and Medicare, Lexis, accessed: 6/24/10, TS)

<In recent years, Europeans resented America's superpower status, but now they are regretting that their wish for a weaker US is coming true. In whispered tones, many Europeans are wondering whether they should continue to place their security bets on the US. These doubts are playing out in NATO's closed-door negotiations over developing a new strategic concept. The strains in the alliance are deep and historic, but they come in the context of equally historic economic strains over the stability of the euro and the viability of the European Union. America's combat activities in Iraq are winding down, but the conflict in Afghanistan, which draws us even further into the maelstrom of Pakistan, is far from over and the very concept of a victory in the region is muddied at best. For Europe, the key strategic question is not how best to help an overextended US win this war on terror, but how to find security itself. Should it continue to rely on the US? Should it bolster its armed forces to become self-reliant? Or should it seek out a new security partnership - perhaps a grand bargain with Russia or even with Middle Eastern states opposed to both Israel and the US?>

## C. Afghanistan, additionally this is an internal link turn

## Hamilton et al, Director Center for Transatlantic Relations SAIS – JHU, 2009

## (Daniel, Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century The Washington NATO Project, February, accessed: June 25, TS)

<Visions of a more effective, resilient partnership will be moot if allies fail to quell terrorism and turmoil in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. Afghanistan has become a crucible for the Alliance. NATO’s credibility is on the line.  We must be clear regarding the threat, our goal, and our strategy: o Terrorist threats to the U.S. and Europe directly linked to the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands present the most immediate acute danger to transatlantic security today. o Our goal is to prevent any attacks and ensure that this region never again serves as a base for such threats. o Our strategy must have various components:  greater understanding that NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan follows from the Alliance’s invocation of its Article 5 collective defense clause on September 12, 2001;  more effective, integrated international coordination, working from Afghan priorities, coupled with political engagement of local leaders;  a broader region-wide approach geared to stability in Pakistan and beyond.>

# 1AR – NATO DA – N/U Central Europe

## Central and Eastern Europe concerns over the security of Central Asia is destroying Cohesion due to NATO’s ignorance of their pleads.

## More evidence - Russia

## Dempsey, Staff Writer for the New York Times, 2010

(Judy, East Europe feels ignored by NATO, Report says, NYTimes <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/europe/17iht-nato.html?pagewanted=print>, accessed: 6/23/10, TS)

<Over the past nine months, Mrs. Albright has led a team of defense and security experts to examine what NATO has to do in the coming years to deal with new challenges, remain relevant, decide how far it should enlarge and whether to include such countries as Georgia and Ukraine. “Some of the allies worry that NATO would not be able to come to their defense in a crisis,” said Tomas Valasek, one of the authors who is also advising Mrs. Albright’s team. Some NATO member states believe Russia could provoke small, regional conflicts, which are hard to plan against or deter, the report says. NATO was unprepared for Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the report continues. It lacked intelligence sharing and a sophisticated crisis management mechanism. It has also ignored nonmilitary forms of intimidation such as cyberattacks, including one faced by Estonia two years ago. The report says that sense of insecurity among East European countries, and members like Norway and Iceland, will make it more difficult for the Alliance to “reset” its relations with Russia, which is the ambition of the NATO secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. NATO is divided over reassuring its eastern members or resetting its relations with Russia, the experts said. “It is a false dilemma,” the report says. “It should have a dual track strategy that accomplishes both.”> \

## Central and East Europe don’t believe in security commitment of NATO

## Manca and Serafimescu MA in international relations and BA in Political Science ‘10

## (Octavian and Julia, March 2010, proquest, 6/25/10, EL)

It is thus understandable why the revision of the missile defence proposal by the Obama administration generated a significant crisis of confidence in the Eastern flank's capitals, especially in Warsaw and Prague. The political elites in the region, who invested a tremendous amount of political capital in pushing the missile defence proposal high on the national and European agenda, now fear that the Americans are not as committed to the security of this geopolitically sensitive and vulnerable part of Europe as they used to be. To a certain extent, the debate surrounding the Obama policy reversal regarding the missile defence had the virtue of clarifying the core security stakes: what really mattered for East Europeans was hardly the shield per se, but the informal security guarantees provided by the presence of the US facilities in this part of Europe - an uncomfortable and inconvenient truth that has been there for more than a decade or so: "Poles and Czechs favoured the American bases only because they would bring American troops to their territory. But they favour American troops on their territory only because two successive American presidents have refused to invest in NATO's presence in Central Europe".13

# 1AR – NATO DA – N/U U.S. Lead

## Differences with Europe over bilateral issues such as the currency and entanglement in the middle east undermines NATO cohesion due to their backlash against the U.S.

## More evidence – U.S. counterinsurgency knowledge

## Foxely, Researcher for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2009

## *(Richard,* March and April, A NATO military perspective Or: Failure is an Option…, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf,PG>. 28, accessed: 6/26/10, TS)

Within NATO there appears to be different interpretations of the mission and a lack of knowledge of counter-insurgency techniques – and indeed only a limited desire to learn about it and apply it. There has been poor storage and sharing of information and use of data and databases. US policy decisions and military capability dominates everything – and the US has the capability for actions independent of NATO, through its own force, Operation Enduring Freedom. Many of these activities risk cutting across or contradicting NATO actions. Caveats continue to hamper operations – there are at least two ‘tiers’ of forces – those who will fight and those who will not. And., even if this statement is considered unfair, this is the way the issue is being presented in the international media.

# 1AR – NATO DA – N/U Afghanistan

## Instability and U.S. irresponsibility in handling the counterinsurgency is destroying NATO cohesion over the issue – we internal link turn this, we solve instability in Afghanistan, that’s our Jones evidence

## More evidence

## Rubin and Rashid is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation , Fellow at the Pacific Council on International Policy ‘08 (Barnett and Ahmed, Foreign Affairs, November/December 08, 6/25/10,EL)

Afghanistan requires far larger and more effective security forces, international or national, but support for U.S. and NATO deployments is plummeting in troopcontributing countries, in the wider region, and in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world but for a handful in Africa and with the weakest government in the world (except Somalia, which has no government), will never be able to sustain national security forces sufficient to confront current--let alone escalating--threats, yet permanent foreign subsidies for Afghanistan's security forces cannot be guaranteed and will have destabilizing consequences. Moreover, measures aimed at Afghanistan will not address the deteriorating situation in Pakistan or the escalation of international conflicts connected to the Afghan-Pakistani war. More aid to Pakistan--military or civilian--will not diminish the perception among Pakistan's national security elite that the country is surrounded by enemies determined to dismember it, especially as cross-border raids into areas long claimed by Afghanistan intensify that perception. Until that sense of siege is gone, it will be difficult to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan. U.S. diplomacy has been paralyzed by the rhetoric of "the war on terror"--a struggle against "evil," in which other actors are "with us or with the terrorists." Such rhetoric thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous "terrorist" enemy. Only a political and diplomatic initiative that distinguishes political opponents of the United States--including violent ones--from global terrorists such as al Qaeda can reduce the threat faced by the Afghan and Pakistani states and secure the rest of the international community from the international terrorist groups based there.

## NATO is being undersourced – jacking cohesion

## McNamara, Senior policy analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, 2009(Sally, NATO 60th Anniversary Summti: An Agenda for American Leadership, March 25, 2009, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/03-60th-anniversary-summit-an-agenda-for-american-leadership>)

NATO's current Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General John Craddock, has stated that it will be at least three years before the Afghan National Army can fill shortfalls in Afghanistan's security requirements. If the mission is to succeed, these shortfalls must be plugged by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the interim, which can only be accomplished if participating nations take on their fair shares of the burden. At present, the majority of Continental European allies under-resource their commitments to Afghanistan and place national caveats on their deployments to keep them out of harm's way. This has effectively created a two-tiered alliance within NATO. Although many European nations are more inclined toward reconstruction and humanitarian missions for political reasons, alliance members must not be allowed to opt for one or the other exclusively.

# **2AC – NATO DA – A2: Afghanistan**

## U.S. not entirely key to destroy NATO cohesion

## Bardaji and Coma, Leaders of the Strategic Studies Group 10

**(NATO 3.0, Ready for a New World, February,** [**http://www.acus.org/files/NATO3.0.pdf**](http://www.acus.org/files/NATO3.0.pdf)**, 6/29/10, AU)**

<In the first place, it is unquestionable that the Afghan government is besieged by an array of forces – the most dangerous are Mullah Omar’s Taliban and the al‐Qaeda terrorists. NATO troops have engaged them and other random groups in combat with relative success: They can be tactically clobbered, but they are not defeated. It is impossible to contemplate victory with current troop levels. The new American administration has understood this need clearly; therefore, it is ready to repeat the “surge” policy that reaped such good results in Iraq. However, an additional effort on the part of the European allies to provide troops and equipment is necessary. The United States can assume the leadership, but it does not have to be the only country significantly increasing the number of troops and assuming the risks of combat.>

# 2AC – NATO DA – NATO = Useless

## Alliances form against threats and disappear- NATO/ Cold War

## Goldgeier, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations, 2009

## (http://hir.harvard.edU-index.php?page=article&id=1879&p=3, NATO’s Future: Facing Old Divisions and New Threats, James Goldgeier, spring 2009)

When the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, there seemed little reason to expect NATO to remain in business. After all, history suggests that alliances form against threats; when those threats disappear, so do the alliances. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union formed the Grand Alliance to defeat Nazi Germany. That alliance did not long survive the end of World War II. But while NATO was formed primarily to defend against a Soviet attack, that was not its only rationale. NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay famously declared that NATO was necessary not just to keep the Russians out, but to keep the Americans in and the Germans down. It thus always had a stabilizing mission in Western Europe: as long as the United States stayed engaged on the continent and helped ensure that no military rivalries emerged in the West as they had before World War II, countries could be assured of security and stability.

# 2AC – NATO DA – No ! (Out of Area Support)

## Afghanistan has crushed out of area support

## Haddick, Managing Editor of *Small Wars Journal*, 2010

## (Robert, This Week at war: will NATO ever fight again?, May 21, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/21/will_nato_ever_fight_again?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>, accessed: 6/23/10, TS)

<But looming over the panel's effort is NATO's inheritance from Afghanistan. Following a review of lessons learned in Afghanistan, the report calls for guidelines on when and where the alliance will again operate outside its borders. The authors remind readers that "NATO is a regional, not a global organization; its financial resources are limited and subject to other priorities; and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and countries can be counted upon to handle." Although the report left open the hypothetical possibility that NATO could engage in another out-of-area mission, it also plainly discussed the political limitations that member states will put on the organization's ambitions. Those member states with detachments in Afghanistan will no doubt be eager to join the U.S. caravan that will begin departing in 2011. After that, crushing fiscal retrenchment and sour memories of Afghanistan will likely leave most member states in Europe incapable of any significant military expeditions.>

# 2AC – NATO DA – A2: Terror

## NATO doesn’t prevent terrorism

## Vidino, deputy director at the Investigative Project, 2009

## (Lorenzo, Washington quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Vidino.pdf>, accessed: 6/25/10, TS)

<Each country’s assessment of what constitutes extremism and their subsequent determination of what the goals of their counterradicalization programs should be are the necessary starting points from which these countries examine the issue of partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations. Yet, an array of concurrent factors also plays a role in the complex decisionmaking process over the matter. The Security Environment The most important factor influencing policymakers is the security threat facing their country. Governments faced by a relatively high level of radicalization among their Muslim population and a severe threat of a terrorist attack are more likely to focus simply on violent radicalization rather than more general and less immediately visible threats to social cohesion.

# 2AC – NATO DA – A2: Burden Sharing

## Burden sharing fails, few countries send enough troops

## Sperling and Webber, Sperling- professor of political science at the university of Akron, Webber- professor of international politics at Loughborough University 2009

(James and Mark, NATO from Kosovo to Kabul, April 5, <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122368466/PDFSTART>, accessed: 6/25/10, TS)

<NATO was profoundly affected by the war in Kosovo. A report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly claimed that ‘virtually everything that has been said about the Alliance’s roles and mission will sooner or later have to be reconsidered in light of this event’.31 One central issue was that of burden sharing—an area in which NATO, so it has been claimed, proved ‘spectacularly unsuccessful’.32 The broader context of OAF, however, leads to a more nuanced set of considerations. In the round, the spread of contributions was not so disproportionate. While the US contributed some 60 per cent of air sorties, 13 other allies (according to the US Department of Defense) provided ‘about the same share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign’ as well as ‘virtually all the basing facilities, air traffic coordination, and supporting elements to keep [the] air armada of over 1,000 aircraft functioning throughout the conflict’.33 The NATO extraction force in Macedonia was largely European in personnel, and remained so once deployed as KFOR in Kosovo. Troop contributions to Operation Allied Harbour in Albania and Macedonia were also predominantly from European allies. Significantly, the US military and political leadership, rather than criticizing the European contribution, went to great lengths to commend it.34 Much greater concern was voiced over European capability shortfalls. OAF demonstrated for many in the US that NATO was a ‘two-tiered’ alliance and provided proof (if ever the matter was still in doubt) of how utterly reliant the European allies were on American military resources.35 Yet this too was a problem easily exaggerated. No one in NATO was surprised by imbalances on this score and the related concerns, of interoperability and defence autonomy, were expressed as much in Europe as they were in the US. The problems simply affirmed the need for initiatives already under way either within NATO (the Defence Capabilities Initiative) or in parallel to it (the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy).>

# 2AC – NATO DA – A2 : K/T Peacekeeping

## NATO lacks capabilities for peace building

## Davis, is the founding director of NATO Watch, 2009

*(Ian,* march and april, Affirming collective defence and ‘moral, muscular

multilateralism’ as the primary purpose of NATO , <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf>,PG.54, accessed: 6/26/10, TS)

In summary, NATO is not ideally suited to peacekeeping operations. If this is to become a core goal of the Alliance, it would need to adapt its doctrines to clearly separate peacekeeping from war-fighting. It also needs to adjust its approach to planning. Rather than seeking to make NATO operations ‘comprehensive’ by bringing a greater range of actors into its planning process, it needs to orient its planning towards implementation of core military peacekeeping tasks, as defined in a peace agreement or a commonly agreed peacebuilding/recovery strategy. While it must evidently strive to be networked with other civilian actors – and well informed of its operational context –it must relinquish its ambition to direct the entire international reconstruction effort. This is not only politically unrealistic, but is arguably unhelpful in so far as it limits the diversity and innovation in support of complex political stabilization or peacebuilding processes, and reduces the space for local leadership in the peacebuilding effort

# \*\*\*POLITICS\*\*\*

# 2AC – Obama Good

## Fiat takes out the link – most logical interpretation is fiating past attitudinal inherency, means either congress doesn’t backlash against themselves or we don’t get an aff because one senator wouldn’t like the plan.

## Politics is bad – discourages case specific research and undermines small schools ability to have ample updates against big schools

## Link turn -

## A. Public

Malick 10

(Ibrahim, is a Pakistani-American writer, technologist, and social entrepreneur. Mr. Malick graduated from New School for Social Research with a master’s degree in anthropology, “Civilian Murders: Those condoning illegal Drone Bombings are complicit in war crimes,” 6/8/2010, <http://thedawn.com.pk/2010/06/08/cia-drone-murders-are-a-war-crime-those-condoning-it-are-complicit-in-a-war-crime/>, 6/25/2010, HR)

A 29 page report submitted today to the UN Human Rights Council, by special representative Philip Alston demanding an immediate suspension of drone attacks will not persuade Obama’s war cabinet to change course; but an ever growing domestic opposition appears promising. In categorical terms Philip Alston told journalists at the UN media stakeout today that those dropping bombs in Pakistan are so distant from the combat zone that they are “desensitised” – as though they were playing video games. Alston said: “because operators are based thousands of miles away from the battlefield, and undertake operations entirely through computer screens and remote audio-feed, there is a risk of developing a ‘Playstation’ mentality to killing.” Although this statement will be prominently displayed in Pakistani newspapers, this assertion is neither compelling nor novel. Brookings scholar and, author of “Wired for War”, PW Singer has been making similar arguments (watch my interview of Singer) for quite some time. However, there is a growing opposition to drone strikes from anti-war activists with journalists and powerful American think tanks now joining the fray. While the anti-war activists are viewed by the American media as irrelevant, one can hardly say that about elite think tank analysts. The Council on Foreign Relations, America’s most influential center-to-right think tank yesterday challenged the Obama administration to publicly debate the drone strategy. Mind you, CFR does not oppose the war on terror per se, but questions the claimed efficacy of unmanned armed drones to lead the effort. CFR’s Fellow for Conflict Prevention, Micha Zenko, questioned this strategy pointing out that in 8-9 years there have been over 125 drone strikes, but al Qaeda’s military leadership is still operative. Compare this to the Second World War when it took allied forces less than six years to destroy the German army – one of the greatest war machines the world has ever seen. The occupation of Afghanistan notwithstanding, the current centrality of drone operations has prohibited the US military from undertaking more comprehensive military operations – the kind where you walk on the ground and directly engage the enemy. However, American political will is not ready to deploy more young Americans in an unwanted war; so they keep on dragging their feet and using tactics like drones and cruise missiles from a safe distance. American defense experts now argue that a massive army operation that searches for militants from mountain to mountain and cave to cave is the only way to really end the al Qaeda menace. The Obama administration also faces legal challenges. Drones have been used extensively in Pakistan and that country is not a declared war zone. According to the Geneva Conventions, it is against international law and the laws of war to use force in a place that is not a war zone.

## B. Congress

## **Malick 10** (Ibrahim, is a Pakistani-American writer, technologist, and social entrepreneur. Mr. Malick graduated from New School for Social Research with a master’s degree in anthropology, “Civilian Murders: Those condoning illegal Drone Bombings are complicit in war crimes,” 6/8/2010, <http://thedawn.com.pk/2010/06/08/cia-drone-murders-are-a-war-crime-those-condoning-it-are-complicit-in-a-war-crime/>, 6/25/2010, HR)

American think tanks agree that unmanned drones cause greater degrees of civilian casualties than directly human operated weapons of war. A report published by the Brookings Institution claimed that for every militant killed by a drone attack, ten civilians were killed. Precision drone attacks are never really very “precise,” because, first, this requires a level of intelligence about the target and the kill radius that is impossible to achieve, and second, because terrorists use human shields as a countermeasure to drones, and these human shields are almost always innocent civilians forced against their will to act as shields. This offsets the American argument that drones stop American soldiers from getting killed in war. If an American soldier is saved and ten civilians are killed in a country considered a US ally (Pakistan), sooner or later the ethical accounting of casualty statistics will show a shortfall. Until organised opposition began to grow against the drone attacks, it was easy for the US government to silence Pakistani opposition with diplomatic equivocations. But with the inclusion of American journalists and major military strategists in the opposition to drones, it is becoming challenging for Obama to continue with the drone attacks. While there are several strands of argument (some are anti-war, some are pro-war), all have one thing in common; they are all anti-drones. Given this growing opposition, Barack Obama will have to curb, if not stop altogether, his drone programme in the very near future.

## Rational policymaker can choose to pass \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and the plan

## No link – we don’t reduce all presence, there’s still the perception of ample U.S. forces preventing any risk of backlash

# 1AR – Obama Good XT L/T

## We access the middle ground – Rightwing and Leftwing opposition to drone attacks due to inefficiency, ethical, and instability issues in countries they are deployed within coalesces into a consensus against Drone attacks. Conservative and liberal ideas about war are blurred under the ideology of extra-judicial killings.

## The public is a critical internal link – anti-war, pro-war and prominent think tank opposition is necessary for plan popularity, upcoming midterm elections increases the incentive for the GOP and democrats to listen to their constituents.

# 1AR – Obama Good XT Ptix bad

## Politics is illogical – the plan needs to fiat past political opposition in order to get passed, otherwise under their interpretation the plan would never get passed, gutting aff ground.

## Aditionally – its bad for debate – reject it.

## A. Infinitely regressive – condenses the debate toward debating about whether or not 1 senator or committee dislikes the plan, killing all affirmative offense.

## B. Topic Specific education – defaults to political process and learning about random viewpoints from staffwriters instead of in depth education and the function of the resolution and the plan.

## C. Small schools – undermines their ability to compete with bigger schools ability to have access to politics updates, making it unfair and causing exclusion.

# \*START – UQ DB8\*

# 2AC – START N/U – Laundry List

## Won’t Pass – Laundry list

## Xinhua 2/9 "US Senate Republicans could use START to derail Obama's disarmament agenda ...” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-02/10/c_13170319.htm>

Even if Russia and the United States agreed next month on an arms treaty, it might be at least another six months away from ratification -- a process in the U.S. legislature that could jeopardize the Obama administration's aggressive disarmament agenda, a veteran U.S. arms control negotiator told Xinhua on Tuesday. As Democrats do not have a decisive majority in the U.S. Senate, Republicans have the opportunity to hold the successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) hostage to future obligations or conditions, said Ambassador Thomas Graham, who chairs the Bipartisan Security Group, a coalition of Republican and Democratic experts with experience in diplomacy, law, intelligence and military affairs. It is possible that those conditions would make further reductions in U.S. nuclear arsenal more difficult, and/or, make Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) out of reach, said Graham. "The (START) ratification process could prove to be very difficult, very complicated and could last a long time," he said. "The Republican senators "could say, 'You don't give us the amendments we want, and we'll block the (START) treaty.'" Graham is a former senior U.S. diplomat, who has been involved in every major arms control agreement of the last 30 years, including the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Treaties, START, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the CTBT. Graham told Xinhua during a phone interview that once Russia and the U.S. come to an agreement, possibly in March, the text will then be sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification, where it will need a two-thirds majority, or 67 votes. There are 57 Democrats in the Senate, plus two independents, who will probably vote in favor of the START agreement. Being eight votes short, Democrats will have to find at least eight Republicans who would be willing to support the START treaty. "The administration will find those eight votes, and probably more than that, but there may be attempts to have understandings, reservations, and related obligations attached the resolution of ratification," said Graham. The whole process could take up to six months, just in time for midterm elections when senators tend to be less flexible, Graham added. The timing could make it that much harder for Obama to ratify the CTBT and give the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) more authority and resources to tighten the NPT regime.

# 1AR – START N/U – Laundry List

## START won’t pass – Xinhua indicates Republican concern over national security conditions in the provision may delay passage past summer or indefinitely

## This accesses their nuclear conditions impact – our impact is short and quick, escalation will happen before START creates reductions necessary to solve stability in the Middle East.

# 2AC – START N/U – Spies

## Spies are damaging credibility of Russia, and could push some US Senators to vote against START Arkhipov and Kim 6-29

## (Ilya and Lucian, “U.S. Claims Recall Cold War ‘Spy Mania,’ Russia Says” 06-29-2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-29/u-s-claims-recall-cold-war-spy-mania-russia-says.html 06-29-2010) TC

The U.S. Justice Department’s claims that it broke up a Russian spy ring are “regrettable” and reminiscent of the Cold War at a time when relations are improving, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said. “Such actions are completely unfounded and serve unseemly goals,” the ministry said today on its website. The allegations are “in the spirit of cold war spy mania,” according to the statement. Ten alleged members of a “long-term, deep-cover” Russian spy ring have been arrested on the U.S. East Coast, the Justice Department said yesterday. The suspects, who are accused of seeking to infiltrate U.S. policy-making circles, face charges including conspiring to act as illegal Russian agents and to commit money laundering. The arrests were announced less than a week after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Washington as a part of a “reset” in relations the U.S. initiated last year. President Barack Obama has made a nuclear arms control treaty, which still requires Senate ratification, the centerpiece of improved ties. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who met with former U.S. President Bill Clinton today at his residence outside Moscow, joked that Clinton had come at the right time because police in America were “out of control, throwing people into jail.” “I truly expect that everything positive that we’ve accumulated recently in the inter-state relationship will not be affected by recent events,” Putin said during an exchange shown on state television. “I very much hope that people that cherish Russia-U.S. relationships understand that.” While the spy scandal won’t necessarily affect the Obama administration’s position on Russia, it could push some senators to vote against the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, said Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs magazine. “If this becomes the reason for the non-ratification of the new START treaty, it will seriously damage the reset,” Lukyanov said. Since arms control is linked to other issues, failure to ratify the accord may also affect missile defense talks and cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program, he said. Russia will probably wait before reacting with a reciprocal move because the situation is unclear and tit-for-tat actions would only confirm the validity of the charges, Lukyanov said. The timing of the Justice Department’s announcement shows that there are “hawks” in the U.S. security services opposed to better relations, said Alexei Malashenko, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center. “There is no way to stop the reset as long as Obama is in power,” Malashenko said. “But a scandal like this is meant to show Americans that Russians are untrustworthy and that confrontation continues.”

# 2AC – START N/U – GOP

## START will have trouble passing Senate because of Republicans

## **Daily Nation 6-20-10**

## (Daily Nation, Arms treaty stuck in US Senate, 6-20-10, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/Arms%20treaty%20stuck%20in%20US%20Senate/-/1068/942806/-/vjg9rv/-/>) DS

The document should be approved by both houses of Russian Parliament and the US Senate, and that makes the world keep an eye on any statements concerning the possible ratification dates. As agreed by the two countries’ Presidents, Moscow and Washington will synchronise the ratification process. Despite all controversies surrounding the treaty, it has won major political support in Russia, making people generally unconcerned about the document’s passage through the country’s Parliament. Still, lawmakers worldwide will monitor the fate of the new START Treaty in Washington. The treaty cuts the total number of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia by about a third. Specifically, it fixes a ceiling for each country of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. Some top Senate Republicans, however, have expressed skepticism about the accord, arguing it ties the US hand in developing a missile defence system. The treaty needs 67 votes in the Senate to be ratified. The situation is quite different in the United States, despite all pledges by Ms Gottemoeller to urge ratification of the agreement. The biggest challenge is to persuade Senators that it imposes no constraints on the development of the American ABM system, she quoted US Defence Secretary Robert Gates as saying.

# 1AR – START N/U – GOP

## Double bind, either the GOP likes START including missile defense, alienating the Russians or the Russians get what they want and the GOP dislikes the new START treaty due to national security concerns.

## No passage till next year – GOP

## Joe **DiMascio 4/15** Politico, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35816.html>

Of all President Barack Obama’s nuclear arms reduction initiatives — including his world without nuclear weapons and a test ban treaty — negotiating and ratifying an updated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia was seen as the easiest step.  But in a congressional session so poisonous that even a jobs bill was in doubt at a time of soaring unemployment, securing the two-thirds vote of the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty is no sure thing. Conservative commentators say Obama’s recent steps on nuclear issues, including START, the Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Security Summit, will weaken national security. But Senate Republicans have been much more cautious in their criticism, pledging some level of support for the treaty.  That said, most Republicans have questions about the administration’s nuclear agenda that they want answered before they’ll vote yes. That means debate over the START treaty is likely to become the battleground for policy differences on matters of missile defense, nuclear modernization and a new generation of bombers.

## GOP complicates passage

## The Wonk Room, 5/25

## <http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2010/02/25/new-tactic-to-kill-start-revealed-obstruct-it/>

Rogin’s piece in fact just tips the hand of those seeking to defeat START. Opponents will seek to make the START process dysfunctional. Rogin revealed as much when he speculated that, “It’s not clear whether leading GOP senators like Minority Whip Jon Kyl, R-AZ, will complicate the timeline further by moving to stall the new treaty or jam it up altogether.” In other words, the same obstruction techniques and complaints that have been used over health care – the endless filibusters, the claims the bill is too long, that things are moving too fast, that more time is needed, or the latest talking point, that the Administration should just start over – will allow be used against a new START treaty.

## More evidence

## **RFE** (Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty) **4/22**

<http://www.rferl.org/content/New_START_Ratification_Process_To_Begin_In_Early_May/2021717.html>

But ratifying the new START treaty may face challenges in both Russia and the United States. Margelov warns that in the Duma, retired generals with an “institutional memory” of the Cold War may argue against arms reductions. In the U.S. Senate, Democrats will need Republican support to achieve the needed two-thirds vote -- support that may be hard to come by in Washington’s deeply partisan climate. A number of senators also see the new START as interfering with U.S. defense capabilities, even though the treaty does not constrain plans for the possible construction of missile-defense shields in Romania and Bulgaria. The U.S. ratification process may also be slow. The Senate already has a busy legislative agenda, and mid-term elections to be held later in the year could put a further drag on the process by decreasing the number of days senators meet to vote on legislation.

# 1AR – START N/U – GOP

## And more Russia evidence

## **News Daily 1/27** <http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/tre60q2du-us-russia-usa-arms/>

On the divisive issue of missile defense, Lyakin-Frolov said the United States must take Russia's interests into account in the negotiations but suggested the pact might not address the issue in detail. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said last month that the United States should give Russia telemetry on anti-missile systems if it wants data on Russian offensive missiles, a potential deal-breaker because the U.S. Senate is unlikely to ratify a pact encompassing missile defense.

## And more GOP evidence

GSN (Global Security Newswire) 4/14 “Senate Might Not Ratify START Pact Until Next Year, Reid Says”

Some GOP senators have said that they would not vote for the accord if they believe it would curtail U.S. plans for a Europe-based missile shield that has been a source of frustration for Moscow. They have also said that their support would be contingent upon Obama's moves to update the nation's nuclear stockpile (Agence France-Presse/[Yahoo!News](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100413/pl_afp/usnuclearsummitrussiapoliticssenate), April 13).

## You can’t turn the direction of uniqueness – Missile defense is still unresolved

## Steven **Groves** (Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and a contributor to ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives) **4/14** <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/The-New-START-Treaty-Did-the-Russians-Have-Their-Fingers-Crossed>

The U.S. Senate is charged with giving (or refusing) its consent to any treaty put before it and thus must resolve any ambiguity as to the terms of the New START. Based on statements from the Obama Administration and the Russian Federation, it is clear not only that the issue of missile defense—a matter crucial to both parties—remains unresolved but that a wide gulf regarding that issue exists between the two nations. It does not advance the interests of the U.S. for the Senate to give its consent to a treaty whose terms were in dispute even before the ink was dry on the President’s signature.

# 2AC – START N/U – Russia

## START language undermines Russian passage

## **Carmichael 6-25**

## (Lachlan, Writer for the Associated Press, “US, Russia mark improved ties but still face pitfalls”, 06-25-2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5geQCjs0d\_7qf9\_wqqE8JU55zLOhA 06-28-2010) TC The Obama administration and Russia have put a modern and friendly gloss to ties that have made genuine progress since the 2008 war in Georgia, but they still face pitfalls, analysts say. The good atmospherics were created last week when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev enjoyed both his trip to Silicon Valley and his lunch with US President Barack Obama at a burger joint outside the US capital in Virginia. His visit to the cradle of US high-tech innovation highlighted an economic dimension to cooperation that has focused on reducing and fighting the spread of nuclear weapons, defeating terrorism and stabilizing Afghanistan. "Certainly the atmosphere has been improved," Stephen Cohen, a Russia expert at New York University, told AFP. "And certainly some cooperation that had been more or less vaporized by (former US president George W.) Bush has been restored and some new cooperation achieved," Cohen said. He was referring to Russia's cooperation within the UN Security Council to impose a fourth set of sanctions on Iran for its refusal to halt sensitive nuclear work. But he warned that Moscow's cooperation with Washington on Iran may run up against limits if the Islamic republic decides to support Islamist movements in Russia, which has 25 million Muslim citizens. "If it suddenly decided Russia was a heathen and not a friend, Iran could become a supplier of all sorts of destabilizing things to Islamic insurgents or even foment unrest in the Caucusus and elsewhere," he said. He also warned that the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) -- signed to great fanfare in Prague on April 8 as the first disarmament treaty of its scale in years -- contained a potential "timebomb" in its prologue. The language gives Russia the right to withdraw from the treaty if the United States pursues missile defense plans in a way the Kremlin feels threatens its security. The language, he said, is an ominous reminder of the deep mistrust Moscow still feels toward Washington about matters it deems within "its sphere of influence," fears that lie dormant but can still flare up dangerously. The Obama administration has been less aggressive than the previous Bush administration in pursuing both missile defense plans in eastern Europe as well as the expansion of NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia, on Russia's borders. But it has stopped short of actually abandoning such policies. US expansion under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cohen said, sparked a dangerous US-Russia proxy war in August 2008 when Russia sent troops in support of breakaway regions of neighboring Georgia, a US ally. "The Kremlin has bent to it (such expansion), but it is done bending. That was the meaning of the Georgian war," he warned. Nixon Center analyst Paul Saunders said both sides "have made real progress and clearly the relationship is in a different place than it was" over Georgia nearly two years ago. "At the same time, a lot of the progress really has to do with changing circumstances rather that changing policies," Saunders told AFP, echoing points Cohen also made. For example, he said, NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia are "off the table," not so much because of US policy, but because many European governments are strongly opposed and the new government in Kiev is not interested. He said powerful Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appears more set lately on improving ties with Washington, but Moscow wants US investment, a civilian nuclear deal and Congressional support for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. "If some of those don't happen, then we might find that Putin and some of the people around him may be a little bit less enthusiastic about the relationship than they have been," he said. He said the decision taken during the Obama-Medvedev summit to resume US poultry exports to Russia would help lead to support for WTO membership. Stephen Sestanovich, an analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, said Medvedev's pre-summit visit to Silicon Valley and meetings with entrepreneurs there represent the "most interesting element" of the trip. "You've got this interesting theme of remaking Russian society and its economy, symbolized by the trip to Silicon Valley," Sestanovich said on the CFR website. "There's almost a cautious Russian re-embrace of a Western model of Russian development," he said, suggesting there may not be a backlash from nationalists at home.

# 2AC – START N/U – Delays

## Won’t Pass – Delays

## Defense News, 6/9/2010

<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4663913&c=AME&s=TOP>

"It has been quite a nuclear spring," Tauscher said, but "we may run out of days for a summer ratification." A factor working against swift ratification, she conceded, is that the administration's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) won't be issued until July. Among other things, the NIE is expected to discuss the United States' ability to verify compliance with Russian weapons cuts required by the treaty.

# 1AR – START N/U – Delays

## And delays due to the National Intelligence Institute estimations prevents any sort of ratification indefinitely or in the new future

## Additionally, several issues prolong START passage

Joe DiMascio 4/15 Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35816.html

The administration’s goal for passing the treaty, which expired in December, was as soon as possible. Now that is being described as a hope.  Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) told reporters Tuesday the treaty “may take until the first of the year.”  For starters, the Senate hasn’t seen the treaty yet. The administration isn’t expected to provide the Senate with the document, along with its detailed annexes, until May, after which it can begin hearings with top officials.  And by then, debate over the next Supreme Court nomination may be dominating the Senate.

Large Agenda creates delays

Politico 4/15 <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35816.html>)

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START dead in 2010

United Liberty 4/14 "START ratification not happening in 2010 ", http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/5554-start-ratification-not-happening-in-2010)

Ratification of the START treaty, which will require the United States and Russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, may not happen this year: Sen. Lamar Alexander (Tenn.), the third-ranking GOP member of the Senate, said that it would take longer than the end of the year to get together the 67 votes necessary to ratify the nuclear arms treaty President Barack Obama signed last week with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. “No, not this year. That's my view,” Alexander said during an appearance on Fox News when asked if the Senate would ratify the treaty this year. “We have a lot of questions,” he said. “We need to get the right answers and then it might get 67 votes.” Alexander's admonition on a timeline appears to be more than partisan bluster, too. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) has suggested the votes aren't there to ratify the treaty for now, and that assurances to modify the U.S. nuclear stockpile may be needed to win Senate support. The top GOP senator said that a busy calendar in the Senate, including a Supreme Court nomination, combined with colleagues' many questions would likely push things until next year. “There are a lot of questions we need to ask. It took 431 days to ratify the treaty in 1991,” he said. “It'll probably take about the same amount of time to do this one.” The retirement of Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens killed any chance of the treaty being ratified this year, as noted in the article. This doesn't help President Barack Obama and Democrats, who are desperately seeking something besides the unpopular health care bill to run on in November.

## (I guess you can stop reading here, but if you want more cards ahead lol)

# 1AR – START N/U – Delays

## Financial reform and supreme court confirmation will delay START till 2011

## Reuters **4/15** <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/13/us/politics/politics-us-nuclear-summit-start-senate.html>

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - It may be early next year before the [U.S. Senate](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/senate/index.html?inline=nyt-org) approves a major arms reduction treaty that President [Barack Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) signed last week with Russia, Senate Majority Leader [Harry Reid](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/harry_reid/index.html?inline=nyt-per) said on Tuesday. Reid, a Democrat, said he could not imagine Republicans rejecting the pact, which would reduce the deployed nuclear warheads of the United States and Russia by about 30 percent and follows up on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Senate consent is required for the new START treaty to go into force. But the chamber faces a large workload between now and congressional elections in November, including tougher regulation of the financial industry and confirmation of a [Supreme Court](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/supreme_court/index.html?inline=nyt-org) nominee. Obama's Democrats have a majority in the Senate but not the required 67 votes, or the two-thirds, needed to pass a treaty, so some Republican votes will be needed. "I am going to do everything I can to advance this as quickly as I can," Reid told reporters when asked about the prospects for the START treaty. "It may take until the first of the year to get it done. But I think it's important that we try to get this done. ... This treaty is important. And ... although I've been surprised in the past, I can't imagine the Republicans saying no to this," he said.

## START dead in 2010

## United Liberty4/14"START ratification not happening in 2010", <http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/5554-start-ratification-not-happening-in-2010>

Ratification of the START treaty, which will require the United States and Russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, may not happen this year: Sen. Lamar Alexander (Tenn.), the third-ranking GOP member of the Senate, said that it would take longer than the end of the year to get together the 67 votes necessary to ratify the nuclear arms treaty President Barack Obama signed last week with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. “No, not this year. That's my view,” Alexander said during an appearance on Fox News when asked if the Senate would ratify the treaty this year. “We have a lot of questions,” he said. “We need to get the right answers and then it might get 67 votes.” Alexander's admonition on a timeline appears to be more than partisan bluster, too. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) has suggested the votes aren't there to ratify the treaty for now, and that assurances to modify the U.S. nuclear stockpile may be needed to win Senate support. The top GOP senator said that a busy calendar in the Senate, including a Supreme Court nomination, combined with colleagues' many questions would likely push things until next year. “There are a lot of questions we need to ask. It took 431 days to ratify the treaty in 1991,” he said. “It'll probably take about the same amount of time to do this one.” The retirement of Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens killed any chance of the treaty being ratified this year, as noted in the article. This doesn't help President Barack Obama and Democrats, who are desperately seeking something besides the unpopular health care bill to run on in November.

## Reid admits agenda too full

## **GSN** (Global Security Newswire) **4/14** "Senate Might Not Ratify START Pact Until Next Year, Reid Says ", <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100414_3873.php>

It could take the U.S. Senate until next year to ratify a new nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said yesterday (see GSN, April 12). "I'm going to do everything I can to advance this as quickly as I can," Reid said of the treaty, which requires two-thirds Senate approval to be ratified, Agence France-Presse reported. "It may take until the first of the [new] year to get it done, but I think it's important we try to get this done," he said.

## No Treaty this year

## **FOXNews 4/13** <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,590824,00.html>)

VAN SUSTEREN: Last week, the president was in Prague and signed a treaty with the Russian president to start the treat. Is it going to be ratified by the U.S. senate this year? ALEXANDER: No, not this year. That's my view. Now, it's mono step, but I think a good step in the right direction, this is a step Nixon, Reagan, first Bush, and second Bush all have taken us. We take us down to 1500 deployed nuclear warheads that ought to be enough to blow everybody to kingdom come if we chose to do it. But it took a year and a half to do it. We have a lot of questions. We need to get the right answers and then it might get 67 votes. VAN SUSTEREN: All right. Why wouldn't you, at least push it. I realize that you're in the Minority party, but why not push it for ratification, what did you need to know? ALEXANDER: We can go to work on it. But, it's not like the health care bill we want to read it. We've got -- and it takes 67 votes to pass it. So, we can insist on that. We don't even get the whole thing until May. And now, we have the Supreme Court nomination to deal with which is going to take most of the next three or four months. We need to know, can we verify? There has been new technology since the start one treaty.

# \*START – Impact DB8\*

# 2AC – A2: START Solves Rltns

## The reset of relations between the US and Russia is failing

## Fly 6-25

## (Jamie, Writer for National Review Online, “President Obama’s Failed ‘Reset’ with Russia”, 06-25-2010 http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MzRiYzI1NWRkZWJiNzA1NzM0OGE4NDIwYTI2NmYwNDM= 06-28-2010) TC

On the occasion of Russian president Medvedev’s visit to the White House yesterday, President Obama tried to argue that his “reset” of relations with Moscow has moved the U.S.-Russian relationship into a new post–Cold War era. President Medvedev’s trip to the United States was rife with talk of technology cooperation and modernization of the Russian economy that overshadowed real questions about the success of the administration’s “reset.” As my organization, the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), pointed out in an FPI Analysis released on Tuesday, “The supposed successes of the ‘reset’ related to arms control, Iran, and Afghanistan have been limited and the United States has paid the heavy price of alienating key allies in Central and Eastern Europe and those fighting for human rights and enhanced freedoms on the streets of Russian cities.” Instead of engaging in an honest debate about its Russia policy, the administration and its allies are intent on depicting critics of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and of the broader “reset” as out of touch Cold warriors. In a piece by Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin, administration officials mocked Sen. DeMint’s recent criticism of the administration’s new arms-control agreement with Russia, which faces an uncertain fate in the U.S. Senate. At the FPI event where those remarks were made, Sen. DeMint rightly pointed out that Russia and the United States have different obligations — Russia being “a threat to many but a protector of none” and the United States being “a protector of many and a threat to none.” DeMint also emphasized that he wants “a good relationship with Russia, but understanding their political environment right now, the only way we can work with them is to demonstrate that we have the resolve, the commitment, and the strength to back up what we say.” This is a concept that the Obama administration has shown itself unable or unwilling to grasp as it has rushed to grant every possible concession to Moscow in an effort to obtain a new arms-control agreement. Despite the visit to a burger joint, talk about Russian economic modernization, and supposed civil-society cooperation, President Obama’s relationship with President Medvedev has been defined by one thing: arms control. If Russia were truly ready for a “reset,” President Obama would be able to express concerns about political repression, the rule of law, and Russia’s policies towards its neighbors without risking the collapse of the relationship. President Obama has shown no willingness to broaden his engagement with Moscow to include such issues. Unlike President Reagan’s engagement with Moscow on arms control, which was coupled with criticism of the Soviet Union’s repression of its citizens, this administration has stood by while the situation in Russia deteriorates. They, not critics like Senator DeMint, are the real Cold Warriors.

# 1AR – A2: Start Solves Rltns

## Start is a platform that prevents stable relations – 2 reasons

## A. Domestic Russia – Obama still has discontent about political repression, the rule of law and Russia’s policies towards its neighbors undermining the benefits of START talks

## B. Foreign Russia – exclusion of Russia’s allies and neighboring nations from START talks alienates them undermining the process

## And missile defense undermines relations

## Patricia H. **Kushlis 2-8**-10, 27 years public diplomacy experience in Europe, Asia and Washington, DC as a US foreign service officer. International affairs writer, analyst and commentator. “START, Missile Defense and Nuclear Power Games” <http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2010/02/start-missile-defense-and-nuclear-power-games.html>

Russian fears What the Russians fear most is that a functioning American missile defense system against long range missiles would render Russia defenseless against the US. This is not an unreasonable fear particularly when viewed through the prism of the Old Cold War and games great powers play. But the US interceptor missiles destined for Romania are not effective against long range missiles – and the Russians also know this. So what’s the problem? Will the Russians really turn this into a START replacement treaty deal breaker? Rough Sledding Ahead? I’m skeptical since the deal’s basically in place – both sides say so – but as New York Times reporter Ellen Barry suggested in her February 6, 2010 article more likely the differences between the two countries on missile defense - among other issues - could mean rough sledding ahead in US-Russian relations over the next few years. What scares Russian analysts is that the Romanian missile defense equation might change “when a second generation of (US) interceptors is put in place in 2018” and that the Russian government would have no say in preventing this from occurring. Well, yes, I suppose the equation might change eight years down the road - providing the US makes a sudden breakthrough in missile defense technology. But thus far I've certainly not seen reports to indicate that a "star wars" type Armegeddon is much closer to reality than it was several years ago.

## Aditionally START can’t solve – external Russian foreign policy

## Fyodor Lukyanov 1-25-10 'Resetting' a catchy term to cover lack of strategy RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest January 25, 2010 Lexis

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs, believes that Russia and the United States are no longer opponents as 25 years ago, since the systemic basis for their confrontation is gone now. But the paradox of new relations is that each sees the other as "a declining" power. America does not believe Russia has a future - given its shrinking population, degraded infrastructure, and commodity-dependent economy squeezed between economic growth centers. Russia's ambitions as a full- fledged global "pole" are not being taken seriously, not when compared with giants showing real growth like China. Russia, in turn, is obsessed with spotting signs suggesting the end of the era of U.S. dominance. The concept of a multi-polar world, which long seemed little more than an abstract slogan used by America's ill-wishers in Paris, Beijing or Moscow, is slowly materializing, Lukyanov writes. Both perspectives are justified, but they reflect each side's expectations rather than current facts, which results in hazy mutual policies. Obama's government tried to play on Russia's ego, supposing that, if they made an effort to compensate for the earlier lack of heed, they could achieve progress on vital issues such as Iran, Afghanistan and nuclear nonproliferation. This policy could have worked a couple of years ago, Lukyanov says. Moscow was then seriously aggrieved by being ignored, and prestige was one of its political priorities. However, Washington did not care much about Moscow's opinion back in the mid-2000s. And now it is too late for encouraging statements: Russia is now less concerned over recognition by the United States than over the danger of harming relations with other major players. Russia is trying to maneuver, which annoys America. However, Washington cannot afford to cut all interaction with Moscow now, as Beijing refuses to enter into any binding relations, while Europe does not make much difference being at such a far distance from the Euro-Atlantic region. The new START treaty will soon be finalized, and transit cooperation in Afghanistan will continue in one format or another. But there will be no clarity between Russia and America, as neither of the two countries is willing to revise its own and each other's role in the 21st-century world. So far, Moscow and Washington are either clinging to their views of the past, or biding their time to see what happens. The new concept of "resetting" is only good for disguising their lack of strategy, the analyst concludes.

# 1AR – More Start /=/ Rltns Cards

## START does not solve relations – it is a imitation of cooperation that does not address the fundamental political difference between Russia and the US.

## LILIA SHEVTSOVA 1-5-10 The Kremlin Kowtow Why have Western leaders and intellectuals gone soft on Russia's autocracy?http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/05/the\_kremlin\_kowtow

The U.S. "reset button" policy demonstrates this paradox nicely. The United States, of course, needs to have a dialogue with Russia on security issues, including arms control. But turning a nuclear arms pact into the main item on the agenda only reveals how reluctant both sides are to discuss the real issues at stake -- the fundamental political differences between the two societies. Instead, Moscow and Washington revive ghosts of the past and use a Cold-War era mechanism to try to imitate cooperation. In the end, the U.S.-Russian security dialogue will do little to help President Barack Obama accomplish his goals of reining in an aggressive Iran, ending the war in Afghanistan, and advancing a nonproliferation regime. Instead, it will work in the Kremlin's favor, bolstering Russia's great-power status and making it easier to prop up the current authoritarian system.

## US conventional capabilities plus Russian wariness over American intentions mean that START will not solve relations.

## Volha **Charnysh 1-6** 2010 The game of nuclear rearmament/disarmament a-la Kremlin

[**http://blog.psaonline.org/2010/01/06/the-game-of-nuclear-rearmamentdisarmament-a-la-kremlin/**](http://blog.psaonline.org/2010/01/06/the-game-of-nuclear-rearmamentdisarmament-a-la-kremlin/)

With viewpoints so different, it is not surprising that US and Russian experts are still haggling over a new strategic arms reductions treaty – already four weeks past the initial goal of Dec. 5. As if to make the negotiators’ task even more difficult, 40 Republican Senators and Joe Lieberman are urging the Obama administration to follow Moscow’s suit. They stress the need for a large-scale nuclear-warhead modernization program at a time when Washington is already spending approximately $30 billion per year to maintain and upgrade its arsenal for the next 20-30 years. Russia’s expensive and unnecessary modernization plan neither threatens the United States nor necessitates intensification of the US modernization program, however. The Kremlin’s most recent saber rattling is scarcely more than an attempt to play hardball on the START negotiations issues. In fact, if Russian modernization of strategic nuclear forces continues in the direction it seems to be going, its nuclear deterrent may actually weaken. Speaking to reporters Dec. 29, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said the US missile defense system is the main obstacle in the arms reduction negotiations. “If we are not developing an anti-missile shield, then there is a danger that our partners, by creating such ‘an umbrella,’ will feel completely secure and thus can allow themselves to do what they want, disrupting the balance, and aggressiveness will rise immediately,” he said. Putin said the US missile defense plans would upset the Cold War balance of power, forcing Russia to develop new offensive weapons. Moscow’s determination to upgrade its nuclear forces is hardly new or surprising. Russia embarked on a modernization program years ago, investing enormous resources despite falling oil and gas prices. Russia’s procurement budget for 2009 was set at about $45 billion, with nearly $12 billion slated for upgrading the strategic nuclear forces. The newest systems under development are the Topol-M long-range missile and the Borey-class submarine with Bulava SLBMs. On Dec. 23 Russia began use of a new radar station. On Christmas Eve, it successfully tested a nuclear-capable missile RS-20V Voevoda (Satan). On its Dec. 17 50th anniversary, Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Command called for a new MIRVed missile by 2016. Between 2025 and 2030, Russia also plans to deploy a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber. What is new, however, is Moscow’s attempt to explain the need for modernization with the US missile defense plans. **In reality, the rapid modernization efforts – as well as its move toward adopting a first-use nuclear doctrine and a proposal of a new European Security treaty – stem from Moscow’s concerns over the widening gap between Russian and US conventional capabilities.** Russian strategic forces are growing increasingly obsolete. Today modern equipment accounts for only 10 percent of the existing arsenal. An astute politician would think twice before broadcasting aggressive modernization plans at a time of a renewed push for a nuclear weapons-free world. An old hand at politics, Putin was playing for both domestic and foreign audiences when he shared the issue with the press instead of settling it in the bilateral negotiations with the United States. To the Russian voters, he demonstrated his skill at preserving Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower in the economic crisis and his deep concern for national security. To Washington (where some say the United States “should not pay for what is free” because Russia has to reduce its aging strategic forces with or without an arms control treaty), Putin signaled that the Russian nuclear arsenal is still strong. Parading its nuclear arsenal is a sign of the deep distrust with which Moscow watches Washington’s every move nine months after the “reset” despite attempts by the Obama administration to ease tensions over missile defense plans in Eastern Europe. Calling on others to do away with the Cold War legacy, the Kremlin itself suffers from the Cold War symptoms. Its leaders continue to brace up for scenarios that involve the United States destroying Russian missiles, as if trying to wage the war that the USSR had lost two decades ago. Few doubt Russia’s ability to develop nuclear forces impressive by Cold-War standards, but even fewer doubt that these standards are dangerous and irrelevant in the new security environment

# 2AC – A2: START solves Iran Prolif

## START is irrelevant to Iran cooperation.

## Brose, former State dept. admin and speech writer, 7/6/09

## (Christian, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/1796>)

I’m all for “de-linkage” in U.S.-Russia relations -- working together where our interests converge, agreeing to disagree where our interests conflict, and preventing those disagreements from impeding constructive cooperation. In short, what Bush and Putin spelled out last April in Sochi. That said, let’s be honest about what that means for our interests: It means that Obama has just invested a lot of time and effort to secure an agreement to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles to a level that could still annihilate the world several times over. This may be an achievable goal, but it is hardly a pressing one -- not when Iran is speeding toward a weapon of its own, and the United States and Russia cannot seem to find much agreement on how to proceed on that. Indeed, the question of Iran is illustrative, because Russia has solid national interests in never, ever wanting to see Iran open to the world -- the critical carrot that the West holds out in every diplomatic gambit it has conceived on the Iranian nuclear question. The reason? Gas. Nick Gvosdev explains: One potential concern for Russia is that if it joins in putting real pressure on Tehran, Iran could eventually negotiate a Libya-style settlement with the West, clearing the way for major new Western investments in Iran’s energy sector. Right now, Moscow benefits from Iran’s isolation from the West. Not only are Iran’s formidable gas reserves not accessible to European users, preserving Russia as the Continent’s major supplier, but alternate routes for Central Asian energy that could traverse Iran are also not possible. Yet resolution of the nuclear issue could open up the vast reserves of Iranian natural gas for use through the Nabucco line, the major pipeline on the drawing boards for getting energy to Europe without going through Russia. The project is currently nearly moribund because there isn’t enough supply to justify the huge investments. Iran would be a game-changer. So color me skeptical that Russian interests will ever lead it to be an effective partner in pressuring Iran on its nuclear weapons ambitions. And what's more, anyone who thinks the U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions that Obama just won will help to halt the Iranian nuclear program needs to refrain from operating heavy machinery. Something tells me that Iran’s rulers will be none too persuaded to give up their nuclear aspirations simply because the United States and Russia have now agreed to retain a couple thousand fewer nukes apiece between them

# 1AR – A2: Start solves Iran prolif

## Brose indicates START won’t be the carrot to solve Iranian proliferation – Russia has a stake in an isolated Iran through oil and natural gas reserves. Be highly skeptical START will overcome Russian interests by incentivizing pressuring Iran on nuclear weapon issues.

## Aditionally Iran won’t become persuaded to give up on proliferation – the reductions won’t spillover and Iran will still be weak without the weapons.

## Russia doesn’t have and wouldn’t use the leverage to solve

## Antonenko is a Senior Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies, 7/17/09 p. http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1247856828

The second area of potential challenges involves Iran policy. U.S. officials have already expressed their hope that cooperation on strategic arms control – which they view as primarily benefiting Moscow – should lead to Russia’s more substantial cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue. Just days after Obama left Moscow, the Russian Foreign Ministry explicitly rejected such a linkage. However, the fact remains that it is very likely that as early as later this year the U.S. will come to Russia asking for its cooperation on a new UN resolution calling for tougher sanctions on Tehran. Moreover, it is conceivable that if nothing is done to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions, it will be under Obama’s administration that the impossible choice between accepting a nuclear Iran and using force to stop it will force its way onto the U.S. agenda. America still sees Russia as the key player in helping it to avoid facing this choice. There are significant reasons to believe that Washington overestimates the degree of Moscow’s leverage over Tehran. In the past few years, maintaining the image of Russia as an “indispensable” partner for dealing with Iranian nuclear issue has been Moscow’s clear achievement. However, it remains uncertain whether Moscow really fears a nuclear-armed Iran as much as a more pro-Western - and thus more open to exporting its gas to Europe – Iran. Obama’s visit to Moscow has produced a good first step to initiate a joint assessment of the missile threat, including that coming from Iran. It remains unclear, however, what joint policy recommendations could emerge from this study that could significantly alter a pattern of interaction on Iran that, so far, has proved unsatisfactory to both Russia and the United States.

## And Russia assumes relations with the U.S. are external to Iranian policy

## Sestanovich et al, top Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2006

## (Steven, [www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia\_TaskForce.pdf](http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf))

All themany reasons that can be brought to bear for why the United States should care about the state of Russian democracy do not mean that it is the only thing that the United States cares about, nor that it will always be the most important thing. Terrorism and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, for example, are currently of great concern to U.S. policymakers. Although President Putin is presiding over the rollback of Russian democracy, the United States should obviously work with him to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to keep terrorists from attacking either his country or ours. President Putin has not suggested that he will do so only as long as the United States pretends that he is a champion of Russian democracy. Russia cooperates with the United States on Iran to advance its own interests, and will continue to do so unless it comes to see its interests differently

# 2AC – A2: START Solves prolif

## START follow-on too modest to have an effect on the NPT – there are much bigger issues.

## **Xinhua** 2-10-10 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-02/10/c\_13170319.htm

"I hope I don't sound overly negative but I don't think this phase of START will have much effect on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," he said. "It's a modest reduction and it really doesn't get at the real NPT issues, which is partly the test ban and really low levels of nuclear weapons down into the hundreds." What would be groundbreaking is if the U.S. ratified the CTBT, which rests on the agreement that non-nuclear states will not pursue atomic weapons as long as nuclear states halt testing their own. "It is the principle quid for the quo," said Graham. "I think we're running out of time in terms of having a strong NPT and there's nothing more important than that for us."

# 1AR – A2: Start Solves Prolif

## Xinhua indicates new reductions from START are only modest – they can’t solve low levels of nuclear weapons that would comply with NPT and CTBT issues. The talks prevent solvency for those treaties, it distracts them from it.

## START isn’t key to NPT – other countries won’t follow

The International Herald Tribune 2-8, 2010Russia and U.S. lead calls to reduce nuclear arsenals Lexis

## Start II was ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996 and by the Russian legislature in April 2000. But the Americans and Russians said at Munich that a new strategic arms reduction treaty would be only the first step. ''Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility for the disarmament process,'' said Sergei Ivanov, Russia's first deputy prime minister. ''At the same time, it would be an obvious simplification to boil it all down only to Russian-American relations. Nuclear disarmament is a common objective for all parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty.'' A conference in May called to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, is important for Mr. Obama as he tries to promote a new global consensus on nuclear nonproliferation. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, was claimed at the time as one of the most effective tools in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The five permanent members of the U.N Security Council - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France - have signed the NPT, but other nuclear states, including Israel and India, have not. And with Iran and North Korea pursuing their own nuclear ambitions, Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, gave a grim warning. ''The NPT risks unraveling unless we do something about the challenges,'' Mr. Kerry said at the Munich conference. Mr. Obama wants to go further by having the United States ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, ban the production of fissile material worldwide and give the International Atomic Energy Agency more authority and resources to tighten the NPT regime. Even if the United States and Russia do take the lead in reducing nuclear weapons, however, other nuclear-armed countries may not follow suit. Mayankote K. Narayanan, former national security adviser of India, gave no hint in Munich that India would either sign up to the NPT or reduce its nuclear arsenal. U.S. and Russian officials are not convinced that Pakistan would reduce its nuclear weapons, given its fierce rivalry with India. And it is not clear whether Britain, China and France would react to American and Russian reductions with reductions of their own.

## START doesn’t solve the NPT

Barry Blechman 2-19-10 “Stop at Start” fellow at the Stimson Center, a national security policy institute, is the co-editor of “Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html>

IN his speech Wednesday at the National Defense University here, Vice President Joe Biden opened a new offensive in the administration’s war on nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. One near-term objective is completion and ratification of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia. But the ultimate goal, he said, remained the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In the absence of a roadmap from a Start accord to global zero, one can only assume that Mr. Biden meant the continued pursuit of similar, incremental arms control agreements. But piecemeal control efforts will never work; we have to think more boldly if we are to achieve global nuclear disarmament. The idea of achieving nuclear zero through arms control agreements is nothing new. It has been pursued for nearly 50 years, and it’s a tough slog, practically and politically. Indeed, such agreements take so long to negotiate and require so much political capital that presidents rarely achieve more than one. I should know: as a midlevel State Department official in 1979, I spent six months trying to persuade Midwestern voters to support that era’s arms-control proposal, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT II. Wherever I went, I encountered opponents. Some were against specific provisions; many simply opposed any limit on American power, or wanted to deal a blow to the Carter administration. Most people recognized that SALT II was just another baby step toward halting the arms race and did little to ease nuclear dangers. The United States and the Soviet Union together possessed more than 50,000 nuclear weapons; the treaty would have barely dented their arsenals. If nuclear war began, we all would have been just as dead, regardless of SALT II. But the problem isn’t just American politics. Piecemeal agreements between two nuclear powers to reduce, but not eliminate, their atomic inventories are insufficient; as the United States and Russia leisurely reduce their stocks, other states are building up arsenals, and still others are gaining the technical skills to advance their own programs. Since 1993, when the United States and Russia signed the last formal arms control treaty, Start II (which was never fully ratified), India, North Korea and Pakistan have joined the nuclear club, and Iran may follow soon. Accelerating nuclear proliferation and terrorist attacks have led diplomats worldwide to embrace disarmament as a long-term goal. At the same time, they say it is unrealistic to pursue zero weapons in the near term.

# 2AC – Verification

## START verification fails particularly in a world of low numbers – on site verification is necessary.

## Eli **Kintisch 2-18**-10 Nuclear Disarmament Science: How to Be Dumb Enough to Be Smart

## <http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2010/02/nuclear-disarmament-science-how-.html>

The secret of cutting the U.S. and Russian arsenals—roughly 7200 and 6000 weapons, respectively—is doing it in a way that both sides can trust that the other is actually reducing its nukes but without revealing too much information. An American Physical Society panel comprised of physicists and policy experts and led by former weapons inspector Jay Davis found no scientific showstoppers to doing so. Scientists have techniques in hand, for example, to work with explosive materials, confirm that weapons are destroyed, and scan a weapon without dismantling it to measure its destructive power. And one of the report’s key recommendations—more science in these areas—is already coming to fruition, as President Barack Obama has requested a 10% increase in the National Nuclear Security Administration’s research budget for this work, up to roughly $350 million. What’s lacking are the more stringent agreements that would allow scientists on the Russian and U.S. sides to use the tools they have. The key irony in the arsenal-cutting endgame is that as arsenals get smaller, the job gets tougher, not easier. That’s because the numbers matter more. In a smaller arsenal, knowing the exact number of the other side’s nukes can be the difference between nuclear parity and superiority. Right now, each side uses so-called counting rules to extrapolate from their adversary’s delivery systems—missiles or bombers—to the number of actual nukes (e.g., that missile means this number of warheads). As the numbers drop from the thousands into the hundreds, the United States, Russia, and other members of the nuclear club will want to actually confirm for the first time how many warheads each system carries. That will require delicately worded treaties that balance top-notch physics with strategic ambiguity. “We have to be smart enough to detect the weapon but dumb enough so that the verification test doesn’t divulge valuable secrets,” says Davis. Scientists and policymakers “have to find a way to do it and not learn information the other side wants to protect.”

# \*\*\*Midterms\*\*\*

# 2ac – Midterms

## Don’t evaluate the threshold for the link – Midterms are too far away, new political challenges, losses, or wins for either the GOP or the democrats within the 4 months could change the direction of the link.

## No link – their evidence is in the context of full or nearly all combat withdrawal from a country – we only remove Drones and Target killing operations

## Not intrinsic – Rational policymakers can chose to do the plan and pass the \_\_\_\_(democratic or GOP) agenda.

# \*Dems Bad\*

# 2AC – Midterms – Dems Bad

## Dems will win –

## A. No GOP momentum

## CQPolitics.com 6/27

## (Bob Benenson, 6/27/10, " Embrace Of Far Right Risky Strategy That Could Pay Off ", <http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docid=news-000003691856&topic=Feature>) AK

A Republican takeover in the House also looms as a relatively tall order at the moment — if for no other reason than it would require a net gain of 39 seats, the biggest jump for either party since the GOP’s 52-seat surge of 1994. That means the Republicans would also have to outperform the 30-seat Democratic takeover gain of four years ago. A race-by-race assessment of all 435 contests across the country suggests that this is not an impossible quest for the GOP — but its chances will be much better if a good number of those upstart conservative activist nominees can translate their appeal during the primaries into a winning general-election formula.

## B. Dems will control both houses

## Hutchinson 6/23/10

## MARTIN HUTCHINSON. [The Midterm Elections: No Panacea for the U.S. Economy](http://moneymorning.com/2010/06/23/midterm-elections/). JUNE 23, 2010. <http://moneymorning.com/2010/06/23/midterm-elections/>. 6/29/10. SR

The results of the primaries have already given us a lot of information about U.S. voter intentions. Voters have already rejected two sitting senators - Arlen Specter, D-PA, and Robert Bennett, R-UT - which suggests a general dislike for incumbents. On the other hand, moderate-Democrat Sen. [Blanche Lincoln](http://lincoln.senate.gov/), D-AR, won her primary handily, defeating an opponent who'd enthusiastically backed the policies of the current Democrat-controlled Congress, the Obama administration, and the unions. That suggests that the moderate-Democrat policies represented by the 1990s Clinton administration still have appeal with U.S. voters. As an overall entity, however, government is viewed with disdain - or even outright contempt. For instance, taken together, the stunning [January victory of little-known Scott Brown](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html), R-MA, and the [current 63% approval in opinion polls for repealing the new national healthcare plan](http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/healthcare/may_2010/63_favor_repeal_of_national_health_care_plan), suggest that the rapid expansion of government attempted by President Obama and the current Congress is very unpopular. There's other evidence, too. Take the proposed "[cap-and-trade](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cap-and-trade)" [environmental legislation](http://moneymorning.com/2009/07/08/waxman-markey-energy/): As drafted, it would give government huge new powers over the economy. The upshot: It's out of favor. Handicapping the Midterms All this doesn't mean that the Republicans will sweep the country. For one thing, memories of the inept [Bush administration](http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush) and the corrupt GOP Congress of 2004-2006 remain fairly fresh. Furthermore, while the "tea party" movement has aroused considerable enthusiasm, voters appear to be developing doubts about its radicalism and sometimes "nutty" views. Thus, the likelihood is for considerable Republican gains - but not outright dominance. In the U.S. Senate, it's almost impossible when only 17 Democratic Senate seats are up for re-election for the Republicans to go from 41 to 51, thereby giving the GOP the 10 additional seats it needs to get a majority (ties would be broken by Vice President Joe Biden - in favor of the Democrats). Even if the popular mood favored Republicans strongly, enough of their candidates would have weaknesses that they would lose some apparently winnable races. For example, [Sharron Angle](http://www.sharronangle.com/about/), who won the Nevada primary to run against the apparently vulnerable Senate Majority Leader [Harry Reid](http://reid.senate.gov/), D-NV, is a "tea-party" candidate whose views and past statements make her vulnerable to attack from the well-funded Reid. Over in the House of Representatives, removing incumbents in large numbers is similarly quite difficult. The greatest turnover in a midterm election since World War II was 54 seats - which occurred in 1946 and again in 1994. Thus, excited Republican calculations of a possible swing of 80 to 100 seats are just not realistic. For the Republicans to get the 270 seats that such a turnover would imply might be possible if they already had 210 to 220 seats. It is not realistic from the GOP's starting position of 179 seats (the Democrats have 255 seats, and two are vacant). A Republican pickup of 39 seats - which would give it a bare majority - is certainly possible, although I place the odds at less than fifty-fifty. It seems equally unlikely that the GOP will gain less than 25 seats or so. Thus, the 112 th Congress is most likely to be close to evenly divided, but partisan - with fewer "[blue dog](http://www.house.gov/melancon/BlueDogs/)" moderate Democrats than there are right now, and very few floor-crossing Republicans. Either President Obama will control both chambers of Congress, albeit with small majorities, or Congress will be split, with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate, again with small majorities.

## C. GOP Division

## Kingsbury 2010

## Alex, 6/21 “Money Race Could Decide the Midterm Elections”

## http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/21/money-race-could-decide-the-midterm-elections---.html

Part of the problem has been conservative supporters dividing both their time and money between traditional Republican candidates and those backed by the more conservative Tea Party groups. While creative tensions between the Republican Party and its more activist right-wing doppelganger may rally voters to the polls, they also threaten to divide a finite pool of donors between Tea Party-backed upstarts and GOP stalwarts—not to mention scaring off independent and moderate voters, poll watchers say. In the U.S. Senate race in Florida, for instance, Tea Party-backed Marco Rubio pulled both likely GOP votes and funding from sitting Republican Gov. Charlie Crist, who later decided to run as an independent. Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, former Rep. Pat Toomey, another Republican favorite of the Tea Party, has already secured a war chest of several million dollars for his U.S. Senate race, ensuring a competitive campaign in the fall against Democratic primary winner Joe Sestak for the seat currently held by Republican turned Democrat Arlen Specter. But whatever the impact of the duplication of effort, conservative voter enthusiasm and the well-documented history of midterm election losses for the ruling party both suggest GOP gains. [See where Sestak's campaign cash is coming from.] The Democrats, for their part, are looking to hold the line at the polls and have one big advantage, incumbency. Incumbents are becoming harder and harder to oust from office, election statistics show, a fact of which big campaign donors, often looking to back a winner, are all too aware. Over the past four decades, the average re-election rate for a sitting congressional representative has been north of 94 percent. Sitting senators also enjoy a large advantage over challengers, though by less substantial average margins than in the House, according to statistics compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics.

## D. Fundraising

## Kingsbury 2010

## Alex, 6/21 “Money Race Could Decide the Midterm Elections”

## <http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/21/money-race-could-decide-the-midterm-elections---.html>

All told, from donors large and small, for expenses ranging from television ads to paper clips, the 2010 elections will cost an estimated $3.7 billion, according to experts. At this point, Democrats hold a slight overall edge in fundraising over Republicans for contests in the House and Senate. That margin is small but significant in a year when the public's opinion of Congress, and the two political parties in general, is at a historic low. Then again, in first-quarter fundraising, Republicans held an advantage over Democrats in a handful of pivotal Senate races, including Pennsylvania, Florida, Ohio, and Illinois—important bellwethers for what could be a "throw the bums out" election year. The election is still several months away, of course, and the vote could yet end either in landslide or photo finish. Still, the so-called money race has often been a strong indicator of which candidate will eventually triumph at the ballot box. Individual donations will be key, but so too will funding from political action committees and other outside sources. One potentially key though as-yet-unknown variable will be the recent Supreme Court decision giving corporations the right to spend money to support or oppose candidates. [See which industries donate the most.]

## E. Polls

## Connelly 6-8

Joel. Author of the Seattle Post Intelligence. Poll: Voters down on GOP, Tea Party. 6-8-2010. [http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/archives/210079.asp. 6-28-2010](http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/archives/210079.asp.%206-28-2010). SK

Only about 30 percent of Americans say they are inclined to re-elect their member of Congress and 60 percent are ready to "look around" for alternatives, according to a new ABC News/Washington Post poll. But the finding of voter dissatisfaction does not automatically translate to glad tidings of great joy for the Republicans. As well, the survey showed an increasingly negative view of the Tea Party movement. Asked which party they trust to cope with the country's main problems, voters opted for the Democrats by a 44-32 margin, with nearly 20 percent saying they trust neither party. Sixty percent of those surveyed voiced dissatisfaction with policies offered by Republicans in Congress, while only 38 percent had favorable opinions. If the election were held today, the poll found, 47 percent would vote for Democratic candidates and 44 percent for Republicans. (A Gallup Poll last week put Republicans in the lead.) The poll also showed growing negative feeling toward the Tea Party movement, although its candidates are expected to do well in today's Republican primaries in South Carolina and Nevada. "Do you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the political movement known as the Tea Party?" the survey asked. Thirty-six percent gave thumbs-up to the Tea Party, while 50 percent had a "Somewhat" or "Strongly" unfavorable view. Fourteen percent had no opinion. Support for the right-wing populist movement was down from 41 percent in March.

## And we’ll link turn plan makes Dems lose –

## A. National Security

## Rucker 2009

## Philip Rucker, “GOP Criticizes Obama on National Security Issues,” PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 12-30-09, [www.post-gazette.com/pg/09364/1024494-84.stm?cmpid=nationworld.xml](http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09364/1024494-84.stm?cmpid=nationworld.xml), accessed 3-4-10.

Republicans are jumping on President Barack Obama's response to the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner as the latest evidence that Democrats do not aggressively fight terrorism to protect the country, returning to a campaign theme the GOP has employed successfully over the past decade. Since before Mr. Obama was sworn into office, Republicans have been building a case that he is weak on national security, and in the wake of the intelligence and security failures that led to last week's incident, they think that narrative might stick. Congressional Republicans and GOP pollsters said they believe the administration's wavering response to the failed attack on a Detroit-bound plane -- along with Mr. Obama's decisions on Guantanamo Bay and the intelligence lapses connected to November's massacre at Fort Hood, Tex. -- damages the Democratic brand.

## B. Detracts from economic focus

## Balz 2009

## Dan Balz, “Entering the Election Year, Democrats Sharpen Focus on Jobs,” WASHINGTON POST, December 8, 2009, p. A6.

But will the Democrats' attention to the economy prove to be little more than an exercise in checking a box or the beginning of a sustained and determined focus on a problem that many Americans fear has gotten too little attention from their elected leaders? Will the economy have to compete in the coming year with issues like climate change and immigration reform, which Obama has promised to push once the health-care debate ends, or will the administration delay shifting to those problems until it has dealt more successfully with the economy? Democratic strategists are keenly aware of the potential problem for their party. "There is a sense that we pick up that people are not only worried about the substantive issue, but they're not sure that Washington is focused on that issue and they'd like to see Washington focused much more on that issue," said Mark Mellman, a Democratic pollster. Although the unemployment rate ticked down from 10.2 percent to 10 percent in the latest report, released Friday, about one-sixth of the workforce is either out of work or underemployed. Not since the early 1980s has the jobless rate hit levels this high, and Republicans suffered major losses in the 1982 midterm election. Democrats could suffer the same fate next year. "Democrats are now scrambling to catch up, not only with public concern but also the facts on the ground, which are pretty dismal," said William Galston of the Brookings Institution, where Obama will speak Tuesday. "This job market has deteriorated far more than anyone thought possible even a year ago."

## That’s key to a win

## Balz 2009

## Dan, “Entering the Election Year, Democrats Sharpen Focus on Jobs,” WASHINGTON POST, December 8, 2009, p. A6.

Obama and the Democrats face two challenges. The first is to find the substantive policies, and the money to pay for them, that will prime the job-market pump and stimulate more widespread hiring in the private sector. The second will be to demonstrate a commitment to economic issues at a time when other problems will be competing for the president's attention. "The one thing the White House has to its advantage is the bully pulpit and the ability to dominate the news agenda," said Carl Forti, a Republican strategist. "The problem the Obama White House has had is there are too many issues they're trying to center on."

# 1AR – N/U – No GOP Momentum

## CQPolitics indicates the perception that the GOP is sitting around and not doing anything as the party of NO overshadows any risk they will win. Democratic turnout will increase due to their proactive stance on political change and taking some sort of action on policy issues.

## This also controls the direction of voter turnout – even if some oppose the democrats, people perceive the democrats are the only way to get something done.

# 1AR – N/U – Cntrl Both Houses

## Hutchenson indicates even if the GOP might get some wins, it wouldn’t be significant enough to take out the democratic agenda.

## Aditionally - we control public perception, people still think the democrats are better, the previous GOP caucus of corruption and neoconservatism is still fresh in people’s minds, people are now shifting to moderate democrats as a concession to their ideology.

## **Democrats win both houses.**

## Washington Post, 6-13

## [2010 [“What do we know about November?,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/11/AR2010061104617.html>, last accessed 6/29/2010, LS]

Similar ideological coups in other primaries have diminished Republicans' midterm chances; instead of energizing the GOP, the Tea Party movement now marginalizes it. Democrats will lose seats in November but fewer than the conventional (un)wisdom assumes -- and they will keep control of both houses.

## **Dems will win— closing enthusiasm gap.**

## Silver 3-28

[Nate. an American [statistician](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistician), [psephologist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psephology), and [writer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Writer). [Can Democrats "Win" The Midterms?](http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/03/can-democrats-win-midterms.html). 3-28-10. [http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/03/can-democrats-win-midterms.html. 6-29-10](http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/03/can-democrats-win-midterms.html.%206-29-10).] SK

For some time, I've been part of the doom-and-gloom brigade when it comes to Democrats' fortunes at the midterm elections this November. As early as last August, on a panel at the Netroots Nation conference, I said that I expected a loss of 20 to 50 Democratic seats, which necessarily implied that a loss of their majority was quite possible. I've since revised the low end of that estimate [downward](http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/02/republicans-must-defend-senate-seats.html), to a loss of 20 to 60 seats. I'm not sure that there's yet been enough time to assess whether the Democrats' passage of health care reform seven days ago could mitigate -- or broaden -- their losses. Most polls suggest that the health care reform bill itself has become somewhat more popular since passage. But President Obama's approval ratings are little moved, and there has thus far been little new polling on the generic ballot or perceptions of the Democratic congress. Moreover, any changes in the polling may prove to be temporary. Still, there is one set of numbers that potentially contain relatively good news for the Democrats. These concern the [enthusiasm gap](http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/08/enthusiasm-gap-revisited.html), which may be lessening. Daily Kos / Research polling has [found](http://dailykos.com/weeklypoll/2010/3/25) that while Republican voters remain exceptionally engaged by the midterm election cycle, Democrats are becoming increasingly engaged as well. Rasmussen, meanwhile, has [found](http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama%3Cadministration/obama%3Capproval_index_history) that about 5-7 percent of voters nationwide have gone from being somewhat approving of to Obama to strongly approving of him -- and almost all of the movement is accounted for by Democrats. (Obama's disapproval -- including his strongly disapprove numbers -- are little changed in the poll). At the very least, there does not appear to be any fresh animus toward the Democrats for their actually having passed health care, whereas there probably is some fresh enthusiasm from their base. As such, I would probably revise my estimate of the Democrats' losses just slightly, from a loss of 20-60 seats to a loss of 15-55. (Think of these numbers as representing perhaps the 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively; there remains some chance that the Democrats could lose more than 55 seats, or fewer than 15.)

# 1AR – N/U – GOP Division

## Moderate and conservative GOP members create a divide over the unity of the party, shifts public perception toward the united democratic party and moderate democratic party members because they think they are more stable to create a new policy agenda.

## Aditionally prefer our evidence – it cites statistical analysis and how incumbency prevents any risk of being kicked out through new elections.

# 1AR – N/U – Fundraising

## Kingsbury indicates the democrats have the financial edge over the GOP, even a small gap in monetary funds could make or break an election – this is necessary to generate ads, speeches, commercials for democratic support. The public is dumb, they’ll probably default to whoever they see on TV and whoever is able to reach out toward them.

## Aditionally we control the direction of the uniqueness debate – Kingsbury cites studies that indicate monetary factors are the biggest internal link to a political win.

# 1AR – L/T – National Security

## Rucker indicates slow policy on terrorism after the Christmas bombing generates GOP showcasing of national security failiure, when we withdraw drones people will perceive it as a national security threat, allowing the GOP to spin it against the democrats as poor policy.

## Aditionally more

## Being soft on terrorism costs the Dems the midterm.

## Muravchik, 5-5

## [2010, Joshua, fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, “Obama’s leftist heart,” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/muravchik>]

As for Obama’s caution about closing Guantanamo, that too was in response to political pressure since the public (and their representatives in Congress) strenuously opposed bringing those prisoners to American soil, and no other country wanted them. Likewise for his administration’s reckless decision to try Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a civil court, which would have given al-Qaeda an intelligence windfall had Obama not been forced to reconsider by a backlash from Democratic politicians. Compounding these examples is his approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Obama went out of his way to strike a stance antagonistic to Israel. Probably this was a calculated part of his courtship of the Muslim world. He pushed this hostility as far as he could until other Democratic leaders warned this would compound the party’s problems in the midterm elections. Now the administration is embarked on charm offensive toward Israel. “No wedge will be driven between us,” said the wedge-maker-in-chief.

## Obama is perceived as strong on terror now—GOP will spin withdraw**.**

## **Ditz, 10-2-09**

## [James, Political Commentator at Anti-War.Com, “GOP Hopes to ‘Out-Hawk’ Obama in Midterm Elections,” <http://news.antiwar.com/2009/10/02/gop-hopes-to-out-hawk-obama-in-midterm-elections/>]

Faced with the hope of cutting into President Obama’s massive majorities in both houses of Congress in 2010 and the prospect of selling a rival candidate in the 2012 elections, the Republican Party is already looking to differentiate itself from Obama on foreign policy. This would seem to be easier said than done as the broad strokes of the president’s foreign policy have been the same as President Bush’s, he has abandoned his promise to withdraw from Iraq, escalated dramatically in Afghanistan, and made little concrete progress on his pledge to close Gitmo. But GOP strategists are hoping that they can portray President Obama as not sufficiently hawkish, failing to continue damaging relations with Russia and not instantly approving Gen. McChrystal’s call to add another 45,000 troops to Afghanistan. Congressmen have been attacking the president’s policy hard in recent days, even though it seems very difficult to pin down any ways in which he hasn’t been quite hawkish. Sen. McCain has condemned his slowness to approve a second escalation as a “sign of weakness,” while Mitt Romney and Governor Pawlenty, two would be 2012 contenders, are both condemning Obama as “dangerously” non-hawkish.

# \*Dems Good \*

# 2AC – Midterms – Dems Good

## Non unique –

## A. Afghanistan and Health Care

## Romano 2010

## Andrew June 25, 2010Poll: Afghanistan War Hurting Obama's Support at Homehttp://www.newsweek-interactive.com/2010/06/25/obama-s-approval-ratings-slump-in-latest-newsweek-poll.html?from=rss

In fact, solid majorities of Americans now disapprove of the way the president is handling almost every major challenge confronting his administration—a complete reversal from April 2009. Last year, only 41 percent frowned on Obama's economic leadership; now that number has risen to 58 percent. Then, a mere 27 percent felt negatively about the president's command in Iraq; today, 51 percent disapprove. A whopping 60 percent don't like the way Obama is grappling with the oil spill in the gulf, and the majority of Americans are also critical of his efforts to reform the financial sector—the split there is 53 percent against, 36 percent for. Even health care - the administration's major accomplishment and a purported selling point for the fall midterm elections—isn't a plus. Overall, 43 percent approve of Obama's handling of health care, while 51 percent don't. Newsweek Unless the picture improves, Obama's Democrats will have a hard time retaining their congressional majorities in November. Obama may have run as the change candidate in 2008, but the public's attitude toward the federal government is as negative today as it was during George W. Bush's second term. Only one in five Americans claims to be "basically content" with Washington, while three of every four describe themselves as either frustrated (52 percent) or angry (24 percent). Anger in particular has reached its highest level since NEWSWEEK first asked the question in 1997, and is especially pronounced among groups that tend to swing low-turnout midterm elections toward the GOP: self-identified Republicans (35 percent) and voters between the ages of 50 and 64 (32 percent). Congressional Democrats, whom voters have long preferred to congressional Republicans, are now just as despised as their GOP counterparts: 53 percent of voters disapprove of the former, and 54 percent disapprove of the latter. More than 60 percent of independents, the key swing-vote constituency, disapprove of both.

## B. Economy

## Sidoti 6/26/10

## LIZ SIDOTI. Analysis: Lack of jobs could undercut Obama win 6/26/10. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gc3hVsmf2nnrYIxmLaOhO2Ss6olAD9GJ40FG0>

WASHINGTON — The sweeping overhaul of the nation's financial industry is President Barack Obama's answer to the nation's outrage over Wall Street bailouts. But come November if more Americans don't have jobs, Democrats in Congress could very well lose theirs, too. That's clearly not lost on party leaders. "This law will send a clear warning: no longer will we allow recklessness on Wall Street to cause joblessness on Main Street," House Speaker Nancy Pelosi declared after the House and Senate reached agreement around dawn Friday on a measure overhauling rules overseeing the financial industry. "The legislation will end the era of taxpayer-funded bailouts and too-big-to-fail financial firms, and it will be fully paid for, with Wall Street footing the bill." Her carefully worded pitch was by design a nod to populist anger coursing through the electorate. The still-fragile economy and persistently high unemployment are by far the foremost issues on voters' minds in a tough election year for the party in power. Democrats are on defense while Republicans have enthusiasm on their side four months before the first midterm elections of Obama's presidency. Democrats are counting on bills like the health care overhaul and the financial regulation to help level the playing field. A remake of U.S. energy policy could be next.

## C. **Polls**

## Wall Street Journal, 6-24

[Karl Rove, he former senior adviser and deputy chief of staff to President George W. Bush, “Obama and the woes of the Democrats,”

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704629804575324732508609048.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj]

Democrats are acknowledging they'll lose ground in the midterms. The only question is how much. Today, the evidence points to quite a lot. The most important indicator is the president's job approval. In the Real Clear Politics average of the last two weeks' polls, President Obama has a 48% approval and 47% disapproval rating. This points to deep Democratic losses. The president's approval rating last November was 54% when his party was trounced in New Jersey and Virginia. On the economy, a mid-June AP poll reported that Mr. Obama has 45% approval, 50% disapproval. That's a dangerous place for any president when jobs are issue No. 1. The problem is worse in swing areas. Last week's National Public Radio (NPR) poll of the 60 Democratic House seats most at risk this year showed just 37% of voters in these districts agreed Mr. Obama's "economic policies helped avert an even worse crisis and are laying a foundation for our eventual economic recovery"; 57% believed they "have run up a record federal deficit while failing to end the recession or slow the record pace of job losses." Mr. Obama also suffers because his handling of the catastrophic Gulf oil leak has undermined perceptions of his competence. Both national and Louisiana polls rate Mr. Obama's handling worse than the Bush administration's Katrina response, widely viewed as a tipping point in that presidency. Mr. Obama's failures mean he can't lift his party by campaigning. A Public Policy Poll earlier this month reported that 48% said an Obama endorsement would make them less likely to vote for the candidate receiving it, while only one-third said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate endorsed by the president. Republicans jumped into the lead last November in Gallup's party generic ballot match-ups among all voters, and since March the GOP has led or been tied every single week except one. In the Rasmussen Poll's tracking among likely voters, Republicans have been ahead by an average of seven points, 44% to 37%, since March. This reflects a significant political development—independents breaking for the GOP. Then there is the intensity gap, which is particularly important in midterms. In Gallup, 45% of Republicans are "very enthusiastic" about voting this fall versus 24% of Democrats. This staggering 22-point gap is the largest so far this election year. And in the NPR survey of 60 swing Democratic districts, 62% of Republicans rated their likelihood of voting as 10, the highest. Only 37% of Democrats were similarly excited. All these trends are influencing individual races. State-by-state surveys show that if the election were today, 49 Democrats and 43 Republicans are poised to win in the Senate. Eight races are too close to call, but Republicans lead in five. House races are historically much more difficult to predict. But the NPR survey found in the 30 Democrat seats considered most at risk, the GOP leads 48% to 39%. This nine-point margin points to Republican winning virtually all 30 seats. In the next tier of most vulnerable Democratic districts, Republicans lead 47% to 45%, meaning the GOP could take many of those 30 seats. By comparison, in the 10 Republican districts thought at risk, Republicans lead 53% to 37%. Republicans should hold virtually all of those. It will take a net of 10 Senate and 40 House seats for the GOP to win control of the legislative branches. These are big numbers—but they are within reach.

## D. Oil spills

## Pappas 06/29

## [2010 [Alex, staff writer, “Focus groups show Obama losing independents over oil spill”, <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/29/focus-groups-show-obama-losing-independents-over-oil-spill/>] JR

Resurgent Republic, a not-for-profit organization made up of high-profile Republicans, released the five-state focus group results Tuesday showing that the BP oil spill has independents concerned about how Obama will perform during a future crisis, such as a terrorist attack. The focus groups were held in June and comprised of independent voters in battle congressional districts in Iowa, Ohio, New Jersey, Arkansas and Florida. Most of those in the focus groups, Gillespie said, voted for Obama in 2008. During the focus groups, independent voters used the words “frustration,” “upsetting,” “confusion,” “incompetence” and “anger” to describe both Obama and BP. They drew comparisons of Obama’s handling of the oil spill to the way the federal government responded to Hurricane Katrina during the Bush administration. “It should be troubling for Democrats should this critique take hold among more swing voters,” the report states.

## E. Health Care

## Andres 6-22

## [2010, Gary, staff writer,” [Health Care Legislation = Bad Political Medicine?](http://www.resurgentrepublic.com/Resurgent%20Republic%20Blog/2010/06/22/health-care-legislation-bad-political-medicine)”, <http://www.resurgentrepublic.com/Resurgent%20Republic%20Blog/2010/06/22/health-care-legislation-bad-political-medicine>, last access 6/29/2010, LS]

After controlling for a host of political and demographic variables, the authors found voting against health care created a substantial political benefit for GOP candidates. In both January and May, opinion about reform had a statistically significant and electorally important impact on voter sentiment against the Democratic candidate for Senate. Voters who opposed health reform were around 20 percentage points more likely to vote for the Republican candidate.  They also find a growing impact on House races over the past four months: In January, voters who opposed health reform were 24 points more likely to vote Republican; by May, they were 44 points more likely.

# \*\*\*2AC – Kritiks\*\*\*

# 2AC – Kritiks – FRAMEWORK

## The affirmative gets to weigh the advantages of the 1AC versus the negative’s competitive policy option or status quo option.

## This is best –

## A. Fairness – alternative frameworks are unlimiting and biased toward the negative because they can kritik 1000’s of different frameworks.

## B. Education – debate must have a common starting point, policy debate focus does that, which is necessary for educational in depth debate. They can still run kritiks but framed into policy options.

# 2AC – Kritiks – Floating PIKS Bad

## Floating PIKs are a voter

## Steals the aff – does the entirety of the affirmative making it impossible to weigh the best offense against a kritik.

## Disproves the link – if the alternative can include the plan, then the plan should be able to overcome the link with the permutation

# \*FEM IR\*

# 2AC – Fem IR

## Permutation do the plan and problematize the affirmatives gendered discourse of security – solves the link, we are able to do the plan and examine the problems within the discourse of our impact scenarios to deconstruct patriarchal discourses. And it’s not severance, we are not severing out of the 1AC discourse, if the neg wins the discourse is bad the problematization of the affirmative’s discourse should solve through embracing and comparing different conceptualizations of securitized thought.

## Utopian fiats a voter

## A. Fairness – no stable literature or ground against perfection, skews the debate to the negative

## B. Education – no policymaker learns about impractical utopian situations like a kritik alternative.

## Justifies permutation do the plan and make the world perfect

## No Solvency – alternative just problematizes the discourse of the plan, doesn’t include the plan, we should get to weigh our advantages.

## Case outweighs – Targeted killings increase resentment and fuel the counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. That leads to central Asian conflict, Middle Eastern instability, and Indo-Pak pre-emptive warfare. All lead to nuclear war and extinction due to resulting power struggles. We control terminal impact uniqueness.

## No actor to the alternative is a voter – judge counter interpretation doesn’t solve, destroys stable literature base and disads due to magically done alternatives without any disads to the mechanism or plan actor. We can’t find disads to the judge doing the alternative.

## Realisms inevitable – its embedded biologically

## **Thayer 2k** (Bradley A., PhD. At the Department of Social Science at Baylor University, “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”, International Security, Volume 25, Issue 2, Autumn

Contemporary evolutionary theorists offer excellent arguments for explaining some of the human behavior expected by realism. Particularly interesting are those in the subdiscipline of evolutionary theory known as sociobiology, the study of human behavior from the perspective of evolutionary theory.31 Thus far, however, realists have not used evolutionary theory to place realism on a stronger foundation.32 After briefly reviewing the evolutionary process, I dis- cuss how it can explain the origins of egoism and domination and why it is a better ultimate cause of realist behavior than those put forth by Niebuhr and Morgenthau.33 THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION In evolutionary theory, Homo sapiens, or the anatomically modern human, is an animal, and like all animals behaves as he does as a result of evolution by natu- ral selection.34 The essence of evolution by natural selection is that most behav- ioral characteristics of a species evolve because they help the species survive and reproduce.35 According to philosopher of biology Elliott Sober, there are 31. Formally, sociobiology is a subdiscipline of evolutionary theory that applies the theory to the social behavior of animals, including Homo sapiens, in order to study how social behavior is shaped by natural selection. The locus classicus is Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology: A New Synthesis (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). Wilson defines it as "the systematic study of the bi- ological basis of all social behavior." Ibid., p. 4. Sober offers a broader definition: "a research program that seeks to use evolutionary theory to account for significant social, psychological, and behavioral characteristics in various species." Sober, Philosophy of Biology, p. 184. 32. In a broader context, the intellectual intercourse between social sciences and biology should be increased. Notable for their work at the nexus of biology and social science, in addition to the au- thors noted elsewhere, are Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Francesco Cavalli-Sforza, The Great Hu- man Diasporas: The History of Diversity and Evolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1995); Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science," World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (April 1971), pp. 321-370; Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); and Thomas C. Wiegele, ed., Biology and the Social Sciences: An Emerging Revolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982). 33. While evolutionary theory can explain this behavior, the egoism or drive to dominate of any individual may result from other causes as well. 34. More precisely, human behavior is the result of the environment and genotype. The perspec- tive begins with Charles Darwin's description of natural selection, the mechanism of evolution in Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1964[1859]). 35. "Those whose genes promote characteristics that are advantageous in the struggle to survive three constituents of this process.36 First, there must be genetic variation in the species. If all individuals are the same, then there is no basis for change. Gene frequencies, however, alter regularly through genetic drift, migration, muta- tion, and natural selection.37 Thus for sexually reproducing species, only iden- tical twins (or other monozygotic multiple births) are truly identical; all others possess differences. Second, genetic variation must improve what biologists term "fitness": A member of a species is fit if it is better able to survive and re- produce-hence the term "survival of the fittest."38 These individuals will be better represented in the next generation than those less fit. Finally, there must be heritable variation in fitness: The characteristic must be passed from parent to offspring.39 According to evolutionary theory, human behavioral traits (the genetic causes of human behavior) evolve and genes that increase fitness spread though the population. By displaying these traits, an individual stands a better chance of surviving long enough to reproduce and of having her genes repre- sented in the next generation. This is the essence of the basic model of evolu- tionary theory upon which realism may build.40

## And our representations are accurate – its indicative of experts in the field that study the international processes of the middle east, prefer it over their generic theorists speaking of global power conflict.

## The alternative can’t solve – it will be co-opted by the state, only working within the system is necessary.

## Richard **Rorty**, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford, Achieving our country, **1998**, p. 98-99

The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that “the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism,” but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice.The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marx’s philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi- conscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy—and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneyland—as a country of simulacra—and to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list— endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toilets—might revitalize leftist politics.

## We’ll internal link turn the impact – the securitized logic of the neo-conservative Bush admistration and militaristic pre-emptive tendencies of the Obama admistration is what justified targeted killings in the first place. Our impacts are your impacts, the more we try to securitize ourselves by targeting non-state leaders we create more resentment and endless cycles of war.

## The exclusive focus on feminist international relations excludes other modes of though – recreating patriarchal masculine logic

## **Caprioli 2004** (Mary, PhD Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota, Duluth. “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 253-269) BN.

Contrary to the argument that conventional IR theory excludes feminist inquiry, space exists within the field of international relations for feminist inquiry even allowing for a state-centric focus, just as room exists for scholars interested in exploring the democratic peace and ethnonationalism. International relations feminists make the same mistake that they accuse IR scholars of making: narrowing the space for various worldviews, thereby creating competition and a sense of exclusion among the so-called others. If the role of "feminist theory is to explain women's subordination, or the unjustified asymmetry between women's and men's social and economic positions, and to seek prescriptions for ending it" (Tickner 2001:11), then feminist IR scholarship ought to allow for an explanation of how women's subordination or inequality has an impact on state behavior, assuming a statecentric focus, while at the same time challenging the predetermination of a structural analysis.

## **Alternative doesn’t solve – fracturing the masculine international relations sphere results in hegemonic competition, that results in more conflict.**

## Marysia **Zalewski**, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, **and** Jane **Parpart**, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, **98** [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear. Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)

**Reject their impact claims- vague, non-falsifiable claims of violence should be given no weight- unless they can outline a specific scenario you can't do a proper impact comparison. There have been thousands of acts of securitization in the past- they didn't all culminate in genocide.**

# 1AR – Cede the Political

## Rorty takes out the alternative and is a net benefit to the permutation – philosophical methodology gets co-opted by the state. Emperically proven, leftist ideology and the philosophical methodology to embrace a true universal health care system without concrete change lead to a crappy republican option. The alternative will suffer the same fate. Only combining problematization of anti-feminist discourses with the plan solves through concrete political change

## Aditionally – the kritiks total rejection alternative dooms any risk of coalescing political activism against the problems with the state

## **Krishna ’93** [Sankaran, Dept. of Polit. Sci., Alternatives, 1993]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic”, essential unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear oppression, the Nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, that according to him, was operating along obsolete lines emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4)Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freedom movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics

# 1AR – Realism Inevitable

## Even if realism is bad – its biologically embedded within us. Evolutionary theory explains that the survival of the fittest mentality, to sustain one species survival mirrors that and spills over to that of the International sphere. Prefer our evidence – scientists and professors in IR like Thayer have concrete peer reviewed studies that explain this.

## Aditionally – it’s not another link – even if you kritik realism and have an alternative to attempt to overcome realism, it ignores the science and truth claims of how realism is inevitable. It’s not a question of discourse but rather a question of truth.

## Realism and securitized thought is inevitable – as long as states exist in an anarchic vacuum explains their tendencies for power.

## **Slater 09**

(Hannah Louise, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, November 25 2009, http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/politics/1949577-tragedy-great-power-politics/) SLS

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ by John Mearsheimer, outlines his theory of “Offensive Realism”. It describes what motivates the international system and offers historical explanations as well as future predictions. The book begins with the central tenet of Offensive Realist theory: the international system is anarchic and this causes states to fear each other and compete for power. A state’s ultimate aim is become a hegemon because this is most secure. Thus states are constantly trapped in security competition, seeking to increase their share of world power. Mearsheimer argues that power is based on military capabilities a state possesses and the strongest power is the state with the strongest army as only land power can win a major war alone. Latent power –based upon population and wealth, which create large armies- is significant but not as important as actual power. Hesitance about using nuclear weapons means land power remains the key measure of power, while this hesitance means nuclear arsenals increase stability between great powers. Offensive Realism says configurations of power emerge across regions, affecting fear levels between states. Fear levels determine the intensity of security competition and likelihood of war. ‘Bipolarity’ causes least fear and is most stable, ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ causes most fear, thus is the least stable configuration; and ‘multipolarity’ sits in between. Mearsheimer posits that large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces, reducing fear and also explaining why there is no global hegemon. Offensive Realism says war is inevitable and the author argues that China and the US are “destined to be adversaries” as growing Chinese economic might translates into military might. Mearsheimer adds Offensive Realism to a long tradition of Realist theory, bringing some of his own ideas and combining others. He agrees with Waltz’s Defensive/Structural Realism that international anarchy causes states to engage in security competition. However he diverges from Waltz there saying, like Morgenthau’s Human Nature/Classic Realism, states will maximise their power constantly, striving ultimately for hegemony. He adds ideas such as “the stopping power of water” and he has striven to ensure his is a workable theory for explaining the past and predicting the future, making his book a significant contribution to the canon of International Relations theory. ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ challenges the Liberal paradigm to a certain extent, but Mearsheimer does this by using abundant examples to prove his points, rather than through dissecting Liberal theory. Instead he focuses more on critiquing Defensive Realism and does this throughout the book. With regard to Liberalism, Mearsheimer says that cooperation between states does exist, but only to promote a state’s selfish interests, not for the sake of world peace. Security competition remains essential in today’s world which, despite international institutions, remains anarchic. Indeed, such institutions are simply another arena for furthering national interests, he argues. So while Mearsheimer’s book does refute Liberal ideas, it is not a detailed critique instead concentrating on making the case for Offensive Realism. A fascinating and in-depth addition to Realist thought, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is a good attempt to reveal what really causes war and conflict in the international system.

# 1AR – Fem IR – Feminism ---> Exclusion

## Focus on feminist international relations dismisses other international relation theory. The impact to the kritik is dominance over the other that mirrors patriarchal logic. Alternative focus on feminism embraces a dominance over other forms of through whether it be masculine realism or rationality or neo-liberalism. The resulting power conflict from the new dominant re-creates the same impact of endless war.

## Feminist international relations recreate the oppressive structures they seek to dismantle by assigning and categorizing by gender.

## **Stern and Zalewski 09** (MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

In this section we clarify what we mean by the problem of sexgender and how it transpires in the context of feminist narratives within IR – which we will exemplify below with a recounting of a familiar feminist reading of militarisation. To re-iterate, the primary reason for investigating this is that we suspect part of the reason for the aura of disillusionment around feminism – especially as a critical theoretical resource – is connected to the sense that feminist stories repeat the very grammars that initially incited them as narratives in resistance. To explain; one might argue that there has been a normative feminist failure to adequately construct secure foundations for legitimate and authoritative knowledge claims upon which to garner effective and permanent gender change, particularly in regard to women. But for poststructural scholars this failure is not surprising as the emancipatory visions of feminism inevitably emerged as illusory given the attachments to foundationalist and positivistic understandings of subjects, power and agency. If, as poststructuralism has shown us, we cannot – through language – decide the meaning of woman, or of femininity, or of feminism, or produce foundational information about it or her;42 that subjects are ‘effects’ rather than ‘origins of institutional practices and discourses’;43 that power ‘produces subjects in effects’;44 or that authentic and authoritative agency are illusory – then the sure foundations for the knowledge that feminist scholars are conventionally required to produce – even hope to produce – are unattainable. Moreover, post-colonial feminisms have vividly shown how representations of ‘woman’ or ‘women’ which masquerade as ‘universal’ are, instead, universalising and inevitably produced through hierarchical and intersecting power relations.45 In sum; the poststructural suggestion is that feminist representations of women do not correspond to some underlying truth of what woman is or can be; rather feminism produces the subject of woman which it then subsequently comes to represent.46 The implications of this familiar conundrum are far-reaching as the demands of feminism in the context of the knowledge/political project of the gender industry are exposed as implicated in the re-production of the very power from which escape is sought. In short, feminism emerges as complicit in violent reproductions of subjects and knowledges/ practices. How does this recognisable puzzle (recognisable within feminist theory) play out in relation to the issues we are investigating in this article? As noted above, the broad example we choose to focus on to explain our claims is militarisation; partly chosen as both authors have participated in pedagogic, policy and published work in this generic area, and partly because this is an area in which the demand for operationalisable gender knowledge is ever-increasing. Our suggestion is that the increasing requirement47 for knowledge for the gender industry about gender and militarisation re-animates the sexgender paradox which persistently haunts attempts to translate what we know into useful knowledge for redressing (and preventing) conflict, or simply into hopeful scenarios for our students.

## Feminism will never be able to resolve the question of gender identity in militarization because it cannot resolve the contradiction between sex and gender.

## **Stern and Zalewski 09** MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

In familiar feminist fables of gender and militarization, gender conventionally materializes as if it were real (in a foundational sense) yet our critical feminist theorizing tells us it is a construction. We ‘know’ that when we speak woman, we re-constitute her, we construct and delimit her through our stories about her; a paradox indeed. If an apparent move is made toward gender (usually there is an assumption that this is different from, more advanced than, or more inclusive than feminist theorizations of woman) then gender metamorphoses into masculinity or femininity, or on the relations between the two in order to show how they act on, impact, influence or provide roles for the sexed body. ‘Opening’ the feminist agenda to include ‘men’ and ‘masculinity’ does not alter this dynamic. Masculinity tends also to become a (gender) ‘thing’ which we have learned, understood, imported, conveyed, tried to change; more inflections of paradox. ‘Gender’ becomes reduced to either ‘women’, ‘men’, or ‘femininity’, ‘masculinity’; and crucially we lose sight of the productive power involved – productive of the paradox mentioned above, as well as other related paradoxes such as perpetrator victim, 54 security-insecurity,55 and even war-peace.56 We suggest that being attendant to how the ‘move’ from sex to gender and the ‘move’ from a focus on ‘women’ and ‘men’ to looking at constructions of masculinity and femininity and the hierarchical relations between the two may not be as large a step away from feminism parsimoniously defined as is usually imagined. Indeed it is perhaps not a step ‘forward’ at all, as we shall illustrate. This side-step invokes the specter of anxiety as it raises questions about the possibility of responsible feminist political interventions, given the paradox with which we grapple. Importantly however, we suggest the sexgender paradox or aporia can never be successfully resolved; ‘an aporia is not a contradiction which can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalisable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure.’57 As such we see the production of sexgender as irresolvable – as a perpetual conundrum. We return to this point in our conclusion. To reiterate: through the following critical reading of a familiar feminist fable of militarisation58 we illustrate the logic which produces the paradox of feminism that demands (but ultimately belies) resolution. We explore how feminist narratives are not able to fulfil their supposed transformative promise since attempts to transgress the discursive frameworks in which they are framed are haunted; thus ensuring the failure of feminist stories. Failure, in this sense, is judged in feminism’s (in)ability to resolve its inherent contradiction.

# 1AR – Fem IR – I/L/T

## Extend the internal link turn –

## The kritiks impact is endless war due to securitized processes and our ability to dominate the other with our ability to wage war against them in the international sphere. For example, we use securitized thought against the terrorist threat by engaging in extra-judicial, pre-emptive warfare against the leaders of non-state actors. The impact to this is resentment and endless war due to martyrdom and the collateral damage associated with these pre-emptive strikes. Our impact is the same as theirs, this supercharges the permutation’s solvency – we are a step away from the actions of dominant patriarchal securitized discourses.

# 2AC – Mind/Body Turn

## A. Feminism’s focus on gender as a social construction ignores the material conditions that separate each individuals lived experience

## Cheah, graduate student in English at Cornell University, 1996

## [Pheng, *Review Essay: Mattering*, Diacritics 26.1, Project Muse]

In the immediate instance, Grosz's and Butler's return to the body can be understood as a reaction to the inadequacies of social constructionism as a paradigm for feminist theory. Simply put, social constructionism espouses the primacy of the social or discourse as constructive form over preexisting matter which is said to be presignificative or nonintelligible. Butler and Grosz are critical of this position for various reasons. For Butler, social constructionism oscillates between two untenable positions. In presupposing and so retroactively installing the category of "nature" in the prelinguistic position of a tabula rasa, social constructionism can consider sex either as natural and thus unconstructed or as the fictional premise of a prediscursive ground produced by the concept of gender [6]. In the first scenario, sex cannot be accounted for and political contestation is confined to the level of gender conceived as the interpretation or meaning [End Page 109] of sex. The second scenario leads either to a linguistic monism that cannot explain how the bodily materiality of sex can be produced by language/discourse or to the anthropomorphizing of "construction" into a nominative subject endowed with the power of self-causation and causing everything else. Grosz points out that feminists concerned with the social construction of subjectivity recode the mind/body opposition as a distinction between biology and psychology and locate political transformation in psychological change where the body either is irrelevant or becomes the vehicle expressing changes in beliefs and values [17]. This effectively ignores the point that the body is a unique social, cultural, and political object. It also bears the mark of differences (sex and race) that are not easily revalued through consciousness-raising precisely because they are material differences which are not eradicable without disfiguring the body [18].

## B. This destroys women’s agency—relegating them to another form of masculine domination

## Cheah, graduate student in English at Cornell University, 1996

## [Pheng, *Review Essay: Mattering*, Diacritics 26.1, Project Muse]

As Grosz observes in her succinct account of Cartesianism, a mechanistic understanding of the body is harmful to feminist theory because it deprives women's bodies of agency by reducing the body to a passive object, seen as a tool or instrument of an intentional will rather than a locus of power and resistance [9]. But while a teleological account of nature invests bodies with activity, this activity is always the predication of intelligible form. This can lead to a biological-deterministic justification for the oppression of women particularly because the form/matter distinction originating from Greek philosophy is always articulated through a gendered matrix where the productive or creative agency of form is associated with a masculine principle while matter, which is passively shaped, is coded as feminine [Grosz 5; Butler, ch. 1]. Thus, Butler suggests that "[w]e may seek a return to matter as prior to discourse to ground our claims about sexual difference only to discover that matter is fully sedimented with discourses on sex and sexuality that prefigure and constrain the uses to which the term can be put" [29]. One might further argue that despite the Cartesian sundering of intelligence from nature in the distinction between res cogitans and res extensa as ontologically different substances, Cartesian and Greek ontology are continuous insofar as the form/matter and mind/matter distinctions are subtended by a common opposition between intelligent activity and brute passivity. In a mechanistic understanding of nature, the form/matter distinction which was interior to bodies in Greek ontology becomes an external relation, either practical-causal or theoretical-contemplative, between rational consciousness and objective exteriority. Thus, by rethinking the body as something invested with a transformative dynamism or agency, Butler and Grosz also question the pertinence of the oppositions between intelligible form and brute matter, culture/history and nature.

# \*Stupid Military/Police K\*

# 2AC – Stupid K

## This is the dumbest argument of all time – WE ABSOLUTLY DON’T LINK. THE PLAN TEXT DOES NOT MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY OR POLICE OR DEFINES TARGETED KILLINGS AS MILITARY OR POLICE PRESENCE. THERES NO DISCOURSE LINK.

## No alternative solvency – there are several different dichotomies, global/local. You and me, friend and enemy, black and white, taco/burrito. The alternative doesn’t attempt to solve these.

## Utopian fiats a voter

## A. Fairness – no stable literature or ground against perfection, skews the debate to the negative

## B. Education – no policymaker learns about impractical utopian situations like a kritik alternative.

## Justifies permutation do the plan and make the world perfect

## Permutation do the plan and lift the veil that cloaks the police and military dichotomy – solves the link, we lift the cloak.

## The kritik can’t turn the case, the policy and military will still be on equal terms because we don’t remove the forces your evidence is in the context of.

Saying that the police are or are not militarized is beside the point and distracts from the basic need to oppose militarism, making their alternative impossible

Kraska 2007 (Peter B. Kraska. Professor and Senior Research Fellow, College of Justice and Strategy, Eastern Kentucky University, USA. “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” December 13, 2007. Policing Journal (2007): pam065v1-pam065. http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pam065v1#B15. MR)

Evaluating police militarization is a credible and important endeavor, and it can be accomplished through empirical evidence and rigorous scholarship. Of course, the integrity of this endeavor hinges on the clarity of our concepts. Militarism, in its most basic sense, is an ideology focused on the best means to solve problems. It is a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. It emphasizes the exercise of military power, hardware, organization, operations, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools. Militarization is the implementation of the ideology, militarism. It is the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict. To militarize means adopting and applying the central elements of the military model to an organization or particular situation. Police militarization, therefore, is simply the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model. As seen in Figure [1](http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pam065v1#F1), four dimensions of the military model provide us with tangible indicators of police militarization:material—martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; cultural—martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and values; organizational—martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers [e.g. (COMPSTAT)], or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas (as opposed to the traditional officer on the beat); Operational—patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or war-making/restoration (e.g. weed and seed. It should be obvious that the police since their inception have been to some extent ‘militarized.’ After all, the foundation of military and police power is the same—the state sanctioned capacity to use physical force to accomplish their respective objectives (external and internal security) (discussed further in Kraska, 1994). Therefore, the real concern when discerning police militarization is one of degree—or put differently, the extent to which a civilian police body is militarized. Police militarization, in all countries and across any time in history, must be conceived of as the degree or extent of militarization. Any assertion that the police are or are not militarized is simply misguided. This is a nuance easily overlooked by police analysts who react defensively to using these organizing concepts (Kraska, 1999). They reason that because a police paramilitary squad such as a US SWAT team retains key attributes of civilian police—for example not being allowed to indiscriminately kill—the concepts of ‘militarization’ or ‘militarism’ do not apply. This encourages a one-dimensional conceptual lens which sees police as either being militarized or not. The point here is that any analysis of militarization among civilian police has to focus on where the civilian police fall on the continuum—culturally, organizationally, operationally, and materially—and in what direction they are currently headed (Kraska, 1999). It is worth noting that beyond the police, militarism and militarization can operate as powerful theoretical lenses to make sense of many issues and trends in society—particularly those societies such as the United States that place a premium on military superiority. In fact, many analysts see these as dominant influences in foreign policy and increasingly domestic policies when it comes to issues of security.

There is a reason the police and military are separately defined; they serve inherently different functions in society, combining the terms creates a bloodthirsty military, turns the impact of the kritik

Schneier 05 (Bruce, Chief Security Technology Officer of British Telecom “Giving the U.S. Military the Power to conduct domestic Surveillence”, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/11/giving\_the\_us\_m.html, November 28, 2005, Accessed June 22, 2010)

The police and the military have fundamentally different missions. The police protect citizens. The military attacks the enemy. When you start giving police powers to the military, citizens start looking like the enemy. We gain a lot of security because we separate the functions of the police and the military, and we will all be much less safer if we allow those functions to blur. This kind of thing worries me far more than terrorist threats.

And, This insistence on the blurring of the military – police line enables a state of police failure and fascism

Healy 2003 (Gene, Senior Editor at the Cato Institute, “Blurring the Civilian-Military Line”, The Freeman, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/blurring-the-civilian-military-line/, Volume 53, Issue 2 , February 2003, Accessed June 22, 2010) SS

That does not mean that Pentagon involvement in the sniper hunt is no cause for concern, however. Federal officials’ eagerness to seek military help in this case suggests that we’ll see more military involvement in high-profile investigations in the future. As former U.S. Representative Bob Barr put it, “If you use this as a precedent, where do you then draw the line? The next time you have a sniper, do you bring the military in after two deaths?” And even where the military’s role is limited to advice, training, and provision of equipment, the erosion of the civilian-military line is troubling. After all, to the best of our knowledge, Army personnel at Waco limited themselves to provision of equipment and advice. Even that limited involvement helped lead to the greatest disaster in U.S. law-enforcement history. Increasingly, public officials are coming to view militarization of law enforcement not as a last resort for situations in which civil order breaks down entirely, but as a panacea to be used whenever public safety is threatened. In the midst of the sniper ordeal, then-Maryland Governor Parris Glendening announced he was considering using the National Guard to provide security at polling stations on election day. Put aside concerns about effectiveness (the snipers shot one victim who was standing less than 50 yards from a Virginia state trooper) and collateral damage to innocents (what, after all, are soldiers trained to do when they come under fire by a sniper?): consider the ominous image of armed soldiers surrounding polling places. It’s an image one normally associates with a banana republic, not a free, democratic one.

The military/police distinction is good—prevents total war

Habermas, 2007 (Jurgen, Professor of Philosophy and International Relations at Frankfurt, The Divided West, p 32-33)

In the face of enemies who are globally networked, decentralized, and invisible, only prevention at *other* operative levels can be of help. Neither bombs nor missiles, neither fighter jets nor tanks, are of any help here. What *will* help is the international coordination of flows of information among national intelligence services and prosecutorial authorities, the control of flows of money, and, in general, the detection of logistics networks. The corresponding “security programs” in support of these goals concern civil rights within states, not international law. Other dangers arising from self-incurred policy failures concerning the non-proliferation of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons are in any case better handled through negotiations and inspections than through wars of disarmament, as the muted response to North Korea illustrates. (*DW* 32-33)