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# Hard Line – Good (1/3)

1. Turn – hard-line approach key to a successful softline

**Heritage Foundation,**09**,**(Kim Holmes**,** States News Service, 06/12, lexis BH & JH)

Many, if not most, Europeans credit "soft power" for the peace they've enjoyed for decades. Thinking their version of a Kantian universal peace arose from the committee chambers of the European Union - and not from the victories of the Western powers in World War II and the Cold War - they hold up soft power as a model for the rest of the world. In their view, bridging the often hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires mainly negotiation and common understanding. The importance of our military strength is downplayed and sometimes even seen as the main obstacle to peace. Even when its importance is acknowledged, it's a perfunctory afterthought. Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this vision, too. But the futility of it can be seen everywhere, from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from their nuclear programs over the past five years - a period in which their efforts have only matured - to the lackluster response to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory. The limits of soft power have not only bedeviled Mr. Obama but George W. Bush as well. After applying pressure on North Korea so diligently in 2006, the Bush administration relaxed its posture in early 2007, and North Korea concluded that it was again free to backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this effort to "engage" North Korea, which the  [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T7884629225&returnToId=20_T7886004752&csi=8058&A=0.17367766875591006&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P) continued even after North Korea's April 5 missile test, has only led North Korea to believe that it can get away with more missile tests and nuclear weapons detonations. And so far, it has. The problem here is not merely an overconfidence in the process of "talking" and trying to achieve "mutual understanding" - as if diplomacy were merely about communications and eliminating hurt feelings. Rather, it is about the interaction and sometimes clash of hardened interests and ideologies. These are serious matters, and you don't take them seriously by wishing away the necessity, when need be, of using the hard power of force to settle things. It's this connection of hard to soft power that Mr. Obama appears not to understand. In what is becoming a signature trait of saying one thing and doing another, Mr. Obama has argued that America must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy." But since becoming president he has done little to demonstrate an actual commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military power with diplomatic strategies. For America to be an effective leader and arbiter of the international order, it must be willing to maintain a world-class military. That requires resources: spending, on average, no less than 4 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense. Unfortunately, Mr. Obama's next proposed defense budget and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates' vision for "rebalancing" the military are drastically disconnected from the broad range of strategic priorities that a superpower like the United States must influence and achieve.If our country allows its hard power to wane, our leaders will lose crucial diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense white paper concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and its implications for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. The United States can succeed in advancing its priorities by diplomatic means only so long as it retains a "big stick." Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support. The next British leader - and the rest of our allies - need to know they can count on the U.S. to intervene on their behalf any time, anywhere it has to. That will require hard power, not just soft, diplomatic words murmured whilst strolling serenely along " Obama Beach.

# Hard Line – Good (2/3)

**2. Hard Line approach solves - Pressure from sanctions and incentives causes North Korea to negotiate.**

**Pritchard, et al. ’10.**

(Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., Scott A. Snyder,  President of the Korea Economic Institute (KEI)  & former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution; Tilelli = degree in economics from Widener University; Snyder = Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html?breadcrumb=/region/478/northeast\_asia, Date Accessed: June 25, 2010, CC)

Option 3—Rollback A third option would be to immediately and consistently press for North Korea’s return to the path of denuclearization. This approach would involve a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs. There would be constant political pressure by the international community on North Korea—including the ratcheting up of the international sanctions regime—to limit its alternatives to negotiation. In return for cooperation, North Korea would receive political and economic benefits, such as development and energy assistance, through implementation of the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement. Conversely, its failure to cooperate would result in enforced sanctions and other penalties.

3. Economic chokehold key to disarm North Korean program

Horowitz **a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University Harvard University**05(Michael, Winter 04-05, 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 21–44. and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. “Who’s Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang”, The Washington Quarterly 28:1 pp.21-44, JH & BH)

Although plagued by its own uncertainties, largely as a result of the opaqueness of the North Korean economy, relatively more accurate conclusions can be drawn about North Korea’s economic vulnerabilities and the ability of the United States or East Asian actors to put economic pressure on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program. The trick with economic leverage is to take care to threaten the economic prosperity of Kim Jong Il and the regime elites but not bluntly damage the North Korean economy as a whole, harming its already undernourished population. To accomplish this, attempts to wield economic leverage should target North Korean means of acquiring hard currency. It will require establishing new multilateral initiatives focused on restricting North Korean profits from drug smuggling and counterfeit operations to complement existing, successful efforts to cut into North Korea’s arms export profits**,** such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Cutting the flow of remittances— wages from relatives of North Koreans living abroad—to North Korea will also help target regime elites. The goal is to convince North Korea that its previous methods of generating hard currency are no longer sustainable, thus making the country’s only option for economic survival the receipt of benefits if it irreversibly dismantles its nuclear program.

# Hard Line – Good (3/3)

**4. Hard-line approach is key now**

**Min, a defense contractor, 2009** (Bryan; Epsilon Systems; June 5; “North Korea: Basketball diplomacy might work”; <http://www.sdnn.com/sandiego/2009-06-05/politics-city-county-government/north-korea-basketball-diplomacy-might-work>)

North Korea is like the little kid on the block who wants attention. They want to show they can do whatever they want anywhere, anytime. That’s really at the heart of what’s going on. Now everyone has to come to the negotiation table and figure out the best way to pacify the “kid,” so he plays by the rules that will translate to predictability. This is a global issue. It’s not just about North and South Korea. It’s about Japan, China, Russia and the rest of the world.

3. Hard-Line approach more successful – Our evidence is comparative

Persaud, 2004 [Randolph B., Associate Professor of International Relations at American University “Shades of American Hegemony: The Primitive, the Enlightened, and the Benevolent,” 19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 263, Spring, Lexis]

<The fifth feature of primitive hegemony is actually more of a principle. The principle is that strength is more important than legitimacy, and by implication that when strength is applied in the form of coercion, there will be followers, or at a minimum the will of adversaries may be broken. In geostrategic terms this is based on the notion of positional advantage. n9Positional advantage, in part, is a strategic  [\*266]  concept that advocates the diffusion of United States military capability all over the world. In addition to the obvious advantage of being able to rapidly respond to actual conflict theatres world wide, positional advantage is also intended to forge compliant behavior on account of the proximity and preponderance of American military power. Here is what the Joint Vision 2020 report says on that subject: In a conflict, this ability to attain positional advantage allows the commander to employ decisive combat power that will compel an adversary to react from a position of disadvantage, or quit. In other situations, it allows the force to occupy key positions to shape the course of events and minimize hostilities or react decisively if hostilities erupt. And in peacetime, it constitutes a credible capability that influences potential adversaries while reassuring friends and allies.>

# Hard Line – Good Ext. (1/3)

**1. Implementation of stick policies key**

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As more nations become nuclear states, there is a higher chance of nuclear accidents and more opportunities for weapons or materials to fall into terrorist hands. After this occurs, we would wish that The United States and its allies had developed an urgent, coordinated, and direct diplomatic effort with North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear weapons programs, using both carrots and sticks.

2. Negotiations to denuclearize will fail.

Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College, 2009

(Jonathan D., The Washington Quarterly: Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist, pg. 164, October 2009, accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

<North Korea, however, no longer demonstrates serious interest in renewed negotiations, except on terms wholly unacceptable to the United States and others. It insists that it will never bargain away its nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang is also seeking to reassert central control over the economy. China’s presumedcomparative advantage in the North therefore seems somewhat suspect at present. Beijing also recognizes that the ROK and Japan will strengthen their defense plans and programs in light of the DPRK’s open hostility and threats, developments that are clearly not in Beijing’s interests.>

**3. Soft line can’t solve nuclear proliferation**

**Schulter 10**(George L., Former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Foreign Affairs “Stopping Proliferation Before it Starts” July/August 2010 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66452/gregory-l-schulte/stopping-proliferation-before-it-starts> Accessed on 6/25/10 GW)

International efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons typically focus on thwarting the atomic ambitions of North Korea and Iran. This, however, is a game that is unlikely to be won. North Korea has built and tested nuclear weapons, and Iran is on the threshold of being able to build them. The leaders of both countries remain unmoved by international condemnation and pressure. To them, the prestige, security, and influence presumed to derive from nuclear weapons seem more compelling than the weak penalties and uncertain inducements of multilateral diplomacy. Another round of sanctions or talks is unlikely to change this calculus.

# Hard Line – Good Ext. (2/3)

4. South Korea supports economic hard-line approach

Synder, 05 (Scott, Senior Associate at the Asia Foundation & the Pacific Forum/CSIS, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol 24 No 8, pg. 102-3, FT & RV)

South Korean and U.S. analysts diverge over the extent to which inter- Korean economic engagement is sustainable while North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program. Many U.S. analysts question whether South Korea should be extending an economic lifeline that might serve indirectly to sustain the North Korean regime and its persistence as a military threat. These analysts wish to see the Roh administration reduce economic assistance as a tool to pressure and isolate the North further. Yet, any consideration of reducing South Korean economic assistance to the North has been inhibited by the South Korean public’s continued support for economic engagement with North Korea, fears that the withdrawal of economic benefits from North Korea would eliminate prospects for further inter-Korean dialogue, and humanitarian concerns that innocent North Korean people would be the primary victims of sanctions that would heighten North Korea’s isolation.In addition, South Korean analysts view economic assistance as a kind of pacifier, asserting that North Korea can be most dangerous, destabilizing, and irresponsible when it has nothing to lose. South Koreans are also concerned that reductions in inter-Korean economic assistance would serve only to increase China’s political influence and that inordinate Chinese influence over North Korea may serve to thwart South Korea’s goals of reconciliation and eventual reunification with North Korea. Despite the temptations of enhanced coordination with China, given the complementary nature of their respective preferred policy approaches toward the United States, the fear of further weakening or breaking the alliance with the United States and strategic distrust of China’s ultimate intentions toward the Korean peninsula underscore the risks of any approach that aligns South Korean policy too closely with that of China.

**5. A permanent five-power council will put pressure on North Korea**

**FUKUYAMA 2k5**

FRANCIS, is a Professor of International Political Economy at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University “Re-Envisioning Asia” Foreign Affairs, pp. 85 Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), (SH /MH)

The second major obstacle to creating a permanent five-power organization is North Korea itself, which does not belong in any Responsible community of nations, given its human rights and security record. Pressing ahead too rapidly to convert narrowly focused six-party negotiations into a permanent five-powerorganization could undermine the current talks and lead to North Korean obstructionism on all fronts. The trick will be to isolate Pyongyang within the six-party format while making the other five powers comfortable with the prospect of working together over the long term. North Korea's current refusal to return to the talks may even present an occasion for a five-power meeting without Pyongyang. The larger goal aside, this strategy is something Washington should work toward to increase the pressure on Pyongyang. Eventually, the United States may be able to put new issues on the table for the five powers to discuss.

# Hard Line – Good Ext. (3/3)

5. Soft-line fails The U.S. can’t get others on board – other powers think all problems are just for the U.S.

Gvosdev 6/12/09(Nikolas, a senior editor at The National Interest, is a professor of national-security studies at the U.S. Naval War College, The End of Multilateralism, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21600, 6/12/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC

The Obama administration entered office pledging a renewed commitment to multilateralism—approaching global issues as “joint problems requiring joint solutions.” This commitment, **however,** is running up against a growing attitude in many parts of the world that the concerns the United States are identifying as threats to global peace and security are really just problems for America alone. In the months after 9/11, Amitai Etzioni saw the emerging foundations of what he termed a “Global Safety Authority” (GSA) as states worked together to pool intelligence on terrorists and collaborated more closely in efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. If, in the past, nations had focused only on specific threats to their own national security, the GSA would work to eliminate threats to the stability of the international system as a whole. Etzioni saw in this emergent GSA a way for the United States to receive “considerable assistance in its drive to deproliferate Iran and North Korea,” because there was a growing awareness that these states “pose a danger to others.” The philosophical bas`is of the GSA was the belief that a threat to one state posed a threat to the entire system. The lesson of 9/11 was that a successful strike against one state would have negative ramifications for every state, in both economic and security terms. A shared community of interests would bind the key powers of the world together. There is a familiar litany of excuses as to why this consensus has dissipated.The American penchant for “unilateralism” and desire to pursue action unhindered by the need to build consensus with other states, beginning with the Iraq War. The blame that many in the rest of the world ascribe to the United States for the current global economic crisis—that “U.S. economic irresponsibility” has inflicted hardship on other countries by dragging down the world’s economy. But there is another shift that has taken place. And it is to see many of the world’s major threats as problems for the United States alone. Few capitals are losing sleep over the prospect, say, of an Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapon detonating on their territories. Most see whatever capabilities Pyongyang and Tehran are acquiring as meant to deter Washington—not to threaten the rest of the world. The feeling seems to be that either there is no threat to the global system, or the threat is containable. We are seeing other countries of the world preparing to live with the realities of a nuclear-armed North Korea and an Iran with a significant nuclear infrastructure at its disposal. And foreign governments are not inclined to take much more decisive measures to ensure the deproliferation of either regime**.**No other country, therefore, seems prepared to do the “heavy lifting” needed to exert significant pressure on either Tehran or Pyongyang. Most countries, for instance, believe that the six-party talks on North Korea have failed. And yet, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with his counterparts at the Shangri-La Dialogue this past week, there was little agreement about the next steps that should be taken. One of Gates’ party was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “There’s no prescription yet on what to do.”The GSA, at least as envisioned by Etzioni in the months after the 9/11 attacks, is dead. And the United States is in no position to unilaterally assume upon itself the functions of the GSA. The fact that Gates left Asia to tour U.S. missile defense sites—and proclaimed both that he had “good confidence” the system in Alaska could deal with a “launch from a rogue state such as North Korea” and that “the way is opened in the future to add to the number of silos and interceptors up here”—signals that Washington could easily pull back to a more defensive position to protect American interests. And what happens if the United States were to decide that it is time to end the free-riding of the rest of the world on American efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan? Such a [proposal](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/opinion/29iht-edweiss.html) was advanced by Stanley Weiss, of Business Executives for National Security, in the New York Times: It is now clear that the United States alone cannot stabilize the situation in Pakistan or Afghanistan. As President Obama said, it is a regional problem that demands regional solutions.  It is time for America to make China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India an offer they can’t refuse: Either join us or we leave.Drawing back from the world or continuing to act (and expend blood and treasure) while others sit on the sidelines are not attractive options for the administration. But until the world experiences another 9/11-style shock to the system, there is going to be no decisive multilateral action taken—on Iran, North Korea, climate change, trade or a whole host of other issues.  No speech is going to change that reality.

# Soft Line – Good (1/4)

**1. Turn - DESPITE THE ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT, THE US HARDLINE APPROACH REMAINS THE BIGGEST IMPEDIMENT**

John S. **Park July 18, 2010**(Project MUSE, Brown University)

While the Bush administration has remained predominantly focused on terrorism, South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun’s primary concern has been maintaining the stable security environment needed to promote his administration’s “Peace and Prosperity Policy,” a continuation of Kim Daejung’s “Sunshine Policy.” Through his policy, Roh wants to expand nascent economic ties with Pyongyang to develop inter-Korean relations further. Seoul seeks to avoid the massive costs that a rapid reunification with Pyongyang would entail and instead achieve a gradual integration and reunification of the two Koreas through South Korean direct investment and growing inter-Korean trade.5 A major impediment to this approach has been the U.S. policy toward North Korea of tailored containment, through which Washington has sought to force a rollback of North Korea’s nuclear programs through economic and political pressure. Following North Korea’s admission in October 2002 that it had been conducting a clandestine HEU weapons program, Washington sought to send a clear message to Pyongyang that it would not negotiate with a country that had cheated on its nonproliferation commitments. In pursuing its tailored containment policy, the Bush administration caused two unintended reactions in South Korea that significantly altered the way Seoul viewed the rising tensions between Pyongyang and Washington. The first was to boost the presidential electoral prospects of the leftwardleaning candidate Roh in the 2002 contest. Determined to pick up where his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, had left off, Roh made continuing the Sunshine Policy a pillar of his campaign platform. In opposing this policy, Roh’s rival, the arch-conservative Lee Hoi-chang, essentially aligned himself with Washington’s approach. Just days before the November elections, two U.S. servicemen who had earlier struck and killed two South Korean schoolgirls with their military vehicle were acquitted of criminal negligence by a U.S. military court in Seoul.6 In a presidential contest that was the closest in the short history of South Korea’s democracy, Lee’s endorsement of the U.S. policy toward North Korea proved to be a distinct liability in the atmosphere of widespread, virulent anti-Americanism that followed the acquittals. In pursuing tailored containment, the Bush administration had publicly challenged the legitimacy of the Sunshine Policy and laid out the main policy battleground in the South Korean presidential election. The second unintended consequence of the tailored containment policy was that it enabled Roh to foster the broad public support needed to take the Sunshine Policy to the next level. Soon after his inauguration in February 2003, Roh initiated a more proactive South Korean role in inter-Korean relations. In direct contrast to Washington’s policy and its refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang, Roh sent senior government officials to meet with the North Korean leadership. Roh’s envoys reportedly conveyed specific plans for unprecedented inter-Korean economic relations, with “aid on a massive scale.”7 Seeking to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, Pyongyang suspended inter-Korean talks until June 2005, citing the hostile U.S. policy. Ironically the impetus for, as well as the main obstacle to, implementing Seoul’s bold plan to integrate North Korea into the regional economic system remains Washington’s adherence to tailored containment.

# Soft Line – Good (2/4)

**2. Hard Line Fails - trying to punish North Korea for their actions as a “rogue state” is a flawed policy framework which empirically fails
Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003** (Roland Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis” Accessed on JSTOR, pg. 4, jb, sob)

One of the most revealing interpretations of the dynamics that led to the crisis and its resolution was conducted by Leon Sigal. In a counter-reading of US nuclear diplomacy towards North Korea in the years leading up to the crisis, Sigal documents how coercive diplomacy brought Korea to the brink of war. He writes of a US foreign policy pattern that discouraged cooperation and, instead, promoted a 'crime-and-punishment approach' which constituted North Korea above all as a threatening rogue state. While acknowledging the numerous instances that would, indeed, give rise to such an image, Sigal also deals with the interactive nature of the conflict. In a crucial passage he asks why, if North Korea was allegedly so keen on developing nuclear weapons and had numerous opportunities to do so, did it not simply go ahead and build bombs. Sigal's answers highlight Washington's inability to recognize that North Korea was playing 'tit-for-tat in nuclear diplomacy'. I Some of Sigal's arguments have become controversial. He has, for instance, been accused of downplaying North Korea's failure to uphold its obligations. That may well be the case; but at a more fundamental level Sigal is nevertheless able to reveala striking empirical pattern: each time the US used an aggressive policy to pressure North Korea into giving way, the latter became more recalcitrant. By contrast, when Washington relied on a more cooperative attitude Pyongyang usually responded with concessions. Tension on the Korean peninsula thus decreased only when the US adopted a 'give-and-take' diplomatic style in recognition that Pyongyang's recalcitrance can, and should, be read as a bargaining tactic to get something in return for giving up the nuclear option.'2

3. No Impact - Decrease in pressure doesn’t lead to war – Clinton proves

Bleiker, **Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University**, Jul 2003

(Roland, “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis”,

 International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 6 jb, sob)

Once that first nuclear crisis was solved in I994, all parties concerned embarked on a more cooperative route. of Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's president in early I998 signaled the advent of a policy that was more conciliatory or at last more willing to engage the arch-enemy across the dividing line. The US administration under President Clinton was strongly supportive of this approach. Of particular significance here is an official policy review, conducted by then former Defense Secretary Perry. In some respects the report advocated little new. It called for a realist approach based on 'a hard-headed understanding of military realities', which, translated into practice, meant no changes to Washington's 'strong deterrent posture towards the Korean Peninsula'.Not surprisingly, the Perry Report located the main threat in North Korea's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons or to develop, test and deploy long-range missiles. 'The United States must, therefore, have as its objective ending these activities.'13 At the same time, though, the Perry Report called for a fundamental review of US policy towards Pyongyang, advocating a position that rests not only on military deterrence, but also on a 'new, comprehensive and integrated approach' to negotiations with North Korea.'4In some sense the report sought to promulgate the very tit-for-tat approach that Sigal found missing during the early days of the Clinton administration. The new policy still revolved around a strong defensive posture and an inherent distrust of North Korea, but it also foresaw the possibility of rewarding Pyongyang for concessions.In this respect the Perry Report signified a remarkable departure from the US position of viewing rogue states as inherently evil, irrational and incapable of compromising.

# Soft Line – Good (3/4)

4. Turn - Increased pressure causes North Korea to increase nuclear weapon production

Cha and Kang 04 (Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha is D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and David C. Kang is director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, “The Debate over North Korea”, pg. 243-244, JSTOR Database, 05/18/2010, JB and ZB)

Thus, the Agreed Framework of 1994 is dead. Both North Korea and the United States are now in essentially the same position they were in, in 1994? Threatening war, moving toward confrontation. Given the levels of mistrust on both sides, this comes as no surprise. If North Korea feels threatened, threatening them is unlikely to make them feel less threatened. Gregory Clark pointed out that "Washington's excuse for ignoring the nonaggression treaty proposal has to be the ultimate in irrationality. It said it would not negotiate under duress. So duress consists of being asked to be nonaggressive?"41 An intense security dilemma on the Korean peninsula is exacerbated by an almost complete lack of direct interaction between the two sides. Levels of mistrust are so high that both sides hedge their bets. The United States refused to provide formal written assurances of nonaggression to the North. The North thus retains its military and nuclear forces in order to deter the United States from acting too precipitously.

**5. US reluctance to join soft line approaches was major contributor to lack of solution with North Korean tensions.**

**Park 2005** (John S. Park; John S. Park is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

(BCSIA) at Harvard University. He is currently project leader of the North Korea Analysis Group, a Managing the Atom Project working group at BCSIA; The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the MIT The Washington Quarterly • 28:4 pp. 75–91; Washington Quarterly; August; <http://muse.jhu.edu> BH)

Because of Washington’s singular focus on terrorism, North Korea has become a secondary issue on the administration’s national security priority list, thereby imposing policy constraints on dealing effectively with Pyongyang. A clear indication of this is the relatively midlevel U.S. diplomatic person- nel assigned to dealing with the crisis. Compared to the vice foreign minis- ter–rank officials in China and equivalent-level diplomatic officials from other countries, the primary U.S. official was James Kelly, an assistant secre- tary of state. Chinese government policy analysts indicated that their country’s leadership viewed Washington’s unwillingness to designate a more senior decisionmaker as an indication of U.S. reluctance to fully support China’s multilateral diplomatic effort.Although Washington has been publicly supportive of Beijing’s activities in the context of the six-party talks, senior Bush administration officials have expressed frustration to their Chinese counterparts in closed bilateral meetings over China’s reluctance to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.3 This stance is predicated on the U.S. belief that Beijing has substantial influence over Pyongyang. During the Korean War, relations between China and North Korea were heralded as being as close as “lips and teeth.”4 Yet, since then the Sino–North Korean relationship has had a long history of mutual distrust and deep suspicion. In sum, the greatest challenge facing the Bush administration in dealing with North Korea is its lack of strong policy coordination with China in jointly leading the multilateral diplomatic effort. This divergence is encap- sulated in the different historical model that each country uses for a poten- tial solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.While China and

# Soft Line – Good (4/4)

{Park 2005 cntd}

other countries, including South Korea, Russia, and North Korea itself, look to Ukraine as a potential model, the United States, along with Japan, advo- cates using the Libyan caseas a model for a potential solution. The Bush ad- ministration has heralded Libya’s decision in December 2003 to give up its nascent nuclear weapons program in return for readmission into the inter- national system as a guiding example of how offering carrots against the background of a hard-line approach bolsters international nonproliferation efforts. Washington seeks the same response from North Korea: voluntary nuclear disarmament in return for integration into the international system. In this respect, Washington has applied tailored containment as an interim measure until North Korea relinquishes its nuclear weapons programs.

# Soft Line – Good Ext. (1/4)

**1. Turn - Adding pressure on North Korea will likely lead to nuclear terror**

**O’Hanlon,a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program**, **2003**

(Michael, “Economic Reform and Military Downsizing: A Key to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis?”, The Brookings Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20081126, KK/EL)

North Korean leaders tend to become more intransigent when their backs are against the wall, and they are clearly willing to see their own people starve before capitulating to coercion. Pushing North Korea to the brink may also increase the odds that it will sell plutonium to the highest bidder to rescue its crumbling economy and preserve its power.

2. Soft line key - Cooperation with key countries necessary for DPRK disarm

Horowitz **a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University Harvard University**05 (Michael, Winter 04-05, 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 21–44. and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. “Who’s Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang”, The Washington Quarterly 28:1 pp.21-44, JH & BH)

Combating Pyongyang’s very diverse set of legal and illegal contacts that generate its hard currency throughout the world requires a multilateral approach**.** The United States must work with the key countries involved to ensure that pressure is correctly, rather than indiscriminately, applied to North Korean elites. Building the capability to continue restricting weapons exports, to crack down on North Korean drug trafficking and counterfeiting operations, and to set clear conditions for aid and remittance flows may allow the United States and its allies to place the economic prosperity of North Korea’s elites at risk, putting pressure on the North Korean regime in ways that the traditional package of U.S. economic sanctions have failed to do. In the best case scenario, using multilateral cooperation to pressure North Korean elites directly will raise the cost of maintaining a nuclear program to levels impossible for the regime to sustain, leaving North Korea with little choice but to negotiate in good faith**.**

# Soft Line – Good Ext. (2/4)

**3. Soft line necessary - DPRK talks need a strat change – we risk one of the biggest impacts.**

Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College, 2009

(Jonathan D., The Washington Quarterly: Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist, pg. 169-170, October 2009, accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

<Northeast Asia’s latent instability derives principally though not exclusively from the DPRK’s isolation, vulnerability, and position as the region’s conspicuous strategic outlier. The North’s exceptionalism reinforces the urgency of a true strategic conversation, beginning with Beijing, Seoul, andWashington, the states that would most likely to be immediately and directly affected by any use of force. All may hope for renewed negotiations with the North, but (beyond oblique hints from Pyongyang of ‘‘a separate method of dialogue’’) the current prospects remain decidedly bleak.39 Prospective discussions among the affected parties, however, should not be premised on the end of the North Korean system, as any effort to enlist China in heightened cooperation premised on regime extinction is a non-starter. But a very different strategic discussion is now urgently needed, especially between the United States and China. A new strategy must pay explicit heed to Pyongyang’s expressed convictions about the legitimacy and irreversibility of its nuclear weapons program, with North Korea intent on securing the ultimate acquiescence of others to the existence of such capabilities. Without coordinated efforts to forestall such a grim outcome, Pyongyang will not feel pressured or compelled to alter course. But even with such measures success is not guaranteed. North Korea’s nuclear defiance has thus deeply sobered the United States and others to the possibility of a strategic future in Northeast Asia where the DPRK’s antagonisms toward the outside world could persist or even increase. The stakes for regional peace and development could not be higher, and warrant the urgent attention of the United States and all of Pyongyang’s neighbors.>

4. The US must use soft line over hard line with the DPRK

China Daily 09 (“Diplomacy the Path to Peaceful Peninsula” April 7, 2009 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

If the [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9367122866&returnToId=20_T9367379704&csi=227171&A=0.5818079453284389&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P) can rein in its own military, as well as its dependent allies in Seoul and Tokyo, and pursue the avowed aim of a world free of nuclear weapons, DPRK might play along. "Pyongyang's basic stance is that as long as Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul remain adversaries, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear missiles to counter that threat," writes Leon Sigal, an expert on the Korean crisis, in the January 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. However, "if Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul move toward reconciliation it will get rid of these weapons. Whether the DPRK means what it says isn't certain, but the only way to test it is to try to build mutual trust over time by faithfully carrying out a series of reciprocal steps." Short of fuel and unable adequately to feed its own people, the DPRK badly needs international economic assistance. The other five parties should strive for an immediate quid pro quo involving massive but graduated assistance to the DPRK in return for denuclearization. Such a result would not only pave the way for a settlement on the Korean Peninsula but could also enhance the prospects of containing Korean nuclear technology from being exported to other states. The DPRK launch represents a step back in the region, but there is a way forward. The Six Party talks must resume and come to acceptable terms. In the 21st century, choosing militarism over diplomacy invites disaster.

# Soft Line – Good Ext. (3/4)

**5. Turn - Soft line policies are exceptionally key to success of hard line**

**Nye Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University 2004** (Joseph S. Nye Jr. Reproduced with permission from "Soft Power and Leadership," Compass: A Journal of Leadership, Spring <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>)

Soft power has always been a key element of leadership. The power to attract—to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda—has its roots in thousands of years of human experience. Skillful leaders have always understood that attractiveness stems from credibility and legitimacy. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction as well as fear. When the United States paid insufficient attention to issues of legitimacy and credibility in the way it went about its policy on Iraq, polls showed a dramatic drop in American soft power. That did not prevent the United States from entering Iraq, but it meant that it had to pay higher costs in the blood and treasure than would otherwise have been the case. Similarly, if Yasser Arafat had chosen the soft power model of Gandhi or Martin Luther King rather than the hard power of terrorism, he could have attracted moderate Israelis and would have a Palestinian state by now. I said at the start that leadership is inextricably intertwined with power. Leaders have to make crucial choices about the types of power that they use. Woe be to followers of those leaders who ignore or devalue the significance of soft power.

**5. Democratic solutions including ‘carrots’ are key to solve**

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As more nations become nuclear states, there is a higher chance of nuclear accidents and more opportunities for weapons or materials to fall into terrorist hands.After this occurs, we would wish that The United States and its allies had developed an urgent, coordinated, and direct diplomatic effort with North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear weapons programs, using both carrots and sticks.

# Soft Line – Good (4/4)

6. Hard line fails - US needs to remove pressure on NK, to make changes

Cha and Kang 04 (Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha is D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and David C. Kang is director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, “The Debate over North Korea”, pg. 241, JSTOR Database, 05/18/2010, JB and ZB)

The North consistently maintained that it wanted the United States to lower the pressure. On 20 October 2002, Kim Yong Nam, Chair of the Supreme People's Assembly, said that "If the United States is willing to drop its hostile policy towards us, we are prepared to deal with various security concerns through dialogue."36 On 3 November 2002, Han Song Ryol, DPRK Ambassador to the UN, reiterated that "Everything will be negotiable, including inspections of the enrichment program... . [O]ur government will resolve all U.S. security concerns through the talks if your government has a will to end its hostile policy."37 As the crisis intensified, Colin Powell refused to consider dialogue with the North, remarking that "We cannot suddenly say 'Gee, we're so scared. Let's have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.' This kind of action cannot be rewarded."38