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**\*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\***

Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable

U.S. primacy is sustainable

Ye 05 (Min, Ph.D Candidate, Princeton University, “The U.S. Hegemony and Implication for China,” Jan 30, http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf, JH)

Clearly Waltz argued that the unipolarity in the wake of the Cold War was temporary. For one, nations rise and decline. The U.S relative power will decline and it will increasingly become difficult for it to preserve unipolarity, as Robert Gilpin argued. Furthermore, other nations will come into each other’ aid to balance against the U.S, because minor states feel safer to be with other minor states. Waltz’s prediction may not hold, however, if we consider the following aspects of U.S power. First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers— Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable-Econ

America’s economic hegemony is safe

The Times 06 (Gerard Baker, Staff writer, “America's economic hegemony is safe,” Apr 25, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/united\_states/article708963.ece, JH)

Given that the United States is a $12 trillion ($6,700 billion) economy, the new data mean that in the first quarter the US added to global output an amount that, if sustained at that pace for a year, would be about $600 billion — roughly the equivalent of adding one whole new Brazil or Australia to global economic activity every year, just from the incremental extra sweat and heave and click of 300 million Americans. Think of it another way. In an era in which China embodies the hopes and fears of much of the developed world, the US, with a growth rate of half that of China’s, is adding roughly twice as much in absolute terms to global output as is the Middle Kingdom, with its GDP (depending on how you measure it) of between $2 trillion and $4 trillion and its growth of about 10 per cent. Even when you account for the fact that US growth is not going to continue at 5 per cent, but will revert to its trend of more like 3.5 per cent per year, you are still talking about an economy adding more than $400 billion in inflation-adjusted terms every year (not quite Brazil or Australia, but significantly bigger than Switzerland or Belgium) . That means that, on current trends, for at least the next decade the US will actually keep growing in total dollar or yuan numbers by a larger amount than will China (even if the yuan is substantially revalued, by the way). And beyond that ten-year horizon, can anybody really be confident that China will maintain its current rate of growth? (We haven’t even talked here about per capita GDP, where the US advantage will remain unapproachable for decades.) Think of it yet another way: at current economic and population growth rates, the United States — now about 30 per cent larger than the eurozone in GDP — will be twice the size of Europe’s economy in less than 15 years. **I give you this little statistical litany not just for its own intrinsic appeal, but as a healthful antidote to some of the wishful thinking about America’s inevitable decline you can read in the rest of the media.**  Historically speaking, indeed, America’s economic hegemony has never been greater. However messy Iraq and Afghanistan get, it would be unwise to bet that the US will not continue to be Top Nation for quite a while yet. What could undermine long-term US dominance? Some fret that the precarious American fiscal position could do it. However, this is mostly hyperventilation. The fiscal deficit, at a cyclically adjusted 2.5 per cent of GDP, is on the large side, but American public debt as a proportion of GDP — at less than 70 per cent — still puts the United States comfortably among the more frugal of the world’s big nations. The inevitable unravelling of global financial imbalances could certainly harm US demand growth in the short term, as both public and private sectors increase savings, but, assuming these extra savings are efficiently allocated by America’s highly flexible capital markets, they might even end up improving long-run potential. The ageing population will surely crimp American economic activity. Most economists expect trend growth to slip a bit in the early part of the next decade as the proportion of the population in work begins to drop. Yet relative to the rest of the world this may not matter that much. America’s demographics — a reasonable birth rate and strong immigration flows — are actually rather better than for most other industrialised countries. A century ago, China’s population was almost six times that of the US. In 50 years’ time, on current trends, it will be less than three times the size.

Uniqueness: Hegemony High

Trends show strengthening U.S. hegemony

Augustana Chronicle, 2010 (In a troubled world, America still has a multitude of strengths, accessed: 2/22/10, <http://chronicle.augusta.com/2010-02-19/troubled-world-america-still-has-multitude-strengths?v=1266701777>)

With so much in the media that is gloom and doom, it might be useful to remind ourselves that America has many fundamental strengths. Here is a listing of some of the political, economic, technological, cultural, creative and entrepreneurial factors that define the United States today. Largest economy. At $14 trillion, our Gross National Product is the largest in the world. You must add up the three next largest -- Japan ($5.5 trillion), China ($4.5 trillion) and Germany ($ 4 trillion) -- to get to America's total. Best military. Although our services have faced many stresses since 9-11, the U.S. military excels in many ways. The only military with a genuine worldwide reach, it has more combat experience than the military of any other nation. Best alliance/coalition potential. Our ability to find coalition partners has been especially helpful to us in countering terrorism (even the Russians and Chinese assist), and in the war in Afghanistan. Best brain/talent sponge. If you live in another country, are really smart and want to get both a great education and an enlightening work experience, the United States will, in most cases, be your first choice. More and better entrepreneurs. It seems to be in our genes. Productive work force. Whereas Japan led the way in the past, recent analyses by a number of international agencies rank the United States first. Ability to bounce back from major setbacks. Just think of what we have faced in the past 70 years -- Pearl Harbor, 1941; Korea, 1950-53; Sputnik, 1957; Vietnam, 1965-1975; Watergate, 1974; the 9-11 attacks, 2001; and the Great Recession, 2007-2009. Venture capital availability. If you are German, Japanese, Chinese or Brazilian with a great idea or a new invention, finding venture capital within your own nation is very hard. Communications reach and cultural influence. Beginning in the 1940s, America has surpassed all others in reaching even the most remote parts of the world. Natural resources. America's supply of coal and natural gas is enormous. In addition, the potential of solar power is huge. Unlike northern Europe, Russia and northern China, America has a great amount of sunshine. Being windy is another American asset. The English language. For almost 100 years, English has been dominant. Computer power. Led by such corporations as Google, EMC, Cisco, IBM and Intel, America holds the top spot in gross computer power. Culture of lifetime learning. Americans have a great love of learning. A high percentage of mature Americans, often encouraged by company policies on pay and promotions, pursue college and postgraduate education. Technical colleges. These colleges are a treasure for those seeking good jobs. The CSRA has two first-rate schools, Augusta Tech and Aiken Tech. Universities. Sixty-six of the 100 top universities in the world are American. Agricultural sector. Only the Brazilians come close to the productivity of the American farmer. Contributions of philanthropies. It is not just Bill and Melinda Gates who give away money with great skill. Foundations in the CSRA help make our community a better place to live, work and enjoy our lives. Birth rate of 2.1. This ideal birth rate, combined with our ability to attract so many talented and hard working people from other nations, should ensure that we will meet the challenges of the future. Diversity. Having so many of us coming from different national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups allows America to interact comfortably with the world's many cultures. Nanotechnology, biotechnology and genome research. America leads the world. Fundamental optimism. Americans continue to have high confidence in their ability to solve problems, as well as to get things done and done well. This probably is our greatest strength. I would like to close on a personal note. In the more than 75 years that I have had the blessing of being an American, only twice have I been pessimistic about America's future. First, in the period between the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle of Midway (I had witnessed the attack, and in the months following I read lots of scary headlines about Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Singapore and Bataan). Second, in 1969 when I returned from Vietnam and observed America in turmoil. **In sum, sustained pessimism can create a death spiral for any organization or institution. Tough-minded realism with an overlay of optimism is the key to our future.**

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\*\*\*Hegemony Good Frontline\*\*\*

Hegemony Good Frontline (1)

1. U.S. withdrawal is worse than the status quo–escalation and economic collapse would draw will cause multiple escalatory conflicts globally dragging the United States back into conflict

Robert J. Lieber (Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University) 2005 The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century p 53-4

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,21 elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan world have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons — which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

2. American decline threatens extinction – withdrawal would be the largest mistake in the history of geopolitics

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Christopher Layne” p 118

To abandon its leadership role would be a fundamental mistake of American grand strategy. Indeed, in the great history of the United States, there is no parallel, no previous case, where the United States has made such a titanic grand strategic blunder. It would surpass by far its great mistake of 1812, when the young and ambitious country gambled and declared war against a mighty empire, the British, believing London was too distracted by the tremendous events on the Continent—the formidable military genius of Napoleon and the prodigious threat from the French empire and its allies--to notice while it conquered Canada. The citizens of the United States cannot pretend that, by weakening ourselves, other countries will be nice and respect its security and interests. To suggest this implies a naiveté and innocence about international politics that would be charming, if only the consequences of such an opinion were not so serious. Throughout its history, the United States has never refrained from acting boldly to secure its interests. It should not be timid now. Many times in the great history of the United States, the country faced difficult decisions—decisions of confrontation or appeasement--and significant threats--the British, French, Spanish, Germans, Italians, Japanese, and Soviets. It always has recognized those threats and faced them down, to emerge victorious. The United States should have the confidence to do so now against China not simply because to do so maximizes its power and security or ensures it is the dominant vice in the world's affairs, but because it is the last, best hope of humanity.

Hegemony Good Frontline (2)

3. Maintaining dissuasion power is key to prevent global instability

Thayer 07 (Bradley A.; Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; American Empire: A Debate – Reply to Christopher Lane: The Strength of American Empire; pg 103)

In contrast to Layne’s argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible.

4. Multipolarity is worse and transition will be rough Even if all major power joined they will not replace American leadership

Zbigniew Brzezinski (Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of foreign policy @ Johns Hopkins) 2004 “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership” p 2-4

In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Chula. Only the United States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in everyone of the twenty-year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before.' The former major European powers—Great Britain, Germany, and France—are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena. Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan's population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next "superstate" now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among the above—a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims—would lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove. Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America's leadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hegemony would not dampen the dashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions—in the event of America's decline—could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerously the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction.

Hegemony Good Frontline (3)

5. No risk of a turn--U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars.

Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 “A World Without Power,” FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

**\*\*\*Terminal Impacts\*\*\***

Khalilzad 95

U.S. hegemony solves nuclear war.

Zalmay Khalilzad (Dep. Secretary of Defense) Spring 1995 The Washington Quarterly

A world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts. Finally, US leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival, enabling the US and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.

Thayer 06 (1)

Hegemony solves great power wars, economic growth and stability, and human rights

Bradley A. Thayer, November/December, 2006 “In Defense of Primacy,” NATIONAL INTEREST Issue 86

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are

CONTINUED…

Thayer 06 (2)

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facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74 000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

Great Power Wars (1)

US hegemony key to maintain world stability and check back major wars

Thayer 2007(Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB) Stability –

Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent.

Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome’s power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too. So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. his is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its “normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.

Primacy prevents great power wars

Thayer 7 [Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007,//HS]

So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its “normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.

Hegemony solves great power wars

Thayer 07 (Bradley A.; Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; American Empire: A Debate – Reply to Christopher Lane: The Strength of American Empire; pg 103)

In contrast to Layne’s argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible.

Great Power Wars (2)

U.S. primacy solves nuclear war

Thayer 07 (Bradley A.; Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; American Empire: A Debate – Reply to Christopher Lane: The Strength of American Empire; pg 103)

If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. hey would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse of than it is now. That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It wields enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it.

Collapse guarantees multiple conflicts globally

**Thayer 07** (Bradley A.; Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; *American Empire: A Debate* – Reply to Christopher Lane: The Strength of American Empire; pg 103)

**There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy**. Primacy is the best and most effective means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic “alternative” is a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United States and for other countries. **A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. hat is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United States** Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. **It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States** like Japan and Turkey.

Hegemony Deters War

U.S. hegemony prevents conflict escalation

Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at Carnegie, FDCH, September 30, 1999

There have in recent weeks and months been numerous after-action reports on how the war in Kosovo was conducted. There has been much discussion of whether the air campaign was successful, whether it was waged correctly from the beginning, and whether planning for a ground war was the decisive factor in Milosevic's eventual capitulation. But there has been almost no discussion of whether the war itself could have been avoided or whether the objectives could have been achieved with less force and, above all, without the frightful toll in human life that occurred when Serbia launched its offensive against the Kosovo Albanian population. I want to congratulate this committee for focusing today on this latter question. Much attention is paid to how we wage war. Far too little attention is paid to the question of how to deter it. There is perhaps no more important topic for the American foreign policy community, for the Congress and for future administrations. And let us be clear. The question is not merely how to prevent humanitarian disasters like those which occurred in Kosovo, in Rwanda a few years ago, and in East Timor most recently. As was true in the case of Kosovo, there often more than humanitarian issues at stake in such crises. In the future, too, interests and morality will often intersect, and the United States and its allies will have to act both to save innocent victims from slaughter and to defend vital interests in important regions of the world. The main task of the United States in the coming decades is going to be to deter conflict, and the requirements of deterrence are pretty much the same regardless of whether the goal is the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe or the defense of vital national interests. In recent years we have focused on deterring conflict in the Balkans. Over the next decade, I predict we will be increasingly consumed with deterring conflict across the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean peninsula, in South Asia, and in the Persian Gulf, areas of unmistakably vital strategic significance to the United States.

Hegemony solves great power war – no scenario for conflict

Michael Mandelbaum, Director of the American Foreign Policy program at the Johns Hopkins University. Foreign Policy. Washington: Jan/Feb 2006. , Iss. 152; pg. 50, 7 pgs. “David’s Friend Goliath.”

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan’s neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

Historically, primacy solves global power conflict – the soviets just backed down

Keir Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, July/August 2007, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/china-nukes

The previous period of American nuclear primacy--the 1950s and early 1960s--illustrates some of the strategic implications of such preeminence. The United States was able to force the Soviet Union to concede during a series of crises over Berlin from 1958 to 1961. At the peak of the 1961 Berlin crisis, President Kennedy carefully explored launching a surprise nuclear attack to disarm Soviet forces. Soviet leaders, although unaware of these deliberations, knew that any escalation was a losing proposition for them, and they backed down.

A2: Miscalculation

U.S. credibility prevents miscalculation

Ronald Bosrock, Chair of Management at St. John's University and is the founder and director of the Institute for Global Expansion, Star Tribune, December 27, 1999

As we enter the 21st century the conditions calling for a strong U.S. role have increased dramatically. In order for globalization to deliver the promises of a better life for much of the world, the strategy will have to be one of global interdependence rather than global dominance. The United States should play role of broker or moderator. The protesters at the recent World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle had some legitimate complaints. Globalization has provided the benefits of a worldwide economy to only a relatively small number of the Earth's 6 billion inhabitants. In part this disappointment is because the WTO, IMF, World Bank and other agents of economic distribution have lacked a strong and consistent hand of leadership. Only the United States and its partners can bring that to the ever-growing numbers of participants in the global economy. Competition for the world's resources continues to get more crowded as players such as China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, to name a few, jockey for position. It cannot be in the best interest of the United States or any of the current developed economies to allow a vacuum of leadership to develop. When no one is willing to lead, the threat of miscalculation becomes greatest \_ and that could lead to confrontation. If the good guys won't lead, you can only be too sure that the bad guys will be willing to. Recently we have seen China make a bid for entrance into the WTO at the same time Russia looks to China for support because of our somewhat feeble reaction to the mainly civilian war in Chechnya. Russia has made it clear that it does not intend to be left behind in the struggle for globalization. And China has made it clear that it, not Japan, is to be the new Asian superpower.

And, Even if miscalculation does occur U.S. nuclear counterforce missions prevent escalation

Charles Glaser, Professor of the School of Public Policy Studies at U Chicago, Steven Feter, Professor at the school of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, 2005, “Counterforce Revisited,” International Security, 30.2, 84-126

Although not addressed in the available portions of the NPR, the ability of the United States to destroy the adversary’s nuclear weapons before they are launched would have essentially the same effect. Reducing U.S. vulnerability would limit the effectiveness of the adversary’s deterrent, thereby increasing U.S. willingness to intervene in pursuit of its foreign policy interests. Both pre-emptive and retaliatory attacks could provide this benefit, but in somewhat different ways. U.S. preemption, if perfectly effective, would deny the adversary the option of escalating, thereby enabling the United States to act in the region without fear of nuclear attack; even a partially effective attack would reduce U.S. vulnerability to a small nuclear force. In contrast, U.S. threats of second use of nuclear weapons, intended to destroy any nuclear forces that an adversary holds in reserve following its initial use of nuclear weapons, would enhance the ability of the United States to deter the adversary’s escalation to nuclear use, which would in turn reduce the risks of U.S. intervention in the region.

\*\*\*Impact Modules\*\*\*

\*\*\*Economy\*\*\*

Economy Module

**U.S. hegemony key to world economic prosperity**

**Thayer 7** (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB)

Stability – Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefits, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that “economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability”; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and “we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity…business follows the lag.”60 • Bradley A. Thayer Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard “evidence and experience” that stemmed from “working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career” caused this profound change.61 Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order “has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity.”62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States, Lal argues, to use the LIEO to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity

Impact is nuclear war

Mead ‘92

The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.

Hegemony Key to the Economy-Oil

Loss of hegemony means countries can sell oil in something besides dollars – destroys the economy

Petrov 06 (Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D, professor of Macroeconomics, International Finance & Econometrics, American University in Bulgaria, interviewed by Kaleem Hussain, LLB, LLM in International Economic Law, Warwick University, UK, in “Global Economic Hegemony: A New Kind of Warfare?” Mar 15, Information Clearing House, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12346.htm, JH)

Dr. Krassimir Petrov: In 1971, as it became clearer and clearer that the U.S Government would not be able to buy back its dollars in gold, it made in 1972-73 an iron-clad arrangement with Saudi Arabia to support the power of the House of Saud in exchange for accepting only U.S. dollars for its oil. The rest of OPEC was to follow suit and also accept only dollars. Because the world had to buy oil from the Arab oil countries, it had the reason to hold dollars as payment for oil. Because the world needed ever increasing quantities of oil at ever increasing oil prices, the world's demand for dollars could only increase. Even though dollars could no longer be exchanged for gold, they were now exchangeable for oil. The economic essence of this arrangement was that the dollar was now backed by oil. As long as that was the case, the world had to accumulate increasing amounts of dollars, because they needed those dollars to buy oil. As long as the dollar was the only acceptable payment for oil, its dominance in the world was assured, and the American empire could continue to tax the rest of the world. If, for any reason, the dollar lost its oil backing, the American empire would cease to exist. Thus, imperial survival dictated that oil be sold only for dollars. It also dictated that oil reserves were spread around various sovereign states that weren't strong enough, politically or militarily, to demand payment for oil in something else. If someone demanded a different payment, he had to be convinced, either by political pressure or military means, to change his mind. Dr. Krassimir Petrov: The U.S Government has supported the Saudi government for many years both economically and militarily. If the Iron Clad Agreement was no longer viable, I am sure that the U.S Government would use all its economic and military power to restore its ascendancy in the region. The other nations that would benefit, would be the likes of China, Russia & the Asian countries. Many countries in the region would cherish the opportunity to curtail the U.S. monopoly in this area. Although many and I included would like to see the day when these oil rich nations disenfranchise themselves from the U.S. and the dollar, the likelihood of it happening in the foreseeable future is very minimal.

Econ key to Hege

The economy is key to hegemonic power.

DuBoff03(Richard, is Professor Emeritus of Economics, Bryn Mawr College, CBS Moneywatch.com, “US hegemony: continuing decline, enduring danger” Dec 03, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is_7_55/ai_111503528/pg_11/?tag=content;col1>, 6/26/10, HR)

"Global hegemony" might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing, regulating, and stabilizing the world political economy. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony, but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests, and it raises the danger of imperial overreach, as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899-1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962-1975).

Brink-Small Decline Now=Collapse

Small economic decline creates a self fulfilling prophecy of economic collapse.

Samuelson, 6/14 (Robert J. Samuelson, contributing editor of the Washington Post, “Our economy’s crisis of confidence”, June 14 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/13/ AR2010061303330.html?hpid=opinionsbox1, 6/26/10, HR)It's psychology, stupid**.**

Not since World War II has an economic recovery been so hobbled by poor confidence. Every recession leaves a legacy of anxiety and uncertainty. But the present residue is exceptional because the recession was savage and -- more important -- its origins (housing bubble, financial crisis) were unfamiliar. People are super-sensitive to the latest news, for good or ill, because their vision of the future is blurred and their bias is gloomy. Having underrated economic risk during the boom, Americans may be overrating it now. Unfortunately, perceptions can become self-fulfilling. The Obama administration is grappling uneasily with this reality. It can rightly claim that its economic policies quelled the near-hysteria of late 2008 and early 2009. But the success was partial, and the administration isn't getting much credit even for that. Only 23 percent of the public say President Obama's policies have improved the economy, reports a new Pew survey. By contrast, 29 percent think his policies made matters worse and 38 percent believe they made no difference. For or against, those policies haven't restored faith in the economy's underlying strength. The danger is that pessimism feeds on itself and leads to a dreaded "double-dip" recession. Companies won't hire because they fear customers won't spend; and customers don't spend because they fear companies won't hire -- or may fire. For the moment, a double-dip seems a long shot. Private hiring has restarted; inventories have been depleted; strong growth in China, Brazil and India has boosted U.S. exports; psychology could turn for the better. Still, the fact that some knowledgeable observers fear a renewed recession attests to the low state of confidence.

A2: China Challenges Econ

China can’t challenge us in economic might or leadership

Holmes 10 (Kim R., former assistant Secretary of State, Ph.D from Georgetown, “When China Rules the World? Sorry, Not Likely,” Feb 24, Heritage Foundation, first appeared in the Washington Times, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/02/When-China-Rules-the-World-Sorry-Not-Likely, JH)

There's lots of loose talk these days about how China will some day "rule the world." Some people who look forward to a "post-American world" seem to assume that China will either emerge as a great power equal to the United States or take on sole outright leadership of the world. China is indeed on the rise. Its economy grew at an 8.7 percent rate last year. It is modernizing its military with a vengeance, thanks to double-digit growth in defense spending each year since the early 1990s. And its official holdings of around $800 billion in U.S. Treasuries lead some to fear that China has become America's banker. But China has a long way to go to replace America as a world leader. Concerns about its influence and control over the U.S. economy are overblown. So, too, are predictions that its rising military power will lead to world leadership. Yes, China may someday surpass the U.S. as the world's largest economy, but this does not mean that it would become the world's economic leader. China's economy is as large as it is because it has well over a billion people, not because it has unlocked any great secret to economic prosperity. Its economy remains largely closed, as indicated in its abysmal ranking of 140 out of 179 countries graded on this year's Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom. Its undervalued currency, state-controlled export policies and closed domestic economy are wholly out of step with what truly makes a global economic leader - namely, economic liberalization. Nor should we fear China's ownership of U.S. debt. As my colleague, Derek Scissors, explains, there is little danger that China will be able to control America's economy. Official Chinese holdings of Treasuries amount to less than 7 percent of U.S. Treasury debt. That's a lot of money, unfortunately, but it's hardly enough to exercise control. Not only that, China's ownership of our debt is actually a sign of dependence on us, rather than the other way around. The Chinese have no choice but to buy U.S. bonds, because ours is the only market sound enough and big enough to park their excess funds. Since China's currency is tightly controlled, they can't spend those dollars on their own economy. They invest even more in the U.S. economy, thus funneling billions of dollars we spend on Chinese goods right back to us. If anything, China's investment in U.S. bonds reflects domestic weakness. If Beijing's economy were freer, the Chinese could invest in their own economy instead. But they know this is bad idea under current conditions. China's authoritarianism is like a yoke around its own neck. It both fosters investment in the U.S. economy and blocks domestic reforms that would enable China to compete in an open economic system.

A2: BRIC (1)

BRIC can’t take over for us – 5 reasons Economic might Differences within BRIC Multipolarity engenders insecurity Won’t stop Iran Does bad stuff in South/Central America

Cohen et al 10 (\*Ariel, Ph.D , Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tuft University, \*Lisa Curtis, B.A. in Economics, Indiana University, \*Derek Scissors, Ph.D in Political Science in International Political Economy, Stanford University, \*Ray Walser, Ph.D, University of North Caroline at Chapel Hill, “Busting the Brazil/Russia/India/China (BRIC) Myth of Challenging U.S. Global Leadership,” April 16, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Busting-the-Brazil-Russia-India-China-BRIC-Myth-of-Challenging-US-Global-Leadership, JH)

On April 15–16, the city of Brasilia will host a summit of the leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). Since Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill employed the acronym BRIC in 2001 to help sell emerging markets investment products, the world has been bullish on the BRICs. At the BRIC summit, China’s Hu Jintao, India’s Mammohan Singh, Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev, and Brazilian host Lula da Silva will seek to advance the impression that the BRICs are uniquely positioned to shape the global economic and political agenda. Such an impression is reinforced by the Obama Administration’s readiness to buy into the notion that America is declining in competitiveness, influence, and power as part of a transition to a “Post-American,” multi-polar world. Yet, there are five myths about BRIC that Americans should recognize before succumbing to Obama-inspired fatalism Myth 1: BRIC Economies Are Eclipsing the U.S. Fixated by China’s astronomic growth rates, Americans tend to overrate the BRICs’ economic weight. The International Monetary Fund estimates that, after trying to adjust for purchasing power, the BRICs collectively are about 15 percent bigger than the U.S. Using standard GDP, however, the U.S. ($14 trillion) is more than 60 percent larger than all four BRICs combined ($8.6 trillion). The BRICs combine for about 15 percent of the world’s economy, while the U.S. alone accounts for almost 25 percent. On a per capita basis, the results are even more disparate. Adjusting for purchasing power, one U.S. citizen (of which there are 307 million total) is almost eight times richer than the average BRIC citizen (of which there are 2.6 billion total). Using standard GDP, that number explodes to the average American being almost 15 times richer. Myth 2: BRICs Have Much in Common While all four BRIC members hope to maximize their influence in international economic and security affairs, there are far more fundamental differences than similarities within the BRICs. In standard GDP terms, China’s economy is larger than the rest of the BRICs put together, thereby giving the PRC a far bigger global footprint. Yet on a per capita basis, China is poorer than Brazil and Russia, though considerably richer than India. While China is arguably the world’s biggest commodities importer, Brazil and Russia are among the biggest commodities exporters. Russia’s exports are primarily hydrocarbons and natural resources, whereas the other three BRIC members have robust, diversified industrial economies. India has started a demographic expansion the likes of which the world may never have seen, China is growing old before it is rich, and Russia’s population is shrinking outright. With regard to foreign policy, Russia wants to revive its Soviet-era “sphere of exclusive interests” and be perceived as Washington’s equal. Moscow is obsessed—more than other BRIC members—with diluting American power around the world. India, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate it is pursuing a foreign policy based on its tradition of “strategic autonomy.” During the Cold War years, India was a major leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and leftist constituencies in India today oppose India’s warming relations with the U.S. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Congress-led government, on the other hand, are deeply committed to stronger ties with the U.S. Participating in BRIC activities showcases India’s role as an emerging economic power and plays well at home. Unlike China or Russia, Brazil has democratic roots, limited global reach, and the smallest military base of the BRICs. The left-leaning Lula has presided over a remarkable economic boom but leaves office this year. He hopes his legacy includes an upgrade in Brazil’s international role—such as a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council—and increased influence throughout South America. As a BRIC member, Brazil believes it can project global, economic, and diplomatic influence. Moreover, there are longstanding security concerns that divide the BRICs, including outstanding border issues between China and India, Indian reliance on Russian arms to balance China, and Russian concerns about the influx of Chinese immigrants to the under-populated Russian Far East. Myth 3: A Multi-Polar World Will Enhance Global Security A Russian spokesman recently announced that the BRICs are a “stabilizing factor” and a “reliable pillar in the formation of a poly-centric, fair, and democratic world order.” Regrettably, such rhetoric—calling for a change in the world order—has far too often proven to be the stalking horse of leaders harboring anti-West, anti-U.S., anti-democratic venom. Today’s tyrants and anti-American firebrands—from Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Iran’s Mahmoud Admadinejad to Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez—have all reiterated a similar desire for a ‘multi-polar” world” and the diminution of U.S. influence. Premature proclamations of a new, BRIC-centric international order only lend credence to the fiery rhetoric of these rogue leaders. Myth 4: BRIC Will Help Curb Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions At the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit, the Obama Administration worked hard to convey the impression that participants, especially Russia and China, are amenable to working with the U.S. and others on sanctions against Iran. Outside of the Obama charm orbit, Chinese officials including Hu Jintao reiterated their commitment to dialogue and negotiations, a codeword for inaction. Russia’s cooperation with Iran on nuclear and missile matters remains vital to its nuclear ambitions, and India’s Singh says sanctions will only hurt the Iranian poor. In Washington, Lula

A2: BRIC (2)

practically defended Iran’s right to nuclear arms, noting that Israel and Pakistan had them and therefore the world should understand Iran’s quest for security; Lula is scheduled to visit Tehran in May. With regard to Iran’s nuclear program, BRIC leaders are likely to remain a coalition of the unwilling and will not provide the U.S. with the genuine diplomatic support it seeks. Myth 5: The Western Hemisphere Profits from BRIC Actions While China’s purchases of commodities helped fuel Latin American growth, investments have often lagged, and the region’s capacity to escape its dependency on commodity exports has been limited, with domestic industry often undercut by Chinese competition. China has helped sustain the outdated, tyrannical Communism of the Castro brothers in Cuba and works closely with Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia as it seeks to consolidate populist authoritarianism. The Venezuela–Russian relationship—now focused on energy, arms, and nuclear power—should cause concern in Washington as arms sales and regional insecurity increase. From the standpoint of U.S. interests and influence, the roles of China and Russia in the hemisphere are far from benign. An Effective Response In order to respond effectively to the BRIC challenge, the Obama Administration and Congress should: \* Work with BRIC member governments on a bilateral level to secure their support for sanctions against Iran, reminding them that such support is a litmus test for relations with Washington and vital to international peace and security. \* Recognize that BRIC countries are, however, massively investing in their public diplomacy capabilities. A comparable effort by the U.S. to enhance public diplomacy and strategic education about BRICs is urgently needed. \* Get back to basics by promoting competition and completing free trade agreements. The BRICs confidently tout accumulating economic clout while the Obama Administration offers deficits, federal regulation, and a sluggish trade agenda. The Obama Administration owes the American people a coherent strategy for growth with security. An Exercise in Stagecraft While anxious to flex economic and diplomatic muscle, BRIC leaders will engage in international stagecraft in Brasilia as much as actual statecraft. In response, the U.S. should recognize its underlying strengths and awaken to the international challenges ahead. The American people cannot blindly cede global leadership on critical issues like trade, democracy, and Iranian nuclear weapons.

A2: Low Employment

Traditional conceptions of employment are irrelevant in a globalized, stratified, neo-liberal economy

Dymski 02 (Gary A., Professor of Economics, University of California, Riverside, Ph.D in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, “Post-Hegemonic U.S. Economic Hegemony: Minskian and Kaleckian Dynamics in the Neoliberal Era,” Journal of the Japanese Society for Political Economy, April 2002, http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers02/02-13.pdf, JH)

Kalecki’s Political Business Cycle and Global Imbalances. It follows from this argument about the dollar that those with substantial amounts of dollar-denominated wealth hold the key strategic position within the U.S. In this context the shift of the U.S. toward greater wealth inequality during the Neoliberal period (Wolff 1995, 1998) has been a key factor in softening the Kaleckian political constraint. The neoliberal period witnessed a weakening of trade unions in the U.S. and the relocation of a large proportion of U.S.-based manufacturing to peripheral regions or offshore. Much of the manufacturing which survives has imported lower wages and labor standards from abroad; most workers now live “one paycheck at a time.” The service economy, in the meantime, has grown in a bifurcated manner: on the one hand, privileged enclaves of workers with specialized skills, who command scarcity rents and have interests aligned with wealth-owners; on the other, reserves of economically insecure workers in routine tasks paying low wages, mostly minority and often undocumented. These shifts in wealth and income distribution have had several effects. For one thing, the changing composition and real wages of production and routine-task workers is undoubtedly, along with the high dollar, a determinant of the low and stable inflation rate of the Neoliberal era. In addition, business and consumer services have increasingly been targeted toward upscale customers—the prosperous few whose fortunes are tied to the stock market—while being supplied by low-wage and immigrant labor. This supply-demand interlock, like the rise of the global factory and of immigrant labor, affects the dynamics of Kalecki’s political business cycle. Gains in employment will have very different economic rewards for ‘average’ (routine-task) workers than did employment gains in the Big Government era. And unemployment pressures may operate differently than before: pain felt in the lower reaches of the wage and skill structure may be invisible in the privileged reaches of the workforce (and vice versa). Some portions of the “working class” gain when new sources of low-wage labor are opened up; and other portions lose. Class solidarity by workers threatens to dissolve in the face of the working class’s numerous skill-based, education-based, racial and gender divides (Dymski, 1996b).

A2: Recession Changes Everything (1)

The recession will have no lasting geopolitical consequences:

A. Their cards are exaggerations

Blackwill 09 (Robert D., former U.S. Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, Belfer Lecturer in International Security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution,” July 30, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>, JH)

Will there be corresponding substantial modifications in the art and practice of power in world politics as a consequence of the current economic crisis? With Chou Enlai’s alleged comment on the signifi - cance of the French Revolution—“it’s too soon to tell”—in mind, are there signs that consequent geopolitical changes are underway? Many who prophesy such elemental international shifts either use examples at the periphery of world politics (the government in Hungary falls, a growing humanitarian tragedy in Sudan) or foresee geopolitical spasms that might happen (China implodes, America retreats) but have not occurred. Moreover, humans often naturally tend to exaggerate the importance of what is happening to them at any particular time. Since this is also true of international politics, Marcel Proust provides a useful admonition: “The only thing that does not change is that at any and every time it appears that there have been ‘great changes.’” A Hegelian thought experiment might assist this inquiry. Imagine that it is five years from today. If there have been lasting geopolitical effects produced by the current economic crisis, what might they be? As indicated earlier, this would likely mean major changes in the external policies and interrelationships of the major global powers, particularly the policies of the United States and China toward each other and the world, as well as Russia’s foreign policies. It would also entail changes to a host of other issues, including acceleration in nuclear proliferation, particularly in Iran and North Korea; perhaps substantial shifts in the futures of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, India, and such long-time U.S. allies as Japan and Europe; and heightened problems with international efforts, such as the Middle East peace process. Keeping front and center Aristotle’s definition of analysis—“to illuminate through disaggregation,” here follows a brief look at each of these possible structural changes in the world order.

B. United States

Blackwill 09 (Robert D., former U.S. Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, Belfer Lecturer in International Security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution,” July 30, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>, JH)

First, the United States, five years from today. Did the global recession weaken the political will of the United States to, over the long term, defend its external interests? Many analysts are already forecasting a “yes” to this question. As a result of what they see as the international loss of faith in the American market economy model and in U.S. leadership, they assert that Washington’s infl uence in international aff airs is bound to recede, indeed is already diminishing. For some, the wish is the father of this thought. But where is the empirical evidence? From South Asia, through relations with China and Russia through the Middle East peace process, through dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and North Korea’s nuclear weaponization and missile activities, through confronting humanitarian crises in Africa and instability in Latin America, the United States has the unchallenged diplomatic lead. Who could charge the Obama Administration with diplomatic passivity since taking office? Indeed, one could instead conclude that the current global economic turbulence is causing countries to seek the familiar and to rely more and not less on their American connection. In any event, foreigners (and some Americans) often underestimate the existential resilience of the United States. In this respect, George Friedman’s new book, The Next Hundred Years, and his view that the United States will be as dominant a force in the 21st century as it was in the last half of the 20th century, is worth considering. So once again, those who now predict, as they have in every decade since 1945, American decay and withdrawal will be wrong15— from John Flynn’s 1955 The Decline of the American Republic and How to Rebuild It,16 to Paul Kennedy’s 1987 The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,17 to Andrew Bacevich’s 2008 The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism,18 to Godfrey Hodgson’s 2009 The Myth of American Exceptionalism19 and many dozens of similar books in between. Indeed, the policies of the Obama Administration, for better or worse, are likely to be far more influential and lasting regarding America’s longer-term geopolitical power projection than the present economic decline. To sum up regarding the United States and the global economic worsening, former Council on Foreign Relations President Les Gelb, in his new book, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy,20 insists that a nation’s power “is what it always was—essentially the capacity to get people to do what they don’t want to do, by pressure and coercion, using one’s resources and position. . . . The world is not flat. . . . Th e shape of global power is decidedly pyramidal—with the United States alone at the top, a second tier of major countries (China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Brazil), and several tiers descending below. . . . Among all nations, only the United States is a true global power with global reach.” Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, agrees: “After the crisis, the US is most likely to remain at the top of every key index of national power for decades. It will remain the dominant global player for the next few decades. No major issue concerning international peace and stability can be resolved without US leadership, and no country or grouping can yet replace America as the dominant global power.”21 The current global economic crisis will not alter this reality. And the capitalist market model will continue to dominate international economics, not least because China and India have adopted their own versions of it.

A2: Recession Changes Everything (2)

C. China

Blackwill 09 (Robert D., former U.S. Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, Belfer Lecturer in International Security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution,” July 30, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>, JH)

Next, China. Again, five years from today. Did the recession undermine the grip of the Chinese Communist Party on the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? No. Again, as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same recent speech, “China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crises—the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—few societies have been so stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic.” Did the crisis make Washington more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of PRC holdings of U.S. Treasury Bonds? No. Did it alter China’s basic external direction and especially its efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system in Asia? No. Did it cause the essence of Asian security to transform? No. **China has arrived. On issue after issue, it is the second most important global power, after the United States. In 2007, it contributed more to global growth than the United States. China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty in the past 30 years, a truly remarkable achievement. It has already overtaken Russia as the second largest defense spender after the United States. China is now the leading emitter of carbon dioxide. It has been the core manager of the six-party talks concerning North Korea. Reinforced by its sophisticated, reassuring, and effective diplomacy, it is the most aggressive nation in seeking energy and mineral resources in the world. By any measure, these are extraordinary statistics. Yet, China also has major vulnerabilities. It remains governed by an authoritarian regime.** Th e Communist Party has little organic legitimacy**, and it seems questionable whether the Communist leadership now has “the Mandate of Heaven” with the people of China.** Political reform moves at the speed of a glacier and there are tens of thousands of peasant protests each year. **Decentralization to regional and local levels is now prevalent in China’s power and politics.** From greenhouse emissions to national tax collection, the edicts of the central government are often ignored**.** Gaps between rich and poor grow dramatically, as do disparities between coastal and interior, western parts of the country**. Some 140 million young men fl oat through China’s cities.** The Chinese population ages rapidly**. There are serious shortages of internal energy resources and water supply, and there is profound environmental degradation. Even with these sobering realities in China, some forecast a switching of the guard in international leadership from the United States to the PRC, with China becoming the dominant superpower it was 500 years ago. Again, this is unconvincing. By most measures,** the Chinese economy is less than one quarter the size of the United States’**. In 2007 (the latest year for which data are available),** China’s gross domestic product **(GDP) in constant 2000 U.S. dollars** was 21 percent of U.S. GDP**; in current dollars, it was 23 percent. In constant terms adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP; 2005 international dollars), it was almost 52 percent. While China’s aggregate GDP is above 20 percent of U.S. GDP, its per capita GDP is well below. In constant 2000 dollars, it was less than 5 percent of U.S. per capita GDP in 2007; in current dollars, it was slightly more than 5 percent; in PPP terms, it was almost 12 percent.22 Will the current economic crisis modify China’s long-term objective to weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia, the only potential coalition that might be employed to balance the rise of Chinese power? No. In that context, it seems likely that** the PRC no longer operates on the basis of a U.S. “cork in the bottle of Japanese defense spending.” Given Japan’s impressive military buildup and force modernization over the last decade, Beijing concluded some years ago that this was not much of an American cork, and China’s policies began to evolve accordingly**. So the PRC’s long-term goal is to create parallel regional structures that exclude the United States—the Asian Summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—and at the same time to alternately pressure and cultivate Japan and to engage South Korea and Southeast Asia.** None of these elements regarding long-term Chinese geopolitical intensions appears to have much to do with the present world economic weakening. Alternatively, will the current world economic crisis change relations between China and the United States in a much more positive and intimate direction**, producing what some are calling a transcendent G-2?** This seems improbable **for seven reasons. First,** the United States and China have profoundly different visions of Asian security. **For Washington, maintaining U.S. alliances in Asia is the hub of its concept of Asian security, whereas, for Beijing, America’s alliance system is a destabilizing factor in Asian security and over time should wither away. These opposing concepts will be an enduring source of tension between the two sides. Second,** these two countries systematically prepare for war against one another, which is reflected in their military doctrines, their weapons procurement and force modernization, and their deployments and military exercises**. As long as** this **is the case, it** will provide a formidable psychological and material barrier to much closer bilateral relations**. Th ird, the United States is critical of China’s external resource acquisition policy, which Washington believes could threaten both American economic and security interests in the developing world. Fourth, despite their deep economic dependence on each other, U.S.-China economic relations are inherently fragile. China sells too much to the United States and buys too little, and the United States saves too little and borrows too much from China. Th is will inevitably lead to a backlash in the United States and a Chinese preoccupation with the value of its American investments. Fifth, Chinese environmental policy will be an increasing problem, both for U.S. policymakers who are committed to bringing China fully into global eff orts to reduce climate degradation and for Chinese leaders who are just as determined to emphasize domestic economic growth over international climate regimes. Sixth, China and the United States have wholly different domestic political arrangements that make a sustained entente diffi cult to manage. Americans continue to care about human rights in China, and Beijing resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its domestic aff airs. Th is will be a drag on the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. And seventh, any extended application by Washington of “Chimerica,” as Moritz**

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A2: Recession Changes Everything (3)

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**Schularick of Berlin’s Free University has called it,23 would so alarm America’s Asian allies, beginning with Japan, that the United States would soon retreat from the concept.24 Nevertheless, these factors are unlikely to lead to a substantial downturn in U.S.-China bilateral ties.** In addition to their economic interdependence, both nations have important reasons to keep their interaction more or less stable.As Washington wants to concentrate on its many problems elsewhere in the world, especially in the Greater Middle East, Beijing prefers to keep its focus on its domestic economic development and political stability. Neither wants the bilateral relationship to get out of hand. **In sum,** a positive strategic breakthrough in the U.S.-China relationship or a serious deterioration in bilateral interaction both seem doubtful in the period ahead. **And the current economic downturn will not essentially aff ect the abiding primary and constraining factors on the two sides. Th erefore, the U.S.-China relationship in fi ve years will probably look pretty much as it does today—part cooperation, part competition, part suspicion—unaff ected by today’s economic time of troubles, except in the increasing unlikely event of a cross-strait crisis and confrontation.**

D. Russia

Blackwill 09 (Robert D., former U.S. Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, Belfer Lecturer in International Security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution,” July 30, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>, JH)

**Now on to** Russia**. Again,** five years from today**.** Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. **(President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit).** Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it affect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian **Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum,** Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy**. For Moscow, these foreign policy fi rst principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26** None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

Blackwill 09 (Robert D., former U.S. Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, Belfer Lecturer in International Security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution,” July 30, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>, JH)

**Now moving more quickly.** Did the economic slump lead to strategic amendments in the way Japan sees the world? No. Did it slow the pace of India’s emergence as a rising great power? No. **To the contrary, the new Congress-led government in New Delhi will accelerate that process.** Did it alter Iran’s apparent determination to acquire a nuclear capability **or something close to it**? No**.** Was it a prime cause of the recent domestic crisis and instability in Iran after its 2009 presidential election? No. Did it slow or accelerate the moderate Arab states intent to move along the nuclear path? No. Did it affect North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear calculations? No.Did it importantly weaken political reconciliation in Iraq? No, because there is almost none in any case. Did it slow the Middle East peace process? No, not least because prospects for progress on issues between Israel and the Palestinians are the most unpromising in 25 years. Did it substantially affect the enormous internal and international challenges associated with the growth of Jihadiism in Pakistan? No. **But at the same time, it is important to stress that Pakistan, quite apart from the global recession, is the epicenter of global terrorism and now represents potentially the most dangerous international situation since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.** Did the global economic downturn systemically affect the future of Afghanistan? No. The fact that the United States is doing badly in the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the economic deterioration. **As Henry Kissinger observes, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. Th e guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” And NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.** Did it change in a major way the future of the Mexican state? No. Did the downturn make Europe, because of its domestic politics, less willing and able over time to join the U.S. in effective alliance policies? No, there will likely be no basic variations in Europe’s external policies and no serious evolution in transatlantic relations**. As President Obama is experiencing regarding Europe, the problems with European publics in this regard are civilizational in character, not especially tied to this recession—in general, European publics do not wish their nations to take on foreign missions that entail the use of force and possible loss of life.** Did the downturn slow further EU integration? Perhaps, at the margin, but in any case one has to watch closely to see if EU integration moves like a turtle or like a rock. And so forth.

A2: Defense Spending Kills Econ

Defense spending does not collapse the economy.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 14

And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the world's total defense spending. Second, the United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined. Of course, most of those major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily affordable for the United States into the future.

Cutting defense spending incites depression

James Cypher, Professor of Economics at CSU-Fresno, Dollars & Sense, July-August, 2002, p19(4)

Military spending is once again propping up an economy burdened by excess capacity and withering private-sector investment. (See James M. Cypher, "Return of the Iron Triangle: The New Military Buildup," D&S, January/February 2002.) But military spending also crowds out social programs supported by public-sector funds, such as healthcare, public transportation, education, and environmental protection. James M. Cypher Since World War II, military spending has been used by the U.S. government as an imperfect form of domestic planning. It has functioned as a vital economic prop for a system that is prone to stagnation and depression. It has created an artificial demand for the "metal eating" industries (autos, steel, aluminum, coal, iron ore, machine tools, shipbuilding, etc.) whenever these industries faced a declining domestic market. In short, military spending has helped the U.S. economy grow.

Military spending causes more investment, preventing recession from turning into depression

James Cypher, Professor of Economics at CSU-Fresno, Dollars & Sense, July-August, 2002, p19(4)

The CEP attempts to show that the U.S. economy's low level of growth in recent years is due to a high level of military spending which leads to a low level of investment. (Military spending "crowds out" investment.) In fact, the opposite is true. In the United States, when military spending declines, investment declines. Thus, in 1970, military spending declined 1.6% and investment went down 2.0% (see table). In 1974 military spending fell 3.5% while investment decreased 1.7%. In both cases in the following year, military spending was increased to counteract the fall in investment. In expansionary periods we find that both military spending and investment increase. Thus, given the need for the stimulus that military spending provides for the U.S. economy, we find that military spending directly and via its ripple effect leads U.S. corporations to expand their capital base. In periods of slump and recession, the stimulus provided by military spending stops investment from declining as much as it otherwise would without the military buildup. This helps to put a "floor" underneath the economy, helping to stabilize its otherwise erratic movement.

\*\*\*Regional Conflict\*\*\*

Regional Conflict Module

US stability solves regional conflicts and stops international rivalries all over the globe from escalating- it’s not about benevolence it’s about nation- states protecting self- interests

**Thayer 7** (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB)

The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race Between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post–Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it would be a mistake to seek “benevolence” in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might appear to be “benevolent” actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually intertwined with a humanitarian impulse. The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”2

\*\*\*Chinese Hegemony\*\*\*

Chinese Hegemony Module (1)

U.S. leadership prevents Chinese hegemony

**Thayer 07** (Bradley A.; Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; *American Empire: A Debate* – Reply to Christopher Lane: The Strength of American Empire; pg 103)

General Douglas MacArthur said that there was no substitute for victory. Just as there is no substitute for victory, there is no alternative for leadership. For if the United States does not provide that leadership to its allies by pledging to use all of its power in their defense, then they will provide their own security. **If the United States does not lead the world, another hegemon will rise to replace it. hat hegemon will be China. China will then be in a position to dictate to the rest of world, including the United States.** he United States would be far less secure in such a world. This is **because, first, the physical security of the United States would be jeopardized. Due to its military superiority, China would have the ability to triumph over the United States in the event of war or an international crisis**, like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. **The United States would be forced to back down, thus placing China’s interests before its own. China would be able to blackmail the United States**, to coerce it to do Beijing’s bidding. he United States would be relegated to the role of pawn on the international chessboard. **Second, the United States would lose its allies and global influence. As China’s power grew, countries would look to Beijing to be their ally in order to gain security and assistance**. It will be the case that countries long allied with the United States, such as Australia, will no longer be allies as their interests require them to look to Beijing and away from Washington. **Third, the Chinese economy will dominate the global economy. Worldwide, both countries and businesses will look to China not simply as a market, as they do now, but the economic locomotive of the world’s economy, as the lender of last resort, and as the stabilizer of economic exchange and the international trade and monetary regimes**. Countries will have to appease China economically or face the consequences of its wrath. **Fourth, Chinese will be the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the Internet, world sport, and global culture. Additionally, China will dominate science and technology, in all of its forms—the life sciences, bioengineering, computer science, and even space exploration. It will be a great blow to the pride of the United States**, greater than Sputnik in 1957, **when China travels to the Moon, as they plan to do, and plants the communist lag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.**

Specifically hegemony key to contain chinese aggression

Swaine 1998 (Michael- Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998 )

The second vital interest is to prevent the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia. Any hegemonic state capable of dominating the Asian land mass and the lines of communication, both internal and external, represents an unacceptable challenge to the safety, prosperity, and power position of the United States. For reasons well understood by geopoliticians since Sir Halford Mackinder, Asia’s great wealth and resources would serve its possessors well in the struggles endemic to international politics. If the region’s wealth and resources were secured by any single state (or some combination of states acting in unison), it would enable this entity to threaten American assets in Asia and, more problematically, in other areas such as the Middle East, and finally perhaps to challenge the United States itself at a global level. This entity, using the continent’s vast resources and economic capabilities, could then effectively interdict the links presently connecting the United States with Asia and the rest of the world and, in the limiting case, menace the CONUS itself through a combination of both WMD and conventional instruments. Besides being a threat to American safety, a hegemonic domination of Asia by one of the region’s powers would threaten American prosperity—if the consequence of such domination included denying the United States access to the continent’s markets, goods, capital, and technology. In combination, this threat to American safety and prosperity would have the inevitable effect of threatening the relative power position of the United States in international politics. For these reasons, preventing the rise of a hegemonic center of power in Asia—especially one disposed to impeding American economic, political, and military access—would rank as a vital interest second only to preserving the physical security of the United States and its extended possessions. This interest inevitably involves paying close attention to the possible power transitions in the region, especially those relating to China in the near-to-medium term and to Japan, Russia, and possibly India over the long term. In any event, it requires developing an appropriate set of policy responses—which may range from containment at one end all the way to appeasement at the other—designed to prevent the rise of any hegemony that obstructs continued American connectivity with Asia.

Chinese Hegemony Module (2)

Containing China is key to avoiding WWIII

Charles Krauthammer 7/31/1995 (“why we must contain china” Time Magazine, <http://jcgi.pathfinder.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,983245,00.html>, Date Accessed 7/30/2006)

Does containment mean cold war II, with China playing the part of the old Soviet Union? Not quite. There is no ideological component to this struggle. Until late in life, the Soviet Union had ideological appeal, with sympathizers around the globe. Today's China, unlike Mao's, has no such appeal. China is more an old-style dictatorship, not on a messianic mission, just out for power. It is much more like late 19th century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on. Its neighbors are beginning to feel the pressure. China is extending its reach deep into the South China Sea, claiming islets hundreds of miles from China, near four of its neighbors but within the reach of its rapidly growing military. Indeed, while defense spending in Russia and the West has declined, China's is rising dramatically, doubling in the past 10 years. Those dollars are going to intercontinental rocketry, a modernized army and a blue-water navy.Nor is China deploying its new might just locally. It is sending missile and nuclear technology to such places as Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistan connection represents a flanking maneuver against China's traditional enemy, India; Iran, a leapfrog to make trouble for that old imperial master, the West. Containment of such a bully must begin early in its career. That means building relations with China's neighbors, starting with Vietnam. For all the emotion surrounding our decision to normalize relations with Vietnam, its significance is coldly geopolitical: Vietnam is China's traditional enemy (they fought a brief war in 1979). We must therefore make it our friend. A map tells you the rest of a containment strategy: 1) a new security relationship with democratic India, now freed from its odd, cold war alliance with the Soviets; 2) renewing the U.S.- Japan alliance, now threatened by a U.S. Administration so hell-bent on selling carburetors in Kyoto that it is blithely jeopardizing the keystone of our Pacific security; and 3) cozying up to the Russians, who, however ornery elsewhere, have a common interest in boxing in China. Containment is not a cold war invention. It is a principle of power politics going back centuries. After the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna created a system of alliances designed to contain a too dynamic France. In our time the Atlantic Alliance contained an aggressive Soviet Union. In between, the West failed to contain an emergent Germany. The result was two world wars. We cannot let that happen with the emerging giant of the 21st century.

A2: China Will Collapse U.S. Hege

**China won’t topple US as world hegemon multiple warrants**

**Thayer 7’** (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB)

China is a major country undergoing a dramatic modernization process. It is where the United States was a hundred years ago or where most major European countries were one hundred and fifty years ago. Periods of modernization result in great economic growth as economies move from agrarian to an industrial or postindustrial information economy. Its economic growth rates are very impressive—an 8 percent real increase in GDP in 2000, 7.3 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, and 9.1 percent in 2003.42 So the trend of economic growth is clear and certainly will continue for the next few years, before falling off as economic deficiencies and returns on trade decline. Eventually, China will have economic growth rates of 1 percent, 2 percent, or 3 percent per year, which is typical for developed countries. Nevertheless, as a result of its rapid growth, China will be in a position to threaten the dominant role of the United States in world politics. According to the National Intelligence Council, China is projected to have about a $4.3 trillion GDP in 2016.43 hat is equivalent to the 2003 GDP of Japan. About 2042, China is expected to have the GDP (about $10.9 trillion) that the United States possessed in 2003. Although its continued economic growth is impressive, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United States as the world’s hegemon. The first of these is a rapidly aging population beginning in 2020. Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over sixty-five years old by 2020. This could be a source of unrest and economic stagnation. Younger generations will be pressed to care for the older population. There will be a great discrepancy between the numbers of young people and the elderly, and China lacks the pension and health care infrastructure characteristic of Western societies. Many Chinese will have to work far into old age and will not be able to care for themselves should they fall sick or be too old to earn a wage. As we see with Japan, economic productivity will peak. This situation is the direct result of the “one child” policy adopted in 1979 to halt explosive population growth. When China took its first countrywide census in 1953, its population was 600 million. By 1970, it was approximately 800 million. As a result of the “one child” policy, the Chinese birthrate has fallen from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to fewer than 2 per woman in 2000. The “one child” policy is believed to have resulted in 300 million fewer Chinese. A second big problem stemming from the “one child” policy is the imbalance between the sexes. For social and economic reasons, if only one child is permitted, most Chinese parents will choose a son. This has led to widespread abortion, female infanticide, and female adoption out of China. Simply put, there are too few females in China. The normal worldwide divergence between the number of boys to girls is about 103 males to 107 females. In China, about the Case for the American Empire • 119 boys are born for every 100 girls. In rural areas, where the preference for sons is the strongest, the imbalance is even greater, about 133 to 100.44 here are an estimated 40 million more men than women in China’s population. The declining birth rates that low from this will hinder economic growth in the long run. China eventually will face other major economic and social problems as well, including those related to the economic fragility of its financial system and state-owned enterprises, economic malaise brought on by widespread corruption, ubiquitous environmental pollution, HIV/AIDS and other epidemic diseases like SARS, and the high energy costs, which stile economic growth. In addition, unlike the United States, China is not a model for other countries. Chinese political values are inferior to those of the United States because China is repressive. The Chinese do not respect human rights, including religious and political freedom. There is also the wildcard of potential conflict over Taiwan. A war with Taiwan would retard China’s economic progress and scare neighboring states. The fact that China has so many territorial and other disputes with its major neighbors, Japan, India, Russia, and Vietnam, means that many countries see it as a threat and will want to ally with the United States against Chinese power. The rise of China is ripe for potential conflict with its neighbors, and this constitutes a big danger in international politics.

\*\*\*Iraq Collapse\*\*\*

Hegemony Good: Iraq Collapse

US hegemony in Iraq prevents Iraqi collapse

Washington Post **‘0**7 (“IF Leave, Regional War and ‘Shiastan’”, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/leon\_krauze/2007/04/keep\_foot\_on\_or\_chaos\_and\_shia.html, April 30, 2007) BW

For a while now, there have been only two possible outcomes in Iraq: the bad and the worse. Which is the latter and how to avoid it? The worst outcome for Iraq would be a full-scale civil war that ends in the country’s partition. There is little question that, once the American forces leave, the country will become a far bloodier and more lawless battleground than it is now. Once that happens, I see no reason why Moqtada al-Sadr and other Shiite strongmen would seek any kind of compromise with Sunni leaders in a pluralist government. Outright Shia domination of Iraq should never be allowed. Given the recent history of both the Middle East and Islam, secularity is a precious asset. In fact, Saddam’s pragmatic view of religion was perhaps the man’s only virtue. It wasn’t an insignificant attribute, especially given the aggressive expansionist theocracy next door. America (and the world) should make sure that Iraq remains a diverse multicultural federation rather than become three isolated and weak enclaves. So the bad but not the worst is a state more like India than the former Yugoslavia. But is this even possible? Can this be achieved without a violent, revolutionary period? The stakes are too high to wait and find out. The consequences of an enormous “Shiastan” right in the heart of the Middle East could prove to be disastrous. Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria would stretch out their own claws soon enough. Regional conflict would be, literally, around the corner.

\*\*\*Proliferation Module\*\*\*Proliferation Module

American military power allows it to coerce other nations – this can solve proliferation.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 16

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America's shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it possessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu'ammar Qadhafi agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein "'"

Proliferation causes extinction.

Victor A. Utgoff 2002, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions” 2002 p. 87-90

The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.’ Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Hegemony solves proliferation

Hegemony prevents massive nuclear proliferation.

Barry Posen (Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT) and Andrew Ross (Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College) Winter 1997 International Security

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation. There would like be more war. Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of the wars, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

Withdrawal causes proliferation

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.

Strong deterrence prevents proliferation and use of WMD

General J. H. Binford Peay III, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, FNS, March 11, 1997

First, deterring conflict, reassuring friends and allies, and fighting are a continuum. We deter by convincing would-be aggressors that the risks of going to war are unacceptably high. Conveying this message is becoming increasingly more important as potential adversaries acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Complicating deterrence in the Central Region is the presence of unpredictable leaders, who are willing to incur high civil casualties and major losses in their military while pursuing risky personal ambitions. Yet, we know from experience that such leaders respect and are intimidated by military strength. Consequently, we deter these individuals by continuing to organize, equip, and exercise premier joint and combined forces; positioning a credible mix of those forces forward in the region; maintaining the national will to use them; and communicating our resolve to our opponents.

U.S. leadership is key to blocking proliferation

Kim Holmes, VP of the Kathryn and Shelby Collon Davis International Studies Center, and Thomas Moore, America’s Proper Role in the World, 1996, http://www.heritage.org/issues/96/chpt15.html, accessed 3/18/02

To defend the American people and territory from attack. Thus, America's top priorities should be not only to deploy a ballistic missile defense for the U.S. homeland, but also to take a lead role in countering nuclear proliferation and other global threats to security. The greatest threat to the peace and stability in the world today is the acquisition by rogue regimes or hostile forces of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with the ballistic missiles to deliver them, will result inevitably in greater confrontation and conflict unless the free nations, led by the United States, take steps to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of potential enemies. America has the resources to counter the proliferation of advanced weaponry, including the ability to build an effective defense against ballistic missiles, thereby rendering them less useful. Harnessing these resources and demonstrating the leadership necessary to use them should be a top priority for U.S. foreign and defense policy.

\*\*\*Pakistan\*\*\*

Pakistani Insurgency Impact Module

US influence is critical to thwart insurgency in Pakistan – Curtis ’10

(Lisa, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, “Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration must be Clear and Firm” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Taliban-Reconciliation-Obama-Administration-Must-Be-Clear-and-Firm>, March 2010, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM

If the U.S. seeks to prevent Afghanistan from turning back into a safe haven for terrorists that want to attack the U.S., it must convince Pakistani officials to crack down on Taliban leaders who find sanctuary in their country. Pakistani public opinion is beginning to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. If the U.S. tries to find a quick exit from Afghanistan, however, these gains in Pakistan will be squandered and the Taliban's ideology will regain legitimacy throughout the region.

The U.S. should support Afghan reconciliation efforts on the ground in Afghanistan diplomatically and financially, and at the same time militarily squeeze the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan that is still closely linked to al-Qaeda. These actions should occur simultaneously so that the local Taliban fighters view the U.S., NATO, and Afghan authorities as being on the winning side, and simultaneously see a process through which they can switch sides without punishment. But U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan would likely undermine efforts to coax local fighters into the political mainstream, thus jeopardizing General McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and prolonging [instability](http://www.heritage.org/Issues/International-Conflicts/Iraq-War/Threats-in-Iraq/Instability) throughout the region.

\*\*\*Allied Prolif\*\*\*

Allied Proliferation Module

Hegemony prevents Japanese and German proliferation.

Ashley Tellis, et al, “Sources of Conflict in Asia,” Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy, ed Khalilzad and Lesser, 1998, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap5.pdf, accessed 8/10/02

The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies— critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase—to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up, especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.

The impact is multiple nuclear wars.

Millot 1994 (Marc Dean Millot, Defense Analyst at RAND, Washington Quarterly, Summer)

The outcome of this refusal to face the emerging reality of regional nuclear adversaries is that the United States is not preparing seriously for the possibility of having to fight in a regional nuclear war. If it continues down this path, it will be unable to cope with the potential threat of nuclear aggression against its allies. If it cannot assure the security of its allies against this threat, the result is likely to be further proliferation among these allies, highly unstable regional military situations, a severe reduction of the United States' international influence, and a growing probability of regional nuclear wars involving U.S. forces.

Hegemony key to maintain Alliances

**LOWER U.S. ARSENAL ENCOURAGES ALLIES TO ARM THEMSELVES; WIDESPREAD PROLIF**

**Feith and** **Shulsky 09**

(Douglas J.  Abram N. , 8/3/2009. Former under secretary of defense for policy and senior fellow @ the Hudson Institute; and former Defense Department official who dealt with arms control issues, and senior fellow @ the Hudson Institute. “Why Revive the Cold War?” Wall Street Journal,<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574328430978849134.html>. GM)

There is an important connection between proliferation risks and modernization. But the Obama administration seems to have it backwards. **If the U.S. fails to ensure the continuing safety and reliability of its arsenal, it could cause the collapse of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and others might decide that their security requires them to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, rather than rely indefinitely on the U.S. The world could reach a tipping point, with cascading nuclear proliferation,** as the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission warned in its May 2009 report. The Obama administration's nuclear weapons policies—including its treaty talks with Russia—affect the way America's friends and potential adversaries view the integrity of the U.S. deterrent. **The wrong policies** can endanger the U.S. directly. They can also **cause other states to lose confidence in the American nuclear umbrella and to seek security in national nuclear capabilities. If that happens, the dangers of a nuclear war somewhere in the world would go up substantially.** It would not be the first time a U.S. government helped bring about the opposite of its intended result—but **it might be one of the costliest mistakes ever.**

Hegemony maintains alliances

**United States hegemony is key to maintaining allies- The United States has 84 countries allied with it and as they become more dependent on the United States for security and support this increases US dominance throughout the world**

**Thayer 7’** (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB)

Third, countries want to align themselves with the United States. Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it. The vast majority of countries in international politics have alliances with the United States. There are approximately 192 countries in the world, ranging from the size of giants like Russia to Lilliputians like Vanuatu. Of that number, you can count with one hand the countries opposed to the United States—China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Once the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela change, there is every reason to believe that those countries will be allied with the United States, as they were before their present rulers—Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez—came to power. North Korea will collapse someday, removing that threat, although not without significant danger to the countries in the region. Of these states, only China has the potential power to confront the United States. The potential power of China should not be underestimated, but neither should the formidable power of the United States and its allies. There is an old saying that you can learn a lot about someone by looking at his friends (or enemies). It may be true about people, but it is certainly true of the United States. Of the 192 countries in existence, a great number, 84, are allied with the United States, and they include almost all of the major economic and military states. his includes twenty-five members of NATO (excluding the United States—Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); fourteen major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan); nineteen Rio Pact members (excluding Argentina and Venezuela—he Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay); seven Caribbean Regional Security System members (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), and thirteen members of the Iraq coalition who are not captured by the other categories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga, and Ukraine. In addition, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Tunisia are now important U.S. allies. This is a ratio of almost 17 to 1 (84 to 5) of the countries allied with the United States against those who are opposed to it. And other states may be added to the list of allies. For example, a country like Nigeria is essentially pro–United States although there is no formal security arrangement between those countries. This situation is unprecedented in international politics— never have so many countries been aligned with the dominant state in modern history. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, it is a big change from the Cold War when most of the countries of the world were aligned either with the United States (approximately forty-five) or the Soviet Union (about twenty-four countries), of the Soviet Union, as captured by Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 illuminates the ratio of states aligned with the United States to those opposed to it in the post–Cold War period. So, while we are entitled to our own opinions about international politics, we not entitled to our own facts. They must be acknowledged. In the post– Cold War world, the United States is much better of—it is much more powerful and more secure—than was during the Cold War. What is more, many of the allies of the United States have become more dependent on the United States for their security than during the Cold War. For many years now, most NATO countries have only spent a fraction of their budget on defense, and it is not transparent how they would defend themselves if not for the United States did not. Only six of the twenty-five members of NATO (not counting the United States) are spending 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense, while nineteen spend less than 2 percent. Such a low level of defense spending is possible only because of the security provided by the United States.

\*\*\*Terrorism Module\*\*\*

Terrorism Module

Hegemony deters terrorism

Andrew Tully, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 20, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/11/20112001082904.asp, accessed 3/18/02

Spencer says Washington and its allies should take diplomatic steps first. If those steps fail, he says, the U.S. should not hesitate to make war: "I think the first step is trying to get weapons inspectors back in there [in Iraq]. It's my feeling that probably Saddam Hussein's not going to be very cooperative, and therefore military action may very well be required." According to Spencer, the U.S. has a rare opportunity to offset the threat of terrorism that is likely to define diplomacy in the 21st century, just as it held the key to deterring nuclear war with the Soviet Union during part of the previous century: "If we show adequate commitment in Afghanistan, and then we also find that we do need to use military action in Iraq, and if in Iraq we also show adequate commitment, I think what you'll begin to see...established is a deterrence for the modern era, where we're not worried about necessarily deterring nuclear war any more, but we're trying to deter rogue nations, or any nation for that matter, from being involved in this international terrorism." Spencer says he is not concerned that going to war against Saddam would cost the U.S. the support of nations who back the war in Afghanistan. He says any military action against Saddam would require a new coalition that is built independently of the existing alliance.

Unchecked terrorism results in extinction.

Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States, The Washington Times 8/28/2003

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

\*\*\*Sustainability Debate\*\*\*

Hegemony Sustainable Frontline

The United States can maintain hegemony:

A. No offense- comparative economic, societal and military advantages ensure the United States’ position as a superpower.

**Walt 2k9** (Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University.) What I told the Navy, 6/18/9, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/18/what_i_told_the_navy>

The global balance of power is and will remain **very favorable for the United States**, and that the main dangers to U.S. security in the near-term are various self-inflicted wounds. In other words, the United States can do more to harm itself through misguided policies than our adversaries can do to us through deliberate acts of malevolence. We shouldn't drop our guard, in short, but we should also take care not to shoot ourselves in the foot.  
This view is at odds with a lot of contemporary writing about America's international position. Over the past several years, for example, several prominent books and studies have concluded that America's position is deteriorating and that a new MP world is rapidly emerging. For example, both Fareed Zakaria's [The Post-American World](http://www.fareedzakaria.com/books/index.html" \t "_blank) and the National Intelligence Council's [Global Trends 2025](http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf" \t "_blank) study argue that the rise or resurgence of Russia, China, the EU, Brazil, and India are recreating a multipolar world, and that this will have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy.   
This prediction is mistaken, or at least premature. To begin with, the U.S. economy still dwarfs the other major powers. According to the [World Bank](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf" \t "_blank), US GDP was $13.9 trillion in 2007, compared with $4.3 bn. for Japan, $3.3 bn. for Germany, $3.2 bn. for China, and $2.8 bn. for Great Britain. In 2007, therefore, the US economy was bigger than next four powers combined.  It’s true that the U.S. economy took a big hit in 2008, but so did everyone else, including China.  
Second, U.S. military power dwarfs all others, despite our difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only does the United States spend more on national security than the rest of the world [combined](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures" \t "_blank), but no other major power spends as large a percentage of its GDP on national security as the United States does. Not surprisingly, no country has the global reach of the United States or the capacity to operate with near-impunity over most of the world's [common spaces](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/posen_summer_2003.pdf" \t "_blank)Third, this situation isn't going to change very much, because the United States is the only advanced industrial power whose population will grow significantly over the next few decades. Most European countries have low birth rates, which means their populations are both shrinking and getting older. This trend is especially evident in Russia and also in Japan. China's population will projected to increase slightly over the next twenty years and then begin to decrease, as the effects of the "one-child" policy kick in. China will also have a very large demographic bulge of retirees, which will be an increasingly costly burden over time.  
The United States, by contrast, is going to continue to grow, in part because U.S. birth rates are higher and also because legal (and illegal) immigration to the United States will almost certainly continue. The United States will have the [youngest population](http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/pyramids.html" \t "_blank) of any major power in 2030, therefore, which is good news for our long-term strength.

B. Military dominance

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 12-3

The U.S. military is the best in the world and it has been so since end of World War II. No country has deployed its forces in so many countries and varied climates—from the Arctic to the Antarctic—from below the sea to outer space. No country is better able to fight wars of any type, from guerrilla conflicts to major campaigns on the scale of World War II. No country or likely alliance has the ability to defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield. Thus, measured on either an absolute or relative (that is, comparing the U.S. military to the militaries of other countries) scale, American military power is overwhelming. Indeed, it is the greatest that it has ever been. This is not by accident. The United States has worked assiduously, particularly since 1940, to produce the best military. The causes of American military predominance include extensive training and professional education, high morale, good military doctrine, frequency of use, learning from other militaries in the right circumstances, exceptional equipment and sound maintenance, and high levels of defense spending.

Hegemony Sustainable Frontline

C. Economic lead – competitor overstretch is far more likely.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 24-5

Given the historical economic growth rates of these countries, it is unlikely that any of them (or the EU) will be able to reach the levels of economic growth required to match current U.S. defense spending and, thus, supplant the United States. China comes closest with 6.6 percent annual economic growth estimated by the World Bank through 2020, or the 7 percent annual economic growth estimated by the World Economic Forum through 2020" It is not even clear if China can sustain its growth rates and, other than China, no other country is even in the ballpark. Table 1.5 shows the sustained economic growth rates necessary to match the present military spending by the United States. Thus, the economy is well placed to be the engine of the American Empire. Even the leading proponent of the "imperial overstretch” argument, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy, has acknowledged this. Imperial overstretch occurs when an empire’s military power and alliance commitments are too burdensome for its economy. In the 1980s, there was much concern among academics that the United States was in danger of this as its economy strained to fund its military operations and alliance commitments abroad. However, Kennedy now acknowledges that he was wrong when he made that argument in his famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, because of the robustness of American economic and military power. Indeed, if there is any imperial overstretch, it is more likely to be by China, France, Britain, India, Russia, or the EU—not the United States.

**D. No Challengers**

**Jerusalem Post 08** (Amotz Asa-El, Middle Israel: Barack Obama and the decline of America, Nov 13)

Decline is by definition a relative term, and America's many eulogizers were never short of choices to anoint as Uncle Sam's successors**.** Two decades ago, when Japan was the eulogizers' toast, all were impressed, and rightly, with its foreign aid program, which by the late '80s reached an annual $50 billion and surpassed America's. In the '60s it was Sputnik's launch into outer space, an achievement that shocked the West and made many suspect that the Soviets had become scientifically superior to America. And now it is the so-called BRIC powers - Brazil, Russia, India and China - that are turning America's eulogizers on with their new economic vitality. The Obama presidency will indeed be measured by the state of the gap between America's clout and these emerging powers' sway. Yet this doesn't at all mean America is on its way out. THE SUBSTANCE of superpowers, scholars now agree, is first of all military reach. A superpower must by definition possess the capacity to arrive quickly anywhere with troops that can impose their government's will. That rules out, for now, Brazil, India and Japan, but Russia and China sure can throw their weight around, and this is while America's delivery in its two current wars has not been decisive. Then there is the economy. As Kennedy concluded already before the USSR's downfall, superpowers must also be financially super. That obviously calls into question America's current condition, considering that its entire investment-banking industry is now lying in the middle of Wall Street as fallen and broken as the Twin Towers on 9/12. Has the US lost its financial superpower status, as German [Finance](javascript:void(0)) Minister Peer Steinbrueck argued last month in the Bundestag? Is the American superpower itself history? Not quite. First of all, the economic crisis has not given rise to an alternative power; everyone is in it together. And if there is no rising alternative then there is no declining superpower, only a superpower in crisis. In fact**,** all the would-be successors have themselves been exposed as economically ill by the crisis, from China with its overproduction of cheap goods to Russia and its overreliance on extraction of raw materials, all of which now face drastically reduced demand**.** And that is also why th**e** military abilities of Russia and China must also be seen in the light of their economic weaknesses. They too will need money should they fight long and distant wars, and the difference between them and America is that they will have even less of it. Beyond this, the American superpower has advantages that transcend war and economics. Culturally, none of America's rivals offers even a fraction of its originality. The world still rotates around an axis made of American inventions, from the airplane, the motorcar and the computer to the motion picture, the skyscraper and spaceship. There is no sign for now of a Russian, Indian, Japanese or Chinese [Alexander Graham Bell](javascript:void(0)), Orville Wright, Bill Gates or Steve Jobs. Now add to this America's social power. America has just tapped into deep social aquifers in a way that none of its rivals will do any time soon. China distances its masses from civic leadership, Russia abandons millions to the devices of organized crime, Brazil has even more millions teeming in favelas, India still has pariahs who can only dream of American blacks' acceptance, and Europe keeps at arm's length vast immigrant populations. America, with all its problems, is socially healthier than all of them.

\*\*\*Off Shore-Balancing\*\*\*

A2: Offshore Balancing

United States hegemony secures the US and even though it is not sustainable doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive to maintain it as long as possible- Offshore balancing is a defensive passive approach that invites attack and doesn’t take into account the true chaos of international politics

**Thayer 7’** (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, MJB)

There is a category of events in life: things that almost never happen. Included in this are rich people complaining that they have too much money, athletes saying they are too strong, Hollywood stars bemoaning that they receive too much publicity, and countries asserting they have too much power and want less. Countries want more power to protect their people and their other interests, such as economic growth and allies. Layne is right about a fundamental cause—the anarchy of the international system. But there is a debate among theorists of international relations concerning whether states should adopt a “Goldilocks” strategy—having just enough power, not too little nor too much—or if they should maximize their power to the extent that they are able to do so.1 Defensive realists like Layne favor a “Goldilocks” strategy for security. Offensives realists, like me, favor maximizing power for security. For the United States, defensive realists are more passive, support a smaller military, and favor reducing its commitments abroad. Offensive realists are more active, support a larger military, and favor using the power of the United States to protect its interests overseas, e.g., by taking the fight to the terrorists in the Middle East rather than waiting for them to come to the United States to attack Americans. Reply to Christopher Layne • **0** Each country knows it will never be perfectly secure, but that does not detract from the necessity of seeking security. International politics is a dangerous environment in which countries have no choice but to participate. Any involvement—from the extensive involvement of the United States to the narrow activity of Switzerland—in this dangerous realm runs the risk of a backlash. That is simply a fact of life in international politics. The issue is how much participation is right. Thankfully, thus far the United States recognizes it is much better to be involved so that it may shape events, rather than to remain passive, having events shaped by other countries, and then adjusting to what they desire. In contrast to Layne’s argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.

\*\*\*Balencing\*\*\*

A2: Balancing

Their balancing predictions are all hype – 50 years of failed redistribution prove.

William Wohlforth (Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, where he is also the Chair of the Department of Government) Spring, 2007 "Unipolar Stability," Harvard International Review Vol. XXIX, No. 1 p 44

In all of these cases, real changes were occurring that suggested a redistribution of power. But in each case, analysts' responses to those changes seem to have been overblown. Multipolarity — an international system marked by three or more roughly equally matched major powers—did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s and each decline scare ended with the United States' position of primacy arguably strengthened. It is impossible to know for sure whether or not the scare is for real this time—shifts in the distribution of power are notoriously hard to forecast. Barring geopolitical upheavals on the scale of Soviet collapse, the inter-state scales of power tend to change slowly. The trick is to determine when subtle quantitative shifts will lead to a major qualitative transformation of the basic structure of the international system. Fortunately, there are some simple rules of power analysis that can help prevent wild fluctuations in response to current events. Unfortunately, arguments for multipolarity’s rapid return usually run afoul of them.

No scenario for counter-balancing – the world has too much stake in American leadership.

Charles S. Maier (Leverett Salstonall Professor of History at Harvard University and the former Director of the Center for European Studies) Spring, 2007 "Dark Power," Harvard International Review Vol. XXIX, No. 1 p 64

This does not mean that patient and forceful use of military assets cannot overcome the challenge of insurrections, resistance movements, and ambitious dictators. But it does mean that old-fashioned international politics seems less relevant for determining our collective future. Increasingly, most states with some organized military capacity and political cohesion have prioritized keeping terrorism at bay, the world economy open, and the threat of global warming distant. When the United States acts in reckless ways other nations deplore its policies, but in general they have an interest to act with the United States to contain what they perceive as growing disorder.

A2: Balancing-Russia

Russia will not rise to power – poor morale, weak infrastructure and moderate leaders ensure cooperation instead of conflict.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of foreign policy @ Johns Hopkins) 2004 “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership” p 99

None of the three traditional rivals for regional preeminence—Russia, Turkey, and Iran—now has the power to impose its unilateral will on the area as a whole. Even a combination of two against one—say Russia and Iran against Turkey—would be insufficient, as in the background lurk both the United States (through NATO, of which Turkey is a key member) and the European Union (to which Turkey aspires). Yet without some active external involvement, the internal social, political, ethnic, and religious conflicts of the Caucasus will not only continue to fester but are likely to erupt into periodic violence, as they have already done several times since 1990. That increasingly self-evident reality may even induce Russia to conclude, albeit reluctantly, that its interests would be best served by some form of collaboration with the Euroatlantic community to promote a more stable, eventually cooperative and prosperous, CaucAsian region. The two bloody wars Russia brutally waged against the independence-seeking Chechnya in the decade following the disintegration of its historic empire not only did enormous damage to Russia's moral standing but demonstrated the physical limits of its capacity to wage an imperial war in the post-imperial age.

A2 Balancing – China

Demographics will undermine China’s ability to challenge U.S. hegemony.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 32-3

The Threat from China: Significant, but Reduced by the Dragon's Demographics China is a major country undergoing a dramatic modernization process. It is where the United States was a hundred years ago or where most major European countries were one hundred and fifty years ago. Periods of modernization result in great economic growth as economies move from agrarian to an industrial or postindustrial information economy. Its economic growth rates are very impressive—an 8 percent real increase in GDP in 2000, 7.3 per-cent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, and 9.1 percent in 2003.4' So the trend of economic growth is clear and certainly will continue for the next few years, before falling off as economic efficiencies and returns on trade decline. Eventually, China will have economic growth rates of 1 percent, 2 percent, or 3 percent per year, which is typical for developed countries. Nevertheless, as a result of its rapid growth, China will be in a position to threaten the dominant role of the United States in world politics. According to the National Intelligence Council, China is projected to have about a $4.3 trillion GDP in 2016." That is equivalent to the 2003 GDP of Japan. About 2042, China is expected to have the GDP (about $10.9 trillion) that the United States possessed in 2003. Although its continued economic growth is impressive, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United States as the world's hegemon. The first of these is a rapidly aging population beginning in 2020.Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over sixty-five years old by 2020. This could be a source of unrest and economic stagnation. Younger generations will be pressed to care for the older population. There will be a great discrepancy between the numbers of young people and the elderly, and China lacks the pension and health care infrastructure characteristic of Western societies. Many Chinese will have to work far into old age and will not be able to care for themselves should they fall sick or be too old to earn a wage. As we see with Japan, economic productivity will peak. This situation is the direct result of the “one child" policy adopted in 1979 to halt explosive population growth. When China took its first countrywide census in 1953, its population was 600 million. By 1970, it was approximately 800million. As a result of the "one child" policy, the Chinese birthrate has fallen from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to fewer than 2 per woman in 2000. The “one child” policy is believed to have resulted in 300 million fewer Chinese. A second big problem stemming from the “one child” policy is the imbalance between the sexes. For social and economic reasons, if only one child is permitted, most Chinese parents will choose a son. This has led to widespread abortion, female infanticide, and female adoption out of China. Simply put, there are too few females in China. The normal worldwide divergence between the number of boys to girls is about 103 males to 107 females. In China, about 119 boys are born for every 100 girls. In rural areas, where the preference for sons is the strongest, the imbalance is even greater, about 133 to 100 " There are an estimated 40 million more men than women in China's population. The declining birth rates that flow from this will hinder economic growth in the long run. China eventually will face other major economic and social problems as well, including those related to the economic fragility of its financial system and state-owned enterprises, economic malaise brought on by widespread corruption, ubiquitous environmental pollution, HIV/AIDS and other epidemic diseases like SARS, and the high energy costs, which stifle economic growth. In addition, unlike the United States, China is not a model for other countries. Chinese political values are inferior to those of the United States because China is repressive. The Chinese do not respect human rights, including religious and political freedom.

China can’t gain support – viewed as a threat.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 33

states. The fact that China has so many territorial and other disputes with its major neighbors, Japan, India, Russia, and Vietnam, means that many countries see it as a threat and will want to ally with the United States against Chinese power. The rise of China is ripe for potential conflict with its neighbors, and this constitutes a big danger in international politics.

\*\*\*Hard Power \*\*\*

Hard power solves war

Military power is the crucial factor for securing peace

David Talbot, Salon.com, January 3, 2002

From the Gulf War on, the hawks have been on the right side in all the major debates about U.S. intervention in the world's troubles. The application of American military power -- to drive back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, stop Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaigns in the Balkans, and destroy the terrorist occupation of Afghanistan -- has not just protected U.S. interests, it has demonstrably made the world safer and more civilized. Because of the U.S.-led allied victory in the Persian Gulf, Saddam -- the most blood-stained and dangerous dictator in power today -- was blocked from completing a nuclear bomb, taking control of 60 percent of the world's oil resources and using his fearsome arsenal (including biological and chemical weapons) to consolidate Iraq's position as the Middle East's reigning force. Because of the U.S.-led air war against Milosevic, the most ruthless "ethnic cleansing" program since the Holocaust was finally thwarted -- first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo -- and the repulsive tyrant is now behind bars in the Hague. And in Afghanistan, the apocalyptic master plan of the al-Qaida terror network was shattered by America's devastatingly accurate bombing campaign, along with the medieval theocracy that had thrown a cloak of darkness over the country. These demonstrations of America's awesome firepower were clearly on the right side of history. In fact, the country's greatest foreign policy disasters during this period occurred because the U.S. government failed to assert its power: when President George H. W. Bush aborted Operation Desert Storm before it could reach Baghdad and finish off Saddam (whose army had only two weeks of bullets left) and when he failed to draw a line against Milosevic's bloody plans for a greater Serbia; and when President Bill Clinton looked the other way while a genocidal rampage took the lives of a million people in Rwanda and when he failed to fully mobilize the country against terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the later attacks on American targets abroad -- a failure that extended through the first eight months of Bush II.

Hard Power key to Hege

Hard power is key to hege

Holmes ’09 (Kim, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation and author of Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century (2008), “Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Sustaining-American-Leadership-with-Military-Power>, June 1, 2009, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM

The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of America's diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a "big stick" can the United States succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support.

Hard Power + Soft Power key to Hege

****Military power and diplomacy are only effective when operating in tandem****

**Holmes ’09** (Kim, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation and author of Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century (2008), “Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Sustaining-American-Leadership-with-Military-Power>, June 1, 2009, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM

**Backing Carrots with Sticks Works** In the past, when America chose to flex its diplomatic muscle *with* the backing of its military might, the results were clear. During the Cold War, the foundational document for U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, NSC-68, concluded that military power is "one of the most important ingredients" of America's national power. This power gave the U.S. the ability not just to contain and, if necessary, wage war against the Soviet Union and its proxies, but also, during tense diplomatic stand-offs like the Cuban Missile Crisis, to reinforce its political objectives with robust strength. This same equation of military-diplomatic power proved effective in easing tensions during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996, when President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to demonstrate America's firm commitment to the Taiwanese democracy. Similarly, the display of America's military strength against a defiant Saddam Hussein in 2003 convinced Libyan President Moammar Qadhafi to abandon his weapons of mass destruction program.

Soft Power Fails

Soft power fails to solve problems unilaterally – Europe proves

Holmes ’09 (Kim, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation and author of Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century (2008), “Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Sustaining-American-Leadership-with-Military-Power>, June 1, 2009, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM

To witness the consequences when policymakers and politicians believe that hard and soft power are disconnected, one need look no further than Europe. The Europeans--many of whom believe that the peace that has broken out on their continent is the model for a post-sovereign world order--have become convinced that the anarchic order of the Westphalian system of nation-states can be breached through the exercise of soft power alone. In their view, bridging the often hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires only negotiation and common understanding. Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this vision, but the futility of this approach can be seen everywhere, from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from their nuclear programs over the past five years--a period in which their efforts have only matured--to the lackluster response to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory. Whether it is states like Iran and North Korea that believe a nuclear weapons program is central to regime survival, or human-rights abusers like Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, or rising powers like China, which continues to use its military to emphasize its sovereignty in the South China Sea, diplomacy alone has not been enough to bring about change in a direction that is favorable to America's interests.

Hard power key to soft power

Soft power is impossible without strong military power

Josef Joffe, German journalist, Conversations with History, “Power and Culture in International Affairs,” January 20 and March 23, 2000, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Joffe/joffe-con4.html, accessed 10/15/02

I think power has to be seen like a bundle of currencies. Traditionally the most important currency of power was military power, strategic power. Machiavelli said it's easier to get gold with good soldiers than to get good soldiers with gold. So on top, the most fungible of all currency is strategic. Then you can go down to all kinds of other "currencies": economic power, the attraction of your political and social system, even of your movies and your TV, your diplomatic skills. Or the power radiating from ideas: part of the great power that the Soviet Union had for a while was that this idea of socialism was a very powerful, attractive idea which inspired the entire Third World after decolonization. Everybody wanted a kind a Marxist-Soviet model of economic development and one-party states. So in the Berlin-Berkeley Belt, where the strategic issue for the time being does not arise, those who have the most soft power sources will do very well, such as Germany. But also the United States. Yes. But the most important thing is, the best deal you can get is when hard power and soft power come together. The Vatican has a lot of soft power but it has no hard power and so that means the influence of the Vatican is limited. Switzerland has a lot of soft power but nothing in the hard power field. So if you really want to sit pretty today you have to be like the United States, because the United States has all of these resources in spades. It's the mightiest military power in the world, it is the mightiest economy.

A2 Soft power

Hard power is more important than soft power.

Post and Courier, June 20, 1998

But what also struck me, as I munched fries in Yogya, was the gap between America's power to shape global culture and its power to influence global affairs. Our domination of the airwaves, soundwaves and Web sites won't bring democracy to Jakarta. Throughout Indonesia's recent political upheavals, America's influence has been almost zilch. This disconnection is important to ponder. After the Cold War ended, many analysts believed the nature of power had changed. "In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence, power is becoming ... less tangible and less coercive," wrote Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr., who held key diplomatic and intelligence posts in the first Clinton administration. The kind of power that matters now, Nye argued - in a phrase that became a buzzword - is "soft power." Soft power means that a country's ideas (democracy, free trade, consumerism) are so attractive that others will imitate them. America's culture (and the hold it has on the global imagination) are supposed to be an important source of soft power. Nye and others thought the importance of soft power would continue to grow relative to that of "hard power" - typified by military strength. Soft power was supposed to be an essential tool of the "world's sole remaining superpower." It was supposed to make "them" want to be like "us." But as I watched events unfold in Indonesia, soft power seemed irrelevant. It hardly served to bolster democracy. What young Indonesians see as the essence of America is consumer goods and media images of sex and violence. They know almost nothing about America's democratic values. Only those Indonesians with deeper knowledge of the United States (from studies abroad or professors) know that America is defined by both consumerism and democracy. Nor does the McWorld syndrome make leaders in other countries saturated by U.S. cultural exports toe the U.S. line. Soft power won't soften up Chinese leaders. McWorld won't make those leaders desist from exporting missile technology; that requires the hard-power technique of sanctions, which the Clinton team has found difficult to apply. The same holds for Japan, where a McDonald's sprouts in every neighborhood and an Elvis look-alike cult dances on Sundays in a downtown park. The veneer of U.S./global culture, despite its omnipresence, does not penetrate the foundation of Japanese-ness. Thus, American pleas for Japan to deregulate its economy and bail out its failing banks so Tokyo can power a new Asian growth spurt fall on deaf ears. Japanese leaders are willing to let the yen's value plummet, even though that drags all Asian economies down with it, because they think cheap exports will get their country out of its recession. No hard-power tools are easily at hand for Washington to pry open the Tokyo mindset. And all the McDonald's in Asia won't change Japanese thinking. Soft power is even less effective in countries that have resisted U.S. consumer products. McDonald's is in India (although it doesn't serve beef, since cows are sacred). But in a country long closed to Western exports and deluged with its own, home-produced movies, the Ameri-global culture has yet to take hold. But even if it had, that wouldn't have stopped India's government from exploding the bomb. The blasts were about hard power. Perhaps therein lies the clue to the relevance of soft power, or its lack. Since the Cold War's end, using hard power is tougher, because the objectives are less clear. A lot of wishful thinking has emerged about the impact of America's global empire of burgers and bytes on the projection of U.S. power. McWorld is great for exports (and for convincing foreign youths that their countries should go, and stay, capitalist). But in real power terms, it is still hard power that matters. The only punch delivered by a burger in Yogya is the bite of the hot chili sauce.

\*\*\*Airpower vs Groundpower\*\*\*

Airpower key to Deterrence

Strong air power is uniquely key to U.S. air deterrence capability- airplanes move quickly and have supreme power over other forces – Kak ’01

[Kapil Kak, Former Deputy Director of IDSA, “A Century of Air Power: Lessons and Pointers”, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, 03/01. Ciao-Net] DM

While joint combat power can provide deterrence through denial, in the punishment quotient there are major variations. In the 'denial' mode, land power is overwhelmingly superior, but it has very limited capacity to deter through punishment except by destruction of the adversary's land forces which is a risky proposition in a situation of nuclear overhang. Disengagement and escalation control is also beset with problems. On the other hand, naval power can provide substantive capabilities for deterrence both for denial and punishment but its capabilities are confined to the maritime environment that may be precluded by a conflict on our Northern/Eastern land borders. In contrast, combat air power inherently possesses attributes, which invest it with capabilities for deterrence through denial as also punishment. Aircraft can fly across national boundaries and geographical barriers to hit targets deep inside enemy territory. Highly calibrated escalation as well as disengagement control is feasible with air power and in a limited war this is a great asset to a defence planner. But this potent option for war prevention does not come cheap just as there is a distinct global trend towards prioritisation for air and naval power. China is the foremost example. The necessity, therefore, to arrest the decade-long trend of vastly reduced funding for modernisation of combat power thus becomes pressing. High technology weapon system assets, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), in-flight refuellers, advanced sensor technologies (space and airborne platform based) for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA), C4I2 systems, precision guided munitions (PGMs) and long range strike capabilities would need to be inducted by us without further delay. This capability-enhancement would improve effectiveness of India's air power and enable it to serve as the primary instrument for conventional deterrence as well as for finely calibrated punitive strikes. This is particularly important because coercive and deterrent diplomacy are likely to assume greater importance in the coming decades. Command of the air or air superiority, the raison d'être of the counter air campaign has often not only generated inter- service controversy but as a key doctrinal component remained little appreciated. The overall strategy is to seize the initiative, carry the war into enemy territory, neutralise air power, and establish control of the air to provide freedom of action for our surface forces. Such an air offensive is aimed not only to further land, maritime and other operations, but also for the very successful pursuit of overall war aims and defence strategy.

Airpower key to Hege

**Air power key to military dominance; plan key to prevent collapse of air power – Hornitschek 06’**

[Michael J. Hornitschek, Lt Col, USAF, 2/17/2006, WAR WITHOUT OIL: A CATALYST FOR TRUE TRANSFORMATION, <http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/sustainability/other%20articles/War%20Without%20Oil.pdf>] DM

A review of the last 60 years of American military doctrine reveals a heavy emphasis on airpower as either a stand-alone strategic instrument or as a complement to ground forces that can gain, achieve, and then exploit air superiority to maximize terrestrial opportunities. Airpower leverages inherent surprise, maneuverability, mobility, and the ability to mass firepower to overwhelm an enemy and reduce risk to one’s own forces. This American-perfected and synergistic air-land dominance comes at great energy cost, and by studying the DESC FY04 Fact Book one can identify some force structure vulnerabilities that would quickly manifest themselves should the U.S. military ever find itself in a strategically or operationally constrained petroleum environment. The first clue can be found in the breakdown of total fuels used in DoD. Accounting for $5B of the Department’s $437B FY04 budget, DESC procured 134M barrels of liquid fuel (370,000 barrels/day), of which 75 percent or 101M barrels were some form of aviation fuel (JP-4, JP-5, JP-8, or Jet A).51 By combining the Air Force’s $2,841M bill with the $722M JP-5 portion of the Navy’s $1,627M bill53, and other smaller Army and USMC amounts, Table 3 reveals that in fact 75 percent of DoD’s petroleum purchases went to fuel aircraft and some ships, with the Air Force accounting for 57 percent of the total DoD bill in FY04.54 Deeper analysis reveals that of the Air Force’s $2.8B aviation fuel bill, 54 percent went to mobility air forces, 38 percent went to combat air forces, and the remaining 8 percent was consumed by aircrew training and other aviation operations.55 The fact that 8 of 10 entries on DESC’s list of Top Ten Customers for FY04 are air mobility bases56 seemingly confirms that air mobility (airlift and air refueling) is the single most petroleum-intense activity within DoD, making focused logistics and dominant maneuver the most energy-vulnerable dimensions within DoD’s vision of full spectrum dominance for Joint Vision 2025

Airpower key to Ground Power

Air power is ONLY effective as a compliment to ground forces – Pape ’04

(Robert, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “The True Worth of Air Power”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59714/robert-a-pape/the-true-worth-of-air-power>, March/April 2004, Accessed June 26, 2010) DM

Decapitating the enemy has a seductive logic. It exploits the United States' advantage in precision air power; it promises to win wars in just days, with few casualties among friendly forces and enemy civilians; and it delays committing large numbers of ground troops until they can be welcomed as liberators rather than as conquerors. But decapitation strategies have never been effective, and the advent of precision air weaponry has not made them any more so.

No doubt, precision technology has increased the accuracy of bombing. Today, 70 to 80 percent of guided munitions fall within 10 meters of their targets, even at night, with overcast skies, or in moderate winds. This is a remarkable improvement compared to World War II, when only about 18 percent of U.S. bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their targets, and only 20 percent of British bombs dropped at night fell within 5 miles of theirs.

Yet greater accuracy has not enabled air operations alone to win major wars any more than they did before the precision age. Independent air operations have rarely been decisive. From World War I until the 1980s, they were most effective in support of ground power, serving as the "hammer" to ground power's "anvil," with the anvil usually doing most of the work. Thanks to precision weapons, air power has become a far more effective complement to ground power; the hammer now does much more work for the anvil.

Airpower key to Accuracy

Air forces critical to successful warfare – increased accuracy – McPeak ’04

(Merrill, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, “Hit or Miss”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60107/merrill-a-mcpeak-and-robert-a-pape/hit-or-miss?page=show>, September/October 2004, Accessed June 26, 2010) DM

Pape concludes that "precision air weapons ... have not brought about the revolution often proclaimed by many air power advocates." Yet he also notes that in just over a decade the United States "has won five major wars ... at the cost of only about 400 combat fatalities overall." This hardly describes old-fashioned warfare; on the contrary, something remarkable must have happened. In fact, the widespread use of PGMS has indeed enabled air power to deliver on its early promise.

As Pape notes, the old way of bombing was to miss the target. The average miss distance for all U.S. bombs dropped on Germany during World War II was about a kilometer. By the Vietnam War, it had improved to 100 meters, still leaving bombs ineffective against many targets. Now, with PGMS, bombing accuracy is about 10 meters-good enough against most targets. Yet Pape seems to think that "hitting" is only a slight variation on "missing." From the target's point of view, however, the outcome is binary.

It is true that the transition to accurate weaponry occurred rather slowly with air-to-ground munitions. But air-to-air weaponry evolved rapidly. Dumb bullets were replaced long before dumb bombs, because flight officers were convinced their first job was to take away the enemy's hammer. Pape ignores this progress, however-a curious omission in an article about the "true worth" of air power.

Airpower Key

Lack of air power causes failed military practices and ineffective stategy – McPeak ’04

(Merrill, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, “Hit or Miss”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60107/merrill-a-mcpeak-and-robert-a-pape/hit-or-miss?page=show>, September/October 2004, Accessed June 26, 2010) DM

Moreover, stripping away the opponent's hammer has freed the U.S. anvil to maneuver as it wishes, including, for example, to stay out of the fight entirely, as it did in Kosovo or at al Khafji in the Persian Gulf War-a battle that will surely be studied at the war colleges. When Pape says that "tactics commonly used by large mechanized armies ... have not changed with the advent of precision weaponry," he must be talking about the large, mechanized U.S. Army, whose tactics have not changed because they have not had to. On the other hand, as Pape also notes, enemy soldiers facing precision air power now simply separate themselves from their equipment. One can hardly imagine a more pronounced change in tactics.

Targets are what give a war its character, so it is worth turning to the "never effective" decapitation strategy. Pape objects to using air-delivered PGMS to target enemy leadership. Yet he never explains why it is a bad idea to pursue decapitation with PGMS, as opposed to, say, the soldiers who killed Saddam Hussein's sons and captured the man himself. As of this writing, Osama bin Laden is still being chased with both ground and air forces, and I presume Pape joins in the hope that the results will be precise. If, for whatever reason, the United States decides to attack enemy leadership, it is a no-brainer to do it with accurate instead of inaccurate weaponry.

Ground Forces key to Afghanistan

Ground forces are uniquely key to stabilizing Afghanistan – Phillips ’09

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The war in Afghanistan cannot be effectively waged merely with air power, predator drones, and special forces. In the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration hurled cruise missiles at easily replaceable al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, but this "chuck and duck" strategy failed to blunt the al-Qaeda threat. The Bush Administration's minimalist approach to Afghanistan in 2001 was a contributing factor that allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from his mountain redoubt at Tora Bora. Afterwards, Washington opted to focus narrowly on counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan--rather than counterinsurgency operations--in order to free up military assets for the war in Iraq. This allowed the Taliban to regroup across the border in Pakistan and make a violent resurgence. The "small footprint" strategy also failed in Iraq, before it was abandoned in favor of General Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the surge of American troops, in early 2007. Despite this record of failure, some stubbornly continue to support an "offshore" strategy for landlocked Afghanistan today. But half-measures--the hallmark of the "small footprint" strategy--will not work. Precise intelligence is needed to use smart bombs smartly. Yet few Afghans would risk their lives to provide such intelligence unless they are assured of protection against the Taliban's ruthless retaliation. Providing such protection requires more American boots on the ground beyond the 68,000 that will be deployed by the end of the year. In Iraq, the surge of American troops encouraged Iraqis to climb down off the proverbial fence and offer a flood of valuable intelligence tips that enabled a much more effective targeting of al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent forces.

Ground Forces key to Afghanistan

Troops are critical to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent the collapse of Pakistan – Phillips ’09

*(*James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, “Obama risking failure in Afghanistan By Not Sending More Troops”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/12/Obama-Risks-Failure-in-Afghanistan-By-Not-Sending-More-Troops>, December 2009, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM

The Obama administration deserved praise earlier this year for recognizing that Afghanistan needed more high-level attention, resources and U.S. troops. In March the president announced the adoption of a new counterinsurgency strategy to protect Afghan civilians, build up the Afghan army and police, provide more foreign aid and help Afghans build a more effective national government. He also dispatched 21,000 more U.S. troops to lay the foundation of the new strategy and selected Gen. Stanley McChrystal to lead the effort.

In late August McChrystal submitted a situation report that concluded that more U.S. troops were required to carry out the strategy. McChrystal reportedly requested about 40,000 more troops. But the White House apparently has gotten cold feet about implementing its own strategy, announced with much fanfare last March, opting for a commitment to provide 30,000 more troops for a period of three years.

This downsizing of urgently requested troop reinforcements could lead to a dangerous and tragic outcome. If Obama retreats to a "McChrystal Light" option that shortchanges his own hand-picked commander, it will greatly increase the risk of failure, not only in Afghanistan but in the struggle against Islamist radicals in neighboring Pakistan. It could result in a downward spiral of security in Afghanistan: a resurgent Taliban, eventual collapse of the Afghan government, an even bloodier civil war, renewed humanitarian crisis and a refugee exodus. Moreover, the Taliban will bring back not just their ally al-Qaida, but a rogues' gallery of almost every major Islamist insurgent movement in the world today.