# \*\*AFF answers to the China CPs\*\*\*

# Couple of notes:

1. **Every aff should have a US key warrant and a US space policy key warrant—those advantages are solvency deficits and add-ons that the CP can’t solve for.**

**2. you can argue that the plan portion of the perm would be shielded by the non-space policy**

**3. international fiat start of a block in one of these 2ac blocks---you should write your own theory blocks.**

**4. China is evil evidence from original file can be used with some of the China rise to the top bad ev in the HE-3 and India cooperation affs.**

# China Do It CP 2AC

1. **Case is a Da to the CP-Us is key to the advantages: Our evidence assumes that US leadership is key to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. Failure to use the US means that the CP ensures the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ impact will happen.**

**2. Turn--China leadership in space leads to space race**

Marlow 9- a Marshall Scholar working on the European Space Agency’s ExoMars mission at Imperial College London

(Jeff Marlow is a Marshall Scholar working on the European Space Agency’s ExoMars mission at Imperial College London, Spring 2009, *“*Moon-rush: Is the United States

Sitting Out of the Next Space Race?”, <https://www.nss.org/Ad_Astra_Spring_09-Final.pdf>, AD: 6/20/11, SL)

The Asian space race was ignited in large part by China, which in 2003 became just the third nation to achieve manned spaceflight. China’s manned missions—there have now been three—are all part of a long-term agenda that will see the construction of a Chinese space laboratory and permanent space station. The program, titled Project 921, has been on the books since 1992, reflecting the persistence and foresight with which China has pursued its spacefaring ambitions. Though it has been a long time in the making, China’s space program is finally achieving visible results, and the rest of the world has noticed. China’s distinctive blend of militaristic tendencies and nationalistic fervor, highlighted by a 2007 antisatellite missile test, has triggered a powerful reaction. Other Asian powers have responded, and a new story has begun to unfold in the regional battle for cultural, technological, and economic supremacy.

**b. Space race bad—escalates global conflict**

**Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008** (Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database)

<Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities [see box at left], proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competition--whether in space or elsewhere--equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic.)

**3. perm do the plan and the CP—cooperation with China good improves relations**

**cooperation ensures regional stability**

**Van Der Putten, Clingendael Institute, 2010**

(Frans- Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010 accessed 6/26 st)

The most fundamental element in China’s policy towards North Korea is that Beijing regards the US as a greater security threat than the situation on the Korean peninsula. Since neither China nor the US is by itself the predominant great power in Korean affairs, Beijing can only assume responsibility for regional stability if it does so jointly with the US. However, this will not happen since China and the US each regard one another as their main potential military adversary. They also have contrary interests on the Korean peninsula.

# China Do It CP 2AC

**4. No solvency—export controls limits their space program and cooperation with US**

**Williamson, space technology and consultant, 2007**

(Mark, Engineering and Technology, April 16, 2007, “Space the Chinese Way” accessed June 21, 2011, AT)

<In 1999, the US Congress transferred responsibility for satellite technology from the Commerce Department to the State Department, making exports of all satellite components, software and intellectual property subject to the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) rules.

In order to restrict technology transfer to China, the ITAR regime demanded the removal of commercial satellites containing American components from the Long March launch manifest. At a stroke, this curtailed China’s plans to become a commercial launch provider. ITAR also forced American satellite manufacturers to default on Asian satellite contracts and made it difficult for European contractors to include American components in their spacecraft.

**5. CP links to politics (if net benefit) the CP would be unpopular—China bashers would hate allowing China to do the plan alone and instead of the US**

**6. Read your US key add-ons. When in doubt read the US Heg good from the SPS affirmative (leadership adv extensions)>**

**7. International Fiat is bad**

**a. Judge is a US policymaker:** no way for judge to compare utility of US versus China action .

**b. No solvency literature**--since we cannot read or use the literature of the country because of language and access issues. No solvency advocate for China to do the plan instead of the US. Voting issue reciprocity and competitive equity.

 **c. voting issue—reject the team and the cp**

# China Do It CP 2AC

8. Turn—China space dominance bad

**Whittington, 3 - writer and space policy analyst**

[Mark, The coming space race with China, June 23, 2003, The Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/28/1>]

This aspiration to extend China’s influence to Earth’s nearest neighbor represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States and its allies. China, which has aspirations to become the second superpower, or even to supplant the United States as the sole superpower, seems to have hit upon expansion into the heavens as a means of achieving that goal. Jim Oberg, a former NASA engineer and space policy analyst, has coined the term “space power.” Space power consists of a state’s ability to utilize space for economic, political, and military advantage. China understands that in the 21st century the state which is best able to acquire and exert space power will be most likely to be the greatest superpower of the future. Just as sea power was the key to super power status in the 18th and 19th centuries, and air power in the 20th century, space power is the key for such status in the new century. In the meantime, the United States has no definitive plans to send humans beyond low Earth orbit. Certainly the nuclear propulsion and power technologies being developed by Project Prometheus will have applications for such missions. The myriad of robotic probes being sent to Mars and a proposed sample return mission to the lunar south pole are understood to be precursors for astronauts to follow. But no one in a position of authority has been willing to say when—or even if—humans will voyage back to the Moon and on to Mars since the collapse of President George H.W. Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative. America’s human space program seems stuck in low Earth orbit and, with the Columbia accident, seems to have only a tenuous hold even there. The prospect of the Chinese landing yuhangyuans on the Moon and even establishing a permanent presence there while America dithers should be a matter of great concern. China is ruled by a fascist government that, despite certain economic reforms, still regularly violates the human rights of its own citizens and threatens other countries with invasion or destruction. China’s ascendancy as the sole superpower, helped along by her space activities, would be a horrific development, threatening freedom and world peace. Even without reference to China’s lunar ambitions, the military implications of Shenzhou should give one pause. The integration of technologies achieved by Shenzhou , including recoverable satellite capability, implies the ability to hit targets in the United States with nuclear warheads with a great deal of accuracy. Also the same low-power propulsion technology used to adjust a spacecraft’s orbit could also be used to alter the path of offensive missiles, helping them evade proposed US anti-missile defense systems, military expert Song Yichang told the state-run China Business Times a few years ago. “We can use this technology to change trajectories in flight, making missiles do a little dance and evade opponents’ attacks,” the newspaper said. China’s space ambitions suggest, and indeed demand, a response from the United States and her allies. In order to avoid being left behind in space, and thus having its position as sole superpower called into question, the United States should jump start its moribund space effort. In effect, the United States should challenge China to a space race. The appeal of such a race is obvious. It could be suggested that more progress was made in perfecting the art of space travel in the eight years between Kennedy’s lunar challenge and the landing of Apollo 11 than in the over thirty years since Apollo ended. Reintroducing the spur of international competition would seem to be a potent idea.

# Stop Taiwan Arms Sales 2ac

**1. perm—do the plan and stop Taiwan arms sales**

**2. Case is a DA to the plan---failure to increase space exploration means that we don’t \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. This is real bad.**

**3. No solvency for relations and conflict--the Taiwan question is only a symbol of the underlying structural problems in relations – only the plan solves**

**Weitz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, June 21, 2010 [Richard, “**[**China Overplays Taiwan Arms**](http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/21/china-overplaying-taiwan-arms/)**,” http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/21/china-overplaying-taiwan-arms/2/] SM**

Although the United States severed its formal defence alliance with Taipei when it recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government continues to sell arms to the country under the Taiwan Relations Act, an approach it says helps sustain the peaceful status quo by balancing the PLA’s growing capabilities. Washington fears that declining to assist the Taiwanese military would encourage China to adopt more aggressive policies toward Taiwan, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation. It has become clear in recent years that further defence exchanges or confidence-building measures can’t by themselves overcome what both sides view as fundamentally issues of principle—preserving regional security for the Americans, and defending national sovereignty and rights as an emerging great power for the Chinese (although as Gates noted, their persistent defence differences haven’t prevented the two sides from collaborating on other important issues, especially in the economic realm).

But it’s anyway doubtful that the United States and China could have a healthy defence relationship even if Washington were to completely sever ties with Taiwan because, despite decades of sustained engagement, the bilateral military dialogue remains highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks. The most important impediment to better Sino-US defence ties has been the underlying contentious nature of their relationship in general. This has been most apparent over Taiwan, but reflects deeper differences over power and values.

**4. No risk of conflict over Taiwan—means it can’t solve the China advantage or de-escalate tensions**

**Tkacik September 2007** [John J., Jr., Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, , 2007, WebMemo #1606, accessed 9/11/07 http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1606.cfm]

But a crisis is in the making. While Taiwan's leaders remain tone-deaf amid the vast global preoccupations of their most important friend, the United States, the Bush Administration appears on the verge of reversing its "long-standing" agnosticism on the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait to punish Taiwan's tone-deafness. On August 30, a National Security Council aide flatly and un-agnostically declaimed that "Taiwan is not a state in the international community."[10]

Beijing, naturally, is delighted. An American declaration that Taiwan is "not a state" has been Beijing's dream for a half a century. That the United States would, in the face of Chinese threats, appear to simply abandon a "long-standing" policy must also send a sobering signal to the rest of Asia: Washington is so distracted with real shooting wars that it cannot bring itself to risk Beijing's ill will under any circumstances. Even President Bush's "reiteration" at the Sydney APEC of "America's commitment to help strengthen the expansion of freedom" in the region looks squishy as Taiwan's political legitimacy erodes.[11]

# US China Cooperation CP 2ac

1**. no solvency—China won’t believe the CP is a genuine gesture Chinese beliefs about US motivations mean plan spun as containment not as concession.**

**Lieberthal, Director John Thornton China Center Brookings Institution, 2010 (Ken,** “Discussion of THE PERILS OF PROXIMITY: CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS” Brookings Institution, October 18, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/1018_china_japan.aspx> accessed tm 12/24)

MR. LIEBERTHAL: Well, it clearly is a dangerous dynamics. It’s interesting. If you go back to President Obama’s trip to Beijing last November and look at the joint statement that was issued there, that was the most authoritative major statement put out by our governments jointly since the third communiqué back in 1982. So this is a serious thing to examine.

And to my knowledge, for the first time the two governments jointly acknowledged that one of the major problems in the relationship is a lack of mutual trust. Basically, what we anticipate the other side’s goals are vis-à-vis us over time. And that that was a problem that needs to be worked on. I agree with that completely. It’s somewhat ironic that since then mutual trust has deteriorated significantly and the narrative in China now that I hear everywhere from people who I know, you know, overmany years basically had a very strong desire to see a strong U.S.-China relationship and so forth, is that the U.S. is really acting now to constrain China and disrupt its rise. And the basic assumption is the hegemon cannot tolerate the rise of a truly competitive power. And with that assumption that there is a capacity to put almost any American action into this narrative in the sense that it’s all part of some sort of conspiracy in one way or another to bog China down, divert it from what it ought to be doing, give it responsibilities it isn’t prepared to take on, and rally countries around its periphery to call for a bigger U.S. presence to offset China’s growing powers.

**2. Perm—do the plan and engage in cooperation with China**

**3. China won’t agree to the perm—creates budget tradeoffs**

**Asia Times 2010**

**(**July 16 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html> accessed tm )

"China will likely be the country to most clearly benefit," said Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US Naval War College. "That said, China likely still faces the most challenges. Cooperation between the US and China will be a learning process, and likely not an easy one for either party. And, because space technology is largely dual-use there will inherently be questions about intent and demands for transparency that are uncomfortable for both sides."

China's objectives are political, not technical in this instance. As the Chinese strive to become respected members of the international community of space-faring nations, some Chinese aerospace professionals see cooperation with the US as an obstacle, according to Kulacki. A cooperative project with the US in human space flight, for example, would take time, personnel and resources away from their existing program.

"To date there have been no concrete proposals for cooperative projects from either side, despite the express wishes of both presidents. US Secretary of State Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang [Jiechi] seem to have dropped the ball," said Kulacki. "The Chinese aerospace community has their own long-standing plan for a national space station and they are well on their way to completing it. They do not need access to US technology to do it."

**4. CP links to politics—cooperation with China on space unpopular**

**Asia Times 2010**

**(**July 16 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html> accessed tm )

Political infighting aside, it is not just US conservatives who do not want the US to embrace China in space.

"Many members of the Obama administration and a large majority of the members of Congress are opposed to cooperation with China in space. They want to deny China status as a member in good standing of the international community of space-faring nations," said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists. "Many believe they have not earned that right. At the same time, however, they have not specified what China must do to earn it. Some tie cooperation in space to human rights. Others connect cooperation in space it to other troublesome issues in the bilateral relationship."

# US China Cooperation CP 2ac

**5. Case is a DA to the CP-- Obstacles to US China space cooperation—limit effectiveness**

**Fukushima, National Institute Defense Studies, 2011**

(Yasuhito, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646), Feb 2011 ebsco 6/20 rs)

<Yet it should be noted that there are some obstacles to having substantial cooperation in space. First, as many have noted, collaboration among nations does not necessarily contribute to cost savings. Rather, it sometimes causes budget overruns and delays. Even if one can expect cost reductions, space-related activities still entail a lot of costs. Some countries may therefore hesitate to collaborate and prefer continued reliance on the USA or commercial services. Second, the future of the ongoing reform of the US export control system is uncertain while the domestic political scene in the USA remains cloudy. Lastly, some American lawmakers have voiced concerns that even civil space cooperation with China may strengthen Chinese military capabilities.[26](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610001165%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn26) These are the issues which need to be considered when promoting international cooperation.>

**6. No incentive for cooperation-- Key sticking points now bigger deal because of Chinese strength relative to the US**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

Last year, when China broke off military-to-military talks after the Obama administration's long-expected sale of defensive arms to Taiwan, a high American official asked his Chinese counterpart why China reacted so strongly to something it had accepted in the past. The answer: "Because we were weak then and now we are strong."

On a recent visit to Beijing, I asked a Chinese expert what was behind the new assertiveness in China's foreign policy. His answer: "After the financial crisis, many Chinese believe we are rising and the US is declining."

#  Condition China CP 2AC

1. perm—use the plan as the condition. The counterplan is not competitive—there is no reason why you can’t do both—there is nothing about the net benefit that is a reason to reject the affirmative—there is no DA to not using the plan as a condition only a net benefit to using the plan as a condition.

2. Conditions CP = bad

a. The affirmative cannot generate offense to the condition counterplan with their aff and this is a reason to reject because this skews competitive equity in the world of offense-defense

b. reject the counterplan because time based competition is artificial and skews competitive equity

3. Case is a DA to the CP--the CP is really just a delay cp in disguise—advantages of the plan in the transition while we are waiting for China to agree to the conditions outweigh the net benefit

**4. No solvency—China will only view the CP as method of tricking China into containing them**

**Lieberthal, Director John Thornton China Center Brookings Institution, 2010**

 (Ken, “Discussion of THE PERILS OF PROXIMITY: CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS” Brookings Institution, October 18, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/1018_china_japan.aspx> accessed tm 12/24)

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5. Turn—CP viewed as effort to leverage US position in space China freak out China would perceive US action as aggression

Hitchens and Chen, World Security Institute, 2008 (Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 24, Issue 3](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232008%23999759996%23695059%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000059713&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=108429&md5=11c3c2aa9a0fab5ca0d3e089bee8b924), June 21, 2011, sciencedirect.com. ST)

(Since the Reagan era, US interest in on-orbit and anti-satellite weapons has stemmed from three intertwining strategic concerns: the threat of ballistic missile strike, protecting the space systems upon which the US military depends, and preventing an adversary from using space in the same way as the US military does to enhance its conventional military prowess. After President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, “China began a program to modernize its strategic missile forces because of doubts about the survivability of its small nuclear deterrent” [[5]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib5). The Pentagon notes that the Chinese Navy is developing the necessary technologies to field a nuclear submarine fleet, a key to increasing the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent in the face of a second-strike-nullifying ballistic missile shield [[6]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib6). The current US strategic policy of “space dominance” aims at ensuring US freedom of action in space, as well as the ability to deny the use of space to adversaries [[7]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964608000477%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib7). China, with some good reason, sees itself as particularly vulnerable to such space doctrine, and in response may feel compelled to develop countervailing measures, in order to counteract the proscriptions of US policy. The USA cannot reasonably be expected to abandon its space capabilities, but a more constructive *modus vivendi* can surely be found by demonstrating that both the USA and China are “responsible stakeholders” in the realm of space.)

# Condition China CP 2AC

**6. conditioning will take a long time with China---internal political processes**

**Lavin, China Expert, 2011**

(Frank, Consequential China: U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition

Published on June 28, 2011 by [Franklin Lavin](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/nonstaff/L/Franklin-Lavin) <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Consequential-China-US-China-Relations-in-a-Time-of-Transition> accessed tm)

**LAVIN:** I think you might have put your finger on one of the challenges. I agree with you; there are a lot of challenges in information flow in China. There are a lot of people you can have very thoughtful discussions with. And it is encouraging that the kind of discussion we’re having in this room, that you can do trade-offs. What are your interests where are you trying to go? How might those impinge on my interests? In what ways can we collaborate? That’s normal give and take of foreign policy, but it’s easier to have that on a track two channel than a track one. A track one tends to be a bit more formal maybe a bit more dogmatic a bit more maximalist and so forth, so it is a bit harder to have useful discussions.

But I spent a long time in formal negotiating rounds with China. One of our rules of thumb was that at least the first round of trade negotiations was done for domestic consumption. That participants had to go into this room and say that here is what I do not like about you and here is what I need and here is why I will not go along with you, and they had to be all out there on the table in order for them to then be able to say, What can we work on and what do we have to do? So information does not flow as readily as it could in that system. And there is a problem, I think, with hierarchy and there is a problem with filtering mechanisms.

# Arms Control with China 2AC

**1.** **perm—do the plan and engage in United States federal government should initiate arms control dialogue with the government of the People’s Republic of China paralleling the United States’ arms control agenda with Russia. Solve by putting the plan into the context of arms control policy not space policy—shield from the space links to the net benefits**

**2. CP links to politics the plan doesn’t:** CP viewed as cooperation making nice with China, the plan isn’t.

**3. NO solvency---zero evidence that the CP is the kind of CBM necessary to solve our China must be checked internal link**

**4. NO solvency--- China will reject the CP and space policy is still key how China views the US. Failure to act on space will be mean that the arms control regime won’t work to alter China policy.**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

<In considering the Chinese approach to what the West has termed anti-access/area denial strategies, it is important to recognize that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a careful observer of Western, and especially American, approaches to what they first termed Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions, and is now termed Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions. These include the Falklands conflict, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, NATO’s campaigns in the Balkans, the toppling of the Taliban, and the March 2003 march to Baghdad. Consequently, PLA defense planning is being shaped, in no small part, by the lessons that they have derived from observing how potential opponents, but especially the United States, have been waging their wars.

Under Mao Zedong, the PLA expected to fight “early wars, major wars, nuclear wars,” which would entail protracted war fought on Chinese soil, with a heavy reliance on guerrilla warfare. Since the rise of Deng Xiaoping, however, the expectation is for more localized, limited conflicts. PLA analyses of Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions, and subsequently of Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions posit that future wars:

* Will be shorter, perhaps lasting only one campaign;
* Will almost certainly not entail the occupation of China, although Chinese political, economic, and military centers are likely to be attacked;
* And will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space, and the application of advanced technology, especially information technology.

Chinese analyses of these wars have sought to derive actionable lessons for the PLA from these conflicts. The evolution of the so-called new “three attacks, three defends,” for example, posits that the PLA should pay special attention to attacking stealth aircraft, long-range cruise missiles, and attack helicopters, while defending against precision strike, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance and surveillance. The two I’d like to address in my testimony are:

* The ability of the United States to dictate the operational and tactical terms of the conflict, by conducting closely coordinated precision strike operations with joint forces through the use of space assets.>
* The ability of the United States to dictate the strategic terms of the conflict, by influencing domestic opinion, opposition will, and third-party support.
* The theme underlying these aspects is the creation of a defense-in-depth against the United States, not only at the tactical and operational level through the creation of layered defenses, but also strategically, by denying the U.S. the ability to set the strategic context of the conflict.

# Military to military with China CP 2AC

1. **perm—do the plan and the United States federal government should expand military to military and lab to lab exchanges with the government, including the military and scientific agencies, of the People’s Republic of China. Proves that the plan would be viewed in context of scientific experiments not space policy shields the plan**

**2. no solvency—no evidence that the military to military cooperation key to stopping space aggression.**

**3.Case is a DA to the CP: US space policy key to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**4. CP links to the DA—the CP would be viewed as softline towards China very unpopular.**

**5. no solvency No incentive for military to military talks given China position relative to the US**

**Nye,** professor at Harvard, **April 12 2011**

(Joseph, “Chinese hubris and US fear obscure true power picture” The Nation (Thailand)

April 12, 2011 lexis accessed 4/13 tm)

Last year, when China broke off military-to-military talks after the Obama administration's long-expected sale of defensive arms to Taiwan, a high American official asked his Chinese counterpart why China reacted so strongly to something it had accepted in the past. The answer: "Because we were weak then and now we are strong."

On a recent visit to Beijing, I asked a Chinese expert what was behind the new assertiveness in China's foreign policy. His answer: "After the financial crisis, many Chinese believe we are rising and the US is declining."

# \*\*\*Negative\*\*

# China Do It CP 2NC AT: “perm do both—solves cooperation”

**1. perm is intrinsic—adds cooperation: nothing about the plan and the cp is cooperation. Even if they win that they can do the plan and China can do it, there’s no cooperation net benefit just means that the US and China are acting simultaneously. The net benefit still links to the US action. Voter for reciprocity and competitive equity.**

**2. no solvency—China won’t believe the perm is a genuine gesture Chinese beliefs about US motivations mean plan spun as containment not as concession.**

**Lieberthal, Director John Thornton China Center Brookings Institution, 2010**

(Ken, “Discussion of THE PERILS OF PROXIMITY: CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS” Brookings Institution, October 18, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/1018_china_japan.aspx> accessed tm 12/24)

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**3. China won’t agree to the perm—creates budget tradeoffs**

**Asia Times 2010**

**(**July 16 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html> accessed tm )

"China will likely be the country to most clearly benefit," said Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US Naval War College. "That said, China likely still faces the most challenges. Cooperation between the US and China will be a learning process, and likely not an easy one for either party. And, because space technology is largely dual-use there will inherently be questions about intent and demands for transparency that are uncomfortable for both sides."

China's objectives are political, not technical in this instance. As the Chinese strive to become respected members of the international community of space-faring nations, some Chinese aerospace professionals see cooperation with the US as an obstacle, according to Kulacki. A cooperative project with the US in human space flight, for example, would take time, personnel and resources away from their existing program.

"To date there have been no concrete proposals for cooperative projects from either side, despite the express wishes of both presidents. US Secretary of State Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang [Jiechi] seem to have dropped the ball," said Kulacki. "The Chinese aerospace community has their own long-standing plan for a national space station and they are well on their way to completing it. They do not need access to US technology to do it."

# China Do It CP 2NC AT: “perm do both—solves cooperation”

**4. perm links to politics—cooperation with China on space unpopular**

**Asia Times 2010**

**(**July 16 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html> accessed tm )

Political infighting aside, it is not just US conservatives who do not want the US to embrace China in space.

"Many members of the Obama administration and a large majority of the members of Congress are opposed to cooperation with China in space. They want to deny China status as a member in good standing of the international community of space-faring nations," said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists. "Many believe they have not earned that right. At the same time, however, they have not specified what China must do to earn it. Some tie cooperation in space to human rights. Others connect cooperation in space it to other troublesome issues in the bilateral relationship."

# China Do It CP 2nc AT “China lacks money to do the plan”

**China has lots of funding—and top leaders support for space**

**Washington Times January 8 2010**

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/08/china-eyes-high-ground/> accessed tm

NASA’s experts understand the capabilities, talents - and intentions - of their Chinese counterparts perhaps better than anyone outside China and Russia. China’s Long March V rockets are in development now; Russian space scientists now aid their Chinese counterparts in perfecting the Shenzhou class of manned vehicles - closely modeled on the rugged, tried-and-true Soyuz; China has also purchased Russia’s spacesuit designs and the KURS and APAS rendezvous and docking systems.

In contrast, NASA has resigned itself to the realities that America’s space shuttles will be decommissioned by 2010 and, while the test-launch of the Ares 1-X heavy lift booster was successful, the follow-on Constellation manned program does not have a budget that will get it off the blueprint tables. Nor is NASA staffed with the scientists needed to support it. The median age of NASA’s manned space engineers is now over 55. Over a quarter are past retirement age. Meanwhile, China’s average lunar probe engineer is about 33 years old and the Shenzhou manned-space program engineers average about 36.

China’s space program also seems to have all the funding and resources it needs, partially due to the fact that seven of China’s nine most senior leaders - the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo - are themselves engineers.

# Frontline versus “US should check China power” Advantages//India Cooperation Aff (China Adv)

1. **Turn—China watching US policy—increase in development will not deter China, it will embolden them militarily**

**Cheng, Asian Studies Center, 2011**

(Dean, Heritage Foundation, *February 1, 2011* , http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact, 6-22-11, kc)

In the tactical and operational realm, PLA observation of Western conflicts has led them to conclude that, in order to conduct the high-tempo, dispersed operations typical of recent Local Wars, it is essential to have access to space. Chinese analyses of the first Gulf War, the conflicts in the Balkans, and the march to Baghdad are rife with statistics on the number of satellites employed, whether maintaining surveillance over opponents, providing essential weather information, or guiding munitions and forces.

Thus, as one PLA analysis notes, in places like Afghanistan, when U.S. military forces have identified the enemy, they have promptly exploited GPS to determine the enemy’s location and satellite communications to transmit the target’s location to weapons operators, in order to attack targets promptly. Similarly, in Iraq, the use of space was essential for the U.S. military’s intelligence gathering and battlefield command and control.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1)

From their perspective, the ability to exploit space is essential for the ability to wage non-contact, non-linear, non-symmetric warfare. This reliance is so extensive that another Chinese analysis posits that the U.S. could not conduct the kind of warfare it prefers, but only high-level mechanized warfare, if it could not access space.

The implication is that an essential part of any Chinese anti-access/area denial effort will probably entail operations against the U.S. space infrastructure, both in order to secure space dominance, *zhitian quan*, for the PLA, as well as to deny it to the United States. Space dominance, in this case, is defined as the ability to control the use of space, at times and places of one’s own choosing, while denying an opponent the same ability.

It should be noted here, first, that there is still no indication of whether the PLA has developed a formal space doctrine governing military operations in space. The available PLA literature does have, however consistent themes that emerge.

2. **Turn—US attempts to maintain space hegemony like the plan causes China space race—we can’t win**

Su, Xiao Jiaotong University, 2010

( Jinyuan Su, Space Policy, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University, August 2010, sciencedirect, accessed 6/27 ST)

 (The illegality and ineffectiveness of space-based weapons are not what have created the urgency for the PPWT, as one could argue that we are still well off so long as states refrain from deployment. Rather, the PPWT is indeed urgently needed because of the development of ground-based ASATs. Today the world is already half way down the road to space weaponization, and is still marching on. The USA’s R&D into space-based kinetic kill vehicles and laser beams is no secret. Its official policies that advocate space weaponization touch the nerves of other states, in particular those not allied to it. Although such advocacies do not establish actual deployment, states seeking to decipher its behaviour can only infer that the USA plans to weaponize outer space.[57](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn57) The abrogation of the ABM Treaty is read as an arbitrary step of clearing away the legal obstacles to weaponization. Certain states are therefore sure to prepare for a worst-case scenario, because space-based weapons cover a global operating range and deployment could bring overwhelming superiority. Bruce MacDonald of the US Institute of Peace said as much at a March 2009 congressional testimony: “[W]e could create a self-fulfilling prophecy: as nations like China or Russia see evidence of US attempted space hegemony, they would accelerate their own efforts, just as we would if the roles were reversed.”[58](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn58) To respond, China, for instance, has the options of building more warheads, developing missile defence countermeasures, developing ASATs, and reconsidering arms control and nonproliferation commitments.[59](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn59) As for Russia, competing with the USA in space, as the USSR did in the past, is fairly popular among its political and military leaders, and may be explained by the fact that space technology is one of the few areas in which Russian technologies remain internationally competitive.[60](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn60) The USSR was the only country that developed and operationally deployed an ASAT system to attack satellites in low-Earth orbits (LEOs).[61](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn61) India is also upping the pace in order not to lag behind. Recent debates on India’s need to refine and test a “satellite killing” capability have emerged since the US decision to shoot down a faulty spy satellite on 20 February 2008.[62](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/science/article/pii/S0265964610000573%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn62)

# Frontline versus “US should check China power” Advantages//India Cooperation Aff (China Adv)

**3. Turn—its not a question of who wins the race—even if they are right that the plan results in US dominance in space, China will lash out and first strike, well, first, before it sees its position slipping further**

**Chinese Space militarization in response to US leads to war and instability including first strike and escalation**

**Hitchens, CDI Director, 2008** (Theresa Hitchens, Scientific American, CDI Director, March 2008, Academic Search Database)

<Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities [see box at left], proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competition--whether in space or elsewhere--equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic.)

# Frontline versus “US should check China power” Advantages//India Cooperation Aff (China Adv)

**4. Empirically, when the US tries to outdue China, China lashes out—nuke weapons prove**

**US China Relations Link—US unilateral action perceived as hostile by China, hurts relations**

Dingli, 2008

 (Shen, Survival February-March 2008 accessed June 20, 2011)

<When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defence, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the United States refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent. The cost should never be a worry for Beijing, as Washington might eventually lose a defence–offence race; effective defence is far more costly on the ground. This picture could be blurred if the United States militarises space. With space-based sensors and weapons platforms, US military capability will be many times amplified. For a benign and peace-loving country to acquire this capacity might be acceptable, if it truly upholds ‘peaceful purposes’ and ‘benefits of all humanity’, but US actions regarding Taiwan lead a majority of Chinese to reject the idea, and the invasion of Iraq has alienated the United States from many other countries. The world respects America’s right to national security, but cannot accept its militarisation of space for its security, as there would be no way to stop it if it decided to promote its security at the cost of another. Therefore, absent an agreement to contain space weaponisation, there needs to be a space balance of force to assure a new type of security stability. A China that can preserve its deterrence, whether from the surface of the Earth or outer space, is an asset to the world, if there is no way to dissuade America. It is understandable that others suspect China’s long-term strategic intentions, but China welcomes others to check and balance it through a multipolar structure. The world can rest assured that China does not aspire to be a new sole superpower; the rise of China reinforces peace as it checks and balances other actors if they behave irresponsibly. The recent reports on US space policy and its equivalent often declare that the United States ought to have the capacity to bar other states from access to space should Washington decide to do so. Such rhetoric is imperialistic. To be sure, the United States deserves legitimate security, as does any country. But the United States, as any other state, should not get its security at the cost of others. America is welcome to tap space for peaceful purposes; but so are all other states. If the United States finds value for its security from the use of space, it is not entitled to disallow others from using space the same way. If the United States considers that its military use of space is for peaceful purposes, as it has a right to self-defence and it is a benign country, then other states are entitled to the same reasoning and to access space militarily for peaceful purposes, especially when their legitimate national interest are already undermined by America. Countries are equals; neither the United States nor China nor any other nation is superior. On the surface of the Earth, the United States has hurt China’s legitimate interests rather than the other way around. China has responded with a moderate nuclear deterrent to attain a certain assurance and has tried to emphasise where it can cooperate with America for the global good. The United States tends to have a short memory: when it bluffed China with nuclear weapons, China responded in kind. Though China is still far behind America, Beijing is a little wealthier these days. If Washington aspires to dominate space, it may discover that Moscow, Beijing and perhaps New Delhi will stand it its way. All of them would join Washington in its professed fundamental goal: the use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. But if America deviates from this noble task, and this is not unlikely, they will help America stick to its previous benign objectives. So, welcome Beijing. Space arms control remains a goal for Beijing. The next US administration could also be more cooperative internationally. Nevertheless, if it or any other government refuses to cooperate for collective security, Beijing will insist that space is for all, and China has an equal right to use it for peaceful purposes. China will not threaten others, but will develop means for being less threatened itself. American rhetoric should apply to China as well: ‘if this fundamental goal (use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefits of all humanity) is threatened by foreign counterspace activities aimed at Chinese space assets, the People’s Republic of China has no choice but to defend and win’. It has been suggested the Chinese economy will overtake America’s by 2025 and India will surpass America by 2050. Such conjectures may be overimaginative. But in the long run America may not always be able to prevail unilaterally. Instead, all states should seek a collective, win–win situation.

**5. Claims that bringing India on board will get China on board not supported by the evidence—our evidence says that China views India as a rival—proves that the plan’s cooperation would be perceived as a balancing alliance not as an invitation to China**

# Ext #3—first strike

1. **All of our evidence that China is pursuing space dominance now proves that they think that they are winning the space race. Even if this is wrong, its perception that is key. China will lash out first to try to undercut US position or hold it constant**

**More evidence in the China space militarization file**

# India Cooperation Taiwan Scenario Answers

**1. Taiwan tension over underlying structural problems not perception that China could invade if no US space superiority—plan can’t solve**

**Weitz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, June 21, 2010 [Richard, “**[**China Overplays Taiwan Arms**](http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/21/china-overplaying-taiwan-arms/)**,” http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/21/china-overplaying-taiwan-arms/2/] SM**

Although the United States severed its formal defence alliance with Taipei when it recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government continues to sell arms to the country under the Taiwan Relations Act, an approach it says helps sustain the peaceful status quo by balancing the PLA’s growing capabilities. Washington fears that declining to assist the Taiwanese military would encourage China to adopt more aggressive policies toward Taiwan, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation. It has become clear in recent years that further defence exchanges or confidence-building measures can’t by themselves overcome what both sides view as fundamentally issues of principle—preserving regional security for the Americans, and defending national sovereignty and rights as an emerging great power for the Chinese (although as Gates noted, their persistent defence differences haven’t prevented the two sides from collaborating on other important issues, especially in the economic realm).

But it’s anyway doubtful that the United States and China could have a healthy defence relationship even if Washington were to completely sever ties with Taiwan because, despite decades of sustained engagement, the bilateral military dialogue remains highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks. The most important impediment to better Sino-US defence ties has been the underlying contentious nature of their relationship in general. This has been most apparent over Taiwan, but reflects deeper differences over power and values.

**2. No risk of conflict over Taiwan—US won’t engage in China on Taiwan with or without space superiority**

**Tkacik September 2007** [John J., Jr., Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, , 2007, WebMemo #1606, accessed 9/11/07 http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1606.cfm]

But a crisis is in the making. While Taiwan's leaders remain tone-deaf amid the vast global preoccupations of their most important friend, the United States, the Bush Administration appears on the verge of reversing its "long-standing" agnosticism on the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait to punish Taiwan's tone-deafness. On August 30, a National Security Council aide flatly and un-agnostically declaimed that "Taiwan is not a state in the international community."[10]

Beijing, naturally, is delighted. An American declaration that Taiwan is "not a state" has been Beijing's dream for a half a century. That the United States would, in the face of Chinese threats, appear to simply abandon a "long-standing" policy must also send a sobering signal to the rest of Asia: Washington is so distracted with real shooting wars that it cannot bring itself to risk Beijing's ill will under any circumstances. Even President Bush's "reiteration" at the Sydney APEC of "America's commitment to help strengthen the expansion of freedom" in the region looks squishy as Taiwan's political legitimacy erodes.[11]

# AT Chinese CCP collapse

**China not facing internal cohesion issues—its stable**

**Lavin, China Expert, 2011**

(Frank, Consequential China: U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition

Published on June 28, 2011 by [Franklin Lavin](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/nonstaff/L/Franklin-Lavin) <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Consequential-China-US-China-Relations-in-a-Time-of-Transition> accessed tm)

**KATY WANG:** I’m Katy Wang with New Tang Dynasty Television. We have seen more and more riots or strikes in China, it keeps on increasing every year. Also, recently, China started to crack down on activists because of the Jasmine revolution. They are afraid that it will influence China. So I’m wondering how do you evaluate the inner stability of the Chinese Communist Party?

**LAVIN**: I might disappoint you with my answer, but I would say that China has a high degree of inner stability, even though we know there is a lot of workplace disruption, workplace turmoil, and also know that China has cracked down in the wake of this Jasmine spring in the Mid-East and has tightened up some human rights policies. I have spent a fair amount of time studying the workplace stability issue, and what’s important to note is that, essentially, none of this has a political dimension. It sometimes can be directed against local political corruption, but the point is it is not political in the sense of what we saw in the Middle East. It is not motivated by people’s views of Beijing; it’s typically very local workplace issues. People think they’ve been treated unfairly, maybe there is local corruption. There is instability in that jurisdiction because of those local issues.

But it is not a broad national political issue and one of the challenges in China is that what we could call the normal workplace elements that allow disputes to be resolved do not exist; normal negotiations on wage-related activity do not exist in the same way. You are just going to see more friction and more strikes and more direct worker reaction than you see in the United States. I would not draw any conclusions about national stability from those set of activities.

# AT Chinese CCP collapse

**No internal link—Chinese political system is resilient**

**Ma, 2007**

[Ying, Hoover Institution Policy Review, China's Stubborn Anti-Democracy, February and March, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/5513661.html>] RG

To promote democratization in China effectively, the United States must better understand the reasons for authoritarianism’s resilience. Various factors contribute to such resilience, including spectacular economic growth, regime institutionalization, suppression and cooptation of the political opposition, and stringent restriction of what democracy theorists called “coordination goods”. First and foremost, the Chinese regime’s ability to deliver continued economic growth has prolonged its ability to govern. Between 1978 and 2005, the World Bank reports, China’s gdp growth averaged 9.4 percent annually. For the past four successive years, China’s eonomy has grown approximately 10 percent each year.2 This growth has created jobs, raised living standards, delivered modernization and boosted national pride. According to the United Nations Development Program, 250 million Chinese citizens were lifted out of poverty between 1980 and 2005. Though some critics, notably Gordon Chang, have predicted that China’s economy will collapse before the end of this decade,3 economists such as Thomas Rawski and Barry Naughton and institutions such as the imf argue that China’s prospects for continued economic development appear bright.4 Ironically, impressive economic growth has bolstered the government’s legitimacy and reduced pressures for it to liberalize politically. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs argue, economic growth, at least in the short term, stabilizes and legitimizes authoritarian regimes more than it undermines them.5 For this reason, Chinese President Hu Jintao expects — and fervently hopes — that China’s gdp in 2020 will quadruple that in 2000.<6 Aside from achieving spectacular gdp growth, the regime has also increasingly institutionalized its bureaucracy. Instead of weakening, floundering or over-centralizing, observes Andrew Nathan, the ccp has smoothed out succession politics, promoted meritocracy over factionalism for the advancement of political elites, modernized a disparate and large bureaucracy, and established the means of political participation at the local and work-unit levels to strengthen legitimacy.7 According to Nathan, this means that leadership successions, such as the recent ones in 2002 and 2003, now occur in an orderly fashion and are no longer characterized by the violent factional struggles of the Maoist era. Senior government leaders arrive at top posts increasingly because of their educational background and technocratic competence rather than pure loyalty to specific ccp leaders. The party has decreased its interference in the work of government organs and bureaucracies, allowing them more leeway to oversee their functional responsibilities. All the while, the central government has also instituted mechanisms for — or created the appearances of — being receptive to citizen opinions at the very micro levels of society. The regime, in contrast to previous eras, has shown little internal disagreement over its overarching approach to governance. Institutionalized and unified, the regime is determined to tackle China’s major economic and social challenges, suppress any viable political opposition, and stay in power. Of course, regime institutionalization alone cannot quell political discontent, dissent, or opposition, but this is where the effective suppression and cooptation of rival political groups come in. Beijing has brutally suppressed the spiritual group Falun Gong, a Buddhist sect that surprised and alarmed the regime by massing outside of its walled leadership compound in Beijing in a 10,000-strong silent protest on April 25, 1999. Similarly, the ccp has effectively cracked down on the China Democracy Party, which democracy activists in 1998 attempted to organize as the first national opposition party under communist rule. Simultaneously, the ccp has keenly and successfully co-opted potential political competitors. According to Minxin Pei, the party has built coalitions with 1) intellectuals, who were at the forefront of criticizing the regime in the 1980s and in leading the Tiananmen Democracy Movement of 1989; 2) private entrepreneurs, who comprise the emerging middle class that many believed would demand more rights as they acquired fuller stomachs; and 3) technocratic reformers, who focus on the changes necessary to institutionalize and modernize China’s governance.8 By doling out everything from party membership to senior government positions to financial perks, the party has rendered moot the political threat from these three potent and potential opposition groups.9 The ccp’s suppression strategy is capped off with the restriction of what democracy scholars refer to as “coordination goods.” These goods include political rights, such as free speech and the right to organize and protest; general human rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest; and press freedom. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs contend that the availability of coordination goods affects democratization because they drastically influence the ability of political opponents to coordinate and mobilize but have little impact on the continued economic growth that is crucial for sustaining an authoritarian regime’s legitimacy.10 The Chinese government suppresses these goods by censoring the press and the Internet, cracking down on coalition-building and organization among dissident groups, diffusing and discouraging protests through a combination of cash payoffs and outright intimidation, and trampling on the human rights of its citizens. By suppressing these coordination goods, Beijing has in effect elevated and prolonged its survival prospects. In short, the Chinese regime has not sat haplessly by when confronted with challenges to its rule but has instead aggressively fought to maintain power. Its tactics may have differed with each political challenge, but the result — continuation of ccp rule — has remained the same.