# MGW China File

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# China Strategy Notes

**This file has a few strategic uses for you:**

**CP to have China do the plan—the solvency cards are good about China’s ability to do the various aspects of space exploration and development**

**China Militarization DA—this is a nuanced version of relations over space. While there are lots of other things that effect terrestrial relations, currently the US is pursuing an accommodative policy towards China. The plan is a unilateral shift from this approach. This causes China to alter its strategy on space exploration to prioritize space militarization. You could read some of the US China relations good impact cards too in the block—but the args are specific to militarization are good.**

**Frontlines versus war and cooperation advantages—including solvency: this may or may not be helpful to you at the tournament but will during the season when people claim these sorts of advantage.**

# \*\*\*Counterplans\*\*\*

# \*\*\*China Should Do the Plan CPs\*\*\*\*

# China Do It CP 1nc

**Text: The People’s Republic of China government should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Contention one: Competition—plan avoids US DAs like politics and spending**

**Contention tow: solvency**

**China Increasing funding for satellites and human missions**

**Williamson, a space technology consultant and writer, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, March, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

[CHINA became only the third nation to launch a man into space using home-grown technology when Yang Liwei became the first ‘taikonaut’ on 15 October 2003.

Liwei’s flight was news around the world. The scientific and commercial development of China’s space industry is less well known, but equally striking. It started in October 1956, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China established the Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defence, including the Rocket Research Institute. Its first director was Tsien Hsue-Shen, an applied mathematician who had won a scholarship to the US in 1935, spent a year at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and then moved to Caltech to study under renowned aerodynamicist Theodore von Kármán.

Tsien helped start the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California in 1944. He was later declared an ‘undesirable alien’ by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, and deported in 1955 as part of a prisoner exchange deal. Once home, Tsien began work on updating China’s missile technology and laying the foundations of the Chinese space program.

China launched its first satellite, Dong Fang Hong 1 (DFH-1), on 24April 1970. Named after the Chinese national anthem, ‘The East is Red’, the experimental science spacecraft also served as a propaganda tool, by transmitting a version of the anthem to an expectant population. Since then, China has conducted close to 100 launches of scientific, communications and imaging satellites using variants of its Long March launch vehicle.

To achieve this, it has developed a space design and manufacturing industry which, in 1999, was consolidated under the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), a state-owned enterprise headquartered in Beijing. CASC has seven major research, development and production complexes, employing more than 100,000 people to build and operate the nation’s satellites and launch vehicles.

According to the Chinese government’s white paper on space in 2000, the space industry is “an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy”. It’s difficult to know what this means in terms of spending. When LuoGe, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration visited the US in 2006, he said China spends $500m a year on space. Dean Cheng, ananalyst at Washington-based think tank CAN Corp, says this “almost certainly represents only a fraction of actual Chinese space spending”. Western estimates of China’s expenditure range from $1.4bn to $2.2bn, comparable to that of France or Japan.>

# China Do It CP -SATs

**China is increasing satellite investment and launches**

**Williamson, space technology and consultant, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, April 16, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

<Apart from the development of the Long March rocket, a good deal of effort has been expended on satellite communications, which helps to provide equality of access to health and education information for China’s dispersed population. Given China’s political background, it is less obvious that launch and satellite provision would develop as a commercial endeavor, but this has become an integral part of the Chinese space program.

China’s first communications satellite was the DFH-2, which was sent into orbit on 8 April 1984. Just six years and 21 launches later, China conducted its first commercial launch, for Hong Kong-based AsiaSat. This proved a forerunner to launches for Western companies such as Aussat/Optus, Echostar, Intelsat and Iridium.

Meanwhile, China was developing its own, more advanced broadcasting and telecommunications platform, the DFH-3 series, first launched as Xhongxing-5 in November 1994. This was a modest satellite, with a power budget of 1600Wand a communications payload of relatively low-powered amplifiers. It was also China’s first international collaboration on a communications satellite, with DASA (now part of EADS-Astrium) providing the antennas and attitude-control systems.

The next significant development, Sinosat-1, launched on 18 July 1998. It was built for Sino Satellite Communications, a company established jointly by several Chinese organizations, with the People’s Bank of China as its main customer. The satellite benefited from European cooperation: EurasSpace, a company jointly owned by CASC and DASA, was responsible for in-orbit delivery and testing. The satellite was also based on a European platform, the Aerospatiale (now Alcatel) Spacebus 3000A.

Collaboration provided education, experience and technology transfer for Chinese industry. It followed a model adopted by several Asian nations that typically gives their engineers a chance to work with prime contractors in Europe or America and allows local manufacturers to supply satellite components or subsystems.

For China, the arrangement culminated in the production of an advanced satellite platform known as the DFH-4. Designed for broadcasting applications, it is meant to compete with similar products from Western manufacturers, so its specifications include an industry-standard 15-year design lifetime, an end-of-life power output of 10kW and competitive capabilities in terms of payload mass and power.

The first satellite to use the new platform was China’s Sinosat-2, which carried an Alcatel-supplied payload of 38 C-band and 16 Ku-band transponders. It was launched in October 2006, but its solar arrays failed to deploy, depriving it of power, and the mission failed.

This was particularly unfortunate, as China needs a direct broadcasting satellite (DBS) system in place for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This would enable indigenous broadcasters to disseminate live TV to the nation, rather than relying on foreign broadcasts.]

# China Do It CP—satellites

**China expanding space program can solve for the AFF**

**China pursuing space program for economic and tech benefits**

**Kulacki,** Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.**, 2008**

(Gregory, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Spring 2008, ebscohost.com, 6-20-11,kc)

<As we look back on 50 years of space flight, President Eisenhower's quiet commitment to the Corona satellite reconnaissance program is still overshadowed by the historical and political theatrics surrounding Sputnik, despite the fact that Corona contributed far more to American national security than the pursuit of the "space race" initiated by Senator Lyndon Johnson, at the suggestion of a Democratic political operative, during hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee in November of 1957. The images Corona returned from space allowed Americans to base security policies on facts rather than fear, on information rather than speculation. In much the same way, and for many ofthe same reasons, the headlines and hyperbole surrounding China's high-profile space programs obscure the more significant accomplishments of China's burgeoning space industry. The most economically and militarily useful space activities are those that take advantage of the ability of space-based assets to conduct large-scale simultaneous observation ofthe Earth's surface and atmosphere, and to enable communication between, and simultaneously broadcast to, large parts of the Earth. Access to those capabilities is mediated by a small community of American, European, and Russian providers. China's space industry is positioning itself to change that, beginning with a concerted effort to become the provider of choice for the developing world The successful Chinese launch of a Nigerian communication satellite in May of 2007 marked the first time China provided the compiete package of satellite design, manufacturing, launch, and on-orbit servicing under a contract for a foreign client. The 5086 kg satellite v\/as built on China's newest satellite bus, the DFH-4, and was placed into a geostationary orbit on the 56th consecutive successful launch of a Chinese Long March rocket. It carries 28 transponders in four bands that, according to the Chinese trade press, will save Nigerian users approximately 95 million dollars a year in broadband access fees and other African users another 6.6 billion dollars in telecommunication and data transfer costs over the satellite's fifteen-year life span. Satellite applications in e-commerce, e-government and distance education are expected to provide Nigerians with 150,000 new jobs in telecommunications and related fields. China is constructing two expansive research and production facilities—one in Beijing and the other near Shanghai—which, in addition to establishing China as a significant player in the international satellite industry, will supply China's growing domestic demand for a widerange of military and civilian satellite applications. The nth Five-Year Plan for Space Development, announced by COSTINO shortly after the close of 17th Party Congress in November of 2007, confirmed China's intention to build a global positioning system that will provide a free public service in addition to a secure government service. It also includes plans for a significant expansion and upgrade of their earth observation capabilities, including a new generation of polar and geostationary weather and océanographie satellites, high-resolution imaging satellites, interferometric synthetic aperture radar satellites, and a constellation of micro satellites to conduct environmental monitoring and manage natural disasters..>

# China Do it CP–Moon landing

**China pursuing lunar mission**

**Williamson, space technology and consultant, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, April 16, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

[So, what’s next for China in space? Are reports that China aims to land one of its citizens on the Moon by 2020 mere propaganda?

It is clear that China intends to launch its first unmanned lunar orbiter, Chang’e-1, this year, just two years after ESA managed a similar feat with SMART-1. According to the CNSA’s Luo Ge, this is the first step in an ambitious lunar exploration program that will see an automated rover on the Moon by 2012 and a sample return mission in 2017.

In parallel, according to Wang Zhougui, director of China’s manned spaceflight engineering office, its third manned spaceflight – of Shenzhou 7 – will feature the first Chinese spacewalk in 2008. Shenzhou 8 will demonstrate the docking of two spacecraft in 2011. Although a lot can happen between now and then, this progress is consistent with a manned lunar flight by 2020.

Moreover, the proposal by the Indian Space Research Organization, in 2006, to begin its own manned spaceflight program, with a goal of landing an Indian national on the Moon by 2020 may boost the Chinese program. It’s already being called Space Race II.]

# China Do It CP Moon Mining

**China mapping Moon and making plans to mine He-3**

**Kazan, newscientist writer, 2010**

(Casey, October 3, 2010, <http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2010/10/china-launches-second-moon-mission-is-mining-helium-3-an-ultimate-goal.html>, 6-27-11, KC)

<In 2007, shortly after Russia claimed a vast portion of the Arctic sea floor, accelerating an international race for the natural resources as global warming opens polar access, China announced plans to map "every inch" of the surface of the Moon and exploit the vast quantities of Helium-3 thought to lie buried in lunar rocks as part of its ambitious space-exploration program.

Ouyang Ziyuan, head of the first phase of lunar exploration, was quoted on government-sanctioned news site ChinaNews.com describing plans to collect three dimensional images of the Moon for future mining of Helium 3: "There are altogether 15 tons of helium-3 on Earth, while on the Moon, the total amount of Helium-3 can reach one to five million tons."

"Helium-3 is considered as a long-term, stable, safe, clean and cheap material for human beings to get nuclear energy through controllable nuclear fusion experiments," Ziyuan added. "If we human beings can finally use such energy material to generate electricity, then China might need 10 tons of helium-3 every year and in the world, about 100 tons of helium-3 will be needed every year."

Helium 3 fusion energy - classic Buck Rogers propulsion system- may be the key to future space exploration and settlement, requiring less radioactive shielding, lightening the load. Scientists estimate there are about one million tons of helium 3 on the moon, enough to power the world for thousands of years. The equivalent of a single space shuttle load or roughly 25 tons could supply the entire United States' energy needs for a year.

Thermonuclear reactors capable of processing Helium-3 would have to be built, along with major transport system to get various equipment to the Moon to process huge amounts of lunar soil and get the minerals back to Earth.

With China's announcement, a new Moon-focused Space Race seems locked in place. China made its first steps in space just a few years ago, and is in the process of establishing a lunar base by 2024. Russia, the first to put a probe on the moon, plans to deploy a lunar base in 2015. A new, reusable spacecraft, called Kliper, has been earmarked for lunar flights, with the International Space Station being an essential galactic pit stop.

The harvesting of Helium-3 on the could start by 2025. Our lunar mining could be but a jumping off point for Helium 3 extraction from the atmospheres of our Solar System gas giants, Saturn and Jupiter.>

**China shuttle can bring back plenty of He-3**

**Reynolds, Editor-at-Large of three dailies owned by** [**Brunswick News**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brunswick_News) **Inc, including the Telegraph-Journal, 2010**

(Neil, July 5, 2010, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/many-moons-to-go-the-promise-of-lunar-mining/article1626913/>, 6-27-11, KC)

<By some calculations (including China’s), a four-ton shuttle load of lunar Helium-3 per week would theoretically provide enough safe nuclear-fusion energy to meet the needs of the entire world. (The only practical Earth source for Helium-3 is apparently obsolete nuclear warheads.) Russian scientists have advanced similar analysis – suggesting that lunar mining could be under way by 2020, provided governments invested $6-billion in up-front funding.

Only Americans – 12 of them – have walked on the moon. U.S. astronaut Harrison Schmitt, a geologist, was the last – in 1972. Mr. Schmitt champions lunar mining of Helium-3 and puts the up-front cost at $15-billion, or (he says) roughly the cost of building the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled the U.S. space shuttle program, reversing president George W. Bush’s policy that NASA “should extend a human presence across our solar system.” He has not, however, ended all lunar exploration. NASA will still attempt to land robotic “prospectors” on the moon within the next four years to test technologies (in NASA’s words) for “in-situ resource utilization.” In other words, for mining.

Mr. Schmitt says that private-sector investors are now prepared to do the job of mining the moon by themselves. (By some calculations, a ton of Helium-3, delivered to Earth by shuttle, would be worth a billion dollars – a sum the G20 summit again immediately evokes.) But, independent of commerce, human destiny compels public investment, too. As the poet e.e. cummings once emphatically put it, “listen: there’s a hell of a good universe next door – let’s go.”>

# China Do it CP Moon Mining

**China’s lunar mission suffers from delays and tech gaps—CP’s key**

**Interspace News, 10** (“China Needs To Develop Core Technologies Of Its Own For Space Exploration”

3/4/10, <http://www.interspacenews.com/FeatureArticle/tabid/130/Default.aspx?id=4548>)

Beijing, March 4 (Xinhua) -- China's first lunar probe program had been delayed as the country had to wait for the belated arrival of an imported component, an official in charge of the country's moon probe mission said here Thursday. Hu Hao, deputy director of the moon probe project, made the remarks in an interview with Xinhua prior to the third session of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC), China's top legislature. "The delayed delivery of imported components for the project happened from time to time," said Hu, an NPC deputy. "Our efforts in space probe are affected by other countries due to our relatively weakness in technology." About 20 percent of components of China's first lunar probe, the Chang'e-1 satellite, were imported, and the chip used in the Satellite's CCD camera arrived more than six months behind the schedule, he said. He said that not all domestically-developed instrument can meet the special requirements for exploration in outer space. "To make breakthrough in fields like the aerospace projects, we must redouble our efforts in the research and development of core technologies and basic advanced components," he said. China sent its first lunar probe Chang'e 1 into space in 2007. Previous reports said China planned to launch the Chang'e-2, the country's second lunar probe, at the end of 2010.

**China is exploring possible HE-3 mining sites—creating a lunar base and further development is key**

**Nguyen, 11** (Tuan, “China to launch lunar rover, mine moon for nuclear fuel”, 5/10/11, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/china-to-launch-lunar-rover-mine-moon-for-nuclear-fuel/7158)

A top Chinese official has confirmed that the world’s most populous nation plans to send robots to the moon. Ziyuan Ouyang, chief scientist of the Chinese lunar exploration program, made the announcement at the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), held in Shanghai. The missions, scheduled for launch in 2013 and 2017, will serve as a tune up for a more challenging goal: putting a man on the moon by 2025. “But why?” you ask. Well, beyond obvious bragging rights, the China National Space Administration’s ambitious foray into lunar exploration is part of a grander scheme to exploit the moon’s vast iron reserves and its abundance of Helium-3, a rare but heavily sought-after fuel for nuclear fusion plants. This elaborate operation to mine the moon for these coveted natural resources was set in motion back in 2007 when the agency launched into space its first lunar orbiter Chang’e-1 (named after the moon goddess of Chinese folklore) to scan the landscape and produce a detailed 3-D map of the moon’s surface. This was followed in 2010 by the successful launch of another probe, Chang’e-2, which was equipped with a higher-resolution camera and orbited at an even closer distance of 100 kilometers. The data is being used to pinpoint an ideal landing spot for a rover. Ouyang says it’s been decided that Chang’e-3’s spacecraft, which includes an unmanned lunar lander and autonomous lunar rover, will be sent to explore the Sinus Iridium region. Equipped with a solar-powered battery, sensors, cameras, x-ray and infrared spectrometers, as well as a radar, the robots will navigate and explore the terrain. The rover will be the first to launch, while the lander will be sent later to drill, conduct experiments and collect samples. But if past interplanetary unmanned missions are any indication, China’s engineers have their work cut out for them. IEEE Spectrum, which hosted the event, explains in detail the kinds of challenges the researchers are facing: One of the (many) tricky parts of operating on the moon is designing a rover that can stay alive during the lunar night, which is a half-month long, making solar power an impracticality. To help keep itself alive, the Chinese rover will have a supplementary nuclear battery powered by plutonium 238, which will give the rover a lifespan of 30 years, although its mission life will be only three months. This is the same type of radioisotope thermoelectric generator system (RTG) being used on the Mars Science Laboratory rover, Curiosity.

**Mining HE-3 on the moon solves Chinese energy demands—current timelines are behind schedule, only the CP solves**

**Derzko, 05** ( Walter, Expert, Consultant and Guest Speaker on emerging Smart Technologies, Strategic Planning, Business Development, Lateral Creative Thinking and author of an upcoming book on the Smart Economy ", 11/2/11, <http://smarteconomy.typepad.com/smart_economy/2005/11/mining_the_moon.html>)

Mining the moon; Will China become the New Saudi Arabia of the 21st century? I've always felt that China had alternative motivations to their space program, other than just planting a flag on the moon. While Western media's reaction to China's space aspirations has largely been nonchalant-"been there - done that", I strongly suspect that China is striving to become the new "Saudi Arabia of the 21st century" -not with oil, but with Helium-3 [HE-3], mined on the moon and brought back to earth. Stacey Solomone, a Ph.D. student at the Future Studies program at the University of Hawaii supports my conjecture. In a paper published in the current Futures Research Quarterly-- China's Space Program: Tang and Tea Together at Last, Stacey speculates: "China's lunar project can incorporate the mining of Helium-3 (HE-3) as a new, clean, efficient, safe and cheap nuclear fusion fuel. The foreign sales and internal uses of HE-3 will help offset the high price of maintaining a lunar base." Scientists have known since 1998 about the abundance of HE-3 on the moon, when researchers from two universities in Arizona and Hawaii produced the first maps of the moon's resources in a paper entitled: "Estimated Solar Wind-Implanted Helium-3 Distribution On The Moon." "The mineral ilmenite [FeTiO3], or iron titanium oxide, retains helium much better than other major lunar materials, [such as titanium dioxide (TiO2)]. The older soils should be better sources of helium-3, says the report, because they have been exposed to the solar wind longer and contain greater amounts of fine-grained aggregates that absorb helium-3. Also, solar wind-implanted particles are more abundant on the far side, because the Earth shields the Moon's near side from the solar wind for a portion of each solar orbit." "The scientists estimate that the greatest amounts of helium-3 will be found on the far side maria, or "seas," of the Moon, due to the higher solar wind, and in nearside areas with high concentrations of titanium dioxide [TiO2]. Their hypothesis is based on analysis of rock samples brought back by Apollo astronauts and mineralogical maps produced by the Clementine spacecraft." Oxygen, needed to maintain a lunar habitat ,seems not to be a problem either. The current issue of Science News reports that the same mineral - ilmenite can be used to generate oxygen to sustain human exploration and mining. Impacts: The Americans aren't oblivious to these facts either. In April 2004, several planetary scientists testified before the US House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics in a hearing called: "Lunar Science & Resources: Future Options." The subcommittee was studying the feasibility of lunar-based scientific and commercial activities. Challenges: Researchers noted however that several technical problems must be solved before helium mining will become economically feasible. Trend: So the new [HE-3] space race is off and running. Who do you think will become the new Helium Sheiks of the next decade? or will it be a Sino-US partnership? ETA: While I think we are at least a decade away ~2015, Stacy Solomone has several entries in her China Space Program timeline that are more optimistic: 2009 March- Lunar rover returns to Earth with samples and marks successful completion of Chang's Project 2009 July-China launches three more lunar rovers to the moon and deposits more modules for future base. 2009 July-China begins exploiting HE-3 collected from lunar rovers.

# China Do it CP--SBSP

**Solvency: Solar Powered Satellites will solve Chinese future energy crisis and blackouts**

**Ji and Xinbin, China Academy of Space Technology, 2010**

(Gao and Hou, 10-29-10, <http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/ji.html>, 6-27-11, KC)

<Since 1968, when Dr. Peter Glaser proposed the first SPS scenario, the concept of solar power satellites has been under consideration. During those 40-plus years, the renewable energy requirement for electricity has been continuously going up. As one of the principal economies in the world, China is thirsty for energy to water its blooming industries. SPS is regarded as a reasonable path to energy production. Either from geostationary earth orbit (GEO) or in low earth orbit (LEO), this type of power system will have more direct access to the power of the sun. In analyzing the characteristics of SPS and space solar power applications, the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) concludes that the advantages of SPS for China can be grouped into three relevant directions: sustainable economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation, and the retaining of qualified personnel and the cultivating of innovative talents.

Sustainable development: With its population growth and rapid economic development, over the next 30 years China will become one of the most powerful and influential economies of the world. During this time, energy resources and environmental issues will be serious challenges for China. To avoid the grave consequences and to learn lessons drawn from others' mistakes, a sustainable development strategy will need to be adopted. This strategy can be expected to include renewable energy sources from outside earth to alter the heavily reliance on fossil fuels, a process that will contribute to world energy development and assure environment protection.

The acquisition of space solar power will require development of fundamental new aerospace technologies, such as revolutionary launch approaches, ultra-thin solar arrays, on- orbit manufacture/assembly/integration (MAI), precise attitude control, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) for deep space exploration and space colonial expansion. Since SPS development will be a huge project, it will be considered the equivalent of an Apollo program for energy. In the last century, America's leading position in science and technology worldwide was inextricably linked with technological advances associated with implementation of the Apollo program. Likewise, as China's current achievements in aerospace technology are built upon with its successive generations of satellite projects in space, China will use its capabilities in space science to assure sustainable development of energy from space.

Disaster prevention and mitigation: In 2005, Hurricane Katrina killed thousands of people in the U.S. Meanwhile, every year several typhoons bother the east coast of China. From preliminary research, it appears that microwave wireless power transmission may heat the top of the clouds, thereby reducing the force of typhoons and hurricanes. In 2008, China's southern region experienced a rare snowstorm; such an extreme weather attack led to a complete paralysis of the entire southern power grid due to the frozen grid. Without wired power supplied, the economy of the Southern provinces suffered heavy losses in the first few months of 2008. Again, if there had been an operational SPS power system in China, wireless power transmission quite possibly could have unfrozen the grid, and restored power to the region.>

# China Do it CP--SBSP

**China taking lead on green tech including space based power**

**Cox, 2011**

(William John, March 23, 2011, <http://www.consortiumnews.com/Print/2011/032311b.html>, 6-27-11)

<Space-solar energy is the greatest source of untapped energy which could, potentially, completely solve the world’s energy and greenhouse gas emission problems.

The technology currently exists to launch solar-collector satellites into geostationary orbits around the Earth to convert the Sun’s radiant energy into electricity 24 hours a day and to safely transmit the electricity by microwave beams to rectifying antennas on Earth.

Following its proposal by Dr. Peter Glaser in 1968, the concept of solar-power satellites was extensively studied by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). By 1981, the organizations determined that the idea was a high-risk venture; however, they recommended further study.

With increases in electricity demand and costs, NASA took a “fresh look” at the concept between 1995 and 1997. The NASA study envisioned a trillion-dollar project to place several dozen solar-power satellites in geostationary orbits by 2050, sending between two gigawatts and five gigawatts of power to Earth.

The NASA effort successfully demonstrated the ability to transmit electrical energy by microwaves through the atmosphere; however, the study’s leader, John Mankins, now says the program “has fallen through the cracks because no organization is responsible for both space programs and energy security.”

The project may have remained shelved except for the military’s need for sources of energy in its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the cost of gasoline and diesel exceeds $400 a gallon.

A report by the Defense Department’s National Security Space Office in 2007 recommended that the U.S. “begin a coordinated national program” to develop space-based [solar power](http://www.consortiumnews.com/Print/2011/032311b.html).

There are three basic engineering problems presented in the deployment of a space-based [solar power system](http://www.consortiumnews.com/Print/2011/032311b.html):  the size, weight and capacity of solar collectors to absorb energy; the ability of robots to assemble solar collectors in outer space; and the cost and reliability of lifting collectors and robots into space.

Two of these problems have been substantially solved since space-solar power was originally proposed. New thin-film advances in the design of solar collectors have steadily improved, allowing for increases in the efficiency of energy conversion and decreases in size and weight.

At the same time, industrial robots have been greatly improved and are now used extensively in heavy manufacturing to perform complex tasks.

The remaining problem is the expense of lifting equipment and materials into space. The last few flights of the space shuttle this year will cost $20,000 per kilogram of payload to move satellites into orbit and resupply the space station.

It has been estimated that economic viability of space-solar energy would require a reduction in the payload cost to less than $200 per kilogram and the total expense, including delivery and assembly in orbit, to less than $3,500 per kilogram.

Although there are substantial costs associated with the development of space-solar power, it makes far more sense to invest precious public resources in the development of an efficient and reliable power supply for the future, rather than to waste U.S. tax dollars on an ineffective missile defense system, an ego trip to Mars, or $36 billion in risky loan guarantees by the DOE to the nuclear power industry.

With funding for the space shuttle ending next year and for the space station in 2017, the United States must decide upon a realistic policy for space exploration, or else it will be left on the ground by other nations, which are rapidly developing futuristic space projects.

China is currently investing $35 billion of its hard-currency reserves in the development of energy-efficient green technology, and has become the world’s leading producer of solar panels. In addition, China has aggressively moved into space by orbiting astronauts and by demonstrating a capability to destroy the satellites of other nations.>

# China Do it CP—Space Station

**China’s space program pursuing multiple missions—including space station**

**Oberg, NBC News space analyst, 2009**

(James, Astronews, January 2007, ebscohost.com, 6-21-11, kc)

<However, after seven Shenzhou missions in the past 10 years -- the last three with astronauts -- it has become easier to identify reliable sources of information about China's intentions in **space**. In addition, Shenzhou's success has prompted **Chinese** government **space** officials to be much more open about their activities, their plans, and even their problems.

Enough information is now available about Tiangong to understand the basic outlines of China's **space** lab **program**. It appears to be a cylinder with a docking port, similar in size and mass to the Shenzhou manned spacecraft. Its design may be derived from Shenzhou's orbital module.

On some past Shenzhou missions, the orbital module -- equipped with its own power, communications, and control systems -- flew on in orbit for months after the crew cabin had detached from it and returned to Earth. The opposite sequence will occur in the Tiangong mission: A **Chinese** rocket will launch the **space** lab into orbit, and subsequent Shenzhou crews will visit it. According to China **space** **program** expert Chen Lan, the first Tiangong mission will consist of a simple rendezvous and docking test. It could happen in the next year or two. By 2011 or 2012, Tiangong could be a fully equipped orbital outpost, able to host visiting crews of **Chinese** astronauts for a year-long orbit. That vehicle would be the first reliably observable **Chinese** vehicle in **space**. Its higher orbit will make it visible from a larger area on the ground.

Bigger **space** steps require a bigger rocket. In this aspect of its **space** **program**, China is taking its greatest leap in capabilities since the 1970s. The Long March 5 rocket, to be launched from a new base on Hainan Island off China's south coast, is not the usual enhanced version of a military missile. It's an entirely new design, from airframe to engines to control systems. The first test flights are expected in 2011 or 2012.

The new booster will be able to carry heavy commercial communications satellites as well as large science probes. A robotic Moon sample return mission is also a possibility. Having the lifting power of an Ariane 5 or the **space** shuttle, it could launch a Mir-class **space** station -- or even send a modified manned Shenzhou out around the Moon as a nationalistic demonstration.

Actually landing taikonauts on the Moon would require an even bigger rocket, one not yet in the design stage. Despite the Shenzhou **program's** recent successes, **Chinese** **space** officials admit that leaving a footprint on the Moon won't be possible until after 2020.>

# China Do It CP India Co-op

**China-India space cooperation would ease tensions and prevent space mil conflicts**

**Yahoo News India, 11** (1/21/11, <http://in.news.yahoo.com/india-keen-bringing-china-space-negotiations-20110121-031331-070.html>)

New Delhi, Jan.21 (ANI): Ruling Congress Party spokesperson Manish Tewari has called for "acceptable rules of the game" and "a global space coordinating agency" to prevent militarisation of space. Delivering the valedictory address at the three-day international conference "Space, Science and Security: The Role of Regional Expert discussion", Tewari said in Asia, there are three countries with robust space programmes - China, Japan and India. He said the three countries should work together to avoid the kind of "competitive alternations" which were witnessed between the US, erstwhile USSR and the Europe. "The need for regional and international dialogue and rules of operation cannot but be emphasized. At the regional level, it is fairly obvious that India will seek increasing cooperation with other space faring nations, most notably China, Japan, South Korea and Australia," he said. Pointing out that New Delhi and Tokyo have already worked towards ideas for regional and bilateral cooperation, Tewari said "more such bilateral and regional initiatives are the call of our time." "There could be several trilateral partnerships in the space domain in the near future - between India, US and Israel, and India, US and Japan. However, India will be happy to explore the possibility of bringing in China into this dialogue network," he said. Tewari said: "China's role is critical for any of these regional measures to be successful and the potential for cooperation is immense between the two Asian giants." Emphasizing on the need for non-discriminatory, acceptable rules of the game, Tewari said that we must learn from the follies of the Industrial Age where we left too little for the poor and the weak regions and countries. "We cannot usurp their right to orbital real estate and we must not allow space squatting either. Rules must be framed and rights must be secured. Obligations must be charted," Tewari said.

**China-India space cooperation empirically key to solve India space program development**

**DNA, 10** (Daily News & Analysis, 6/13/10, <http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_bangladesh-china-plan-road-link-via-myanmar-space-cooperation_1395963>)

Bangladesh and China plan to construct a road link via Myanmar to boost connectivity between the two nations as they seek to deepen bilateral relationship, including space cooperation. The two countries will discuss constructing a road link for connecting China with Bangladesh via Myanmar during Chinese vice president Xi Jingping's visit tomorrow, foreign minister Dipu Moni said today. They will also discuss launching of satellite stations during the two-day official visit of the Chinese vice-president that begins on Monday. "There will be discussion on launching of satellite stations in Bangladesh with Chinese assistance," Moni was quoted as saying by the private bdnews24 online. The foreign minister said Chinese companies had recently made proposals to help with launching of satellites. The report, quoting foreign ministry sources, said Bangladesh will be able to collect necessary data on land use and disasters such as cyclone, flood, surge and drought with the satellite. Ashfaqur Rahman, a former Bangladesh ambassador to China, was quoted as saying that the Chinese government in 2007 gave Bangladesh a ground station for launching satellite stations. Sparso, which is under defence ministry, looked after the satellite ground station, he said. The minister told reporters that an agreement on economic cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing would be signed during Xi's visit. In addition, she said, the two sides will also discuss other regional matters during the talks headed by prime minister Sheikh Hasina and Xi. Moni said the two leaders would also discuss the progress on implementation of the joint communiqué signed during Hasina's China visit.

# China Do It CP—Ratify Moon Treaty

**China hasn’t ratified the Moon Treaty**

**Li, Associate professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, and the director of the China Institute of Space Law, 2009**

(Li Juqian, Associate professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, and the director of the China Institute of Space Law, 2009, [**http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=219&Itemid=8**](http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=219&Itemid=8), ST)

As we know, international space law was initiated in the 1950s, developed quickly in the 1960s and 1970s, and took shape in complete form by the end of the 1970s. This set of laws governed major space activities and had legal force, including the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Space Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1975), and the Moon Treaty (1979).1 There were some additional principles and declarations, but none with legal force.

These treaties established the principles, rules and system for space activity, encompassing the legal definition of outer space, the liabilities for those acting in space, the registration of space objects, the rescue of astronauts, and activities on the moon. These treaties have powerful effect within the international community based on their broad participation.2 All the main countries engaged in space activity have signed up to most of these treaties, with the possible exception of the Moon Treaty, whose participation remains low at only 13 countries to date.3 The wide international acceptance of these treaties also serves as the evidence for customary law - to a degree - which gives force to the legal principles reflected even over non-States Parties.

As a major actor in space**,** China has acceded all of the above treaties except for the Moon Treaty. That is consistent with all other dominant players in outer space, all of which have so far opted out of the Moon Treaty, including the United States - the only country that has landed on the moon to date.

**U- China has not signed moon treaty**

Lo, South China Morning Post, 2008

(Alex Lo, South China Morning Post, October 25, 2008, accessed: June 28, 2011

The failed 1979 United Nations Moon Treaty is a lot more specific. It says the moon and all its natural resources are the common heritage of humankind. That seems a bit ethnocentric. What if there are extraterrestrial civilisations out there? But anyway, under the UN **treaty,** anything mined by an earth-bound country should be shared. Unfortunately, Kammerer says China, Japan, South Korea, the US and Russia have not signed it; India has signed but not ratified it. "That's the thing about these **treaties** - whoever signs them is the sucker," he says.

What then is the solution? When push comes to shove, probably the country with the biggest ray gun wins. But this probably won't happen for a few decades. So, in the meantime, a more civilised approach may be to negotiate an international convention among all the space-faring nations.

# \*\*\*China Advantage CPs\*\*\*

**These advantage cp would work in the future against any aff that claimed to facilitate cooperation with China**

# XO China Treaty CP—solves cooperation

**Executive branch has the power to negotiate bilateral space treaties**

**Space Politics, 11** (“What’s the future of US-China cooperation in space”, 5/5/11, <http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/05/whats-the-future-of-us-china-cooperation-in-space/>)

One of the few specific space policy provisions included in the final continuing resolution that funds the federal government through the rest of fiscal year 2011 has to do with cooperation with China–or, rather, prohibiting cooperation with China. The CR prevents NASA and OSTP from using any funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company” unless specifically authorized in a future law. That also prevents NASA from using any funds “to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by” the space agency. That would appear to put the brakes on any prospects for cooperation with China, at least through this fiscal year. However, in testimony before the CJS subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on Wednesday, OSTP director John Holdren suggested that the administration has found a “loophole” in that ban, according to ScienceNow. The White House has concluded, he said, that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation between the two countries that dates back to 1979. Holdren, Space News reported, has pragmatic reasons for seeking cooperation with China on space exploration in particular, including a future human expedition to Mars. “If China is going to be, by 2030, the biggest economy in the world… it could certainly be to our benefit to share the costs of such an expensive venture with them and with others,” he said. That did not sit well with some members of the subcommittee, including chairman Frank Wolf (R-VA), who has been very critical of China, in particular its human-rights record. An “irate” Wolf, as described by Space News, criticized the idea of Sino-American space cooperation, “repeatedly pounding a hand against the table top in front of him.” However, according to ScienceNow, Wolf appeared to accept Holdren’s constitutional explanation, asking for consultation on “a case-by-case basis” when any administration dealing with China might conflict with the law. By contrast, Rep. John Culberson (R-TX), another subcommittee member, was not assuaged at all by Holdren’s statements, warning Holdren that “you’re endangering your funding and NASA’s funding” by contemplating any cooperation with China. “You have a huge problem on your hands.”

# CP Stop Taiwan arms sales—solves space

**\*\*\*\*\*\*Solvency CP Taiwan arms sales solves China space program**

**Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong 2011** (Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 March/April 2011, pp. 311-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed June 21, 2011)

**<THE ALTERED SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT** Until May 2008, the Taiwan Strait was a hot spot for military conflicts that could potentially drag China and the U.S. into a major war. This prospect put tremendous pressure on the PLA to search for ways to counter the massive conventional military superiority of the U.S. Now, because of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s accommodation strategy toward Beijing, a new cross-strait relationship has emerged. Military tension and pernicious mutual mistrust have given way to institutionalized dialogues, expanded economic integration, and greater people-to-people exchanges. Indeed, the Taiwan Strait situation has been completely altered since Ma assumed the presidency in May 2008. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China has declared that cross-strait relations have “achieved a historical transformation.” This new and positive assessment has drastically changed the PLA’s perception of the prospects for war in the strait, and thus the possibility of U.S. military intervention. Major General Peng Guangqian of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences commented that economic integration and institutionalized political dialogues would make military conflict in the Taiwan Strait “unlikely and even unthinkable.”48 Yan Xuetong, an influential Chinese international relations scholar with close ties to the military, has also revised his past pessimistic views. Whereas he once insisted that war in the strait was inevitable, he now believes that the probability is, currently, extremely low. With minimized chances of military conflict occurring in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA should no longer be obsessed with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Indeed, the Taiwan Strait constitutes the only realistically plausible cause of war between China and the U.S. As noted earlier, Major General Jin Yinan recently concluded that the prospect of such a military conflict was extremely unlikely. The new Taiwan Strait situation could play a major role in improving the U.S.-China military space relationship. The fear of U.S. intervention was once an important reason for the PLA’s pursuit of space warfare capabilities Now, the Chinese military should perceive no compelling reason to develop space warfare capabilities to level the playing field. >

# CP – US China Coop

**US China cooperation expands science, integrates information and save money**

Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, August 2008 (Yi Zhou, *Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics*, 6/23/11)

At the moment the USA observes China's space policy and capabilities through statements in China's white papers. But studying one paper every five years is too limited and does not provide sufficient detail. Some Americans are consulting and research institutions may simply rely on graduate students’ superficial papers to try to gain insight into the direction of China's space development. These are not full-scale or always entirely accurate, and may sometimes result in misunderstandings. If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China's space activities and directions. They may even be able to make some good suggestions for China's space projects and policies. These win–win suggestions should be readily adopted by China's policy makers to extend the two countries’ space and national benefits.

Scientists in the USA have many interesting ideas and proposals for space science and space exploration, but the US space budget, though huge compared with that of other countries, is still limited. If the USA were to cooperate with China in space science and space exploration, there would be more opportunities for US scientific discovery. For example, in the China–ESA cooperative Double Star Exploration Program, China supplied the launch service and satellite. ESA supplied the back-up scientific instruments of the Cluster mission on the satellites. This helped ESA obtain more scientific data for research through the added payload. Greater research results were achieved. ESA's instruments were valued at €800 000, which alone certainly cannot support a major new European science mission

Earth observation research is a good example. China's Earth observation data and other useful data and research achievements could enrich US research models or pools in the same fields. Scientists from both countries need to integrate data for research and development. Another example is that US scientists may need China's ground-based magnetic storm data to perfect their space weather prediction model. It will be very helpful to both countries to undertake joint research in these areas.

# ASAT CP—ban ASAT Treaty

**Solvency—US should advocate new space treaty to include ASAT**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<Instead, the United States should advocate adopting a UNCLOS III-type treaty for space that would provide a detailed legal regime protecting the interests of all nations in space. n115 Even though this would circumscribe the United States' freedom of action in space by, inter alia, putting strict limits on the weaponization of space, the United States would be better served overall. Its other satellite systems (including non-weaponized military support satellites) would be protected by limits on ASATs, and it would not have to bear the expense and insecurity inherent in an arms race in space. Just as "freedom of the seas" became obsolete in the 20th century when states saw that unilateral exertions of power to protect their interests at sea caused unnecessary expense and insecurity, "freedom of space" is an obsolete concept that should be reigned in by international law. All nations--and humanity at large--will be better off.>

# Moratorium on ASAT development CP

Temporary ban on ASAT testing solves for space militarization

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

<The most likely outcome would be to prohibit testing, deployment and use of space-based weapons and ground-based ASATs alike. And a moratorium on ASATs testing should be placed in the course of negotiations. This is advisable for at least three reasons. First, it could effectively guarantee the peaceful use of outer space. Testing is a significant stage for effective arms control as in almost all cases weapons must be tested repeatedly before being used in actual combat. This is even truer for space weapons, which are extremely complex and require high accuracy. As Blazejewski puts it, “without the capacity to test, any space weapons program will be stifled at an early stage of development.”[75](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn75) It would also discourage R&D. Blazejewski also argues that allowing R&D alleviates the USA’s concern over others’ break-through capability, as once it becomes clear that a state is preparing to launch space weapons it could respond by executing its own space weapons contingency plan.[76](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn76) Second, the prohibition of testing, deployment and use is critical for the environmental protection of outer space, given the large amount of orbital debris that would be generated. However, a set of practice guidelines should be established to accommodate states’ legitimate need to bring down their own satellites endangering other satellites. Third, it eases verification. R&D, which in most cases happens within national jurisdictions and can easily be concealed, is much more difficult to verify than deployment, testing and use. Seeking complete prohibition at the cost of verification difficulties would reduce the compactness of the treaty and the confidence of prospective states parties.)

# Condition China CP---use space policy leverage

**Solvency—US should negotiate code of conduct with China using ISS leverage**

Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST**)** <Considering Chinese investment in its space program as a centerpiece of national prestige and as a lever for economic development, the USA has the opportunity to link a variety of related economic incentives with opening, and concluding, negotiations on a code of conduct in space, including Chinese abandonment of destructive anti-satellite weapons programs. These potential bargaining chips include such options as participation in the International Space Station (ISS), joint exploration missions, reform in US policies restricting sales of commercial satellite hardware, and licensing of Chinese launch services. In exchange, China might willingly restrict behaviors that could lead to strategic miscalculation in space, as well as certain forms of counter-space capabilities. Providing what the Chinese want in civil and commercial space arguably would cost the USA little, and in this value–cost differential exists the potential of a mutually beneficial agreement. In international prestige, no greater prize currently exists for China than to be recognized and be admitted as a partner in the ISS. While the ISS program would benefit from Chinese investment and the potential use of *Shenzhou* modules for crew or cargo transport, the reality is that China needs ISS more than ISS needs the Chinese, even with the imminent retirement of the Shuttle fleet. With the successful docking and cargo transfer of the European Space Agency's Automatic Transfer Vehicle in March 2008, the need for a backup to *Soyuz* is not yet a dire urgency [[10]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477" \l "bib10). The approach can be gradual, with perhaps the visit of a Chinese space tourist to the station, before the docking of a *Shenzhou* cargo vehicle, then perhaps the inclusion of a Chinese module to the station, culminating in a routine rotation of Chinese personnel on the station. Indeed, ISS participation offers a stepwise schedule of incentives in negotiations with the Chinese.

# China US Arms Control CP

**Text: United States federal government should initiate arms control dialogue with the government of the People’s Republic of China paralleling the United States’ arms control agenda with Russia.**

**Contention 1: competition---avoids troops links and solves relations adva**

**Contention 2: Solvency**

**Arms control agenda key to decrease risk of war and improve relations**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

**(Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)**

President Barack Obama’s April 5 speech in Prague made it official: Arms control is back. The United States and Russia already are pursuing a new bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which expires on December 5. Work toward a second, more ambitious bilateral treaty is expected to follow. Another early goal of the administration is to secure Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All of these steps, it is hoped, will smooth the path for a successful 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The administration’s agenda is driven both by the START calendar and by a belief that rapid progress will build momentum for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. But amid these urgent plans, it pays to recall something equally important. Traditionally, arms control has two fundamental purposes—to contain the risks of war and to prevent the spiral of mistrust driven by arms races, either numerical or technological. Neither of these goals can be achieved without a parallel arms control agenda, one focused on the United States and China. Today, there is no longer a plausible war scenario between the United States and Russia. But the U.S.-Chinese relationship remains dogged by the potential for conflict that emanates from the 60-year contest over the status of Taiwan. Major defense acquisitions on both sides seem inexorably to be justified in terms of this scenario, spurring mutual fear and suspicion.

# China US Arms Control CP 2NC

**Force Modernization net benefit:**

**\*\*you probably wouldn’t be but make sure you’re not running this w/ China Militarization DA**

**CP solves US China force modernization and weapons development key to cooperation and conflict**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

(Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)

But the present calm is not guaranteed to last. Two waves of confrontation between the United States and China took place in the strait, in the 1950s and in the 1990s. Serious tensions have come and gone, depending on developments in China, Taiwan, and beyond. Moreover, in the decade since the U.S. Air Force accidentally bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade in March 1999, military developments on both sides of the Pacific have drifted into unfamiliar and potentially dangerous waters. What political scientist Christopher Twomey aptly calls an “interlocking pattern” of new or upgraded strategic forces increases tensions and risks for both sides.1 In future war scenarios, the interactions of strategic forces may encourage preemptive moves that risk even more serious forms of escalation. Current risks—already a source of discomfort—are only liable to grow as China and the United States continue to modernize their strategic forces. Each side tends to draw ominous inferences about the other’s intentions for new weapons developments, which justifies countermoves and, most of all, injects considerable suspicion and antagonism into a centrally important international relationship. The particular crisis, war, and escalation scenarios that animate this security dilemma are outweighed in significance by their potential to confound cooperation on crucial global challenges: financial stabilization, trade relations, economic recovery, and climate change. But this outcome can be avoided. China and the United States should seize on the current lull in cross-strait tensions to quell the prospect of a trans-Pacific strategic arms race before it becomes self-fulfilling.

**Impact--US China strategic weapons escalate conflict**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

**(Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)**

This situation seems benign on its face. China is neither main-taining a large force on high alert nor racing to catch up to the Unit-ed States numerically. The United States, therefore, feels little pres-sure to stay ahead of China. But two issues complicate the picture: (1) the unpredictable effect of emerging Chinese doctrine and op-

erational practices in a crisis; and (2) the emergence on both sides of new strategic weapons, primarily based on ballistic missile tech-nology but adapted to purposes other than nuclear attack or retalia-tion. In a crisis or a limited conflict, these new weapons would have the potential to interact with both conventional forces and strategic nuclear forces, creating a pathway for escalation. Furthermore, each side’s acquisition of non-nuclear strategic forces has begun to jus-tify the other side’s acquisition of its own.

# China US Arms Control CP 2NC solvency—solves your add-ons

**Negotiations on arrangements to manage, verifiably limit or ban certain weapons as well as negotiate on rules of sea engagement key to deescalate conventional conflicts**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

(Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)

The present situation not only engenders risk but deepens suspicions when the opposite is needed. Considering that even limited, conventional conflict would entail profound and unacceptable harm for everyone involved, trying to cut a firebreak between the cataclysmic and the merely catastrophic might seem like a misallocation of national energies. But the single great-est benefit of quashing an incipient strategic arms race may simply be to interrupt the cycle of suspicion and antagonism that lends an adversarial cast to relations and makes war scenarios seem plausible at all. Both to ease mutual suspicions and to minimize escalation pressures, it is in the interests of both sides to negotiate ar- rangements to manage, verifiably limit, or ban entirely classes of non-nuclear weap-ons—such as non-nuclear applications for ballistic missiles and directed-energy weapons—which interact with nuclear weapons and with each other. Separately, the United States and China should consider ne-gotiating a “code of conduct” for maritime operations in the Pacific, potentially along the lines of the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972.

# Military to military dialogue CP 1NC

**Text: The United States federal government should expand military to military and lab to lab exchanges with the government, including the military and scientific agencies, of the People’s Republic of China.**

**Contention one: competition—avoids space**

**Contention two: solvency**

**Increase military to military, lab to lab exchanges improves relations—consultation on issues increase confidence building measures**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

(Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)

In the meantime, the countries can pursue a number of working-level activities to develop greater mutual familiarity and promote understanding of each side’s concerns. Expanding military-to-mili-tary dialogue would be valuable, as would resuming the laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges that have been suspended for more than a decade. Renewed lab-to-lab contacts could help to build a common understanding of verification technology, information barriers, and other technical aspects of arms control practice. Arms control ex-pert Lewis Dunn also has put forth a useful proposal to hold consul-tations with Chinese officials during the course of the ongoing Nu-clear Posture Review and to provide briefings on the results.23Whatever mechanisms U.S. and Chinese officials settle on, it is important for them to start early and to continue even in the event

of one of the periodic incidents that tend to perturb the U.S.-Chi-nese relationship. Without a dialogue aimed at developing agree-ments to regulate military interactions and limit forces, mutual risk and suspicion will only grow. <

**military to military exchanges key to cooperation and mutual understanding necessary to avoid conflicts—also proves that troops reduction won’t solve in current strategic environment**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

In addition to the analysis of China’s military capabilities, several new topics are discussed in the DoD report. A chapter is devoted for the first time to the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” which were assigned by Hu Jintao in December 2004. Fulfilling the new congressional requirement for the annual report, another chapter discusses military-to-military exchanges between the US and China. It argues that “sustainable and reliable” military ties are an important part of the bilateral relationship. However, “a sustained exchange program has been difficult to achieve,” and the “on-again/off-again” nature of the military relationship has limited “the ability of the two armed forces to explore areas of cooperation, enhance mutual understanding, improve communications, and reduce the risk that misapprehension or miscalculation could lead to crisis or conflict.”

Military to military dialogue CP 2NC Solvency

**High level contacts key to strategic trust necessary for cooperation**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

**(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)**

State Councilor Dai Bingguo underscored the need to carefully manage differences between the two countries. He told the US government representatives, “Strategic trust is the basis of China-US cooperation.” According to a release by the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Dai expressed China’s willingness to work with the US, increase high-level contacts, and expand cooperation in all areas in a bid to push forward China-US relations. The positive atmosphere of the meetings and the high-level treatment accorded to Donilon and Summers signaled both to China’s domestic audience and to the US that Beijing continues to attach great importance to the bilateral relationship and hopes to keep ties on an even keel in the run-up to Hu’s planned visit to the US.

# \*\*China Militarization DA\*\*

**This argument says that US is pursuing an accommodative approach to space development and exploration in the SQ under Obama. The plan is viewed as unilateral policy and/or militarization of space by China. This leads to China adopting a space policy that seeks to check US space dominance. This risks first strike space arms race and general mayhem.**

**The key uniqueness question isn’t whether or not China will dominant space now but rather whether they perceive US action as seeking “permanent space dominance”. The plan moves away from cooperation of space in the SQ.**

**A word of caution—you probably shouldn’t run this with the China CP b/c the perm would solve..probs a lot.**

# China Militarization DA 1NC

A. **US approach to maintaining its space primacy now is cooperative and accommodative of China. This sends a signal that space is to be shared, even if competition exists between private companies.**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<Under these circumstances the USA is attempting to maintain its primacy in space by utilizing increased international cooperation and collaboration. Michael Nacht, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, stated in May 2010 that expectations of flat to declining military space budgets in the next couple of years is the motivation for enhancing international cooperation.[11](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165#fn11) Furthermore, while space is becoming a more competitive domain where other nations are increasing their presence, the USA seems to be aiming to shape the direction of global space activities in its favor and to expand its market opportunities through cooperation with other nations. In the case of space-based PNT, the new NSP stipulates that, for the purpose of maintaining US leadership in this area, the country shall “engage with foreign GNSS providers to encourage compatibility and interoperability, promote transparency in civil service provision, and enable market access for US industry.”>

B. Link—Unilateral increases in space exploration and development like the plan disrupt the balance in space relations between China and the US, causing China to seek aggressive militarization of space

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

(The illegality and ineffectiveness of space-based weapons are not what have created the urgency for the PPWT, as one could argue that we are still well off so long as states refrain from deployment. Rather, the PPWT is indeed urgently needed because of the development of ground-based ASATs. Today the world is already half way down the road to space weaponization, and is still marching on. The USA’s R&D into space-based kinetic kill vehicles and laser beams is no secret. Its official policies that advocate space weaponization touch the nerves of other states, in particular those not allied to it. Although such advocacies do not establish actual deployment, states seeking to decipher its behaviour can only infer that the USA plans to weaponize outer space.[57](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn57) The abrogation of the ABM Treaty is read as an arbitrary step of clearing away the legal obstacles to weaponization. Certain states are therefore sure to prepare for a worst-case scenario, because space-based weapons cover a global operating range and deployment could bring overwhelming superiority. Bruce MacDonald of the US Institute of Peace said as much at a March 2009 congressional testimony: “[W]e could create a self-fulfilling prophecy: as nations like China or Russia see evidence of US attempted space hegemony, they would accelerate their own efforts, just as we would if the roles were reversed.”[58](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn58) To respond, China, for instance, has the options of building more warheads, developing missile defence countermeasures, developing ASATs, and reconsidering arms control and nonproliferation commitments.[59](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn59) As for Russia, competing with the USA in space, as the USSR did in the past, is fairly popular among its political and military leaders, and may be explained by the fact that space technology is one of the few areas in which Russian technologies remain internationally competitive.[60](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn60) The USSR was the only country that developed and operationally deployed an ASAT system to attack satellites in low-Earth orbits (LEOs).[61](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn61) India is also upping the pace in order not to lag behind. Recent debates on India’s need to refine and test a “satellite killing” capability have emerged since the US decision to shoot down a faulty spy satellite on 20 February 2008.[62](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn62)

# China Militarization DA 1nc

**c. 1. Chinese Space militarization in response to US leads to war and instability including first strike and escalation**

**Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008** (Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database)

<Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities [see box at left], proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competition--whether in space or elsewhere--equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic.)

# China Militarization DA 1nc

**2. Unchecked space militarization leads to nuclear war**

**Ross** Reporter for the Chicago Daily News **2009**

(Sherwood Ross, “Space Race Increasing Risk of Nuclear War,” Atlantic Free Press, [http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/8948-space-race-increasing-risk-of-nuclear-war.html accessed 6-28](http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/8948-space-race-increasing-risk-of-nuclear-war.html%20accessed%206-28) tm)

An unchecked race to militarize space is underway that is “increasing the risk of an **accidental nuclear war** **while shortening the time for** sanity and **diplomacy to** come into play to **halt crises**,” an authority on space warfare says.

By 2025, the space capabilities of the leading space powers---**the U.S., Russia, India and China**---will be roughly equal “due to information sharing in a globalized economy,” says noted space researcher Matt Hoey in an exclusive interview. Hoey is international military space technology forecaster who provides analysis on issues related to technology proliferation and arms control. He is also a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and has contributed to publications such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Space Review.

Through their military and commercial research facilities, the world’s military powers are pursuing development of a reusable, unmanned, hypersonic, space-strike delivery platform that “would permit rapid precision strikes worldwide in 120 minutes or less,” Hoey said.

The strike platform could loiter in near-space or in low earth orbit and assault terrestrial targets at incredible speed “with a nuclear or conventional payload and then return to any base in the world on demand,” he explained.

While “there will not be a dedicated ‘space war’ in our lifetimes or our children’s,” Hoey said, “we are likely to witness acts of space warfare being committed…in concert with other theatres of combat” on land, sea, and air and cyber space.”

Hoey said his research analysis suggests:

“Back and forth escalation regarding military space capabilities would fuel each nation’s respective space industries as would commercial space races driven by national pride.”

“If these systems are deployed in space we will be **tip**ping **the nuclear balance** between nations that has ensured the peace for decades,” Hoey continued. “The military space race will serve the defense industry much like the cold war and this is already being witnessed in relation to missile defense systems.”

Hoey pointed out the arms control community “is still trying to put the nuclear genie from decades ago back in the bottle” and adds “once this new genie(space war) is out it is not going back in anytime soon, either.”

The five treaties governing space “are highly outdated,” Hoey said, notably the milestone “Outer Space Treaty” of 1967. Theoretically, the U.S. is also bound by The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 that declares our “activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” (Rep. Dennis Kucinich(D-Ohio), in introducing a bill to ban the weaponization of space, charged the Bush administration with breaking with that policy by “putting weapons in outer space to give the U.S. the power to control the world.” Kucinich charged “the Air Force is seeking permission to put both offensive and defensive weapons in space.”)

Hoey said the research community is expecting space warfare systems to come from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL). But instead of doing straight military R&D in-house, the Pentagon is funding civilian research that has dual-purpose use capabilities---civilian applications as well as military.

Because military space race technologies are the same as those needed to explore the heavens, service the international space station and defend against threats from near earth objects, the civilian-military partnerships “present the most challenging dilemma for the arms control community,” Hoey said. That’s because arms control proponents cannot object to their military applications without also opposing “technologies that benefit mankind.” And he warned this will continue to be the case as long as existing treaties fail to differentiate between commercial and military space technology.

Because their overlap is “overwhelming,” Hoey noted, in that “systems that destroy can also create and facilitate discoveries,” it behooves the international arms control community to act before our military and commercial industries become “inextricably integrated with military space systems and unable to extract themselves.”

Hoey said the defense community is actively scouting students still enrolled in high school who have demonstrated a talent in aerospace, cryptology and computer security for military research, “in an attempt to compete with emerging science and technology rivals such as China and India.” This would place future generations who dream of discoveries on a fast track towards the defense industry, Hoey said, even if they land jobs in the private sector. As dual-usage progresses, far more space technology roads will lead to careers that contribute to the development space warfare-enabling technologies.

Companies engaged in nanotechnology, robotics and Artificial Intelligence are also being wooed by the military with fat checks, Hoey said. “These (space exploration and space warfare) systems are being developed through multi-tiered collaborations that include NASA, the Defense Department, universities, big defense contractors and small space start- ups. “The work force consists of military scientists and engineers, students, scientists, and even foreign nationals” ultimately enabling **tech**nology **prolif**eration **globally**.

For an arms control community that is focusing primarily on banning specific space weapons currently in development, nearing deployment, and in some cases already deployed, efforts should also be focused towards lobbying the international community to begin establishing rules of the road that differentiate between peaceful commercial space technologies and destructive military space applications before the lines between the two are **irreversibly blurred**, Hoey urged. By doing so, “next generation space warfare systems and space security threats can, as a result, be prevented long before they have a chance to further undermine peace in outer space and increase the probability of **nuclear war**,” he said.

# \*\*\* China Militarization DA Uniqueness\*\*\*\*

# U US Space Dominance Eroding now

**Uniqueness: US space dominance is challenged by other countries including China**

**Choong, Senior financial writer, 2007** (William, Space Race Widens As More Nations Rise To The Challenge; Europe, Russia, China and Japan Are New Contenders In Race To Moon And Beyond The Straits Times, October 5, 2007, Lexis Nexis, accessed June 23, 2011, AT)

IN CANBERRA - ON OCT4, 1957, the Soviet Union sparked off a space race by launching the basketball-sized Sputnik1 satellite into orbit. Fifty years on, its political heir, Russia, is keen to reclaim past glories by joining in a new race to militarize space and return to the moon and beyond. This time around, however, the list of competitors is longer: not only is the United States joining the fray, but also Europe, China, Japan and India. By far, the biggest area of competition is in the militarization of space. Last year, US President George W. Bush sparked controversy by signing an order tacitly asserting the American right to space weapons and opposing the development of treaties or other measures restricting them. He also tabled an ambitious program for space-based missile defense, and the development of missiles, ground lasers and other devices to shoot down satellites. Both Russia and China have pushed hard for a global agreement banning space weapons. Last week, the chief of Russia's space forces warned that Moscow would have to retaliate if others deployed weapons in space. In comments directed at Washington, Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin said: 'We don't want to wage a war in space, we don't want to gain dominance in space, but we won't allow any other nation to dominate space. 'If any country deploys weapons in space, then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear.' During the 1990s, Russia's space program languished following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the Russian economy is now flush with petro-dollars, and a more assertive Moscow is bolstering its rhetoric with concrete plans. Last month, a Russian television program broadcast in Europe chronicled the development of the country's 'Buran' reusable spacecraft in the 1980s. The project was abandoned subsequently, but Russia is seeking new ways to use it as a platform for delivering nuclear strikes from space, the BBC reported. Russia is not the only country challenging the US for space dominance. In a chest-thumping demonstration of ballistic prowess, China's military destroyed one of its own older satellites with a guided missile in January. 'There is considerable talk about new space races - US-China, US-Russia, China-Japan,' Dr Joan Johnson-Freese, a renowned space expert at the US Naval War College, told The Straits Times. 'But it needs to be made clear that there are many kinds of races, for example, political, technological, military and manned.' The US is clearly ahead in terms of technology and it is unlikely that any country will catch up in the next 20 years, she said. 'That is not to say, however, that China, for example, could not beat the US back to the moon, using relatively spartan technology, because China has a political will to support the program that is lacking in the US,' she added. Apart from the militarization of space, most major powers have focused their efforts on reaching the moon and beyond. These missions go further than America's historic 1969 moon landing, since they entail the setting up of long-term outposts there. At a conference on space exploration in India last week, China reiterated its intent to set up an outpost on the moon after 2020. And last month, Japan launched a lunar orbiter. Its space agency has also said it will send astronauts to the moon by 2020 and build a lunar outpost by 2030. India is also preparing to launch a mission next year. Not to be outdone, the US' Constellation programme is developing new vehicles capable of returning astronauts to the moon and eventually taking them to Mars. Some analysts, however, warn that many of these plans are without concrete budgets as yet. 'Only poets write strategies without budgets,' said Dr Johnson-Freese. 'There's a difference between conceptual discussions and programmes that are adequately funded to carry them out,' she pointed out.

# U– US Space Primacy Low

**US losing its primacy in space—multiple challenges**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

The current US primacy in space is, however, no longer secure and is challenged by budget pressures and growing competition. The push for more budget cuts is especially apparent in the national security space sector. In June 2010 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced his intention to save over $100 billion of the defense budget over a five-year period starting from fiscal year 2012 and this is where the space-related budget is expected to suffer.[6](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn6) In addition, the proliferation of space activities has intensified heated competition in space. For example, the US Global Positioning System (GPS) has been widely used as the “gold standard” for space-based positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and generated huge positive economic effects.[7](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn7) Nevertheless, other countries have recently been preparing their own global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Russia is rebuilding its Glonass constellation, which aims to be fully operational by the end of 2010.[8](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn8) European countries are funding the Galileo system, which is scheduled to be partially operational in 2014.[9](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn9) China is also constructing the Beidou/Compass system, which is intended to achieve global coverage by around 2020.[10](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn10) These systems are designed to be dual-use and are sure to have great impact on related markets.>

# U—US space primacy through cooperation now

**Cooperation increases US primacy in space**

Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<Under these circumstances the USA is attempting to maintain its primacy in space by utilizing increased international cooperation and collaboration. Michael Nacht, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, stated in May 2010 that expectations of flat to declining military space budgets in the next couple of years is the motivation for enhancing international cooperation.[11](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn11) Furthermore, while space is becoming a more competitive domain where other nations are increasing their presence, the USA seems to be aiming to shape the direction of global space activities in its favor and to expand its market opportunities through cooperation with other nations. In the case of space-based PNT, the new NSP stipulates that, for the purpose of maintaining US leadership in this area, the country shall “engage with foreign GNSS providers to encourage compatibility and interoperability, promote transparency in civil service provision, and enable market access for US industry.”>

# U US pursuing accommodative China policy

**US pursuing accommodative China policy**

[**Pomfret**](http://www.cfr.org/experts/china-vietnam-human-rights/john-pomfret/b10138) **‘10**

[Ph.D. in International Relations, 2010, Greg Austin, All at Sea: Misrepresenting China, April 23, 2010, <http://www.ewi.info/all-sea-misrepresenting-china>, 6-22-11, Rg. ]

Obama entered office on a program of effectively embracing his predecessor's China policy and wanting to build on it. That's unusual. Bill Clinton basically criticized George H.W. Bush for coddling the "butchers of Beijing," but ultimately adopted a relatively positive China policy. George W. Bush came into office criticizing Bill Clinton's policy and calling China a strategic competitor, even though Bush in the end adopted a relatively soft China policy. Obama came into office without criticizing his predecessor's China policy and basically said he wanted to build on it and make the relationship even better. In fact, the Obama administration in 2009 had an ambitious program of working with China on global warming, on cleaning up the financial mess, on dealing with Iran and North Korea, and on a lot of other issues.

The Obama administration's high expectations led them, publically at least, to deemphasize human rights as a real issue between the two countries. But when the administration realized it was not getting that much support [on Iran, North Korea, etc.], it decided, "We have to say publically what we say privately."

# U US pursuing accommodative China policy

**Obama engaging China on space cooperation now**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

<The Obama Administration appears absolutely intent on engaging the PRC in space cooperation. How else to explain the claim by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren that the congressional restriction banning U.S.–Chinese space cooperation under just about any circumstances was not, in fact, a ban?

According to Holdren, the White House has concluded that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation between the two countries that dates back to 1979. One doesn’t need a presidential signing statement to see that the White House is near-desperate to engage the PRC in space cooperation.

# U US pursuing accommodative China policy

**US China cooperation now—common interests**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<The Obama administration is now trying to promote space cooperation with China. In November 2009 President Obama and China’s President, Hu Jintao, agreed to seek further discussions on space science cooperation and to initiate a dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration.[22](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn22) The two leaders also welcomed reciprocal visits of the NASA administrator and his Chinese counterpart in 2010. This led to an official visit to China by NASA Administrator Charles Bolden in October 2010.[23](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn23) Bolden met his counterpart, Chen Qiufa, head of the China National Space Administration and visited Chinese human spaceflight related facilities.[24](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn24) In addition, both presidents shared the view that the two countries have common interests in the promotion of the peaceful use of space and agreed to take steps to enhance security in space. In pursuance of this the administration is seeking bilateral TCBMs with China. In October 2010 Defense Secretary Gates mentioned the need for strategic dialogue, which includes the issue of space security, in a meeting with China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie.[25](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn25)>

# U US pursuing accommodative China policy

**Uniqueness: US pursuing accommodation in space policy towards China**

**Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong **2011** (Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 March/April 2011, pp. 311-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed June 21, 2011)

After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.”44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.

# U US pursuing accommodative China policy

**Obama accommodating China space policy via cooperation**

Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

Above all, the NSP’s great emphasis on the importance of international cooperation has significant meaning for Asia. The USA has a long history of international space cooperation, especially in the field of civil space, and past administrations also pledged the promotion of international cooperation in their NSPs. Even the former Bush administration’s NSP, which was sometimes regarded as a product of unilateralism, included “cooperation with other nations” as one of the principles of US space programs and activities.[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165#fn1)

Obama’s NSP is, however, rooted in cooperation and incorporates the concept throughout, instead of just mentioning it in one section. The introduction states that “the United States hereby renews its pledge of cooperation,” whereas for the principles of space activities, the USA will adhere to its principles “in this spirit of cooperation” and proposes that other nations follow suit. Also, as one of the goals of its national space programs, emphasis is placed on the expansion of international cooperation. In the inter-sectoral guidelines there is a special section on international cooperation, which stipulates the need to strengthen US space leadership, identify areas for potential international cooperation, and develop transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). According to a senior administration official, who played a central role in shaping the document, enhancing international cooperation and collaboration in space is positioned as a “key cornerstone” in Obama’s NSP.

# Uniqueness: China on the rise

**Uniqueness: China space policy demonstrates shift in space dominance now   
Branigan and Sample, The Guardian 2011**(Tania and Ian, Front: Space: Meanwhile Chinese unveil their new space station plan, April 27 2011, Lexis Nexis accessed June 24, 2011 AT)

China has laid out plans for its future in space, unveiling details of an ambitious new space station yesterday to be built in orbit within a decade. The project, which one Nasa adviser describes as a "potent political symbol", is the latest phase in China's rapidly developing space programme. It is less than a decade since China put a human into orbit for the first time, and three years since its first spacewalk. The space station will weigh around 60 tonnes and consist of a core module with two laboratory units for experiments, according to the state news agency, Xinhua. Officials have asked the public to suggest names and symbols for the unit and for a cargo spacecraft that will serve it. Prof Jiang Guohua, from the China Astronaut Research and Training Centre, said the facility would be designed to last for around a decade and support three astronauts working on microgravity science, space radiation biology and astronomy. The project heralds a shift in the balance of power among spacefaring nations. In June, the US space agency, Nasa, will mothball its whole fleet of space shuttles, in a move that will leave only the Russians capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the International Space Station. The $100bn (£60bn) outpost is itself due to fly only until 2020, but may be granted a reprieve until 2028. Bernardo Patti, head of the space station programme at the European Space Agency (ESA), said: "China is a big country. It is a powerful country, and they are getting richer and richer. They want to establish themselves as key players in the international arena. "They have decided politically that they want to be autonomous, and that is their call. They must have had some political evaluation that suggests this option is better than the others, and I would think autonomy is the key word." He added that China's plans would be "food for thought" for policymakers elsewhere.

# Uniqueness-China pursuing cooperative space policy

**China cooperation in space policy**

**Domme, Intern, CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, 2010**

(Lisa, CSIS technology, March 23 2010, <http://csis.org/blog/chinese-space-policy-collaboration-or-competition>, 6-22-11, kc)

<General Xu Qiliang, the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, has argued that space exploration is critical to China’s national security interests. His remarks reflect the Chinese government’s growing interest in space exploration and the development of space technology. China’s space program has made significant progress over the past decade. China is scheduled to start building its own space station in 2011 with the launch of an unmanned module named Tiangong-1. China’s success is in part due to its ability to exploit (and in some cases steal) foreign technology and its cooperation with foreign governments.

China has collaborated mostly with other developing nations on its space technology, especially Russia and Brazil. Russia is working with China to help the Chinese refine their Shenzhou manned vehicles (based off of the successful Russia Soyuz design). China also purchased spacesuit designs from Russia.

China works with Brazil to improve its satellite technology. In 1988, China and Brazil formed a joint committee called the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Program to handle constructing, launching and operating satellites. The CBERS program has led to the launch of three satellites since 1999, and a fourth satellite launch is scheduled for the middle of 2011.>

# Uniqueness China Pursuing Cooperation Now

**Uniqueness-China international space cooperation now despite restrictions by US**

**Williamson, space technology and consultant, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, April 16, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

<China might not have a good relationship with the US, but that hasn’t stopped it developing ties with other nations. For a country that many would characterize as ‘closed’, China has a surprising heritage in international space cooperation. Examples include collaboration with Russia for the development of the manned Shenzhou spacecraft; with France for communications satellite payloads; and with the UK for the Disaster Monitoring Constellation. China has also worked with Brazil on a series of China Brazil Earth Resources Satellites; and with the European Space Agency for the Double Star science mission.

It is now clear China wants to be an internationally recognized supplier of commercial satellites. It signed its first satellite export order in December 2004 for the Nigerian government’s Nigcomsat-1, which is due to be launched by a Long March rocket in March 2007. The Nigerian Space Research and Development Agency reportedly paid 20%of the cost, with the balance financed by the Chinese Export Import Bank. The contract included provision for 50 Nigerian engineers to visit China for training, mirroring the model used by Western satellite manufacturers to secure contracts from Asian operators. Since then, China has signed a contract with the Venezuelan government for theVenesat-1 satellite, due to be launched in 2008. >

# Uniqueness – China pursuing cooperation

**China cooperative long term space strategy now**

Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, August 2008 (Yi Zhou, *Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics*, 6/23/11)

China is currently developing a long-term space strategy (through 2050). An effective and comprehensive space policy will promote and develop China's economy, technology and other interests. As one of the main development objectives, fundamental policies involving international cooperation were announced in a white paper entitled *The Chinese Government will Develop International Space Exchanges and Cooperation*.

Over the past 10 years China has made some progress in international cooperation and its contributions to the space benefits, the national economy and political objectives. Besides space business and launch services, China has built stable cooperative relationships with Brazil, France, Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA). Within the next 15 years, additional international cooperative projects will be announced in the Space Development Plan for the Next 15 Years; they include, among others, the Small Exploration for Solar Eruptions (SMESE) Project[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000404#fn1) and the Kuafu Project.

# Uniqueness China Wants Space Cooperation

**China wants US space cooperation over multiple areas—ITAR debates prove**

**De Selding, 11** (Peter, staff reporter for *Space News,* 4/14/11, <http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110414-chinese-official-space-cooperation.html>)

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — A top Chinese government space official on April 14 appealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned spaceflight, in which China has made massive investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have made it impossible to export most satellite components, or full satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR has all but locked China out of the global commercial launch market. The U.S. government is reviewing the current ITAR regime, which U.S. industry says has had the unintended effect of making it difficult to sell satellites and satellite components just about anywhere in the world. At the same time, China’s domestic demand for launches of its own telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation and science satellites — and its manned space program — has given the Long March vehicle sufficient business to earn it a record of reliability. The global insurance underwriting community now ranks the Long March vehicle alongside Russian and European rockets for reliability when it sets insurance premiums. Addressing the National Space Symposium here, Lei said Chinese vehicles launched more than 20 U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s. While cooperation with the United States has been shut down, he said, China has maintained relations with the 18-nation European Space Agency, Brazil, France, Russia and others. China also has developed a telecommunications satellite product line that has been bundled with a Chinese Long March vehicle to offer in-orbit delivery of telecommunications spacecraft to a half-dozen nations that in many cases can offer China access to their crude oil reserves. Lei said he sees three areas in which U.S.-Chinese cooperation would be in both nations’ interests. The first, he said, is an open commercial access of each nation to the other’s capabilities in satellites and launch vehicles. The second, he said, is manned spaceflight and space science, particularly in deep space exploration. The third is in satellite applications including disaster monitoring and management.

# \*\*\*China Militarization DA Links\*\*\*\*

# China Space Militarization DA Unique Link-increase explo US loss of launch vehicle allows China gains in space—increase exploration restores US preeminence The Washington Times 2011 (EDITORIAL: Exploring frontiers of science Shuttle’s last flight could cede space dominance to China, May 31, 2011, Lexis Nexis accessed June 24, 2011AT)

Given the past few years of economic hardship, it's easy to think the era of boundless opportunity that has characterized the American story is coming to an end. In times such as these, it's comforting to remember that as long as we retain our inquisitive nature, our discoveries could yield possibilities for better days ahead.

The space shuttle Endeavour is scheduled to return to Earth Wednesday after its final mission. Installation of the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (ASM), a state-of-the-art particle physics detector, on the International Space Station during its 16-day mission shows how much will be lost without our own manned space fleet. The ASM is designed to detect information emanating from far beyond our own galaxy to discern clues regarding the structure and origin of the universe. NASA scientists are looking specifically for evidence of the existence of antimatter and dark matter. Stars, or visible matter, account for just 5 percent of the measurements of the mass of the universe. Scientists suppose much of the rest must be in the form of "dark" matter.

Last month, astronomers produced evidence confirming that a force other than gravity was responsible for the accelerating expansion of the universe. Two studies by Australian astronomers accepted for publication by the Royal Astronomical Society concluded "dark energy" is at work in the way clusters of galaxies formed following the Big Bang 16 billion years ago and in the subsequent distribution of galaxies in space.

It's hard to know if any of this new knowledge about the fundamental composition of the universe will have any practical application for improving life on Earth, but there is seldom certainty on the frontiers of discovery. Too few are predisposed to venture beyond their comfort zones, but those who do are often the ones who change the world. Recent history has shown that an inordinate proportion of those who are inclined to do so have been Americans.

That's why it is sad to see the U.S. space-shuttle program grounded next month after a 30-year run, just as Beijing appears ready to kick off its own space-exploration program with the ultimate goal of sending a manned mission to Mars. Let us hope that the next generation of Americans can rekindle the inquisitive spirit that has characterized our national identity and restore U.S. preeminence in space. The same irrepressible zest for knowing what's out there is bound to help us hurdle the obstacles that now confront us down here.

# China Militarization DA Link: China models US policy

**L: China models US military policy including role of space in policy**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

<In considering the Chinese approach to what the West has termed anti-access/area denial strategies, it is important to recognize that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a careful observer of Western, and especially American, approaches to what they first termed Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions, and is now termed Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions. These include the Falklands conflict, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, NATO’s campaigns in the Balkans, the toppling of the Taliban, and the March 2003 march to Baghdad. Consequently, PLA defense planning is being shaped, in no small part, by the lessons that they have derived from observing how potential opponents, but especially the United States, have been waging their wars.

Under Mao Zedong, the PLA expected to fight “early wars, major wars, nuclear wars,” which would entail protracted war fought on Chinese soil, with a heavy reliance on guerrilla warfare. Since the rise of Deng Xiaoping, however, the expectation is for more localized, limited conflicts. PLA analyses of Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions, and subsequently of Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions posit that future wars:

* Will be shorter, perhaps lasting only one campaign;
* Will almost certainly not entail the occupation of China, although Chinese political, economic, and military centers are likely to be attacked;
* And will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space, and the application of advanced technology, especially information technology.

Chinese analyses of these wars have sought to derive actionable lessons for the PLA from these conflicts. The evolution of the so-called new “three attacks, three defends,” for example, posits that the PLA should pay special attention to attacking stealth aircraft, long-range cruise missiles, and attack helicopters, while defending against precision strike, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance and surveillance. The two I’d like to address in my testimony are:

* The ability of the United States to dictate the operational and tactical terms of the conflict, by conducting closely coordinated precision strike operations with joint forces through the use of space assets.>
* The ability of the United States to dictate the strategic terms of the conflict, by influencing domestic opinion, opposition will, and third-party support.
* The theme underlying these aspects is the creation of a defense-in-depth against the United States, not only at the tactical and operational level through the creation of layered defenses, but also strategically, by denying the U.S. the ability to set the strategic context of the conflict.

# China Space Militarization DA Link: China models US space policy

**China looks to US space policy as to guide their military doctrine**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

In the tactical and operational realm, PLA observation of Western conflicts has led them to conclude that, in order to conduct the high-tempo, dispersed operations typical of recent Local Wars, it is essential to have access to space. Chinese analyses of the first Gulf War, the conflicts in the Balkans, and the march to Baghdad are rife with statistics on the number of satellites employed, whether maintaining surveillance over opponents, providing essential weather information, or guiding munitions and forces.

Thus, as one PLA analysis notes, in places like Afghanistan, when U.S. military forces have identified the enemy, they have promptly exploited GPS to determine the enemy’s location and satellite communications to transmit the target’s location to weapons operators, in order to attack targets promptly. Similarly, in Iraq, the use of space was essential for the U.S. military’s intelligence gathering and battlefield command and control.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact" \l "_ftn1)

From their perspective, the ability to exploit space is essential for the ability to wage non-contact, non-linear, non-symmetric warfare. This reliance is so extensive that another Chinese analysis posits that the U.S. could not conduct the kind of warfare it prefers, but only high-level mechanized warfare, if it could not access space.

The implication is that an essential part of any Chinese anti-access/area denial effort will probably entail operations against the U.S. space infrastructure, both in order to secure space dominance, *zhitian quan*, for the PLA, as well as to deny it to the United States. Space dominance, in this case, is defined as the ability to control the use of space, at times and places of one’s own choosing, while denying an opponent the same ability.

It should be noted here, first, that there is still no indication of whether the PLA has developed a formal space doctrine governing military operations in space. The available PLA literature does have, however consistent themes that emerge.

# China Militarization DA Link—unilateral actions

**US unilateral action towards space dominance leads to China freak out China would perceive US action as aggression**

Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST)

(Since the Reagan era, US interest in on-orbit and anti-satellite weapons has stemmed from three intertwining strategic concerns: the threat of ballistic missile strike, protecting the space systems upon which the US military depends, and preventing an adversary from using space in the same way as the US military does to enhance its conventional military prowess. After President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, “China began a program to modernize its strategic missile forces because of doubts about the survivability of its small nuclear deterrent” [[5]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477" \l "bib5). The Pentagon notes that the Chinese Navy is developing the necessary technologies to field a nuclear submarine fleet, a key to increasing the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent in the face of a second-strike-nullifying ballistic missile shield [[6]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477" \l "bib6). The current US strategic policy of “space dominance” aims at ensuring US freedom of action in space, as well as the ability to deny the use of space to adversaries [[7]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477" \l "bib7). China, with some good reason, sees itself as particularly vulnerable to such space doctrine, and in response may feel compelled to develop countervailing measures, in order to counteract the proscriptions of US policy. The USA cannot reasonably be expected to abandon its space capabilities, but a more constructive *modus vivendi* can surely be found by demonstrating that both the USA and China are “responsible stakeholders” in the realm of space.)

# China Space Militarization DA Link: Unilateral space

**US China Relations Link—US unilateral action perceived as hostile by China, hurts relations**

Dingli, 2008

(Shen, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defence, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the United States refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent. The cost should never be a worry for Beijing, as Washington might eventually lose a defence–offence race; effective defence is far more costly on the ground. This picture could be blurred if the United States militarises space. With space-based sensors and weapons platforms, US military capability will be many times amplified. For a benign and peace-loving country to acquire this capacity might be acceptable, if it truly upholds ‘peaceful purposes’ and ‘benefits of all humanity’, but US actions regarding Taiwan lead a majority of Chinese to reject the idea, and the invasion of Iraq has alienated the United States from many other countries. The world respects America’s right to national security, but cannot accept its militarisation of space for its security, as there would be no way to stop it if it decided to promote its security at the cost of another. Therefore, absent an agreement to contain space weaponisation, there needs to be a space balance of force to assure a new type of security stability. A China that can preserve its deterrence, whether from the surface of the Earth or outer space, is an asset to the world, if there is no way to dissuade America. It is understandable that others suspect China’s long-term strategic intentions, but China welcomes others to check and balance it through a multipolar structure. The world can rest assured that China does not aspire to be a new sole superpower; the rise of China reinforces peace as it checks and balances other actors if they behave irresponsibly. The recent reports on US space policy and its equivalent often declare that the United States ought to have the capacity to bar other states from access to space should Washington decide to do so. Such rhetoric is imperialistic. To be sure, the United States deserves legitimate security, as does any country. But the United States, as any other state, should not get its security at the cost of others. America is welcome to tap space for peaceful purposes; but so are all other states. If the United States finds value for its security from the use of space, it is not entitled to disallow others from using space the same way. If the United States considers that its military use of space is for peaceful purposes, as it has a right to self-defence and it is a benign country, then other states are entitled to the same reasoning and to access space militarily for peaceful purposes, especially when their legitimate national interest are already undermined by America. Countries are equals; neither the United States nor China nor any other nation is superior. On the surface of the Earth, the United States has hurt China’s legitimate interests rather than the other way around. China has responded with a moderate nuclear deterrent to attain a certain assurance and has tried to emphasise where it can cooperate with America for the global good. The United States tends to have a short memory: when it bluffed China with nuclear weapons, China responded in kind. Though China is still far behind America, Beijing is a little wealthier these days. If Washington aspires to dominate space, it may discover that Moscow, Beijing and perhaps New Delhi will stand it its way. All of them would join Washington in its professed fundamental goal: the use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. But if America deviates from this noble task, and this is not unlikely, they will help America stick to its previous benign objectives. So, welcome Beijing. Space arms control remains a goal for Beijing. The next US administration could also be more cooperative internationally. Nevertheless, if it or any other government refuses to cooperate for collective security, Beijing will insist that space is for all, and China has an equal right to use it for peaceful purposes. China will not threaten others, but will develop means for being less threatened itself. American rhetoric should apply to China as well: ‘if this fundamental goal (use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefits of all humanity) is threatened by foreign counterspace activities aimed at Chinese space assets, the People’s Republic of China has no choice but to defend and win’. It has been suggested the Chinese economy will overtake America’s by 2025 and India will surpass America by 2050. Such conjectures may be overimaginative. But in the long run America may not always be able to prevail unilaterally. Instead, all states should seek a collective, win–win situation.

# China Space Militarization DA Link: US unilateral action

**China militarizes to hedge against the US space dominance**

**Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong **2011** (Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 March/April 2011, pp. 311-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed June 21, 2011)

[China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact, China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.” Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.” This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly.]

# China Space Militarization DA Link: US unilateral action

**China space program to limit US space power**

**Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong **2011** (Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 March/April 2011, pp. 311-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed June 21, 2011)

China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.” The military space relationship between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6 This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China’s military space program. The first is China’s attempt to respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S. military’s plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that dominance. The second factor is China’s concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably compromise China’s offensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities. Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article suggests that precisely because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in the strategic environment that could extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration to curb missile defense, and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window of opportunity for the two countries to relax the tensions in their space relationship. With the right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space arms race.

# China Space Militarization DA Link: US unilateral action

**China concerns over US space policy causes Chinese space race   
Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong **2011** (Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 March/April 2011, pp. 311-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed June 21, 2011)

One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth:

The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target anywhere on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century

This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doctrines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called *Military Doctrines for Air Force*, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.

**China Space Militarization DA Link—US space weapons**

**Link: Space race causes U.S.-China relations/MAD treaty to collapse**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<China's recent test of an anti-satellite weapon on January 11, 2007, put the incipient arms race in space between the United States and China back into the public consciousness. n1 Under the Bush Administration, the United States has been aggressively pursuing offensive space weapons that have the potential to seriously threaten China and upset the longstanding geopolitical equilibrium based on mutually assured destruction. n2 Russia and others also fear the U.S. pursuit of space weapons, n3 and these countries are likely to rally to China as the arms race progresses. As the overall situation continues to deteriorate, it is becoming increasingly clear that the unbridled American pursuit of space weapons is a dangerous game and that the consequences could be very severe indeed.>

**China Space Militarization DA Link—US space weapons**

**Link—US space weaponization hurts US-Sino relations**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<The development and deployment of space weapons will cost enormous sums n9 and ultimately lead to a much less safe and stable world. Kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers are very complex devices that **[\*135]** have the potential to unleash enormous firepower on ground targets, but they are themselves extremely vulnerable to relatively cheap and simple anti-satellite weapons ("ASATs"). n10 Moreover, the deployment of space weapons and further development of ASATs will upset the longstanding strategic logic of mutually assured destruction by significantly weakening the effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles ("ICBMs") armed with nuclear warheads. n11 If the United States chooses to go the route of aggressive space weapons development in spite of these dangers, it is sure to further alienate the rest of the world--especially Russia--and drive it into the arms of a welcoming China. n12 In short, there are a number of very serious long-term consequences to the development of space weapons that the United States would be wise to consider before it is too late.>

# China Space Militarization DA Link—US unilateral actions

**U.S. unilateral space development sparks China reaction**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<The United States appears to be increasingly determined to proceed with the development and deployment of space weapons. Late in 2006, President Bush signed a new National Space Policy that categorically rejects all future legal limitations on space weapons and declared that the United States has the right to deny access to space to those that are "hostile to U.S. interests." n32 One of the President's top priorities is to "enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there." n33 This sounds laudable, but in an interconnected world there are sure to be dangerous consequences to the pursuit of entirely "unhindered" U.S. operations in space. Specifically, other nations will also have a license to pursue "unhindered" operations in space, presenting the United States with grave military threats in the future. n34 Even now, China sees the U.S. operations as a direct threat and tensions between the two countries will increase as the United States goes down this unilateral path. n35 Ultimately, the current policy of simply flouting the positions of other world powers will come back to haunt the United States.>

# China Militarization DA Link—space weapons

**Increased space weapons increase risk of space arms race**

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

*(*Deploying space-based weapons may be interpreted by other states as an attempt to establish space hegemon*y.*[47](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn47) Such an interpretation is no exaggeration in the light of the US Space Policy 2006 which speaks of “deny[ing], if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests”.[48](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn48) Denying other states access to outer space could only be justified by acts necessary for self-defence. *In* time of peace a state’s deployment of space-based weapons would justify others doing the same. If others are denied the possibility of following suit, it would be contrary to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which allows free exploration and use “without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law”.[49](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn49))

# China Space Militarization Da Link—US Action on Asteriods

**Hsu, Space.com staff writer, 2009**

(Jeremy, April 28, 2009, <http://www.space.com/6624-asteroid-threat-call-space-lawyers.html>, 6-27-11, KC)

<Asteroids that might threaten Earth could pose a challenge beyond the obvious, if nations can't get their act together and figure out a unified plan of action.

There are currently no known space rocks on a collision [course](http://www.space.com/6624-asteroid-threat-call-space-lawyers.html) with Earth, but with ample evidence for past impacts, researchers say it's only a matter of time before one is found to be heading our way.

A swarm of political and legal issues bedevil any national or international response, whether it's responsibility for collateral damage from deflected asteroids or the possible outcry if one country decides to unilaterally nuke the space threat.

"The word 'unorganized' is spot on here," said Frans von der Dunk, space law expert at the [University](http://www.space.com/6624-asteroid-threat-call-space-lawyers.html) of Nebraska-Lincoln. "There is no such thing as even a platform for some level of coordination regarding possible responses — and, to be honest, some quarters very much would like it to remain that way."

Legal experts discussed such problems last week at a University of Nebraska-Lincoln conference titled "Near-Earth Objects: Risks, Responses and Opportunities-Legal Aspects." Their talks underscored how underprepared the international community is to deal with policy and legal fallout from a potential asteroid threat.

**Saving Earth vs. scaring everybody**

Many scientists have already brainstormed a variety of ways to deflect or destroy rogue asteroids, such as sending out spacecraft to nudge the space rock aside for a near-miss or simply blasting it apart. But some solutions may have different levels of appeal for various nations, especially when they involve launching potential weapons into space.

For instance, international concern surrounded a U.S. shoot-down of a failing satellite last year, not to mention China's 2007 knockout of its own aging weather satellite with a ballistic missile. Both cases raised worries about the demonstration of potential missile defense systems or satellite-killer technologies.

"The international political reactions to the U.S. shooting down of its own satellites a year ago to prevent presumably dangerous and toxic fuel from reaching Earth only foreshadows what would happen if the U.S. would detonate nukes claiming to destroy an incoming asteroid," von der Dunk told *SPACE.com*.

Other scenarios could highlight the question of international unity. A United Nations Security Council decision on a certain asteroid response would likely shield participating nations against any liabilities for collateral damage from a failed deflection or interception attempt, if the past serves as any guide — the U.S. and other coalition nations that kicked Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 were not held responsible for damages to Iraq under Security Council mandate.>

# China Space Militarization DA Link—BMD

**space based interceptors freak out risks Chinese preemptive strike**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<If the United States starts to deploy space-based interceptors that can shoot down ICBMs, China will face enormous internal pressure to at least consider the idea of launching a massive nuclear first strike. n62 This is because once a robust space-based interceptor system is deployed, the United States would have essentially unlimited power to dictate terms to China on any matter it chooses--China would be at the absolute mercy of the United States. n63 China would have a limited window of time in which to use its ICBMs before they became worthless in the face of orbiting interceptors, and it could very well feel compelled to do so in order to avoid the total collapse of its strategic nuclear deterrent.> n64

# China Space Militarization DA Link—space weaponization

**Link-space weaponization risk Chinese backlash**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<Some conservatives in the United States have argued strongly for the further development of space weapons. n146 They claim that "a powerful and influential United States is good for world peace, stability, and enforcing the rule of law internationally," n147 and that therefore American space weapons **[\*154]** development will actually serve to increase global stability, rather than decrease it. n148 This argument seems to assume that the United States is so much more powerful than all other nations that it does not really need to worry about how they will react to a space weapons deployment--if China and Russia resent American military action in space, they will need to keep their opinions to themselves due to fear of overwhelming American military superiority. However, as has been discussed above, n149 the deployment of space weapons will not provide this sought-after military superiority--ASATs will still pose a serious threat to the much more complicated and expensive space weapons being considered for deployment. Moreover, China, Russia, and others are unlikely to submit so easily to American power, no matter how advanced the available weaponry. >n150

# \*\*\*\*China Militarization DA Impact\*\*\*\*

# China Militarization DA Impact--Debris

**Space militarization risks space debris---multiple catastrophic results**

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

<Environmental concerns have played an important role in some arms control negotiations, such as the Antarctic Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty. One of the underlying philosophies of not militarizing Antarctica is that the benefits in terms of peaceful uses, in particular scientific research, outweigh the narrow benefit gained through militarization.[30](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn30) Military activities could easily damage the fragile ecosystem and bring to an end the prospect of scientific research or harm the region’s intrinsic value as a world park. Similarly, one of the concerns behind the prohibition of nuclear tests in outer space is the harmful effects of electro-magnetic pulse radiation on spacecraft.*[31](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn31)* With regard to space weaponization, many more debates have taken place over inter-state strategic trade-offs than over the cooperative interest of avoiding a disaster arising from orbital debris. Today around 21,000 orbiting debris larger than 10 cm in diameter are tracked; and it is estimated there are over 100,000 pieces larger than a marble. Debris in orbits higher than about 800 km above the Earth’s surface will be up there for decades, above 1000 km for centuries, and above 1500 km effectively forever.[32](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn32) Therefore, the amount of orbital debris is unlikely to decrease by natural degradation unless technology development enables us to dispose of it. Space debris moves at an extremely high speed of 27,000 km per hour; even tiny pieces can cause destruction to a satellite.[33](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn33) This danger will be exacerbated as the Earth orbits become increasingly crowded. In addition, there is also a high risk of a chain reaction of destruction, the so-called “Kessler Syndrome”,[34](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn34) in which, if a collision does occur, the resulting fragments become an additional collision risk. The deployment of space-based weapons would generate great quantities of space debris just during the initial deployment and far more if they are used.[35](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn35) Testing of ASATs would further increase the amount. In the event of a real “space war”, the Earth orbits could be veiled by debris clouds, making them no-go areas and jeopardizing the possibility of space exploitation. A conservative estimate shows that a modest space war involving destruction of 30 satellites would increase the level of space debris by almost a factor of four, while a larger one involving destruction of 100 satellites would increase it by 1250%, excluding Kessler Syndrome effects.[36](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn36) The space industry was projected to exceed $150 billion per year in revenues by 2010,[37](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn37) yet even this figure may not fully display humanity’s heavy reliance on space technologies for daily life. If the Earth orbits were to become too inhospitable for satellites, the global economy would collapse and human society would step back in time several decades. Meanwhile, although it is possible to distinguish enemy satellites from neutral ones, collateral damage may be caused to the in-orbit or on-Earth properties of neutral states. The belligerent states would be liable, jointly or severally, to the third state.[38](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn38))

# China Space Militarization DA Impact--ASATs cause space debris

**Space militarization and asat explosions increase space debris**

**Tellis ‘07**

[Senior adviser for Department of Defense, 2011, Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space Strategy, September 1, 2007, [**http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752**](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752), 6-23-11, Rg]

In the predawn darkness of 11 January 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile lifted off from a launch site at the Xichang space facility in Sichuanprovince. Fired from a mobile transporter-erector-launcher, the new two-stage,solid-fuelled missile – designated the SC-19 by the US intelligence community– carried a kinetic kill vehicle that slammed several minutes later into an ageingChinese weather satellite deployed in low Earth orbit at an altitude of some864 kilometres. Since the satellite, the *Fengyun-*1C (FY-1C), was heading southat the time of its intercept, and since the azimuth from the interceptor launchpoint to the target was approximately 346◦, the attack involved a virtual head-on

collision at extremely high velocity with thousands of blast fragments ejectedat speeds of up to some 2,253km per hour into various orbits ranging from3,800km to 200km in altitude.1 As of 30 May 2007, over 1,736 objects of trackabledebris, each at least 10cm in diameter, had been catalogued and monitored. AndNASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office has estimated that the explosion produced more than 35,000 shards larger than 1cm, justifying the judgement that this test was undoubtedly the ‘worst single debris event ever since it instantaneously produced a 10% increase in the 50-year total of space artefacts capable of threatening spacecraft flying in low Earth orbits.

**Space Debris causes technology collapse and societal collapse**

**Horvath 3**

[ John Horvath: TP, Apocalypse Soon? 9-29-2003, http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/15/15747/1.html]

Not only this, but as with electricity and our insatiable thirst for energy, the mere dynamics of technological expansion is a major contributor to the problem. Satellites play an increasingly crucial role in transmitting information around the planet, with space becoming an essential part of telecommunication infrastructure. Over the last few years, a number of problems have started to emerge whose cause is loosely termed "space debris". Much of this man-made: the remnants of rockets, satellites, and space stations. Some of the problems, however, are also of natural origin: meteors and solar radiation, for instance. In fact, ESA (European Space Agency) and NASA scientists have warned that the earth is about to face a decade long galactic dust storm (cf. www.cordis.lu; record control number 20688). They estimate that the amount of galactic dust entering the solar system is three times higher than during the 1990s. It's believed that the sun could be responsible for the increase, which threatens to play havoc with our space-borne machinery. Already accidents have started to occur. In May 1988, a satellite operated by PanAmSat spun out of control because of "sky static". Pager traffic was wiped out, credit card transactions halted, and media stations (TV and radio) were knocked off the air. In 1997 AT&T's Telstar 401 satellite was destroyed, knocking out thousands of television sets and telephones. In light of the impressive catalog of minor disasters which have thus far occurred, some (like Antony Milne in his book "Sky Static: The Space Debris Crisis") conclude that it's inevitable that eventually something catastrophic will occur. But we don't have to look so high in the sky for such catastrophes: a more down to earth example, like the ice storm which hit eastern Canada in 1999, did an impressive job in crippling all aspects of social life: both on-line and off. While accidents do happen, it's another story altogether when the scale of these accidents are exacerbated by negligence and even ignorance, coupled with an interdependence which turns a local problem into a regional, national, or even an international one. When all this is combined with the fact that western society has prematurely put most of its vital functions in terms of commerce, bureaucracy, and even access to basic information on weak and dilapidated energy and communications network infrastructures, it's a recipe for disaster.

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—ASATS bad

**ASATs cause preemptive strike with U.S. and China**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<The ASATs that already exist are quite capable of destroying the orbiting space-based weapons of the future. n39 This is the fundamental problem with the strategic logic behind the development of kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers--they pack an amazing offensive punch, but can be destroyed extremely easily. n40 As long as both China and the United States have ASATs only, there is strategic stability. If either country used ASATs in anger against the other's satellites, the other could retaliate in kind. n41 On the other hand, once space-based weapons are deployed, the situation changes dramatically. n42 As soon as a conflict begins, an adversary equipped with ASATs would use them to destroy the enemy's spaced-based weapons (as well as other critical satellites). n43 Therefore, in order to be effective, space-based weapons would need to be used first, in a massive surprise attack. n44 This is extremely destabilizing logic. n45 As tensions rise between two countries, each would have a huge incentive to strike first--one to use space-based weapons before they could be destroyed, the other to use ASATs to destroy the space-based weapons before they could be used. n46 Unlike the situation in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War of the twentieth century, there is no guarantee of mutually assured destruction to prevent the onset of conflict. n47 Whoever strikes first gains an enormous advantage.

Given this reality, spaced-based weapons are not a wise investment. n48 A robust deployment of kinetic kill vehicles alone would have costs in the **[\*139]** hundreds of billions of dollars, n49 but these weapons could be neutralized by ASATs costing several orders of magnitude less. n50 Any country contemplating extensive development of these weapons should take this into account. n51 Other weapon systems may very well cost less and be much more effective in the long run.>

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—ASATS bad

**Impacts—ASATs leads to terrorist or rogue state destruction of US dominance**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<While the United States, China, and perhaps Russia are the only countries on earth with any likelihood of developing space-based weapons in the first half of the twenty-first century, n52 ASATs could easily find their way into the hands of rogue states and even non-state actors. As noted, they are orders of magnitude less expensive than space-based weapons and do not require nearly the same level of technical expertise to deploy and use effectively. n53 A terrorist organization or rogue state could destroy American satellites--including multi-billion dollar weapons systems--with ASATs costing only a few million dollars. This threat from smaller adversaries is another reason to forego the extreme expense and risk involved in full-scale development and deployment of space-based weapons.>

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—ASATS bad

**ASATS decrease US nuclear deterrent risks instability**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< In addition to the strategic interplay between space-based weapons and ASATs discussed above, n54 space-based weapons would have a major impact on the effectiveness of ICBMs, n55 the mainstay weapons of the second half of the twentieth century. ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads have been the primary guarantor of mutually assured destruction since their inception in the 1960s--any use of ICBMs against another country also equipped with them would lead to massive retaliation in kind. n56 The threat of mutual annihilation kept the peace between the superpowers during the Cold War and has continued to preserve stability among powerful nations up to the present day. n57 Even in today's so-called "uni-polar" world, Russia and China maintain vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction that serve as **[\*140]** a strong deterrent to any potential adversary considering an attack. n58 Unfortunately, with the development of space-based weapons, especially missile interceptors, this stability would be eviscerated. n59 Space-based interceptors would be accurate and fast enough to reliably shoot down ICBMs in flight. n60 If one country possessed space-based interceptors, it would effectively neutralize the ICBMs of all other countries, allowing it to use its own ICBMs with relative impunity.> n61

# China Militarization DA Impact—arms race

China space mil risks SPACE RACE with JAPAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA

Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008(Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, Central Defense Institute Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database)

<Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations, including one of China's regional rivals, India, may feel compelled to seek offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. The U.S. trade journal Defense News, for instance, quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kinetic-energy (nonexplosive, hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons. If India goes down that path, its archrival Pakistan will probably follow suit. Like India, Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system. Even Japan, the third major Asian power, might join such a space race. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a bill backed by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for "military and national security" purposes. As for Russia, in the wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscow's stance against the weaponization of space. At the same time, though, he refused to criticize Beijing's actions and blamed the U.S. instead. The American efforts to build a missile defense system, Putin charged, and the increasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were prompting China's moves. Yet Russia itself, as a major spacefaring power that has incorporated satellites into its national security structure, would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space.)

# China Space Militarization DA Impact: Rods from Gods

**Rods from gods development sparks arms race**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< **[\*136]** One of the most widely discussed possibilities for the near future is the so-called "rods from God." n19 These are tungsten rods twenty feet in length and one foot in diameter that could hit a target anywhere on earth at 36,000 feet per second with about fifteen minutes notice. n20 Such a weapon would obviously be extraordinarily threatening to any potential adversary, and there would be a huge incentive to develop methods of countering the threat. n21 In other words, there would be a new and terrifying arms race--each country would feel the need to develop its own weapons program in order not to be completely outmatched by its potential adversaries.>

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—Russia and China Alliance

**US space weapons gets China and Russia alliance.**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<Even though Russia is now much weaker than the Soviet Union of the Cold War era, n65 it still has thousands of ICBMs, n66 and the United States should carefully consider the ramifications of its planned space weapons deployment in light of that reality. n67 Russia's opinion cannot be ignored. n68 While it may not be capable of effectively deploying space-based weapons in the near to mid-term, it may well have an operational ASAT capability n69 and, in any case, its ICBMs demand respect. n70 Like China, Russia depends **[\*141]** on its ICBM capability to maintain its international respect. By being able to threaten any potential adversary with nuclear annihilation, Russia maintains its strength and independence in a changing world. n71 Also like China, Russia is understandably worried about the American pursuit of space weapons, which have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of ICBMs. n72Russia has long been a strategic player in the space weapons arena. In the late 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into negotiations on an ASAT ban, but the discussions fell apart before any agreement was reached. n73 Ever since, the Soviet Union (later Russia) has been wary of American plans to deploy any kind of weapon in space or further pursue ASAT capabilities. n74 The Strategic Defense Initiative under the Reagan administration--a predecessor to twenty-first century American space weapons programs--arguably hastened the collapse of the Iron Curtain. n75 The actual deployment of satellite-based weapons in the coming decades is sure to inflame Russia and drive it further away from the United States. If Russia moves away from the United States, it will move towards China. n76 Now that China has taken the geopolitical lead in opposing the United States--particularly with respect to space weapons development n77 --a disillusioned Russia is sure to find a strong ally in its neighbor to the east. n78 >

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—Russia and China Alliance

**Link—Space weaponization creates China-Russia alliance**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< The space weapons currently under development are extremely complex and extremely expensive devices. They are inherently vulnerable to asymmetrical attacks by much cheaper and less complex ASATs, and the strategic interplay between them, ASATs, and ICBMs will greatly increase geopolitical instability between the United States and China. Space weapons are also sure to inflame Russia and others and drive them into the welcoming arms of China. The long-term consequences for the United States of a lack of law in this area could be quite serious--China, at least, is likely to reach economic parity with the United States later in the century, and by that time it will have its own offensive space weapons capability.>

# China Space Militarization DA Impact—US hegemony

**space weaponization bad despite US dominance, weaponization challenges US position**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< International law has served the world well in a number of important contexts, most notably at sea n104 and in the general field of arms control. n105 Wherever international law is applied successfully, relative anarchy turns into relative peace and security; n106 just as all individuals benefit from the rule of law in a given nation, all nations benefit from the rule of law in the international context. Now, in the 21st century, these lessons must be applied to space.

The development of space law is analogous to the growth of the law of the sea from the Mare Clausum ideas of the 17th century, through the **[\*146]** "freedom of the seas" of the 19th century, to the 1982 UNCLOS III treaty. n107 Mare Clausum, or "closed seas," involved the idea that each country had the right to claim as much of the ocean for itself as it could--the more powerful the navy, the wider the sovereignty. n108 This worked reasonably well for 200 years, but with the coming of the industrial revolution, the dominant sea power--Great Britain--found that its interests would be much better served by "freedom of the seas." n109 Britain would be better off if it could sail the globe unhindered by the territorial claims of other nations, even if this meant that it had to give up its own territorial claims to parts of the oceans where it had the ability to exert control by brute force. n110 Britain was still the dominant sea power for another century after "freedom of the seas" supplanted Mare Clausum, and even though it did have to give up its claims to actual sovereignty at sea, its navy was as strong as ever and it prospered greatly during this period. n111 Eventually, however, "freedom of the seas" itself became obsolete and unmanageable as more and more nations began to assert themselves at sea and interfere, directly or indirectly, with the freedom of other nations. n112 The solution was international law, as embodied in the UNCLOS III treaty. n113

Like Britain in the 19th century with respect to the oceans, the United States in the 21st century sees the idea of "freedom" as the perfect legal regime for space. No country "owns" space--there is no Mare Clausum in space--but every country has the right to use its power however it sees fit in order to exploit its interests there. In every conventional sense, the United States is the dominant world power of the early 21st century. But unfortunately, as was demonstrated on September 11, 2001, conventional power does not guarantee security in today's world. This vulnerability is even more apparent in space. While the United States is indeed capable of unilaterally extending its military presence into space via the deployment of satellite-based weapons, these multi-billion dollar devices are inherently vulnerable to attack from relatively cheap and unsophisticated ASATs based on Earth. A determined enemy would be able to cripple any potential United States space weapon systems, and an ability to cripple satellite-based weapons implies an ability to cripple any other satellites--including military reconnaissance satellites currently in use by the United States. Before **[\*147]** opening this Pandora's box of satellite-based weapons, the United States should consider the downsides of discarding the "gentleman's agreement" against space weaponization that has prevailed for decades. n114

# \*\*\*China Militarization DA 2NC Answer to Answer blocks\*\*\*

# AT “We stop China from being evil”

**China pursuing space policy to deter US---would attack early in the process**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

All of these efforts suggest that, in the event of a Sino-American confrontation, the PLA would seek to engage American space systems early in the crisis. This would deny American forces the ability to establish information dominance (*zhi xinxi quan*), that all-aspect understanding of an opponent’s forces, deployments, and capabilities. As important, it would also disrupt the coordination of American forces, including not only widely dispersed combat forces, but also the essential combat support elements that would sustain U.S. operations. PLA writings also suggest that there may be demonstrations of anti-space capabilities, the conduct of space exercises, redeployment and reinforcement of space assets, and most worrisome, actual use of space weapons, in order to deter and dissuade the United States from intervening. The very possession of an effective space warfare capability, PLA writings note, allows China to effect space deterrence.

Two aspects of space deterrence should be especially noted. In the first place, such measures almost certainly would not occur in isolation, but would be part of a larger pattern of activities, involving not only the full range of the PLA but all the assets, economic, diplomatic, political, cyber, available to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And many of these measures, especially ASAT tests and the conduct of space war games, may be occurring months or even years in advance, so as to influence U.S. decision-making far in advance of any actual outbreak of hostilities.

# AT China won’t militarize--interests

Even if China knows it is not in its interest to militarize, if hand is forced, China will---increased risk of first strike

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

<Developing space-based weapons is believed to be US official policy as part of its missile defence project.[18](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn18) The envisaged capability is to detect and intercept missiles, preferably in the boost phase. This may be interpreted by others as an effort to immunize the USA against MAD, because missile defence could neutralize Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear weapons carried thereon. Enormous consequences would thereby be incurred. *(First,* deployment of space-based weapons by a state would be highly likely to set off a space arms race. Other states in the “space club” may not be willing to accept the USA as the sole country possessing space-based weapons, and choose to follow suit. But since developing space-based weapons is an extremely expensive task, exacerbated by the huge sums of money needed for maintenance and modernization of the large number of space-based assets required in order to be effective,[19](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn19) the more appealing scenario would be to develop ground-based ASATs, an effective, cheaper and less high-tech countermeasure. China is more likely to limit its number and quality of space weapons, if necessary, to the capacity of acting as an effective defence mechanism.[20](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn20) This balance is a more credible option because, on the one hand, China does not have the ambition or ability to enter into a drawn-out space weapons race; on the other hand, neither does it want to place its national security at the mercy of others. The primary concern when such a space race happens is that both conventional weapons in outer space and ground-based ASATs could become real-use weapons and there is an incentive to strike first, because, unlike nuclear weapons these can be applied selectively and discriminately. The situation would worsen as more states acquired an ASAT capability.)

# AT “space competition good for US”

**Space Mil would be incredibly cost and time ineffective**

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

<Effectiveness probably plays as big a part in policy making as legitimacy does. The USA is more likely to abandon space-based weapons if they are seen to be unable to fulfil the tasks perceived for them. As discussed by one of its State Department officials, national security is the highest responsibility of a government, and each nation must decide on the elements of its security policy; arms control and disarmament are not ends in themselves but tools to enhance security.[50](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn50) In fact, the USA, as the country most dependent on satellites for commercial and military purposes, has the most to lose if it deploys weapons in space. Such an act would legitimatize and encourage other states to develop, test and even deploy increasingly advanced ASATs. Satellites, even space-based weapons, have inherent vulnerabilities because of their predictable orbits and weak capacity to protect themselves. Ground-based ASATs, by contrast, have the advantages of low cost, modest technical requirements, mobility, rapid speed, etc. They could be overwhelmingly superior if laser technologies are ripe for the purpose. Although ASAT lasers are still not available, they will soon become a reality if they are not banned. As Krepon predicts, “any other spacefaring nation that wished to spend the money would not be far from developing those kinds of capabilities”.[51](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn51)*)*

# AT “our time frame is quicker”

**Uniqueness : US China space relations at a crossroads—now focused on competition China wants to be powerful, finally has medium to do it** **Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008**

(Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST)

<Nearly 40 years later, **China finds itself** again **dealing with a restive and nationalistic populace**, struggling to maintain economic growth, and restrained by technological embargo. On the sidelines, the American superpower is again weighing the mandates of confrontation versus engagement, except this time the mandate lies in the heavens.**In Washington's space security community the debate has coalesced around the question of whether the future of Sino-US relations in space should more closely resemble arms control or an arms race**—illustrated by the intercepts and destruction of satellites by both nations a year apart. Whatever direction Washington and Beijing take in their nascent military space competition is certain to be followed by other major and emerging space powers. Unfortunately, **the existing trend in both nations is for promoting an offensive space strategy aimed primarily at one another**. With a new US administration, whichever candidate enters office will face the challenge of finding viable alternatives to the anti-satellite arms race that lies at the end of the present course, an outcome that would be in neither party's interest. The incoming president might avoid such a security dilemma with China by utilizing the full range of US soft power, backed by realistic hard power consequences. This will require the incoming administration to expand its understanding of what constitutes a space issue, and to develop a deeper knowledge of what motivates China's leadership. Using both persuasion and dissuasion to craft a kind of “grand bargain” with China regarding space, the next president may be able to steer Sino-US competition toward trade, economics and sport, rather than military one-upmanship. Accomplishing this would strengthen US national security and international stability in the Pacific region.)

# AT “China can’t expand enough to be a threat”

**Reality doesn’t matter only perception does---nationalism and Chinese perception of power risks conflict with the US**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

But many Chinese do not see the world this way. They believe that the recession of 2008 represented a shift in the balance of world power, and that China should be less deferential to a declining United States. This overconfident power assessment has contributed to a more assertive Chinese foreign policy in the last two years. The shift in perceptions seems to have emboldened the Chinese government, even though the judgement is wrong.

For years, China followed the advice of Deng Xiaoping to keep a low profile. However, with its successful economic recovery from the recession and 10 per cent growth rate, China passed Japan as the world's second-largest economy last year, and many in China pressed for a stronger foreign policy. Some blame this on President Hu Jintao, but that view is too simple. The top leaders still want to follow Deng's strategy of not rocking the boat, but they feel pressured from below by rising nationalism, both in the bureaucracy and the blogosphere.

# \*\*Affirmative Answers—China Militarization DA\*\*\*\*

# No impact– No Chinese space militarization

**No impact– China not pursuing space militarization**

**Krepon co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia, and the author of *Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb* 2008**

(Michael, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

< Ashley Tellis is a formidable intellect and prodigious author. What he writes matters, so I applaud the editors of *Survival* for publishing his provocative essay, ‘China’s Military Space Strategy’, and for soliciting comments and rebuttals. Tellis’s logic train related to China’s military space programme may be summarised as follows: (1) Anti-satellite (ASAT) programmes are driven by national interest and ‘rooted in strategic necessity’. (2) Therefore, they have internal logic and essential coherence. (3) Consequently, threats to space assets will necessarily grow, especially to nullify US warfighting advantages. (4) It follows that arms-control solutions to this threat are fatuous. (5) Ergo, national security dictates the need ‘to run an offence–defence arms race in space, and win’.

There are several aspects of this logic train that are especially worthy of comment. First, this progression is, indeed, logical and internally consistent. Secondly, this logic train actualizes itself: if US leaders were to accept Tellis’s argument, they would implement his recommendations, including developing ‘offensive counterspace capabilities’ (a euphemism for ASATs) which, he asserts, ‘will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-satellite weaponry and to hold at risk’ Chinese satellites. Implementing Tellis’s recommendations would, in turn, ensure the threatening behaviour elsewhere that requires Tellis’s proposed remedies. Here Tellis would no doubt point us back to his first proposition – that Beijing will follow the dictates of national security, regardless of US actions. His logic is impeccably circular and self-reinforcing. National security calculations, however, tend to be more complex than circular. China’s national interests could prompt a wide range of actions, since Beijing’s equities in space and its dealings with the United States are multi-dimensional. When these factors are rolled into the equation, Tellis’s logic train breaks down. Given the opaqueness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tellis necessarily draws many inferences to assemble his argument. Because the Pentagon is far more transparent than the PLA, fewer inferences are required for Chinese (and Russian) analysts to arrive at Tellis’s same exact conclusions when evaluating US military space policy. For example, the ‘U.S. Air Force Space Command’s Strategic Master Plan for Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond’ states that: Our charter is to rapidly obtain and maintain space superiority and the space, nuclear, and conventional strike capabilities that produce desired warfighting effects. This requires a fundamental shift in our thinking. Instead of focusing on the force enhancement role of our space systems and the deterrence role of our nuclear and conventional forces, we must also pursue the ability to apply conventional combat in, from, and through space. China’s Military Space Strategy: An Exchange | 159 This guidance is entirely consistent with the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by Secretary of Defense-designate Donald Rumsfeld, which called for US ‘power projection in, from and through space’. If the PLA and its Second Artillery Corps are on the same wavelength as space-warfighting advocates in the US Air Force and Donald Rumsfeld, does this mean that power projection in space will evolve as Tellis regrettably suggests? The experience of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War points to a very different conclusion. Back then, many serious military strategists in Moscow and Washington accepted without question Tellis’s logic train. Many citations from Soviet military doctrine could be found to support this hard-bitten analysis, which perhaps reached its apotheosis in the annual series of Pentagon publications, *Soviet Military Power*, issued during the Reagan administration. The 1987 edition estimated that the Kremlin spent almost $80 billion on military space programmes over the previous decade. These and other dire warnings of space warfare were highly exaggerated, but they weren’t made up out of thin air. The Soviet Union, like the United States, had the means to seriously damage or destroy satellites. The Kremlin carried out 20 ASAT tests during the Cold War, nine of which were believed to be successful. Each of the nuclear-tipped missile-defence interceptors around Moscow could (and still can) be used as an indiscriminate satellite killer, as could the many hundreds of medium-, intermediate- and intercontinentalrange ballistic missiles possessed by the Soviet Union. The USSR possessed a space-related infrastructure that dwarfs that of China today, including the hit-to-kill (albeit a different method than the one utilised by the PLA), electronic, and directed-energy warfare capabilities that China possesses. Oddly, Tellis asserts that, on the basis of what he describes as three failed and one successful test, ‘Chinese space denial programmes exceed those pursued by Moscow at the height of the Cold War in diversity, depth and comprehensiveness’. This assertion seems rather exaggerated. Joan JohnsonFreese estimates Chinese space spending at between $1.4–2.2bn annually. )

Tellis even suggests, citing one exegesis of Chinese military doctrine, that Beijing may be seeking space dominance. 160 | Forum If so many influential US and Soviet military and strategic analysts subscribed to Tellis’s logic train, why did the superpowers exercise such uncommon restraint in pursuing anti-satellite weapons? Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the USSR tested ASATs a grand total of 53 times. To some, this may seem like a large number, but it pales in comparison to over 1,700 nuclear tests (on average, one per week from the Cuban missile crisis to the fall of the Berlin Wall), and the tens of ballistic missile flight tests conducted annually during these harrowing years. When many hundreds, and then thousands of nuclear weapons were deployed and ready for prompt launch, only a very few, rudimentary ASATs were considered deployed, and only then for brief periods. Tellis, who agrees that the heightened superpower competition did not extend into space, explains this as a natural consequence of a bipolar competition between two states whose huge nuclear arsenals were intimately connected to satellites. To attack satellites upon which both relied for intelligence, targeting, communication, early warning and military-related weather forecasting would invite uncontrolled escalation across the nuclear threshold. For just this reason, and to assist treaty monitoring, Washington and Moscow pledged not to interfere with each other’s ‘national technical means’ of monitoring compliance – agreements that one or both capitals have tossed, or are now threatening to toss, overboard.

# No impact—no Chinese ASATs

**No impact—China lacks tech to fully use ASATS**

Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database st) <According to assessments by U.S. military and intelligence officials as well as by independent experts, the Chinese probably destroyed their weather satellite with a kinetic-energy vehicle boosted by a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile. Technologically, launching such direct-ascent antisatellite weapons is one of the simplest ways to take out a satellite [see box at right]. About a dozen nations and consortia can reach low Earth orbit (between roughly 100 and 2,000 kilometers, or 60 to 1,250 miles, high) with a medium-range missile; eight of those countries can reach geostationary orbit (about 36,000 kilometers, or 22,000 miles, above Earth). But the real technical hurdle to making a hit-to-kill vehicle is not launch capacity; it is the precision maneuverability and guidance technology needed to steer the vehicle into its target. Just how well China has mastered those techniques is unclear. Because the weather satellite was still operating when it was destroyed, the Chinese operators would have known its exact location at all times.>

# No impact: No Chinese aggressive space policy

**No impact: China won’t pursue aggressive space policy—multiple strategic factors**

**Hagt director of the China Program at the World Security Institute and is editor of China Security Quarterly 2008** (Eric, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<Ashley Tellis weaves a compelling argument of China’s counterspace strategy and its implications for space arms control. His logic rests on two principle elements. ‘China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities … is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies … but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States.’ This underpins Tellis’s conclusion that ‘Washington should not invest time, energy and resources in attempting to negotiate space-control arrangements ... Such regimes are destined to be stillborn because the larger strategic logic conspires against them.’ In other words, the pursuit of a space arms-control regime is futile, even harmful to US interests, because China’s strategy to challenge American space dominance is unyielding to anything the United States can do.

Both pillars of Tellis’s rationale are problematic. A comprehensive assessment of China’s strategic aims does not confirm such an inflexible posture. Rather, his assumptions about China’s strategy are far-reaching and worstcase scenarios, most of which are speculative and contradict considerable evidence. The United States, as he repeatedly points out, is an important driver of China’s strategic posture. As such, there are a number of measures the United States can indeed explore to positively alter the security dilemma in space. It is important to understand the core assumption underpinning all of Tellis’s analysis, which is related to but goes beyond the issue of space. That is, his overarching judgement that China is seeking to construct a ‘Sinocentric order in Asia and perhaps globally’. And since the ‘United States, and its superior military power, remains the biggest objective constraint on China’s ability to secure its own political interests’, China will not only challenge the United States in immediate concerns over Taiwan, but will rival US hegemony, particularly in military terms. How does Tellis know Beijing is committed to such an expansive military strategy or will challenge US military dominance? The evidence is inconclusive at best. China’s policies do not state such goals, but to avoid the debate over their reliability, let us leave government rhetoric aside. Chinese analysts, on balance, certainly argue against this paradigm and the US scholarly community is divided over the validity of such assumptions. That leaves individual interpretation of China’s strategic calculations; Tellis’s is imbued with a highly realist zero-sum framework. He cites the military component of China’s strategic interests as being ‘preventive’, ‘protective’ and ‘defensive’ in nature. Though these terms are fairly accurate, they only support the claim applied to specifically defined goals, which he concurs are, in the near term, ‘to defeat any US expeditionary force that might be committed in support of [Taiwan]’. From this point, however, he moves to a far more expansive strategy: ‘the capabilities thus obtained are intended to mutate gracefully into servicing other, more ambitious geostrategic aims’. In this way Tellis subtly, though assertively, leaps from ascribing to China a defensive posture to one that seeks to challenge and even rival US military power. The literature is not nearly so definitive. Such theorising of China’s strategic intent is highly speculative. Tellis uses a number of examples of American–Soviet competition to support his thesis that China will inevitably seek to confront US military dominance. Meanwhile, he declines to entertain the notion that China’s incentives and actions vis-à-vis the United States may be shaped by strategic values and interests outside his framework. In fact, China’s strategic considerations toward the United States are influenced and constrained by factors beyond a direct militarily antagonistic relationship. They range from China’s profound domestic development challenges; its precarious geopolitical relations with regional players; and its deep dependence on global commercial and energy markets. China also has a unique set of historical experiences (colonialism, foreign occupation, border wars) as well as the lessons learned from current events, not the least of which is the US quagmire in Iraq. These point to conditions for China and an international environment significantly different than were extant during the Cold War.>

# No impact—China soft power checks

**No impact—China soft power constrains needs for use of space for hard power**

**Hagt director of the China Program at the World Security Institute and is editor of China Security**

**Quarterly 2008** (Eric, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<Even if one assumes that some form of challenge to US hegemony is inevitable, China has a growing kit of tools at its disposal to wield nonmilitary influence. China now has clout in financial, trade and even softpower terms, all of which could bring to bear considerable economic and political pressure on a potential adversary or strategic competitor. This is not to suggest China would forgo its military options in a conflict with the United States. But it should, at the very least, give pause to consider alternative strategic modalities by China. Tellis doesn’t mention any of these, much less figure them into China’s counterspace strategy. Tellis brings that strategy within his broader framework of China’s goals to challenge and rival the United States. China’s best shot at accomplishing these expansive strategic goals, Tellis writes, is to have a ‘riposte against [America’s] Achilles heel’, its space dominance. >

# No impact : No China US war—US military dominance deters

**No impact : No China US war—US military dominance deters**

**Hagt director of the China Program at the World Security Institute and is editor of China Security**

**Quarterly 2008** (Eric, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<Tellis overstates both China’s ability and its incentives to use space in a conflict with the United States. He draws the analogy of Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States: ‘neither side had an incentive to attack the other’s space systems, even though both developed modest instruments for this purpose, because the costs to each individually far outweighed the benefits’. The unstated implication is that China does have the incentive to attack America’s disproportionately vulnerable space assets. He is partly right; the United States is arguably now more vulnerable to asymmetric ASAT weapons that China could employ. But concluding that China has the incentive to act on this advantage removes the ‘battle’ of space out of the context of the larger conflict that such a battle would either be a part of, or would most probably escalate to. It wrongly isolates space from the US capabilities that could be brought to bear on a much inferior China in the dynamic of any military conflict. The United States has overwhelming military superiority over China. Besides vastly outnumbering China’s conventional and nuclear forces, other key elements include the dramatic advantage the United States has accrued in the past decade in precision-strike conventional weapons. These may even be capable of taking out even hardened nuclear silos in certain circumstances, thus comprising a new threat to China’s nuclear deterrence.1 There is also the developing US multi-layered missile defence system with boost-phase components based in space that threaten China’s missile force. Even considering space alone, US capabilities and programmes far exceed those of China: for example micro- or nanosatellites, such as the XSS-10, XSS-11, DART, MiTex, *Orbital Express* and the new DARPA TICS and F6 programmes. There are also laser weapons: MIRACL, the ABL and its COIL, various solid-state HEL and FEL programmes, and the *Starfire* adaptive optics range, all of which have powerful ASAT capabilities. All this means that even if the United States is currently vulnerable in space, China would have little incentive to attack American space assets because the risk of escalation to generalised conflict – a conflict China would have no chance of winning – is far too great, as Tellis admits. Failing to incorporate this into China’s strategic calculus leads to a narrow reading of what China is capable of, to say nothing of what its intentions may be. China’s own investment and interests in commercial and civilian space are also rapidly increasing, serving as a further check on any bellicose use of space.>

# No space militarization—infeasible

SPACE MILITARIZATION IMPRACTICAL, EXSPENSIVE

Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008(Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database)

(What, then, is holding the U.S. (and other nations) back from a full-bore pursuit of space weapons? The countervailing pressures are threefold: political opposition, technological challenges and high costs. The American body politic is deeply divided over the wisdom of making space warfare a part of the national military strategy. The risks are manifold. I remarked earlier on the general instabilities of an arms race, but there is a further issue of stability among the nuclear powers. Early-warning and spy satellites have traditionally played a crucial role in reducing fears of a surprise nuclear attack. But if antisatellite weapons disabled those eyes-in-the-sky, the resulting uncertainty and distrust could rapidly lead to catastrophe. One of the most serious technological challenges posed by space weapons is the proliferation of space debris, to which I alluded earlier. According to investigators at the air force, NASA and Celestrak (an independent space-monitoring Web site), the Chinese antisatellite test left more than 2,000 pieces of junk, baseball-size and larger, orbiting the globe in a cloud that lies between about 200 kilometers (125 miles) and 4,000 kilometers (2,500miles) above Earth's surface. Perhaps another 150,000 objects that are a centimeter (half an inch) across and larger were released. High orbital velocities make even tiny pieces of space junk dangerous to spacecraft of all kinds. And ground stations cannot reliably monitor or track objects smaller than about five centimeters (two inches) across in low Earth orbit (around a meter in geostationary orbit), a capability that might enable satellites to maneuver out of the way. To avoid being damaged by the Chinese space debris, in fact, two U.S. satellites had to alter course. Any shooting war in space would raise the specter of a polluted space environment no longer navigable by Earth-orbiting satellites. Basing weapons in orbit also presents difficult technical obstacles. They would be just as vulnerable as satellites are to all kinds of outside agents: space debris, projectiles, electromagnetic signals, even natural micrometeoroids. Shielding space weapons against such threats would also be impractical, mostly because shielding is bulky and adds mass, thereby greatly increasing launch costs. Orbital weapons would be mostly autonomous mechanisms, which would make operational errors and failures likely. The paths of objects in orbit are relatively easy to predict, which would make hiding large weapons problematic. And because satellites in low Earth orbit are overhead for only a few, minutes at a time, keeping one of them constantly in range would require many weapons. Finally, getting into space and operating there is extremely expensive: between $2,000 and $10,000 a pound to reach low Earth orbit and between $15,000 and $20,000 a pound for geostationary orbit. Each space-based weapon would require replacement every seven to 15 years, and in-orbit repairs would not be cheap, either.)>

# No impact No “rods from gods” impact

**No impact—no “rods from gods”** **possible**

Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database st)

<Though not by definition a space weapon, the Pentagon's Common Aero Vehicle/Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (often called CAV) enters into this discussion because, like an ICBM, it would travel through space to strike Earth-bound targets [see top box on next page]. An unpowered but highly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, the CAV would be deployed from a future hypersonic space plane, swoop down into the atmosphere from orbit and drop conventional bombs on ground targets. Congress recently began funding the project but, to avoid stoking a potential arms race in space, has prohibited any work to place weapons on the CAV. Although engineers are making steady progress on the key technologies for the CAV program, both the vehicle and its space plane mothership are still likely decades off. Some of the congressional sensitivity to the design of the CAV may have arisen from another, much more controversial space weapons concept with parallel goals: hypervelocity rod bundles that would be dropped to Earth from orbital platforms. For decades air force planners have been thinking about placing weapons in orbit that could strike terrestrial targets, particularly buried, "hardened" bunkers and caches of weapons of mass destruction. Commonly called "rods from God," the bundles would be made up of large tungsten rods, each as long as six meters (20 feet) and 30 centimeters (12 inches) across. Each rod would be hurled downward from an orbiting spacecraft and guided to its target at tremendous speed. Both high costs and the laws of physics, however, challenge their feasibility. Ensuring that the projectiles do not burn up or deform from reentry friction while sustaining a precise, nearly vertical flight path would be extremely difficult. Calculations indicate that the nonexplosive rods would probably be no more effective than more conventional munitions. Furthermore, the expense of lofting the heavy projectiles into orbit would be exorbitant. Thus, despite continued interest in them, rods from God seem to fall into the realm of science fiction.>

# AT Space militarization good—China evil

China has multiple incentives to not weaponize space---only will if perceive US as threat

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

<Some suspect that PPWT proponents like China are determined to develop their own space weapons, and that the proposal is merely to give them a chance of a break-through. Therefore, the USA has no choice but to run an offensive–defensive arms race, and win.[112](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn112) China’s stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985, when it first submitted a working paper to the CD introducing its position on space weapons.[113](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn113) For many, the 2007 ASAT test has cast doubt on its good will, although China has reaffirmed its commitment to the peaceful development of outer space thereafter. But the political impact may not be as negative as some think (except for the debris generated). Although it was predicted that the test would push the USA further away from the negotiation table,[114](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573" \l "fn114) what has in fact happened is that several weeks after the Chinese test the Bush administration abandoned the USA’s long-held categorical rejection of the PPWT in the CD. In any case, the USA is not going to lose its superiority in space by abandoning space weaponization. First, as discussed above, with a ban on testing, the possibility of a break-through is low. Second, that attaining space dominance is not possible is as true for other states as for the USA. Third, China is becoming increasingly dependent on space technologies for civil and passive military purposes. For instance, it is building its “Plough” navigation system which is expected to compete with the American GPS and Russia’s Glonass. Moreover, the priority given to its economic development has benefited from and still favours a peaceful international environment.>

# Non unique no US-China Cooperation Now

**US tech dominance means no incentive to cooperate with China**

Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, August 2008 (Yi Zhou, *Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics*, 6/23/11)

No single country or region has a monopoly on the ideas or technical capabilities to enable humans to live and work safely in space. The USA certainly knows that. It has been more than 30 years since Americans began to cooperate with the USSR. When such cooperation began, the USSR had strong space capabilities and experience. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Russian economy and space industry were severely short of funds. The USSR's experienced engineers and professionals, and their capabilities, could have been transferred to other countries, potentially to countries not allied with the USA. Such a development might have brought danger to the USA and the world. The USA helped Russia and helped itself at the same time by engaging in cooperation with that country, taking advantage of its rich experiences. Another example is that of Canada, which, while not in the same league as the USA (or Russia), possesses the unique technology of the robot arm that has become an important section of ISS. Today, although China has developed many technologies and capabilities, there is still no other country whose technology is more advanced than that of the USA, which is one reason why the latter lacks a compelling motivation to engage in cooperation with China.

# Non-unique-U.S. containment policy now

**U: US pursuing containment policy towards China space program**

**Kulacki, Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists., 2008**

(Gregory, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Spring 2008, ebscohost.com, 6-20-11,kc)

<The State Department has issued "guidance" on the implementation of these controls that prevents NASA, which has a broad mandate to engage other countries for the purpose of scientific collaboration and space exploration, from engaging in virtually any form of bilateral dialog or cooperation with their Chinese counterparts. The penalties for violating this guidance are so intimidating that prior to departing for the 2007 annual summer session ofthe International Space University, hosted this year by the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, NASA attendees were warned not to speak with Chinese students and faculty. NASA Administrator Michael Grifñn traveled to China in September of 2006, purportedly to try to establish a foundation for future cooperation. But his ability to engage the Chinese was severely limited, and the visit was a dismal failure. It may have even set back efforts by other public and private US organizations to engage the Chinese on scientific and commercial space issues. An ironic consequence of the concerted US effort to isolate the Chinese space community and inhibit Chinese access to advanced space technologies may be an acceleration of China's ability to produce these technologies on their own. China made significantly more progress in the eight years since the Cox Report then they did in the eight years prior. Chinese space technology is still less advanced than technology they could have purchased from the United States and Europe in the absence of restrictions, and Chinese scientists and engineers acknowledge there is much they could learn through commercial and scientific collaboration.>

# Non-unique—US pursuing space dominance now

US refuses to give up ensuring space superiority

Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008

(Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST**)**

(While China and Russia have long sought a treaty to ban weapons in space, off-and-on interest in Washington in space-based missile defenses and a US reluctance to close off options for ensuring “space superiority” have thwarted any forward motion for decades. That said, one cannot easily dismiss the concerns of many in the US military leadership that China's interest in a space weapons ban stems primarily from a desire to block US space-based missile defenses, as well as to limit the ability to contain China's growing military presence in space. Indeed, while the draft treaty tabled by China and Russia earlier in 2008 at the UN Conference on Disarmament would prohibit space-based missile defenses, it would not ban terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons of the kind Beijing tested in January 2007. Further, one cannot totally dismiss US government arguments that using a traditional, technology-based arms control approach to ban counter-space weapons might prove to be problematic given the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between benign and offensive technology. While the Bush administration has recently signaled interest in voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures regarding the use of space, it continues to reject any legally binding instrument. China, meanwhile, has refused to consider anything less than a full-blown weapons ban treaty, to be negotiated under the auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament. Thus, the quest for diplomatic constraints on any future anti-satellite arms race continues to be held hostage to the China–US stalemate.)

# Non-unique Chinese Space Mil Now

**China is already pursuing space militarization to challenge the US**

**Wall, 11** (Mike, senior writer for Space.com, 5/12/11, <http://www.space.com/11646-china-space-policy-united-states.html>)

U.S. power brokers aren't sure how to handle China's rapidly expanding space capabilities, according to testimony at a congressional hearing yesterday (May 11). China recently demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites on orbit, and it's ramping up plans for a space station and a possible manned lunar landing in the next decade or so. At a hearing on "The Implications of China's Military and Civil Space Programs," a range of experts discussed what these developments might mean for the United States. While opinions and viewpoints varied, a few key themes emerged, including the need to engage with China to better understand just what the nation hopes to achieve in space. [Photos: China's First Space Station] What is Quantum Jumping? www.QuantumJumping.comDiscover Why Thousands of People are "Jumping" to Change Their LifeOfficial PowerFrame® Site www.Powerframe.com/BatteryFor True Strength, Always Suggest a Car Battery with a PowerFrame® Logo2 Stocks to Hold Forever www.StreetAuthority.comBuy them, forget about them, and never sell them.Ads by Google "There's still a lack of clear understanding of what Beijing's goals are, and how we interact with those," Ben Baseley-Walker of the Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization committed to space sustainability, told SPACE.com. Baseley-Walker attended the hearing, which took place at the Capitol in Washington, D.C. NASA, Russia and their space station partners are not the only countries launching humans off the planet. China has launched two manned spaceflight aboard its Shenzhou spacecraft since 2003, with plans set for a three-person flight, spacewalks, future orbital laboratories and even unmanned and crewed moon mission in the coming decades. Here is an image of China's first spacewalk. CREDIT: China National Space Administration View full size image China's space capabilities ramping up In 2007, China destroyed one of its own satellites on orbit during an anti-satellite test, showcasing an ability that makes the United States and other nations nervous. Since then, the country has conducted other tests advancing its military space capabilities, including a 2010 missile-interception demonstration. Beijing is also ramping up its human spaceflight program. In 2003, China became the third nation to launch a person into space, and it has flown several manned missions since. The country also hopes to build a large space station between 2015 and 2022, according to hearing panelist Alanna Krolikowski, a visiting scholar at George Washington University's Space Policy Institute. And, beyond that, China appears to be gearing up for a manned lunar landing. The nation's human spaceflight program aims to complete an in-depth concept study on the subject by about 2020, Krolikowski said at the hearing. [Infographic: How China's First Space Station Will Work] Take a look at how China's first space station, called Tiangong ("Heavenly Palace") will be assembled in orbit in this SPACE.com infographic. CREDIT: Karl Tate/SPACE.com View full size image These developments have some politicians and policy experts worried. They think China may be positioning itself to challenge outright the United States' dominance in space, which currently gives America a huge advantage on the battlefield. “What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that, unlike the U.S., it is being led by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)," Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) testified at the hearing. "There is no reason to believe that the PLA’s space program will be any more benign than the PLA’s recent military posture." Is Beijing a threat? The White House has recently stated a willingness to work with China on expensive, difficult space projects, such as a manned mission to Mars. Wolf thinks this is a bad idea, citing the potential threat China poses as well as its abysmal human-rights record. "The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program," said Wolf, who chairs the commerce, justice and science subcommittee of the powerful House Appropriations Committee.

# China Militarization Impact Turn—space competition good

**Turn Competition good—sparks innovation**

**Branigan and Sample, 2011**

(Tania and Ian, The Guardian **“**Front: Space: Meanwhile Chinese unveil their new space station plan”, April 27 2011, Lexis Nexis accessed June 24, 2011 AT)

ESA and other nations are already discussing a next-generation space station that would operate as a base from which to explore space beyond low-Earth orbit; future missions could return astronauts to the moon, land them on asteroids, or venture further afield to Mars. "Another country trying to build its own infrastructure in space is competition, and competition always pushes you to be better," Patti said. The central module of the Chinese space station will be 18.1 meters (59ft 5in) long, with a maximum diameter of 4.2 meters and a launch weight of 20 to 22 tons. The laboratory modules will be shorter, at 14.4 meters, but will have the same diameter and launch weight. Pang Zhihao, a researcher and deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine Space International, told Xinhua: "The 60-tonne space station is rather small compared with the International Space Station (419 tons) and Russia's Mir space station (137 tons), which served between 1996 and 2001. "But it is the world's third multi-module space station, which usually demands much more complicated technology than a single-module space lab." China is also developing a cargo spaceship, which will weigh less than 13 tons and have a diameter of no more than 3.35 meters, to transport supplies and equipment to the space station. John Logsdon, a NASA adviser and former director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, said China's plans would give it homegrown expertise in human space flight. "A significant, and probably visible, orbital outpost transiting over most of the world would be a potent political symbol." China often chooses poetic names for its space projects, such as Chang'e - after the moon goddess - for its lunar probes; its rocket series, however, is named Long March, in tribute to communist history. The space station project is currently referred to as Tiangong, or "heavenly palace". But Wang Wenbao, director of the China Manned Space Engineering Office, told a news conference: "Considering past achievements and the bright future, we feel the manned space program should have a more vivid symbol, and that the future space station should carry a resounding and encouraging name. "We now feel that the public should be involved in the names and symbols, as this major project will enhance national prestige and strengthen the national sense of cohesion and pride." China plans to launch the Tiangong-1 module later this year, to help master docking technologies. An unpiloted spacecraft will attempt to dock with the module; two piloted spacecraft will then follow suit. Wang Zhaoyao, spokesman for the program, said researchers were developing technology to ensure astronauts could remain in space for at least 20 days and to ensure supplies could be delivered safely. China hopes to make its first moon landing within two years and to put an astronaut on the moon as early as 2025.

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# \*\*\*China-US Relations Debate\*\*\*\*

# \*\*Uniqueness US China Relations High now\*\*\*

# Uniqueness – U.S.-China Relations high now

**Relations increasing through communication**

Euhwa Tran December 17, 2010 (Euhwa, <http://www.ewi.info/discreet-communication-bolster-us-china-relations> ,6/22/11)

More discreet communication and non-official forms of candid exchange would bolster relations between the United States and China, suggests Wang Jiarui, Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC).

Wang spoke at the EastWest Institute (EWI) on December 8, 2010, to an audience that included EWI Co-Chairman Ross Perot, Jr. (who chaired the event); Edward Cox, Chairman of the New York Republican State Committee; Maurice Greenberg, Chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc.; Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to China; and Frank G. Wisner, Jr., International Affairs Advisor at Patton Boggs LLP.

Wang shared his first-hand impressions of the United States and China’s approach to addressing various global challenges. In his speech, Wang endorsed a piece of advice given to him by Henry Kissinger, a former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor who helped normalize relations between the U.S. and China in the 1970s. Kissinger had suggested that the two countries find solutions to differences in private rather than present the contents of all conversations publicly to the media.

Wang emphasized the value of this kind of discreet communication in approaching the North Korean leadership, particularly during the current crisis on the peninsula. Regarding U.S. calls for China to take more forceful action against North Korea, he noted that his country does not publicize all that it does. Therefore, simply because China has not announced that it is conducting quiet diplomacy does not mean that it is not doing so. Wang also suggested more candid exchanges between the United States and China, similar to the [2nd U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue](http://www.ewi.info/historic-visit-china-us) recently convened in Washington, D.C. Lauding the dialogue as an important new platform for promoting relations between the two countries, he proposed the possibility of organizing additional dialogues between various groups, such as businessmen or youth. Citing interest by Ohio political leaders in attracting Chinese businesses to their state, Wang stressed, for example, the constructive role that a dialogue between Chinese and U.S. businessmen could play. This speech came at the end of a nine-day, four-city visit of the United States by a 22-member Communist Party of China (CPC) delegation led by Wang. Following the dialogue sessions in Washington, D.C. with Democratic and Republican leaders, the CPC delegation visited Chicago, Illinois, and Columbus, Ohio, before concluding their trip in New York City. In Chicago and Columbus, the delegation had meetings with a number of prominent local Republicans and Democrats (including Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Ohio Governor Ted Strickland, and Ohio Governor-Elect John Kasich), members of the Midwest U.S.-China Association, leading Ohio businessmen, and The Ohio State University President Gordon Gee. In New York, the delegation also met with Dr. Henry Kissinger.

# \*\* US China Relations Low Now\*\*

**Lots of alternative causes of friction in US China relations---no evidence that the plan solves.**

**a. Ground Based midcourse defense system**

**Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, proliferation, and deterrence issues 2009**

**(**Joshua, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July August 2009 ebsco tm accessed 12/24)

One of these new “entangling” weapons is the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, the only strategic ballistic missile de-fense system deployed by the United States. Although the U.S. Mis-sile Defense Agency states that the system is designed exclusively

to counteract emerging threats from North Korea and Iran, Chinese officials and experts take a skeptical view of these claims. And in theory, the system—in combination with theater defense systems—could provide U.S. leaders with the ability to blunt China’s threat of retaliation should they choose to threaten a U.S. nuclear first strike. With this added edge, or so Beijing might conclude, Washing-ton could return to the “bullying” that originally motivated China’s

acquisition of nuclear weapons. This possibility has been cited as driving some aspects of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile modernization, including the development of decoys and counter-measures to overcome defenses. But as long as Beijing perceives the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system as emboldening Washing-ton, Chinese military planners will be tempted to consider the sys-tem a legitimate target, especially because it is not a nuclear target.17

**B Currency valuation**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

Economic issues remained front and center in the US-China relationship this quarter as pressure mounted from US lawmakers and industry groups to punish China for an undervalued currency that has boosted Chinese exports and deprived Americans of jobs and profits. Since the People’s Bank of China announced on June 19 that it would pursue a more flexible exchange rate after keeping the currency at about 6.83 per dollar for almost two years, the yuan has appreciated a mere 2.2 percent. With the US unemployment rate at 9.7 percent and the US mid-term elections only months away, there are signs that the Obama administration is losing patience with China on this issue.

**C WTO trade disputes**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

US frustration with Chinese trading practices was further evidenced by the submission of two new cases against China at the WTO on Sept. 15 in response to claims of discrimination against US industries by the steel industry and credit card companies. US Trade Representative Ron Kirk expressed concern that China is “breaking its trade commitments to the United States and other WTO partners” by excluding US credit and debit card companies and by unfairly restricting imports of US steel. The move was applauded by key lawmakers on trade issues. “We can’t stand by while China abuses its unfair trade laws for protectionist purposes,” said Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), the lead Republican on the Senate Finance Committee.

**D Taiwan arms sales**

**Barrister Harun ur Rashid, former ambassador to the UN, 2010**

( The Daily Star, December 25 2010 <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=167242> accessed tm 12/24)

Mr Obama approved a $6 billion arms sale to Taiwan. The divergence of opinion on the military sale to Taiwan stems from how the West and China sees Taiwan. Most Westerners believe that Taiwan is a separate sovereign entity that should only rejoin China if it wishes to do so. Therefore, Americans see these military sales as fulfilling the Taiwan Relation Act by providing Taiwan with additional defensive deterrent. The weapons themselves are very advanced, but they are defensive in nature and are not going to change the military balance across the straits. The best hope for Taiwan is still to make peace with China and maintaining strong relationship with America. Most Chinese people believe that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China that no other country should interfere with. Therefore, any sale to Taiwan is looked as containing Chinese power, violating its sovereignty and interfering with its internal affairs.To the Chinese, the US president appears to have reneged on promises in 2009 November's joint statement of the two countries during President Obama's visit to China to concentrate on mutual interest and ignore intractable differences.

# US China Relations Low Now--Taiwan

**Alt causality—Taiwan arms sales hurts relations**

**Klein- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group ,2011**

(Stephanie T. Kleine- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group , Huffington Post, January 21, 2011 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx accessed 6-26](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx%20accessed%206-26) st)

Beijing's stance on North Korea is only the latest example of its increasingly assertive foreign policy behavior*. Over the past year,* it *has intensified sweeping claims to disputed territories in the South China Sea and Diaoyu Islands,* escalated a minor incident at sea into a major confrontation with Japan, and showed off a new stealth fighter aircraft just as the U.S. and China were trying to restart their military relations*.* Beijing is more unwilling now to yield to external demands and increasingly expects quid pro quos from the West in return for cooperation on third country issues such as North Korea and Iran. A common question in Chinese policy circles is why continue to cooperate with the U.S. when it continues to sell arms to Taiwan.

North Korea will attack if provoked

**Non-unique—military presence in region undercuts US China relations**

**Klein- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group ,2011**

(Stephanie T. Kleine- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group , Huffington Post, January 21, 2011 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx accessed 6-26](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx%20accessed%206-26) st)

When North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island on November 23 and after the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan on March 26, China's initial reaction was to dismiss international calls to pressure North Korea. Instead, it criticized U.S. and South Korea for military exercises held in response, which it viewed as more threatening to its security than North Korea's violent behavior. It felt the U.S. was using tensions on the Peninsula as a justification to expand its regional military presence. China also worried about the deepening military cooperation between the U.S., South Korea and Japan, seeing U.S. security assistance not only as an attempt to contain China but also as emboldening regional players against it. While weeks after the shelling, China toned down its criticism of the U.S. and sent an envoy to Pyongyang, it has made no changes to its fundamental economic, military and political support to Pyongyang. Beijing's tactical moves should not be confused with a broader shift in its approach towards North Korea.

# US China relations resilient

**US China relations resilient---and influenced by lots of factor the plan can’t solve**

**Lampton, phd, 2008**

(David, “United States-China Relations and the Korea Peninsula: The Need for Multilaterally Articulated

Deterrence and Prevention” Washington Journal of Modern China volume 9 no 2accessed ebsco tm 12/24)

A convergence of strategic circumstance, domestic

leadership, and public opinion in both China and the United States

has created an environment conducive to fundamentally stable,

though not frictionless, U.S.-China relations. The building blocks of

this foundation likely will remain in place for some time. Saying this

is not to assert that one could not imagine adverse developments

that could put U.S.-China relations on a different path. Among

destabilizing developments one could envision are: Chinese

reactions to weapons sales to Taiwan or some unwelcome cross-

Strait development; a serious bout of U.S. retaliation against

Chinese currency and trade practices resulting from an American

polity that has lost patience; and, an event in either the United

States or China that stimulates a “nationalistic reaction” that

politicians might find difficult to control.

**US China relations stable—multifaceted shared interests including domestic concerns stabilize relations**

**Lampton, phd, 2008**

(David, “United States-China Relations and the Korea Peninsula: The Need for Multilaterally Articulated

Deterrence and Prevention” Washington Journal of Modern China volume 9 no 2accessed ebsco tm 12/24)

The idea of stabilization is the central common interest that supports U.S.-China relations. This diversified base for U.S.-China relations is intrinsically a firmer, interest-based foundation for ties than was the initial pillar of relations in the 1960s-1980s—explicit and quite broad-ranging anti-Soviet cooperation. With the demise of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself in the 1989-1991 period, punctuated by the Tiananmen tragedy of June 1989, the U.S.-China relationship came to rely upon an economic rationale vulnerable to human rights and security critics in the 1990s and into the new millennium. By early in the Obama administration, however, a broader tripod of shared interests in stabilization had come to be articulated―on her February 2009 trip to Asia, in Seoul ,Secretary of State Clinton noted that, “Successive administrations and Chinese governments have been poised back and f on these issues [human rights-related concerns], and whave to continue to press them. But our pressing on those issues can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.”5 Beyond these overlapping strategic concerns is a more fundamental reality—both China and the United States are so preoccupied with their domestic problems, and so motivated to minimize the drain, or further drain, of foreign entanglements, that neither leadership believes that it can afford a major problem with the other, though I have the lurking anxiety that Chinese have come to (mistakenly) believe that Washington “needs” Beijing more than vice versa. A January 2009 Pew public opinion poll reported that 71 percent of Americans wanted their incoming president, Barack Obama, to focus on domestic affairs—only 11 percent said the focus should be on foreign affairs.6 As for the Chinese, Beijing never tires of repeating the mantra that foreign policy provides an environment for the peaceful pursuit of domestic modernization .

**South China Sea efforts prove that China and US have strong relations**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

As the quarter drew to a close, Washington and Beijing signaled a shared desire to defuse tensions over the South China Sea and other issues. Following a meeting between President Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader portrayed the preservation of peace and stability in the South China as a win-win rather than a zero-sum issue between the US and China, commenting that “there are no principles that [Secretary Clinton] laid out that China should object to.” Wen declared alongside President Obama that common interests between the US and China “far outweigh” any differences the two may have, adding that he hoped to “foster favorable conditions” for President Hu’s visit to the US next year.

# \*\*\*China Evil Debate\*\*\*\*

# Uniquenss: China has ASATs

**China has anti-satelittle weapons**

**Tellis ‘07**

**[Senior adviser for Department of Defense, 2011, Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space**

**Strategy, September 1, 2007,** [**http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752**](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752)**, 6-23-11, Rg]**

US policymakers, too, were aware of the preparations leading up to the test as well as its successful outcome but, after considerable internal deliberations, chose to keep silent.9 A week later, when an American scholar, Jerry Lewis, and *Aviation Week & Space Technology* finally broke the story almost simultaneously, the Chinese government responded with a mixture of confusion and denial. Even as it reiterated China’s long-standing opposition to the ‘weaponisation of space’, the Chinese Foreign Ministry declined to either confirm or deny the test. The Defence Ministry, too, claimed to be unaware of the event, insisting that foreign accounts were little other than ’hearsay’.10 After bobbing and weaving, for almost two weeks, an official spokesman finally confirmed that China had successfully tested a new anti-satellite weapon, but wanly and unconvincingly declared that this demonstration ‘was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat.

# Uniqueness-China pursuing aggressive space policy

**China pursuing aggressive policy to check US**

**Tellis ‘07**

[Senior adviser for Department of Defense, 2011, Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space

Strategy, September 1, 2007, [**http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752**](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752), 6-23-11, Rg]

There is simply no way to ban or control the use of space for such military purposes. Beijing’s diplomats, who repeatedly call for negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better than most that its best chance of countering the massive conventional superiority of the United States lies in an ability to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears and voice of American power. The lure of undermining America’s warfighting strengths in this way prompts Beijing to systematically pursue a variety of counterspace programs even as it persists in histrionic calls for the demilitarization of space.22 China’s Janus-faced policy suggests it is driven less by bureaucratic accident or policy confusion than by a compelling and well-founded strategic judgment about how to counter the military superiority of its opponents, especially the United States.

**Uniqueness: China pursuing aggressive space policy-nationalism**

**U: China pursues space policy to enhance space power and nationalism**

**Kulacki,** Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.**, 2008**

(Gregory, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Spring 2008, ebscohost.com, 6-20-11,kc)

<With People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Guo Boxiong and officials from the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA) standing by his side. Premier Wen thanked the technicians on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the State Council and the Central Military Commission. He told them the success ofthe Chang E lunar orbiter "demonstrates that our comprehensive national strength, our creative capabilities and the level of our science and technology continues to increase, with extremely important practical implications, and deep historical significance, for raising our international standing and strengthening the force of our ethnic solidarity." It was not the first time in recent memory a Chinese leader connected success in space to the fate of the nation. Four years earlier, shortly after the first Chinese astronaut returned from space. President Jiang Zemin, wearing army fatigues and standing before a collection of military officers, compared the importance of their piloted space program to China's successful effort to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles Words and images like these make non-Chinese nervous. To some they convey a shrill nationalism reminiscent of Imperial Germany or Meiji Japan. Those who give credence to great power theories of international relations tie concerns about Chinese nationalism to dire predictions of what one American scholar called "an intense security competition with a considerable potential for war." In January of 2007, China destroyed one of their own aging weather satellites as part of a series of antisatellite weapons tests that lent new weight to these forecasts..>

**Uniqueness: China pursuing aggressive space policy-nationalism**

**U: China space program tool of nationalism**

**Kulacki,** Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.**, 2008**

(Gregory, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Spring 2008, ebscohost.com, 6-20-11,kc)

<Contemporary histories of China's space program are written as object lessons for the next generation in the relationship between mastering science and preserving Chinese sovereignty and security. While these lessons can sound shrill and aggressive to outsiders, the propaganda connecting science to national restoration also extends to environmental protection, conservation, agriculture, economics, management, and every other imaginable field of professional endeavor. In the same way the concept of "moral values" animates contemporary American politics, respect for "science" and "education" define Chinese aspirations for the future.>

# Uniqueness – China pursuing space mil

**China progressing faster in space than any country towards space mil**

Roger Handberg and Zhen Li06 **(**Roger Handberg and Zhen Li Routledge6/22/11)

By keeping the story rich with domestic and international context, the authors reveal a Chinese space program very much like its Soviet and American counterparts. It is clear that political and economic support from top political leaders was necessary to sustain such efforts, and such support has varied over the course of all three space programs. While the Soviets and Americans catapulted ahead in the space race due to their “fear” motivation and better economic and technical situation, China nonetheless progressed forward, using time to develop requisite capabilities in a manner that it could best afford. Unfortunately, two relevant controversies occurred just before and after the book’s publication and thus are not discussed therein: accusations that China lased an American reconnaissance satellite in 2006 and China’s use of an antisatellite weapon in January of 2007 to destroy one of its defunct weather satellites. Many believe such incidents signal the Chinese intention to strike satellites during conflict, despite their public stance against space weaponization. Presumably, the authors would point out that this is merely fertile ground already tilled by the Soviets and Americans.

# Uniqueness—China pursuing aggressive space policy

**China pursuing space weapons as method of checking US power now**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

While the United States is the only country in the world with the potential to deploy space weapons within the next two decades, China, Russia, and others may have the capability later in the twenty-first century. n36 Nothing lasts forever. The United States may be the dominant economic and military power at this point in history, but China, at least, is catching up. Current projections have China reaching economic parity with the United States around 2050. n37 As with the American development of nuclear weapons in the twentieth century, a robust deployment of space weapons by the United States will open up a Pandora's box of unpredictable and frightening consequences as the twenty-first century progresses. n38 China, **[\*138]** seething with resentment at the United States' cavalier attitude on space weapons earlier in the century, will be as determined as ever to develop its own offensive space weapons as soon as it is able to. Russia and eventually others are sure to follow. Ultimately, it may be better for no one to have these weapons than for everyone to have them.>

# Uniqueness – China expanding Space Program

**China pursuing increase development in space**

Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, George Washington University, August 2008 (Yi Zhou, Space Policy article, 6/23/11)

China is currently developing a long-term space strategy (through 2050). An effective and comprehensive space policy will promote and develop China's economy, technology and other interests. As one of the main development objectives, fundamental policies involving international cooperation were announced in a white paper entitled *The Chinese Government will Develop International Space Exchanges and Cooperation*.

Over the past 10 years China has made some progress in international cooperation and its contributions to the space benefits, the national economy and political objectives. Besides space business and launch services, China has built stable cooperative relationships with Brazil, France, Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA). Within the next 15 years, additional international cooperative projects will be announced in the Space Development Plan for the Next 15 Years; they include, among others, the Small Exploration for Solar Eruptions (SMESE) Project[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000404" \l "fn1) and the Kuafu Project.

# Uniqueness China is a threat

**China viewed as increasing threat by regional actors**

**Asia One, December 17 2010**

<http://www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20101217-253369.html> accessed tm 12/24

TOKYO, Japan - Japan on Friday labelled the military build-up of rival China a global "concern" and said it would strengthen missile defences against the threat from North Korea, as part of a major strategic review. The changes would also see Tokyo boost its southern forces and submarine fleet and upgrade its fighter jets as part of a shift in its defence focus from the Soviet Cold War threat to southern islands nearer China. The cabinet of officially pacifist Japan approved the National Defence Programme Guidelines months after a territorial row flared up with China and weeks after North Korea launched a deadly artillery strike against South Korea. The new guidelines labelled North Korea - which in recent years has fired missiles over Japan, staged two nuclear tests and last month unveiled a new uranium enrichment plant - an "urgent, grave factor for instability". Japan, like its top security ally the United States, again voiced concern over China's recent military build-up and increased assertiveness in what it sees as its ancestral waters in the East China and South China seas. "China is rapidly modernising its military force and expanding activities in its neighbouring waters," said the guidelines. "Together with the lack of transparency on China's military and security issues, the trend is a concern for the region and the international community," said the paper, which sets out strategic planning for the coming decade. Security analyst Akira Kato, a professor at Tokyo's Oberlin University, said "the guidelines underline Japan's clear shift of focus to counteracting China's growing naval power, which is a major threat to Japan and the United States."

**China increasing its military power**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

In the report, the Department of Defense maintained that China is pursuing anti-access, area-denial and force projection through expanding its capabilities. An important element of China’s anti-access and area-denial pursuits highlighted in the report is the continued development of its missile program, which is the “most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world.” For the first time, the report indicated that “China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).” China is also developing a longer-range B-6 bomber which, when armed with a long-range land-attack cruise missile, “will enable strikes as far as the second island chain.” The PLA Navy now “has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia,” but in 2009 only the number of missile-equipped patrol craft has increased.

# \*\*\*\*US-China Relations Good Impacts\*\*\*\*

# US China Relations Good Impact—Regional Stability

**Good relations and cooperation ensures regional stability**

**Van Der Putten, Clingendael Institute, 2010**

(Frans- Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010 accessed 6/26 st)

The most fundamental element in China’s policy towards North Korea is that Beijing regards the US as a greater security threat than the situation on the Korean peninsula. Since neither China nor the US is by itself the predominant great power in Korean affairs, Beijing can only assume responsibility for regional stability if it does so jointly with the US. However, this will not happen since China and the US each regard one another as their main potential military adversary. They also have contrary interests on the Korean peninsula.

# US China relations Good Impact: Trade

**US China relations increases trade**

[**Pomfret**](http://www.cfr.org/experts/china-vietnam-human-rights/john-pomfret/b10138) **‘10**

[Ph.D. in International Relations, 2010, Greg Austin, All at Sea: Misrepresenting China, April 23, 2010, <http://www.ewi.info/all-sea-misrepresenting-china>, 6-22-11, Rg. ]

If the United States' economy remains lousy for a significant period of time, it's easy to turn China into a congressional and an executive branch whipping boy, and even a media whipping boy. It's easy to blame China for our woes. China can often help that process by doing things like not revaluing its currency, although that is less of an issue now than it was six months ago, since the currency has gone up about 5 percent and a little bit more if you add inflation. The Chinese have begun to revalue slowly. But the other issue in the relationship is that Americans need to see that we're benefiting from this great trade relationship. Our exports to China are definitely booming, [though] they're by no means close to our imports. China's investment in America has just begun, and if it starts to be much more significant, like Toyota or other Japanese auto companies, you could see the smoothing out of that relationship.

# US China Relations Good Impact—North Korea

**Chinese cooperation on sanctioning North Korea is the only way to solve denuclearization**

**Oh 10—PhD from Korea University in North Korean studies, researcher at the Sejong Institute**

(Gyeong-seob, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume\_id=101&content\_id=103198&category=G, Sejong Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, “International Cooperation for the Denuclearization of North Korea: Limitations and Alternatives,” KC)

<International efforts to disarm North Korea have failed because of China`s reluctance to participate in sanctions on the North. Following North Korea`s second nuclear test in May 2009, there were heated debates between China`s “strategists” and “traditionalists.” The former argued that the Chinese government should strongly push for the North`s denuclearization by fully utilizing its political and economic leverage on Pyongyang, pointing to changes in the two countries` bilateral relations. The traditionalists emphasized the importance of the Beijing-Pyongyang alliance. They called for substantial economic aid to the North, which they said was necessary to stabilize the North Korean situation and prevent provocative activities against South Korea and the United States.

The traditionalists won the debate. The Chinese government decided that the stabilization of the North Korean regime was more important than the denuclearization of the North. In order to prevent the fall of the North Korean regime, China started economic aid to the North.

When special relations between nations cause a crack in international sanctions against a targeted country, the measures are destined to lose their effect. China resisted sanctions on North Korea because of its unstable relations with the United States. In the post-Cold War era, the ideological and systemic differences between the United States and China and their economic and psychological conflicts have produced a roller-coaster relationship that alternates between competition and cooperation.

The United States has had a two-track approach to China. The relationship is marred with political and military friction. Washington has been wary about the rise of China as a military power in Asia and has tried to halt the expansion of Chinese influence on U.S. allies in the region. While Washington does not want to aggravate relations between China and Taiwan, it believes that their different positions on human rights in China and regional issues obstruct smooth cooperation between the two countries.

Washington attempts to offset China`s negative influence in the region by enhancing its traditional alliance with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and other Asian nations. At the same time, the United States has pursued comprehensive, positive and constructive relations with China. Washington regards economic cooperation with China as an important element of its own prosperity and expects that the rise of China`s influence in the international community will greatly contribute to the promotion of peace, security and prosperity across the world.

As for China, the Asian continent is where it can exercise maximum influence and where its foreign policies have the greatest stakes. Chinese leaders regard the United States as having direct influence on its pursuit of national interests in the region. China needs U.S. assistance and cooperation to continue economic development. With these basic perceptions, China has warned against U.S. hegemony in the region but is also trying to prevent its conflict and competition with the United States from escalating into outright confrontation.

The strategic interests of the United States and China, the two key players in the international cooperation for the North Korean nuclear issue, clash in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula, particularly surrounding the North Korean regime`s fate and its denuclearization. With the primary goal of denuclearizing the North, the United States calls for strong sanctions regardless of their social and political consequences. The 2010 National Security Strategy Report of the White House says that North Korea can be politically and economically integrated with the international community if it abandons its nuclear armament programs, but warns that measures will be taken to isolate the regime from the international community if it refuses to do so.

China, while adapting to the existing U.S.-led order in Northeast Asia to a certain extent, seeks to replace the status quo with new political and economic systems in the region. On the Korean peninsula, China`s long-term objective is to have pro-Chinese governments in both North and South Korea. A rapid improvement of relations between the United States and North Korea and increased U.S. influence on the North will be detrimental to China`s security interest on the peninsula. China wants to stabilize North Korea rather than using forceful means that will weaken its regime in the denuclearization process.

China believes that preventing the collapse of North Korea is consistent with its national interests. Beijing fears that the fall of the regime could bring millions of refugees into Chinese territory; it also feels uneasy about the loss of a buffer zone separating China from U.S. allies. Besides, a unified Korea could have significant political, economic and military impact on China.>

# US China Relations Good Impact —North Korea

US China cooperation key to stop North Korea conflict

**Van Der Putten, Clingendael Institute, 2010**

(Frans- Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010 accessed 6/26 st)

The United States government believes China needs to do more to contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula*. According to this view,* North Korea is highly dependent on Chinese support and Beijing should use its influence to moderate Pyongyang’s behavior*. As some American and other Western observers have put it, it is time for China to start behaving like a responsible great power. But it is not likely that China will fundamentally alter its policies.* The *main reason for this is that* geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States overshadows the situation on the Korean peninsula.Lately both Chinese and US actions have [escalated](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/13/united-states-and-china-will-positive-relations-endure/) this rivalry. As long as the two powers are more interested in keeping the other in check than in stabilising the peninsula no significant progress in terms of stabilising the region is possible.

# US China Relations Good Impact—North Korea

**Relations key to getting China to help with North Korea—relations deteriorating in the SQ**

**Van Der Putten, Clingendael Institute, 2010**

(Frans- Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010 accessed 6/26 st)

A major precondition for China to change its policy towards North Korea is an improvement in Sino-US relations. In the past months these have been deteriorating. This is the result of China’s growing power, and America’s increasing concern that Beijing is not using its influence for the right purposes. Washington has been strengthening its strategic ties with actors such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia and India. The US government has also shown [greater involvement](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/25/asia-and-the-united-states-a-changing-relationship/) in territorial disputes between China and some of its neighbours. It is likely that, from a Chinese perspective, the US deploying an aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea is merely the latest attempt by Washington to exploit a regional security crisis in order to strengthen its own position and weaken that of China. The American dual strategy of trying to get China to put pressure on North Korea while at the same time attempting to limit the growth of Chinese influence in regional affairs is unlikely to result in a more stable Korean peninsula.

**China key to North Korea cooperation**

**Carpenter, VP Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, 2010**

(Ted Galen Carpenter, VP Defense Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/46072745/Policy-TedGalenCarpenter accessed 6-27 ST)

Maintaining the non-nuclear status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be a significant Chinese objective, but it is not their most important one.5 Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the US sphere of influence in Northeast Asia. Chinese leaders probably fear that rigorous

sanctions would increase the danger of the North Korean state imploding, much as East Germany did in 1989. Such a development could lead to a unified Korea allied to the United States right on China's doorsteps-probably with the continued presence ofAmerican military bases on the Korean Peninsula. It might lead to a massive flow ofNorth Korean refugees into China. Uneasiness over these scenarios limits the amount ofpressure that Beijing is willing to exert on Pyongyang.

In theory, China might be able to use its economic leverage as North Korea's principal source ofenergy, food, and other vital commodities to compel Kim Jong II's regime to halt its nuclear weapons program. Without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang. And given Washington's dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US Treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions

**Cooperation good--Cooperation on North Korea key to regional security**

Bush, Brookings Institute, 2011

(Richard C. Bush III, Director for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0113\_us\_china\_korea\_bush.aspx, January 13, 2011 accessed tm 6-27)

The stakes on the Korean peninsula could not be higher. If Presidents Hu and Obama are able to return to the cooperation of 2009, their joint efforts will impart to Pyongyang the clear costs of its actions, as well as inhibit additional risk taking by North Korea. It will also demonstrate that U.S.-China cooperation on crucial regional security issues is possible. If the leaders fail in these efforts, the dangers of 2010 will continue and deepen, and the risks of a wider conflict will grow.

In an early December telephone conversation with President Obama, Hu Jintao characterized the security of the Korean peninsula as "very fragile," with a continuing threat of escalation and "even in the loss of control." As the two leaders meet face to face in the White House, President Hu needs to be fully prepared for a strategic conversation that the United States has long sought.

# US-China Relations Good Impact-- South China Sea Impacts-miscalc

**China naval buildup and aggression in South China Sea greatest source of potential miscalculation and arms racing**

**Washington Times April 13 2011**

(“China blocks off coastal waters; Pacific's chief calls shadowy move 'troubling'” Lexis accessed tm 4/13)

China's aggressiveness near its coasts also was singled out as increasing the potential for a miscalculation that could lead to confrontation.

Official Chinese statements and actions indicate growing encroachment by Beijing in "near seas" around China, posing "a direct challenge to accepted interpretations of international law and established international norms," Adm. Willard said.

Adm. Willard was referring to China's threats against Navy exercises in the Yellow Sea last year and earlier incidents of naval harassment against U.S. surveillance ships in the **South China Sea.**

**China** also threatened Japan after a naval confrontation between Japanese coast guard ships and a Chinese fishing vessel near the Senkaku Islands between Okinawa and Taiwan.

The Chinese maritime encroachment includes area of international waters in the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East **China** Sea and the **South China Sea**, Adm. Willard said.

He said recent statements from senior Obama administration officials at regional conferences in Asia prompted China to back off somewhat from the near-seas aggressiveness.

Adm. Willard also said China's first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Russian ship, will begin sea trials as early as this summer, a development viewed with concern by nations in Asia.

China's military has made advancements in numbers and capabilities for its submarine forces, which Adm. Willard described as a "sizable fleet" that is prompting other states in Asia, including Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, to invest in their submarine forces.

# US-China Relations Good Impact--South China Sea Impacts-oil

**Oil drilling in South China Sea worsens potential conflict**

**South China Morning Post April 12 2011**

(Greg Torode, “Uneasy Calm” April 12 2011 lexis accessed tm 4/13)

In April, the waters of the South China Sea are unusually calm. The northern monsoon has all but died and the turbulence of typhoon season is yet to start. It is, among other things, a good time to drill for oil. Before the end of the month, exploratory drilling is due to start in waters off Danang on Vietnam's central coast as part of an agreement between US oil giant ExxonMobil and the Vietnamese government, according to Vietnamese media.

There, any sense of seasonal calm ends. The drilling serves as a reminder that, despite an easing - in public at least - of the diplomatic tensions surrounding South China Sea disputes, key issues remain unresolved and potential flashpoints loom.

The activities off Danang are particularly interesting. The world's largest oil firm, Exxon is a symbol of ongoing US interests in an otherwise regional dispute - interests that saw Washington raise Beijing's ire by leading a diplomatic charge during regional meetings last year.

ExxonMobil is one of the reasons the strategic South China Sea - for decades a source of potential tension - started pinging again on Washington's radars. Shortly after Exxon struck a preliminary exploration deal with Hanoi in 2008 over two blocks off its southern and central coast, it emerged that Chinese envoys had privately but repeatedly warned the company to pull out of the contract or risk hampering its China business. Similar threats had been made to other international firms courting Hanoi, including British, Australian and Japanese operations.

Within days of the South China Morning Post revealing the warnings in July 2008, foreign ministry spokesmen confirmed that **China** had warned "relevant parties" of its "clear and consistent" position on the **South China Sea. "China** opposes any behaviour that undermines **China's** sovereignty and jurisdiction in the **South China Sea**," a ministry spokesman said at the time.

**China** claims the entire Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes that straddle the important waterway. Vietnam is the only other nation to claim both island groups, while the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia claim them in part. Taipei's claim mirrors that of Beijing.

Beijing officials have yet to comment on the upcoming drilling but, make no mistake, various arms of the government are watching developments closely. And, in return, government and military analysts in countries across East Asia and beyond are watching how China will react, particularly for hints of any evolving military-diplomatic strategy or signs of military or oil industry involvement in foreign policy.

Chinese government and People's Liberation Army officials complain privately that the Vietnamese are effectively internationalising the dispute by involving foreign oil firms as strategic partners. Hanoi officials, meanwhile, claim their own sovereignty and insist that such drilling has been a long-standing policy, pointing to their cold-war-era agreement with then-Soviet joint venture partners that is still responsible for the bulk of its exports of crude oil.

The oil is a reminder, too, that the dispute is not just about sovereignty as some obscure legal concept. The islands that dot the sea are highly strategic and the mineral reserves highly prized. Several senior PLA officials have warned in recent years that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are stealing the march on **China** by exploiting **South China Sea** assets - a theme expanded upon in more crudely nationalistic terms in online chat rooms. Not surprisingly, then, foreign oil firms are also watching developments closely.

Washington's more direct involvement in South China Sea issues last year has spurred oil giants to update worst-case scenarios and try to discreetly figure out which country has the strongest claims in the unlikely event that the dispute ever comes to a world court. Part of that interest also reflects the fact that changes in technology have made fractured South China Sea oilfields easier and cheaper to exploit.

The region is watching as drilling begins. The sea itself will be calm, but everything else that surrounds it remains turbulent.

# US-China Relations Good Impact--South China Sea Impacts

**Chinese policy of core interest increases importance of resolving the South China Sea issue**

**International Herald Tribune 2011**

(“Beijing lets a delicate issue lie - for now; News Analysis, March 31 lexis accessed 4/13 TM)

When President Hu Jintao of China dropped in on Washington last winter, one hot-button topic was notably absent from the agenda: the South China Sea. Nor will Chinese officials be keen to discuss it during a summit meeting between the two countries planned for May in Washington.

In the past year, it has been one of the most delicate diplomatic issues between China and the United States. Perhaps no other point of tension has been as revealing of the difficulties U.S. officials have in reading and responding to Chinese foreign policy. But in recent months, Chinese leaders apparently have been happy to let the issue quiet down, perhaps for the sake of smoothing over relations with the Obama administration after a year of mounting tensions.

China, Taiwan and four Southeast Asian nations have been wrangling for years over territorial claims to the South China Sea, where the strategically significant Spratly Islands are located. Last July, amid heightening tensions in the waters, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton rallied with Southeast Asian nations to speak out against China. She bluntly said in Hanoi that the United States had a ''national interest'' in the area and that China and other countries should abide by a 2002 agreement guaranteeing a resolution of the sovereignty disputes by ''peaceful means.''

Chinese officials were shocked that the United States was getting involved, analysts say. A public debate erupted in **China** over this question: Should **China** officially upgrade the **South China Sea** to a ''core interest,'' placing it on par with other sovereignty issues like Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang, which could justify military intervention?

Some Chinese officials appeared to have floated that idea in early 2010 in private conversations with their U.S. counterparts. Several U.S. officials told reporters in Beijing and Washington last year that one or more Chinese officials had indeed labeled the South China Sea a ''core interest.'' Chinese leaders have not explicitly come out with a policy statement describing the **South China Sea** as such - nor have they denied it.

''It's not Chinese policy to declare the **South China Sea** as a core interest,'' said Zhu Feng, a professor of politics and international relations at Peking University. ''But the problem is that a public denial will be some sort of chicken action on the part of Chinese leaders. So the government also doesn't want to inflame the Chinese people.''

The Foreign Ministry and the State Council, China's cabinet, did not answer questions on the issue, despite repeated requests.

Michael D. Swaine, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has published a paper in The China Leadership Monitor looking at China's growing use of the term ''core interest.'' Since 2004, Chinese officials, scholars and news organizations have increasingly used the term to refer to sovereignty issues over which China will not tolerate any foreign interference. Initial references were to Taiwan, but the term now also encompasses Tibet and Xinjiang, the restive western region. After examining numerous Chinese print sources, Mr. Swaine concluded that **China** had not officially identified the **South China Sea** as a ''core interest.''

Some ''unofficial differences in viewpoint, along with the likely dilemma involved in confirming whether the South China Sea is a core interest, together suggest the possibility of disagreement among the Chinese leadership on this matter,'' Mr. Swaine wrote.

That is not to say that China has refrained from asserting its sovereignty claims. On March 24, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, said that China holds ''indisputable sovereignty'' over the Spratly Islands and adjacent waters and that any oil or gas exploration could take place only with China's permission.

Some U.S. officials reportedly heard Chinese officials in the spring of 2010 privately start referring to the South China Sea as a core interest. In a November interview with The Australian, a newspaper, Mrs. Clinton said Dai Bingguo, the senior foreign policy official in the Chinese government, did so at a summit meeting in May 2010. ''I immediately responded and said, 'We don't agree with that,''' Mrs. Clinton said. Some scholars in the United States and China question whether Mr. Dai made the remark.

# US-China Relations Good Impact—AT “South China Sea no big deal to China”

**Actions in region better measure than the public statements their evidence is talking about---US current policy encourages a more assertive Chinese posture**

**International Herald Tribune 2011**

(“Beijing lets a delicate issue lie - for now; News Analysis, March 31 lexis accessed 4/13 TM)

The debate in the Chinese news media had seemed to reflect a divide among Chinese officials over upgrading the issue. Then in the fall, news organizations were ordered to stop writing about it.

''Now, I think they are backing away and downplaying the question because of the trouble it is causing with the U.S. and the Asean,'' said Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor of international relations at Harvard and a former Pentagon official. ''But this does not mean the issue is resolved.''

Monitoring **China's** actions in the **South China Sea** is a more reliable way of gleaning its intentions, said Lyle J. Goldstein, director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. In August, Modern Ships, a publication linked to the Chinese Navy, detailed how two civilian surveillance ships planted a Chinese flag in the southern part of the sea floor. He said the fact that the ships were unarmed showed that China was taking a cautious approach.

But ''there has been an increase in hawkish declarations by Chinese naval leaders since last summer, reflecting a dangerous escalation of tensions,'' Mr. Goldstein said. In November, Modern Ships quoted Adm. Hu Yanlin as saying that ''international anti-China forces led by America'' had stirred up discord in the region.

''We are peace-loving,'' Admiral Hu said, ''but we also need to make the appropriate plans and preparations.''

# \*\*AT US China Relations Good Impacts\*\*\*

# AT “China solves North Korea” impacts

**China abandoned policy of using its leverage with North Korea—no evidence post dates this indicating that the reasons for the shift in Chinese policy can be reversed by the plan**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

In the following two years, the Chinese responded impressively, although only partially, to this shift in U.S. policy. Beijing not only continued to host the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program but also participated in the crafting of international sanctions against Pyongyang in the UN Security Council. Especially in late 2006 and early 2007, China also exerted bilateral economic pressure on North Korea, which led to the disablement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, the only concrete progress made to date as part of the six-party talks.

Beijing also changed course on Sudan. It went from protecting Sudan's regime against international pressure over human rights abuses in Darfur to backing then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's three-phase plan for peace and stability in the region in late 2006. Chinese officials pressured Khartoum to accept the second phase of that plan, which called for the creation of a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force. Then, in early 2007, after a dialogue about the region between the U.S. State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing agreed to send more than 300 Chinese military engineers to Darfur, the first non-African peacekeepers committed to the UN operation. In late 2008, China also agreed to send a naval contingent to the Gulf of Aden to assist in the international effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Perhaps most significant, considering Beijing's traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the UN resolution enabling the mission allowed for the pursuit of pirates into Somalia's territorial waters.

To be sure, Washington and its diplomatic partners would have liked to have seen even more from Beijing in this period. But China's new policies represented more than a minor shift. Beijing was moving away from its traditional foreign policy relationships and softening, although not abolishing, its long-held and once rigid positions on sanctions and noninterference in the internal affairs of states.

By making clear to skeptical Chinese audiences that Washington does not view the relationship as a zero-sum game, the Bush administration's initiative was good for U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations. More important, U.S. policy underscored that addressing global problems, such as nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, terrorism, transnational crime, global financial instability, environmental degradation, and piracy on the high seas, is in everyone's interest, including China's. Finally, the U.S. initiative reflected Washington's understanding that with China's rising clout comes increased responsibilities. Put simply, China has become too big to maintain its traditional policy of noninterference and its aversion to economic sanctions; too big to preserve friendly diplomacy toward international pariahs such as Pyongyang, Khartoum, and Tehran; and too big to fall back on its developing-country status as a way to resist making sacrifices to stabilize the world economy and mitigate environmental damage.

**LOST MOMENTUM**

Unfortunately, China has failed to maintain this positive momentum in its foreign policy, damaging U.S.-Chinese relations in the process. The most dramatic change is in its North Korea policy: rather than pressuring Pyongyang after its nuclear and missile tests in the spring of 2009, Beijing seems to have doubled down on its economic and political ties with Kim Jong Il's regime. Knowledgeable observers believe that trade and investment relations between China and North Korea have deepened over the past three years. There has also been frequent high-level public diplomacy between Chinese and North Korean leaders, including two visits by Kim to China last year. Last October, Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee, stood with top members of the Kim regime during the Korean Workers' Party's anniversary celebration. This attention was most welcome in Pyongyang during the regime's sensitive transition period, in which Kim has been grooming his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, to eventually take over.

Driven by the fear of a precipitous collapse of a neighboring communist regime and the reduction of Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing has fallen back on long-held conservative Communist Party foreign policy principles in backing North Korea. In particular, it stood by the Kim regime during the course of several crises sparked by Pyongyang last year. In May, an international commission determined that a North Korean submarine had indeed sunk the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March; for its part, China refused to review the evidence and protected North Korea from facing direct criticism in the UN Security Council. In so doing, Chinese leaders alienated many in the international community, especially South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Beijing similarly protected North Korea from international condemnation after Pyongyang revealed last fall that it had secretly developed a uranium-enrichment facility. And then, after North Korea shelled a South Korean island in November, Beijing once again adopted an agnostic pose, simply calling for calm and warning all sides against any further escalation. The only specific warning it could muster was its ultimately unsuccessful effort to dissuade U.S. warships involved in joint U.S.-South Korean naval exercises from entering the Yellow Sea, which overlaps with China's exclusive economic zone.

# AT “China solves North Korea” impacts

**China won’t pressure North Korea---other concerns trump fears of proliferation**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

Similarly, no one believes that China truly supports North Korea's military provocations or development of nuclear weapons. But Beijing's concerns about maintaining domestic stability in North Korea, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and social stability in China have prevented Chinese officials from criticizing North Korea publicly or allowing the UN Security Council to do so. What is more, these interests also keep Chinese officials from refuting conspiracy theories in the Chinese media and on the Internet that the United States and South Korea plotted to exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula to create an excuse to carry out military exercises near China's borders. To the contrary, the Foreign Ministry only fed the fire in July and November 2010 by warning the United States not to place warships in waters near China without Beijing's permission. This move may have won some favor within the Chinese military and the Chinese public, but the diplomatic costs of being seen to pardon or even defend Pyongyang's actions were high in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. A truly assertive great power would not allow a small pariah state to hijack its foreign policy in such a fashion.

# China won’t help on North Korea

**China won’t pressure North Korea**

**Van Der Putten, Clingendael Institute, 2010**

(Frans- Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010 accessed 6/26 st)

China will probably continue to give more support than any other country because it is highly vulnerable to the consequences of political or economic collapse in North Korea. The longest and most accessible border of North Korea is the one it shares with China. Chaos in North Korea would harm stability in China’s northeast, the region formerly known as Manchuria. Moreover, Beijing is less motivated to put pressure on the North Korean regime than other countries are. The US is primarily interested in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technologies from North Korea. South Korea and Japan are mainly worried about the military threat from the north. Compared with these countries, China is less concerned about such issues.

**Diplomacy only way to solve---hardline approach risks war**

**Carpenter, VP Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, 2010**

(Ted Galen Carpenter, VP Defense Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/46072745/Policy-TedGalenCarpenter accessed 6-27 ST)

Moreover, having seen what the United States did to Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-II would likely consider even limited air strikes as a prelude to a US-led campaign to overthrow his government. With nothing to lose, his probable response would be to go on the offensive against US and South Korean forces using North Korea's substantial conventional military capabilities. In addition to short- and medium-range missiles, Pyongyang has the ability to fire 300,000 artillery shells an hour into South Korea's capital, Seoul, where nearly half that country's population resides.

North Korea might also expand military operations to include attacks against other targets in South Korea and Japan, including US military bases in both countries. Any effort to solve the North Korean nuclear and missile problems through force runs the risk of triggering a general war on the Korean Peninsula and perhaps a war throughout Northeast Asia.

**Non-unique—US military presence undercuts China help on North Korea**

**Klein- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group ,2011**

(Stephanie T. Kleine- Ahlbrandt, China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group , Huffington Post, January 21, 2011 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx accessed 6-26](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx%20accessed%206-26) st)

China's top concern of instability on its border deepened in 2009 following reports of Kim Jong-Il's failing health, a disastrous currency reform, and uncertainties surrounding leadership transition. But Beijing's calculations are also increasingly shaped by rising concerns about a perceived U.S. strategic "return to Asia" and by opposition to American military and political presence in the region. China is using its close ties with Pyongyang as a bulwark against U.S. military dominance in the region, giving the rogue nation virtually unconditional diplomatic protection. The two presidents' joint statement this week glosses over all of these realities.

# AT “we get sanctions on North Korea”

**Impact turn---Sanctions bad—increase of nuke tech sales**

**Carpenter, VP Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, 2010**

(Ted Galen Carpenter, VP Defense Foreign Policy, Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/46072745/Policy-TedGalenCarpenter accessed 6-27 ST)

Even if harsher sanctions could be imposed, it's not clear that it would be a wise strategy. US leaders have always argued that North Korea faces a stark choice: abandon its quest for nuclear weapons and gradually become a normal member ofthe international community or face ever greater isolation. President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have explicitly described the options in such binary terms.

But this strategy could prove to be quite dangerous. If isolation does not succeed in getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, we may be faced with a troubling predicament. North Korea would still possess nuclear weapons, but its isolation would exacerbate strategic tensions in the region and increase the possibility of a fatal miscalculation. Imposing further economic sanctions on an already impoverished North Korea may also lead Pyongyang to seek revenues from

other sources, especially by selling its missile and nuclear technologies to any paying state or non- state customer.

# \*\*Frontlines versus China Advantages/cooperation Solvency\*\*

# 1nc Frontline versus US China War Advantage

**1. No impact---China only investing in defensive tech doesn’t pose a threat to the US**

**Bandow,** foreign policy analyst, **2009**

(Doug, “First Among Equals” National Interest January 12 <http://nationalinterest.org/article/first-among-equals-2968> accessed TM 4/13)

Yet this assessment is far less threatening than it sounds. The PRC is not capable (nor close to being capable) of threatening vital U.S. interests-conquering American territory, threatening our liberties and constitutional system, cutting off U.S. trade with the rest of the world, dominating Eurasia and turning that rich resource base against America. After all, the United States has the world's most sophisticated and powerful nuclear arsenal; China's intercontinental delivery capabilities are quite limited. America has eleven carrier groups while Beijing has none. Washington is allied with most every other industrialized state and a gaggle of the PRC's neighbors. China is surrounded by nations with which it has been at war in recent decades: Russia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India.

Indeed, today Beijing must concentrate on defending itself. In pointing to the PRC's investment in submarines, the *JOE 2008* acknowledges: "The emphasis on nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China's energy imports of oil-80% of which go through the straits of Malacca." The Chinese government is focused on preventing American intervention against it in its own neighborhood, not on contesting U.S. dominance elsewhere in the world, let alone in North America.

**2. No space war--Interdependence checks risk of war and increases incentives for cooperation**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<Another reason the USA is in need of cooperation has something to do with the fact that outer space is a highly interdependent domain. Just as the maritime domain has several major routes for transportation called the sea lines of communication, highways for satellites (e.g. LEO and GEO) exist in outer space.[12](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn12) These are shared by all spacefaring nations and non-state actors, and are becoming increasingly congested as satellites and space debris increase. In this context, the NSP states “the now-ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world’s growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.” The NSP also names the increase in the amount of space debris and the risks of satellite collisions as examples of challenges for the sustainable use of space. These descriptions are no doubt influenced by the results of two incidents – China’s 2007 ASAT test and the 2009 US–Russia satellite collision – which have occurred since the last NSP was released in 2006. These two incidents have made the challenges to the sustainability of the space environment more imminent, multiplying the number of catalogued LEO space objects by more than 60%.>

**3. No war--China lack of military power relative to the US**

**Lieberthal, China expert-Brookings Institution, 2010** (Ken, Ethos August 2010 [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal.pdf accessed tm 1/10](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08_china_development_lieberthal/08_china_development_lieberthal.pdf%20accessed%20tm%201/10) )

In terms of other aspects of nationalstrength, the US has military powerthat is truly global and by far the mostadvanced; China is beginning to acquirelong-range capabilities, but still lagsbehind. In addition, China has a skewedage distribution in its populationthat bodes ill for the future. Due toa combination of rapidly decliningfertility in the 1970s and populationcontrol in the 1980s, China now hasan unusually high percentage of itspopulation in working age, as againstdependents either too young or too old towork. By 2015, the population structurewill begin to invert and, by 2030, Chinawill look much like Italy and Japan, interms of national age distribution, butit will still be a developing country in terms of per capita GDP, which isa very challenging situation. This isa population age pyramid the US hasavoided only because of significantimmigration flows. Finally, the US hashad many decades of experience inthinking and acting as a global power.China is now being thrust into theposition of being a global power butwithout the mindset yet to necessarilyhandle that comfortably.

# 1nc Frontline versus US China War Advantage

**4. Aff evidence overestimates power of the developed part of Chinese economy---ignore the rural and developing population Lieberthal, China expert-Brookings Institution, 2010** (Ken, Ethos August 2010 [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal.pdf accessed tm 1/10](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08_china_development_lieberthal/08_china_development_lieberthal.pdf%20accessed%20tm%201/10) )

All this is not to say that America is in good shape or does not face major problems. Instead, it is a reminder that China’s leaders are accurate when they say that China is still a developing country — albeit one with some remarkable achievements. In a sense, China, with a little over 1.3 billion people, really consists of islands of modernity populated by perhaps 450 million people, surrounded by a sea of over 800 million people that is a developing country. And the two interact in every way, every day, all the time. It is this interaction between a developing country and a developed country that defines the problems of China and the opportunities. Most foreigners go to China and never see the developing country side of that equation, but it critically defines the equation. It will take a number of decades at a minimum to transform China into a fully developed country. Those who assume that China can roughly match the US in capabilities now, therefore, are bound to be frustrated and disappointed by many of the things that may develop in the coming few years.

# Extension No war—military capacity

**No impact: China lacks naval power for conflict**

**Austin ’10**   
 [Ph.D. in International Relations, 2010, Greg Austin, All at Sea: Misrepresenting China, April 23, 2010, <http://www.ewi.info/all-sea-misrepresenting-china>, 6-22-11, Rg. ]

According to a Pentagon report this year, China “has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia”. The report notes that “China’s naval forces include some 75 principal combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped patrol craft.” According to an August 2010 report of the United States Congressional Research [Service](http://www.neurope.eu/articles/All-at-sea-Misrepresenting-China-/102967.php), China has only commissioned around two new major surface combatants per year for the past twenty years. The CRS also obliquely criticized the Pentagon report, not least because “China’s navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships”. The Office of Naval Intelligence predicts a small decline in the number of major surface combatants by 2015 and a further small decline by 2020.

At the end of the day, the Pentagon statement that China has the “largest” naval force “in Asia” – though true – is misleading. It really needs to be qualified by clearer assessments of the technology levels compared with potential enemies, the age of the ships, procurement rates, China’s relative maritime military power in Asia, the capability of related air assets, the missions assigned the naval forces as part of national strategy, or even perhaps the amounts of maritime territory. Japan alone has around 50 principal combatants even if it has far fewer though more capable submarines and far fewer amphibious ships. If we add the capability of the US Pacific Forces and the political commitment of other Pacific allies to the strategic power of Japan, then PLA naval strength is not the game changer some are suggesting – even on its own door step.

# Extension No war—resilient relations

**China and US won’t go to war—relations resilient**

[**Pomfret**](http://www.cfr.org/experts/china-vietnam-human-rights/john-pomfret/b10138) ‘10

[Ph.D. in International Relations, 2010, Greg Austin, All at Sea: Misrepresenting China, April 23, 2010, <http://www.ewi.info/all-sea-misrepresenting-china>, 6-22-11, Rg. ]

<China and the United States next week hold their first military-to-military talks since 2009, following on the heels of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic[Dialogue in Washington](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/11/c_13868779.htm) May 9-10. China's foreign and domestic policies have hardened considerably over the past couple of years, says CFR China expert [John Pomfret](http://www.cfr.org/experts/china-vietnam-human-rights/john-pomfret/b10138). The Chinese have shown "quite bumbling and counterproductive" policies toward South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, says Pomfret, who also points out that China's domestic crackdown--which has drawn sharp criticism from the Obama administration--is "the worst since" the Tiananmen Square shootings. On the complex ties between the United States and China, Pomfret quotes a former premier, Zhu Rongii, who said: "U.S.-China relations can never be wonderful, but they really can't collapse.">

# Extension No war: No Taiwan conflict

**AT Taiwan conflict increases risk of space conflict—no China still not capable of doing it**

**Hagt director of the China Program at the World Security Institute and is editor of China Security**

**Quarterly 2008** (Eric, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<There is, of course, one plausible scenario where China could have incentive to attack US assets in space, despite its military disadvantage: a conflict over Taiwan. Kinetic-energy ASATs or other asymmetric counterspace weapons could very well be used if the United States employed its own space assets in a confrontation over the island. But this would be only in extreme circumstances, an act of desperation or self-preservation, since China understands such a scenario could very well bring down the full force of US military might on China. The possibility of China making this calculation is far from certain, however, since to avoid escalation (possibly to nuclear exchange) or outright failure, China would need to reduce US military might to a level relative to its own (a formidable task even without space assets). Just diminishing US military dominance will not suffice if America remains powerful enough to prevail in a conflict. China may one day have the counterspace capability to achieve this goal, but one ASAT test does not get it there. For a successful kinetic-energy ASAT capability alone, China would have to conduct more tests, to say nothing of the other capabilities that would need to be developed and deployed to effectively disable US space assets. Furthermore, all this assumes that the United States is indeed highly vulnerable in space, an assumption scarcely borne out by current Chinese ASAT capabilities and inherent redundancy of US space assets.3 This more narrowly defined scope for China’s counterspace capabilities fits within its overall strategic parameters and defined goals. And Tellis’s judgement that the potential conflict in space will ‘likely persist whether or not the Taiwan conflict is resolved’, is entirely possible if the United States and China find new strategic terms to compete over, but that outcome is speculative and is an entirely separate issue from China’s rivaling US space dominance writ large. A note on sources is also in order, since Tellis uses only secondary material to make sweeping assumptions about China’s military and counterspace strategies. The discussion of source material often comes up with the subject of China because of the difficulty in deciphering the vast body of literature, often of questionable reliability and predominantly in Chinese. Tellis remains undaunted, however, and cites secondary Western publications analysing this literature that primarily support his hawkish version of China’s space ambitions while giving scant mention to other more moderate positions. A selection of the provocative statements and ambitions on the American side would present a similarly distorted picture of US policy and intentions. A comprehensive reading of the Chinese literature is highly inconclusive with regard to both China’s policies and intentions as well as its programmes and capabilities. >

# AT “China rise inevitable makes war inevitable”

**US still greater power than China—economic structures and education gap**

**Lieberthal, China expert-Brookings Institution, 2010** (Ken, Ethos August 2010 [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal/08\_china\_development\_lieberthal.pdf accessed tm 1/10](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08_china_development_lieberthal/08_china_development_lieberthal.pdf%20accessed%20tm%201/10) )

The third dimension of whether China is drawing equal, or nearly equal with the US has to do with underlying strengths and fundamentals. The US still has the highest GDP in the world, while China’s is very much smaller, in both absolute and per capita terms. China simply does not yet have high quality corporations that know how to run global operations or leverage technological change effectively. Indeed, China’s economy is dominated by stateowned, vertically integrated enterprises, whereas for the past two decades, multinational corporations have been going in the opposite direction towards de-integration and focusing on being very niche, innovative, high valueadd players. Global corporations have become enormously flexible because they are not vertically integrated and no longer have to maintain their current product lines to keep the corporation going, whereas China in some ways seems to be rushing headlong into the 1980s in terms of basic corporate strategy. China is just beginning to jumpstart its technological base for innovation, whereas the US already has a very advanced and enormously effective system for ongoing innovation. The US has a higher education system that took many decades to construct; China is expanding its system at a startling rate, but it still takes several generations to build a mature, quality higher education system.

# 1nc Frontline versus China Cooperation Good Affs

1. **Even if they are right that there are benefits to cooperation, China views any US compromise as weakness—increase assertiveness of Chinese power . nothing about the plan alters inaccurate power calculations**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

Given that China and the United States face global challenges such as financial stability, cyber security and climate change, the two countries have much to gain from working together. Unfortunately, faulty power assessments have created hubris among some Chinese, and unnecessary fear of decline among some Americans, and these shifts in perception make cooperation difficult. Any American compromise is read in Beijing as confirmation of American weakness. But with more realistic projections and policies, China and America need not repeat the disastrous experience of Germany and Britain a century ago.

2.**Obstacles to US China space cooperation—limit effectiveness**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<Yet it should be noted that there are some obstacles to having substantial cooperation in space. First, as many have noted, collaboration among nations does not necessarily contribute to cost savings. Rather, it sometimes causes budget overruns and delays. Even if one can expect cost reductions, space-related activities still entail a lot of costs. Some countries may therefore hesitate to collaborate and prefer continued reliance on the USA or commercial services. Second, the future of the ongoing reform of the US export control system is uncertain while the domestic political scene in the USA remains cloudy. Lastly, some American lawmakers have voiced concerns that even civil space cooperation with China may strengthen Chinese military capabilities.[26](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165" \l "fn26) These are the issues which need to be considered when promoting international cooperation.>

**3. Key sticking points now bigger deal because of Chinese strength relative to the US**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

Last year, when China broke off military-to-military talks after the Obama administration's long-expected sale of defensive arms to Taiwan, a high American official asked his Chinese counterpart why China reacted so strongly to something it had accepted in the past. The answer: "Because we were weak then and now we are strong."

On a recent visit to Beijing, I asked a Chinese expert what was behind the new assertiveness in China's foreign policy. His answer: "After the financial crisis, many Chinese believe we are rising and the US is declining."

# 1nc Frontline versus China Cooperation Good Affs

**4. Multiple alternative causes to tensions---NO evidence the plan resolves them or set a framework for resolving those issues too**

**BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political 2011**

**(**March 17, 2011 “US official says NKorea, China remain 'major regional strategic challenges'” lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

The US was embroiled in a tense military rivalry with China last year over South Korean-US drills in the Yellow Sea, US-Vietnamese joint naval exercises in the **South China Sea** and Washington's pledge to defend the Senkaku Islands in the East **China** Sea, also claimed by China, under its alliance with Japan.

The two superpowers also locked horns last year over Washington's decision to sell more than US$6 billion in weapons to Taiwan and to allow a visit to Washington by the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, whom China considers a separatist.

The Sino-US rivalry peaked when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton weighed in on disputed islets and seabed resources in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in July. The issues have long been taboo at the ARF under China's influence.

A Pentagon report in August expressed concerns over China's military buildup, including construction of aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles that could target aircraft carriers and other advanced weapons. China dismissed the report as disregarding "objective facts" and undermining the sides' military ties.

While in Beijing in January, Gates expressed concerns over China's development of stealth fighters, bombers and anti-ship missiles. The Chinese military tested the stealth aircraft during the US defence chief's visit.

**5. No solvency for cooperation until at least 2012—Chinese domestic issues will preclude improvements in relations, even if the US acts now to make nice**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)That is the good news. What is less commonly noted, however, is that the same factors that have caused China's recent tensions with its neighbors and the United States have produced an arguably stickier and more consequential long-term problem: they have retarded, if not halted outright, what was a very positive and much-needed shift in Chinese foreign policy during the last two years of the Bush administration. During that period, Beijing showed a willingness to soften some of its traditional prohibitions on an assertive foreign policy so as to assist the international community in dealing with problems faced by all global actors, including China.

Even if U.S.-Chinese ties improve and China reverses the negative trends in its regional diplomacy, Washington may still be unsatisfied if the shift does not include enhanced Chinese participation in international efforts to tackle global problems, especially proliferation in North Korea and Iran. For the United States and its allies, securing this kind of Chinese cooperation may be the highest hurdle to clear. Obama has an impressive group of advisers on Asia, but the domestic political and psychological factors in China will create reasons for pessimism, at least until China's succession is complete in 2012. Unfortunately, without such a change in China's policies, solving problems from proliferation to climate change will be much more difficult for the United States and the rest of the international community. In this one important sense, the United States needs a more assertive China.

**6. Turn—when China perceives US weakness, they are less cooperative**

**Glaser, senior fellow in the Freeman Chair in Chinese Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC and senior associate for the Pacific Forum CSIS, 2010**

(Bonnie, Pacific Forum CSIS, No 57 November 22, 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

It is fair to say that the US-China relationship has failed to meet the hopes and expectations of the United States from the president on down. Obama’s team worked assiduously the first year in office to put the US-China relationship on solid footing, hoping to lay the groundwork for cooperation on major global challenges like coping with climate change, preventing nuclear nonproliferation, and building a new global economic order. Beijing proved unwilling to jointly tackle these problems. Moreover, the Chinese viewed the United States as weakened by the global financial crisis and concluded that the power gap between China and the US was rapidly narrowing.

A succession of events since early 2009 suggests that Beijing has been testing the hypothesis that the relative decline in US power and China’s growing strength has provided Beijing with increased leverage. Although China denies an intention to directly challenge US interests, it has shown a willingness to more assertively defend what it sees as Chinese core national interests.

# 1nc Frontline versus China Cooperation Good Affs

**7. No solvency for improving relations—US media will cover problems in relationship only**

**Glaser, senior fellow in the Freeman Chair in Chinese Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC and senior associate for the Pacific Forum CSIS, 2010**

(Bonnie, Pacific Forum CSIS, No 57 November 22, 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

A lot of inaccurate information is being published about the Obama administration’s China policy. US officials are generally disappointed that Beijing has not embraced President Obama’s offer to elevate the US-China relationship through cooperation on global issues of consequence to both countries, but they have not retracted the proposal. Washington continues to try to work with China on a broad range of issues where our interests overlap. While there is concern about a pattern of more assertive Chinese rhetoric and behavior this past year, there has been no decision to forge an anti-China coalition in concert with China’s neighbors.

US media reports about US policy toward China can lead to mistaken conclusions, however. The Washington Times reported (Oct. 21) that there is a policy dispute between two factions, the “kowtow” group that favors policies of conciliation and concessions in relations with China and another group that is “sad and disappointed” by Beijing’s refusal to work cooperatively with the United States for the past two years. A few days later (Oct. 25) the New York Times reported that the Obama administration was “stiffening its approach toward Beijing” and seeking to shape coalitions to pressure China to change its unacceptable policies. Then the Sankei Shimbun claimed (Nov. 14) that the main purpose of President Obama’s trip to Asia was to issue a warning to China.

**8. Turn—efforts to cooperate viewed by China as effort to reassert US control--South China Sea incidents proves**

**\*\*\*be careful when reading hardline good cards or heg OR the cooperation CP**

**Glaser, CSIS/Pacific Forum CSIS and Billingsley, CSIS 2010**

(Bonnie and Brittany Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations October 2010 accessed tm 12/24)

From China’s perspective, the US attempt to forge a coalition against China on the South China Sea issue was part of the Obama administration’s strategy to reassert US influence in the region. Clinton’s speech at the ARF further exacerbated Chinese suspicions that the US was attempting to tighten its strategic encirclement of China and undermine relations between China and its neighbors. Some Chinese media sources accused the US of using “divide and rule” tactics to deal with disputes and conflicts in the international arena, while others warned that the US “intention to sow discord between China and Southeast Asian countries will be in vain.” At a press conference on July 30, China’s Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng reiterated that China had “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea and the nearby waters. On the eve of the ASEAN-US summit in New York in September, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said, “We resolutely oppose any country which has no connection to the South China Sea getting involved in the dispute, and we oppose the internationalization, multilateralization or expansion of the issue. It cannot solve the problem, but can only make it more complicated.”

# Extension no cooperation solvency—multiple issues

**Multiple issues undercut US China relations as well as China Japan**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

Last year was also marked by bilateral tension between the United States and China over such issues as Chinese Internet hacking and media restrictions, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and U.S. President Barack Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama. Even though U.S. policies on these issues were not new, the reaction in Beijing was more strident than in the past. China was also rankled by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's diplomacy regarding the management of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Vietnam last July. China is the only nation in the region that claims all the disputed islands in the sea. Its expansive claims are also ambiguous, relying on maps that predate the People's Republic of China and sometimes on vague terms such as "historic waters," which carry no validity in international law. At the meeting, Clinton called for the peaceful settlement of differences, freedom of navigation, a legal basis for all claims rooted in customary international law, and multilateral confidence-building measures. Even though Clinton did not specifically name China and her comments did not change the United States' traditional neutrality on maritime sovereignty disputes, the U.S. initiative was unwelcome in Beijing. The Chinese foreign minister's harsh reaction at the conference -- warning regional actors against collaborating with outside powers in dealing with the disputes -- created tension between China and relevant ASEAN states and between China and Japan, which, like the United States, has no territorial claims in the South China Sea but is concerned about maintaining freedom of navigation there and regional security.

# Extension No cooperation solvency—nationalism

**No policy Chinese policy changes possible—nationalist elements dominate media outlets prevents changes**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

The second negative and important effect on China's foreign policy is that Beijing has become less likely to join the international community in tackling global problems. For example, a tough Chinese stand on North Korean or Iranian nuclear proliferation is now easily portrayed by nationalist elements as an accommodation to the United States. At the same time, domestic interest groups -- such as energy companies and financial institutions in the case of sanctions against Iran and economic interests in northeastern China and the military in the case of North Korea -- oppose policy innovations that would hurt their parochial interests. Such groups can express themselves directly in a more diversified policy process, and they can also use the media and the Internet to create a negative domestic political environment for policy changes.

**No solvency---China fopo set growing nationalism and perception of decline in US power will lock in their policy**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

China's new assertiveness affected its relations with others besides the United States. Its policies in the South China Sea created fear among countries in the ASEAN, and its overreaction to Japan's actions after a ship collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands led Tokyo to reaffirm its alliance with Washington. Beijing alienated South Korea by failing to criticise North Korea's shelling of a South Korean island, irritated India over border and passport issues, and embarrassed itself in Europe and elsewhere by overreacting to the Nobel Peace Prize granted to jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo.How will these issues play out in the coming year? It is likely that China's leaders will draw back somewhat from the overly assertive posture that has proved so costly. Hu's stated desire to cooperate on terrorism, nonproliferation and clean energy should help reduce tensions, but powerful domestic interest groups in export industries and the People's Liberation Army want to limit economic and military cooperation. And most important, given the increasing nationalism of the Chinese people that one sees on display in the blogosphere, it will be difficult for top Chinese leaders to change their policies dramatically. Hu's state visit to Washington in January helped improve matters, but the relationship will remain difficult as long as many Chinese suffer from hubris based on nationalism and a mistaken belief in American decline.

**China won’t cooperate—domestic pressures**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

What explains the acerbic turn in Beijing's foreign policy? Rather than a simple assertion of its newfound power, China's negative diplomacy seems rooted in a strange mix of confidence on the international stage and insecurity at home. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese citizens, lower-level government officials, and nationalist commentators in the media have often exaggerated China's rise in influence and the declining power of the United States. According to some of my Chinese interlocutors, top officials in Beijing have a much more sober assessment of China's global position and of the development challenges ahead. Yet those domestic voices calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy have created a heated political environment. Popular nationalism, the growth in the number of media outlets through which Chinese citizens can express their views, and the increasing sensitivity of the government to public opinion in a period of perceived instability have provided the space for attacks on the United States and, by association, criticism of Beijing's U.S. policy as too soft. These are the views of not just those far from power, however: the authors of such critiques have notably included active-duty military officers and scholars at state-run think tanks and universities.

# Extension No coop solvency —domestic audience

**No cooperation---domestic pressures**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx)**, Nonresident Senior Fellow,** [**Foreign Policy**](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx)**,** [**John L. Thornton China Center**](http://www.brookings.edu/china.aspx)**—Brookings Institution, 2011**

(Thomas J “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy”Foreign Affairs March/April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1> accessed 4/13 tm)

Apparently gone are the days when Chinese elites could ignore these voices. The government currently seems more nervous about maintaining long-term regime legitimacy and social stability than at any time since the period just after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Party leaders hope to avoid criticism along nationalist lines, a theme that has the potential to unify the many otherwise disparate local protests against Chinese officials. Moreover, individual officials need to foster their reputations as protectors of national pride and domestic stability during the leadership transition process, which will culminate in 2012 with the party's formal selection of a successor to President Hu Jintao. Such an environment does not lend itself to policies that might be seen as bowing to foreign pressure or being too solicitous of Washington.

# \*\* Solvency because there are probably some good affs on China when you get home\*\*\*

# Solvency US China space cooperation—plan mechanism

US should adopt unilateral space policy to engage China on space

Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST) <The USA has the opportunity to use both dissuasion and persuasion to break the impasse and open a dialogue. Short of withdrawing from the western Pacific, the USA can employ many different methods to convince China to play a more responsible role as an emerging space power. First, in the matter of dissuasion, many analysts have pointed out that anti-satellite weapons provide very little in terms of added security for US space assets. Rather, the best way to preserve US conventional force lethality and information dominance is through implementation of defensive measures for on-orbit assets, transition to more flexible networks of satellite constellations, and diversification to alternative service delivery platforms. These measures would spread the risk of losing any one segment of the network, reducing the potential strategic or tactical payoff in targeting the space segment in the first place [[9]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477" \l "bib9). Such measures require no bilateral negotiation, and can in effect enhance the bargaining position of the USA. Given very real resource constraints, the Chinese military may elect to divert to other projects the investment needed for research, development, and procurement of an effective and reliable anti-satellite capability. Therefore, an early and decisive policy of dissuasion on the part of the USA, and allies, could effectively dampen enthusiasm in China for destructive technologies and behaviors. Nevertheless, without an agreed upon understanding, the incentive to strike at what many Chinese strategists consider the Achilles’ heel of the US military machine is likely to remain a dominant consideration in China's space strategy. Clearly, China's leaders are driven by the strategic imperative to protect and project national sovereignty. This motivation has resulted in the *Shenzhou* manned spaceflight program and the *Chang-e* lunar probe mission, as well as the formation of cooperative associations such as the Asia–Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. An important dividend of these programs is the promotion of China's national prestige, both domestically and abroad. As the defenders of China's sovereignty and international image, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies on such programs as a bulwark for the regime's claim to legitimacy. Yet, even as the CCP stokes nationalistic zeal, it fears losing control of its citizens, making constructive outlets for nationalism, such as can be offered through international space cooperation, of vital importance. The next US president must recognize these incentives in the regime's calculus, and leverage them as key points for agreeing on limits to the nascent space arms race.>

# Change ITAR solvency

ITAR key to Co-OP Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST) <Finally, lifting the ITAR restrictions, in whole or at least in large part, opens the previously blocked path of cooperation with China in space exploration. Cooperation on civil space traditionally has been seen in the USA as a tool of soft power and a method of dampening tensions between potential adversaries, dating back to the *Apollo*–*Soyuz* Test Project. Enabling, for example, a multi-nation cooperative program in lunar exploration would again be a “prestige” incentive for China, which wants very badly to be seen as a world-class space power. Arguably such broad international cooperation on space exploration would also benefit the USA directly by allowing NASA to more widely share the nontrivial cost burdens at a time when budgetary pressure on the US government is growing rapidly.>

# PPWT Good Link/Impact: Chinese-Russian Alliance

**Link and impact—failure to negotiation anti-space weapons treaty risks Chinese-Russian alliance against the US, undercuts US interests on Iran and North Korea**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<In fact, it already has. n79 In 2002, Russia and China jointly submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to completely ban space weapons. n80 The preamble to this proposed treaty states that "for the benefit of mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and it shall never be allowed to become a sphere of military confrontation." n81 **[\*142]** The basic obligations proposed include "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" and "not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects." n82 This sweepingly broad language was too much for the United States, and it declined to enter any kind of negotiations on the proposal. n83 But even so, the proposal should serve as a strong warning to the United States of the close alignment between China and Russia on the space weapons issue. n84 If the United States completely flouts the manifest wishes of China and Russia on this issue, those two countries will be driven more closely together--not just on space weapons, but generally. n85 The United States would be wise to consider the significant long-term consequences of fortifying the Moscow-Beijing axis in this way. n86 The combined geopolitical--and specifically, military--might of these two nations would pose a grave threat to U.S. interests all over the world. n87 If a united Russia and China decided to support Iran or North Korea, the United States would be effectively blocked from pursuing its interests and security vis-a-vis those states. n88 As China inevitably becomes more powerful economically and militarily, the United States must do its best to maintain good relations with Russia and prevent it from moving completely into the Chinese camp. n89 Showing a willingness to negotiate on the space weapons issue would serve that goal well.>

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modernization stops weaponization

**modification of Outer Space Treaty necessary to limit space weaponization**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< The meat of the **Outer Space** **Treaty** was placed in Article IV: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." n97 This agreement on weapons of mass destruction was a major accomplishment in 1967. At that time, ICBMs were first being deployed and there was real fear that soon nuclear weapons would be stationed in space. n98 The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that, even if stationing nuclear weapons in space were feasible, such a development would be very dangerous for both sides and would hamper the noble, peaceful uses of space that are outlined in the Treaty's preamble. n99 A ban would be best for both sides and for humanity at large. n100

In 1967, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit was the only significant military threat that either side could envision in space. n101 The idea of precision-guided kinetic kill vehicles or laser weapons being effectively used in space was science fiction at the time and thus did not merit serious attention in the Treaty. But in 2007, these weapons are not only conceivable, they are being actively pursued and some could become operational within the next decade. n102 While perhaps not as massively destructive in their own right as actual nuclear weapons, these weapons have **[\*145]** the potential to be just as damaging to world peace and to humanity's future. Kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs have the potential to seriously disrupt the effectiveness of ICBMs and thus vitiate the peace through mutually assured destruction that has prevailed for more than half a century. n103 These threats are at least as serious today as the stationing of nuclear weapons in space was in 1967, and updating the Treaty to deal with them is the only way to fulfill the spirit of the Treaty in the 21st century.>

**counterplan solvency : Outer Space Treaty modification to include allegedly defensive weapons and technologies**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

< The current **Outer Space** **Treaty** is dangerously outdated, but so far all proposals to update the legal regime for space weaponry have fallen on deaf ears. The 2002 joint proposal by China and Russia was too blunt an instrument and was completely ignored by the United States. Instead of simply banning all space weapons in a new treaty, Article IV of the original **Outer Space** **Treaty** should be updated to include certain types of kinetic kill vehicles, laser weapons, and ASATs, in addition to the weapons of mass destruction that it already expressly bans. This is likely to be a more palatable option for the United States, which will still be able to pursue other military uses of space essential to its national security.>

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications stops weaponization

**U: Need international treaty for space to limit risk of weaponization**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<It is unlikely that a treaty on the scale of UNCLOS III will be needed for space any time soon. But some of the fundamental principles of UNCLOS III can and should be adapted to the space context and incorporated into the **Outer Space** **Treaty**. Specifically, the "freedom of space" idea that largely prevails under current international law should be reigned in to some extent, in the same manner that "freedom of the seas" has been reigned in by UNCLOS III. n125 At a general level, this is the way to deal with the most pressing issues in space--namely, the impending deployment of kinetic kill vehicles and lasers, and the continued development and testing of ASATs.>

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications stops weaponization

**US China space relations---need to negotiate new outer space treaty to avoid space arms race**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<The arms control treaties of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union--particularly the ABM Treaty n126 and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("SALT Treaties") n127--were instrumental in reducing tensions and mitigating the scale of the continuous arms race **[\*150]** between the two superpowers. n128 Today, the United States, China, and Russia should look to this past experience as a guide to the potential benefits of constructively updating the **Outer Space** **Treaty**. The United States and China are at a crossroads--they can either throw themselves into a destabilizing arms race involving space-based weapons and ASATs, or they can come to the table and rethink the aging **Outer Space** **Treaty**. The consequences of the former could be catastrophic, but they will in any case be very expensive. The latter option, however, would lead to increased stability and understanding between the two nations and to a better, more peaceful world.

The ABM Treaty, which was in effect from 1972 to 2002, serves as an excellent model for what should be done with the **Outer Space** **Treaty**. The ABM Treaty provides a very detailed description of the types of weapons it is designed to affect:

For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. n129

This is exactly the sort of detailed weapons definition that should be done for the **Outer Space** **Treaty**. Both sides should agree on specific definitions of kinetic kill vehicles, space-based laser systems, and ASATs, and spell out those definitions in the text of an updated Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty**. The ABM Treaty lasted from 1972 to the end of the Cold War, and then for another decade. n130 Without it, both the United States and the Soviet Union would have been forced into a destabilizing and expensive arms race that could have had tragic consequences.>

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications--Relations

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<The principles behind other Cold War arms control treaties are also highly relevant to the current standoff between the United States and China over space weapons. The SALT treaty recognizes in its preamble that nuclear war would be disastrous for both sides and that limiting the weapons that could take part in or instigate such a conflict is a good idea for both sides. n132 The Parties to the SALT II Treaty were "conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind" and "convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security." n133 These very same ideas militate in favor of adopting amendments to the **Outer Space** **Treaty** that would ban destabilizing kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs. With a new geopolitical dynamic and rapidly advancing technology, the Cold War limits on ICBMs and the current **Outer Space** **Treaty's** ban solely of weapons of mass destruction in space are no longer enough to protect the peace and security of humanity in the 21st century.

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications stops weaponization

**Renegotiation of Outer Space Treaty deals with emerging threats**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

It will not take much to effectively update the **Outer Space** **Treaty** to deal with emerging threats related to the development and deployment of space weapons and ASATs. As discussed above, n134 the relevant portion of Article IV of the Treaty currently reads "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such **[\*152]** weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." n135 It should be updated to read:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons, any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, kinetic kill vehicles, or directed energy weapons, install such weapons on celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, or attack objects in outer space with weapons based on Earth.

Put simply, Article IV of the Treaty must be updated to ban not only weapons of mass destruction--as it currently does--but also kinetic kill vehicles, space-based laser weapons, and ASATs.

These simple changes would make a world of difference, and could prevent catastrophe. In any case, they will save all sides the enormous trouble and expense that would be involved in a full-fledged arms race in space. Eventually the legal regime in space will need a more complete overhaul along the lines of UNCLOS III--by the 22nd century, humanity's use of space could easily be as common and complex as its use of the oceans is today--but in the near to mid-term, amending Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty** in the manner described would be enough to avert the worst dangers. In any case, as discussed below, n136 it is the option with the most realistic chance for success.>

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications stops weaponization

**U.S. affirming Outer Space Treaty now is key to solving US China Relations**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<If the United States continues to refuse to negotiate an extension to the **Outer Space** **Treaty**, the geopolitical standoff with China will become more and more severe as the 21st century progresses. China's bold test of an ASAT in January 2007 demonstrates that it is not cowed by the current U.S. technological superiority in space, and that it is able and willing to continue developing its own weapons. It will have no incentive to slow down or halt development of these weapons until the United States comes to the negotiating table to discuss limiting its own weapons. n137 While it might be possible for both sides to reach a sort of de facto agreement on limiting space weapons, a written document--specifically the proposed amendment to Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty**--is preferable because it will provide more certainty, and terefore more security overall. n138

**[\*153]** >

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications solves cooperation

**solvency : U.S. and China adoption of amendment to outer space treaty creates cooperation**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<Ultimately, this simple proposed amendment to Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty** is likely to be accepted by both the United States and China. The critical thing for the United States is that such a change will not hamper its ability to effectively develop and deploy the types of military support satellites that it currently uses and plans to use in the future. n139 For China, such a change to the **Outer Space** **Treaty** would have almost the same effect on its security as the ban on "all types of weapons" that it is currently proposing n140--all major offensive space weapons would be banned.

The United States has recently reaffirmed its unequivocal support for the current **Outer Space** **Treaty**. n141 Eric M. Javits proclaimed--in reference to arms control treaties affecting space--that "most important ... is the **Outer Space** **Treaty**, to which the United States remains firmly committed." n142 In order to appear firmly committed to international law in space, the United States continues to make statements such as this, where it reaffirms its complete commitment to past treaties. n143 The problem, however, is that space weapons technology is advancing rapidly, and a firm commitment to uphold the letter of the 1967 **Outer Space** **Treaty** is not enough to uphold the spirit of the treaty in the 21st century. Throughout his speech, Mr. Javits references the bold principles set forth in the preamble to **Outer Space** **Treaty**, discussed extensively above, n144 and reaffirms unequivocal support for those principles. n145 If such proclamations are true, the United States ought to be willing to sit down and discuss modest extensions to the Treaty in order to allow it to keep up with the times. A simple proposal to extend Article IV of the Treaty in the very targeted manner advocated here could very well meet with a receptive response>.

# Solvency: Outer Space Treaty modifications stops weaponization

**Solvency—US would accept the amendment to Outer Space Treaty if focused on tech developments**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

<A ban on "all types of weapons" is a complete non-starter to the United States because it has already invested significantly in various military support satellites that could technically fall within that language, and it would be unwilling to turn back the clock in favor of its potential adversaries. But banning only kinetic kill vehicles and space-based laser weapons (and ASATs) through the amendment to Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty** proposed above would be a very different matter. If the language in the amended treaty is made sufficiently clear so that only these weapons, and not any other types of satellites, are banned, the United States is much more likely to at least come to the table and discuss amending the Treaty. Also, a simple amendment to Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty**--which has been in effect since 1967 and has never been the subject of significant controversy in the interim--might be easier to swallow than an entirely new treaty. On a visceral level, the idea of adopting a new treaty based on the China-Russia joint paper might be unpalatable to the United States in a way that amending the current treaty would not be. The **Outer Space** **Treaty** must simply be updated to keep pace with changing technology--an eminently reasonable proposition.

The actual implementation of this proposed amendment to Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty** would be relatively straightforward. A ban on actual space weapons--kinetic kill vehicles and lasers--would be easy to implement since these weapons have yet to be deployed at all. A ban on the use of ASATs would be a bit more difficult because these weapons are already operational. However, both sides realize that ASATs are extremely destabilizing from a strategic point of view. Additionally, since ASATs threaten all satellites--not just actual space weapons--they have the potential to disrupt all sorts of vital infrastructure. Banning them would be to everyone's benefit, and would be no more difficult to implement than the reductions in ICBM inventory required under SALT. If the international **[\*156]** community can muster the will to amend Article IV of the **Outer Space** **Treaty**, the implementation of that amendment will be reasonably painless.>

# \*\*\*Miscellaneous\*\*\*

# Uniqueness US Export Controls limit China

**Uniqueness—US policy of export controls for goods exported to China limits their space program and cooperation with US**

**\*also a solvency argument for US-China coop Aff**

**Williamson, space technology and consultant, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, April 16, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

<In 1999, the US Congress transferred responsibility for satellite technology from the Commerce Department to the State Department, making exports of all satellite components, software and intellectual property subject to the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) rules.

In order to restrict technology transfer to China, the ITAR regime demanded the removal of commercial satellites containing American components from the Long March launch manifest. At a stroke, this curtailed China’s plans to become a commercial launch provider. ITAR also forced American satellite manufacturers to default on Asian satellite contracts and made it difficult for European contractors to include American components in their spacecraft.

One of the US-built satellites affected by ITAR was Chinasat-8, which was built by Space Systems/Loral for China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite Corp. The spacecraft was completed in December 1998, but ITAR halted its delivery and it has been in storage ever since. After nearly six years of trying to obtain US government approval to deliver the satellite, Loral gave up and, in 2004, negotiated a release from its contract with Long March operator China Great Wall Industry Corp.

Chinasat-8 has since been sold to Bermuda-based ProtoStar, which plans to operate an Asian DBS TV service. Renamed ProtoStar-1, the satellite is currently booked on an Ariane 5 launch in 2008.

The American export regime also led Alcatel Space to develop an ‘ITAR-free’ satellite, which could be marketed worldwide and launched on any rocket, including Long March. The $145m contract signed by Alcatel in 2004 for China Satellite Communications Corp’s Chinasat-9 spacecraft showed that ITAR had, unintentionally, deprived American industry of satellite contracts. Zhang Qingwei, president of CASC, was blunt on the matter: “The US policy to restrain China’s space industry has made cooperation between China and the United States very difficult.” >

# AT Russia and China do it CP

**Russia and China cooperation difficult—multiple obstacles**

**China Daily 2009** (China and Russia Shake Hands In Outer Space, December 25, 2009, Lexis Nexis Academic, accessed June 24, 2011, AT )

Cooperation needed for success of mission to put vehicle on moon Mutual trust is crucial to the success of five upcoming joint space programs between **China** and **Russia,** experts said.

First on the list is a study of the moon, Alexander Rodin, chief representative in China for the Russian Federal Space Agency, said yesterday in Beijing.

"Currently the space administrations and relevant enterprises of the two countries are discussing ways to install scientific facilities onto each other's spacecraft," said Rodin. The projects fall under the 2010-2012 **China-Russia Space Cooperation** Outline.

Once the Chang'e 1 spacecraft finishes its mission in the moon's orbit, China is preparing to conduct the second phase of its lunar exploration program, which is to land a vehicle on the moon.

Russia also has similar plans to send a vehicle to the moon, according to Rodin.

With China's rapid development in space technology in the last 10 to 15 years, **Russia** has taken on **China** as a partner rather than a competitor, according to Rodin. "Actually, there is no field where we need to compete with each other in space," Rodin said.

Despite Rodin's friendly gesture, at least one analyst is disgruntled with **Russia's** actions.

"**China** has been cheated by **Russia,**" said Song Xiaojun, a Beijing-based military expert, referring to the postponement of a joint mission to Mars.

According to an agreement signed between the two countries in 2007, **Russia** was to launch a rocket carrying **China's** Mars probe YH-1 into orbit in October 2009.

However, the launch was postponed by Russia for two years as it said it needed to further perfect the functions of its carrier rocket, Rodin explained.

# Space Weaponization Treaty erodes Chinese interests

**China hurt by space treaty to limit weaponization**

**Tellis ‘07**

[Senior adviser for Department of Defense, 2011, Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space

Strategy, September 1, 2007, [**http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752**](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752), 6-23-11, Rg]

This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they’re right. Weaponization of space would indeed be costly and especially dangerous to the United States, which relies most heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are correct when they emphasize that advanced powers stand to gain disproportionately from a universal regime capable of protecting their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they believe such a regime is attainable and therefore ought to be pursued. Weaker but significant challengers such as China simply cannot permit the creation of a space sanctuary because of its consequences for their own interests. Even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial collectively and particularly to Washington, its specific costs to Beijing in terms of national military strategy would be remarkably high. Not surprisingly, then, the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party has authorized counterspace programs remarkable for their comprehensiveness and diversity.

# Russia China relations Link: space coop

**Russia and China cooperation improves relations**

**China Daily 2009** (China and Russia Shake Hands In Outer Space, December 25, 2009, Lexis Nexis Academic, accessed June 24, 2011, AT )

Russia indeed lacks money, according to Guo Xiaobing, a researcher with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, but it has technology and skills. "China needs to consider every important aspect of the cooperation for a win-win situation," said Guo. Other plans for cooperation include a communication system for members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a remote monitoring system of the Earth and a positioning system that shares signals between the two countries. Confidentiality can be a concern in such cooperative space programs, according to Gong Jinyu, deputy secretary-general of Chinese Society of Astronautics. "However, we should not stop cooperation because of the risk of leaking information," said Gong. "If we want to develop our power in space, we need to cooperate with other countries." Guo agreed with this and noted that mutual trust is the answer to solving such problems. An agreement on informing each other of ballistic missile and carrier rocket launches was signed during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to China this October, which "is a good example of the increase of strategic mutual trust between the two countries," Guo said. Two social communities, the Chinese Society of Astronautics and Russia's K. E. Tsiolkovsky Astronautics Institution, signed an agreement this December aiming to promote space exchanges at the academic level. "The cooperation between such organizations is very important to the development of **China** and **Russia's** space cause," said Rodin, who promoted the cooperation and attended the signing ceremony on Dec 12. "This kind of exchange is crucial for enhancing mutual trust and understanding between the two countries," said Gong.

# Uniqueness: U.S. not using international space law

**-US adopting hands off approach to international space law**

**Englehart, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association , 2008**

(Alex B., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, January 2008, <http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1> kc)

Unfortunately, under the Bush administration, the United States seems firmly committed to "freedom of space"--it sees no need to consider other possibilities. n116 For the last several years, the United States has pursued space weapons technology in the face of opposition from the rest of the world. n117 The justifications for these space weapons programs usually come back to national security, but commercial interests in space for the United States and its citizens are also implicated. n118 As with other aspects of United States foreign policy in the last several years, the American position on space weapons has been characterized by a distinct unwillingness to compromise with other nations. In a major speech to the Conference on Disarmament, the U.S. representative stated that "the commitment of the United States to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations, for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humanity, is clear. But the peaceful exploration and use of space obviously does not rule out activities in pursuit of national security goals." n119 The United States sets its national security goals, and pursues them unilaterally--it has so far been unwilling to consider all of the manifold international ramifications of its policies. The space weapons debate has been simmering since the 1970s, but only since **[\*148]** the early 21st century has it reached crisis proportions--not only because of rapidly advancing technology, but also because of American domestic politics.> n120