**Proliferation Advantage**

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# Prolif 1AC

**War with south and North Korea is high now**

**Lubin 10’**

([Gus Lubin](http://www.businessinsider.com/author/gus-lubin) “a writer for business insider” June 25, 2010 <http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-threatens-war-if-north-korea-makes-one-more-provocation-2010-5>)QJ

South Korea's Lee Myung-bak announced his retaliation plan for the [attack on the Cheonan](http://www.businessinsider.com/category/korea)this morning in Seoul. Although restrained like he has been for the past two months, the president finally referred to the possibility of war: Moving from "passive defense to proactive deterrence" is a significant shift for a country that [seems to get pushed around by North Korea every year](http://www.businessinsider.com/were-calling-it-this-is-not-the-start-the-restart-of-the-korean-war-2010-3). Just this month South [Korea](http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-threatens-war-if-north-korea-makes-one-more-provocation-2010-5) fired warning shots when North Korean ships ventured across the border. On the other hand, if Kim Jong-il were to refrain from lighting the powderkeg for a year or so, he'd be getting off easy. The rest of Lee's retaliation involves a ban on [sand and fish imports](http://www.businessinsider.com/south-koreas-will-avenge-torpedoed-warship-by-banning-imports-of-sand-and-fish-2010-5). South Korea will continue to share an industrial complex with [North Korea](http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-threatens-war-if-north-korea-makes-one-more-provocation-2010-5) and continue sending foreign aid across the border. Lee will also bring his case to the UN, but the UN can do little [without the support of China](http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-begs-china-for-support-against-kim-jong-il-2010-4). Here's the rest of Lee's statement, from [Joongang Daily](http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2920857): "From this moment, no North Korean ship will be allowed to make passage through any of the shipping lanes in the waters under our control, which has been allowed by the Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation,” Lee said. “The sea routes meant for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation must never again be used for armed provocations.” “In close consultations with the nations concerned, the government will refer this matter to the UN Security Council, so that the [international community](http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-threatens-war-if-north-korea-makes-one-more-provocation-2010-5) can join us in holding the North accountable,” Lee said. “Many countries around the world have expressed their full support for our position.” “Trade and exchanges between the Republic of Korea and North Korea will also be suspended,” Lee said. “However, we will continue to provide assistance for infants and children,” he said. “Matters pertaining to the Kaesong Industrial Complex will be duly considered, taking its unique characteristics into consideration.”

# **NK Policy – Must withdraw**

**Withdrawing from Korea is needed for denuclearization.**

Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College, 2009

(Jonathan D., The Washington Quarterly: Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist, pg. 158-159, October 2009, accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

<North Korea, however, was already laying down new policy markers, suggesting that the DPRK had decided to seek explicit political assent by the United States and others that the DPRK would resume negotiations as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang characterized the North’s 2006 test and its accumulation of weaponized plutonium as a fundamental strategic turning point that diminished the importance the DPRK had previously attached to diplomatic relations with the United States.28 According to senior North Korean diplomats, ‘‘the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’’ would require the United States to disengage from its security commitments in Northeast Asia, remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, withdraw U.S. military forces from the peninsula, and develop a U.S.—DPRK ‘‘strategic relationship’’ paralleling the U.S.—ROK alliance. North Korean officials also asserted that normalization, presumably entailing a peace agreement to supplant the armistice accords of July 1953, would have to precede denuclearization. Moreover, dismantlement and final verification would not be possible unless and until the United States again provided the light water reactors initially pledged under the now defunct Agreed Framework.>

**Denuclearization in North Korea needed to stabilize Northeast Asia.**

**Pritchard, et al. ’10.**

(Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., Scott A. Snyder,  President of the Korea Economic Institute (KEI)  & former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution; Tilelli = degree in economics from Widener University; Snyder = Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html?breadcrumb=/region/478/northeast\_asia, Date Accessed: June 25, 2010, CC)

The Task Force finds that **a nuclear-capable North Korea under its current leadership threatens the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime and undermines Northeast Asia’s stability. An approach that attempts to contain the risks of North Korean proliferation while managing to freeze nuclear and missile capabilities at their current levels is necessary, but the Task Force finds that these steps are not enough to achieve full denuclearization of the Korean peninsula**. The Task Force finds that the debate over nonproliferation versus denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization.

# Impact Comparison: Nuke trade > nuke war

The true danger is that of terrorists getting nuclear weapons – not a nuclear exchange.

Perry, 19th Secretary of Defense, 2006

(Dr. William J., former co-director, preventive defense project, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor and School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism: Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Missile Crises, pg. 78-79, September 2006, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097840> , accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

<During the cold war, we were confronted by a hostile Soviet Union with thousands of thermonuclear weapons. Our strategy, deterrence, was easy to understand but hard to implement. The United States maintained a huge store of nuclear weapons on high alert, poised to destroy the Soviet Union if they launched nuclear weapons against us -- or our allies. It was a dangerous strategy, but in the end, it worked. Today the risk is not of a thermonuclear exchange. The danger is that terrorists will acquire a nuclear weapon and detonate it in on U.S. soil. Fortunately, no terror group is able to build a nuclear bomb from scratch; only a nation-state can manage a project of that complexity. For a terror group to obtain a nuclear bomb, they must buy or steal one from a nuclear power or, with more difficulty, construct one using plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) acquired from a nuclear power or the nuclear black market. To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, therefore, we must keep terrorists from getting the bomb or the fissile material in the first place. That will require sustained action on three different fronts: dealing with the "loose nukes" problem; maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and keeping dangerous nations from going nuclear. This article addresses one aspect of die latter front: the efforts we have undertaken through the years to keep North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal.>

# Proliferation Advantage Extensions

**Six Party talks will resume conversations due to the rising threat of nuclear proliferation of North Korea**

**MNNA ‘10**

(June 22, 2010; No Six-Party Talks Before Addressing Warship Sinking: South Korean FM; <http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=507855>; Malaysian National News Agency; AW)

SEOUL, June 22 (Bernama) -- The six-way talks aimed at ridding the North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) of its nuclear programmes would not resume before addressing the sinking of a South Korean warship currently blamed on Pyongyang, South Korea's top diplomat said Tuesday

"As North Korea (DPRK) has been found to be responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan, the government plans to focus on responding to the incident at the current stage," Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the parliament, according to Yonhap News Agency.

"The government will discuss resuming six-party talks with countries concerned after completing its response," Yu reportedly said.

Yu reiterated Seoul's stance that Pyongyang should make actual progress in the denuclearization process, and that the government would pursue a so-called "grand bargain" approach once the stalled talks reopen.

The approach, called for by South Korean President Lee Myung- bak, is aimed at achieving the DPRK's denuclearization at once, rather than gradually approaching the goal in phases, in return for international aid and other incentives for Pyongyang.

The minister's remarks come at a time when two Koreas are making their separate cases at the UN Security Council over alleged Pyongyang's torpedo attack on a navy corvette, which killed 46 South Korean seamen.

Seoul is hoping to adopt a new resolution or a strongly worded presidential statement condemning its wartime rival, which denies its involvement.

Fifty-eight countries and five international organizations have rebuked the DPRK and shown support for South Korea's response to the deadly incident, Yu reportedly said.

**Russia and US decide to raise sanctions against NK b/c of prolif threats**

**Downing ’10**

([Russia, U.S. agree on sanctions against Iran, N.Korea - Obama](http://en.rian.ru/world/20100625/159567571.html); Larry Downing; 25/06/2010; <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100625/159567571.html> ; AW )

Russia and the United States agreed that sanctions against Iran and North Korea should be boosted, President Barack Obama said Thursday at a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev after top-level talks.

Western powers suspect Iran of attempting to build nuclear weapons and the UN Security Council approved on June 9 the fourth round of economic sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, including tougher financial controls and an expanded arms embargo. Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is aimed at generating peaceful civilian energy.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said he regrets the UN Security Council's decision to impose a new round of sanctions against Iran and called the move "counterproductive." He said Iran will make no concessions to any country.

Following the imposition of the new sanctions, the Iranian parliament passed a bill directing the government to scale down its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran's nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced Wednesday his country had produced 17 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium and could produce as much as it needed. He said Tehran was not going to turn its entire uranium stockpile into 20%-enriched fuel but that it reserved "the right to enrich fuel to any level needed."

The six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program stalled last April after Pyongyang pulled out of negotiations in protest to the United Nations' condemnation of its missile tests.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased when the 1,200-ton South Korean warship[Cheonan](http://en.rian.ru/trend/south_korean_corvette_2010/) sunk near the disputed Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea on March 26, causing the loss of 46 lives. South Korea says it has proof that North Korea fired a torpedo at the vessel from a submarine, although Pyongyang denies the attack.

While the United States and South Korea continue to insist on imposing fresh sanctions on the North, veto-wielding China has made it clear that it is against the sanctions.

**Since the Korean War, NK has been stockholding nuclear supplies**

**Perry Davis Schoff Yoshihara 04** (Charles M. Perry Jacquelyn K. Davis James L. Schoff Toshi Yoshihara, “Alliance Diversification and the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship”, June 30, 2004, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., ZB)

From the Korean War onward, North Korea responded to this nuclear blackmail by building enormous facilities underground or in mountain redoubts, from troop and material depots to munitions factories, even to subterranean warplane hangars. American control of the air in that war illustrated a deterrence principle supposedly developed only with “smart” weapons- namely, that “once you can see the target, it is already destroyed”. The North Koreans have long known this and have acted upon the principle. In the mid-1970’s P’yongyang faced more the activity only under enormous American pressure, while retaining formidable potentialities. The ROK went ahead with its clandestine program to develop “indigenous ability to build ballistic missiles” capable of carrying nuclear warheads. South Korea also garnered a reputation as a “renegade” arms supplier to pariah countries like South Africa and to Iran and Iraq during the war. Much of this reads as if it were written about North Korea, not South Korea, and puts P’yongyang’s activities into perspective: much of it was in response to U.S. pressure and ROK initiatives. threats as the Park Chung Hee government sought to develop nuclear capabilities, ceasig.

**North Korea has shown it is building nuclear weapons to deter smaller countries from building weapons**

**Cumings 05** (Bruce Cumings, September 2005, Bruce studied in Modern Korean History, East Asian Political Economy; International History at the University of Chicago, “Korea’s Place in the Sun a Modern History”, pg 481-482, published September 2005, ZB)

The DPRK probably decided in 1991, if not earlier, to develop a small-state deterrent for a country surrounded by powerful enemies, like Israel: to display enough activity to make possession of a nuclear device plausible to the outside world, but with no announcement of possession, in order to lessen the chance that those same enemies will determine to develop nuclear weapons (e.g., South Korea or Japan)- in short, to appear to arm itself with an ultimate trump card and keep everyone guessing whether and when the weapons might become available. (One expert documented South Korea’s identical interest in the Israeli deterrent model.) This is the only explanation for the Yongbyon facility’s being built above ground, where it can be “seen” by spy satellites: if the North Koreans had not been interested in the worlds discovering their program, they would have put it well below ground (as they have so much else, and as the Israelis did their Dimona complex, where they reprocessed plutonium and built bombs eighty feet underground).

Nuclear prolif **and** terrorism **must be avoided – these threats rise above all others is urgency**

**Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government 2010** (Graham Allison “Nuclear Disorder”, printed in Foreign Affairs January-February 2010 Vol 89 Issue 1, pg. 2, jb, sob)

Obama has put the danger of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda. He has called it "a threat that rises above all others in urgency" and warned that if the international community fails to act, "we will invite nuclear arms races in every region and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine." Consider the consequences, he continued, of an attack with even a single nuclear bomb: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city--be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris--could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life."

# Impact – Proliferation / Econ

DPRK conflict escalates to global economic collapse and proliferation.

Howard 04 (Peter, December 04, Dr. Peter Howard focuses on US foreign policy and international security, “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4, Date accessed: 6/22, JH & BH)

Following the comparison of material capabilities presented in Table 1, North Korea poses a bigger threat to the United States because it has the greatest ca-pability to threaten U.S. interests. The DPRK has a larger military, more forces concentrated closer to U.S. and allied targets, more missiles with longer ranges, and more fissile material than either Iran or Iraq. While Iran and Iraq do have the ability to severely disrupt the global oil markets, North Korea also has the ability to threaten the global economy. Japan and South Korea, the second and 11th largest economies in the world, respectively, as well as major U.S. trading partners, are both vulnerable to any DPRK attack. A nuclear-armed North Korea could also drastically shift the military balance in North East Asia, prompting South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear programs and increase their military forces to protect against North Korea (Oh and Hassig, 1995). China and Russia, both sharing a border with North Korea, would also be implicated in any future Korean conflict. The potential danger of an unchecked North Korean nuclear program is so severe that the United States was prepared to go to war in 1994 to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons (Reiss, 1995; Sigal, 1998; Oberdorfer, 2001; Ho-ward, 2002; Drennan, 2003).

# **N-S Korea Prolif**

South Korea won’t go nuclear – U.S. nuclear umbrella gives them security.

Synder, 07 (Scott, Senior Associate at the Asia Foundation & the Pacific Forum/CSIS, “Responses to North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol 30 No 4, pg. 39, FT & RV)

To some extent, Japan and South Korea had begun hedging against North Korea’s nuclear program even before the nuclear test. The first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1992–1994, during which the DPRK first threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before negotiating a freeze of its program under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in October 1994, prompted an internal Japanese review in 1995 on whether to develop nuclear weapons, an idea that was rejected at the time as not in the national interest.16 South Korean experiments with laser enrichment of uranium isotopes, albeit only sporadic and on a limited scale between 1982 and 2000, went unreported to the IAEA until the IAEA conducted inspections in 2004.17 It is well known that both countries have the technological capacity, know-how, and necessary materials to go nuclear in a matter of weeks or months. As long as both states are allies of the United States and therefore under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, however, there appears to be little likelihood that either Japan or South Korea would go nuclear.

**Extent of nuclear proliferation of North Korea depends on Sino-American relations, which will only be successful with multilateralism**

Cossa et. al. 09

(Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum CSIS, Brad Glosserman Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS, Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.) Vice President and Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Dr. James Przystup Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Dr. Brad Roberts research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration”, February 2009 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)

**The Korean Peninsula denuclearization process** (or the lack thereof) **will continue to have a significant impact on ROK** and Japanese **thinking about security**. **It has also created a** diplomatic **dynamic in which Beijing’s** apparent **leverage** with Pyongyang **places a premium on Washington’s maintaining cooperative relations with China**. To some degree, **the success of U.S. attempts to achieve a fully denuclearized North Korea depends upon good Sino-American relations**. It also requires the other five members of the Six-Party Talks—China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States—to speak with one voice in dealing with a recalcitrant North Korea. Meanwhile, the **continued reliance on the six-party process** to deal with this issue **underscores another trend in the Asia-Pacific region** over the past decade: **the increased tendency to build**, if not rely upon, **multilateral initiatives to deal with** regional **challenges and promote** broader regional **cooperation**.

**North Korean nukes threaten the non-prolif regime
Auton, NATO research fellow and Ford postdoctoral fellow in European Society and Western Security at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, 2008** (Graeme P. Auton, “Review of North Korea: Another Country by Bruce Cummings”, accessed at Project Muse, pg. 3, jb, sob)

Such is particularly the case with the North Korean nuclear crisis, now in the throes of its culmination. There can be no doubt that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the stability of both Northeast Asia and the global nonproliferation regime. Yet, as Cumings notes, the important question involves how we got here and what might have been done to avert this turn of events. It is only through an understanding of that question that the parties embroiled in Pyongyang’s nuclear showdown can reach a solution. Amnesiac Americans too easily forget that before 1991 the United States threatened a non-nuclear-armed

North Korea with nuclear retaliation, in violation of the spirit—if not the letter—of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, the threat of such retaliation has persisted to the present, despite the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula during the George H. W. Bush administration. As Pyongyang’s ﬁrst successful nuclear test elicits global condemnation, Americans also forget that an imperfect but hard-won Framework Agreement—negotiated by Robert Gallucci and his colleagues in 1993–94—was summarily thrown away by a George W. Bush administration more interested in impressing its evangelical constituency, lobbing schoolyard taunts, and treating bilateral diplomacy as a reward for good behavior than in resolving practical security issues on the Korean Peninsula.7

**Painting North Korea as an evil “rogue state” reinforces the nuclear crisis – empirics agree**
**Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003** (Roland Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis” Accessed on JSTOR, pg. 13 jb, sob)

Despite numerous and obvious signs, and despite detailed and insightful studies of North Korea's previous negotiation behaviour, in 2003 US decision-makers repeated exactly the same mistakes made during the first crisis: they believed that by demonizing North Korea as an evil rogue state they could force Pyongyang into concessions. Whether this policy resulted from ignorance or specific design remains open to debate. The bottom line is that the US position was firm: 'America and the world will not be blackmailed,' stressed President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address.5? The result was predictable: Pyongyang became more recalcitrant. A new nuclear crisis started to take hold of the Korean peninsula.

Discourse about international affairs is so abstracted that real understandings are impossible.

Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003

(Roland, “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis”,

 International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 16 jb, sob)

Why is it so difficult to deal with, or even recognize, the interactive dynamics of security dilemmas? Why is it still possible to present as rational and credible the view that North Korea alone is responsible for yet another nuclear crisis on the peninsula? And why have militaristic approaches to security come to be seen as the only realistic way of warding off the perceived threat, even though they are quite obviously implicated in the very dynamic that led to its emergence in the first place? Answers to these complex questions are, of course, not easy to find. I certainly do not pretend to offer them here. But at least some aspects can be understood by observing the central role that defense analysis plays in the articulation of security policy. The latter has in essence been reduced to discussions about military issues which, in turn, are presented in a highly technical manner. Consider a random example from one of many recent 'expert' treatises on North Korea's missile programme: If North Korea launches a ballistic missile attack on South Korean airfields and harbors, it could seriously impede Flexible Deterrence Options (FDO) operations by US forces. The argument has been made that even if the North uses ballistic missiles, the accuracy or circular error probable (CEP) of the Rodong-i (about i km) is such that it would not be able to under take airstrike missions.66 A fundamental paradox emerges: on the one hand, an array of abstract acronyms and metaphors has removed our understanding of security issues further and further from the realities of conflict and war. On the other hand, we have become used to these distorting metaphors to the point that the language of defence analysis has become the most accepted-and by definition most credible and rational-way of assessing issues of security. The ensuing practices of political legitimization provides experts-those fluent in the techno-strategic language of abstraction-not only with the knowledge, but also with the moral authority to comment on issues of defence.67

DPRK Prolif bad – causes terrorism

Kairouz Writer for the Economic and Political Weekly Magazine 04 (Aki, Jan. 04, Writer for the Economic and Political Weekly Magazine, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 1, Date accessed: 6/22, JH & BH)

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the leadership firmly believes that chemical and biological weapons should complement conventional and nuclear power as they would demoralise the enemy and destroy his defensive lines. All these mass destruction weapons, by contrast, would serve to coerce and deter the US from launching a counter-offensive aim-ing at seizing Pyongyang. To achieve this victory, North Korea has only a month to discourage Washington and its allies from undertaking any military action against it. Internationally, North Korea has sought to secure as many allies, friends and support-ers as possible as well as neutralising others. For this end, it has produced, supplied and sold large quantities of weapons including offensive missiles to customers such as Iran, Pakistan, Yemen and others.10 some analysts believed, , notably the US and Japan.

Increased pressure causes North Korea to increase nuclear weapon production

Cha and Kang 04 (Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha is D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and David C. Kang is director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, “The Debate over North Korea”, pg. 243-244, JSTOR Database, 05/18/2010, JB and ZB)

Thus, the Agreed Framework of 1994 is dead. **Both North Korea and the United States are now in essentially the same position they were in, in 1994? Threatening war, moving toward confrontation. Given the levels of mistrust on both sides, this comes as no surprise.** If North Korea feels threatened, threatening them is unlikely to make them feel less threatened. Gregory Clark pointed out that **"Washington's excuse for ignoring the nonaggression treaty proposal has to be the ultimate in irrationality. It said it would not negotiate under duress. So duress consists of being asked to be nonaggressive**?"41 **An intense security dilemma on the Korean peninsula is exacerbated by an almost complete lack of direct interaction between the two sides. Levels of mistrust are so high that both sides hedge their bets. The United States refused to provide formal written assurances of nonaggression to the North. The North thus retains its military and nuclear forces in order to deter the United States from acting too precipitously.**