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# District 9 Spoken 1AC

**In 1982 a massive starship appeared over Johannesburg, South Africa. South Africans and people all over the world were alarmed and terrified, not knowing for sure whether the -- raterrestrials were here to benevolently share their knowledge of the universe with us or were here to conquer Earth.**

**To humanity’s profound surprise, neither of these scenarios happened. Instead, the ship just sat there hovering over South Africa. It did not communicate or respond to efforts to contact it.**

**Finally, after 3 months of heated debate and deliberation, the international community hesitantly decided that they had to literally go into the ship to see who or what was inside and determine the motivations for their presence on Earth.**

**Once a team of engineers was finally able to cut their way through five feet of metal, the were shocked to discover not a supremely intelligent and powerful race of beings but rather a huge population of desperate and helpless aliens, starving and dying.**

**There were more than a million of them. Somehow, the aliens on board had lost their leadership and intelligencia, probably due to disease of some kind, and were powerless to return to where they came from or maintain the basic needs for their survival.**

**In the face of such suffering and desperation, there was an outpouring of international humanitarian sentiment to help the dying aliens. It was clear that aid efforts could not be carried out on the ship, and so the alien population was transported to an area on the ground in Johannesburg where relief efforts were concentrated into a kind of refugee camp, and before they knew it it had become a slum. The camp was called DISTRICT 9**

**Relations between the aliens and the local population quickly turned sour amidst a climate of fear, a climate that soon became outright hostility. The “prawns”, as the aliens were called, were thought to be aggressive and violent, and anti-alien riots soon erupted.**

**The international community responded by enclosing the camp in a highly militarized border for the purported protection of both the aliens and the local population. Their presence came to be thought of as a burden, and the people of Johannesburg began to either want the aliens to either be removed or eradicated.**

**Today, District 9 is caught up in a web of power relations. The aliens are neither inside nor outside the law; they are both beings to be protected as well as feared and contained through a legal system of racial segregation. Given the surging hatred of the aliens by the local population of Johannesburg, the international community has no choice but to relocate the aliens to District 10, a newly formed, modern day version of a concentration camp.**

**This is the thesis of the film District 9, a movie directed by a South African, filmed in South Africa, and set in South Africa. The location of the film is not a co-incidence: the movie enacts a kritik of the logic of racial otherization that was the core logic of the Apartheid System in South Africa. The apartheid system was a legal regime of racial separation that lasted from 1948 to 1994.**

**The South African metaphor is uniquely potent because it is one of the most explicit cases of the -- remes of racism at the governmental level, where racial categories where encoded in all levels of government structure for decades—this makes the South African cont-- ripe for application to other racial cont-- s because, just like in District 9, the bureaucratic system of management creates an ethical distancing that reduces the other to a disposable level, enabling genocide**

**Muhr 2000**

(Sara Louise, PhD Copenhagen Business School, “Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulnerability of Diversity Management”, <http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/7736/Sara_Louise_Muhr.pdf?sequence=1>)

In this way, the atrocities, which happened during the apartheid regime, was allowed to happen to a great -- end because of what Bauman (1993, 1999) inspired by Levinas called moral distance. Traditional ethics based on guidelines, codes or calculations tends to create moral distance and undermine personal morality (Parker, 1998, Jones et al., 2005, Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995, Bauman, 1993, Jones, 2003, ten Bos, 1997). Ten Bos and Willmott (2001) -- ends this argument as they point out that bureaucracy allows and encourages its employees to develop what they call a ‘calculating instinct’ instead of a ‘moral instinct’. This moral distance is -- ended in bureaucratic organizing where decisions seldom rely on the individual moral of the employee, but instead on specific rules or virtues defined by a management. Management decides what constitutes a ‘virtuous’ character and thus a ‘good’ employee. The horizon of a particular action is thus not determined by how the actor himself thinks about its effects, but by its being in conformity with the rules laid down by those who occupy a higher rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. (ten Bos, 1997: 999) Distance—both geographical and hierarchical—is in this way following Jones et al. (2005) a strategy that often lead to the disposal of personal care. Bureaucrats have to obey orders at all times, and orders are not questioned by a sense of personal moral (Kaulingfreks, 2005a). On this view, actors attempt to achieve moral neutrality through both physical and hierarchical distance (Jones et al., 2005). The face of the other person disappears when there is a distance in between the self and the other; and we are exposed to what both Bauman and Levinas would denote as an effacement. In effacement, the face disappears and individuals are only seen as categories or entities to be managed. The idea about moral distance created by bureaucracy is put to its -- reme by Bauman (1999), who discusses how the holocaust was morally possible. Holocaust, for Bauman is the cruelest example of how a large number of people can be subjected to an essentially utilitarian calculation, where the only concern is how the best means available can meet a particular end. The remarkable question following Jones et al. (2005: 90) is how bureaucratic organizations manage to encourage normally moral people to behave in what would otherwise be regarded as immoral ways. Ten Bos relates to this when he argues: that it was normal and civilized people and not inveterate sadists who paved the way for Treblinka. These normal and civilized people were working for bureaucratic organizations: They could destroy a whole people by sitting at their desks. (Ten Bos, 1997: 997) Kaulingfreks follows this line of argumentation with the claim that bureaucratic “institutions numb our moral impulses and dehumanize us. They make us forget ourselves in order to rely solely on rules and obedience to laws and management experts” (2005a: 38). In this way, a business ethics build on bureaucratic distance, removes employees from their personal sense of morality. On this view, ethics does not encourage moral actions; in fact it undermines it, because its foundation rules out the personal moral responsibility. As long as we act solely in conformity with rules, we are ‘only’ legally responsible, but we are never morally responsible. Although South Africa did not experience something as horrible as the Holocaust or the genocides in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the cruelties in South Africa can be compared to these other cruelties for being targeted systematically against a particular group of the population. The above mentioned analyses of the Holocaust and moral distance can therefore also be applied to the apartheid regime in South Africa. What happened in South Africa was also affected by a ‘numbed personal morality’ and a ‘moral distance’, and its scale was not due to the entire white population being inherently evil, but because of an ingrown legal structure, which supported segregation—a segregation, which was (and to a large degree still is) so deeply rooted in the people, that even the black population supported the basic ideas of the segregation policy (Bhargava, 2002). Many have also told stories of how they were never true supporters of apartheid. But as it was something so many people grew up with and for many it took quite some time to realize what in fact had happened (Nagy, 2002).

**Even as the film’s South African cont-- gives the metaphor of race a powerful potency as a social reflexive criticism, the personification of otherness in the figure of the alien enables the film to provoke insights and critical thought concerning our most basic values and issues such as social inequality, racism, segregation, encampment, science, and militarism. It is only through the science fiction narrative of aliens that such a social critique can issue forth.**

**Michaud 2007**

(Michael A.G., a U.S. Foreign Service officer for 32 years before turning full time to writing, served as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and Technology, Director of the State Department’s Office of Advanced Technology, Minister-Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and as Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology at the American Embassy in Paris. “Contact with Alien Civilizations Our Hopes and Fears about Encountering -- raterrestrials”, Date Accessed: 6/24/11 http://godsandaliens.com/resources/Contact%20With%20Alien%20Civilizations%20-%20Michael%20A.G.%20Michaud.pdf, BTN)

There is only one honest answer to the question of what intelligent aliens will be like and how they will behave toward us: No human knows. All of us are speculating. That does not mean that we are being frivolous; speculations can have value. Our speculations are a way of looking at ourselves, of thinking about Humankind from a novel perspective. The concept of -- raterrestrial intelligence encourages us to look again at the meaning of human existence, proposed James Christian, to philosophize again, to theologize again, to take another look at our laws, our ethics, our minds, our knowledge. 11 Our speculations about other civilizations are a way of looking into our own future. They can suggest either the future we wish for ourselves or the future that we fear will come if we do not change our ways. When we expect -- raterrestrials to be morally superior and altruistic, we are hoping that we will be more moral and altruistic in the future. As Achenbach put it, the great moment of contact may simply remind us that what we most want is to find a better version of ourselves. 12 Our speculations also are warnings. Predicting that other societies may have succumbed to war, runaway population growth, environmental damage, or disastrous experiments is a way of warning ourselves of how we might derail the human adventure. When we imagine aliens to be vicious conquerors, we are projecting fears about human conflicts. Our speculations are platforms for moral lessons, as they have been for centuries. We still exploit the idea of alien intelligence to advance social, political, and ideological agendas through the imagined views and practices of advanced -- raterrestrials. Theories about aliens often are intended to support other beliefs. Our speculations suggest opportunities for collective self-improvement. Many of us want to change the future, not just let it happen to us. We want to rise above our current condition. The quest for other and better forms of life, society, technology, ethics, and law may not reveal that they are actual elsewhere, suggested Beck, but it may in the long run help us to make some of them actual on Earth. Imagining other worlds also can be an approach to science. Nobel Prizewinning medical researcher Peter Medawar observed that scientific investigation begins by the invention of a possible world or of a tiny fraction of that world. Another Nobel Prize winner, geneticist Francois Jacob, noted that mystical thought begins the same way.14 The debate opens our minds to what might be possible.

**We are confronted with all sorts of alien images our daily lives through science fiction. The alien has entered into our cultural imaginary, and its status is a site of contention as various conceptions wrangle over portraying their conception of society through the metaphor of aliens.**

**Some narratives portray aliens as friendly and living among us, such as alf or the contemporary animated program. But the vast majority of alien science fiction represents aliens as a terrifying threat, visiting planet earth for dark and sinister purposes. In these narratives, the alien is the enemy of human kind and must be destroyed and -- erminated at all costs.**

**Media of this genre include War of the Worlds, Independence Day, Alien, the Thing, Killer Clowns from Outer Space… the list goes on and on. These science fiction representations are projections of our own fears and anxieties onto an imaginary other who is personified in the form of a hostile alien race, with whom we are permanently at war.**

**Racist groups and the military are seizing hold of this narrative of the evil alien and perpetuating a closure towards otherness in the social imaginary, shoring up oppressive ideologies**

**Mizrach ‘2** [Dr. Steven Mizrach, professor of anthropology at Florida International University, “UFO’s In the Information Age,” 5/23 http://www.fiu.edu/~mizrachs/UFO-info-age.html//les]

Whereas many people in the First World tend to interpret the UFO as a mechanism (an -- raterrestrial spaceship), people in the Third World or Fourth World tend to see it in other cont-- s. They often interpret UFO beings as gods, spirits, angels, devas, or faeries. Simplistically and paternalistically, Western researchers assume that they are not "smart" enough to realize they are dealing with what we, in a technologically advanced society, know to be material "nuts and bolts" objects. But some UFOlogists are coming around to the realization that the "alien" view may be a product of our own unique folklore and culture. Growing up on a diet of science fiction, Americans are predisposed to assume anything they don't understand must come from outer space. Some in the UFO research community are carefully deconstructing the boundaries between UFO experiences and other kinds of events, ranging from religious visions (such as Fatima) to earlier reports of strange objects in the sky (the 1896-7 "Great Airship" wave, etc.) Although many researchers want to conveniently date the beginning of the UFO phenomenon to 1947, it seems like UFOlike encounters have existed throughout history, and that the -- raterrestrial interpretation of researchers grew out of the cont-- of American culture at that time. The UFO seems to have displayed, for a long time, a "reflective" property, strangely mirroring or anticipating the expectations or beliefs of the society where it is encountered. One thing that this is forcing the researcher to do is to focus more heavily on the percipient and less on the percept. Part and parcel of the "new ufology" is a realization that not only do some UFO witnesses have multiple "close encounters," but also they often have a life history full of other kinds of strange parapsychological, paranormal, or unusual experiences, ranging from poltergeist-type phenomena to interference with electronic equipment. UFO encounters sometimes seem to trigger outbreaks of these unusual phenomena or awakenings of psychic potentials, but often they follow strange experiences (such as precognitive dreams or hearing strange noises) as well. The information age has made humankind aware that these types of experiences can be found in just about any culture, but how they are dealt with varies from society to society. Some cultures reward and value precious contacts with the Otherworld. In Western society, we often greet such experiences with diagnoses of mental illness or worse. One thing that appears to be clear is that these types of encounters seem to proliferate in cultures that are more accepting of them. But it may not be the case that they are more frequent; it may simply be that people in those societies are more willing to describe and discuss unusual experiences with their peers. The cultural impact on UFO experiences appears to be clear, but how influential it is requires further exploration. Though a global understanding of the UFO phenomenon shows this inherent cultural malleability of the experience, by this I don't mean to suggest that there aren't universals. We need to separate the experience from the cultural interpretations that people overlay onto it. However, what makes this problematic is that the phenomenon itself seems to help reinforce those interpretations, even responds to them in some paradoxical way. We need to go beyond the manifestations to the inner workings of the phenomenon. And intrinsically, it seems to be a control system of some kind. The UFO as a Control System The UFO, whatever it may be, appears to have the ability to alter consciousness, perception, and to some degree, maybe even space and time itself. Like Dick's VALIS, it appears to be an "information singularity," which seems to draw bits and pieces of reality around it into a new order. Physical reality is distorted in various ways (cattle mutilations, crop circles, "implants," percipient physiological changes, subsidiary poltergeist phenomena, etc.) in its wake. But it doesn't appear to be any true "accidental tourist"; its transits through our reality seem deliberate, almost contrived, focused on some sort of interaction with us. Half-baked predictions are told to contactees, abductees, and alien "channellers" about impending cataclysms, "Earth changes," and transitions in human evolution. The peculiar mix of truth and fiction, insight and bullshit, and wisdom and stupidity found in these messages led UFOlogist John Keel to dub them broadcasts from some "Great Phonograph in the Sky," stuck in some worn celestial groove. Like Keel, we need to stop focusing so much on the content of these messages, and start looking at the mechanisms of the messengers. Information is given to UFO experiences - but carefully controlled information, maybe disinformation. The key to disinformation is to mix truth with deception, so that it's hard to distinguish one from the other; but there's just enough truth to keep the person coming back for more. People are told about fabulous new devices and technologies which will save the human race, but never seem to work properly. People are promised evidence and "smoking guns" to prove the existence of UFOs, which then never materialize completely. People are given explanations of the motives and origins of the UFOnauts, which seems at once profound and yet also ridiculously absurd. The paradoxical nature of this information seems to point to some deeper truth than vast -- raterrestrial conspiracies. It points to the role of the human consciousness in organizing complex and contradictory information into a coherent whole. It points to a reality which is socially constructed through communication and interaction between human beings with different semantic structures for organizing their perceptions. It points to the dramatic ways in which science and technology seem to be transforming fundamental concepts of epistemology and ontology. The medium is the massage... Vallee suggests the UFO functions as a kind of "thermostat," a regulator which helps navigate our society back toward the subtle and the invisible, after it's become too focused on the gross and the visible. It functions as a kind of autoresponsive control system, utilizing feedback to challenge ossified paradigms, memetic structures, and belief systems. But the use of subtle control mechanisms cannot have been lost on the men of DARPA, who may be interested in the UFO technology for more overt kinds of psychological control. Paranoia as Control Mechanism In the media and popular culture, as well as the UFO press, talk of UFO invasion and colonization seems to be growing. What are these sinister Grays up to, after all, with their genetic sampling, cattle mutilating, and secret underground bases? Although alien invasions have been a staple of movies since War of the Worlds , Invasion of the Body Snatchers, and Hollywood 50s saucer flicks, it seems like the hostile-alien-invasion meme has returned with a vengeance in the 1990s. We've gone from the "lovable alien" flicks of the 1980s (Starman, ET, Close Encounters), to paranoid masterpieces such as Independence Day, and TV shows such as the X-Files and Dark Skies, where anyone, even your neighbor, can be a pawn of the aliens' sinister master plan. Even video games like Area 51 or Disney rides like the -- ra-TERRORestrial Encounter help feed this mythology into public consciousness. In twilight areas of the alternative media, militia groups and UFO groups start sounding like mirror images of each other, protesting of black helicopters, surveillance, electronic harassment, Men in Black, and "New World Orders" on the move. White supremacist groups have gotten into the game, offering their own vision of superhuman blond Aryan Pleiadeans here to save us from swarthy intergalactic bankers and parasites. "Race mixture," it turns out, is just another strategy by the bad aliens to weaken the strain and prepare us for invasion. Was the Gulf War syndrome an -- raterrestrial virus found on the Tunguska meteorite? Did MAJESTIC-12 kill JFK? Was the NASA Mars Explorer scuttled to avoid people finding out the truth about the Cydonia artefacts? These and other questions seem to swirl around the UFO field today, fact and fiction blending seamlessly together, easily outdoing the mild speculations of earlier UFO researchers regarding Air Force whitewashes and coverrups. As the military has learned throughout history, fear is a great mobilizer of people, and an excellent preparer for war. Even if the enemies are imaginary or their deeds exaggerated. In an era where the Cold War is ending, how can the U.S. military forces maintain their incredible portion of the national pie? Many UFOlogists have mentioned Ronald Reagan's quip that the n-- great battle be against an enemy from space. People are finding less and less that they can unite to fight against. **Inhuman things from space might fill the bill quite nicely.** Nuclear weapons and SDI can find a new secondary justification for warding off rogue asteroids from space, maybe even evil Grays out to turn us into protein soup. However, I don't think this new paranoid phase in the U.S. is all deliberately contrived by the miltary-multimedia complex. What I think has happened is that the military's obsession with secrecy, discipline, and strength has permeated our entire society, a natural result of living under a culture of "national security" for so long. Rather than some Big Brother watching us, we've all started watching each other through our camcorders, radio scanners, and amateur spy equipment. **The UFO myths permeating the Internet are part and parcel of a larger, stranger xenophobia which seems to be taking hold in popular consciousness.** Fear robs people of their reason, and closes their minds against the unknown; it activates the most instinctual parts of the human mind, those concerned with personal survival.

**The truly profound thing about District 9 is that it subverts this narrative. Rather than being hostile and evil, the aliens in District 9 are, at first, desperate and helpless. The aliens are soon placed in a sort of refugee camp that becomes militarized and oppressive similar to the death camps of Nazi Germany.**

**Through this unique imaginary of aliens, District 9 enacts a critique of the logic of otherization that results in the genocide of those deemed different and less than human. District 9’s critique of otherization applies not just to apartheid, but also to all of the logics of social violence, including US military imperialism including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enslavement of Africans, and the genocide of all the peoples in the Americas.**

**Jones 2010**

(Matthew, University of Manchester, “District 9: Review”, Film & History 40.1, Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/film_and_history/v040/40.1.jones.html>)

So begins District 9, directed by Neill Blomkamp and produced by The Lord of the Rings' Peter Jackson. At its heart, this is a science fiction blockbuster that has, alongside Watchmen, sought to recover some respectability for the genre amid 2009's crop of popcorn spectacles (Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen, Terminator: Salvation and Gamer come to mind). Replete with obvious allusions to South Africa's brutally segregated past, this is a film in which something much more interesting is at work beneath the sci-fi gloss than in its multiplex cousins. Indeed, the media has done much to promote this as a film that in some way engages with the history of apartheid, using the 'Otherness' of its aliens to discuss South Africa's racial Others of recent decades. There is much within the film itself to support claims that it exploits the possibilities for social commentary that are inherent in the science fiction genre. Coming to the screen entrenched in a strong sense of man's inhumanity to man, District 9 is not satisfied with its allusions to apartheid but instead looks much deeper into the history of the 20th century and connects the dots between all the human cruelty it finds. When van de Merwe warns one of the aliens not to go to District 10, the new camp built specifically for the visitors, the sense of urgency and horror in his voice leads one to imagine that inspiration for the solution to the alien problem might have been drawn from the Nazi's Final Solution or the Soviet Gulags. These camps were themselves based on precedents set by the Spanish during the Ten Years' War, the Americans during the Philippine-American War and the British during the Boer War in South Africa itself. District 9's District 10 draws on a long and dreadful human heritage of interment and casts its horrors into an all too imaginable future. Thus the film suggests that as long as we perceive physical difference, be it in terms of race or species, to be a signifier of psychical dissimilarity then such brutalisation will recur. It is not, however, only historical horrors that are allowed to emerge into the film t-- . The underground, militarised experimentation site operated by the shadowy Multinational United, in which Wikus is subjected to inhuman cruelty so that information can be gathered about him, displays more than a passing similarity of function and purpose to Guantanamo Bay and the so-called CIA 'black sites' across the globe. The fact that a non-governmental organisation manages this operation recalls the farming out of security responsibilities to Blackwater Worldwide (now Xe) and the profiteering of Haliburton during the ongoing war in Iraq. Though District 9 makes explicit efforts to draw connections between its dystopian future and specific historical atrocities, it also seeks to comment on the current disregard for human beings displayed in contemporary conflicts. In so doing it suggests that we are part of our own histories, repeating the brutality of our past and, if we continue unabated, projecting it into a future where visitors to our planet will be treated in much the same way as we have treated and continue to treat each other. [End Page 121] There is hope, however, in the film's suggestion that the boundaries between Self and Other are permeable. Wikus undergoes a process of mutation, becoming an alien himself. One of the visitors makes his own journey from threatening potential terrorist, cooking up a technological device in a hidden lab in the slum, to protector and saviour of the weak and wounded Wikus. By the end of his transformation he has been given a human name, Christopher, and begins to display human emotions. That which separates man from alien, and hence race from race, is fragile and perishable; the Self and the Other are ultimately the same thing. This marks a drastic change from the science fiction of the 1950s, from which this film draws stylistically. The bug-eyed aliens and gigantic monsters that stalked America's cinema screens in the middle of the 20th century were not there to be understood but to be eliminated. The overwhelming majority were hostile and intent on our destruction. Films such as Invasion of the Saucer-Men (1957) and The War of the Worlds (1953) cast aliens as irreconcilably different from and unremittingly threatening to human beings. Though it lifts some visual references from these films, District 9 serves to highlight just how far cinema has come by depicting the human Self and the alien Other as two halves of the same whole. The message that the film has for the world, it seems, is that, if science fiction cinema can abandon its age-old belief that biological (and hence racial) difference equates to manifest distinctions, why is the rest of the world still cutting each other open, prejudging one another according to skin colour and responding as if pigmentation were destiny? This is a science fiction blockbuster that truly highlights the potential of its medium to challenge the socio-political status quo.

**It is this otherization that is the foundation of genocide and nuclear annihilation**

**Kovel, Prof Pol, Comm, & Psych @ Einstein, 1984**(Joel, *Against the State of Nuclear Terror*, p175-6)

The irrationality that often befalls groups on the margins of society reveals the working of a general mechanism that undoubtedly contributes in a major way to the stability of irrational and oppressive social orders. When society as a whole is irrational and permeated with violence and domination, then each individual within it will stand to internalize some of the same as he or she runs the gauntlet of personal development. By “internalize,” I mean the development of unconscious structured relations with others. We each have an internal (i.e., intrapsychic) group of relations between the “I” and the “Other” that is, on the one hand, quite fantastic and out of immediate contact with -- ernal reality, while, on the other, is shaped by that reality and is shaped by it in turn. Such shaping occurs through the mental processes called *introjection* (modeling of the self by the world) and *projection* (modeling of the world according to the self). The Other, being the negation of the self, can take on many characteristics, good or bad. The Other, therefore, is both a rough replication of the goodness and badness of the -- ernal world as well as a determinant of that goodness or badness.When we congrugate into groups (including the society which is integral to these groups) the relations of Otherness take on a decisive importance. For in the formation of a group a kind of splitting necessarily takes place between elements of the Other. This splitting is shaped about the irreducible fact of the group (or society) and its identity. If there is a group, then one is either in it or not. From another angle, groups take shape about the deployment of the feeling of “insideness.” And once one is in, then there must be an outside. If there is an America, then one can be an American. If so, then all others become Other, and non-Americans or foreigners.A lot of history has turned around the fact that the basic inside-outside relations of groups have come to be fused with the goodness and badness of the Other. Then all those inside become good, and all outside, bad. The members of the group each return to being of the “purified pleasure ego,” described earlier when we were developing the notion of paranoia and the general psychology of technocracy. Insofar as the bad outside takes on a persecutory quality, the group itself becomes paranoid—with this key difference between the group and the individual level: that the individual paranoiac experiences the persecution immediately, while the member of the group is insulated by identification with the others and his or her participation in the group’s practice. In this way, the paranoia is delegated to the group as a whole. We might say that it becomes de-subjectified and passes beyond the psychologies of the individuals of the group. The individual mind remains under the sway of the affiliation of the good Other that remains inside group relations. Meanwhile the persecutory potential of the outsiders is reduced by dehumanization. This is how people remain “normal” individually while countenancing and even actively carrying out the most heinous and irrational acts on the “thingified” and dehumanized bodies of outsiders. It tells us a lot about how gracious and kindly white Southerners could lynch and castrate blacks; of how good, clean efficient Germans could turn Jews into lampshades; of how Israelis, with their ancient tradition of Jewish compassionateness, earned through centuries of suffering, could calculatedly dispossess the Palestinian people; and of course, how the friendly Americans could annihilate Hiroshima and cut their swath through history.

**As an imaginative gesture of acknowledgment and critical reflection on the history of colonialism and as a condemnation of the type of violent otherization made explicit in the science fiction narrative of District 9, we offer the following plan:**

**The United States Federal Government should build a triangular monument on the International Space Station.**

**Building a monument on the International Space Station responds to the close relationship of the space station to the colonial enterprise. Even the space station laboratory is named Columbus—the triangular shape reflects the triangular European/African/Americas nature of colonization, reflecting the triangle of merchantalism and the triadic structure of imperialism/slavery/genocide. Such a monument would symbolically inculcate a working through of the history of genocide AND create a cautionary principle for space exploration against future colonialist violence by orienting our ethics towards respect and dignity for alien life**

**Marsiske 2010**

(Hans-Arthur, Writer and Journalist, “The Legacy of Columbus”, Leonardo 43.2, Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/leonardo/v043/43.2.marsiske.html>)

By giving the name "Columbus" to the European Space Laboratory the European Space Agency (ESA) has put itself in the tradition of European explorers and erected a historical monument in space. But this monument is incomplete, since it ignores the high price that humanity has paid for European expansion. If space exploration is really about humanity going to space and not only a few technologically developed nations, as representatives of ESA repeatedly declare, then another monument should be added to the European Space Laboratory. The name of Christopher Columbus has a good reputation in the space community. Exploring space is often perceived as a direct continuation of the ventures of European discoverers of the 15th and 16th centuries. A very striking example of this construction of tradition can be seen in the mission patches of the space mission that transported the European space laboratory Columbus to the ISS. The Shuttle mission STS-122 itself shows in its patch Columbus' flag ship "Santa Maria" directly connected to the Space Shuttle "Atlantis" by three strong, energetic lines. It looks as if the "Santa Maria" was using the Atlantic Ocean as a runway and while gaining speed it was converting itself into "Atlantis." The mission patch for the European space laboratory "Columbus" shows a blue circle as a symbol for planet Earth crossed by a white line. This line stands for Columbus' fleet crossing the Atlantic from east to west, as well as for the Space Shuttle crossing it from west to east thereby transporting the new module to the International Space Station ISS. These pictures are too beautiful to be true. There is not the slightest hint at the ambiguity of the legacy that Columbus and his contemporaries left for us. It looks as if the European discoverers set out for the oceans purely to gain knowledge, to prove that the Earth is round. But that is not the truth. They had massive economic motives: European trading companies were eagerly looking for new trade routes to Asia to counter the Islamic traders who controlled the transport by land. Portuguese sailors were trying to solve this problem by circling Africa. Their approach appears more application-oriented, going step by step. Actually, they reached the economic goal quicker than Columbus, who set out for the west. This was a fundamentally new approach which paved the way to prove empirically that the Earth really was a globe. In the long run it turned out to be more successful even in economic terms. Columbus' discovery brought unprecedented wealth to Europe by opening up the trans-Atlantic trade. Seaport-towns like Liverpool, Bristol, Bordeaux, or Brest blossomed in surprisingly short time by taking advantage of these new business opportunities. But you don't easily find monuments that remind you of how this wealth, which in the long run made a high-tech complex like the ISS possible, was created. This memory is not proudly presented in orbit where everybody could see it. It is shamefully hidden on Earth. You could find it for instance on an unspectacular traffic island in an unspectacular part of Hamburg where only very few tourists will go. This triangular-shaped traffic island is located near the place where I currently live in a district called Wandsbek. Here, in front of the Wandsbek town hall, the administration decided to erect three bronze sculptures showing important personalities from Wandsbek's past. The one which caused public protests showed Heinrich Carl Graf von Schimmelmann (1724–1782), who in his lifetime was considered the richest man of Europe. Monuments for Slave Traders It was the source of Schimmelmann's wealth and the way it was mentioned on a nearby plate that caused the protests. Visitors of the monument could read there: "Schimmelmann . . . is considered as the founder of Wandsbek's economic strength. Under his lordship the region flourished. Also because of the so-called triangle trade (calico and rifles, slaves, sugar-cane and cotton) between Europe, Africa and America he was considered the richest man of Europe." (See Fig. 1.) The discoveries of Columbus paved the way for the triangular trade which included slaves in unprecedented numbers. Like many other citizens of Hamburg I felt ashamed that my government erected a monument for a slave trader. But before articulating my protest I wanted to know more about this "triangle trade." I learned that it was a kind of inter-continental production chain, arguably the first really global business. Schimmelmann loaded his ships in Europe with cotton products like calico, rifles, and alcohol, which had all been produced in his own manufactures. These goods were transported to the west coast of Africa where they were exchanged for slaves. The slaves were brought to the Caribbean Islands to work on Schimmelmann's own plantations or to be sold in slave markets. Loaded with sugar cane and cotton from the plantations, [End Page 176] the ships went back to Europe, where these goods became raw material for Schimmelmann's manufactures to start the n-- triangle cycle [1]. Of course, Schimmelmann wasn't the only one engaged in the triangle trade. This business model fueled European wealth for more than 200 years. As Eric William wrote in 1943: "By 1750 there was hardly a trading or manufacturing town in England which was not in some way connected with the triangular or direct colonial trade. The profits obtained thereby provided one of the main streams of that accumulation of capital in England which financed the Industrial Revolution" [2]. I was really shocked. Some abstract knowledge suddenly became very concrete und uncomfortably close. Until then I somehow had believed that the slave trade belonged mainly to other countries like the U.K., Spain, Portugal. I thought it was foreign trading companies like the West India Company or the East India Company that were engaged in this bloody business and thereby laid the foundation for the wealth that European citizens like me are still enjoying today. But now I had to realize that one of the biggest slave traders performed his business in my direct neighbourhood. On the other hand, I was glad I finally had learned about these things. It is important to know about the foundations you are standing on. In principle, there is nothing wrong with monuments for slave traders. But it should be done properly. It should express a clear position on this kind of business and its implications for the present and the future. And, perhaps most important, it should be erected at a proper location. In front of the Wandsbek town hall the Schimmelmann sculpture, which subsequently was removed by its owner, Imtech GmbH, did nothing but express pride and appreciation for the achievements of this businessman. There was no irritating element, not the slightest hint of the possible significance of these achievements for our future. But what about erecting the sculpture at a place where the future really is in the making, where we are preparing for the exploration of new worlds, and where we are at risk to repeat the same mistakes done after Columbus? What about sending the Schimmelmann sculpture to the ISS and erecting it in the Columbus module? History may not repeat itself, but some well-known constellations can occur again and again. Sending humans to Mars puts us in a situation similar to the European explorers. We may find life on the red planet. Do we want to deal with it the same way we did with the natives of Africa and America? Do we want to exploit the new cosmic triangle between Earth, Moon, and Mars (Fig. 2) the same way we exploited the triangle Europe-Africa-America? A new cosmic triangle is taking shape. To avoid repeating the tragedies of the past we have to act now. A New Triangle Granted, a heavy bronze sculpture may not be a very practical solution for a space monument. It would be expensive to send it into orbit. What's more, it could be a potential hazard to the astronauts living and working on the space station. But some kind of monument is necessary. Without it a space laboratory with the name of Columbus would not be complete. We need something clearly visible to the astronauts as well as to people watching from below that reminds us to think ahead before we set foot on other heavenly bodies. Currently the prevailing attitude in Western culture seems to be to apologize later instead of asking for permission. But that is not acceptable when it comes to exploring and settling space. The legacy of Columbus contains a clear imperative: We should not enter any planet that is inhabited, unless we are clearly invited. Even if the Masters of Mars could only be seen with a microscope, we would have to respect them as the owners of their planet. Of course, we already have entered Mars with our robots. But we should be prepared to stop the landing of further robots and humans in case we encounter life there. That does not necessarily mean that we have to stop the exploration of the solar system. There are many other worlds to explore and settle. We can even build free-flying space settlements like those envisioned by Gerard O'Neill. And of course, we should establish space stations in Mars orbit to observe how the life on this planet evolves with time. Some day in the future we may even learn to communicate with these life forms so they can finally invite us for a visit. What a fantastic project for a space-faring civilization! Going to space we have a unique opportunity to upgrade our social operating system. There has never been a better time to change the direction of human evolution. But we need strong symbols to help us to fulfill this enormous task. We need such a symbol especially on the Columbus module. There should be a public debate about how best to commemorate the victims of European expansion. To start the debate I propose that such a monument on board Columbus should have a triangular shape.

**District 9’s profound social critique can only be carried out through science fiction: only through science fiction can the fundamental metaphysical source of otherization and violence be made apparent and contestable—the core of science fiction lies in its interrogation of the legacy of colonialism and it is the only framework which can effectively problematize and transform our relationship to our colonial past**

**Rapphun 2009**

(Eric, Professor of Theology at the University of Otago, “District 9 as Postcolonial Science Fiction”, <http://dunedinschool.wordpress.com/2009/08/19/cinema-as-exorcism-two-district-9-as-postcolonial-science-fiction/>

Continuing on with the occasional ‘Cinema as Exorcism’ series, we will be delving into the murky waters of the postcolonial world with a trip to District 9, the very fine debut film from South African director Neill Blomkamp, produced by local boy made good Peter Jackson. The film is an allegorical exploration of the ongoing costs of European colonialism for Africa and its peoples. Though in a very different sense, this is the film as exorcism, a visceral grappling with the ghosts of the past, particularly that of South African apartheid, though some of the film’s message is more universal. District 9 is set on an alternative timeline in the city of Johannesburg. In a twist on the classic science fiction story of alien invasion – the sight of the giant saucer hanging over the city evokes t-- s as diverse as the film Independence Day and the old television series V – the alien visitors arrive on Earth not as conquerors but as starving, demoralised and leaderless refugees. Their massive spacecraft, which has a far more functional look than those we are used to seeing, is a derelict wreck, stopped over the city not for strategic reasons, but because that’s where it happened to break down. The South African government, at first pleased that the aliens had chosen their country, soon finds itself with more than a million alien visitors, who they herd into the titular District 9. The narrative of the film opens as the private company in charge of alien affairs – the sinister and all too believable Multinational United (MNU) – sets out to evict all of the aliens and move them to District 10, a tent city hundreds of kilometres outside Johannesburg that is, even in MNU’s estimates, nothing less than a concentration camp. Though on the surface, the film is thrilling and intriguing enough to be getting on with, it would be a great disservice to read it literally. On one level, it certainly is a story about aliens living in South Africa, but on another level, it is about something altogether more serious and something far more unsettling. The analogy between the aliens and the South African segregationist policy of apartheid, which officially was ended only in 1994, is highly specific: District 9 is a teeming, improvised ghetto that bears a distinct resemblance to South African townships; the aliens speak in a language that includes clicking noises that recall many native South African languages; the aliens are given ‘slave names’ by the government; the official policy is of segregation and containment, all perpetuated under the guise of maintaining order and working for the greater good. CONTINUED The film’s critique of the treatment of the aliens, impoverished and trapped in a country where they are both feared and hated, -- ends allegory to its real-world cont-- , where memories of the townships are still very fresh. The film is about apartheid, but it is also, again allegorically, about what has happened afterwards. In one of the film’s most striking images, in a long shot, we see Wikus arriving home after a gruelling day of serving eviction notices, the alien mothership hanging over his comfortable middle class home with a massive unacknowledged, almost unconscious weight. There are, the film suggests, truly horrifying things hanging over the world of men like Wikus, who perform(ed) utterly irrational acts of prejudice and injustice in the name of safety and rationality, even after apartheid as an official policy has ended. One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of Apartheid can always be treated as a metonymy. In its past as well as in its present. By diverse paths (condensation, displacement, expression, or representation), one can always decipher through its singularity so many other kinds of violence going on in the world. At once part, casue, effect, example, what is happening here translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and whererever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience. Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx (1994): xv. This is the first major African-made (though Blomkamp spent much of his life in Canada) science fiction film and it to the makers’ credit that this is a story that could be told only in Africa. It is also a story that could only be told as science fiction. In its almost unrelentingly dark vision of humanity, District 9 is a deeply subversive film. The distancing effect of the fantastic elements of science fiction – faster than light travel, interstellar civilisations, etc. – allows science fiction to tell such difficult stories and ask difficult questions in ways that more classically realist genres of storytelling cannot. Science fiction is, as Peter Nicholls notes, both ‘the great modern literature of metaphor’ and ‘pre-eminently the modern literature not of physics, but of metaphysics’.[1] To expand on this topic a bit further, we need only to look at the stunning ‘re-boot’ of the television series Battlestar Galactica (2003-2009), another contemporary science fiction t-- that uses a carefully created allegory to deconstruct the postcolonial situation and to ask unsettling questions about the colonial powers, in the case the United States. Given this, as Brian Ott notes, it is ‘a profound mistake’ to interpret the genre ‘literally’. Writing of Battlestar Galactica’s robotic antagonists, the Cylons, he argues, ‘The issue is not what Cylons are, but what they represent’.[2] The same is true of the aliens in District 9, which, like Battlestar Galactica, is told in a visual language that mixes the fantastic with a gritty, handheld, quasi-documentary realism. As we have seen, what the aliens in District 9 represent remains an open question, but the first step to answering this question is to recognize the allegorical nature of the narrative itself. CONTINUED There is perhaps a further argument to be made, at least tentatively: science fiction is genre most suited for telling postcolonial stories. Though on first glance it might seem that this is true only of telling stories about the victors in the colonial struggle, given that it is the victors who have the greatest access to the technological apparatus so crucial to science fiction; however, Blomkamp, and to a lesser -- ent Moore and Eick, are showing that there are ways to give voice to those silenced in colonial cont-- s by using the same genre conventions. This is, it must be noted, not an entirely original conceit. Rieder, in fact, argues, ‘The thesis that colonialism is a significant historical cont-- for early science fiction is not an -- ravagant one’.[8] Expanding on this, he writes: science fiction exposes something that colonialism imposes. However … colonialism is not simply the reality that science fiction mystifies. I am not trying to argue that colonialism is science fiction’s hidden truth. I want to show that it is part of the genre’s t-- ure, a persistent, important component of its displaced references to history, its engagement in ideological production, and its construction of the possible and the imaginable.[9] Thus science fiction is in some senses dependent upon European colonialism for its meaning and for its very existence. There can be little doubt that science fiction as we know it emerged – and I will go out on a limb here and argue that Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein is the first work of proper science fiction – during a period of rapid European expansion. In an important sense, it also emerged as a reaction to, and at times a reaction against the same technological innovations that made colonial expansion and administration possible in the first place.

**Only examining and working through our complicity in the colonial genocidal processes can we overcome present-day instantiations of otherization and genocide that are based on the logic that treats others as vermin to be -- erminated, helping us to tackle the root cause of all present day destructive practices**

**Lorenz 2001**

(Helene, PhD and Prof of Depth Psychology at Pacifica Graduate Institute, “Silenced Knowings, Forgotten Springs: Paths to Healing in the Wake of Colonialism”, <http://radicalpsychology.org/vol2-2/lorenz-watkins.html>)

While many of those oppressed by the cultural genocides perpetuated by colonialism have worked hard to elaborate the internal wounds that colonialism bred (Memmi, 1965; Maalouf, 2001), those who have profited from colonialism have had disincentives to reflect on the psychological correlates of being involved in oppressive structures. For those in colonizing cultures, colonial ideologies have contributed to dissociating the personal from the cultural, lending us a sense of interiority that is strangely disconnected from cont-- , historical and cultural. When we have sought to understand ourselves most often in colonial psychologies, we have turned to intrapsychic, biological, and familial explanations for our thoughts and behaviors. Working to make the cultural unconscious visible in our identities has been addressed only sporadically and inadequately within the history of depth psychology. Without looking in detail at the kind of consciousness that has been structured through participation with oppressive relations, we cannot know the psychological toll and disfiguration oppression causes those involved in it. And we are all involved in it. It is as though there is a sickness of which we are unaware. To heal it, we must begin to experience it. Yet it is this very difficulty in experiencing it that is part of the illness. It is only by looking compassionately at ourselves--not through the prism of guilt--that we can begin to make out the contours of the landscape we are living in. Even if we don't express it, the multiplicity of the world is assimilated by the self, giving rise to a multiplicity within each of us. We see this multiplicity displayed in the many characters of our nightly dreams. If we reflect on everyday thought, we can see the multiple and often contradictory internal dialogues that arise as we think situations through or respond internally to events and experiences. Self and community are reflections of each other. Using this framework, we can ask how the dissociated world that is the legacy of colonialism impacts our psychological organization and well being, our paths of development. The self that relates to "otherness" in an instrumental way, in terms of how the other can serve the self, must necessarily be involved in a set of serious dissociations. Lifton (1986), in his work on Nazi doctors, describes how the self doubles in order to perpetuate violence against others without experiencing it as such. In exchange for the material and psychological benefits conferred on them for helping with "racial cleansing," i.e., genocide, Nazi doctors underwent a splitting of themselves into two functioning wholes. The Auschwitz self allowed him to adapt to and accomplish his genocidal tasks, while his prior self allowed him to see himself as a caring physician, husband, and father. Such a doubling protected him from feelings of guilt associated with the violation of the ethical principles he was originally committed to. In this state of psychic division, murder was seen as "cleansing," medical tortures as "research," the other as "vermin." In globalization, we have an analogous situation where practices that undermine local economies and their sustainability, that have led to increasing poverty and massive dislocations of populations, are called “development.” Colonialism's story of the Other as inferior, backward, and primitive mitigates against direct perceptions of violence perpetrated against that other. This causes a dissociation within the self between the dominant cultural narrative and any other empathetic feelings or transgressive knowings that must now be defended against. It is in this way that dissociations within cultural history become translated into psychic dissociations. Such dissociations require energy to be sustained. This is why psychological dissociation is a state that is connected with neurotic suffering and symptoms as well as compromises in vitality, creativity, eros, and compassion. The projective field that reduces the personhood of the Other acts as an obscuring cloud, allowing one not to experience human suffering. The work of healing requires asking what of our own suffering, thoughts, feelings and perceptions have been "disappeared" in this process.

# District 9 Video 1AC

**{{{PLAY MOVIE CLIP}}}**

**This clip is from the movie District 9, directed by a South African, filmed in South Africa, and set in South Africa. The location of the film is not a co-incidence: the movie enacts a kritik of the logic of racial otherization that was the core logic of the Apartheid System in South Africa. This system was a legal regime of racial separation that lasted from 1948 to 1994.**

**Even as the film’s South African cont-- gives the metaphor of race a powerful potency as a social reflexive criticism, the personification of otherness in the figure of the alien enables the film to provoke insights and critical thought concerning our most basic values and issues such as social inequality, racism, segregation, encampment, science, and militarism. It is only through the science fiction narrative of aliens that such a social critique can issue forth.**

**Michaud 2007**

(Michael A.G., a U.S. Foreign Service officer for 32 years before turning full time to writing, served as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and Technology, Director of the State Department’s Office of Advanced Technology, Minister-Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and as Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology at the American Embassy in Paris. “Contact with Alien Civilizations Our Hopes and Fears about Encountering -- raterrestrials”, Date Accessed: 6/24/11 http://godsandaliens.com/resources/Contact%20With%20Alien%20Civilizations%20-%20Michael%20A.G.%20Michaud.pdf, BTN)

There is only one honest answer to the question of what intelligent aliens will be like and how they will behave toward us: No human knows. All of us are speculating. That does not mean that we are being frivolous; speculations can have value. Our speculations are a way of looking at ourselves, of thinking about Humankind from a novel perspective. The concept of -- raterrestrial intelligence encourages us to look again at the meaning of human existence, proposed James Christian, to philosophize again, to theologize again, to take another look at our laws, our ethics, our minds, our knowledge. 11 Our speculations about other civilizations are a way of looking into our own future. They can suggest either the future we wish for ourselves or the future that we fear will come if we do not change our ways. When we expect -- raterrestrials to be morally superior and altruistic, we are hoping that we will be more moral and altruistic in the future. As Achenbach put it, the great moment of contact may simply remind us that what we most want is to find a better version of ourselves. 12 Our speculations also are warnings. Predicting that other societies may have succumbed to war, runaway population growth, environmental damage, or disastrous experiments is a way of warning ourselves of how we might derail the human adventure. When we imagine aliens to be vicious conquerors, we are projecting fears about human conflicts. Our speculations are platforms for moral lessons, as they have been for centuries. We still exploit the idea of alien intelligence to advance social, political, and ideological agendas through the imagined views and practices of advanced -- raterrestrials. Theories about aliens often are intended to support other beliefs. Our speculations suggest opportunities for collective self-improvement. Many of us want to change the future, not just let it happen to us. We want to rise above our current condition. The quest for other and better forms of life, society, technology, ethics, and law may not reveal that they are actual elsewhere, suggested Beck, but it may in the long run help us to make some of them actual on Earth. Imagining other worlds also can be an approach to science. Nobel Prizewinning medical researcher Peter Medawar observed that scientific investigation begins by the invention of a possible world or of a tiny fraction of that world. Another Nobel Prize winner, geneticist Francois Jacob, noted that mystical thought begins the same way.14 The debate opens our minds to what might be possible.

**We are confronted with all sorts of alien images our daily lives through science fiction. The alien has entered into our cultural imaginary, and its status is a site of contention as various conceptions wrangle over portraying their conception of society through the metaphor of aliens.**

**Some narratives portray aliens as friendly and living among us, such as alf or the contemporary animated program. But the vast majority of alien science fiction represents aliens as a terrifying threat, visiting planet earth for dark and sinister purposes. In these narratives, the alien is the enemy of human kind and must be destroyed and -- erminated at all costs.**

**Media of this genre include War of the Worlds, Independence Day, Alien, the Thing, Killer Clowns from Outer Space… the list goes on and on. These science fiction representations are projections of our own fears and anxieties onto an imaginary other who is personified in the form of a hostile alien race, with whom we are permanently at war.**

**The truly profound thing about District 9 is that it subverts both of these dominant narratives. Rather than being simply benevolent and friendly or hostile and evil, the aliens in District 9 are, at first, desperate and helpless. The aliens are soon placed in a sort of refugee camp that becomes militarized and oppressive similar to the death camps of Nazi Germany.**

**Through this unique imaginary of aliens, District 9 enacts a critique of the logic of otherization that results in the genocide of those deemed different and less than human. District 9’s critique of otherization applies not just to apartheid, but also to the all of the logics of social violence, including US military imperialism including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enslavement of Africans, and the genocide of all the peoples in the Americas.**

**District 9 critiques the self/other dichotomy that is the foundation for Nazism and American military imperialism**

**Jones 2010**

(Matthew, University of Manchester, “District 9: Review”, Film & History 40.1, Project Muse, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/film\_and\_history/v040/40.1.jones.html)

So begins District 9, directed by Neill Blomkamp and produced by The Lord of the Rings' Peter Jackson. At its heart, this is a science fiction blockbuster that has, alongside Watchmen, sought to recover some respectability for the genre amid 2009's crop of popcorn spectacles (Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen, Terminator: Salvation and Gamer come to mind). Replete with obvious allusions to South Africa's brutally segregated past, this is a film in which something much more interesting is at work beneath the sci-fi gloss than in its multiplex cousins. Indeed, the media has done much to promote this as a film that in some way engages with the history of apartheid, using the 'Otherness' of its aliens to discuss South Africa's racial Others of recent decades. There is much within the film itself to support claims that it exploits the possibilities for social commentary that are inherent in the science fiction genre. Coming to the screen entrenched in a strong sense of man's inhumanity to man, District 9 is not satisfied with its allusions to apartheid but instead looks much deeper into the history of the 20th century and connects the dots between all the human cruelty it finds. When van de Merwe warns one of the aliens not to go to District 10, the new camp built specifically for the visitors, the sense of urgency and horror in his voice leads one to imagine that inspiration for the solution to the alien problem might have been drawn from the Nazi's Final Solution or the Soviet Gulags. These camps were themselves based on precedents set by the Spanish during the Ten Years' War, the Americans during the Philippine-American War and the British during the Boer War in South Africa itself. District 9's District 10 draws on a long and dreadful human heritage of interment and casts its horrors into an all too imaginable future. Thus the film suggests that as long as we perceive physical difference, be it in terms of race or species, to be a signifier of psychical dissimilarity then such brutalisation will recur. It is not, however, only historical horrors that are allowed to emerge into the film t-- . The underground, militarised experimentation site operated by the shadowy Multinational United, in which Wikus is subjected to inhuman cruelty so that information can be gathered about him, displays more than a passing similarity of function and purpose to Guantanamo Bay and the so-called CIA 'black sites' across the globe. The fact that a non-governmental organisation manages this operation recalls the farming out of security responsibilities to Blackwater Worldwide (now Xe) and the profiteering of Haliburton during the ongoing war in Iraq. Though District 9 makes explicit efforts to draw connections between its dystopian future and specific historical atrocities, it also seeks to comment on the current disregard for human beings displayed in contemporary conflicts. In so doing it suggests that we are part of our own histories, repeating the brutality of our past and, if we continue unabated, projecting it into a future where visitors to our planet will be treated in much the same way as we have treated and continue to treat each other. [End Page 121] There is hope, however, in the film's suggestion that the boundaries between Self and Other are permeable. Wikus undergoes a process of mutation, becoming an alien himself. One of the visitors makes his own journey from threatening potential terrorist, cooking up a technological device in a hidden lab in the slum, to protector and saviour of the weak and wounded Wikus. By the end of his transformation he has been given a human name, Christopher, and begins to display human emotions. That which separates man from alien, and hence race from race, is fragile and perishable; the Self and the Other are ultimately the same thing. This marks a drastic change from the science fiction of the 1950s, from which this film draws stylistically. The bug-eyed aliens and gigantic monsters that stalked America's cinema screens in the middle of the 20th century were not there to be understood but to be eliminated. The overwhelming majority were hostile and intent on our destruction. Films such as Invasion of the Saucer-Men (1957) and The War of the Worlds (1953) cast aliens as irreconcilably different from and unremittingly threatening to human beings. Though it lifts some visual references from these films, District 9 serves to highlight just how far cinema has come by depicting the human Self and the alien Other as two halves of the same whole. The message that the film has for the world, it seems, is that, if science fiction cinema can abandon its age-old belief that biological (and hence racial) difference equates to manifest distinctions, why is the rest of the world still cutting each other open, prejudging one another according to skin colour and responding as if pigmentation were destiny? This is a science fiction blockbuster that truly highlights the potential of its medium to challenge the socio-political status quo.

**District 9’s profound social critique can only be carried out through science fiction: only through science fiction can the fundamental metaphysical source of otherization and violence be made apparent and contestable—the core of science fiction lies in its interrogation of the legacy of colonialism and it is the only framework which can effectively problematize and transform our relationship to our colonial past**

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At once part, casue, effect, example, what is happening here translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and whererever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience. Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx (1994): xv. This is the first major African-made (though Blomkamp spent much of his life in Canada) science fiction film and it to the makers’ credit that this is a story that could be told only in Africa. It is also a story that could only be told as science fiction. In its almost unrelentingly dark vision of humanity, District 9 is a deeply subversive film. The distancing effect of the fantastic elements of science fiction – faster than light travel, interstellar civilisations, etc. – allows science fiction to tell such difficult stories and ask difficult questions in ways that more classically realist genres of storytelling cannot. Science fiction is, as Peter Nicholls notes, both ‘the great modern literature of metaphor’ and ‘pre-eminently the modern literature not of physics, but of metaphysics’.[1] To expand on this topic a bit further, we need only to look at the stunning ‘re-boot’ of the television series Battlestar Galactica (2003-2009), another contemporary science fiction t-- that uses a carefully created allegory to deconstruct the postcolonial situation and to ask unsettling questions about the colonial powers, in the case the United States. Given this, as Brian Ott notes, it is ‘a profound mistake’ to interpret the genre ‘literally’. Writing of Battlestar Galactica’s robotic antagonists, the Cylons, he argues, ‘The issue is not what Cylons are, but what they represent’.[2] The same is true of the aliens in District 9, which, like Battlestar Galactica, is told in a visual language that mixes the fantastic with a gritty, handheld, quasi-documentary realism. As we have seen, what the aliens in District 9 represent remains an open question, but the first step to answering this question is to recognize the allegorical nature of the narrative itself. CONTINUED There is perhaps a further argument to be made, at least tentatively: science fiction is genre most suited for telling postcolonial stories. Though on first glance it might seem that this is true only of telling stories about the victors in the colonial struggle, given that it is the victors who have the greatest access to the technological apparatus so crucial to science fiction; however, Blomkamp, and to a lesser -- ent Moore and Eick, are showing that there are ways to give voice to those silenced in colonial cont-- s by using the same genre conventions. This is, it must be noted, not an entirely original conceit. Rieder, in fact, argues, ‘The thesis that colonialism is a significant historical cont-- for early science fiction is not an -- ravagant one’.[8] Expanding on this, he writes: science fiction exposes something that colonialism imposes. However … colonialism is not simply the reality that science fiction mystifies. I am not trying to argue that colonialism is science fiction’s hidden truth. I want to show that it is part of the genre’s t-- ure, a persistent, important component of its displaced references to history, its engagement in ideological production, and its construction of the possible and the imaginable.[9] Thus science fiction is in some senses dependent upon European colonialism for its meaning and for its very existence. There can be little doubt that science fiction as we know it emerged – and I will go out on a limb here and argue that Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein is the first work of proper science fiction – during a period of rapid European expansion. In an important sense, it also emerged as a reaction to, and at times a reaction against the same technological innovations that made colonial expansion and administration possible in the first place.

**As an imaginative gesture of acknowledgment and critical reflection on the history of colonialism and as a condemnation of the type of violent otherization made explicit in the science fiction narrative of District 9, we offer the following plan:**

**The United States Federal Government should build a triangular monument on the International Space Station.**

**Building a monument on the International Space Station responds to the close relationship of the space station to the colonial enterprise. Even the space station laboratory is named Columbus—the triangular shape reflects the triangular European/African/Americas nature of colonization, reflecting the triangle of merchantalism and the triadic structure of imperialism/slavery/genocide. Such a monument would symbolically inculcate a working through of the history of genocide AND create a cautionary principle for space exploration against future colonialist violence by orienting our ethics towards respect and dignity for alien life**

**Marsiske 2010**

(Hans-Arthur, Writer and Journalist, “The Legacy of Columbus”, Leonardo 43.2, Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/leonardo/v043/43.2.marsiske.html>)

By giving the name "Columbus" to the European Space Laboratory the European Space Agency (ESA) has put itself in the tradition of European explorers and erected a historical monument in space. But this monument is incomplete, since it ignores the high price that humanity has paid for European expansion. If space exploration is really about humanity going to space and not only a few technologically developed nations, as representatives of ESA repeatedly declare, then another monument should be added to the European Space Laboratory. The name of Christopher Columbus has a good reputation in the space community. Exploring space is often perceived as a direct continuation of the ventures of European discoverers of the 15th and 16th centuries. A very striking example of this construction of tradition can be seen in the mission patches of the space mission that transported the European space laboratory Columbus to the ISS. The Shuttle mission STS-122 itself shows in its patch Columbus' flag ship "Santa Maria" directly connected to the Space Shuttle "Atlantis" by three strong, energetic lines. It looks as if the "Santa Maria" was using the Atlantic Ocean as a runway and while gaining speed it was converting itself into "Atlantis." The mission patch for the European space laboratory "Columbus" shows a blue circle as a symbol for planet Earth crossed by a white line. This line stands for Columbus' fleet crossing the Atlantic from east to west, as well as for the Space Shuttle crossing it from west to east thereby transporting the new module to the International Space Station ISS. These pictures are too beautiful to be true. There is not the slightest hint at the ambiguity of the legacy that Columbus and his contemporaries left for us. It looks as if the European discoverers set out for the oceans purely to gain knowledge, to prove that the Earth is round. But that is not the truth. They had massive economic motives: European trading companies were eagerly looking for new trade routes to Asia to counter the Islamic traders who controlled the transport by land. Portuguese sailors were trying to solve this problem by circling Africa. Their approach appears more application-oriented, going step by step. Actually, they reached the economic goal quicker than Columbus, who set out for the west. This was a fundamentally new approach which paved the way to prove empirically that the Earth really was a globe. In the long run it turned out to be more successful even in economic terms. Columbus' discovery brought unprecedented wealth to Europe by opening up the trans-Atlantic trade. Seaport-towns like Liverpool, Bristol, Bordeaux, or Brest blossomed in surprisingly short time by taking advantage of these new business opportunities. But you don't easily find monuments that remind you of how this wealth, which in the long run made a high-tech complex like the ISS possible, was created. This memory is not proudly presented in orbit where everybody could see it. It is shamefully hidden on Earth. You could find it for instance on an unspectacular traffic island in an unspectacular part of Hamburg where only very few tourists will go. This triangular-shaped traffic island is located near the place where I currently live in a district called Wandsbek. Here, in front of the Wandsbek town hall, the administration decided to erect three bronze sculptures showing important personalities from Wandsbek's past. The one which caused public protests showed Heinrich Carl Graf von Schimmelmann (1724–1782), who in his lifetime was considered the richest man of Europe. Monuments for Slave Traders It was the source of Schimmelmann's wealth and the way it was mentioned on a nearby plate that caused the protests. Visitors of the monument could read there: "Schimmelmann . . . is considered as the founder of Wandsbek's economic strength. Under his lordship the region flourished. Also because of the so-called triangle trade (calico and rifles, slaves, sugar-cane and cotton) between Europe, Africa and America he was considered the richest man of Europe." (See Fig. 1.) The discoveries of Columbus paved the way for the triangular trade which included slaves in unprecedented numbers. Like many other citizens of Hamburg I felt ashamed that my government erected a monument for a slave trader. But before articulating my protest I wanted to know more about this "triangle trade." I learned that it was a kind of inter-continental production chain, arguably the first really global business. Schimmelmann loaded his ships in Europe with cotton products like calico, rifles, and alcohol, which had all been produced in his own manufactures. These goods were transported to the west coast of Africa where they were exchanged for slaves. The slaves were brought to the Caribbean Islands to work on Schimmelmann's own plantations or to be sold in slave markets. Loaded with sugar cane and cotton from the plantations, [End Page 176] the ships went back to Europe, where these goods became raw material for Schimmelmann's manufactures to start the n-- triangle cycle [1]. Of course, Schimmelmann wasn't the only one engaged in the triangle trade. This business model fueled European wealth for more than 200 years. As Eric William wrote in 1943: "By 1750 there was hardly a trading or manufacturing town in England which was not in some way connected with the triangular or direct colonial trade. The profits obtained thereby provided one of the main streams of that accumulation of capital in England which financed the Industrial Revolution" [2]. I was really shocked. Some abstract knowledge suddenly became very concrete und uncomfortably close. Until then I somehow had believed that the slave trade belonged mainly to other countries like the U.K., Spain, Portugal. I thought it was foreign trading companies like the West India Company or the East India Company that were engaged in this bloody business and thereby laid the foundation for the wealth that European citizens like me are still enjoying today. But now I had to realize that one of the biggest slave traders performed his business in my direct neighbourhood. On the other hand, I was glad I finally had learned about these things. It is important to know about the foundations you are standing on. In principle, there is nothing wrong with monuments for slave traders. But it should be done properly. It should express a clear position on this kind of business and its implications for the present and the future. And, perhaps most important, it should be erected at a proper location. In front of the Wandsbek town hall the Schimmelmann sculpture, which subsequently was removed by its owner, Imtech GmbH, did nothing but express pride and appreciation for the achievements of this businessman. There was no irritating element, not the slightest hint of the possible significance of these achievements for our future. But what about erecting the sculpture at a place where the future really is in the making, where we are preparing for the exploration of new worlds, and where we are at risk to repeat the same mistakes done after Columbus? What about sending the Schimmelmann sculpture to the ISS and erecting it in the Columbus module? History may not repeat itself, but some well-known constellations can occur again and again. Sending humans to Mars puts us in a situation similar to the European explorers. We may find life on the red planet. Do we want to deal with it the same way we did with the natives of Africa and America? Do we want to exploit the new cosmic triangle between Earth, Moon, and Mars (Fig. 2) the same way we exploited the triangle Europe-Africa-America? A new cosmic triangle is taking shape. To avoid repeating the tragedies of the past we have to act now. A New Triangle Granted, a heavy bronze sculpture may not be a very practical solution for a space monument. It would be expensive to send it into orbit. What's more, it could be a potential hazard to the astronauts living and working on the space station. But some kind of monument is necessary. Without it a space laboratory with the name of Columbus would not be complete. We need something clearly visible to the astronauts as well as to people watching from below that reminds us to think ahead before we set foot on other heavenly bodies. Currently the prevailing attitude in Western culture seems to be to apologize later instead of asking for permission. But that is not acceptable when it comes to exploring and settling space. The legacy of Columbus contains a clear imperative: We should not enter any planet that is inhabited, unless we are clearly invited. Even if the Masters of Mars could only be seen with a microscope, we would have to respect them as the owners of their planet. Of course, we already have entered Mars with our robots. But we should be prepared to stop the landing of further robots and humans in case we encounter life there. That does not necessarily mean that we have to stop the exploration of the solar system. There are many other worlds to explore and settle. We can even build free-flying space settlements like those envisioned by Gerard O'Neill. And of course, we should establish space stations in Mars orbit to observe how the life on this planet evolves with time. Some day in the future we may even learn to communicate with these life forms so they can finally invite us for a visit. What a fantastic project for a space-faring civilization! Going to space we have a unique opportunity to upgrade our social operating system. There has never been a better time to change the direction of human evolution. But we need strong symbols to help us to fulfill this enormous task. We need such a symbol especially on the Columbus module. There should be a public debate about how best to commemorate the victims of European expansion. To start the debate I propose that such a monument on board Columbus should have a triangular shape.

**Only examining and working through our complicity in the colonial genocidal processes can we overcome present-day instantiations of otherization and genocide that are based on the logic that treats others as vermin to be -- erminated, helping us to tackle the root cause of all present day destructive practices**

**Lorenz 2001**

(Helene, PhD and Prof of Depth Psychology at Pacifica Graduate Institute, “Silenced Knowings, Forgotten Springs: Paths to Healing in the Wake of Colonialism”, <http://radicalpsychology.org/vol2-2/lorenz-watkins.html>)

While many of those oppressed by the cultural genocides perpetuated by colonialism have worked hard to elaborate the internal wounds that colonialism bred (Memmi, 1965; Maalouf, 2001), those who have profited from colonialism have had disincentives to reflect on the psychological correlates of being involved in oppressive structures. For those in colonizing cultures, colonial ideologies have contributed to dissociating the personal from the cultural, lending us a sense of interiority that is strangely disconnected from cont-- , historical and cultural. When we have sought to understand ourselves most often in colonial psychologies, we have turned to intrapsychic, biological, and familial explanations for our thoughts and behaviors. Working to make the cultural unconscious visible in our identities has been addressed only sporadically and inadequately within the history of depth psychology. Without looking in detail at the kind of consciousness that has been structured through participation with oppressive relations, we cannot know the psychological toll and disfiguration oppression causes those involved in it. And we are all involved in it. It is as though there is a sickness of which we are unaware. To heal it, we must begin to experience it. Yet it is this very difficulty in experiencing it that is part of the illness. It is only by looking compassionately at ourselves--not through the prism of guilt--that we can begin to make out the contours of the landscape we are living in. Even if we don't express it, the multiplicity of the world is assimilated by the self, giving rise to a multiplicity within each of us. We see this multiplicity displayed in the many characters of our nightly dreams. If we reflect on everyday thought, we can see the multiple and often contradictory internal dialogues that arise as we think situations through or respond internally to events and experiences. Self and community are reflections of each other. Using this framework, we can ask how the dissociated world that is the legacy of colonialism impacts our psychological organization and well being, our paths of development. The self that relates to "otherness" in an instrumental way, in terms of how the other can serve the self, must necessarily be involved in a set of serious dissociations. Lifton (1986), in his work on Nazi doctors, describes how the self doubles in order to perpetuate violence against others without experiencing it as such. In exchange for the material and psychological benefits conferred on them for helping with "racial cleansing," i.e., genocide, Nazi doctors underwent a splitting of themselves into two functioning wholes. The Auschwitz self allowed him to adapt to and accomplish his genocidal tasks, while his prior self allowed him to see himself as a caring physician, husband, and father. Such a doubling protected him from feelings of guilt associated with the violation of the ethical principles he was originally committed to. In this state of psychic division, murder was seen as "cleansing," medical tortures as "research," the other as "vermin." In globalization, we have an analogous situation where practices that undermine local economies and their sustainability, that have led to increasing poverty and massive dislocations of populations, are called “development.” Colonialism's story of the Other as inferior, backward, and primitive mitigates against direct perceptions of violence perpetrated against that other. This causes a dissociation within the self between the dominant cultural narrative and any other empathetic feelings or transgressive knowings that must now be defended against. It is in this way that dissociations within cultural history become translated into psychic dissociations. Such dissociations require energy to be sustained. This is why psychological dissociation is a state that is connected with neurotic suffering and symptoms as well as compromises in vitality, creativity, eros, and compassion. The projective field that reduces the personhood of the Other acts as an obscuring cloud, allowing one not to experience human suffering. The work of healing requires asking what of our own suffering, thoughts, feelings and perceptions have been "disappeared" in this process.

**In 1982 a massive starship appeared over Johannesburg, South Africa. South Africans and people all over the world were alarmed and terrified, not knowing for sure whether the -- raterrestrials were here to benevolently share their knowledge of the universe with us or were here to conquer Earth.**

**To humanity’s profound surprise, neither of these scenarios happened. Instead, the ship just sat there hovering over South Africa. It did not communicate or respond to efforts to contact it.**

**Finally, after 3 months of heated debate and deliberation, the international community hesitantly decided that they has to literally go into the ship to see who or what was inside and determine the motivations for their presence on Earth.**

**Once a team of engineers was finally able to cut their way through five feet of metal, the were shocked to discover not a supremely intelligent and powerful race of beings but rather a huge population of desperate and helpless aliens, starving and dying.**

**There were more than a million of them. Somehow, the aliens on board had lost their leadership and intelligencia, probably due to disease of some kind, and were powerless to return to where they came from or maintain the basic needs for their survival.**

**In the face of such suffering and desperation, there was an outpouring of international humanitarian sentiment to help the dying aliens. It was clear that aid efforts could not be carried out on the ship, and so the alien population was transported to an area on the ground in Johannesburg where relief efforts were concentrated into a kind of refugee camp, and before they knew it it had become a slum. The camp was called DISTRICT 9**

**Relations between the aliens and the local population quickly turned sour amidst a climate of fear that soon became outright hostility. The “prawns”, as the aliens were called, were thought to be aggressive and violent, and anti-alien riots soon erupted.**

**The international community responded by enclosing the camp in a highly militarized border for the purported protection of both the aliens and the local population. Their presence came to be thought of as a burden, and the people of Johannesburg want the aliens to either be removed or eradicated.**

**Today, District 9 is caught up in a web of power relations. The aliens are neither inside nor outside the law; they are both beings to be protected as well as feared and contained through a legal system of racial segregation. They are moreover a target of military manipulation due to their advanced technology. Given the surging hatred of the aliens by the local population of Johannesburg, the international community has no choice but to relocate the aliens to District 10, a newly formed, modern day version of a concentration camp.**

**This is the thesis of the film District 9**

\*\*\*2AC

# 2AC – ALIEN METAPHOR KEY

**The narrative of aliens is the most effective way to critically reflect on social structures of power and exclusion**

**Corcos 10**

(Christine A Corcos, Professor of Law at Louisiana State University, March 17, 2010, Visits to a small planet: Rights talk in some science fiction film and television series from the 1950’s to the 1990’s, June 24, 2011 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578921> KG)

SF authors have used the alien-invasion narrative as a proxy for whatever social, legal, economic or other threat the culture may fear the most at the time. The depiction of aliens in alien invasion narratives beginning with War of the Worlds14 and continuing through sagas such as V15 and films such as Independence Day16 as deceptive, vicious, and single-minded beings intent on using Earth for their own purposes allows us to project human traits onto non-existent imaginary beings and examine them from a comfortable distance. If -- raterrestrial life exists, we have little reason to believe that it is particularly interested in Earth or Earth’s inhabitants or that -- raterrestrials would have warlike intentions. Instead, invasion, enslavement, and exploitation are more likely to be characteristic of humans, other primates or intelligent mammals than of -- raterrestrials. Thus, much SF in alien-invasion narratives serves as a proxy for human characteristics and an analogy for threats that are much closer to home. For example, novels and films about alien invaders produced in the 1950s emphasize the dominant fear at the time, which was that of a Communist takeover, either through an overt attack launched by the Soviet Union or Cuba, or in concert with the assistance of “fifth columnists”—Communist sympathizers in the United States. The 1950s alien-invasion narratives depict the aliens as undesired, unwelcome, and unsympathetic beings. Often the invading aliens in such narratives were seen as proxies for communists.2In day-to-day life, many Americans were concerned about identifying those within their midst who might harbor ill intent toward the government. In the real world, both the citizenry and elected officials demanded loyalty oaths and other demonstrations of patriotism, leading to cases that challenged the constitutionality of such oaths, statutes, and demonstrations. Beginning with My Favorite Martian, television series depicting aliens visiting Earth begin to reject the alien-invasion and alien-infiltration narratives’ notion of the 1950s that aliens necessarily pose a threat to humanity. Later series such as Mork & Mindy, Alien Nation, and 3rd Rock from the Sun, in which aliens arrive on Earth with peaceful or neutral intentions and remain here covertly for an -- ended period of time, tend to emphasize the non-confrontational nature of the alien beings’ visits and their genuine interest in humans as—if not species of equal intelligence and power—at least species of some interest worthy of at least some protection or non-interference. These “friendly alien” narratives use the technique of science fiction in order to critique society and examine, in particular, issues of civil rights in United States society in the second half of the twentieth century. But they do so by pointing out, paradoxically, that “real aliens” may not pose the threats that some have always believed. By -- ension, the groups they represent in popular culture may also not pose the threats some have believed. In order to accomplish this representation, however, the friendly alien narrative must facilitate an exchange of ideas within the SF convention itself. Using SF allows the audience to discuss issues of race, sex, and religion without making viewers too uncomfortable about confronting human differences. By exaggerating the differences of the “other” in the SF universe, the viewing audience can then consider whether the differences in American (and world society) present such obstacles. This is what television series such as My Favorite Martian, Alien Nation, and 3d Rock from the Sun allow us to do.

**By exploring for aliens, we are exploring ourselves and our place in the universe.**

**Caiazza 2010**

John, Ph.D Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Rivier College “THE COSMOLOGICAL VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE” InSight: RIVIER ACADEMIC JOURNAL, VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1, Date Accessed: 6/25/11, http://www.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-Spring-2010/J373-Caiazza.pdf BTN)

The cosmological implications of the value of human life are apparent in the search for life on other planets. The search for alien life has generated great interest in the last half century including the “SETI” program (“Search for -- ra-Terrestrial Intelligence”) which uses radio-telescopes to detect possible signals from alien civilizations and the rocket launched “rovers” that have traveled the surface of Mars which are designed to detect the presence of biochemical molecules in the Martian soil. Despite all the time, human energy and funds that have been expended in the search, there is no actual evidence that life exists anywhere else than on Earth. No electronic signals have been detected coming from outer space that indicate the presence of advanced civilizations, and despite many reports of alien abductions and flying saucers, there is no likely evidence that alien astronauts have been visiting the Earth. Rockets sent to explore other planets have not been able to detect any sign of life and this includes explorations on planets other than Mars. The Soviets sent an exploratory rocket to Venus in the 1970’s but rather than discovering a lush jungle planet, they found an oven hot planet shrouded by greenhouse gasses; the Russians also discovered that Venus is a dead planet. Mars has seemed a more likely candidate for life, and the possibility of this has been increased by the discovery that water once ran in liquid form on the surface of the planet. But so far there has been no sign of life of Mars, i.e. no discovery of primitive onecelled organisms or even of the pre-biotic compounds required for life. The final word on life on Mars however will probably have to wait until astronauts visit the planet, which may take us well beyond this century. There is also an ideological aspect to the search for life on other planets that involves the issue of the value of human life, which is the subject of this paper. There is an underlying idea that if there is life on other planets - in fact if there is life on a lot of other planets that life is not so special a thing in the universe**.** Furthermore, it has been argued that given the -- reme likelihood that there is life on a nearly infinite multitude of planets, then it is very probable that on some of these planets which support life, intelligent life has evolved (this view was expressed in a formula ii ). Thus it can be concluded that even intelligent life is not so special a phenomenon since it probably occurs throughout the universe, and in this way, the value of human life in a cosmological cont-- is diminished. The view that human life is not special and that assertions of its importance are merely examples of humanity’s self regard, has been held by some of the best known proponents of what may be called modern scientific ideology including Bertrand Russell, Steven Jay Gould and many others. iii The scenario of a universe filled with life and producing intelligent life as the result of automatic, evolutionary processes has until recently dominated scientific thinking about -- ra-terrestrial life. What is beginning to change the thinking about the occurrence of life in outer space is that despite constant searching for it, no actual sign of life on other planets has been discovered thus far. To the degree that life is rare in the universe, its significance and value becomes that much more apparent. So when we send up Mars rovers and await the slow transmissions of data, we are not only looking to see if there is life on the “Red Planet”, we are looking to find an indication of mankind’s place in the universe.

**Imagination and belief in -- raterrestrials allows humans to have spiritual contemplation and thinking.**

**Keen 10**

(Judy, a Journalist for USA Today, “ Probing odds of alien visitors; New UFO incidents give steam to an infinite debate: Are we not alone? Or just irrational?”, Lexis Nexis, Date Accessed: 6/24/11, BTN)

Fascination with unidentified flying objects seems unabated, though there are limits: Denver voters on Nov. 2 rejected a ballot measure that would have required the city to develop a protocol for welcoming aliens. Michael Shermer, publisher of Skeptic magazine, says there's no tangible evidence of visits from other planets. "The evidence is so fleeting, so thin, so fraught with human error," he says. "People have fantastic imaginations." George Mason University astronomer Harold Geller says Venus and Jupiter might be responsible for recent sightings. "The more reports picked up by the media, the more people report seeing such apparitions," he says, but there's "no convincing evidence" of alien visitors. Some search for hope, hostility Christopher French, a University of London psychology professor who studies paranormal beliefs, says some UFO believers are drawn to the idea that aliens are contacting humans. "It would just make the world a more interesting place," he says. For some, belief in **-- raterrestrials** "takes on a spiritual dimension," French says. Stephen Diamond, a clinical and forensic psychologist in Los Angeles, says the need for meaning can be satisfied by UFOs. "It's a questing for something to believe in that goes beyond ourselves" and is especially potent in times of cultural upheaval and economic crisis, he says. "People need a sense of beauty in life, and a sense of mystery and awe," Diamond says, and the "sense of dread" that accompanies the notion of alien beings also can be tantalizing. "People who view the world as a hostile place are more likely to think **-- raterrestrials** will be hostile," says Douglas Vakoch, a psychologist who leads a SETI Institute project to compose messages that could be sent in reply to a signal from -- raterrestrials. The institute uses astronomy in its Search for -- raterrestrial Intelligence.

**The morals and critical thoughts of humans can be best accessed with the belief of aliens and -- raterrestrials.**

**Blincoe 2005**

(Nicholas, an English author, critic and screenwriter, “The aliens who colonise our minds Nicholas Blincoe on an ambitious, slightly freaky study that examines our need to believe in -- raterrestrials” The Daily Telegraph, Lexis Nexis Date Accessed: 6/23/11 http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.dodocLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T12224914401&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVAN CE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T12224914404&cisb=22\_T12224914403&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8109&docNo=22 BTN)

Appleyard demonstrates his scientific rationalism early on. One might suppose that, because the universe is so incomprehensibly large, the chances that**aliens** are out there must be quite strong.Appleyard shows that this is not necessarily so. Attempts to conjure up a mathematical formula, or to calculate backwards from the probable number of suns with planets, all betray forms of wishful thinking: the hope that we are not alone, and that something similar is out there. Prior to reading this, one might have been willing to agree that aliens probably existed, without caring one way or another. Indeed, one might have argued that this is precisely what separates belief in aliens from a belief in God. While it may be logical to believe in aliens, it hardly seems necessary. With God, the position is reversed. There may be no logical reason to believe in Him, but many compelling arguments have been made as to why it is necessary. With Appleyard, theology and alienology become far more similar: he criticises the logic, while inflating the reasons why a belief in aliens might be valuable. However, while a theology based on faith might lead us to Kierkegaard, for instance, Appleyard's plea for aliens leads pretty inexorably to the thoughts of Gene Roddenberry, creator of Star Trek. It seems an unequal pursuit. So how real are they? Appleyard gives four answers. First, an interest in aliens has produced various kinds of modern institution, from television shows and films to Nasa projects. Aliensare part of the fabric of modern life. Second, belief in aliens can be compared to more ancient beliefs in elves or demons or ghosts. Superstition is an ineradicable part of the human experience, and our superstitions now revolve around ET and his friends. The third reason is that reflecting upon**aliens** helps us to understand ourselves. The interest in**aliens** grew up alongside advances in nuclear weapons and rocket technology: at the same moment that we realised we could leave this world, we also learnt that we could destroy it.**Aliens** provide us with a perspective from which we can reflect on our moral and mental states. Finally, the way we reflect upon ourselves, at a self-conscious level, is quite complex: we see ourselves awake and in dreams; we accept we may have unconscious desires; at times we are creative and at other times benumbed. And quite often, we find there is something alien in ourselves, even to the point that we are unable to recognise ourselves. We are the Alien. Appleyard's defence of the alien rests upon reasons three and four. But one suspects that he is most interested in the final one: the idea that we are strange, and that the harder we try to grasp our strangeness, the more our essence evades us.

**By tearing down the discursive otherness that surrounds the alien, we are able to use this acceptance as a precedent of how to view others.**

**Dean 97,** Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith , t**he Familiarity of Strangeness:  Aliens, Citizens, and Abduction**, Theory And Event, 6/24/11, EG

Denaturalizing the strange and alien even as it literalizes it, the UFO discourse provides a means for grappling with the foreign unlikely to explain or analyze otherness away. No matter how familiar, cliched, or banal, the alien remains. In abduction accounts, moreover, the closer the alien gets, the more foreign it becomes. I thus use the ufological alien, the product of a discourse fabricated to protect the credibility of those rejected by the legitimating discourses of science and law, to mark the contemporary situation of American techno-political life.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html#FOOT12) Because it appears in popular culture as an icon we can click on to run a program of non-assimilation, we can use the alien to open a window to narratives that cling to claims of reason and reality even as they contest them.

# 2AC -- EVIL ALIENS NARRATIVES BAD

**Rhetoric of evil alien others causes the worst violence and xenophobia**

**Greer 2006**

[Steven, (M. M.D., Director, The Disclosure Projec); “XOPOLITICS OR XENOPOLITICS?”; <http://www.DisclosureProject.org> //les]  
  
We have watched with some concern as the emerging area of exo-politics has taken a dangerous and potentially ruinous turn towards rumor, urban-myth speculation and inflammatory xenophobia. While there are certainly diverse opinions regarding why any given -- raterrestrial civilization may wish to visit Earth at this time in our history, recent public comments by Michael Salla have added a virulent strain of fear-based xenophobia, based on the flimsiest of documentation. While I am usually reticent to engage in commentary regarding the opinions espoused by certain personalities, I feel a point has been reached where silence only redounds to the further empowerment of a message of fear, hatred, prejudice – and the unwitting buttressing of the argument for weapons and war in space. Clearly, more is unknown than known in the vast field of -- raterrestrial studies. And at this embryonic stage of human--- raterrestrial relations, there is yet much to learn, explore and discover. But in the past year, Salla, who purports to support peaceful initiatives in this regard, has put forth prejudicial and dangerous characterizations of ET actions – up to and including the ludicrous accusation that a certain tall, white ET race caused the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004! He has maintained that a nefarious and injurious group of ETs have made a secret pact with covert humans – and have a harmful agenda towards the human race. This, and more. The Disclosure Project has over 450 military, government and corporate insiders who have first-hand knowledge of actual UFO/ET events and projects. We find it odd that not a single one of these insiders can confirm the xenophobic rumors proffered by Salla. The conflation of urban myth and rumor as fact is a dangerous precedent given what is at stake: The early stages of ET/Human interaction and relations. We cannot afford to recklessly take every rumor and tale - often originating from counter-intelligence operatives who are tasked with either defaming the UFO subject or sowing fear and prejudice - as a point of fact upon which to reach a conclusion. The facile acceptance of every story as true- no matter how dangerously xenophobic - is irresponsible and can only serve the agenda of those who wish to see the populace dis-informed, panicked and cowed into eventually accepting a military, space-based solution to the ET problem. Consider: The Disclosure Project, as well as other researchers, have found a multi-decade pattern of hoaxed UFO/ET related events that are clustered around pseudo-contact experiences (also know as abductions) mutilations, vivisections and the like. Numerous, corroborative military and shadowy para-governmental witnesses have testified to actually conducting abductions and mutilations for their psychological warfare value. Once such witness, an Army Ranger involved with special ops stated to me: “You have no idea how many people – including prominent military and political figures – we have abducted and terrified so that they will learn to hate the ET presence and support conflict with them…” Martin Cannon in the 1980s, and later the book MILAB (Military Abductions) documented the sophisticated use of electronics, ARVs (man-made UFO look-alike craft called alien reproduction vehicles) and ‘stage-craft’ to hoax ET contact events for their psychological warfare value. Indeed, CIA documents released to us under FOIA, and which appear in ‘-- raterrestrial Contact: The Evidence and Implications’, and ‘Disclosure’, both by this author, discuss using the UFO matter for psychological warfare purposes. The Canadian top–secret document by Wilbert Smith from the early 1950s explains that the UFO matter is the most secret subject in the US government, exceeding even the secrecy surrounding the development of the hydrogen bomb. Given these facts, is it reasonable to accept as true every scary account circulating in the public, and based on such tales, make sweeping, prejudicial statements regarding this ET race or that? **We must use restraint and caution if we are to avoid being manipulated into the acceptance of another false enemy to unite around and fight**. Numerous senior shadow government insiders have independently described to me a concerted effort to dis-inform the public and create the false impression **of a threat from space**, so that eventually a multi-trillion dollar build-up of weapons in space will be accepted by the masses. Such propaganda is nothing new. Every military power that has wished to further engage in warfare has first demonized the enemy. Hitler and his minions expertly demonized Jews, gay people and others so that people would passively accept the ‘final solution’. The virulent, negative portrayal of such groups was essential to the creation of a supposed enemy to be dealt with violently. Today, we see racist appellations applied to certain alleged ET groups – The Grays! The Reptilians! The Tall White Ones! Must we go down this tired, dirty path again? Must we replay the sordid history of human racism, prejudice, and xenophobia as we begin our first steps towards the stars? **No. We must not**. We must restrain our lower fears and tame our own demons – and look with the eye of truth at the cosmos around us, and ask ourselves this: Who would benefit from such fearsome portrayals of ET life? Where might such a shadowy group wish to lead us? How much information – bandied about so cavalierly as fact - may actually be sophisticated counter-intelligence disinformation designed to sow the seeds of hate and fear – thus justifying weapons in space. The usual suspects – those who thrive on enormous concentrated wealth and power - would like to unite the world - but not in peace. They wish to unite and control us not for that good future that assuredly awaits humanity. Rather, they wish to control through fear and war – a war between worlds – the final master-play of power consolidation where all of humanity may be stampeded into a unified opposition to some – maybe only one - **ET race**. And by so doing, amass the ultimate global control, through fear spreading like wildfire amongst the people. Dr. Von Braun on his death-bed warned of such a plan. He warned us that after the Cold War, there would be ‘rogue nations and nations of concern’; and that this would be followed by global terrorism; and that this would be followed by a threat from space – the ultimate trump-card of fear, whereby the entirety of humanity could be united to, as the movie ‘Independence Day’ put it, “kick alien butt!” There is no way to assess an ET agenda without first grasping the covert human agenda. We cannot discern what is real and what is Memorex – what is ET and what is pseudo-ET disinformation, unless we penetrate the halls of smoke and mirrors that is the vast shadow government’s propaganda machine. It is not easy. It takes enormous patience, perseverance, diligence and care. But it is worth it - for to do otherwise is to wittingly or unwittingly make exo-politics an arm of the propaganda war machine. We must do better than this. We must restrain our fears and prejudices and avoid the dissemination of negative and fear-inducing stereotypes, based on anecdotal tales and counter-intelligence programs. We must investigate fully the technological and psychological capabilities of those who are behind human UFO secrecy - and learn to discern the false from the real. CSETI (The Center for the Study of -- raterrestrial Intelligence - [www.CSETI.org](http://www.cseti.org)) which is the parent organization for The Disclosure Project ([www.DisclosureProject.org](http://www.disclosureproject.org)) has been sending expeditions around the world for 16 years to make contact with ET peoples. We have never been harmed. We have never been threatened. We have never been afraid. Thousands of people over the course of hundreds of expeditions, have interacted with these UFOs – and with the beings on-board them. Through all of this, we have only found ET people who want to understand and help us. They are waiting for us to join them in space - as a people at peace. Then and only then will we find the arms of the Cosmos wide open, ready to embrace a peaceful and enlightened humanity, which will then travel freely among the stars.

**Through the mistrust of “The evil alien”, we only push ourselves further into an oblivion of mistrust and judgment.**

**Dean 97,** Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith , t**he Familiarity of Strangeness:  Aliens, Citizens, and Abduction**, Theory And Event, 6/24/11, EG

Once linked to the ultimate undecidability of the rationality of the public sphere, and hence to the collapse of its very possibility, the alien highlights two important characteristics of the contemporary politics site. Conveniently, "The X-Files," that exemplar of contemporary popular fascination with the alien, provides handy and appropriate catch phrases. The first is "trust no one." The public sphere ideal relies on a minimum of trust, on at least the ability to distinguish friends from enemies and "us" from "them."[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html#FOOT13) The ufological alien is like a clone produced through the concentrated replication of the themes of mistrust and conspiracy running throughout US history and particularly pervasive today. What connects the space alien with the immigrant is the supposition of a conspiracy undermining America's experiment in freedom and democracy.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html#FOOT14) Voices in nativist and UFO discourses alike express anxiety about breeding, miscegenation, and hybridity, about the collapse of distinctions between the alien and ourselves. In each discourse appear concerns about governing, about whether confidence in those entrusted with the protection of democratic freedoms is warranted, or if, in fact, they, too, are corrupt, part of some covert plot that will bring us down. Today's mistrust may indicate a more general suspicion of experts and politicians than an actual supposition of conspiracy.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html#FOOT15) Rather than indicating the marginality of conspiracy theory, however, such a dispersion of mistrust creates a particular problem for democratic politics in that specific networks of trust and confidence become ever more fragile and tenuous. Ufology, then, is one version of larger cultural patterns of suspicion, conspiracy, and mistrust.

**Representing of evil aliens are xenophobic lies that prop up militarism**

**Gilliland ’99** [James, (Author of Becoming Gods A Reunion with Source and Becoming Gods II which covers Interdimensional Mind, Earth Changes, Planetary Ascension, UFOs their Origins and Intentions)“Contact and Censorship”//les]

Let us now address the Military. The goals of the military are to get the knowledge and technology to dominate or overpower others. The national security depends upon being top dog with the most destructive weapons available. Their agenda is to shoot them down, get the knowledge and technology for power over rather than service. To them these off world entities are a threat. Everything they do not understand and do not have power over is a threat. Do you understand why they are not being contacted? **Do you understand why they need to cover up the existence of UFOs. They have no control over them**. These off world visitors are superior on all levels with complete stealth capabilities. They are capable of interstellar and interdimensional flight with weaponry capable of turning this planet on its side or into a cinder in a moment. How does that make one feel who is responsible for your protection? Quite inadequate, therefore they must cover up the existence of UFOs and continue to back engineer the crashed ones here and there until they have a model of their own. This has already been done, yet it is grossly inferior. They also must keep the threat alive because their very existence depends upon having a constant threat. All they can see with, unfortunately, is a military mind.

**Aliens are not here to kill us – any representations of Aliens as Evil are locked into our own ethnocentrism which can only be overcome by our ethics of hospitality**

**Boyland ’98** [Richard, (PHD. And secretary of the Academy of Clinical Close Encounter Therapists);

“FINDINGS ABOUT THE REAL ETs VERSUS THE BOGEYMEN OF PROPAGANDA” <http://www.karinya.com/watchers2.htm> //les]

Yes, the -- raterrestrials who interact with humans are benevolent. There are major human misunderstandings of some -- raterrestrials, due to human anthropomorphic lack of understanding of quite different cultures and personality styles. As anthropologists have shown in dealing with culturally very different human groups on Earth, it is incorrect to judge the culturally-different human group by the cultural standards of one's own culture. Even in America there are people who put down another ethnic group because they think/phrase things/behave differently than "we" do. Some ET races are here to teach, some here to guide, some to heal, some to advance us culturally, some to advance us biologically, some to study us, some to passively observe, some to take samples of our flora and fauna, some to stand guard. None are here to invade, none are here to kill, none are here to intimidate, none are here to culturally take over. We humans are not the "bad guys", but we have some less-evolved persons in our midst. That is the way it is in the universe as well, we are told. However, the difference is that the less-evolved cultures on other planets are not permitted by the Inter-Galactic Federation to roam the galaxy freely and cause havoc on vulnerable planetary populations, such as us. There are reasons why we have been assigned the Watchers since our earliest times. And protection is certainly one of those reasons. The above description is in marked contrast with the disinformation peddled by "ex"-CIA John Lear, Jr., "ex"-ONI "Wild Bill" Cooper, shadowy billionaire-financed David Jacobs, and their ilk. But the above is the truth.

**The alien “Other” represents our ultimate insecurity – only opening a relationship with the other can open boundaries that are key to end war**

**Dean ’97** [Jodi, (teaches political theory at Hobart and William Smith); “The Familiarity of Strangeness: Aliens, Citizens, and Abduction”; Project Muse //les]

Slavoj Zizek's discussion of the "theft of enjoyment" can help us understand not just the thematization of passivity in the alien abduction narrative but also the way the program as a whole disrupts the fantasy of global citizenship.[65](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.uvm.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html" \l "FOOT65#FOOT65) In his analysis of nationalism, Zizek suggests that we impute to the other an "excessive enjoyment," always suspecting the other of attempting to steal ours. He writes: "What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack ('castration') is original."[66](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.uvm.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html" \l "FOOT66#FOOT66) In abduction, the alien takes away our agency, and the sense of security and certainty upon which our agency was predicated. This theft of agency is manifest not just in the power of the alien to paralyze us and abduct us at will but also in its technological superiority and pernicious breeding project. Because of its expertise, it takes away our pride in technological achievement. Because of its genetic investigations, it abducts our children, our ability to determine, or at least influence, our future. Zizek's formulation reminds us that the abduction narrative functions to conceal the fact that our agency was an illusion, just like our security and certainty. The technology has been controlling us, developing, spreading, replicating with its own momentum, a momentum no one of us can comprehend. We might have thought that our genes are all we have, but since we can't really be said to own or possess them (they constitute us, or so we are told), their theft by aliens marks our contradictory and ambiguous relationship to our own bio-chemistry. The alien steals a security we never had. Describing the complexity of abductees' emotional lives, Hopkins explains: We get through life partly by the fact that we can read another's face, we can read their body language, we can get some sense of emotion. All of those things are denied us during contact with aliens. There's really no way we can tell what they understand about us. Their understanding might be incredibly subtle in some ways, but miss on some other major things. There's no way to know . . . One man I've worked with who is an abductee said to me, "Budd, when I was standing there with them, if I could have thought of them as enemies and cranked myself up with hate, I would have somehow handled the whole thing better. But," he said, "it was the ambivalence of not knowing what this is, the total confusion. This **isn't an enemy, it isn't a friend, it's not like me, What is it? I can't read it**." He said the confusion added to his sense of helplessness.[67](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.uvm.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html" \l "FOOT67#FOOT67) **The aliens steal our security, our ability to tell friend from enemy. They take away our capacity to establish borders, boundaries**. Of course, deep down these borders have been illusions. Some things never really fit. So, while it is often thought that the alien is that which is completely other, the abduction discourse exposes the alien as that which reminds us that nothing is completely other (and everything is somewhat other), that the very border between like and unlike is illusory.

**Manifest destiny and the genocide of the Native Americans was rooted in the Eurocentric notion that the Europeans are the center of the universe – this is analogues to the current debate over the alien other – only the aff can bring an awareness and respect for all sentient life**

**Zimmerman ‘2** [Michael E. (assistant professor of religious studies, Stanford University); “Encountering Alien Otherness”; The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca Saunders; (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 153-177 //les]

Just as people have used differences in skin color, religion, gender, cultural practices, language, ideology, and economics to justify violence against other humans, people have also used differences between humans and other life forms to justify needless violence against plants, animals, and entire ecosystems. For centuries, people have claimed that one trait or another--from tool using to linguistic ability--demonstrates human superiority over other life. **The nineteenth century doctrine of Manifest Destiny proclaimed that a united American people (white, of European descent) was bound to "develop" the continent's natural resources from coast to coast**. Modernity’s ideology of anthropocentric humanism, which “others” nature by depicting it solely as an instrument for human ends, generates enormous ecological problems. In recent decades, the “dark side” of modernity has come in for deserved criticism. Despite its undeniable problems, however, modernity has also made possible great improvements in political freedom, material well-being, scientific knowledge, and human lifespan. Unfortunately, modernity’s efforts to elevate humankind to the top of the cosmic heap have generally come at the expense of other life forms. Even if humans are more fully conscious or intelligent than (most) other animals, this fact does not justify insensitive treatment of so-called "lower" species. The capacity for greater awareness brings with it an obligation to exhibit care and respect for all sentient life. Just as many religious and democratic traditions have called for an end to dehumanizing attitudes found in racism, sexism, and xenophobic nationalism, many environmentalists now urge humankind to acknowledge its kinship with and dependence on the rest of terrestrial life. Attempts to "dominate" both nature and other human beings remain attractive, however, partly because they alleviate anxiety about personal and social mortality and evil. Success in curbing the human urge to dominate domination hinges on increased psychological and social integration, which leads individuals and groups to face up to, instead of projecting, their own mortality and proclivity toward evil. A constructive postmodernity will make such integration a top priority.

**The European’s treatment of natives is a reflection of human centeredness and their efforts to reassure themselves as the center of the universe – only the aff can solve because contact with the alien gaze would disprove the thesis that we are at the center of the universe making us unable to commit such acts of violence**

**Zimmerman ‘2** [Michael E. (assistant professor of religious studies, Stanford University); “Encountering Alien Otherness”; The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca Saunders; (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 153-177 //les]

The first part of this essay briefly studies how colonial Westerners reacted to their encounter with technologically inferior non-Europeans, and how those non-Europeans reacted to their encounter with the technologically superior Europeans. We know that in non-Europeans often suffered from that encounter, but what is less well known is the -- ent to which European culture never quite recovered from the culturally decentering blow of contact with native peoples in the New World, even though those people were colonized and often enslaved. Descartes' search for an indubitable foundation for truth was motivated partly by the skepticism that arose after discovery of New World peoples. Arguably, the brutal cultural and ecological practices involved in Western colonialism reflects Western ~~man's~~ [persons] desperate effort to reassure ~~himself~~ [herself ] about ~~his~~ [her] own cultural centrality. Having treated allegedly inferior human others so ferociously a few centuries ago, how might Westerners expect to be treated if discovered and colonized by technologically superior others? The second part of the essay investigates the -- ent to which the phenomenon of alien abduction can shed light on human experience of the foreign, the other, the "alien." Temporarily bracketing the question of the ontological status of these aliens, I focus on the experience reported by abductees. Even if such experience is ultimately explicable in terms of complex psychological processes, and thus even if the aliens turn out not to be "objectively" present, much can be learned by examining the experience involved in encountering what at least seemed to be radically other. Moreover, study of such experience may suggest that mainstream views of "reality" may need to be expanded. Because the abduction experience is too complex to be studied exhaustively in an essay of this length, I will focus on one particular aspect of it: the experience of being apprehended by the alien gaze.\*\*\*

# 2AC -- SCIENCE FICTION GOOD

**Science Fiction films give us ideas of what is beyond our perception**

**Blassnigg, Punt and Surman 06**

(Michael Punt. Martha Blassnigg. David Surman. Wake Forest University. Leonardo, Volume 39, Number 1, February 2006, pp. 13-18 (Article). June 22, 2011. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/len/summary/v039/39.1punt01.html> KG)

This paper was stimulated by the film Galaxy Quest (Parisot, 1999), which collapses the fictitious dimensions of space travel into the scientific perception of real space travel in order to reveal some insights into the cultural construction of space. In this collaboration, the three authors [1] inquire into the metaphorical, metaphysical and metadiscursive aspects of technology by integrating a range of scholarly activities and amplifying them through non-hierarchical collaboration within an institutional environment [2]. It combines the research of artists, filmmakers, photographers and designers with the aim of advancing our understanding of the history of technology and exploring new modalities of academic and practical research. Consistent with this overarching concern, this paper deals with the human imagination and regards it as a mirror image of space. Like space, the imagination is largely unknowable, and all that we can ever say about it as an entity is based on conjecture drawn from our fragmentary perception of the wake of its apparently infinite energy. We have chosen, as a methodology, to study the visible residue of the human imagination in the arts, science and technology and to -- rapolate the network forces that seem to intersect at their instantiation, aware all the time that we are describing a human and cultural condition rather than explaining it. For this group of authors our common point of departure is cinema, a technological anachronism that initially caught the public imagination in ways that no scientist, inventor, technologist, entrepreneur or showman ever predicted. The 19th-century conjuror and cinema pioneer Georges Méliès and a few British eccentrics—mediums, showmen and instrument makers—are possible exceptions.

**Science fiction embraces science and leaves open an entire branch of criticism and theory bound by rationalism.**

**Rabkin,** **04** Eric S. Thurnau Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan, Science Fiction and the Future of Criticism, PMLA, issue No. 3, volume No. 119, 21/6/11, EG

If we ask what science fiction is, we may find many answers. One that I have promulgated, in The Fantastic in Literature, is that it is the branch of fantastic literature that claims plausibility against a background of science. But that is a narrow definition, quite workable for the t-- -minded but inadequate to a broader criticism, the sort of criticism that science fiction invites, because science fiction is not limited to t-- s.

**Our kritik is not limited to scientific expansion, it is exploration**

**Rabkin, 04** Eric S. Thurnau Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan, Science Fiction and the Future of Criticism, PMLA, issue No. 3, volume No. 119, 21/6/11, EG

Science fiction, in other words, is no more limited to science fiction literature than love is limited to love letters. Science fiction is what I would call, adapting McHugh’s term, a cultural system, and the future of criticism lies in exploring cultural systems. Toward this future, science fiction should lead the way.

**Once supported, Science fiction will surpass even science**

**Rabkin,** **04** Eric S. Thurnau Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan, Science Fiction and the Future of Criticism, PMLA, issue No. 3, volume No. 119, 21/6/11, EG

As we become ever more connected, the cultural system that is science fiction will produce a criticism that is ever more collaborative, crossing the boundaries of individual contributors just as it crosses productive domains from household appliance to political debate. As the number of contributors increases, and as the body of shareable knowledge increases, criticism will inevitably add quantative methods to its ever-more-capacious qualitative methods.

**Science Fiction opens up possibilities to what could be**

**Yanarella 01**

(Ernest J. Yanarella, University of Kentucky, The Cross, The Plow and The Skyline: Contemporary Science Fiction and the Ecological Imagination, 2001 pp. 6 (Chapter 1) June 22, 2011, <http://www.bookpump.com/bwp/pdf-b/1124023b.pdf>, KG)

Yet another critical element to science fiction is implicit in Suvin’s phrase, the “imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment.” This has to do with the hegemonic role of the novum. Because science fiction diverges significantly from naturalisitic or realistic fiction, it almost invariably incorporates into its plot structure some version of the novum (the radically new or novel). As we shall see, novums are polymorphous and include as concrete examples such elements as LeGuin’s ansible, Lem’s sentient sea, Benford’s tachyons, Wilhelm’s clones and Asimov’s gadgets. Working in complicity, the cognitive norms underlying science fiction, it’s defamiliarizing effect, and the hegemony of the novum tend to prompt the involved reader to oscillate between the author’s imperical world and the estranged SF world, “feed[ing] back into the reader’s own presuppositions and cultural invariants questioning them and giving him/ her a possibility or critical examination” (Suvin, 1983: 308). As a result, science fiction as critical political theory often issues in a powerful critique of existing social institutions, cultural norms, and prevailing structures of power. In the process, it opens up alternative ways of socially constructing the lived world and disclosing utopian possibilities latent in the present and emergent in that different possible future. As well, prevailing scientific practice and technological possibilities are frequently interrogated or subverted in the process. As Malmgren puts it, “in part because its discourse is rooted in a scientific epistemology, in part because its novums are drawn to or tied to developments in science, the most significant SF necessarily investigate the dominant scientific paradigm of the day.” “In a sense,” as he goes on to say, “the genre simultaneously affirms and interrogates science, resting as it does on faith in reason and the scientific method while at the same time probing the assumptions, limits, and blind spots of each” (Malmgren, 1991: 30).

Science Fiction is not unscientific, it advances scientific knowledge to the public

Dominik and Zarnecki 10

(Martin Dominik and John C. Zarnecki, University of St. Andrews researchers; SUPA, January 25, 2010, Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society, June 21, 2011 <http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1936/499.full?sid=9c424938-a25a-455f-83f0-7be2c010cf44>, KG)

Various scenarios of encounters with -- ra-terrestrial life have already been portrayed in the science-fiction literature and films, some of these being more scientific, others more fictional Imagination, however, must not be underestimated as a valuable means to advance knowledge towards new frontiers, and is not at all an unscientific concept. It is also valuable that a broad public has been given the opportunity to reflect on this topic. Similarly, scientists involved in relevant research themselves should engage with journalists and the public. Media reports and weblogs debating -- ra-terrestrial life, including those that relate to this very Royal Society Discussion Meeting, also provide some evidence on public opinion and reactions that can be expected.

# 2AC -- ETHIC OF OPENNESS TO OTHERNESS

**Through the metaphysical distance imposed by utilitarian logic humans are allowed to be categorized allowing for holocaust.**

**Muhr 2000,** Sara Louis, Ph.D. from Copenhagen Business School, has since 2008 been lecturer at Lund University, *Moral Distance – when Ethics Disappears,* Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulnerability of Diversity Management, 6/26/11, EG

Distance—both geographical and hierarchical—is in this way following Jones et al. (2005) a strategy that often lead to the disposal of personal care. Bureaucrats have to obey orders at all times, and orders are not questioned by a sense of personal moral (Kaulingfreks, 2005a). On this view, actors attempt to achieve moral neutrality through both physical and hierarchical distance (Jones et al., 2005). The face of the other person disappears when there is a distance in between the self and the other; and we are exposed to what both Bauman and Levinas would denote as an *effacement*. In effacement, the face disappears and individuals are only seen as categories or entities to be managed. The idea about moral distance created by bureaucracy is put to its -- reme by Bauman (1999), who discusses how the holocaust was morally possible. Holocaust, for Bauman is the cruelest example of how a large number of people can be subjected to an essentially utilitarian calculation, where the only concern is how the best means available can meet a particular end.

**Racism and genocide are not aberrations performed by perverse people- nor are they predestined. The kill to save mentality and the attribution of threatening qualities to the strange and foreign enemy stem from the failure to recognize our vulnerability in the face of the other and devaluation of difference.**

**Burggraeve 2005**

(Roger, Professor of Moral Theology at K.U.Leuven, “Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other”, Human Rights Review; 6:2)

According to Levinas, the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or failure to appreciate similarities between people, but in the denial, or better, the failure to appreciate and value people’s fundamental and irreducible otherness by which they fall outside of every genre and are thus “unique”: “alterity flows in no sense out of difference, to the contrary difference goes back to alterity” (VA 92). A racist relation wants to recognise and value only the “same,” or one’s “own,” and therefore excludes the “foreign.” Out of self-defense, we are easily inclined to accept and consider positively only that which agrees with, or is “similar” to ourselves. One finds the other embarrassing, **threatening, and frightening**. One therefore tries to expel him from oneself, to place him outside so that he can be considered the **“enemy**” from whom one “may” (!) defend oneself, and whom one may even **“destroy” as what brings life** and well-being under pressure—unless one can reduce him to oneself or make him a part of oneself. One wants to accept “others” (or “strangers,” or “foreigners”) only to the -- ent that they belong to one’s own “genre” or “kind,” which is to say to one’s own blood and soil, to the same family, tribe, sex, clan, nation, church, club or community, to do the same work, have the same birthplace and date. One’s “own” is praised and even divinised at the price of the “other,” which is vilified. The “stranger” becomes the scapegoat on whom we blame all of our problems and worries. One accepts differences only in so far as they are a matter of accidental particularities or specificities within a same genre or basic design, in which individuals differ from one another within a same “sort” only very relatively (for example, character, taste, intellectual level), and in which their deeper affinity is not at all tested. Against this background, it is clear that for Levinas, anti-Semitism, as a specific and advanced form of racism, takes aim at the Jew as the intolerable other. For anti-Semitic thinking and sentiment, the Jew is simply the enemy, just as for every racism the other is the enemy as such, that is to say not on the basis of personality, one or another character trait or a specific act considered morally troublesome or objectionable, but due only to his or her very otherness. In anti-Semitism, the Jew, as “other,” is always the guilty one. It is never “oneself,” but the embodiment of the “same” which not only arranges everything around itself but also profiles itself as principle of meaning and value. From this perspective on racism as rejection of the other, it appears, according to Levinas, that racism is ***not*** a rare and improbable phenomenon existing in the heart and thought of only some “perverse” people, **and which has nothing to do with us**. In so far as one is, according to the spontaneous dynamic of existing, or “*conatus essendi*,” directed toward the “same,” toward maintaining and fortifying one’s “own”—all such as I have just sketched it—one must be considered “by nature” potentially racist, though of course without being “predestined” for it. In itself, this admits no question of psychological or pathological deviation. According to Levinas, this implies that one can not simply dispense with the racism of Hitler and the Nazis—in contrast with something instead occurring only once—as a wholly distinct and incomparable phenomenon, at least if one views it not quantitatively but qualitatively, which is to say in terms of its roots and basic inspiration. In an attempt to hold open a pure— in fact, Manichean—distinction between “good” (us) and “bad” (the “others”), thus keeping oneself out of range of the difficulties in question, it happens all too often that Hitlerism is described as something completely unique which has nothing in common with the aims and affairs of the common mortal. The perspective of Levinas shows that Hitlerism with its genocide and other pro grams of eradication is only a quantitative -- ension, that is to say a consistent, systematic, and inexorably refined outgrowth of racism in its pure form—one which, in its turn, represents a concretization of the effort of existing, which, as the reduction of the other to the same, is the “nature” of our existence (without, however, us being abandoned to this “nature” as a fatality, since as ethical beings we can overcome it). **No one is invulnerable**: any of us is a potential racist, and at least sometimes a real racist. Racism, like Hitlerism, does not occur by chance, or by an accidental turn. Nor is it an exceptional perversion occurring in a group of psychologically disturbed people. It is a permanent possibility woven into the dynamic of our very being, so that whomever accedes to and lives out the dynamic of his or her own being inevitably -- ends racism in one or another form. We can no longer blame racism and anti-Semitism on “others,” for both their possibility and the temptation to them are borne in the dynamic of our own being, as “non-reciprocal determination of the other”—which is precisely the kernel of our *conatus essendi* (AS 60- 61).

**It is an acceptance of the absurdity or impossibility of true ethics that is transformative**

**Thompson and Derrida ’97** [Ashley and Jacques, An interview with Dominique Dhombres for Le Monde, December 2, 1997. “The Principle of Hospitality; Project Muse//les]

LM: In the same book, you ask this question: ‘Does hospitality consist in interrogating whoever arrives?’, in the very first place by asking him his name, ‘or does hospitality rather begin by the unquestioning welcome?’ Is the second attitude more in conformity with the principle of ‘unlimited hospitality’ that you are evoking? JD: There again, the decision is taken at the heart of what seems an absurdity, what resembles the impossible itself (an antinomy, a tension between two equally imperative laws but without opposition). Pure hospitality consists in welcoming whoever arrives before imposing any conditions on ~~him~~, {her} before knowing and asking anything at all, be it a name or an identity ‘paper’. But it supposes also that one address him, singularly, that he be called therefore, and that he be understood to have a proper name: ‘You, what is your name?’ Hospitality consists in doing everything to address the other, to accord him, even to ask him his name, while keeping this question from becoming a ‘condition’, a police inquisition, a blacklist or a simple border control. This difference is at once subtle and fundamental, it is a question which is asked on the threshold of the ‘home’ and at the threshold between two inflections. An art and a poetics, but an entire politics depends on it, **an entire ethics is decided by it.**

**It’s impossibe to escape responsibility for others since our intersubjective relationship is predicated on recognition of others.**

**Crowe ‘6** [(Law @ Univ of Queensland); Dec 2k6; Ratio Juris; 19: 4; “Levinasian Ethics and Legal Obligation”

In the “total nudity of [the Other’s] defence less eyes,” I encounter a “primordial” demand for recognition; the *infinity* of the face “paralyses power” (ibid., 199). Confronted with the gaze of the Other, my freedom becomes “inhibited,” “guilty,” and “timid” (ibid., 203). In the ethical moment, I am compelled to acknowledge that affirming my own subjectivity **necessarily involves assuming responsibilities “**for which no one can replace me and from which no one can release me” (ibid., 245). Levinas’s description of **the ethical encounter makes ethics unavoidable**. The demand encountered in the face of the Other is *primordial* (ibid., 199). It is prior to subjectivity, prior to choice. I cannot posit myself as a subject without distinguishing myself from that which I am not. I must thematize the world around me. However, it is not possible to conceptualise the world without reaching out to the Other. In affirming myself as subjectivity in the face of the Other, I posit myself as responsible (ibid., 215). Subjectivity and morality “constitute one sole and same process in being” (Levinas 1969, 245). It follows that it is impossible to evade my ethical obligations. The assumption of ethical responsibility for the Other is “passive” and “non-voluntary” (Levinas 1998, 15). As Levinas says, “to be unable to shirk: This is the I” (Levinas 1969, 245).

**An ethical engagement must fulfill an unconditional obligation to the other – you decisions must take the absolute risk of stepping beyond pragmatic calculation – in order to be a decision for the other it must interrupt the possible**

**Derrida and Assheur ’99** [ J, (Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, USA); “Intellectual Courage, an Interview”; Culture Machine <http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j002/Articles/art_derr.htm> //les]

Q: You often underline that your philosophy proceeds by means of paradoxes. You show precisely how established philosophies of justice or of friendship yield to aporia, but at the same time the claim to an unconditional justice or the idea of a friendship that is 'totally other' always returns in your argumentation. Do you not fear that your philosophy discourages from the start any political project as it always draws the risk of an aporia or a paradox? And concerning your own political engagement: would you say that it is an engagement against or despite your philosophy, or does one rather have to see here a proper way for deconstruction to go into politics? JD: Yes, I try everything I can above all to attempt to adjust my 'engagements' to the unconditional affirmation that traverses 'deconstruction'. This is not easy, one can never be sure of succeeding. It can never be the object of a knowledge or a certitude. Like others, I often feel the discouragement of which you speak, but in my eyes that is also a necessary test. If the whole political project would be the reassuring object or the logical or theoretical consequence of assured knowledge (euphoric, without paradox, without aporia, free of contradiction, without undecidabilities to decide), that would be a machine that runs without us, without responsibility, without decision, at bottom without ethics, nor law, nor politics. There is no decision nor responsibility without the test of aporia or undecidability. Q: The notion of 'decision' occupies a pivotal place in your reflections: what is the place of the decision in your concept of the political? Does it somehow replace justice? JD: It does not replace it, on the contrary it is indissociable from it. There is no 'politics', no law, no ethics without the responsibility of a decision which, to be just, cannot content itself with applying existing norms or rules but must take the absolute risk, in every singular instant, or justifying itself again, alone, as if for the first time, even if it is inscribed in a tradition. For lack of space, I cannot explain here the discourse on decision that I try to elaborate elsewhere. A decision, though mine, active and free in its phenomenon, cannot be the simple deployment of my potentialities or aptitudes, of what is 'possible for me'. In order to be a decision, it must interrupt that 'possible', tear off my history and thus be above all, in a certain strange way, the decision of the other in me: come from the other in view of the other in me. It must in a paradoxical way permit and comprise a certain passivity that in no way allays my responsibility. These are the paradoxes that are difficult to integrate in a classical philosophical discourse, but I do not believe that a decision, if it exists, would be possible otherwise. Q: If all political engagement runs the risk of falling into aporia, would it not be more consequential to say: let us forget the aporias and get pragmatic? Let us do what needs to be done, everything else is a kind of political metaphysics? JD: **In my eyes what you call 'a kind of political metaphysics' would be exactly the forgetting of aporia itself, which we often try to do. But the aporia cannot be forgotten**. What would a 'pragmatics' be that consisted in avoiding contradictions, problems apparently without solution, etc.? Do you not think that this supposedly realistic or empirical 'pragmatics' would be a kind of metaphysical reverie, in the most and imaginary sense one gives these words?

**The impact is a process of social separation that culminates in Otherization and the conditions necessary for the Holocaust.**

**Bauman 1989** (Zygmunt, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Modernity and the Holocaust; P. 182-184

Most emphatically, *my responsibility is unconditional*. It does not depend on prior knowledge of the qualities of its object; it precedes such knowledge. It doe not depend on an interested intention stretched towards the object; it precedes such intention. Neither knowledge nor intention make for the proximity of the other, for the specifically human mode of togetherness; ‘The tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility’; and this moreover, whether accepted or refused, whether knowing or not knowing how to assume it, whether able or unable to do something concrete for the Other. To say: *me voici*. To do something of the Other. To give. To be human spirit, that’s it…I analyze the inter-human relationship as if, in proximity with the Other- beyond the image I myself make of the other man- his face, the expressive of the Other (and the whole human body is in more or less face) were what *ordains* me to serve him…The face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an order in my regard, this is not in the manner in which an ordinary sign signifies its signified; this order is the very signifyingness of the face. Indeed, according to Levinas, *responsibility is the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity*. Responsibility which means ‘responsibility for the Other’, and hence a responsibility ‘for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me’. This existential responsibility, the only meaning of subjectivity, of being a subject, has nothing to do with contractual obligation. It has nothing in common either with my calculation of reciprocal benefit. It does not need a sound or idle expectation of reciprocity, of ‘mutuality of intentions’, of the other rewarding my responsibility with his own. I am not assuming my responsibility on behest of a superior force, be it a moral code sanctioned with the threat of hell or a legal code sanctioned with the threat of prison. Because of what my responsibility is not, I do not bear it as a burden. I become responsible while I constitute myself into a subject. Becoming responsible ***is*** the constitution of me as a subject. Hence it is my affair, and mine only. ‘Intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is *his* affair.’ Responsibility being the existential mode of the human subject, *morality is the primary structure of intersubjective relation* in its most pristine form, unaffected by any non-moral factors (like interest, calculation of benefit, rational search for optimal solutions, or surrender to coercion). The substance of morality being a duty towards the other (as distinct from an obligation), and a duty which precedes all interestedness- the roots of morality reach well beneath societal arrangements, like structures of domination or culture. Societal processes start when the structure of morality (tantamount to intersubjectivity) is already there. *Morality is not a product of society. Morality is something society manipulates*- exploits, re-directs, jams. Obversely, immoral behaviour, a conduct which forsakes or abdicates responsibility for the other, is not an effect of societal malfunctioning. It is therefore the incidence of immoral, rather than moral, behaviour which calls for the investigation of the social administration of intersubjectivity. Responsibility, this building block of all moral behaviour, arises out of the proximity of the other. Proximity means responsibility, and responsibility *is* proximity. Discussion of the relative priority of one or the other is admittedly gratuitous, as none is conceivable alone. Defusion of responsibility, and thus the neutralization of the moral urge which follows it, must necessarily involve (is, in fact, synonymous with) replacing proximity with a physical or spiritual separation. The alternative to proximity is social distance. The moral attribute of proximity is responsibility; the moral attribute of social distance is lack of moral relationship, or heterophobia. *Responsibility is silenced one proximity is eroded; it may eventually be replaced with* ***resentment*** *once the fellow human subject is* ***transformed into an Other****.* The process of transformation is one of social separation. It was such a separation which made possible for thousands to kill, and for millions to watch the murder without protesting. It was the technological and bureaucratic achievement of modern rational society which made such a separation possible.

**Anything unfamiliar to the state becomes Other and ultimately evil and strange – seeing alterity as a threat justifies nationalist responses to “invading enemies” – this paranoia has lead to the worst atrocities of the nation state**

**Kearney ’99** [ Richard, (Richard Kearney is Professor of Philosophy at University College Dublin and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Boston College); “Aliens and Others: Between Girard and Derrida”; Cultural Values, 13625179, Jul99, Vol.3, Issue 3 //les]

The tendency of media hype, so prone to hysteria, is to anathemise anything that is unfamiliar as 'evil'. The 'other' thus becomes the 'alien', the stranger the scapegoat, the dissenter the devil. And it is this proclivity to demonise alterity as a threat to our collective identity which so easily issues in **paranoid** **fantasies about invading enemies**. Any threat to 'national security' is met with immediate defence-attack mechanisms. One thinks of McCarthy's blacklists and Reagan's Starwars, the Soviet show trials and gulags, Mao's cultural revolution and Tienanmen Square, the embargo of Cuba and the mining of Managua, the bombing of Cambodia and sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, Bloody Sunday and the introduction of internment without trial in Ulster, Kristalnacht and Auswitch, Satilla and Chabrilla, Sarajevo and Kosovo. The list is interminable. Like Girard, Derrida acknowledges that most nation-states are so bent on preserving their body politic from alien viruses that they seek to pathologize and purge their adversaries. Faced with a threatening outsider the best mode of defence becomes attack. Again and again the national we is defined over and against the alien them. That's one reason borders exist, with nationals 'in' and aliens 'out'. You can of course cross the border with the right passport and become an alien resident. But to be truly nationalised, you need something more --something not always readily available if you happen to be arriving from beneath the Rio Grande or beyond the Gaza strip. National security draws a cordon sanitaire around the nation state, protecting it from alien trespassers. Like the line drawn in sand at the Alamo. Or the Mason-Dixon line. Or other lines separating north and south -- in Vietnam, in Korea, in Lebanon, in Ireland. It is in the cont-- of such partitioning and polarising that Derrida has pursued the questions of justice and hospitality in recent years. Every nation-state is logocentric to the -- ent that it excludes those who do not conform (non-a) to its identity logic (a is a). This is necessary up to a point, as even the cosmopolitan Kant recognised when he accepted the need to issue conditions for refugee visitors to a state: for example, that their sojourn be temporary, law-abiding, non-divisive (Kant, 1957). The world belongs to everyone, yes, but within the borders of nation-states it belongs to some more than to others. Granted, some form of immigration/emigration laws are inevitable. That's the law and Derrida accepts this; but he goes on to argue that there's something beyond the law. Namely, justice. And justice demands -- ra, perhaps something that is ultimately impossible: unconditional hospitality to the alien (Derrida, 1992 and 1997a; Dillon, 1999).

**A political act of responsibility can’t be based on a pregiven moral content but instead on must invent a new rule or norm based on the singularity of its cont-- .**

**Critchley ‘4** [Simeon, (British Philosopher, studied at the University of Essex, teaches at the New School for Social Resarch); April 2k4; Political Theory; 32: 2//]

3. To summarize the first two steps of the argument in a question: If politics is nonfoundational (because that would limit freedom) and nonarbitrary (because that would derive from a conception of freedom), then what follows from this? How does one think a nonfoundational and yet nonarbitrary relation between ethics and politics? Derrida’s claim would seem to be that there is indeed a link between ethics and politics, claiming in *Adieu* that ‘*This relation* *is necessary (il faut ce rapport)*, it must exist, it is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics’ (*A* 198). Against Schmitt, Derrida tries to capture this sense of a nonfoundational, yet nonarbitrary, relation between ethics and politics with the notion of ***the other’s decision in me***, a decision that is taken, but with regard to which I am passive. On my understanding, this means that particular political decisions are taken in relation to the universality of an ethical demand for action that I approve: infinite responsibility to the other, justice, the messianic a priori, or whatever. Although this is not the way Derrida understands it, I would interpret the other’s decision in me as an experience of *conscience*, where the content of the latter is the other’s demand to which I am infinitely responsible and that counsels me to act in a specific situation.18 4. Politics, then, is the task of ***invention*** in relation to the other’s decision in me—nonfoundationally and nonarbitrarily. But how does one do this exactly? Perhaps in the following way: in a quite banal sense, each decision is necessarily different. Every time I decide I have to invent a new rule, a new norm, which must be absolutely singular in relation to both the other’s infinite demand made on me and the finite cont-- within which this demand arises. I think this is what Derrida means, in ‘Force of Law’ and elsewhere, by his qualified Kierkegaardian emphasis on the madness of the decision, namely, that each decision is like a leap of faith made in relation to the singularity of a cont-- .19 Such a position might be linked to one of Wittgenstein’s more cryptic remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where he writes that in following a rule, ‘it would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage (*es sei an jedem Punkt eine neue Entscheidung nötig*)’.20 5. So, each political decision is made experientially *ex nihilo*, as it were, **and is not deduced or read off procedurally from a pregiven moral content**, **and yet it is not arbitrary**: there is a rule that shapes the taking of that decision. The demand provoked by the other’s decision in me calls forth political invention, which provokes me into taking a decision and inventing a norm for the specific situation. The ***singularity*** of the cont-- in which the demand arises provokes an act of invention whose criterion is ***universal***. All the difficulty of politics consists precisely in this passage from the universal to the particular.

**The aff is a politics of ethical difference where politics must be mediated ethically. Responsibility for the other leads back to politics as a responsibility to questioning and demanding for justice. This is the only politics that avoids totalizing politics like National Socialism and war.**

**Critchley ’99** [Simeon, (British Philosopher, studied at the University of Essex, teaches at the New School for Social Resarch); The Ethics of Deconstruction; P. 221- 223]

The Levinasian account of the passage from ethics to politics leads to a different vision of political space from that seen in Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy: what I shall call 'a politics of ethical difference', where politics must be mediated ethically. (It is significant — and much could perhaps be made of this — that Derrida barely mentions this move to the third party, politics and justice, in his essays on Levinas (cf. *ED* 156n./*WD* 314, n.37).) For Levinas, I would claim, ethics is the disruption of totalizing politics: anti-semitism, anti-humanism, National Socialism. As the French and Hebrew epigraphs to *Otherwise than Being* make clear, National Socialist anti-semitism is not restricted to a hatred of the Jewish people, but is expanded by Levinas to mean a hatred of the other person as such. Anti-semitism is an anti-humanism, if by 'humanism' one understands a humanism of the other human being. National Socialism is an exemplar of all forms of totalizing Levinas to mean a hatred of the other person as such. Anti-semitism is an anti-humanism, if by 'humanism' one understands a humanism of the other human being. National Socialism is an exemplar of all forms of totalizing politics or forms of immanentism that are premised on a refusal, or reduction, of transcendence. The crematoria at Auschwitz are testimony to the attempted destruction of transcendence and otherness. The philosophy of Levinas, like that of Adorno, is commanded by the new categorical imperative imposed by Hitler: namely, 'that Auschwitz not repeat itself' (*dab Auschwitz nicht sich wiederbole*). In both his major works, *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being*, the exposition begins with the statement of the domination of totalizing politics, which for Levinas is always associated with the fact of war. This means both the empirical fact of war, which, Levinas claims, 'suspends morality' (*TeI* ix/*TI* 21), and the Hobbesian claim that the peaceful order of society is founded on the war of all against all. Levinas writes: 'It is then not without importance to know if the egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled...proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the irreducible responsibility of the one for all, and if it can do without friendship and faces' (*AE* 203/*OB* 159-60). Levinasian ethics is a reduction of war (which, as will be shown, is not a complete reduction). For Levinas — and here his analysis rejoins the description of totalitarianism given above — the domination of totality is also the total domination of politics, where 'everything is political'. Left to itself, politics engages in the reduction of all areas of social life, and more particularly that of ethics to politics. The primacy of politics is the primacy of the synoptic, panoramic vision of society, wherein a disinterested political agent views society as a whole. For Levinas, such a panoramic vision, not only that of the philosopher but also that of the political theorist, is the greatest danger, because it loses sight of ethical difference — that is, of my particular relation to and obligations towards the Other. As Levinas notes, 'Politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself' (*TeI* 276/ *TI* 300), and it is necessary to oppose the particular ethical relation with the Other to the panoramic vision of political life that views society only as a whole. Of course, to the totalizing political philosopher, this ethical relation will appear ridiculously naïve; Levinas remarks: 'Politics is opposed to morality as philosophy to naïveté' (*TeI* ix/*TI* 21). Thus Levinas's thinking is, in a genuine sense, a critique of politics, in so far as he is opposing the domination of politics enacted in totalizing or immanentist conceptions of society. However, if one were tempted to claim that his critique of politics is directed only against narrowly defined totalitarian regimes, then it should be noted that he also criticizes liberal politics, in so far as it has been dominated by the concepts of spontaneity, freedom, and autonomy. In the 1990 Preface to a republished essay, he wrily notes, 'We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic dignity for the human subject.' The Levinasian critique of politics is a critique of the belief that only political rationality can answer political questions. To take a concrete and far from neutral example, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the peace agreement reached between Israel and Egypt were, for Levinas, phenomena irreducible to the operation of political rationality. Levinas claims that what took place on both sides was a recognition of the Other in their otherness; ethical peace overriding and guiding political reason. Levinas's disruption of totalizing politics permits the deduction of an ethical structure irreducible to totality: the face-to-face, proximity, substitution, and responsibility prior to questioning. However, Levinas's critique of politics and his insistence on the primacy of ethical difference does not result in an a-politicism, in a quietism or a 'spirituality of angels' — that is the source of his critique of Buber's I-Thou relation (*TeI* 187-8, 40-1/*TI* 213, 68-9). **Rather, ethics leads back to politics, responsibility to questioning, to the interrogative demand for a just polity**. I would go further and claim that, for Levinas, ethics is ethical for the sake of politics — that is, for the sake of a new conception of the organization Of political space. The leitmotif for the latter is a verse from Isaiah 57, cited in *Otherwise than Being*: 'Peace, peace, to the neighbour (*le prochain*) and to the one far off (*le lointain*)' (*AE* 200/*OB* 157). Peace, or responsibility, to the near one, the neighbour, *is* peace to the one far off, the third party, or human plurality. All humanity looks at me in the eyes of the Other. My claim is that politics provides the continual horizon of Levinasian ethics, and that the problem of politics is that of delineating a form of political life that will repeatedly interrupt all attempts at totalization.

**To have true ethical politics one must have unconditional hospitality to the other and infinite responsibility without calculation – we must be willing to intervene in the name of the other without any guarantees**

**Critchley ‘4** [Simeon, (British Philosopher, studied at the University of Essex, teaches at the New School for Social Resarch); April; Political Theory; 32: 2]

However, and this is the really interesting move in the argument, rather than judging this hiatus negatively, Derrida claims that the absence of a plausible deduction from ethics to politics should not induce paralysis or resignation. The claim is therefore that if there is no deduction from ethics to politics, then this can be both ethically and politically welcome. On the one hand, ethics is left defined as the infinite responsibility of unconditional hospitality. Whilst, on the other hand, the political can **be defined as the taking of a decision without any determinate transcendental guarantees**. Thus, the hiatus in Levinas allows Derrida both to affirm the primacy of an ethics of hospitality, whilst leaving open the sphere of the political as a realm of risk and danger. Such danger calls for decisions or what Derrida, citing Levinas, calls ‘political invention’(*A* 144), an invention taken in the name of the other **without this being reducible to some sort of moral calculus**. However, Derrida’s position does not, I think, collapse into a vapid formalism or empty universalism. He emphasizes how the very indeterminacy of the passage from ethics to politics entails that the taking of a political decision must be a response to the utter singularity of a particular and inexhaustible cont-- . **The infinite ethical demand arises as a response to a singular cont-- and calls forth the invention of a political decision**. Politics itself can here be thought of as ***the art of a*** ***response to the singular demand of the other***, a demand that arises in a particular cont-- —**although the infinite demand cannot simply be reduced to its cont--** —and calls for political invention, for creation.

**The other’s suffering demands responsibility- their framework turns you into a complicit bystander where any act of evil is tolerated (this led to Holocaust and Rwanda)**

**Bernstein ‘2** [The Cambridge Companion to Levinas; P. 258- 259]

Levinas’s response to useless suffering is neither that of Nietzsche who calls for a ‘transvaluation of values’, nor is it the self-laceration of Ivan Karamazov who refuses to accept a world in which there is useless suffering. Levinas’s response to the evil of useless suffering that is maliciously inflicted is an ***ethical* response** – an ethical response that leads to his distinctive understanding of our asymmetrical and non-reciprocal responsibility to and for the other, a response to the suffering of the other, my neighbour: But does not this end of theodicy, which obtrudes itself in the face of this century’s inordinate distress, at the same time in a more general way reveal the unjustifiable character of suffering in the other person, the scandal which would occur by my justifying my neighbour’s suffering? So that the very phenomenon of suffering in its uselessness is, in principle, the pain of the other. For an ethical sensibility – confirming itself, in the inhumanity of our time, against this inhumanity – the justification of the neighbour’s pain is certainly the source of all immorality. [us 163] We can see why Levinas’s understanding of our ethical relation to the other is at once so demanding and yet so appealing. When confronted with the horrendous evils of the twentieth century, we tend to **focus on the actions of the perpetrators and the suffering of the victims**. We are much more **ambivalent about the responsibility of** so-called **bystanders** – those who allow such actions to take place and who **justify their complicity** – **those who excuse themselves from any direct responsibility**. But think how different the course of events might have been in our century, not only during the Nazi period, but in other instances such as the genocide that took place in Rwanda, if so-called bystanders had **anticipated and responded to the suffering of their fellow human beings**. Levinas’s claim is poignantly illustrated by an incident that Hannah Arendt relates in her report of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. She tells the story of Anton Schmidt, whose name came up in the course of the trial. Anton Schmidt was a German soldier who helped Jewish partisans by supplying them with forged papers and trucks until he was apprehended and executed by the Germans. Arendt tells us that when Anton Schmidt’s story was told in the Jerusalem court, it was as if those present observed a two minute silence in honour of this German soldier who saved Jewish lives. Arendt’s comment is certainly in the spirit of Levinas’s insistence on one’s ethical responsibility for the gratuitous suffering of one’s fellow human beings: And in those two minutes, which were like a sudden burst of light in the midst of impenetrable, unfathomable darkness, a single thought stood out clearly, irrefutably, beyond question – how utterly different everything would be today in this courtroom, in Israel, in Germany, in all of Europe, and perhaps in all countries of the world, if on y more such stories could have been told.7 When we think of those instances where an individual ethically responds to the useless suffering of others, we can better understand why Levinas claims that the suffering for the useless suffering of the other person, the just suffering in me for the unjustifiable suffering of the Other, opens upon the suffering the ethical perspective of the inter-human *. . .*It is this attention to the Other which, across the cruelties of our century – despite these cruelties, because of these cruelties – can be affirmed as the very bond of human subjectivity, even to the point of being raised to a supreme ethical principle – the only one which it is not possible to contest – a principle which can go so far as to command the hopes and practical discipline of vast human groups. [us 159]

# 2AC -- ETHICS FIRST

**We should not place questions of truth of being above the suffering of the “Other” doing so subordinates the other culminating in totalitarian violence**

**Gauthier ‘4**[David J., (B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1995, M.A., Baylor University, 1997, Doctoral Student U of Alabama); “MARTIN HEIDEGGER, EMMANUEL LEVINAS, AND THE POLITICS OF DWELLING”; <http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-11052004-163310/unrestricted/Gauthier_dis.pdf> //les]

The Dutch philosopher Theo de Boer describes the difference between Heidegger and Levinas as follows: In Levinas the central point of his thought is not truth or unconcealment **of Being, but rather the reality of persecuted people in the daily history of the world.** Levinas does not blame traditional metaphysics for having forgotten the truth of Being, but he holds against it that it has forgotten the dignity of (people) ~~men.~~ In its insensitivity to justice and injustice, and its indifference to good and evil. The jurisdiction of history is a form of terror. The victims of history make their judgement on history. To listen to their voice is more in line with the dignity of philosophy than to lend an ear to the anonymous event that is called the truth of Being.61 As this chapter has noted, Levinas’s emphasis on “the reality of persecuted people in the daily history of the world” informs his critique of Heidegger. Levinas’s critique of Heideggerian ontology identifies how the ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan cast of the latter’s thought is inherently totalizing. This can be viewed as the first of Levinas’s two principal objections to fundamental ontology. The second major objection, which I have ignored until now, relates to its political consequences. In sum, **fundamental ontology** necessarily leads to tyranny: “Even though it opposes the technological passion issued forth from the forgetting of Being hidden by the existent, Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relationship with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny.”62 Viewed from the perspective of Levinas’ critique of the Occidental ontological tradition, such a conclusion is to be expected. For Levinas, Heideggerian Being represents merely the latest arche utilized by Western ontologists to eliminate the alterity of the Other and promote the freedom of the self. As the political manifestation of the totalization of the Other that ontology perpetrates in the realm of thought, tyranny represents the diluted essence of ontological politics. Much as ontological thought facilitates the domination of the other person by the autonomous ego, so too does it enable the state to totalize its “Other”– its subjects – in a comparatively comprehensive manner: “For the philosophical tradition the conflicts between the same and the other are resolved by theory whereby the other is reduced to the same – or, concretely, by the community of the state where by anonymous power, though it be intelligible, the I rediscovers war in the tyrannic oppression it undergoes from the totality.”63 In this light, the tyrannical rule of the modern state -- ends into the political realm the violent, thematizing tendencies that characterize ontology generally.

**Alterity trumps ontology. The relation to the Other is a precursor to either epistemology or ontology, we must engage in a unconditional hospitality**

**- Our action should be based on impossible morality, not political calculations**

**Keating '4** [Paula, (Dr. Candidate in the School of Philosophy at University of New South Wales.); "The Conditioning of the Unconditioned: Derrida and Kant”;http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\_2004/keating\_conditioning.htm; Borderlands, vol 3 no 1//les]

39. The question then becomes, is impossible hospitality something that we can acknowledge as a duty? Yes, because responsibility for the other is for Derrida, following Levinas, part of our own meaning of being. **The relation to alterity is a pre-condition for ontology.** Without pure hospitality we could not have the idea of the other. I owe hospitality to the other for I do not exist without the other. So we must commit impossible hospitality. And in order to commit this act, we must determine. But for Derrida, we cannot decide in an Aristotelian deliberative sense. **We must determine and act "beyond knowledge**". "If there are responsibilities to be taken and decisions to be made, responsibilities and decisions worthy of these names, they belong to the time of risk and an act of faith. Beyond knowledge. For if I decide because I know within the limits of what I know and know I must do, then I am simply deploying a foreseeable program and there is no decision, no responsibility, no event." (Derrida, 2003: 118) 40. Derrida does give us a style in which we should act, a way of determining this impossible moral response. He believes we must determine our **moral response based on impossible hospitality**. I now quote from one of Derrida’s most recent discussions of hospitality, where he speaks of determination in his dialogue after September 11 with Giovanna Borradori, called "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides": Unconditional hospitality is transcendent with regard to the political, the juridical, perhaps even to the ethical. But – and here is the indissociability – I cannot open the door, I cannot expose myself to the coming of the other and offer him or her anything whatsoever without making this hospitality effective, without, in some concrete way, giving something determinate. This determination will have us re-inscribe the unconditional into certain conditions. Otherwise, it gives nothing. What remains unconditional or absolute (unbedingt, if you will) risks being nothing at all if conditions (Bedingungen) do not make of it some thing (Ding). Political, juridical, and ethical responsibilities have their place, if they take place, only in this transaction – which is each time unique, like an event – between these two hospitalities, the unconditional and the conditional. (2003: 129-130) 41. Even in absolute morality, for Derrida, we determine our response, in the act of impossible hospitality we must give something determinate. We must ask the question: What should I do? (Was soll ich tun? Interestingly, in the above quote Derrida makes deliberate use of the language of Kant’s moral philosophy – German). The determination remains essential for the effectivity of morality, impossible hospitality does entail an activity, it is not merely a passive waiting for the eternally deferred event. This proves practical reason to be, not a mere calculation but an actual response to a moral problem. We act on impossible ideas because they require construction themselves, the highest good is something we fathom, something we condition. In this interview, after more such claims by Derrida, Borradori finally states the obvious: "This sounds like a regulative idea …" To which Derrida replies that he has "reservations" concerning this name and that "the regulative idea remains for him, perhaps, an ultimate reservation. Though such a last recourse risks becoming an alibi, it retains a certain dignity; I cannot swear that I will not one day give in to it." (2003: 134) 42. Derrida has three reservations. Firstly, the way the regulative idea is currently used, though not in a Kantian way, as an ideal of the possible. His impossible, he says is nonvirtualizable, the law comes to me from a greater and older other and it never lets me rest. He says it is not an ideal for it is undeniably real, like the other. His second reservation is that responsibility for what should be done is not realised by following a norm or rule. Ethical response is not automatism. The third reservation to the regulative idea is that in order to employ such a term one would have to subscribe to the whole architectonic, including taking the world, "ich selbst" (myself) as soul or as thinking nature, and God as regulative ideas. 43. What I have shown here is that "real" participation in the impossible is the exact task of moral response. Responding to the impossible is a moral task. The positive effect of soul as a guiding idea means that it is something that one enacts and this is the general form of a person, the basis of all our action. The world as an idea means that it exists as our problem and when we are talking about hospitality it is with the world as a whole that we are concerned. God exists in much the same way as impossible hospitality, not as a possible knowledge or experience but rather as moral perfection. Kant’s metaphysics of morals is immanent. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant wonders what human activity would be like if we did not experience the questioning of how we should act and the need to determine for ourselves our moral response, and writes that "human conduct would be thus changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be no life in the figures." (CpracR, 5:147). Kant too is opposed to automatism. Morality is not only a part of our natural responses but also an expression of our own vitality. Derrida believes that it is faith in the possibility of the impossible that must guide our decisions. (2003: 115) Kant in the Preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason laments the failure of pure reason and celebrates the necessity of practical reason when he exclaims: "Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith". (CpR: Bxxx) Moral response is a faithful one, we attempt to live up to the impossible universal moral law of hospitality.

**The ethics framework must come first. The basis for obligation to the other shouldn’t come from knowledge, even knowledge of the instrumental consequences of one’s actions. Knowledge as the foundation of our relation to others will inevitably obliterate the other by reducing it to an agent of sameness**

**Gottlieb ’94** [9 Prof humanities @ Worcester Polytechnic Institute); 1994; “Ethics and trauma”; <http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm>]

Levinas seeks to overcome the fundamental rationalist, egocentric presuppositions of Western philosophical ethics. His project centers on a basic assertion about human relationships, which can be summarized thus: Other philosophies of human existence have tended to describe our ethical obligations as consequences of historically, conceptually, or developmentally prior structures of social life, rational thought, or experience. These philosophies generate the need for ethics out of the contradictions of a life without ethics (as in contract theory or, to some -- ent, Hegel); or out of the dialectical development of self-consciousness; or out of ontological assumptions about the nature of humanity, nature, reason, or God. Traditionally, in short, ethics is secondary to knowledge of "things" (with that term construed as broadly as possible), including knowledge of or concerns about oneself. It is this sense of knowledge of things that Levinas tries to capture under various rubrics -- most importantly, in his two major philosophical works, as "totality," "essence," and "being." (Levinas believes that the attempt to generate ethics out of self-knowledge or interest is simply a form of war.) For him, **knowledge is necessarily aimed at or inevitably leads to objectification, alienation, and domination**. Therefore knowledge cannot be the basis of ethical life -- that is, of a kind of transcending concern for other people, a concern untouched by our own needs, desires, or attempts to control. As Hume could not get an "ought" from an "is," Levinas finds an unbridgeable gap between knowledge and ethics. If we begin with knowledge -- in the guise of science or philosophy, technique or ontology, rational reflection or psychoanalysis -- we will never respect the other person as irreducibly other. Knowledge is something acquired, dispensed, and instrumentally used by us. Consequently, knowledge of others necessarily reduces the other to something we possess, something we have acquired, and something -- ultimately -- we will use.[(3)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN3) If the foundation of our relation to others is knowledge, the other will be reduced to the same. Otherness will not be allowed to coexist with the agent of sameness.

# 2AC -- CRITICAL POSTCOLONIAL REFLECTION SOLVES

**Science fiction is a reflexive and transformative mode of critical reflection**

**Thacker 2001**

(Eugene, Professor of Technology and Culture at Rutgers University, “The Science Fiction of Technoscience”, Leonardo 34.2, Project Muse,

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/leonardo/v034/34.2thacker01.html)

In order to approach such a question, it will be helpful for us first to attempt to outline something like a "definition" of contemporary science fiction. To be sure, histories of science fiction as a genre refer to as many definitions as there are movements or types of science fiction .5 However, for our purposes here, we might begin with the following: science fiction names a contemporary mode in which the techniques of -- rapolation and speculation are utilized in a narrative form, to construct near-future, far-future or fantastic worlds in which science, technology and society intersect. This is of course a provisional definition, but in it are three important components that characterize contemporary science fiction (most often in fiction, film and video games). The first is the distinction between the methodologies of -- rapolation and speculation .6 Generally speaking, -- rapolation is defined as an imaginative -- ension of a present condition, usually into a future world that is "just around the corner" or even indistinguishable from the present ("the future is now"). By contrast, speculation involves a certain imaginative leap, in which a world (either in the distant future or altogether unrelated) markedly different from the present is constructed. As can be imagined, most science fiction involves some combination of these, culminating in worlds that are at once strange and very familiar. Secondly, science fiction's narratological goal is the delineating of a total space in which certain events occur; that is, the construction of entire worlds that operate according to their own distinct set of rules that form their own "reality" (what has been called the "ontological" mode in science fiction) .7 Finally, more and more genre science fiction is coming to terms not just with technical concerns, but also with social, cultural and political concerns. As such, the use of -- rapolation or speculation and the construction of ontological worlds move science fiction into a realm that involves thinking about the complex dynamics between technology and globalization, science and gender, race and colonialism, and related concerns. Such a complexification of science fiction has been highlighted by critics such as Fredric Jameson as a critical function. In an article entitled "Progress versus Utopia," Jameson articulates two critical functions that science fiction can have .8 The first is characterized by the development of "future histories" or ways in which science fiction places itself in relation to history. Discussing science fiction as the dialectical counterpart to the genre of the historical novel, Jameson suggests that one of the primary roles of science fiction is not to "keep the future alive" but to demonstrate the ways in which visions of the future are first and foremost a means of understanding a particular historical present. A second role Jameson ascribes to science fiction is a more symptomatic one. Referencing the work of the Frankfurt School on the "utopian imagination," science fiction can form a kind of cultural indicator of a culture's ability or inability to imagine possible futures. For Jameson, writing during the high point of postmodernism, science fiction was an indicator of a pervasive loss of historicity and the atrophying of the will to critically imagine utopias. Thus, not only is each vision of the future conditioned by a historical moment in which it is imagined, but, increasingly, science fiction's main concern is with the contingency involved in producing the future, as well as interrogating the constraints and limitations that enable the capacity to imagine the future at all.

**Working through the memory of the legacy of colonial violence is key to overturn the logic of otherization**

**Lorenz 2001**

(Helene, PhD and Prof of Depth Psychology at Pacifica Graduate Institute, “Silenced Knowings, Forgotten Springs: Paths to Healing in the Wake of Colonialism”, http://radicalpsychology.org/vol2-2/lorenz-watkins.html)

The colonial self, profiting from the oppression of others, has created a view of others that justifies oppression. The other is inferior, impulsive, underdeveloped, unable to abstract, superstitious. The other needs colonial stewardship to contribute to their minimal survival. Colonial superiority, intelligence, disciplined work ethic, logical thought, resourcefulness, scientific thinking elevate the colonial self and justify control of the "cake." But this colonial self must also split-off its own inferior, underdeveloped, impulsive, and vulnerable aspects. This binary splitting, whereby one pole is lauded and the other degraded, falls into the psyches of both colonizer and colonized, creating caricatures of identity, and mis-readings of history. Intelligence becomes severed from feeling, intuition, imagination. Work becomes disassociated from spontaneity, vitality, generativity (Martin-Baro, 1994). To begin to face the legacy of a rigid dissociative complex requires a defeat of a striving, individualistic ego with its attempts to control history, and to avoid painful memories. It is only in the recovery of cultural memory, in the listening to previously unheard feelings, symptoms, and narratives that the internal dissociations can begin to heal. To hold our history in ways that can inform our present we must nurture our capacities for grief and mourning, for truth and reconciliation. We know that mourning requires the availability of support and rapport. Part of the sadness that must be faced is how we may have prevented some of our deepest knowings from informing the major choices in our life.

**Breaking the silence of repressed worldviews is vital to fashioning a new ethics to prevent oppression and -- inction through environmental or nuclear destruction**

**Lorenz 2001**

(Helene, PhD and Prof of Depth Psychology at Pacifica Graduate Institute, “Silenced Knowings, Forgotten Springs: Paths to Healing in the Wake of Colonialism”, http://radicalpsychology.org/vol2-2/lorenz-watkins.html)

When Adolf Harash went to Chernobyl after the nuclear accident as a trauma psychologist, he worked with many of the nuclear plant’s workers and engineers. A frightening number of them confessed with tragic dismay that prior to the accident they had been beset by nightmares about the plant’s possible malfunction, given their familiarity with its difficulties and bad repair. Rarely, were any of these knowings given voice, even within one’s family. Such knowings felt forbidden in the workplace. Yet these forbidden knowings could have prevented the worst nuclear accident in history, the effects of which stretch far, far into our shared future. Here the personal suffering of individuals and the collective danger to the community coincided and interpenetrated completely. If there had been a possibility to share personally disowned voices in dialogue, the surrounding community might have been able to prevent disaster in time. We are convinced that from the psyches of its members, communities of all kinds could have access to crucial knowings that have long been silenced; knowings that if listened to could restore a sense of wholeness to what is now fractured, denied, and dismissed. It is itself a moral choice to open our hearts and minds to hear the pieces of story that have been depotentiated by their dissociation. From the liberation of these silenced knowings a deepened sense of ethics can emerge; individual development and ecological survival can coincide. No truly sustainable development can develop out of the repression of silenced knowings. We invite you into the experiential work that will bring forth the pieces of knowing that you have access to. By listening deeply to the pieces of melody your neighbors and colleagues offer, there may be ways to re-imagine how such alternating voicing and listening could be incorporated into the places where you work and live. Everywhere around you there are invisible unspoken narratives waiting to emerge, stories from which we could learn much about our environment and ourselves. Breaking the normalization of silence is a crucial first step.

**Reflection on the legacy of US colonialism creates a framework for overcoming environmental destruction**

**Gilman May 2011**

(Robert A., PhD U Minnesota, “In the Shadow of Removal”,

http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/107657/1/Gilmer\_umn\_0130E\_11934.pdf)

The simultaneous rise of both the Red Power and the modern environmental movement made these discourses about Indians even more powerful and relevant because of the ways native people were forcing themselves back into a national spotlight. The frustration and outrage of Indian people at the past and contemporary injustices committed against them made non-Indians confront the continuing legacy of colonialism in the United States. By bringing these issues to the fore, it also created a space for environmentalists to draw on those discourses surrounding America’s Indian past to critique its contemporary treatment of the environment. Non-Indians, as self-proclaimed inheritors of the American landscape, were obligated to live up to the imagined ethos its previous owners. However, not all Cherokees appreciated being defined by non-Indian discourses.

# 2AC -- MONUMENTS SOLVENCY

**We need a monument to help question our colonial mindset when exploring space**

**Marsiske 10**

(Hans-Arthur, writer and journalist for MIT press, “The Legacy of Columbus”, Leonardo, Volume 43, Number 2, April 2010, pp. 176-177 (Article), The MIT Press, 6/26/11, ZB)

Granted, a heavy bronze sculpture may not be a very practical solution for a space monument. It would be expensive to send it into orbit. What's more, it could be a potential hazard to the astronauts living and working on the space station. But some kind of monument is necessary. Without it a space laboratory with the name of Columbus would not be complete. We need something clearly visible to the astronauts as well as to people watching from below that reminds us to think ahead before we set foot on other heavenly bodies. Currently the prevailing attitude in Western culture seems to be to apologize later instead of asking for permission. But that is not acceptable when it comes to exploring and settling space. The legacy of Columbus contains a clear imperative: We should not enter any planet that is inhabited, unless we are clearly invited. Even if the Masters of Mars could only be seen with a microscope, we would have to respect them as the owners of their planet. Of course, we already have entered Mars with our robots. But we should be prepared to stop the landing of further robots and humans in case we encounter life there. That does not necessarily mean that we have to stop the exploration of the solar system. There are many other worlds to explore and settle. We can even build free-flying space settlements like those envisioned by Gerard O'Neill. And of course, we should establish space stations in Mars orbit to observe how the life on this planet evolves with time. Some day in the future we may even learn to communicate with these life forms so they can finally invite us for a visit. What a fantastic project for a space-faring civilization! Going to space we have a unique opportunity to upgrade our social operating system. There has never been a better time to change the direction of human evolution. But we need strong symbols to help us to fulfill this enormous task. We need such a symbol especially on the Columbus module. There should be a public debate about how best to commemorate the victims of European expansion. To start the debate I propose that such a monument on board Columbus should have a triangular shape.

**A monument in space will change the motive behind exploration**

**Marsiske 10**

(Hans-Arthur, writer and journalist for MIT press, “The Legacy of Columbus”, Leonardo, Volume 43, Number 2, April 2010, pp. 176-177 (Article), The MIT Press, 6/26/11, ZB)

On the other hand, I was glad I finally had learned about these things. It is important to know about the foundations you are standing on. In principle, there is nothing wrong with monuments for slave traders. But it should be done properly. It should express a clear position on this kind of business and its implications for the present and the future. And, perhaps most important, it should be erected at a proper location. In front of the Wandsbek town hall the Schimmelmann sculpture, which subsequently was removed by its owner, Imtech GmbH, did nothing but express pride and appreciation for the achievements of this businessman. There was no irritating element, not the slightest hint of the possible significance of these achievements for our future. But what about erecting the sculpture at a place where the future really is in the making, where we are preparing for the exploration of new worlds, and where we are at risk to repeat the same mistakes done after Columbus? What about sending the Schimmelmann sculpture to the ISS and erecting it in the Columbus module? History may not repeat itself, but some well-known constellations can occur again and again. Sending humans to Mars puts us in a situation similar to the European explorers. We may find life on the red planet. Do we want to deal with it the same way we did with the natives of Africa and America? Do we want to exploit the new cosmic triangle between Earth, Moon, and Mars (Fig. 2) the same way we exploited the triangle EuropeAfrica-America?

**Monuments speak to themes such as cruel dehumanizing slavery**

**Graham 04**

(Narda, a graduate of Cornell University, Ithaca, where she studied comparative literature, economics, and international relations, “Whose Monument? The Battle to Define, Interpret, and Claim Emancipation”, Small Axe, Number 16 (Volume 8, Number 2), September 2004, pp. 170-178 (Article), Published by Indiana University Press, 6/25/11, ZB)

Our point of the departure in evaluating Facey Cooper's work can only be its function as a national monument, for which purpose it was commissioned. I believe a national monument can be judged on the basis of two criteria: aesthetic value and symbolic [End Page 172] value. Aesthetic value, though essential, is merely a prerequisite, because it practically goes without saying that a national monument is to be artistically well-executed—able to stand on its own purely as a work of art. However, it is the symbolic value of a monument that is of greatest importance. This is especially so for a monument created with the purpose of speaking to the theme that is as evocative as "the Emancipation of Jamaican slaves from centuries of the cruel, dehumanizing system of slavery."4 Before embarking on any kind of analysis, it must be said that symbols do not operate on an intellectual plane, though the analysis of their effect might. The acid test of symbolic value is immediate gut reaction. What is therefore most telling is what the monument says to the viewer on a visceral, emotive level, and contrary to the artist's hope, many are unmoved by Redemption Song.5 When one gets past the first shock of the nudity (if one is of the so-called prudish disposition), there seems to be nothing remaining except a large blandness. Redemption Song inspires puzzlement, indifference, salacious curiosity, peripheral anger (that is, anger that has nothing to do with the work's intent), and admiration as "great art," but I have yet to hear a heartfelt negative or positive reaction to the monument's meaning, to what it is trying say. It has stimulated little or no discussion on the meaning of Emancipation in today's Jamaica. Something has clearly gone amiss when most Jamaicans cannot understand the symbolism of a national monument celebrating our freedom, or when they bypass the symbolism completely and discuss anatomical features instead. Although we are told that the figures symbolize rebirth and reverence (the telling of which should be unnecessary), the comments I have heard from those around me are that the man seems blind and that both figures seem trapped and passive. The symbolism has missed its mark.

**Monuments forces reflection within individuals**

**Graham 04**

(Narda, a graduate of Cornell University, Ithaca, where she studied comparative literature, economics, and international relations, “Whose Monument? The Battle to Define, Interpret, and Claim Emancipation”, Small Axe, Number 16 (Volume 8, Number 2), September 2004, pp. 170-178 (Article), Published by Indiana University Press, 6/25/11, ZB)

However, a monument is nothing if it is not a community experience. Monuments are intended to reflect, and thus concretize and preserve, national memory and identity. [End Page 176] Although monuments could also be said to, in a sense, "create" national identity and memory, this cannot be done in dissonance with the collective consciousness. In this case there is a disconnect between monument and memory because although Facey Cooper wishes her piece to transcend pain, pain is irrevocably woven into the fabric of Jamaica's national consciousness. Angst and struggle are components of our national identity and narrative, which we are accustomed to seeing, and need to see, represented. Without the sense of "we likkle but we Tallawah,"7 of striving and overcoming, who are we? The struggle, dynamism, energy, and rhythm that we see as our national birthright are absent from the statues comprising Redemption Song, thus we are unable to recognize ourselves in them. We are unable to identify with their bland peace. The statues also exhibit an absence of narrative, unlike the struggle monuments in Caribbean countries such as Barbados, Guyana, and Haiti. In the case of Barbados, the Emancipation Statue, which features an unidentified slave breaking his chains, is popularly referred to by Barbadians as "Bussa," the name of a slave who helped inspire a revolt against the English planters in 1816. It is important that Barbadians are able to recognize the iconic moment being portrayed by the monument, and place it in a story they know by heart. This is a story in which pain is present, as Bussa was killed when the revolt came to a bloody conclusion, but it apparently remains triumphant and emblematic in the minds of Barbadians.

**Monuments show us how we should feel toward significant events**

**Shein 07**

(Avital, Ph.D. in Philosophy at Berkely, “MONUMENTS AS A NATIONAL PRACTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM”,<http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/6892/1/umi-umd-4386.pdf>, 6/25/11, ZB)

The interplay of the past and the present in monuments has a pedagogic element. Monuments can instruct us about events we never lived through. Since most monuments are constructed to last for many generations, or at least so that they *seem* to last forever, most monuments are seen by people who did not actually live through the events that the monuments memorialize. Despite not having lived through the experience that is being memorialized, the fact that it been deemed worthy of a monument teaches the audience that this event was, and continues to be, important to the nation. In addition, a monument teaches *how* one ought to remember a specific event. The monument represents a specific interpretation and explanation of the past and as such it is, once again, a tool of memory. The audience is instructed in what the past, the event that is memorialized, should mean to them. For example, the Korean War Memorial bears the inscription “Freedom is not free.” The inscription is significant because it simultaneously teaches us that the war required human sacrifice, and, more importantly, that the war was fought for the sake of freedom. In this way, monuments can “supplement” our memory, that is, teach us about the past, as well.3

**Monuments will change the way we address the future!**

**Shein 07**

(Avital, Ph.D. in Philosophy at Berkely, “MONUMENTS AS A NATIONAL PRACTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM”,<http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/6892/1/umi-umd-4386.pdf>, 6/25/11, ZB)

Though monuments are artifacts of memory and therefore are bound to the past, they also promise an existence in the future. The construction of collective memory implies a timeline which -- ends not only from the past to the present, but to the future as well. Gellner observes that “the most commonly used word in the nationalist vocabulary: [is] *awakening.*” (Hutchinson & Smith 1994, 8) He argues that saying that national sentiments are being awakened, rather than constructed, implies that one conceives of the nation as having been merely asleep rather than non-existent. Monuments participate in a similar process of awakening because they remind us of—literally, they bring *back* to our attention—memories that otherwise would be forgotten. This is particularly interesting when the meaning of monuments change over time. To illustrate how this occurs, in 1988 the artist Hans Haaschek built a replica of a Nazi monument in Garz, Germany as a protest against the Nazi regime. The same monument that previously celebrated Nazi Germany now served to condemn it. What is important here is that although the meaning of monuments may change, the existence of the monument itself provides an important link between the present generation and the future ones. In this case, it allows for a symbolic dialogue between Nazi Germany and the present non-Nazi generation. Therefore, a monument can address present as much as future viewers.

**Monuments can be made in which the general lesson is understood by all**

**Palm 08**

(Jessica, Ohio State University advised by Professor Aron Vinegar Department of History of Art, “Christo + Jeanne-Claude: Violence, Obsession, and the Monument”, <https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/32214/FINAL2.pdf?sequence=1>, 6/25/11, ZB)

Emerging from the body of scholarly discussion concerning the monument at the end of the nineteenth century is Alois Riegl’s investigation of monumental ideology. With The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin, Riegl outlines the way in which monuments were understood and how these material objects were imbued with subjective values. He distinguished three categories of monuments in the modern mindset: the intentional monument, the unintentional monument, and the age-value monument. The intentional monument, “in its oldest and most original sense is a human creation, erected for the specific purpose of keeping single human deeds or events (or a combination thereof) alive in the minds of future generations.”13 Intentional monuments are distinguished with an original intentionality intended by the creators of these monuments. The unintentional monument is one whose meaning is interpreted not by their makers, but by modern ideas about these monuments.14 This is to say that such monuments are imbued with historical meaning by later generations who associate them with the past, as exemplified by the German population’s sentiments towards the Reichstag building in Berlin. Finally, the age-value monument is any object that “trigger[s] in the beholder a sense of the life cycle.”15 In other words, age-value monuments evoke the sense of history regardless of one’s actual familiarity with specific historical narrative. Thus, age-value monuments may not always signify a particular history but rather the past in a larger and more general sense. Both the unintentional and age-value monument relate to the notion of cultural memory—a memory that is instilled in a human by his or her culture. Cultural memory as defined by Jan Assmann is “knowledge that directs behavior and experience” in a society and that is obtained “through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation.” 16 Because of the generational passing-on of cultural memory it is deeply instilled within members of a society. Thus monuments such as the Reichstag falling into Riegl’s categories of unintentional and agevalue are bound to ideas and memories that seem innate to a culture which in turn intensifies the relationship between a monument and society. These monuments serve to remind audiences of the life cycle, perhaps even to accelerate it by marking it visually and physically.

**Monuments promote a pluralistic approach to the future**

**Shein 07**

(Avital, Ph.D. in Philosophy at Berkely, “MONUMENTS AS A NATIONAL PRACTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM”,<http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/6892/1/umi-umd-4386.pdf>, 6/25/11, ZB)

Finally, monuments can be a vehicle for the expression and exercise of pluralism in a liberal society. The most obvious way to do so is by integrating multicultural representation into monument design, as was done, for example, in Hart’s sculpture at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.18 However, for Andrew Shanken this attempt “to bronze multiculturalism” is insipid and quickly devolves into kitsch. (Shanken 2005) Its literalness closes, rather than opens, the field of possibilities. However, monuments can give voice to pluralism in another way. As I have discussed before, Johnston argues that a memorial complex with numerous memorial structures to the same event can express a *plurality* of views and interpretations. Such a proliferation of monuments does not need to be seen as an over-crowding or an obnoxious clutter. Rather it can represent, or more accurately *be*, an active playing field of ideas that is constantly changing and reinventing itself. This means that monuments can enact pluralism in a broader sense. They can provide us with the tools and the space “by which individuals and groups come together to discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future.” (Gillis 1994, 20) In this dissertation, I have sought to show that liberal monuments capture the dilemmas of liberal nationalism, and they articulate these dilemmas in space. As a tool of liberal nationalism, monuments go beyond merely representing an image of a liberal nation; they are a valuable practice for it to remain both liberal *and* a nation. In other words, liberal nations not only can tolerate monuments: they can benefit from monuments.

**Monuments can signify unity and an idea of community in the post – colonial era.**

**Rufer 2007**

Mario, at El Colegio de México, “Monuments, Museums and the Re-articulation of Nation: Pedagogies, Performances and Subaltern Apprehensions of Memory”, Date Accessed: 6/27/11, http://www.uri.edu/iaics/content/2007v16n2/13%20Mario%20Rufer.pdf, BTN)

The nation’s history as a space for struggle is a common sense since the apparent dissolution of totalizing identities or communities. However, it would be a mistake to argue the dissolution of the “experience” of nation (Bloom Hansen & Stepputat, 2001), its sensuousness in practice, t-- ures and signs. All this is eminently present, coeval with the most impressive trends of globalization (Calhoun 2002). One of the obvious sites for struggle over nationhood is heritage, not only understood as cultural patrimony, but mainly as a tool for developing a strong evocation of historical experience: the continuum past-present-future is no longer “here-at-hand”, rather it is a cultural palimpsest (Werbner, 1998, p. 16) in which memory is re-written, not as a purely mechanic device, but as a political supplement in which the past, as Proust has stated, is much more uncertain than the future. The last important thing to remember is the advertence of Andreas Huyssen when he states: “the political site of memory practices is still national, not post-national or global” (2000, p. 6). There are salient studies on how monuments and memorials were linked directly to the “commemoration” of national events, to fix a precise referent on the triad nation/origin/destiny. What happens when the nation-state is the “warrant” of historical reposition/re-composition after traumatic events? In postcolonial societies the pedagogic projection of nation was a substantial part of public politics of memory to create “new” senses of communities. There, social meanings are translated with re-inscriptions that can displace the space of the enunciating locus: this is to say, there are appropriations of the sites of memory, public or private ones. The struggle for meaning, if we understand by this a process socially agencied, can not be conceived only from the ‘constitutive’ space of the mnemonic artifact, but from the appropriations and translations produced in social dynamics traversed not only by time but also by gender variables, (dis)positions and experience. This paper discusses some of these topics juxtaposing cases from South Africa and Argentina specifically, regarding the public debate about the construction of “new” national memories after traumatic events in those (post) colonial countries. How are we to understand the permanence and re-signification of monuments in post apartheid South Africa or the use and re-making of old symbols and the creation of new ones? How can we understand the state role in the re-composition of history using and regarding its old signs? Something is evident: cultural artifacts of memory pervade social arenas and significations but also, its referents are longer in time than its stability as signs (Coombes, 2003). Many episodes could be evoked to assess the relevance of conjuring up history as a reference to take a political place (and a concrete desirability) in the present. This is a process largely rooted in social terms, but we can not undermine the role of the postcolonial state in these situations, mainly because the state is involved in the construction not only of a history with political intentions, but also of a political present rooted in the articulations of the past. Of course, this is not a neutral past. It is a past informed by the dimensions of political subjects, citizenship belonging, sameness and otherness in the body of the nation. However, this is not to say that we must see the state as a fairly ideological agent in the manipulation of history. State is a powerful institution where imaginations about the self and the other are carefully constructed, but of course, they are not homogeneous, stable or pervasive per se. Contestations arise in the very state and in societal arenas, and its cultural projections in artifacts must be thought as unstable signs appropriated, translated, and domesticated into regimes of memories 1 sometimes particularly local, but with powerful meanings.

**Monuments can remind us of events that have occurred in the past.**

**Rufer 2007**

Mario, at El Colegio de México, “Monuments, Museums and the Re-articulation of Nation: Pedagogies, Performances and Subaltern Apprehensions of Memory”, Date Accessed: 6/27/11, http://www.uri.edu/iaics/content/2007v16n2/13%20Mario%20Rufer.pdf, BTN)

The episodes I dealt with here are related to the symbology of public pasts. Probably they illuminate much more about the multiple mediations of memory and about postcolonial ambivalence than what they do about the concrete manners in which memory would operate**.** Fugacity of referents and the persistence of meanings–even contingent and heterogeneous– is the vulnerable fate of memorial artifacts and their “temporalization.” These are some of the elements we have to assess. The unwarranted character of memory, as an immutable exercise, is precisely the force which embedded its radicalism. Perhaps we will never know if Argentine society will easily accept a history of inner violence that has strong ramifications in which the inclusion of the indigenous people signifies a deeper struggle for historical recognition and an entire displacement of meanings of identity, saying clearly “we are postcolonial, historically violent, non-European nation”. Neither will we know if a fragmented black community can impose another reading of historical events translating a monument’s display in South Africa. But one thing is clear: in these spaces of tensions and contradictions taking museums and **monument**s (among the very indios about authenticity, between them and the state, between them and the public intellectuals who are defining a public history of the facts of violence, between the new state and far right wings) history is made into a contested terrain in which the struggles for the past are also struggles for an unwarranted present in symbolic, social and imaginative terms. The sensibility to analyze its permanent liminary transformation can helps us to understand more accurately how monuments, statues, pictures (and their political uses) are telling things about impressions of modernity, experiences of nation, political arenas and the real configuration of the state from the symbolic dramaturgy. All this shows the struggles over the configuration of historical time in this “cosmopolitan capitalism” era, strongly traversed by all the collapses in which the nation has been a witness, even reinforced by them, and re-mastered there.

# AT SCIENCE GOOD KRITIK

**Scientific theories have lead to oppression of minorities in society.**

**Mohr 2009**

(James M., Leadership Studies at Gonzaga University, “Oppression by Scientific Method: The Use of Science to “Other” Sexual Minorities”,

Date Accessed: 6/24/11, http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/againsthate/Journal%207/Mohr.pdf BTN)

The rise of belief in scientific interpretations of reality and the decline of the unquestioning acceptance of theological viewpoints as valid, combined with the American belief that one cannot impose religious beliefs on others, has led organizations that perpetuate anti-LGB ideas to use and misuse science to support their beliefs when explaining their views in the public debate on homosexuality. However, this is not the first time that science has been used to promote injustice and oppression. Science’s attempt to understand racial differences quickly entered the political discourse on human rights and freedom, the limitations of democracy, the necessity of racial segregation, the inevitability of socioeconomic disparities between the races, national welfare, and public education (Tucker, 1994, p. 5)—all to the detriment of people of color. Likewise, the study of homosexuality is used by organizations and individuals to justify limiting the rights and societal involvement of LGB individuals. Similarly to research into racial differences that is used to reject the rights of people of color, the scientific study of homosexuality has also been critiqued. Schmidt explained that every etiological theory of homosexuality—psychoanalytic, learning, sociological, biological, or a combination of them—has been used against LGB individuals (1984, p. 138). These theories and the corresponding research are rooted in -- ra-scientific normative values (Suppe, 1999, p. 175). The inherent heterosexist biases contained within research on LGB people have been used to suggest that science should focus on the causation of homophobia and its prevention rather than on the etiology of homosexuality (Schuklenk & Ristow, 1996, p. 25). However, science is too valuable a tool for anti-LGB groups to stop their research, as it allows them to Other LGB people and to promote their political, moral, social, and ideological agendas under the guise of empirical science.

**Science is not an objective truth and the objectivity claims of science are illusory**

**Littledyke 00**

(Michael, Cheltenham & Gloucester College of Higher Education PhD, Post Grad Certificate of Education and Fellow of the Higher Academy, Paper by Littledyke called “Science Education and the Environment”, September 7-10 2000, 6/23/11, ZB)

Monod typifies modern scientists’ support for objectivity by his statement that ‘science depends upon the postulate of objectivity’ (1972, p. 30). The assumption is that it is possible to distance feelings to produce logical, dispassionate and value free scientific judgements. However, objectivity has been shown to be illusionary and is best seen as a relative rather than an absolute position. This is confirmed by neurophysiological findings which show that logical processes and emotion are both involved during thought (Rose 1994). Thus, it is not possible to dispel the affective dimension from scientific processes, nor is it desirable, as inspiration, excitement, curiosity, a sense of wonder, as well as respect for living things, are essential ingredients in good science. The scientific process has a degree of neutrality in its requirement for observable evidence to verify hypotheses, but the selection of topics for investigation and the interpretation of findings cannot be devoid of a subjective element, hence there is no such thing as neutral or value-free science. The problem of objectivity is also demonstrated strikingly by findings from quantum physics which show that matter at the quantum level cannot be understood independently of an observer, in that an experimenter can influence the outcomes of an investigation through the procedures which are chosen (Bohm, 1983). Science is never fully objective or value-free, hence it is just as important to identify the purposes, values and implications of science activities as it is to maintain scientific rigour in the processes.

**Our science bad claims do not mean that discourse shapes reality**

**(S&TS = Science and Technology Studies)**

**Schneider 01**

(Stephen, Department of Biological sciences at Stanford University nobel peace prize winner, “A constructive deconstruction of Deconstructionists: A response to Demeritt”, 338-339, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0004-5608.00246/abstract>, 6/24/11, ZB)

S&TS borrows and -- ends historical, sociological, and anthropological approaches. It contrasts with traditional history and philosophy of science, which tends to focus on individuals, their personal backgrounds and discoveries, and analysis of science as a rational enterprise. Instead, S&TS focuses on the *credibility, authority, and social role* of scientific knowledge. It explores the links between science and other sources of authority and knowledge, such as political institutions, cultural traditions, and “common-sense” understanding. Much S&TS analysis has concluded that science acquires its credibility from socially embedded, culturally specific systems of norms and practices for warranting public knowledge (for a recent review, see Jasanoff et al. 1995). “Warranting” refers to the justification or validation of knowledge through such methods as public demonstration of experiments, independent replication of results, and credentialing of professional scientists. Only if warranting techniques achieve broad acceptance can they serve their purpose of justifying knowledge claims. S&TS examines how science and society together have created (and sometimes dismantled) general assent to the effectiveness of particular methods in generating truth (Shapin and Shaffer 1985; Jasanoff 1990; Cole 1992; Jasanoff 1996). In these important senses, S&TS concludes that scientific knowledge is socially constructed. For this reason, the S&TS viewpoint is often identified with a broader, sometimes radical epistemology known as “social constructivism.” Although a few people may actually think that social agreement literally produces -- ernal reality, I regard such a belief as bordering on the insane. As Wittgenstein famously put it, thinking does not make it so. No social consensus that people can fly by flapping their arms will help anyone survive a swan dive from the World Trade Center. Nor would a social decree that the planetary climate either is or is not warming change anything about the actual future trend of global temperatures. However, this is not what most social constructivists believe. Social constructivism is—or ought to be—a methodological principle for the empirical study of knowledge production. As methodology, it requires an agnostic stance toward the truth or falsity of any given knowledge claim. In other words, it does not begin by asking whether a particular claim is true or false; rather, it questions *why people believe* , or do not believe, that claim. Social constructivism represents an empirical investigation—as dispassionate and objective as any other empirical science, in principle—into the causes of belief. The fundamental argument is this: given that people in all times and places (including ourselves) have believed many things that later turned out to be false, truth itself cannot be the *cause* of any belief’s credibility. (Edwards 2001)

**Using scientific evidence excludes other types of knowledge resulting in fascist logic and reinforced power structures**

**Holmes Murray Perron and Rail 06**

(Dave Stuart Amelie and Genevieve, all PhD and focus in Health sciences nursing university of Ottawa and department of English, “Deconstructing the evidence-based discourse in health sciences: truth, power and fascism”, 180-186, <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Pharmacology/dc-bits/holmes-deconstruction-ebhc-06.pdf>, 6/24/11, ZB)

The mastery of scientific Newspeak is, for the most part, a regurgitation of prefabricated formulas (buzz words or catch words) that is informed by a single, powerful lexicon. This new guide book of scientific vocabulary, including terms connected with EBM (e.g. systematic literature review, knowledge transfer, best practices, champions, etc.), is taken seriously in the realm of health sciences, so much so that it is considered vital as a reflection of ‘real science’. The classification of scientific evidence as proposed by the Cochrane Group thus constitutes not only a powerful mechanism of exclusion for some types of knowledge, it also acts as an organising structure for knowledge and a mechanism of ideological reinforcement for the dominant scientific paradigm. In that sense, it obeys a fascist logic. Along with Deleuze and Guattari,1 we understand such fascist logic as a desire to order, hierarchise, control, repress, direct and impose limits. *Fascism* is one of the many faces of totalitarianism – the total subjection of humanity to the political imperatives of systems whose concerns are of their own production.25 In light of our argument, *fascism* is not too strong a word because the exclusion of knowledge ensembles relies on a process that is saturated by ideology and intolerance regarding other ways of knowing. The process at play here is one that operates hand-in-hand with powerful political or ‘power’ structures and that gears and sustains scientific assertions in the same direction: that of the dominant ideology. Unfortunately, the nature of this scientific *fascism* makes it attractive to all of us – the subjected. In Foucault’s words: the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. . . . And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini – which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively – but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. (p. xiii)1 Fascism does not originate solely from the outside; it is a will within us to desire, although often unwittingly, a life of domination.1 Such a ‘lovable’ fascism requires little more than the promise of success (grants, publications, awards, recognition, etc.) within its system to get us to participate wholeheartedly.25 Perhaps it is time to think about governing structures that impose their imperatives (academic, scientific, political, economic) on academics and researchers, and to ask ourselves what drives us to love *fascist* and exclusionary structures.

**It is the very objectivity of science that is rooted with homophobic, racist and sexist prejudices**

**Mohr 09**

(James M, Ph.D. from Stanford and Professor of History at College of Arts and Sciences, “Oppression by Scientific Method: The Use of Science to “Other” Sexual Minorities, 07/17/2009, 22-23, <http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/againsthate/Journal%207/Mohr.pdf>, 6/24/11, ZB)

In the West, the relationship between science and values began to be transformed during the Renaissance (Longino, 1990, p. 162), with the Enlightenment raising science to serve as the epitome of enlightened reason (Hamilton, 1996, p. 37); and in modern American society science became institutionalized as the best way to understand the world (Terry, 1999, p. 11). Science is seen in this manner because it provides a framework for discovering and understanding natural and human phenomena without the use of theological, cultural, or other subjective biases. It acquires knowledge through the use of observation and experimentation. This acceptance of science was supposed to signal a movement away from beliefs based on superstition, religious faith, and subjectivity, and one toward beliefs supported by reason, objectivity, and scientific understanding. However, religious and juridical concepts about homosexuality were incorporated into scientific research, allowing for new justifications of old prejudices and biases (Terry, 1999, p. 11; Wood, 2000). For example, psychoanalytic theories arose from an assumption that homosexuality was pathological and unhealthy, an assumption which then served as the foundation for the construction of psychological models of homosexuality (Rosario, 2002, p. 267). It was also theorized that the gay man had a woman’s soul merged in his male body (Bohan, 1996), demonstrating the connection of a religious concept, soul, with psychological concepts of mental illness. Homosexuality quickly became labeled as a disease as part of a scientific movement to medicalize diverse social phenomena such as alcoholism, unconventional sexual behaviors, and insanity (Drescher, 1998). One of the benefits of using science was that people could now claim their biases and assumptions were based on objective criteria as observed in nature, granting a sense of authority to their preconceived views that was not necessarily deserved. These claims of objectivity were based on the idea that scientists study their topic from an unbiased perspective when their own personal or professional interests are not at stake (Porter, 1995, p. 4). These claims are furthered by the notion that scientific research appeals solely to reason and is untouched by cultural and historical forces (Gaukroger, 2006). This impartial pursuit of knowledge, often based on the scientific method, is considered the way to uncover an understanding of the world. Scientific discourse quickly became a privileged way of speaking about human diversity, including homosexuality (Terry, 1999, p. 29). Though claims of objectivity and impartiality are contested, especially when they are presented in the absence of historical and cultural cont-- , these ideas have found their way into people’s understanding of science (Gaukroger, 2006). In many cases, scientists injected their research on nature into political arguments to justify oppression (Tucker, 1994, p. 6). Just as racist and sexist attitudes guided research into racial hierarchies and the differences between the sexes, heterosexist bias is another of the unstated assumptions that often underlies scientific research. This bias expresses itself as scientific heterosexism.

**The scientific method as the only way of knowing the world is self-fulfilling and excludes alternatives**

**Young and Heller 00**

(Courtenay and Michael, UKCP Registered Psychotherapist and Psychology Department at the University of Geneva, “The scientific ‘what’ of psychotherapy: psychotherapy is a craft not a

science!”, <http://www.courtenay-young.co.uk/courtenay/articles/Scientific_what_of_psychotherapy.pdf>, 6/25/11, ZB)

Relying on just proofs and validations, which are often quoted as crucial issues in the determination of ideas and the expansion of knowledge, is a non-scientific view of science. They may form part of some sciences, but usually more of the experimental branches. There can be little ‘proof’ (and few double-blind tests) about what happened in the first few seconds immediately after the ‘Big Bang’ in the formation of the universe, but much of the *science* of cosmology and particle physics centres around this precise issue. Furthermore, science has created an orthodoxy which, like many others, claims a monopoly on truth. Gill Edwards (1992) argues that science sees the ‘scientific method’ as the only valid path towards knowledge, and since it ignores whatever does not fit this paradigm, it is satisfyingly self-fulfilling. However, this debases and debunks alternative versions of reality, which may be based more on intuitive knowledge or subjective experience. It is precisely these areas that are often paramount in psychotherapy. Science excludes them; erroneously we claim. Psychotherapy, it can thus be argued, falls more perhaps into the field of metaphysics, which is where it has its richness, its soul.

**Science leads to the pitfalls of violence and immorality.**

**Yezzi 1996**

(Ron Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Minnesota State University “Seven Root Causes of Violence," Date Accessed: 6/21/11, http://krypton.mnsu.edu/~yezzi/sciviol1.html BTN)

Now I am ready to consider ways in which science without humanity can be a cause of violence. In talking about violence, I prefer to associate the term with intense harm as much as with physically destructive activity. So I want to allow for psychological violence as well as violence to the quality of human life. If this preference leads to too much "watering down" of the term violence though, we may have to search out more careful associations. In a general sense, scientists ignoring their moral responsibilities create situations that increase the potential for science being the cause of violence. Thus scientists can proceed without humanity when they ignore the destructive force of technological products such as weapons. For example, they may make possible production of poison gas without considering how it may be used as a technique of genocide. It is not hard to come up with additional examples. I want though to be more specific about the ways that a sense of humanity fails to appear and violence can result. I also want to consider the more subtle ways that science loses a sense of humanity. So I want to talk about two problems of overconfidence and two problems of distraction. Problems of OverconfidenceWhen scientists get overconfident about what science can do, they at least "set the stage" for violent consequences. This is a major theme of the movie, "Jurassic Park." Here I want to talk about two problems of overconfidence, Faustian bargains and oversimplification. Faustian BargainsFaustian bargains occur when the promise of a scientific benefit masks greater consequential burdens that are ignored for the sake of the benefit. There is not so much a total absence of humanity as there is a stilted conception of it. So a new manufacturing plant provides jobs for people without taking account of the pollution costs for a greater number of people. Or a new t-- ile factory in a third world country improves the quality of t-- ile goods without considering how the technology puts large numbers of local workers out of a job--in a way that produces greater poverty or other hardships. Or a society accepts western style industrialization without recognizing how it will radically affect the traditional culture. Oversimplification When science oversimplifies human behavior, it can increase the potential for violence to human beings. For example, what are alleged to be adequate scientific studies of race over the past few centuries have laid the foundation for violence against various social groups. Another case may be the over-- ension of a field such as behavioristic psychology. Behavioristic psychology can function well as a technique for modifying and changing human behavior; but it treads on dangerous ground when it becomes an interpretation of human nature. As an interpretation of human nature, behavioristic psychology reduces human beings to something less than they are. By challenging notions of human dignity as--for example, B. F. Skinner did-it raises the potential for violence being done to human beings in the name of desirable conditioning. Problems of Distraction When scientists are distracted from the consequences of their work, they create situations with a potential for violence. It is not that they do anything actively themselves to cause violence, but they omit doing what is necessary to prevent possible violence. My two problems of distraction are insulation from effects and overspecialization. Insulation from EffectsIt is the nature of contemporary science that an active agent is often insulated from the consequences of actions. It is often pointed out that dropping a bomb from a plane flying at high altitude insulates a soldier from the human consequences of the bomb in a way that fierce hand-to-hand combat on the battlefield does not. Similarly, the specialization of activities and the "long reach" of science and technology can insulate, or distract, persons from the consequences of their actions. So the chemist who works out the formula for the poison gas may have nothing to do with the production or administering of the gas--thereby providing insulation from the effects of the chemist's own actions. This problem also arises when an economist is willing to prescribe unemployment as a cure for inflation, without any personal contact with, or appreciation of, the consequences for workers who lose their jobs.

**Science causes devaluation of life and carries humanity away from nature.**

**IHU AH 2007**

(Alloysius Shaagee**,** Department of Religion and Philosophy Benue State University,Makurdi. Nigeria. “SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN ETHICAL PARADIGM” p. 20 Date Accessed: 6/22/11 http://www.scribd.com/doc/24653785/SCIENCE-AND-TECHNOLOGY-IN-SUSTAINABLE-DEVELOPMENT-AN-ETHICAL-PARADIGM-Ph-D-Thesis BTN)

It is Thus Reasonable to Say That the Horrifying Truth is That, So Far as Much Techno-Science is Concerned, No One is in Charge, Thus Creating the Feeling in Today’s Global Neigbourhood That Life Has Lost Its Significance. the Chariot of Human Development Has Gained Momentum and It Seems to Be Running Amok Without a Charioteer. That the Forces of Science and Technology Have Created and are Creating Unheard of Material Bounties for Humanity, They are Improved Means to an Unimproved End. Today, Humanity is Through the Discovery and Use of the Tremendous Hidden World of Energy and Potency of the Atom, on the Threshold of Utterself-Destruction. the Misuse of Modern Science and Technology Has Posed the Greatest Threat to Humanity by Carrying It Away from Its Essential Nature. in this Work, We Establish That Genuine Human Development is Premised on Human Activities Geared Towards the Promotion of Life on Earth. It is the Liberation of Man from the Negative Hold of the Forces of Techno-Scientific Economy. It is a Conscious Endeavour to: Act in Such a Way That the Effect of Our Action Will Be 20 Compatible with the Permanence of an Authentically Human Life on Earth. Devendra Kumar (2001:2) Makes the Same Point Thus: We Could Learn from the Bees the Manner We Serve Nature and Get Its Sustenance Simultaneously. the More the Honey It Collects from Flowers, the More It Serves in the Propagation of the Plants by Helping in Their Fertilization. We Could Emulate the Bees by Fulfilling Our Needs Through a Similar Symbiotic Relationship with Nature. Such is the Philosophy of Sustainable Human Development That Must Guide the Biotic Community. It is Informed by a Nonviolent and Gentle Attitude Towards Nature. It is a Consciousness of the Limits in Which We Must Live in Order Not to Degrade Our Environment and Ourselves. this Represents the Spirit of the African Humanistic Heritage, an African Moral Philosophy That Ensures Care, Concern, Co-Existence and Communal Responsibility That Ensures a Harmonious Relationship with Other Members of the Biotic Community.

**The side effects of science are detrimental. Science threats humanity and the environment around it.**

**IHU AH 2007**

(Alloysius Shaagee**,** Department of Religion and Philosophy Benue State University,Makurdi. Nigeria. “SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN ETHICAL PARADIGM” p. 22 Date Accessed: 6/22/11 http://www.scribd.com/doc/24653785/SCIENCE-AND-TECHNOLOGY-IN-SUSTAINABLE-DEVELOPMENT-AN-ETHICAL-PARADIGM-Ph-D-Thesis BTN)

However, the use of scientific technology unveils several difficult questions; it has generated many problems and has solved some as well. In the face of this paradox, man’s continued existence is not only threatened, humanity and its environment is at the threshold of utter disaster due to the negative effects of science and technology. Today, the historical dialectics of science and technology are increasingly assuming paradoxical dimensions, more purposeful and purposeless, more meaningful and bizarre, and more useful and destructive. While the achievements in science and technology have served to prolong life, they have also served to provide resources for its brutal -- ermination. What this means is that increase in scientific knowledge and technological know-how itself is not enough to guarantee human development. Science and technology provide the material ingredients which human development requires though, happiness, ethical values, spiritual well being and wholesomeness of man are no less needed as important elements of a humane society. In this connection, it is germane to raise again the question of what constitutes development in the first place, and what constitutes the role of normative science of human conduct in the endeavours of science and technology in the enterprise of a sustainable human development.

**Technology will push us on the verge of destruction. We must find a harmonious connection with nature and move away from the grasp of technology.**

**IHU AH 2007**

(Alloysius Shaagee**,** Department of Religion and Philosophy Benue State University,Makurdi. Nigeria. “SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN ETHICAL PARADIGM” p. 257 Date Accessed: 6/22/11 http://www.scribd.com/doc/24653785/SCIENCE-AND-TECHNOLOGY-IN-SUSTAINABLE-DEVELOPMENT-AN-ETHICAL-PARADIGM-Ph-D-Thesis BTN)

While not succumbing to the temptation of slipping into the fallacy of mistaking economic growth to human development, it suffices to argue that, global experience calls for a new world order in which humanity must itself not fail to begin to perceive reality from a radically different perspective than that which has become popular especially with the success of western civilization. Though humanity train (of development) has gathered momentum, it is derailing. We are headed for destruction, and with our technological powers, the plants and the animals, the seas and the rivers. But if humanity must survive on the face of the earth**,** 257 there is need for a radical break with our immediate past in terms of our values and our worldviews**.** Human development premised on a philosophy is holistic, functional and humane, entails a shift from the materialistic to the humanistic. To this we shall focus our n-- attention. 5.4.1Human Development: Between Materialism and Humanism To a considerable -- ent, nature as accessible through causal-mechanistic law has enabled humanity to control nature and provide for itself the good life on earth. The same view has also contributed to destruction of the natural environment and alienation of human beings. Ehusani argues this point further that, After liberating them from the authority of God, technological science promised them unending joy, peace and immortality; but has failed to deliver any of these goods, leaving them more confused and disoriented. And today, blinded by materialism, enslaved by greed and humiliated by aggressions, human beings appear to have lost their sense of meaning and purpose (Ehusani, 1991:241). The necessary reaction in respect of this scenario is to seek a balance such that we may maintain a sustainable harmonious relationship between the human species and nature. The main task of the moment is to formulate a new vision of reality, a world-view that is holistic, functional and humane. Such a philosophy of human integration is here referred to as African humanistic value system. This brand of humanism restores meaning and wholeness, not just in human community, but in the entire cosmos. For creation has meaning only in the human person, and when the human person loses his or her sense of meaning and purpose, the rest of creation is subject to futility, and groans in utter travail.

# AT DISADVANTAGES

**The impact to a framework where moral criteria and justifications are the determination of our ethics is the devaluation of all life to the zero point, where holocaust is possible. The alternative to calculability is infinite responsibility for otherness.**

**Dillon ’99** [Michael, April 99; Political Theory; 27:2 ]

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can -- end to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contingency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to ‘decision’. But it does not exhaust ‘decision’, and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a ‘decision’. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between ‘decision’ and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been—could not as yet have been—known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I am referring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every ‘decision’; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly **never be discharged**. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability—taking it on—is what makes a ‘decision’ a ‘decision’; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsibility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indictment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For deconstruction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decidedness. Thus ‘decision’ is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither ‘decision’ nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is therefore what ‘we’ are—or suffer—an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said—I would want to say—is what distinguishes political life.

**Risk society leads to organized irresponsibility through its calculations and argument crafting.**

**Cottle ’98** [Sociology @ Bath Spa Univ College, UK; 1998; European Journal of Communication; 13: 1//]

Beck’s understanding of ‘reflexive modernization’ also leads him theoretically to argue that the media, notwithstanding their commercial pursuit of ratings, readers and revenue and consequent parading of spectacle, drama and entertainment, can serve to focus the spotlight on society’s latest technologically induced catastrophes and environmental disasters. In today’s ‘risk society’, where calculations of risk, risk avoidance and risk compensation are based upon earlier industrial society’s more knowable, calculable, controllable and predictable risks, the institutional responses towards the ‘social explosiveness of hazard’ are **destined to be inadequate**: following each disaster such **‘organized irresponsibility’** inevitably attracts the media spotlight. The hazards can only be minimized by technological means, never ruled out. In an age of world-wide growth of large scale technological systems the least likely event will occur in the long-run. The technocracy of hazard squirms in the thumbscrews of the safety guarantees which it is forced to impose on itself, and tightened time and again in the mass media spotlight of the bureaucratic welfare state. (Beck, 1995: 1) Beck does not want to suggest, however, that the media spotlight is **allowed to illuminate unopposed**; the growing army of public relations officials and experts, or ‘the **argumentation craftsmen’** (Beck, 1992b: 32), of modern industry and the (‘provident’) welfare state engage in strategies of information management and damage limitation, etc., in their unending battle to ward off the destructive effects of contestable scientific knowledge and compensation claims: ‘Normality, i.e. the malleable, protean character of scientific findings jeopardises the business interests that are based on them’ (Beck, 1995: 140). Generalizing statements on the mass media such as these, however, remain theoretically underdeveloped as to where exactly the balance of power resides between the ‘argumentation craftsmen’ and the media, or the factors that will influence the course of mediated presentation and those competing claims for legitimacy and public acceptance. Beck’s key point though, is that in today’s ‘risk society’, and against a rising tide of social expectations and felt uncertainty, the media are positioned to perform a critical surveillance role.

The system of institutionally heightened expectations forms the social background in front of which — under the close scrutiny of the mass media and the murmurs of the tensely attentive public — the institutions of industrial society present the dance of the veiling of hazards. The hazards, which are not merely projected onto the world stage, but really threaten,

are illuminated under the mass media spotlight. (Beck, 1995: 101)

Their disad and system of calculation are part of a system of politics that simply refuses to believe that human suffering matters – their preoccupation with notions like hegemony and the international balance of power subordinates ethics. A vote for the negative framework ensures massive systemic violence and internal link turns their scenario   
**Falk ‘2** [Richard, “Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World,” p. 173-175 //les]

Every phase in the history of international relations and world order can be identified by its distinctive achievements and failures. Much as Tolstoy observed with reference to families, all historical moment resembles each other in their moral achievements, but it is in their failures that each becomes distinct. Yet, as Ken Booth observes in an influential essay, there has been a systematic refusal on the part of academic specialists and diplomats to acknowledge moral failure with respect to the organization of international political life, that domain of political behavior called international relations or world order. [1](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429202) With some notable exceptions, world order has been analyzed for centuries as if human suffering were irrelevant, and **as if the only fate that mattered was** either **the destiny of a particular nation or the more general rise and fall of great powers,** the latter being regarded as an inevitable consequence of the eternal, natural rivalry of self-serving states competing for territory, wealth, influence, and status. [2](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429202) Even such an egoistic moral aperture is generally misleadingly large, as it is rare indeed that the whole of a given people share in power and authority sufficiently to be regarded as effectively included in the self; that is, “self-serving.” The struggle in constitutional democracies to -- end tolerance and suffrage to minorities and women reminds us that even in societies committed in principle to equality of rights, the representation of the self by the state is partial, at best, and by no means complete. In fact, one impact of globalization seems to have been to marginalize the participation of those victimized by the discipline of regional and global capital, as well as to undermine the capacity of the elec- toral process to serve the interests of society as a whole and of territorial interests in particular. At most, international morality is reduced to lame “realist” claims that peace is a public good achieved mainly through the rational calculations of the privileged, reflecting the dynamics of political will and relative power, and given direction by a set of predatory assumptions about human nature. This realist mode of perceiving morality is rarely turned inward, and is quite comfortable with a hypocritical but politically convenient division between the benevolent sense of self and a malevolent vision of the other. This radical dichotomy between the general assessment of world order and the specific enactments of foreign policy has been particularly pronounced in this century-perhaps most brazenly in the mythic self-image of the United States, which sees itself as a world leader in unflagging pursuit of noble ideals. This pattern of posturing allows that master practitioner of realist statecraft, Henry Kissinger, to contend that the United States has been so captivated by Wilsonian moralism that in its pursuit of a just world order it has dangerously overlooked the protection of its own national interests. [3](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429202) Such a false rendering of America's role as world leader confuses, perhaps deliberately and with the help of compliant media, propaganda with policymaking. It is a message that enjoys little credibility abroad, even in Western Europe, where the American outlook is generally regarded, at best, as a compromise between moral pretensions and dangerous naïveté about how things really work in international life. Indeed, it has been the role of the most influential realists to instruct the American people on how things really work, especially in view of the alleged failure of Wilsonian policies to provide responsible world leadership after World War I, and the perceived success of a realist foreign policy throughout the cold war era. [4](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429202) In recent decades this realist way of conceiving the world has gained unchallenged ascendancy in policymaking circles and has been most prominently associated in this period with the ideas and practice of “containment, ” “deterrence, ” “balance of power, ” and “credibility.” [5](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429202) Such a self-satisfied orientation toward a bipolar image of world order was perversely captured by John Lewis Gaddis' notion of “the long peace, ” a phrase that resonated with the moral pretensions of Americans, while showing monumental insensitivity to the bloody ordeal of many non-Western peoples during the last half-century. It is a “peace” marred, and partially sustained, by more than 125 wars and upward of forty million war-related deaths. [6](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429203) The widespread acceptance of such a terminology in academic circles, especially in the United States, also exhibited the persisting Eurocentricism of mainstream intellectual approaches to matters of war and peace, and of living and dying. [7](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429203) Wars are endlessly explicated as defining moments in international history, especially those involving the leading states, with scant regard to the existential consequences for the peoples engaged. [8](http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108429203) The avoidance of war among the rich and powerful is merely a matter of “deterrence, ” a brutish balance of virtually unlimited destructive capacity. Such violence-laden arrangements are, then, equated with peace. Even among allies, espionage is habitually practiced and shifts of alignment are never ruled out in the inner circles of statecraft. Such a peace is never peaceful.

**Also it’s try or die, their disads are a rationalization of the other’s suffering which is the root of violence means their impa**cts are inevitable   
**Meister ‘5** [Robert, (Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he teaches political and moral philosophy, social thought, institutional analysis, and jurisprudence); “Never Again”’ Postmodern Culture, Vol. 15, No. 2, Project Muse//les]

The primacy of ethics over politics implicitly presupposes, however, specific limitations on the field of ethics itself. Viewed broadly, the raw material of ethics concerns languages and bodies in the sense that these are what matter from the ethical perspective when considering questions of agency and choice.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.uvm.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v015/15.2meister.html" \l "foot2#foot2) Ethical discussion of languages (and cultural systems that resemble languages) are now commonly expected to focus on the problem of difference, and to prefer a baseline cultural relativism to the culturally imperialist danger of false universals. In ethical discussion of bodies--and especially bodies that suffer--the greater danger is now widely seen to be false relativism (Lévinas, "Useless Suffering" 99). A principled resistance to moral relativism when it comes to the suffering of bodies is, thus, the specific ethical view that underlies the present-day politics of human rights. For proponents of this politics, the suffering body is the ultimate wellspring of moral value, the response to bodily suffering the ultimate test of moral responsibility. "The supreme ordeal of the will is not death, but suffering," said the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, who took the primacy of ethics to its -- reme by putting it ahead, even, of ontology and God (the world itself and its Creator) (Totality and Infinity 239). He argued that the suffering of another is always "useless," always unjustified, and that attempting to rationalize "the neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality"("Useless Suffering" 98-9). Lévinas is not here referring primarily to the growing medicalization of humanitarian invention, although he does regard analgesia as a paradigmatically ethical response to physical pain (see Kennedy and Rieff). His point is that my ethical responsibility, which merely begins with first aid, does not arise from any previous relationship between sufferer and provider, or from a political history consisting of prior vows or crimes, but from "a past irreducible to a hypothetical present that it once was . . . . [and] without the remembered present of any past commitment"("Diachrony and Representation" 170). Our responsibility to alleviate suffering comes before the past in the sense in which ethics can be said to come before politics. The priority of ethics arises "from the fear of occupying someone's place in the Da of my Dasein": "My . . . 'place in the sun,'" he says, "my home--have they not been a usurpation of places which belong to the others already oppressed or . . . expelled by me into a third world" ("From the One to the Other" 144-5). Lévinas's point is that in ethics, unlike politics, we do not ask who came first and what we have already done to (or for) each other. The distinctively ethical question is rather one of proximity--we are already here and so is the other, cheek-by-jowl with us in the same place. The neighbor is the figure of the other toward whom our only relationship is that of proximity. For Lévinas, the global movement to give ethics primacy over politics must be accompanied, within ethics, by the effort to give primacy to the ethics of the neighbor--the local over the global. In this way, the global primacy of ethics crystallizes around our horror of the inhuman act (the "gross" violation of human rights) rather than, for example, around the international distribution of wealth or the effects of global climate change.

# AT STATE BAD

**The state is inevitable- our only option is to make it as ethical as possible. Rather than placing limits to the -- ension of our hospitality, the law must make unconditionally hospitality to the other concrete. Our affirmation is constantly trying to move the state closer to the side of justice, and as such, is always a democracy to come.**

**Simmons ‘2** [“Toward A Postmodern Anti-Foundational Foundation for Human Rights”; P. 13-15//]

So, unconditional hospitality implies that you don't ask the other, the newcomer, the guest, to give anything back, or even to identify himself or herself. Even if the other deprives you of your mastery or your home, you have to accept this. It is terrible to accept this, but that is the condition of unconditional hospitality; that you give up the mastery of your space, your home, your nation. It is unbearable,. If, however, there is pure hospitality it should be pushed to this -- reme (Derrida, 1999b, 70). This hospitality, must be manifest in the political. "The political task then becomes that of finding the best 'legislative transaction, the best 'juridical' conditions so that in a given situation the ethics of hospitality should not be violated in principle—and should be respected as much as possible. For this, it is necessary to change laws, habits, phantasms, an entire 'culture" (Derrida, 1998, 149). We must do everything precisely so that the laws of hospitality are written into positive law. When this is impossible, everyone should, in soul and conscience, occasionally in a private manner, judge what must be done (when, where, how, to what -- ent) without the laws or against the laws" (Derrida, 1998, 150). Ethics to Politics: The Third Levinas's philosophy champions the ethical relationship with the Other, but this is not the end of his philosophy. Levinas worries that the ego can become infatuated with the Other to the point of ignoring all others. This embrace of lovers, as Levinas calls it, is interrupted by the simultaneous appearance of another person, "the Third" (le tiers) who also demands an infinite and concrete hospitality. If the ego is confronted with one Other, then ethics is straightforward: the ego is infinitely, and concretely responsible for the Other. However, with the appearance of the Third, the ego's attention is divided: a host of new questions arise. Are both others the Other? How can the ego be infinitely responsible for more than one Other? Which Other should receive its attention first? What if one Other makes war on the other Other? Can the ego defend the Other against attacks from an-Other? If so, can the ego use violence, even kill an-Other in defense of the Other? Levinas, in an infamous interview, said If your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right, and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong (Levinas, 1989). The Third necessitates an -- ension of the ego's an-archical responsibility into the realm of the said, that is, responsibility must be made concrete in language, justice, and politics. The decisions that must be made between Others, leads to the famous weighing on the scales of justice. Further, with the appearance of the Third, the ego can no longer prioritize those in proximity, it must give attention to all Others. However, it is impossible to have a face-to-face relationship with each member of humanity. Those far away can only be reached indirectly through social and political institutions. Notice that the raison d’etre / reason for being for politics and justice is ethics. And Levinas believes that **the modern liberal state can best actualize the ethical**. The liberal state, according to Levinas, **is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just**, or, in Derrida’s terms, it is “a Democracy-to-Come”. To summarize Levinas' and Derrida’s thought; since "it is impossible to escape the State," they insist that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice, and politics. Levinas calls for both the saying and the said, ethics and politics, and anti-foundationalism and justice.

**Our ethical demands can transform the law – legal discourse is vulnerable to the infiltration of ethical meaning, it is impossible to separate ethics from law, our only hope is to transform normative meaning through our responsibility to the other**

**Crowe ‘6** [ Law @ Univ of Queensland; Dec 2k6; Ratio Juris; 19: 4; “Levinasian Ethics and Legal Obligation”//]

Law, if conceived as a self-contained normative order, faces the permanent task of pushing aside competing layers of ethical meaning in order to motivate action. **Such a view of law is permanently constituted as open; it is always probable that ethical judgments will come to dominate the relevant process of normative reasoning**. It is, at best, a partial system; it appears far too weak to support a view of law as a generic network of peremptory rules. There is a deeper problem here. Hart notes in *The Concept of Law* that “those who accept the authority of a legal system [. . .] express their sense of its requirements in internal statements couched in the normative language which is common to both law and morals,” which commonly includes reference to obligations (Hart 1994, 203). On Levinas’s view, however, the cont-- for such normative language is primordially ethical. It follows that ethical meaning permeates the legal cont-- from the outset. It is useful, in this cont-- , to consider the following question. How are we to grasp the meaning of normative language, as used in relation to legal standards? **If legal discourse is not to derive its meaning from primordial ethical experience, legal language must effectively be -- racted from the social situation, drained of its ethical significance and iterated anew for legal purposes**. Is it plausible that such a procedure fails to preserve ethical meaning? On the one hand, law’s attempts to maintain itself as an autonomous discourse are prone to be infiltrated and undermined by the insistent weight of ethical cont-- .5 On the other hand, any systematic attempt to accommodate ethical significance within legal discourse makes it unfeasible to maintain the separate nature of the discipline. **It seems impossible either to permanently set aside ethical demands or to consistently admit them into legal judgments while retaining the institutional closure of law**. Legal discourse is **particularly vulnerable** to **infiltration by ethical meaning, since it is generally concerned with actions of ethical significance**. Consider a game of chess. Suppose I move my rook diagonally across the board and you say to me, “you ought not to move your piece in that way.” How am I to grasp the meaning of your statement? Presuming that I am intending to play chess and not merely moving the pieces without any sense of their significance, it is straightforward for me to conclude that you are talking about what, *in the cont-- of the game of chess*, I ought to do.

# AT XO CP

**Allowing the political process to determine a right of access will inevitably result in manipulation and selective disclosure and increased manipulation of facts – ensuring the “Others” destruction**

**Papandrea ‘5** [Mary Rose, (assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. J.D. University of Chicago Law School); “IMMIGRATION LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL LINE DRAWING POST-SEPTEMBER 11: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE: UNDER ATTACK: THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE WAR ON TERROR”; 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 35 ln//les]

But as scholars have argued for decades, abandoning the right of access to the whims of the political process is problematic. The government's tendency to suppress damaging news and to highlight favorable news is often a deliberate effort to skew public debate and the public's perception of the government's performance and foreign affairs. [235](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n235#n235" \t "_self) [\*76] Former executive branch officials have admitted that they selectively released sensitive information in a conscious effort to generate public support for its policies or serve some other bureaucratic or personal agenda. [236](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n236#n236" \t "_self) For example, former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted that he released otherwise sensitive information for "explicit administration purposes," the former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Carter conceded that "he had the authority to declassify particular pieces of information when that seemed necessary,'" and a White House official under President Kennedy agreed that high-ranking administration officials "knowingly and deliberately disseminated [classified] information from time to time in order to advance the interests of a particular person, [or] policy." [237](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n237#n237" \t "_self) As one commentator noted, "the executive's power to classify and declassify information raises the specter of government misinformation, or its weaker and less noxious relative, spin **control.'**" [238](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n238#n238" \t "_self) The result is a distortion of the public debate on fundamental public issues. Although the Executive has not hesitated to release details concerning the arrest and prosecution of individuals believed to have a connection to terrorism -- such as Hamdi, Padilla, and Moussaoui -- the Executive has continued to resist information requests regarding the other individuals investigated after September 11 who have been found to have no connection to terrorism. This sort of selective disclosure of information raises the concern that the government is abusing the "national security" umbrella to conceal its counterterrorism efforts that have been less than successful and in turn to "spin" public debate on the government's performance. The political process notoriously has failed to force the disclosure of information, particularly in times of crisis. A particularly instructive example of this failure is the "trial" of eight Nazi saboteurs during World War II. [239](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n239#n239" \t "_self) In 1942, eight Nazis landed on the shores of the United States in a bungled attempt to sabotage the nation's industrial complexes. [240](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n240#n240" \t "_self) Their plans were never set in motion, and their brief visit to the United States was cut short after one member of the conspiracy turned everyone in [\*77] to the FBI. [241](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n241#n241" \t "_self) Although the government announced that the FBI had foiled a Nazi plot and released some information about the plot itself and the identities of the captured, it purposely failed to disseminate any information about the conditions of the arrests in order to obtain the greatest political benefit possible. [242](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n242#n242" \t "_self) The government implied that other sabotage attempts were possible, and that therefore releasing information about how these eight men were captured might undermine the government's efforts. [243](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n243#n243" \t "_self) As a result, the public celebrated the FBI's "victory" over the Nazis, a bit of good news in an otherwise grim period of the war. [244](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n244#n244" \t "_self) The government specifically chose to use a military tribunal to try the saboteurs in order to conduct the proceedings in secret. [245](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n245#n245" \t "_self) The tribunal announced that this secrecy was essential for national security, while in truth, the government merely did not want to reveal that one of the saboteurs had surrendered the group. [246](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n246#n246" \t "_self) The trial was held on the fifth floor of the Department of Justice, in a lecture room literally shrouded in secrecy, with heavy black curtains draped over the windows and the glass doors on each end of the room blacked out. [247](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n247#n247" \t "_self) The press and public were excluded from the proceedings, except when a small group of reporters was permitted to take pictures of the hearing room while proceedings were suspended. [248](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n248#n248" \t "_self) General McCoy, the president of the commission, issued daily communiques to the press about the trial, but these releases typically consisted of little more than the times the hearings commenced and concluded. [249](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n249#n249" \t "_self) Although the press was frustrated with its limited access to the proceedings, the secrecy did not bother the public much at all. [250](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n250#n250" \t "_self) Instead, the public's debate focused on why the government was taking so long to execute these men and whether death by hanging or firing squad [\*78] was more appropriate. [251](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n251#n251" \t "_self) When the Supreme Court announced it would hold a special session to consider the defendants' habeas corpus claim of entitlement to trial before a civil court, the public and most of the press expressed outrage that such a "spectacle" would be held for "a group that came among us to blast, burn and kill." [252](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f5147edbe8e0f5cbb1b84d93b9e5656f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c4d51aea1d078bf1e2c331c3bff6f050" \l "n252#n252" \t "_self) There was no public pressure to hold the military trial proceedings in the open; if anything, **the public was pressuring the government not to hold any trial at all.** The treatment of the Nazi saboteurs is of course just one example of a time during the history of the United States when the majority has willingly jettisoned the civil liberties of minority groups. During the Palmer Raids in the 1920s, the public did not complain when immigrants were rounded up as suspects in the bombing of Attorney General Palmer's home. During World War II, the public did not object to the internment of citizens and noncitizens of Japanese, Italian, or German origin. Undoubtedly such apathy is due at least in part to the majority's readiness to regard foreigners as inherently suspect.

**Executive secrecy enlarged presidential powers to a dangerous level. Only the Court can delimit the power of the executive and restore democracy by creating a presumption of openness.  
Ross ‘4** [Susan Dente (Associate Professor, Edward R. Murrow School of Communication, and Director, AccessNorthwest, Washington State University); “SECRECY'S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO OPEN TRIALS” 40 Idaho L. Rev. 351 ln//les]

The number and diversity of Bush Administration actions that increase secrecy and impede public oversight is difficult to ascertain because the government has refused to report on many aspects of its ongoing war on terrorism. [80](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n80#n80" \t "_self) **However, this "war" is operating on several fronts that implicate the fundamental right to an open judiciary.** First, with the support of the Attorney General, the INS has held more than 600 individuals of "special" interest to the federal terrorism investigation in secret detention, subjected them to secret removal hearings (sometimes without counsel), and imposed deportation without permitting appeal to federal courts. [81](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n81#n81" \t "_self) Second, an unidentified number of "persons of interest" and "material witnesses" have been secretly jailed around the country under USA PATRIOT Act authority as part of the anti-terrorist initiative. [82](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n82#n82" \t "_self) Third, the President replaced open civilian trials with closed military tribunals without counsel and without judicial review in cases involving alleged "enemy combatants." [83](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n83#n83" \t "_self) The same order authorized the detention of these individuals outside U.S. territory. [84](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n84#n84" \t "_self) The following timeline demonstrates the types and diversity of government secrecy initiatives and highlights some of the most sig- [\*364] nificant policies that limit access to judicial and immigration processes. [85](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n85#n85" \t "_self) September 2001: A little more than a week after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, INS changed its detention policy. Under the new policy, Immigration and Naturalization Service [86](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n86#n86" \t "_self) would not limit detentions to the previously established 24-hour maximum but would hold detainees without charges any "reasonable period of time" needed to deal with an "emergency or other -- raordinary circumstance." [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Within ten days of the attacks, the Department of Justice closed all INS proceedings that the DOJ unilaterally determined to be of "special interest" for national security reasons. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy informed all immigration judges that they were required to separate hearings in "special interest" cases from all other cases on the docket, hold "secure" hearings closed to the public, and avoid disclosing information about these cases outside the immigration court. [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) Asserting that secrecy was necessary to advance the nation's "war on terrorism," the Creppy Directive presumptively barred media and the public from all special interest hearings and required immigration judges to impose a permanent gag on the respondents and their attorneys [\*365] October 2001: The FBI initiated a policy of blanket opposition to bond for any post-September 11 detainee. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) In a response to a pending lawsuit, Attorney General John Ashcroft reported that, "to date, our antiterrorism offensive has arrested or detained nearly 1,000 individuals as part of the September 11 terrorism investigation." [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) Before the end of October, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. Among its sweeping investigative and enforcement initiatives, the USA PATRIOT Act included provisions that increase the power of the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") courts, [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) establish new grounds for deportation, [93](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n93#n93" \t "_self) broaden the circumstances requiring mandatory detention of aliens, [94](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n94#n94" \t "_self) and authorize the Attorney General to circumvent probable cause requirements by initiating surveillance through national security letters without court oversight or review. [95](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n95#n95" \t "_self) The USA PATRIOT Act authorized government, on mere suspicion, to indefinitely jail (without access to counsel or effective recourse to the federal courts) non-citizens and citizens designated by the President as "enemy combatants." The law also required immigration judges to grant stays to releases on bond. As the month ended, forty groups filed a formal Freedom of Information Act request to obtain information from the Department of Justice on post-September 11 detainees. [96](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n96#n96" \t "_self) INS issued an interim rule to trigger automatic stays whenever immigration judges ordered an alien's release from detention in cases [\*366] where the alien was being held without bond or at bond of $ 10,000 or more. [97](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n97#n97" \t "_self) November 2001: The Department of Justice announced that it would release information only on the number of individuals charged with federal crimes or immigration violations in its post-September 11 investigation and would not provide the total number of all detainees. [98](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n98#n98" \t "_self) President Bush issued an executive order authorizing the use of military tribunals to try non-citizens on charges of terrorism. [99](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n99#n99" \t "_self) In late November, Attorney General Ashcroft reported that 93 people had been charged with crimes arising from the September 11 investigation. The crimes were mostly credit card fraud or making false statements on passport applications. [100](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n100#n100" \t "_self) Ashcroft also released the nationalities, dates of birth, and the charges, but not the names, of 548 people who remained in custody on immigration charges. The Attorney General said he was withholding the detainees' names to avoid aiding Osama bin Laden by revealing which of his associates are in custody. December 2001: When their FOIA request was denied, the Center for National Security Studies, the American Civil Liberties Union and seventeen other organizations [101](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n101#n101" \t "_self) filed suit in federal district court to obtain detainee information from the DOJ. The complaint asked for immediate disclosure of government documents concerning the more than 1,000 individuals who had been detained or arrested since September 11. [102](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n102#n102" \t "_self) The filing noted that "the government candidly acknowledges that hundreds of people remain in federal custody but refuses to [\*367] disclose, among other basic facts, who these detainees are and where they are being held. **This secrecy is unprecedented and deprives the public of information it is lawfully entitled to receive**." [103](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n103#n103" \t "_self)January 2002: In response to concerns about acts by the President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice, immigration judges recommended that trial- level immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals be removed from the Department of Justice and housed in a new and separate executive branch agency. The National Association of Immigration Judges said the proposal came in response to "disturbing encroachments on judicial independence" following September 11. [104](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=5c025784d3e4bee02bd81afe1453b032&_docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=eb18f3d4ee4a77c8fc9ac8d59c87c2fa" \l "n104#n104" \t "_self) In response to the court filing by the Center for National Security Studies, the Department of Justice agreed to release a list of the names, date of charge, date of release, and attorney contact information on some of those detained in connection with

**And, executive privilege will overwhelm your counterplan  
Haridakis ‘6** [Paul, (PHD is an associate professor in the School of Communication Studies at Kent State University); “CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY”; 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 3 ln//les]

Executive Branch Action. Although Congress has, to some -- ent, supported governmental suppression of information during the War on terrorism, the exercise of suppression has most often been carried out by the [\*23] executive branch. [173](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n173#n173" \t "_self) In addition to closing deportation hearings, authorizing closed military tribunals, and broadly interpreting FOIA exemptions, the Bush administration has taken great pains to cloak other activities in secrecy. [174](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n174#n174" \t "_self) A significant mechanism has been an expansive interpretation and use of legal privileges, including executive privilege. [175](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n175#n175" \t "_self) For example, when Congress requested information regarding activities of Vice President Cheney's energy task force, which he impaneled in his capacity as the President's head of national energy policy, the executive branch claimed the information sought was privileged from disclosure. [176](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n176#n176" \t "_self) When records of former President Ronald Reagan were due to be released and made available to the public pursuant to the Presidential Records Act of 1978, [177](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n177#n177" \t "_self) President Bush invoked executive privilege to restrict disclosure of presidential records to which the public would otherwise have access. [178](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n178#n178" \t "_self) Specifically, he issued Executive Order 13,233 [179](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n179#n179" \t "_self) to eliminate a presumption of disclosure and expand the scope of the records that could be delayed from disclosure. [180](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n180#n180" \t "_self) The Executive Order also -- ended such protection to the Vice President. [181](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n181#n181" \t "_self) In July 2005, the President nominated John Roberts, one of the circuit court judges who ruled in Hamdan that the President's military trials could proceed, to fill the vacancy on the United States Supreme Court created when Sandra Day O'Connor resigned. [182](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n182#n182" \t "_self) When Congress asked the White House to turn over documents regarding Justice Robert's advice during his tenure in the administrations of former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the administration invoked the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges to withhold documents from disclosure. [183](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.uvm.edu/universe/document?_m=f73f34ca7fc3ecfc210889f6ce4a5d95&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=ac21045ea834146c5edc3352c359d9fb" \l "n183#n183" \t "_self) The administration took a similar approach in the face of congressional requests for documents pertaining to the work product of recently appointed UN Ambassador, John Bolton.

# AT OCCULARCENTRISM

**The film is critical of its own medium—the cinematic medium is necessary to disrupt the ocularcentrism of mainstream science fiction films by deconstructive engaging its representation format**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

From its first image, D9 is hyper-reflective on its own status as a medium. As viewers, we are confronted with a flamboyant play of remediation, as sketched out by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin.[3] There, the two strategies of immediacy (a medium makes itself transparent on the referent: ‘looking through’) and hypermediacy (a medium reflects on itself by differentiating itself from another: ‘looking at’) struggle in manifold ways to constitute a complexity not only of the narrative and its semiotic significance but also the overall status of the depicted. In D9, documentaries from the 1980s are used to depict the arrival of the aliens in South Africa. TV-reports are added, which not only show the (militant) conflicts between the local population and the aliens but also the struggles of the aliens with the local police over the following years. In interwoven faux documentaries ‘experts’ express their opinion concerning all social and political issues that the film raises within its course, culminating in a fictitious TV-report with a well-known news anchor man from the SABC network. Visual and aesthetic strategies from Hollywood movies, surveillance cameras and computer games complement and complicate this overloaded genre play. The authenticity or putative origin of any identity (and therefore of any social reality depicted in the film) did not exist beforehand but is rather the effect of its positioning through media This form of hypermediacy not only references surveillance societies and 24-hours news cycles but characterizes the film from its beginning as hybrid. As a hybrid the film systematically denies the viewer easy access to the authenticity of what is portrayed. By doing so the film unsettles dichotomies such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ as well as understandings of difference and identity. This needs to be understood as a strategy of subversion but more importantly as the productivity of the film itself. The reality that the film pretends to represent is in fact only produced through the film. In this way it becomes clear that the authenticity or putative origin of any identity (and therefore of any social reality depicted in the film) did not exist beforehand but is rather the effect of its positioning through media. Accordingly, it is important to look closely at the media strategies that are initiated through the film at particular moments and examine their purpose to either authenticate referents or to display their constructedness. We will return to these strategies throughout this article.

**And the focus on the medium (mediality of the film) shows its most important insight that moves beyond the question of the symbolic interpretation of metaphors in the film and towards the way it constitutes the viewer as subject**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

When District 9 (D9) was released in August 2009, the film was an immediate box office hit in several countries. This was much to the surprise of critics, reviewers and bloggers, who seemed astonished by the fact that a science fiction film with this impact could originate from South Africa. Internet forum discussions and an E-Symposium emerged as a response to the film, which continues to be the subject of controversial discussion.[1] While many celebrate the film in relation to the ‘generic’ genre of Science Fiction as a promising representative of a thriving African Cinema, others reject the film on the basis of its socio-political message, as yet another racist movie about Africa – with reference to the depiction of both ‘the Nigerians’ and the aliens.[2] In this article, we would like to move beyond a crudely metaphorical reading of representation (‘the aliens stand for X in reality’), and explore the degree to which the film foregrounds its own mediality. This focus moves us beyond a polarizing position that immediately rejects the film as racist, and allows us to engage with a complex and original t-- unlike so many other films that take ‘Africa’ as their subject.

# AT: International CPs

**The fact that other countries could solve does not change our ethical obligation to pass the plan**

**Singer 1997**

(Peter, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton, “The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle” New Internationalist, http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/199704--.htm)

To challenge my students to think about the ethics of what we owe to people in need, I ask them to imagine that their route to the university takes them past a shallow pond. One morning, I say to them, you notice a child has fallen in and appears to be drowning. To wade in and pull the child out would be easy but it will mean that you get your clothes wet and muddy, and by the time you go home and change you will have missed your first class. I then ask the students: do you have any obligation to rescue the child? Unanimously, the students say they do. The importance of saving a child so far outweighs the cost of getting one’s clothes muddy and missing a class, that they refuse to consider it any kind of excuse for not saving the child. Does it make a difference, I ask, that there are other people walking past the pond who would equally be able to rescue the child but are not doing so? No, the students reply, the fact that others are not doing what they ought to do is no reason why I should not do what I ought to do.

**The US is morally responsible for the its own legacy of colonial atrocities**

**Ozer 1998**

(Irma Jacqueline, PhD NYU, JD New York Law School, “Reparations for African Americans”, 41 How. L.J. 479)

Daisy Collins, n26 one of the early reparations scholars, points out that Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, provides that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude. n27 The author argues that the [\*483] disparate position of the average black man is a relic of slavery, and thus a form of slavery in violation of Article 4. n28 Moreover, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter states that the members of the United Nations are "to fulfill, in good faith, obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter." n29 Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter mandate fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race. n30 Since the United States is a member of the United Nations, our government has the "obligation to remove all racial inequality for which it is responsible." n31 The Honorable Silis Muhammad, C.E.O. of the Lost Found Nation of Islam, has a petition n32 before the United Nations Human Rights Commission seeking reparations for African Americans. n33

**The United States has a unique ethical obligation to combat colonialism due to the history of slavery**

**Burkett 2008**

(Maxine, Associate Professor of Law at University of Colorado Law, “Reconciliation and Nonrepetition”, http://www.law.uoregon.edu/org/olr/archives/86/burkett.pdf)

34 As a member of the international community, the United States is arguably bound to some form of reparations, as America’s past practice of slavery places it well within the obligations of international law. To demonstrate America’s obligation with respect to African-Americans, an early reparations scholar, Daisy Collins, cited Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was a product of the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. See Ozer, supra note 18, at 482. Article 4 states that “[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. As a signatory of the Universal Declaration, the United States has a unique “obligation to remove all racial inequality for which it is responsible.” Ozer, supra note 18, at 483 (citation omitted).

# AT: TOPICALITY

**It is of the upmost importance to challenge the blindspots in science in the cont-- of todays socio political environment**

**Dean 97,** Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith , t**he Familiarity of Strangeness:  Aliens, Citizens, and Abduction**, Theory And Event, 6/24/11, EG

This familiar conception of the public sphere and its citizens has already been subjected to convincing critiques, some based in sex, race, and class. These critiques draw attention to the partiality that disguises itself as universality, to the constitutive effects of exclusions made in reason's name.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2dean.html#FOOT11) Despite their persuasive force, I worry that the critiques might be too limited because they still allow, indeed, require, the possibility of a group of "us," a mainstream, a public, who speak a common language and employ a common rationality. This common rationality is the standard by which deviations, irrationalities, are judged, through which exclusions are not only effected but discerned. Differences end up deposited onto some set of others, onto unfamiliar strangers. I am interested in situations where deployments of this supposedly common rationality, discussions in this common language produce strange, contradictory, incredible, irrational results. I am interested in discourses like that of ufology where participants think they speak and reason like everyone else, but everyone else finds what they are saying incomprehensible and irrational. I'm interested because this is the situation of America at the millennium.

**Science fiction naturally merges the acceptance of otherness and the joy of learning.**

**Parrinder, 2k**, Patrick, Professor of English at the School of English and American Literature at the [University of Reading](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Reading), Before the Novum: The Prehistory of Science Fiction Criticism, Learning From Other Worlds, 6/24/11, EG.

Not only is science ﬁction an idea of tremendous import, but it is to be an important factor in making the world a better place to live in, through educating the public to the possibilities of science on life which, even today, are not appreciated by the man on the street ... If every man, woman, boy and girl, could be induced to read science ﬁction right along, there would certainly be a great resulting beneﬁt to the community, in that the educational standards of its people would be raised tremendously. Science ﬁction would make people happier, give them a broader understanding of the world, make them more tolerant.10

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# AT FETISHISM KRITIK

**District 9 is actually a kritik of the LACK of post-colonialism at the governmental level—the negative’s notion (that the aliens’ resistance is merely a fetish that makes us comfortable with our relation to colonialism) ignores the unmistakably powerful counter-assault against otherization**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

Conclusion: colonial continuity in postcolonial filmmaking While Daniel Magaziner concludes his analysis by arguing that ‘District 9 thus is less about apartheid and South African history, than about how South African history is packaged and sold, to both the international and domestic markets’[20] we conclude, rather, as follows: in its portrait of contemporary South African society the film criticises the lacking postcoloniality of the nation-state. We understand this as the progressive statement which, in its clarity, is rather rare within African Cinema. This criticism is formulated without losing sight of the specific history of colonialism and apartheid in the country as well as contemporary global politics, as reflected, for example, in issues around multinational companies, border management, migration, war, terrorism and xenophobia. Social (and disjunctive) technologies of exclusion which work on the basis of belonging seem to point to continuities rather than a radical break with coloniality On many levels this post-colonial society inevitably comes across very poorly – a society that continues to be shaped by whites, although key positions are occupied by blacks. The society is marked by apartheid continuities and a concomitant inability to develop a coexistence with the aliens; a society that does not shy away from neo-liberal technologies of normalization, as evident, for example, in the disciplining of sexual relationships between aliens and human beings. Social (and disjunctive) technologies of exclusion which work on the basis of belonging seem to point to continuities rather than a radical break with coloniality. No single group within South African society is presented in a sympathetic way, neither the MNU people or the military, nor the people on the streets or the ‘experts’ interviewed.[21] And still many reviews understand inclusion in this society as the pre-condition for a possible reading of individual characters or entire groups (such as the aliens or the Nigerians) as positive. The fact that the majority of responses to D9 read the disorder, the non-legibility and the destructiveness that mark the aliens as negative does raise several questions. It points to an inability to understand the (partially militant) resistance by the aliens as a legitimate action against permanent repression and regulation. This inability needs to be analyzed as the interpretation of the aliens as categorically ‘Other’, an interpretation reinforced by reviewers who are not prepared to distinguish between what the aliens ‘are’ and what they turn into in the cont-- of the conflict with the humans. Responses of such kind in fact (re-)affirm technologies of ‘Othering’ that the film sets out through various media-strategies to disrupt.

**The aliens have such a profound resistive agency that it is not reducible to scapegoating**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

The aliens possess an agency that does not dissolve into habits of cooperation, compromise or assimilation In D9 references to this (historical) resistance against spatial segregation are made by showing how the aliens arm themselves against the human population and how they develop more militant forms of resistance, the derailing of trains, for example. This form of resistance is usually widely neglected in the reviews of and responses to D9 or, if included, then read (surprisingly) negatively. This might be primarily due to the fact that this resistance is placed into the post-apartheid cont-- (although this is not explicit, as mentioned before) and that it is understood as a given that a post-colonial nation-state should have restored to it the monopoly on the (legitimate) use of physical force (in the film the state’s structures are freshened up with private contractors, in this case a multinational company).[15] It could also be due to the fact that the reviews silently/unconsciously reproduce one central phantasm of a post-apartheid society: the fact that the aliens resist with armed forces makes them even more antipathetic, more unwilling to adapt, more unreasonable and therefore more strange. However, by placing the events of D9 in the ambiguous historical cont-- of post/apartheid South Africa, their resistance is also cont-- ualized, and politicized. As the film authenticates the aliens as radically different, the concept of resistance refuses to reduce them to either the status of victims or to a clueless/unsystematic and violent crowd. More specifically, a particular form of (political) agency is ascribed to the aliens. There is rationality, communication, tactical thinking and solidarity evident amongst the aliens that the humans do not understand – and are probably not supposed to. The film deals with this issue productively as it accepts and does not judge this ‘Otherness’, which the population can only read as aggression, threat and lack of integration. The aliens possess an agency that does not dissolve into habits of cooperation, compromise or assimilation. We concentrate here on the processes of becoming, on becoming-alien. We focus on the possibility of reading the behaviour of the Nigerians as defying assimilation into a society that rejects them

# AT NIGERIANS TURN

**The metaphor of Nigerians in District 9 is not one that reduces them to passive and superstitious “others”—instead, their subversive position in the film thematizes their agency**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

The depiction of the Nigerians in D9 accords not only with colonial images of Africans that are continuously updated in post-colonial Hollywood cinema about Africa (see for example the depiction of the armed gangs in Shooting Dogs, 2005 and Blood Diamond, 2006), but also on the streets of Johannesburg in relation to other African communities, in particular the Nigerian. This is a forceful approach, and it is very painful to watch. It is therefore not very surprising that the depiction of the Nigerians is widely considered racist, as the images emanate from a racist discourse, even when analyzed through a more open approach. We would like to propose an alternative reading that refuses to join in the slating reviews on the basis of the Nigerians’ racist depiction. By doing so we focus on how the Nigerians respond to and position themselves in such discourses. To be more specific, we concentrate here on the processes of becoming, on becoming-alien. We focus on the possibility of reading the behaviour of the Nigerians as defying assimilation into a society that rejects them. As such, the Nigerians are working against occupying a ‘profitable and valuable/useful’ position within society. They even resist the core morality of contemporary South African society – a morality that seems quite similar to that of the apartheid regime and to which Wikus as well as other decolonized South Africans and even reviewers of the film still refer positively – by having sex with aliens and, on top of that, commercial sex.[19] The Nigerians in the film follow their own interests and do not take up a subordinate role in relation to the aliens (although they are able to adapt) and where necessary they work against them. While in our view a more open reading of the depiction of the Nigerians is possible, the non-development of the Nigerian characters as well as black characters in general is in line with the tradition of colonial filmmaking and impossible to ignore.

\*\*\*NEG

# CRITICAL FRAMEWORK/ TOPICALITY CARDS

**Topicality/framework negative**

**(A) The inclusion of science fiction fosters bad education for students, robbing them of the scientific literacy that is key to a functioning citizenry and rational democratic deliberations**

**Hodson 1998**

(Derek, Professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, “Science Fiction: the continuing misrepresentation of science in the school curriculum”, Curriculum Studies Vol 6 No 2, http://web.missouri.edu/~hanuscind/8710/Hodson1998.pdf)

Despite -- ensive writing in this area in recent years [1], many students still leave school with deficient or distorted views of science (Ryan, 1987; Carey et al, 1989; Larochelle & Desautels, 1991; Duveen et al, 1993; Abell & Smith, 1994; Solomon et al, 1994, 1996; Lubben & Millar, 1996; Leach et al, 1997). Apart from concern that a significant aspect of humankind’s cultural achievement should be so poorly understood, there are economic and sociopolitical implications to consider. There is ample evidence, for example, that the unfavourable image of science and scientists to which students are exposed is one of the major reasons why many students turn away from science at an early age (Holton, 1992). Thus, it prematurely limits the pool of talent from which future scientists are drawn, with potentially damaging effect on society’s economic well-being. Moreover, failing to provide every student with an adequate understanding of the nature of science runs counter to the demand for an educated citizenry capable of responsible and active participation in a democratic society. A proper understanding of science and the scientific enterprise is a key component of scientific literacy, and is just as essential as scientific knowledge (i.e. conceptual understanding) in ensuring and maintaining a socially-just democratic society (Reid & Hodson, 1987).

**(B) The breakdown in democratic communication is the root cause of war and conflict Habermas**, Prof Phil @Frankfurt**, 2003**

(Jurgen, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, p 35)

Since September 11 I have often been asked whether or not, in light of this violent phenomenon, the whole conception of “communicative action” I developed in my theory has been brought into disrepute. We in the West do live in peaceful and well-to-do societies, and yet they contain a ***structural*** violence that, to a certain degree, we have gotten used to, that is, unconscionable social inequality, degrading discrimination, pauperization, and marginalization. Precisely because our social relations are permeated by violence, strategic action and manipulation, there are two other facts we should not overlook. On the one hand, the praxis of our daily living together rests on a solid base of common background convictions, self-evident cultural truths and reciprocal expectations. Here the coordination of action runs through the ordinary language games, through mutually raised and at least implicitly recognized validity claims ***in the public space of more or less good reasons***. On the other hand, due to this, conflicts arise from ***distortion in communication***, from misunderstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception. When the consequences of these conflicts become painful enough, they land in court or at the therapist’s office. The spiral of violence begins as a spiral of distorted communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust, to the breakdown of communication. If violence thus begins with a distortion of communication, after it has erupted it is possible to know what has gone wrong and what needs to be repaired.

**Modern science is the greatest way to achieve self governing democracies proven to be the most just.**

**Longino 2006**

(Helen, "The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Date Accessed: 6/21/11 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/>. BTN)

Modern science has been regarded as both a model of democratic self-governance and an activity requiring and facilitating democratic practices in its supporting social cont-- (Popper 1950, Bronowski 1956). In this perspective, science is seen as embedded in and dependent on its supporting social cont-- , but insulated in its practices from the influence of that cont-- . As the reach of science and science-based technologies has -- ended further and further into the economy and daily life of industrialized societies, new attention is paid to the governance of science. Regardless of one's views about the social character of knowledge, there are further questions concerning what research to pursue, what social resources to devote to it, who should make such decisions, and how they should be made. Philip Kitcher (Conclusions, Science, Truth, and Democracy, 2001) has opened these questions to philosophical scrutiny. Kitcher largely endorses the epistemological views of his (1993). In this new work, however, he argues that there is no absolute standard of the significance (practical or epistemic) of research projects, nor any standard of the good apart from subjective preferences. The only non-arbitrary way to defend judgments concerning research agendas in the absence of absolute standards is through democratic means of establishing collective preferences. Kitcher, thus, attempts to spell out procedures by which decisions concerning what research directions to pursue can be made in a democratic manner. The result, which he calls well-ordered science**,** is a system in which the decisions actually made track the decisions that would be a made by a suitably constituted representative body collectively deliberating with the assistance of relevant information (concerning, e.g., cost and feasibility) **s**upplied by experts. Kitcher's "well-ordered science" has attracted attention from other philosophers, from scientists, and from scholars of public policy. Winning praise as a first step, it has also elicited a variety of criticisms and further questions. The criticisms of his proposal range from worries about the excessive idealism of the conception to worries that it will enshrine the preferences of a much smaller group than those who will be affected by research decisions. Kitcher's proposal at best works for a system in which all or most scientific research is publicly funded. But the proportion of private, corporate, funding of science compared to that of public funding has been increasing, thus calling into question the effectiveness of a model that presupposes largely public control (Mirowski and Sent 2002, Krimsky 2003). Kitcher's model, it should be noted, still effects a significant separation between the actual conduct of research and decisions concerning the direction of research and scholars who see a more intimate relation between social processes and values in the cont-- and those in the conduct of research will be dissatisfied with it. The counterfactual character of the proposal raises questions about the -- ent to which well-ordered science really is democratic. If the actual decisions do not need to be the result of democratic procedures but only to be the same as those that would result, from such procedures how do we know which decisions those are without actually going through the deliberative exercise? Even if the process is actually carried out, there are places, e.g. in choice of experts whose advice is sought, which permit individual preferences to subvert or bias the preferences of the whole (Roth 2003). Furthermore, given that the effects of scientific research are potentially global, while democratic decisions are at best national, national decisions will have an effect well beyond the population represented by the decision makers. Sheila Jasanoff has also commented that even in contemporary industrialized democracies there are quite different science governance regimes. There is not one model of democratic decision making, but many, and the differences translate into quite different policies (Jasanoff 2005).

# SCIENCE GOOD KRITIK

# 1NC Shell—Science Good Kritik

**(A) Imagination trainwrecks science—Their valorization of imagination undermines the scientific project, causing a retrenchment to nihilism and barbarism**

**Bookchin 1994**

(Murray, Founder of the Social Ecology Movement, author of hundreds of books and articles, Professor Emeritus at Ramapo College, “History, Civilization, and Progress: Outline for a Criticism of Modern Relativism”, http://www.theyliewedie.org/ressources/biblio/en/Bookchin\_Murray\_-\_History,\_Civilization,\_and\_Progress.html)

The riddle of our times is whether today's relativists would have equipped us intellectually and ethically to cross into that most expansive realm of freedom. We cannot merely be driven into greater freedom by blind forces that we fail to understand, as Marxists implied, still less by mere preferences that have no standing in anything more than an "imaginary," "instincts," or libidinal "desires."[28] The relativists of our time could actually play a sinister role if they permitted the "imaginative" to loosen our contact with the objective world. For in the absence of rational objective standards of behavior, imagination may be as demonic as it may be liberatory when such standards exist; hence the need for informed spontaneity--and an informed imagination. The exhilarating events of May-June 1968, with the cry "Imagination to Power!" were followed a few years later by a surge in the popularity of nihilistic postmodernism and poststructuralism in academy, an unsavory metaphysics of "desire," and an apolitical call for "imagination" nourished by a yearning for "self-realization." More than ever, I would insist, we must invert Nietzsche's dictum "All facts are interpretations" and demand that all interpretations be rooted in "facts," that is, in objectivity. We must seek out broader interpretations of socialism than those that cast socialist ideals as a science and strangled its movements in authoritarian institutions. At a time when we teeter between Civilization and barbarism, the current apostles of irrationality in all their varied forms are the chthonic demons of a dark world who have come to life not to explicate humanity's problems but to effect a dispiriting denial of the role of rationality in History and human affairs. My disquiet today lies not in the absence of scientific "guarantees" that a libertarian socialist society will appear--at my age, that will never be my privilege to see--but in whether it will even be fought for in so decadent and desperate a period.

**(B) Any incorporation of imaginative gestures into an evaluation necessarily makes it unscientific**

**Cogan 81**

(Marc, Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities at Wayne State University, Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon, 216-217, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall, 1981), Penn State University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237295>, 6/21/11, ZB)

Since the faculties of reason and will do not operate on sensory experience but on the sensible images the imagination presents to them, the imagination stands in the center of all human activi-ties, both speculative and practical, and thus wields an inescap-able influence over both thought and action, as Bacon frequently points out. In the realm of action, if the imagination presents to the will only the images of the senses and passions (ignoring the directions proposed by the reason), or if it misrepresents the dictates of the reason to the will, it can, in effect, "usurp" the reason 's proper role as governor of action, and direct the will on its own, irrationally.21 In the realm of abstract thought, if the imagination misrepresents the evidence of the senses to the reason, it can contaminate the workings of the reason, and render them fallacious and futile.22 It is not accidental that Bacon chose the word idola instead of the more familiar and therefore neutral imagines for the images the imagination passes to the reason. Though not strictly identical to the Idols of the mind, whose récognition and avoidance forms an important part of Bacon" s art of Judgment,23 they share an essential quality. Since the imagination is not necessarily a trustworthy reporter of the evidence of the senses, its representations to the reason have the same specious and dangerous nature that the idols (in the sensé that Bacon uses the term elsewhere in the de Augmenüs and in the Novum Organ-um) have. As Bacon says, the imagination communicates the images of perceptions to the reason already hearing "the print of truth/9 That is, it takes what is merely data, colors it, and gives it thereby the look of truth, with its consequent seductiveness. The danger this poses to science is at the heart of Bacon9 s conviction that any effective scientific logic must proceed by exclusion: by stripping away those false appearances of truth that lead to premature and erroneous conclusions. The reason must submit the Idols of the mind and the idola of the imagination to scrutiny before choosing some and rejecting others. In-deed, the susceptibility of the human reason to both sorts of idols (and the need for an instrument to overcome this weak-ness) is, for Bacon, one of the facts that demand the construction of a new logic.2

**(C) Denial of objective truths culminates in the end of humanity**

**Violet B. Ketels, 1996, Professor of English – Temple University, 548 Annals 45, November, l/n**

THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent , frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." n1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. n2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting . In the current cont-- , however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience . "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," n3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," n4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge . n5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [\*47] humanist soul," n6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 't-- s' masquerading as facts ." n7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget . Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now . The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities . It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. n8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives . Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying . Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past . It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it . Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety ? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet . "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! n9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [\*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." n10 A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. n11 We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another " have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity." n12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

**(D) Disrupting and problematizing science actually sweeps the rug out from under anti-colonial movements attempting to use science to counter domination and violence—it ends up validating all non-Western views, including reactionary, nationalist, and oppressive**

**Nanda, 1997**

(Meera, Phil of Science @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst , “Against social destruction of science: cautionary tales from the third world”, Monthly Review, March <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is_n10_v48/ai_19344899/>)

One of the most remarkable - and the least remarked upon - features of the "radical" movement engaged in deconstructing natural science is how it ends up denying the unity (i.e., universality) of truth, reason, reality, and science precisely in the name of those who need these unities most urgently - the "people resisting despotism and its lies." This includes those of us from non-Western societies fighting against the despotism of some of our own cultural traditions, and the untested and untestable cosmologies that are used to justify these traditions. A loose and varied assortment of theories that bear the label of social constructivism have declared the very content of modern natural science to be justified, in the final instance, by "Western" cultural values and social interests. Once modern science is seen not as a universally valid knowledge about the natural world, but as a particular or "ethno"-construct of Western society, it becomes easy to see science as a part of the imperialistic West's despotism, which the west's "Others" must resist in the name of cultural survival and anti-imperialism. Modern science thus becomes a despotism, an object of resistance rather than an ally of those resisting despotism.My goal in this paper is to cast a critical look at these anti-realist and relativist views of "Western" science, which have gained wide currency in the postmodern academy; and I want to look at them from the perspective of the people's science movements in non-Western countries. These theories - unlike the Marxian idea of social mediation of knowledge with which they are often confused - have eroded the distinction between scientifically justified beliefs and folk beliefs and/or ideology. What has undermined these distinctions is the fundamental thesis of social constructivism which states that all beliefs alike are justified by the community consensus, which is itself based upon social power, rhetoric and custom. There is no objective truth about the real world which scientifically justified knowledge can aim toward, but rather all "truth" about "reality" is literally constructed out of choices between equally justifiable interpretations that a "thought collective" makes. These choices, in turn, are driven by the conscious and unconscious biases and interests of the members of any community of inquirers. Though varied in emphases and details, constructivist theorists agree that there simply is no truth, or even reality, that can transcend the local social cont-- of inquiry. The "unities" of truth and reason that Ian Hacking speaks for (above), are treated in the constructivist discourse as remnants of the imperialistic impulse of the Enlightenment which sought to impose the West's own peculiar stories about truth and reality on the rest of the world. Such a view of knowledge justifies itself in the name of cultural autonomy, tolerance, and respect for non-Western ways of knowing the world and living in it. But I will argue that, in actual practice, such "tolerance" has only ended up providing theoretical grounds for, and a progressive gloss on, the fast growing anti-modernist, nativist and cultural/religious revivalist movements in many parts of what used to be called the Third World. These movements seek to subordinate scientific rationality to local traditions, and thus are incapable of critically interrogating these same traditions, many of which are patently illiberal and oppressive to women and other marginalized groups in non-Western societies. Almost in direct proportion to the rise of nativist anti-modernist social movements, which correspond with ascendance of social constructivist theories in the academy globally, many pans of the Third World have seen a decline and stigmatization of people's science movements. These people's science movements seek to appropriate the contents and methods of modern science in order to bring traditional knowledge under empirical scrutiny and critique. In the part of the Third World that I am most familiar with - my native India - people's science movements have come to be eclipsed by the highly visible and vocal transnational alliance that has emerged around the idea that modern science is Western, and that the non-West needs its non-Western "ethno"-sciences. Affirmed and emboldened by the most avant-garde intellectuals in the West and at home, these nativist movements tend to label any critique of traditional knowledge from the vantage point of modern science as a sign of Western imperialism, or worse, a hangover from the old, "discredited" and "Western" Enlightenment (although, interestingly, they continue to applaud the critique of "Western" science from the perspective of ethnosciences as anti-Eurocentric, and therefore progressive).(1) Indeed, I believe that the recent electoral success of the religious right (the BJP) in India has definitely benefited from the cultural climate in which even the supposedly Left-inclined intellectuals and activists tend to treat all liberal and modern ideas as "Western," inauthentic, and thus inappropriate for India. Thus I will try to show that although the animus against the rationality of modern science is purportedly justified in the name of anti-imperialism and egalitarianism, its real beneficiaries are not the people but the nativists and nationalists of all stripes, religious or "merely" cultural/civilizational.

**(E) Decision rule—all decisions must begin from the standpoint of the most oppressed—this is the only way to ensure that a framework is emancipatory and not just a thinly veiled cooptationCook, Assoc Prof Law @ Georgetown, 1992**

(Anthony E., 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)

Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed. [\*762] To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

**(F) Even if science can be used to the detriment of the oppressed, it is an essential tool for every subversion of power and must be retained at all costs**

**Wilkin, Prof Pol & IR, 2000**

**(Peter, “Solidarity in a Global Age – Seattle and Beyond”, Journal of World-Systems Research, 6.1**

**http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol6/number1/v6n1\_pdf/jwsr-v6n1-wilkin.pdf)**

Equally, some groups within the anti-systemic movements that have emerged in the wake of the 1968 revolutions have adopted a hostility to rational inquiry, science, technology and any kind of systemic analysis of world order. Such a tendency is, in my view, a severely retrograde step. Science and technology are potentially tools that can be used to liberate human beings from a great deal of the drudgery of life and are central to any humane, ordered society. They are not, in themselves, inherently flawed products of Western culture, or some such thing. As for the issue of rational analysis, I would paraphrase Noam Chomsky here who has commented that 'I know of no good arguments for irrationality.' In part such tendencies have been influenced, I suspect, by some of the insights of postmodernist attempts to reverse the Enlightenment idea that knowledge is power, potentially a tool for liberation. The power/knowledge equation associated with Foucault presents a more Nietzschean and insidious view of knowledge as an endless power struggle with one 'regime of truth' ultimately replacing another in a circular process of domination (Wilkin, 1999). Suffice to say this seems a very narrow view of progress and social change which can only make sense if we ignore the very real forms of progress that have occurred in the world. Issues such as women's rights, human rights, anti-racism, antisexism, gay rights are all developments that represent a movement towards a better world order where meaningful rather than simply formal equality might yet emerge among all peoples. Knowledge may raise important issues of power but this is not to say that all knowledge is simply a form of domination. On the contrary, knowledge can give us the power to improve social relations, as the above examples suggest. The -- ent to which these ideas can be found in some sections of the anti-systemic movements reflects worryisome tendencies that will ultimately do little to foster a world where solidarity is the bedrock for a good society, rather than power and hierarchy.

**(G) Epistemology outweighs—only a correct method of thinking can yield actions that effectively intervene in real world social struggles**

**Anderson 2006**

(Elizabeth [Department of Philosophy](http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/) [University of Michigan](http://www.umich.edu/)  “The Epistemology of Democracy”, Project Muse, Date Accessed: 6/27/11, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1anderson.html> BTN)

John Dewey offered an experimentalist account of the epistemic powers of democracy. He characterized democracy as the use of social intelligence to solve problems of practical **interest** (Dewey 1981a; Putnam 1990). Practical intelligence embodies an experimental method (Dewey 1976). Deliberation is a kind of thought experiment, in which we rehearse proposed solutions to problems in imagination, trying to foresee the consequences of implementing them, including our favorable or unfavorable reactions to them. We then put the policies we decide upon to an actual test by acting in accordance with them and evaluating the results. Unfavorable results—failures to solve the problem for which the policy was adopted, or solving the problem but at the cost of generating worse problems—should be treated in a scientific spirit as disconfirmations of our policies. They give us reasons to revise our policies to make them do a better job solving our problems. Practical intelligence, then, is the application of scientific method to practical problems. This requires abandoning dogmatism, affirming fallibilism, and accepting the observed consequences of our practices as the key evidence prompting us to revise them. Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state officials. It is cooperative social experimentation. Dewey's model is the only one of the three that represents the epistemic powers of all three constitutive features of democracy: diversity, discussion, and dynamism[End Page 13] (feedback). Dewey stressed the central importance to democracy of bringing citizens from different walks of life together to define, through discussion, what they take to be problems of public interest, and to consider proposed solutions (Dewey 1981c). He saw that universal inclusion of diverse citizens was essential to satisfying both the internal and -- ernal criteria of success for democratic decision-making. Exclusion casts doubt on the claim that problems and solutions as defined by those allowed to participate are truly in the public interest—responsive in a fair way to everyone's concerns, insofar as they legitimately lay a claim on public action. It also undermines the ability of collective decision-making to take advantage of citizens' situated knowledge—the fact that citizens from different walks of life have different experiences of problems and policies of public interest, experiences that have evidential import for devising and evaluating solutions. Universal inclusion makes maximal use of such situated knowledge, which we have seen is critical for solving the kinds of complex problems modern democracies face. Collective, democratic discussion and deliberation is a means of pooling thiso asymmetrically distributed information for decision-making. Most importantly, Dewey's experimentalist model of democracy helps us see the epistemic import of several democratic institutions that sustain its dynamism, its capacity for change: periodic elections, a free press skeptical of state power, petitions to government, public opinion polling, protests, public comment on proposed regulations of administrative agencies. In Dewey's model, these are mechanisms of feedback and accountability that function to institutionalize fallibilism and an experimental attitude with respect to state policies. They push governments to revise their policies in light of evidence—public complaints, as expressed in both votes and discussion—that they are not working, or expected not to work. On Dewey's model, votes and talk reinforce one another, the votes helping to insure that government officials take citizens' verbal feedback seriously, the talk helping to define and articulate the message conveyed by votes. Dewey stressed that for democracy to work, it was not enough simply to institute legal arrangements such as representation and periodic elections. Culture had to change too, so that citizens at large, interacting with one another in civil society, welcome diversity and discussion, and take an experimental attitude toward social arrangements. "The future of democracy is allied with the spread of the scientific attitude" toward practical affairs (Dewey 1981b, 167). If the people themselves are hidebound and dogmatic, thinking, for example, that social arrangements *must* follow tradition, or revert to principles laid down in an ancient religious t-- , they will not be prepared to take the untoward consequences of current habits, or policies following ancient principles, as evidence disconfirming their claim to practical success. Dewey's experimentalist model enables a fairly fine-grained assessment of the epistemic powers of social arrangements, both legal and cultural. Diversity and discussion need to be embodied and facilitated in the institutions and customs of civil society. If a social arrangement has a systematic and significant impact on some social group, information about that impact needs to be conveyed to decision makers. This typically requires that the group organize into an association or party, so that its members can share their experiences and, through discussion, articulate shared complaints and advance proposals to address them. The lack of such associations in civil society makes the state blind to [End Page 14] the impacts of its policies, and decision makers immune from accountability for these impacts, even if the formal apparatus of democracy is in place. This helps explain why democrats in post-Communist Europe have focused so much energy on the construction of civil society, rather than constitutional arrangements: they had to overcome the legacy of totalitarianism, which systematically destroyed independent associations of citizens by forbidding independent political parties and assemblies of citizens.

# 2NC -- IMAGINATION DERAILS SCIENCE

**The imagination is the mix of images formed in the head rationally but the use of the imagination is arbitrary and playful and is the source of error in our actions**

**Cogan 81**

(Marc, Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities at Wayne State University, Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon, 215, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall, 1981), Penn State University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237295>, 6/21/11, ZB)

Though most classical, medieval, and Renaissance psychological theories recognize a function for the imagination, differences in details among the theories support quite different, and irreconcilable, accounts of the function.14 In Bacon' s organization of the psyche the imagination is a mental faculty distinct from the senses, and distinct also from both reason and memory. It is not itself the source of the images that exist in the mind. Rather, images arise directly in the senses, and perhaps in the reason, and as already formed images are passed to the imagination,15 which then takes up its position and function intermediate between the senses and the rational faculties.16 It receives the data of the senses as images, and transmits them to the mind. In the process of this transmission the imagination also possesses the power of recombining images or parts of images into forays which need not exist in nature, but can be willful, arbitrary, or playful.17 The conscious and deliberate use of this power is, for Bacon, the source of poetry, which he defines as counterfeit history.18 The unconscious operation of this power is the source of the entire range of error that results from wishful thinking or from speculation about unrealities.1

**And their aff is overwhelmed by things that are vivid and suddenly strike them such as irrational science fiction this oppresses science and controls our actions till science eventually loses turning their entire case**

**Cogan 81**

(Marc, Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities at Wayne State University, Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon, 217-218, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall, 1981), Penn State University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237295>, 6/21/11, ZB)

In all of its opérations the imagination is most strongly influenced by what can be called "présence," by things (or their images) which are immediate and vivid: The human understanding is moved by those things most which strike and enter the mind simultaneously and suddenly, and so fili the imagination." 25 "Those things that manifest themselves as présent fili the imagination more strongly."26 The impressions of the sensés and the urgings of the appetites hâve this "présence." They are naturally and literally présent at the moment that their images are received by the imagination. But the judgments and directions of the reason do not in themselves bave the same "présence" possessed by the reports of the sensés or appetites. They lack it either, metaphorìcally, because as speculative and logicai they are abstract rather than concrete, or because, inasmuch as they refer to future or indirect goods, they are literally "not présent" to the imagination. "The affection beholds principally the good which is présent; reason looks beyond and beholds likewise the future and sum of ali."27 But since the imagination is always moved most strongly by "présence," and since "présence" is not a quality of the naturai form of rational conclusions and dictâtes, in the compétition for the attention of the imagination, and thus for control over the objects the will chooses (and the will itself), the reason will inevitably lose to the représentations of the sensés and the appetites. "The affections themselves carry ever an appetite to apparent good, and have this in common with reason; but the différence is that affection beholds principally the good which is présent; reason looks beyond and beholds likewise the future and sum of all. And therefore since what manifests itself as présent fills the imagination more strongly, reason is commonly vanquished overcome."28

# 2NC -- SCIENCE KEY TO COMBAT OPPRESSION

**Science is used to question cultural norms and break down oppression**

**Nanda 98**

(Meera, writer historian and philosopher of science with a Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “Reclaiming Modern Science for Third World Progressive Social Movements” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol.33, No. 16, Apr. 18-24, 1998, JSTOR, 6/24/11, ZB)

All of this was perfectly commonplace - there were similar groups in most educational institutes, many of them linked to a couple of very well known and innovative science for people groups (especially Kishore Bharati and Eklavya) that produced excellent teaching methods and cultural means for popularizing new knowledge. India is pretty near the top in the world ranking in the number of professionally trained scientists and engineers. Some of us were bound to start questioning the cultural norms of our society that allowed and justified terrible inequities. Indeed, a critical attitude toward the traditional cultural explanations about social inequities was an article of faith for some of us. We believed that the findings of modern science had the potential to demolish the traditional justifications for caste, for inferiority of women and the belief in after-life, cultural attitudes that are deeply engrained in Indian society and contribute to injustice and oppression in our society. Unlike the cultural critics of today, who for the most part are content to reveal, over and over again, the play of power behind all knowledge, we were committed to a rational critique of all oppressions. Scientific knowledge was not just a target for deconstruction, but served as a vantage point for critical evaluation of our social cont-- . Of course we were critically aware of the western origins of science, and its role in legitimation of colonialism, racism and militarism. But we had not taken the n-- self-defeating step that our social constructivist and postmodern/ postcolonial friends have taken: that is to say, we never confused science as a social institution for science as a method of arriving at partial and provisional but the best corraborated accounts of reality. Because we did not make the very critieria of truth as emerging out of the admittedly patriarchal, western-colonial and capitalist institions in which modern science was born and raised, we were able to retain the critical potential of science.

**Science provides a picture of the world in which we can learn to break down western and patriarchal notions due to experience**

**Nanda 98**

(Meera, writer historian and philosopher of science with a Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “Reclaiming Modern Science for Third World Progressive Social Movements” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol.33, No. 16, Apr. 18-24, 1998, JSTOR, 6/24/11, ZB)

Hardly anyone but a few diehard positivists deny that science has cultural roots. But I don't see that that realisation must lead to cultural relativisation of sciences. I believe a critical realism that can account for the cultural biases is perfectly viable. I have written a detailed defense of a critical cont-- ual realism in the recently published issue of Socialist Register [Nanda 1997b]. Basically, I am arguing for a gradual and relentless revision of our conceptual categories in the light of new evidence obtained from controlled experiments, which are simply not as question begging and circular as social constructivist make them out to be - for the results of the experiments are justified in the lights of other theories with independent empirical support. While constructivist critics of science have explored the influence of culture on our perceptions, they have not paid equal attention to the processes through which these cultural categories are themselves revised through our changed perceptions of the natural reality - a reality that is independent of our perceptions. Seen as a continuous mutually self-correcting dialogue between an independent reality, and our stock of knowledge at any given time, science can give us not absolute truths but pictures of the world which are closer approximations to the facts and a picture which is more reasonable to believe. Seen thus, science is not inherently western, patriarchal or inherently anything, but simply as the best mechanism that we have developed so far to constantly learn from experience by confronting experience, by challenging it with theories, biases, prejudices, conjectures and guesses. Sure this method of learning can be obstructed by not allowing challenges from socially powerless groups. But the way out is not to give up trying, but to try harder.

**Rejecting science allows for illegitimate and oppressive ideologies; science is the only way to reason out of them**

**Nanda 98**

(Meera, writer historian and philosopher of science with a Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “Reclaiming Modern Science for Third World Progressive Social Movements” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol.33, No. 16, Apr. 18-24, 1998, JSTOR, 6/24/11, ZB)

I am all for challenging technocracy and scientism and surprising though it may sound, even for defending traditional ways of relating to the world against scientific rationality. But I don't see why we have to reject science in order to do that? The constructivists have assumed that because of its western origins, technocracy and hubris is 'inherent' in the very conceptual categories of modern science, and that an indigenous science will reflect the traditional and putatively kinder, gentler ways of relating to each other and nature and thus will not be as arrogant as western science. The problem with this reasoning is that it leaves no grounds for resisting illegitimate and oppressive demands of the indigenous culture. Take a concrete example: The postcolonials have successfully opposed construction of big dams in the name of people who would be evicted - they have, that is spoken up for the situated lives and cultures of living communities against the demands of progress. But what happens when a politician uses precisely the logic of traditions and local knowledge to evict a people from a slum in order to build something that has a religious meaning. If they are consistent in giving priority to local knowledge, the postcolonials cannot oppose that move. Or take another example: postcolonials have insisted that traditional cultural symbols and religious t-- s be seen as legitimate sources of indigenous knowledges. What happens when the religious right uses the exact same reasoning to reinterpret cultural symbols to fuel sectarian violence, as has been happening in India? What if women, in the name of the their traditional roles as powerful mothers celebrated by ecofeminists, turn on the other community in order to protect and nurture their own, as happened recently in the anti- Muslim riots in Bombay and Ayodhya? I believe that science understood not as capital S science as a dogma but as scientific temper which John Dewey once described as 'an attitude to inquire, to discriminate, to draw conclusions on the basis of independent evidence', is the best antidote not only to scientism and relativism, but also to the tendency of social movements to get caught in their own rhetoric. It is a legitimate task of science critics to critique, on a case by case basis, any social forces and prejudices blocking the full flowering of this spirit of science. It is however, n ot legitimate to elevate prejudice and biases as founding principles of science. That way lies disaster. A disaster that those of us in the third world can least afford.

**When science has evidence showing otherwise preconceived radical and cultural biases are overwhelmed**

**Nanda 98**

(Meera, writer historian and philosopher of science with a Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “Reclaiming Modern Science for Third World Progressive Social Movements” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol.33, No. 16, Apr. 18-24, 1998, JSTOR, 6/24/11, ZB)

But Sokal is only one among a host of critics of the radical claims for social/cultural constructedness of the content of science. Some of the finest analytical philosophers of science in the world (including Larry Laudan, Philip Kitcher, Susan Haack, Richard Boyd), prominent natural scientists, including Nobel laureates (Dudley Herschbach, Barbara McClintock, Abdus Salaam and Steven Weinberg) and well-respected Marxist philosophers (Roy Bhaskar, Christopher Norris, Alex Callinicos) have argued, with great rigor and passion, against the thesis that the criteria of truth are social conventions. These critics have pointed out that the radical social constructivist arguments do not adequately explain the other side of scientific inquiry when inquirers change their preconceived assumptions, including theories they have devoted their entire careers to, in the face of overwhelming evidence which they cannot interpret to keep it consonant with their biases and interests. It is true that individual scientists, or some influential schools themselves, may be influenced by the conscious and unconscious biases and cultural assumptions to accept evidence when it is not warranted, as indeed happened in racist anthropometric studies of skull size and intelligence and in some other episodes in the history of science. But science being a fundamentally social, and increasingly global and cross-cultural activity, there are pressures within the community of science itself to challenge unwarranted knowledge claims. In other words, while these scholars admit of the need for greater vigilance, social responsibility and self-critique among the members of the scientific community, they do not accept the radical claim that social/ cultural biases are built into the very criteria of validity themselves, and that, consequently, the experimental methods and institutional structures of science are in principle incapable of correcting these biases.

# 2NC -- SCIENCE KEY TO POLICY MAKING

**Science provides a clear thought using facts and evidence allowing truths in the world to form that can be applied to the world as means to theorize solutions to problems such as AIDS and global warming**

**Sokal 1996**

(Alan D. professor of mathematics at University College London and professor of physics at New York University B.A. from Harvard and Ph.D. from Princeton. “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies”. 4/15/1996. [http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua\_franca\_v4/lingua\_franca\_v4.html. 6/22/11](http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4.html.%206/22/11). ZB)

**Why did I do it?** While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social T-- raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There isa real world; its properties are notmerely social constructions; facts and evidence domatter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language. Social T-- 's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literarytheory -- carried to its logical -- reme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``t-- ,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an -- remely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

**Science does not involve claims of truth or assertions of fact but rather provides truth and facts by marshalling evidence of logic and that does not exclude other truths that are also logical only the logical and evident truths can provide a basis for change in the world**

**Sokal 1996**

(Alan D. professor of mathematics at University College London and professor of physics at New York University B.A. from Harvard and Ph.D. from Princeton. “Truth or Consequences: A Brief Response to Robbins”. November/December 1996. [http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/sokal\_tikkun.html. 6/22/11](http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/sokal_tikkun.html.%206/22/11). ZB)

This error is repeated throughout Robbins' essay: he systematically confuses truth with claims of truth, fact with assertions of fact, and knowledge with pretensions to knowledge. These elisions underlie much of the sloppy thinking about "social construction" that is prevalent nowadays in the academy, and it's something that progressives ought to resist. Sure, let's show which economic, political and ideological interests are served by our opponents' accounts of "reality"; but first let's demonstrate, by marshalling evidence and logic, why those accounts are objectively false (or in some cases true but incomplete). "Those of us who do cultural politics sometimes act," Robbins candidly admits, "as if ... truth were always and everywhere a weapon of the right." That's an astoundingly self-defeating attitude for an avowed leftist. If truth were on the side of the right, shouldn't we all -- at least the honest ones among us -- become right-wingers? For my own part, I'm a leftist and a feminist because of evidence and logic (combined with elementary ethics), not in spite of it. Ellen Willis (Village Voice, June 25) has eloquently criticized those know-nothing lefties who are impatient with theoretical social analysis. "We need to know a lot," Robbins correctly observes, "and a lot of what we need to know is cultural." But Robbins then misrepresents my assertion that "theorizing about `the social construction of reality' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming," by quoting only the second half of the sentence. My objection is not to cultural analysis per se, but only to a social-constructivist and anti-realist philosophy run amok.

# 2NC -- DECISION RULE – VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM

**No matter how complicated or convoluted philosophical debates may seem, the only way to determine if your framework is progressive is by considering the view from the oppressed—this perspective means that you decision concerning methodology must hinge on the question of whether or not it helps the oppressed**

**Cook 1990**

(Anthony, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida, “Beyond Critical Legal Studies”, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 985, LexisNexis)

In conclusion, I believe CLS too often falls victim to a myopic preoccupation with the limited role of theoretical deconstruction and a too narrowly tailored experiential deconstruction that focuses exclusively on how individuals experience liberalism. Hegemonic ideologies are never maintained by logical consistency alone. Knowledge of how people experience oppression, or knowledge of the full range of conditions under which they remain oppressed, exposes new problems and possibilities. When one begins to contemplate how alternative visions of community might look and be implemented, one must consider carefully the view from the bottom n75 -- not simply what oppressors say, but how the oppressed respond to what they say. Like the examination of the role of religion in Locke's theory, the view from the bottom may offer insights into why individuals accept their subordinate status in society despite the illogic and inconsistency of the dominant ideology. It may also provide the basis and catalyst for transformative social change. As I argue below, this is the case with African-American prophetic religion. The view from the bottom may cause us to revise our strategy of struggle. If we knew that coercion, religion, race, gender, or some other reality shaped consensus and legitimated authority, [\*1012] we would devote more energies to understanding and struggling against those phenomena rather than exclusively channeling our energies into a familiar critique of the inherent inconsistencies of liberal theory. In addition, we might begin to rethink the location of struggle, and to spread our concerns from the sequestered legal academy to religious institutions, community organizations, and the streets.

# 2NC -- CONCLUSIVE COMPARISON

**The critique ignores the practical side of life. We must be able to use logic and rationality in order to solve the basic problems of our society. The criticism would leave us in endless questioning over meaning.**

**Jarvis**, senior lecturer @ University of Australia, **2K**(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism )

To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the sub­versive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new cont-- s, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of the­ory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privi­leges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? How do we go about the activity of living, making decisions, engaging in trade, deciding on social rules or making laws, if objective criteria are not to be employed and reason and logic abandoned? How would we construct research programs, delimit areas of inquiry or define problems to be stud­ied if we abandon rationalist tools of inquiry?

# 2NC -- EPISTEMOLOGY KEY

**Epistemology is key to make a better democratic institutions and is the foundation of all informed decision making**

**Anderson 2006**

(Elizabeth [Department of Philosophy](http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/) [University of Michigan](http://www.umich.edu/)  “The Epistemology of Democracy”, Project Muse, Date Accessed: 6/27/11, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1anderson.html> BTN)

Socially dispersed information can be transmitted in three forms: talk, votes, and **[End Page 8]** market prices. Markets respond primarily to price information; democratic states primarily to talk and votes. So Hayek's work raises the question of what problems we need votes and talk—democratic institutions—to solve. Beyond this question, institutional epistemology calls for an assessment of the epistemic powers of alternative designs for democratic institutions. In this paper, I shall propose an epistemic analysis of democratic institutions designed to advance this aim. My first task shall be to construct a model of democracy that adequately represents its epistemic powers and reveals the epistemic functions of its constitutive institutions (such as periodic elections and a free press). I shall argue that John Dewey's experimentalist account of democracy offers a better model of the epistemology of democracy than alternatives. One of the advantages of Dewey's model is that it allows us to represent dissent, even after a decision has been made, as epistemically productive, not merely a matter of error. Following Dewey's model, I shall offer an account of the multiple epistemic roles of dissent at different points in democratic decision-making. Finally, I will address questions of democratic design through a case study of community forestry groups in South Asia. These groups aim to manage the forest commons, so as to provide sustainable levels of forestry products for community use. I shall show how the exclusion of women from participation in community forestry groups hobbles the epistemic powers of these groups, by excluding the situated knowledge women have of the capacities of local forests. A Deweyan epistemic analysis of democracy thus provides a powerful tool for advancing the reform of democratic institutions. The epistemic needs and powers of any institution should be assessed relative to the problems it needs to solve. Let us therefore begin with a sketch of the characteristics of problems democratic states need to solve. These are problems (a) of public interest, the efficient solution to which requires (b) joint action by citizens, (c) through the law. The last two conditions indicate why the solution cannot be left up to the unregulated voluntary choices of individuals or private associations. The first sets a constraint on what problems may be legitimately assigned to state action. Suppose we asked what it would take to solve the "problem" of religious pluralism. Empowering the majority to establish their preferred religion and forbid all rivals by law would solve this "problem," and is probably the only effective way to solve it. Hence, the last two conditions for expecting the state to solve the problem are satisfied. However, for whom is this a problem? Christian evangelists consider the fact that millions of people are not Christian to be a problem for them. But it is not a problem of *public* interest. Citizens of modern democracies have declined to authorize the state to dictate to individuals what their religion should be, and thereby declared religious problems to be of private interest. Since democratic states should not be in the business of solving such problems, their epistemic needs are therefore reduced: they have no need for theological expertise.

# 2NC AT SCIENCE EXCLUDES ALTERNATIVE WORLDVIEWS

**Science and alternative epistemologies are not exclusive. BUT science must still be prioritized in cont-- s where it is necessary and appropriate AND science is key to translate across epistemologies—this means that the scientific framework accounts for and supercedes their offense (the subaltern knowledges arguments)**

**Hodson 1998**

(Derek, Professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, “Science Fiction: the continuing misrepresentation of science in the school curriculum”, Curriculum Studies Vol 6 No 2, http://web.missouri.edu/~hanuscind/8710/Hodson1998.pdf)

It is these suggestions that so enraged Good & Demastes (1995) and led them to accuse advocates of this approach of relativism and of “not taking science seriously”. There are two responses. First, different ways of knowing yield different answers to the same question and, more often, ask different questions. In Pomeroy’s (1996) words, “they are not equal; they are different, and their value is that they provide alternative ways of understanding phenomena. One does not use a hammer to fasten a bolt; the appropriateness of the tool lies in the use to which it is put; equality has nothing to do with it.” Secondly, asking questions about what is distinctive about science and scientific understanding is an essential part of the epistemological understanding necessary for moving freely across borders between sub-cultures. To say that scientific knowledge arises in a particular culture (the Western scientific community) is not to discredit it or to say that it has no currency at all outside that social cont-- , or that it may not (on occasions) be close to a true account of the world. Exposing students from non-Western cultures to the ideas of science or to any other ideas that are from cultures other than their own, providing it is done sensitively, is not to do them a disservice. Quite the contrary; it is a key aspect of their education! Nor is there anything morally repugnant in asserting that traditional knowledge and everyday understanding often fails to stand up to rigorous scientific scrutiny. As Siegel (1997) points out, Western science is ‘biased’ in the sense that it makes epistemological presuppositions that are cultural artefacts, and are not shared by some non-Western cultures, but the bias is only a pernicious one when science is presented as absolute truth or as the only way of knowing. Consideration of traditional knowledge within the science curriculum is not a threat to science, nor is the presentation of scientific knowledge necessarily a threat to traditional knowledge. Within an individual’s personal framework of understanding they can co-exist and can be separately accessed as and when appropriate. The key is a careful consideration of issues located in the history, philosophy and sociology of science.

**Science is not exclusive, racist, or oppressive; rather it provides the best way to produce knowledge in that specific instance**

**Pedynowski 03**

(Dena, Institute for International Studies Center for Environmental Science and Policy Stanford University, ”Progress in Human Geography”, sagepublications, <http://phg.sagepub.com/content/27/6/735>, 747-748, 6/23/11, ZB)

In some situations, this approach is intuitive. For instance, when seeking perspectives on vegetation changes on a landscape, I might consult religious revelation, local experiences and plant sciences. Given the differing beliefs and methods of knowledge production for these perspectives, I would likely choose the botanists' and long-time residents' knowledges as a more valid basis for public environmental policy than the cult leaders' knowledge. However, if I was enquiring about possible doomsday scenarios, I would defer to the cult leaders' expertise instead. Judgment of appropriate knowledges in a given situation is not necessarily exclusivist, racist, colonialist or sexist. There are goals for the uses of information - those purposes should be made transparent and explicit - and the knowledge(s) chosen should reflect the purpose of their application. After all, with respect to the process of bringing all types of human knowledges to an equal level, 'a level playing field is one thing; but a playing field without rules or referees is a free-for-all where bullies win' (Soule, 1995: 150).

**You evidence is specific to a stereotyped westernized version of science. More often than science fiction, it is other side of science itself, which is known to criticize and provide alternate paradigms for how we view the universe.**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

Space and time are dimensions that give perspective on our place in the order of the universe, our origins and ends. These themes have always fascinated the human imagination, they are present in the narrative tradition of all cultures and traditions of thought. They are the basis of religious teaching, the building blocks of epistemology and philosophy as well as science. The early myths and epic sagas of many narrative traditions relate stories about shifting, transcending or disrupting space and time. In mythic tradition such stories provide lessons in the proper order and meaning of space, time and the powers and forces of the universe. Myths and sagas popularise and disseminate epistemology as well as sophisticated contemporary knowledge about the world, they hone this material to their major purpose: providing basic moral and ethical precepts. Epistemology, philosophy and science begin, in all civilisations, with the same cultural perspective on the bounded sets of relationships between space and time as that found in the narrative tradition of myths and epic sagas. Just as there are many narrative traditions, there are many distinct traditions of science apart from the dominant Western tradition: Islamic science, Indian science, Chinese science, for example.1These sciences do not survive only in ancient treatises in archives and museums. Increasingly, they are revitalised in current academic thought, they are repositories for critiques of Western science, they are making a comeback as ingredients of other civilisational perspectives.2 2 Aliens R Us

# 2NC AT SCIENCE = NO VALUE TO LIFE

**Science’s search for life in the universe increases our value to life**

**Caiazza 10**

(John, Senior Lecturer Ph.D. Department of Philosophy at Rivier College, “THE COSMOLOGICAL VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE”, InSight: RIVIER ACADEMIC JOURNAL, VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1, SPRING 2010, 6/25/11, ZB)

There is also an ideological aspect to the search for life on other planets that involves the issue of the value of human life, which is the subject of this paper. There is an underlying idea that if there is life on other planets - in fact if there is life on a lot of other planets \_ that life is not so special a thing in the universe. Furthermore, it has been argued that given the -- reme likelihood that there is life on a nearly infinite multitude of planets, then it is very probable that on some of these planets which support life, intelligent life has evolved (this view was expressed in a formulaii). Thus it can be concluded that even intelligent life is not so special a phenomenon since it probably occurs throughout the universe, and in this way, the value of human life in a cosmological cont-- is diminished. The view that human life is not special and that assertions of its importance are merely examples of humanity’s self regard, has been held by some of the best known proponents of what may be called modern scientific ideology including Bertrand Russell, Steven Jay Gould and many others.iii The scenario of a universe filled with life and producing intelligent life as the result of automatic, evolutionary processes has until recently dominated scientific thinking about -- ra-terrestrial life. What is beginning to change the thinking about the occurrence of life in outer space is that despite constant searching for it, no actual sign of life on other planets has been discovered thus far. To the degree that life is rare in the universe, its significance and value becomes that much more apparent. So when we send up Mars rovers and await the slow transmissions of data, we are not only looking to see if there is life on the “Red Planet”, we are looking to find an indication of mankind’s place in the universe.

**Science’s observations on details about human life on Earth make apparent life’s true value**

**Caiazza 10**

(John, Senior Lecturer Ph.D. Department of Philosophy at Rivier College, “THE COSMOLOGICAL VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE”, InSight: RIVIER ACADEMIC JOURNAL, VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1, SPRING 2010, 6/25/11, ZB)

The new cosmology has not only uncovered the fact that universe is dynamic and has a life cycle, it has also made discoveries about the nature of matter on the atomic, molecular and sub-atomic levels that reveal the fine details of physical reality that make life possible, and human life in particular. A host of physical facts and constants have to be precisely what they are in order for life to exist and such facts can be discovered at all levels of physical reality. On the atomic level, the peculiar inner structure of the carbon atom enables it to form chains with six atoms linked together. From each of the six carbon atoms, a string of other atoms and molecules can -- end allowing the existence of the complex organic compounds which are the basis of life. On the astronomical level, the position of the earth is not too close to the Sun like Venus or too far away like Jupiter and so is in just the right orbit for life to evolve and exist, a condition called by astronomers, “the Goldilocks effect.” On the middle level, water, praised by St. Francis as “very useful, humble, precious and pure” has unique qualities among chemical compounds which are necessary for the existence of life. Due to its peculiar chemical structure, for example, water in its solid state, as ice, is lighter than its liquid state. This means that lakes and rivers do not freeze from the bottom up but from the top down, enabling aquatic plants, fish and other life forms to survive over the winter. As science has proceeded to uncover the complexity of the physical universe in ever more detail, the conditions necessary for life have added up until the probability that life arrived in the universe and on the earth *by accident* is no longer plausible.ix Consideration of these new discoveries provides a high tech version of the classical argument from design, now refined by the addition of new forms of scientific evidence.x Added to these newly acquired facts is a new appreciation of what has always been true about scientific discovery – namely, that it is human beings with their wills and intellects who are making the controlled observations and devising the abstract theories that are the basis of scientific inquiry. The fact that humans beings have evolved as part of the universe and may be discerned to be an intended part of it, and whose existence is necessarily involved with the detection of scientific truth is encapsulated in a new principle, the *anthropic* principle. The anthropic principle asserts that the universe cannot be understood without including the fact of human existence \_ that is, to use Teilhard de Chardin’s terminology, science has to take into account “the phenomenon of man.” Much has been written about this principle and whether it has a place in physics, but it has several variations, from “strong” anthropic principles to “weak” versions. The strong version asserts generally that the universe evolved for the purpose of producing human intelligence, and that it would not exist if it were not for the presence of human intelligence.xi

# MONUMENTS BAD

**If the monument does not move the viewer it will seal their memory of awareness completely**

**Palm 08**

(Jessica, Ohio State University advised by Professor Aron Vinegar Department of History of Art, “Christo + Jeanne-Claude: Violence, Obsession, and the Monument”, <https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/32214/FINAL2.pdf?sequence=1>, 6/25/11, ZB)

Memory, and subsequently the trauma of memory, are inseparable elements from the monument. The monument must be traumatic in some way in order to be effective. It must work to upset, unsettle, or disturb the regular patterns of memory so as not to be forgotten. Choay states that the monument shakes the individual’s memory.17 Such language alludes to a physical aspect of the mental interaction between the monument as a signifier and the viewer identifying the meaning of its message. The monument is meant to move the viewer; it is mentally jarring amidst the everyday landscape in which it exists. Yet many monuments serve to contain and cauterize their traumatic roots. Scholars such as James E. Young argue that the traditional monument enclose and sanitize the trauma of monuments. Young’s account of memory asserts an imperative notion of traumatic memory in relation to the monument explaining the rejection of traditional memorials which: Either console viewers or redeem such tragic events, or indulge in a facile kind of Wiedergutmachung or purport to mend the memory of a murdered people. […] Instead of searing memory into public consciousness, [… some monuments] seal memory off from awareness altogether.18 These aspects of the architectural monuments Christo and Jeanne-Claude wrap complicate and add depth to the connotations of their work. Their projects transform the monument and force the public to reconsider the familiarity of this architectural and monumental object. If the monument in question has been serving to “console viewers” and allow memory to be sealed off, the Christos’ project can work to renew consciousness and memory. On the other hand, if the monument still signifies a particularly traumatic memory their wrapping could exacerbate this sentiment as the wrapping is a sort of defacement. Further, their project could also serve to calm and soothe a traumatic monument by disguising it temporarily – as I believe it does in the case of the Reichstag. These are simply three suppositions to exemplify how Young’s statement illustrates the multi-dimensional effects of the Christos’ projects.

**Monuments don’t always the same message across to everyone**

**Alderman 10**

(Derek H., Department of geography at East Carolina University, “Journal of Historical Geography”, Author’s Personal Copy, Journal of Historical Geography 36 (2010) 90–101,<http://myweb.ecu.edu/aldermand/pubs/alderman_JHG_savannah_2010.pdf>, 6/27/11,ZB)

Memorials and monuments retell the past through a variety of visual media, including directly through their words, sentences, and other t-- ual references. These commemorative narratives, although having the appearance of being objective and value-free, are deeply implicated in the social construction and contestation of history. Deborah Schriffin has found that struggles over the use of language in public commemoration are ‘part of the social, cultural, and political struggle over rights to ‘tell a story’.34 Similarly, Tyler-McGraw asserted that the power to contribute to public discourse about the past is at ‘the heart of claims to public space’. Further, she suggested: ‘Public monuments and displays are a form of civic education, and control of their sites, forms, and inscriptions is control of the meaning of local history’ (emphasis added).35 Yet, this control over history is never complete and commemorative inscriptions are open to any number of readings or interpretations depending on what these t-- s symbolize to people ideologically. For African Americans, the writing and reading of historical accounts of slavery through monuments is a power-laden and potentially contested process of claiming the right to acknowledge (or to ignore) the memory of slavery and the right to choose what surrogate images and stories satisfactorily stand in for the histories and identities of the enslaved.

# ALIENS BAD

**No solvency. Aliens would not help society, but rather, society would be the same because of 21st century technology.**

**Derbyshire 2011**

(David, a journalist for the Daily Mail, “ET! YOU DON'T SCARE US”, DAILY MAIL (London), Lexis Nexis, Date Accessed: 6/24/11, BTN)

THE sight of flying saucers over Britain, so science fiction would have us believe, would see panicking mobs in the streets. But it seems we may be far more worldly than writers, or over-protective governments, have ever given us credit for. Psychologist Dr Albert Harrison argues that people have become so used to the idea of alien life that they would be 'unfazed' if the proof appeared before their eyes. He said things have changed dramatically since 1961, when the U.S. Congress was warned evidence of -- ra-terrestrials would lead to widespread panic. In North America and Europe at least, neither the discovery of an alien nor the detection of alien radio signals were now likely to lead to 'widespread psychological disintegration and collapse', he concluded. Advances in our technology have brought civilisation to a point where the idea of other beings travelling through space to Earth no longer seems far-fetched or frightening,' Dr Harrison argues in a special edition of the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society devoted to aliens. People had been getting used to the idea of -- ra-terrestrials since the Seti (Search for -- ra-Terrestrial Intelligence) project first began listening out for alien radio signals 50 years ago, he said. Today, surveys suggest that half of the U.S. and Europe believe in aliens, while a 'substantial proportion' are convinced alien spacecraft had already visited the Earth. A second paper in the same journal argued that the discovery of intelligent alien life was unlikely to threaten the world's faiths. Ted Peters, theologian at the Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary in Berkeley, California, surveyed 1,300 people of different faiths around the world. He wrote: 'It became clear that the vast majority of religious believers, regardless of religion, see no threat to their personal beliefs caused by potential contact with intelligent neighbours on other worlds.' He also argues that worshippers would be able to accept that heaven would welcome aliens too. However, elsewhere in the journal, evolution expert Professor Simon Conway Morris, from Cambridge University, said the chances of intelligent alien life were low. If evolution were the same throughout the universe it would be unthinkable that advanced space travellers in older parts of the universe should not have reached the Earth by now, he said. Prof Conway Morris added: 'That did not happen, and it will not happen. We never had any visitors, nor is it worth setting up a reception committee in the hope that one day they might turn up. 'They are not there, and we are alone.'

**Contact with -- extra-terrestrials could lead to disaster**

**Vaas 10**

(Ruediger Vaas, German Science Journalist, Editor of Image of Science Magazine, May 2010, Fear of Fanatics: Why Stephen Hawking is Right, And We Should Not Contact Intelligent -- raterrestrials, June 24, 2011, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Aliens114.html> KG)

Stephen Hawking has repeatedly warned against transmitting messages into the sky with a view to contacting -- raterrestrial civilizations (Hawking 2002, p. 65; Hawking 2010). And he once presumed that the first contact, if it had happened, would have been recognized easily because of its similarity not with the movie E.T. but with *Independence Day* (Hawking 2001, p. 179). Though not a specialist in these issues, Hawking is an eminent cosmologist and one of the most famous scientists of the 21st century (Vaas 2005a, 2008a), thus his influential opinion makes a difference. It is praiseworthy that he brought up again a worry about a possible contact with -- raterrestrials (ETs), though his opinion should not be confused with – and was not meant as – a scientific statement. Such a contact, although eagerly awaited by some, could turn out to be a disaster in human history. "We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn't want to meet," Hawking (2010) said. "If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn't turn out very well for the American Indians."

**Aliens want our souls!**

**Vaas 10**

(Ruediger Vaas, German Science Journalist, Editor of Image of Science Magazine, May 2010, Fear of Fanatics: Why Stephen Hawking is Right, And We Should Not Contact Intelligent -- raterrestrials, June 24, 2011, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Aliens114.html> KG)

It is important to keep in mind that an active attempt to contact ETs, CETI (Communication with -- raterrestrial Intelligence) instead of SETI (Search for -- raterrestrial Intelligence), is not the same as the passive and involuntary signs of Earth's biological activities: First the signals would (have to) be much stronger, and second they indicate our willingness to meet the aliens. This makes a difference, because exactly this can motivate some ETs to visit us – if they are eager to exploit not our resources but our minds: The most severe danger is not that ETs want our planet or our bodies – but that they want our souls. Though it is unlikely that souls exist as entities ontologically distinct from bodies, for instance as ghostly Cartesian egos (Vaas 1999a & 2002b), it remains likely that there are intelligent beings who believe in the existence of such entities, just as many of our fellow humans still do. On Earth quasi-schizoid attitude systems such as hightech engineering abilities going hand-in-hand with old-fashioned belief in creationism are relatively common too, even in technologically advanced civilizations like the United States of America. Thus it is a real possibility that alien astronauts would like to visit us for reasons of interstellar proselytization; and no belief in Cartesian dualism is necessary for this, of course – the ETs might hold convictions we can hardly imagine. This sounds like science fiction, but there is already some scientific evidence right here on Earth, i.e. some examples and arguments from evolutionary psychology and sociology.

**We should avoid any kind of ET contact, it could be devastating for humanity**

Leake 10

(Jonathon Leake, Reporter for the Sunday Times, April 25, 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article7107207.ece> KG)

THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out, at least according to Stephen Hawking. He has suggested that -- raterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact. The suggestions come in a new documentary series in which Hawking, one of the world’s leading scientists, will set out his latest thinking on some of the universe’s greatest mysteries. Alien life, he will suggest, is almost certain to exist in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space. Hawking’s logic on aliens is, for him, unusually simple. The universe, he points out, has 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of millions of stars. In such a big place, Earth is unlikely to be the only planet where life has evolved. “To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said. “The real challenge is to work out what aliens might actually be like.” The answer, he suggests, is that most of it will be the equivalent of microbes or simple animals — the sort of life that has dominated Earth for most of its history. One scene in his documentary for the Discovery Channel shows herds of two-legged herbivores browsing on an alien cliff-face where they are picked off by flying, yellow lizard-like predators. Another shows glowing fluorescent aquatic animals forming vast shoals in the oceans thought to underlie the thick ice coating Europa, one of the moons of Jupiter. Such scenes are speculative, but Hawking uses them to lead on to a serious point: that a few life forms could be intelligent and pose a threat. Hawking believes that contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity. He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.” He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky”. He said: “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.”

# SCI FI BAD

**Science fiction inherently translates the alien into the other, and therefore justifies anihilation and dehumanization. This turns their case and perpetuates all of the harms of the 1AC**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

In science fiction, the ‘other’ as ‘alien’ is deployed to concretise the deeply divisive dichotomies of race and gender embedded in the repressive structures and relations of dominance and subordination. Modernity remains intact, the moral guardian of the future, whilst the ‘other’ emerges demonised and thus can be justifiably annihilated. ‘The centre,’ as John Rutherford has argued, ‘invests the “other” with its terrors. It is the threat of dissolution of self that ignites the irrational hatred and hostility as the centre struggles to assert its boundaries, that constructs self from not self.’2Of all the categories of cinema, ‘alien invader’ films are the most prolific and conservative for, as Susan Hayward notes, ‘They point at otherness as threatening to life and/or social mores’ and ‘represent the most “worrying” category of all with their innate potential for misogyny, racism and nationalistic chauvinism’.3

**Science Fiction discursively traps us in an endless cycle, where the current problems of the west are forever immortalized.**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

Science fiction explores space – ‘in a galaxy far, far away’, The Outer Limits, Space: Above and Beyond. It projects us into imagined futures – ‘Beam me up, Scottie.’ Yet as a genre the space that science fiction most intimately explores is interior and human; to tell future stories it recycles the structure and tropes of ancient narrative tradition and to devise dramatic tension it deploys issues and angst that are immediately present. The fiction in science fiction is the fiction of space, outer space, and time, future time. Far from being the essential object of its concern the devices of space and time are window dressing, landscape and backdrop. The ‘science’ offered by science fiction is populist dissection of the psyche of Western civilisation, its history, preoccupations and project of future domination – past, present and future. Science fiction is a time machine that goes nowhere, for wherever its goes it materialises the same conjunctions of the space-time continuum: the conundrums of Western civilisation. Science fiction shows us not the plasticity but the paucity of the human imagination that has become quagmired in the scientist industrial technological, culturo-socio-psycho babble of a single civilisational paradigm. Science fiction is the fiction of mortgaged futures. As a genre it makes it harder to imagine other futures, futures not beholden to the complexes, neuroses and reflexes of Western civilisation as we know it. ‘Houston, we have a problem.’

**Impact Turn-The very essence of science fiction is purely western thought. This turns their case because SCI-FI instigates the same narrow vision of the future which it claims to solve.**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

So the basic ingredients out of which science fiction has been fashioned exist everywhere, in different civilisations and cultures, in the past and the present. Yet science fiction, the genre as we know it, does not. Science fiction is a very particular possession of just one tradition – Western civilisation. It does not exist in India, China (leaving out the special case of Hong Kong), Indonesia or Egypt – countries with flourishing and -- ensive film industries.3Moreover, only one kind of science provides the backdrop for science fiction, while its creators, contributors and in large part its audience are drawn from the West. This particularity is not accidental. An examination of the structure, themes and dramatic devices of science fiction provides an explanation for this particular and necessary relationship. What distinguishes science fiction is a particular view of science; a scientistic view of humanity and culture; the recycling of distinctive narrative tropes and conventions of storytelling. In each case science fiction employs the particular constellations of Western thought and history and projects these Western perspectives on a pan-galactic scale. Science fiction re-inscribes Earth history, as experienced and understood by the West, across space and time.

**Science fiction links to the K, by creating the very doomsday discourse it tries to prevent.**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

Science fiction has deep roots in the narrative tradition of Western Civilisation, but its most immediate impetus is horror, fear, disquiet and disaffection at the power of the human intellect. It begins with Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, who is not the monster (though that is, interestingly, the predominant popular misconception) but the scientist creator of the name less monster, Dr Frankenstein; and up the narrative thread where alchemists, magi, witches and wizards left off. Science fiction begins by viewing science as dabbling with dark arts and all their dangers. It begins as a nightmare Gothic horror story. Mary Shelley said she conceived the story in a nightmare, it was written as her contribution to a collective challenge Is used to the guests at a weekend party to produce ghost stories. Science fiction in all its guises has never shed the essential characteristic of an air of menace. In some senses the essence of the science and the futures such fiction imagines is pervasive, potential doom. Science fiction, from the out set, has been the narrative of dooms day scenarios.

**To maintain its status as a mainstream literary genre, Sience fiction must constantly Otherize the alien, therefore claiming no solvency.**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02,** Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

Alien presence is basic to science fiction. Yet, when science fiction makes the great leap of imagination and concludes we are not alone its speculation is mostly grounded in the present and past of Western civilisation. Outer space, distant galaxies, the whole universe is populated by fictional creatures intimately familiar from the narrative conventions of Western civilisation, springing almost unchanged from the pages of travel literature of the history of Western expansion on planet Earth. Alien presence is basic in another sense. It is the brooding menace of another kind of Gothic horror story. Alien creatures serve the purpose of ghosts, ghouls and things that go bump in the night – they are the dark antithesis that illuminates the patches of light within the structure of stories, throwing into relief what it is to be human. Aliens demonstrate what is not human the better to exemplify that which is human. Difference and otherness are the essence of aliens, for only then can they stiffen the sense of self and self-defence that completes the chain of science fiction as normative genre. Coming full circle, aliens are often devils incarnate, ready and willing to offer the Faustian bargain. Across space and time science fiction materialises the constellations of ideas and narrative tradition that personify and are distinctive of Western civilisation. Without aliens space and time, that is outer and future, would indeed be novel, unlike anything that had gone before. The possibilities of ethical questioning and morality plays would be limited, lacking the dynamics in which such questions present and have presented themselves within the history and experience of Western civilisation.

6 Aliens R Us

**Science fiction inherently translates the alien into the other, and therefore justifies anialation and dehumanization. This turns their case and perpetuates all of the harms of the 1AC**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

In science fiction, the ‘other’ as ‘alien’ is deployed to concretise the deeply divisive dichotomies of race and gender embedded in the repressive structures and relations of dominance and subordination. Modernity remains intact, the moral guardian of the future, whilst the ‘other’ emerges demonised and thus can be justifiably annihilated. ‘The centre,’ as John Rutherford has argued, ‘invests the “other” with its terrors. It is the threat of dissolution of self that ignites the irrational hatred and hostility as the centre struggles to assert its boundaries, that constructs self from not self.’2Of all the categories of cinema, ‘alien invader’ films are the most prolific and conservative for, as Susan Hayward notes, ‘They point at otherness as threatening to life and/or social mores’ and ‘represent the most “worrying” category of all with their innate potential for misogyny, racism and nationalistic chauvinism’.3 This is an apt summary of Independence Day. The film unashamedly elevates American ideology as the last bastion of universal independence, so that in one swift move America becomes both ‘globo cop’ and ‘interstellar guardian’. This reification of American hegemony as the ‘end of history’4is arguably just about tolerable as a piece of Hollywood fiction but American foreign policy and her military presence in the Gulf is metaphorically and symbolically vindicated via the narrative of the film. Put another way Independence Day becomes a libratory tract emphasising the ‘moral’ right to obliterate ‘difference’ – to annihilate all that is not Western.

**Science fiction has been coopted by NASA and corporations to further their scientific projects and glorify technological progress**

**Thacker 2001**

(Eugene, Professor of Technology and Culture at Rutgers University, “The Science Fiction of Technoscience”, Leonardo 34.2, Project Muse,

<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/leonardo/v034/34.2thacker01.html>)

As third-order simulacra, science fiction is not necessarily different from the technologies and the sciences it narrativizes, and in fact it creates the conditions for their possibility. In fact, science fiction is necessary in order for biotech and biomedicine to continue constructing their narratives of technological advancement and the increasing sophistication of a biotechnology of the population. In other words, the functions and attributes of genre science fiction (which still exist in genre science fiction, but which can now only belatedly keep up with developments in science and technology) have been incorporated by the technosciences. As a powerful political tool, science fiction enables the biotech industry to create a narrative of a bioinformatically based, disease-free, corporate-managed future. In doing so, it is also creating a history, a self-fulfilling narrative of progress. What is unique about the manifestation of science fiction at the opening of the biotech century is that science fiction is no longer the proper domain of culture (that is, of culture's critically commenting upon the intersection of society, science and technology). Instead, science fiction has come to be self-consciously embodied as part and parcel of the domains of biotech and biomedicine. To take two examples: researchers at the NASA Ames Center for Virtual Surgery explicitly utilize the rhetoric of science fiction in a language infused with the giddiness of new technologies. They clearly envision a future of telemedicine that would be at home in the Cyberpunk worlds of Gibson, Sterling or Cadigan .13 Their experiment in the spring of 1999 of a three-way, fully simulated, telesurgical collaboration is a concrete manifestation of what the discourse of science fiction can make possible.

# WELCOME THE OTHER BAD

**By accepting the other as the other, we allow them to fully embrace their identity as a unique individual. When the 1ac tries to incorporate the other into themselves, they perpetuate all their harms.**

**Muhr 2000,** Sara Louis, Ph.D. from Copenhagen Business School, has since 2008 been lecturer at Lund University, *Moral Distance – when Ethics Disappears,* Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulnerability of Diversity Management, 6/26/11, EG

In line with the conformity argument, Levinas stresses that there is a strong human tendency toward an egocentric attitude and to think of other individuals either as different versions of oneself, or as alien objects to be manipulated or illuminated (Wild, 1969). Thus, otherness or alterity is often perceived as a temporary interruption that one must attempt to eliminate by incorporating it into the self. In fact, this urge for conformity is an attempt to reduce the Other to the Same. After all, neither of these egocentric views—of manipulation and illumination—do justice to our original experience of the other person as Other. “The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I’” (Levinas, 1969: 39). The Other for Levinas, can therefore not be contained in a ‘we’ or a ‘they’ for that matter; the Other is never a mere object to be included in one of my categories. Instead, if I focus on the Other’s otherness, I may find him be essentially different from me. Due to the alterity and strangeness of the Other, the relationship with the Other is, therefore, never an “idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion” (Levinas, 1987b: 75). If that were the case, it would mean that the Other was reduced to the same, a situation similar to groupthink. The relationship with the Other is instead always of an ethical nature, as our relationship is shaped by whether I ‘let the Other be Other’ or whether I try to reduce other people to the same by stereotyping them. Nemeth et al. (2001) stressed the importance of the minority’s ability to feel free to deviate from expectations. Drawing on Levinas, Jones et al. (2005: 75) turns it into an ethical issue by asking, “how can I treat a person ethically if I do not acknowledge his difference of being an Other?” This acknowledgement of the Other, and the fact of letting the Other be Other, is a central part of the ethics of Levinas.

# SPECIFIC DISTRICT 9 CASE DEFENSE

**District 9 fails to posit a reasonable alternative to human divisiveness**

**Jones 2010**

(Matthew, University of Manchester, “District 9: Review”, Film & History 40.1, Project Muse, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/film\_and\_history/v040/40.1.jones.html)

These are, however, too lofty ambitions for a film with such populist tendencies. Ultimately the tightrope walk between respectability and commerciality proves too difficult for District 9. As the film moves into its final act, and slowly but surely the guns and robots emerge from the shadows for one final battle, it is pervaded by a creeping sense of disappointment; all those glittering fragments of ideas that flashed before our eyes, all those promises of a truly complicated blockbuster, are killed off just as violently as the cannon fodder within the diegesis. Just as the more traditional camera work that creeps into the film forces out the sense of veracity and significance produced by its early reliance on supposedly found footage and news reports, so too do the trappings of the Hollywood science fiction film evacuate the historicity and allegory that the films utilised early on. District 9 is, in the final analysis, a film that promises to challenge not just our prejudices, both past and present, but also the very medium in which this challenge is delivered. Unfortunately it falls disappointingly short of these laudable goals with the result that it ends its runtime hiding behind the clichés that it at first sought to destroy.

**District 9’s science fiction framework separates the reader from the real time-space of South Africa, rendering its critique totally politically impotent**

**Rinelli 2009**

(Lorenzo, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, “-- raterrestrial Xenophobia”, http://www.jgcinema.com/single.php?sl=district-9-postcolonial-racism-south-africa-science-fiction-rinelli)

Technically the director employs three distinctive esthetics of narrative: faux documentary, omniscient narrative description and first person shooter (videogame-style). While it may indicate cinematic aptitude, the director’s approach evacuates the critical potentiality of this movie. In fact the creative treatment of actuality at the beginning of the movie carries a determinable link with the geographical and historical world of South Africa whose implications exist or have existed independently of the camera. This is the same world that the viewer moves around in and therefore interacts with. Instead, although at different levels, the other two modes of narration delineate a fiction that suspends time and actuality to enter the temporality of the narrative to which the scenes belong, consequently taking away the participation of the viewer from the time/space peculiarities of post-apartheid South Africa. As a matter of fact, while Blomkamp seems to be aware of the implications of his imaginative story, he refuses to deal with them. He states: ‘The thing of District 9 is that I’m not trying to be overly metaphorical or have any preachy lessons or any political standpoint other than I grew up in that environment, and I love science fiction, and I’m merging the two (1). At the end of the story this is JoBurg of District 9, whose violent traits have been amazingly portrayed before in, among others, the award winning Tsotsi (2006). Both movies spectacularize a dark vision of post-apartheid South Africa that definitely will heave the anticipation of the very exclusive audience that n-- summer will rush to the first Soccer World Cup in South Africa. Both movies make little effort to highlight how resentment is the outcome and production of a city with the world’s highest ratio of urban inequality. Ultimately Johannesburg, characterized by an endemic violence and intolerance, seems to be merely the perfect setting for a collision of races. On the other hand, the creative plot’s turn that delineates the aliens-humans encounter provides just a tool for playing with cutting-edge graphic technology: almost a distraction from the film’s core message of how to rethink the relation between two realities, each one on the other side of the wall. Instead, at the end of the movie we are left with a sense of vacuum and the certainty that hospitality is meant to be a temporary condition, bound only for replanetation.

**Even if District 9 on the surface seems to offer a compelling social criticism, its retrenchment to the norms of Hollywood narrative ultimately renders it pessimistic and incapable of promoting an overcoming of hostile difference and divisiveness**

**Zborowski 2010**

(James, PhD Film Studies-University of Warwick, “District 9 and its world”, Jump Cut No. 52, Summer, <http://www.ejumpcut.org/currentissue/zoborowskiDst9/3.html>

District 9 is an arresting thought experiment: what would happen if aliens arrived on earth? The scenario it envisages is a pessimistic yet thrilling critique of human xenophobia and the repressive and exploitative tendencies of states and corporations. The aliens would be viewed with fear and suspicion, subjugated, and if not set to work then exploited for whatever other potential for profit and power they possessed.

However, moving beyond the movie’s evocative iconography and penetrating dramatizations of encounters between the powerful and the powerless, its alternative world possesses less resonance and depth than its teeming surface might suggest. The alien population is represented as a perfect set of the attributes that colonialism and xenophobia alike assign to “natives” and immigrants respectively, thus blocking from the outset any prospect of progress or integration, and contradicting the movie’s more liberal impulses. Christopher Johnson’s exceptionality remains largely unexplained, and he is cut off from the rest of the alien population. The character of Wikus is left little room to breathe because of the conflicting roles he must fulfil: figure of fun, allegorical pawn, central identification figure. Like the aliens, Wikus is not granted a social existence that we can believe in or value. This makes the home that he wants to return to nothing more than a stock concept, and limits the movie’s ability to effectively dramatize a theme that, given its genre and action, is crucial to it — that of identity. The movie’s treatment of its “evil corporation,” MNU, usefully summarizes for us the pattern of District 9 as a whole. It begins by promising nuanced contemporary socio-political analysis, sketching a complex network of competing supraindividual actors, but then, in the service of a chase narrative, the film narrows it focus and coarsens its representations. As the classical Hollywood cinema at its best endlessly demonstrates, narratives focused on individuals can dramatize “impersonal social forces”[14] and offer far-reaching critiques of institutions and modes of social organization. However, I cannot see the evidence to argue that such a critique is fully sustained or developed beyond District 9’s introductory scenes.

# FETISHISM KRITIK

**(A) Scapegoating -- No matter how liberatory District 9’s attack on racial segregation may seem, the film reduces moments of resistance to a scapegoat that is thoroughly racialized, making the alternative that film offers remain within the paradigm of racialization and otherization simply in reverse**

**Rieder 2011**

(John, Professor of English, Critical Theory, and Science Fiction at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, “Race and revenge frantasies in Avatar,

District 9 and Inglourious Basterds”, Science Fiction Film and Televison, V 4 Iss 1, Spring, Project Muse)

The climaxes of Avatar, District 9 and Inglourious Basterds feature spectacularly violent, racialised revenge fantasies directed against white-male representatives of organised racial injustice. This essay argues that these fantasies draw upon a deep reservoir of popular resentment against the status quo. Yet, while the films express this resentment, they also deflect and redirect it. Comparing the different ways the films manage the spectacle of violence helps map out some of the current ideological and critical horizons of mass cinematic narrative. However, it also points to two overriding similarities: first, the strong degree to which race continues to evoke violence and to demand identification or counter-identification and, second, the films' shared reliance on the fetishistic identification of scapegoat figures. Although the films follow different strategies in order to mystify, disavow or contradict the revenge fantasies, the racialised scapegoat remains a definite centre of gravity. Although a good deal of early response to James Cameron's Avatar (US/UK 2009) and Neill Blomkamp's District 9 (US/New Zealand/Canada/South Africa 2009) was devoted to comparative evaluations based on the way the two films differ (see Steinglass), I want to begin by taking notice of something these two high-budget, mass-circulation films share: the privileged position each gives to a spectacularly violent, racialised revenge fantasy. At the conclusion of the major battle scene in Avatar, the indigenous princess-heroine, Neytiri (Zoë Saldana), uses a wooden spear to skewer the hyper-masculine white male military commander, Colonel Quaritch (Stephen Lang), who epitomises the arrogant, racist aggression of the mining corporation invading her planet. At the end of the -- ended chase sequence in the latter half of District 9, an anonymous gang of alien 'prawns' literally tears limb from limb the hyper-masculine white male South African soldier, Koobus Venter (David James), whom the film has presented as the embodiment of the corporate and political regime of racist brutality directed against them. The parallels are obvious, and even the stark contrast between the strong identification Avatar encourages with Neytiri and the distance District 9 maintains from the gang of prawns only helps to emphasise another commonality: that the fantasy of retribution is relatively indifferent to the emotions of its on-screen agent and is instead constructed primarily from the point of view of the cinematic apparatus itself. We can triangulate the revenge fantasies in Avatar and District 9 with a third 2009 big-budget blockbuster in which the revenge fantasy holds a more prominent, self-conscious [End Page 41] position. In Quentin Tarantino's Inglourious Basterds (US/Germany), the climactic sequence culminates with a cinematic audience of Nazi dignitaries, including Hitler, Goebbels and Goering, having their film interrupted by the gigantic close-up face of a white woman, Shosanna Dreyfus (Mélanie Laurent), who gleefully informs them that she is the Jewess about to burn them all to death, even as the promised flames break out from behind the screen.

**Scapegoating justifies violence and -- ermination**

**Stavrakakis, 99**

(Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Fellow in Psychoanalysis and Political Science at the University of Essex. “Lacan and the Political” p. 100-101)

What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis. 4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by -- ermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110).

(B) Pressure value

**District 9 gathers together all of the anger that we hold against the status quo, including concerns like the environment, the erosion of values, and the failures of the welfare state only to divert all of the angers onto a fictionalized demonized characters in the same way as a pressure value—all of our critical resistive energy is thus diffused**

**Rieder 2011**

(John, Professor of English, Critical Theory, and Science Fiction at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, “Race and revenge frantasies in Avatar, District 9 and Inglourious Basterds”, Science Fiction Film and Televison, V 4 Iss 1, Spring, Project Muse)

What should we make of this pattern? First of all, it is a familiar one. Meting out violent retributive 'justice' to a criminalised or vilified individual or group has been a typical and enduring feature of much mass cinema, as in the shootouts that have brought closure to so many Westerns and crime and police dramas over the decades. One might be tempted to write off filmmakers' pandering to the public's thirst for violent spectacle as merely the debt popular fiction pays to human nature, citing the shootout's continuity with blood sport or classical gladiatorial contests and so on. True, the moral fervour invested in killing the 'evil' antagonists of Westerns or crime dramas distinguishes the killings from mere brute violence, but only tentatively and provisionally, as becomes obvious when the moral lines are blurred in a self-reflexive, meta-fictional piece like Clint Eastwood's Unforgiven (US 1992). Yet the current crop of vengeance killings is not only insistently moralistic, at least in Avatar and District 9 (the case of Inglourious Basterds will require further discussion below), but also is directed not at the standard lawbreakers of Western or police drama, but at white men in positions of power and authority. The vilification of 'psycho soldiers' can be dismissed as Hollywood's latest fad, as Brian D. Johnson has done in Maclean's, or it can be seen as a symptom of political correctness run amok, as John Podhoretz has done in his review of Avatar in The Weekly Standard. I want to argue that the revenge fantasies in these three films ought to be taken more seriously, however. The pattern of violence in these fantasies is not directed just at its immediate objects, the 'psycho soldiers' Colonel Quaritch in Avatar, Koobus Venter in District 9 and Colonel Landa (Christoph Walz) in Inglourious Basterds. It clearly -- ends beyond them to the institutional power structures that command, support and legitimise their actions. Thus the revenge climax alludes to the fundamental social issue of the distribution of the right to violence, in each case seizing it from the 'evil' representatives of the fictional status quo and wielding it against them in the name of justice. If the revenge fantasies allude to or resonate with some strong thirst for political justice, or rather for vengeance-as-political-justice, their significance exceeds the explanatory power of arguments based on the audience's 'natural' hankering after violent spectacle, and the fantasy's political weight and specificity likewise militate against trivialising explanations based on Hollywood fads [End Page 42] or the film industry's shallow liberalism. I want to advance the hypothesis that the repetitive attraction of these moments draws upon a deep reservoir of popular resentment — whether about the environment, or crime, or the crumbling away of traditional values or the rewards and security society has promised its dutiful workers and citizens but has not delivered to them. However, it must immediately be added that, at the same time as these fantastic moments might testify to and even act out a generalised anger contemporary mass audiences share against the status quo, they certainly divert that anger from the powerful groups the mass audience finds itself unable to hold effectively responsible for the world's sorry state of affairs, directing it instead at some fictional, demonised object. It is in the turn that Avatar, District 9 and Inglourious Basterds give to this displacement of the revenge fantasy's object that they become especially interesting. Unlike the more commonplace demonisation of outlaws and criminals, these three films fix upon some of the most notorious examples of organised racial injustice available to them — Nazi anti-Semitism, South African apartheid and, in Avatar, an allegorically simplified version of colonialist resource -- raction.

**(C) We turn colonialism**

**Their colonialism reflection ends up completely containing our sentiments against racism and merely serves to repress our complicity in the colonial heritage**

**Rieder 2011**

(John, Professor of English, Critical Theory, and Science Fiction at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, “Race and revenge frantasies in Avatar, District 9 and Inglourious Basterds”, Science Fiction Film and Televison, V 4 Iss 1, Spring, Project Muse)

If the common ideological ground shared by these three films is the fetishism of the revenge fantasy, their divergence concerns the strategies by which [End Page 46] each of them exploits the fantasy's raw energy while simultaneously containing it in a more complex narrative exploration of the issues of race and violence. Here — you will not be surprised to hear — each of the films stakes out one of the other three quadrants of Žižek's rhetorical compass. Thus, Avatar mystifies race and violence, repressing the heroes' own participation in the same project as the villains in order to afford these heroes all the rewards of colonialism with none of the guilt. This is what Žižek calls the liberal position, the classic self-congratulatory ideology of the beneficiaries of colonial expropriation who once blithely identified their private profit with the advance of civilisation and now find it happily coincides with salvation of planetary ecology. Inglourious Basterds deploys the logic of cynicism because its marvellously accomplished and elaborately self-reflexive filmmaking disavows its investment in the crude racism and graphic violence it nonetheless continues to unabashedly exploit. Finally, in District 9 we can discern Žižek's ideologico-critical strategy on the basis of its unmasking the protagonist's complicity with his ruthless corporate employers, as the plot forces him fully to confront the conditions of the aliens' shantytown and the consequences of the relocation project that he cheerily represses in the early stages of the story. Working out this diagram is only a way to get started on an analysis of the films, of course — a kind of pre-writing exercise, as we would call it in an English Composition class.4 Let me now try to add some detail to this initial mapping-out of the films' rhetoric by laying over it another analysis, this one having to do with a pair of generic sf conventions that the films develop in quite different ways. The first of these conventions is the sf motif, shared by Avatar and District 9, of the hero's transformation into the alien other. This is a venerable sf trope rooted in the genre's always strong proximity to and referencing of colonial history and ideology. In fact, Avatar's and District 9's antithetical renderings of the white male protagonist's achievement of sympathetic identification with the racial other reproduce a pair of polarised possibilities that have been endemic to sf for more than a century.5Avatar and District 9 show that this polarisation, [End Page 47] and so too the ongoing referentiality of sf to colonial history and ideology, continues unabated, if updated and revised, in contemporary sf cinema. Thus one classic point of reference, obviously echoed by District 9, is the rendering of the Martian invasion of London in H. G. Wells's War of the Worlds (1898) as an allegory for English colonialism — in particular, the genocidal impact of English settlement on the indigenous inhabitants of Tasmania. Wells's nightmare plot is a perspectival inversion of the more commonplace exploration fantasy, just as obviously echoed in Avatar, in which a white male explorer 'discovers' a 'lost race' who end up welcoming him as their redeemer and king.

# 2NC FETISHISM KRITIK -- EXTENSIONS

**Just like the hippie criticizing capitalism while wearing designer clothes, District 9’s fantasy of subverting the dominant social order only sustains our comfortable relation to corporations and big government—after experiencing the film narrative, we feel sufficiently cleansed to remain all the while remaining within the oppressive paradigm**

**Rieder 2011**

(John, Professor of English, Critical Theory, and Science Fiction at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, “Race and revenge frantasies in Avatar, District 9 and Inglourious Basterds”, Science Fiction Film and Televison, V 4 Iss 1, Spring, Project Muse)

What mainly distinguishes fetishistic ideologies from symptomatic ones, according to Žižek, is the intransigence of the fetish in the face of traditional demystifying or rationalist critiques. Žižek glosses the fetish in First As Tragedy, Then As Farce as 'the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth' (65). Perhaps the most distinctive quality of these sustaining lies is their incontrovertible functionality: 'fetishists feel satisfied in their fetishes, they experience no need to be rid of them' (68). Žižek calls the ideological strategy that combines fetishism with identification 'fundamentalist' — although in contemporary terms it would certainly refer not only to Christian and Muslim fundamentalisms but also to populist anti-Wall Street and anti-Big Government ideologies. In sharp contrast to the distinction between identification with and distance from symptoms, the distancing of the fetish, rather than undermining its power, simply 'pretends to accept argumentation, but ignores its symbolic efficiency' (68-69). This results in what Žižek calls the 'cynical' stance that practices the same logic of disavowal he earlier ascribed to the 'ideological fantasy', in the grip of which people 'know very well how things are, but they [act] as if they did not know' (Sublime Object 32). Thus the cynic disavows any fetishistic belief in 'the system' but continues to draw energy or profit from it. The power of fundamentalist and cynical fetishism is one that Žižek sees steadily gaining importance in contemporary society, with a concomitant weakening of classic liberalism and its counterpart, the critique of ideology.2 The mapping I want to propose here takes fetishistic identification as the common ground shared by all three of these films. In the climactic revenge fantasies they share, fetishism takes the form of scapegoating. Thus, if the fetish is 'the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth', the Lie in these cases would be the responsibility transferred onto the revenge object, and the unbearable truth the systemic violence of which this [End Page 45] object becomes both putative source and symbolic recipient. The logic by which hyper-masculine, white representatives of notorious racist regimes occupy the position of the scapegoat for capitalism and colonialism certainly contradicts the patriarchalism and nationalist fervour of other prominent types of fundamentalism, and it is in this contradiction that their 'utopian' energy is perhaps most obvious. But this should not distract us from their resolutely fetishistic character. The one-dimensional, exaggerated renditions of Colonel Quaritch and Koobus Venter and the parodic depiction of Adolf Hitler in Inglourious Basterds equally testify to the way the symbolic functionality of these characters overrides considerations of realistic or plausible representation. Indeed, given the radically non-mimetic quality of these 'daemonic' characters, it would be all too easy to exaggerate the degree to which the fantasy of turning racist violence back against its most notorious practitioners in these films signals any actual decline or weakening of racism (or sexism).3 The spectacularly violent punishment of racist villains is not only a utopian moment in these high-budget, mass-circulation films, but also a tactically crucial means of achieving the emotional satisfaction demanded in the closure of such films. Thus the strong degree to which race continues to evoke violence and to demand identification or counter-identification would seem to me to be one of the primary conclusions about contemporary ideology to be drawn from the three films.

**The accusatory revenge fantasies of District 9 may at first seem like symbolic victories against the military or corporations, but the cinematic form displaces this resistance onto the figures in the film that represent those structures, fundamentally short circuiting all critical potential and diffusing collective desires for resistance to these structures**

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All three cinematic representations can qualify as cogent synecdoches of the world-historical catastrophe of modern racism, raising the revenge fantasies themselves into some kind of proximity with what Frantz Fanon prescribed some fifty years ago as the cure for the ubiquitous internecine violence that besets the native populations of colonial regimes: active, violent resistance to the political and economic power structure that excludes its racialised subjects from personhood.1 Yet this hint of revolutionary content remains no more than a hint. In spite of the identification of these potent racist regimes as the enemy, the revenge fantasies in these films remain vicarious, diversionary and compensatory. According to an economy of representation described by Norman Holland and elaborated by Fredric Jameson in his 1979 essay 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture', the films' 'utopian' anticipation of political justice is contained or neutralised by its 'reified' cont-- ualisation. This containment of utopia by reification ensures that the violence stays spectacular rather than effective, and the audience's role stays passive and receptive, not active or directing. On this view, each of the three films can be expected not only to exploit but also to manage or redirect the violent energies of the revenge fantasies and the volatile content of racial injustice. In the very act of raising and drawing upon the liberatory desires of popular violence and the aggressive demands for an end to racial injustice inherent in their content, the films will find ways to deflect and redirect those desires. That is to say, the films remain mass cultural, mass distributed artefacts of the entertainment industry that draw upon the energy of vengeful, racialised scapegoating not to stir the fires of rebellion or rouse the audience's political consciousness from its daydreams, but rather to cash in on those daydreams. In the readings that follow I want to ask how the revenge fantasies fit into or disrupt the three narratives, with the further goal that, in mapping out and describing the different ways the films manage the spectacle of violence, we can survey and assess some of the current ideological and critical horizons of mass cinematic narrative.

# NIGERIANS TURN

**Despite the seeming progressiveness of District 9, the film’s portray of Nigerians is fundamentally racist and ignores the true history of Nigeria’s resistance to apartheid**

**Ray 2010**

(Carina, Assistant Professor of African and Black Atlantic History at Fordham University, “Humanizing Aliens or Alienating Africans?: District 9 and the Politics of Representation”, <http://www.zeleza.com/symposium/949>)

In convening this eSymposium for the Zeleza Post, I want to open up a frank and rigorous discussion of D9 and explore how we can use the film to encourage ourselves, our students, colleagues, and the wider public to confront our individual and collective assumptions about Africa, not least because this is the "Africa film" that everyone is talking about. I believe wholeheartedly that when moments in our shared popular culture provide us with opportunities to engage in meaningful conversations about how we understand Africa we can't afford not to seize them. This is especially the case with D9 because evidence suggests that most moviegoers are leaving the film excited about what they've seen and what's more, they believe that the film has a strong social message. What that social message is, however, is unclear at best, and malignant at worst**.** The film's target audience is men between the ages of 18 and 35 and if they've been lured into the theatre by the promise of lots of blood, guts, and explosions, are they prepared to multitask sensory overload with critical thinking? If not, what impression does the film leave the average viewer with after the special effects have worn off? And what's at stake for Africa and Africans in all of this? While the contributors to this eSymposium eloquently tackle these questions and more from a variety of viewpoints, it is striking to note that every contributor singled out the film's portrayal of Nigerians as egregious, if not unforgivable. I note this not simply because it is the aspect of the film upon which, in my opinion, D9 impales itself, but also because mainstream reviewers hardly mentioned it at all. This fact speaks volumes about the times we are living in and underscores the necessity of calling attention to popular culture's blind spots in ways that go beyond pointing fingers. This eSymposium does just that by bringing together members of the Africanist community to reflect upon their encounters with D9 within the wider cont-- of Africanist knowledge. The dialogue will then be opened up to the widest possible audience for further debate. Our stellar ensemble of contributors has deftly covered much of what I wanted to say; however, there is one point that I want to emphasize in relation to D9's thoroughly racist depiction of its Nigerian characters. In the same way that the recent wave of xenophobic violence against Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, and other immigrants from former Front Line States (FLS) in Johannesburg represented an unthinkable betrayal of the sacrifices that the FLS made to liberate South Africa, D9's portrayal of Nigerians as the ultimate enemy, as less human/humane than aliens, spits in the faces of the millions of Nigerian citizens who devoted themselves to the anti-apartheid movement. At the state level, as well, it should be noted that Nigeria not only led the 1986 boycott of the Commonwealth Games in protest over Britain's refusal to enact full sanctions against apartheid South Africa, it also chaired the U.N. anti-apartheid committee and supported the anti-apartheid movement and southern African liberation movements financially.

**The representations of Nigrerians in the film re-instantiates the fear of the alien by positing these figures as alien migrants to be feared and racially otherized**

**Gunkel & Konig 2010**

(Henriette & Christiane, Gunkel is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and König is assistent professor at the Anglo-American Institute of the History Departement at Cologne University, “‘You are not welcome here’: post-apartheid negrophobia & real aliens in Blomkamp’s District 9”, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/02/07/you-are-not-welcome-here/)

Within the film’s classic anti-migration discourse aliens are thus treated like migrants in South Africa. And in fact the aliens enter South Africa – apartheid South Africa that is – at a time when the Aliens Control Act was still included in the Immigration Law.[9] The likeness of aliens and migrants is further accentuated through statements made by people on the streets of Johannesburg (which are inserted in order to authenticate the information presented by the experts) as it is not clear whether they refer to the aliens exclusively or also refer to the Nigerians who are introduced as the third main social group in this film. Representing all African migrant groups in South Africa, the Nigerians have organized their life in D9, n-- to the aliens. The statements made could in fact refer to both groups: they have no understanding of ownership; they take away our wives; or, ‘[the government] is spending so much money to keep them here when they could be spending them on other things. At least they keep them separate from us’. As some reviewers of D9 have pointed out, the film was inspired by the short film Alive in Joburg that Blomkamp shot in 2005, and in which he conducted interviews that asked black South Africans about Nigerians and Zimbabweans.[10] But more importantly the statements harshly remind us of those made by citizens of Joburg in the cont-- of the so-called xenophobic attacks that took place over a period of three weeks in May 2008, killing sixty-two people and displacing tens of thousands. Similarly, some of the TV-News images of South Africans hunting aliens in the movie are very similar to the images that we saw in May 2008 on South African television. The images that are supposedly fictitious could therefore be – at least in part – real images incorporated into the plot. So while in D9 aliens are targeted, the aliens alongside the aliens – the Nigerians as representatives of any other African migrant group in South Africa – are the target of prejudice and discrimination.