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\*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\*

Uniqueness: Hegemony Collapsing

**Americans hegemonic dominance as come to an end, Middle Eastern states are becoming increasing less subservient and complacent to its intervention**
**The New Nation 6-25**-10 Engr. Mirza Ferdous Alam http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/06/25/news0989.htm

**After the** collapse of **Soviet Union, the US** took the global leadership as the lone super power and **bestowed itself with the responsibility to look after the world affair** with commanding posture. **The responsibility includes meddling in geopolitical issue which the US thinks related to its interest and interest of its allies. From American perspective, its interest spreads in many dimensions all over the world and the directives in resolving those must be falling in line of its choosing. For the last couple of years perception of developing countries vis-à-vis America has been changing, especially in the Middle East** due to America's special "rock solid" relation with the state of Israel and over enthusiasm for the countries ruled by dictators. **In the post recession new world order, the US appears to have lost the edge of hegemonic weight. It is not winning wars in recent time, putting itself into quagmire in two wars waged by them unilaterally, not achieving success in resolving important world affairs despite repeated rhetoric of success by its diplomats and not managing its domestic economy efficiently which is flooded with toxic assets** arouse due to credit crunch of housing bubble. Consequently, **the developing countries of the world are not very keen to provide unconditional support to the US dictates any more.** From the point of view of these upcoming countries, " **risk of paying price for not obeying American directives is a distant possibility".** The massive show of flexing muscle over brain burst a global perception bubble about America's intentions, capabilities and reason**. With the massive burden of National Debt of 13 trillion Dollars on top of its shoulder, the US has been bogged down in war in two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan.** Benefit cost analysis after many years of military campaign in these regions will not reveal encouraging numbers for the war pundits who inspired and influenced President Bush Junior to get into the mess. **The prevailing state of affairs within the US and ever deteriorating war situation appears to curtail its ability to launch more major wars in the area**, although appetite for waging war seems very much engrossed in the mindset of the remnants of neocon hawks within the Obama Administration. In this precarious situation, the US can go for another war with only borrowed money from either China or Saudi Arabia. The prospective donors do not seem to have the generosity to invest money in America's potential new war project!

Uniqueness: Heg Low-Econ

U.S. hegemony is unstable due to economic burdens
New American Foundation 10 (Michael Lind, Michael Lind is Policy Director of New America’s Economic Growth Program. He is a co-founder of the New America Foundationtaught at Harvard University and Johns Hopkins, March 30, “The U.S. Is Stuck in the Cold War” http://growth.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/the\_us\_is\_stuck\_in\_the\_cold\_war\_29951 6/26/10 RCM)

Meanwhile, **the security half of America's global strategy is headed for a crash** as well. **Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has mindlessly sought to fill every power vacuum from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf to Central Asia, while spending far less on the military than it did in the Cold War. The U.S. has gone into debt to finance the Iraq and Afghan wars. You don't have to be a grand strategist to figure out that extending territorial commitments without commensurately expanding funding and troop levels is a formula for strategic and perhaps national bankruptcy.** By declaring that the new deficit commission would not consider any cuts in military spending, only in entitlement spending, President **Obama reflected the preferences of America's policy elite. Its members would gladly cut Social Security and Medicare in order to pay for bases and "nation-building" abroad. In the same way, for half a century, America's foreign-policy elite tolerated the targeted deindustrialization of America by Asian mercantilist states, as long as those countries did not challenge America's global military hegemony.**

Uniqueness: Heg Low-Econ

**Americans hegemony is held up by an economy that is increasingly becoming hollowed out**New American Foundation 10 (Michael Lind, Michael Lind is Policy Director of New America’s Economic Growth Program. He is a co-founder of the New America Foundationtaught at Harvard University and Johns Hopkins, March 30, “The U.S. Is Stuck in the Cold War” http://growth.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/the\_us\_is\_stuck\_in\_the\_cold\_war\_29951 6/26/10 RCM)

For the time being, however, **America's out-of-touch foreign policy establishment continues to favor the policy of expanding America's geopolitical frontiers while allowing our self-interested industrial rivals to hollow out the American economy. Policies that made sense in the early years of the Cold War emergency continue to be followed out of inertia, when their original strategic rationale has long since vanished**. In the words of the philosopher George Santayana, **"Fanaticism consists in redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim."**

Uniqueness: Multi-polarity Now

**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving\_goodbye\_hegemony\_6604Why? **Weren't we supposed to reconnect with the U**nited **N**ations **and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective security and prosperity**? Indeed, **improvements to America's image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little.** Condoleezza Rice has said **America has no "permanent enemies," but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America's armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks**, insurgent groups and "asymmetric" weapons like suicide bombers. **America's unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived,** and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.

Uniqueness: Multipolarity Now

**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving\_goodbye\_hegemony\_6604

**At best, America's unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s**, but that was also a decade adrift. **The post-cold-war "peace dividend" was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership.** So now, rather than bestriding the globe, **we are competing -- and losing -- in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world's other superpowers: the European Union and China.** This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. **The Big Three make the rules -- their own rules -- without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.** The more we appreciate the differences among the American, European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an "East-West" struggle; it remained essentially a contest over Europe. **What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multicivilizational, multipolar battle.**

Uniqueness: Hege low-Asia and Africa

**China has expanding influence in East Asia and Africa over the U.S., is filling in power vacuums over the world and is increasing weapons production
The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604> **The East Asian Community is** but **one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place** as the world's "Middle Kingdom" **to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the U**nited **S**tates. In America's own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chávez's Venezuela, **China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers, aid workers, dam-builders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The whole world is abetting China's spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product** -- and **China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war**, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. **Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example.** Without firing a shot**, China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia's rising economies**, a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. **Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from America's economic uncertainties.** Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle -- of which China sits at the center -- has surpassed trade across the Pacific. **At the same time, a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out, resulting in America's grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea, no country -- friend of America's or not -- wants political tension to upset economic growth**. To the Western eye, it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China, but **increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries** -- the so-called Stans -- **China is the new heavyweight player, its manifest destiny pushing** its Han pioneers **westward while pulling defunct microstates** like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan**, as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan, into its orbit.** The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the "NATO of the East."

Uniqueness: Alliance’s not reliant

**States are no longer dependent on just the U.S. trends prove
The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604>

The Big Three are the ultimate "Frenemies." Twenty-first-century geopolitics will resemble nothing more than Orwell's 1984, but instead of three world powers (Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia), we have three hemispheric pan-regions, longitudinal zones dominated by America, Europe and China. As the early 20th-century European scholars of geopolitics realized, because a vertically organized region contains all climatic zones year-round, each pan-region can be self-sufficient and build a power base from which to intrude in others' terrain. But in a globalized and shrinking world, no geography is sacrosanct. So in various ways, both overtly and under the radar, China and Europe will meddle in America's backyard, America and China will compete for African resources in Europe's southern periphery and America and Europe will seek to profit from the rapid economic growth of countries within China's growing sphere of influence. Globalization is the weapon of choice. The main battlefield is what I call "the second world." The Swing States There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.

Hegemony Low-Central Asia

U.S. in on the decline in Central Asia troops and focus are the deciding factor for winning and losing the great game
**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604>

Western diplomats have a long historical familiarity, however dramatic and tumultuous, with Russia and Turkey. But what about the Stans: landlocked but resource-rich countries run by autocrats? Ever since these nations were flung into independence by the Soviet collapse, China has steadily replaced Russia as their new patron. Trade, oil pipelines and military exercises with China under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization make it the new organizing pole for the region, with the U.S. scrambling to maintain modest military bases in the region. (Currently it is forced to rely far too much on Afghanistan after being booted, at China's and Russia's behest, from the Karshi Khanabad base in Uzbekistan in 2005.) The challenge of getting ahead in the strategically located and energy-rich Stans is the challenge of a bidding contest in which values seem not to matter. While China buys more Kazakh oil and America bids for defense contracts, Europe offers sustained investment and holds off from giving President Nursultan Nazarbayev the high-status recognition he craves. Kazakhstan considers itself a "strategic partner" of just about everyone, but tell that to the Big Three, who bribe government officials to cancel the others' contracts and spy on one another through contract workers -- all in the name of preventing the others from gaining mastery over the fabled heartland of Eurasian power. Just one example of the lengths to which foreigners will go to stay on good terms with Nazarbayev is the current negotiation between a consortium of Western energy giants, including ENI and Exxon, and Kazakhstan's state-run oil company over the development of the Caspian's massive Kashagan oil field. At present, the consortium is coughing up at least $4 billion as well as a large hand-over of shares to compensate for delayed exploration and production -- and Kazakhstan isn't satisfied yet. The lesson from Kazakhstan, and its equally strategic but far less predictable neighbor Uzbekistan, is how fickle the second world can be, its alignments changing on a whim and causing headaches and ripple effects in all directions. To be distracted elsewhere or to lack sufficient personnel on the ground can make the difference between winning and losing a major round of the new great game.

Uniqueness Hege Low-Latin America

The Monroe Doctrine is crumbling Latin America is siding with China
**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604>

**The Big Three dynamic is not just some distant contest by which America ensures its ability to dictate affairs on the other side of the globe. Globalization has brought the geopolitical marketplace straight to America's backyard, rapidly eroding the two-centuries-old Monroe Doctrine in the process**. In truth, **America called the shots in Latin America only when its southern neighbors lacked any vision of their own. Now they have at least two non-American challengers: China and Chávez**. It was Simón Bolívar who fought ferociously for South America's independence from Spanish rule, and today it is the newly renamed Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that has inspired an entire continent to bootstrap its way into the global balance of power on its own terms. Hugo **Chávez**, the country's clownish colonel, may last for decades to come or may die by the gun, but either way, he **has called America's bluff and won, changing the rules of North-South relations in the Western hemisphere. He has emboldened and bankrolled leftist leaders across the continent,** helped Argentina and others pay back and boot out the I.M.F. and sponsored a continentwide bartering scheme of oil, cattle, wheat and civil servants, reminding even those who despise him that they can stand up to the great Northern power. Chávez stands not only on the ladder of high oil prices**. He relies on tacit support from Europe and hardheaded intrusion from China, the former still the country's largest investor and the latter feverishly repairing Venezuela's dilapidated oil rigs while building its own refineries.**But Chávez's challenge to the United States is, in inspiration, ideological, whereas the second-world shift is really structural. Even with Chávez still in power, it is Brazil that is reappearing as South America's natural leader. Alongside India and South Africa, **Brazil has led the charge in global trade negotiations, sticking it to the U.S. on its steel tariffs and to Europe on its agricultural subsidies**. Geographically, Brazil is nearly as close to Europe as to America and is as keen to build cars and airplanes for Europe as it is to export soy to the U.S. Furthermore, **Brazil, although a loyal American ally in the cold war, wasted little time before declaring a "strategic alliance" with China. Their economies are remarkably complementary,** with Brazil shipping iron ore, timber, zinc, beef, milk and soybeans to China and China investing in Brazil's hydroelectric dams, steel mills and shoe factories. Both China and Brazil's ambitions may soon alter the very geography of their relations, with Brazil leading an effort to construct a Trans-Oceanic Highway from the Amazon through Peru to the Pacific Coast, facilitating access for Chinese shipping tankers. Latin America has mostly been a geopolitical afterthought over the centuries, but in the 21st century, all resources will be competed for, and none are too far away.

Uniqueness: Losing Primacy Now

**The U.S. is becoming a lonely superpower China and the EU are gaining influence**
**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604>

**The rise of China in the East and** of **the** **E**uropean **U**nion **within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity** -- pro or anti. **As Europe's and China's spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence, America's spirit is weakened. The E.U. may uphold the principles of the** **U**nited **N**ations **that America once dominated, but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator?** And why should China or other Asian countries become "responsible stakeholders," in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's words, in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? **Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism, others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium -- that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order -- has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace, there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate**, not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago, **Western imperialism united the globe, but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever -- materially or morally**. Despite the "mirage of immortality" that afflicts global empires**, the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline**, and as Toynbee also pithily noted, **the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down.**

Uniqueness: Multi-Polarity Now

**Multi-polarity now, the U.S. is far from being the sole superpower and is on the decline, fighting this reality can only be disastrous**
**The New American Foundation 08**  Parag Khanna, author of The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order2007 he was a senior geopolitical advisor to USSpecial Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2002-5, he was the Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution; from 2000-2002 he worked at the World Economic Forum in Geneva; and from 1999-2000, he was a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604> **The web of globalization now has three spiders. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals -- which Europe may now represent better than America does** -- **but** rather its **geography. America is isolated, while Europe and China occupy two ends of the** great **Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics**. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan, South Korea, Australia and Thailand, it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. **Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous; it has been shunned by the E.U. and Turkey, is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia's confidence**. "Accidental empire" or not, **America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. Maintaining America's empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. It isn't worth it, and history promises the effort will fail. It already has**. **Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its** organizing principle and **leader? It's very much too late to be asking, because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. Neither China nor the E.U. will replace the U.S. as the world's sole leader; rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another.** Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa, while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game.

 \*\*\*Hegemony Bad Frontline\*\*\*

 Hegemony bad frontline

History proves American hegemony is unsustainable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 63

States are ever-vigilant when it comes to maintaining their security because they want to survive as independent players in international politics. Up to a point, therefore, it is a good thing for a state to be powerful. But when a state becomes too powerful, it frightens others; in self-defense, they seek to offset and contain those great powers that aspire to primacy. And the ironclad lesson of history is clear: states that bid for hegemony (primacy) invariably fail.As Henry A. Kissinger has said, "hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants have sooner or later exhausted themselves."34Indeed, the history of modern international politics is strewn with the geopolitical wreckage of states that bid unsuccesfully for primacy: The Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, France under Louis XI V and Napoleon, Victorian Britain, Germany under Hitler. By pursuing a strategy of primacy, the United States today risks the same fate that has befallen other great powers that have striven to dominate the international political system.

Hegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts and nuclear war – withdrawal prevents automatic deployment to honor alliances.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 169

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

Regional threats ensure balancing behavior – even if the U.S. does not scare states into military buildup, its security guarantee can never be strong enough to dissuade it in all instances.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 151

Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American hegemony. However, Washington's ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.S. security guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases already have--to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S. assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States, they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of balancing against the United States, or as a result of others arming themselves as a hedge against regional rivals—the consequences for America's hegemonic grand strategy are the same. Precisely because multipolarity is antithetical to the Open Door world that the United States seeks, the aim of American grand strategy is to prevent the other major powers—even U.S. allies—from gaining autonomy in the realm of security.

Hegemony Bad Frontline

Multipolarity is inevitable in a world of either American hegemony or withdrawal – engagement fosters a violent war-filled transition.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth and avoids great power wars – sooner is better than later.

Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

Hegemony Bad Frontline

Their impact is silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war in Asia and Europe – these areas can easily secure themselves.

Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

Potential to redeploy solves all of their offense.

Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1126

A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived as a wider threat to Europe. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written, Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist ambitions. The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran--continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as power remains diffused throughout the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to deal with that problem.

\*\*\*Terminal Impacts\*\*\*

Chomsky

**US hege leads to nuclear Armageddon**

Chomsky 03 (Noam Chomsky He is an [Institute Professor](file://localhost/wiki/Institute_Professor) and professor [emeritus](file://localhost/wiki/Emeritus) of [linguistics](file://localhost/wiki/Linguistics) at the [Massachusetts Institute of Technology](file://localhost/wiki/Massachusetts_Institute_of_Technology). The Case Against US Adventurism in Iraq ,Star Tribune, March 13, 2003)

The most powerful state in history has proclaimed that it intends to control the world by force, the dimension in which it reigns supreme. President Bush and his cohorts evidently believe that the means of violence in their hands are so extraordinary that they can dismiss anyone who stands in their way.

**The consequences could be catastrophic in Iraq and around the world. The United States may reap a whirlwind of terrorist retaliation -- and step up the possibility of nuclear Armageddon.**

Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and company are committed to an "imperial ambition," as G. John Ikenberry wrote in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs -- "**a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor"** and in which "no state or coalition could ever challenge it as global leader, protector and enforcer."That ambition surely includes much expanded control over Persian Gulf resources and military bases to impose a preferred form of order in the region.

**Even before** the administration began beating the **war** drums **against Iraq, there were plenty of warnings that U.S. adventurism would lead to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as terror, for deterrence or revenge.** Right now, **Washington is teaching the world a dangerous lesson: If you want to defend yourself from us, you had better mimic North Korea and pose a credible threat. Otherwise we will demolish you.**

Heg Bad: Primacy = Counter Balancing

**No matter how “benevolent” US primacy is, the magnitude will inevitably produce counter balancing powers**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

The claim that others regard American primacy as benevolent because of U.S. sot power and shared values is similarly dubious. And again, Iraq played an important role in exploding this myth. Beginning with the run-up to the invasion of Iraq to the present, one public opinion survey after another has revealed that a vast “values gap” exists between the United States and the rest of the world. Tellingly, this gap exists not just between the United States and East Asia and the Middle East, but between the United States and Europe. One would think that if there is any part of the world where shared values really do cause others to view American primacy as benevolent, Europe would be the place. Yet, a September 2004 poll of eight thousand respondents on both sides of the Atlantic found that 83 percent of Americans, and 79 percent of Europeans, agreed that Europe and the United States have different social and cultural values.48 On a host of issues—including the death penalty, the role of religion in everyday life, and attitudes toward the role of international law and institutions—Europeans and Americans hold divergent views, not common ones. he Iraq war has exposed the huge gulf in values that gradually is causing the United States and Europe to drift apart—in large measure because Europe regards the United States as being a geopolitical rogue elephant, rather than as a “benevolent hegemon.” the problem with rogue elephants, of course, is that when they are on the loose anyone nearby is at risk of being trampled. This is why other states are uneasy about American primacy.For sure, many states do benefit both economically and in terms of security from American primacy. And it also is true that not all other states will feel threatened by U.S. hard power. Eventually, however, some of the other states in the international political system are going to believe that they are menaced by American primacy. For example, far from being “of-shore” as the primacists claim, U.S. power is very much on shore—or lurking just beyond the coastline—and very much in the faces of China, Russia, and the Islamic world. And, in this sense, international politics is not a lot different than basketball: players who push others around and get in their faces are likely to be the targets of a self-defensive punch in the nose. Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, **benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal**. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them—and for good reason. In today’s world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America’s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all, “No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised.”49 While Washington’s self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that if U.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in America’s hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states’ security, and Washington’s ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.

Heg Bad: Blowback

**Primacy causes ‘blowback’**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

Contrary to what its proponents claim, in at least three respects, **primacy causes insecurity** for the United States. First, even before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, the heavy hand of U.S. primacy pressed down on the Middle East, as the United States sought to establish political, military, and cultural ascendancy in the region. **Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are a form of blowback against long-standing U.S. policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—including American support for authoritarian regimes in the region, and uncritical support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians**. America’s current strategy of primacy and empire also means that the United States is on a collision course with China and Iran. In both cases, the logic of U.S. strategy suggests that preventive and preemptive options are on the table to thwart the rise of a prospective peer competitor (China) and a regional rival (Iran). Tensions with China and Iran also are being fueled by the liberal—Wilsonian— thrust of American strategy that challenges the legitimacy of nondemocratic regimes while aggressively aiming at the promotion of democracy abroad.

**Aggressive hegemony makes great power wars inevitable**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

In this chapter, I argue that primacy and empire is a strategy that will lead to bad consequences for the United States. Rather than bringing the United States peace and security, the pursuit of primacy and empire will result in a geopolitical backlash against the United States. It already has. The 9/11 attacks were a violent reaction against America’s primacy—and speciically against its imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, the quagmire in Iraq also is a direct consequence of U.S. imperial aspirations. And it will not end there. Because it is premised on the belief that the United States must embark on assertive policies to bring about regime change by imposing democracy abroad, the pursuit of primacy and empire will drag the United States into otherwise avoidable wars—what one proponent of the strategy has termed “savage wars for peace.” Looking ahead, **if the United States continues to follow its current strategy of primacy** and empire, **it** almost certainly **will find itself on a collision course with Iran** (and possibly **North Korea** and **Syria**) **and**—more importantly—**China.**

\*\*\*Impact Module\*\*\*

\*\*\*Terrorism\*\*\*

Terrorism Impact Module

**Terrorist are not irrational actors, but attack for specific political goals that are fueled by US primacy**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

9/11 was not a random act of violence visited upon the United States. The United States was the target of al Qaeda’s terrorist strikes because that group harbored specific political grievances against the United States. If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, put it, “In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of al Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism…meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals….” Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.” As Clausewitz himself observed, “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.” Terrorism really is a form of asymmetric warfare waged against the United States by groups that lack the military wherewithal to slug it out with the United States toe-to-toe. **9/11 was a violent counter reaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—primacy.** As Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article, “It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.” U.S. primacy fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of **“blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role. As long as the United States uses its global primacy to impose its imperial sway on regions like the Persian Gulf, it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups** like al Qaeda.

Extinction

Yonah Alexander (professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States) 8/28/2003 The Washington Times

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Hegemony 🡪 Terrorism

**Terrorists are only attacking because of US occupation**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, “Why do they hate us?” his question missed the key point, however. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do “hate” the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And, for sure, notwithstanding American neoconservatives’ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the War on Terrorism inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations.” Still, this isn’t—and should not be allowed to become—a replay of the Crusades. As Scheuer says, “**one of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S. leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.”** The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it’s hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself as violently as it did on 9/11. Experts on terrorism understand the political motives that drive the actions of groups like al Qaeda. In his important recent study of suicide terrorists, Robert A. Pape found that what **“nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”** Pape found that “even al Qaeda fits this pattern: although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, a principal objective of Osama bin Laden is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region.” This finding is seconded by Scheuer, who describes bin Laden’s objectives as: “the end of U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that state; the removal of U.S. and Western forces from the Arabian Peninsula; the removal of U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands; the end of U.S. support for oppression of Muslims by Russia, China, and India; the end of U.S. protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and the conservation of the Muslim world’s energy resources and their sale at higher prices.” Simply put, it is American primacy, and the policies that flow from it, that have made the United States a lightning rod for Islamic anger.

U.S. hegemony makes it the target of terrorist attack.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 69-70

Terrorism: When Over There Becomes Over Here 9/11was not a random act of violence visited upon the United States. The United States was the target of al Qaeda's terrorist strikes because that group harbored specific political grievances against the United States. If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. AsMichael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osamabin Laden andal Qaeda,put it, "In the context of ideas bin Laden shares withhis brethren, the military actions of al Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, notterrorism...meant to advance bin Laden's clear, focused, limited, and widelypopular foreign policy goals..." Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.' As Clausewitz himself observed, "war is not anact of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object ?'" Terrorism really is a form of asymmetric warfare waged against the United States by groups that lack the military wherewithal to slug it out with the United Statest oe-to-toe. 9/11 was a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical—andcultural—primacy. As Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 For-eign Affairsarticle, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would behatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the UnitedStates had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah ofIran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault onIslam." U.S. primacy fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world roles"As long as the United States uses its global primacy to impose its imperial sway on regions like the Persian Gulf, it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups likeal Qaeda.

\*\*\*U.S. China War Module\*\*\*

U.S. China War Module

Hege makes war with China inevitable

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state**. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in** **the next decade** or two **in a war**. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. **If the United States continues to** **aim at upholding its** current **primacy,** however, **Sino–American conflict is virtually certain.**

Draws in Russia, ends in extinction

Straits Times 6-25-2000

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

U.S. China War

As long as the US subscribes to primacy, a war with China over Taiwan is inevitable

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

Finally, Taiwan is a powder-keg issue in Sino–American relations. China remains committed to national reunification, yet Taiwan is moving perceptibly toward independence. Almost certainly, **Beijing would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli**. It is unclear how the United States would respond to a China–Taiwan conflict, although President George W. Bush created a stir in 2001 when he declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For sure, however, it is safe to predict that there would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of American intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute “aggression,” ideological antipathy toward China and support for a democratizing Taiwan would be powerful incentives for American intervention. On Taiwan, in other words, the arguments of U.S. primacists have come close to locking-in Washington to a potentially dangerous policy. The primacists’ claim that the United States must be prepared to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion overlooks three points. First, for nearly a quarter century, the United States has recognized that Taiwan is a Chinese province, not an independent state. Second, America’s European and Asian allies have no interest in picking a quarrel with China over Taiwan’s fate. If Washington goes to the mat with Beijing over Taiwan, it almost certainly will do so alone. (Given their unilateralist bent, however, the prospect of fighting China without allies might not be much concern to American primacists.) Third, by defending Taiwan, the United States runs the risk of armed confrontation with China—probably not in the immediate future, but almost certainly within the next decade or so. It would be an act of folly for the United States to risk conflict for the purpose of defending democracy in Taiwan. The issue at stake simply would not justify the risks and costs of doing so. Indeed, **regardless of the rationale invoked, the contention that the United States should risk war to prevent Beijing from using force to achieve reunification with Taiwan amounts to nothing more than a veiled argument for fighting a “preventive” war against a rising China**. If U.S. primacists believe that preventive war is a viable option for coping with a rising China, instead of using Taiwan as a fig leaf they should say so openly so that the merits of this strategy can be debated. So what should the United States do about China? **If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino–American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy.** The United States’ desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia’s political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China’s rise.

A2: Free Trade Curbs China

Free trade will not curb China, China rise is inevitable

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

There are three elements of current U.S. grand strategy toward China that needed to be reconsidered. The first two are the linked issues of trade and domestic liberalization. Trade is an issue where just about everyone involved in the current debate about America’s China policy has gotten it wrong. Engagement— based on economic interdependence and free trade—neither will constrain China to behave “responsibly” nor lead to an evolutionary transformation of China’s domestic system (certainly not in any policy-relevant time span). Unfettered free trade simply will accelerate the pace of China’s great power emergence: the more China becomes linked to the global economy, the more rapidly it is able to grow in both absolute and relative economic power. To be sure, **short of preventive war, there is nothing the United States can do to prevent China from eventually emerging as a great power**. Thus, there would be no point in simply ceasing economic relations with China. But the United States must be careful about how—and why—it trades with Beijing.

\*\*\*Great Power Wars\*\*\*

Power wars module

A. U.S. hegemony makes power wars unavoidable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 54-5

In this chapter, I argue that primacy and empire is a strategy that will leadto bad consequences for the United States. Rather than bringing the UnitedStates peace and security, the pursuit of primacy and empire will result in a geopolitical backlash against the United States. It already has. The 9/11 attacks were a violent reaction against America's primacy—and specifically against its imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, the quagmire in Iraq also is a direct consequence of U.S. imperial aspirations. And it will not end there. Because it is premised on the belief that the United States must embarkon assertive policies to bring about regime change by imposing democracyabroad, the pursuit of primacy and empire will drag the United States into otherwise avoidable wars—what one proponent of the strategy has termed"savage wars for peace." Looking ahead, if the United States continues to fol-low its current strategy of primacy and empire, it almost certainly will find itself on a collision course with Iran (and possibly North Korea and Syria)and—more importantly—China.

B. The next major power war will cause extinction.

Gwynne Dyer, Toronto Star, "The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village" December 30, 2004 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future.The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population.

\*\*\*Iran War\*\*\*

Iran war module

A. American leadership in the Middle East makes war with Iran inevitable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 76-7

Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at leastthe one that has grabbed thelion'sshare of the headlines—is Tehran's evidentdetermination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington's policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is"intolerable."Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassadorto Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq's recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on thebrink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Ira-nian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America's ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in currentU.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. TheBush Doctrine's three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor ofpreventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radicalshake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S.dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that theadministration's policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclearweapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democ-ratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay theadministration's pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. Thekey question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

B. China and Russia will intervene; escalates to nuclear world war.

Abid Ullah Jan 2006 “Why American will Reap in Iran What It Doesn’t Expect”, Posted February 20, http://mathaba.net/0\_index.shtml?x=528456>

Many analysts believe that an attack on Iran will turn into a World War because the Iranian government has a long-range strategy for "asymmetrical" warfare that will disrupt the flow of oil and challenge American interests around the world. Certainly, if one is facing an implacable enemy that is committed to "regime change" there is no reason to hold back on doing what is necessary to defeat that adversary. However, the main reason for escalation of the conflict will be exactly the assumption on the part of the United States, Israel and Britain that Iran cannot respond with nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear material—including red mercury and different forms of Uranium—were flowing in the streets of Pakistan, a high ranking Pakistani official, working in the Iranian consulate, told this writer that Iran is obtaining smuggled nuclear material from its field commanders in Afghanistan. It was well before the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan took place. Keeping this fact in mind, it is simply naïve to assume that the United States or Israel will launch an un-provoked war of aggression on Iran, and Iran will remain a sitting duck and not retaliate with what it must have refined and retooled since mid-nineties.[3] Even if we assume that the Iranian government purchased nuclear material without any intention of putting it to use, it is highly unlikely that it will still let this material gather dust while it is being openly and seriously threatened by the United States and Israel. If scientists in Germany and the United States could work to develop nuclear weapons from scratch during the World War II, how long will it take a nation pushed against the wall and with all the ingredients available to put something workable together and retaliate with a bang? So, the practical chances of Iran’s retaliation with a nuclear weapon in the face of a war of aggression imposed on it are far more than the theoretical assumptions that Iranian Intelligence will plan covert operations which will be carried out in the event of an unprovoked attack on their facilities. It is true that a nuclear response from Iran would mean a definite suicide when looked in perspective of the nuclear power of the United States and Iran. But it also doesn’t make any sense that the United States would keep bombing Iran, the way it has planned, into the Stone Age, yet despite being able to respond, Iran will simply turn the other cheek. This chain of inevitable reactions will in fact lead a wider conflagration that the warlords in Washington and Tel Aviv have not even imagined. Emboldened by their adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deluded by the IAEA conclusion that Iraq has no nuclear weapons, the warlords are set to go into a war that will definitely lead to massive bloodshed in the Middle East and the downfall of the United States as we see it. Despite Bush and company’s claims that the world is not the same after 9/11, the world remained more or less the same after 9/11. However, their world will surely turn upside down with their miscalculation of going into a third war of aggression in five years. The Russian and Chinese stakes in this issue cannot be ignored altogether. Attacking Iran would prove too much for Russia and China. Russia has snubbed Washington by announcing it would go ahead and honor a $700 million contract to arm Iran with surface-to-air missiles, slated to guard Iran's nuclear facilities. And after being burned when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority invalidated Hussein-era oil deals, China has snapped up strategic energy contracts across the world, including in Latin America, Canada and Iran. It can be assumed that both China and Russia will not sit idly by and watch Iran being annihilated by the United States. If Iran is attacked with lethal force, it will retaliate with the utmost force available at its disposal; that much is certain. Remembering my discussion 9 year ago with a well informed source who was working for the Iranian government, I am pretty sure that the utmost force in the hands of Iran definitely includes nuclear weapons. One of the signs for that is the confidence with which the Iranian government responds to US threats. Iranian leaders have acted responsibly and reasonably so far. It is always the mistake of extremists to misjudge the behavior of reasonable men. The Iranians tried to avoid purchasing nuclear material from the Pakistani black market to avoid arousing unnecessary suspicion. They kept their nuclear program limited to energy production. It is the United States and its allies which are provoking it into reaction. As a result, it has been a mistake of reasonable men in Iran to mistake the behavior of extremists in Washington and not getting out of NPT or testing a few nuclear devices to balance its power against its enemies. Many analysts are predicting that attack on Iran will be provoked because a majority of Americans are not in favor of a new war. Although setting up a pre-text for domestic support cannot be ruled out, one can say with certainty from the track record of Bush and company that they will hardly bother to engineer another terrorist attack.[4] In the fits of madness, they have already made themselves believe that they have enough justification to wage a war or aggression on Iran. The Washington Times has already started beating war drums and promoting "policy experts" who believe the US must go alone if needed (Feb 6, 2006).[5] Irrespective of any pretext and going alone or in a coalition of barbarians, the signs tell us that the warlords are not going to relinquish their totalitarian dreams. It is very unfortunate on their part that they are putting their hands in hornet nest where they may get stung with nuclear weapons. Their retaliation, for sure, will lead to total disaster. A disaster, far worse than what the title "World War 3" can convey.

\*\*\*Iran Proliferation\*\*\*

Iranian Proliferation Module

**US primacy is what is pushing Iran to get the bomb**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

The very notion that undeterrable “rogue states” exist is the second questionable assumption on which the administration’s strategy is based. In an important article in the Winter 2004/2005 issue of International Security, Francis Gavin points out that the post-9/11 era is not the first time that American policy-makers have believed that the United States faced a lethal threat from rogue states. During the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, the People’s Republic of China was perceived by Washington in very much the same way as it perceived Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or, currently, Iran. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party imposed harsh repression on China and killed millions of Chinese citizens. Moreover, Beijing—which had entered the Korean War in 1950, menaced Taiwan, gone to war with India in 1962, and seemingly was poised to intervene in Vietnam—was viewed (wrongly) as an aggressive state. For Washington, Mao’s China was the poster child of a rogue state, and during the Johnson administration the United States seriously considered launching a preventive war to destroy China’s embryonic nuclear program. In many ways, Mao was seen by U.S. policy-makers as the Saddam Hussein of his time. Moreover**, like Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad— who has made outrageous comments denying the Holocaust and threatening Israel’s destruction—Mao also suffered from diarrhea of the mouth**. Indeed, Mao arguably was even more afflicted because he trivialized the consequences of nuclear war. Thus—before China became a nuclear power (1964)—Mao’s rhetoric cavalierly embraced the possibility of nuclear war. “If the worse came to worst and half of mankind died,” Mao said, “the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.” Once China actually became a nuclear power, however, where nuclear weapons were concerned both its rhetoric and its policy quickly became circumspect and responsible. In fact, a mere five years after the Johnson administration pondered the possibility of striking China preventively, the United States and China were engaged in secret negotiations that, in 1972, culminated in President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing and Sino–American cooperation to contain the Soviet Union. The United States’ experience with China illustrates an important point: the reasons states acquire nuclear weapons are primarily to gain security and, secondarily, to enhance their prestige. This certainly was true of China, which believed its security was threatened by the United States and by the Soviet Union. It is also true of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and today’s Iran. As Gavin writes, “In some ways, the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s early analysis of China mirrors the Bush administration’s public portrayal of Iraq in the lead-up to the war. Insofar as Iraq was surrounded by potential nuclear adversaries (Iran and Israel) and threatened by regime change by the most powerful country in the world, Saddam Hussein’s desire to develop nuclear weapons may be seen as understandable.” The same can be said for Iran, which is ringed by U.S. conventional forces in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, and which also is the target of the Bush II administration’s policy of regime change and democratization**. Tehran may be paranoid, but in the United States—and Israel—it has real enemies. It is Iran’s fear for its security that drives its quest to obtain nuclear weapons**.

Extinction

Reza Bayegan, a commentator on Iranian politics who was born in Iran and currently works for the British Council in Paris, 9/6/2004. “Symposium: Atomic Ayatollahs,” FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID={397000C4-101C-4C73-A8CF-662D0DAB8981}

The danger we face from the regime in Tehran acquiring the nuclear bomb cannot be exaggerated. Our democratic values and the very survival of Western civilization are at stake. In particular such an eventuality would be the worst nightmare scenario for the state of Israel and an unprecedented blow to peace and liberty throughout the world. Since September 11, we have seen how terrorists are able to strike anywhere they choose and hijack Western democratic processes by intimidating the public as they did during the recent Spanish election. With a nuclear bomb at their disposal they can do this without risking their own lives and by pushing -- or just threatening to push -- a button. With or without WMDs, the danger the clerical regime poses is far greater than the other members of the 'axis of evil' i.e. Iraq during Saddam Hussein and North Korea. This danger is rooted in a ruthless anti-Western ideology that manipulates the religious belief of the masses and justifies any means for reaching its deadly objectives. If the mullahs get their hands on a nuclear bomb we might as well assume that Hamas and other terrorist organizations have access to it also.

A2: Nuclear Iran = arms race

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq now are agitating for war with Iran. If Iran gets nuclear weapons they say, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable in the extreme. During the early 1960s, American policy-makers had similar fears that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, but these fears did not materialize—and a nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power (as is Pakistan, another regional power). The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. As MIT professor Barry Posen points out, however, each of these three states would be under strong pressure not do to so. Egypt is particularly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky economy depends on foreign—especially U.S.—economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market—which is closely watched by the United States—and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Turkey is constrained by its membership in NATO and its quest to be admitted to membership of the European Union.

A2: nuclear Iran = nuclear terrorism

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

Notwithstanding the near-hysterical rhetoric of the Bush administration and the neoconservatives, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to say that Tehran has not abetted groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, or Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. Clearly, it has. However, there are good reasons that states—even those that have ties to terrorists—draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): **if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state—which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike**. Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believed the administration’s overheated rhetoric about the indifference of rogue state leaders about the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes—which means that they can be deterred.

A2: nuclear Iran will be aggressive

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack or intimidate its neighbors. Just as it did during the Cold War, the United States can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region—like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly but will also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.

Iranian Prolif = Inev. Better than attempts to curb

**Iran getting nukes is inevitable, attempts to prevent or slow down this fact cause massive middle east instability and war**

**Layne, 2007 [Christopher, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, American Empire: A Debate//HS]**

 But it should be. Attacking Iran would be a strategic blunder of the first magnitude—far worse than going to war with Iraq. To be sure, while the United States may be short of ground troops, it still possesses more than enough air power to mount a sustained bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The problem, of course, is that the United States does not know the location of all of Iran’s nuclear sites. Consequently, although a bombing campaign probably would inflict enough damage to impose some delay on the Iranian nuclear program, the fact that the United States cannot pinpoint all of Tehran’s nuclear facilities means that the United States cannot destroy the Iranian nuclear program or inflict long-term disruption. Simply stated, the United States ultimately cannot prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the risks to the United States in bombing Iran’s nuclear infrastructure are high—higher than any benefit that might be gained by slowing down Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Because of its links to the Iraqi Shiites, Iran has the capability to intervene in Iraq and put U.S. forces—and the entire American project there—in even greater jeopardy. Tehran can also use its ties to Hezbollah and Hamas to create instability throughout the region. Indeed, the events of summer 2006 in Gaza and Lebanon suggest that it may be doing so—perhaps to remind the United States that Iran has the capability of responding to any military action that Washington might take in regard to Iran’s nuclear programs. War is always a risky proposition—even for states that have impressive military capabilities. As German Chancellor Theobald Bethamann-Hollweg said during the July 1914 crisis, war is “a leap into the dark”—and a “cosmic roll of the iron dice”—because there are so many imponderables and so many things that can go wrong. This is a lesson that the current administration would do well to take to heart with respect to its Iran policy (and one it should have learned from its experience in Iraq). U.S. military and civilian strategists are so enamored with the idea of using shock and awe to impose America’s will on its enemies that they forget what strategy is all about: strategy is a two-player game, not a single-player game, in which U.S. adversaries have options of their own. Iran, in fact, has many options because of its links to terrorists, its own military capabilities (which are sufficient to impose high costs should American forces ever launch a ground war against Iran), and the importance of its oil to the global economy. Iran is in no position to slug it out toe-to-toe against the United States in a conventional military conflict, but it has political, economic, and even diplomatic cards that it can use to make it very costly to the United States to employ military force in an attempt to halt or delay Iran’s nuclear weapons program. If the United States does use force against Iran, it will be opposed diplomatically by Europe, China, and Russia. More important, a military strike against Iran would unleash forces that could trigger a true “clash of civilizations” and would make the Persian Gulf and Middle East even more unstable—and more anti-American—than it is now. Simply put—unpalatable though it may be—the military option is not viable with respect to Iran. Still, although a nuclear-armed Iran is not a pleasant prospect, neither is it an intolerable one. Tehran won’t be the first distasteful regime to acquire nuclear weapons (nor will it be the last). The United States has adjusted to similar situations in the past and can do so this time. Rather than preventive war and regime change, the best policies for the United States with respect to Iran are the tried and true ones of containment, deterrence, and diplomatic engagement.

\*\*\*Economy\*\*\*

Economic Collapse Module

Maintaining preeminence makes it impossible to sustain economic growth – puts too much pressure on the dollar

Dymski 02 (Gary A., Professor of Economics, University of California, Riverside, Ph.D in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, “Post-Hegemonic U.S. Economic Hegemony: Minskian and Kaleckian Dynamics in the Neoliberal Era,” Journal of the Japanese Society for Political Economy, April 2002, http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers02/02-13.pdf, JH)

6. Conclusion This essay has updated Dymski and Pollin’s (1994) empirical investigation of Minsky’s small/big government cyclical variability. Dymski and Pollin conjectured that the 1980s represented a return to small-government cyclical patterns. The current paper suggests instead that the 1980s and 1990s represent a new “Neoliberal” period, with its own distinctive cyclical dynamics. Others have defined the Neoliberal era as a period of global deregulation and privatization. This essay has shown that the post-1980 period also has distinctive business-cycle dynamics—GDP and employment and investment growth has become less volatile, and growth periods have persisted for longer than in the past. Inflationary pressure has virtually disappeared due to the strong dollar; monetary policy has shifted in focus from domestic to global markets; and Kalecki’s upper bound on unemployment has been altered through structural shifts linked primarily to globalization processes. Why have these cyclical dynamics changed? Since 1980, the U.S. dollar has persistently been high, and the U.S. external balance has persistently embodied a deficit on current account and a surplus on capital account. This paper has gone on to explore the causes of the structural asymmetry between the U.S. economy and all remaining nations in the global economy. These causes include the role of the U.S. as a global safe haven; the emergence of U.S. households as consumers of last resort; the global power of Wall Street; and behind these factors, the global reach of the U.S. military. Clearly, no economy can avoid the “law of gravity” and expand without limit; the U.S. has had a recession before reaching the end of history. **U.S. prosperity now rests on the ability of the American household to maintain consumption expenditures and absorb more debt—the knife-edge balance between asset-price appreciation, debt buildup, and consumption. This balance has become more precarious as the boom in financial prices has spread into housing and other positional assets.** U.S. prosperity also depends on the dollar’s safe haven role in a world of stagnation and insecurity. Thus far, the dollar’s safe-haven role has worked to the advantage of the U.S.: the worse are conditions in the rest of the world, the higher the rental value of the dollar, and the more unbalanced the United States’ external position can become. Can this be the sustainable calculus of 21st century economics? It seems unlikely. Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant once argued that a global dollar shortage justified a U.S. trade deficit together with a high dollar. What is on offer now, perhaps, is not so much a dollar shortage as a global security shortage. Eventually, the globe’s leading nations will have to choose yet again between military and populist solutions to problems of global capitalist crisis. History has recorded how this choice was resolved in the last century; can we be wiser in this new one?

Impact is nuclear war

Mead ‘92

The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.

Heg Bad – Econ

Hegemony creates an international race for dollars, making economic collapse inevitable

Liu 02 (Henry C K, educated at Harvard University, professor at UCLA, Harvard and Columbia Universities, chairman of the New York-based Liu Investment Group, “US dollar hegemony has got to go,” Apr 11, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/global-econ/DD11Dj01.html, JH)

There is an economics-textbook myth that foreign-exchange rates are determined by supply and demand based on market fundamentals. Economics tends to dismiss socio-political factors that shape market fundamentals that affect supply and demand. The current international finance architecture is based on the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency, which now accounts for 68 percent of global currency reserves, up from 51 percent a decade ago. Yet in 2000, the US share of global exports (US$781.1 billon out of a world total of $6.2 trillion) was only 12.3 percent and its share of global imports ($1.257 trillion out of a world total of $6.65 trillion) was 18.9 percent. World merchandise exports per capita amounted to $1,094 in 2000, while 30 percent of the world's population lived on less than $1 a day, about one-third of per capita export value. Ever since 1971, when US president Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard (at $35 per ounce) that had been agreed to at the Bretton Woods Conference at the end of World War II, the dollar has been a global monetary instrument that the United States, and only the United States, can produce by fiat. The dollar, now a fiat currency, is at a 16-year trade-weighted high despite record US current-account deficits and the status of the US as the leading debtor nation. The US national debt as of April 4 was $6.021 trillion against a gross domestic product (GDP) of $9 trillion. World trade is now a game in which the US produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies. To prevent speculative and manipulative attacks on their currencies, the world's central banks must acquire and hold dollar reserves in corresponding amounts to their currencies in circulation. The higher the market pressure to devalue a particular currency, the more dollar reserves its central bank must hold. This creates a built-in support for a strong dollar that in turn forces the world's central banks to acquire and hold more dollar reserves, making it stronger. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the US has extracted from oil-producing countries for US tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973. By definition, dollar reserves must be invested in US assets, creating a capital-accounts surplus for the US economy. Even after a year of sharp correction, US stock valuation is still at a 25-year high and trading at a 56 percent premium compared with emerging markets. The Quantity Theory of Money is clearly at work. US assets are not growing at a pace on par with the growth of the quantity of dollars. US companies still respresent 56 percent of global market capitalization despite recent retrenchment in which entire sectors suffered some 80 percent a fall in value. The cumulative return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) from 1990 through 2001 was 281 percent, while the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) developed-country index posted a return of only 12.4 percent even without counting Japan. The MSCI emerging-market index posted a mere 7.7 percent return. The US capital-account surplus in turn finances the US trade deficit. Moreover, any asset, regardless of location, that is denominated in dollars is a US asset in essence. When oil is denominated in dollars through US state action and the dollar is a fiat currency, the US essentially owns the world's oil for free. And the more the US prints greenbacks, the higher the price of US assets will rise. Thus a strong-dollar policy gives the US a double win. Historically, the processes of globalization has always been the result of state action, as opposed to the mere surrender of state sovereignty to market forces. Currency monopoly of course is the most fundamental trade restraint by one single government. Adam Smith published Wealth of Nations in 1776, the year of US independence. By the time the constitution was framed 11 years later, the US founding fathers were deeply influenced by Smith's ideas, which constituted a reasoned abhorrence of trade monopoly and government policy in restricting trade. What Smith abhorred most was a policy known as mercantilism, which was practiced by all the major powers of the time. It is necessary to bear in mind that Smith's notion of the limitation of government action was exclusively related to mercantilist issues of trade restraint. Smith never advocated government tolerance of trade restraint, whether by big business monopolies or by other governments. A central aim of mercantilism was to ensure that a nation's exports remained higher in value than its imports, the surplus in that era being paid only in specie money (gold-backed as opposed to fiat money). This trade surplus in gold permitted the surplus country, such as England, to invest in more factories to manufacture more for export, thus bringing home more gold. The importing regions, such as the American colonies, not only found the gold reserves backing their currency depleted, causing free-fall devaluation (not unlike that faced today by many emerging-economy currencies), but also wanting in surplus capital for building factories to produce for export. So despite plentiful iron ore in America, only pig iron was exported to England in return for English finished iron goods. In 1795, when the Americans began finally to wake up to their disadvantaged trade relationship and began to raise European (mostly French and Dutch) capital to start a manufacturing industry, England decreed the Iron Act, forbidding the manufacture of iron goods in America, which caused great dissatisfaction among the prospering colonials. Smith favored an opposite government policy toward promoting domestic economic production and free foreign trade, a policy that came to be known as "laissez faire" (because the English, having nothing to do with such heretical ideas, refuse to give it an English name). Laissez faire, notwithstanding its literal meaning of "leave alone", meant nothing of the sort. It meant an activist government policy to counteract mercantilism. Neo-liberal free-market economists are just bad historians, among their other defective characteristics, when they propagandize "laissez faire" as no government interference in trade affairs. A strong-dollar policy is in the US national interest because it keeps US inflation low through low-cost imports and it makes US assets expensive for foreign investors. This arrangement, which Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan proudly calls US financial hegemony in congressional testimony, has kept the US economy booming in the face of recurrent financial crises in the rest of the world. It has distorted globalization into a "race to the bottom" process of exploiting the lowest labor costs and the highest environmental abuse worldwide to produce items and produce for export to US markets in a quest for the almighty dollar, which has not been backed by gold since 1971, nor by economic fundamentals for more than a decade. The adverse effect of this type of globalization on the developing economies are obvious. It robs them of the meager fruits of their exports and keeps their domestic economies starved for capital, as all surplus dollars must be reinvested in US treasuries to prevent the collapse of their own domestic currencies. The adverse effect of this type of globalization on the US economy is also becoming clear. In order to act as consumer of last resort for the whole world, the US economy has been pushed into a debt bubble that thrives on conspicuous consumption and fraudulent accounting.

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Heg Bad—Econ

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The unsustainable and irrational rise of US equity prices, unsupported by revenue or profit, had merely been a devaluation of the dollar. Ironically, the current fall in US equity prices reflects a trend to an even stronger dollar, as it can buy more deflated shares. The world economy, through technological progress and non-regulated markets, has entered a stage of overcapacity in which the management of aggregate demand is the obvious solution. Yet we have a situation in which the people producing the goods cannot afford to buy them and the people receiving the profit from goods production cannot consume more of these goods. The size of the US market, large as it is, is insufficient to absorb the continuous growth of the world's new productive power. For the world economy to grow, the whole population of the world needs to be allowed to participate with its fair share of consumption. Yet economic and monetary policy makers continue to view full employment and rising fair wages as the direct cause of inflation, which is deemed a threat to sound money. The Keynesian starting point is that full employment is the basis of good economics. It is through full employment at fair wages that all other economic inefficiencies can best be handled, through an accommodating monetary policy. Say's Law (supply creates its own demand) turns this principle upside down with its bias toward supply/production. Monetarists in support of Say's Law thus develop a phobia against inflation, claiming unemployment to be a necessary tool for fighting inflation and that in the long run, sound money produces the highest possible employment level. They call that level a "natural" rate of unemployment, the technical term being NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). It is hard to see how sound money can ever lead to full employment when unemployment is necessary to maintain sound money. Within limits and within reason, unemployment hurts people and inflation hurts money. And if money exists to serve people, then the choice becomes obvious. Without global full employment, the theory of comparative advantage in world trade is merely Say's Law internationalized. No single economy can profit for long at the expense of the rest of an interdependent world. There is an urgent need to restructure the global finance architecture to return to exchange rates based on purchasing-power parity, and to reorient the world trading system toward true comparative advantage based on global full employment with rising wages and living standards. The key starting point is to focus on the hegemony of the dollar. To save the world from the path of impending disaster, we must: # promote an awareness among policy makers globally that excessive dependence on exports merely to service dollar debt is self-destructive to any economy; # promote a new global finance architecture away from a dollar hegemony that forces the world to export not only goods but also dollar earnings from trade to the US; # promote the application of the State Theory of Money (which asserts that the value of money is ultimately backed by a government's authority to levy taxes) to provide needed domestic credit for sound economic development and to free developing economies from the tyranny of dependence on foreign capital; # restructure international economic relations toward aggregate demand management away from the current overemphasis on predatory supply expansion through redundant competition; and # restructure world trade toward true comparative advantage in the context of global full employment and global wage and environmental standards.

Heg hurts the economy

Hegemony’s financial toll is not sustainable and rising – economic decline is inevitable if America pursues primacy, making power, itself, unsustainable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Bradley Thayer” p 124-6

In fact, if anything, the costs of the American Empire are likely to increase in coming years. There are two reasons for this. First, there is the spiraling cost of the Iraq quagmire. As some readers may recall, the Bush II admin-istration's economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, was fired because he daredto predict that the cost of the Iraq war, and its aftermath, might reach $200billion. The administration predicted that the war itself would cost no morethan $50-$60 billion and that Iraq would pay for its own postwar recoveryfrom oil sales. Of course, the United States to date has borne most of the costof Iraq's postwar recovery. As far as the ultimate economic costs of the war areconcerned, it is apparent that the administration's $50-$60 billion estimate was a projection right out of Fantasyland. Recently, Joesph Sitglitz (a Nobellaureate in economics) and Linda Bilmes have indicated that, at the end of theday, the budgetary cost of the war will be somewhere between $750 billionand $1,184 billion (which includes, among other things, the costs of militaryoperations, Veterans Administration costs attributable to the war, increaseddefense spending, and additional interest on the national debt). Moreover, they estimate that the direct and indirect costs of the war to the U.S. economywill be between $1,026 billion and $1,854 billion." 'The second reason that defense spending is likely to increase is the simple fact that the U.S. military is not large enough to meet all of America's imperial commitments. Since the Cold War's end, the United States has shown everysign of succumbing to the"hegemon' temptation"—the temptation to use itsmilitary power promiscuously—and Iraq, along with the simultaneous criseswith Iran and North Korea, have highlighted the mismatch between America'shegemonic ambitions and the military resources available to support them. To maintain its dominance, the American military will have to be expanded in size, because it is too small to meet present—and likely future—commit-ments.'sNo one can say for certain how long significant U.S. forces will needto remain in Iraq (and Afghanistan), but it's safe to say that substantial num-bers of troops will be there for a long time. At the same time, in addition to theongoing War on Terrorism (and the concomitant requirements of homeland defense), the United States faces possible future conflicts with North Korea,Iran, and China. During the past fifteen years or so since the Soviet Union's collapse, theUnited States was able to postpone the need to grapple with the painful issuesKennedy raised in 1987. However, the chickens are coming home to roost,and those questions soon will have to be faced. Gilpin's 1987 description ofAmerica's grand strategic and economic dilemmas is, if anything, even moretimely today: With a decreased rate of economic growth and. a low rate of nationalsavings, the United States was living and defending commitments farbeyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power backinto balance once again, the United. States would one day have to cutback further on its overseas commitments, reduce the American stan-dard of living, or decrease domestic productive investment even morethan it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was threat-ened. by a potentially devastating fiscal crisis." At some point, the relative decline of U.S. economic power that is in the offing will bring American primacy to an end. In the shorter term, however, theUnited States can prolong its primacy if Americans are willing to pay the pricein terms of higher taxes, reduced consumption, and curtailment of domesticprograms. But, of course, there is a treadmill-like aspect to preserving the American Empire, because perpetuating it will hasten the weakening of the economic base upon which it rests.

Heg hurts the economy

**Hegemony causes economic collapse – current economic crisis proves**

**Eland 9 (**Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, B.A. Iowa State University, M.B.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University, Ivan, The Independent Institute, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, May 11th, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498)

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

A2 Hegemony solves economy

Withdrawal will not threaten U.S. growth – trade ties take forever tor re-form, American products are always attractive and others can’t afford to cut us off.

Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

A fifth notable argument against restraint is raised by those who believe that a military withdrawal from Europe and Asia would threaten American prosperity more than its security. Even if great power wars are unlikely, without a stabilizing American military presence other great powers may eye each other suspiciously, concern themselves with relative economic gains, and close off the free international flow of goods and capital.107 This argument draws its roots from the literature on hegemonic stability, in which the reigning hegemon (i.e., the United States) must provide international collective goods in order to maintain an open international economic environment.108 If the United States ceases to provide those collective goods, huge prosperity benefits might be at risk. This line of argument is wrong for two reasons: multipolar security competition does not require a focus on relative gains in purely economic affairs, and international economic openness has not historically been maintained by the actions of hegemons. First, among powers of approximately equal strength (as would be the case in Europe after an American withdrawal), the size of the relative economic gains from trade tends to be small compared to the size of the great power economies in question. Consequently, it would take a long time of static trade and alliance relationships for the relative economic gains to translate into a dangerous strategic imbalance. Meanwhile, there is no reason to believe that the trade and alliance relationships would remain static.109 In fact, balance-of-threat theory suggests that, if an imbalance were to emerge, alliance relationships would change in response to the danger. Furthermore, if great powers became concerned by their neighbors’ military strength, they could not afford to waste national resources by distorting their pattern of trade. Protectionism costs money, and high levels of international threat tend to highlight wasteful policies whose reversal might lead to a greater power-generation capability’ 1° Even if threatened states felt the need for economic closure with respect to a particular, threatening adversary for relative gains reasons, none would feel the need for protectionism vis-à-vis the United States. America would be likely to benefit from other countries’ heightened desire to trade with the United States. Finally, history does not confirm the hegemonic stability interpretation of the international economy. Most of the benefits of international openness are selective goods which the United States can capture through bilateral economic policies. For example, the spillover benefits of bilateral trade relationships helped reverse the worldwide economic decline of the 1930s—which the hegemonic stability theorists tend to cite as a crucial case for their theory.tm The bottom line is that it is not American troops deployed overseas that make American products and services attractive to foreign consumers; it is the quality of American goods, the image of America’s prosperity, and the productivity of American workers. None of those factors would be affected by a policy of military restraint.

A2 Hegemony key to trade

Trade ties and economic exchange would be safer in a world of U.S. withdrawal.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 177-8

Advocates of hegemony (and selective engagement) also seem to have a peculiar understanding of international economics and convey the impression that international trade and investment will come to a grinding halt if the United States abandons its current grand strategy—or if a Eurasian great power war occurs. This is not true, however. If the United States abandons its current grand strategic role as the protector of international economic openness, international economic intercourse will not stop, even in time of great power war.110 If the United States were to adopt an offshore balancing grand strategy, its own and global markets would adapt to the new political and strategic environment. Finns and investors would reassess the risks of overseas trade and investment, and over time investment and trade flows would shift in response to these calculations. Instead of being diminished, international trade and investment would be diverted to more geopolitically secure regions, and these "safe havens"—especially the United States—would be the beneficiaries. Finally, the assumption that a Eurasia dominated by a hegemon would be closed economically to the United States is dubious. AEurasian hegemon would have a stake in its own economic well-being (bothfor strategic and domestic political reasons), and it would be most unlikely to hive itself off completely from international trade.

\*\*\*Middle East Prolif\*\*\*

Hegemony Bad: Middle East Prolif

First, US hegemony in the Middle East is would encourage the development of nuclear weapons in the region undermining

Yale Global **‘0**4(“Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/gulf-security-globalizing-world-going-beyond-us-hegemony, June 29, 2004) BW

Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US “friends and allies” on one side, and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, and this decision would be based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those “rogue” states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a “regime conversion” or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as “bad” in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counter-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states’ security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran.

\*\*\*Unsustainability\*\*\*Unsustainability – General

Globalization and technological expansion.

**Corocran 2k9** (Ed, Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org) [United States Global Leadership](http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090619392-united-states-global-leadershi.htm), Globalsecurity.org, 6/19 <http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090619392-united-states-global-leadershi.htm>

European allies are declining to support various US initiatives, in particular they are reluctant to provide combat elements to the struggle in Afghanistan. Russia, with an increasingly autocratic leadership, is developing a significant economic leverage over Europe thanks to its large energy resources. China is becoming more and more assertive on the international stage. Even in Latin America, the United States faces new challenges with drug wars in Mexico spilling over into the US southwest and new autocratic regimes consolidating their position in Bolivia and Venezuela. And in the Far East, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile developments not only threaten stability there, but also raise the potential for nuclear materials to leak to radical elements and complicate global nonproliferation efforts.
On top of this, globalization is presenting a whole new set of challenges to the United States. The rise of China with its vast manufacturing capability has significantly increased the attractiveness of overseas production for many US firms and helped to seriously undermine the US job market. But there is a deeper global transformation than just the potential for overseas production - it is the potential for overseas intellectual work. The internet has suddenly put Indian managers, Chinese engineers, and Russian programmers in direct competition with skilled US workers, often providing comparable services at a fraction of US wage and benefit costs. Around the world, citizens are demanding an increased share of global wealth. It is no longer possible to sustain a prosperous island of industrialized nations in a global sea of relative poverty. Increased resource competition, already seen in the oil market, is only one manifestation of this challenge. On top of this, the effects of climate change are only beginning to be felt. The impact in the decades ahead is unclear, but what is clear is that this impact will be negative and could be profoundly destabilizing. And as recent outbreaks of bird flu have shown, devastating pandemics are also possible.

International perceptions, public disenchantment and structural barriers to hegemony.

**Corocran 2k9** (Ed, Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org) [United States Global Leadership](http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090619392-united-states-global-leadershi.htm), Globalsecurity.org, 6/19 <http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090619392-united-states-global-leadershi.htm>

Within the United States, there is widespread disillusionment with the international situation, exacerbated by the current global economic crisis. The nation has no visible or coherent strategy; it is reacting piecemeal to the threats and challenges it faces.
Global leadership is urgently needed. The United Nations is incapable of providing this, particularly since decisions in its core leadership, the Security Council, often pit the United States against Russia, China, or both. The only nation capable of providing the needed global leadership is the United States, but it is withdrawing from this role, becoming more of an ordinary state, no longer a state forcefully promoting freedom and democracy. At the same time that it needs it badly, the world is rejecting US leadership for several major, and even contradictory, reasons. The United States is widely seen as arrogant, particularly after its unilateral decision to invade Iraq and the subsequent refutation of its core justification: Iraqi WMD. Beyond that, the United States declines to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to accede to the World Court, or to join in international efforts to address global warming. The United States appears ready to tell other nations what they should do, but as unwilling to be told anything itself.

US ideals are seen as hollow, mere cover for efforts at domination. The United States preaches democracy but supports autocrats, while providing little assistance to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Haiti which are struggling to develop democratic institutions. It proclaims religious freedom even while loud and highly placed individuals assert it is a Christian nation and Muslims are increasingly discriminated against. Similarly, racism, supposedly vanquished, seems alive and well in discrimination against Hispanic immigrants and Middle Easterners. More recently, the rule of law has been a cover for illegal seizures and torture.

Although US ideals are widely seen as discredited, they still inspire patriots around the world and still pose a challenge to autocratic regimes everywhere. So it is no wonder that such regimes disparage US actions, oppose US initiatives, and loudly publicize US shortcomings.

The United States is seen as the primary source of the current global economic recession. This is particularly true in Russia where market and political reforms in the 1990s led not to prosperity but to widespread impoverishment on the one hand contrasted sharply with the rise of oligarchs appropriating the most attractive economic assets of the former Soviet Union. Historical ambivalence toward the West, reinforced by decades of Communist anti-Western propaganda, brought widespread disillusionment, including suspicions that the West had intentionally and maliciously manipulated Russia into a clearly inferior position. The eventual global outcome of the current economic challenges is still problematical, but the preeminent economic position of the United States has unquestionably been undermined.

The United States is seen as a nation in decline. Its vaunted military forces are bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems unable to stabilize Pakistan or to respond to Iranian and North Korean provocations, not to mention unable to address repression in Burma, Sudan and even Venezuela.

Unsustainability – General

Heg will inevitably collapse – attempting to hold on makes the decline worse

**Pape 09** professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (Robert, Empire Falls, National Interest, 1/22)

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied,not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but ratherby a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position**.** Further,the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming**.** America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms—the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school—the United States has already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning,since China will soon have as much economic potential to balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from 1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished, whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition that could approximate America’s potential power**.** Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a serious possibility.So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures—relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see “the conflict of history” repeat itself. Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey**,** to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay**,** complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend.True, the UnitedStates remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up tothecollective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously.Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade**.** The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.   A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this great-power trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China’s increasing power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China’s economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world’s leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer—indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040—and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely doomed to failure. China’s growth turns mainly on domestic issues—such as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areas—that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although China’s growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfire—and only exacerbate America’s problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for future growth**.** Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces

Continued…

Unsustainability – General

Continued…

bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO **to** Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent**.** If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy?Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy.With30percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put America’s grand strategy into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades**.** Together, these factors point toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades.America needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels in Europe and Asia**,** even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end**.** True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America’s declining relative power.The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran’s nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard’s Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America’s environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America’s new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma**.** This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete**,** other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.

Unsustainability – Modernization

Imperialist hegemony is not sustainable – modernization has accelerated the capability and likelihood of balancing that past empires did not contend with.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 206-8

It is revealing to contemplate Figure 8, which shows how the longevity of empires has shrunk dramatically of late. More importantly, it suggests that in our time the exercise of international influence is likely to be both too costly and eventually counterproductive, if it comes to be seen by others as involving a reversion to imperial domination. Therein lies animportant lesson for the world's currently dominant power: the only way to exercise leadership is through subtle indirection and consensual rule. America'smodel is neither the Ro-man nor the British empire; perhaps in the future theChinese may draw a more relevant lesson from their imperialpast of how a deferential tributary system can work. In any case, the combined impact of global political awakening and modern technology contributes to the accelerationof political history.What once took centuries now takes a decade; what took a decade now happens in a single year. The paramountcy of any power will henceforth come under mounting pressure for adaptation, alteration, and eventual abolition.The dynamism of a populist—nationalist awakening on every continent involving the empowerment of the hitherto largely passive majority of humanity signals not only that traditional empires have seen their day but that heavy-handed global domination by a single state will not historically endure.

Unsustainability – Defense Spending

**Defense funding cuts will cause a decrease in U.S. heg**

Robert **Kagan**. Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and served in the State Department from 1984 to 1988 as a member of the Policy Planning Staff. "No Time To Cut Defense." The Washington Post. Pg. A15. 2/3/**09**. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/AR2009020202618.html>

It doesn't make fiscal sense to cut the defense budget when everyone is scrambling for measures to stimulate the economy. Already, under the current Pentagon budget, defense contractors will begin shutting down production lines in the next couple of years -- putting people out of work. Rather than cutting, the Obama administration ought to be increasing defense spending. As Harvard economist Martin Feldstein recently noted on this page, defense spending is exactly the kind of expenditure that can have an immediate impact on the economy. · A reduction in defense spending this year would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the **U**nited **S**tates is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the **U**nited **S**tates to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun.

Balancing must—read\*\*\*

Balancing will precede bandwagoning and cooperation – the power asymmetry that maintains a semblance of stability will last longer without hegemony.

G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan Fall 2004 “liberal realism: the foundations of a democratic foreign policy” The National Interest http://www.aspenberlin.org/interesting\_articles.php?iGedminId=72

It is misguided, however, to assume that America′s preponderant power, when combined with an assertive unilateralism, promotes stability as a matter of course. As the record of the past four years makes clear, the unfettered exercise of U.S. primacy has not led to deference and bandwagoning, but to resentment and incipient balancing. The problem is not unipolarity per se, but changes in the exercise of U.S. power that have in turn changed foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions and how the United States will use its preponderant strength. A dominant America that reassures others and deploys its power to secure public goods induces systemic stability; unfettered primacy deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite. The Bush Administration′s grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U.S. primacy is durable. To be sure, America′s economic and military might ensures that it will remain the world′s leading nation for decades to come. But current power asymmetries will inevitably diminish in the years ahead. The European Union′s wealth already rivals that of the United States, and it may well forge a more independent and unified security policy as this decade proceeds. Over the course of the next decade, Japan may tire of always following America′s lead, China will emerge as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and more assertive players. It will be impossible for the United States to sustain current power asymmetries. Indeed, if America seeks to preserve unipolarity and its attendant sway over global affairs, it will only ensure that other centers of power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States.

Everybody is leaving America’s bandwagon – even allies are acting independently.

Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier

Rather than rallying behind the United States, countries around the world are distancing themselves from Washington and locking arms to resist a wayward America. France, Germany, and Russia did their best to block America's rush to war against Iraq; the Western alliance is unlikely to survive the transatlantic rift that has opened. After North Korea restarted its nuclear weapons program, South Korea, China, and Japan all made clear they would not back Washington's refusal to negotiate bilaterally with Pyongyang. Anti-American sentiment has been on the rise in just about every quarter of the globe.[1] Even in countries that have for decades been close U.S. allies — such as Germany and South Korea — politicians are winning office by running on platforms calling for independence from Washington. America seems well on its way to compromising perhaps its most precious asset — its international legitimacy.

Counter–balancing

U.S. hegemony is not sustainable – it’s only a matter of time before rivals emerge.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 64-5

Can the United States Be Caught?Upto a point, the primacists are correct. Interms of hard power, there is a yawning gap between the United States and thenext-ranking powers. It will take some time before any other state emergesas a true"peer competitor" of the United States. Nevertheless, at some point within the next decade or two, new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. To put it slightly differently, American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic, not static, which means thattat any point in time some states are gaining inrelative power while others are losing it. Thus, as Paul Kennedy has observed, no great power ever has been able"to remain permanently ahead of all others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growthrates, technological advance, and military developments which has existedsince time immemorial."36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to betrue, which is why they concede that American primacy won't last forever.Indeed, the leading primacists acknowledge, that—at best—the United Stateswill not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. There are indi-cations, however, that American primacy could end much sooner than that.Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the processof emerging. This is what the current debate in the United States about theimplications of China's rise is all about. But China isn't the only factor in play, and transition from U.S. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. For example, in its survey of likely internationaldevelopments up until 2020, the CIA'sNational Intelligence Council's reportMapping the Global Futurenotes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the UnitedStates in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as theAmerican Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time whensome in the developing world led by China and India came into theirown." In a similar vein, a recent study by the CIA's Strategic Assessment Groupprojects that by 2020 both China (whichMapping the Global Futurepegs as"by any measure a first-rate military power" around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power." For sure, there are always potential pitfalls in pro-jecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is noteasy to convert economic power into effective military power). But if the ongo-ing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power inthe international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two.The real issue is not if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end.

Soft balancing

Soft balancing undermines American diplomatic channels, which facilitates anti-American coalitions and hard balancing.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 144-5

Soft balancing is a concession to the disparity in military power between the United States and other major states in today's international system.48 Soft balancing relies on diplomacy—conducted through ad hoc coalitions or through international institutions—and, rather than challenging U.S. hegemony directly, it seeks to constrain the United States and limit Washington's ability to impose its policy preferences on others. The key idea underlying soft balancing is that by coordinating their diplomacy and lending one another mutual support, soft balancers can gain outcomes vis-a-vis the United States that they could not obtain by acting separately. To date, soft balancing has taken two forms. First, the second-tier major powers have cooperated—either through informal ententes or by creating organizational structures—to rein in America's exercise of hegemonic power. Examples include periodic summit meetings (Sino-Russian, Franco-Russian, Sine-Indian-Russian) that pledge cooperation to restore multipolarity, and the Shanghai Cooperation Council, created by Moscow and Beijing to coordinate efforts to resist the intrusion of U.S. power into Central Asia.49 The second-tier major powers also engage in "binding" strategies that seek to enmesh the United States in international institutions, to ensure that it is restrained by international law and norms of permissible great power behavior. However, as the combinedefforts of France, Germany, and Russia to use the United Nations to preventthe March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrate, binding is an ineffectivemeans of constraining U.S. hegemony (although perhaps marginally moresuccessful as a means of delegitimizing U.S. unilateral actions). This does notmean, however, that soft balancing is unimportant. After all, grand strategy isabout utilizing the key instruments of a state's power—military, economic,and diplomatic—to advance its interests and to gain security. Diplomacy invariably is an integral component of counterbalancing strategies. Thus, soft balancing's real significance is that, if states learn that they can work together diplomatically in standing up to the United States, the groundwork may belaid for future coalitions that will he able to engage effectively in hard balancing, or semi-hard balancing, against the United States.

U.S. preponderance is spurring soft-balancing now – these indirect efforts will turn into a hard-line counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw.

Robert A. pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” Inernational Security

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.

Soft balancing

Soft balancing is occuring against the United States now – multiple areas prove that hegemony is being undermined.

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” Inernational Security

Soft balancing is replacing traditional hard balancing as the principal reaction of major powers to the Bush administration's preventive war doctrine. Until now, there has been no concept for this form of balancing behavior, and so it has been difficult to detect that the early stages of soft balancing against U.S. power have already started. On August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney called for the United States to launch a preventive war to depose Saddam Hussein. In September the United States issued its new strategy, asserting the right to wage preventive war against rogue states. Shortly thereafter, European, Middle Eastern, and Asian powers undertook a series of steps to contain U.S. military power using soft-balancing instruments. First, France, Sweden, and other European states used institutional rules and procedures in the UN to delay, if not head off completely, U.S. preventive war against Iraq. In the past, the United States has often been able to legitimate foreign and military policies by gaining the approval of the UN Security Council. In September 2002 it sought to gain such sanction for war against Iraq. France, however, threatened to veto the resolution authorizing war -- which would have been the first time a U.S. resolution had ever been vetoed in the Security Council -- unless two conditions were met: (1) the Bush administration would have to accept a serious effort to resolve matters with Iraq through weapons inspections; and (2) it would need to wait for a resolution authorizing war until after the inspections were completed. The administration agreed, even though this meant delaying its plan for war. In March 2003 the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, declared that the inspections had made substantial progress but would take months longer to complete -- a judgment that effectively prevented the United States from gaining the votes necessary for a Security Council resolution in support of the war. Second, Turkey and Saudi Arabia firmly denied the United States the use of their territory for ground forces and have been ambiguous about providing basing rights for logistic efforts and airpower. Turkey is the most important case because Bush administration officials made repeated efforts to gain its cooperation. In January 2003 the administration asked Turkey to allow the deployment of between 60,000 to 90,000 U.S. ground troops who then would cross Turkish territory into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Ankara balked. "The government has indicated its preparedness to meet American requests basically in all areas with the exception of the stationing of a large number of ground forces in Turkey," a Turkish official said. Turkey was strategically important to a low-cost, high-confidence strategy for defeating Iraq. The United States hoped to invade Iraq from Turkey in the north and Kuwait in the south, and so attack Saddam Hussein's overstretched military forces from different directions and quickly overwhelm them. Although U.S. officials expected that they could conduct a successful attack to conquer Iraq even without access to land bases in Turkey, they granted that such a war would be, as one ranking official put it, "harder and uglier." U.S. ships with an infantry division waited off the coast of Turkey for weeks, but the Turkish government remained firm.n62 Third, China and South Korea are attempting to elevate their role in diplomatic negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program, making it more difficult for the United States to use force. In October 2002 North Korea admitted to having an ongoing nuclear weapons program, declaring that in response to the growing U.S. threat to its country from the Bush doctrine of preventive war, it would accelerate its efforts to build nuclear weapons. The North Korean leadership offered to halt the nuclear program if the United States would sign a nonaggression treaty agreeing not to attack their country. While the United States has refused to make this pledge, South Korea has sided with North Korea, asking the United States to sign a nonaggression treaty in return for Pyongyang's agreement to abandon nuclear development and meeting with Japanese and Russian officials to gain their support for this position. December 2002 Gallup polls show that more South Koreans had a positive view of North Korea than of the United States. Of those surveyed, 47 percent felt positively about North Korea, while 37 percent held an unfavorable view. Only 37 percent had a positive view of the United States, while 53 percent viewed it unfavorably. This represented a significant change from 1994 when 64 percent of South Koreans surveyed said they liked the United States and only 15 percent disliked it. Also in December 2002 South Korea elected a new president, Roh Moo Hyun, who advocates continuation of the sunshine policy of engagement with North Korea and who, after the election, met with military officials and instructed them to draw up plans that assume a reduction in U.S. forces stationed there. "The U.S. military presence must be adjusted," says Kim Sangwoo, a foreign policy adviser to Roh.n63 None of these moves directly challenges U.S. military power, but they all make it more difficult for the United States to exercise that power. They impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of U.S. power by entangling the United States in diplomatic maneuvers, reducing the pressure on regional states to cooperate with its military plans, and bolstering the claims of target states that U.S. military threats justify the acceleration of their own military programs. They also establish a new pattern of diplomatic activity: cooperation among major powers that excludes the United States. If the United States remains committed to its unilateral military policies, such soft-balancing measures are likely to become more common. Balancing against a sole superpower such as the United States will have a logic of its own, one perhaps not wholly unique, but one that is nonetheless distinctive to the condition of unipolarity.n64

Historically our argument is true – Marshall plan, Bismarckian Germany.

Robert A. pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” Inernational Security

Soft balancing is most conducive to the politics of unipolar systems, but examples of it can be found in history. Today, the U.S. strategy of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War is thought of as a military strategy, but this is not how it started out. The crucial first step was the Marshall Plan, a massive program of U.S. economic aid to rebuild the shattered industries, agricultural areas, and cities of Europe and Japan in the aftermath of World War II. This economic instrument helped desperate states resist the temptations of communist doctrines of class struggle and revolution; it also integrated Western Europe and Japan into a North Atlantic trading network. Although the Marshall Plan did not create military forces or commit states to use force against the Soviet Union, it was the crucial long-term bond that ensured that the world's key industrial centers would be in the Western camp and that the Soviet Union would remain permanently inferior to it.n60 A second example is Bismarckian Germany. After Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, France remained Bismarck's immediate problem, both because it retained the most latent power of any state on the continent and because it might have tried to avenge its loss. A comprehensive German-led alliance against the French, however, was not possible. Austria, Russia, and Britain were worried about France, but they were also worried about a newly unified Germany, and so could be tempted into an alliance with Paris. Bismarck's solution was to set up a series of cross-cutting alliances and contradictory international commitments that, at its peak, included half of Europe but excluded France. This system was largely useless in case of war, but that was not the point. As Josef Joffe has written, "Bismarck did not construct his system in order to aggregate power but to devalue it -- balancing and stalemating a la Britain, but in totally un-British ways." n61 In other words, this new web of international cooperation isolated and balanced against a potentially superior power not through addition (amassing military forces in opposition) but through dilution (removing capabilities available to the opponent) and without confronting the power of the opponent directly.

Leash-slipping

Other states will seek autonomous military power for self-protection – this hastens transition to multipolarity no matter what the U.S. does.

Christoper Layne Fall, 2006 “The Unipolar Illussion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment” International Security 31.2 (2006) 7-41

The United States' hard power poses a nonexistential (or soft) threat to others' autonomy and interests. By acquiring the capability to act independent of the United States in the realm of security, however, other states can slip free of the hegemon's leash-like grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the [End Page 29] United States to respect their foreign policy interests. As Posen writes, other major states are expected "at a minimum [to] act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the U.S. and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should it become necessary." 81 Leash-slipping is not traditional hard balancing because it is not explicitly directed at countering an existential U.S. threat. At the same time, it is a form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion. 82 As Robert Art puts it, a state adopting a leash-slipping strategy "does not fear an increased threat to its physical security from another rising state; rather it is concerned about the adverse effects of that state's rise on its general position, both political and economic, in the international arena. This concern also may, but need not, include a worry that the rising state could cause security problems in the future, although not necessarily war." 83 If successful, leash-slipping would result in the creation of new poles of power in the international system, thereby restoring multipolarity and bringing U.S. hegemony to an end.

Semi-hard balancing

Semi-hard balancing is ongoing – countries build up military and economic insurance policies in the event of American menace or weakness.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 146-7

In a unipolar world, an existential threat posed by the hegemon's power is not the only incentive for second-tier major powers to counterbalance by building up their military capabilities. America's hard power also poses a nonexistential "soft threat": a threat to the autonomy and interests of potential adversaries and U.S. allies alike. Because of its dominant position, the United States can exercise its power to "shape the international system" inways that promote U.S. interests while simultaneously curbing others' freedom of action and undercutting their interests, especially in regions like the Middle East/Persian Gulf where the interests of the United States and the second-tier major powers could diverge. Moreover, second-tier major powers that are beneficiaries of U.S. protection have reason to hedge against future American unwillingness to continue its regional stabilizer role in Eurasia. For these reasons, the second-tier major powers have strong motivation to engage in `semi"-hard balancing by building up their own military capabilities, even if they have little reason to apprehend that America's hegemonic power threatens their sovereign existence. By investing themselves with thecapability to act autonomously of the United States in the realm of security, the second-tier major powers can constrain the United States, gain bargaining leverage, acquire the means to force the United States to respect their interests abroad rather than running roughshod over them, and ensure they can take care of themselves if the United States withdraws its security umbrella. This kind of balancing is `semi"-hard because it is not explicitly directed at countering a U.S. existential threat. At the same time, however,semi-hard balancing is a form of insurance against a United States that may someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion or decideto abandon them strategically. In a unipolar world, the creation of new polesof power in the international system—even by U.S. allies—is, in itself, semi-hard balancing against hegemonic power. De Gaulle's challenge to U.S.hegemony in the early 1960s was a clear example. Obviously, France did notfear a U.S. invasion. De Gaulle did fear, however, that Europe had surren-dered its military and diplomatic independence to Washington, and his strat-egy aimed to constrain U.S. power and regain Europe's autonomy by creat-ing a new pole of power in the international system that was independent ofU.S. control. The European Union's current "state-building" effort--includ-ing its creation of a common foreign and security policy backed up by in-dependent military capabilities and an integrated European defense indus-try—also is a form of semi-hard balancing against American hegemony.

United States low

United States hegemony is in a state of quick decline.

Immanuel Wallerstein (Senior Research Scholar at Yale University and the former president of the International Sociological Association) Spring, 2007 "Precipitate Decline," Harvard International Review Vol. XXIX, No. 1 p 50

Most analysts contend that the United States was at its hegemonic apex in the post-1991 era when the world was marked by unipolarity, as contrasted with the bipolar structure that existed during the Cold War. But this notion has reality absolutely backwards. The United States was the sole hegemonic power from 1945 to approximately 1970. Its hegemony has been in decline ever since. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major blow to US power in the world. And the invasion of Iraq in 2003 transformed the situation from one of slow decline into one of precipitous collapse. By 2007, the United States had lost its credibility not only as the economic and political leader of the world-system, but also as the dominant military power.

U.S. hegemony is being rejected in every area of the world.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 176-7

The near-term threat of terrorism does not remotely approach that level. Yet when confronted by the possibility of painful but essentially sporadic acts of terrorism, Bush made it a point to designate himself a "wartime" president. Official stoking of public anxiety spawned a huge array of terror "experts"conjuring apocalyptic predictions. The mass media plunged into a competition in popularizing almost on a daily basis their various horror scenarios. As a result a confident national psyche is being transformed into a nation driven by fear. In its present garrison-state mentality, America risks becoming a huge gated community, self-isolated from the world. The nation's tradition of civil rights and its capacity to project itselfworldwide as an appealing and self-confident democracy are diminished. As Global Leader III, George W. Bush misunderstood the historical moment, and in just five years dangerously undermined America's geopolitical position. In seeking to pursue apolicy based on the delusion that "we are an empire now, andwhen we act, we create our own reality," Bush endangered America. Europe is now increasingly alienated. Russia and China are both more assertive and more in step. Asia is turning away and organizing itself while Japan is quietly considering how to make itself more secure. Latin American democracy is becoming populist and anti-American. The Middle East is fragmenting and on the brink of explosion. The world of Islam is inflamed by rising religious passion and anti-imperialist nationalisms. Throughout the world, public opinion polls show that U.S. policy is widely feared and even despised.