**Withdrawal bad…………………………………………………………………………………...2**

**Ext: withdrawal hurts relation……………………..………………………………………….....6**

**Ext: withdrawal t/f………………………………………………………………………………..7**

Ext: presence key **………………………………………………………………………………….8**

**Solvency def turn……………….…………………………………………………………………10**

**A2: Non-Reunification…………………………………………………………………………..11**

**Presence Key……………………………………………………………………………………..12**

**C/P Solvency……………………………………………………………………………………..13**

**A2: North Korea Soft Line Politics…………………………………………………………….14**

**A2: Keep The Status Quo………………………………………………………………….........15**

**C/P Solvency……………………………………………………………………………………..16**

**A2: Withdraw Bad………………………………………………………………………………17**

**Withdrawal bad 1/4**

**America key to deter North Korea – China fears collapse of North Korea and South Korea wants American aid
Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, May 31, 2010** (Max Boot, “America is Still the Best Guarantor of Freedom and Propsperity”, published in the Los Angeles Times, pg. 2, jb, sob)

China is South Korea's largest trade partner by far, but Beijing shows scant interest in reining in Kim Jong Il. The greatest fear of Chinese leaders is that North Korea will collapse, leading to a horde of refugees moving north and, eventually, the creation an American-allied regime on the Yalu River. Rather than risk this strategic calamity, China continues to prop up the crazy North Korean communists — to the growing consternation of South Koreans, who can never forget that Seoul, a city of 15 million people, is within range of what the top U.S. commander in South Korea describes as the world's largest concentration of artillery. South Korea knows that only the U.S. offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 American troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure.

Presence key – nuclear umbrella required for deterrence.

O’Neil 2007 (Andrew, October 07, Senior Lecturer in the School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, Australia. He also worked with Australia’s Department of Defence as an intelligence analyst. “Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: The Quest for Security”, JH, BH, QJ, RK)

For as long as Washington continues to extend its nuclear umbrella to allies in Northeast Asia, the Pyongyang regime will appreciate that any use of nuclear weapons on its part would precipitate war with the United States and its allies and inevitably lead to its rapid demise." Notwithstanding the likeli-hood that the United States will continue gradually withdrawing major ground force elements from South Korea and Japan, Washington has made it clear that it intends to maintain the presence of its air and naval strike plat¬forms in the Asia-Pacific, many of which are configured with nuclear-capable systems." While the United States no longer deploys tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and although the U.S. Navy has removed nuclear weapons from its surface fleet, American submarines traversing the Pacific Ocean are armed with a nuclear cruise missile capability and B-52s stationed in Guam in the Pacific remain nuclear capable." These theater force ele¬ments could be supplemented by nuclear-capable systems on the continental United States, including the B-2 bomber force and America's large ICBM arsenal. Against this background, the chances of North Korea being deterred from using (or even seriously brandishing) nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia are greater than many within the policy and academic community have conceded. Despite previous statements by the Bush administration alleging that the Pyongyang regime is "evil" and "unbalanced" in its behavior, senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, have signaled their belief chat North Korea will remain deterred at the nuclear level for as long as the United States maintains a credible strategic presence in Northeast Asia."

**Withdrawal bad 2/4**

**South Korea still fears north Korea the removal of troops increases this fear**

**Kim, writer at Asian Affairs, 2004**

(Jinwung, Asian Affairs, “Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the Unites States Forces Korea)

http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172590

The most important factor to influence South Korean views of the USFK has been the presence of hostile North Korea beyond the DMZ. North Korea constitutes a threat to South Korea's survival. Pyongyang's provocation of the Korean War and its continued threat to invade the south have justified the U.S. military presence and made the American withdrawal a taboo subject, a policy that existed even before the Korean War. On 13 October 1948, immediately after the ROK was established, a quarter of the members of the ROK National Assembly introduced a resolution calling on the United States to remove its troops from Korea. But the public mood in South Korea shifted after the outbreak of the Yosu-Sunch'on Rebellion. On 19 October 1948, two thousand troops of the Fourteenth Regiment of the South Korean Army, instigated by the Communists, rebelled at the port city of Yosu as they were about to embark for Cheju-do to suppress the uprising on the island. The troops seized control of the city and the nearby rail junction at Sunch'on. The rebellion finally ended on 26 October, but it unsettled the South Korean public, undermined confidence in their security forces, and increased the likelihood of an overt North Korean military assault across the 38th parallel. A tremendous wave of anxiety swept the country. Many of the same politicians who had sponsored the resolution demanding that American troops leave now clamored for temporary halting of the withdrawal.

**AT Withdrawal – U.S. troops are necessary to the region**

**Manosevitz,** Graduate student in the Department of Political Science, George Washington University, **2003**

(Jason, “Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence”,

 Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5, accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557858, KK/EL)

The thrust of my argument cautions that even though Japan and South Korea have reached a stage where we should expect them to cooperate on some security issues, their interaction is not necessarily fungible with alignment with the United States. Nor can their activities act as a substitute for American commitment to the region.

**Withdrawal bad 3/4**

**Full US pullout bad – Restructuring USFK would solve conflict better**
**Cha, associate professor of government and D.S.Kong-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at Georgetown University, 2002** (Victor D. Cha, “Focus on the Future, Not the North”, accessed on Project Muse, pgs. 9-10, jb, sob)

To perform these new missions and address its traditional role, the United States should restructure its forces on the peninsula to be: •Credible. In spite of any transformations in the USFK, the resulting force must still represent and preserve the traditional role as a reliable manifestation of the U.S. commitment to the defense and security of Korea. •Flexible. While being large enough to be militarily significant, the U.S. presence should be flexible enough to handle a broad range of tasks ranging from antiterrorism operations to peacekeeping to force-projection dominance in the region. •Deployable. Combined with other U.S. capabilities in the region (especially in Japan), the presence in Korea must be capable of reacting swiftly to regional developments and offer an integrated joint force with the full range of mobility, strike, maneuverability, and sustainability. •Unobtrusive. While being politically equivalent to the old force structure as a symbol of the alliance, the new presence should possess a footprint that the Korean people do not perceive as an obstacle to peace. With these objectives in mind, the United States should transform USFK ground, air, and naval assets from a heavy, ground-based force to a more mobile, rapid-reaction force. The types of changes needed in Korea will certainly be contingent on the status of other U.S. forces and bases as well as on access arrangements elsewhere in the region, but such a restructured USFK could resemble the force described below. The United States should restructure the existing ground presence along the lines of Gen. Eric Shinseki’s objective force concept, as a mobile, medium-sized force, easily deployable but more lethal and sustainable than existing light infantry.19 This army force of about one medium-sized deployable brigade (5,000) could react quickly to regional developments, including but not limited to unification of the peninsula, and maintain a strong U.S. presence in the region. These forces might be stationed in the southern portion of the peninsula around the demilitarized zone and outside of Seoul.

**Withdrawal bad 4/4**

US Withdrawal would destroy US influence in asia

**Cha and Kang 03** (Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha is D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and David C. Kang is director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, 2003, Washington Post Newsweek, “The Korean Crisis”, pg. 20, JSTOR Database, 05/18/2010, JB and ZB)

Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cock- tails hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the op-ed pages of major newspapers about South Korea. **As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of anti-Americanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell CBS television's investigative program 6o Minutes that Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Korea's new president, Roh Moohyun, was avowedly anti-American in his younger days.** Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are anti-American, to be sure, but many are grateful. **South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely emotional.** Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nation's capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul.But **hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such trans-Pacific anxiety, particularly as the U.S.-South Korean alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the U**nited **S**tates **would lose influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world-an outcome it neither wants nor can afford.** In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance. Some South Koreans might welcome a larger role for China-a romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all, did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world. The alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans Seoul would have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of Israel and Saudi Arabia for example). Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military presence across East Asia, as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about the raison questions keeping its troops in Japan. A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not

**Withdrawing is bad; 1970s prove**

**Kim, writer at Asian Affairs, 2004**

(Jinwung, Asian Affairs, “Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the Unites States Forces Korea) http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172590

The U.S. military presence had been a taboo subject for Koreans. As late as the 1970s, anyone who suggested withdrawal of U.S. forces might have faced instant arrest and been charged with supporting North Korea in violation of the strict National Security Law. During this time, debates in America concerning the withdrawal of troops disappointed many South Koreans and made them feel uneasy about their nation's security. The American decision to withdraw the Sev-enth U.S. Army Division in 1970, which decreased the number of the USFK from approximately 60,000 to 40,000, was regarded as a breach of faith among many Koreans. When the Carter administration announced its plan to withdraw he Sec-ond U.S. Army Division from South Korea in 1977, most Koreans expressed fears that this action would prompt North Korea to invade and asked Americans not to support the withdrawal. Carter's withdrawal plan caused a major political crisis, even public panic, in South Korea. The United States was forced to drop the idea.

**Ext: withdrawal hurts relations**

**U.S. withdrawal hurts Relations shift**

Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture Author(s): Chang-hee **Nam** Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 20**06**), pp. 615-631 Published by: University of California Press ( 6.22.10) (ELKK)

**Withdrawal** or reduction of U.S. military forces have **historically played a significant role in the dynamics of ROK-U.S. relations and security on the Korean Peninsula. Many older Koreans believe that the North Korean invasion** of the South in 1950 **was related to the full-scale withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1949. The relocation and reduction of U.S. troops amid the acute on going tension over North Korea's nuclear affairs--would significantly change the security environment on the peninsula. The Grand National Party, the largest opposition party**, and some security specialists **question the timing of the realignment in light of widely shared concerns about North Korea's dangerous "nuclear black-mail diplomacy." By ending the role of forward deployed U.S. ground forces** as a "tripwire" **along the** Demilitarized Zone **(DMZ), the Pentagon is seeking a different war-fighting posture for the** ROK-**U.S. combined forces. This unprecedented move on the part of the USFK is heading in a direction that challenges the half-century-old alliance between the U.S. and ROK, but the action also simultaneously promotes a new partnership between the two countries.**

**A rift in the US-South Korea alliance leads regional conflict in asia**

**Easley, 07.**

(Leif-Eric, Ph.D candidate at Harvard University’s Department of Government, Summer-Fall 2007, “Defense Ownership or nationalist Security: Autonomy and Reputation in South Korean and Japanese Security Policies,” SAIS Review vol. 27 no. 2, p. 155, Project MUSE, Date of Access: 06/22/10, CC/ LF)

Another future is possible, however, if nationalist agendas come to shape security policies. **If Seoul’s drive for autonomy opens a rift in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, North Korea would** look to **exploit the situation. Competition would increase among regional powers for influence on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s security may** tragically **decrease** as a result. Meanwhile, if Japan’s assertive diplomacy in search of international reputation damages trust with its neighbors, regional security dilemmas may ensue and tensions could rise ove**r disputed islands and waters.**

**Ext: withdrawal t/f**

Withdrawal improbable – South Korea wants the US to stay longer

Korea Times 10

(“ROK-US more effective to counter NK”, February 24, 2010 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)

**Defense Minister Kim** Tae-young **expressed hope** Wednesday **that the U.S.-led defense system would stay intact in coming years amid the lingering North Korean military threat**.

**Referring to the** planned transition of operational control (**OPCON**) of South Korean troops during wartime from the U.S. to Korean commanders **in 2012**, Kim said the military was putting forth the best efforts to take over OPCON in 2012.

He said the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture would be more effective in defending South Korea for the time being, given the lingering threat posed by North Korean missile and nuclear programs.

"**I** also **hope that the U.S.-led defense scheme will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat**," Kim said at a lecture hosted by a naval defense research institute in Seoul.

US intends to keep an army in South Korea even after 2012

Korea Times 09

(“New US Command” November 8, 2009, Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

**The** U.S. Forces Korea (**USFK**) on Friday **disclosed a plan to keep the Eighth U.S. Army** (EUSA) **in South Korea even after it hands over wartime operational control to Seoul in 2012**. There is no question that **the American military highly recognizes the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula**. In this sense, the **continued presence of EUSA in the country will help ease some worries among South Koreans about a potential security vacuum that may be created by a possible relocation** to Hawaii.

Instead of the relocation plan, **the USFK is to create a new theater command** - Korea Command (**KORCOM**) - around June next year. **The envisioned command is seen as part of U.S. efforts to restructure its forces stationed in South Korea in line with its global military strategy**. **KORCOM is** expected **to serve as a frontline military foothold for the U.S. in Northeast Asia under its global policy of "strategic flexibility**." Thus, **the role of the USFK is likely to shift** from its exclusive defense of South Korea **to redeployment of forces to other disputed regions** around the world.

**Ext: presence key**

US presence good – key to stable nuclear order

Cossa et. al. 09

(Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum CSIS, Brad Glosserman Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS, Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.) Vice President and Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Dr. James Przystup Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Dr. Brad Roberts research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration”, February 2009 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)

**Proliferation threatens U.S. homeland security and regional stability in Asia**. **Efforts to halt WMD proliferation should include: the pursuit of strategic dialogues with Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea**; an arms control agreement with Russia that safeguards continued nuclear reductions and holds out the promise of future participation by other states; and the promotion of a vigorous and effective nonproliferation regime and treaty implementation in the Asia-Pacific, focusing on the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference while exploring the conditions under which nuclear abolition might become possible. For now, **continued U.S. extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea remains essential for a stable nuclear order.**

**Ext: presence key**

**U.S. still needed in North East Asia to deter conflict**

Author(s): Jason U**. Manosevitz** Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct.,20**03**), “ Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence” pp. 801-825 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557858 Accessed: 18/05/2010 16:28 (EL/KK)

**The international community** should **expect to see Japan and South Korea cooperate on a range of security activities, now that their security relations have reached adolescence. Direct military relations provide a "safe haven" for basic security cooperation, aloof from remaining** quibbles over historical issues. **Information exchanges, limited joint activities, and security dialogues create a measure of stability** through transparency and confidence building that has not been witnessed in the region for quite some time. This leaves the puzzle of whether greater stability in Japan-South Korea relations could lead to a decline in the need for American attention to the region's security needs. I do not think so. **Japan and South Korea still need security treaties with the U**nited **S**tates **to deter major conflict. With Japan and South Korea managing their day-to-day security interests, it is possible that they will seek greater influence in how the U**nited **S**tates **plans and provides leadership to avoid a regional hegemon and major conflict.**

**US military presence key to prevent conflict in Taiwan.**

**Christensen 09** (Thomas J. Christensen, July 2009, Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Director of the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University, The Washington Quarterly, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration”, pg.90-91, Center for Strategic and International Studies, JB and ZB)

**First, by maintaining a strong U.S. security presence in Asia in the form of** **U.S. forces and bases along with a network of strong alliances and non/-allied** **security partnerships, the United States makes it difficult for experts, advisors,** **and decision makers within China to advocate the use of coercive force against Taiwan or other regional actors as an inexpensive and effective way for Beijing to address its problems.** The term ‘‘hedging’’ is often used, even in official government documents, to describe this role of the U.S. security presence. The term has some validity, but it does not fully capture the role that U.S. regional power plays**. Hedging implies that the U.S. presence will only be useful if diplomatic engagement fails to convince a rising China to avoid belligerence. In fact, the maintenance of U.S. military superiority in the region, properly considered, is an integral part of that broader engagement strategy and makes diplomatic engagement itself more effective.** **The military strength of the United States and its allies and security partners in Asia complements positive U.S. diplomacy by channeling China’s competitive energies in more beneficial and peaceful directions.**

Solvency Deficit Turn

**Solvency Deficit/Turn: Any withdrawal of troops in South Korea will have negative effects – proven by the Korean War**

**Nam,** Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni-versity, **2006**

(Chang-hee, “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture”, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4, accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4497196, KK/EL)

Withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military forces have historically played a significant role in the dynamics of ROK-U.S. relations and security on the Korean Peninsula. Many older Koreans believe that the North Korean invasion of the

South in 1950 was related to the full-scale withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1949.

The relocation and reduction of U.S. troops-amid the acute ongoing tension over North Korea's nuclear affairs--would significantly change the security environment on the peninsula. The Grand National Party, the largest opposition party, and some security specialists question the timing of the realignment in light of widely shared concerns about North Korea's dangerous "nuclear black- mail diplomacy." By ending the role of forward-deployed U.S. ground forces as a "tripwire" along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Pentagon is seeking a different war-fighting posture for the ROK-U.S. combined forces. This unprecedented move on the part of the USFK is heading in a direction that challenges the half-century-old alliance between the U.S. and ROK, but the action also simultaneously promotes a new partnership between the two countries. This paper analyzes how the realignment of the U.S. forces in Korea has transpired since the February 2003 inauguration of the Roh Moo-hyun administration both from a domestic standpoint and also in the larger strategic context of military transformation. It also assesses how much impact a change in the deployment of U.S. forces is likely to have on security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Special attention is given to examining the emerging partnership between the U.S.and ROK amid the strained alliance relations resulting from the changing defense posture.

A2: NON-REUNIFICATION

**A unified Korea would desire the U.S. military**

**Mitchell**, senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, **2003**

(Derek, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea”, The Washington Quarterly• 26:1 pp. 123–137, accessed at http://muse.jhu.edu, KK/EL)

Arguably, Korea’s interest will continue to lie in the retention of its alliance with the United States following unification. Despite some frictions, the alliance has served to help preserve Korea’s essential freedom of action and to facilitate its historic political and economic development over many decades. Maintaining an alliance with the United States will also help preserve the U.S.-led, alliance-based security structure in East Asia that has served as a stabilizing force in the region, hedged against the rise of an aggressive regional power, and protected Korea from becoming the political if not military battleground upon which the major Asian powers have historically sought regional advantage. Indeed, a unified Korea will need the stability and reassurance engendered by its alliance with the United States more than ever during the many years of transition following unification, particularly under collapse or war scenarios.

A unified Korea also will arguably have a substantial interest in accepting a U.S. military presence on the peninsula following unification. This presence would serve as a key component of continued alliance relations and the overall U.S. regional military presence to preserve stability throughout East Asia. Korea’s continued hosting of U.S. forces would sustain the special relationship between the governments and armed forces of both sides, facilitate their coordination of regional strategy, and continue to serve as a deterrent to others seeking advantage on the peninsula.

**U.S. troops will remain in a unified Korea to substantially assist with problems**

**Mitchell**, senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, **2003**

(Derek, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea”, The Washington Quarterly• 26:1 pp. 123–137, accessed at http://muse.jhu.edu, KK/EL)

The Korean people must handle the process of unification on the peninsula themselves. Particularly in a war or collapse scenario, however, the challenges to domestic security in the aftermath of unification may be substantial. Despite the high quality of Korean personnel, such turmoil may prove overwhelming for Korean capabilities. The United States will have substantial interests in ensuring that the peninsula is stable and under sufficient police control to prevent the emergence of a haven for transnational crime including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and WMD proliferation. The United States should be prepared to organize and provide assistance to Korean civil authorities as requested by the Korean government, perhaps in conjunction with regional or UN forces. Such assistance might take the form of transport, construction, engineering, refugee repatriation, or other public safety initiatives.

Presence Key

Presence key – nuclear umbrella required for deterrence.

O’Neil 2007 (Andrew, October 07, Senior Lecturer in the School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, Australia. He also worked with Australia’s Department of Defence as an intelligence analyst. “Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: The Quest for Security”, JH, BH, QJ, RK)

For as long as Washington continues to extend its nuclear umbrella to allies in Northeast Asia, the Pyongyang regime will appreciate that any use of nuclear weapons on its part would precipitate war with the United States and its allies and inevitably lead to its rapid demise." Notwithstanding the likeli-hood that the United States will continue gradually withdrawing major ground force elements from South Korea and Japan, Washington has made it clear that it intends to maintain the presence of its air and naval strike plat¬forms in the Asia-Pacific, many of which are configured with nuclear-capable systems." While the United States no longer deploys tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and although the U.S. Navy has removed nuclear weapons from its surface fleet, American submarines traversing the Pacific Ocean are armed with a nuclear cruise missile capability and B-52s stationed in Guam in the Pacific remain nuclear capable." These theater force ele¬ments could be supplemented by nuclear-capable systems on the continental United States, including the B-2 bomber force and America's large ICBM arsenal. Against this background, the chances of North Korea being deterred from using (or even seriously brandishing) nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia are greater than many within the policy and academic community have conceded. Despite previous statements by the Bush administration alleging that the Pyongyang regime is "evil" and "unbalanced" in its behavior, senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, have signaled their belief chat North Korea will remain deterred at the nuclear level for as long as the United States maintains a credible strategic presence in Northeast Asia."

**A2: North Korea Soft-Line Policies**

**Rogue states like North Korea can only be dealt with hardline policies, diplomacy doesn't work**

**Choo 03** (Yong Shik Choo, winter-spring 2003, is a Ph.D. and research fellow at the Japan and Korea Studies Program of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS Review, pg. 46, “Handling North Korea: Strategy and Issues”, Project Muse Database, 5/18/10, JB and ZB)

Neoconservatives, the main pillar of foreign policy thinking in the Bush administration, view the Pyongyang regime as a major threat to U.S. post-Cold War security. Their position on “rogue states” has been consistent: no persuasion, no compromise, only victory. According to this camp, the United States and rogue states are pitted against each other in irreconcilable conflict; because U.S. values and its economic system threaten to undermine the foundations of such regimes, rogue states will attempt to upset the international order the United States has worked to build under its hegemony. “They have, and will continue to have, a clear and immutable interest in flouting [it].”4 With such a damning view of rogue nations, neoconservatives believe that only regime change can finally resolve these issues. They criticize engagement policies for failing to eliminate the threat from Pyongyang and, in fact, propping up the Kim Jong Il regime, which otherwise would have continued toward the collapse it was approaching in the mid- 1990s. Thus, U.S. neoconservatives advocate aggressive containment or even regime change for North Korea. Needless to say, such hawkish views are welcomed by anti-communist hardliners in Seoul.

A2: Keep Status Quo

Status Quo bad - Current withdrawal plan increases South Korea vulnerability

Korea Herald 10

(“Transfer of OPCON lingers as concern” May 17, 2010 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)

**Skeptics of the transfer believe that the military alliance is one of the most "efficient" defense systems in the world, and therefore should be sustained as long as the North Korean threat prevails.**

"**The C**ombined **F**orces **C**ommand **is cited as the world's most efficient allied command system, and one that North Korea fears the most. The combined forces also would play a key role in clinching victory at war by operating under a single, effective command.**

"**Disassembling the command**, therefore, **would** be **mean empowerment of the North Koreans**," said Park Se-hwan, president of the Korea Veterans Association.

Michael O'Hanlon, **a senior fellow at** the **Brookings** Institution, **said** in a recent article in the Los Angeles Times that **delaying the transfer may be required for "practical reasons**." **He also called for the allies to retrace their steps to when and how the decision for the transfer was made under the previous allied governments**.

US military key to dismantle North Korean nuclear program

Horowitz **a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University Harvard University** 05 (Michael, Winter 04-05, 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 21–44. and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. “Who’s Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang”, The Washington Quarterly 28:1 pp.21-44, JH & BH)

U.S. military leverage theoretically functions both in a negative fashion, as U.S. deployments and commitments deter North Korean military adventurism, and in a positive fashion, because incentives to ratchet down military tension might elicit cooperative behavior from Pyongyang. This is not to say that Washington should make direct military concessions to Pyongyang in response to threats; doing so would serve to reinforce the North Korean belief that their foreign policy goals can be best achieved through brinkmanship. Yet, U.S. military power remains a potential source of leverage and will inevitably be employed as a piece of a negotiated agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program or if a new nuclear bargain is not achieved.

Withdrawal improbable – South Korea wants the US to stay longer

Korea Times 10

(“ROK-US more effective to counter NK”, February 24, 2010 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)

**Defense Minister Kim** Tae-young **expressed hope** Wednesday **that the U.S.-led defense system would stay intact in coming years amid the lingering North Korean military threat**.

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"**I** also **hope that the U.S.-led defense scheme will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat**," Kim said at a lecture hosted by a naval defense research institute in Seoul.

C/P Solvency

**CP solvency: Negotiations could solve the nuclear crisis**

**Michishita,** Assistant professor of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, **2009**

(Narushige, “Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation”, The Washington Quarterly • 32:4 pp. 139-152, KK/EL)

In 2002, Kang Sok-ju, first vice foreign minister and Jong-il’s right-hand man, reportedly said, ‘‘What is wrong with us having our own uranium enrichment program? We are entitled to possess our own HEU, and we are bound to produce more powerful weapons than that.’’ Kang Sok-ju also said that North Korea considered the 1994 Agreed

Framework nullified and stated that the DPRK would resolve this issue if the

United States concluded a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK, lifted the embargo on North Korea and stopped interfering with Japanese—North Korean normalization, normalized relations with the DPRK, and compensated North Korea for previous delays in light water reactor construction.5 Now that North Korea has acknowledged possessing the uranium-enrichment program, it is on the table to be negotiated.

Status Quo Policy is decreasing troops to increase heg

Yeo 10

(Andrew Department of Politics Catholic University of America “U.S. Military base realignment in South Korea”, Peace Review May 18, 2010 Accessed 6/21/10 AW GW)

By July 2004, Seoul and Washington proposed a new vision for the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. After ten rounds of negotiations under the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), **U.S. and South Korean officials confirmed** several developments concerning the future of USFK and the U.S.–ROK alliance. These included **the withdrawal of 12,500 U.S. troops** by December 2008 from South Korea, **the relocation of USFK headquarters** from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, **and the consolidation of the Second Infantry Division** to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area. **USFK also presented** **a**n ambitious **plan to reduce** the number of **U.S. facilities** in South Korea **from** approximately **ninety-five** in 2001 **to ten by 2012**, with a major strategic hub centered in Pyeongtaek. **The shift to Pyeongtaek highlighted the** Pentagon’s **emphasis on rapid deployment and mobility**. **Unlike Seoul**, which lacked a port or major airfield, **Camp Humphreys is located near the coast, and is close to a major air base in nearby Osan.**

South Korea self-reliance leads to a better defense system

Lt Gen Wood 08

(Stephen G. “The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula” Fall 2008 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

**In an intradependent relationship, each air force would not depend entirely on the other for the successful accomplishment of a particular task**. of course, **self-reliant nations** still **have unique strengths that**, when brought together, **create synergies otherwise nonexistent**. **This is why the alliance between our two nations is so special**. The **ROK defense Ministry continues to forge intradependence in its air force with plans to increase spending on arms acquisition** by 19.8 percent for fiscal year 2008. This effort will make defense-acquisition spending a total of 29.7 percent of the total defense budget. Three projects included in this budget increase are essential to the ROKAF’s self reliance and force modernization: the surface to- air missile (SaM-X), the fighter-X (FX), and the early warning aircraft-X (eX).

A2: Withdrawl Bad

South Korean self-reliance will increase stability in Asia

Lt Gen Wood 08

(Stephen G. “The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula” Fall 2008 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

**Seventh air Force and the republic of Korea’s air Force operations Command are truly ready to fight tonight**, and we will be ready to adapt our integrated operations to a supporting to- supported construct by 2012. **our robust exercise schedule will challenge us to perform under the new construct while optimizing our relationship with the supported KJFC through inclusion of an integrated US and ROK ACCE**. Force-modernization efforts for both nations will play a significant part in our transformation agenda as we approach the disestablishment of ACC. The SaM-X, FX, and eX projects provide only a few examples of how the ROKAF is moving towards intradependence. **The ROKAF’s continued pursuit of self-reliance and the strong friendship between our two nations will assure the foundation for sustained peace and stability in northeast Asia**.

South Korea can already fend for itself, no ground troops needed

Lt Gen Wood 08

(Stephen G. “The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula” Fall 2008 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

**The alliance’s capability and will to defend the Republic of Korea from North Korean aggression has never been stronger**. Well known to the reader are the advancements in US military capability over the last two decades. **Less well known is the fact that the republic of Korea has placed tremendous emphasis on modernization and military competence**. **The republic of Korea is now the 13th largest economy in the world, spending approximately $24.3 billion**—about 2. percent of its gross domestic product—on defense **each year**. **Its military comprises 77,000 active duty personnel, equipped with the most modern military technology**. For instance, nearly 40 percent of the ROK Air Force’s (ROKAF) 500 fighters are F-1 K and F-1 aircraft.4 However, **the bedrock of the ROK military is its ground forces, with 41,000 active duty personnel and an additional 2.9 million trained soldiers in reserve. The leadership of the ROK army is also top notch, as proven during exercise vignettes in which the CFC commander cedes control to his ROK counterpart**. Consequently, from an alliance perspective, **the ROK military is capable of leading the ground campaign**. Thus, under the CFC transformation plan, the US military’s contribution to the alliance will become more air and naval-centric in the future.