2AC India Coop: Frontier K

**1. Our interpretation is that the negative gets to defend a competitive policy alternative**

1. **Predictability – there are millions of representations that we can’t predict – the resolution says USFG so we should debate that – predictability is key to fairness**
2. **Education – policy discussions foster better informed debate which is key to make real world decisions, such as responses to war or genocide.**

**2. Overview – Don’t let the negative convince you that their generic 1NC is proof that the 1AC is justification to explore the unknown. Through cooperation with India the aff is able to work multilaterally to ensure a sustainable peace. The intent of the plan to create a global consortium must be prioritized over an irrelevant claim of a flawed methodology. Only way to institute change is the plan.**

Chomsky 1998 (Noam, Professor of Linguistics at MIT. The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian, p. 84-85)

So Argentina is “minimizing the state”—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn’t popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you’re simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is “expanding the floor of the cage.” They understand that they’re trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it’s under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they’re so vulnerable, they’ll get murdered. That’s something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don’t understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we’re not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

**3. Case O/W –**

1. **Kashmir conflict is occurring now, that’s our Yardley 10. Revamping Indian economy key to prevent escalation into nuclear war - no forced US involvement.**
2. **Indian coop is key to check terrorism in Indonesia. And extend Chalk 09, Indonesian terrorism is a springboard for global terrorists causing extinction. That’s Morgan ’09.**
3. **CSLA critical to US launch ability – extend Walker 02, that’s key to revamp aerospace industry which is key to maintain global leadership and peace – that’s Thayer.**

**4. The kritik falsely assumes plan passes with a intent to explore space and perpetuate a universal narrative. However, the Launch Agreement is only a means to sustain peace through US leadership in democracy and allows India to be heard on an international scale – that turns their universal narrative impact.**

**5. Alt can’t solve – counter-memory cannot change the economic status of US space industry or India. Plan key to prevent 3 extinction scenarios.**

6. Perm do the plan and recognize past injustices – that’s key to remember the oppression and hidden narrative of Indian history.

Gong 2001(Gerrit W. is a senior associate at CSIS in Washington, D.C., and assistant to the president at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2001, p. 45)

Those who assume time heals all wounds are wrong. Accelerated by the collision of information technology with concerns of the past, issues of “remembering and forgetting” are creating history. They are shaping the strategic alignments of the future. Remembering and forgetting events define what individuals and countries remember and when, as well as what individuals and countries forget and why. Remembering and forgetting issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that direct the future in the name of the past. They are the personal and policy aftermaths of peoples and countries—including Germany, Japan, and China—whose identities and international roles are rooted deep in history. Remembering and forgetting issues thus encompass, but are by no means limited to, Germany’s Holocaust; Japan’s colonization of Korea and later brutal occupation of China; China’s civil war; and Taiwan’s February 28 incident, when Chinese mainlanders killed native Taiwanese in 1947. Efforts to promote justice and reconciliation are now manifest in issues as diverse as slave and forced labor claims in Japan and Germany, “comfort women” and World War II textbook lawsuits in Japan, and Agent Orange allegations in Vietnam or the Philippines. In Asia and elsewhere, companies and states should prepare for the intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance of remembering and forgetting events for at least four reasons. First, modern technologies are digitally enhancing our memories and then broadcasting our most passionate personal concerns and most polarized divergences. They are playing and replaying our worst nightmares through cyberspace, with an expanding global and personal reach.

**7. Turn - Endless investigation of power makes real struggles against oppression impossible. Traditional policies still key.**

**Hicks**, **03-** Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY (Steven V., “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. 72 “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

**8. Perm do both - philosophical questioning about space can’t get off the ground without hard policy analysis.**

**Daly & Frodeman 2008** Erin Moore Daly, grad student @ Arizona state in department of life sciences, and Robert Frodeman, chair of department of philosophy @ University of North Texas, 2008, “Separated at Birth, Signs of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics and Space Exploration”, *Ethics & The Environment* Vol. 13 No.1 RJ

Such reflection should be performed by philosophers, metaphysicians, and theologians in regular conversation with the scientists who investigate space and the policy makers that direct the space program. The exploration of the universe is no experimental science, contained and controlled in a laboratory, but takes place in a vast and dynamic network of interconnected, interdependent realities. If (environmental) philosophy is to be a significant source of insight, philosophers will need to have a much broader range of effective strategies for interdisciplinary collaborations, framing their reflections with the goal of achieving policy-relevant results. If it is necessary for science and policy-makers to heed the advice of philosophers, it is equally necessary for philosophers to speak in concrete terms about real-world problems. A philosophic questioning about the relatedness of humans and the universe, in collaboration with a pragmatic, interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems, is the most responsible means of developing both the science and policy for the exploration of the final frontier.

**9. Turn – The negative’s focus on recognizing the oppressed works both ways. Only remembering history through the eyes of the fallen allows atrocities such as the Nazi’s holocaust to be deemed reasonable – that turns their genocide impact.**

**10. The Alternative has it all wrong. By focusing on only the bad parts to western history the alternative prevents politics. The most violent wars happen between western countries, not done in the name of some frontier – not the root cause of all violence and genocide.**

**Simms 10** ( By BRENDAN SIMMS, APRIL 15, 2010. Mr. Simms, a professor of international relations at Cambridge University, is the author of "Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire." Remorse As a Way of Life Dwelling on the West's past sins is strangely narcissistic—debilitating, too.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 4052702304168004575178791674850652.html, DA” 6/26/11, CP)

Over the years, historians and political scientists, studying the ways in which societies organize themselves, have come up with a range of categories to describe the state itself: the "feudal state," for instance, or the "garrison state," or, more recently, the "knowledge state." Properly applied, such labels can be a useful way of understanding the character of a nation or society at a particular historical moment. In "The Tyranny of Guilt," the French novelist and philosopher Pascal Bruckner adds yet another variant: the "penitent state." Its principal characteristic is an eagerness to apologize for the sins of colonialism and genocide and other Western crimes. The penitent state, by definition, is never an innocent victim of terrorist attack but a deserving one: It has, after all, provoked the wrath of the oppressed, either at home or abroad. Mr. Bruckner cites literary figures, journalists and intellectuals throughout the Western world making the case that whatever punishments the West has been made to suffer—e.g., the horrors of 9/11—are merely well deserved. View Full Image .The Tyranny of Guilt By Pascal Bruckner Princeton, 239 pages, $26.95 .The problem with such self-flagellation, Mr. Bruckner notes, is not factual error. On the contrary, the list of Western crimes, from slavery to genocide, is long. The problem is that a culture of remorse makes the justified, and necessary, criticism of non-Western crimes almost impossible. Serial human-rights abusers such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, or Sudan's Omar al-Bashir, are quick to cry hypocrisy, to good effect, when a Western government faults them for their undeniable acts of cruelty. Mr. Bruckner observes that while the crimes with which the West is charged are of a universal character—no society is without sin—the West's record of atoning for them is unique. "There is no doubt," he writes, "that Europe has given birth to monsters, but at the same time it has given birth to theories that make it possible to understand and destroy these monsters." He reminds us that the West's most destructive wars—against Nazism in 20th-century Europe, against slavery in 19th-century America—have been waged against other Westerners, not against hapless Africans or innocent Asians. The West, in Mr. Bruckner's felicitous phrase, is "like a jailer who throws you into prison and slips you the keys to your cell." Though Mr. Bruckner makes frequent references to Nazism and the Holocaust, he has little to say about the politics of remorse in present-day Germany. This is a pity, since the German case is a particularly good example, if not of the penitent state, then of the penitent state of mind. As Bernhard Schlink observes in "Guilt About the Past," Germany first "repressed" the memory of Hitler and then became "fixated" by it. View Full Image .Guilt About the Past By Bernhard Schlink Anansi Press, 143 pages, $15.95 .Mr. Schlink is a German law professor best known for his novel "The Reader" (1995). In its film version, in 2008, Kate Winslet played the role of Hanna, a former concentration-camp guard with whom the teenage hero, Michael, falls in love. Mr. Schlink hardly refers to his novel in "Guilt About the Past," even though "The Reader" has been criticized for giving a human face to a perpetrator of Nazi crimes. In the chapter on literary representations of guilt, Mr. Schlink argues for the primacy of "telling the story" while conceding that "to tell a thrilling story can easily tempt one into tolerating someone else's hurt too easily." He leaves the tension between these positions unresolved, and their implications for his own work unremarked. Most of "Guilt About the Past" is devoted to a scrupulous, if somewhat ponderous, study of the legal and cultural aspects of Germany's guilt after 1945. Mr. Schlink notes that German citizens were considered to be collectively, and continuously, guilty, even though fewer and fewer of them, over the years, were even of adult age at the time of the Nazi genocide against the Jews. Luckily, Mr. Schlink's analysis is peppered with autobiographical vignettes that show how much the Nazi past came to be part of a struggle between the members of the 1968 generation and their parents. Mr. Schlink narrates an incident at Heidelberg University in 1970 when a law professor, himself a conformist during the Nazi period, became involved in a scuffle with students outraged at both his past and the way in which he sought to suppress their protests. Both Mr. Schlink and Mr. Bruckner believe that an obsession with guilt can easily become a disabling form of narcissism. "Fighting and winning yesterday's moral battles with bravery in one's mind," Mr. Schlink writes, "doesn't necessarily prepare one for today's moral conflicts." The patience of the NATO powers wore thin in the early 1990s, for instance, when they were told that their German ally could not participate in the effort to stop Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims. When the Berlin government eventually abandoned that position in 1994-95, joining NATO's campaign in Bosnia at last, it couched the decision in terms of the need to prevent "another Auschwitz," as if the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing was not enough in itself. The French like to say that "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse": He who tries to justify himself incriminates himself. There is much in European history to confirm the adage. Reading Messrs. Bruckner and Schlink, one realizes that the opposite is true as well: "Qui s'accuse, s'excuse." Westerners who fetishize their historical guilt may intend only to own up to past sins, but they often end up conveniently excusing themselves from taking responsibility for the future.

**11. Turn – universal histories are key to provide balance between national and individual ‘truths’ – that’s key to changing the present.**

**Michaels, 96**

(Walter Benn Michaels author of Our America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (1995) and The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History (2004). PhD in 1975 from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Afterwards, he taught at Johns Hopkins University (1974–1977, 1987–2001) and the University of California, Berkeley (1977–1987). taught at the University of Illinois at Chicago. "You who never was there": Slavery and the New Historicism, Deconstruction and the Holocaust, Narrative Vol. 4. No. 1, pg 1-3 (Jan., 1996), DA: 6/25/11, CP)

At the same time, however, from Veyne's perspective, the answer to the question, do the Americans believe their myths, must be no. For once we recog nize that, as he puts it, "'reality' is the child of the constitutive imagination of our tribe" (113), we must also recognize that "truth," as we ordinarily conceive it (in the sense, say, that we might think our myths true and the Greek myths false) "does not exist" (115). Indeed, "As long as we speak of the truth, we will under stand nothing of culture and will never manage to attain the same perspective on our culture as we have on past centuries, when people spoke of gods and myths" (113). So if, on the one hand, we must believe our myths, on the other hand, we must not believe that they are true. That is the whole point of "culture" as Veyne understands it: "culture, without being false, is not true either" (127). And while the Greeks, "of course," believed their myths, insofar as in believing their myths they believed them to be true, they were, of course, mistaken. We, who know that our culture is neither true nor false, also believe our myths but we believe them in the right way; in fact, insofar as "our perspective" on our own culture is "the same" as our perspective on the cultures of "past centuries, when people spoke of gods and myths," we must not only believe our own myths, we must also believe the myths of the past. So not only must the Greeks have believed their myths and must the Americans believe theirs, the Americans must believe the Greek myths too. And, in fact, at least some Americans do. In his 1987 best-seller, Commu nion, Whitley Strieber argues that the alien "visitors" who on several occasions have made their presence known to him and who look, he thinks, like the an cient goddess Ishtar, are probably the originals for "the whole Greek pantheon" (121). His theory is that humans, unable to deal with "the stark reality of the visitor experience" ("the bad smells, the dreadful food, and the general sense of help lessness"), dress it up in what he calls "a very human mythology," one that pre serves the essential truth of "the visitor experience" while at the same time making it more palatable. But Communion is subtitled A True Story rather than An Es say on the Constitutive Imagination; whether or not the Greeks, in believing their myths, believed them to be true, Whitley Strieber does. His memories of his own experience count as testimony to their truth not only because they provide modern analogies for ancient myths but because they may be understood to pro vide more direct evidence: "Do my memories come from my own life," he won ders, "or from other lives lived long ago, in the shadowy temples where the grey goddess reigned?" (123). If they come from his own life, they provide evidence that god-like creatures are currently interacting with humans and they provoke the reflection that such interactions may have taken place also in the past; if they come from lives lived long ago, they provide evidence that god-like creatures have always interacted with humans and so that the old mythologies are not only compatible with recent experience but true. But how does the fact that some Americans believe the Greek myths shed any light on the question of whether Americans believe their own myths? It might, of course, be argued that the belief in "visitors" is an American myth and so that, for people like Whitley Strieber, believing in the Greek myths is a way of believing American myths. In my view, however, the fact that Whitley Strieber believes in the Greek pantheon is less relevant to American mythology than the question he raises in the course of stating that belief: "Do my memories come from my own life or from other lives lived long ago?" For it is this question, I want to suggest, that lies at the heart of the myths Americans believe insofar as it is in attempting to answer this question?do our memories come from our own lives or from other lives lived long ago?that Americans can come to think of themselves as distinctively American. "History is to the nation," Arthur Schle singer Jr. has recently written, "rather as memory is to the individual. As an individual deprived of memory becomes disoriented and lost ... so a nation denied a conception of its past will be disabled in dealing with its present . . . As the means of defining national identity, history becomes a means of shaping history" (20). Memory is here said to constitute the core of individual identity; national memory is understood to constitute the core of national identity. In sofar, then, as individuals have a national as well as an individual identity, they must have access not only to their own memories but to the national memory; they must be able to remember not only the things that happened to them as in dividuals but the things that happened to them as Americans. The way they can do this, Schlesinger says, is through history. History, in other words, can give us memories not only of what Strieber calls our "own" lives but of "other lives lived long ago." And it is in giving us these memories that history gives us our "iden tity." Indeed, it is because our relation to things that happened to and were done by Americans long ago is the relation of memory that we know we are Americans. We learn about other people's history; we remember our own.

12. US intervention is critical to world peace – there is no substitute

Elshtain **03** Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, ‘03 (Jean Bethke, “Just War Against Terrorism” pg. 169)

The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not require that the United States remain on hair-trigger alert at every moment. But it does oblige the United States to evaluate all claims and to make a determination as to whether it can intervene effectively and in a way that does more good than harm—with the primary objective of interdiction so that democratic civil society can be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort visible in Rwanda, in Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to Americans by some of our European critics. At this point in time the possibility of international peace and stability premised on equal regard for all rests largely, though not exclusively, on American power. Many persons and powers do not like this fact, but it is inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, the "most carefree and confident empire in history now grimly confronts the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9 Furthermore, America's fate is tied inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the world. If large pockets of the globe start to go bad—here, there, everywhere (the infamous "failed state" syndrome)—the drain on American power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be borne.

13. Turn - The attempt to deconstruct universal history ends up validating all non-Western views, including reactionary, nationalist, and oppressive and prevents true anti-colonialism

**Nanda**, Phil of Science @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, **1997** (Meera, “Against social destruction of science: cautionary tales from the third world”, Monthly Review, March

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_n10\_v48/ai\_19344899/)

One of the most remarkable - and the least remarked upon - features of the "radical" movement engaged in deconstructing natural science is how it ends up denying the unity (i.e., universality) of truth, reason, reality, and science precisely in the name of those who need these unities most urgently - the "people resisting despotism and its lies." This includes those of us from non-Western societies fighting against the despotism of some of our own cultural traditions, and the untested and untestable cosmologies that are used to justify these traditions. A loose and varied assortment of theories that bear the label of social constructivism have declared the very content of modern natural science to be justified, in the final instance, by "Western" cultural values and social interests. Once modern science is seen not as a universally valid knowledge about the natural world, but as a particular or "ethno"-construct of Western society, it becomes easy to see science as a part of the imperialistic West's despotism, which the west's "Others" must resist in the name of cultural survival and anti-imperialism. Modern science thus becomes a despotism, an object of resistance rather than an ally of those resisting despotism.My goal in this paper is to cast a critical look at these anti-realist and relativist views of "Western" science, which have gained wide currency in the postmodern academy; and I want to look at them from the perspective of the people's science movements in non-Western countries. These theories - unlike the Marxian idea of social mediation of knowledge with which they are often confused - have eroded the distinction between scientifically justified beliefs and folk beliefs and/or ideology. What has undermined these distinctions is the fundamental thesis of social constructivism which states that all beliefs alike are justified by the community consensus, which is itself based upon social power, rhetoric and custom. There is no objective truth about the real world which scientifically justified knowledge can aim toward, but rather all "truth" about "reality" is literally constructed out of choices between equally justifiable interpretations that a "thought collective" makes. These choices, in turn, are driven by the conscious and unconscious biases and interests of the members of any community of inquirers. Though varied in emphases and details, constructivist theorists agree that there simply is no truth, or even reality, that can transcend the local social context of inquiry. The "unities" of truth and reason that Ian Hacking speaks for (above), are treated in the constructivist discourse as remnants of the imperialistic impulse of the Enlightenment which sought to impose the West's own peculiar stories about truth and reality on the rest of the world. Such a view of knowledge justifies itself in the name of cultural autonomy, tolerance, and respect for non-Western ways of knowing the world and living in it. But I will argue that, in actual practice, such "tolerance" has only ended up providing theoretical grounds for, and a progressive gloss on, the fast growing anti-modernist, nativist and cultural/religious revivalist movements in many parts of what used to be called the Third World. These movements seek to subordinate scientific rationality to local traditions, and thus are incapable of critically interrogating these same traditions, many of which are patently illiberal and oppressive to women and other marginalized groups in non-Western societies. Almost in direct proportion to the rise of nativist anti-modernist social movements, which correspond with ascendance of social constructivist theories in the academy globally, many pans of the Third World have seen a decline and stigmatization of people's science movements. These people's science movements seek to appropriate the contents and methods of modern science in order to bring traditional knowledge under empirical scrutiny and critique. In the part of the Third World that I am most familiar with - my native India - people's science movements have come to be eclipsed by the highly visible and vocal transnational alliance that has emerged around the idea that modern science is Western, and that the non-West needs its non-Western "ethno"-sciences. Affirmed and emboldened by the most avant-garde intellectuals in the West and at home, these nativist movements tend to label any critique of traditional knowledge from the vantage point of modern science as a sign of Western imperialism, or worse, a hangover from the old, "discredited" and "Western" Enlightenment (although, interestingly, they continue to applaud the critique of "Western" science from the perspective of ethnosciences as anti-Eurocentric, and therefore progressive).(1) Indeed, I believe that the recent electoral success of the religious right (the BJP) in India has definitely benefited from the cultural climate in which even the supposedly Left-inclined intellectuals and activists tend to treat all liberal and modern ideas as "Western," inauthentic, and thus inappropriate for India. Thus I will try to show that although the animus against the rationality of modern science is purportedly justified in the name of anti-imperialism and egalitarianism, its real beneficiaries are not the people but the nativists and nationalists of all stripes, religious or "merely" cultural/civilizational.