**\*\*\*LINK**

**Link- Satellites**

**Satellites reduce the world into a flat space with a single controlling entity that disqualifies the voice of the other** **and allow for capitalist formation**

**Kato 93**. Masahide, **“**Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339  
  
As mentioned earlier, the absolute point of the strategic gaze abolishes the historical contestation over perspectives, giving way to a total monopoly of interpretative media. The camera's eye from outer space produced what had been long sought since the invention of camera and the rocket: a historical or transcendental "rectitude. "An aerial photographer captures the emergence of such rectitude very succinctly: The advantage of hyperaltitude space photographs is that each one shows vast terrains in correct perspective, from one perspective and at one moment of time. Thus they are far more accurate than mosaics of the same area pieced together from photographs taken from the constantly shifting points of view of conventional aircraft at random periods of time, extending from dawn to sunset or even over weeks and months, depending upon clear weather? The pursuit of rectitude in the field of aerial photography has been none other than a constant battle against the three-dimensional existence of forms and volumes that allow more than a single point of view. With the vantage point of hyperaltitude from outer space,"three-dimensional forms are reduced to texture, line and color."1° Rendering the totality of Earth a two-dimensional surface serves no purpose other than for technostrategic interpretation of the earth as data and maps, thereby disqualifying "other" points of view (i.e., spatiolocality). In this way, with the back-up of technoscientific reason, the "absolute" point of the strategic gaze manifests uncontestable control as far as the interpretation of surface of the earth is concerned.  Flattening the surface of the earth has also brought about a radical change in the regime of temporality. As the words of the aerial photographer quoted earlier reveal, the notion of rectitude also depends on the construction of the single privileged moment. The image of every part of the earth is now displaced onto that "absolute" moment. In other words, the "absolute" point of the strategic gaze produces a homogeneous temporal field (i.e.,an a-temporal field, or to use common vocabulary, "real time") in which "juxtaposition of every locality, all matter" becomes viable. "The so-called" real time" is therefore the very temporality of the strategic gaze, that is, the absolute temporality that presides over other forms of constructing time (i.e., chronolocality). Such construction of temporality did not suddenly emerge with the advent of the new mode .of communication. It is a historical tendency of capitalism to displace geographical distance on to temporal distance. As Karl Marx pointed out, development of transportation and communication displaces spatial distance onto temporal distance, which is arranged and hierarchized in relation to the metropoles. "Therefore, to borrow Paul Virilio's term, the development of transportation and communication transforms geopolitics into "chronopolitics." The "instantaneous transmission" produced by satellite communication has rendered metropolitan centers capable of pushing chronopolitics further to the absolute level in which temporal distance reflects nothing but the strategic networking of capital.

**The strategic gaze of satellites causes the Earth to be organized by capitalist formations and creates a detached image of the Earth perceived by the camera’s gaze.**

**Kato 93**. Masahide**, “**Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 342

As I have argued, the objectification of Earth from the absolute point of the strategic gaze leads to a rearrangement of each locality into an order organized according to the late capitalist strategy. Such rearrangement finds its expression in an iconographic image of the globe representing the order of the world. The emergence and propagation of this image have crucial relevance to Jameson's second thesis, capital's penetration into the unconscious. Significantly, the commercialization of the unconscious consolidates the First World way of seeing by disseminating images through the mass media. One such manifestation of the First World way of seeing is the fiction of the earth as a finite, unified and integrated whole. The representation of the globe as a unified whole, however, is not a new concept: it has been the cognitive basis of world- wide expansion of capital since the Renaissance. "Nevertheless, the significance of the image of the globe in the late capitalist phase differs from that of earlier phases on three accounts. First, unlike in earlier phases, the image of the globe is based on a photo image which is mechanically reproducible and transmittable. The dissemination of images, which is ideological reproduction sui generis, proceeds extensively with the commercialization of the unconscious. In otherwords, the photo image of the globe needs to be situated in the historical context where in mechanically reproducible images are the very materiality of the reproduction of the social order. Second, the notion of the globe is no longer anchored in a cartographic abstraction of the surface of the earth, but is now a figure perceived by the camera's eye. Thus the image ineluctably involves the problematic of technosubjectivity in the construction of the social totality. Third, the image (ultimately the technosubject) serves as a principle of equivalence between self (First World self) and matter in general (earth, humanity, environment, and soon). In other words, technosubjectivity renders the First World self capable of attaining an unprecedented mode of domination over the rest of the world. I will defer my ideological analysis on the last two points to the next section. Let us first focus on the emergence of the global discourse facilitated by the dissemination of the image of the globe.

**Link- Surveillance**

**The art of seeing through surveillance is a masculine form of power which infiltrates the home of the other through the use of the eye- this sets the ground for lack of alterity of the other.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

Because the face, for Levinas, at least on the most obvious reading, is not seen, and the face-to-face encounter occurs otherwise than through the gaze, it is immediately appropriate that Derrida would see the blindman as an ethical figure, for all of the blindman's encounters with others must occur without seeing their form.[10 <#foot10>] In Specters of Marx and Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida considers positions of blindness in terms that, for Levinas, describe ethical relations. A particular form of blindness described in Specters of Marx and Echographies of television is the "visor effect," the situation in which "we do not see who looks at us" (Specters 7). For Derrida, the most dramatic example of such a scenerio of a-reciprocal vision occurs in hauntings: The specter is not simply this visible invisible that I can see, it is someone who watches or concerns me without any possible reciprocity, and who therefore makes the law when I am blind, blind by situation. The specter enjoys the right of absolute inspection. He is the right of inspection itself. (Echographies 137 [121]) The "right of inspection" ("/droit de regard/") is described earlier in Echographies as "the right to control and surveillance" (42 [34]). This right to see, control, and survey is evoked as a specifically masculine form of power: "the right to /penetrate/ a 'public' or 'private' space, the right to 'introduce' the eye and all these optical prostheses . . . into the 'home' of the other [/il s'agisse du droit de pinitrer dans un espace 'public' ou 'privi', d'y faire 'entrer,' dans le 'chez-soi' de l'autre/]" (Echographies 42 [34]). This phallic vision infiltrates into the intimate spaces of others either through the use of the eye itself or through prosthetic devices such as surveillance cameras, and, as shall be seen, Derrida describes the feminized, blind, and a-reciprocal submission to this masculine gaze in ethical terms.

**Link- Truth Claims/Knowledge**

**The aff presents the neg with a static image claiming to solve concrete problems, but ignore the fluctuating and temorary nature of truth through their reliance on outward appearances.**

**Jay 88** (Jay, Martin, History- UC Berkeley. "The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism." *Duke University Press*9.2 (1988): 310-13. Print.)

(1985: 11). Images can give us nothing but external appearances and behavior, never inward meaning. Claiming to represent the truth, vision actually operates on the level of deceptive artifice. What is seen, moreover, can produce unease and disquietude but never genuine mystery. "Sight," Ellul charges, "introduces us to an unbearable shock. Reality when seen inspires horror. Terror is always visual" (Ibid.: 12). **V**ision is also problematic, he continues, because its synchronic gaze produces an instantaneous totality, which forecloses the open-ended search for truth through language with its successive temporality**.** If we accept the evidence of our senses, most notably sight, we are lost, for "evidence is absolute evil**.** We must accept nothing based on evidence, contrary to Descartes' recommendation (Ibid.: 97). Vision and the fall are thus coterminous for Ellul. The contemporary version of our fallen condition is exemplified, he claims, in our worship of "Money, State and Technique-the new spiritual trinity that manifests itself in quite visible idols, belonging exclusively to the visible sphere" (Ibid.: 95).

**The privileging of sight as a sense of knowledge production serves to exclude those who in what is a western construction have "not seen the light", demonstrating a very exclusive means of producing and judging knowledge. They have normalized the Western Enlightenment manner of pursuing knowledge.**

**Cassell 09** (Kevin Cassell. founder and CEO of Natural Capital Group. "Convergence Culture's Ocularcentrism: Our new media disenfranchizes blind people while satiating the eyes of the sighted". Kevincassell.com. December 29, 2009. 6-20-11. <http://www.kevincassell.com/blog/index.php?id=61>. CH)

For almost two thousand years, people believed that eyesight actually interacted with material reality, a notion called “extramission,” or “light from eyes” (220). Visual perception was conceived as an action performed by a sighted individual with the visual field serving as a dynamic site of contest and negotiation. In Athenian society, sightedness was virtually institutionalized in the assembly, the law-court, the theatron (‘place of viewing”; related to theoria, theory). These institutionalized spaces, Simon Goldhill argues, “established the citizen’s gaze as the field in which position was contested and made the collective, participatory spectator the role of the citizen” (19). Hellenistic philosophy, thanks to aesthetes known as sophos, established epistemological links between sight[edness] and true knowledge, a taken-for-granted assumption that worked its way into Christian theology and Renaissance humanism. Johannes Kepler’s 1604 analogy between the eye and the camera obscura, followed by the optics research of Hermann von Helmholtz, gradually disintegrated the theory of extramission and transformed the eye from active agent to a passive receiver, one through which, according to Rosalind Krauss, light “passe[d] to the human brain as if it were transparent as a window pane”(qtd in Brennan 221). the 17th and 18th centuries, according to Peter de Bolla, widely-held assumptions regarding vision furnished “some of the grounding figures of conceptualization in general. In this sense,” he asserts, “one might say that vision figures Enlightenment thought” (65). Though theorists and philosophers have interrogated the privileging of visuality in Western culture for some time now, the entrenchment of ocularcentrism in modernity has remained, ironically enough, invisible to most of us. Consequently, the marginalization of those who interact with and come to understand the world through other modes of perception—nonsighted people, for instance—have been marginalized while those who "see the light," and everything else, are normalized as the standard. I think we might say that such ocularcentric assumptions also figure convergence culture, at least as it’s detailed by Henry Jenkins. In chapter after chapter, page after page, Jenkins unveils a world in which “knowledge communities” develop around a series of cultural spectacles, each engendering a “collective intelligence” grounded almost entirely in visual acuity.

**Unlike other senses of the body, vision is static and offers only a single truth to our eyes which is tyrannically definitive.**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

It is this "objective" quality of sight that has made it the ultimate scientific and "intellectual" sense.**371** The same quality, however, has occasionally rendered sight problematic in social situations where subjectivity and even empathy are valued. Unadulterated, unmitigated looking - precisely because it "objectifies" - is generally considered antisocial. Children are taught, "Don't stare." As Walter Ong has noted, "[I]ooking fixedly at another person has normally the effect of reducing him to a surface, a non-interior, and thus to the status of a thing."372 [2.58] The determinacy of sight has been expressed in two ways. In the first place, sight has been said to be "single-perspectival." Vision takes in one visual perspective or vista at a time, which it instantly resolves to a single, unique point-the "point of view" (a point which, by being duplicated in a painting or text, may moreover be imposed on another observer).373 Presuming that one is looking straight ahead, other potential perspectives-alternative vistas behind, beside, above, or below-are invisible, discoverable only with the subsequent intervention and assistance of other faculties (particularly movement, which would allow one to appreciate different perspectives by circumnavigating an object). To this extent, the purely visual world is always a single truth before our eyes. Like the photograph, it is tyrannically definitive, implicitly rejecting all other views as wrong or illegitimate. The phrase "that is exactly the way it looks to me" rapidly becomes "this is the place to see it from."374 Vision has also been considered determinate in light of the manner in which colors - primary constituents of the visual world - routinely interact; when combined in the same space, they lose their original hues and become one entirely new entity.375 By virtue of both these phenomena, the visual sense has been deemed relatively incapable of supporting existential diversity. **[2.59]** Sight has been thought timeless because it is not dependent upon the dynamic unfolding of events. Unlike hearing, which depends on the next sound or phoneme to form a coherent noise or word, or touch, which depends on the next feeling to discern a shape, sight need not wait upon the next image to bring meaning. As Hans Jonas has explained: All other senses construct their perceptual "unities of a manifold" out of a temporal sequence of sensations which are in themselves time-bound and nonspatial. Their synthesis therefore, ever unfinished and depending on memory, must move along with the actual progress of the sensations, each of which fills the now of the sense from moment to moment with its own fugitive quality.376 Vision can extract a tremendous amount of information from a static, literally timeless scene. Indeed, rapid change in the environment may make the visual extraction of information more difficult.377 Vision may therefore be said to demand a certain degree of constancy or "being"; in this sense, it peculiarly "lends itself to a static conception of eternal truths.'"378

**Link- Seeing of the 1AC**

**Both the rhetoric used within the 1AC and the rhetoric of the 1AC perpetuate the visual metaphors that penetrate our language**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

Visuality penetrates our very language. We routinely rely on visual metaphors to communicate understanding and knowing, or phenomena understood and known.**57** When we comprehend something, we say "I see." Someone who does not understand "can't see" what we mean; he or she may even be "blind" to the obvious. We describe good leaders in metaphorical terms that suggest that they see far or well: they are "visionary"; they have "insight" or "foresight"; they have "perspective" or a "world view." We also associate knowledge and understanding with light, the physical presence of which is necessary for seeing. If I want someone to explain a topic, I might ask them to "illuminate" it or "shed light" on it. In the same vein, smart people are "bright." Darkness, on the other hand, inhibits seeing and therefore denotes ignorance. If I don't know what's going on, I'm "in the dark." As a general matter, not-so-smart people are "dimwits." [2.8] American law has both reflected and actively contributed to our overall cultural visuality. Even in American trial courts which have resounded with the voices of lawyers, litigants, judges, and jurors, seeing has traditionally been given priority over the other senses.58 Great effort has gone into making testimony and arguments visible in writing. Eyewitnesses testifying to what they have seen have been preferred over "earwitnesses" testifying to what they have heard.59 Frequently, earwitnesses have been barred as bearers of inadmissible hearsay.60 Our judges and juries have generally given greater weight to visual evidence (in the form of both writings and exhibits) than to oral evidence.61 The existence of some visible written instrument has traditionally precluded oral testimony as to that instrument's meaning (the parol evidence rule). On appeal, disputed cases have come before appellate judges who have been expressly tasked with resolving them in writing. The appellate process still requires these judges to read visible briefs, precedents, and statutes rather than listen to live witnesses or (given severe time limits on oral argument) even attorneys.62 [2.9] In part because our judicial process has been so skewed towards visuality, American courts and legislators have traditionally shown particular sensitivity to visible declarations, visible claims, and visible injury. Written deeds, wills, and contracts have been readily and literally enforced;63 unwritten, such "instruments" have tended to be void or at least problematic. Judicial recognition of property rights has often depended on whether property-claimants have visibly manifested their claims by formal registration or, adversely, by "open and notorious" possession.64 Under the doctrine of "substantial interference," nuisance plaintiffs demonstrating visible harm from soot, smoke, or other pollutants have usually been better off than those complaining about noise or odor.65 In negligence law, visible injury has historically been more compensable than less visible, often invisible emotional distress.66 In defamation law, visible libel has been taken far more seriously than oral slander.67 In civil

rights law, "visible minorities" have received more attention and protection68 than have other subjugated groups (such as the deaf)69 whose identities have been less visually defined.

**Link- Law/Legal Metaphors**

**The visuality of the Legal metaphor is involved in power relations of oppression**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

The traditional visuality of American legal metaphor has, however, been more than just a function of general cultural circumstance. It has also been the product of power: the power of American men over women, the power of American whites over blacks, the power of American "Anglos" over Hispanics, and the power of American Protestants over Catholics and Jews. By making special use of the written word to secure or extend their cultural authority, members of the former groups have gained a special respect for vision and the visual that they have unilaterally made the standard for "American" culture as a whole. In conditions where their literacy has been involuntarily restricted or their own traditions have set limits to their trust of writing, members of the latter groups have either been forced or have chosen to grant relatively more respect to aural expression and experience.213 As American men, whites, Anglos, and Protestants have used their cultural authority to first monopolize, and then numerically and politically dominate the ranks of the American legal profession, they and those whom they have coerced or co-opted have indulged their visuality in, among other things, a consistent preference for visual legal metaphor. They have literally shaped American legal language in their own images.

**Visual metaphors have the ability to shape our thoughts and actions- if a reconfiguration of American law were to occur, a displacement of modal metaphors from one sensory organ to another would be necessary**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

As an integral part of our mentality, metaphors can also shape our thoughts and even our actions.42 Calling chess a battle (or hearing someone else call it a battle) certainly encourages me to conceive of it, however inaccurately, as a harsh, even potentially violent confrontation between grim-faced opponents. The psychological impact of the metaphor may be all the more powerful if I have had little or no previous experience with the game. The way I think about chess may in turn affect my behavior. In light of the metaphor, maybe I will decide to play, or maybe I will choose to do something less aggressive. If I do choose to play, the metaphor I used or heard might well influence how I play. For instance, if chess is a battle, an intimidating, combative strategy may seem appropriate. If the "battle" metaphor becomes popular, an entire culture may be led to the same conclusion, and play chess accordingly. Modal metaphors can have an especially strong impact on how we think and what we do. If, for example, I call "thought" itself "reflection," I am figuratively characterizing thought as a visual enterprise. Insofar as reflection literally presumes a visual subject, the metaphor may subtly encourage thinkers to believe that they should look for intellectual stimulation, rather than listen for it; in other words, the metaphor may affect their epistemological orientation. The same visual metaphor may alternatively imply that only individuals from visually biased backgrounds can properly engage in thought, prompting individuals from other traditions that prize other senses to be dismissed (or not to regard themselves) as legitimate or competent participants in intellectual inquiry. In this context, the "casual" choice of a "simple" metaphor may have profoundly divisive social implications. Describing thought as "reflection" may even induce thinkers to behave in a manner considered appropriate to a visual process: for example, the metaphor may suggest that thinkers should passively watch the world, rather than become actively engaged with it. Regardless of whether metaphors are considered as consequences or causes, the partial or total displacement of one metaphor by another is a significant cultural event. As a general matter, such displacement may reflect the development of new conditions or values, some of which may not, as yet, have risen above the horizon of awareness. Alternatively, or even additionally, displacement may help bring about new conditions or values. In law, a shift in metaphor may indicate or promote a new doctrine or even a new jurisprudential theory that cannot easily be brought into the fold of existing figures of speech. The reconfiguration of American legal discourse that is the topic of this Article is, however, even more fundamental than this, for it involves the partial-displacement of one entire family of modal metaphors (indirectly appealing to the eye) by another (indirectly relating to the ear). If the preceding overview of the cognitive, cultural, and behavioral significance of metaphors in general-and modal metaphors in particular-is accurate, such a sensory shift would seem both to reflect and portend major paradigmatic changes in American law and society.43 For this reason, it is well worth exploring.

**\*\*\*INTERNAL LINKS**

**Internal Link – Patriarchy/Feminism**

**Visual observations have perpetuated the patriarchal power of the male through the exclusion of women and the devaluation of aural forms of thought.**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

It may be argued that the extent of their involvement with written material has led American men as a group-like men in other Western societies-to take a great interest in the phenomenon of visual observation that has been the source of so much of their textual knowledge and authority.221 As modern feminist scholarship has taken pains to emphasize (if not necessarily explain), the "gaze" has historically been more of a "male" than a "female" medium.222 In the American tradition, men have been primarily responsible for reducing the world-and, in the process, women-to visual, two-dimensional texts, paintings, photographs,223 electronic images,224 diagrams, and equations.225 In their capacities as school administrators, college professors, historians, curators, and archivists, American men have long been in charge of preserving and perpetuating the corpus of American visual culture over time. As scientists and philosophers, they have further indulged their visuality by using mostly visual metaphors to describe the central intellectual operations of thinking and knowing: they have made "observations," offered "perspectives," and "speculated" on the nature of reality.226 The desire and even the need to look that has animated American male experience has frequently been coupled with a limited and somewhat selective devaluation of aurality and evocatively aural forms. At least since the late eighteenth century, most American men have rejected dialogue and story as respectable vehicles for the communication of important written information.227 More generally, American men as a group have been eager to prescribe silence as a positive personal and social value for others, if not necessarily for themselves.228 This latter strategy has been feasible in part because many American men have had access to a visual medium of communication (writing) which in their experience has not depended on sound to provide its sense. The strategy has moreover been politically useful because it has enabled American men to consolidate their control of other groups that have been more dependent on aural expression. The command that women (not to mention children) be "seen and not heard"-implicitly evoked from the anti-scolding laws of the seventeenth century**229** through the marital evidence laws of the nineteenth century**230**-has been a prime guarantor of patriarchal power.

**only when the eyes are rendered blind can the presence of a masculanized and authoritative other yield to an encounter with feminized ethics**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

In multiple ways we have seen that Derrida chooses to explore the haunting of the self in terms that evoke the ethical relation in Levinas, a relation in which the face-to-face encounter is an a-reciprocal response to an elevated other whose alterity I cannot subsume or grasp, which I cannot reduce through vision, touch, or knowledge, and which takes place in language and commands me, in response to which I must listen and speak. The feminized position of being blind in the presence of masculinized and authoritative other, of being unable to return a specifically patriarchal and "male gaze," of being forced to respond to another through language even while the linguistic exchange must take place on the other's terms--which Sartre and a quite a few feminists might describe as a hell of other people (if we were only able to thematize the ghost as such)--is thus presented by Derrida as the condition under which an encounter with alterity--a feminized ethics, for Levinas--may occur

**Internal Link – Education**

**Once a part of society, the sounds and voices of the world have been silenced in favor of the visual senses of the mind- this silencing is bad for debate education**

Professor Bernard J. **Hibbitts**, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 19**94** Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse<http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

In favoring the visual, white American culture did not reject aurality completely.260 For instance, for a long while the culture continued to produce, trust, and even revere great speakers.261 From the mid- to late nineteenth century, however, as white Americans approached "universal" literacy under the impetus of new developments in printing technology,**262** many seemed less confident in what they said or heard. Within the white community, public speech became more dependent on visual, written scripts;263 old-fashioned oratory was increasingly dismissed as "mere rhetoric."264 Storytelling survived, but it was largely, if not altogether accurately, associated with children, members of less literate lower classes, and inhabitants of backward rural areas. Most white American authors jettisoned the more obvious aural mannerisms and formats that had characterized so much American literature in the antebellum era.265 At the same time, white Americans gradually embraced silence as both a social norm and a primary means of social discipline. Increasingly used to sitting quietly in front of texts, white American theater- and concert-goers who had formerly been inclined to spontaneously talk to each other and interact with stage performers266 became more willing to sit in silent (or at least suspended) judgment on the musicians and actors who appeared before them.267 In the schoolroom where white American teachers had once taught their students to read by recitation, the most important meta-lesson became, as it today remains, how to sit, write, and read in contented quiet.268

**Internal Link – Discrimination**

**Visual identity, present in everyday life, is also apparent in the categorization of individuals and discrimination present in society**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

In Part I of this Article I argued that metaphors can reflect the circumstances and attitudes of the society that generates them. In light of this point, it seems reasonable to suggest that the traditional popularity of visual metaphors in American legal language has much to do with the bias towards visual expression and experience that has traditionally characterized American culture and, inevitably, American law. The traditional American bias towards the visual is aptly captured by the observation that "[i]n our society, . . . to be real, a thing must be visible."45 We**46** demonstrate our visual bias in numerous ways and in numerous contexts, usually without recognizing that such a bias even exists. Every time we sing the first line of the national anthem, we ask a question about looking: "Oh say can you see . . .?" We pay for goods and services with dollar bills that bear a staring eye on their backs.**47** We go on vacation not to hear the sounds, but to "see the sights"; we take along cameras, not tape recorders.**48** We give aesthetic priority to visual effect. Our glass and steel buildings are monuments to the power of sight, rather than sound or touch.49 Our idea of personal beauty is primarily visual.50 So is our idea of art, to the point where, in ordinary discourse, that term denotes purely visual painting, not music or dance.51 Our visual orientation even colors our approach to art forms which, at least in theory, are not altogether dependent on visual appreciation: we regularly highlight the visuality of sculpture-and, at the same time, neutralize its tactility-by posting signs in our museums and art galleries that read "Do Not Touch." Is it any wonder that in such a context, our sculpture should have become "painterly,"52 i.e., designed much more for seeing than feeling? Less obviously, but more fundamentally, our visuality shapes our sense of social identity and difference. We tend to group one another more on the basis of similar visual appearance than on, say, similar accent.53 This is most obvious when we categorize individuals according to the color of their skin: in our visualist culture, most Americans are "white" or "black." Visual identity has indeed become so important to us that we not only differentiate, but actually discriminate against one another on a visual basis. Having skin of a certain color may in practice entitle us to, or alternatively, it may disqualify us from educational opportunity, economic wealth, and political power.

**Internal Link – Hyperreality**

**Occularcentrism has created a distinction between the abstract and the material- this has allowed for a state of hyperreality to glaze over reality and form a simulacrum.**

**Syn 10.** Syn, Min. "From Ocularcentrism To Hyperreality." *From Building To Architecture*. 21 Sept. 2010. Web. 23 June 2011. <http://archimalaya.blogspot.com/2010/09/from-ocularcentrism-to-hyperreality.html>.

Well, I think the development of ocularcentrism can be divided in to 3 phases, being the foundation-laying Platonic classical idea - the 'first science' period, next, its proliferation in architecture started by the influence of Renaissance Alberti's writing, lastly the late revival or the total explosion during the post-industrial time. What I meant was the comeback and the more aggressive form of occularcentrism that has marched into a fatal Hyperreality in the post-industrial phase. It started with Plato's structure of the mind-body binary concept, distinction between the abstract and materiality, first ever. Since then the mind has slowly manipulating the physical body, like a parasite, like an all-seing ruler that commands the body. Its main tool is the eyes. (I am not sure the employment of eye has anything to do with the eyes location relative to the brain). Knowing is directly associated with finding the correct manner of observing. But this has yet to cross the discipline of architecture then, building was still considered a lower form Knowledge, it is material, physical, born out of utility, endeavour of the lower classes. Alberti and Brunelleschi are those who elevate architecture as a formal Knowledge, that require visual examination, architecture since then is ocularly quantified. The biggest influence probably belonged to Alberti's On Painting and On the Art of Building. With the invention of the Cartesian perspective,(tribute to Descartes) architecture in this visual form serve a strong commanding role, the image suggest a worldly center, viewer stare and examine, signified by a new portray of world view, and seemingly detached from just emotional sensation. The eyes are still the slave of the dictator-like mind. The power of image started. The correspondence between the sign of image and its referent still exist in pre-industrial time. Image in architecture in that time was still a part of the representational system, existed only as a hegemony and overpowering the other senses, but has yet to entirely codify reality. The situation change in post-industrial time. The 'simulacrum' as Baudrillard putted, has replaced reality. The contemporary mass media is the cause. It is the simulation without controlled depth or substances. Sign and referent no longer share bonding. In this state of Hyperreality, reality, illusion and appearance could never be identified and distinguished. The seeing eye is ever so passive but became more passive like an America in front of the TV under the state of Hyperreality. The Hyperreality further disorienting the eye towards an all-accepting mechanism of knowing and awareness. I think this hyperreality has much to do with the history of consumerism in the U.S. The culture of superficiality like watching TV ads was designed by pioneering European psychologists, employed by the US government during the post-war 20-th century, when the capitalist economy truimphed. It was to design a system of superficial adverts images that can submerge and answer deep into our subconscious desire by manipulating the vulnerable human eyes. One of the father of cousumerism I can remember is Edward Bernays. Well, living in a world of superficiality, of hyperreality, of ocularcentrism, scale does not involve the participation of our already-numb non-visual senses. Living in blindness is interesting, it frees the eyes from succumbing to the disillusioning of the dictating mind and allow other senses to flourish. Joseph Grange I think is never an architecture scholar, the 'structure' of posture, orientation, feel and comprehension as quoted are unresolved and contradicting examples, each has immense inconsistency...Posture as body language, could be considered free from the rules of eye; orientation is largely dependent on the positioning from the eye; comprehension is Knowing, undoubtedly influenced by eye. Except for the structure of posture, I could not see any concrete reasonning that can detach 'founding' a building scale from the absolute tyrany of the eye today.

**\*\*\*IMPACTS**

**Impacts – Standing Reserve (Detailed)**

**The technological age places humans and nature in standing reserve- Standing reserve is to be objectified, counted and calculated- the impact is you are assigned no value to your life**

**Mitchell 5** [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at StanfordUniversity, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/rip;jsessionid=7macig5us3335.victoria" \t "_blank), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]//jrc

Opposition is no longer an operative concept for Heidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that would separate the supposedly opposed parties. The analysis of technology in Heidegger's work is guided by the (phenomenological) insight that "All distances in time and space are shrinking" (GA 79: 3; cf. *GA* 7: *157/PLT,* **165).13**Airplanes, microwaves, e-mail, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaphysical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between subject and object. This modern dualism has been surpassed by what Heidegger terms the standing-reserve*(Bestand),* the eerie companion of technological dominance and "enframing." Insofar as an object *(Gegenstand)* would stand over against *(Gegen)* a subject, objects can no longer be found. "What stands by in the sense of standing-reserve, no longer stands over against us as object" *(GA 7:* 20/QCT, 17). A present object could stand over against another; the standing-reserve, however, precisely does not stand; instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. It is simply not present to be cast as a thing. With enframing, which names the dominance of position, positing, and posing *(stellen)* in all of its modes, things are no longer what they were. Everything becomes an item for ordering *(bestellen)* and delivering *(zustellen);* everything is "ready in place" *(auf der StellezurStelle),* constantly available and replaceable (GA 79: 28). The standing-reserve "exists" within this cycle of order and delivery, exchange and replacement. This is not merely a development external to modem objects, but a change in their being. The standing-reserve is found only in its circulation along these supply channels, where one item is just as good as any other, where, in fact, one item is identical to any other. Replaceability is the being of things today. "Today being is being-rephlceable"***(VS,*** 107/62), Heidegger claims in 1969. The transformation is such that what is here now is not really here now, since there is an item identical to it somewhere else ready for delivery. This cycle of ordering and delivery does not operate serially, since we are no longer dealing with discrete, individual objects. Instead,there is only a steady circulation of the standing-reserve, which is here now *just as much as* it is there in storage. The standing-reserve spreads itself throughout the entirety of its' replacement cycle, without being fully present at any point along the circuit. But it is not merely a matter of mass produced products being replaceable. To complete Heidegger's view of the enframedstandingreserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementary determination of being: "Being has become value" *(GA* 5: 258/192). The Nietzschean legacy for the era of technology (Nietzsche as a thinker of values) is evident here. But the preponderance of value is so far from preserving differences and establishing order of rank, that it only serves to further level the ranks and establish the identity of everything with its replacement. When everything has a value, an exchangeability and replaceability operates laterally across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogenizing and globalizing effect. The standing-reserve collapses opposition. The will that dominates the modem era is personal, even if, as is the case with Leibniz, the ends of that will are not completely known by the self at any particular time. Nonetheless, the will still expresses the individuality of the person and one's perspective. In the era of technology, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. In fact, the will in question no longer wills an object outside of itself, but only wills itself; it is a will to will. In this way, the will need never leave itself. This self-affirming character of the will allows the will an independence from the human. Manifest in the very workings of technology is a will to power, which for Heidegger is always a will to will. Because the will to will has no goal outside of it, its willing is goalless and endless.The human is just another piece of a standing-reserve that circulates without purpose. Actually, things have not yet gone so far; the human still retains a distinction, however illusive, as "the most important raw material" (GA 7: *88/EP,* 104). This importance has nothing to do with the personal willing of conditional goals, as Heidegger immediately makes clear,"The human is the 'most important raw material' because he remains the subject of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionally in this process and simultaneously becomes the 'object' of the abandonment of being" *(GA 7:* 88/EP, 104). Unconditioned willing transcends the merely human will, which satisfies itself with restricted goals and accomplishments. Unconditioned willing makes of the subject an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to objectify everything. The more the world comes to stand at the will's disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. For this reason-and the following is something often overlooked in considering Heidegger's political position between the wars-Heidegger is critical of the very notion of aFR'hrer, or leader, who would direct the circulation of the standing-reserve according to his own personal will. The leaders of today are merely the necessary accompaniment of a standing-reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders' seeming position of "subjectivity," that they are the ones who decide, is again another working of "objectification," where neither of these terms quite fits, given that beings are no longer objective. The willfulness of the leaders is not due to a personal will: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will *[Eigensinn].* In truth, however, leaders are the necessary consequence of the fact that beings have gone over to a way of errancy, in which an emptiness expands that requires a single ordering and securing of beings. *(GA* 7: 89/EP, 105; **tin)** The leaders do not stand above or control the proceedings, the proceedings in question affect beings as a whole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points of convergence or conduits for the channels of circulation; they are needed for circulation, but are nowhere outside of it. No leader is the sole authority; instead, there are numerous "sectors" to which each leader is assigned. The demands of these sectors will be similar of course, organized around efficiency and productivity in distribution and circulation. In short,leaders serve the standing-reserve.

**Impacts –Violence**

**the blindness that accompanies our static vision causes violence, rage and inhumanity through the inability to face the victims of our actions.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

David Michael Levin has repeatedly considered Levinas's complex understanding of vision, most exhaustively in The Philosopher's Gaze. Taking a very different stance towards "blindness" and the narrowing of our human, lidded eyes than, as shall be seen, Derrida does in Memoirs of the Blind, Levin dedicates this book to the "remembrance of centuries of victims brought by inhumanity and cultural blindness, by eyes narrowed in brutal lust, rage, and hate, into depths of pain and suffering--or to even darker cruelties engraved in dust and ashes." Like Derrida, Levin takes an interest in Diderot's writing on blindness, but cites a very different passage: while Derrida will focus on Diderot's writing of a love letter blind (Memoirs 101), Levin cites Diderot's suspicion that those who do not see may consequently be impaired in their abilities to feel: What difference is there to a blind person between a man urinating and a man bleeding to death without speaking? Do we ourselves not cease to feel compassion when distance or the smallness of the object produces the same effect on us as lack of sight does on the blind? Thus do all our virtues depend on our way of apprehending things and on the degree to which external objects affect us . . . . I feel quite sure that were it not for fear of punishment, many people would have fewer qualms at killing a man who was far enough away to appear no larger than a swallow than in butchering a steer with their own hands. And if we feel compassion for a horse in pain though we can crush an ant without a second thought, are these actions not governed by the same principle? (Philosopher's Gaze 4-5) However dubious Diderot's generalizations about the capacity for compassion in blind persons,[5 <#foot5>] this passage may have something to say to us today, at a moment when we have available to us ways of killing and enforcing poverty "blindly," or upon vast numbers of sentient beings at a great distance, thus avoiding looking upon the sufferings that we cause: we now place slaughterhouses ousibly tside of our cities,[6 <#foot6>] we exploit child and adult laborers in poverty-stricken countries, and we engage in modern forms of warfare that do not require soldiers to see the people they kill**.** Violence today is facilitated by our blindness, by our no longer needing to meet our victims face-to-face. Significantly, if we resist denying the relevance of visuality in the face-to-face encounter, we can fruitfully use a Levinasian theory of ethics to consider the grounds of possibility of modern forms of violence.

**Calculative thought incorporates all surroundings into a homogenous standing reserve. Even human beings become objectified and replaceable.**

**Mitchell 5** [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/rip;jsessionid=7macig5us3335.victoria" \t "_blank), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

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The demands of these sectors will be similar of course, organized around efficiency and productivity in distribution and circulation. In short, leaders serve the standing-reserve.

**Stemming from a white patriarchical society that ensures oppression modern ocularcentrism results in panopticism in which violence and totalitarianism entrench space.**

David Michael **Levin 1999** Professor at the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, Ch.13 Keeping Foucault and Derrida in the Discourse of Metaphysics, pgs.441-443

Focusing this new relationship in a word, Foucault began speaking about Jeremy Bentham’s blueprint for a Panopticon, a model prison, and about “panopticism,” the institutional forms that disciplinary power assumes when hegemonized by ocular-centrism. Panopticism is the political equivalent of the metaphysics of presence: social control-the order in stability and integration-by means of the new technologies of oversight and supervision, and a network of disciplinary practices and institutions penetrating and circulating through all spheres of the social world, ensuring the constant and permanent regulation of daily life. In “Types of Lighting,” Walter Benjamin called attention to the fact that soon after the invention of electricity, there were projects for city lighting based on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment “idea of universal illumination,” and recalled how, as early as 1836, Jacques Fabien warned against the effects of an overabundance of light. Foucault saw what Benjamin saw: the dangerous connection between the Enlightenment and administrative panopticism, which modern technologies and technocracies have finally made possible. Only in modernity does the ocularcentrism of our culture appear as panopticism: the system of administrative institutions and disciplinary practices organized by the conjunction of a universalized but instrumental rationality and advanced technologies of visibility. In the early years of his career, it happened that Foucault found employment in psychiatric hospitals, where he positioned himself primarily in the roles of spectator, observer, and witness. His experiences working in these institutions made a deep and last impression on him. Thus, it is not surprising that as his early work on psychiatric institutions and the practices and institutions of medicine abundantly document, Foucault began to see, in the world around him, signs and symptoms of what he later would describe as an ever-increasing panopticism. This perception was confirmed and strengthened by his reading of Bentham’s design for a “Panopticon.” Here he found the frightening prospect of a “transparent society,” “power through transparency,” “a visibility organized around a dominating, overseeing gaze,” and a totalitarian politicization of space in the form of “a project of universal visibility.” Consequently he saw the need for studies that would make the apparatuses and workings of “the eye of power” visible-visible, that us, as the disciplinary power of surveillance, a “new type of gaze,” keeping individuals and populations as much in sight as possible. And he saw the need to reflect on the historical relationship between this increasing panopticism and the ideals and illusions of the Enlightenment. For whereas the Enlightenment thought of illumination only as a rational liberation of the subject, one of the legacies of this episteme is a light of violence, a light that involves the subject not only in social relations organized for increasing subjection but also in the normalization of self-regulatory processes-the forever vigilant inner eye of “conscience.” Foucault has shown how it is possible to trace the connection between conditions of our lives-the economy of capitalism, the imperatives of a patriarchical culture, the persistence of racism-and the gaze of power-even the more enlightened gaze achieved by the Enlightenment. He has shown, moreover, that even after the historical changes of the Enlightenment, this gaze, produced in and by a patriarchical white culture, has continued to function under the spell of the will to power, reproducing this culture and its violence, reproducing through the very structure of perception-through the very structure of intentionality-an economy based on possessive and aggressive ambitions and a social world in which subjects encounter one another in cruel and destructive ways.

**Impacts – Value to Life**

**Modern technology creates a paradox- while simultaneously stripping humans of their potential of establishing value to life, it also crowns them rulers of the earth which creates the greatest danger ever known in history**

**Beckman 00** - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and SocialSciencesHarveyMuddCollege – 2000 (Tad, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

To see the essence of technology in this way delivers us into the final phase of Heidegger's analysis, the great danger to humanity that technology represents. Just as enframing organizes our lives progressively into a disposition of challenging and ordering the things around us into standing reserve, itsprogress as a development of human destiny challenges and orders us into standing reserve for its own ends.

"The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself." {[7], pp. 26-7; emphasis added}  
Just as humans have progressively limited the being of the natural objects around them, Heidegger observed, they too have acquired a progressively limited character or being. While we have come to think that we encounter only ourselves in the world, "in truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., in his essence." {[7], p. 27} While all epochs of human evolution contain danger, the epoch of modern technology possesses the gravest danger because it is the epoch whose characteristic is to conduct humanity out of its own essence. Modern technology, in Heidegger's view, is the highest stage of misrepresentation of the essence of being human. (9) In order to understand this danger completely and, certainly, in order to come to accept it as a correct analysis, will require a more extensive review of Heidegger's theory of human nature and its essence. But this will be easier and also more appropriate in the final section of this essay, after we have reviewed Heidegger's understanding of art. For art, in its essence and not as we presently conceive of it, from the disposition of enframing, is a wholly separate path of human development.

**Calculative thought kills value to life – turns nature and humanity into standing reserve**

**McWhorter, 92** – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at NortheastMissouriStateUniversity

(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)//JRC

<The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human manage­ment. We can never have, or know, it all; **we can never manage everything.** What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere *Bestand,* standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. >

**Impacts – VTL Outweighs Nuclear War**

**Our evidence is comparative- Loss of essence outweighs extinction and makes extinction from nihilism inevitable- Recapturing the essence of being is a prerequisite to reestablishing a proper form of ethics and politics (1NC?)**

**deBeistegui, 97** – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick (Miguel, Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG)JRC

Yet, at this point, everything happens as if our postmodern condition were nothing but the experience of the unlimited acceleration of time, an acceleration that results in the “spatialisation” of the planet (and of the universe as a whole), that is, in the absolute domination of space in the form of total and readily available presence. The need of being is no longer needed. The essential unfolding of presence has withdrawn, and we are left with beings in the form of standing-reserve. As a result, man is for the first time confronted with the greatest of all dangers, a danger far greater than that of the total and destructive unleashing of power over the earth, and that is the danger of the threat of the annihilation of his essence. The essence of man consists in being needed by being. So long as we do not envisage the destination of man according to his essence, so long as we do not think of man together with being, but solely with the unrelentless releasing of beings, nihilism will continue to prevail, both in essence and in actuality.In essence, as the most extreme manifestation of the *Seinsvergessenheit;* in actuality, as the politics of world domination, which our “democracies” seem to carry out with particular effectiveness. Thus, a politics that concerns itself only with “man,” and not with the *essence* of man is bound to nihilism as to its most intimate fate. Does this mean that Heidegger promotes something like a politics of being? No, insofar as politics is always and irreducibly ontic: it concerns man’s relation to man. Yet this relation is itself made subject to the way in which being claims man. There can be no politics of being, whether in the sense of a politics inspired by being or with being as its object, because being cannot be the stake of a political program or will. A politics of being is as meaningless as an ethics of being. Yet neither ethics nor politics can be without the prior disclosure of the epochal configuration within which they emerge. In this sense, ethics and politics are always of being. Both ethics as dwelling and politics as place point to man’s necessity to find an abode on this earth and to dwell amongst beings. And if Heidegger is so weary of ethics and politics, it is precisely insofar as these modes of dwelling no longer satisfy man’s essence, no longer provide man with an abode that is adequate to his essence, in other words, no longer constitute the space of his freedom understood as freedom for his essence (for his relation to the default of being), but are entirely summoned by the power of machination. Unless we come to think of ethics and of politics as the site of a conversion toward the essence of being, a site in which man would find his proper place.

**Impacts – Terrorism**

**Terrorism the result of technological domination of the world – it is an attempt to break free from the standing reserve.**

**Mitchell 5** [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/rip;jsessionid=7macig5us3335.victoria" \t "_blank), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

Nothing stable, this juncture in being itself must be followed and traced. It trembles. Terror takes a situation that looks hopelessly doomed and finds the essential within it, but terror contains its own demise, too. We flee from it. We respond to it with a hardening of our own ways; we reaffirm the identity of being instead of opening ourselves to others. The American response to terror has been one of Americanism, there can be no doubt about that. Terror ends in this, and there is no commemoration, just a forgetting. The commemorative aspect of terror allows us to remember the fallen and understand how they can still be with us today in our American way of being.  Terrorism will take place in the withdrawal of beyng, in the unworld of machination. The modem configuration of war is surpassed by the technological plan of homogenized circulation, and the distinction between war and peace falls away in their mutual commitment to furthering the cycle of production and consumption. The abandonment of being that forms this unworld by draining the world of its being does not occur without a trace, however, and terror in its trembling corresponds to that trace. Terrorism necessarily results from such a devastation-or, "becoming-desert," *Vendiistung-of*the world; terrorism is always born in the desert. Terrorism is metaphysical because it touches everything, every particular being, all of which may be attacked and annihilated. The circulation of the standing-reserve sets an equivalence of value among things with a resulting worldlessness where existence is another name for exchangeability. The exchanged and replaceable things are already replaced and exchanged, not serially, but essentially. They are not fully present when here. Terrorism names this absence, or rather is the effect of this absence, which is to say it is that absence itself, since here we are not dealing with an absence that could be the effect of any loss of presence. The absence in question is not an absence of presence, but an absence in and through presence. It would be ridiculous to think that such a change in being would lack a corresponding change in beings. This change in' the nature of being shows itself in the fact that all beings today are terrorized. They all stand under a very real threat of destruction via -terrorist acts. There would be no terrorist threat were it not for these terrorists, yet there would be no possibility of a threat were it not for being. Certainly terrorism is not the only "effect" of this absence in presence; Heidegger frequently refers to the atomic bomb in precisely this regard. Terrorism's claim, however, is distinct from that of atomic war.  Like the atomic bomb, terrorism operates at the level of threat. Insofar as it calls into question all beings, terrorism is itself a *metaphysical determination of being.*Terrorism makes everything a possible object of terrorist attack, and this is the very terror of it. Everything is a possible target, and this now means that all beings exist  *as*possible targets, *as*possibly destroyed. But this should not be taken to mean that there are discrete beings, fully present, now threatened with destruction. The ineradicable threat of destruction transforms the nature ofthe being itself. The being can no longer exist as indifferent to its destruction; this destruction does not reside outside of the being. Instead, destruction inhabits the being and does so, not as something superadded to the being, but as the essence of the being itself. Beings are henceforth *as though*destroyed. Terror brings about an alteration in the very mode of being of reality, the real is now the terrorized. Reality is already terrorized; the change has already taken place, -and this regardless of whether an attack comes or not. Beings exist as endangered, as terrorized, and this means as no longer purely self-present. It means that, in terms of pure presence, beings existas*already destroyed.*Destruction is not something that comes at a later date, nor is it something that may or may not already have taken place. Destruction exists now as threat. The effectiveness of terror lies in the threat, not the attack.

**Impacts – Bare Life**

**Technology reduces all creatures to bare life to be exterminated**

**Athanasiou 3** [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 14.1, p.125-162, Muse]

In Heidegger's questioning (understood as a will to essence), edibility and extermination are interlaced, and as such, are inscribed—or emplaced—within the regime of industrial planning and technology. The mass annihilation of human bodies and the mass production of the means of human subsistence together usher in the era of technological Enframing, articulated—through Heidegger's framing device of analogy—as instances of the modern technologies of amassing, clearing, crashing, and becoming-waste. [10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/differences/v014/14.1athanasiou.html" \l "FOOT10" \t "_blank)Man, plant, and, most crucially, the animal—the other of man in Western metaphysics—emerge as essential categories whose ontological distinctions are blurred and collapsed at the horizon of modern technology. With the obsolescence of the (nostalgic) aletheic essence of "handling" [11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/differences/v014/14.1athanasiou.html" \l "FOOT11" \t "_blank) in favor of mechanical means, bodies (human and non-human) are figured as final products, mere effects, of a technological inevitability, vestigial (or skeletal) residues of *physis* in the topos, or better, in the *thesis*, of the factory and the camp, the wastelands of modernity. The emphasis on this essential *operational* affinity occludes—or brings to light precisely by "writing out" of the self-aware tropological space—the singularities and temporalities of the human/non-human spectrum: those whose labor and time are consumed and exploited in the automated assembly-line of human food agriculture; those who feed their human living mortality by consuming the industrially produced agricultural commodities; those who, by virtue of their assigned biogenetic and **[End Page 135]** morphological status as non-human animals—are susceptible to being confined to motorized frameworks of human "handling"; and those, naked and anonymous, who were not only forced into slave labor but reduced to "life that does not deserve to live" by the biopolitical technology of the Nazi extermination camp. These disparate singularities remain unacknowledged—bound to dissolve in the crucible of Enframing—not only precluding certain kinds of questions and foreclosing the possibility of a different kind of questioning but also absolving the philosopher from the "task" of responding differently to the paradigm of extermination. In the Heideggerian text, the agricultural factory and the concentration camp thus become the exemplary delimited spaces of modern Enframing, where the spectrum of technomediated "mere life" is delineated in all its limits, continuities, and discontinuities. In the exchange of typical instances, "examples," "para-deigma-ta," the regime of Enframing, where "man is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve," is fused with technological execution whereby the naked body is left bare of any subjective content, standing before the sovereign power that constitutes and obliterates it as such. Heidegger's reference to the concentration camp *gives* an example as much as it *sets* an example: it brings to light the naked body of the technologies of modernity as indistinguishable from its intimate limit, and the word *s*o*ma* thus resumes its Homeric Greek limit-designation of a fallen or thrown nonliving body, a "corpse." But it does so, however, in a way that obliterates the eponymous subjectivity of those nonliving bodies, reducing them to a faceless and nameless mass of "by-products." It does so in a way that undermines any involvement with response-ability for the Nazi realm of Enframing, a regime of decimating Jews, homosexuals, Gypsies, and communists, all precluded from the realm of humanness and, as such, put to death. The subjugation of human life and death to biopolitical sovereignty comes to be what is at stake in modern technology; it also returns to haunt Heidegger's questioning of technology. In a certain sense, the force of substitution encapsulated in Heidegger's use of the correspondence between industrial agricultural production and the industrial production of corpses here resonates uncannily with the scene of sacrificial offering (in its particular instantiation in the scene of the "holocaust," which signifies "burnt offering"). And thus, absolved from the form of political execution sanctioned as the racial purgation of "the human," the systematic obliteration of the crematoria becomes redolent with the innocuous expiation of the sacrificial pyre. In the illuminating ritual flames of **[End Page 136]** symbolic exchange and fusion, the forces of displacement and replacement take the upper hand; boundaries bleed and limits are tested between the living and the dead, subject and object, the natural and the social, the sacred and the profane, inclusion and exclusion, humanity and divinity, human form and animal form, animate and inanimate matter, the saved and the lost, the edible and the discarded, killing and purifying, and killing and eating.

**Impacts – Root Cause**

**Enframing reduces nature’s value to raw materials – this is the root cause of the environmental crisis.**

**Rohkrämer, 05** – History and Philosophy professor at LancasterUniversity (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 189)

Why did Heidegger see "enframing" as the greatest danger? Heidegger's main concern was not environmental pollution or degradation, and he did not mention material limits of growth, although these worries were already being voiced throughout his lifetime. Instead, he was primarily concerned about the reductionist relationship between human, and their world. Within the constellation of "enframing," the world reveals itself to us as nothing but raw material. Consequently, humans lack appreciation and respect for the world, which in turn makes an unscrupulous use of the environment appear legitimate and appropriate. We see everything without respect, as "stuff," and thus treat it as such – to the point, even, that we kill humans who do not seem to fit into our design. However, the practical consequences are secondary for Heidegger: the real damage is already done, once humans are alienated from their world. It is all the worse, for Heidegger, if the technical world functions well, because then we do not even feel the degradation and fail to see the problem. "Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, thateverything is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them. I do not know whether you were frightened, but I at any rate was frightened when I saw pictures coming from the moon to the earth. We don't need any atom bomb. The uprooting of man has already taken place. The only thing we have left is purely technological relationships. This is no longer the earth on which man lives."

**Impacts- Ethics of the Other (Levinas)**

**Vision and light blind us from oppression and violence of the world- a liberation from the language of vision is necessary if the obligation to the Other is ever to be fulfilled.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

Returning to "Violence and Metaphysics," it is important to note that even while drawing out Levinas's critique of heliological philosophy, Derrida stresses the manner in which vision itself is given to us through language, and thus that the problematic features of vision are problems not intrinsic to the sense of sight but rather embedded in metaphysical discourse. It is not so simple a matter, therefore, as positing language as an ethical alternative to seeing, for sight only comes to us through its discursive constructions. As such, if we wish to change the violent ways in which we see, we must first change the language of vision**.** In particular, Derrida highlights the metaphorical sense in which Levinas is speaking of vision and light, or the manner in which the seeing that Levinas describes as violent is not characteristic of the sense of sight per se, nor even of sight as we need necessarily experience it, but is rather the manner in which sight as we practice and think it has been given to us by the Greek metaphysical tradition. As such, Derrida makes clear that it is "the heliological /metaphor/" which is in question (136 [92]). This metaphor has functioned as an "alibi," Derrida argues, or, in so far as we believe in the literalness of the metaphor, we "innocentize" oppression, we "turn our gazes away" from the violence, and thus, in a sense, the metaphor of light allows us to not see, or prevents us from seeing otherwise than as the metaphor allows: this light in language blinds us and prevents us from seeing the other as she is and from responding to her oppression. As such, Derrida argues that Levinas is not really advocating blindness rather than sight, but is "denouncing the blindness of theoretism" as a metaphysically constructed way of seeing which does not allow us to see the other ("Violence and Metaphysics" 130 [87]). Levinas does not describe a natural history of a sensation, but the history of an experience mediated by language. There is hence no escaping the metaphors of vision, light, enlightenment, and manifestation, and it must therefore be a transformation of that metaphor which Levinas would enact in his writing, or the first steps towards the theorization of other ways of seeing which he is taking, even if by all appearances, or in a more self-conscious way, he seems to be rejecting vision and light altogether. As such, on this more nuanced reading, which may or may not have been Levinas's own, it is not non-vision which would be sought by Levinas, for, in Derrida's words, "light perhaps has no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 137 [92]). It cannot be darkness and blindness that Levinas would prefer to vision and light, but, as Derrida stresses, a form of seeing which is other than that which the Greco-Christian tradition of philosophy has inscribed in language and history, what Levin calls a "postmetaphysical vision."[8 <#foot8>]

**Impacts- Culture/Architecture**

**the nihilistic way in which the eye has become the body’s dominant sense perpetuates fake images and destroys the architecture of human culture.**

**Syn 10.** Syn, Min. "Our Narcissistic Eyes and The Architecture Of Visual Images." From Building To Architecture. 23 Jan. 2010. Web. 23 June 2011. <http://archimalaya.blogspot.com/2010/01/of-our-narcissistic-eyes-and\_23.html>.

As philosopher Martin Heidegger observed, the modern world has plunged into a highly nihilistic and narcissistic expression of pleasing the dominanting sense of eye. Our narcissistic eye views and demand architecture to be solely as a means of selfish self-expression, detached from its original mental, social and organic connections with real people and real culture. The nihilistic eye see everything as a set of images, disengage and isolate our soul from the real intimacy, materiality and tactile aspect of true architecture. The postmodern world have since becomes a meaningless visual journey of fake images, brought about with the help of technology like CAD and 3D imaging computer software, symbolically reinventing the misleading cultural signifiers, rather than was born as integral part of it. The senses of touch, smell and hearing are now the secondary routes of evaluating everything including architecture. Juhani Pallasmaa in his writing 'The Eyes of The Skin' states: 'The cancerous spread of superficial architectural imagery today, devoid of tectonic logic and a sense of materiality and empathy, is clearly part of this process.' (the process of the cancer of treating architecture as mere visual images). The hegemony of the eye is deadly, as it increasingly separate the 'self' from the real world, the relationship and distant between people and his habitat now are confined between his eye and artificial graphic, and not the tectile, close and unconscious way we experience architectural space traditionally using the 5 senses. We are now unable to generate architecture that is truly speak for the majority people and needs (the interior world). We are now merely the 'spectators' of architecture, and are not inseparably belonged to it. -The cancer tumor of the architecture of images and graphics has invaded education institutions. For me, the death of architecture starts with the detachment of human bodily senses (not only the visual) from the physical materiality of it. This is because the term 'architecture' was a specific term, historically referring to a human culture that is guided by their bodily made craft, driven by the 5 senses, creating poetic beauty out of the chemistry between each of them, the same way a bird shapes its nest by its bodily movements, bees shape their honeycomb by their teamwork, or our indigenous mud architecture shaped by the very organic haptic and muscular craft of the local people...These are architecture. -Architecture of People, by the People, for the People...Intimate, existential, true, functional, the articulation of 'fit' as the real beauty of architecture. Whatsoever, the connectedness between the human's self and the worldly incarnated environment has ever be so close before the invention of our narcissistic eye and of course the computer imaging. Since the time of Renaissance Alberti's jugment of architecture as visual perception, proportion and harmony, the sense of eye has suppressed the other senses as the dominant yardstick of testing the good and bad of architecture. This classical thought inherited until our time culminated in Corbusian modernism in which he once wrote: I exist in life only if I can see; One need to see in order to understand; Man looks at the creation of architecture with his eye,...plus his famous etho: 'Architecture is the masterly, correct and magnificent play of masses brought together in light'. These undeniably set and define and resulted in our time's preoccupation with the 'architecture of the eye'. Now, they are the architecture of the eye, plan of the eye, elevation of the eye, city planning of the eye (le regard surplombant), they pursuit the 'Hygiene of the Eye', where pleasing the sensory pleasure of the eye has push the importance of our cultural, emotional and utilitarian participation in making architecture, to death. The existential plastic and spatial experience had gave way to the hyperbolic advertising and psycological persuasion of fake but striking visual computerized images. They are the dead instantaneous impact of our narcissistic self-expression, these architecture unable to sustain the test of time.

**Impact – Patriarchy**

**Patriarchy is the root cause of all war and will lead to extinction**

Reardon, 93

[Betty, Director of the Peace Education Program at Teacher's College Columbia University, 1993, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2]

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to "strut their stuff" as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one's character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay-all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a "necessary evil," that patriarchal assumptions are simply "human nature," then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983) These cultural tendencies have produced our current crisis of a highly militarized, violent world that in spite of the decline of the cold war and the slowing of the military race between the superpowers is still staring into the abyss of nuclear disaster, as described by a leading feminist in an address to the Community Aid Abroad State Convention, Melbourne, Australia: These then are the outward signs of militarism across the world today: weapons-building and trading in them; spheres of influence derived from their supply; intervention-both overt and covert; torture; training of military personnel, and supply of hardware to, and training of police; the positioning of military bases on foreign soil; the despoilation of the planet; 'intelligence' networks; the rise in the number of national security states; more and more countries coming under direct military rule; the militarization of diplomacy, and the interlocking and the international nature of the military order which even defines the major rifts in world politics. (Shelly 1983).

**The justification of exploitation during war rises from male domination of women.**

**Warren and Cady 94**

Karen J. **Warren**, Duane L. **Cady**, Professors at Macalester and Hamline, Spring 19**94**, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810167?cookieSet=1>

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress." And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability.

**AT: Extinction Outweighs**

**Loss of being is worse than extinction – it is better to die than to go on living in the world of technological domination which expands without purpose.**

**Mitchell 5** [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/rip;jsessionid=7macig5us3335.victoria" \t "_blank), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

Devastation (Verwistung) is the process by which the world becomes a desert (Wfiste), a sandy expanse that seemingly extends without end, without landmarks or direction, and is devoid of all life.20 If we follow the dialogue in thinking an ancient Greek notion of "life" as another name for "being," then the lifeless desert is the being-less desert.The world that becomes a lifeless desert is consequently an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner makes this connection explicit, "The being of an age of devastation would then consist in the abandonment of being" (GA 77: 213). As we have seen, this is a process that befalls the world, slowly dissolving it of worldliness and rendering it an "unworld" (cf. GA 7: 88, 92f./EP, 104, 107f., etc.). Yet this unworld is not simply the opposite of world; it remains a world, but a world made desert. The desert is not the complete absence of world. Such an absence would not be reached by devastation (Verwisiung), but rather by annihilation (Vernichtung); and for Heidegger, annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation: "Devastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [blofleVernichtung]. Mere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrary orders [bestelht] and spreads everything that blocks and prevents" (WHD, 11/29-30; tin). Annihilation as a thought of total absence is a thought from metaphysics. It is one with a thinking of pure presence: pure presence, pure absence, and. purely no contact between them. During another lecture course on H6lderlin, this time in 1942 on the hymn "The Ister," Heidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda of America in regards to the "homeland," which is here equated with Europe: "We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate [zuvernichten] Europe, that is, the homeland, and that means: the inception of the Western world. The inceptual is indestructible [unzersto'rbar]" (GA 53: 68/54; tm). America is the agent of technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions of presence and absence that it itself is so expert at dissembling. America resolves to annihilate and condemns itself to fdilure in so doing, for the origin is "indestructible." We could take this a step further and claim that only because the origin cannot be annihilated is it possible to destroy it. This possibility of destruction is its indestructible character. It can always be further destroyed, but you will never annihilate it. Americanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction of the world ever further into the unworld. America is the agent of a malevolent being. This same reasoning explains why the older man's original conception of evil had to be rethought. Evil is the "devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it" (GA 77: 207), he said, but this annihilation is simply too easy, too much of an "Americanism." The human essence is not annihilated in evil-who could care about that? Instead it is destroyed and devastated by evil. Devastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. Without limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessantiy urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. Annihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There would be nothing left to protect and guard, nothing left to concern ourselves with-nothing left to terrorize. Devastation is also irreparable; no salvation can arrive for it. The younger man is able to voice the monstrous conclusion of this thinking of devastation: "Then malevolence, as which devastation occurs [sichereignet], would indeed remain a -basic characteristic of being itself" (GA 77: 213, 215; em). The older man agrees, "being would be in the ground of its essence malevolent" (GA 77: 215). Being is not evil; it is something much worse; being is malevolent

**\*\*\*ALTERNATIVES**

**Vision of Subversion Alternative**

**Their attempts to incorporate resistance fail due to institutionalization and risk fascism, only by engaging in open dialogue do we gain a new understanding of vision and social realms**

David Michael **Levin 1999** Professor at the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, Ch.13 Keeping Foucault and Derrida in the Discourse of Metaphysics, pgs.446-449.

Admirable though this is, however, we must not overlook the fact that Foucault had a serious deficiency: in truth, a debilitating blind spot. There is no recognition in his writings of the different contemporary gazes, multiplied and strengthened by our visual technologies, in which the actions of public officials, and the practices and institutions of civic life, are subject to public scrutiny. Much can be said about how investigative reporting, making visible the concealed operations of government, and the televising of courtroom proceedings, debates in the halls of Congress, and special congressional hearings serve the visibility conditions essential to a participatory democracy. Just as women are now “taking back the night,” so there are citizen groups taking back the light, deflecting the panoptical spotlight of disciplinary regimes of power and turning it on the agents of public trust. Foucault seems not to have seen the various ways in which our contemporary democracy encourages the proliferation of citizen interest groups and popular organizations with the power to make government visible, keeping public officials in sight and overseeing their actions. Foucault did not see that critical eyes like his can actually be incorporated and institutionalized, operating through an array of public instruments and a multitude of citizen associations and organizations. Like Derrida, Foucault was committed to liberal politics of individualism. Although they both eschewed the traditional discourse of sovereign rights, there is no question of their support for struggles to secure new freedoms. But this focus on liberty tends to marginalize questions of equality and social justice and to reduce our field of action to a choice between resistance or acquiescence. Understood in the context of their strong individualism, the politics of resistance tends to marginalize collective will-formation-the processes of social interaction and coalition building constitutive of participatory democracy. Correspondingly, their understanding of vision tends to be limited to seeing it in reciprocity, blind to the roles of the gaze in building a sense of community. One has reason to fear repressive unities, the totalist collective, the “we” of fascism; but in the politics of Foucault and Derrida, I see this fear condensed into a tragic blind spot. Nearing the abrupt end of his life, it seems that Foucault began to realize that it is not enough to think and practice a vision of resistance, a vision of subversion. Very slowly, tentatively, and awkwardly, he even began to acknowledge, not only in his practice but also in his thought, a vision of mutual recognition, a vision of reciprocity. In “The Concern for Truth” (May 1984), Foucault argued, with words that echo Habermas, that the intellectual must renounce the god’s-eye vantage point in order to “participate in the formation of a political will,” bringing the workings of power to the light, making them visible, and prob-lematizing practices and institutions that have been naturalized, or falsely assumed to be based on consensus. In effect, Foucault was thus suggesting that resistance and reform must learn to adapt to skirmishing strategies of guerrilla warfare to the rationality-conditions of discursive will-formations. Presumably, there would be a corresponding change in the micro-politics of a vision committed to such formations. An interview with the title “How Much Does It Cost for Reason to Tell the Truth?” adds a crucial dimension to this suggestion. After telling us that “reason is a long narrative, which ends today and makes room for another,” Foucault assures us that the historical contingency of forms of rationality “doesn’t mean that these forms of rationality are irrational. They rest,” he says, perhaps reminded of Levinas, “upon a foundation of human practices and human faces.” Surprising language! Near the end of his life, as the certainty of death gradually inhabited him, it seems that he began to shift his position, putting away his topological maps of the political terrain, maps drawn as if from an imperial height, and began moving closer to people, closer to the positions of the practical subject. What concerned him, he said, is “politics as an ethics.” What exactly this means he has left to us. However, there was an interview conducted by Paul Rabinow in May 1984, just before his death, on the basis of which one might infer that what he meant was a politics of dialogue, a “discourse ethics,” with the subjects opposing one another positioned face to face-procedurally, if not necessarily literally. Instead of warfare, polemics, confrontation, subjects are now peacefully engaged in rational discussions, arguing and debating, questioning both others and themselves, examining their motives, their perceptions, their viewpoints, and the reasons claimed to justify their respective positions, and cooperating in the attempt to work through their differences and conflicts. Resistance and subversion, the moment of transgression, are still important to him, but he now gives more attention to actions that are symmetrical and constructive. There are, perhaps, some faint echoes here of Habermas. There is a surprising reliance here on the concepts of “rights,” “reciprocity,” “responsibility,” and “obligations,” although the way in which he speaks of rights implicitly breaks with the “sovereign natural rights” of the classical juridical discourse, moving, rather, in the direction of a conception of a dialogically constituted rights-rights recognized and established as constitutive of the conditions necessary for a discursively legitimated social formation: In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, etc. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his discourse he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the other. Questions and answers depend on a game…in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue.

**Heidegger Alternative- “The Lighting”**

**in order to open ourselves to blindness, the alternative is to accept Heidegger’s idea of “the lighting” and detract from the sovereignty of the gaze and reject the power of the eye**

**Levin 99** (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, “The Philosopher’s Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment” *Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting*, pp 190-193)

Following the passage on the interpretation of which we have just been reflecting, Heidegger asks: Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the object and its objectivity, and the subjectivity, and hence is prior to the realm of their recipricrocity? Carrying this question forward in the direction that Heidegger’s preceding discussion would suggest,we are led to the thought that subject and object are gathered together and belong together in and by grace of the field of the field of the lighting-that elemental presencing of being which opens up, lays down, and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that first joins subject and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that, in its configuration as ground, offers and submits itself to the conditions of perceptivity that rule in the life of a mortal. But in modern times, this “mortal” has become an ego-logical subject: someone who, constituting himself as a subject, focuses on what is present and turns it into an object, a figure split off from the dynamic ground, the surrounding contextual referential field**.** If our time is “our of joint,” so is the figure-ground Gestalt. This splitting off, of subject from object, figure from ground, and the Gestalt itself from the presence of the lighting, is symptomatic of the antagonisms that persist in our deeply divided and still unreconciled society. And when we consider what this splitting means when the “object” of the gaze in another “subject” –when it is a question of how another “subject” is looked at, faced, seen, made to figure in the figure-ground Gestell-then we are approaching the root of the suffering, rage, and violence distinctive of the contemporary world. How different social relations would be if they could be deeply rooted, by virtue of an awareness (Stimmung) that does not presently form very often, in a felt sense of being gathered together in to the underlying unity of the lighting, a felt sense of belonging together in the Laying-down-that-gathers-and of having always already belonged together, gathered through the gift of that lighting, in a dimension of being “prior to the realm of their reciprocity” ! Stereotyped, reifying perceptions of the other, ways of looking at others that are inseparable from racism, nationalism, and ethnic hatreds, would be more difficult to sustain, if the awareness toward which Heidegger is gesturing were to be cultivated as the subsoil in which our vision needs to be well rooted**.** To be sure, as Heidegger says, “the jointure thanks to which revealing and concealing are mutually joined must remain the invisible of all invisibles, since it [is that which] bestows shining on whatever appears.” It must be certainly protected from the will to total visibility, because if not properly cared for, its gift of light and darkness would fall and negation, placed at the disposal of the dominant will to power; and the peoples of the world would eventually be left without any place to hide from totalitarian tyranny and terror. But this possibility, this danger, makes it all the more necessary that we not let the invisibility, the withdrawal of the jointure fall into total oblivion, absolute negation. We need to make this jointure visible in our world: visible, however, as the invisible of all invisibles**.** And this means that our looking and seeing must let themselves be appropriate by this invisibility, becoming, through their capacity for ontological recollection, its hermeneutic organ, protecting and preserving its necessary withdrawal. This interpretation points toward the need for a historically different way of looking and seeing a way of looking and seeing that obeys in care the way of the lighting**.** Heidegger continues: If we think it [i.e., the presencing of being] as lighting, this includes not only the brilliance, but also the openness wherein everything, especially the reciprocally related, comes into shining**.** Lighting is therefore more illuminating, and also more than laying bare. Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open. It is the bestowal of presencing**.** According to Heidegger, “The event of lighting [das Ereignis der Lichtung) is the world. The meditatively gathering lighting which brings into the open is revealing; [but] it abides in self-concealing. Thus it is necessary that, in virtue of our way of looking and seeing, we protect and preserve the self-concealment of the lighting, while at the same time opening to this “event” and letting it come into its own by gathering it into our way and making it visible hermeneutically as that which opens up our world. Heidegger’s discussion of the lighting is haunted, however, by deep-and well-founded-anxieties. What concerns him is the danger that, in spite of all his precautions, reference to this lighting will be misunderstood. For the self-giving of the lighting both is and is not a lighting, a light we can see. Taking place within the realm of the visible, it can appear only as that which visibly withdraws from the reach of our vision. Thus, most of all, Heidegger is worried that the “event,” the giving, of the lighting- the wonder of gift, that there is light- will be degraded by a reduction to the physics and optics of light. “The lighting,” he says,” **is** no mere brightening and lightening.” And that is because what he is trying to get us to see is a “revealing-concealing lighting concerned with the presencing of what is present.” Appealing, in spite of the terrible dangers, to our capacity, our potential for vision, he tells us that “the lighting not only illuminates what is present, but gathers it together and secures it in advance in presencing.” Thus, were our own way of looking and seeing to become a recollection and mimetic repetition of this gift of lighting-or, in other words, were our way to become an ontologically appropriate, ontologically appropriated, it would, in its own way, become a gathering, a vision of the Geviert, gathering earth and sky, gods and mortals. Because we are being gifted with a capacity-to-see the potential of which still remains unrealized and unfulfilled, the gift of the lighting-the wonder that Es gibt lighting-makes a claim on us: a claim that burdens us with the responsibility to realize our great potential for vision, our capacity for responsiveness, our response-ability. Gods and men, says Heidegger, Are not only illuminated in the lighting, but are also enlightened from it and toward it. Thus they can, in their own way, accomplish the lighting (bringing it to the fullness of its essence) and thereby protect it.... [moreover, because they receive this lighting and are dependent on it,] they are appropriated into the event of lighting, and are never concealed. On the contrary, they are revealed, thought in still another sense [i.e., in that the claim of this lighting on their responsiveness, e.g., on their responsibility for “using” their capacity to perceive it, puts them on trial]. Just as those who are far distant belong to the distance, so are the revealed-in the sense now to be thought-entrusted [zugertraut] to the lighting that keeps and shelters them. As beings of sight, we are dependent on the gift of the lighting, and therefore are entrusted to it. But we are also thereby entrusted with it, because the lighting can come into its own, or come back to itself “in fullness of its essence” (as Heidegger puts it), only through the mediation of our way of looking and seeing. For it is only by (the) virtue of our looking and seeing that the lighting can be made visible hermeneutically, visible as the coming of the lighting which first makes our vision possible. Furthermore, the coming of the lighting, as the interplay of concealment and unconcealment within which all that is comes to presence, can be protected and preserved only by (the) virtue of a way of seeing and looking that [1] makes it visible in its invisibility, acknowledging our finitude, our limited horizons, and the immeasurable abyss of the invisible, and that thereby [2] respects the withdrawal and self-concealment of the lighting, protecting and preserving it, instead of violently penetrating its abodes of concealment with an insolent demand for total visibility, total clarity, total control. The lighting gives us light but it also subverts that sovereignty of the gaze, leading it into the shadows, into the dark, into the realms of semblance and deception; obstructing its powers of penetration; compelling submission to the invisible beyond being. The lighting opens our eyes-to blindness. Following Heraclitue, who was merciless in criticizing the ways of his contemporaries, Heidegger formulates his own criticism of the looking and seeing that predominates in the contemporary world. He writes: Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights everything present in its presencing. But they turn from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present, which is what immediately concerns them in their everyday commerce with each other.... They have no inkling of what they have been entrusted with: presencing, which in its lighting first allows what is present to come to appearance. In the lighting of which they come and go, remains concealed from them and forgotten. As Heidegger is quick to point out, however, the recollection of the lighting cannot take place in a perception, a way of looking and seeing, for example, that is grasping, possessive, driven by the will to power: The golden gleam of the lighting’s invisible shining cannot be grasped, because it is not itself something grasping. Rather, it is the purely appropriating even [das reine Ereignen]. The invisible shining of the lighting streams from the wholesome self-keeping in the self-restraining preservation of destiny [Geschick].

**Legal/Law Alternative**

**Only by embracing a legal language that is not defined by a certain sensory line will avoid marginalization and oppression.**

**Hibbitts 1994** (Bernard J. is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfigurations of Law, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/27642367/Making-sense-of-Metaphor-law-history-Bernard-J-Hibbitts>,)

Here, one might offer several answers. First, it may be argued that insofar as legalmetaphors are shaped by circumstance**,** neither American culture nor American law willprobably be able to sustain a complete or near-complete transition to aurally based legallanguage.715 Aural technology may have surged in the last century or so, but as I have repeatedly noted in this Article, visual technology has hardly stood still for it. The same age which has given us the telephone, the radio, and the tape recorder has also given usinexpensive photography, motion pictures, television, and the computer. The last three of these "visual" technologies have actually joined sound to sight, promoting a trend towards sensory synthesis that has culminated in today's "multimedia" technology. In this new environment, American culture is likely to embrace both sight and sound rather than encourage a definitive turn from one sense to the other. **By the same token,** it is not likely to generate or support a legal discourse that would consistently prefer aural over visual metaphors.The likelihood of metaphoric transformation is decreased even further by the certainty that the composition of the American legal academy(not to mention the American legal profession) will in the foreseeable future remain mixed along a variety of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious lines, thereby ensuring the continued participation in American legal discourse of individuals coming from a variety of relatively more visual and relatively more aural traditions. Insofar as individuals of all backgrounds remain willing and able to draw consciously or subconsciously on their own historical experiences for intellectual inspiration, it is likely that some will continue to favor visual legal metaphors, while others will turn to aural legal language.Diversity will allow for difference. Apart from what is likely to happen, one might argue that **a complete shift from**visual to aural figures of legal speech in American legal discourse would be inadvisable,even for those persons who have thus far gained or been empowered by the increased popularity of aural legal metaphors. In the guise of liberating and validating the relatively more aural experiences of individuals from traditionally marginalized American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, such a transformation might ironically do much to legitimate and validate the circumstances of their marginalization.For instance, when feminist legal scholars embrace aural metaphors such as "dialogue" and "conversation," are they not coining a legal language in large part born of the very conditions of subordination and oppression that they seek to challenge and change? Do not their words-for all their obvious appeal-at some level accept and endorse the sensory limitations that others (in this instance, men) have traditionally imposed on them?716 In this context, the true liberation of individuals from marginalized backgrounds arguably requires that they not arbitrarily limit themselves to-or preemptively define themselves by-aural metaphors that others have in some sense chosen for them.717 Undue reliance on aural metaphors might even distance outsider legal theoristsfrom other important aspects of their own cultural histories and experiences. No human culture-however constituted-is ever completely visual or aural, and we all run the risk of misunderstanding and distorting ourselves if we try to redefine the world-or law-along a single sensory line. Here, the historical experience of male, white, Anglo, and Protestant Americans may serve as both a lesson and a warning:in allowing themselves to have been drawn so strongly to visuality, many individuals from these backgrounds have largely forgotten or failed to appreciate the not-insignificant degrees of aurality inherent in their own traditions-an aurality which they are only now rediscovering in an increasingly aural age. Their extreme indulgence of the visual has thus come at a critical cost not only to others, but to themselves.

**Derrida/Levinas Alt- Weeping**

**crying allows for the human race to engage in a sphere of ethics- absent the presence of tears, inhuman values take shape and events like the holocaust become justified**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

Derrida illustrates his discussion of tears with an image of a woman at the cross who, weeping, covers her eyes with her hands in the gesture of the blindman, and yet we may think of ways of weeping in which the eyes are not covered, closed, or blinded. Levin, in a chapter of The Opening of Vision entitled "Crying for a Vision," conceives of seeing, and seeing in tears specifically, not as a form of knowing but of learning. His aim is to "to reintegrate the perceptivity of crying into the larger process of vision, letting it show itself as a moment of extremely important learning." Unlike Derrida, he sees tears not as blinding the eyes, but as enabling them to see in an ethical manner. He elaborates: "With the crying, I began to see, briefly, and with pain. Only with the crying, only then, does vision begin" (Opening of Vision 172): our eyes are not only articulate organs of sight; they are also the emotionally expressive organs of crying . . . . Is it merely an accidental or contingent fact that the eyes are capable of crying as well as seeing? Or is crying in the most intimate, most closely touching relationship to seeing? . . . What is the ontological significance of crying as a mode of visionary being? (PAGE ##?) Like Derrida, Levin notes that only human beings cry with their eyes, and thus that crying may well be what makes our eyes specifically human. Unlike Derrida, however, for Levin crying is also what makes our /vision/ human, rather than blinding that vision. Here it is not a matter of "imploration rather than vision" (Memoirs 125 [126]), but of vision which implores and responds to imploration. Levin argues that crying may "ennoble" vision in the human sphere, the sphere of ethics, and that the absence of the ability to shed tears may be what "marks off the inhuman." This inability describes the Nazi commandant and his victim, neither of whom could cry, having been dehumanized in very different ways. Levin writes: by the "inhuman" I mean the monstrous and the inwardly dead: the Nazi commandant, for example, and his victim, the Jew, locked into a dance of death, neither one, curiously, able to shed a tear: for different reasons, their eyes are dry, empty, hollow**.** What we have seen, we who are alive today, of human cruelty and evil demands that we give thought to this capacity for crying and examine, looking into ourselves, the nature--or character--of its relation to vision. What does this capacity make visible? What is its truth? What is the truth it sees? What does it know as a "speech" of our nature? How does it guide our vision? (PAGE ##)

**Aural Alternative**

**instead of relying on truth through what is seen, discourse should be shaped around the aural - A rejection of the ocular framing of the 1AC is necessary to prevent the deceptive nature of vision in favor of a sound, which is receptive to outside influences.**

**Jay 88** (Jay, Martin, History- UC Berkeley. "The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism." *Duke University Press*9.2 (1988): 310-13. Print.)

Ellul's hostility to vision, like that of many others in the anti-visual discourse, rests, as we have seen, on a concomitant encomium to hearing. Whereas images are like dead objects before us, hearing, they claim, engenders an intersubjective dialogue. Whereas sight encourages the hubris of a subject who can direct his gaze wherever he chooses, hearing entails a healthy receptivity to outside influences, in particular to the voice of God, which cannot be blocked by shutting the ears as we can close our eyes. Hearing calls for a response to clarify the mystery of the interlocutor. As such, it has an ethical import absent from the subject-object manipulation fostered by vision.9 True religion, Ellul concludes borrowing a dichotomy of Ricoeur's, is therefore derived from proclamation rather than manifestation (Ricoeur 1974).

**weeping is the form of blindness that reveals the proper eye- since weeping is the supreme function of the eye, tears allow for illumination and a greater understanding of ethics.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

In the final pages of Memoirs, Derrida describes weeping as a form of blindness which is the "truth" of the eyes, its most human function.[11 <#foot11>] He writes, now if tears /come to the eyes/, if they /well up in them/, and if they can also veil sight, perhaps they reveal, in the very course of experience, in this coursing of water, an essence of the eye, of man's eye, in any case, the eye understood in the anthropo-theological space of the sacred allegory. Deep down, deep down inside, the eye would be destined not to see but to weep. For at the very moment they veil sight, tears would unveil what is proper to the eye**.** And what they cause to surge up out of forgetfulness, there where the gaze or look looks after it, keeps it in reserve, would be nothing less than /al\_theia/, the /truth/ of the eyes, whose ultimate destination they would thereby reveal: to have imploration rather than vision in sight, to address prayer, love, joy, or sadness rather than a look or gaze. Even before it illuminates, revelation is the moment of the "tears of joy."(Memoirs 125 [126]) Weeping, as opposed to seeing, is the supreme function of human eyes for Derrida because, while other animals can see, only humans cry with their eyes (of course, while Derrida does not note this, other animals do cry and respond to the suffering of human and animal others /vocally/).[12 <#foot12>] As Derrida also observes, while not all humans can see, all humans, including the blind, can weep. Derrida notes that in representation it is most often women who weep, as in the representations of Mary and other women at the cross[13 <#foot13>], and so exemplary blindness, like that of the subject encountering the "visor effect" or the a-reciprocal gaze, is thus culturally feminine, as is ethics for Levinas. In Totality and Infinity, the feminine is related to the receptive or welcoming domesticity of ethics, while in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence ethics is associated with maternity**.** We may think once more of Mary's tears.

**when vision is blurred by tears, sight becomes an imprecise act, and the invisible imperialism of vision over the mind fades**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

Derrida concludes his book on blindness with the citation of Marvell's poem, "Eyes and Tears," the concluding line of which is "these weeping eyes, those seeing tears." Derrida's interlocutor asks, "tears that see . . . . Do you believe?" and Derrida answers, "I don't know, one has to believe" (129). Here, Derrida's "step" is hesitant, like that of the blindman or the myopic Cixous; he does not know, and he considers tears that /see/, and wishes to believe in this /vision/. Yet, unlike Marvell, Derrida's discussion of tears has not been of tears that see, nor of eyes in tears which see, but of tears which blind, and of other forms of blindness, of eyes which do not see. It is significant that wet, soft eyes are /not/ blind eyes, and that we can see through tears, and see tears. We see while in tears, and see others in tears, and cry because of what we see. Vision is not blinded by tears, but rather may respond in tears, tears which blur without fully obscuring, veil with transparent matter. Seeing in tears is thus an example of the way in which sight may be confused, unknowing, and thus not always an imposition of knowledge on the object of the gaze. Because we cry at what we see, and cry involuntarily, crying is an instance of sight which is passive, a response to the object of the gaze acting upon the eyes, an example of another way of seeing other than that which has dominated Western metaphysics.

**A seeing of tears is the only way to responsibly view the world-** **weeping rejects the visions of the 1ac through the blurring of the known. our relationship to the eye sets the ground for ethics.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

Levin suggests that Levinas sometimes recognizes that vision functions ethically, otherwise than as philosophers, including Levinas himself, have frequently assumed. For Levin, it is these other ways of seeing that need to be further developed, and not sight that must be rejected /tout court/. **He** cites T. S. Eliot's confession, "I see the eyes but not the tears/ This is my affliction," and it seems that this distinction may capture for Levin the two manners of seeing in question: a seeing that does not see tears, and a seeing that sees tears, and that perhaps sees /through/ or /in/ tears as well. Levinas has most often assumed the seeing eye that does not see tears, and that would not shed tears in response to what it sees, that imposes and absorbs rather than being passively struck by the other and her suffering. At other moments, however, and in his consistent use of visual metaphors to describe the ethical encounter, Levinas is developing new ways of thinking about seeing, and thus new ways of seeing in language and in history, ones that depend on an understanding of the second way of seeing, an ethically responsive seeing, a seeing of tears.

**\*\*\*****FRAMEWORK**

**Ontology Comes First**

**Only ontological examination can lead to true understanding of our world – their affirmative is a blind leap of faith which is doomed to failure**

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With the exchange of subjectivity for worldliness the problem of em­pathy is en route to being solved. But doubts persist. How does one really know that the disclosed world actually exists, that anything is what it seems to be and is not merely the product of one's imagination?

In other words, how does one overcome recurring Cartesian doubts about the reality of the world? Heidegger's answer is that one does not try. An unassailable demonstration of the world's existence is impossible. "A skeptic can no more be refuted," Heidegger straightforwardly admits, "than the Being of truth can be 'proved'" (BT 271). But refutation is unnecessary and unwarranted. Indeed, it is illegitimate, for implicit in any attempt to prove the existence of the world is the unfounded premise of an isolated subject engaged in the effort of proving. The skeptic's problem of worldly reality is effectively dissolved by Heidegger's refusal to entertain this premise. Heidegger refuses to posit the primacy of an isolated "I" or "ego" that subsequently comes to doubt the reality of its world, for any such doubting exposes its precondition, namely, an already-in-the-world doubter. Heidegger writes: "To wish to prove that the world exists is a misunderstanding of the very questioning. For such a questioning makes sense only on the basis of a being whose constitution is Being-in-the-world .... World in its most proper sense is just that which is already on hand for any questioning" (HCT 215). Faced with the impossibility and illegitimacy of proof of an external reality, we are not to assume that the only available alternative is a leap of faith. Any leap of faith would necessarily be grounded in the supposed preexistence of a leaper. Again, the (potentially faithful) subject is already illegitimately posited in distinction to its world. "With such presuppositions," Heidegger explains, "Dasein always comes 'too late'; for in so far as it does this presupposing as an entity (and otherwise this would be impossible), it is, as an entity, already in a world. 'Earlier' than any presupposition which Dasein makes, or any of its ways of behaving, is the 'a priori' character of its state of Being" (BT 249). The metaphysical tradition, as Heidegger summarizes the problem, must always first "bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it" (BT 250). Heidegger wants to be done with this metaphysical sleight of hand.

The metaphysical trick works only because it has been carefully prepared. First, Being is reduced to beings. Subsequently, beings are reduced to things defined only by their exactness, their "presence-at¬hand" (Vorhandenheit). With Being fully encompassed by presence-at hand, and this presence verifiable only by the perceiving subject, reality appears to the individual as a subjective experience, as being "merely 'inner'" (BT 250). Having first created the conditions for this subjectivist doubt, metaphysics then presents us with the impossible task of welding together subjective experience with objective reality. Rather than take on this task, Heidegger begins with a relation of Being-in-the- world. He rejects the metaphysical supposition, first articulated by Plato, that "man is, in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced 'into' a space" (BT 83). It is a grave mistake to separate epistemologically the perceiving and knowing subject from its concrete worldliness and it is a vain effort to try to bridge this chasm once it is formed. Hence Heidegger insists that we do not have bodies. Rather, "we 'are' bodily" (WPA 99). Likewise, we do not have a world. Rather, we "are" worldly.

Our concrete, spatial existence is not separate from our perceiving, mental existence. A structural unity exists (BP 164). Knowledge, therefore, is not something gleaned by mind from a separate, external reality, but something absorbed in the midst of worldly existence. In Heidegger’s words, "the Dasein is not also extant among things with the difference merely that it apprehends them. Instead, the Dasein exists in the manner of Being-in-the-world, and this basic determination of its existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all" (BP 164). The upshot is that "every act of knowing always already takes place on the basis of the mode of being of Dasein which we call Being-in, that is, Being-always-already-involved-with-a-world" (HCT 161). To know or to question is already to have evidence of one's situated, worldly being and to undercut any prerogative to a more radical doubt. Heidegger's understanding of Being-in-the-world allows him to reject both radical (Nietzschean) individualism and Cartesian dualism. Rethinking the nature of knowledge and perception is called for.

**The way we understand vision is critical in nature; vision’s invisible imperialism over the mind is crucial to understanding our own humanistic desires, and without further investigation we will continue on as a society, blind without hope of unlocking this key ontological concept.**

**Jay 88** (Jay, Martin, History- UC Berkeley. "The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism." *Duke University Press*9.2 (1988): 310-13. Print.)

Also speaking against the static, ahistorical implications of vision attributed to it by Ellul is the counter-evidence he himself supplies by citing the Epistle of Saint John mentioned earlier concerning the "lust of the eyes." A frequent source of hostility to vision has, of course, been the anxiety unleashed by what Augustine called "ocular desire"8 in the more ascetic, anti-hedonist critics of idolatry. What they have recognized is that desire is a source of restless dissatisfaction, preventing humans from contentment with their lot. As such, it provides a stimulus to living in an imagined future or perhaps returning to a lamented past. That is, it has a deeply temporalizing function. However we may conceptualize the multiple sources of desire-ontologically, psychologically, socially, mimetically or whatever-the recognition that vision plays a key role in generating and sustaining it means that sight, contra Ellul, must be understood as far more than an ahistorical valorization of presence. In fact, the current society of the spectacle is based on the stimulation of visual desire without true fulfillment in ways that suggest the complicity of sight and absence. In more positive terms, we might say that the metaphor of far-sightedness, which we use to indicate a capacity to plan for the future, also suggests a potentially temporal dimension of vision forgotten by those who emphasize only the gaze of Medusa.

**Ontology comes first- only by knowing oneself can we engage in action without destroying the authenticity of others**

**Thiele, 1995** –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, “Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics”, Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 56-57)

To become authentic, not only must we reject radical solitude but we must come to feel at home in a shared world. "Being-with-one-another is not a tenacious intrusion of the I upon the thou," Heidegger insists; "instead, existence as together and with one another is founded on the genuine individuation of the individual.... Individuation does not mean clinging obstinately to one's own private wishes but being free for the factical possibilities of current existence" (BP 288). Authenticity entails an acknowledgment of the with-world, not as a constraint on individuality but as the chief medium of its expression. Heidegger explicitly states that "only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self."? In other words, only through Being-with-others do we come to know ourselves as individuals. "Knowing oneself [Sichkennen]," Heidegger insists, "is grounded in Being-with" (BT 161). Because our social being is the ground for self-knowledge, it is also the ground for self-reflective activity. Whether this activity is cooperative, competitive, or individualistic, it is carried out in authenticity (and I might add here in freedom, though this will be explained and justified later) when it is self-consciously embedded in human plurality. Resistance to the full ramifications of our thrownness in the with world is inherent in everyday life. Such resistance is the normal means we have of coping with daily affairs. Ontological concerns force us disruptively to interrogate rather than pragmatically to engage our agency, to underline its contingency rather than establish its viability.They must be placed in abeyance while we cope. However, any self-conscious denial or rejection of our Being-with constitutes a delusive, or even (" pathological, inauthenticity. It marks the destructive attempt to gain one's autonomy at the expense of one's worldly contextuality. When Nietzsche engaged in exposing the illusion of community, he occasionally lapsed into this pathology. As Albert Camus observes, Nietzsche "confused freedom and solitude, as do all proud spirits."! In one of, his most-important and least-recognized confrontations with Nietzsche, Heidegger offers ontological therapy for this pathological confusion. The human mind and body evolved together in a world of codiscovered meaning. To exist humanly is to exist socially and culturally, in both a phenomenological and a historical sense. Thought, speech, and action, even when riddled with doubt and uncertainty, remain embedded in a shared world. In defending these statements, Heidegger exposes the illusion of solitude and deconstructs its sovereign freedom. The politics that I claim lies submerged in Heidegger's philosophy emerges from this deconstruction.

**Ontology Comes First- AT: Ontic Focus/ Truth Claims**

**Ontological examination forms the foundation for all ontic truth- our knowledge shapes the objects around us, not the other way around**

**Elden, 2003-** BSc (Hons) in Politics and Modern History (1994) and a PhD in Political Theory (1999), both from Brunel University*,* Professor in the department of Geography at Durham University(Stuart, *“*Foucault and Heidegger Critical Encounters”, Reading Genealogy as Historical Ontology, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London, Questia, REQ)

It is worth drawing out some of the potential implications of *Being and Time.* From the discussion of Newton, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is context dependent. [22](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740325" \t "_top)This does not mean that truth is only what an individual thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein.[23](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740325" \t "_top)Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. It clearly follows from this that if being changes or is historicized, so, too, is truth. It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in *Being and Time,* suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later Heidegger toward an understanding of the historical nature of being, of Dasein, which leads to a historicizing of truth. [24](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740325" \t "_top) Immediately after *Being and Time,* Heidegger turned his attention to Kant. In terms of the issues at stake here, the crucial part of this reading is the suggestion that Kant recognizes the ontic/ontological distinction. Heidegger suggests that ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger's own exercise as fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just of the ontic sciences, but of the ontologies that precede and found them. Ontological knowledge provides the a priori conditions for ontic knowledge; it concerns being rather than beings. [25](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740325" \t "_top)The predominant strain of Kant interpretation in Heidegger 's time was the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, which argued that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was a work of epistemology. This view, put forward by Hermann Cohen, Heinrich Rickert, and Paul Natorp, among others, held sway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Heidegger, lecturing at Marburg, tackles this interpretation head on: the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a theory of knowledge, but it is not a theory of ontic knowledge (i.e., experience) but rather of ontological knowledge—transcendental philosophy, ontology [26](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740325" \t "_top)Ontic knowledge (of beings) must conform to ontological foundations (being). This is the real meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution: that instead of our knowledge conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge. [27](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740326" \t "_top)

**Enframing Comes First**

**The way the world is ‘enframed’ in the technological age is a prior question to the impact of the affirmative- We must first examine how the world is being defined in relation to humans before making any knowledge claims things that will happen in the world- The impact is calculability leading to humans as standard reserve**

**Xuanmeng 2003** – Professor@ShanghaiAcademy for Social Sciences

(Yu.“Heidegger on Technology, Alienation and Destiny.” <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/III-11/chapter_ii.htm>.)

Further, since the essence of modern technology is from destiny, Heidegger sees not first of all alienated man, but a danger within the destiny itself. Man’s situation can be uncovered only by working out the above danger. Unfortunately, destiny, like revealing as such, is not something revealed, but conceals itself even while unconcealing. We cannot describe destiny as easily as we describe something revealed, for it is rather mystical. However, destiny reveals itself in various ways, as does Being. When the essence of modern technology holds sway, it blocks other ways of revealing as challenging to ordering; it even conceals technology as a way of revealing, because here everything seems to be revealed not by some mystic power, but in being challenged-forth by a certain order. Thus, "Where Enframing holds sway, the regulating and securing of standing in reserve marks all. They no longer even allow their own fundamental characteristic of revealing to appear." "Thus the challenging Enframing conceals not only a former way of revealing or bringing-forth, but it conceals itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, e.g., truth, comes to pass."26 One might question this as we are getting more and more knowledge by means of technology, but Heidegger distinguishes correct from true, maintaining that in technology "nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces" which "can indeed permit correct determinations", but "in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw."27

Based on the above consideration, Heidegger concludes "The destiny of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such."28 "Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense."29

Since technology has a relation with destiny, we must consider the situation of man in the age of technology. First of all, regarding the relationship between man and destiny Heidegger says that "Man is rather `thrown’ from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that existing in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. . . . Man is the shepherd of Being."30 Further, he maintains that "Man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destiny and so becomes one who listens and hears (Horender), and not one who is simply constrained to obey."31 Freedom means openness in which the unconcealing happens; when man listens and hears in the realm of destiny, he is in openness.

Because Enframing, which is the essence of modern technology, lies in destiny, everything seems to be all right for man in the age of modern technology, for there man is in destiny. However, as challenging and ordering, Enframing blocks the other possible ways of revealing, especially when it holds sway; otherwise, as the guard of destiny, "man might be admitted more, sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order to experience as his essence his need of belonging to revealing."32 Furthermore, when Enframing reigns, it blocks revealing as such, and hence does serious harm to man’s freedom.

In the light of the relationship between man and destiny, Heidegger points out another phenomenon which is also a danger to man, namely, that it is of the essence of modern technology that man seems to become the lord of the earth because here the revealing as such is blocked. As a result, man no longer holds that destiny is the source of the beings being unconcealed, but on the contrary the impression prevails that everything man encounters exists only as his own construct. This leads to a final delusion: "It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself."33 This is taken as a disadvantage by Heidegger for the true "advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being."34

**This will to dominate stemming from the hegemony of vision seeks to reduce beings to standing reserve, escaping this authoritarian gaze is a pre-requisite to politics.**

**Levin 99**. David Michael Levin 1999 Professor at the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, Ch.13 Keeping Foucault and Derrida in the Discourse of Metaphysics, 403-404

As critics of structuralism, a school of thought with a long history of complicity in the hegemony of representation, both philosophers exhibit ways of exercising, or practicing, their capacity for vision that make major contributions not only to the current critical discourse on modernity, but also to current efforts to think ourselves beyond the metaphysical culture, the metaphysical politics of modernity. The hegemony of vision driven by the will to power as the will to dominate and master is not all restricted to the discourse of philosophy, where it all installed a metaphysics of presence; the historical domination of vision is also manifest in, and as, a politics of domination, a politics of presence. To be mastered, all beings, and very being of beings, must be made constantly visible, constantly present, ready to hand.Thus the politics that is allied with the metaphysics of presence is a politics of invisible surveillance, disciplinary regimes of supervision, the totalitarian administration and authoritarian control of vision and visibility. Panopticism. I have suggested that both Derrida and Foucault make use of vision in a critique of vision. Thus, we must see that there is a potential in our vision that is opposed to the potential that our modern age has tended for the most part to realize. Our vision also has an emancipatory, or utopian, potential: a potential as a way of contributing to processes of enlightenment. In the reading I am proposing here, Derrida and Foucault each put into writing, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, their own versions of a Kantian critique of (the philosophical vision of) reason and a Kantian critique of (the) reason (in vision). In effect, they not only practice a politics of subversion, using vision itself to resist the willful character of vision, its dreams and images of domination, its ethics, its politics of violence, its metaphysics of presence; they also use their vision to examine the limits and antinomies of vision-and the rationality of vision with this type of character.

**Ocularcentrism is a hegemonic enframing that detaches us from the world we see- only by getting rid of this philosophical gaze can we come to appreciate the ways we affect our surroundings.**

**Levin 99** .David Michael Levin 1999 Professor at the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, Ch.13 Keeping Foucault and Derrida in the Discourse of Metaphysics, 400-401

Although I am not going to press the point here, since I have argued for it elsewhere, I do want to suggest that because of the technology-driven economy which prevails in the modern world, ocularcentrism became much more pervasive and much more powerful than it was in earlier times, and that, in keeping with the egocentric, possessive individualism of modernity, the will to power, the will, to dominate, that had always been a latent but very strong predisposition already operative in the very nature of vision, took possession of vision and suppressed other potentialities (e.g., the capacity to be touched and moved by what is seen, what is given to our beholding), so that the character of the vision that became hegemonic turned increasingly willful, and therefore, too, increasingly totalizing and reifying. In the modern period, this ocularcentrism, centering, grounding, and enframing us in a vision of power that alternates between the sovereign position of an outside spectator and the engaged position of a strictly instrumental optics, contributed to the hegemony of a sociocultural paradigm that until very recently subordinated epistemology and ontology to the will to power as the will to dominate and master. The philosophical gaze has always taken pride in its theoretical detachment, its abstractness, its ability to remain untouched and unmoved by what it sees, what it is given to behold. In modern times, it also takes pride in its empiricism, its extensions of the empire of science and technology. The domination of a vision with this character-the circulation and reproduction of such a vision within our culture-has also made a difference, and continues to make a difference, in the relations of power that structure the public and private spaces of our social interactions. In every social interaction, relations of power, and consequently relations structured by the politics of vision, are involved. All too often, our way of looking at others subjects them to a gaze bent on domination; similarly the numerous administrative extensions of this vision subject people to the visibility of a dominating visual regime. If we are willing to look at our world with care and thought, we will see it as we have made it. We will see that, and also how, the distinctive character of our modern vision has made a world that manifests and reflects this very same character. In other words, if the world that we see around us, when we look at it with a critical gaze, manifests and reflects aspects that appear wrathful, we should take the opportunity to look into the ways in which the character of our vision may be responsible for this condition. In the first instance, responsibility is the exercising of an ability to be responsive. It is a question of our response-ability. When the objects of our gaze look back at us, it is possible to see how our way of looking at them has affected them, making them how we see them, making them what they eventually become. Moreover, as Nietzsche pointed out in Beyond Good and Evil, “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not himself become a monster. When you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks back into you.” Having understood the necessity of a critique of the metaphysics of presence, Foucault and Derrida inscribe and trace the effects, if not also the activity, of a postmetaphysical vision, a way of seeing in which there is a different, historically novel Gestalt formation: the deconstruction of the structural moment, constituted by the simultaneous coemergenceof a sovereign subject and its other, takes place in the sites of sight, to the extent that the visionary subject-an individual, a group, or an institution of the state-accepts a different relationship to presence and absence, the visible and the invisible, and the framing of the ground, within the fields of exercise.

**AT: Essentialism**

**Generalizing about perspectives is risky- an involvement between both the known and the unknown is necessary to reject sameness and ideas of a static truth.**

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

Generalizing about the circumstances or perspectives shared by the members of any group is a risky business. One must steer between the Scylla of "essentialism" and the Charybdis of "antiessentialism," recognizing on the one hand that individuals falling into a single category may, as individuals, be different in many respects,214 while acknowledging on the other hand that diverse individuals sharing a particular identity may, fortunately or unfortunately, have had similar experiences or developed similar views by virtue of that identity or society's reaction to it.215 In this portion of the Article, I nonetheless focus on differences between groups more than on differences between individuals because I fear that following the latter course would compromise our appreciation of important power relationships that have historically operated for and against certain Americans by virtue of their gender, racial, ethnic, and religious associations. Here I should stress a point I previously made in passing:216 the group generalizations to be discussed are strictly limited by being contingent constructs of culture, not inevitable incidents of biology. They moreover illustrate differences of degree, rather than of kind. They reveal, if you like, human differences mediated by human sameness.**2**17Keeping all this in mind, I will spend the next few pages exploring how greater exposure to, dependence on, and even literal faith in writing have traditionally encouraged some American groups to embrace visuality more enthusiastically than have others. I will then examine how the members of these former groups have imposed their visuality on American legal culture and, in that course, on American legal language.

**\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS**

**Aff – No Impact**

**Viewing the world in an ocularcentric view is not bad**

**Gummer 02**

(Natalie, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies Mouat Professor of International Studies Beloit College, Book Review: Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahayana Buddhism. Globalbuddhism.org, 2002, 6/24/11. <http://www.globalbuddhism.org/6/gummer05.htm> CH)

In "Conclusions and Occlusions," McMahan presents an appropriately cautious yet thought-provoking assessment of the contribution that the primacy of vision in Mahayana Buddhism might make to broader discussions of ocularcentrism in the academy. While scholars have generally viewed the ocularcentrism of the Modern West in a rather negative light, ascribing to this sensory predilection the tendency toward objectification of the other that underlies Enlightenment thought and imperialism, McMahan sees in Buddhist ocularcentrism more positive potential. While comparable claims to universal knowledge can also be discerned in Buddhist traditions, "the refusal of most Buddhist schools in India to attempt to ground philosophical discourse in supposed ontological foundations may have averted some of the problems inherent in modern Western ocularcentrism" (p. 191). Thus, McMahan concludes, we should avoid generalizing about ocularcentric orientations in different cultural and historical configurations. As should be evident from the preceding description, McMahan seeks to weave together a number of seemingly distinct issues and theoretical orientations in a creative and provocative manner in order to illuminate historical and conceptual connections among a wide range of texts and practices. In the vast scope of this project lies both the strength and the weakness of Empty Vision. McMahan's study offers significant insight into visual metaphors for knowledge and their generative applications. His attention to the possible relationships among the paradoxical dialectic employed in Perfection of Wisdom sutras, the visionary literature of the Mahayana, and Tantric visualization practices enable us to see significant and mutually illuminating continuities among doctrinal, textual, and ritual practices. McMahan constructs an interpretive lens through which numerous Buddhist texts can be read, and provokes a much keener awareness of the presence and potential soteriological function of visual metaphors and imagery. McMahan's argument that visual metaphors become concretized in devotional and visualization practices is especially productive in its potential to enrich scholarly appreciation both of the ritual aspects of literature, and of the literary aspects of ritual practices.

**Aff – Inevitable**

**Occularcentrism is inevitable**

**Kavanagh 04**

(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/24/11, abstract, <http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract> CH)

There is a contemporary scepticism towards vision-based metaphors in management and organization studies that reflects a more general pattern across the social sciences. In short, there has been a shift away from ocularcentrism. This shift provides a useful basis for metatheoretical analysis of the philosophical discourse that informs organizational analysis. The article begins by briefly discussing the vision-generated, vision-centred interpretation of knowledge, truth, and reality that has characterized the western philosophical tradition. Taking late 18th-century rationalism as the high-point of ocularcentrism, the article then presents a metatheoretical framework based on three trajectories that critiques of ocularcentrism have subsequently taken. The first exposes the limits of the metaphor by, paradoxically, taking it to its limits. The second trajectory seeks to displace the primordial position of the ocular metaphor and replace it with an alternative lexicon based on other human senses. Last, the third trajectory describes how the Enlightenment ocular characterization of the visual and mental worlds has effectively been inverted in the postmodern moment.

**Aff – Vision Good**

**Vision and its metaphors are critical to poltics**

**Kavanagh 04** (Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/24/11, pg 3, <http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract> CH)

Plato made the important distinction between the sense of sight, which he grouped with the creation of human intelligence and soul, and that of the other senses, which he placed with man’s material being. Not only was sight ‘by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived’ (Plato 1974: VII 507), but sight, unlike the other senses, had a theological dimension as it was directly connected, via light, to the sun deity: ‘the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight’ (Plato 1974: VII 508). Plato also made the critical division between the visible world and the intelligible world (1974: VII 509–510), although his description of the latter is always based on ocular metaphors: for him, the ‘soul is like the eye’ (1974: VII 508) and things in the intelligible domain ‘can only be seen with the eye of the mind’ (1974: VII 510). His well-known myth of the cave was especially important in the development of the ocularcentric paradigm because it demonstrated how the immediately experienced sight of one’s eyes (the visible world) is impure, in contrast to the pure Truth that is only attainable through the speculative ability of the mind’s eye (the intelligible world). Plato’s interpretation of the allegory is that ‘the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and ... the journey upwards [is] the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world’, which, importantly, he always describes using light, sight, shadows, and vision, for example:

**Vision is critical to the establishment of a subject object dichotomy. This construction of enlightenment provides critical reflections and is fundamentally essential to productive politics**

**Kavanagh 04**

**(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/24/11, pg 4-5,** [**http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract**](http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract) **CH)**

So impressed was Democritus by Plato’s reasoning that he supposedly blinded himself in order to ‘see’ better with his intellect and thus discern truths denied to his normal vision. Likewise, Plato’s suspicion of e-vision was the reason for his hostility to all mimetic arts, which he saw as a form of deception. Many centuries later, Descartes was equally distrustful of what he saw and, like Plato, he rejected the visible world (e-vision) as a potential or actual illusion. Ironically, his alternative (the sovereign power of reason) was essentially a model based on the metaphorics of vision (the mind’s eye), in which the properties of the visible were transferred into the mental domain. Descartes then used this model-in-thought to construct the visible world (as in, for example, his Dioptric (Descartes and Olscamp 1965)). The ocular paradigm was further enhanced by the discovery of perspectivism in the 16th century and Newton’s work on optics in the 17th century. As Berger (1972: 16) put it: ‘Perspective makes the single eye the center of the visible world. Everything converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. The visible world is arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.’ In time, the modern individual (the ‘I’) came to be centred on, if not abbreviated to, the eye (‘I’ equals eye). This infatuation with the visual reached a new zenith during the Enlightenment (a term that is itself based on an ocular metaphor) when the rationalist understanding that the mind’s eye (Reason) could potentially ‘see’ the Truth came to dominate intellectual thought. For rationalists, ‘a certain class of reasons ... carry their own credibility with them: they will be visible because they glow by their own light’ (Barnes and Bloor 1982: 29). What is interesting for our purposes is that many of the Enlightenment’s central precepts, such as objectivism, reflection, critical rationality, and subjectivism, are fundamentally based on the primacy accorded to the visual. In particular, the dominant ocularcentric paradigm promulgated during the Enlightenment worked to elevate static Being over dynamic Becoming and fixed essences over ephemeral appearances. This ontological consequence is because, as Jonas (1966) has explained, sight is essentially the sense of simultaneity, of seeing a wide field at one moment, while hearing is significantly more temporal because it operates through intertwining past, present, and future into a meaningful whole. In addition, sight, unlike hearing, leaves the visible undiminished by its action, creating a unique sense of otherness. Moreover, the phenomenon of distancing, which is the most basic function of sight, helps create the belief that objects are distant from and neutrally apprehended by sovereign subjects, which, in turn, provides the basis for the subject-object dualism that is so typical of Greek and western metaphysics. The dominance of visual metaphors continues to this day in contemporary academic discourse: in conceptualizing we seek insight and illumination; we speculate, inspect, focus, and reflect; and when we speak of points of view,synopsis, and evidence, we may forget or be unaware of these concepts’ sightbased etymology. The ‘spectatorial’ nature of modern epistemology is also evident when we consider that the word theory has the same root as the Greek word for ‘theatre’, theoria, meaning to look at attentively, or to behold. Likewise, writing is largely a visual exercise, in contrast to speaking, which is centred on the sense of hearing. Thus, in modern philosophy, the eye is the hinge point between the subjective and the objective, the window to the world and the mirror of the soul. In this spectatorial epistemology, the ocular subject has become the ultimate source of all being, with ‘the world’ being seen, reflected in, represented by, objectified, and instrumentalized by the sovereign subjective self.

**Occularcentrism is key to nationalism and hegemony**

**Kavanagh 04**

**(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/25/11, pg 6,** [**http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract**](http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract) **CH)**

While Abrams asserts that the two metaphors are ‘antithetic’ to one another, for us they are both fundamentally ocular, or sight based. Moreover, the Romantics followed in the tradition of the rationalists by invariably presenting optimistic, progressive, and, one might say, innocent visions of the future. Prototypical of these creative and imaginative visions was the 19thcentury catalogue of utopian texts that provided a life-force and inspiration for many subsequent political and social movements. While one has to be wary of reductionism, it is clear that the Romantic movement of the early 19th century provided an important philosophical basis for both socialism and nationalism, the two primary movements of radical political change in the late 19th century and throughout the 20th century (Jones 1974). In particular, Romantic literature, with its celebration of the vernacular and folk traditions, certainly inspired nationalistic feeling throughout Europe in the 19th century. Moreover, in terms of ocular metaphors, both nationalism and socialism were still founded on a ‘fixed point of view’, or what Trimble refers to as ‘the Platonic pursuit of abstract perfection’. ‘I say Platonic because that savage pursuit of abstract perfection starts in the western world with Plato’s Republic. It rises to a plateau with the French and Russian revolutions. It descended to new depths with the Nazis and is present in all the national, ethnic and religious conflicts current after the collapse of communism, itself the most determined and ruthless Platonic experiment in perfecting the economic system whatever the cost in human life.’ (Trimble 1998) Marshal McLuhan identified a further connection between ocularcentrism and nationalism when he noted the important role played by print technology during the 19th century: ‘by print a people sees itself for the first time. The vernacular in appearing in high visual definition affords a glimpse of social unity co-extensive with vernacular boundaries’ (1962: 217, original emphasis). Elsewhere he reiterated the link when he asserted that ‘Nationalism depends upon or derives from the ‘fixed point of view’ that arrives with print, perspective, and visual quantification’ (McLuhan 1962: 220).

**The Occular is critical to self relfection and change. The metaphor can criticize the self-indulgent and self-centered postmodernist – plan key to make sure your alternative is not bougie**

**Kavanagh 04**

(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/25/11, pg 7-8, <http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract> CH)

Foucault was just as averse to the ‘spectator’ theory of knowledge, but his line of argument was quite different. Foucault’s insight was that while the subject was constituted as a detached, contemplative, disinterested, autonomous entity in a spectatorial epistemology, his historical studies showed how the subject was better understood as being incarcerated and, indeed, constituted by various technologies of visualization. For him, vision becomes supervision: ‘the gaze that sees is the gaze that dominates’ (Foucault 1973: 39). In other words, the power to see, to make visible is the power to control, which is why Foucault sees knowledge and power as fundamentally indwelling. In the Birth of the Clinic (subtitled An Archaeology of Medical Perception), he argued that the medical gaze took hold once pathological anatomy and the autopsy (which was essentially a project of spatializing disease) came to be accorded central status in medical practice after 1800. In Discipline and Punish, he mapped out the 19th-century shift from sovereign to disciplinary power: the shift from ‘governmentality organized around the gaze of the sovereign to governmentality organized by surveillance, panopticism, the normalising gaze dispersed throughout the social system, maintaining civil order’ (Levin 1993a: 20–21). In a disciplinary regime, ‘power is exercised by virtue of things being known and people being seen ... by surveillance rather than ceremonies’ (Foucault and Gordon 1980: 154), and in this regime, individuals are no longer autonomous entities, but are better understood as being constituted by technologies of visualization, such as the examination, which, in turn, includes self-observation, selfexamination, and self-monitoring. Notwithstanding Foucault’s antipathy to vision, his archaeological and genealogical methods are fundamentally ocular (in so far as they make visible the correlations between vision and truth, and vision and power, respectively) and he makes generous use of spatial metaphors throughout his writings (see Flynn (1993) for development of this). Other writers have also followed a similar path, critiquing modern epistemology, but still retaining the ocular metaphor as central to their ‘new’ paradigm. Typical of this approach would be the so-called ‘reflexive turn’ taken by many sociologists of science during the 1980s on the back of the postmodern critique of modern epistemology (see, for example, Woolgar 1988). One difficulty with this project is that the concept of reflection is itself based on an ocular metaphor, which is precisely why Winner (1993: 373) dismissed the reflexive turn as ‘that endlessly enchanting hall of mirrors’. Within this group we might also locate the more self-indulgent and selfcentred of the postmoderns.

**Aff – Alternative Cannot Solve**

**Rejecting the alt is key to solving for the hegemony the sight**

**Kavanagh 04**

(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/25/11, pg 9, <http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract> CH)

It is arguable that organization theory and management studies have always embraced this ‘narrative turn’. For instance, the influential writings of Chestar Barnard (1938) and, more generally, case studies are, in essence, based on a narrative rather than a logico-scientific form of knowledge (Bruner 1986). At the same time, positivist epistemology has maintained an almost hegemonic position in these fields. This hegemony has come under attack, especially through the influence of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) famous framework, and, more latterly, through organization theory’s own narrative turn (Van Maanen 1988; Czarniawska-Joerges 1998; Gabriel 2000).

**alt can’t solve: there is no alternative to the metaphor to light- blindfolding sight and blurring our vision can never escape the metaphorical aspect of light.**

**Taylor 06.** Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. Web. 22 June 2011. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>.

What these examples show is that, as Derrida argues in "Violence and Metaphysics**,"** the theory of vision and light as violent is but a metaphor, even if it is one of the fundamental metaphors which has shaped our history, experience, and thought, and which has served too often as an alibi for real violence. Nonetheless, I have argued that Levinas's persistent use of visual metaphors throughout his work despite his own critique of visuality shows not only that this metaphor is, as Derrida says, inescapable, but also that it can be transformed to describe other ways of seeing that we already experience. Derrida notes that there is no alternative to the metaphor of light, and certainly night and blindfolded synagogues are not such alternatives, and yet we can think of options other than the binding and blinding of eyes, and of other forms of light than the penetrating gaze of the sun. As such, we can develop new metaphors of light and seeing, moonlit metaphors of bewildered and responsive vision. One such image of vision I have developed in this essay is that of seeing tears and of seeing in tears, an image that, as seen, occurs briefly in Levinas's discussion of the sculptures of Sacha Sosno, and equally briefly in the conclusion of Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind. As Derrida concludes Memoirs, so I would like to conclude here with the suggestion that we need to believe in "these weeping eyes, those seeing tears," and in a visionary ethics.

**You can’t drop kick occularcentrism**

**Kavanagh 04**

(Donncha, Senior Lecturer in Management at University College Cork, the National. University of Ireland, Cork, Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis, sagepub.com, 2004, 6/26/11, pg 16, <http://oss.sagepub.com/content/25/3/445.abstract> CH)

Notwithstanding the extensive criticisms of Enlightenment rationality and ocularcentrism that have been summarized above, there is much evidence that the ocularcentric paradigm is now stronger than ever. For instance, new information and communication technologies permit spectacularizations that have not been possible before (Baudrillard 1983; Vattimo 1992; Debord 1983), while globalization and just-in-time production are both predicated on the existence of intensive surveillance and supervisory technologies — constituting a form of electronic panoptica. Furthermore, there are many indications that western thought, with its attendant practices of objectification and subjectification, is colonizing new locales and discourses at an accelerating rate, creating what Power (1999) has referred to as an audit society that seeks to make everything visible. In addition, the prevalence of fervent nationalism shows that teleological meta-narratives based on a ‘fixed point of view’ still provide a pervasive and potent organizing logic across the world. Moreover, it is clear that, no more than nuclear technology can be ‘unlearned’, one cannot simply drop-kick western philosophy into oblivion because one is uneasy about its ocularcentrism. Likewise, this text is peppered with the language of a spectatorial epistemology (aspect, insight, points of view, perspective, clear, see, focus, and so on), although if we were to dispense with this language totally, we would probably be either silent or unintelligible. The lesson, maybe, is that it is just as inappropriate to dismiss the vision metaphor (which would be impossible anyway) as to be transfixed by it.

**Aff -Permutation**

**Perm: Do both- rather than radically changing our perception of the world and prioritizing one sense over another, a consideration of the implications of rejecting sight should come first.**

**Jay 88** (Jay, Martin, History- UC Berkeley. "The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism." *Duke University Press*9.2 (1988): 310-13. Print.)

In short, despite Ellul's rigid dichotomy, the implications of privileging one sense over another are not so straightforward. Rather than essentializing sight, hearing or any other sense, it is far more fruitful to tease out their multiple, even contradictory potentials and recognize that different cultures at different moments have stressed some over others. At present, if the recent popularity of hermeneutics is any indication,11 we may well be entering a new period of distrusting vision, an era reminiscent of the other great iconoclastic moments in Western culture. Before we allow the pendulum to swing too far in the new anti-visual direction, however, it may well be worth pondering the contradictory implications of the humiliation of the eyes. Some of these have been touched on in our discussion of Ellul's extreme version of ocularphobia. In the remainder of this essay, I will focus on three others, which have particular resonance in the development of hermeneutics.

**Permutation solves, by repositioning our gaze we are capable of overcoming hegemonic forms of vision**

David Michael **Levin 1999** Professor at the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, Ch.13 Keeping Foucault and Derrida in the Discourse of Metaphysics, pgs.438-440

One cannot overestimate the significance of this text for understanding the evolution of Foucault’s way of working with, and working through, the problematic of light and vision. What Foucault discovered in reading Nietzsche was an accurate articulation of the very technique, the very style of looking and seeing, that he had already been practicing, but only unconsciously and gropingly. Reading Nietzsche, then, he learned more about how and what to look for, how and what to notice and observe, and how to clarify, mirror, and reflect what he saw in a way that is critical, subversive, and effective. And he learned something about the importance of recognizing and multiplying perspectives, thereby decentering the “sovereign gaze,” the gaze that figures not only in traditional historiography but also in the discourse of metaphysics and in the politics of all monarchies and hierarchies. Positioned in the margins and on the borderlines, positioned, always, where one would least expect it, the Foucauldian gaze exposes the secret workings of power. Moved only by the light of truth, it turns our attention to the cruelty and violence we do not want see. It insists on looking at what others have kept invisible. It questions both the visible and the invisible, requiring that we justify the institutions that determine them. Henceforth, the sovereign gaze of an ocularcentric metaphysics, a gaze whose will to power pressures this discourse to require absolute presence in a center of focus, and whose character readily collaborates with social processes to install authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of power, will be challenged and resisted by a positioning of the gaze, and a way of looking and seeing, that put into effect a continual process of decentering and dispersion. The anarchic gaze that organizes Foucault’s discourse and speaks from its marginal and invisible positions: this gaze, with its strange angles and optics, subverts the hegemonic vision. To understand how it works, we must adopt its positions, its angles, its optics; and we must follow its radically democratic proliferation of perspectives and viewpoints, its demonstration of a gaze that enjoys exceptional mobility and freedom, and its vigilance as a theoretically informed vision capable of subjecting regimes of power to continuous public scrutiny. What Foucault learned from Nietzsche continued the evolution of his thinking about light and vision, and it encouraged him to put into practice a sight singularly well adapted to what I would call his “politics of positions.” In closing “What is Enlightenment?” an essay that represents his homage to Kant, Foucault asks: “How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?” Foucault’s answer, I suggest, would be that there cannot be any disconnection, but capabilities-our willingness, for example, and our capacity to look and see things fearlessly and honestly, as they actually are,-can nevertheless grow and develop in ways that make them powerful and disciplined challenges to oppressive forms of power. Sight is not only a natural endowment; it is also the gift of capacity that can be developed. And since it is a “power” in its own right, sight can learn and mature in its discipline, its vigilance, its fearlessness, its ability to exercise its open freedom, its skillfulness and resourcefulness as a critical witness to power. It is precisely because the growth of our capabilities-our sight, for example-cannot be disconnected from relations of power that these capabilities can function critically and as a source of resistance. This function is made possible precisely when, and precisely where, the growth of our capacities encounters oppressive orders of power and suffers as a result.

**Aff – Ontology Bad**

**Alternative doesn’t solve: An ontological focus will forever delay political action**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 139-140)

This we might interpret as faceless description without meaning, commitment without purpose, and theory without reason. As William Connolly notes, Ashley creates a poststructuralism bereft of logic, direction, or mission, where “theory does not ‘impose’ a general interpretation; it does not offer ‘a guide’ to the ‘transformation’ of life ‘on a global scale.’” Well might we ask then, what does it do? After all, is this not the purpose of theory? Apparently not. It is enough for Ashley that we simply fret against transcendental grounds, universal projects, and grand designs. But, as Connolly observers, buy imposing “this set of interwoven self-restrictions, Ashley may have reduced ‘poststructuralism’ to one perpetual assignment to ‘invert the hierarchies’ maintained in other theories. One might call this recipe for theoretical self-restriction ‘post-ponism.’ It links the inability to establish secure ontological ground for a theory with the obligation to defer indefinitely the construction of general theories of global politics. And it does so during a time when the greatest danger and contingencies in the world are global in character.

**Because different people have different conceptions of a good value of life, politics cannot be responsible for creating a good value to life. Any attempt to do so will be totalitarian**

**Szacki 1996 (Jerzy, Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University. Liberalism After Communism, p. 197)**

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that – as Joseph Raz wrote – ‘there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible’ It recognizes that—as John Rawls put it—‘a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’. What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of; he or she is ready to acknowledge that ‘now this variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different’. Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, ‘political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.’

**Prioritizing ontology and epistemology over specific policy formulations paralyzes problem solving measures ensuring short-term annihilation**

David Owen Millennium Journale of international studies 2002 “Re-Orientation Internatioal Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulatesthe idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**Privileging ontology over everything fails to prevent violence – it doesn’t question freedom in terms of violence**

Child et al 95 (Mark, PhD Candidate in Instructional Psychology @ BYU, "Autonomy or Heteronomy? Levinas's Challenge to Modernism and Postmodernism," <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/Educational-Theory/Contents/45_2_Child_etal.asp>)

If violence and oppression are to be avoided, the work of securing autonomy must itself be called into question; in other words, the autonomy of the "I," the very act of freedom, must be called into question and shown to be unjust. While the ontology of situatedness does indeed mark, name, and argue for the conditions of possibility for "difference" or "otherness," it does not call the freedom of the I into question ethically; does not refer to the shame that the I feels in seeing its use of freedom to be murderous and usurpatory. Of course, there is a sense in which the ontology of situatedness does call the freedom of the I into question. By articulating the limits of situated existence it questions the I existentially. But this actually works to secure freedom rather than call it into question. Knowing the ontological limits becomes itself a freedom; it enables self-rule. That is, "knowing" places the knower in a position both to comprehend the ontological limits of Being (and thus beings, which renders others comprehensible in these terms) and to take up resolutely that which is afforded, disclosed, or given within one's own situation. In other words, "knowing" places one in a position to take up resolutely and attenuate one's autonomy. The appeal to situatedness articulates the limits and possibilities of Being. But this ontology cannot account for the calling into question ethically of the very " cans" and I/cannots," the very freedoms, of Being. This issue is at the heart of the criticism Levinas made of Martin Heidegger, perhaps the most influential "postmodern" philosopher of this century. In his monumental work, Being and Time, Heidegger "calls attention to the forgetting of Being," and attempts to (re)establish the "preeminence of ontology over metaphysics" (PII, p. 53).11 Heidegger argues that in seeking the metaphysical we have forgotten the here and now, earthly existence; we have forgotten Being. What is needed, he contends, is an interrogation and recovery of the meaning of Being.12 Thus he takes up the question: What is the meaning of Being?13 His response to this question is to reformulate our thinking in terms of the verbal form of "Be-ing" rather than the nominative form "Being." This enables him to interpret "Being" as always already relating; always already interpreting; always already "there," Be-ing. Heidegger's work brilliantly illuminates and renders intelligible what situated existence might mean. Dasein (literally, "Being-there") is Heidegger's way of referring to human existence as located, or situated, within and as a horizon. One's location as "Being-there" affords possibilities, or freedoms; it reveals and conceals. The freedom in "Being-there" consists in that which is afforded by one's place. in other words, the autonomy of Dasein is extended and maintained by taking up resolutely that which is afforded within the limits of Being-there. Heidegger's work exactingly and profoundly describes and analyzes many important aspects of what Levinas refers to as the self(same), or the play of earthly, sensuous existence (though the same and Dasein are not strictly synonymous). Levinas's criticism of Heidegger's work is that his phenomenology illuminates the freedom of the self(same) in terms of Dasein, but does not refer to the possibility of the self(same) having its freedom called into question in other than ontological terms. Levinas argues that the ontology of situated, temporal, embodied existence does not concern itself with the experience of having one's freedom, the freedom of the 1, put into question such that one's actions, or potential actions, are shown to be unjust, violent, or evil. In other words, it overlooks the experience where one may, ontologically speaking, choose to commit violence, but where one concomitantly " knows" that doing so would be unjust; where one is therefore awakened to a shame in regard to one's acts or potential acts. In Heidegger the focus remains on articulating the freedom of Being, and in resolutely taking up the freedom which is disclosed within the limits of Dasein. Thus, argues Levinas, he continues the work of securing and extending autonomy: When [Heideggerl sees man possessed by freedom rather than possessing freedom, he puts over man a neuter term [the freedom in Be-ing] which illuminates freedom without putting it in question. And thus he is not destroying, but summing up a whole current of Western philosophy (PII, p. 51). The tendency, then, in postmodernism to place highest priority on ontology is problematic to the degree that it tends to "illuminate freedom without putting it in question" ethically. The problem is not with ontology per se, but with the work of making ontology preeminent; of subsuming ethics in ontology. That is, we can make an ontological argument for ethics such as, a teacher cannot justify her teaching practices by appealing to a universal notion of what constitutes real learning because such universals are illusions. But an appeal to the ontology of situatedness does not account, for instance, for the teacher who, in her concrete relations with a particular child, finds her "project" deeply questioned and feels she ought not, in spite of her own good reasons to the contrary, do what she has the "authority" to do and the freedom to do. Moreover, it does not help us to get a sense for what might be happening when the teacher, who decides in fact to go ahead and do what she feels she ought not do, feels a need to justify her actions. The ontology of situatedness is only suited to giving an account of ethics in terms of ontological, but not ethical, affordances and constraints. That is, ideas such as justice, goodness, and peace are argued for by showing, for instance, how our place in the web of Being is one in which we are always already related and relating to the world around us. Thus, being situated means being interdependent. Understanding our interdependence should render us more concerned about living peaceably within our respective situations. But what does "peaceably" mean? If we are seeking the "truth" of this word in the direction of autonomy, then we will seek to know what living peaceably "is" ontologically so that we may then know how to live. But, as we have argued, the work of securing autonomy by means of ontology can lead to violence and oppression.