1NC – Short Shell

**Outer Space is just a new stage for American Imperialism to exert notions of manifest destiny unto the ‘unexplored’ and ‘unknown’ frontier. The 1AC views space as a new frontier for Eurocentric perspectives. It is this socio-political frontierism conditions United States Space Policy**

**Young 87**

(M. Jane, Professor of American Studies and Regents Lecturer, both at the University of New Mexico, “Parables of the Space Age-The Ideological Basis of Space Exploration,” Western Folklore, October of 1987,DA:6/25/11, CP)

**The "mainstream" American view of outer space is a reflection of traditional ideologies, the projection of the past onto the future. The urge toward adventure and exploration-travel into the unknown has been a basic element of folklore and mythology since the early days of Western civilization.** One can consider, as Williamson suggests, the Greek myth of Icarus and Daedulus flying through the sky with artificial wings, or the Christian biblical story of the building of the tower of Babel. Both tales describe human attempts to bridge the gap between heaven and earth, both attempts resulted in disaster, and both contain warnings that the gods will punish humans whose hubris (inordinate pride or belief in one's own ability) leads them to overstep their proper place and enter the realm of the gods. Linked with such hubris throughout history has been **the Euro-American notion of "manifest destiny," the belief that exploration and consequent exploitation is not only a challenge but a right. Certainly, one outcome of this idea was the European colonization of the "New World," based on the erroneous notion that the land was inhabited only by savage peoples and, therefore, open territory for those from "civilized" nations. The resulting years of struggle and misunderstanding between Western Folklore** 46 (October, 1987): 227-233. **227 Euro-Americans and Native Americans arose, in part, because of their differing world views-their conflicting perspectives concerning the relationship between humans and the natural world. Whereas Europeans saw the elements of the cosmos as forces to explore and conquer, the Native Americans regarded them as living beings with whom they attempted to coexist in harmony**. For instance, tribes such as the Navajo and Pawnee regarded the sky and earth as beings to whom they were intimately connected; the journey towards understanding these beings was accomplished in the context of ritual activity. Thus, for the Native American, the "real" adventure was internal, an exploration of one's own being in relationship to the cosmos. In contrast, for Euro-Americans the challenge was external. They set out to conquer the wilderness and push the frontier ever westward. Their folk heroes, generally masculine, were those who accomplished this task**. Certain characteristics of such folk heroes necessarily changed as the frontier itself changed, but a constant was the image of this hero as a loner, a rugged and aggressive individual who traveled unknown territories, guided always by the spirit of adventure, the thrill of the unknown.' These qualities were embodied in turn by personages such as the woodsman, the pioneer, the cowboy, the oilman, the businessman, and, finally, the spaceman, all characterized as much by their exploitation of the natural environment as by their drive towards exploration. In recent times, as various areas of the earth have been labelled nostalgically as the "last frontier," the need for adventure and for new sources of energy has given rise to the concept of outer space as the "new frontier." Strengthened by representations in the media, the lore of the western frontier has been used to argue for the expanded exploitation and settlement of outer space**. The internal/external, Native American/Euro-American contrast mentioned above relates to the way differing peoples regard their bodies as well as to their attitudes toward the relationship between themselves and the cosmos. For example, according to Keith Basso, the Western Apache say that Euro-Americans (or Anglos, whites) are overly concerned with the "surfaces of themselves ... their hair, faces, body, and dress."2 In contrast, the Western Apache are anxious to avoid this form of self-consciousness that pertains only to appearance, rather than to inner reality. Mary Douglas argues similarly that the use of the human body is a significant symbol of social and political order.3 **Thus, the Anglos, concerned with the outside of their bodies, and hoping to be noticed, are also concerned with extending their domain, first into the frontier of the American West and now into the frontier of outer space**. In contrast, Native American groups such as the Navajo, Zuni, Hopi, and Western Apache pay little attention to the external body. Examples of this are the healing ceremonies that focus on the mind as much as the body. Nor do individuals from these tribes wish to be seen as different or standing out. Significantly, these Native American groups focus on inner-directed experience. The adventure for them has been to live in balance and harmony with the natural world. Since Native Americans travel to the sky in their minds, they have no need to build space shuttles. Stoeltje emphasizes that **the metaphor of the frontier as applied to outer space is a false metaphor, a construct that maintains a sense of excitement while obscuring the reality that the endeavor is essentially a materialistic enterprise. Stoeltje adds that the term metaphor implies a similarity between outer space and the western frontier that is lacking; instead, it is the concept of the frontier as entitling myth, as unambiguous justification for an authorative plan of action, which shapes the U.S. space program. Williamson uses his unique position to explore the way in which the concept of outer space as frontier affects the direction of the U.S. space program, suggesting at the same time that the analogy between settling the American West and settling space may be seriously flawed. It has been suggested that the real motivation behind the early Apollo moon shots was political rather than scientific.** In fact, a number of the scientists involved have complained that they were not given time between one shot and the next to analyze the material brought back from the moon, nor has such analysis been a major consideration since then.4 **One needs only to consider the image of big business as a new frontier to realize that the prime aim of space exploration is not so much to obtain knowledge of the unknown as it is to obtain a replacement for earth's dwindling natural resources. It is only a small leap from this to the assertion that humans have begun to look towards outer space for an almost magical solution to the problems we have created here on earth by our excessively materialistic orientation. Thus, not only is outer space the "new frontier" in the sense of physical exploration, it has also become an arena for the projection of fantasies**. Mary O'Drain suggests, for example, that the gods of early Western mythology have given rise to the extraterrestrials of today, those benevolent beings who will have the knowledge and resources to repair the mistakes we have made.5 The answers are located "out there," rather than within ourselves. Another example of this reliance on a "fantastic" solution to earth's dilemma is the tendency in recent times to translate faith in a myth sequence or the tenets of religion into overweening faith in "the wonders of Science." Among modern, **technologically-oriented Americans, not only has the belief in UFOs and extraterrestrial beings become the folkloric expression of traditional ideologies, but science has replaced myth as the sacred charter, the system of beliefs that mediate between the known and the unknown.** It is for reasons such as these that Williamson advises us to explore the expressive behavior embodied in space exploration. The scientists, engineers, technicians, astronauts and others involved can be regarded as constituting a folk group whose behavior reflects the human role in outer space. **This professional "new class" has its own mythologies-systems of signs and signification that serve them in reaching goals consonant with their own particular worldview.6 These myths, in turn, shape reality so that these people are bound to view certain aspects of experience, such as the meaning of outer space and space exploration, from a limited perspective**. Although they rationalize this perspective by asserting that it is informed by science rather than myth, and therefore objective, in reality what we call **science is just another word for a contemporary, subjective mythology**.7 In relating the exploration of outer space to the Euro-American exploration of the frontier, replete with its pioneers, Conestoga wagons, frontiersmen, and so on, this professional new class is appropriating a myth that justifies their activity. The result is a distortion of the frontier experience, the creation of an artificial myth based on an experience that is no longer viable. However, according to Barthes, this "re- constituted myth will in fact be a mythology."8 Furthermore, as Stoeltje points out**, the frontier myth itself was from the beginning an artificial myth, created and disseminated largely by members of the Eastern elite who "nurtured a myth that validated the social structure as they preferred it." She describes the frontier of space as a "sociopolitical process ... designed to validate a specific social structure and development during a time of change and upheaval." As Farrer, too, points out, "our stories influence our science which influences our stories." Her conclusion, consonant with all the essays in this section, is that we cannot predicate the future upon the past, that we need a new mythology for a new age**. Indeed, it has been argued that we need a new science as well, one that recognizes the subjective nature of all human endeavor and encompasses feeling and intuition as well as logical thought.9 One might question Williamson's labeling the group of professionals directly involved in **the U.S. space program as a "folk group." This hinges, of course, on the definition of the folk adopted by contemporary folklorists.** One of the most radical definitions is offered by Michael Owen Jones, who suggests that we replace the word "folklore" with the term "human behavior."'0 In such a conceptualization there is little distinction between the elite, popular (mass-mediated), and folk cultural expressions of the mythologies discussed above. Indeed, as early as 1972, Henry Glassie stated that the terms folk, popular, and elite referred not to separate socio-economic classes of people but to opposing mental constructs of the individual. Thus one person could, in different situations, express concepts that were folk, popular, or elite." Similarly, Stoeltje suggests that the folklore process in a complex society "thrives in a web of forces directly connected to the larger world as well as to the intimate relations of the family and tribe." All of these scholars imply, then, that **the mythologies of folk, popular, and elite groups operate in a similar manner-as sociocultural processes that serve to validate culture, that create an image of the world particular groups prefer to see, and that justify certain actions and behaviors that are regarded as desirable. Furthermore, many contemporary scholars perceive little real distinction between these groups, other than one based on the idiosyncratic intuition of the folklorist**. **The proponents of the U.S. space program have consciously constructed the Myth of Space as the New Frontier to justify a materialistic rather than ideological enterprise. And, indeed, the myth has served them well in creating around the astronaut and other professionals involved with the exploration of space, an image of heroes and frontiersmen who venture into the great unknown of space for the good of all humankind**. Although this myth has gone largely unchallenged, perhaps because there have been so few tragedies (at least few that the general public has known about) linked with the space program, the recent explosion of the Challenger and deaths of its crew-men and women who could have stepped right out of the pages of Tom Wolfe's The Right Stufjf2-has served to shock many people into wondering if the adventure is worth such loss. Others say that we owe it to the noble crew to continue the program. One newspaper editorial cartoon shows a mourning cowboy leaning against his Conestoga wagon (complete with oxen) as he looks towards seven crosses-the entire scene is set in a star- and planet-studded "frame" of outer space.13 In addition, the awareness of this tragedy, the "very thought of unnecessary loss of life," led to the series of Challengerjokes that rapidly swept the country, a series of "sickjokes**" whose underlying motive was the impulse to ward off threats of personal death and global disaster.'4 Not merely examples of extreme tastelessness, what these jokes are really "about" are some crucially serious issues in American culture; they serve as social commentary and critique**.15

**These notions of Frontierism aren’t new – History can prove the violent and imperial power of such epistemologies. Space is just a new arena for a cycle of massacre and extermination. The 1AC creates new modes cultural, social and political warfare through myths of progression, civilization and modernization.**

**Slotkin 92**

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**By the terms of the Frontier Myth, once imperial war was conflated with savage war both sides become subject to the logic of massacre. The savage enemy kills and terrorizes without limit or discrimination in order to exterminate or drive out the civilized race. The civilized race learns to respond in kind partly from outrage at the atrocities it has suffered, partly from a recognition that imitation and mastery of the savages’ methods are the best way to defeat them. A cycle of massacre and revenge is thus inaugurated that drives both sides toward a war of extermination. Only an American victory can prevent actual genocide; the savage enemy would indeed exterminate all of the civilized race, but the civilized carry massacre only as far as necessary to subjugate the savage. To achieve victory in such a war, Americans are entitled and indeed required to use any and all means, including massacre, terrorism, and torture**. This is the argument implicit in war correspondent Henry Loomis Nelsons account of soldiers thinking about the course of war. The soldier reasoned that, **as the United States have imposed upon them the duty of putting down the insurrection, these brown men must be overcome at all hazards; while the war against them must be conducted upon the principals of savage warfare, since most of those who are fighting against us are classed as barbarians. …there are but two possible conclusions to the matter**. We must conquer the islands or get out. .. If we decide t stay we must bury all qualms and scruples about Weilerian cruelty, the consent of the governed, ect., and stay. **We exterminated the American Indians, and I guess most of us are proud of it, or at least, believe the end justify the means; and that we must have no scruples about exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and enlightenment if it is necessary. The use of extermonationist rhetoric by American commanders are correspondents was not intended as the lateral promulgation of a policy of genocide. Rather, it was a polemical device by which to accept the new political measures and changes in our ideological tradition that imperialism would require**. **The commission of atrocities by American troops was admitted by both pro imperialists and anti imperialists**. Indeed, some of the most effective propaganda of the anti imperialists consist of quotations from journalists who cite such incidents with approval. The correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger offered graphic descriptions of American atrocities but cited them as the inevitable and appropriate methods for prosecuting a savage war. The present war is no bloodless, fake, opera bouffe engagement. **Our men have been relentless; have killed to exterminate men, women, children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people, from labs of ten and up**, an idea prevailing that the Fillipino, as such, was little better then a dog, a noisome reptile in some instances, who’s best disposition was in the rubbish heap. **Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to “make them walk”, have taken prisoner people who… peacefully surrendered, and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show that they were even insurrections, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to… float down as an example to those who found their bullet-ridden corpses… It is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with civilized people. The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality, and we give it to them. This sort of frank avowal, not only of the fact but of the logical necessity of atrocious behavior by American troops**, ran the risk of providing ammunition for the anti-imperialists. Advocates of the war ran that risk in order to bring the American public to something like an informed consent to the principle of imperialism; the necessity for a superior people to impose its will on a weaker race or nation. **The psychological basis for public acceptance of the logic of massacre is the expectation, born of continual cultural reinforcement, that a people defined as savage will inevitably commit atrocities; acts of violence so extreme that they seem to violate the laws of nature. By defining the extreme limit of permissible uses of human power, a culture’s way of defining and responding to atrocity reveals a good deal about the concerns that shape its value system. The recurring themes in accounts of savage war atrocities are those of massacre and torture, particularly by rape and/or sexual mutilation**. What rape is in the myth of the “White woman’s captivity, torture and mutilation are to the story of the White males potential victimization by his ”blood enemy.” In these acts, the White victim is held powerless, while his/her body is cruelly manipulated, invaded, and destroyed by a race that-according to “natural law” – ought to be subordinate to the White. The White woman’s body and blood are polluted by the sexual invasion of her genitals and womb; the White man is emasculated, deprived of his manhood through figurative or literal castration. The politics of torture/rape/mutilation are also a parody of revolution in which a natural and legitimate order of subordination is violently and (from the White Man’s perspective) inappropriately reversed. **To prevent or avenge such an atrocity, to restore the social balance in which the hegemony of Whites could be taken for granted, the White man must respond with a similarity extraordinary level of violence; for only such a reciprocal atrocity can balance the shame of the original rape. Hence the prevalence of sexual mutilation and rape of Indians when Whites succeeded** in suprising a major village, as happened at Sand Creek (1864), the Washita (1869), and White Mountain (1870). But the same rationale and the same propensity for mirror-image atrocities, characterizes American behavior in those struggles we define as similar to savage warefare, particularly in southern lynching campaigns since 1865; and in extreme circumstances, in vilante attacks on labor organizers, like those on IWW agitators.

The Alternative is to embrace a Global Space History – This alternative framework shifts away from nation-centered approaches by de-emphasizing ownership and national borders. This global history would shift our gaze from nations to communities and seeing history as inherently fluid. The Frontier’s myth construction only has power because it assumes a totalizing view of history.

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 438-440, DA:6/21/11, CP)

**By rethinking the relationship between modernity and the postcolonial state, postcolonial thought challenges us to rethink the connection between modernity and spaceflight, and, ultimately, to replace the “national” with the “global” when thinking of space exploration, an exercise that has become doubly important as dozens of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are now spending money on space exploration**. Writing on the history of nuclear power, Itty Abraham has noted that “practically no state travelled alone.”31 Further, Abraham adds: **One of the most enduring tropes of nuclear histories is the idea that atomic energy programs are always national programs. The close relation between nuclear power and national power has led to the assumption that, for reasons of security especially, nuclear programs must be uniquely identified with particular countries.** Official histories and scientists encourage this belief, for obvious parochial reasons, but it is rarely true. **No atomic program anywhere in the world has ever been purely indigenous**.32 Abraham’s argument in favor of moving toward a global history of nuclear energy has much to offer to the case of rocketry and space exploration. The available evidence points strongly to similar processes of knowledge flows in the evolution of ballistic missiles and space technology. **33 Every nation engaged in this technology has been a proliferator and has benefited from proliferation; this process of proliferation began in the 1920s when an informal and international network of spaceflight enthusiasts in Europe**—particularly in Germany, Austria, France, Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—and in the United States generated the first substantive exchange on topics related to rocketry and space exploration.34 The development of sophisticated German ballistic missiles in the 1930s benefited from this discourse, as did parallel but less ambitious Soviet efforts to build rockets. In the aftermath of WorldWar II, the remainder of the German missile program—the most developed effort at that point— then fed into several different postwar missile programs, including, of course, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. The Soviet Union in turn passed both German and “indigenous” technology to the Chinese while the Americans did the same for the Japanese. By the mid-1970s, the “space club” included all of these countries, joined in the 1980s by India and Israel, both of which depended on flows from the United States,Western Europe, and the Soviet Union**. Europe itself—in the form of international agreements—had many cooperative efforts that blurred distinctions of ownership, even as it gained the “indigenous” capacity for space activity in 1979.35 I am not suggesting that we should ignore nations, national identity, or vital indigenous innovation. But I believe that nation-centered approaches, useful and instructive as they were, occlude from view important phenom- ena in the history of space exploration.** My hope is that **by deemphasizing ownership and national borders, the invisible connections and transitions of technology transfer and knowledge production will be become clear in an abundantly new way**. Such an approach would inform a project encompassing the entire history of modern rocketry and space exploration, from the late nineteenth century to the present, focusing on Europe, America, Russia, and Asia. **Most important, a global history of rocketry and space exploration would avoid the pitfalls of the “discursive battles” between nation-centered histories and open up the possibility to revisit older debates in the historiography of space exploration in entirely new ways. Taking a global history approach, one that favors decentering the conventional narrative, would allow historians to redirect their attentions in three ways: we can shift our gaze from nations to communities, from“identification” to identities, and from moments to processes**. These three strategies, in one way or another, are inspired by the problems posed by historicizing the ambitions and achievements of emerging space powers, which operate in a postcolonial context where categories such as indigenous, modern, and national are problematic. I offer some brief examples of each below**. In the space imagination, nations typically represent airtight constituencies despite evidence to the contrary that communities cutting across borders and cultures—national, institutional, and disciplinary—represent important actors and actions**. The most obvious example here, of course, is the German engineers who formed the core of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the United States in the 1950s and who later directed the development of the Saturn V rocket that put Americans on the surface of the Moon. Wernher von Braun’s team represented a unique mix of Germans and Americans who worked together with several different communities, from Boeing, North American Aviation (including its separate Space and Rocketdyne divisions), Douglas Aircraft Company, and International Business Machines. **These communities represented scientists and engineers, the government and private industry, and customers and contractors. In the rush to draw up airtight national narratives, we inevitably tend to gloss over the ambiguities and flows among each of these communities**. **By highlighting communities, we can also avoid the reductive problems of essentialization** (another way of talking about “national styles” of science and technology) **that aspire to explain everything but fail to elucidate much at all**.36 Instead, one might think in terms of fluid identities of scientists and engineers engaged in particular projects, identities which are not only tied to national identification but also regional, professional, cultural, religious, and educational markers, to name only a few categories. **Using the perspective of mutable identity— able to understand more clearly the ways in which space exploration has not only been a project of national consideration but also the result of communities (or individuals) who identify with a whole host of other markers that are not connected to national claims.** In other words**, it is a way to problematize the notion that space exploration represents national aspirations. Finally, space historians have tended to focus on moments in history that define the story**. For example, **we use the notion of “achieving a capability”** (the space equivalent of “going nuclear**”) as shorthand for encompassing a variety of complex processes**. Whether it be the first indigenous launch of a satellite or the first test of a liquid hydrogen rocket engine, these moments become historical signposts, turning points, bereft of the messiness inherent in the process of innovation. As a result, space history slips into the comfort mode of “what and when” instead of the more illuminating path of “how and why.” **The focus on process would highlight the ambiguities instead of the binary poles (success, failure) inherent in isolated moments, thus encompassing both the material event and how the event becomes constructed as a historical moment**. **All of these approaches also reinforce and foster the kind of social history that has become fundamental to most histories of technology but is largely absent in the literature on spaceflight**, a lacuna explicable **by the fetish for nation-centered cold-war geopolitics as the central organizing framework for most histories of space exploration**. Barring a few notable examples, space historians have avoided in-depth inquiries into the lived experiences of large demographics such as engineers, servicemen and -women, military and intelligence personnel, launch crews, staff workers, and spouses and families of engineers. Likewise**, little work has been done on public enthusiasm for the space program,mass campaigns in support of space exploration, and popular participation in programs usually identified with state-centered institutions**.37 Finally, **using analytical categories such as communities, identities, and processes would direct our attention to the problem of “consumption” in the history of space technology.** Despite a recent surge of scholarship on the role of consumers in shaping technology and technological systems, we have traditionally focused on production rather than consumption in chronicling the history of spaceflight.38 Who has “consumed” the space different in different circumstances—wemight be program? How do we ascribe identities to them as “consumers”? How and where do producers and consumers of the space program interact? Exploring these questions would open up new areas of investigation and enrich our understanding of the cold-war space race.

1NC – Kennedy’s Speech

[Play Sound Clip…]

Given in 1961 at Rice University, this speech by President Kennedy highlighted a shift in United States policy that sought an ‘uncharted and undiscovered frontier’. The romanticized notions of space exploration in Kennedy’s speech established an imagined national identity bolstering America’s prestige and mastery over the public audience and outer space.

Jordan in 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

The first component in Kennedy’s strategy of transcendence was a rhetorical cartography designed to bring the moon within the tangible grasp of his audience. In order to do this, Kennedy expanded his “New Frontier”rhetoric and established outer space as a reachable destination. Rhetors have frequently used frontier imagery as a mythic framework for proposed human action,relying on its ability to yield “a clearer conception of how history’s presentation of the past molds myths which are bases of action for the future.”37Rhetoric evoking the mythic frontier has provided Americans with a guiding sense of identity and enabled them to draw “pragmatic conclusions about practical applications.”38It constructed for audiences an adventuring,pioneer ethos that became “a dominant factor in our national her- itage.”39 The frontier imagery of the Rice University address enabled Kennedy to construct a transcendent bridge between the moon and his audience, a rhetorical strategy that allowed him to frame risks as adventures and contemporary Americans as intrepid pioneers.40 Even with the benefits of frontier rhetoric’s mythological framework, Kennedy’s task was still daunting.Getting people to think ofthemselves as pioneers is one thing; convincing them that outer space is a traversable frontier is quite another.Before his audience could cloak themselves in the mythic garb of the American frontiersmen, Kennedy needed to transform the moon and outer space into a tangible setting suit- able for the enactment of the pioneer persona. Kennedy’s approach to the problem was to craft a spatial rhetoric that minimized the distance and obstacles between Earth and the moon, thereby recasting space in terms that connected the moon to Earth in a seemingly reasonable way.Toward this end,Kennedy fashioned the moon as the next landing point on the “new frontier ofscience and space,”41and in so doing provided the people with a destination that stood, literally and figuratively, above their more troubling and politically charged earthly concerns. This approach demanded that he walk a fine line between the practical and the sublime in his characterization ofspace as a frontier.Although the infinity ofspace may have lent more of a sense of awe to the mythic character of Kennedy’s vision, it was not a viable option for his specific task. The sheer immensity ofspace might have left his audience dumbfounded and terrified in the face of their own cosmic insignificance. Scholars have identified this pitfall as the paradox of frontier rhetoric, which “implies unlimited space on the one hand [and] encourages con- quest on the other.”42Space is sublime, in the way Kenneth Burke used the word, confronting us with “some vastness of magnitude, power, or distance, dispropor- tionate to ourselves. . . .We recognize it with awe.”43The larger we understand the universe to be, the smaller and more insignificant we seem. Rhetors typically brace their audiences against this terror by bringing the sublime into symbolic language, thus achieving some measure of control over our fear.Crafting a “poetry ofthe sub- lime,”as Burke might have called it,enabled Kennedy to displace this fear and artic- ulate the enormity of space in a much safer manner. The president’s rhetoric was dependent on a tangible characterization ofthe moon,for “without an identifiable, concrete goal like the moon, the parallel between the western wilderness and outer space seems less believable.”44 At the same time, reducing the moon to an exploratory pit stop likely would not have provided much inspiration to his audi- ence, either.A balance between awe and action needed to be achieved so as to pro- vide an appropriate level ofinspiration and motivation. Kennedy charted his new frontier map by articulating the audience’s worldview as the focal point for a broadening series of imaginary concentric circles that tied together places, people, and personae into one grand terrain. He began by saying, “We meet at a college noted for knowledge, in a city noted for progress, in a State noted for strength.”Kennedy paralleled this progression later when he spoke of“this city of Houston, this State of Texas, this country of the United States.”It is impor- tant to take note of Kennedy’s use of“ we,” which centered “the people” as the con- stant origin of the spatial progression. By starting with the people and then expanding outward, Kennedy drew a connection between the people and a larger beyond, one that transcended immediate geographic boundaries through the knowledge that their immediate surroundings were a part of a larger entity that now reached into outer space. Each new location broadened the audience’s scope in both size and magnitude, an expansion of the core. The progression always began with the audience and pointed to the outer reaches, enthymematically stretching to the moon itself as the symbolic entity large enough to stand as a conclusion for the expansion. Moving through the familiar/immediate to the unfamiliar/remote, Kennedy brought the points together as magnifications ofone another.In this spa- tial argument,the moon seemed less the unfamiliar territory ofspace than the next largest locale toward which “we”must venture. Kennedy furthered this spatial redefinition through the use of familiar naviga- tional terms applied to the new context of space exploration. At a relatively early moment in the speech, he referred to outer space as a “vista”and promised that its exploration would be “one of the great adventures of all time.”Kennedy further described space as a “new sea”upon which “we set sail,”assuring his audience that “space can be explored and mastered.”He concluded his familiarization with a diminishing progression that funneled attention back onto his audience:“But why, some say,the moon? Why choose this as our goal? And they may well ask why climb the highest mountain? Why, 35 years ago, fly the Atlantic? Why does Rice play Texas?” In equating past achievements—both heroic and comparatively mun- dane—with journeying to the moon, Kennedy circumvented questions about the rational basis behind the lunar mission by appealing to the popular tradition ofself- justifying exploration. We climb mountains simply because “we”pioneers love the challenge,and Rice plays Texas simply because that is what “we”do.This quasi-logic was suggestive of Sir Mallory’s famous justification for climbing Mount Everest— “because it is there”—and Kennedy justified the moon shot by concluding that “Well,space is there,and we’re going to climb it,and the moon and the planets are there, and new hopes for knowledge and peace are there.”The spatial progressions redrew the map ofhuman exploration to include our celestial neighbor and enabled Kennedy to dismiss questions about the practicality of the mission as being con- trary to our national character,ultimately transforming the issue into one ofinitia- tive rather than pragmatism.

And, it was this rhetorical moment in history, which anchors our argument. Kennedy established a universal narrative in United States Space Policy through appeals to a nationalistic memory of progress, leadership and optimism. The space frontier is depicted as an International race and the Affirmative has pre-determined the United States as the benevolent winner. Don’t be fooled by their posturing – their optimistic rhetoric only serves to displace the responsibility of plan onto the public

Jordan in 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

Kennedy’s sense of determination was buttressed by the inclusion of a national- istic appeal,although a relatively mild one given the expectations the audience may have had at the height ofthe Cold War.The lunar landing was articulated as a stage in the space race,the importance ofwhich was that “no nation which expects to be the leader ofother nations can expect to stay behind in the race for space.”Though clearly not the featured persuasive element ofthis particular speech, Kennedy nev- ertheless briefly acknowledged his audience’s geopolitical interests and demon- strated an appreciation for what the lunar mission could mean for his audience with respect to Cold War nationalism.51This foray into “space race”rhetoric also allowed him to reclaim his previous campaign attacks as part of his larger, and now fully realized,rhetorical vision ofthe U.S.space program.The transcendent turn enabled Kennedy to articulate the space race as part ofan overall understanding ofthe long- term importance ofjustly governing space,not simply as a desire to beat the Soviets in this particular instance. This concept emerged as a reworking of the space race metaphor through moral imperatives: We have vowed that we shall not see [space] governed by a hostile flag ofconquest,but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and under- standing. The addition of a sense of just governance was vital to Kennedy’s larger vision for his audience’s identity as pioneers.It must be a “good”people who fulfill the dream ofspace exploration,for “space science,like nuclear science and all technology,has no conscience ofits own.” Kennedy’s rhetoric ofspace exploration,however,could not be contained by the metaphor ofa competitive race,even one between superpowers.In fact,the hostil- ities of war were mentioned as dangers to space objectives and he expressed his hope that “space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours.”In order to illustrate the audience’s role in the play of history, Kennedy focused on a goal beyond international competition, something that transformed the space race from an end to a means. He placed the responsibilities ofstewardship in the hands ofhis audience,saying,“whether [space] will become a force for good or ill depends on man,and only ifthe United States occupies a posi- tion of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.”In the end, the goal was not simply to be the first people on Earth to reach the moon, but to demonstrate their worthiness and shoulder the mantle ofbeing the next great generation in history.This concep- tualization ofthe telos ofthe space race and just governance also created a part for future generations to play, as their task would be to build on the good character of the present audience and secure a peaceful legacy for space exploration. Kennedy’s rhetoric not only gave the space race a more optimistic purpose, it invoked a sense ofstewardship that prepared the audience for a long endeavor.

**And, Kennedy spoke that day in 1962 saying,**

We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people. **For space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war. I do not say that we should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any more than we go unprotected against the hostile use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours.**

**But Mr. President you were never so wrong --- Outer Space is just a new stage for American Imperialism to exert notions of manifest destiny unto the ‘unexplored’ and ‘unknown’ frontier. Like Christopher Columbus is seen as a great American Hero for his conquest and slaughter of Natives, United States Space Policy is a dimension of imperialism that attempts to know, control and colonize “New Worlds”. Just as we saw Native lands rich with new resources and land, Eurocentric epistemologies see outer space as new frontier for humanity.**

**Young 87**

(M. Jane, Professor of American Studies and Regents Lecturer, both at the University of New Mexico, “Parables of the Space Age-The Ideological Basis of Space Exploration,” Western Folklore, October of 1987,DA:6/25/11, CP)

**The "mainstream" American view of outer space is a reflection of traditional ideologies, the projection of the past onto the future. The urge toward adventure and exploration-travel into the unknown has been a basic element of folklore and mythology since the early days of Western civilization.** One can consider, as Williamson suggests, the Greek myth of Icarus and Daedulus flying through the sky with artificial wings, or the Christian biblical story of the building of the tower of Babel. Both tales describe human attempts to bridge the gap between heaven and earth, both attempts resulted in disaster, and both contain warnings that the gods will punish humans whose hubris (inordinate pride or belief in one's own ability) leads them to overstep their proper place and enter the realm of the gods. Linked with such hubris throughout history has been **the Euro-American notion of "manifest destiny," the belief that exploration and consequent exploitation is not only a challenge but a right. Certainly, one outcome of this idea was the European colonization of the "New World," based on the erroneous notion that the land was inhabited only by savage peoples and, therefore, open territory for those from "civilized" nations. The resulting years of struggle and misunderstanding between Western Folklore** 46 (October, 1987): 227-233. **227 Euro-Americans and Native Americans arose, in part, because of their differing world views-their conflicting perspectives concerning the relationship between humans and the natural world. Whereas Europeans saw the elements of the cosmos as forces to explore and conquer, the Native Americans regarded them as living beings with whom they attempted to coexist in harmony**. For instance, tribes such as the Navajo and Pawnee regarded the sky and earth as beings to whom they were intimately connected; the journey towards understanding these beings was accomplished in the context of ritual activity. Thus, for the Native American, the "real" adventure was internal, an exploration of one's own being in relationship to the cosmos. In contrast, for Euro-Americans the challenge was external. They set out to conquer the wilderness and push the frontier ever westward. Their folk heroes, generally masculine, were those who accomplished this task**. Certain characteristics of such folk heroes necessarily changed as the frontier itself changed, but a constant was the image of this hero as a loner, a rugged and aggressive individual who traveled unknown territories, guided always by the spirit of adventure, the thrill of the unknown.' These qualities were embodied in turn by personages such as the woodsman, the pioneer, the cowboy, the oilman, the businessman, and, finally, the spaceman, all characterized as much by their exploitation of the natural environment as by their drive towards exploration. In recent times, as various areas of the earth have been labelled nostalgically as the "last frontier," the need for adventure and for new sources of energy has given rise to the concept of outer space as the "new frontier." Strengthened by representations in the media, the lore of the western frontier has been used to argue for the expanded exploitation and settlement of outer space**. The internal/external, Native American/Euro-American contrast mentioned above relates to the way differing peoples regard their bodies as well as to their attitudes toward the relationship between themselves and the cosmos. For example, according to Keith Basso, the Western Apache say that Euro-Americans (or Anglos, whites) are overly concerned with the "surfaces of themselves ... their hair, faces, body, and dress."2 In contrast, the Western Apache are anxious to avoid this form of self-consciousness that pertains only to appearance, rather than to inner reality. Mary Douglas argues similarly that the use of the human body is a significant symbol of social and political order.3 **Thus, the Anglos, concerned with the outside of their bodies, and hoping to be noticed, are also concerned with extending their domain, first into the frontier of the American West and now into the frontier of outer space**. In contrast, Native American groups such as the Navajo, Zuni, Hopi, and Western Apache pay little attention to the external body. Examples of this are the healing ceremonies that focus on the mind as much as the body. Nor do individuals from these tribes wish to be seen as different or standing out. Significantly, these Native American groups focus on inner-directed experience. The adventure for them has been to live in balance and harmony with the natural world. Since Native Americans travel to the sky in their minds, they have no need to build space shuttles. Stoeltje emphasizes that **the metaphor of the frontier as applied to outer space is a false metaphor, a construct that maintains a sense of excitement while obscuring the reality that the endeavor is essentially a materialistic enterprise. Stoeltje adds that the term metaphor implies a similarity between outer space and the western frontier that is lacking; instead, it is the concept of the frontier as entitling myth, as unambiguous justification for an authorative plan of action, which shapes the U.S. space program. Williamson uses his unique position to explore the way in which the concept of outer space as frontier affects the direction of the U.S. space program, suggesting at the same time that the analogy between settling the American West and settling space may be seriously flawed. It has been suggested that the real motivation behind the early Apollo moon shots was political rather than scientific.** In fact, a number of the scientists involved have complained that they were not given time between one shot and the next to analyze the material brought back from the moon, nor has such analysis been a major consideration since then.4 **One needs only to consider the image of big business as a new frontier to realize that the prime aim of space exploration is not so much to obtain knowledge of the unknown as it is to obtain a replacement for earth's dwindling natural resources. It is only a small leap from this to the assertion that humans have begun to look towards outer space for an almost magical solution to the problems we have created here on earth by our excessively materialistic orientation. Thus, not only is outer space the "new frontier" in the sense of physical exploration, it has also become an arena for the projection of fantasies**. Mary O'Drain suggests, for example, that the gods of early Western mythology have given rise to the extraterrestrials of today, those benevolent beings who will have the knowledge and resources to repair the mistakes we have made.5 The answers are located "out there," rather than within ourselves. Another example of this reliance on a "fantastic" solution to earth's dilemma is the tendency in recent times to translate faith in a myth sequence or the tenets of religion into overweening faith in "the wonders of Science." Among modern, **technologically-oriented Americans, not only has the belief in UFOs and extraterrestrial beings become the folkloric expression of traditional ideologies, but science has replaced myth as the sacred charter, the system of beliefs that mediate between the known and the unknown.** It is for reasons such as these that Williamson advises us to explore the expressive behavior embodied in space exploration. The scientists, engineers, technicians, astronauts and others involved can be regarded as constituting a folk group whose behavior reflects the human role in outer space. **This professional "new class" has its own mythologies-systems of signs and signification that serve them in reaching goals consonant with their own particular worldview.6 These myths, in turn, shape reality so that these people are bound to view certain aspects of experience, such as the meaning of outer space and space exploration, from a limited perspective**. Although they rationalize this perspective by asserting that it is informed by science rather than myth, and therefore objective, in reality what we call **science is just another word for a contemporary, subjective mythology**.7 In relating the exploration of outer space to the Euro-American exploration of the frontier, replete with its pioneers, Conestoga wagons, frontiersmen, and so on, this professional new class is appropriating a myth that justifies their activity. The result is a distortion of the frontier experience, the creation of an artificial myth based on an experience that is no longer viable. However, according to Barthes, this "re- constituted myth will in fact be a mythology."8 Furthermore, as Stoeltje points out**, the frontier myth itself was from the beginning an artificial myth, created and disseminated largely by members of the Eastern elite who "nurtured a myth that validated the social structure as they preferred it." She describes the frontier of space as a "sociopolitical process ... designed to validate a specific social structure and development during a time of change and upheaval." As Farrer, too, points out, "our stories influence our science which influences our stories." Her conclusion, consonant with all the essays in this section, is that we cannot predicate the future upon the past, that we need a new mythology for a new age**. Indeed, it has been argued that we need a new science as well, one that recognizes the subjective nature of all human endeavor and encompasses feeling and intuition as well as logical thought.9 One might question Williamson's labeling the group of professionals directly involved in **the U.S. space program as a "folk group." This hinges, of course, on the definition of the folk adopted by contemporary folklorists.** One of the most radical definitions is offered by Michael Owen Jones, who suggests that we replace the word "folklore" with the term "human behavior."'0 In such a conceptualization there is little distinction between the elite, popular (mass-mediated), and folk cultural expressions of the mythologies discussed above. Indeed, as early as 1972, Henry Glassie stated that the terms folk, popular, and elite referred not to separate socio-economic classes of people but to opposing mental constructs of the individual. Thus one person could, in different situations, express concepts that were folk, popular, or elite." Similarly, Stoeltje suggests that the folklore process in a complex society "thrives in a web of forces directly connected to the larger world as well as to the intimate relations of the family and tribe." All of these scholars imply, then, that **the mythologies of folk, popular, and elite groups operate in a similar manner-as sociocultural processes that serve to validate culture, that create an image of the world particular groups prefer to see, and that justify certain actions and behaviors that are regarded as desirable. Furthermore, many contemporary scholars perceive little real distinction between these groups, other than one based on the idiosyncratic intuition of the folklorist**. **The proponents of the U.S. space program have consciously constructed the Myth of Space as the New Frontier to justify a materialistic rather than ideological enterprise. And, indeed, the myth has served them well in creating around the astronaut and other professionals involved with the exploration of space, an image of heroes and frontiersmen who venture into the great unknown of space for the good of all humankind**. Although this myth has gone largely unchallenged, perhaps because there have been so few tragedies (at least few that the general public has known about) linked with the space program, the recent explosion of the Challenger and deaths of its crew-men and women who could have stepped right out of the pages of Tom Wolfe's The Right Stufjf2-has served to shock many people into wondering if the adventure is worth such loss. Others say that we owe it to the noble crew to continue the program. One newspaper editorial cartoon shows a mourning cowboy leaning against his Conestoga wagon (complete with oxen) as he looks towards seven crosses-the entire scene is set in a star- and planet-studded "frame" of outer space.13 In addition, the awareness of this tragedy, the "very thought of unnecessary loss of life," led to the series of Challengerjokes that rapidly swept the country, a series of "sickjokes**" whose underlying motive was the impulse to ward off threats of personal death and global disaster.'4 Not merely examples of extreme tastelessness, what these jokes are really "about" are some crucially serious issues in American culture; they serve as social commentary and critique**.15

**These notions of Frontierism aren’t new – History proves the violent and imperial power of such epistemologies. Space is just a new arena for a cycle of massacre and extermination. Universal historical narratives of conquest, progress and modernization will lead to inevitable forms of violence through a re-emerging sense of manifest destiny. The collective memory of National Identity will master outer space for its productivity, resources and physical space. We’d be fools to believe their lies – The frontier myth creates imperial wars and genocide by enacting violence that is beyond the laws of nature.**

**Slotkin 92**

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**By the terms of the Frontier Myth, once imperial war was conflated with savage war both sides become subject to the logic of massacre. The savage enemy kills and terrorizes without limit or discrimination in order to exterminate or drive out the civilized race. The civilized race learns to respond in kind partly from outrage at the atrocities it has suffered, partly from a recognition that imitation and mastery of the savages’ methods are the best way to defeat them. A cycle of massacre and revenge is thus inaugurated that drives both sides toward a war of extermination. Only an American victory can prevent actual genocide; the savage enemy would indeed exterminate all of the civilized race, but the civilized carry massacre only as far as necessary to subjugate the savage. To achieve victory in such a war, Americans are entitled and indeed required to use any and all means, including massacre, terrorism, and torture**. This is the argument implicit in war correspondent Henry Loomis Nelsons account of soldiers thinking about the course of war. The soldier reasoned that, **as the United States have imposed upon them the duty of putting down the insurrection, these brown men must be overcome at all hazards; while the war against them must be conducted upon the principals of savage warfare, since most of those who are fighting against us are classed as barbarians. …there are but two possible conclusions to the matter**. We must conquer the islands or get out. .. If we decide t stay we must bury all qualms and scruples about Weilerian cruelty, the consent of the governed, ect., and stay. **We exterminated the American Indians, and I guess most of us are proud of it, or at least, believe the end justify the means; and that we must have no scruples about exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and enlightenment if it is necessary. The use of extermonationist rhetoric by American commanders are correspondents was not intended as the lateral promulgation of a policy of genocide. Rather, it was a polemical device by which to accept the new political measures and changes in our ideological tradition that imperialism would require**. **The commission of atrocities by American troops was admitted by both pro imperialists and anti imperialists**. Indeed, some of the most effective propaganda of the anti imperialists consist of quotations from journalists who cite such incidents with approval. The correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger offered graphic descriptions of American atrocities but cited them as the inevitable and appropriate methods for prosecuting a savage war. The present war is no bloodless, fake, opera bouffe engagement. **Our men have been relentless; have killed to exterminate men, women, children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people, from labs of ten and up**, an idea prevailing that the Fillipino, as such, was little better then a dog, a noisome reptile in some instances, who’s best disposition was in the rubbish heap. **Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to “make them walk”, have taken prisoner people who… peacefully surrendered, and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show that they were even insurrections, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to… float down as an example to those who found their bullet-ridden corpses… It is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with civilized people. The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality, and we give it to them. This sort of frank avowal, not only of the fact but of the logical necessity of atrocious behavior by American troops**, ran the risk of providing ammunition for the anti-imperialists. Advocates of the war ran that risk in order to bring the American public to something like an informed consent to the principle of imperialism; the necessity for a superior people to impose its will on a weaker race or nation. **The psychological basis for public acceptance of the logic of massacre is the expectation, born of continual cultural reinforcement, that a people defined as savage will inevitably commit atrocities; acts of violence so extreme that they seem to violate the laws of nature. By defining the extreme limit of permissible uses of human power, a culture’s way of defining and responding to atrocity reveals a good deal about the concerns that shape its value system. The recurring themes in accounts of savage war atrocities are those of massacre and torture, particularly by rape and/or sexual mutilation**. What rape is in the myth of the “White woman’s captivity, torture and mutilation are to the story of the White males potential victimization by his ”blood enemy.” In these acts, the White victim is held powerless, while his/her body is cruelly manipulated, invaded, and destroyed by a race that-according to “natural law” – ought to be subordinate to the White. The White woman’s body and blood are polluted by the sexual invasion of her genitals and womb; the White man is emasculated, deprived of his manhood through figurative or literal castration. The politics of torture/rape/mutilation are also a parody of revolution in which a natural and legitimate order of subordination is violently and (from the White Man’s perspective) inappropriately reversed. **To prevent or avenge such an atrocity, to restore the social balance in which the hegemony of Whites could be taken for granted, the White man must respond with a similarity extraordinary level of violence; for only such a reciprocal atrocity can balance the shame of the original rape. Hence the prevalence of sexual mutilation and rape of Indians when Whites succeeded** in suprising a major village, as happened at Sand Creek (1864), the Washita (1869), and White Mountain (1870). But the same rationale and the same propensity for mirror-image atrocities, characterizes American behavior in those struggles we define as similar to savage warefare, particularly in southern lynching campaigns since 1865; and in extreme circumstances, in vilante attacks on labor organizers, like those on IWW agitators.

These rhetorical constructions of memory have created themselves as self-evident and true. Kennedy’s frontierism has crafted a temporary logic found in status quo space policy. Responsibility to human progress and future populations were put into the hands of the audience and therefore sustaining a national collective narrative removing individual agency and responsibility from decision making.

Jordan in 3

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A second strategy evinced in Kennedy’s transcendent appeal was the rhetorical appropriation and manipulation of time to generate a sense of both urgency and perseverance. Crafting a temporal rhetoric that defines the present moment as the precipice before the next stage of human enterprise, Kennedy compelled his audi- ence to realize and make good on their ancestral heritage by embarking toward the moon. Kennedy not only sought to convince his audience that the moon could be grasped, but that history was waiting for them to do so. This strategy was compli- cated,however,by the fact that the urgency needed to garner support for the mission would have to be sustained over several years and with questionable chances for suc- cess. Therefore, his construction of time needed to speak both to an immediate urgency and to a sustained effort over a decade’s worth ofstruggle and innovation. His strategy for navigating through these concerns was a historical vision that moti- vated his audience, not because of any immediate circumstances but because the history ofhumanity necessitated that that generation move forward at that time. Strategic chronologies had, in fact, been part of Kennedy’s lunar rhetoric from its first mention in the “Special Message to Congress,”where the time frame for landing on the moon was cagily defined as “before this decade is out.”46He did lit- tle to narrow this broad target in the Rice University address,merely rephrasing the deadline as “the decade of the Sixties” and “before the end of this decade.” Kennedy’s ambiguous time frame worked toward dual purposes, giving him room to maneuver while simultaneously providing the audience with a sense of finitude necessary for transforming an abstract idea into a specific task. The present moment of the speech could extend throughout “this decade,”making the goal of landing on the moon appear imminent without requiring it to be immediate. The audience was relieved from the burden of haste, making it easier for them to take the first in a series of steps over a reasonable period of time rather than an all-or- nothing shot. Kennedy’s time-based strategy contextualized the rhetorical moment within a larger, transcendent chronology. Early in the address he stated that “we meet in an hour of change and challenge,in a decade of hope and fear,in an age of both knowl- edge and ignorance.”Just as his spatial rhetoric connected the audience’s immedi- ate surroundings to a universal perspective while simultaneously reassuring them that they were the center of the new universe, so his reworked chronology tran- scended the immediate moment by placing his audience in the ambiguous time frame ofan “age.”The concentric circles oftime and space allowed Kennedy to draw connections not only between Americans in different locales, but across time itself. His rhetoric established a diachronic perspective on time that connected the past and the present as chronological points within a broader calendar of human pio- neering and technological achievement. Within this age, however, he was quick to point out that it was the audience’s present circumstances that were significant and served as the focal point for this broader history. His message to his audience was that the key to their future lay in their ability to realize the immediate opportunity and to take the next great step forward.

Therefore, we offer the following alternative to the Status Quo narrative - “Vote Negative to reject the American frontier myth” – our critique serves as a process of counter-memory, a forgetting of the frontier myth in favor of an open investigation of identity itself – this examination reveals identity as contingent and arbitrary, opening up the possibility for genuine freedom. By understanding the history of United States space exploration and development as inherently fluid, never ending and open to alternative truths the collective national narrative is deconstructed thus preventing the inevitable violence of space frontierism.

Clifford, ‘1

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, *Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities*, p. 134-137]

“Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, his effort has been attended with torture, blood, sacrifice,” observes Friedrich Nietzsche. Memory, for Nietzsche, refers to the more or less violent imposition of values that become fixed, obligatory, “unforgettable.” Memory is the first condition for the establishment of conscience, which consists in the recognition of a moral constraint. Through memory we are bound to a set of moral obligations, the “forgetting” of which sanctions a possible punishment. Memory is a form of confinement, a subtle but incarcerating restriction on our freedom – which is not a right, but simply our freedom to be *otherwise*.

Foucault’s *counter-memory* is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” (*aktive Vergesslichkeit*). Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves, not in the tradition sense of self-reflection, but of wrenching the self – this identity – apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of *difference*. Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of *our-selves*. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, *be* a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this *subjection*. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity – a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the *identical*.

Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute ourselves an identity. “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects. These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligation imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, in this transgression – for those who have the stomach for it. There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.

Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves; a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy, says Foucault, “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.” Genealogical critique is an *exposition* of our history as subjects that has the effect of *dis-posing* subjectival constraints by *ex-posing* the contingency of their *imposition*. Genealogy turns the firm *posture* of the self-identical subject into the mere *posing* of a pretentious display.

Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.” Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful *mask*. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for personal-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogeneous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity – identity – is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses.Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom *from* interference, but *for* it –

for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom *for* individuality, but *from* it – a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the *office of government*, but against *governmentality* – against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body.

In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.” That is, by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits. This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible *transformation*.” This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation – which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sough for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we are able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant. It is crucial to understand, however, that what is being required here is *not* a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in *On Liberty*) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.

This debate is all about methodology – There is no opportunity for a permutation because the 1AC has already done harm. Its advancement of the frontier myth has constructed a universal narrative of violence that has subjected bodies to nationalism, imperialism and epistemological violence. A debate about methods allows us to determine the most education and productive forum for politics because it not just what you have done but what you have justified. Questioning history is critical to challenge exclusion and imperialism – this evidence is specific to high school students and colonial nation state histories

Trofanenko, ‘5

[Brenda, Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Illinois, *The Social Studies*, Sept/Oct]

The debates about the overwhelming problems, limitations, and disadvantages of social studies education noted in the Fordham report attempts to reconcile and advance the idea of nation through a collective history. Our more pressing role as educators, in light of the Fordham report, is to discuss a more nuanced understanding of the U.S. history. This would advance, as noted in La Pietra Report, an understanding about “the complexity and the contexts of relations and interactions, including the ways in which they are infused with a variety of forms of power that define and result from the interconnections of distinct but related histories” (OAH 2000, 1). Taking the U.S. nation as only one example of social analysis involves recognizing the meanings and conditions out of which nations are formed. There is no one experience of belonging to a nation, no single understanding or enactment of sovereignty, and certainly no one meaning or experience of colonization or being colonized. There is, then, a need for these issues to be realized and to be a part of the questioning occurring within our classrooms. That would allow for the substantial reframing of the basic narrative of U.S. history (OAH 2000, 2).Toward a More Global Sense of the NationKnowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage in social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practiced bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that “common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience” (27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States.**The centrality that the west holds** (notably the United States as an imperial power) **is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation**. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the uses of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic.The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students’ realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times.My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as “the ideological alibi of the territorial state” (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. **We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed**. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history’s constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

Link – Frontier

**We undertake a genealogy of the American national identity to uncover its roots in Puritanism and the mythos of the ever-expanding Wilderness – this identity relies on ethnocentrism to make value judgments about populations.**

**Clifford 01** [Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 58-59]

Perhaps the most important enunciative modality of subjects refers to the site of their emergence. Subjectivity is the most defined, the most articulated, where it is bound to an architectural structure or an institution. Here the discourse which delimits subjects can be refined, perpetuated, and put into practice: workers in a factory, soldiers at a military base, patients in a hospital. Yet the most important site of the emergence of modern political subjects is neither a building nor an institution, and it is only by means of an arbitrary delimitation of space that we can even call it a “place.” This site, I would contend, is the nation, what Benedict Anderson has defined as an “imagined political community.”31 The nation delimits a space of political subjectivity; it gives subjects an identity by virtue of their identification with the nation: as an American or German, as Japanese or Bengali. It is a place both real and ideal; real to the extent that it designates fixed (or disputed) geographical boundaries, ideal in that it is a place whose boundaries are defined less by fences, rivers, or mountains than by political subjects who share what Walker Connor calls an “essential psychological bond.”32 That bond has less to do with shared language, shared economy, or shared territory than it does with having a common discourse— through which certain components are articulated as shared, that is, national.33 For all the variation in nations and national identities, we see two common themes recurring in national discourse, in the discourse through which a nation defines itself as such, according to Max Weber. The first theme is that of a “common political destiny” and the second to a myth of “common descent.”34 In this sense, a nation has less to do with physical space than it has to do with time. National identity is both constituted and defined by a temporal dimension, by a “presence” that is at once pastprescribed and future-oriented. The latter idea, the myth of common descent, has to do with the idea that the people of a nation share a common genetic origin. This may have something to do with the word nation itself, which, as Connor points out, derives from the Latin verb nasci, “to be born.”35 For centuries the word nation was used almost interchangeably with the word race. It was not uncommon, Connor reminds us, to refer to the English or German races rather than nations. However, says Connor, this sense of common origin or descent need not be based on actual historical fact. That would be irrelevant, he argues, to the constitution of a nation and, what amounts to the same thing, its self-recognition as a nation. “What ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is. And a subconscious belief in the group’s separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology.”36 Oddly, however, Connor wants to say that America “is not a nation in the pristine sense of the word” precisely because the American people lack this (sense of) common blood or genetic origin. On the contrary, the discourse through which America is defined is ingrained with both of those elements—the myths of common origin and of common destiny—that Weber ascribes to nations generally. In fact, in the nationalist discourse of the United States, both of those elements are present as two sides of the same coin. The notion of a common origin is seen not just in the fact that Americans tend to view themselves as a nation of immigrants, all hailing from foreign shores, but that **our ancestors, of whatever “blood” origin, faced a hostile and forbidding land, a wilderness full of beasts and savages.** Says Frederick Jackson Turner, “**the frontier promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people**. . . . **In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race**, English in neither nationality nor characteristics. The process has gone on from the early days to our own.”37 The American myth of descent has to do with a sense of coming from a stock of people who plunged headlong into this wilderness and who tamed it with little more than their own courage, ingenuity, and personal fortitude. Of course, this myth, **this discourse, tends to be highly white, male, and Anglo-European. It says nothing of the Middle Passage, of that segment of the population forced to come to America whose lineage was considered dark, alien, and “inferior.”** Yet in many **ways America represents a perpetual frontier, a frontier of spirit rather than of territory**. Observes Sacvan Bercovitch, “Traditionally, a frontier was a border dividing one people from another. It implied differences between nations. In a sense, antebellum Americans recognized such differences—their frontier separated them from the Indians—but they could hardly accept the restriction as permanent. This was God’s Country, was it not? So they effected a decisive shift in the meaning of frontier, from barrier to threshold. Even as they spoke of their frontier as a meeting ground between two civilizations, Christian and pagan, they redefined it, in an inversion characteristic of the myth-making imagination, to mean a figural outpost, the outskirts of the advancing kingdom of God.”38 American immigrants of virtually any ethnic origin, at virtually any historical time, can rather easily appropriate the discourse of frontier spirit in the face of a hostile land and make it a part of their own family history; as such, it belongs with the larger national mythology.

**The frontier mentality produces savagery where America sees itself as the beacon of light to the uncivilized spaces of the universe. This results in colonialism that would destroy any that stand in opposition to it.**

**Clifford 01** [Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 60-61]

Of course, this New World frontier mentality is at the very heart of what I have called savage nobility. The measure of that nobility tends to be the degree to which one is able to tame one’s own personal quarter of American wilderness. One of the sad ironies of this mythos is that those who were originally considered “savages” in the conventional sense—I have in mind native American Indians and native Africans, but we could include other groups, past and present—were/are the ones for whom the American landscape was/is the most hostile, the most fraught with danger. Nevertheless, even these marginalized and disenfranchised groups have been able to appropriate the frontier motif of the American mythos by conceiving of their own marginalization and disenfranchisement as a **hostile “wilderness”** of sorts, to be overcome by personal industry and perseverence.40 Thus, one common discursive element that Weber attributes to national identity can be found in a shared sense of the frontier. To be American is to have conquered a hostile wilderness of sorts; herein lies the myth of common descent. The other common discursive element of a national identity, according to Weber, is a sense of common political destiny. In America this destiny is largely a reflection and a projection of that same frontier mentality—the idea **that America is destined to conquer all of the wildernesses** of the world, natural, social, moral, political, economic and technological. By the middle of the nineteenth century this mythos would become explicit and would be concretized in the jingoistic discourse of “Manifest Destiny,” a term coined by John Louis O’Sullivan in 1845 in a popular magazine with a nationalistic orientation. The notion of Manifest Destiny would be appealed to justify the territorial expansion of the United States for the next fifty years or more. This expansion was about much more than the acquisition of land, of course. It was about sending a beacon of light into the darkness, of bringing American values and ideology to that part of the world that remained a kind of wilderness, awaiting its penetration, appropriation, and spiritual intubation. This era paralleled the period of high colonialism during which native peoples—savages—would have Western culture imposed upon them in often cruel and violent ways.41 **Yet colonialism proper differed from the expansionist projects of nineteenth-century America. Americans were “giving” something, not taking it away: namely, freedom and the liberal-democratic values of self-government. Of course, America was willing to go to war with anyone who refused to accept this “gift.”** And well into the twentieth century, even after harsh political realities brought the expansionist policies of Manifest Destiny to a close, America continued to define itself as a nation in similar terms, that is, not only as the land of liberty, but of its fount and guardian around the globe. Any nation that did not share these values automatically became a threat, and was thus subject to American interventions, in the form of trade, aid, diplomacy, and, if necessary, war.

Kennedy’s space frontier has framed contemporary politics relating to space exploration. These new conceptions of the frontier attempt to bring western civilization to uncharted areas. This universal call for action in space reifies the hegemonic narratives of colonization through guises of progress and technology. The United States will justify war in the name of this frontier.

King in ’11

(Byron, an interdisciplinary artist, designer and poet who believes deeply that an individual’s choices have a direct impact on the environment, our bodies and our minds, MDA)

But I will suggest another dimension to the description of progress and frontier.  Perhaps we ought to look at progress today, in the twenty-first century, as the idea of moving toward that which we have yet to encounter, rather than as fashioning either ourselves or the world in an image that presupposes what is desirable.  In this formulation, people would approach the idea of frontier as a site for seeking the universally unknown rather than as one which ensures conquest, either of the other or of oneself by one’s unthinking submission to the imperial mindset.    This is to say that the frontier did not close, as the federal government declared in 1890, but rather, in Turner’s words, that it extended “into new regions.”  It left the continent that once was a colony and colonized those we saw as inferior, savage, and in need of our brand of “civilization.” By the middle of the twentieth century, the United States had developed a unique combination of carrot and stick in approaching the foreign, in eradicating undesirable ideas, in remaking the world in its image.  Of course, “carrot and stick” is a euphemism for the reality, which was that the United States divided its policy roughly between foreign aid and terrorism.  In any case, by this point, the frontier had entered many new phases at once.  And the negotiation of the foreign, at least in terms of defining American-ness, was no longer the job of rugged individualist pioneers, but of technocrats, scientists, lawyers, and generals.  And such negotiation required a degree of coordination, of simultaneity, that did not allow much room for improvisation or waiting to see what the Indians would do, or hoping the fish would bite today.      Hence this new conception of frontier itself needed renewal, by reference to the old.  We see this in a variety of sources, perhaps most notably John F. Kennedy’s acceptance speech at the  1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles.  Facing west at his microphone, Kennedy recalled the old West of the pioneers and their determination to bring civilization to the very edge of the Pacific.  And now, “the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not.  Beyond that frontier are the uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered [province] of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus.”  He went on:               . . . I believe the times require imagination and courage and perseverance.  I am asking each of you to be pioneers towards that New Frontier.  My call is to the young in heart, regardless of age. . . to all who respond to the Scriptural call: “Be strong and of good courage; be not afraid, neither be dismayed.”   One can imagine that in Kennedy’s mind, the specter of nuclear missiles and the prospect of Cold War ideologies going horribly awry stood near the front.  Economic collapse would follow a devastating military exchange, whether staged on American soil or elsewhere.  The American tradition of peaceful power transitions would come to an end.  Such was the frontier no one wanted to confront.  Yet there were other concerns, which underlay the fear of nuclear blight.  In one sense, we have not rid ourselves of them since the Cold War.  But in another, they have always existed in history.  For example, how could it be that we might destroy other humans in a disagreement over how best to live in the world?  If we forego the idea that perpetual war is a necessary instrument of progress, we may have choices about how to define progress.  Here, the unknown that watches us from its wilderness—let’s call it the future—cannot in itself be said to represent change.  Rather, the human approach to that frontier may well decide what kind of mind survives in the new New World.  We might then say that the renunciation of war and conquest as the ultimate means of confronting difference, because it would give up the definition of progress as renewal of the old and hence familiar, could produce a genuinely progressive understanding of progress.  It could, in other words, produce an engagement with the radically new in such a way that would obviate conquest.  Instead of asking of the future, What is it, or How can we make it function as something familiar, we might ask what we ourselves are and where we got our definitions.  The future is here, whether we seek it or not.  Indeed, we are always at the edge of the moment that has not yet arrived, always at the threshold of a wilderness whose purposes or laws are exceedingly difficult to predict.  But perhaps if we let go of the anthropocentric location of natural laws long enough to experience the whole of nature just beyond the threshold of the future, we might not be surprised by what finds us in our natural habitat.

Portrayal of outer space as a frontier is nothing but imperialistic - the same type of historical legacy of American domination of the “west” by exterminating natives and taming the wilderness in the name of prosperity

Marshall 95.

Alan Marshall, Institute of Development Studies @ Massey U., “Development and imperialism in space”, Space Policy, 1995, p. ScienceDirect

In the recent past, nationalist and populist calls for an increase in the US space effort were often imbued with ideological stances aimed at the activities of the USSR in space. Only two years before the onset of glasnost, American space advocates tried to ressurrect a flailing US space interest by appealing to intrinsic ideological sentiments of the US public. James Michener stated ‘I am increasingly disturbed by the Soviet Union’s constantly widening lead in the utilization of low-Earth-orbit flight’ and Jerry Grey stated ‘Those goals, set by the Soviet Un INTERPRETATION ion even before the US formed NASA in 19.58, focus on the permanent occupancy of space by Soviet cosmonauts and eventual domination of the entire cosmos by the Soviet Union’.12 Since the break-up of the USSR in September 1991, the efficacy of campaigning for more US space activities on the basis of a fear of a ‘Commie cosmos’ has diminished considerably. That, in turn, means a direct lessening in the role of nationalism as a force in promoting solar system development, but certainly not to its evaporation. Now, those who appeal to nationalist sentiment in order to increase the space effort have to resort to arguments based upon the resurrection of American technological primacy in the face of European and East Asian competition, and upon appealing to the ‘frontierism’ supposedly entrenched in the American psyche as being responsible for the nation’s economic and political greatness. Frontierism, however, is not so much a social or psychological concept as an economic philosophy. It emerges from the individualism so entrenched in American political and economic thought (which serves to secure the operation of ‘l&w faire-ism’ as sacrosanct). Frontierism involves a belief in the individual to surmount the challenges of a new situation, a new territory or a new environment and carve out an existence. Once the individual has done this they deservedly call that territory or environment their own. By this process the frontier grows larger and carves out an extended base for economic and demographic expansion, so contributing to the wealth of the nation (or more accurately to the wealth of the bourgeoisie) by turning unproductive land into an economic resource. In US history, as in the history of some of the other New World nations, frontierism was an economic policy designed to tame the wilderness and present it in economic terms as soon as possible. In reality frontierism is a more accepted and socially-sensitive word for capitalist imperialism, since (just as in capitalist imperialism) it involves the appropriation of economic resources that are considered previously unowned. Like capitalist imperialism, frontierism perceives nothing of value in the frontier lands except what can be scraped from it economically and converted into capital. In nineteenth-century USA, the value of native peoples and the value of the landscape was arrogantly ignored as the West was made to succumb to the utilitarianism of the imperialistic capitalists. Such is also the outlook of those who advocate pioneering the ‘Final Frontier’. Frontierists views that the planets and moons of the solar system are valueless hunks of rock until acted upon by humans to produce economic value and contribute to capital accumulation. Space frontierists such as Wernher von Braun, Arthur C Clark, Kraft Ehrick, William Hartmann and Gerard O’Neill feel that imperialism can be excised from their frontierism by appealing to the innate curiosity in our personal consciousness. To them, frontierism in space will amply channel the human propensity to explore and expand in a constructive and benevolent way. These rationales for space expansion must, however, stand up for themselves, since they are ultimately separate from the frontierism experienced in history. The fact that there is confusion between these socio-psychological elements and the actual economic nature of fronterism in modern day calls for space development gives credit to the nineteenth century idealogues who so convincingly tied bourgeois economic policy with populist ideology that it continues to fool so many into believing fronterism is a worthy nationalist (even universalist) ideal. Because frontierism is ultimately an economic philosophy its success as a rationale for extraterrestrial development relies on economic forces. As such, it is as doomed a rationale as the other economic models of space development discussed earlier. But what of the socio-psychological and socio-biological aspects inherent in modern frontierist thought. Might they offer a convincing rationale for Solar System development?

The American frontier rhetoric of the 1AC highlights an emergence of exceptionalism through notions of progress, civilization and discovery. This wilderness construction is done in the name of otherization, anxiety and violence.

Spanos in 8

William, American Exceptionalism in the age of globalization : the specter of Vietnam , “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization ; The Specter of Vietnam” , **2008**, June 21, 2011, LMM

In his policy book entitled Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity published in 2004 in the aftermath of 9/11, Samuel P. Huntington lends his substantial authority as a prestigious scholar to the Bush administration’s “argument” for “staying the course” in Iraq in the midst of a weakening of the American people’s resolve to do so. Unlike his predecessor, Francis Fukuyama, however, and far more than Richard Haass, who modified the former’s Hegelian end-of-history thesis to accommodate the global instability that followed the implosion of the Soviet Union, Huntington, in a surprisingly overt way, draws on the canonical cultural history of the United States to call for another “Great Awakening” as the means of sustaining the American national identity in the face of the challenges posed by the emergence of a discourse and practice of diversity to its unity—and power—and of enabling the “fulfillment” of America’s History-ordained errand in the global wilderness. What Huntington means by a new Great Awakening cannot be entirely understood simply by attending to his invocation of earlier Great Awakenings that were defined by the original Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s identified with the great Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards. His call, which should remind us, ironically, of the “Puritan/American calling” and, more specifically, the “American jeremiad,” so enablingly analyzed by Sacvan Bercovitch, must be seen in the context of the origins of American exceptionalism in the Massachusetts Bay Puritans’ exodus from the “Old World” into the “New,” which is to say, the defining distinction they made between a civilized world that had become “old,” “decadent,” “sterile,” “impotent,” “tyrannical,” “collective,” “immobile,” “effete,” “profane” that is, overcivilized, and a civilized world that was “new,” “creative,” “manly,” “productive,” “free,” “individualist,” “kinetic,” “progressive,” “godly.” More specifically, it must be seen in the context of the threat posed by the settled or sedentary life—the domesticating and familiarizing dynamics of civilization—to the youthful, virile, and creative energies that were precisely the characteristics the early settlers invoked to distinguished themselves from the Old World. Reconstellated into this inaugural American context, it will also be seen that Huntington’s representative call for a new “great [Anglo-Protestant] Awakening” is a call for the reaffirmation or rejuvenation of the perennially American notion of the “frontier”: that forward-moving boundary line between wilderness and settlement, the unfamiliar and the familiar, anxiety and complacency, distrust and confidence, violence and peace, “them” (an enemy) and “us,” that became in the future the sine qua non of rejuvenating American civilization and the exceptionalist American national identity.

The 1AC fears that the New World is becoming Old – it uses a renewed sense of progress and principles of human knowledge to justify imperial policy making.

Spanos in 8

William, American Exceptionalism in the age of globalization : the specter of Vietnam , “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization ; The Specter of Vietnam” , **2008**, June 21, 2011, LMM

Like Parkman’s, it is an American exceptionalist problematic determined by his New England heritage and takes the rhetorical form of the jeremiad. If there is a difference, it lies in Webster’s more immediate relationship to his Puritan roots and to the jeremiad than Parkman’s. But to identify Webster’s problematic with American exceptionalism and its form of articulation with the jeremiad as such is inadequate. No less than his Puritan predecessors (e.g., John Danforth and Increase and Cotton Mather) and, Cooper and Parkman, what is at stake for Webster at each of the occasions of his Bunker Hill orations is the perennial New World/Old World opposition, the anxiety that the New World is becoming old (effete and/or dispersed) like Europe, and the need to identity a threat to the well-being of the covenanted nation that would both recuperate the failing consensus and renew the American peoples’ productive energy. I quote from the representative last paragraph of the first of these commemorating orations, which Webster delivered at the laying of the cornerstone of the Bunker Hill Monument at the site of the battle on June 17, 1825, its fiftieth anniversary. After identifying himself and his audience as the belated filial offspring of those Puritan founders, whose “patience and fortitude” and “daring enterprise” had “set the world an example of founding civil institutions on the great and united principles of human freedom and human knowledge (the echo of Winthrop’s sermon on board The Arabella is distinct),” and, more immediately, of the great pioneers of the American Revolution who died at Bunker Hill in their behalf, and the ground on which they stand to commemorate them, the site of “the sepulchers of our fathers,” Hill accomplished. But what is crucial to note in this paradoxical move is that, in invoking “improvement” as the task to which the “spirit of the age invites us,” Webster is internalizing the wilderness, that is, reconstellating the spatial frontier into the ethos of the Anglo-Protestant American “core culture” in its advanced, democratic/capitalist allotrope, in which the “enemy” is identified as the laboring multitude, and, beyond that, the unimproved or in the more current language of policy makers, underdeveloped, world a large. This transformation becomes clear when it is remembered that earlier in his oration, and in preparation for this duplicitous conclusion, Webster had said, in a way that echoes the Puritan calling—and Althusser’s analysis of the interpellated subject and its work ethic: A chief distinction of the present day is a community of opinions and knowledge among men in different nations, existing in a degree heretofore unknown. . . . Mind is the great lever of all things; human thought is the process by which human ends are ultimately answered; and the diffusion of knowledge, so astonishing in the last half-century, has rendered innumerable minds, variously gifted by nature, competent to be competitors or fellow-workers in the theatre of intellectual operation. From these causes important improvements have taken place in the personal condition of individuals. Generally speaking, mankind are not only better fed and better clothed, but they are able also to enjoy more leisure; they possess more refinement and more self-respect. A superior tone of education, manners, and habits prevail. This remark, most true in its application to our own country, is also part true when applied elsewhere. It is proved by the vastly augmented consumption of those articles of manufacture and of commerce which contribute to the comforts and decencies of life; an augmentation which has far outrun the progress of population. And while the unexampled and almost incredible use of machinery would seem to supply the place of labor, labor still finds its occupation and its reward; so wisely has Providence adjusted men’s wants and desires to their condition and their capacity. (WS, 248)

The 1AC’s attempt to know outer space exerts astro-political subjugation through frontier rhetoric. This building of a space empire simply brings the same ole ism into space.

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the

orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

Different orbits have different astropolitical purposes. The most crowded portion of space is the Lower Earth Orbit (LEO), between 150 and 800 km above the surface of the Earth. This is the most accessible part of space (in terms of energy expenditure), and the most useful for reconnaissance satellites and manned flight missions. Medium-altitude orbits (MEO) range from 800 to 35,000 km and are often used for navigational satellites (like the American GPS network). High- altitude orbits exceed 35,000 km and provide the maximum coverage of the Earth with a minimum number of satellites. Of particular interest here is Geostationary Orbit (GEO) whereby the orbital period is identical to one full rotation of the earth such that a satellite at 0° inclination (i.e. above the equator) will appear stationary from any fixed point on Earth. This enables near-continuous contact with the Earth, so it is particularly useful for global communications and weather satellites. These then are some of the ‘environmental’ features which influence (rather than determine) the colonization of outer space and the extent to which any aspiring power can maintain astropolitical dominance. I’ll return to this when discussing the theory and practice of astropolitics. The historic relationship between knowing a space and exerting political and strategic dominion over it is entirely familiar to geographers. Just as the geographical knowledge of Empire enabled its military subjugation, colonization, and ultimately its ecological despoliation, this same pattern is being repeated in the 21st century ‘frontier’ . It is also worth remembering that the geographies of imperialism are made not given. In what follows, I want to examine how the geographies of outer space are being produced in and through contemporary social life on Earth. Such an account inevitably throws up some concerns about the politics and socialities of the new space age. Against this background, I set my argument on a trajectory, which is intermittently guided by two key writers on technology with very different sensibilities. It is my intention to hold a line between the dark anticipations of Paul Virilio and the resplendent optimism of Nigel Thrift. This discursive flight may well veer off course; such are the contingencies of navigating space.

The myth of the American frontier valorizes death and atrocity – this makes even nuclear attacks an act of American heroism and drives the United States to the extremes of total obliteration

Slotkin, ‘85

[Richard, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, *The Fatal Environment*, p. 60-61]

This ideology of savage war has become an essential trope of our mythologization of history, a cliché of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: “KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!” Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an “effete democracy”; and that is what they got, with the additional horrors of war that modern science can produce.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of the atomic bomb at the war’s end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of “effeteness.” The trope of savage war thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it provides advance justification for a pressing of the war to the extreme point of extermination, “war without quarter”: and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The American mythology of violence continually invokes the prospect of genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and our wars against nationalist and Communist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America to justify many critics in the belief that America is an exceptionally violence society.

The 1AC’s frontier movement is part of American expansionism attempting to control the wilderness of space. Just like the Eurocentric powers committed genocide on Native Americans under the guise of benevolence, don’t let the affirmative fool you. It is all part of the same American Empire.

Stuckey in ’11

(Mary E., Professor of Communication at Georgia State University in Atlanta, “The Donner Party and the Rhetoric of Westward Expansion page 238-239, MDA)

In the frontier myth, American expansion is in many ways about control—controlling the wilderness, controlling indigenous peoples (and others), and controlling events. To justify such control, some element of self-control had to be demonstrated. Those seeking to establish control over the frontier, then, worked within a cultural fiction that, unlike American Indians, for instance, white Americans were capable of self-control and thus suited to control the continent. " The expansion of the American nation was justified on the idea that it was somehow benevolent—the gifts associated with “America” and with its presumptive civilization were to be disseminated across the continent. " This idea has always been part of the justification for conquest and colonization in the Americas, and is a vital component of the ideology of empire in general. American Indians, African Americans, and all sorts of Others were castigated and deemed unworthy as participants in the American polity on the grounds of their appetites. Either they were too weak (as in the case of some analyses of indigenous peoples) or too strong ( in the case in negative depictions of African Americans). Anglo-Americans, in contrast, had just the right mix—they were passionate enough to want land and to sacrifice to settle it, but not so passionate as to become subservient to their passions. " They were masters of their appetites and were thus suited to master the continent.

Space Exploration represents a new age of frontierism – Developing this frontier is co-opted by white supremacy, genocide and expansionism.

Stuckey in ’11

(Mary E., Professor of Communication at Georgia State University in Atlanta, “The Donner Party and the Rhetoric of Westward Expansion page 239-240, MDA)

Those who were capable of exerting self-control were more likely to be able to exert control over the external environment. They were the ones best able to convert the “empty wilderness” into a profitable and productive agrarian paradise. Indeed, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America has a section entitled, “American Democracy’s Power of Self-Control,” in which he explicitly links whiteness, self-control, and the mastery of territory. Contemplating the tendency of American Indian nations to “vanish,” and the equally frequent revolutions and “convulsions” in South America, Tocqueville even wonders if such types would be better served by despotism.Clearly these “primitives” had no business managing the continent. The developing fiction of the frontier, then, combined erasure and white supremacy and insisted that given their superiority, whites were best suited to continental expansion.

The frontier myth deployed by the United States is based in a drive to conquer the wilderness and therefore justifying violence onto others.

Stuckey in ’11

(Mary E., Professor of Communication at Georgia State University in Atlanta, “The Donner Party and the Rhetoric of Westward Expansion page 241, MDA)

The frontier myth depended first upon the erasure of the continents’ indigenous people, either by rendering them invisible or by assimilating or exterminating them. Second, it required that Americans be seen as an appropriately masterful and civilizing force, who were both competent to conquer the wilderness and justified in doing so by providing a virtuous alternative to the savage and untamed wilds. Americans did not merely impose order on the continent; they rendered it virtuous through their influence.

Link – Manifest Destiny

The notion of Manifest Destiny is a form of imperial expansionism that is evidence in astropolitics. This cosmological rationale leads to the inevitable genocide and violence towards difference as it attempts to assimilate and remove all socio-cultural societies.

Jimson, ‘92

[Thomas, “Reflections on Race and Manifest Destiny,” http://www.cwis.org/fwdp/Americas/manifest.txt]

This sums up much of the rhetoric of the mid 19th Century philosophy of Manifest Destiny. In re-reading the various quotes and passages in Reginald Horsman's work, I gained a clearer understanding of this very important, yet often "ignored" aspect of the creation of the American psyche. Manifest Destiny is really a multi-faceted excuse for slavery, conquest, and genocide. It is the point at which racism, religion, and politics can meet and form a unified front and a unified philosophy for the ignoble aim of world empire. Manifest Destiny (a term coined in the 1840s by John O'Sullivan) can only be understood in the context of race and the philosophy of Anglo-Saxonism that was rampant from the mid 19th Century onward in Europe and North America. The notions of inherent human equality (biological and cosmological but not cultural) and the Biblical unity of humanity that had reigned over the Age of Enlightenment had gradually given way to theories of polygenesis and inherent human inequality.The process of scientific classification of nature by Euroamericans, had by the 19th Century culminated in the classification of humanity itself into separate races with innate qualities of inferiority and superiority. This process is typified by the "science" of phrenology which so revolutionized the 19th Century's view of human relations. Phrenology was not simply the "scientific" examination of the relationship between skull size and intelligence -- it was also the study of brain/skull size in relation to MORALITY, both of which supposedly resided in the frontal and coronal parts of the brain; Euroamericans having the largest coincidentally enough. So Euroamericans were not only more intelligent than non-whites, they were also correspondingly more moral than other types of humanity, with more moral institutions and laws than any other type of human beings; it, in fact, could be derived from phrenology that morality is a unique feature of the Euroamerican stock of humanity, lacking in the darker races. Any similarities between Euroamerican institutions and those produced by non-Euroamericans were explained away as being the product of white blood having been introduced at some point in their history. Science would be the explanation for the slavery of the Africans and the extermination of the Indians. "It is not our fault, we are not murderers and thieves, we are merely fulfilling scientific principles of superiority. In fact we are not killing Indians, they simply cannot survive civilization. It is an inherent fault within them, it has nothing to do with us."This is what made Manifest Destiny such a powerful force in empire building. It placed the responsibility of the destruction of nations and peoples on the victims themselves, not on the perpetrators of it. The power of Manifest Destiny lied in the fact that it created a cosmological rationale for genocide, taking the responsibility out of the hands of the individual. When you set about to dispossess a people of their land and source of livelihood, unless you have no conscience at all, one must find an excuse to safely hide from the truth of the pain and suffering you are inflicting on innocent peoples. In the era of Manifest Destiny and Anglo-Saxonism the excuses were varied but most boiled down to the simple fact that if, indeed, these people were human beings (which is questionable), then they were in fact a lesser type of humanity who had no rights to life, land, or liberty. They could not use the land like Anglos, so they had no right to it; they had no civilizations, so they had no right to their own political institutions; their lives were not worth that of an Anglo, so they had no right to life. Any suffering felt by them is of their own making, or simply a byproduct of their inferior nature when placed in contact with the superior Euroamerican types of humanity. The fault resided with them not the Euroamericans. The fault was that they lived in contact with Euroamericans -- Natural Law dictated the rest. Present conditions were used as proof that this was indeed the divine order. Anglos were the master of the non-Anglos therefore it was their nature to be masters. Non-Anglos were subservient to the Anglos, therefore it was their nature to be servants. Circular arguments were the order of the day. The terms used to describe the genocide are also very telling is this context -- terms such as melting, receding, shrinking, dwindling, disappearing, vanishing. Most of these have connotations of natural processes, like the melting of the snow or the receding tide. None of them have any type of active component. They are all devoid of conscious effort. They "happen" under their own auspices without any intent. These terms are used consciously or unconsciously to, again, lift the burden from the perpetrators of mass murder, thievery, and genocide and place it solidly on the shoulders of the victims, or even more pointedly, on God. They also serve to halt any type of reflection on the realities of expansion. How can one stop the snowfrom melting in the sun? How can one stop the tide from receding from the shore? These are all processes that are beyond human design. They are Divine processes, natural process, scientific process, that are completely absent of human will or intent. Another excuse to hide from genocide and global dispossession of non-Euroamerican peoples was the myth of expansion ridding the world of tyranny and despotism. It made it quite easy to think of expansion in the context of spreading freedom and civilization to the rest of the world that lived under despots and tyrants, spreading culture and philosophy, knowledge and science, to the unlearned masses -- bettering the world with Euroamerican genius and technology. The march of conquest was not genocide, slavery, and dispossession; it was the Peace Corps of the 19th Century.There are, as one might expect, inherent contradictions in the propaganda of Anglo-Saxonism. All non-Euroamericans were savage, brute, warlike, and ferocious -- Euroamericans, contrastingly, were peace-loving, humane, civilized, moral, just, and bringers of freedom giving institutions. Yet when the mood was inviting, the formally negative attributes placed upon non-Euroamerican peoples were all of a sudden some of the most positive aspects of the Anglo-Saxon race. Instead of being brute, warlike, or savage, these attributes when used in the context of Anglo-Saxons conferred upon them heroic qualities; the heroic conqueror, the exterminator of inferior races, replenishing the world with superior institutions and peoples. The personification of this image of the Anglo-Saxon race was Alexander The Great. The U.S. had a somewhat "boyish" quality, of impetuousness, quick temper, youthful virility, yet with a golden heart. The inherent contradictions of this dual image of the Anglo-Saxon race are clear. Anglo-Saxon aggression and violence was virile, manly, and heroic; violence on the part of Indians conversely was savage and barbaric -- proof of their animalistic qualities that in turn provided further excuse for more "manly" violence on the part of the Anglos. Indians murdered women and children, proof of their irredeemable savagery -- Anglo-Saxons simply expanded, women and children "receding" before them. Manifest Destiny is, of course, much more than what is presented here. What I find most intriguing about it, however, is how a broad concept can combine many others into a unifying theory. This is what strikes me as being the power Manifest Destiny had on the American psyche. It gave a holistic and Divine rationale for what in any other era would have been simple conquest and empire building. It is what also made Euroamerican expansion uniquely cruel and genocidal. With the advent of racism and social Darwinism, extermination and supplantation replaced simple imperial designs. This is only one aspect of Manifest Destiny -- mostly psychological -- there is obviously much more to it, yet I do not think one can overestimate the power philosophy plays in human affairs. A philosophy such as Manifest Destiny once internalized in the culture, is never really abolished, it merely adapts to the present conditions and transforms itself into a suitable logic for the times.

Link – Morality

**The puritan mission of bringing civilization to the ignoble land is an attempt to derive morality by viewing oneself as not like the savage beast. Civilizing missions to the Middle East represent a return to the Puritan frontiersperson with a spiritual mission to save the world.**

**Clifford 01** [Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 38-39]

In A Different Mirror, Ronald Takaki points out that Shakespeare’s Tempest was the first play performed in England, in 1611, that had the New World as its dramatic setting. This play also introduced to the English-speaking audience its first New World character: an Indian by the name of Caliban. Caliban, it turns out, is Shakespeare’s anagram of the word cannibal, which is itself derived from the word “Carib,” a term of Spanish origin used to refer to the natives of Central America and northern South America.5 The name Shakespeare chooses for his character is well calculated to tap into one of the deepest fears of his audience, namely, that of being eaten alive. The presumption of cannibalism was, in the European imagination, perhaps the definitive feature of American savagery. This presumption had been fostered by England’s earliest explorers of the New World, who referred to the natives they encountered as “Anthropophagi, or devourers of man’s flesh.”6 William Bradford would solidify this image in his graphic descriptions of the tortures performed by “the savage people” upon their enemies, the worst of which included “flaying some alive with the shells of fishes, cutting off the members and joints of others by piecemeal and broiling on the coals, eat the collops of their flesh in sight whilst they live.”7 Bradford’s “reports” fed fuel to the fire for the Puritans, who already looked upon the natives as devils of the wilderness, a threat to the moral and spiritual well-being of any “civilized” man. The possibility that they might actually be eaten by these savages represented the ultimate abomination.8 Of course, it was these same alleged cannibals who brought food to the starving Virginia colonists during that first terrible winter. The second winter was just as harsh, except that by now there were hundreds more colonial mouths to feed. The conditions were so bad this time that there were reports of people eating not only pets and vermin to survive, but bodies dug up from local graves. And, in an irony of dizzying proportions, John Smith would write in his journals, “So great was our famine that a savage we slew and buried” was dug up by some starving colonists and “boiled and stewed with roots and herbs.”9 Of course, Puritans like Cotton Mather could blame such behavior precisely on the association of the colonists with their heathen neighbors. “We have too far degenerated into Indian vices,” charged Mather. “We have [become] shamefully Indianized in all those abominable things.”10 The Puritans saw their journey to the New World as a kind of spiritual mission, an “errand in the wilderness,” an important goal of which was to bring the heathen natives to Christianity. To become “Indianized,” then, to acquire the very traits and imperfections of those you were trying to convert, represented a failure of that mission. But, more than that, it meant a breach of the individual’s covenant with God, a loss of spiritual substance, a slide into the dark abyss, the consumption of the soul by the wilderness itself. The American Indian represented the quintessential Other for the Puritan, a negative touchstone, an inverted mirror against which they could judge their own moral and spiritual worthiness, indeed through which they constructed and confirmed their own identity. Thousands of miles from their homeland, locked in struggle with a harsh yet indifferent wilderness, for the Puritans the measure of their humanity and civility came to be the degree to which they were not like the savages amongst whom they lived.

Link – Strategic Gaze

The 1AC’s frontier discourse is part of a strategic gaze that monopolizes knowledge over inner and outer space.

Kato in ’93

(Masahide, Professor of political science at the university of Hawaii, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” page 340-341, MDA)

In 1945, amidst the ruins of war, Theodor Adorno noted the decay of the notion of “strategy,” which the facist regime had raised to an “absolute” level. Moreover, optimistically and mistakenly, he hoped for the downfall of technology with the demise of strategy. In the same year, three hundred freight car loads of V-2 rocket components confiscated from Germany arrived at the White Sands Proving Ground eighteen miles west of Alamogordo, where the first nuclear bomb exploded on earth. Along with the procurement of rockets, the United States adopted one thousands German military scientists, many of whom later occupied one important positions in the military, NASA, and the aerospace industry. Originally, German Scientists put the rocket to practical use by revolutionizing access to an aerial view of the earth at the dawn of this century. Historically speaking, the development of perceptive technology, warfare technology, and strategy have always been closely intertwined. Thus, not surprising, the first experimental V-2 rocket launched from the White Sands Proving Ground in 1946 was loaded with a camera that successfully captured the curvature of Earth, that is, a partial image of the “globe.” It took twenty years (until 1966) from the experiment until the totality of the image of the globe became available to the First World community. The “long-shot” of the globe rising from the lunar horizon taken from the Lunar Orbiter I manifested the totality of the globe eloquently to First World eyes. The Most commonly circulated image of the globe, however, was shot by the crew of Apollow 8 in 1968. This attainment of a photographic image of the globe marked the triumph of an “absolute” strategic Gaze. Historical contestations over the privileged position of the gaze and hence over the perspective with higher strategic significance ended with the emergence of the absolute strategic gaze. The newly emerged regime of the absolute strategic gaze rendered obsolete the very notion of perspective and hence dimension. Thus, Adorno’s thesis was proved to be wrong: the downfall of fascist state(s) merely marked the turning point when strategy shifted its gear and dispersed beyond conventional (e.g., national) boundaries with the help of the absolute strategic gaze.

Link – Discovery

Discovery rhetoric is a tool of the frontier myth to perpetuate imperialism

Terrall 98

(Mary. ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR B.A. Harvard University; PhD UCLA. Heroic Narratives of Quest and Discovery. Project Muse. The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature and Science. Pp.223-242. Accessed 6/25/11. EL)

The "new science" of the seventeenth century has long been linked to the voyages of discovery that expanded the conceptual and physical horizons of the European world. [5](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v006/6.2terrall.html#FOOT5) For Francis Bacon, the very existence of hitherto-unknown places and phenomena inspired a challenge to established ways of seeing the world: by the distant voyages and travels which have become frequent in our times, many things have been laid open and discovered which may let in new light upon philosophy. And surely it would be disgraceful if, while the regions of the material globe . . . have been in our time laid widely open and revealed, the intellectual globe should remain shut up within the narrow limits of old discoveries. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v006/6.2terrall.html#FOOT6) In Bacon's view, travel effectively opened up unexpected hidden treasures to the European gaze. The exploration of unfamiliar geographical territory led to discoveries more profound than the particular new phenomena witnessed on the voyage. Bacon's image of the traveler "laying open" distant regions gives the discoverer the power to reveal knowledge to his contemporaries. By the eighteenth century, scientific voyagers dispatched to obtain crucial data were stepping into a well-established tradition of voyages of exploration, even though they were not exploring simply for the sake of finding novelties. Their very willingness to travel beyond the limits of the familiar implied an openness to new ways of seeing and thinking. Their narratives of discovery drew on several generations of voyage literature for some of their literary conventions, while integrating technical accounts of scientific results into their stories. [7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v006/6.2terrall.html#FOOT7) I look here at several astronomical expeditions mounted by the Paris Academy of Sciences to bring measurements back to France from distant parts of the world. Long-distance journeys to exotic destinations provided scientific travelers in the eighteenth century with a model for narratives of their heroic quest for truth. Set in exotic locales, the accounts invoked famous discoveries of new parts of the globe and linked the discovery of arcane scientific knowledge to the popular genre of travel literature. Heroic accounts of scientific expeditions contributed to the representation of science as the accomplishment [End Page 226] of individuals with exceptional physical and moral qualities. In France, this had partly to do with the gradual evaporation of an ideal of corporate collective pursuit of knowledge and the related intensification of individualism. Scientific voyages presented the opportunity to serve the Academy and the state, while simultaneously enhancing individual honor and reputation through tales of heroic feats. These tales instantiated the relation of science to state power, since that power made the expeditions possible. Expedition narratives also underlined the gendered nature of scientific work, as the exploits of heroes were construed in explicitly masculine terms.

Link – Science Fiction

Science Fiction is imperialistic and securitizing in portraying aliens and space as a frontier that needs to be conquered

**Rewell, 01**

(Gregg Rewell, 2001, University of Arizona, Colonizing the Universe: Science Fictions Then, Now, and in the (Imagined) Future, Rocky Mountain Review of Literature, Volume 55, Number 2, 2001, pg 26-28, 13/06/11, DA:6/21/11, CP)

Despite - or perhaps in spite of- scientific and technological advances, in the morning of the 2 l1 century the universe registers in the popular imagination much as it did in Wilson's 19'h-century mind. While orthodox Christians,M uslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and people of other creeds may profess to believe otherwise, **to many the universe is a "place" habited and inhabitable, by friendly and hostile beings, a place where, sooner or later, humans will dare to travel, point camcorders, and plant flags**. **This is, after all, the fantasy of the science fiction literature and film industry** **- not to mention NASA**2 - **and of the many space minded people whose web sites mean to enable galactic colonization. While the science fiction industry purports to be "new," to use as vehicle for its tenor the most advanced sciences and technologies** - even when merely inventions of convenience (rather than necessity), such as those hand-held communicating devices that made it possible for Star Trek's Enterprise crew members Captain JamesT . Kirk and Mr. Spock to converse over long distances - its "new" is nonetheless delimited by the ranges and productions of the human imagination. As Fredric Jameson argues**, the science fiction industry's "deepest vocation is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize our incapacity to imagine the future"( 153): most science fiction "does not seriously attempt to imagine the 'real' future of our social system. Rather, its multiple mock futures serve the quite different function of transforming our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come"** (152). If First Lieutenant Wilson's projection into the universe of hostile invaders of earth may have been extraordinary in 1882, it would be, and is, quite commonplace today - consider, for one recent example among a plethora, 1996's What Wilson's fantasy and Independence Day have in common is fear of colonization, which for the most part informs the whole of the science fiction industry's productions. **That is, the literature of earthly colonization, producedlargely by colonizing Europeans and Americans, and those early colonists' constructions of an "other" have informed ways the science fiction industry has understood its relationship to more recently constructed Others - those allegedly from outer-space. As a result, the science fiction industry has essentially borrowed from, technologically modernized, and recast the plots, scenes, and tropes of the literature of earthly colonization - but without, except in rare cases, questioning, critiquing, or moving beyond the colonizing impulse. But apparently this would be news to the science fiction industry. Most books written about science fiction begin by trying to define its subject, offering an answer to the question, "What is science fiction?"3M lost formulations end to claim one of several elements - science and technology, human, or change, in whatever form - make a fiction a science fiction**. In 1961, however, Kingsley Amis fore grounded something since oft overlooked when, following Edmund Crispin's work on the detective story, **A misclaimed that the "hero" of a science fiction tale is often the plot itself, and then the "idea" that the plot must resolve (137). Put another way, the motivations and resolutions of a generic science fiction plot are often its heroic or seminal qualities. Underlying most science fiction plots is the Science Fictions Then, Now, and in the (Imagined) Future colonial narrative, whether or not readers and viewers of science fiction readily recognize it. The term "science" implies fact, knowledge, certitude, while the addition of "fiction" on the one hand seems to contradict an implicit scientific code of accountability but on another points to the active role of the imagination in the creation and the experience of science fiction, whether literary or cinematic. Those experiencing science fiction may accept and thus believe as plausible or may reject its science as well as the cultural context enabling the trajectory of the plot**.4But, as Darko Suvin has shown, a science fiction text is senseless without "a given socio-historical context": "Outside of a context that supplies the conditions of making sense, no text can be even read.... Only the insertion of a text into a context makes it intelligible"( "NarrativeL ogic"1 ). **Science fiction productions, then, rely on what Suvin calls a "universe of discourse" to be intelligible** ("Narrative Logic"2 ). **The "dark"sun in the galaxy of science fiction, I argue, is the imagination that informs science fiction, that takes from and revises earth history, puts I out there, in a (de)familiarized but cognitively plausible and contextually recognizable "future," even if"A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away...." In very general terms, there are two basic types, and related plot-projections, of alien-contact science fiction films: one inward, one outward; one dealing with alien visitors to or invaders of earth, one chronicling the experiences of earthlings in space- in Star Trek parlance, that "final frontier."I n the former category, these aliens are sometimes well-meaning, friendly beings who drop by to help the inhabitantsof earth mature, become universal citizens**, such as in the 1951 film The Day the Earth Stood Still; the 1956 cult-classic Plan 9 from Outer Space, whose good alien Eros means to lend a hand to the humans he calls a "stupid" race; or the more recent 1996 often these aliens who visit earth are hostile beings or bug-eyed monsters (BEMs) bent on destroying the planet and its inhabitants, enslaving humans and imposing is the plot-motivating intention of First Contacts Borg. **Often these sorts involve the fantasy of human control, which typically comes in two forms: a fantasy projected onto aliens who intend to take over or enslave the human body**, such as in 1953's Invaders from Mars or 1955's Invasion of the Body **Snatchers or a not so fantastic reality in which humans mean to control humans, as represented in 1984, on a literary text, each also has the all-too-familiar trope of a woman, and in these examples a white woman, seemingly in need of masculine protection. Sometimes it is not humans, however, but aliens who desire to mate with and control the female of the species** (ever since D.W. Griffith's 1915 production Birth of a Nation the threat of miscegenation has motivated many a plot and much violence) as one 1958 film made evident in its title, IMarrieda Monsterfrom Outer Space, and another more bluntly in 1966, Mars Needs Women. Finally, in some instances the plot motivation of the earth-bound,a lien-lacking science fiction production is the result of some aberrant or malign scientific project or of an environmental catastrophe, resulting in something as big as Godzilla, as misunderstood as the Frankenstein monster, as angry as a tomato, or as small as a fly. But it is the latter sort of film**, those projecting earthly desires and anxieties outward, into the universe, which are in question here. Of these, there are three which I call the explorative, the domesticative, and the combative. In the explorative and with the possibility of human contact with the often-unfriendly beings inhabiting these foreign worlds. In these cases, the focus is less on the culture or civilization of these otherworld beings than on the physical and psychological torment the galactic colonist experiences**. his focus is very much in line with what Perry Miller called the Puritans'" errand in to the wilderness,"5w here the concern is not on the effect the Puritansh ad on the local Pequot,M assachusetN, arraganset, Wampanoag, Pocasset, Nipuc, Nauset, Seneca, and Iroquois tribes but on the Puritans project, experiences,and intellectual productions, which then justify the Puritan invasion. One critic of science fiction literature even goes so far as to claim that **"the wilderness theme has now become the property" of science fiction** (68).6 Clearly Frederick Jackson Turnerw as wrong in 1893 to call the frontier closed, for the westward gaze has merely moved upward (not to be confused with inward) **toward what Star Trek perhaps too boldly called the final frontier.**

Link – Collective Action

The 1AC’s collective call for action in space is an ordering process by which the West is able to assert dominance

Kato in ’93

(Masahide, Professor of political science at the university of Hawaii, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” page 345-346, MDA)

As I have argued, the objectification of Earth from the absolute point of the strategic gaze leads to a rearrangement of each locality into an order organized according to the late capitalist strategy. Such rearrangement finds its expression in an iconographic image of the globe representing the order of the world. The emergence and propagation of this image have crucial relevance to Jameson’s second thesis, capital’s penetration into the unconscious. Significantly, the commercialization of the unconscious consolidates the First World way of seeing by disseminating images through the mass media. One such manifestation of the First World way of seeing is the fiction of the earth as a finite, unified and integrated whole. The representation of the globe as a unified whole, however, is not a new concept: it has been the cognitive basis of world-wide expansion of capital since the Renaissance. Nevertheless, the significance of the image of the globe in the late capitalist phase differs from that of earlier phases on three accounts. First, unlike in earlier phases, the image of the globe is based on a photo image which is mechanically reproducible and transmittable. The dissemination of images, which is ideological reproduction *sui generis*, proceeds extensively with the commercialization of the unconscious. In other words, the photo image of the globe needs to be situated in the historical context wherein mechanically repredocible images are the very materialist of the reproduction of the social order. Second, the notion of the globe is no longer anchored in a cartographic abstraction of the surface of the earth, but is now a figure perceived by the camera’s eye. Thus the image ineluctably involves the problematic of technosubjectivity in the construction of the social totality. Third, the image (ultimately the technosubject) serves as a principle of equivalence between self (First World self) and matter in general (earth, humanity, environment, and so on). In other words, technosubjectivity renders the First World self-capable of attaining an unprecedented mode of domination over the rest of the world. I will defer my ideological analysis on the last two points to the next section. Let us first focus on the emergence of the global discourse facilitated by the dissemination of the image of the globe. The fiction of the globe as a unified whole lends itself to the emergence of globalism. The discourse of globalism is well epitomized in Richard Nixon’s address to the “planet” in 1969: “for one priceless moment in the whole history of man, all the people on this earth are truly one.” The statement is ideologically more essential than what is later to be called Nixon doctrine: it capitulates the global strategy of transnational capital in the post-Nixon doctrine and post-Bretton Woods era. Therefore, we must read such seemingly universalistic phrases as “global village,” “one earth,” “global community,” and so forth, very symptomatically. Those buzzwords are none other than the manifestation of a global discourse signifying the emergence of a global transnational collectivity disguised in “planetary” vocabularies.

Link – “We” Rhetoric

**Use of the term ‘we’ and an advocation of collective thought paves the way for government intervention into individual lives and the debate space – this form of politicization in debate causes tyrannical rule and coercion, crushing the possibility for participatory democracy**

Kerr in 3

Roger **Kerr**, Executive Director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, ‘**3**(“The 'We' Word: And the Tyranny of the Majority”<http://www.cis.org.au/policy/summer03-04/polsumm0304-4.htm>)

**Of all such terms, 'we' is the most subtle and troublesome**. It is a term that we-so to speak-cannot dispensewith, and so we risk being trapped into connotations that we don't intend or are unaware of. 'We' can be used in an individualistic sense: 'we' taken as individuals, who can act and make decisions on our own behalf. But it can also be used in a collective sense, meaning that on each issue 'we' have to make a single decision that applies to all of us. For example, after a natural catastrophe, someone might say, 'we should all help the victims'. The words by themselves don't expose two crucial distinctions: whether assistance should be by each of us as individuals or organised on a collective basis; and, if collective, whether it should be voluntary (through donations) or involuntary (through government action financed out of taxes). But my deeper point is that **this ambiguity of 'we' can lead us into collective thinking and coercive action** where it isn't necessary. P**olitical rhetoric is full of phrases like 'we as a nation** must decide whether we want a national airline/film industry/manufacturing sector/whatever'. **This assumes that 'we' have to make a single, collective decision** as voters, whereas in reality 'we' as individuals are making that decision every day. If consumers prefer a domestically manufactured product to an imported one, a domestic manufacturing industry or firm will be there to meet the demand; if they prefer the imported product it won't. The demand that 'we as a nation must decide' is to call on people to decide through the political system things that they can readily resolve as individual consumers. The 'we' word may also be used by members of groups that are smaller than, and contained within, the wider society. In a system that encourages lobbying by special interests and institutionalises 'disadvantaged' minorities, spokespersons of those groups may be tempted into a false collectivism. The media encourage this by commonly treating any member of a disadvantaged minority as automatically representative of that sub-set, as if all its members were unanimous about every issue. Underlying the individualist and collectivist senses of 'we' is the distinction between what David Green calls 'corporate association' and 'civil association': *A 'corporate association' is composed of persons united in pursuit of a common interest or objective . . . In the pure form of a nation as a corporate association, there is but one overriding national objective.* *In a nation of 'civil associates', people are united not because they share a concrete goal, or are engaged together in a substantive task, but because they acknowledge the authority of the rules under which they live . . .* *The task of government under a corporate association is to manage the pursuit of the common goal and to direct individuals as appropriate . . . The task of the state under a civil association is to maintain and enforce the laws, and to supply services such as defence, which must be financed from taxation. The role of government is limited and subject to the law.2* As Green notes, if we take society to be a civil association rather than a corporate association, the role of what 'we' collectively have to decide is limited to genuine public goods like law-enforcement and defence-since these are goods that we individually can't otherwise produce in the desired amounts-plus some form of collectively provided social safety net. There are not many genuine public goods, and the number is shrinking with advancing technology. But **the constant use of the collective 'we' in political debate tends to push out the agenda of government into areas where we as individuals are capable of looking after ourselves.** Indeed, most of the time **the 'we' word is really a disguise for the 'it' word: the government**. Those who argue that 'we as a nation' must decide whether we want a manufacturing industry are really saying that, since 'we' as individual consumers have shown that we prefer imports, the government should override those preferences and protect domestic manufacturers from import competition. The scope for special interests to advance under the cover of the 'we' word is obvious. It is true that sometimes such government intervention does appear to command a degree of popular support, and it is a huge advantage to a special interest seeking government favours when this is the case. Indeed, not only special interests but governments themselves are constantly in the business of testing 'public opinion' with polls, consultations, focus groups, and so on, trying to come up with putative majorities to legitimise their proposals instead of seriously demonstrating that they serve genuine collective interests. But **the further away 'we' collectively are taken from 'us' individually, the more contrived, artificial and fragile is the 'majority' that is formed in our name.** For example, advocates of bigger government like to cite opinion polls that appear to show that a majority approves of higher taxes to finance better health, education or welfare benefits. Four major objections can be raised against this. First, the question itself assumes that it is axiomatic that higher taxes actually result in better services. They may well not, but the opinion pollsters don't normally accommodate this possibility. Second, the polls typically present a bogus either-or choice between raising taxes and leaving them unchanged. They exclude the entirely feasible options of charging for some services and lowering taxes to allow more individuals to make private arrangements. So the majority for higher taxes is largely contrived. Third, some of the many beneficiaries may expect others to pay the higher taxes: 'we' doesn't include 'me', as it were. Finally, we tend in the privacy of the polling booth to vote against higher taxes, whatever we think we should say to opinion pollsters. Several Western political parties have lost elections in recent years after promising to increase taxes, or after increasing them when they had promised not to. It is a major problem for opinion polls that respondents may not reveal their true preferences but express preferences that are socially fashionable. Again, the collective 'we's that are constantly cobbled together in support of some proposal or other are highly dependent on the phrasing of whatever it is that is being put to us. The question 'Should we protect our manufacturers from import competition?' may be supported by a majority. But if the question were rephrased 'Should the government raise the prices of manufactured goods by levying a tax on manufactured imports?', the majority would be smaller or even non-existent. If the 'we's that opinion polls record are so precarious, it's not surprising that they can be contradictory as well. A good example comes from the United States in the mid-1990s. In 1994, a new Republican-dominated Congress thought it had a clear mandate to move towards a balanced budget. It duly put up proposals to reduce the growth rate of some welfare entitlement programmes. But no sooner had the proposals been passed than President Clinton vetoed them, invoking the support of a new majority opposing them. Which did US citizens want? A balanced budget or guaranteed entitlement levels? They wanted both. The 'will of the people' may be systematically ambiguous on the decisions that governments make on a daily basis. The truth is that few consequences for the respondent hang on the answers given to an opinion pollster, and there is little incentive to make a considered judgment. This is largely true of voting as well, since a single vote hardly ever determines the outcome of an election. But there is some evidence that people take voting relatively seriously. Devotees of the 'we' word might therefore be challenged to consider making more use of the system of citizens initiated referenda. They are unlikely to do so because, unlike with opinion polls, the results of a referendum cannot be easily manipulated. But the challenge could at least inject a little linguistic hygiene into the Towers of Babel that politicians, lobbyists, intellectuals and journalists have constructed in modern democracies. This is not to suggest that the collective 'we' must be confined to the limited range of collective or public goods that a government has to fund or produce in a civil association. Although the members of a society like Australia or New Zealand are for the most part unknown to one another, we have common bonds and share a common destiny. A civil association does not conscript its members into overriding collective purposes, but nor is it merely a collection of atomised individuals who have nothing to do with one another. We have our voluntary collective activities, like sports, churches, associations of all sorts, and our annual timetable of festivals and rituals. When referring to our common life, we can use the 'we' word without ambiguity or sleight of hand. The problem arises when our common life is made the basis for what are usually spurious majorities for expanding the scope of government beyond its necessary limits. Such majorities typically reflect only the shifting and temporary coalitions that our political system produces, and government that is beholden to them ceases to be the agent of the society and becomes an instrument of coercion. So **beware the 'we' word in politics**, since, despite its apparently communitarian connotations, **it** so often **portends a weakening** rather than a strengthening **of social cohesion**. A key feature of constitutional democracy is the protection of minorities and the rights of dissenting, law-abiding individuals. **Exercising through politics the so-called 'tyranny of the majority', and trampling on individual rights, are recipes for social discord** at best and a slide into an Orwellian world at worst.

**B. The impact of this totalitarianism is a mass genocide that will be inflicted on the people who have come to be dependent on the federal government.  
R. J. Rummel in 96**, Ph.D. in Political Science, Finalist for 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Hawaii, “The Holocaust in Comparative and Historical Perspective,” Vol.3, no.2, April 1, 1998, Idea Journal,[http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=17](http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=17" \t "_blank) accessed july 1  
  
**The more totalitarian and less democratic a regime the more democide, the more genocide, and the greater the annual rate of democide that it commits**. That is, although the independent patterns of domestic democide, foreign democide, genocide, and the others, are not correlated, together they are accounted for by a regime's totalitarian power.[24] Power is the means through which a regime can accomplish its goals or whims. **When a regime's power is magnified through its forceful intervention in** all aspects of **society**, including its control over religion, the economy, and even the family, **then when conjoined with an absolutist ideology or religion, mass killing becomes a practical means of achieving its ends**. Thus we have the megamurderers shown in Table 1, such as the totalitarian USSR, communist China, Nazi Germany, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. And thus, when the regime finds for whatever reason that the continued existence of a social group is incompatible with its beliefs or goals, totalitarian power enables it to destroy that group. **Genocide follows**. On the other hand, democratic elites generally lack the power to, and democratic culture anyway opposes, the outright extermination of people or social groups for whatever reason.

**Collectivization of “we” when in fact there are a multitude of different fractions and individuals is a false generalization that ignres interpersonal conflicts**

**Uri 2k**

(Margolin, Uri, BA cum laude (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel) Philosophy and English Literature. PhD (Cornell University) Comparative Literature, Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to Ideology Margolin, Uri. Poetics Today, Volume 21, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 591-593 (Article) Published by Duke University Press, DA: 6/24/11, CP)

This article aims to provide a definition, description, and typology of collective narrative agents and of collective narratives. **A collective narrative agent occurs in a given narrative if three conditions are satisfied: (a) the argument position in numerous narrative propositions is occupied by an expression designating a group of some kind; (b) the predicate position in these propositions is occupied by predicates that designate the group’s holistic attributes or collective actions; (c) the group as such fulfills a range of thematic roles in the narrated sequence.** A narrative is a collective narrative if a collective narrative agent occupies the protagonist role.**The difference between standard and collective narratives resides therefore in the reversal of the usual proportion between individual and collective agents. Not every collection of individuals** (e.g., Zola’s crowds) **qualifies as a collective agent.To qualify, the collection must act as a plural subject or we-group, capable of forming shared group intentions and acting on them jointly. A different type of collective agent is a community: a group with a shared sense of identity. At the extreme end stands the group as a corporate entity, a totally impersonal network of positions and roles that creates the impression of an independent entity with a will of its own.** **With respect to individual group members, the narrative adopts a collective perspective on them**. The individual is accordingly presented as part of a collectivity or a social self, its actions those of a role bearer within a group, and the relations between any two individuals defined via a plural subject category. With respect to the group as a collective narrative agent, the portrayal of its physical, verbal, and mental activities oscillates between two poles: description in group-as-a-whole terms and in individuals-as-group-members terms. Both individual and collective levels exist concurrently and are irreducible to each other, so that **an unresolved tension between the two is a basic feature of collective narration.The tension increases as one moves from the representation of physical action to that of speech, where the employment of direct discourse features for the speech of many is problematic.The greatest difficulty is encountered on the level of mental activity or experientiality, because exact inner verbalization varies from one group member to another**.The article further discusses collective narrators, narratees, and the appropriation of collective narratives by actual world individuals and groups, using the Passover Haggadah as a primary example. **The vast majority of Western literary narratives consist centrally of the stories of one individual in isolation or of a limited number of interacting individuals. But they may also contain a collective narrative agent** (CNA), that is, a group of two or more individuals represented as a singular higher order entity or agent, a collective individual so to speak, with global properties or actions. **While such CNAs are common and central, and sometimes even obligatory, in numerous nonliterary kinds of narrative** (records of group experiences; historical, political, and sociological narratives), **groups or collective agents are optional elements in literary narratives, and when they do occur, they usually occupy a background or secondary role. But this optional or secondary status is not inevitable. Even if we limit ourselves to contemporary literature, with its supposed emphasis on the individual subject, we could still find in it a good number of narratives, from short stories to novels,whose main protagonist is a collectivity of some kind, ranging in size from a couple** (Barth ; Brechon and Brechon ; Perec ), through a small group of children, technicians, or guests at a birthday party (Greene  []; Silvain ;Walser , respectively) to a large group of deportees to a concentration camp (Borowski  []), to whole generations of Africans (Armah ), and finally to a large portion of humanity, namely, women (Wittig ). In these narratives, the customary foreground/background relation is reversed. While specific individuals do occur in all of them, they are now the ones who play the minor, often purely illustrative role, while the story as a whole is primarily the group’s story. **The intent of the present study is to describe in a systematic manner the specific, differential features of this kind of narrative on several levels, from microstylistic to thematic. Our first task will be to define in an explicit manner the specific nature of a CNA in general and of the type of narrative in which it occupies the central role, namely, the collective narrative** (CN). Such a definition should take into account both literary and nonliterary kinds of narrative (sections –). The next step involves an examination of the possibilities available for the portrayal of a CNA as opposed to an individual agent, and the constraints on this operation (). This examination may also explain, at least in part, the relative scarcity of literary CNs. **Further issues to be examined include the major kinds of CNAs one encounters inside and outside of literature, the various types of interaction involving groups as their main agents, and the major thematic concerns of literary, and possibly also nonliterary**, CNs (). Next follows a brief discussion of the reception, both textually inscribed and actual, of a CN ().The concluding section () expands the horizon of inquiry beyond the contemporary and offers some observations on the Passover Haggadah, a paradigmatic case of a CN.

Link – India Space Cooperation

**Attempting to cooperate and attempts to modernize India are rooted in a racist epistemology that refuses to listen to their historical narrative**

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 434-437, DA:6/21/11, CP)

These questions are relevant and perhaps even urgent, not only for those of us who cross the divide between Russian and American space history and the communities they involve, but **also in light of the “newer” space powers such as China, Japan, and India, who are now defining and writing their own narratives about their roles in the project of space exploration. Like theirWestern predecessors, Indian and Chinese commentators locate their own narratives about space travel in indigenous scientific and technological achievements that have both national and global import.** Many Chinese writers are eager to emphasize the importance of China as the birthplace of rocketry in the premodern era, while Indian writers similarly stress the importance of heliocentric ideas to Vedic Sanskrit texts that long predate Copernicus.25 In their narratives, Sputnik, Gagarin, Apollo— these all are peripheral**. The case of the Indian space program specifically—but postcolonial studies in general—points to fruitful avenues of research for historians of technology grappling with the conundrums posted by multiple and conflicting narratives that make claims for the universal. A growing body of scholarship on the history, sociology, and anthropology of postcolonial science has rendered problematic such essentialist identifiers as “Western” and “colonial” when describing the development of science and technology outside of Europe and the United States.** **This body of postcolonial theory questions the authority of Western knowledge systems as being objective and universally valid**. Warwick Anderson recently underscored that “postcolonial studies have enabled [a] sort of decentered, diasporic, or ‘global’ rewriting of earlier nation-centered imperial grand narratives.” In other words**, the field has rephrased “modernity within the framework of ‘globalisation**.’” 26 **As such, postcolonial theory prompts us to reconsider received wisdom about existing power relations and to avoid distinct markers such as “colonial” and “indigenous” and instead focus on cultural and historical spaces where various types of interaction and exchange can occur. One way to begin such a project would be**—in the words of postcolonial theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty—to “provincialize” Europe, i.e., to question the received structures that make it impossible for us to conceive of modernity (and by extension, one might argue, modernization) without reference to Europe. Chakrabarty argued that there is an “asymmetric ignorance” whereby historians within postcolonial locales must inevitably refer to Europe as a point of orientation without any expectation of the reverse.27 **Postcolonial thought makes possible a provocative rethinking of both the Indian space program and the history of space exploration in general. Western evaluations of the Indian space program have reflexively been grounded in assumptions about the marriage of poverty and high technology**, i.e., a rhetorical questionmark about why a nation so poor should have a space program at all. Because the project of space exploration has been a normativelyWestern idea, non-Western space programs such as the Indian one are understood in relation to aspirations for aWestern modernity. **But the Indian space program, as manifested in its technology, its goals, and its architects, represents a kind of modernity that is neither completely Western nor fully postcolonial—it is a vision of modernity that is decentered, constantly mutating, often contradictory, and globalized**.28 We see these processes in India in the 1960s as an influential domestic constituency invested in space exploration “sold” their goals of self-reliance and social benefit to consecutive governments. This was not easy, given the significant amounts of international collaboration as well as domestic opposition from local advocacy groups who believed that India had more pressing concerns.29 **By rhetorically linking the “modern” space program with the alleviation of poverty, the architects of the space program not only overcame local opposition but created a new vision of space exploration that could exist in the postcolonial context. If previously the question had been “Why should India have a space program when it is so poor?” the answer was now “India should have a space program precisely because it is poor.” Here, on the one hand, the space program with its advanced technologies allows India to be modern, a Western metric of modernity that harks back to the European “machines as the measure of men.”** **On the other hand, the Indian space program fundamentally depends on the existence of** those markers that Vikram Sarabhai, the founder of the effort, identified as less than modern—**poverty, illiteracy, and economic underdevelopment. This built-in tension is complicated by other factors, including migration** (both of people and knowledge) **across borders, evolving aspirations, contingent metrics of “how to be modern,” and military and strategic questions**. In a sense**, what is modern about the Indian space program betrays complexities, contradictions, and considerations that are not easily parsed into conventional Western ideals of modernity. This new postcolonial vision of space exploration is as much part of the fabric of space history as the more well-known American and Soviet models grounded in the cold war**.30 **These multiple perspectives on space travel suggest that our view of the long history of spaceflight may benefit from a standpoint that no longer privileges borders—demarcations that create rigid analytical categories such as ownership, indigeneity, and proliferation. The Indian space program was at the intersection of multiple flows of knowledge from a variety of sources, including, of course, local expertise**. Likewise, the history of spaceflight has been part of a consistent flow of knowledge and technology across (geographical) space and time—among Germans, Soviets, Americans, British, French, Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Israelis, Brazilians, and so on.

Link – Cooperation

Cooperation is only a guise for controlling an invisible enemy. Liberal democratic rhetoric is just a cover up for western, imperial truth.

Spanos in 2K

(William, V. Professor at Bingham, “America’s Shadow: an anatomy of empire, page 154-155, MDA)

In thus overdetermining the spectrality of the invisible "enemy," this baffled writing, which would come to terms with the event of Vietnam, betrays what a purely political or economic analysis of this war, in its reliance on the disciplinary imperatives of positive "science," is precluded from attending to. It does not simply disclose the blindness to alterity — to the Other, the lack, the difference, the trace, that is, the Nothing — of the imperial "truth" discourse informing this writing. As the grotesquely rigorous reasoning of the last passage makes chillingly clear, it also discloses the unthought violence that informs the logical economy of its narrative.50 The response of the American Mission to the "de-structive" strategy of the elusive Vietnamese Other was not to readjust its "European" military tactics of decidability to a kind of warfare in which the spectral enemy was always hauntingly invisible and unknowable, in which, in other words, the differential Other refused to obey the Western rules of warfare. The American Mission, that is to say — and it is important to emphasize this — did not reorient its Western logocentric concept of war in the face of an enemy that refused to answer to the fundamental epistemic imperatives of the European Enlightenment: those emanating from the grounding principle of differentiation (within a larger identical structure). I mean by this last, the knowledge-producing disciplinary table (uniforms, insignia, rank, and so on) that would distinguish soldiers from civilians (and women and children) and its linear/circular impeVietnam and the Pax Americana 155 rial tactical geometries that would render the enemy's moves locatable, predictable, and masterable. On the contrary, the American response to these unexpected and psychologically and practically baffling conditions precipitated by the enemy's refusal to adhere to the structural imperatives of the hitherto self-evident liberal democratic narrative was — predictably — reactive. As is well known (despite the official effort to repress this knowledge), the Pentagon managers and the American Mission in Saigon simply substituted one European form of warfare for another, the frontal assault that would end in the decisive battle for a war of attrition. The "body count," it was hoped, would eventually deplete the spectral numbers of the Vietnamese Other's army to — in a telling locution — the point of no return. True to this unrelenting American will to convert the spectral to verifiable numbers (tabulation), this technologization (and routinizing) of death — Caputo refers to his soul-destroying duties as "Regimental Casualty Reporting Officer" as keeping "Wheeler's [his commanding officer's] Scoreboard" (RV^ 159)51 —the American Mission retaliated by unleashing a technological firepower against the recalcitrantly invisible and undifferentiated Other unprecedented in (nonatomic) military history: We took space back quickly, expensively, with total panic and close to maximum brutality. Our machine was devastating. And versatile. It could do everything but stop. As one American major said, in a successful attempt at attaining history, "We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it."52

Link – International Agreements

The Law is an extension of colonialism – the law justifies bare life, violence and oppression

Blomley 2003

(Nicholas. Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University. Law, Property, The Frontier, Violence: the Survey, and the Grid Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 93, No. 1, March, pp. 121-141, Published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd. JSTOR, Accessed: 6/23/11. EL)

The construction of that which is deemed law thus rests on the definition of a violent world of non law. The inscription of a frontier? which may be figurative,temporal and spatial?is integral to this process.4 The effect is to create a distinction such that law's violence ?rational, regulated, advancing common goals? is separated from and imagined as a counter to the "anomic or sectarian savagery beyond law's boundaries" (Sarat and Kearns 1992a, 5). Without such a division, of course, the commonplace distinctions between terrorist and reason- able force, or murder and execution, break down (Williams 1983, 329-31). Similarly, the very existence of that deemed property has long relied upon a distinction to a domain of non property. Inside the frontier lie secure tenure, fee simple ownership, and state-guaranteed rights to property.Outside lie uncertain and undeveloped entitlements, communal claims, and the absence of state guarantees to property. Inside lies stability and order, outside disorder, violence, and "bare life" (Agamben 1998). This is evident in the Western foundational narratives that tell property's story, which often begin from an a priori and usually violent world before property, such as Locke's ([1690] 1980, ?124) world of "fears and continual dangers" (see also Blackstone [1765] 1838). For Hobbes, this space behind the frontier was one where "there can be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it" (in Fitzpatrick 1992, 77). The absence of government and property, Hobbes ([1651] 1988, 186) argued, underpins a life of "continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." But these worlds without property are also located in space that is before History. "In the beginning," claims Locke ([1690] 1980, ?149), "all was America" (emphasis in original). And it is here that the violent frontiers of property are more sharply spatialized. Western notions of property are deeply invested in a colonial geography, a white mythology, in which the racialized figure of the savage plays a central role:5 "Disorder on law's part can- not... be located in law itself. The sources of disorder must exist outside of law?in the eruptions and disruptions of untamed nature or barely contained human passion against which an ordering law is intrinsically set. The savage was the concentration of these dangers and the constant and predominant want of the savage was order" (Fitzpatrick 1992, 81). Peter Fitzpatrick (1992, 65) documents the ways in which the law of the European Enlightenment reduced the world to European universality: "That which stood outside of the absolutely universal could only be absolutely different to it. It could only be an aberration or something other than that which it should be." Rather than a multiplicity of legal possibilities, difference was positioned relative to the West. European legal identity, he argues, entails the mapping of the colonial subject as purely negative ("ni foi, ni loi, ni roi"), from which the positivity of Western law is derived. This is a strikingly geographic exercise, in which, as Burke put it, "[t]he great Map of Mankind [is] unrolPd at once" (in Fitzpatrick 1992, 65). For many classical European writers on property, the space of the savage was one of the absence of law and property and the concomitant presence of violence. For nineteenth- century legal theorist John Austin, the figure ofthe savage is also foundational. Imagined as incapable of an appreciation of legal rights and duties, including property, the savage is deemed prepolitical and thus set irrevocably apart from the West (Fitzpatrick 1992, 78-81).6Jeremy Bentham offers a more explicit example of the frontier that separates the spaces of property and violence. Property, for Bentham ([1843] 1978, 52), was "an established expectation" that requires the security pro? vided by law for it to exist: "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." In the absence of security, property fails, and so doeseconomic activity.

Gallagher 2005

Don’t Cut yet, Politics, More cards in article

(Nancy. Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY. Space Policy Institute Security Policy Studies Program Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University. <http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/PERSPECTIVES_ON_SPACE_SECURITY.pdf> Accessed 6/25/11 P.7 EL)

Since the space age began, two competing images have influenced policy debates about space security. One conception sees space as the “final frontier,” a largely lawless environment where conflict is inevitable and superior firepower provides the only reliable protection for satellites

and the terrestrial activities that depend on them. The alternative view uses imagery of “the heavens” to suggest that if, and only if, humans can transcend the fear and greed that generate earthly conflict, then there will be a natural harmony of interest that promotes the peaceful use of space for the benefit of all. Neither the “Realist” imagery of unbounded conflict nor the “Idealist” imagery of natural cooperation adequately reflects the amount of effort spent over the past half century on developing rules to manage space operations. When analysts and practitioners do write about the rules for space, they typically focus only on space law, especially those rights and obligations that have been codified by international treaties — another idealized conception of the rules governing space activity. This paper broadly defines the rules for space as anything that induces regularity or restraint in behavior beyond what would be predicted on the basis of interests and power alone. This includes not only formal laws, but also principles, norms, informal understandings, common practices, agreed decision making procedures, and institutional arrangements. In other words, this paper analyses space as an extension of an international system where governance occurs on a piecemeal basis in the absence of a world government with supranational law-making and enforcement powers. The rules that regulated early space activities, while far from ideal in any sense of the word, were reasonably functional and stable because the formal laws, informal operating practices, and strategic context complemented and reinforced each other. Over time, fundamental processes associated with globalization have altered the strategic context and the operational practices for space activities, but international efforts to update the formal legal framework have not kept pace. Instead, the United States has embarked on a unilateral attempt to rewrite key rules related to space in ways that other countries find extremely threatening, while hoping to preserve international support for aspects of space law that the United States finds beneficial. This strategy underestimates negative international reaction both to the substance of US space security policy and to the process whereby the United States is making momentous policy changes while rebuffing international attempts to discuss, let alone negotiate, new rules for space security. More importantly, this strategy overestimates the United States’ ability to accomplish its objectives in space without widespread acceptance of equitable rules to protect legitimate space activities.

Link – Threat Construction

Frontier rhetoric becomes an easy tool for threat construction because others stand in opposition to American ideals

Jordan in 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

In creating this historical impetus toward a predestined rendezvous with the moon, Kennedy also created for himself an opportunity to speak out against opponents of the lunar program, and in so doing found a further means to coa- lesce his audience into a people who would not be held back by the obstinacy of naysayers. Taking the offensive,he said,“It is not surprising that some would have us stay where we are a little longer to rest, to wait. But . . . the United States was not built by those who waited and rested and wished to look behind them. This country was conquered by those who moved forward—and so will space.”He revisited this point later by warning that the “opportunity for peaceful coopera- tion [among space-faring nations] may never come again.”In this characteriza- tion, those who stood in the way of progress were a danger to every American ideal. They lacked the stamina and vigor necessary to take on the challenges set before them, just as they lacked the vision necessary to recognize the moment of opportunity. In contrast, Kennedy’s audience became the forward-looking occu- pants ofthis special moment in history, able to recognize the opportune moment for what it was. Kennedy’s construction of time established a persuasive appeal that united his audience against his opponents and gave “the people”a sense of manifest destiny that would help make their collective decision for them.

Link – Russia Threat Construction

Russia has historical been constructed as a threat through Frontier Rhetoric

Jordan in 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

The space program also had strong Cold War political overtones for Kennedy because of the continued success of Soviet efforts in space and their threats on the ground.16 Questions of international prestige shadowed America’s space program, and although the United States subsequently matched and surpassed the Soviets’ accomplishments in number, there was still a sense of needing to reclaim lost national pride.17The Soviets had scored a number of astounding “firsts”—sending the first satellite, animal, and human into space—and paraded these accomplish- ments before a global audience that increasingly viewed space as the next interna- tional proving ground.18 It did not escape the world’s attention that Soviet accomplishments were historical firsts, while the U.S. space program merely tallied national firsts. Nor did it escape the attention of Vice President Johnson, who reminded Kennedy in a memo that “dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.”19Project Apollo became the thrust of a new policy orientation for the administration, stemming from the realization that “prestige ...would be as important as power in the [Cold War] struggle.”20As president,Kennedy needed a means to transform second-place status into a chance for outright victory in space, and needed to bolster the American people’s faith in the program by giving them a tangible goal to support.

Link – Progress

Action toward progress never takes responsibility for their outcomes because it uses rhetoric of human hopes, needs and desires – Turning Case!

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

The narrative of progress closely resembles various providential versions of human history. Humans are in God’s hands—and he will secure a happy ending to the story even if the present is manifestly imperfect. James is at pains to deny such appeals to providence, but he takes seriously—in fact experiences himself—the late Victorian worry that humans will lose their get-up-and-go if deprived of the guarantee that their actions will (again in the long run) bear fruit. If the universe is inimical to human hopes and desires, what’s the point of striving for the good? Prone to depression, James returns again and again in his work to the question of what could motivate us to the strenuous effort to make the world a better place. In Pragmatism , he quotes Arthur Balfour (another British politician) to capture the fin-de-siécle’s fear of and fascination with nihilism, with the terrifying thought that all of our efforts might be pointless. “The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish....Nor will anything be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect.”8 Nihilism can be enticing because it offers a release from all responsibility, from the weight of Victorian earnestness. Oscar Wilde played that possible liberation in one direction, Friedrich Nietzsche in another. That both came to a bad end suggests that a self unmoored from implication in larger processes— be they social or ontological—courts insanity. Perhaps that is why Nietzsche had to develop a hyperbolic amor fati to exist alongside (even as it contradicted) his equally hyperbolic paeans to willfulness.9 James himself was more prone to the lassitude of depression than to the manic joys of being cut loose from all ties. He sympathizes with Balfour’s need to believe that the self ’s most cherished hopes find an echo in an external “ideal order” that “guarantees” the efficacy of our actions (P, 533). Action aims to transform the world so that it is better aligned with human hopes, needs, and desires. Progress can be defined as movement toward a closer alignment than the current one. All hope—and James insists all reason to act—would be lost if we knew that the world will inevitably frustrate all our efforts.

The 1AC is Progress for Progress’ means – We desire progress in order to justify western expansionism, blocking true liberation and preventing political actions.

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

This focus on the local and the present, Dewey argues, dissolves the epistemological worries that afflict more grandiose versions of progress. Absent appeals to any transcendent and universalist notions like perfection or civilization or modernity, our standard of judgment is comparative. Progress is a present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogression is a present slipping away of significance, determinations, grasp....There are plenty of negative elements, due to conflict, entanglements, and obscurity, in most of the situations of life, and we do not require a revelation of a supreme perfection to inform us whether or no we are making headway in present rectification. We move on from the worse and into, not just towards, the better, which is authenticated not in comparison with the foreign but with what is indigenous. Unless progress is a present reconstruction, it is nothing; if it cannot be told by qualities belonging to the movement of transition it can never be judged. Men have constructed a strange dream-world when they have supposed that without a fixed ideal of a remote good to inspire them, they have no inducement to get relief from present troubles, no desires for liberation from what oppresses and for clearing-up what confuses present action. ...Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man. (HN, 282)

Progress is just a guise for spreading American Imperialism throughout the galaxy

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

The standard of progress, of civilization, not only justifies violence but offers a metric by which to determine which lives are “more precious” than others. And Chamberlain makes it clear that he understands progress and modernity as an imperative. He calls upon the British to summon “the strength” required “to fulfill the mission which our history and our national character have imposed on us.”3 Two years later (1899), Rudyard Kipling would write his famous poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” to urge the United States, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, to take up the same mission. The language is not often so crude today. But, then again, there is Niall Feguson’s Empire . After quoting Kipling’s poem, Ferguson writes: “No one would dare use such politically incorrect language today. The reality is nevertheless that the United States has—whether it admits it or not—taken up some kind of global burden, just as Kipling urged. It considers itself responsible not just for waging a war against terrorism and rogue states, but also for spreading the benefits of capitalism and democracy overseas. And just like the British Empire before it, the American Empire unfailingly acts in the name of liberty, even when its own self-interest is manifestly uppermost.”4 It is hard to know how to read that non-ironic “unfailingly.” Don’t most nations justify their wars by claiming to act “in the name” of high ideals? Is there some special reason to cut empires more slack on that score? If democracy is one of the names for a progressive principle used to justify violence in our time, “globalization” provides another stick with which to beat the recalcitrant. A nation like France is simply being backward and pursuing unsustainable economic policies when it retains generous pension and social insurance programs.5

Progress is not inevitable – The linear notions of progress utilize notions of peace and civility that used to justify violence.

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

Progress is not inevitable; in fact, it is never even secure. Whatever gains toward tolerance, civility, and peace may be made, a reversion to more violent and brutal relations is always possible. And no country can complacently congratulate itself on being further down the path of progress, civilization, and modernity than any other. Those who would oppose the urge to “run things by main force and brute possession,” James tells us, have assumed an “interminable task.”7 History does not march forward in ways that make various past practices impossible in the future. The idea of progress entails an overly linear conception of historical time.

Link – Development

**Development is the strategy of Occidental Imperialism. It becomes a moral imperative to cultivate the wilderness.**

**Spanos 2k** [William Spanos, America’s Shadow, pg. 40-41]

What, however, the panoptic Eurocentric eye of the Enlightenment comes to see in the space within this reconfigured trope of the circle is no longer — or at least not exclusively — a vast "uninhabited" emptiness, in which the natives do not count as human beings. Rather, it comes primarily to see an *uninformed terra incognita.* As the texts of early European travel writers (and social historians) invariably characterize this amorphous and ahistorical "new world," the European panoptic gaze falls on an "unimproved" space. As the privative prefix emphatically suggests, it is a space-time in which everything in it — flora, fauna, minerals, animals, and, later, human beings — is seen and encoded not so much as threatening, though that meaning is clearly there as well, as wasteful or uneconomical and thus as an untended fallow (female) terrain calling futurally for the beneficial ministrations of the (adult, male) center.72 The predestinarian metaphorics of the circle precipitates a whole rhetoric of moral necessity. The "wilderness" as "underdeveloped" or "unimproved" or "uncultivated" (i.e., "unfulfilled" or "uncircular") space must*,* as the privative prefixes demand, be developed, improved, cultivated (i.e., fulfilled or circularized). Indeed, it is the wilderness's *destiny.* From this representation of the colonial Others as mired in and by their own chaotic primordial condition, one of the most debilitating of which is unproductive perpetual war, it is an easy step to representing them, as American writers and historians did the Indian race in the nineteenth century, as either self-doomed73 or *appealing* to the European to save them from themselves by way of imposing his *peace* on their multiply wasteful strife.74 Referring to John Barrow's representative (enlightened) "anticonquest" narrative about his travels as an agent of the British colonial governor in the interior of the Cape Colony at the end of the eighteenth century, Mary Louise Pratt writes:

Link – Technology

The 1AC’s frontier discourse surrounding technology innovation is rooted in western ideals of modernity, progress and futurism. This reproduced new violent binaries!

Dinderstein 06

(Joel Dinerstein, Joel Dinerstein is an Associate Professor of English and the Director of American Studies at Tulane University. He received his Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin , September 2006 Technology and Its Discontents: On the Verge of the Posthuman Dinerstein, Joel, 1958American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 3, pp. 569-571 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, DA: 6/23/11, CP)

**Technological progress has long structured Euro-American identity, and it functions as a prop for a muted form of social Darwinism—either “might makes right,” or “survival of the fittest.” Here is the techno-cultural matrix: progress, religion, whiteness, modernity, masculinity, the future. This matrix reproduces an assumed superiority over societies perceived as static, primitive, passive, Communist, terrorist, or fundamentalist** (depending on the era). The historian of technology Carroll Pursell points out that “the most significant engine and marker” of modernity is “technology ([which is] almost always seen as masculine in our society),” and that only the West invokes modernity as “a signal characteristic of its self-definition.”8 In Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Michael Adas traced the rhetoric of technology as it became the primary measure of intelligence, rationality, and the good society, supplanting Christianity for nineteenth-century colonial powers**. Weapons, mass production, and communication networks became the fetishes of colonial dominance and racial superiority, which were disseminated (for example) in numerous British best sellers through binary opposites of dominance/passivity: “machine versus human or animal power; science versus superstition and myth; synthetic versus organic; progressive versus stagnant.”9 Such oppositions still inform contemporary theories of Western superiority** (e.g., “the clash of civilizations,” “the end of history”). Casting preindustrial (or premodern) peoples as risk-averse and enslaved to obsolescent ideologies—that is, as not progressing—sentences them to second-class status with regard to the future. Sturken and Thomas ask two crucial questions about the role of technology in the American cultural imagination: “Why are emergent and new technologies the screens onto which our culture projects such a broad array of social concerns and desires?,” and consequently, “Why is technology the object of such unrealistic expectations?” I extrapolate the following two answers from the field’s critical framework, by way of Leo Marx, Kasson, Nye, Carey, and Noble (among many others). **New technologies help maintain two crucial Euro-American myths**: (1) the myth of progress and (2) the myth of white, Western superiority.10 In a given society, **a myth functions as “a play of past paradigm and future possibility,”** according to Laurence Coupe’s study, an act of “remembering and re-creating the sacred narratives of the past.” Progress secularized the idea of Christian redemption by inventing (and instantiating) a near-sacred temporal zone—the future—to contain its man-made utopian dreams. **A myth cannot be declared in rational terms; it “resist[s] completion” in order to keep up its “dialectic . . . of memory and desire, of ideology and utopia.” For a myth to have cultural force, it must be unarticulated; it works as “a disclosure rather than . . . a dogma,” an opening into unspoken systems of belief.**11 Technological progress is the telos of American culture, the herald of the future, the mythic proof in the nation’s self-righteous pudding. “Nowhere . . . can we find a master narrative so deeply entrenched in popular imagination and popular language as the mythic idea of progress,” notes the historian of technology John Staudenmeier, “particularly technological progress.”

Technological advancements have been used in Frontier rhetoric in order to justify imperial expansion into space

Jordan in 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

Having redrawn space through familiar conceptualizations, Kennedy further diminished the immensity ofspace by emphasizing the technology behind the space program and its positive function. This was done by conjoining space exploration with state-of-the-art technology. He informed the audience that if the Mariner probe reached Venus, “we will have literally reached the stars.”Technology had cleared the path, built the bridge, and would also serve as the form of transporta- tion; it was the means by which our reach could extend into the heavens and pull the stars down to Earth. Technological achievements were emphasized in para- graphs 18 through 21, which expanded on the present technological advances brought about by the space program,manifested in everything from Saturn rockets to weather satellites.The massive propulsion rockets received particular attention in the speech to demonstrate that the enormity ofspace could now be traversed safely using these enormous technological wonders. This was an important point for Kennedy to make, for in praising the rockets as a positive and peaceful technology, he redefined them.By placing rockets within the context ofspace exploration,they were transformed into useful objects that inspired awe rather than fear.45Advances in rocket technology could be shown in a peaceful context quite different from the omnipresent Cold War imagery, allowing him to boast of American technological know-how. He stressed that the Saturn rockets were “many times more powerful” than the previous Atlas rockets and were roughly equivalent to “10,000 automobiles with their accelerators on the floor.”Even the buildings in which these rockets were assembled dwarfed previous traditional notions ofarchitecture,as the Saturn rock- ets were assembled in a building “as long as two lengths of this [football] field.” Kennedy’s redefinition ofscale made Earth travel seem almost pedestrian.He solid- ified this point with the claim that the guidance system of the Mariner spacecraft was so accurate it was like “firing a missile from Cape Canaveral and dropping it in this stadium between the 40-yard lines.”The sheer scale and power of these new technologies compelled us to reach toward outer space, for space was the only des- tination that presented enough ofa challenge for the audience’s adventurous spirit and their wonderful new tools.

The 1AC’s use of technology leaves a legacy of imperial violence because it is still technology from below. The use of technology to “look down” on earth only recreates the same violence as on earth because we only see it as a new canvass for the same old painting

Redfield in ’93

(Peter, A.B.  Harvard University 1987, M.A. U.C. Berkeley 1989, Ph.D. U.C. Berkeley 1995, Anthropology of Science and Technology; Humanitarianism and Human Rights; Colonial History and Postcolonial Relations; Ethics, Nonprofit Organizations and Transnational Experts; Europe; French Guiana; Uganda, “The Half-Life Empire in Outer Space page 810-812, MDA)

What then to say about those space enthusiasts, dreaming of their extraterrestrial networks? By surpassing the globe would they really leave it behind? In an essay first written in the midst of Space Race fervor, Hannah Arendt (1978 [1968]) wonders what the “conquest of space” might do to the “stature of man”. Her hope is for a renewed appreciation of the earth as “the centre and home of mortal men”, and a recognition of “factual morality” among the conditional limits framing science. Her fear is of a reduction of technology to a biological process, and language to the “extreme and in itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs” which would not merely lower the “stature of man” but actively destroy it [Arendt (1978 [1968]): 279-80]. Amid its anachronistic language and European humanist frame, the essay identifies a crucial aspect of space exploration: the promise of achieving an Archimedean point of sorts, a position beyond the earth from which to survey the planet itself, a location with clear relational implications. The prospect worries Arendt, for she sees the promise as an incomplete one that will be falsely read as an affirmation of power and a transcendence of limits. Once beyond the atmosphere, humans would imagine themselves to be beyond themselves, and thus lose sight of where they are. Quoting Franz Kafka, Arendt writes that man “found the Archimedean point, but he uses it against himself; it seems he was permitted to find it only under this condition” [Arendt (1978 [1968]):278]. Four decades later, thinking about a small road in the tropics, Arendt’s fears read somewhat differently. For all of the dreams of the world’s space agencies, the mythic allusions in rocket and programme names, the indomitable enthusiasm of space aficionados, the multiple imagination of science fiction, and even the farce of the worlds’ first space tourist, human spaceflight has yet really to move beyond the earth. In the absence of the sure reflection of either a god or an alien above, meaning is still measured from below. The point is not simply abstract. As the sky fills with satellites, the prospect of extraterrestrial perspective actively materializes allowing the production and consumption of distinctly global images in support of such diverse causes as corporate profits, environmental awareness and sustainable development. At the same time, however, the import of Kafka’s phrase shifts along with the expanding field of vision. For whom and against whom has this partial transcendence been used – which humans and nonhumans, when and where? Surely the legacy of imperial vision must be incorporated in the act of looking down. Surely past perspectives of differing elevations, past patterns of contest and association are not simply translated or combined. Under the bright light of a higher lens, the “man” of Arendt’s essay splits asunder, not only through the acceleration of instrumental reason ad its lurch beyond the atmosphere, but also through the widening and lowering of a frame of historical reference to include human difference. However much astronauts may still try to birth a singular human in the sky, that new being faces multiple demands of ancestry.

Technological innovations have created a universal narrative concerning United States Space exploration. These notions of nation building have justified imperial expansion

Siddiqi 10

(Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 425-426, DA:6/21/11, CP)

Ask historians of technology from the United States to name the most important event in the history of space exploration, and they will cite the Apollo Moon landing in 1969. Pose the same question to their Russian counterparts and they will recall the flight of Yuri Gagarin in 1961. American historians of spaceflight (or indeed, historians of technology) would be surprised to learn that few beyond the United States remember or care about Apollo, while Russians find it startling that few Americans have even heard of Gagarin**. Two nations that have engaged in essentially the same endeavor—to take leave of this planet—have fundamentally dissimilar perspectives on the same set of events. That history is told differently in different places by different people is hardly surprising. The same historical episode, seen from two different national cultures, can engender entirely different national claims, assertions that are contingent on a complex matrix of deeply ingrained cultural assumptions**. What is unique about the received history of spaceflight is that its claims—such as those for Gagarin or Apollo—have been imbued with a certain universal, even anthropological, significance. In each nation’s canon of space history, Gagarin’s flight and Neil Armstrong’s first step have been compared with the evolutionary movement of life from water to land. **This simultaneous invocation of national aspirations and universal significance is what distinguishes the conflicting national narratives of space history** from other more common Rashomon-like views of history. Essential to this tension between the more specific narrative and the universal claim in the case of the space program is the perceived importance of technological prowess in the construction of a national identity. While the notion that scientific prowess is a constitutive element of national identity goes back to at least the seventeenth century, the Enlightenment strongly reinforced this relationship in the European context. By the late nineteenth century, with the fruits of the Industrial Revolution evident and the appearance of a distinct category of technology, many of the rationales used in favor of science were even more persistently applied to technology and its essential role in the enterprise of nation-building.2 And, as the European colonial project reached its peak, the discussion over modern technology became inseparable from empire-building; technology, in effect, became a dominant metric of modernity—Michael Adas’s “measure of men.”3 **By the early twentieth century, and especially in the light of experiences duringWorldWar I, technology assumed a fundamental role in the projection of national prowess, a role that was now further complicated by the specter of international competition for global dominance—through science, technology, war, and imperial holdings**. In his study of the relationship between technology and modernity in early-twentieth-century Britain and Germany, Bernhard Rieger notes that “[**t]echnological innovations not only underpinned the competitiveness of national economies as well as both countries’ military might; a large range of artifacts also became national symbols and prestige objects that signaled international leadership in a variety of engineering disciplines.**

Technological advancements are a guise for imperialism

Bernard 07

(Carlson, W. Bernard. August 2007, Diversity and Progress How Might We Picture Technology across Global Cultures? Carlson, W. Bernard. Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, Volume 5, Number2 , pp. 135-136 (Article), Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, DA: 6/22/11, CP)

Around 1500 BCE, the Hittites perfected the art of making iron weapons that were superior to the bronze weapons used by other groups; capitalizing on their technological advantage, the Hittites conquered much of the ancient Mediterranean world, only to be defeated as the Greeks and other groups mastered the secrets of working iron (Geselowitz, 2005). Yet other technological developments are pursued in order to maintain the status quo; in a landmark study, David Noble (1984) argued that U.S. managers and engineers in the 1950s introduced automated machine tools in aircraft production in order to curb the power of unionized workers. Hence, **in talking about technology and ideology, we need to be aware that there is often conflict among groups about how to use technology. Moreover, these conflicts may take place at a variety of levels: locally, between groups in an organization** (managers and workers); **regionally** (say, between townspeople and farmers); **nationally** (the aristocracy versus the peasants); **or globally** (as between the Hittites and their rivals). **While there is frequently conflict and ferment within a given culture about specific technological choices, I would suggest that over time, cultures may settle on a general ideology that tends to privilege one function— abundance, order, or meaning—over the others. As one group comes to dominate a particular society, so it articulates an ideology that justifies its authority and explains how the group plans to use technology to create and maintain its vision of the good society. Assuming that a culture has one prevailing technological ideology is, to be sure, a vast simplification of how messy and complex societies are**. However, I would argue that it is a necessary simplification if we want to take a first pass at comparing how different cultures have their own distinctive technologies. **We need to make this assumption if we want to move from the intracultural approach taken by most historians of technology, to considering, at least in this essay, a crosscultural perspective.**3 One example of how a culture may develop a distinct technological ideology can be seen in the absolute monarchies of early modern Europe (Carlson, 2005, 5:32–34). In these states, the king and the aristocracy took the view that the most important thing was to maintain political order, that society should be structured as a hierarchy of classes. The ruling elite expected that all aspects of the economy and culture would be used to maintain this particular political order. As Louis XIV proclaimed, “L’etat, c’est moi.” **To secure the economic resources needed to sustain their political and military power, several states pursued mercantilist policies aimed at capturing wealth from colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas and bringing it back to Europe**. In France, roads and canals were built to permit the king to exert military power throughout the realm, and much innovation was devoted to creating high-quality textiles and porcelain for the aristocracy at royal factories located at the Louvre palace. Both the king and nobility of old-regime France used consumption and display as a means for underpinning their power. Here the dominant idea is that if a culture is able to get the right political and social order, then it has achieved the good society.4 To suggest that the ancien régime of France privileged social and political order over abundance and meaning is not to deny that there was debate within that society. Among the nobles, there were some who pushed for the development of military technology and territorial expansion, while others concentrated on conspicuous consumption on a grand scale, drawing on new technologies to create elaborate houses and splendid gardens.

American views technology as a tool for exploitation and Western domination

Dinderstein 06

(Joel Dinerstein, Joel Dinerstein is an Associate Professor of English and the Director of American Studies at Tulane University. He received his Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin , September 2006 Technology and Its Discontents: On the Verge of the Posthuman Dinerstein, Joel, 1958American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 3, pp. 569-571 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, DA: 6/23/11, CP)

Immediately after 9/11, a Middle East correspondent for The Nation summarized the coming war on terrorism as “[their] theology versus [our] technology, the suicide bomber against the nuclear power.”1 His statement missed the point**: technology is the American theology. For Americans, it is not the Christian God but technology that structures the American sense of power and revenge, the nation’s abstract sense of well-being, its arrogant sense of superiority, and its righteous justification for global dominance.** In the introduction to Technological Visions, Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas declare that “in the popular imagination, technology is often synonymous with the future,” but **it is more accurate to say that technology is synonymous with faith in the future—both in the future as a better world and as one in which the United States bestrides the globe as a colossus.2 Technology has long been the unacknowledged source of European and Euro-American superiority within modernity,** and its underlying mythos always traffics in what James W. Carey once called “secular religiosity.”3 Lewis Mumford called the American belief system “mechano-idolatry” as early as 1934; a few years later he deemed it our “mechano-centric religion.” David F**. Noble calls this ideology “the religion of technology” in a work of the same name that traces its European roots to a doctrine that combines millenarianism, rationalism, and Christian redemption in the writings of monks, explorers, inventors, and NASA scientists. If we take into account the functions of religion and not its rituals, it is not a deity who insures the American future but new technologies**: smart bombs in the Gulf War, Viagra and Prozac in the pharmacy, satellite TV at home. It is not social justice or equitable economic distribution that will reduce hunger, greed, and poverty, but fables of abundance and the rhetoric of technological utopianism. The United States is in thrall to “techno-fundamentalism,” in Siva Vaidhyanathan’s apt phrase; to Thomas P. Hughes, “a god named technology has possessed Americans.” Or, as public policy scholar Edward Wenk Jr. sums it up, “we are . . . inclined to equate technology with civilization [itself ].”

**Technology as an abstract concept functions as a white mythology. Yet scholars of whiteness rarely engage technology as a site of dominant white cultural practices (except in popular culture), and scholars of technology often sidestep the subtext of whiteness within this mythos. The underlying ideology and cultural practices of technology were central to American studies scholarship in its second and third generations, but the field has marginalized this critical framework; it is as if these works of (mostly) white men are now irrelevant to the field’s central concerns of race, class, gender, sexuality, and ethnic identity** on the one hand**, and power, empire, and nation on the other**. In this essay I will integrate some older works into the field’s current concerns to situate the current posthuman discourse within an unmarked white tradition of technological utopianism that also functions as a form of social evasion. By the conclusion, I hope to have shown that the posthuman is an escape from the panhuman. **This is an important moment to grapple with the relationship of technology and whiteness since many scientists, inventors, and cognitive philosophers currently hail the arrival of the “posthuman.” This emergent term represents the imminent transformation of the human body through GNR technologies**— G for genetic engineering or biotechnology, N for nanotechnology, and R for robotics. “The posthuman,” as N. Katherine Hayles defined it in How We Became Posthuman (2000), **“implies not only a coupling with intelligent machines but a coupling so intense and multifaceted that it is no longer possible to distinguish meaningfully between the biological organism and the informational circuits in which the organism is enmeshed.” To be reductive, the posthuman envisions the near future as one in which humans are cyborgs—in which the human organism is, for all practical purposes, a networked being composed of multiple human-machine interfaces. Underlying cultural beliefs in technological determinism matched with the inalienable right of consumer desire will soon produce what even cautious critics call “a social transformation” at the level of the individual body, as consumers purchase genetic enhancements** (to take one example). In other words, steroids, cloning, gene mapping, and surgical implants are just the tip of an iceberg that, when it melts, will rebaptize human beings as cyborgs.5

Technological advancements are meant to civilize and westernize other societies. Western notions of technological progress determine many power relations

Bernard 07

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But **it is not just our assumptions about the past that need to be revised. As Japan, China, and India grow in industrial power and reshape global markets in the twenty-first century, historians and policy makers need to rethink their assumptions about technological diffusion.** Already, vast amounts of goods and services move East to West**, leading one to wonder if before long, ideas and innovation in technology will originate in China and India and then diffuse to Europe and America**. Just as the British had to make sense of the Keying sailing up the Thames, so Americans and Europeans now must make sense of the container ships docking at Long Beach and Rotterdam, disgorging thousands of tons of products from China every day (Donovan & Bonney, 2006**). To revise our thinking about the movement of technology across history and cultures, we should consider our ideas about diversity and progress as they relate to technology. On the one hand, thanks to the work of anthropologists and historians of technology, we can appreciate the remarkable and diverse ways in which people across a variety of cultures use technology to shape their lives** (Edgerton, 2007). From the pyramids of ancient Egypt to the boats of Pacific Islanders to the cell-phone networks established throughout the world today, it is clear that humans have long used technology in response to their needs, wishes, and dreams. **Both historical and contemporary examples amply demonstrate that technology is not something uniquely created by the industrialized West**; one need only recall that paper, the magnetic compass, and gunpowder all moved East to West along the Silk Road during the late Middle Ages. Hence, we need to recognize diversity in the creation and diffusion of technology. Yet, on the other hand, many strongly believe that technology is essential to improving living conditions around the world. We know that certain kinds of technology can provide food, eliminate disease, and raise the standard of living for millions of people. Many also hope that, by using technology to increase the wealth of a society, people may be inclined toward democracy and freedom and away from violence and prejudice. So given our commitment to using technology for human betterment, how do we go about promoting technological change without falling into the trap of automatically applying Western assumptions? The answer, I believe, is to refine our thinking about diversity and progress. To understand the diversity found in technology, I will suggest in this essay that **we consider how different societies use technology to pursue material abundance, social order, and cultural meaning.** Next, I will look at how societies differ from each other in terms of the vision or ideology they develop about how to use technology to pursue these three goals. Having established the notion of technological ideology, I will then turn to **the issue of progress to argue that the common notion of progress springs from the technological ideology of the industrial West: namely, that the good society is based on material abundance, and second, that different societies may have entirely different notions of change across human history. To think about what we mean by progress in industrialized cultures, I will show how we might diagram human history, looking in particular at the resources mobilized by different cultures across time. Throughout, I will emphasize that the Western notion of technological progress is only one of several ways to think about human history, and that the trajectory of human experience can be viewed in a variety of ways. Indeed, it is only by comparing technological activity across cultures and by thinking critically about the nature of progress that we can succeed in understanding how people use technology to shape their experience**.

Link – The State

National narratives construct the state as universal

Pease 1997

(Donald E. Professor of English The Ted and Helen Geisel Third Century Professor in the Humanities Director, Master of Arts in Liberal Studies Program Ph.D., University of Chicago. National Narratives, Postnational Narration. Project Muse. The Purdue Research Foundation. Pp. 1-23. Accessed 6/25/11. EL)

National narratives derived both their coherence and their claim to "universal" value from their opposition to "other" national narratives. These opposed narratives "face one another like images gesturing from opposite directions toward a patriotic threshold, the reader who calls one image reality and the other a reflection is, in fact, declaring what side of the mirror he or she is on" (Sommer 112). The construction of the national Other produced a totalized image of the national community at the surface of this national mirror. A "patriotic" national identity was subsequently structured in the imagined relation of absolute difference from this national enemy. [9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_fiction_studies/v043/43.1pease.html#FOOT9) But the contradictory relation between difference and sameness out of which national narratives and national identities were fashioned could only be resolved into a unity through the state's intervention. When it exercised the power to make a unity out of difference, however, the state also threatened its individual subjects' relation to this unity with disruption at the paradoxical space wherein unification was accomplished (see Bhabha, "DissemiNation"). If state power was required to constitute (and enforce) the national unity that the individual presupposed as a property intrinsic to the nation, however, that accomplished unity would always lack at least one part. Since it required the intervention of the state's power as a force external to the (not-yet-united) nation, the unified nation would always lack the part played by the state in constituting its integrity. Contrarily, insofar as an individual could only consider him or herself as a part of the nation after recognizing his or her apartness from it, her (or his) national identity could only be achieved through an act performed by this part lacking the whole. When either the state or the individual performed the action(s) necessary to make a whole out of these part actions, however, the national unity and the national identity accomplished out of these performatives were manifestly the effect of this paradoxical social [End Page 5] logic--the whole nation minus this part (action) or the part(ial national identity) in addition to the whole nation

When we mentally consign ourselves to the thought that we must discuss advocacies and ideas only in the context of federal government action we make ourselves feel ethically inept and completely detached from global events – we feel we cannot stop war because we are not where the major decisions are made. We engage in mental deputy politics, ceding our agency and negating our potential to effect change in the world.

Kappeler 95

[Susanne, associate professor of school of humanities and social science @ Al-Akhawayn University, *The Will to violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg. 10-11]

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society – which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of ‘collective irresponsibility’, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility – leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens – even more so than those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own actions I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN – finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution’.

‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our ‘non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ – our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is , in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

Link – Hegemony

Hegemony is expressed through imperialism and conquest. Like the land-rush, Nations in space will have little regard for indienous societies causing war and conflict

Gray in ’99

(Dale M. Space Policy Volume 15, Issue 3, Historical Consultant, “Space as a frontier – the role of human motivation, MDA)

The motivation of nations to expand their spheres of influence has historically been expressed in terms of imperialism, colonialism, hegemony and outright military conquest. In America in the 19th century it was most often expressed in terms of Manifest Destiny – the belief that the United States of America should extend across the continent from the Atlantic to Pacific. The movement was personified by folk heroes such a Daniel Boone, Kit Carson and Davy Crockett. However, on a larger scale it was expressed in a generationally driven agrarian and mining expansion from east to west until the Civil War and then a rebound back to the east into the interior from the Pacific in the post-War eras. In the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, the idea of a steady-state society was anathema to national prestige. Nations competed in a global land-rush with little regard for the indigenous societies. The American frontiersmen perceived the land to be empty and brushed away the native populations who could not compete with the technology, organizational structures and aggressive ideologies of the EuroAmerican society. Indeed, national ambition expressed in the expansion of physical borders continues to produce war and the threat of war.

Their project of hegemony serves to secure the American national identity by maintaining a stable division between the undesirable parts of the population

Clifford, ‘1

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State, *Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities*, p. 114]

The second facet of the nation’s integrity centers on its identity. On the international level, diplomatic-military techniques and apparatuses of security contribute toward the preservation of the nation’s identity and, to a great extent, its construction. National identity serves as a measure of integrity to the outside world; it is a complex fabrication of ideologies, doctrines, and policies disseminates through various modes of diplomacy and/or techniques of imperialism and colonialization. It is the crux of treaties and agreements, which in turn underline and reinforce the nation’s identity, vis-à-vis a relation of mutual recognition with other countries. This face which the nation projects is essential to its integrity as a political body. But it is also necessary to project this face inward, to instill or to discover a national identity in the citizenry. National integrity is a matter of unity. Among the many ways this can be achieved is through the production and propagation of discourses of nationalism, which are disseminated by means of governmental intervention in such institutions as education, at the local level where indoctrinal practices make contact with the individual. Yet **any effort to instill a national identity requires a rigorous survey of the social body** – the population – **to determine its nature and makeup**. This leads us to the third historical factor contributing to the shape of modern governments (as a disciplinary technology of power), namely, the development and expansion of the police apparatus.

Link – Space Exploration

The imperialistic ideals of space exploration are intertwined with US policies concerning colonization of the “final frontier”

Grondin 07.

David Grondin, Lecturer of Political Science @ U. Ottawa, “The US Religion of Technology in the Weaponization of Outer Space - A Case for Technological Atheism and Resisting Space War”, Paper to be presented at ISA Convention, 2007, p. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178946\_index.html

Looking at outer Space, from the viewpoint of the United States and of the analogies with the frontier experience, a notable difference in Space is that no “stranger” life yet exists and thus Space exploration does not face the same moral criticisms as would have the colonization of America if it had happened in our time: “The difference between colonialism and Space exploration, of course, is that we do not run immediately into the problem of displacing or interfering with pre-existing inhabitants of whatever Space bodies we explore next, since no such ‘alien’ life-form has yet to be established” (Lin, 2006: 283). That does not mean however that issues and attitudes of colonialism are exempt from the picture. The basic considerations to be discussed with regard to outer Space are indeed those of nationalism and of the pressures of military technology to cope with an uncertain environment. Recognizing the history of Space exploration as a way of producing outer Space as the “final space” in US security identity politics and in light of the US mythic “frontier” tradition, it is not coincidental that one American analyst would in fact bluntly asks the question that if “Space has been long called ‘the final frontier,’ but have we taken the time to consider what our responsibilities are as ‘frontiersmen’?” (Lin, 2006: 282; my emphasis). What does that imply? It is interesting to see that for Lin, although we would indeed be led to think that the “we” employed would refer to humanity, the reference to the trope of frontiersmen calls in the American role in Space exploration and American power. And reactivating the epitomizing and mythic frontier experience, American statesmen, bureaucrats, and military leaders have traditionally relied upon a blind faith on technology, especially with respect to warfare technology to solve problems. As recalls historian Paul Boyer, “the ‘security’-driven faith in technological solutions to foreign-policy issues underlay Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, with its vision of a laser-based shield to protect the nation against foreign attack” (Boyer, 2001: 5).

Space Exploration is inherently tied to the nationalistic state. This framework for policy creates universal rationales for human destiny through notions of human progress, colonization and space travel

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 425-426, DA:6/21/11, CP)

**Space exploration’s link with national identity partly overlapped with its claims to a larger idea that appealed to a global, even universal, vision of humanity. Counterintuitively, these ideas emerged from ideas deeply embedded in national contexts. Roger Launius has noted that nations have historically justified space exploration by appealing to one (or a combination) of five different rationales: human destiny, geopolitics, national security, economic competitiveness, and scientific discovery**.15 The latter four stem from national and nationalist requirements; the first, human destiny, appeals to the idea of survival of the species. In the American context, **this universal rationale of human destiny combines older traditions of technological utopianism and an updated version of “manifest destiny.”** Technological utopianism, i.e., a notion that conflates “progress” (qualified technologically) with“progress” (unqualified), has been an essential part of popular discourse since the late nineteenth century, and if the crisis of modernity and the Great War made Western Europeans less enamored of the panacea promised by technology, Americans continued to embrace more fully the idea of technological utopianism than most other societies.16 As Launius has shown, influential space activists of the past fifty years deployed rhetoric and rationale to support space exploration that simultaneously invoked romanticized notions of the American frontier—Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” was ubiquitous—with emphatic language that underscored that what was at stake with space exploration was not about Americans but the entire human race. Commentators as varied as Wernher von Braun, Gerard K. O’Neill, and Robert Zubrin **all couch**ed **their arguments with a distinctly American spin—ingenuity, frontier, freedom— in their search to create the opportunity for global survival in the form of human colonization of the cosmos.17 Here, the American becomes the normative for space travel for the species.** The situation was and is eerily similar in the Russian (and former Soviet) case. As with the United States, there is a deep strand of technological utopianism in Russian society, a cultural trait that was undeniably heightened by the Bolshevik Revolution. What was once a vision of the future for Russian intelligentsia at the turn of the century took on millenarian overtones after 1917. Beginning in the 1920s, space exploration became a powerful avatar of utopian dreaming in post-revolution Russia. The most powerful symbol of this appeal was the patriarch of Soviet cosmonautics Konstantin Tsiolkovskii, the half-deaf village schoolteacher who, before any other in the world, articulated the practical possibility of space travel in an obscure journal article in 1903. Tsiolkovskii was driven not only by a fervent belief in the power of science and technology to save the world but also by ideas deeply rooted in Russian culture, particularly the philosophy of Cosmism. Cosmism’s intellectual foundations comprised a hodgepodge of Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, theosophy, Pan-Slavism, and Russian Orthodox thinking. **The outcome was a nationalist and often reactionary philosophy that, in spite of its reactionary tenets (or perhaps because of them), continues to attract the attention of many Russian nationalist intellectuals in the post-Communist era.18 The cause of Cosmism was “liberation from death,” a goal that would be achieved by human migration into space which would allow humans to reanimate the atom-like particles of all those who had already “died” in the previous hundreds of thousands of years**. The eccentric late-nineteenth-century Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov, who articulated much of this philosophy before anyone, wrote: “[The] conquest of the Path to Space is an absolute imperative, imposed on us as a duty in preparation for the Resurrection.We must take possession of new regions of Space because there is not enough space on Earth to allow the co-existence of all the resurrected generations.”19 In present-day Russia, the philosophy of Cosmism holds deep sway among many commentators, especially those who meditate on the meaning of Russian space exploration.

Link – USSTRATCOM

STRATCOM is rooted in the imperialist ideology of preserving our hegemonic dominance, at the expense of subjugating the rest of the world. U.S Drive For Hegemonic Security Leads To a Dark Reality Where We Are The Global Tyrants Of The World

Mackay, 03 (Neil Mackay, June 22, 2003, The Sunday Herald, Revealed: US plan to 'own' space;As part of a plan to ensure its total military supremacy, the US is preparing to complete the domination of space - by any means necessary. Neil Mackay explains the terrifying new face of global warfare, l/n, Pg. 21, D:5/2/11, CP)

IT SOUNDS like the stuff of the darkest sci-fi fantasies, but it's not. The Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan is a clear statement of the US's intention to dominate the world by turning space into the crucial battlefield of the 21st century.The document details how the US Air Force Space Command is developing exotic new weapons, nuclear warheads and spacecraft to allow the US to hit any target on earth within seconds. It also unashamedly states that the US will not allow any other power to get a foothold in space.The rush to militarise space will also see domestic laws and foreign agreements torn up. As the document warns: "To fully develop and exploit space some US policies and international treaties may need to be reviewed and modified".The Strategic Master Plan (SMP) changes the nature of war. No longer will battles be fought by ships, aircraft and ground forces. Instead the US will use its technology to dominate any theatre of war from space.The document also opens the door for the US to become the only global policeman. Control of space will give it uniquely instantaneous reach, capable of "worldwide military operations."The first page of the document clearly spells out America's agenda. General Lance W Lord, of Air Force Space Command, writes in his foreword: "As guardians of the High Frontier, Air Force Space Command has the vision and the people to ensure the United States achieves space superiority today and in the future." The document also lays the groundwork for the development of "21st century space warriors'' - a new military cadre tasked solely to fight "from and in" space. The SMP says this Space Corps "is just as crucial to the success of our vision as employing new technologies". Air Force Space Command operates from a base in Colorado and its mission is to "defend America through space and intercontinental ballistic missile operations". Its ultimate goal is to "project global reach and global power". Although little is known about Space Command in Europe, it is central to the US military machine and staffed by some 40,000 military and civilians. General Lord says the strategy of the SMP "will enable us to transform space power to provide our nation with diverse options to globally apply force in, from, and through space with modern intercontinental ballistic missiles and new conventional global strike capabilities".In gung-ho language, the foreword reads: "Precision weapons guided to their targets by space-based navigation - instant global communications for commanders and their forces - enemy weapons of mass destruction held at risk by a ready force of intercontinental ballistic missiles - adversary missiles detected within seconds of launch. This is not a vision of the future. This is space today!" Lord adds: "Our space team is building capabilities that provide the President with a range of space power options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States."The (SMP) says: "Effective use of space-based resources provides a continual and global presence over key areas of the world military forces have always viewed the 'high ground' position as one of dominance. With rare exception, whoever owned the high ground owned the fight. Space is the ultimate high ground of US military operations."Today, control of this high ground means superiority and significant force enhancement. Tomorrow, ownership may mean instant engagement anywhere in the world."The primary goal of the SMP is to give the US military "the capability to deliver attacks from space". The use of "space power" would also let the US deploy military might instantaneously across the face of the earth and completely "bypass adversary defences".In order to "fully exploit and control space", the United States Air Force Space Command says it has to "negate" the ability of foreign powers to develop their own space capabilities. The plan also demands that Space Command "focus on missions carried out by weapons systems operating from or through space for holding terrestrial targets at risk".The document proclaims US aspirations to "global vigilance, reach and power", and Space Command says its vision "looks 25 years into the future and is summed up as follows: space warfighting forces providing continuous deterrence and prompt global engagement for America through the control and exploitation of space".

Link – Satelites

Humanizing space sets the stage for warfare conducted on a grander scale and increases the chance of miscalc

Dickens 09

(Peter Dickens, teaches at the Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, UK. His most recent book, co-written with James Ormrod, is Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe (2009). The Humanization of the Cosmos—To What End?, DA:6/21/11, CP)

The 1969 Apollo 11 moon landing is often seen as the high point of society’s relationship with outer space. Nothing quite so dramatic or exotic seems to have happened in outer space since. But nearby, parts of the solar system (including the moon, some asteroids, and Mars) are now being routinely circled and explored and analyzed by robots. Furthermore, President Obama has recently made important announcements regarding a new U.S. space program that involves manned missions to Mars by the mid-2030s. But the NASA-based Constellation program to the moon and Mars has been cancelled. Instead, NASA will undertake a long-term research and development program aimed at supporting future forms of propulsion and exploration programs. Even more significant in the short-term is a proposed $25 billion being allocated to NASA to kick-start commercial manned spaceflight over the next five years. New forms of transport to the International Space Station will be funded, this time using innovative forms of “space taxis” designed by private sector space companies.2 These plans entail new relations between the private and public sectors in the United States. Meanwhile**, a presence in outer space is being developed by other societies. This is partly because such a presence is seen as an important symbol of modernization, progress, and social unity**. The Indian government has announced a manned mission to the moon in 2013, the European Space Agency envisages projects to the moon and beyond, and the Chinese government is planning a similar project for 2020. This last development has caused some consternation over Obama’s plans. One suggestion is that the United States may after all be the next to send manned missions to the moon, because China’s space project is seen by some as a military threat that needs forestalling.3 Yet among these plans and proposals, it is easy to forget that outer space is already being increasingly humanized. **It has now been made an integral part of the way global capitalist society is organized and extended. Satellites, for example, are extremely important elements of contemporary communications systems. These have enabled an increasing number of people to become part of the labor market.** Teleworking is the best known example. Satellite-based communications have also facilitated new forms of consumption such as teleshopping. Without satellite-based communications, the global economy in its present form would grind to a halt. **Satellites have also been made central to modern warfare**. Combined with pilotless Predator drones, they are now being used to observe and attack Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This action is done by remote control from Creech Air Force Base at Indian Springs, Nevada. The 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars” program, **aimed to intercept incoming missiles while facilitating devastating attacks on supposed enemies**. A version of the program is still being developed, with the citizens of the Czech Republic and Poland now under pressure to accept parts of a U.S.-designed “missile defense shield.” This is part of a wider strategy of “Full Spectrum Dominance,” which has for some time been official U.S. Defense Policy.4 **Using surveillance and military equipment located in outer space is now seen as the prime means of protecting U.S. economic and military assets both on Earth and in outer space.**

Link – Resources in Space

**Frontier discourse is a guise for depletion of the environment and its resources**

**Billings, 06**

(Linda Billings, PhD, Research Associate at SETI Institute, “To the Moon, Mars, and Beyond: Culture, Law and Ethics in Space-Faring Societies,” IASTS 21st Annual Conference, February 3-4, 2006, Baltimore, MD, <http://lindabillings.org/lb_papers/space_law_ethics_culture.pdf>, DA: 6/24/11, CP)

The social, political, economic and cultural context for the U.S. civil space program has changed radically since the 1960s. But the rhetoric of space policy making has not**. In the 21st century, politicians and other advocates are promoting “the Moon-Mars thing” as exploration for the sake of exploring and also as a means of opening up the solar system to private property claims, resource exploitation, and commercial development. In the words of one space advocate, “The solar system is like a giant grocery store. It has everything we could possibly want….** The solar system’s seemingly limitless energy and mineral resources will solve Earth’s resource shortages.”**8 In these remarks is reflected a belief that the values of materialism, consumerism, and hyper-consumption prevalent today are values worth extending into the solar system. This conception of outer space depends on the idea of a solar system (and beyond) of wide-open spaces and limitless resources. The so-called “the myth of the frontier**” (Slotkin, 1973**) in American history embodies a worldview in which the United States is “a wide-open land of unlimited opportunity for the strong, ambitious self-reliant individual to thrust his way to the top”** (p. 5). **President Kennedy’s “new frontier” of the** **1960s was “a heroic engagement” in a campaign against communism, including the civilian space program** (Slotkin, 1990, p. 3). **The frontier metaphor has been, and still is, a dominant metaphor in rhetoric about space exploration; it thrives today in discourse of space exploration planning and policy making. “Space frontier**” means different things to different people, and it is worth thinking about the range of meanings invoked by the metaphor in considering what values are, could be, or should be embodied in the space exploration enterprise. Historian Stephen Pyne (1988) has explained exploration as a cultural invention that “reinforces and reinterprets…myths, beliefs, and archetypes basic to its originating civilization.” The modern cultural invention of exploration in 15th-century Europe functioned as “a means of knowing, of creating commercial empires, of outmaneuvering political economic, religious, and military competitors – it as war, diplomacy, proselytizing, scholarship, and trade by other means” (Pyne, 2003). The postmodern exploration of space is different, Pyne has observed. “With neither a rambunctious imperialism nor an eager Enlightenment,” the case for space colonization is not compelling. **Rationales advanced for space settlement “are historical, culturally bound, and selectively anecdotal: that we need to pioneer to be what we are, that new colonies are a means of renewing civilization….” These rationales do not resonate well with many people outside the space community today. Space advocates continue to conceive of “American history [as] a straight line**,” historian Patricia Nelson Limerick (1994) has observed, “a vector of inevitability and manifest destiny linking the westward expansion of Anglo-Americans directly to the exploration and colonization of space. In using this analogy, space advocates have built their plans for the future on the foundation of a deeply flawed understanding of the past, [and] the blinders worn to screen the past have proven to be just as effective at distorting the view of the future.” The wilderness metaphor has been suggested as an alternative to the frontier. This metaphor is encompassed in the concept of “astroenvironmentalism,” the idea of applying the values of environmental protection and preservation to space exploration (Miller, 2005, 2001). Treating the solar system like “a space wilderness to protect” rather than a frontier to exploit9 could

Link – Resources/Mining/Colonalization

The frontier for new materials and resources in space create a frameworks of instrumentalization. There is no guarantee that these harmful environmental practices will work but instead establish a new ecological crisis.

Dickens 09

Peter Dickens, teaches at the Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, UK. His most recent book, co-written with James Ormrod, is Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe (2009). The Humanization of the Cosmos—To What End? And The Cosmos: Capitalism’s New “Outside” , DA:6/21/11, CP)

**Instead of indulging in over-optimistic and fantastic visions, we should take a longer, harder, and more critical look at what is happening and what is likely to happen. We can then begin taking a more measured view of space humanization, and start developing more progressive alternatives.** At this point, we must return to the deeper, underlying processes which are at the heart of the capitalist economy and society, and which are generating this demand for expansion into outer space. Although the humanization of the cosmos is clearly a new and exotic development, the social relationships and mechanisms underlying space-humanization are very familiar. In the early twentieth century, Rosa Luxemburg argued that an “outside” to capitalism is important for two main reasons. First, it is needed as a means of creating massive numbers of new customers who would buy the goods made in the capitalist countries.7 As outlined earlier, space technology has extended and deepened this process, allowing an increasing number of people to become integral to the further expansion of global capitalism. Luxemburg’s second reason for imperial expansion is the search for cheap supplies of labor and raw materials. Clearly, space fiction fantasies about aliens aside, **expansion into the cosmos offers no benefits to capital in the form of fresh sources of labor power.8 But expansion into the cosmos does offer prospects for exploiting new materials such as those in asteroids, the moon, and perhaps other cosmic entities such as Mars.** Neil Smith’s characterization of capital’s relations to nature is useful at this point. **The reproduction of material life is wholly dependent on the production and reproduction of surplus value. To this end, capital stalks the Earth in search of material resources; nature becomes a universal means of production in the sense that it not only provides the subjects, objects and instruments of production, but is also in its totality an appendage to the production process…no part of the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere, the oceans, the geological substratum or the biological superstratum are immune from transformation by capital**.9 **Capital is now also “stalking” outer space in the search for new resources and raw materials. Nature on a cosmic scale now seems likely to be incorporated into production processes, these being located mainly on earth**. Since Luxemburg wrote, an increasing number of political economists have argued that the importance of a capitalist “outside” is not so much that of creating a new pool of customers or of finding new resources.10 Rather, an outside is needed as a zone into which surplus capital can be invested**. Economic and social crisis stems less from the problem of finding new consumers, and more from that of finding, making, and exploiting zones of profitability for surplus capital. Developing “outsides” in this way is also a product of recurring crises, particularly those of declining economic profitability. These crises are followed by attempted “fixes” in distinct geographic regions. The word “fix” is used here both literally and figuratively**. **On the one hand, capital is being physically invested in new regions. On the other hand, the attempt is to fix capitalism’s crises. Regarding the latter, however, there are, of course, no absolute guarantees that such fixes will really correct an essentially unstable social and economic system**. At best, they are short-term solutions. The kind of theory mentioned above also has clear implications for the humanization of the cosmos. Projects for the colonization of outer space should be seen as the attempt to make new types of “spatial fix,” again in response to economic, social, and environmental crises on earth. Outer space will be “globalized,” i.e., appended to Earth, with new parts of the cosmos being invested in by competing nations and companies. Military power will inevitably be made an integral part of this process, governments protecting the zones for which they are responsible. Some influential commentators argue that the current problem for capitalism is that there is now no “outside.”11 Capitalism is everywhere. Similarly, resistance to capitalism is either everywhere or nowhere. But, as suggested above, **the humanization of the cosmos seriously questions these assertions. New “spatial fixes” are due to be opened up in the cosmos, capitalism’s emergent outside. At first, these will include artificial fixes such as satellites, space stations, and space hotels. But during the next twenty years or so, existing outsides, such as the moon and Mars, will begin attracting investments. The stage would then be set for wars in outer space between nations and companies attempting to make their own cosmic “fixes.”**

Link – Space Colonization

The 1AC’s frontier rhetoric about space colonization will create a slippery slope toward galactic colonialism and a new arms race

Dickens 09

(Peter Dickens, teaches at the Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, UK. His most recent book, co-written with James Ormrod, is Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe (2009). The Humanization of the Cosmos—To What End? And The Cosmos: Capitalism’s New “Outside” ,, DA:6/21/11, CP)

**Space colonization brings a number of other manufactured risks. The farther space vehicles penetrate the solar system, the more likely it is that they will be powered by nuclear, rather than solar, energy**. It is not widely appreciated, for example, that the 1997 Cassini Mission to Saturn’s moons (via Jupiter and Venus) was powered by plutonium. One estimate is that if something had gone wrong while Cassini was still circling the earth, some thirty to forty million deaths could have occurred.22 No plans were in place for such an eventuality. Yet, as early as 1964, a plutonium-powered generator fell to earth, having failed to achieve orbit. Dr. John Gofman, professor of medical physics at the University of California, Berkeley, then argued that there was probably a direct link between that crash and an increase of lung cancer on Earth. **Both President Obama and the Russian authorities are now arguing for generating electricity with plutonium in space, and building nuclear-propelled rockets for missions to Mars**.23 **Some of the wilder plans for space colonization also entail major risk. These include proposals for “planetary engineering,” whereby the climates of other planets would be changed in such a way as to support life**. Dyes, artificial dust clouds, genetically engineered bacteria, and the redirecting of sunlight by satellite mirrors are all being advanced as means of “terraforming,” or making parts of the cosmos more like earth. This and the Cassini example further demonstrate the nature of “manufactured risk.” Science and technology, far from creating Renaissance or Enlightenment-style optimism and certainty, are creating new problems that are unforeseen and extremely difficult to cope with. But even manufactured risks may be minimal in scope, compared with another risk stemming from cosmic colonization. **This is outright war. Armed conflict has long been a common feature of past colonialisms; between colonizing nations as well as between the colonizers and aboriginal peoples. Satellites are already a means by which territories and investments on Earth are monitored and protected by governments operating on behalf of their economic interests. But the prospect of galactic colonialisms raises the distinct possibility of hostilities in space. Galactic wars may therefore be the product of galactic colonialism.** Such a scenario was prefigured by the Star Trek science fiction television series in which the main role of “The Federation” is the protection of capitalist mining colonies.24 It is a discomforting fact that both China and the United States are now actively developing their own versions of “full spectrum dominance.” China demonstrated its capabilities in January 2007 by shooting down one of its own defunct satellites. In February 2008, the U.S. Navy demonstrated a similar capability, destroying a faulty U.S. satellite with a sea-based missile. **An arms race in outer space has already started.**

Link – Space Race

Space Race rhetoric establishes an anxiety over conquering the frontier

Siddiqi 10

(Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 425-426, DA:6/21/11, CP)

In the fifty years since the launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957, more than 6,000 functioning satellites have been launched into Earth orbit and beyond—some to the farthest reaches of our solar system. By its physical nature, space exploration has a resonance beyond national borders—at a fundamental level, it is a project that transcends national claims and appeals to the global, perhaps even to the universal. **Yet our understanding of the half-century of space travel is still firmly rooted in the framework of the national imagination. Until now**, barring very few exceptions**, only nation states have been able to mobilize the resources necessary for regular access to space**. For most laypersons**, the perceived apotheosis of space exploration remains the heady days after Sputnik, when the United States and the Soviet Union competed to trump the other in a series of progressively more complex feats in space. The cold-war space race retains its mystique, either as a benchmark that subsequent accomplishments could never equal, or as an anomaly whose particular conditions could never be repeated. It has, in fact, become impossible to think of space exploration without allusion to the halcyon days of the 1960s and equally inconceivable for historians to interpret the act of space travel without the space race hovering over the very language that we use. My goal in this essay is to offer some thoughts on the way in which the relationship between national identity and space exploration has affected our discipline’s approach to** the **history** of spaceflight—in fact, has been fundamental to it. **This discussion is intended to be a starting point to revisit both the history and the historiography of space exploration and suggest some new avenues of investigation that move beyond formulations rooted in the cold-war space race.** I will begin by illuminating the ways in which multiple and contradictory narratives—engendered by national claims—have been a staple of space history in both the United States and Russia, the two foremost spacefaring nations. The citizens of both nations remember space exploration quite differently, yet they appeal to the same kind of universal import. In addition**, the maturation of other national space programs**—those of China, Japan, and India, for example—**will require us to approach space history with new lenses asmore andmore “new” narratives join the old cold-war-centered approach to space history**. Second, by using the particular case of the burgeoning Indian space program and its postcolonial context, I will draw attention to avenues opened up by de-privileging borders in the history of space exploration, i.e., clearing the path to a potentially global history of space exploration. This line of thinking may raise a set of provocative questions concerning the motivations which lead nations to explore space, and why, in doing so, they take certain pathways that are not explicable by deterministic approaches.

Internal Link – Memory shape National Identity

**Our collective memory shapes national Identity. We win the best internal link to epistemology**

**Cruz, 2k**

(Consuelo Cruz, Identity And Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures Consuelo Cruz \* Copyright © 2000 by The Johns Hopkins University Press, DA:6/25/11, CP)

This article makes two arguments. **The first is that we cannot grasp the nature and dynamics of political identity--and collective identity more broadly--unless we understand the rhetorical frames that emerge as dominant at critical junctures in the history of a group or a nation**. Indeed, **we will see that it is precisely because identity, memory formation, and rhetorical frames are so closely entwined that identity has both the appearance of naturalness emphasized by primordialists and the constructed properties emphasized by constructivists**. The logic here is as follows. **Collective memory, by its very nature, impels actors to define themselves intersubjectively**. Shaped by past struggles and shared historical accidents, collective memory is both a common discriminating experience (this was right, that was wrong) and a "**factual" recollection--a seemingly veridical narrative--of the group's past "as it really was."** 4 **Thus whether in war or in peace, a collectivity expresses and defends its identity by declaring, "We are as we are because the world has made us this way; and because we are who we are, we can change our world only so much without changing ourselves." This declarative imperative does not suggest, however, that identity is reducible to a rhetorical manifesto. Rather, it simply suggests that while the impetus for identity formation arises from collective memory and contextual changes, identity is ultimately contingent on a "realistic" description of the world and on a relatively strict understanding of the permissible and the forbidden**. And on neither of these counts can collective self-definition be completed without the active participation of those living the identity. At critical points, for example, rival political leaders and entrepreneurs seek to persuade themselves and others that things must either remain as they are or be changed in significant ways. In their efforts at persuasion, rivals must appeal to the national group's sense of practical competence (its sense of mastery over the [End Page 276] world) and to its convictions about the possible (what the group can or cannot do; and normatively, what it must or must not do). In brief, rivals seek a political grip on the constitutive elements of collective identity. 5 This they cannot do at will, however. **They must advance their competing visions and agendas within a dominant rhetorical frame--a discursive structure that articulates in accessible ways the fundamental notions a group holds intersubjectively about itself in the world and that allows or disallows specific strategies of persuasion on the basis of their presumptive realism and normative sway**. **The second argument this article makes is that the (trans)formation of collective identity shapes a nation's political and economic development. 6 The logic of this second argument is closely related to that of the first. Because actors situate their struggles within a dominant rhetorical frame, political contests between them engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities, which I define as a restricted array of plausible scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look.** **This field's boundaries are established at critical points, along with new sets of power relations and the rhetorical settlements that accompany their construction. Within such boundaries, actors routinely make claims to vocality, manipulate the positive and negative values assigned to past defining experiences, generalize from these claims and experiences to craft "simply is" statements about reality, and drawing on this generalization, identify viable routes--be they conservative or transformative--to a better future.**

Impact – Extinction

The continuation of an American National Identity rooted in the frontier produces spectral forces that risk annihilation of the planet.

Spanos 08 [William Spanos, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, pg. 95-97]

Huntington, too, like virtually all of the neoconservative deputies of the Bush administration, posits the dependence of a unified civilization (a mobilized national identity) on an “Other,” a rival civilization it can define itself against. In keeping with the binarist logic of this assumption, he and his fellow conservatives not only celebrated the “triumph” of American democracy over the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Invoking the tradition of the American jeremiad (to which I will return in chapter 6, these nationalists also began to lament its end in that it meant the loss of an enemy that could “reinvigorate their core culture” (WAW, 20). As Huntington puts this primary agenda at the beginning of his book, “The dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated one major and obvious threat to American security and hence reduced the salience of national identity compared to subnational, transnational, binational, and other-national identities. Historical experience and sociological analysis show that the absence of an external ‘other’ is likely to undermine unity and breed divisions within a society” (WAW, 17; 277). The attacks by Al Qaeda on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, according to Huntington (and the Bush administration), did not simply fill this disturbing void; these “militant Islamic” terrorist acts also catalyzed the disintegrating essential American national identity, that is, its Protestant “core culture”: “When Osama bin Laden attacked America and killed several thousand people, he also did two other things. He filled the vacuum created by Gorbachev with an unmistakably dangerous new enemy, and he pinpointed America’s identity as a Christian nation” (WAW, 357–358; see also 263). To reiterate, I have invoked Samuel Huntington’s latest books in my attempt to demonstrate the quite remarkable relevance of Greene’s The Quiet American to the post-9/11 global occasion, not for their uniqueness, but because they are, like York Harding’s books in the context of the Cold War, representative of the discourse of the policy makers of the Bush administration about America’s global war against terror. The difference— and it is a crucial one, as we shall see when I return to him in chapter 6—is that Huntington makes quite explicit the deeply backgrounded religiocultural or “civilizational” foundation of this extremely dangerous—but finally self-defeating—national initiative that most of his other neoconservative colleagues conceal behind the geopolitical “realism” of their global vision. I mean specifically the American exceptionalist problematic of the frontier (the Puritan “errand in the wilderness”), epitomized by the American jeremiad, that determined the theory and practice of those who inaugurated and executed the American war in Vietnam—and, in the fulfillment of its oversight, inadvertently turned that which was invisible to it into a spectral force that defeated the most powerful army in the world. As I have been suggesting by way of pointing to the indissoluble relationship between York Harding’s policy books and Alden Pyle’s American Protestant “textual attitude” and its disastrous practical consequences, Greene’s novel about America’s initial intervention in Vietnam is proleptic of the post 9/11 occasion. In perceiving the United States’ original intervention in Vietnam in terms of the perennial American exceptionalist/Cold War/Orientalist problematic, it enables us a halfcentury later to retrieve the singular actualities of the Vietnam War from the oblivion to which they were relegated by the American culture industry in its aftermath. By overdetermining the role of York Harding’s books in the clandestine terrorist practice of Alden Pyle, Greene anticipates not simply that this American exceptionalist problematic, in privileging oversight, in spatializing time/history, manifested itself in the following decade as an oversight that ultimately resulted in the devastation of an inordinate number of innocent Vietnamese people (it is estimated that about half of the two million that were killed were civilians) **and of their land in the name of saving them for the free world.** Insofar as this problematic was necessarily blind to the blood of its subaltern victims, it also rendered that invisible blood visible—made it a specter that haunted the American exceptionalist problematic, a specter whose visible invisibility molecularized and eventually defeated the most powerful army in the history of warfare.45 By thus anticipating these paradoxical consequences of the American exceptionalist problematic in the Vietnam War, Greene’s novel also anticipates the disastrous consequences of the exceptionalist “civilizational” problematic of the intellectual deputies of the Bush administration that is now determining America’s global “war on terror”: not simply the carnage its relentlessly single-minded (Ahabian) perspective (“staying the course,” as the president has insistently put it) is wreaking in the Islamic Middle East in the name of saving it for the “civilized world,” but also, as the sporadic and dispersed but increasingly frequent acts of a “terrorism” suggest, the emergence of a spectral force—one that promises to become global—the visible invisibility of which, as in the Vietnam War, is molecularizing the American juggernaut and thus threatens to eventually produce an impasse that is likely to terminate in the peculiar kind of defeat that America suffered in the Vietnam War—**or the annihilation of the planet**. Unlike the imperial and totalitarian societies it measures itself against, killing its Other—and all too many of its own—“at long range” seems to be the American way: this kind of killing—and the specter it activates— is, to put it succinctly, what renders Graham Greene’s Quiet American, especially in its focus on the remote immediacy of York Harding, a prophecy not only of what was to happen in Vietnam in the years following the United States’ violation of the Geneva Accords, but also of what is happening in the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11. Much of the literature written by American veterans of the Vietnam War will bear witness to these unpleasant realities that Greene foresaw at the origins of America’s intervention in Vietnam. As I will show in the following two chapters, Philip Caputo’s memoir, A Rumor of War, and Tim O’Brien’s Going After Cacciato, are, in their very resistance to its disclosures, remarkably exemplary of this witness.

Impact – Savage War

The myth of the American frontier valorizes death and atrocity – this makes savage war an act of American heroism and drives the United States to the extremes of total obliteration

**Slotkin 85** [Richard Slotkin, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, The Fatal Environment, p. 60-61]

This ideology of savage war has become an essential trope of our mythologization of history, a cliché of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: “KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!” Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an “effete democracy”; and that is what they got, with the additional horrors of war that modern science can produce.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of the atomic bomb at the war’s end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of “effeteness.” The trope of savage war thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it provides advance justification for a pressing of the war to the extreme point of extermination, “war without quarter”: and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The American mythology of violence continually invokes the prospect of genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and our wars against nationalist and Communist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America to justify many critics in the belief that America is an exceptionally violence society.

Impact – Colonialism

Colonlialism is bad, I don’t think I need to explain more.

[Gathii](http://www.albanylaw.edu/sub.php?navigation_id=157&user_id=44) 2k

(James Thuo. Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship; Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law. Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 6, 2000 Survey of Books Related to the Law, pp. 1996-2055. The Michigan Law Review Association. Accessed: 6/24/11. EL)

In my view, colonialism, like liberal democracy and free markets, is in one way or another embodied in the institutional, polemic, and political projects of which the various rules of international law are part. Here, I differ from Roth, who sees colonialism as an exceptional case of illegitimacy. Instead of understanding colonialism as extinct or even exceptional, I argue that debates on legitimacy cannot be seen outside the dynamics of identity, power, wealth, and inequality at the international level. Colonialism has signified and continues to signify the manner in which ideologies based on racial and cultural differences legitimated expropriation, conquest, conversion, and outcomes such as Slavery Governmental Illegitimacy does not fall into nineteenth-century racism and in fact criticizes liberal internationalists for embracing a view of democracy that is liberal and Western in its outlook in a pluralistic society of nations. Yet, this celebration of pluralism could be broader. First, it could be mobilized to delegitimize the uncritical liberal ambition that is shared even in non-Western societies, to the effect of establishing that people are necessarily the repositories of governmental power without a concurrent examination of the quality of governance. Second, and more importantly for this part of the Review, Roth's analysis could have argued that pretensions of universality in the norms of international law have historically been promoted by colonizing and dominant countries. This universalism presupposes that there are primitive societies that fall below the so-called great civilizations of the West. International law has deployed cultural and racial stereotypes in delegitimating societies outside the West because they fell below conceptions of the state whose standards are naturally and necessarily assumed to be those of the so-called great Western civilizations. In other words, Roth's acknowledgement of pluralism in international society does not extend to acknowledging that non-Western societies can legitimately organize their own societies on the basis of their own civic and political virtue - without any interpretation of their legitimacy by outsiders. Roth acknowledges cultural pluralism, but this cannot be equated with the ethical pluralism that flows from the various cultures of the world. While these cultures are not self-contained, Roth simply wants to predicate legitimacy of governments on a Western state denominator - effective control of the population.

Impact – Genocide/Colonialism

There is not hospitality toward the Other, globality is an assimilative process translating into inevitable violence, genocide and colonialism.

Nayar in ’99

(Jayan, RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, MDA)

Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system n14 ), the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15 to the "other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-Westphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world."[\*607] The significance of this evolution of the world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that was brought to prominence through acts of colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it. The idea of a single world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and does not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world" contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of colonialism is now plainly visible.

Colonialism leads to genocide

Wolfe 06

(Patrick, La Trobe Research Fellow in History at La Trobe University, Australia and author of *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* , "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native", hawaii.edu, December 2006, pg 3, <http://www.hawaii.edu/amst/pwolfe/PWolfeArticles/PWolfe_EliminationNative.pdf>, CH)

**The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people,** **though it includes that.** **In common with** **genocide** as Raphae¨l Lemkin characterized it,6 settler **colonialism has** both **negative** and positive **dimensions**. Negatively, **it strives for the dissolution of native societies.** Positively, **it erects a** new **colonial society on the expropriated land base**—as I put it, settler **colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.**7 In its positive aspect, **elimination is an** organizing **principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off** (and superseded) **occurrence.** The positive outcomes of **the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native** citizenship, **child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism.** Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others.

Impact – Inevitable Violence

**Collectivizing humanity allows the U.S unrestricted mental access and control over other countries**

**Uri 2k**

(Margolin, Uri, BA cum laude (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel) Philosophy and English Literature. PhD (Cornell University) Comparative Literature, Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to Ideology Margolin, Uri. Poetics Today, Volume 21, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 599-600 (Article) Published by Duke University Press, DA: 6/24/11, CP)

**When an individual narrator speaks/writes about a ‘‘you’’ or ‘‘they’’ group, his position relative to it is obvious: he is no part of it; nor does he act as its spokesman. When a singular narrator originates a ‘‘we’’ discourse, on the other hand, the situation is, or at least can be, quite ambiguous.** A narrator who says ‘‘I did X’’ may be truthful or not, but there is no doubt he himself is the subject of this assertion.When a narrator says ‘‘We did X,’’ on the other hand, it is clear he is referring to a (con)textually defined group of which he is a member, but it is not clear whether he himself participated in this action, since ‘‘We [as a group] did X’’ is compatible with ‘‘But I did not,’’ as we have seen earlier. **Once more, when an individual speaker makes any ‘‘we’’ claims, he is obviously speaking about a group of which he is a member but not necessarily for it or on its behalf. If he is empowered to speak on behalf of the reference class as a whole, his claims convey a joint communicative intent, the ‘‘we’’ designates both topic entity and originator of the discourse, and his utterance possesses the status of group or collective speech act. But if the speaker is not so empowered, the ‘‘we’’ tokens in his discourse designate topic entity only, and the authority, communicative intent, and illocutionary force of his ‘‘we’’ speech act rest with him individually**. Note, however, that empowerment to speak on behalf of a group or lack thereof cannot be inferred from linguistic features and require contextual information. An uneasy and unstable hybrid is created in **‘‘we’’ narratives originating with a single speaker whenever they contain statements about inner action: mental states, events, or attitudes of any kind, from perceptual to cognitive.** A basic convention of literary narrative is that every personalized speaker has direct, immediate access to his own mental states but not to those of his coagents, which he must infer (fallibly!) from their intersubjectively accessible behavior and statements. Any ‘‘we felt,’’ ‘‘we thought,’’ or ‘‘we observed’’ statements, unlike ‘‘we ran’’ or ‘‘we found ourselves at’’ ones, are hence inherently heterogeneous or hybrid, combining the speaker’s immediate, inside knowledge of his own psyche with hypothetical, indirect, and inferred knowledge formulated by the speaker concerning his coagents’ mental states and activities. One part of the statement rests on one’s own direct experience, while the other consists of experiences attributed to others from the outside.**The problem disappears in an impersonally narrated ‘‘they’’ narrative, which, in analogy to third-person singular narratives, allows the narrating voice unrestricted mental access. A key** (some would say the key) **component of any narrative consists of the portrayal of the physical, verbal, and mental states or actions of narrative agents in a domain.** When a CNA rather than individual agents is being portrayed, the question naturally arises whether or not the same possibilities of action portrayal are still available in this new situation, or whether new constraints and/or possibilities are inevitably added. **The basic tension underlying the portrayal of group states or actions stems from the logical impossibility of describing things on a holistic and individual level at the same time, even though both levels exist concurrently and are irreducible to each other. The problem is ultimately philosophical and has to do with the supervenience or emergent relation between group phenomena and individual ones. There is no doubt that group phenomena cannot exist without lower-level individual ones** (for example, there can be no coordinated group action without individual subactions), and that differences on the lower levelmust lead to differences on the higher one.On the other hand, one can describe group phenomena without reference to individual ones, and the same upper-level phenomena can often be realized through different lowerlevel ones. Furthermore**, collective predicates are irreducible to individual ones, being logically distinct and independent of them, and they cannot be logically derived or inferred from them either. At least some social patterns of action are not reducible to actions of individuals taken as isolated entities, and external group structures (norms, rules, conventions, expectations) can serve from the outset as constraining forces on individual actions (gang rules in Greene, the Nazi death camps structure in Tadeusz** Borowski’s story collection ( []).

Impact Turns Case – Militarization

Even with international barriers to space militarization, plan’s frontier discourse justifies expansionary policies creating dual-use tech and weaponization.

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the

orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

The most striking aspect of the sociality of outer space is the extent to which it is, and always has been, thoroughly militarized. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty banned nuclear weapons in space, on the moon or on other celestial bodies, and contained a directive to use outer space ‘for peaceful purposes’. But its attempt to prohibit the ‘weaponizing’ of space was always interpreted in the loosest possible manner. The signatories to the OST in Washington, London and Moscow were in no doubt that space exploration was primarily about military strategy; that the ability to send a rocket into space was conspicuous evidence of the ability to dispatch a nuclear device to the other side of the world. This association remains strong, as the concern over Iran’s space programme (with its Shahab family of medium range missiles and satellite launch vehicles) makes clear. Several commentators in strategic affairs have noted the expanding geography of war from the two dimensions of land and sea to the air warfare of the twentieth century and more recently to the new strategic challenges of outer space and cyberspace (see for instance Gray, 2005: 154). These latter dimensions are not separate from the battle-‘field’ but rather they fully support the traditional military objectives of killing people and destroying infrastructure. Space itself may hold few human targets but the capture or disruption of satellites could have far-reaching consequences for life on the ground. Strictly speaking, we have not yet seen warfare in space, or even from space, but the advent of such a conflict does appear closer. In post-Cold War unipolar times the strategic rationale for the United States to maintain the prohibition against weaponising space is diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ was adopted by a majority of 163-0 with 3 abstentions: the United States, Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia (United Nations, 2000). Less than two months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld5 issued a report warning that the ‘relative dependance of the US on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets’; the United States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). As space warfare was, according to the report, a ‘virtual certainty’, the United States must ‘ensure continuing superiority’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was qualified by obligatory gestures towards ‘the peaceful use of outer space’ but the report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy. Any difficult questions about the further militarisation (and even weaponisation) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of developing ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian) technology and emphasising the role of military applications in ‘peace-keeping’ operations. Through such rhetoric, NATO’s satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on the 23rd April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction to use outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (Cervino, 2003). Since that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghanistan and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled warfare that aimed to provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of ‘shock and awe’. What Benjamin Lambeth has called the ‘accomplishment’ of air and space power, has since been called into question by the all too apparent limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied dead and wounded from modestly-armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999; Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson, 2003). And yet, far from undermining Allied confidence in satellite imagery or in a ‘cosmic’ view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these abstract photocartographies of violence – detached from their visceral and bloodied ‘accomplishments’ – that have licenced the destruction of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance, Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006).

Impact Turns Case – Dual Use

Plan is not benign it is an extension of militarization that creates dual use technologies resulting in policy failure and new military platforms in space

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the

orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

In this discussion so far, I have been drawing attention to geography’s recent failure to engage outer space as a sphere of enquiry and it is important to clarify that this indictment applies more to human than to physical geography. There are, of course, many bio-physical currents of geography that directly draw on satellite technologies for remote sensing. The ability to view the Earth from space, particularly through the Landsat programme, was a singular step forward in understanding all manner of Earth surface processes and biogeographical patterns (see Mack, 1990). The fact that this new tranche of data came largely from military platforms (often under the guise of ‘dual-use’) was rarely considered an obstacle to science. But as the range of geographical applications of satellite imagery have increased to include such diverse activities as urban planning and ice cap measurements, so too has a certain reflexivity about the provenance of the images. It is not enough, some are realising, to say “I just observe and explain desertification and I have nothing to do with the military”; rather scientists need to acknowledge the overall context that gives them access to this data in the first place (Cervino et al, 2003: 236). One thinks here of the case of Peru, whose US grant funding for agricultural use of Landsat data increased dramatically in the 1980s when the same images were found to be useful in locating insurgent activities of Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerillas (Schwartz, 1996). More recently, NASA’s civilian Sea-Wide Field Studies (Sea-WiFS) programme was used to identify Taliban forces during the war in Afghanistan (Caracciolo, 2004). The practice of geography, in these cases as with so many others, is bound up with military logics (Smith, 1992); the development of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) being a much cited recent example (Cloud, 2001; 2002; Pickles, 1995; 2004; see Beck 2003 for a case study of GIS in the service of the ‘war on terror’).

Alternative – Counter Memory

“Vote Negative to reject the American frontier myth” – our critique serves as a process of counter-memory, a forgetting of the frontier myth in favor of an open investigation of identity itself – this examination reveals identity as contingent and arbitrary, opening up the possibility for genuine freedom

Clifford, ‘1

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, *Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities*, p. 134-137]

“Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, his effort has been attended with torture, blood, sacrifice,” observes Friedrich Nietzsche. Memory, for Nietzsche, refers to the more or less violent imposition of values that become fixed, obligatory, “unforgettable.” Memory is the first condition for the establishment of conscience, which consists in the recognition of a moral constraint. Through memory we are bound to a set of moral obligations, the “forgetting” of which sanctions a possible punishment. Memory is a form of confinement, a subtle but incarcerating restriction on our freedom – which is not a right, but simply our freedom to be *otherwise*.

Foucault’s *counter-memory* is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” (*aktive Vergesslichkeit*). Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves, not in the tradition sense of self-reflection, but of wrenching the self – this identity – apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of *difference*. Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of *our-selves*. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, *be* a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this *subjection*. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity – a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the *identical*.

Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute ourselves an identity. “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects. These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligation imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, in this transgression – for those who have the stomach for it. There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.

Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves; a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy, says Foucault, “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.” Genealogical critique is an *exposition* of our history as subjects that has the effect of *dis-posing* subjectival constraints by *ex-posing* the contingency of their *imposition*. Genealogy turns the firm *posture* of the self-identical subject into the mere *posing* of a pretentious display.

Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.” Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful *mask*. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for personal-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogeneous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity – identity – is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses.

Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom *from* interference, but *for* it –

for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom *for* individuality, but *from* it – a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the *office of government*, but against *governmentality* – against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body.

In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.” That is, by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits. This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible *transformation*.” This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation – which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sough for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”

This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we are able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant. It is crucial to understand, however, that what is being required here is *not* a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in *On Liberty*) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.

Alternative – Counter Memory Solves

Counter Memory displaces contrived discourses that construct official history

Hutchen, 2007

( Benjamin, November 2, Professor at James Madison unversity, **Techniques of Forgetting? Hypo-Amnesic History and the An-Archive,** <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sub/summary/v036/36.2hutchens.html>, , June 25, S.M)

Now, counter-memory can arise at this nexus whenever a forgotten memory becomes remembered in direct opposition to the normative and canonical (“official”) tradition in which it was forgotten. In other words, counter-memory is anti-archival in the sense that it seeks to remember what has been consigned there (or deemed unworthy of consignation); but it also composes a counter-archive which, in opposing the “official” tradition, constitutes an alternative thread of discursive connectivity. Counter-memory displaces the contrived commensuration of the discourse(s) that interpret the archive. It devises alternative protocols for remembering memory, as well as thematic frameworks that can preserve memories that have been excluded from the canon. A counter-memory has an intertextuality (and orality) and a material (or thematic) basis all its own. Thus its material trajectory is defined in terms of the precise co-ordinates of a given mneme to its textual/oral predecessors and to the common theme shared by all counter-memories opposed to the official tradition. Each “token” mneme relates differently to its “typal” tradition and to its theme from the way others do. Often, Assmann argues, a counter-memory remembers precisely what is encrypted in the official history, and indeed, it can strive to establish dialogue with it by disclosing this encryption, especially under conditions of (political) crisis.

**Counter-memory allows us to shatter the mold of national identity**

**Clifford 01**[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 142]

Foucault’s reflections on counter-memory show that freedom is not so much an issue of power (as it is conventionally understood in traditional political philosophy), as it is of identity. Rousseau and Nozick are attempting to elaborate views of political freedom that would liberate the political subject from any arbitrary and excessive exercise of power; but in actuality, they are articulating forms of political identity: the citizen and the autonomous individual, respectively. Both of these identities are best understood in terms of subjectival constraints and determinations through which otherwise meaningless bodies are bound to, and identified in terms of, a set of political (i.e., power) relations. As I argued earlier, both positive and negative freedom are subsumed—in a sense, conscripted—by the disciplinary agendas of a governmental rationality. Moreover, this subsumption is so subtle, so thorough, so efficient that those who are subjugated are not even aware of it. In fact, the success of this disciplinary-identificational machinary is such that those subjected to it assume they are free (in the ideological senses elaborated by Rousseau and Nozick). In this sense, identity is an instrument of power. That is, it is through identity that power is channeled and manifested as this or that political personage: sovereign/subject, master/slave, capitalist/proletarian, liberal/conservative, noble savage/ savage noble, and so on. Counter-memory allows us to break through, to fracture these identificational determinations and to permit a possible transformation by attending to the power relations through which such identities are both constructed and sustained.

Counter-memory opens up space for resistance Against the hegemony of dominant narratives of national identity.

Clifford 01

**[**Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 12-13]

In part 2 of this book, “Against Identity,” I show how these three movements of Foucault’s thought belong together and how, as such, this forces us to rethink the problems of power, political freedom, and the tasks of political philosophy. Specifically, I discuss the axial interplay of discourse, power relations, and modes of self-formation, this time with an emphasis on their interplay and complicity. My aim is to demonstrate how the political subject is fabricated within a complex “matrix of experience” structured and defined by this axial interplay. This matrix houses the “political technology” through which individuals are “constructed.” At the heart of this matrix is the concept of conduire, or conduct, which weaves together the multifarious modes of self-government—understood in a very literal sense, as referring to a form of “self” attenuation and effectuation—with the rationality and instrumentality of governmentality, in such a manner as to constitute the form of selfhood animating modern political identity. The problem of freedom is perhaps the most important issue in any philosophical consideration of political subjectivity. In contrast to the juridical, rights-based conceptions of freedom peculiar to the liberal tradition, **Foucault offers us an understanding of freedom that is quite different, an understanding that is in part effected by rethinking, through genealogy, the formation of political subjectivity**. Genealogy can be understood as the “discipline” that exposes the entrenched forms of valuation and structuralized practices that determine what we are. In so doing, genealogy creates distance—that is, spaces of freedom—from those forms. In this sense, Foucault’s own work is, potentially at least, a vehicle of such freedom. That is, there is a liberational aspect to Foucault’s work which consists in “delimiting,” or transgressing, the historically contingent limitations imposed upon us by the interplay of discursive practices, power relations, and modes of subjectivation. I shall want to show that this liberational aspect lies in what Foucault has called “counter-memory.” **Freedom through counter-memory presents itself as a strategic option to the ideological and philosophically suspect notions of positive and negative freedom offered to us from the liberal tradition.** I have already mentioned how the notion of savage nobility, or free individuality, represents a reversal of the terms immortalized by Rousseau. In a very important sense this whole project represents yet a second reversal of Rousseau, that pertaining to the difference between a hypothetical political history such as Rousseau’s and genealogy as it is understood by Foucault. This is in part accounted for by the difference between Ursprung, or “origin,” and Entstehung, or “emergence,” as Friedrich Nietzsche understood and employed the terms.32 Rousseau’s history, like Hobbes’s, is meant to have the juridical function of justifying a certain kind of political relation between subjects and sovereign power. To accomplish this, Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality adopts the approach of what Nietzsche calls a “Monumental” history: the project of such a history is to convince us “that the great which once existed was at least possible once and may well again be possible sometime,” if only we learn to recover and venerate that which is “exemplary and worthy of imitation” from the past.33 The Ursprung that Rousseau would like to recover is the condition of “original man,” the noble savage.34 Not that Rousseau would have us abolish society and “retire to the woods,” but it is by recovering their lost historical origins that so-called civilized men will learn again to “respect the sacred bonds of those societies to which they belong; they will love their fellows, and will serve them to the utmost of their power.”35 Genealogy, on the other hand, appeals to a notion of origin—Entstehung— that subverts the very ground upon which a monumental project such as Rousseau’s would stand. This is what Foucault refers to as the “parodic” use of genealogy, whereby the “alternate identities” that the monumental historian would like to recover for us are exposed as “ephemeral props that point to our own unreality.”36

Counter-memory is a vital strategy to break the dominance of current identities

Clifford 01

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 133]

Following Foucault, the guiding methodological question of this study is not, “What is the political subject?” but rather, “How are political subjects formed?” The first question is metaphysical; that is, it inquires into the essence of political subjectivity. The second question, on the other hand, is genealogical; it inquires into the contingent historical, discursive and nondiscursive conditions of the emergence of political subjects. Genealogical critique, in fact, challenges the metaphysics of essence, which posits a substantive, given subject. As Foucault explains, “One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that is to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I call genealogy.”17 Genealogical critique is not only “different” from metaphysical inquiries, it puts into play a difference (a suppressed event, a marginalized practice, a forgotten desire) that undermines the necessity of certain metaphysical postulates such as those supporting traditional understandings of the human subject. In other words, genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.”18 For centuries we have been enamored of the idea of a human subject as a self-identical being animated by spirit, consciousness, or will. This notion of a self-identical subject has been imported into the discourses of traditional political philosophy, which take this subject for granted in its projects to define rights and freedoms or to lay down principles of political justice.

A genealogical critique of political identity allows for spaces of resistance that can return subjectivity to the individual and break down the myth of national identity.

Clifford 01

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 5-6]

This book conducts a genealogical critique of modern political identity. Methodologically, I rely on the work of Michel Foucault to trace out the transmutation of Rousseau’s Noble Savage into what I have called the Savage Noble. Specifically, I wish to reveal the mechanisms through which this form of political identity has been both constituted and subjugated. It is important to note, however, that for the purposes of my project the term savage noble is largely a trope for a form of political subjectivity—namely, autonomous individualism—that informs the texts of traditional political philosophy and animates modern politics. It is this form of political subjectivity, and the specific types of political identity to which it gives rise (and not so much the popular figures of the American mythos) that will be my primary object of concern. By individual I mean the traditional notion of the political subject as “a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society.”14 Individuality is without doubt the principle and privileged register of political subjectivity in modern political philosophy, and of our own self-conception as political subjects.15 However, this juridical, rights based notion of the political subject is a relatively recent development. It can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it is only since the nineteenth century that “individualism” has been separated from the problem of absolute monarchy and conceived as a political philosophy on its own terms.16 Since that time the notion of the individual has become so entrenched in our culture that it is seldom even put into question. Of course, it goes without saying that the individual has received a great deal of attention in traditional political discourse, but it is usually in terms of a juridical project to define the rights, freedoms, power, and obligations of the political subject. In this study, by contrast, I will suspend the “givenness” of the individual, in order to see what happens to the necessity of such juridical projects. I want to show how this individual is not merely a symbolic representation of political subjectivity, but a fabrication by an anonymous technology that turns individuality into an instrument of domination and subjection. Why undertake such a study? A genealogical critique of our history as political subjects cannot only help us to better understand the origins and character of our present political identities, but in so doing may cause us to reevaluate the way we presently understand the tasks of political philosophy. In particular, genealogical critique forces us to rethink the notions of political freedom and political power, and to examine the source and necessity of our ideological oppositions, which is the source of so much political conflict. This examination roots out the common genealogical origins of our various political positions, challenges the necessity of their oppositional character, and points toward the possibility of forms of political identity that might avoid (or at least alter in a way less polarizing and hence paralyzing) the fractious and agonistic structure peculiar to modern politics—not in the name of some utopian political brotherhood or sisterhood, but through artful experimentations with identity itself.

Alternative – Global Space History

Rethinking solves

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 438-440, DA:6/21/11, CP)

**By rethinking the relationship between modernity and the postcolonial state, postcolonial thought challenges us to rethink the connection between modernity and spaceflight, and, ultimately, to replace the “national” with the “global” when thinking of space exploration, an exercise that has become doubly important as dozens of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are now spending money on space exploration**. Writing on the history of nuclear power, Itty Abraham has noted that “practically no state travelled alone.”31 Further, Abraham adds: **One of the most enduring tropes of nuclear histories is the idea that atomic energy programs are always national programs. The close relation between nuclear power and national power has led to the assumption that, for reasons of security especially, nuclear programs must be uniquely identified with particular countries.** Official histories and scientists encourage this belief, for obvious parochial reasons, but it is rarely true. **No atomic program anywhere in the world has ever been purely indigenous**.32 Abraham’s argument in favor of moving toward a global history of nuclear energy has much to offer to the case of rocketry and space exploration. The available evidence points strongly to similar processes of knowledge flows in the evolution of ballistic missiles and space technology. **33 Every nation engaged in this technology has been a proliferator and has benefited from proliferation; this process of proliferation began in the 1920s when an informal and international network of spaceflight enthusiasts in Europe**—particularly in Germany, Austria, France, Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—and in the United States generated the first substantive exchange on topics related to rocketry and space exploration.34 The development of sophisticated German ballistic missiles in the 1930s benefited from this discourse, as did parallel but less ambitious Soviet efforts to build rockets. In the aftermath of WorldWar II, the remainder of the German missile program—the most developed effort at that point— then fed into several different postwar missile programs, including, of course, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. The Soviet Union in turn passed both German and “indigenous” technology to the Chinese while the Americans did the same for the Japanese. By the mid-1970s, the “space club” included all of these countries, joined in the 1980s by India and Israel, both of which depended on flows from the United States,Western Europe, and the Soviet Union**. Europe itself—in the form of international agreements—had many cooperative efforts that blurred distinctions of ownership, even as it gained the “indigenous” capacity for space activity in 1979.35 I am not suggesting that we should ignore nations, national identity, or vital indigenous innovation. But I believe that nation-centered approaches, useful and instructive as they were, occlude from view important phenom- ena in the history of space exploration.** My hope is that **by deemphasizing ownership and national borders, the invisible connections and transitions of technology transfer and knowledge production will be become clear in an abundantly new way**. Such an approach would inform a project encompassing the entire history of modern rocketry and space exploration, from the late nineteenth century to the present, focusing on Europe, America, Russia, and Asia. **Most important, a global history of rocketry and space exploration would avoid the pitfalls of the “discursive battles” between nation-centered histories and open up the possibility to revisit older debates in the historiography of space exploration in entirely new ways. Taking a global history approach, one that favors decentering the conventional narrative, would allow historians to redirect their attentions in three ways: we can shift our gaze from nations to communities, from“identification” to identities, and from moments to processes**. These three strategies, in one way or another, are inspired by the problems posed by historicizing the ambitions and achievements of emerging space powers, which operate in a postcolonial context where categories such as indigenous, modern, and national are problematic. I offer some brief examples of each below**. In the space imagination, nations typically represent airtight constituencies despite evidence to the contrary that communities cutting across borders and cultures—national, institutional, and disciplinary—represent important actors and actions**. The most obvious example here, of course, is the German engineers who formed the core of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the United States in the 1950s and who later directed the development of the Saturn V rocket that put Americans on the surface of the Moon. Wernher von Braun’s team represented a unique mix of Germans and Americans who worked together with several different communities, from Boeing, North American Aviation (including its separate Space and Rocketdyne divisions), Douglas Aircraft Company, and International Business Machines. **These communities represented scientists and engineers, the government and private industry, and customers and contractors. In the rush to draw up airtight national narratives, we inevitably tend to gloss over the ambiguities and flows among each of these communities**. **By highlighting communities, we can also avoid the reductive problems of essentialization** (another way of talking about “national styles” of science and technology) **that aspire to explain everything but fail to elucidate much at all**.36 Instead, one might think in terms of fluid identities of scientists and engineers engaged in particular projects, identities which are not only tied to national identification but also regional, professional, cultural, religious, and educational markers, to name only a few categories. **Using the perspective of mutable identity— able to understand more clearly the ways in which space exploration has not only been a project of national consideration but also the result of communities (or individuals) who identify with a whole host of other markers that are not connected to national claims.** In other words**, it is a way to problematize the notion that space exploration represents national aspirations. Finally, space historians have tended to focus on moments in history that define the story**. For example, **we use the notion of “achieving a capability”** (the space equivalent of “going nuclear**”) as shorthand for encompassing a variety of complex processes**. Whether it be the first indigenous launch of a satellite or the first test of a liquid hydrogen rocket engine, these moments become historical signposts, turning points, bereft of the messiness inherent in the process of innovation. As a result, space history slips into the comfort mode of “what and when” instead of the more illuminating path of “how and why.” **The focus on process would highlight the ambiguities instead of the binary poles (success, failure) inherent in isolated moments, thus encompassing both the material event and how the event becomes constructed as a historical moment**. **All of these approaches also reinforce and foster the kind of social history that has become fundamental to most histories of technology but is largely absent in the literature on spaceflight**, a lacuna explicable **by the fetish for nation-centered cold-war geopolitics as the central organizing framework for most histories of space exploration**. Barring a few notable examples, space historians have avoided in-depth inquiries into the lived experiences of large demographics such as engineers, servicemen and -women, military and intelligence personnel, launch crews, staff workers, and spouses and families of engineers. Likewise**, little work has been done on public enthusiasm for the space program,mass campaigns in support of space exploration, and popular participation in programs usually identified with state-centered institutions**.37 Finally, **using analytical categories such as communities, identities, and processes would direct our attention to the problem of “consumption” in the history of space technology.** Despite a recent surge of scholarship on the role of consumers in shaping technology and technological systems, we have traditionally focused on production rather than consumption in chronicling the history of spaceflight.38 Who has “consumed” the space different in different circumstances—wemight be program? How do we ascribe identities to them as “consumers”? How and where do producers and consumers of the space program interact? Exploring these questions would open up new areas of investigation and enrich our understanding of the cold-war space race.

Alternative – Memory Shape Reality

Our socio-political collective memory shape reality

**Pollmann 08**(J. Pollmann, 29-02-2008 , University of Leiden, [http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/talesoftherevolt/approach/ap proach-1.html](http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/talesoftherevolt/approach/ap%20proach-1.html), DA: 6/25/11, CP)

**The terms ‘social’ , ‘collective’ or ‘public’ memory, are often contrasted with ‘private’, ‘individual’ or ‘personal’ memory.** All these terms derive from a fairly new and interdisciplinary scholarly field that is often referred to as ‘memory studies’, and that according to some critics has developed into a ‘memory industry’.1 However diverse the approaches and premises en vogue in memory studies, they commonly trace their scholarly roots to three sources. First, there were the ideas developed by Maurice Halbwachs in his Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire in 1925. Halbwachs was the first to argue **that individual memory develops in interaction with that of social networks and the larger community. As the product of social change, moreover, memory was itself a process, an ever changing representation of the past.** In a second development, and using very different methods, the psychologist Frederick Bartlett showed in 1932 that in **the process of remembering humans rely on summaries or ‘schemes’ of the past – when a person ‘recollects’ what happened, he or she will reconstruct a memory from these schemes, often adding or changing details.** Finally, building on the work of the German scholar Aby Warburg, students of literature focused on the medieval and early modern ars memoriae, techniques for memorizing that bear an interesting resemblance to Bartlett’s schemes.2 For reasons that are hotly debated but that are not really germane to this proposal, little was done with the first two of these notions until the 1980s, when ‘memory’ suddenly began to make an appearance in a range of different disciplines. **The work of psychologists was demonstrating the extent to which memory is subject to change over time and (self)manipulation, issues that became politically controversial through the ‘recovered’ memory** of alleged victims of incest and the trial of John Demjanjuk.3 Meanwhile, **historians and social scientists who studied twentieth-century memory** practices refined Halbwachs’ insight **that there is a relationship between changing social discourses, practices and expectations, and the way in which individuals will remember the past**.4 Whereas Halbwachs used the term ‘collective memory’**, many students of literature and some philosophers prefer the term ‘cultural memory’, while historians and social scientists mostly use the term ‘social memory’. In practice these differences in terminology point less to diverging definitions of communal memory, than to different approaches to studying it.** Halbwachs chose an approach based on sociological categories – family, class, religion. **Many students of ‘cultural memory’ come to the subject with a strong interest in recollection, repression and the subconscious, sometimes informed by psychoanalytical thought, and trace these in literary and visual sources. Both because of a lack of suitable sources and because of issues of genre, the methods and approaches that they use are not very appropriate in an early modern environment**.**5 Students of ‘social memory’ tend to focus more on the social environment of memory and ask how individual stories about the past interact with existing narratives and other forms of commemoration. This, it seems to me, is something for which evidence can be found in early modern societies.**6 The working assumption of this proposal is that both public and personal memory in the early modern period were shaped by a lively interaction between orality, manuscript and print, ritual and material culture, in which memories promoted ‘from above’ interacted with memories ‘from below’.7 **Some scholars have presented social memory as a realm of resistance against the public, dominant version of memory that is known as ‘history’. If traditional history was a discourse about the past that was produced by the victors and that privileged those who had generated written evidence, memory, by contrast, might be seen as the repository of knowledge of ‘people without history’, or traumatized communities who might remember as an ‘act of faith’**.8 **Yet while it is certainly true that social memory can be used very effectively as an alternative for dominant and state-supported views of the past, it seems unhelpful to construct our understanding of social memory around its a priori opposition to dominant, literate or state-associated memory**.9

Indeed, more often than not social memory is the result of a blend between public and personal memorization. For example, the story about food shortages in World War II which I heard an elderly lady tell to her granddaughter on the evening of 4 May 2006, was very much a personal memory. Yet as she told it while they were queuing to lay down their flowers at a war monument, after the two minutes’ silence at the Dodenherdenking by which the Dutch commemorate the dead of World War II, the telling of the tale interacted with, and was probably shaped by, a very public form of commemoration. I believe that similar processes can be detected in the seventeenth century; the history plays about the Revolt that were being staged by exiles from Flanders and Brabant in the Republic could be highly political public statements in discussions about war and peace. Yet, as we shall see below, their political commitment was undoubtedly kindled by the frequent rehearsal of personal memories about the circumstances that had forced their families to leave Flanders and Brabant. As the German scholar Jan Assmann has emphasized, the social memory of an event will change once there is no one alive to tell the tale from their own experience, or to have heard it told by those who experienced it themselves. **In an effort to bridge the gap between ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ memory,** Assmann argues that **at this stage ‘communicative’ memory** (kommunikatives Gedächtnis) **will transform itself into ‘cultural’ memory** (kulturelles Gedächtnis).**10 As our project will cover a period of about 135 years, we will examine whether we can see such a transition at work, and investigate the ‘floating gap’ between these two forms of memory. A final point to investigate is whether processes of social memory in early modern Europe were actually similar to those in the modern world.** Pierre Nora, one of the founders of memory studies in the 1980s, distinguished between a primordial world before the French Revolution in which milieux de mémoire had still been able to function, and a modern world of historical remembrance in which only lieux de mémoire were left.11 While critics agree that Nora’s notions of pre- industrial milieux de mémoire were poorly founded, the idea that ‘modernity’ has had an impact on memory remains widespread. For Aleida Assmann, the years around 1800 were the moment at which the ‘art of memory’ was replaced by the ‘force (vis)’ of memory, in which memory became the motor behind new social developments.12 Others have mentioned mass communication and state formation as the catalysts for profound changes in collective memory.13 Yet such interpretations seem to ride on the back of other assumptions about early modern European culture, such as its alleged lack of a public sphere, its poorly developed notion of the ‘self’, or its deficient historical consciousness, that have already been challenged by historians of the early modern period.14 At the same time**, the gap between history and memory that many modernists discern is much less evident in early modern culture. One obvious task for the team is to develop a better-founded understanding of the distinctive features of early modern social memory**. The novelty of its this project lies (a) in its comparative exploration of the impact that memory practices had on the forging of new identities in the seventeenth-century Low Countries, (b) in its examination of a wide range of media and memory practices, (c) in its focus on the relation between personal and public memory practices in early modern society, and (d) in the attempt to establish what was distinctive about early modern memory practices. The Low Countries offer an ideal laboratory for a student of comparative memory development; a population that shares a past is divided in two opposing camps which develop different canonic versions of that past. Moreover, it offers an opportunity to compare a state in which the central authorities did much to spread a canonic version of the past, with the much more diffuse and decentralized memory practices that prevailed in the Republic. **The main methodological innovation of this project consists in its approach to the sources. By approaching ‘public’ memory as any form of memory available in the public sphere, we consciously look beyond the state as an engineer of social memory. We define ‘personal’ memory as any form of remembrance in which persons establish a link between themselves** (or their ancestors) **and past events. By broadening the source base for personal memory to any form of evidence for storytelling** about the Revolt, **we are circumventing many of the problems that are associated with reconstructing personal memory in this period**. Thus our storytellers do not have to have been eyewitnesses, and we do not need to know what their own source for the story is. **By focusing on the act of ‘telling the tale’, we are also capturing a much greater diversity of memory acts, that are less restricted by genre than would be a concentration on memoirs alone**. Equally, it is no longer a disadvantage that our storytellers are ‘playing to the gallery’; instead, that gives us vital information on what made their tales relevant. The proposal comes at a time when there is a growing yet also quite disparate interest in early modern memory in evidence. **It should come exactly at the right moment to position itself at the heart of debates and scholarly developments that are not just relevant for memory studies, but that will show how the study of early modern memory can help us to gauge the impact of devastating civil conflicts on identity formation.**

**Memory Shapes Reality**

**Behrendt, 10** (Kathy Behrendt, October 2010, Scraping Down the Past: Memory and Amnesia in W. G. Sebald's Anti-Narrative Kathy Behrendt Wilfrid Laurier University Volume 34, Number 2, October 2010, DA: 6/26/11, CP)

**The narrativist outlook portrays the self as viewing or actively fitting the events of life into some coherent and meaningful form, pattern, or story, where the meaning yielded takes us beyond a mere chronology of events**. The nature of this story, if discussed, is often construed along conventional lines as involving a traditional narrative trajectory, including some form of closure: "**A self is just a kind of life that has a beginning, a middle, and an end that are connected in a traditional storylike manner"; 2 one's life is a story that is "understood as a conventional, linear narrative**."3 Sometimes the narrative in question is classified generically, as saga or hagiography, tragedy or comedy, or (for the particularly unfortunate amongst us), farce.4 Many narrativists also treat the self as literally the product that results from this endeavor, and narrative as a condition of self-understanding.5 Hence, "**A person's identity is created by a self-conception that is narrative in form . . . . constituting an identity requires that an individual conceive of his life as having the form and the logic of a story**" (Schechtman, p. 96), **and it is a "basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative**" (Taylor, p. 47); **narrative is the "essential genre" of self-representation, "and not merely . . . one normative ideal among others"** (Flanagan, p. 149). This self-constructing, meaning-generating picture of narrative is sometimes accompanied by a view to the effect that the narrative impulse is basic and is the means by which we experience the world's goings-on in general: "Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and novelists reflecting upon events which had no narrative order before one was imposed by the singer or the writer; narrative form is neither disguise nor decoration" (MacIntyre, p. 211), and we "seem to have no other way of describing 'lived time' save in the form of a narrative" (Bruner, "Life as Narrative," p. 12**). This rough characterisation captures what we might call the "strong" narrativist outlook. Other, more moderate supporters of the view treat the narrative impulse as potentially beneficial to self-understanding, but they do not promote, and sometimes actively discourage, any literal reading of the claim that we are the authors of our lives. Nor do they insist that we cannot but see the world through a narrative lens** (as opposed to sometimes imposing such structure retrospectively on our experience).6 **Memory is undeniably important to any narrativist approach to the** self. Personal (sometimes called "experiential" or "episodic") **memory is a minimal condition for narrativity whether or not the self literally depends on the act of self-narration. One has to remember one's past** [End Page 395**] in order to tell the story of one's life. This is not to deny that other things contribute to the self, but simply to acknowledge memory as a primary factor**. Even narrativist Marya Schechtman, who recognizes the power of the subconscious in shaping the self, admits that "the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean" (p. 114). Our self-narratives must to some considerable degree be explicit to ourselves. A large part of this explicit self-narrative will inevitably consist in remembered experiences; they form the main material of the story. Hence **personal memory is of clear interest and value for narrativist accounts of the self in general.** Skepticism about narrativist approaches to the self (especially in their more common, stronger incarnation) has been expressed by a significant minority. But Galen Strawson's provocative "Against Narrativity" is the primary catalyst for the current debate.7 In that paper he contests many of the above-mentioned claims. He rejects the narrativist view as a psychological description of how we all in fact regard our lives, and he condemns it as a normative prescription of how we ought to think of ourselves and our lives**. Viewing our lives as stories and ourselves as characters in them does not enhance our self-understanding, our well-being, or our metaphysical credentials as selves.**

Memory is key to discovering interpersonal narratives and looking back on history

**Behrendt, 10** (Kathy Behrendt, October 2010, Scraping Down the Past: Memory and Amnesia in W. G. Sebald's Anti-Narrative Kathy Behrendt Wilfrid Laurier University Volume 34, Number 2, October 2010, DA: 6/26/11, CP)

**What are we to say when the pardonable loss of personal memory is sustained by a potentially reprehensible bout of historical amnesia**? **Whatever we may think of Strawson's indifference towards explicit recall of past experience, it becomes pernicious if we extend it beyond personal memory, to include historical memory and awareness. It is not enough that past historical events merely shape the present in ways we are not aware of. We often demand their presence be more explicit. The model of scraping down past memories and effacing them from explicit consciousness is not a palatable option for historical memory. It calls to mind historical blindness, in the form of regrettably familiar cases of collective amnesia concerning atrocities. And if personal amnesia is somehow promoted or sustained through historical-factual forgetting it** [End Page 400**] is likewise tainted by it.** Thus Austerlitz must recover his early personal memories in order not to run the risk of being party to one of the more notorious outbreaks of collective amnesia of our times. So while it may be one thing to ask whether Austerlitz's historical amnesia is explicable (it is, and suffering and trauma are in large part behind it**), there remains considerable scope to question whether it is ethically tolerable. As it happens, we have reason to take Austerlitz at his word when he claims to be at fault for his previous ignorance of the history of persecution of the Jews** (p. 279). **This apportioning of some of the responsibility for historical memory to the victim is not an idiosyncratic notion** on Sebald's part**; it is a recurring theme in the burgeoning field of the ethics of remembering.15 If we follow the view that certain strands of historical memory are morally imperative for all concerned, then Austerlitz is indeed in the midst of a crisis. Whatever psychological mechanisms motivate the repression of Austerlitz's personal memory, they also hinder his ability to fulfill an imperative of recognizing certain historical facts. While this is a situation that we may lament, it is not one we can endorse. We cannot therefore neglect the relation between the personal and the broader historical past. In an effort to distance himself from the rival narrativist position**, Strawson has not taken into account these particular potential repercussions of downplaying the importance of personal memory, viewing it as he does in isolation from historical memory. The case of Austerlitz provokes the question of whether we can entirely isolate the personal from the historical in memory. In so doing, it casts doubt on the wisdom of downplaying memory's significance in the anti-narrativist account. But it does not, I will argue, thereby undermine the anti-narrativist account. IV Austerlitz may well appeal to the narrativist, not just because of its deep concern with memory, but its embedding of personal histories within their larger social and historical contexts. Pioneering narrativist Alasdair MacIntyre, in contrast with Strawson, is highly attuned to **the connection between personal and historical memory when framing his view**. He claims that a non-narratively-inclined self "can have no history." Upon the narrativist outlook, on the other hand, "**the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity**," **and this social identity coincides with historical** [End Page 401] identity (p. 221). Indeed, MacIntyre cites the case of a German born after 1945 who feels the war has no moral relevance for his present life, as a prime example of culpable, individualistic, anti-narrative detachment (pp. 220-21). For MacIntyre, **personal narrative and historical sensibility go hand in hand. Austerlitz might be taken as an illustration of MacIntyre's point. I think any attempt to affiliate Sebald with a narrative view of the self such as MacIntyre's is misguided for several reasons. If Strawson suffers from a disregard of the connection between personal and historical memory, MacIntyre is guilty of extreme optimism concerning the benefits of that connection. For him, mindfulness of the larger historical context of one's life story helps the narrative quest for the unity of a life. This in turn is ultimately a quest for the good—a concept which itself depends on a notion of telos and closure** (pp. 218-21). Once again, however, Sebald's work provides a striking set of counter-examples, in which the recovery of personal together with historical memory leads not to self-completion but to self-dissolution. Austerlitz is an extreme case in point. His uncovering of the surfeit of possible meanings, clues and connections related to the past results in what has aptly been called "an inversed Bildungsroman"—one that leads to "perpetual wandering and not to a resolution, the discovery of the self, personal growth, or the comfort of home."16 But there are many other occasions in Sebald in which **the pursuit of memory, both personal and historical, is tied to a depletion of identity**.

Alternative – Solves Space Policy

Paying attention to the historical narrative of space is essential in solving for our impacts

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 425-426, DA:6/21/11, CP)

My hope is **that by deemphasizing ownership and national borders, the invisible connections and transitions of technology transfer and knowledge production will be become clear in an abundantly new way. Such an approach would inform a project encompassing the entire history of modern rocketry and space exploration, from the late nineteenth century to the present, focusing on Europe, America, Russia, and Asia**. Most important**, a global history of rocketry and space exploration would avoid the pitfalls of the “discursive battles” between nation-centered histories and open up the possibility to revisit older debates in the historiography of space exploration in entirely new ways. Taking a global history approach, one that favors decentering the conventional narrative, would allow historians to redirect their attentions in three ways: we can shift our gaze from nations to communities, from“identification” to identities, and from moments to processes.** These three strategies, in one way or another, are inspired by the problems posed by historicizing the ambitions and achievements of emerging space powers, which operate in a postcolonial context where categories such as indigenous, modern, and national are problematic. I offer some brief examples of each below. In the space imagination, nations typically represent airtight constituencies despite evidence to the contrary that communities cutting across borders and cultures—national, institutional, and disciplinary—represent important actors and actions. The most obvious example here, of course, is the German engineers who formed the core of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the United States in the 1950s and who later directed the development of the Saturn V rocket that put Americans on the surface of the Moon. Wernher von Braun’s team represented a unique mix of Germans and Americans who worked together with several different communities, from Boeing, North American Aviation (including its separate Space and Rocketdyne divisions), Douglas Aircraft Company, and International Business Machines. These communities represented scientists and engineers, the government and private industry, and customers and contractors. In the rush to draw up airtight national narratives, we inevitably tend to gloss over the ambiguities and flows among each of these communities**. By highlighting communities, we can also avoid the reductive problems of essentialization** (another way of talking about “national styles” of science and technology) **that aspire to explain everything but fail to elucidate much at all.36 Instead, one might think in terms of fluid identities of scientists and engineers engaged in particular projects, identities which are not only tied to national identification but also regional, professional, cultural, religious, and educational markers, to name only a few categories.** Using the perspective of mutable identity—different in different circumstances—wemight be able to understand more clearly the ways in which space exploration has not only been a project of national consideration but also the result of communities (or individuals) who identify with a whole host of other markers that are not connected to national claims. In other words, it is a way to problematize the notion that space exploration represents national aspirations. Finally, **space historians have tended to focus on moments in history that define the story.** For example, we use the notion of “achieving a capability” (the space equivalent of “going nuclear”) as shorthand for encompassing a variety of complex processes. Whether it be the first indigenous launch of a satellite or the first test of a liquid hydrogen rocket engine, these moments become historical signposts, turning points, bereft of the messiness inherent in the process of innovation. As a result, **space history slips into the comfort mode of “what and when” instead of the more illuminating path of “how and why.” The focus on process would highlight the ambiguities instead of the binary poles (success, failure) inherent in isolated moments, thus encompassing both the material event and how the event becomes constructed as a historical moment.** **All of these approaches also reinforce and foster the kind of social history that has become fundamental to most histories of technology but is largely absent in the literature on spaceflight, a lacuna explicable by the fetish for nation-centered cold-war geopolitics as the central organizing framework for most histories of space exploration.** Barring a few notable examples, space historians have avoided in-depth inquiries into the lived experiences of large demographics such as engineers, servicemen and -women, military and intelligence personnel, launch crews, staff workers, and spouses and families of engineers. Likewise, little work has been done on public enthusiasm for the space program,mass campaigns in support of space exploration, and popular participation in programs usually identified with state-centered institutions.37 Finally, **using analytical categories such as communities, identities, and processes would direct our attention to the problem of “consumption” in the history of space technology.Despite a recent surge of scholarship on the role of consumers in shaping technology and technological systems, we have traditionally focused on production rather than consumption in chronicling the history of spaceflight**.38 Who has “consumed” the space program**? How do we ascribe identities to them as “consumers”? How and where do producers and consumers of the space program interact? Exploring these questions would open up new areas of investigation and enrich our understanding of the cold-war space race.**

Alternative – Historical Criticism Solves

Questioning history is critical to challenge exclusion and imperialism – this evidence is specific to high school students and colonial nation state histories

Trofanenko, ‘5

[Brenda, Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Illinois, *The Social Studies*, Sept/Oct]

The debates about the overwhelming problems, limitations, and disadvantages of social studies education noted in the Fordham report attempts to reconcile and advance the idea of nation through a collective history. Our more pressing role as educators, in light of the Fordham report, is to discuss a more nuanced understanding of the U.S. history. This would advance, as noted in La Pietra Report, an understanding about “the complexity and the contexts of relations and interactions, including the ways in which they are infused with a variety of forms of power that define and result from the interconnections of distinct but related histories” (OAH 2000, 1). Taking the U.S. nation as only one example of social analysis involves recognizing the meanings and conditions out of which nations are formed. There is no one experience of belonging to a nation, no single understanding or enactment of sovereignty, and certainly no one meaning or experience of colonization or being colonized. There is, then, a need for these issues to be realized and to be a part of the questioning occurring within our classrooms. That would allow for the substantial reframing of the basic narrative of U.S. history (OAH 2000, 2).

Toward a More Global Sense of the NationKnowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage in social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practiced bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that “common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience” (27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States.

**The centrality that the west holds** (notably the United States as an imperial power) **is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation**. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the uses of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic.

The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students’ realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times.

My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as “the ideological alibi of the territorial state” (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. **We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed**. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history’s constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

Alternative – Solves Colonial History

The alternative’s historical examination is a critical process by which the violent ordering of the world can be deconstructed. Their discourse concerning civilization is a guise for colonialism.

Nayar in ’99

(Jayan, RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, MDA)

Through "colonialism" was reshaped the material basis of exchange that determined human relationships. Put differently, the very idea of what is "human" was recast by the imposed value-systems of the "civilizing" process that was colonialism. To be human, to live, and to relate to others, thus, both lost and gained meaning. Lost were many pre-colonial and indigenous conceptions of human dignity, of subsistence, production, consumption, wealth and poverty. Gained was the advent of the human "self" as an objective "economic" agent and, with it, the universals of commodification as the basis for human relations. Following this transformation of the material political-economy of the colonized, or "ordered," colonialism entrenched the "state" as the symbolic "political" institution of "public" social relations. The effect of this "colonization of the mind" was that the "political-economic" form of social organization--the state--was universalized as common, if not "natural," resulting in a homogenization of "political" imagination and language. Thus, diversity was unified, while at the same time, unity was diversified. The particularities and inconveniences of human diversity--culture and tradition--were subordinated to the "civilized" discourse of secular myths (to which the "rule of law" is central), n16 while concurrently, humanity was formally segregated into artificial "states," enclosures of mythic solidarities and common destinies. This brief remembering of colonialism as an historic process, provides us with the most explicit lessons on the violence of the "ordering" of "worlds." From its history we see that an important feature of ordering prevails. The world of those who "order" is the destruction of the "worlds" of those ordered. So many ideologies of negation and (re)creation served to justify this "beginning"--terra nullius, the "savage" native, the "civilizing mission." n17 The [\*608] "world," after all, had to be created out of all this "unworldly" miasma, all for the common good of the universal society of humankind.

Alternative – General Solvency

By creating counter-memories we can challenges the hegemonic narrative of world ordering

Nayar in ’99

(Jayan, RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, MDA)

Setting aside these divergent articulations of the vision of world-order, let us locate the rhetoric of world-order within the realm of social experience. The point of our concern is not simply about "world-order-talk," after all, but rather, about the real or potential impacts of world-orders, real or imagined. I suggest we begin this exploration into an alternative narrative on world-order by stepping off the bandwagon of world-order narratives to reflect on the connotations of its very terminology.What is this "world" that we have in mind when we speak of world-order? What is the nature of "order" that characterizes this world that has come to be the template for our new world-order? What has been the fate and fortune of other "We the Peoples"? n12 Should we seek them out, within this order that has come to be created? Our first challenge, I suggest, is in distinguishing between the imaginations of world-order and the materialities of "world (mis)order(ings)."

Memory Alternative reconceptionalizes the historical landscape that commemorates violence

Schramm, 2011

(Katharina, A perfessor at Martin Luther, Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacres Space, <http://muse.jhu.edu>, 6/24/11, S.M)

In the existing literature, the description of the relationship between official commemorations and popular or minority discourses and countermemories as a contested terrain often implies that these positions are mutually exclusive.3 However, such a dichotomization of positions tends to obscure the many overlaps between them.4 The articles in our collection therefore aim at presenting a more balanced view of these encounters, without denying the existing power asymmetries between different subject positions, or the political interests that are at stake in the commemoration of violence. We therefore focus on the extensive permeation of the several layers of interpretation through which a memorial landscape is perceived and trans/formed.

Alternative – Solves Progress

Alternative is able to suggestion the dystopia of progress. Only by moving beyond the status quo shortsightedness can we counter the doomsday narratives of the 1AC.

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

Shorn of global narratives of progress or of inevitable decline, we are left with the daunting task of trying out how we can make things better here and now, right in front of our noses first, more widely second. The task, with all of its uncertainties, does impart a meaning to our present actions. But it may also appear overwhelmingly difficult. Modesty about our capacity to meet its challenges is salutary in relation to grandiose claims about the direction in which history is necessarily moving. But a modesty that encourages a sauve-qui-peut , cultivate-my-own-garden shortsightedness will hardly suffice to counter the doomsday narratives that currently seem more persuasive than narratives of inevitable progress. To achieve an invigorating sense of the possible it certainly would help if we had a few good examples of collective intelligence to celebrate. Here are a few candidates, tentatively offered: the end of apartheid in South Africa, the creation and dissemination of the polio vaccine, the establishment of social insurance programs in various countries. None of them is perfect, but each represents the enactment of a possibility that was an improvement over what came before. None of these brought utopia, but they do suggest that some actions can improve the quality of life for some human beings. None of these is uncontested, or a completely secure fait accompli . I don’t think we can expect more than such complicated and ambiguous examples, but I also think they are sufficient to prevent us from throwing in the towel.

Alternative – Methodology First

**Only by experiencing history can someone retain memories that are able to narrate the past- taking history in a narrative context creates a desire for liberation from the way things are and have been.**

McGillis, Roderick. "The Opportunity to Choose a Past: Remembering History." *Children's Literature Association Quarterly* 25.1 (2000): 49-55. Print.

Let me be clear here with regard to contemporary historical children's fiction and history. If children receive their history from a literature that derives entirely from the present moment (I think of the many contemporary works of historical fiction available to young people today), and do not experience works from the pastÂ—for example, if they read something like Joan Aiken's Midnight Is a Place (1974) or Jill Paton Walsh's A Chance Child (1978) and do not read work by writers such as Hesba Stretton, Charles Kingsley, or Charles DickensÂ—then their contact with the past is doubly mediated, even skewed. The **lessons we learn from contact with the stuff of the past**Â—with at least a singly mediated past, that is with books actually written in the pastÂ—**allow us to fashion history with some degree of authenticity and immediacy**. No, the word I'm searching for is "authority**." We cannot author history unless we experience it, and the only means of experience we have is through contact with what remains of the past**Â—**places, objects, documents, those things that carry memories**…I take as my subject, then, historical fiction. My premise is that such fictions participate in what Fredric Jameson refers to as "the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity" (19). **The very act of narrative itself testifies to a desire for liberation from the way things are and have been. To narrate is to reconstruct , and in reconstruction lies the desire for something other than what we have. Of course we can narrate without obvious reference to the past, to history, but to take history as the narrative context is clearly to direct attention to the way things were, the way things are, and the way things might be. Implicit in every narrative of the past is a reflection on the present. This is the way things were.** How does this square with the way things are? And do we wish things to be different in the future from the way they are now? In other words, narrative is always a constructing of ideology.

Utilizing a methodology to accurately characterize problems is a prerequisite to taking action

Halperin 95

David M. Halperin, American theorist in the fields of gender studies, queer theory, critical theory, material culture and visual culture, "Sain Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, " New York Oxford University Press, pg. 53-54, 1995, DES.

Keith Gandal has attempted to explicate Foucault's political attitudes and practices, and his account is worth quoting at some length:**Foucault developed a new political role for intellectual work and a new** sort of **political activism that was informed by historical analysis. What has often been thought of as his nihilism was**, first of all, **his sense that articulating a set of values inhibits effective and ethical political action, and**, secondly, **his understanding that resistance cannot stand in pure opposition to the powers that be, but that, instead, struggle and change always take place through co-optation**, that, in fact, change is made possible by co-optation **because**, in the process of co-optation, **in assimilating the resistance, the terms of power change**.... [H]e wanted to establish an activism that was predicated, not on the enumeration of values or the proposal of social policy, but on tactical considerations and ethical practice (including a practice of reform that would not depend upon the expert reformer). Foucault was concerned above all with the effects of his thinking and political activity.... He pursued struggles where the situation was "intolerable," but also where an alteration of power relations was possible.... Those who come to Foucault's work looking for political solutions will be perpetually disappointed. **Foucault's project--in both his politics and his histories-was not to lay out solutions, but rather to identify and characterize problems**.... For Foucault, **Truth did not reside in a set of ideas about the way things should be, but in a practice that talked about problems in a manner that opened up new possibilities for action**. Identifying and sizing up a problem was the most determinate act of thought.... Foucault challenged the intellectual activism whose claim to a progressive politics is a theoretical apparatus, or a correct set of values, or a program for a legitimate political system. He believed that a progressive politics needed, not a vision of what should be, but a sense of what was intolerable and an historical analysis that could help determine possible strategies in political struggles.... If Foucault remained fairly silent on the subjects of answers and principles, it was because he was acting ethically and strategically, it was because he believed that asserting principles would get in the way of an ethic of "popular" participation. He wanted to allow and even inspire a practice of criticism which proceeded, not with expert, theoretical or scientific knowledges, but with "lowranking knowledges."

Our critical approach can provide the tools needed to emancipate individuals in their day to day lives.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

Critical Emancipation. **Those who seek emancipation attempt to gain the power to control their own lives in solidarity with a justice-oriented community. Here, critical research attempts to expose the forces that prevent individuals and groups from shaping the decisions that crucially affect their lives. In this way, greater degrees of autonomy and human agency can be achieved.** In the first decade of the 21st century, **we are cautious in our use of the term "emancipation" because,** as many critics have pointed out, **no one is ever completely emancipated from the sociopolitical context that has produced him or her**. Concurrently, many have used the term "emancipation" to signal the freedom an abstract individual gains by gaining access to Western reason—that is, becoming reasonable. Our use of "emancipation" in an evolving criticality rejects any use of the term in this context In addition, **many have rightly questioned the arrogance that may accompany efforts to emancipate "others."** These are important caveats and must be carefully taken into account by critical researchers. **Thus**, as critical inquirers who search for those forces that insidiously shape who we are, **we respect those who reach different conclusions in their personal journeys** (Butler, 1998; Cannella, 1997; Kellogg, 1998; Knobel, 1999; Steinberg & Kinchcloe, 1998; Weil, 1998).

Alternative – Epistemology

The Alternative is a discursive approach which investigates the social dynamics which feed domination and resistance. Having these methodologies within politics is critical to human agency- allowing us to challenge the entrenched system.

Bleiker, 00 (Roland, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Popular Dissent , Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Discourse is the most central concept in a non-essentialist assessment of human agency. A shift from grand theoretical representations of dissent towards a discursive understanding of power relations is necessary to reach a more adequate understanding of the role that human agency plays in contemporary global politics. A discursive approach is not only able to deal better with entrenched systems of exclusion, but also minimises the danger of imposing one's own subjective vision upon a series of far more complex social events. Instead of focusing on ahistorical theories of power, a discursive approach investigates how social dynamics have been imbued with meaning and how this process of rendering them rational circumscribes the boundaries within which the transversal interaction between domination and resistance takes place. While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination , a discursive approach may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by impenetrable discursive forces. This risk is particularly acute in a world that is characterised by increasingly heterogeneous and perhaps even elusive cross-territorial dynamics. But recognising these transversal complexities does not necessarily lead into a pessimistic cul de sac . Discourses, even if they take on global dimensions, are not as overarching as some analysts suggest. They contain fissures and cracks, weak points which open up chances to turn discursive dynamics against themselves . The previous chapter has outlined this position in detail. A brief rehearsal — even at the risk of appearing slightly repetitive — is necessary to provide the prerequisite for an adequate discursive conceptualisation of human agency in global politics. For this purpose we must , as the prologue has already stressed , seek to see beyond the levels of analysis problematique that has come to frame international relations theory. Rather than limiting the study of global politics to specific spheres of inquiry — those related to the role of states and the restraints imposed on them by the structures of the international system — an analysis of transversal struggles pays attention to various political terrains and the crossterritorial dynamics through which they are intertwined with each other. One of these terrains is the sphere of dailiness, which is all too often eclipsed by investigations that limit the domain of global politics to more visible sites of transversal struggle, such as wars, diplomatic negotiations, financial flows or trade-patterns. The domain of dailiness, though, is at least as crucial to the conduct of global politics, and an investigation into discursive dynamics illustrates why this the case. Cracks and weaknesses in globalised discursive practices can be seen best by shifting foci from epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that in addition to analysing how discourses mould and control our thinking process, we must scrutinise how individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the prevalent discursive order. Being is always a product of discourse. But Being also is becoming. It contains future potential, it is always already that which it is not. Being also has multiple dimensions. Hyphenated identities permit a person to shift viewpoints constantly, to move back and forth between various ways of constituting oneself . Resulting methods of mental deplacement, of situating knowledge, open up possibilities for thinking beyond the narrow confines of the transversally established discursive order. This thinking space provides the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of identity which control the parameters of actions available to an individual. Exploring this thinking space already is action, Heidegger claims, for 'thinking acts insofar as it thinks'. Such action , he continues, is 'the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man'. 3 But how is one to understand processes through which critical thinking breaks through the fog of discourse and gives rise to specific and identifiable expressions of human agency? The concept of tactic offers the opportunity to take a decisive step towards exploring the practical dimensions of Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, without losing the abstract insight provided by Heidegger. The sphere of dailiness is where such practical theorising is most effective. Entering this ubiquitous sphere compels us to one more shift, away from contemplating the becoming of Being towards investigating specific ways in which individuals employ their mobile subjectivities to escape discursive forms of domination . The focus now rests on everyday forms of resistance, seemingly mundane daily practices by which people constantly shape and reshape their environment. One can find such forms of resistance in acts like writing, laughing, gossiping, singing, dwelling, shopping or cooking. It is in these spheres that societal values are gradually transformed, preparing the ground for more open manifestations of dissent. Before drawing attention to the inherently transversal character of everyday activities, it is necessary to point out that the effects they produce cannot be understood by drawing direct links between action and outcome. In this sense, the present analysis departs fundamentally from the manner in which agency in global politics has come to be theorised . Most approaches to international theory, including the influential constructivist contributions to the structure—agency debate, display a clear 'commitment to causal analysis'. 4

**The discourse of acknowledging people as individuals instead of identifying them as a collective comes first**

**Uri 2k**

(Margolin, Uri, BA cum laude (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel) Philosophy and English Literature. PhD (Cornell University) Comparative Literature, Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to Ideology Margolin, Uri. Poetics Today, Volume 21, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 596-597 (Article) Published by Duke University Press, DA: 6/24/11, CP)

**Since literary genres, like all other types of discourse, exist in a discursive space and are defined in a relative, contrastive manner, it might be useful to point out some of the differences between a literary CN and several neighboring types of narrative such as the big city novel**, for example John Dos Passos’sManhattanTransfer () or Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz (), the roman-fleuve, and the family or generational novel, for example, Mann’s Buddenbrooks **(). In all of these types of narrative, a collective level of some kind indeed forms the ultimate thematic focus of the narrative, yet none of them meets the criteria of CN as defined above, since they do not have a unified CNA as their protagonist.The big city novel provides a panoramic vision of a swarming metropolis, and of human existence in it, through the parallel stories of several people from different levels of society** (Dos Passos) or through one individual and his endless, restless wandering through the city (Döblin). It is the shifting, endlessly variegated life of the city—portrayed in the case of Döblin as a veritable pandemonium— that forms the thematic focus of these novels. The ceaseless movement is anchored in one central location (train station, city square) through which everybody passes, and the traditional tracking of one central character is replaced by a stream of alternating momentary glimpses of a large number of individuals**. But this collection of individuals, who, in large part, do not even know each other, is by no means a single unified group or CNA. The replacement of the traditional protagonist by a large number of individuals, none of whom is more central than the others, does not turn the novel into a CN, nor does the aggregate, random, ever shifting population of the metropolis act as a CNA.** The roman-fleuve and the generational novel also aim to provide a wide panorama of the life of one or more generations and/or of one or more social classes, in all their synchronic diversity and diachronic variability. But once again, and in spite of collective titles such as Buddenbrooks or Les Thibaults, a group as a whole is not the central agent of the actions and events portrayed. Even though Mann’s novel is subtitled Verfall einer Familie and portrays the Buddenbrooks decline over four generations, what one actually encounters are just one or two central individual figures from each generation.The text itself does not include any holistic or group level of description, **distinct from the individual one, and generalizations about the family as a whole or any of its generations can be formulated only at a second stage, in retrospect, and on the basis of textual claims about individuals. Such group-level claims are hence of a second order and are by and large readerly constructs based on the twin activities of inference drawing and generalization building. On the other hand, the choice of the most basic human group, the family, the plural title, and the wide range of characters spread over several generations encourage this kind of retrospective collective perspective, with its quest for global patterns, be they synchronic or diachronic, and its construal of an individual figure as embodying a facet or phase of such a pattern**.

Epistemology questions the totalizing truths in the world. These methods are critical to productive politics. In a world without the alternative, even the small advantages claimed by plan won't fundamentally disrupt the power system in the SQ.

Jensen 2004 (Casper Bruun, Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Communication and ACTION for Health Research Project, Simon Fraser University, “A Nonhumanist Disposition: On Performativity, Practical Ontology, and Intervention”, Configurations, Volume 12, Issue 2, Project Muse)

Epistemology is generally seen to concern itself with investigating the foundations of certain knowledge. This inquiry has been almost universally premised on the idea of a split between the ideal and the concrete, and has prioritized the abstract capabilities of the mind over the inadequacies of the body. Scientific ideas are generated in the interaction with obdurate materials with unknown qualities, and a prominent concern of epistemology has been with purifying science from the many biases that could potentially invalidate its knowledge in this interaction. Epistemology thereby tries to establish an ideal relationship between the level of scientific ideas and the level of their practical validation and application, and in this project it has consistently prioritized theory over practice.13 In contemporary epistemology this purification has been typically managed by invocation of the scientific method, which, if properly applied, has been seen as the guarantee of knowledge-claims. In recent years claims pertaining to the absoluteness or universality of such knowledge have been toned down somewhat, and often the emphasis is now on securing the least-fallible knowledge—but, then, the claim to be able to (unequivocally) determine what is least fallible in itself continues to rely on the idea of an external standard.14 [End Page 235] The classical epistemological ambition is regularly presented as a defense against the contamination of knowledge-claims, for instance by the partisanship or local provincialism of their producers. The analytic philosopher Paul Boghossian, in a recent polemic against constructivism in general and Barbara Herrnstein Smith in particular (one, that, incidentally, vividly illustrates Smith's analysis of the microdynamics of incommensurability), offers the following description: What matters to epistemology are three things: first, the claim that only some considerations can genuinely justify a belief, namely, those that bear on its truth; second, a substantive conception of the sorts of considerations that quality for this normative status—observational evidence and logic, for example, but not a person's political commitments; and finally, the claim that we do sometimes believe something because there are considerations that justify it and not as a result of some other cause, such as because it would serve our interests to do so.15 Another recent example is afforded by John Searle's Construction of Social Reality, which has less interest in defending epistemology per se,16 yet leaves no doubt about the undiminished importance of such classical notions as evidence, objectivity, reality, and truth: Having knowledge consists in having true representations for which we can give certain sorts of justification or evidence. Knowledge is thus by definition objective in the epistemic sense, because the criteria for knowledge are not arbitrary, and they are impersonal.17 Undoubtedly the understanding of what exactly counts as proper evidence, objectivity, and truth varies between analytic philosophers, including Boghossian and Searle, as do, therefore, interpretations of what the scientific method would consist in, and what it would mean for it to be properly applied.18 Certainly, analytic philosophers would also contend that these divergences are substantial. However, what remains in the background of these debates is the assumption that (unreconstructed) notions of evidence, objectivity, [End Page 236] reality, and truth cannot be done without—not, at least, without inviting epistemological and quite possibly moral catastrophe. The challenge posed to classical epistemologists by STS-research has therefore been much more severe than internal epistemological quarrels.19 For in insisting on the participation of practical and material effects in the production of knowledge, these studies have problematized virtually all the key distinctions and relations in epistemology—notably, between knowledge and power and between (scientific) ideas and their (technical) concretizations. By doing so they have ineluctably challenged the central epistemological ambition to guarantee the possibility of formulating true (in the sense of reliably decontextualized) statements about the world. This challenge of constructivism is of wide-ranging ramifications for the conceptualization of science, technology, society, and their interrelationships.

**The ontological assumptions of the 1AC are false, identifying humanity as a collectivized whole is false.**

**Uri 2k**

(Margolin, Uri, BA cum laude (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel) Philosophy and English Literature. PhD (Cornell University) Comparative Literature, Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to Ideology Margolin, Uri. Poetics Today, Volume 21, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 597-598 (Article) Published by Duke University Press, DA: 6/24/11, CP)

**Narrative propositions inwhich aCNA, rather than an individual, occurs in the argument position reveal several specific features as regards both their internal logic and the kinds of inferences one can drawfromthem. First and foremost, such propositions operate on a distinct global or holistic level, so that claims about the group as a whole may not be true of all, and sometimes not even true of any of its members individually.** Formally put**, propositions including collective terms in their argument position do not imply that every member, or any particular member of the group individually, is under the scope of any predication involving this group as a whole**. ‘‘They worked hard’’ is thus compatible with ‘‘X, a group member, lazed about.’’ Second, as Margaret Gilbert (: –) has demonstrated convincingly, **two or more people can, as a body, accept a given decision, view, or goal as their joint stance, without it being the personal view or goal of any of them individually** (our view as a group vs. my personal view**).The views or goals of two or more individuals considered as a unit or plural subject thus do not break down into a set of personal goals and commitments. ‘‘Us’’ or ‘‘we’’ in this sense is different from I + you + him/her. The classical conflict between an individual group member and the group’s collective stance, or inside a group member’s mind between collective and personal views, could not occur were it not for this logical feature of collective predicates. There can obviously be no groups without individuals who embody them, but groups can and do have attributes that belong to the holistic level only. In other words, shifting from individual to group-level predicates involves a logical type shift. But the nondistributivity of group predicates can go even further. Collective, plural terms designating groups may have variable extensions or reference classes on different textual occurrences, even though the same group is being designated by all of them**.This is evident in the case of summative sentences describing repeated actions, such as ‘‘The regiment fought long and hard,’’ which does not imply that the regiment was composed of the same soldiers in all its battles, and becomes most obvious when transtemporal, multigenerational groups are involved, like the people of the way (those who remain loyal to their African identity) in AyiK. Armah’s novel (), women in MoniqueWittig’s (), or the people of Israel in the Haggadah (Silverman ). (See section .)

Alternative – Memory and Epistemology

MEMORY AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION GO HAND AND HAND; IT CAN CREATE BELIEF WHICH IN TURNS ACCOUNTS FOR REAL KNOWLEDGE –

Woundenberg in 99

Woudenberg, Rene Van. "Thomas Reid on Memory." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*37.1 (1999): 117-33. Print

In Reid, by contrast, we find nothing of this; in Reid knowing and believing are not mutually exclusive states. "**Memory**," Reid says, "**is always** **accompanied with the belief of that which we remember, as perception is accompanied with the *belief o f* that which we perceive**" *(EIP* 34o; my italics). So, when **there is memory, there is belief; and when there is no belief, there certainly is no memory. Memory**, we could say, **evokes belief**. What belief?. **Belief that what is remembered** actually happened, or **actually was the case**. At the same time, however, Reid says that "**this belief, which we have from** distinct **memory**, **we account real *knowledge****,* no less certain than if it was grounded on demonstration" (ibid., my italics). For John Locke what is demonstrated falls in the area of knowledge, not in the area of belief; knowledge, he holds, excludes belief.'5 For Reid, by contrast, **the** **belief that accompanies what we distinctly remember is epistemically on a par with demonstrative knowledge**; they are equally certain. S's being in the state of knowing that p (where p may be the object of memory), for Reid, then, doesn't exclude S's being in the state of believing that p. And if p is the object of other faculties such as perception or reason, again Reid holds that knowing that p and believing that p are not mutually exclusive. If one were asked to answer the question who was the first to systematically "deconstruct" the traditional opposition between knowledge and belief, "Reid" would not be an altogether unwarranted answer.

Alternative - History from the Losers

**But we do have an answer – you should vote negative, as only rejecting the affirmative’s hegemonic ontology can we Ever begin to affirm ourselves as intellectuals seeking to create change, people that can put the elevator in the Guggenheim, people that can make a difference, and that can work for real change. Vote negative to embrace a positive ontology that separates the affirmative from negative. The loser from the winner.**

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 61-62)

If the genealogy of the triumphalist imperial thinking I have undertaken in this chapter teaches us anything at all, it is to take this telling "qualification" of the end-of-history discourse seriously. Doing so puts one in a position to perceive not only the inordinately persuasive power of this kind of contradiction-defying "technological" thinking, but also its weakness, a weakness that up to now has been obscured by oppositional discourses that contradictorily think resistance in the logic prescribed by the dominant thought of the Enlightenment, the very thought they would oppose. If, indeed, the highly prized Western consciousness as such is a technological optical machine of conquest, if the Western will to know is simultaneously a will to total power, if the Western subject in fact defines itself as "I think; therefore I conquer," and if it is this imperial ocularcentric Western mode of thinking that has gained complete discursive dominion over the planet, then surely in this interregnum the time has come for those who would effectively resist the practical fulfillment of the *Pax Metaphysica* as the *Pax Americana* to return to the site of ontology *as point of departure.* I mean the site of Heidegger's de-struction and of the deconstruction of those like Derrida, Levinas, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and others whose thought — even their critique of Heidegger's — Heidegger's catalyzed. In thus calling for such a "step back," I am not positing the ontological in opposition to the other more "political" sites that, admittedly, these thinkers originally neglected or rarefied. I am suggesting, rather, that the "triumphant" liberal/capitalist democratic culture's overdetermination of the "truth" (the correspondence of mind and thing) in justifying its "triumph" has rendered a rigorous analysis of the ontological ground of this imperial truth an imperative of political resistance against the New World Order, the Pax Americana, that would follow this Pax Metaphysica*.* I mean an analysis such as that inaugurated in the post- Vietnam decade by these "postmetaphysical" thinkers, but this time reconstellated into the context of the global imperial politics enabled by metaphysical thinking in its fulfilled technological/instrumental phase. Far from being identifiable as totalitarian in tendency or simply obsolete, as so many New Historicist, neo-Marxist, cultural, and postcolonial critics have all-too-hastily concluded, these postmetaphysical or postlogocentric or postocularcentric discourses imply recognition not only of the global triumph of the imperialist thought they would oppose. Equally important, they constitute inaugural efforts, precipitated by the very planetary technologization — that is, colonization — of thought, to think thinking differently or, rather, differentially*.* They are, that is, symptomatic manifestations of the contradictions — the subverting or decolonizing Other — that the "fulfillment" and global "triumph" of metaphysical thought, like the end of philosophy, according to Heidegger's quite different reading of modernity, necessarily precipitate at its limits. They are, to put it in Heidegger's terms, symptomatic gestures of the *Abgeschiedene,* the "ghostly" wandering stranger, who, aware of the global colonization of originative thinking by the total instrumentalization and banalization of "enlightening" thought, has parted from the solar "at-homeland," but whose very spectral nonbeing haunts the "victorious" culture of the "age of the world picture."102

Alternative – Forgetting

By forgetting the past we are able to avoid the eternal debt and guilt of forgiveness.

Zupancic 2003

(Alenka is a full-time researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the [Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenian_Academy_of_Sciences_and_Arts" \t "_blank)/ The Shortest Shadow Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two/ Part 1: Nietzsche the Metapsychologist/ pgs.56-57/HS)

There is also an important difference between forgiving and (what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity: the way God has *forgiven* our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the cross, the instrumentof torture, the *memory* of the one who suffered and died so that we could be forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions. We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper”our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the conceptof forgiving with the concept of forgetting(“a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness.\

Forgetting is the surplus of passions that allow us to dismiss past injuries. By forgetting the past we allow for new possibilities.

Zupancic 2003

(Alenka is a full-time researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the [Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenian_Academy_of_Sciences_and_Arts" \t "_blank)/ The Shortest Shadow Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two/ Part 1: Nietzsche the Metapsychologist/ pgs.59-61/HS)

If we read this passage carefully, we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion, we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion. It could also be interesting to relate Nietzsche’s reflections from the quoted passage to the story of *Hamlet,* in which the imperative to remember, uttered by Hamlet’s father’s Ghost, plays a very prominent role. *Remember me! Remember me!,* the Ghost repeats to Hamlet, thus engaging him in the singular rhythm that characterizes the hero of this play—that of the alternation between resigned apathy and frenetic activity or precipitate actions (his killing of Polonius, as well as that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; his engagement in the duel with Laertes . . .). This movement prevents Hamlet from carrying out the very deed his father’s Ghost charges him with. Many things have been said and written about the relationship between action and knowledge in this play, and about how knowledge prevents Hamlet from acting. Although the two notions are not unrelated, it might be interesting to consider this also in terms of memory (not only in terms of knowledge). It could be worthwhile to contemplate the role played by the *imperative* of memory. Could we not say that one of the fundamental reasons for the difficulty of Hamlet’s position  is precisely the structural incompatibility of memory and action—

that is to say, the fact that action ultimately always “betrays” memory? And do we not encounter something similar in the wider phenomenon of melancholy (in the play, Hamlet is actually said to be “melancholic”) as a never-ending grief that keeps alive, through pain, the memory of what was lost? Additionally, although we can recognize in this kind of melancholy a form of fidelity (for instance—to use Nietzsche’s words—fidelity to “a woman or a great idea”), this kind of fidelity, bound to memory, should be distinguished from fidelity to the very event of the *encounter* with this woman or idea. Contrary to the first form, this second form of fidelity implies and presupposes the power to forget. Of course, this does not mean to forget in the banal sense of no longer remembering the person or the idea in question, but in the sense that forgetting liberates the potential of the encounter itself, and opens up—precisely through its “closure”—the possibility of a new one. If we return to the question of the ascetic ideal, we can easily see its link to the imperative of memory: the “sleeplessness” it generates is very closely related to the state of being “everlastingly awake” that Nietzsche identifies as one of the essential features of the ascetic ideal. The same is true of frenetic activity as the very impossibility of actually acting and of the obsession with the fact that everything that happens to us, or everything we do, has to be registered somewhere.

Framework

Our Interpretation is that debate should be a question of methodologies.

A. Education – debate about methodology is a true debate. A competition of ideas is critical to learning and fostering democratic politics.

B. Fairness – Method debates is the most predictable and fair ground for the affirmative. They have to defend the way in which they solve the worlds problems. You can weigh your impacts as justification to vote affirmative, but that means we are able to question those assumptions which is the entire 1NC.

C. Politics is no longer a rule by the elite, we must learn how best to interact with ourselves and others ethically prior to be accountable to the citizenry as a democratically elected policy maker – this internal link turns their education claims.

Clifford 01

[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 68-69]

Later, in the Greco-Roman period to the second or third century A.D., the connection between one’s political subjectivity and one’s sexual subjectivity will be far less isomorphic and much more problematic. In fact, the collapse of the Greek city-state precipitated a “crisis of the subject” in which the self and its relations to others in the social and political sphere were put into question as never before. This crisis was characterized by a “problematization of political activity” that paralleled the political transformations of this period.20 The more complex political structure of the state brought about a “relativization” in the exercise of power. For the individual, this manifested itself in a Stoical detachment from one’s status as a political actor, reflecting a growing awareness of the factors that were beyond the individual’s control. At the same time, the ruler/ruled dichotomy of earlier reflections was replaced with a recognition of the individual’s “intermediary” function in the exercise of power. **Instead of the classical Aristotelian alternation, one is both ruler and ruled at the same time: “Anyone who exercises power has to place himself in a field of complex relations where he occupies a transition point”** (CS, 88). Where the individual found himself in this complex network of relations was a matter of birth or the artificial status projected onto him by society—neither of which he had any control over. But he could control the quality of the power and governance which he exercised from this position—and it was his moral duty to exercise this power the best way he could. And just as for the earlier Greeks, here also “the rationality of the government of others is the same as the rationality of the government of oneself” (CS, p. 89). That is, the object was to control the passions, to cultivate the virtues of discipline and moderation, to develop a self-mastery that would qualify one to govern others. Yet there were two important changes in the relation between self-government and government of others. First, it became less heautocratic, since one had to attend to multiple “levels” in the exercise of power. Second, self-mastery became a much more intense relation to self. This involved a separation, on the one hand, of virtue and the actual ethical work (regimen, ascetic practices) necessary to achieve virtue. On the other hand, while it was recognized that “a whole elaboration of the self by oneself was necessary” for the tasks of governing others, the exercise of power was based on the relationship the individual established (often through an arduous effort and attention to oneself) with himself, which tended to undermine the identification of oneself in terms of one’s socially defined political status. Explains Foucault, “From the viewpoint of the relation to the self, the social and political identifications do not function as authentic marks of a mode of being; they are extrinsic, artificial, and unfounded signs” (CS, 93). Rather, the true measure of one’s integrity, and the true register of one’s subjectivity was, for whatever position or status one held, the quality of character the individual constructed for himself through the “cultivation of the self.” **The Cultivation of Individuality: J. S. Mill’s Manual of Autonomous Selfhood** In Foucault’s analysis of the technologies of the self through which individuals constitute themselves as ethical subjects, he attempts to trace genealogically the cultural patterns that provide frameworks of self-formation for the individuals of a given historical period. He is able to identify such patterns by focusing his analysis on various representative texts, such as Plato’s Republic, Epictetus’s Discourses, and Cassian’s Institutiones. Foucault reads such texts not so much as philosophical treatises in the traditional sense, but rather as “aesthetic manuals,” as “manuals for living,” as practical handbooks that delineate for the individual certain values, standards, and practices the individual can appropriate in order to define a “style of existence,” a mode of being. Reading texts in this way allows Foucault to identify the sorts of problematizations that structure a given form of subjectivation—and thus, to understand the formation of subjectivity under a new dimension. We have seen that in antiquity there was a close connection between forms of political and sexual subjectivity, that the problematizations that structured the self’s relation to itself in these domains tended to overlap. Since Foucault was doing a genealogy of the modern self, had he been able to complete his project, we might have seen similar connections between modern political and sexual subjectivity.21 A genealogy of the modern political subject would concentrate at some point on the texts of the liberal tradition. If we were to analyze such texts as “manuals for living,” rather than as juridicophilosophical projects to define principles of justice that govern the exercise of power (the effect of which is to take the political subject as given), we would discover in them models of political subjectivation that become attached to—or are appropriated by—individuals, determining their actions, practices, beliefs, and ideals—that is, models for the constitution of specific modes of being. Such texts generate views about the ways individuals need to comport themselves politically toward the state and toward each other. They provide frameworks of self-formation and identity construction, modes of selfdefinition and conceptualization. They delineate lines of normativity and abnormality, of social acceptability, of model citizenship and appropriate moral behavior; and they provide points of departure for revolutionary or reactionary personas. Political subjects emerge, in part, as a result of the self-appropriation of concepts generated within the texts of traditional political philosophy, and which are disseminated, in various ways and along various channels, as cultural values. In short, such texts harbor technologies of self through which individuals constitute themselves as modern political subjects.

A2 No Link – Space not the same

Space Agencies are an extension of a national identity

Ryan, 04

(Mike H. Ryan, associate professor of Management at the Rubel School of Business at Bellarmine University in Louisville, Kentucky 2004, The Role of National Culture in the Space-Based Technology Transfer Process,. Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2004, pp. 31-32, DA:6/22/11, CP)

Global patterns of business development over the last 30 years have generated many questions relevant to academics and practitioners alike. To what extent are management theories and practices transferable across national borders? Are these theories applicable to different cultures? (See Adler & Jelinek, 1986; Black & Porter, 1991; Hofstede, 1993; Laurent, 1983**). The growing conclusion is that the “relative exportability of management theory and practice is determined by the compatibility of the cultural values between the exporting and importing nation”** (Bigoness & Blakely, 1996, p. 739). **Research designed to assess how nations differ in terms of attitudes, beliefs, and values has produced some interesting and occasionally variable findings** (Hofstede, 1980; Kanungo & Wright, 1983; Ralston et al., 1992). Ralston et al. (1992) **indicated that understanding managerial values is crucial in a global economy because the business and operational philosophy of a given country depends on the values held by those in management. Space organizations as currently constituted are primarily instruments of their national governments and are led by managers steeped in a specific national culture. This situation makes it important to understand the impact that culture is likely to impose on those organizations both operationally and in terms of technological development. Several scholars have suggested that national culture and organizational cultures are “phenomena of different orders” and that using the terms interchangeably is somewhat misleading** (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990, p. 313). With the possible exception of the European Space Administration (ESA**), the strong cultural identity of a national space agency is at least likely to delay the imposition of organization norms that might stand in direct contrast to a national value set. The important point is the complexity that cultural settings, values, and attitudes are likely to have on organizational structures and processes** (Lachman, Nedd, & Hinings, 1994; Ronen, 1986). With respect to the issues related to technology transfer, Kedia and Bhagat made the point that “to better understand the effectiveness of technology transfers across nations**, we need a conceptual frame work that enhances the role of cultural variations** . . .” (1988, p. 560).

Space is just an extension of the same ole empire

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the

orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

My basic claim, then, is that a geographical concern with outer space is an old project not a new one. A closely related argument is that geography of outer space is a logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration (for instance Driver, 2001; Smith and Godlewska, 1994). Space exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958) as terrestrial exploration. And like its terrestrial counterpart, the move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises. Marina Benjamin, for instance, argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical extension of the American West’ (Benjamin, 2003: 46). Looking at the imbricated narratives of colonialism and the Arianne space programme in French Guiana, the anthropologist Peter Redfield makes the case that ‘outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire’ (Redfield, 2002: 795; 2000). And the historian of science Richard Sorrenson, writing about the ship as geography’s scientific instrument in the age of high empire, draws on the work of David DeVorkin to argue that the V-2 missile was its natural successor (Sorrenson, 1996: 228; DeVorkin, 1992). A version of the V-2 – the two-stage ‘Bumper WAC Corporal’ – became the first earthly object to penetrate outer space reaching an altitude of 244 miles on the 24th February 1949 (Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 1961). Moreover, out of this postwar allied V-2 programme came the means by which Britain attempted to reassert its geopolitical might in the context of its own ailing empire. In 1954, when America sold Britain its first nuclear missile — a refined version of the WAC Corporal — its ossession was seen as a shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s colonial power was waning fast (Clark, 1994; MacDonald, 2006). Even if the political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, the advent of rocketry was basically Cold War (imperial) geopolitics under another name. Space exploration then, from its earliest origins to the present day, has been about familiar terrestrial and ideological struggles here on Earth.

A2 Link Turn –Benevolent

Don’t be fooled by the 1AC – Space is a new space to revamp old imperial ways.

Spanos in 8

William, American Exceptionalism in the age of globalization : the specter of Vietnam , “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization ; The Specter of Vietnam” , **2008**, June 21, 2011, LMM

In this book I contend that the consequence of America’s intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam was the self-destruction of the ontological, cultural, and political foundations on which America had perennially justified its “benign” self-image and global practice from the time of the Puritan “errand in the wilderness.” In the aftermath of the defeat of the American Goliath by a small insurgent army, the “specter” of Vietnam—by which I mean, among other things, the violence, bordering on genocide, America perpetrated against an “Other” that refused to accommodate itself to its mission in the wilderness of Vietnam—came to haunt America as a contradiction that menaced the legitimacy of its perennial self-representation as the exceptionalist and “redeemer nation.” In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the dominant culture in America (including the government, the media, Hollywood, and even educational institutions) mounted a massive campaign to “forget Vietnam.” This relentless recuperative momentum to lay the ghost of that particular war culminated in the metamorphosis of an earlier general will to “heal the wound” inflicted on the American national psyche, into the “Vietnam syndrome”; that is, it transformed a healthy debate over the idea of America into a national neurosis. This monumentalist initiative was aided by a series of historical events between 1989 and 1991 that deflected the American people’s attention away from the divisive memory of the Vietnam War and were represented by the dominant culture as manifestations of the global triumph of “America”: Tiananmen Square, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the first Gulf War. This “forgetting” of the actual history of the Vietnam War, represented in this book by Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, and Tim O’Brien’s Going After Cacciato (and many other novels, memoirs, and films to which I refer parenthetically), contributed to the rise of neoconservatism and the religious right to power in the United States. And it provided the context for the renewal of America’s exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness, now understood, as the conservative think tank the Project for the New American Century put it long before the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as the preserving and perpetuation of the Pax Americana. Whatever vestigial memory of the Vietnam War remained after this turn seemed to be decisively interred with Al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Completely immune to dissent, the confident American government, under President George W. Bush and his neoconservative intellectual deputies and with the virtually total support of the America media—resumed its errand in the global wilderness that had been interrupted by the specter of Vietnam. Armed with a resurgence of self-righteous indignation and exceptionalist pride, the American government, indifferent to the reservations of the “Old World,” unilaterally invaded Afghanistan and, then after falsifying intelligence reports about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capability, Iraq, with the intention, so reminiscent of its (failed) attempts in Vietnam, of imposing American-style democracy on these alien cultures The early representation by the media of the immediately successful “shock and awe” acts of arrogant violence in the name of “civilization” was euphoric. They were, it was said, compelling evidence not only of the recuperation of American consensus, but also of the rejuvenation on America’s national identity.

A2 History has Truth

There is no truth making in history – co opted by nation building

Schramm, 2011

(Katharina, A perfessor at Martin Luther, Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacres Space, <http://muse.jhu.edu>, 6/24/11, S.M)

A third dimension in the discussion of violence and memory concerns the role and contemporary position of perpetrators, which is particularly relevant in German discussions of National Socialism and the Holocaust,27 but also comes up in other contexts, such as the postwar societies of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda after the genocide, or post-apartheid South Africa. Together with the problem of victimhood, it is closely linked to the issue of reconciliation and the political implications of violent pasts. This theme has become prominently exposed in the various public tribunals that have sprung up since the 1990s, following the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In his account of the latter institution, Richard Wilson addresses the problematic representation of the past in a framework of healing and bureaucratic documentation which not only circumvents the issue of justice but also robs the individual of his or her experiences by subordinating them to the objective of nation building.28 Analyzing the “truth-making machine” as a means of producing new South African citizens, Wilson demonstrates how yet again memories of violence are brought to the surface in the public arena only to store them away even more securely afterwards; and he points out the limitations and inconsistencies of such an approach.

A2 Predictions Good

The scientific predictions of the 1AC are fundamentally flawed – you cannot predict anything because there are too many variables

McGowan in ‘8

(John, is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina., “The Possibility of Progress: A Pragmatist Account”, The Good Society, Volume 17, Number 1, 2008, pp. 34, MDA)

Once again, in light of our own pessimistic present, I think it important to stress that we have plenty of empirical and experiential evidence that action sometimes, rarely perfectly or completely but still in “good enough” ways, achieves what it sets out to accomplish. We continue to act because we find action, at times, efficacious. James holds on to this point so fiercely because he is convinced that the very meaning of life depends on it. Only within a horizon where we can plausibly retain “this vague confidence in the future” (P, 537) will we continue to act, to strive, to believe that what we do can make a difference, that our strivings are meaningful because they have results. The confidence is “vague” because so many contingencies step in between intentions and results. We cannot guarantee the exact outcome because of the concatenation with other forces and factors in the production of that outcome. But there is not, in many although not all cases, a total disconnect between intention and result, and that fact is enough to warrant the “vague” confidence needed to go on. “Surely,” James writes, “the only possibility that one can rationally claim is the possibility that things may be better ” (P, 539).

A2 Timeframe

Arguments concerning timeframe are slick rhetorical tools to force an audience into making a decision. These senses of urgency and futurism are guise for imperial frontierism

Jordan 3

John W. Jordan “Kennedy’s Romantic Moon and its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration” Rhetoric & Public Affairs. Vol 6 Num 2. Summer 2003. Pg: 209-231

Kennedy’s rhetorical use of time in the Rice University address concluded by pre- senting the audience with the requisite sense of urgency needed for motivating “today”to support plans starting “tomorrow.”His rhetorical use of time provided a means “to invite audiences to reorient themselves in the present by reconstructing their past or by considering alternative possibilities for the future.”49 Kennedy’s audience needed to be convinced that their task was achievable because an oppor- tune moment had become available at that historic juncture, and they should pur- sue it with urgency. Kennedy’s address arranged time to bear upon the public consciousness by providing a reading of history that practically begged the audience to champion the lunar objective and thereby realize their historical character. As Stephen P.Depoe argues,“when a temporal vision produces a sense of‘public time’ within an audience,the importance or necessity of an impending collective decision is magnified.”50The future, the first step of the new day,was presented in such a way that it was only by going to the moon that Kennedy’s mythic-heroic past could become “our”past, thus connecting the audience with their pioneer heritage.

A2 Perm – Do Alternative

This is a Severance Perm

1. This means the negative will always loose: allowing the aff to do the alternative means they are robbed of any advocacy. This is creates a severe lack of debate and is unfair.

2. This makes the Affirmative conditional: Allowing the affirmative to advocate the alternative shifts the 1ac advocacy. This creates unfair burdens on the negative.

3. Kills Education: the affirmative plan should be the focus of the debate ; when they can sever parts of plan we have no coherent model on which to debate the round off of.

this is voter for fairness and education

A2 Perm – All other Instances

1. Extend Links: all of our links are based of direct plan action and/or their methodological epistemologies in the 1ac. All of our evidence argues that each time these endorsements are made a creation of universal narratives justifies inevitable violence.
2. This perm is a cover-up: Finding some reason to justify plan without changing our epistemological thinking first only furthers the impacts of the 1ac. This is a question of methodology – means this perm doesn’t answer the fundamental question in this debate.
3. 1ac Cannot solve: Our Alternative evidence argues that we must have this type of questioning prior to policy actions otherwise all future policies will fail.
4. Perm severs the immediacy of the alt - this kills competition due to its instrincness.

A2 Perm – Plan then Alternative

This is a timeframe permutation

1. perm kills competitive equity: the negative looses all ground because the affirmative can just endorse all negative frameworks and kills competition - reason to reject the perm.
2. Concedes the Alt solves the aff: The perm argues that the alternative can solve back the affirmative after plan. this means that the alternative can solve 100% of the affirmative even without the perm.
3. It is impossible to read time Disads to critical arguments: If this was a policy argument we might be able to find a disad to a timeframe permutation. But there is hardly any if not no evidence based in critical literature about time delays.

\*\*\* AFF ANSWERS \*\*\*

Aff – History Permutation

Due to the inevitable rise of technology humanity will no longer be able to escape it’s past, only by embracing remembering and forgetting allows us to deal with social injustices  
Gong 2001

(Gerrit W. is a senior associate at CSIS in Washington, D.C., and assistant to the president at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2001, p. 45)  
Those who assume time heals all wounds are wrong. Accelerated by the collision of information technology with concerns of the past, issues of “remembering and forgetting” are creating history. They are shaping the strategic alignments of the future. Remembering and forgetting events define what individuals and countries remember and when, as well as what individuals and countries forget and why. Remembering and forgetting issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that direct the future in the name of the past. They are the personal and policy aftermaths of peoples and countries—including Germany, Japan, and China—whose identities and international roles are rooted deep in history. Remembering and forgetting issues thus encompass, but are by no means limited to, Germany’s Holocaust; Japan’s colonization of Korea and later brutal occupation of China; China’s civil war; and Taiwan’s February 28 incident, when Chinese mainlanders killed native Taiwanese in 1947. Efforts to promote justice and reconciliation are now manifest in issues as diverse as slave and forced labor claims in Japan and Germany, “comfort women” and World War II textbook lawsuits in Japan, and Agent Orange allegations in Vietnam or the Philippines. In Asia and elsewhere, companies and states should prepare for the intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance of remembering and forgetting events for at least four reasons. First, modern technologies are digitally enhancing our memories and then broadcasting our most passionate personal concerns and most polarized divergences. They are playing and replaying our worst nightmares through cyberspace, with an expanding global and personal reach.

The perm solves – there is a gray area between closing the past and keeping it alive

Schramm, 2011

(Katharina, A perfessor at Martin Luther, Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacres Space, <http://muse.jhu.edu>, 6/24/11, S.M)

Declaring something sacred means to remove it from the everyday realm, giving it special attention and symbolic value and, at least ideally, deeming it undisputable. If applied to the commemoration of violence, the process of sacralization can be regarded as an attempt to bring the past to a close and adjust it to a future-oriented and almost evolutionist narrative of progress. Yet, as Walter Benjamin has already demonstrated in his powerful interpretation of Paul Klee’s painting *Angelus Novus*, the possibility of healing remains an illusion.12 Consequently, the attempts to create closure may be contrasted by conscious efforts to keep the past “alive”; or at least to actually address its complexities and the uncomfortable “gray zone,” which characterizes the space in-between unequivocal positions.13 In addition, we deal with processes of embodiment and ritual reenactment that are not necessarily or exclusively discursively framed or reflected. As J. Shawn Landres and Oren Baruch Stier have observed, “In some cases, disputes arise over memories of violence at sacred places; in other cases, the memory of violence itself is what makes the place sacred.”14 The articles in this issue aim to address these different dimensions of the production of sacrality.

**We can combine theory and practice to produce a pragmatism that solves the K**

**Rytövuori-Apunen, ’05** – Prof IR @ U of Tampere in Finland (Helena, Cooperation & Conflict, pg. 147-177, “Forget ‘Post-Positivist’ IR!: The Legacy of IR Theory as the Locus for a Pragmatist Turn”, pg. 163-165, SagePub)

The task of this paper is to seek the locus in quo pragmatist approaches can emerge in IR’s field of knowledge and through articulated disagreement with previous discourse contribute to an increasingly global discipline beyond the logic of universalism/dispersion. I argue that seeing the locus for pragmatism, i.e. seeing more to it than another approach and a ‘new alley of inquiry’, requires rectifying the distortions created by the postpositivist self-comprehension. An alternative explanation to what Frost calls the ‘positivist bias’ can be sought by examining the specific theorycentred orientation in IR and also the discursive mechanisms and the social processes by which this relation to the world becomes the privileged knowledge that is ‘orthodoxy’. ‘Orthodoxy’ appears when the theory-centred attitude to knowing, which emphasizes theoretical perspective and conceptual logic, loses its footprints in its colloquial interpretations and presents reality ‘as it is’ (naturalized ontology). I will now discuss what the disagreement, the articulation of which I argue is required for maintenance of the idea of the corpus of knowledge as a web of discourse, can mean as a research orientation. I point to a way of inquiry which starts with Dewey, but in the epistemic sense draws from C. S. Peirce’s conception of ‘reality’ as pragma and the pragmaticist logic of inquiry. I propose that a focus in the current introductions of pragmatism on the Deweyan inheritance of classical pragmatism (Millennium 31: 3) does not help us to solve the epistemological issues pertinent in the situation which already builds on and looks beyond the ‘linguistic turn’ and calls for methodical solutions that fit together with these more recent tendencies. The Missing Piece: The Interpretative Aspect of ‘Discourse’ and ‘Culture’ The identification of what I suggest is a paradigmatic feature of the disciplinary mainstream and the legacy of IR Theory (capital letter to mark out this legacy) makes it possible, through ontological criticism, to point out two opposed epistemic paths, one based on the primacy of theory, the other proceeding from the primacy of practice. Opposed to the approach that models the world (produces a ‘world picture’, as Martin Heidegger says)22 is the orientation that proceeds from and seeks to refine what already, in some way, is present in our experience. Above, I have criticized the tendency to read disciplinary tradition in a way which, rather than focusing on analytical difference, subsumes instances of previous theory under a shared characterization and thereby suppresses the potentiality that as possibility of interpretation exists in the historical body of knowledge. In the same vein of argument, it is important to note that the opposition of epistemic positions is not only inter- but also intra-textual. For example Organski’s ambition to ‘organize the mass of [...] information to which we are all exposed’ arises from the experience that the international distribution of power is constantly shifting and that this moment, along with the importance of internal determinants of power, has been neglected by the balance of power theory (Organski, 1958: vii; 1961: 373–5). Analysing how concepts relate to historical experience and the dissatisfaction felt about previous approaches provides a point of departure for a reconstruction of theory that, from within the theory, opens up possibilities of interpretation that also challenge the theory-centred ambition (on the parallel to Descartes, see Toulmin, 1990: 56–137). Recontextualization offers a way to redress the biases of decontextualized theory, and this does not mean a Romanticist emphasis on ‘intrinsic meaning’ and the unique in experience (cf. Ashley, 1989: 278). The nexus of theory and practice, which is there in the text but which, beyond the text, deals with a historically situated moral agency, offers a point of departure for an epistemic turn that transcends the bifurcation of empiricist and rationalist epistemology. The question I have in mind is about the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ of specific experience. It is about the modes of encountering and making sense of the world, modes that through their habitual and institutional mechanisms can also become modalities of professional activity, such as the theory-centred episteme discussed above. A pragmatist re-interpretation of the texts of the early realists, for example, can elucidate how the ideals and guidelines for statesmanship and diplomacy arise from a world-experience that is different from but also partly similar or isomorphic to ours, and what commensurability there is, on this basis, in the logics of practice which in the different historical contexts generate policies in order to control perceived threats. Such inquiry and assessment of the legacy of IR theory seeks to sustain a living discourse diachronically through time without turning into a study of past historical praxis.23 Without bypassing the ‘weight of the discourse’ (Foucault),24 it starts out with situated moral agency and collective human intentionality and, on this basis, recognizes the inseparability of lived experience and the structures of experience that organize instances of experience. In the ontological sense, pragma means that whatever ‘is’ for a human interpretant exists not by a substance but by the regularities that endow it with its being. In the pragmatist research orientation, pragma (from the Greek word ‘business’, originally ‘a thing done’)25 means more than a way of carrying out the ‘business’ of research. It involves a critical assessment of the body of previous knowledge and requires that a new practice brings some advancement in relation to it. Like William James, John Dewey – the most influential pragmatist figure in social science and an author to whom the present-day discussion in IR in most cases makes reference – was interested in the question of how the powers of habit that maintain life serve to channel all thought, including the original of creative invention, and how the disposition of habitual responses evolves in the encounter of new types of problems. Dewey’s pragmatist ethics sought to cure the social and individual alienation that in his argument originates from the legacy of Western thought in ontological formalism, i.e. a dogmatic application of Plato’s idealism. Dewey emphasized that the ‘physician is lost who would guide his activities of healing by building up a picture of perfect health’; instead, the physician needs to employ ‘what he has discovered about actual cases of good health and ill health and their causes to investigate the present ailing individual so as to further his recovering; recovering, an intrinsic and living process ...’ (Owen, 2002: 670).Void of the inside knowledge, which involves a reflective relationship to previous practice, praxis (an established or customary practice) is like touching without realizing how by the same act one is being touched, i.e. the static position and alienation which Dewey argued were at the root of social problems (Dewey, 1981: 620–43).

Aff – IR Epistemology Perm

The permutation solves best: endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the blindspots of international relations theory

Stern & Druckman 2000

(Paul and Daniel, National Research Council & Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.“Evaluating interventions in history: The case of international

conflict resolution.” International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under 52Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985); Reilly and Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. 62 Stern and Druckman what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “critical multiplism.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as partial correctives for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

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Aff- Alternative Cannot Solve

**Endless investigation of power makes real struggles against oppression impossible.**

**Hicks**, **03-** Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY (Steven V., “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. 72 “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

**Critiques of power are so localized that they prevent coalition from forming that could genuinely fight oppression.**

**Cook**, **92-** Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School (Anthony E., “A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say *and* do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.

Aff – Memory Cannot Solve

Memory Alternative creates victims of imperialism – their discussion of the Other denies agency

Schramm, 2011

(Katharina, A perfessor at Martin Luther, Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacres Space, <http://muse.jhu.edu>, 6/24/11, S.M)

A second, albeit closely related, field in which violence and memory are brought together, is the narration of victimhood that is often dominated by a discourse of trauma.22 If we consider trauma as the endless repetition of a violent experience, it is necessarily opposed to any idea of closure. Yet the focus on victimhood also entails the problematic dimension of victimization—often by means of a universalized (and mediatized) discourse of suffering that denies agency to survivors who find healing an unavailable (and unacceptable) option.

**Rememberance creates collective identities => linking back into the Kritik**  
**Reyes 2010**  
(G. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Communication at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, Memory and Alterity:The Case for an Analytic of Difference, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 43, Number 3, 2010, pp. 222)  
Research on the relationship between public memory and collective identity is varied and extensive, but one fairly prominent scholarly perspective coalesces around Hannah Arendt’s idea that the practices of remembrance are the lifeblood of the polis. The stakes here are high, for it seems that without remembrance, the very possibility of collective identity and historical responsibility literally “disappear.” 2 Scholars as diverse as Maurice Halbwachs (1992), Benedict Anderson (1991), and Peter Novick (1999) (to name a few) have emphasized this connection between public memory and collective identity (see also Kattago 2001; Kammen 1991; Gillis 1994a; and Bodnar 1992). Although these scholars’ projects diverge in other ways, they hold in common an interest in public memory’s capacity to constitute transnational, national, and local identities. For these scholars, remembrance is not simply a vehicle for tradition; it is also an activity that brings collective identity into being. Collective identity emerges through the other, whose call to remember constitutes collectivity. The ontological space remembrance creates might thus be considered intersubjective, or between subjects.

Aff – Genealogy Cannot Solve

**Genealogy is trapped in a double bind: its extreme relativism either undercuts its political usefulness or a new master discourse is produced.**

Habermas, 87- Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern (Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 279)

Foucault's historiography can evade relativism as little as it can this acute presentism. His investigations are caught ex­actly in the self-referentiality that was supposed to be excluded by a naturalistic treatment of the problematic of validity. Ge­nealogical historiography is supposed to make the practices of power, precisely in their discourse-constituting achievement, accessible to an empirical analysis. From this perspective, not only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the func­tional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of valid­ity claims consists in the power effects they have. On the other hand, this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of the research inspired by it as well. But if the truth claims that Foucault himself raises for his genealogy of knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted to no more than the effects that this theory is capable of releasing within the circle of its ad­herents, then the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point. Foucault pursues ge­nealogical historiography with the serious intent of getting a science underway that is superior to the mismanaged human sciences. If, then, its superiority cannot be expressed in the fact that something more convincing enters in place of the convicted pseudo-sciences, if its superiority were only to be expressed in the effect of its suppressing the hitherto dominant scientific discourse *in fact,* Foucault's theory would exhaust itself in the politics of theory, and indeed in setting theoretical-political goals that would overburden the capacities of even so heroic a one-man enterprise. Foucault is aware of this. Con­sequently, he would like to single out his genealogy from all the rest of the human sciences in a manner that is reconcilable with the fundamental assumptions of his own theory. To this end, he turns genealogical historiography upon itself; the dif­ference that can establish its preeminence above all the other human sciences is to be demonstrated in the history of its own emergence.

**Spanos does not sufficiently connect his genealogy to specific policy recommendations—the alternative fails to influence the real world.**

Lewandowski, 94 - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowsi, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, “Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism,” ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 115-116)

The point to be made here is that Heidegger's politics are not the only (or necessarily the largest) obstacle to coupling him with critical theory. Hence much of Spanos's energetic defense of Heidegger against his 'humanist detractors' (particularly in his defiant concluding chapter, 'Heidegger, Nazism, and the "Repressive Hypothesis": The American Appropriation of the Question') is misdirected. For as McCarthy rightly points out, 'the basic issues separating critical theory from Heideggerean ontology were not raised post hoc in reaction to Heidegger's political misdeeds but were there from the start. Marcuse formulated them in all clarity during his time in Freiburg, when he was still inspired by the idea of a materialist analytic of Dasein' (p. 96, emphasis added). In other words, Heidegger succumbs quite readily to an immanent critique. Heidegger's aporias are not simply the result of his politics but father stem from the internal limits of his questioning of the 'being that lets beings be', truth as disclosure, and destruction of the metaphysical tradition, all of which divorce reflection from social practice and thus lack critical perspective. Spanos, however, thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialist grounding for an emancipatory critical theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger. Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontological site'. Foucault's analysis of power, despite its originality, is an ontology of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p. 138) of power mechanism. Thus it dramatizes, on a different level, the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The 'affiliative relationship' (p. 138) that Spanos tries to develop between Heidegger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being, Foucault ontologizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but subjectless mechanism that 'endows itself' and punches out 'docile bodies', whereas the former sees Being as that neutered term and no-thing that calls us. Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emancipatory, or how emancipation could be realized collectively by actual agents in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom' the later Foucault speaks of in 'What Is Enlightenment?' remained precisely that in his work.4 The genealogy of power is as much a hypostatization as is fundamental ontology: such hypostatizations tend to institute the impossibility of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiently tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reified theory of power seems to undermine the very notion of 'Opposition', since there is no subject (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or, in his later work, a privatized self to be self-made within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in The World, the Text, and the Critic, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society' (p. 221, emphasis added). Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analyses, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails to see, to paraphrase Said's criticisms of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diagram (p. 22l).

Aff – Forgetting Cannot Solve

**Remembering events allows for reconciliation and the ability for history to reinvent itself. Forgetting risks reconciliation to be impossible.**  
**Gong 2001**  
(Gerrit W. is a senior associate at CSIS in Washington, D.C., and assistant to the president at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2001, p. 56)

Some things cannot and must not be forgotten. It is normal to remember, particularly attitudes and actions that must never be repeated. It is also normal, over time, to forget—or at least to remember more positively and allow a process of reconciliation to begin. In some cases, the issue may not be so much remembering and forgetting as remembering and not remembering. When something cannot be forgotten but has been remembered and reconciled, it ceases to be the focus of conscious attention. When reconciliation has consciously occurred, history  can reinvent itself. It can begin anew. It does not leave familiar foundations but can build a new future. The emotional and geographic reach of remembering and forgetting issues is increasing, as is their impact on public perceptions and popularly determined strategic alignments. To make history is, by definition, to describe the past from the perspective of the future. To determine the future is, at some point, to make history. At the crucial nexus of each government’s and each country’s political battle to determine how the past will shape the future, remembering and forgetting issues will provide the vocabulary for and the battlefield on which strategic alignments in the contemporary world will turn. We are witnessing the beginning of a new history.

Aff – Totalizing Histories Good

**There is no such thing as a myth o the frontier, and universal truths are necessary to maintain the balance of history.**

**Michaels, 96**

(Walter Benn Michaels author of Our America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (1995) and The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History (2004). PhD in 1975 from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Afterwards, he taught at Johns Hopkins University (1974–1977, 1987–2001) and the University of California, Berkeley (1977–1987). taught at the University of Illinois at Chicago. "You who never was there": Slavery and the New Historicism, Deconstruction and the Holocaust, Narrative Vol. 4. No. 1, pg 1-3 (Jan., 1996), DA: 6/25/11, CP)

At the same time, however, from Veyne's perspective, the answer to the question**, do the Americans believe their myths, must be no. For once we recog nize that, as he puts it, "'reality' is the child of the constitutive imagination of our tribe**" (113), **we must also recognize that "truth," as we ordinarily conceive it** (in the sense, say, that we might think our myths true and the Greek myths false) **"does not exist**" (115). Indeed**, "As long as we speak of the truth, we will under stand nothing of culture and will never manage to attain the same perspective on our culture as we have on past centuries,** when people spoke of gods and myths" (113). So if, on the one hand, **we must believe our myths,** on the other hand**, we must not believe that they are true**. That is the whole point of "culture" as Veyne understands it**: "culture, without being false, is not true either**" (127). And while the Greeks, "of course," believed their myths, insofar as in believing their myths they believed them to be true, they were, of course, mistaken. We, who know that our culture is neither true nor false, also believe our myths but we believe them in the right way; in fact, insofar as "our perspective" on our own culture is "the same" as our perspective on the cultures of "past centuries, when people spoke of gods and myths**," we must not only believe our own myths, we must also believe the myths of the past.** So not only must the Greeks have believed their myths and must the Americans believe theirs, the Americans must believe the Greek myths too. And, in fact, at least some Americans do. In his 1987 best-seller, Commu nion, Whitley Strieber argues that the alien "visitors" who on several occasions have made their presence known to him and who look, he thinks, like the an cient goddess Ishtar, are probably the originals for "the whole Greek pantheon" (121). His theory is that **humans, unable to deal with "the stark reality of the visitor experience**" ("the bad smells, the dreadful food, and the general sense of help lessness"), **dress it up in what he calls "a very human mythology," one that pre serves the essential truth of "the visitor experience" while at the same time making it more palatable**. But Communion is subtitled A True Story rather than An Es say on the Constitutive Imagination; whether or not the Greeks, in believing their myths, believed them to be true, Whitley Strieber does. His memories of his own experience count as testimony to their truth not only because they provide modern analogies for ancient myths but because they may be understood to pro vide more direct evidence: "Do my memories come from my own life," he won ders, "or from other lives lived long ago, in the shadowy temples where the grey goddess reigned?" (123). If they come from his own life, they provide evidence that god-like creatures are currently interacting with humans and they provoke the reflection that such interactions may have taken place also in the past; **if they come from lives lived long ago, they provide evidence that god-like creatures have always interacted with humans and so that the old mythologies are not only compatible with recent experience but true. But how does the fact that some Americans believe the Greek myths shed any light on the question of whether Americans believe their own myths**? It might, of course, be argued that the belief in "visitors" is an American myth and so that, for people like Whitley Strieber, believing in the Greek myths is a way of believing American myths. In my view, however, the fact that Whitley Strieber believes in the Greek pantheon is less relevant to American mythology than the question he raises in the course of stating that belief: "Do my memories come from my own life or from other lives lived long ago?" For it is this question, I want to suggest**, that lies at the heart of the myths Americans believe insofar as it is in attempting to answer this question?do our memories come from our own lives or from other lives lived long ago?that Americans can come to think of themselves as distinctively American. "History is to the nation**," Arthur Schle singer Jr. has recently written, **"rather as memory is to the individual. As an individual deprived of memory becomes disoriented and lost ... so a nation denied a conception of its past will be disabled in dealing with its present . . . As the means of defining national identity, history becomes a means of shaping history" (20). Memory is here said to constitute the core of individual identity; national memory is understood to constitute the core of national identity. In sofar, then, as individuals have a national as well as an individual identity, they must have access not only to their own memories but to the national memory; they must be able to remember not only the things that happened to them as in dividuals but the things that happened to them as Americans. The way they can do this, Schlesinger says, is through history. History, in other words, can give us memories not only** of what Strieber calls **our "own" lives but of "other lives lived long ago." And it is in giving us these memories that history gives us our "iden tity." Indeed, it is because our relation to things that happened to and were done by Americans long ago is the relation of memory that we know we are Americans. We learn about other people's history; we remember our own**.

A reject of universal histories is universal in and of itself. The Alternative’s method cannot universally work for all people – Native American history offers some incite.

**Michaels, 96**

(Walter Benn Michaels author of Our America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (1995) and The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History (2004). PhD in 1975 from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Afterwards, he taught at Johns Hopkins University (1974–1977, 1987–2001) and the University of California, Berkeley (1977–1987). taught at the University of Illinois at Chicago. "You who never was there": Slavery and the New Historicism, Deconstruction and the Holocaust, Narrative Vol. 4. No. 1, pg 4-5 (Jan., 1996), DA: 6/25/11, CP)

**So American mythology has less (**although, as we shall see, not nothing) **to do with the belief in aliens (space aliens, anyway) than with the belief that we can remember "other lives lived long ago," or perhaps?to put the point more neutrally? than with our ways of talking as if we remembered "other lives lived long ago." For, whether or not the belief that we can remember such lives is wide spread, talk about remembering such lives is extremely widespread.** To stick for another moment to texts that may, to an academic audience, seem marginal, Greg Bear's science fiction novel, Blood Music (1985), imagines the restructuring of blood cells so as to enable them to perform a kind of memory transfer, first from father to son?"The memory . . . was there and he hadn't even been born, and he was seeing it, and then seeing their wedding night" (211)?and then more generally?"And his father went off to war . . . and his son watched what he could not possibly have seen. And then he watched what his father could not possibly have seen." "Where did they come from?" he asks about these memories, and when he is told, "Not all memory comes from an individual's life," he realizes that what he is encountering is "the transfer of racial memory" (212) and that now, in "his blood, his flesh, he carried . . . part of his father and mother, parts of people he had never known, people perhaps thousands of years dead" (217). Blood Music imagines as science what Communion, identifying its "visitors" with the "Greek pantheon" and speculating that they are the "gods" who created us, imagines as religion. But both Blood Music and Communion should probably, as I suggested above, be considered marginal texts, not because they haven't been read by many (Communion, at least, has been read by hundreds of thousands) but because their account of what Blood Music calls "racial memory" is, in a certain sense, significantly anachronistic. By "racial," Greg Bear means "human"; it's the human race, not the white or the black or the red race that his transfusions of blood unite. And while it is true that, in an amazing moment, Whitley Strieber speaks of "visitor culture" (297) and imagines our encounter with it along vaguely multi cultural lines (it may be only "apparently superior"; we will come to understand "its truth" by understanding its "weaknesses" as well as its "strengths"), **it is es sential to remember that the "visitors" he has in mind are not merely foreigner**s. 4 Walter Strieber does produce **the familiar nativist gesture of imagining himself a Native American, the "flower" of his "culture" crushed by "Cortez"-like invaders but the vanishing race for which he is proleptically nostalgic** is, like Greg Bear's, human rather than American. It would only make sense to **understand Communion's aliens as relevant to the question of American identity if we were to understand them as allegories of the aliens threatening American identity. Insofar, however, as the apparatus of the allegory requires the redescription of differences between humans as differences between humans and others, it has the effect of establish ing the human as an internally undifferentiated category and thus of making the designation of some humans as American irrelevant.** In Communion and Blood Music**, the emergence of "racial memory," of a history made almost literally universal, unites us all.** So the technologies of memory imagined in Blood Music and Communion provide an image, but only a partial image, of what is required by Schlesinger's invocation of history as memory. **If the obvious objection to thinking of history as a kind of memory is that things we are said to remember are things that we did or experienced whereas things that are said to have taken place in the histori cal past tend to be things that were neither done nor experienced by us**, Blood Music and Communion imagine ways in which history can be turned into mem ory. But they don't meet Schlesinger's requirement that this history be national. Which is to say that they don't deploy the transformation of history into memory on behalf of the constitution of identity; in Communion, the remembered past is merely a testament to the visitors' persistence; in Blood Music, **the moment in which the past can be remembered actually marks the disappearance of national ity**. It is instead in a much more important and influential text of 1987, Toni Morrison's Beloved, that Schlesinger's identification of memory, history and national identity is given a definitive articulation. And this is true despite the fact that Beloved, according to Morrison, is a story about something no one wants to remember: "

The Alternative creates a new violence universal framework from which people understand history = the Truth of history is key for liberation and political mobility

**Michaels, 96**

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If, in other words**, the minimal condition of the historian's activity is an in terest in the past as an object of study**, Stephen Greenblatt's account of the ori gins of his vocation?"I began with the desire to speak with the dead"?and of the nature of that vocation?"literature professors are salaried, middle-class sha mans" (1)?**both insist on a relation to the past** (he calls it a "link**") that goes beyond that minimal condition, and beyond also** (it's this going beyond that the model of the shaman is meant to indicate**) various standard accounts of the con tinuity between past and present. Greenblatt is not**, that is**, interested in the kind of continuity offered by the claim that events in the past have caused conditions in the present or in the kind of continuity imagined in the idea that the past is enough like the present that we might learn from the past things that are useful in the present.3 Indeed, the interest proclaimed here has almost nothing to do with taking the past as an object of knowledge?what he wants is to speak with the dead, "to re-create a conversation with them," not to find out or explain what they did.** And although he himself proclaims this ambition a failed one, from the standpoint of the heightened continuity that the new historicism requires, the terms of failure are even more satisfying than success would be: "Even when I came to understand that in my most intense moments of straining to listen all I could here was my own voice, even then I did not abandon my desire. It was true that I could hear only my own voice, but my own voice was the voice of the dead . . ." (1). **If what you want is a "link" with the dead that is better achieved by speaking with them than by studying them** (which is achieved, that is to say, by understanding studying them as a way of speaking with them), **then the dis covery that what one hears when one hears the dead speak is actually the sound of one's "own voice" can't really count as a disappointment**. "My own voice was the voice of the dead"; the link envisioned in conversation is only made stronger by the discovery that the conversation is with oneself. For both Morrison and Greenblatt, then, history involves the effort to make the past present, and the ghosts of Beloved and Shakespearean Negotiations are the figures for this effort, the transformation of history into memory, the de ployment of history in the constitution of identity. **If**, then**, we ask** a slightly re vised version of **the question whether the Americans believe their myths?which myths do the Americans believe??the answer turns out to be not visitors, not blood transfusions, not biological races, not even exactly history as such but his tory as memory**. To put the point in this way is no longer to say with Veyne **that the difference between myth and history is erased insofar as the truths of both myth and history are revealed as truths constituted by the imagination. For al though this idealism is, as we all know, widespread today, and although it does succeed in establishing, at least by the back door** (we don't get our identity from history, history gets its identity from us), **the desired link between past and pres ent, the fact that that link must be imposed on the past before it can be derived from it makes it less promising as a ground of identity?if we create our history then any history might be made ours. So what makes our commitment to history a commitment to myth is not our sense that the history we learn is true in** (and only in) **the same way that the Greeks thought their myths were true; what makes our history mythological is not our sense that it is constituted but our sense that it is remembered and, when it is not remembered, forgotten**.4 **Without the idea of a history that is remembered or forgotten** (not merely learned or unlearned), **the events of the past can have only a limited relevance to the present, providing us at most with causal accounts of how things have come to be the way they are, at least with objects of antiquarian interest. It is only when it's reimagined as the fabric of our own experience that the past can be come the key to our own identity. A history that is learned can be learned by anyone** (and can belong to anyone who learns it**); a history that is remembered can only be remembered by those who first experienced it and it must belong to them. So if history were learned not remembered, then no history could be more truly ours than any other. Indeed, no history, except the things that had actually happened to us, would be truly ours at all. This is why the ghosts of the new historicism are not simply figures for his tory, they are figures for a remembered history. But this is also why there is a problem in thinking about these ghosts as figures**. For without the ghosts to function as partners in conversation rather than objects of study**, without rememories that allow "you who never was there" (36) access to experiences otherwise available to "only those who" were there, history can no more be remembered than it can be forgotten. The ghosts cannot, in other words, be explained as metaphoric representations of the importance to us of our history because the history cannot count as ours and thus can have no particular importance to us without the ghosts. It is only when the events of the past can be imagined not only to have consequences for the present but to live on in the present that they can become part of our experience and can testify to who we are. So the ghosts are not merely the figures for history as memory, they are the technology for his tory as memory ?to have the history, we have to have the ghosts. Remembered history is not merely described or represented by the ghosts who make the past Continuity is turned into identity. You who neve ours, it is made possible by them**. Beloved's ghosts are thus as essential to its historicism as Communion's visitors are to its New Age mysticism; indeed, Be loved's historicism is nothing but the racialized and, hence, authorized version of Communion's mysticism. Without the visitors, the remains of UFOs are just fragments of old weather balloons; without the ghosts, history is just a subject we study.5 It is only accounts like Sethe's of how other people's memories can be come our own that provide the apparatus through which **our history can**, as Ar thur Schlesinger puts it, **define our identity.**

**A refusal to look back on history leads for horrific events like the Holocaust to be trivialized**

**Michaels, 96**

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Indeed, there is, precisely from this perspective**, a certain hostility to the idea that the Holocaust is the sort of thing that can be known**. Claude Lanz mann, the maker of Shoah, has insisted that "the purpose of Shoah is not to transmit knowledge" and has instead characterized the film as "an incarnation, a resurrection" (quoted in Felman, 213-14), thus identifying the ambitions of Shoah in terms that we may understand as characteristically **New Historicist: the incar nated dead are the ones with whom Stephen Greenblatt wishes to speak. But where, in the New Historicism, understanding the past is at worst an irrelevance and, at best, an aid to remembering it, understanding the Holocaust seems to Lanzmann an "absolute obscenity" and to try to "learn the Holocaust" is, in fact, to "forget" it** ("Seminar" 85). **The representations and explanations of historians, he thinks, are "a way of escaping," "a way not to face the horror"** ("Obscenity" 481**); what the Holocaust requires is a way of transmitting not the normalizing knowledge of the horror but the horror itself. And it is this "transmission"**?what Shoshana Felman calls "testimony"?that the film Shoah strives for and that, according to Felman, is the project of the major literary and theoretical texts of the post-World War Two period. **But how can texts transmit rather than merely represent "horror?**" How, as Felman puts it, can "the act of reading literary texts" be "related to the act of fac ing horror?" (2) If it could, then, of course, reading would become a form of wit nessing. **But it is one thing, it seems, to experience horror and another thing to read about it; the person who reads about it is dealing not with the experience of horror but with a representation of that experience**. And **Felman has no wish to deny this difference; on the contrary, she wishes to insist upon it and it is out of her insistence that she produces her contribution to the theory of testimony. For when testimony is "simply relayed, repeated or reported,**" she argues**, it "loses its function as a testimony" (3). So in order for testimony to avoid losing its proper function, it must be "performative**" (5); **it must "accomplish a speech act" rather than simply "formulate a statement." Its subject matter must be "enacted" rather than reported or represented. The problem of testimony is thus fundamentally a problem about "the relation between language and events"** (16). **Language that represents or reports events will fail as testimony, will fail, that is, to be properly "performative" or "literary." Language that is itself an "act" and that therefore can be said to "enact" rather than report events will succeed. The reader of the "performative" text will be in the position not of someone who reads about the "horror" and understands it; he or she will be in the position of "facing horror."** But how can a text achieve the performative? **How can a text cease merely to represent an act and instead become the act it no longer represents**? The idea of the performative is, of course, drawn from Austin's speech act theory, where it is famously instantiated in the marriage ceremony: "When I say, before the regis trar or altar, etc., T do,' I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it" (6). Austin's opposition between reporting and indulging anticipates (in a differ ent key) Felman's opposition between reporting and enacting.

Faliure to look back on the Holocaust causes a replication of events and mass genocide

**Michaels, 96**

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This anti-essentialist Jewishness is disarticulated from the idea of a Jewish race and also, albeit less sharply, from the idea of a Jewish religion. Many of those who think of themselves as Jews do not think that they are Jews because they have Jewish blood and are, in fact, skeptical of the very idea of Jewish blood. For them**, as for many members of other races** (so-called), **cultural inher itance takes the place of biological inheritance. And many of those who think of themselves as Jews do not think that they are Jews because they believe in Juda ism. But by redescribing certain practices that might be called religious** (circum cision, for example**) as cultural, Jewishness can sever their connection to Judaism. Thus, Jews can give up the belief in Jewish blood and give up the belief in a Jewish God; what they can't give up is Jewish culture. Hence the significance of the Holocaust and of the widespread insistence that Jews remember it and hence the importance of the idea that "understanding" the Holocaust is a kind of "obscenity." For the prohibition against understanding the Holocaust is at the same You who never was there" 13 and this requirement?fulfillable through technologies like the deconstructive per formative?makes it possible to define the Jew not as someone who has Jewish blood or who believes in Judaism but as someone who, having experienced the Holocaust, can?even if he or she was never there?acknowledge it as part of his or her history. And just as remembering the Holocaust is now understood as the key to preserving Jewish cultural identity, the Holocaust itself is now retrospectively re configured as an assault on Jewish cultural identity.** "The commanding voice at Auschwitz," Lionel Rubinoff writes, "decrees that Jews may not respond to Hit ler's attempt to destroy totally Judaism by themselves cooperating in that destruc tion. In ancient times, the unthinkable Jewish sin was idolatry. Today, it is to re spond to Hitler by doing his work" (150). Jews who might today be understood to be doing Hitler's work are not, of course, murdering other Jews, which is to say that Hitler's work, the destruction of Judaism, is understood here as only in cidentally the murder of Jews. Rather, the Jews who today do Hitler's work are Jews who "survive" as people but not "as Jews" (136**); they stop thinking of themselves as Jews, they refuse the "stubborn persistence" in their "Jewishness**" that is required by Rubinoff as the mark of resistance to Hitler. **What this means is that the concept of "cultural genocide," introduced in analogy to the genocide of the Holocaust, now begins to replace that genocide and to become the Holo caust. "A culture is the most valuable thing we have**" ("Custodians" 122), says the philosopher Eddy M. Zemach, and this commitment to the value of culture requires that the Holocaust be rewritten as an attack on culture. Thus the "Juda ism" that Hitler wanted to destroy ceases to be a group of people who had what he thought of as "Jewish blood" and becomes instead a set of beliefs and prac tices, and the Hitler who in fact "opened almost every discussion on Jewish mat ters with the assertion that the Jews are not primarily a religious community but a race" (Gutman 359) is now reimagined as a Hitler who wished above all to de stroy Jewish religion and culture. From this standpoint Hitler becomes an oppo nent of cultural diversity and those Jews who have, as Zemach puts it, "lost the will to retain their culture" (129) become not only his victims but his collabora tors. They do his work by assimilating, and insofar as, according to Zemach, **American Jews in particular are abandoning their culture, what Jews now con front is the threat of a second Holocaust: if American Jews give up their Jewish ness, Jews "will have lost the greatest and most advanced part of their people" "for the second time this century" (129). This revaluation of assimilation as Holocaust**

Aff – Global Good

We have a moral obligation to the global community, where we were born and where we live are all just accidents.

Nussbaum, 94 – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” The Boston Review,  [www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan /nussbaum1.html](http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan%20/nussbaum1.html))

<Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect. >

Working global allows us to have self-knowledge, solve our problems better, and allows us to recognize the value of each and every person

Nussbaum, 94 – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” The Boston Review,  [www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan /nussbaum1.html](http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan%20/nussbaum1.html))

<Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, they hold that the study of humanity as it is realized in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other reasonable people. Second, they argue, as does Tagore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this way. No theme is deeper in Stoicism than the damage done by faction and local allegiances to the political life of a group. Political deliberation, they argue, is sabotaged again and again by partisan loyalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Only by making our fundamental allegiance that to the world community of justice and reason do we avoid these dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou politês is intrinsically valuable. For it recognizes in persons what is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning in this connection. This aspect may be less colorful than local or national traditions and identities -- and it is on this basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns it in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to see as superficial; it is, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.>

Aff – Astropolitics

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

The primary problem for those advancing Astropolitik is that space is not a lawless frontier. In fact the legal character of space has long been enshrined in the principles of the OST and this has, to some extent, prevented it from being subject to unbridled interstate competition. ‘While it is morally desirable to explore space in common with all peoples’ writes Dolman without conviction ‘even the thought of doing so makes weary those who have the means’ (Dolman 2002: 135). Thus, the veneer of transcendent humanism with regard to space gives way to brazen self-interest. Accordingly, Dolman describes the rescommunis consensus of the OST as ‘a tragedy’ that has removed any legal incentive for the exploitation of space (137). Only a res nullius legal order could construct space as ‘proper objects for which states may compete’ (138). Under the paradigm of res nullius and Astropolitik, the moon and other celestial bodies would become potential new territory for states. And here Dolman again parallels

Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik. Just as Hausofer desired a break from the Versailles Treaty (Ó Tuathail 1996: 45), Dolman wants to see the US withdraw from the OST, making full speed ahead for the Moon (see also Hickman and Dolman 2002). Non-space-faring developing countries need not worry about losing out, says Dolman, as they ‘would own no less of the Moon than they do now’ (140). To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonise space. They will be ‘highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fit’; ‘the best and brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists’; ‘rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions’ (26). In other words, ‘they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they spring’ (27). As if this picture isn’t vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space ‘will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia … so aptly illustrate[s])’ (27; my emphasis). ‘Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals’ (27). Society, he continues, must be prepared ‘to make heroes’ of those who undertake the risk of exploration (146). At the same time, ‘the astropolitical society must be repared to forego expenditures on social programs … to channel funds into the national space program. It must be embued with the national spirit’ (146).Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a ‘logical’ outworking of Astropolitik, to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy. Along the way, he acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the state from its citizenry: ‘the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space’. Although Dolman claims that ‘no attempt will be made to create a convincing argument that the United States has a right to domination in space’, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue ‘that, in this case, might does make right’, ‘the persuasiveness of the case’ being ‘based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the system’ (156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. And if it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure us with his belief that ‘the US form of liberal democracy … is admirable and socially encompassing’ (156) and it is ‘the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world’ (158). His sunny view that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as in various other ‘spaces of exception’ (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben, 2005).

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]

Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15). It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman, 2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section, I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (e.g. Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground. the Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning classical geopolitics in the new garb of ‘astropolitics’; he goes further and proposes an ‘Astropolitik’ – ‘a simple but effective blueprint for space control’ (p. 9) – modeled on Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik. Showing some discomfort with the impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory, Dolman cautions against the ‘misuse’ of Astropolitik and argues that the term ‘is chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the future’ (Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however, his book is basically a manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinder’s famous thesis on the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman argues that ‘who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind’. Dolman sees the quest for space as already having followed classically Mackinderian principles (Dolman, 2002: 87). And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire. ‘Astropolitik like Realpolitik’ he writes, ‘is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is it evil. Its benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by whom’ (Dolman, 2002: 4). Further inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Sea power Upon History, has been widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell, 2006). Mahan’s discussion of the strategic value of coasts, harbours, well–worn sea paths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The implication of Mahan’s work, Dolman concludes, is that ‘the United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do so’ (Dolman, 2002: 37).

Aff – Helium 3

Frontier rhetoric is key to solving all impacts for Helium 3

Stout in ‘10

(Mark, writer for Air University, The Wright Stuff, “Space: Think *Frontier*, Not *Commons*, MDA)

Pertaining to items 3 and 4, although space-based telecommunications and other space services are valuable to society and are capable of providing returns to investors, these pale in comparison to the potential for space-based solar power or Helium-3 mined from the Moon’s soil.  However, the promise of these two important energy sources is unlikely to ever be developed unless we reframe our thinking and start looking at space as a frontier to be developed and less as a sanctuary to be preserved.

Aff – Imperialism No Link

Describing an empire as a powerful state is flawed: it allows for too broad of a spectrum.

Motyl 6 (Alexander J., Prof of Poli-Sci at Rutgers Univ, Foreign Affairs, “Empire Falls”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61764/alexander-j-motyl/empire-falls>, p. 1-2) MAT

There is thus no avoiding the definitional question that bedevils all such discussions. One common mistake is to conflate empire and imperialism, even though the first is a type of polity and the second is a type of policy. The distinction gets lost in Jack Snyder's argument, in the SSRC volume, that overexpansion destabilizes the states that practice it. Such a statement is plausible, but why is it a lesson of empire? Overexpansion, after all, is not usually a weakness of established empires, which are exceptionally durable and not necessarily expansionist. Another mistake is to think of empires simply as "big multinational states." But by this definition, the category would have to include Canada. "Big and powerful multinational states" is better, but still too broad, as it would have to include India. Even "great power" does not work, because some empires, such as that of the Hapsburgs, were not terribly strong and because many great powers lack the structural features of empires. Many scholars agree that empires should be defined as polities with a peculiar kind of relationship between a dominant "core" and subordinate and distinctive "peripheries." The core is not simply larger or more powerful than the peripheries, nor does it simply influence them in some heavy-handed manner. It actually rules them, either directly or indirectly, through local surrogates. No less important is the absence of significant relations between or among peripheries. In empires, the peripheries almost exclusively interact through the core. The resulting arrangement resembles a rimless wheel, consisting of a hub and spokes. The idea of all roads leading to Rome accurately describes the imperial structure.

Aff – Imperialism Good

An imperialist hegemon in society is a necessity, without it our world would see civilization reduce itself to anarchic and barbaric ways of life

Ferguson 4 (Niall, Prof of History at NYU Stern, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power>) MAT

Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world—and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new rivals. “[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century,” contends Mearsheimer. “[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead.” China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too has the potential to become “a formidable rival.” Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipolarity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers—whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states—they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

History proves that any future without a dominant expansionist nation acting within global society spurs on a world in which chaos and discontinuity pervades all parts of the globe

Ferguson 4

(Niall, Prof of History at NYU Stern, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power>) MAT

Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservative hubris is humbled in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal, going from empire to decolonization in less than two years. Suppose also that no aspiring rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums—not only in coping with Iraq but conceivably also Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The nearest approximation in modern times could be the 1920s, when the United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security centered on the League of Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 1922. And by 1936, German revanche was already far advanced. One must go back much further in history to find a period of true and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries. In this era, the remains of the Roman Empire—Rome and Byzantium—receded from the height of their power. The leadership of the West was divided between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who divided up his short-lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was dealing with the Bulgar rebellion to the north. By 900, the Abbasid caliphate initially established by Abu al-Abbas in 750 had passed its peak; it was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T'ang and Sung dynasties. Both these empires had splendid capitals—Baghdad and Ch'ang-an—but neither had serious aspirations of territorial expansion. The weakness of the old empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 957 when she converted to the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks—forebears of the Ottoman Turks—carved the Sultanate of Rum as the Abbasid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections between these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition was the antithesis of globalization. It was a world broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations. One feature of the age was that, in the absence of strong secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, religious institutions often set the political agenda. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema (clerics) who truly ruled. This atmosphere helps explain why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 1095. Yet, this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just another example of the apolar world's susceptibility to long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the ninth century—Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, to name just two. One Frankish chronicler lamented “the endless flood of Vikings” sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed “no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring sea … destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small, defensible, political units: the Venetian republic—the quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy by 840—or Alfred the Great's England, arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886.

Imperialism is an undeniable good – our evidence is comparative

Kurtz, in 03

Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, ’03 (Stanley, April/May, “Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3449176.html)

Our commitment to political autonomy sets up a moral paradox. Even the mildest imperialism will be experienced by many as a humiliation. Yet imperialism as the midwife of democratic self-rule is an undeniable good. Liberal imperialism is thus a moral and logical scandal, a simultaneous denial and affirmation of self-rule that is impossible either to fully accept or repudiate. The counterfactual offers a way out. If democracy did not depend on colonialism, we could confidently forswear empire. But in contrast to early modern colonial history, we do know the answer to the counterfactual in the case of Iraq. After many decades of independence, there is still no democracy in Iraq. Those who attribute this fact to American policy are not persuasive, since autocracy is pervasive in the Arab world, and since America has encouraged and accepted democracies in many other regions. So the reality of Iraqi dictatorship tilts an admittedly precarious moral balance in favor of liberal imperialism.

Aff – West is Best

US intervention is critical to world peace – there is no substitute

Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, ‘03 (Jean Bethke, “Just War Against Terrorism” pg. 169)

The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not require that the United States remain on hair-trigger alert at every moment. But it does oblige the United States to evaluate all claims and to make a determination as to whether it can intervene effectively and in a way that does more good than harm—with the primary objective of interdiction so that democratic civil society can be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort visible in Rwanda, in Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to Americans by some of our European critics. At this point in time the possibility of international peace and stability premised on equal regard for all rests largely, though not exclusively, on American power. Many persons and powers do not like this fact, but it is inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, the "most carefree and confident empire in history now grimly confronts the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9 Furthermore, America's fate is tied inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the world. If large pockets of the globe start to go bad—here, there, everywhere (the infamous "failed state" syndrome)—the drain on American power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be borne.

Cultural imperialism is best – recognizing the superiority of Western values is key to human survival

Tracinski, editor and publisher of The Intellectual Activist and TIADaily and formed member of the Ayn Rand Institute, ’01 (Robert, October 8, “An Empire of Ideals” [**http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7392&news\_iv\_ctrl=1076**](http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7392&news_iv_ctrl=1076))

The long-term answer--the only means by which we can eventually secure world peace--is cultural imperialism. Everyone has finally awakened to the deadly threat posed by terrorism, and some are even willing to admit that the source of this threat is Islamic fundamentalism. But almost no one is prepared to name the long-term answer to that threat. The long-term answer--the only means by which we can eventually secure world peace--is cultural imperialism. "Cultural imperialism" is not exactly the right term. That is a smear-tag created by the academic left, which hates everything good about Western culture and tries to dismiss that culture's worldwide popularity by blaming it on some kind of coercive conspiracy. The same purpose is served by another leftist smear-tag, "cultural genocide," which sounds like mass-murder but actually refers to people in the Third World choosing to adopt Western manners and attitudes, the poor things. The inventors of these smears are the same people who clamor for a "multicultural" society, ostensibly a society that tolerates many different cultural influences--except, of course, any influence coming from the West. The real phenomenon that the phrase "cultural imperialism" refers to is the voluntary adoption of ideas, art and entertainment produced in civilized countries. It refers to the most benevolent kind of "empire" that could be imagined: an empire of common ideals and attitudes; an empire spread purely by voluntary persuasion; an empire whose "conquest" consists of bringing the benefits of civilization to backward regions. Western "cultural imperialism" is the march of progress across the globe. But woe unto he who suggests that Western culture might be worth spreading. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi learned this when he stated that: "We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights and--in contrast with Islamic countries--respect for religious and political rights." The reaction was immediate and fierce. The Belgian prime minister scolded that Berlusconi's remarks could have "dangerous consequences." Gosh, they might cause us to overthrow Middle Eastern dictatorships! The head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, immediately denounced Berlusconi's statements as "racist"--an accusation which itself equates race with culture, as if Arabs are biologically determined to embrace theocracy. Ironically, Moussa got this idea from the West--that is, from our own hordes of anti-Western intellectuals. One such intellectual expressed the prevailing dogma perfectly: "one cannot speak of the superiority of one culture over another." What no one challenged, however, was Berlusconi's factual description of the values held by the West versus those held by the Islamic world. Nearly every country in the Middle East is a dictatorship. These countries are wracked with the chronic poverty bred by dictatorship--with the exception of the rulers, who pocket money from oil reserves discovered, drilled and made valuable by Western technology. All of these countries are overrun--or are on the verge of being overrun--by religious fanatics who ruthlessly suppress any manifestation of the pursuit of happiness in this world, from baring one's ankles to watching television. We broadcast to these oppressed people the Western message of liberty, prosperity and happiness--in forms as low-brow as Baywatch or as sophisticated as the Declaration of Independence. This is the "imperialism" that terrifies Islamic fundamentalists. They should be terrified--because they know that in a fair competition, their values cannot win. On the one side, there are the Western values of intellectual freedom, science, prosperity, individual rights and the pursuit of happiness. On the other side, there are the centuries-old scourges of theocracy, superstition, poverty, dictatorship and mass-murder. Is one of these alternatives superior to the other? You bet your life it is. We must begin a campaign of education designed to export Western values to the barbarous East--and that campaign must be led by our intellectuals, not denounced by them. This war must be fought with televisions, radios, books and movies--and by the intransigently pro-Western statements of our political and intellectual leaders. This is a battle between opposite and irreconcilable cultures, and if we want to survive, we must begin with the conviction that our culture deserves to win. A physical war against terrorist states--a war fought with bombs, rockets and guns against the governments that support terrorism--has now become a necessity. But that battle is only a first step. In the long run, we can only stop the re-emergence of new Islamic fanatics by disinfecting the cultural miasma in which they breed. And light, the light of benevolent Western ideals, is the best disinfectant.

**West good: not perfect, but comparatively better for happiness and freedom. Even if they win their framework of being intellectuals, we must celebrate and teach Western values in this debate round for Western civilization to survive**

**Kors, ’01** – Prof history @ U Penn (Summer 2001, Alan, American Foreign Relations, “America and the West: Triumph Without Self Belief”, pg. 354-355)

The fruits of that civilization have been an unprecedented ability to modify the remediable causes of human suffering, to give great agency to utility and charity alike; to give to each individual a degree of choice and freedom unparalleled in ail of human history; to offer a means of overcoming the station in life to which one was born by the effort of one's labor, mind, and will. A failure to understand and to teach that accomplishment would be its very betrayal. To the extent that Western civilization survives, then, the hope of the world survives to eradicate unnecessary suffering; to speak a language of human dignity, responsibility, and rights linked to a common reality: to minimize the depredations of the irrational, the unexamined, the merely prejudicial in our lives: to understand the world in which we find ourselves, and. moved by interest and charity, to apply that knowledge for good. The contest, then, is between the realists and the antirealists, and the triumph of the West ultimately depends on its outcome. The failure to assess the stakes of the struggle between the West and its communist adversary always came from either a pathological self-hatred of one's own world or at the least, from a gross undervaluation of what the West truly represented in the history of mankind. The West has altered the human relationship to nature from one of fatalistic helplessness to one of hopeful mastery. It has made possible a human life in which biological atavism, might be replaced by cultural value, the rule of law, individuation, and growing tolerance. It also created an intellectual class irrationally devoted to an adversarial stance. That adversarial view of the West, in the past generation at least, had become a neo-Gramscian and thus nee-Marxist one in which the West was seen as an unparalleled source of the arbitrary assignment of restrictive and life-stultifying roles. The enemies of the West—for some, in practice; for others, increasingly in the ideal—represented an active make-believe that supposedly cast grave doubt upon the West's claim of enhancing freedom, dignity, and opportunity. With the triumph of the West in reality, and with the celebration of Marxism and the Third World shown more and more to have been truly delusional, the adversarial intellectual class appears to be retreating into ideologies and philosophies that deny the very concept of reality itself. One sees this in the growing strength in the humanities and social sciences of critical theories that view all representations of the world as mere text and fiction. When the world of fact can be twisted to support this or that side of delusion (as in astrology or parapsychology'), pathology tries to appropriate what it can of the empirical. When the world of fact manifestly vitiates the very foundations of pathological delusion, then it is the claim of facticity or reality per se that must be denied. This is what we now may expect: the world having spoken, the intellectual class, the left academic wing of it above all, may appropriate a little postcommunist chaos to show how merely relative a moral good the defeat of Stalin's heirs has been. If it does so, however, it will assail the notion of reality itself. In Orwell's 1984, it was the mark of realistic, totalitarian power to make its subjects say that all truth was not objective but political—"a social construction,'' as intellectuals would say now—and that, in the specific case, 2 + 2 = 5. By 2004, making students in the humanities and social sciences grant the equivalent of 2 + 2 = 5 will be the goal of adversarial culture. They will urge that all logical—and, one should add, inferential—inductive truths from experience are arbitrary, mere social constructions. The West Has Indeed Sur ived—So Far The ramifications of that effort will dominate the central debates of the humanities in the generation to come. Until there is a celebration and moral accounting of the historical reality of "The Triumph of the West," that "triumph" will be ephemeral indeed. Academic culture has replaced the simplistic model that all culture was functional, a model that indeed could not account for massive discontents or revolutionary change, let alone for moral categories, by the yet more astonishing and absurd model that virtually all culture is dysfunctional. Whole disciplines now teach that propositions are to be judged by their therapeutic value rather than by their inductive link to evidence until, in the final analysis, feeling good about saying something determines the truth-value of what is said. Understanding human weakness, however, the West has always believed that it is precisely when we want to believe something self-gratifying that we must erect barriers of experiment, rigor, and analysis against our self-indulgence and our propensity for self-serving error. The human ability to learn from experience and nature, so slighted in current humanistic theory, is not merely an object of cultural transmission, let alone of social control, but an evolutionary triumph of the species, indeed, a triumph on which our future ultimately depends. There is nothing more desperate than helplessness, and there is no more inveterate cause of helplessness than the inability to affect and mitigate the traumas of our lives. If the role of both acquired knowledge and the transmission and emendation of the means of acquiring knowledge is only a "Western" concern, then it is a Western concern upon which human fate depends. In the current academic climate of indoctrination, tendentiousness, and fantasy, the independence of critical intellect and the willingness to learn open-mindedly from experience of a reality independent of the human will are the greatest hopes of our civilization. Has Western civilization survived? That is, has a human relationship to the world based upon the assumption of a knowable reality-, reason, and a transcendent value of human dignity and responsibility survived? Has a will to know oneself and the world objectively survived? Has a recognition of human depravity and the need to limit the power of men over men survived? I do not think that free men and women will abandon that hard-won shelter from chaos, ignorance, parochial tribalism, irrationalism, and, ultimately, helplessness. Has Western civilization survived, its principle of reality justified and intact? Yes, indeed, though it requires constant defense. The demand for perfection is antinomian, illogical, and empirically absurd. The triumph of the West is flawed but real. While everyone else around you weeps, recall Alexander Ushakov and celebrate the fall of the Soviet threat as he celebrated the fall of Grenada. Then recall how everything depends on realism in our understanding, and rejoin the intellectual struggle.

**Past violence shouldn’t prevent action to stop violence now**

**Gitlin, 2005** (Todd, Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Columbia University, “The Intellectuals and the Flag”, Columbia University Press, 11/11, 137)

Indeed, the United States does not have clean hands. We are living in tragedy, not melodrama. Recognizing the complex chains of cause and effect that produce a catastrophe is defensible, indeed necessary—up to a point. If only history could be restarted at one pivotal juncture or another! That would be excellent. **But the past is what it is, and the killers are who they are. Moral responsibility can never be denied** the ones who pull the triggers, wield the knives, push the buttons. **And now that fanatical Islamists are at work in real time, whatever causes spurred them, the question remains: what should the United States do about thousands of actual and potential present-day killers** who set no limits to what and whom they would destroy? The question is stark and unblinkable. When a cause produces effects and the effects are lethal, the effects have to be stopped—the citizens have a right to expect that of their government. To say, as did many who opposed an invasion of Afghanistan, that the terror attacks should be considered crimes, not acts of war, yet without proposing an effective means of punishing and preventing such crimes, is useless—and tantamount to washing one’s hands of the matter. But for taking security seriously in the here and now, and thinking about how to defeat the jihadists, the fundamentalist left had little time, little interest, little hard-headed curiosity— as little as the all-or-nothing theology that justified war against any “evildoers” decreed to be such by the forces of good.

Western export of ideals is an unavoidable moral duty

Rorty, deceased as of June 8, 2007 and Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University, described as the reincarnation of Jesus Christ, ’99 (Richard, February 5, “The Communitarian Impulse” Colorado College's 125th Anniversary Symposium, Cultures in the 21st Century: Conflicts and Convergences, [**http://www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/anniversary/Transcripts/RortyTXT.htm**](http://www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/anniversary/Transcripts/RortyTXT.htm))

Maybe someday there will be non-Westerners who turn down Western anesthetics on cultural grounds. Baffling as we may find that refusal, we will not force aspirin down their throat. Maybe someday there will be non-Western fighters against injustice, defenders of the weak against the strong, who turn down free elections, a free press, free universities and the like, on cultural grounds. But until some such people turn up, it is a waste of time for us to worry about whether we’re practicing cultural imperialism by doing our best to export these devices. As long as there are persecuted dissidents who think that Western devices are the only way to break the power of the local oligarchs, Western governments should continue doing everything they can to keep those dissidents out of jail, in the news, and on the Net. Ceasing to try to get dissidents out of jail, like ceasing to fly in planeloads of anesthetics, would mean that the West had become just a moneymaking enterprise. All we would be able to leave our children would be money. On the other hand, the West should try to export only that portion of its own culture which gives people in the non-West a chance to choose a different culture or to reconstruct their own. Whether we export capitalism or Coca-Cola™ or Hollywood movies is optional; whether we export democratic institutions is not. Exporting these institutions is a duty we Westerners cannot avoid any more than we can avoid our duty to export anesthetics and to stop exporting automatic rifles and jet bombers. This is not because such initiatives are dictated by transcultural human reason—in my view there is no such thing as transcultural human reason—it’s because we Westerners have talked ourselves into being the kind of people who cannot live with themselves if we neglect those duties. My reference to choosing a different culture may give rise to objections. It will certainly do so if it suggests a naked, not yet acculturated, Sartrian will making a choice behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. But that’s not the picture I have in mind. I’m happy to grant to the communitarians that the difference between abnormality and humanity is acculturation. Yet once a person has been created by acculturation, the result is someone who can say to herself, "The culture which made me what I am turns out to be inferior in the following specific respects to the culture I’ve been reading about or seeing on television." She is in a position to pick and choose elements from various cultural traditions, using the tools of her home culture to grasp the limitations of that very culture. Some cultures, of course, make this kind of criticism harder than others. We call a culture primitive just in so far as persons acculturated in it find such critical reflection difficult. We call a culture advanced just in so far as people raised within are articulate and reflective enough to make intercultural comparisons without much strain.

**Universal Western values are the best – the alternative prevents response to atrocities and makes oppression inevitable**

**Hanson, 2004** (Victor Davis, Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, City Journal, Spring, <http://www.city-journal.org/html/14_2_the_fruits.html>)

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of **anti-Americanism** that **thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s**. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. **Communism’s demise** likewise **freed these trendy ideologies** from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus **they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better**, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), **there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery** in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic **racism and** the legacy of **colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. There was victim status for everybody,** from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. **Anyone could play in these “area studies” that cobbled together** the barrio, the West Bank, and the “freedom fighter” into some sloppy global union of the oppressed—a far hipper enterprise than rehashing *Das Kapital* or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel. Of course, **pampered Western intellectuals** since Diderot **have always dreamed up a “noble savage,” who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization**. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better world—whether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo. **An Ayatollah** Khomeini **who turned back the clock on female emancipation** in Iran, **who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals** nevertheless **seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable** to the Shah—a Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own. Yet in the new world of utopian multiculturalism and knee-jerk anti-Americanism, in which a Noam Chomsky could proclaim Khomeini’s gulag to be “independent nationalism,” reasoned argument was futile. Indeed, **how could critical debate arise for those “committed to social change,” when no universal standards were to be applied to those outside the West**? Thanks to the doctrine of cultural relativism, “oppressed” peoples either could not be judged by our biased and “constructed” values (“false universals,” in Edward Said’s infamous term) or were seen as more pristine than ourselves, uncorrupted by the evils of Western capitalism. Who were we to gainsay Khomeini’s butchery and oppression? We had no way of understanding the nuances of his new liberationist and “nationalist” Islam. Now back in the hands of indigenous peoples, Iran might offer the world an alternate path, a different “discourse” about how to organize a society that emphasized native values (of some sort) over mere profit. **S**o at precisely the time of these increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, **the silly gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments** about the relative value of different cultures. And **if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elites**—coupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World roguery—**explained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans**, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more. This nonjudgmentalism—essentially a form of nihilism—deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely “different” rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make “value judgments” about “other” peoples who are often “victims” of American “oppression.” Thus, **before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said** or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, **they would** more likely **have excused him as a victim of globalization** or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta’s promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

Aff – Epistemology Fails

Privileging concepts like epistemology hides flaws in postmodern approaches to international relations. Their authors prefer dogmatic faith over critical investigation.

Jarvis 2000

(Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 138)

First, I must acknowledge that any theoretical critique of Ashley’s project, including this one, is destined to failure, at least in its ability to affect the course of debate within postmodernism. This problem is not endemic to the nature of the critique(s), but reflects the fact that postmodern theory is as much driven by ideological commitment as by theoretical innovation. Moreover, within international relations theory the postmodernist perspective exists independently of contending approaches, hermetically isolated if only because of its specialized nomenclature and distinctive ideological hue that encloses participants in a select and self-absorbed theoretical-ideological discourse. Membership to this discourse is exclusive and limited to those who promise to take up the faith and propagate it, not question it critically. Thus, regardless of how erudite critiques migh be, or how serendipitous critical analysis proves, we can scarcely expect Ashley to be convinced by intellectual mustings when they are contrary to his political ambitions. For in Ashley’s writings we are confronted as much by ideological intransigence as we debate over ontological and epistemological issues. The postmodernist/modernist divide is more ideological than theoretical, a battle not between contending ontologies so much as between political loyalties. The façade of ontological and epistemological debate has thus been used deceptively to shield the underlying ideological axis upon which these debates ultimately rest. For this reason, we should not be surprised that postmodernists remain unconvinced by modernist theory, or vice versa, or that each is largely uninterested in the others perspective, theory, or arguments. Those views, theories, or paradigms not in accord with one’s own worldview or basic values are rarely considered, let alone studied. And while Ashley would have us believe that these failings are the exclusive prsever of modernist/positivist theory, postmodernist theory too is just as guilty, having evolved in isolation, cocooned by technical nomenclature, reticent to engage contending perspectives in useful dialogue, and trigger happy in rejecting opposing perspectives without first understanding them.

Reforming the state is a strategic necessity – non-state alternatives will either be crushed by the state or result in less accountable tyrannies

Chomsky 1998

(Noam, Professor of Linguistics at MIT. The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian, p. 84-85)

So Argentina is “minimizing the state”—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn’t popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you’re simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is “expanding the floor of the cage.” They understand that they’re trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it’s under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they’re so vulnerable, they’ll get murdered. That’s something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don’t understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we’re not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

Aff – Western Science Good

Their kritik of science sweeps the rug out from under anti-colonial movements attempting to use science to counter domination and violence—it ends up validating all non-Western views, including reactionary, nationalist, and oppressive

Nanda, Phil of Science @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, 1997

(Meera, “Against social destruction of science: cautionary tales from the third world”, Monthly Review, March

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_n10\_v48/ai\_19344899/)

One of the most remarkable - and the least remarked upon - features of **the "radical" movement engaged in deconstructing natural science** is how it **ends up denying the unity (i.e., universality) of truth, reason, reality, and science precisely in the name of those who need these unities most urgently - the "people resisting despotism and its lies." This includes those of us from non-Western societies fighting against the despotism of some of our own cultural traditions, and the untested and untestable cosmologies that are used to justify these traditions.** A loose and varied assortment of theories that bear the label of social constructivism have declared the very content of modern natural science to be justified, in the final instance, by "Western" cultural values and social interests. **Once modern science is seen not as a universally valid knowledge about the natural world, but as a particular or "ethno"-construct of Western society, it becomes easy to see science as a part of the imperialistic West's despotism, which the west's "Others" must resist in the name of cultural survival and anti-imperialism. Modern science thus becomes a despotism, an object of resistance rather than an ally of those resisting despotism.**My goal in this paper is to cast a critical look at these anti-realist and relativist views of "Western" science, which have gained wide currency in the postmodern academy; and I want to look at them from the perspective of the people's science movements in non-Western countries. These theories - unlike the Marxian idea of social mediation of knowledge with which they are often confused - have eroded the distinction between scientifically justified beliefs and folk beliefs and/or ideology. What has undermined these distinctions is the fundamental thesis of social constructivism which states that all beliefs alike are justified by the community consensus, which is itself based upon social power, rhetoric and custom. There is no objective truth about the real world which scientifically justified knowledge can aim toward, but rather all "truth" about "reality" is literally constructed out of choices between equally justifiable interpretations that a "thought collective" makes. These choices, in turn, are driven by the conscious and unconscious biases and interests of the members of any community of inquirers. Though varied in emphases and details, constructivist theorists agree that there simply is no truth, or even reality, that can transcend the local social context of inquiry. The "unities" of truth and reason that Ian Hacking speaks for (above), are treated in the constructivist discourse as remnants of the imperialistic impulse of the Enlightenment which sought to impose the West's own peculiar stories about truth and reality on the rest of the world. **Such a view of knowledge justifies itself in the name of cultural autonomy, tolerance, and respect for non-Western ways of knowing the world and living in it. But** I will argue that, **in actual practice, such "tolerance" has only ended up providing theoretical grounds for, and a progressive gloss on, the fast growing anti-modernist, nativist and cultural/religious revivalist movements in many parts of what used to be called the Third World. These movements seek to subordinate scientific rationality to local traditions, and thus are incapable of critically interrogating these same traditions, many of which are patently illiberal and oppressive to women and other marginalized groups in non-Western societies.** Almost in direct proportion to the rise of nativist anti-modernist social movements, which correspond with ascendance of social constructivist theories in the academy globally, many pans of the Third World have seen a decline and stigmatization of people's science movements. These people's science movements seek to appropriate the contents and methods of modern science in order to bring traditional knowledge under empirical scrutiny and critique. In the part of the Third World that I am most familiar with - my native India - people's science movements have come to be eclipsed by the highly visible and vocal transnational alliance that has emerged around the idea that modern science is Western, and that the non-West needs its non-Western "ethno"-sciences. Affirmed and emboldened by the most avant-garde intellectuals in the West and at home, these nativist movements tend to label any critique of traditional knowledge from the vantage point of modern science as a sign of Western imperialism, or worse, a hangover from the old, "discredited" and "Western" Enlightenment (although, interestingly, they continue to applaud the critique of "Western" science from the perspective of ethnosciences as anti-Eurocentric, and therefore progressive).(1) Indeed, I believe that the recent electoral success of the religious right (the BJP) in India has definitely benefited from the cultural climate in which even the supposedly Left-inclined intellectuals and activists tend to treat all liberal and modern ideas as "Western," inauthentic, and thus inappropriate for India. Thus I will try to show that **although the animus against the rationality of modern science is purportedly justified in the name of anti-imperialism and egalitarianism, its real beneficiaries are not the people but the nativists and nationalists of all stripes, religious or "merely" cultural/civilizational.**

Aff – Alternative Ignores Politics

**The alternative causes abandonment of the public sphere in favor of individualist intellectualizing cedes power to aggressive and reactionary elites that will cause extinction absent political engagement**

Carl **Boggs** (Los Angeles Campus Full Time Faculty Professor) **1997** “The Great Retreat”

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology ^ intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over- come alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved ^ perhaps even unrecognized ^ only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, ¢nance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impo- tence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today,Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num- bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites ^ an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise ^ or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

Aff – History Bad

The Alternative has it all wrong. By focusing on only the bad parts to western history the alternative prevents politics. The most violent wars happen between western countries, not done in the name of some frontier

**Simms 10** ( By BRENDAN SIMMS, APRIL 15, 2010. Mr. Simms, a professor of international relations at Cambridge University, is the author of "Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire." Remorse As a Way of Life Dwelling on the West's past sins is strangely narcissistic—debilitating, too.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 4052702304168004575178791674850652.html, DA” 6/26/11, CP)

**Over the years, historians and political scientists, studying the ways in which societies organize themselves, have come up with a range of categories to describe the state itself: the "feudal state," for instance, or the "garrison state," or, more recently, the "knowledge state." Properly applied, such labels can be a useful way of understanding the character of a nation or society at a particular historical moment.** In "The Tyranny of Guilt," the French novelist and philosopher Pascal Bruckner adds yet another variant: the "penitent state." **Its principal characteristic is an eagerness to apologize for the sins of colonialism and genocide and other Western crimes. The penitent state, by definition, is never an innocent victim of terrorist attack but a deserving one: It has, after all, provoked the wrath of the oppressed, either at home or abroad**. Mr. Bruckner cites literary figures, journalists and intellectuals throughout the Western world making the case that whatever punishments the West has been made to suffer—e.g., the horrors of 9/11—are merely well deserved. View Full Image .The Tyranny of Guilt By Pascal Bruckner Princeton, 239 pages, $26.95 .The problem with such self-flagellation, Mr. Bruckner notes, is not factual error. **On the contrary, the list of Western crimes, from slavery to genocide, is long. The problem is that a culture of remorse makes the justified, and necessary, criticism of non-Western crimes almost impossible. Serial human-rights abusers such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, or Sudan's Omar al-Bashir, are quick to cry hypocrisy, to good effect, when a Western government faults them for their undeniable acts of cruelty**. Mr. Bruckner observes **that while the crimes with which the West is charged are of a universal character—no society is without sin—the West's record of atoning for them is unique. "There is no doubt," he writes, "that Europe has given birth to monsters, but at the same time it has given birth to theories that make it possible to understand and destroy these monsters." He reminds us that the West's most destructive wars—against Nazism in 20th-century Europe, against slavery in 19th-century America—have been waged against other Westerners, not against hapless Africans or innocent Asians. The West, in Mr. Bruckner's felicitous phrase, is "like a jailer who throws you into prison and slips you the keys to your cell." Though Mr. Bruckner makes frequent references to Nazism and the Holocaust, he has little to say about the politics of remorse in present-day Germany. This is a pity, since the German case is a particularly good example, if not of the penitent state, then of the penitent state of mind.** As Bernhard Schlink observes in "Guilt About the Past," Germany first "repressed" the memory of Hitler and then became "fixated" by it. View Full Image .Guilt About the Past By Bernhard Schlink Anansi Press, 143 pages, $15.95 .Mr. Schlink is a German law professor best known for his novel "The Reader" (1995). In its film version, in 2008, Kate Winslet played the role of Hanna, a former concentration-camp guard with whom the teenage hero, Michael, falls in love. Mr. Schlink hardly refers to his novel in "Guilt About the Past," even though "The Reader" has been criticized for giving a human face to a perpetrator of Nazi crimes. In the chapter on literary representations of guilt, Mr. Schlink argues for the primacy of "telling the story" while conceding that "to tell a thrilling story can easily tempt one into tolerating someone else's hurt too easily**." He leaves the tension between these positions unresolved, and their implications for his own work unremarked. Most of "Guilt About the Past" is devoted to a scrupulous, if somewhat ponderous, study of the legal and cultural aspects of Germany's guilt after 1945. Mr. Schlink notes that German citizens were considered to be collectively, and continuously, guilty, even though fewer and fewer of them, over the years, were even of adult age at the time of the Nazi genocide against the Jews.** Luckily, Mr. Schlink's analysis is peppered with autobiographical vignettes that show how much the Nazi past came to be part of a struggle between the members of the 1968 generation and their parents. Mr. Schlink narrates an incident at Heidelberg University in 1970 when a law professor, himself a conformist during the Nazi period, became involved in a scuffle with students outraged at both his past and the way in which he sought to suppress their protests. Both Mr. Schlink and Mr. Bruckner believe that a**n obsession with guilt can easily become a disabling form of narcissism. "Fighting and winning yesterday's moral battles with bravery in one's min**d," Mr. Schlink writes, **"doesn't necessarily prepare one for today's moral conflicts." The patience of the NATO powers wore thin in the early 1990s, for instance, when they were told that their German ally could not participate in the effort to stop Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims. When the Berlin government eventually abandoned that position in 1994-95, joining NATO's campaign in Bosnia at last, it couched the decision in terms of the need to prevent "another Auschwitz," as if the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing was not enough in itself.** The French like to say that "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse": He who tries to justify himself incriminates himself. There is much in European history to confirm the adage. Reading Messrs. Bruckner and Schlink, one realizes that the opposite is true as well: "Qui s'accuse, s'excuse." **Westerners who fetishize their historical guilt may intend only to own up to past sins, but they often end up conveniently excusing themselves from taking responsibility for the future.**